CHAPTER FOUR BRIDGING SOCIAL CAPITAL, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND NETWORKS

Binding Action Networks.....................................................................................................................2 BANs and the Political Process Model of Social Movements........................................................3 The Communities Speak: Data from the Study...................................................................................7 NGOs............................................................................................................................................9 Churches in the Favelas and BANs............................................................................................13 Protests and BANs......................................................................................................................15 Media Framing and BANs.........................................................................................................16 Getting the Goods: Governmental Resources............................................................................18 Competing Hypotheses.......................................................................................................................20 Age and Size and Location as Determinants..................................................................................20 Long-term versus Short-term Residents.........................................................................................22 Another Take on Size of Effect: Three Regression Models..............................................................24

The story above has shown that the government is not predisposed to aid the favelas, that the aid that has been provided has been incomplete, and that there is no single answer for favela improvement and development (NGO, AM, base community). we must turn towards the complex open networks that allow the transfer of necessary local information to the external shapers of opinion and decision makers. In the highly politicized grassroots environment of favela residents and activists, many believe that only the people (o povo) are capable of bringing about meaningful reform, which leads some to reject outside solutions that dont first originate from the movement (o movimento) as external connections are too often cheaply co-opted for the benefit of only a few. And while it is true that local change can only be affected by locals at the local level, favelas are woven into the fabric of society and so cannot simply turn their back on the rest of the world. To pursue their goals outside of their communities, they must pursue external links to help them remove the constraints, created externally, that define the possibilities of the locale. Desmond Arias (2006) made an ethnographic study of two1 of these external networks starting at the favela level. He found that government action only came about much later after the original event and subsequent protests. The success that he reports for one community, Vigrio Geral, was based on the ability of a group of active residents, fronted by a college-educated community leader, who used external contacts with politicians and international funding agencies to finance local-action NGOs. External financing motivated the NGOs to formalize and persevere, and the prestige of the international element that captured the interest of the local, national, and world-wide press that, after three years, pressured the government to help end violence in the favela by installing an occupational force of police. Unfortunately, this was a short-lived solution

Three case studies are included in his research, but one community failed to make external connections because of limitations placed by the drug gang, working in collaboration with the AM president.

and Vigrio Geral remains one of the most violent favelas in Rio. In the long term, international financing and support helped created and maintain a local alternative for youth recreation, Afro Reggae. This local NGO now has branches in several other favelas, and makes international tours in an attempt to lure kids away from the drug business and to raise awareness about the problem of violence in the favelas of Rio (Junior, 2006). The failure to address the underlying problem of Vigrio Geral exemplifies the biggest limitation of the temporary nature of binding social capital in the face of the complexity of the government, bureaucracy, and judiciary. It allows opposing interests to wait it out, safe in the knowledge that popular contention rarely holds together for long and will likely dissipate before any political changes are necessary. This is especially true among the poor residents who get no quick reward for their investment in trying to influence the system, and so they must turn their attention to more immediate concerns. The media is not a reliable ally in their struggle as the press needs fresh news every day. With even the ongoing war in Iraq and Pakistan turning stale, how can the comparatively small problems of small, unwelcome groups hope to keep the public eye throughout their campaign? Binding Action Networks The creation of binding social capital with institutions outside of the favela is absolutely necessary for the creation of the resilient action networks that distinguish successful cases from those that fail to gain governmental resources. The important difference between a durable network constructed from bridging social capital and a resilient network created from binding social capital makes the latter, henceforth named Binding Action Networks (BANs), more difficult to empiricize because each branch of the network may only be activated for a short time, potentially never visible at the same time as any other branch. This collection of on-again, offagain ties distinguishes itself by always activating around the same cause or idea, even though it is 2

not central for most, or even any, of the actors. The various actors or elements in the network can temporarily store the movement to reactivate it later, or can step in at key points to keep it going all without formal coordination. The lack of central organization means that the momentum of the movement may fade away forever, or fade away temporarily only to be re-lit later by a new actor who just discovered the cause, or by a previous actor whose priorities finally shifted to give the movement attention again. This is the same basic picture that New Social Movement (NSM) theory creates for modern movements, the difference with the BAN, particularly in the context of democratization, is that it must involve certain actors: the residents of the poor community, the government, and intervening actors that help to solidify the link between the former two. Consequently, the study of BANs requires an understanding of the public policy process as well as the mechanisms of social movements, which are described here through the lens of social capital. Because of the temporary and fungible nature of the network, literature on interest groups and lobbyists overlooks BANs. BANs and the Political Process Model of Social Movements The most promising framework to understand the success in demand making of favela residents in Rio is Sidney Tarrows (1998) Political Process Model (PPM). This model, constructed to create a unified theory of social movements, is flexible enough to allow the struggle in Rio to be described, but in trying to be all-encompassing, it obscures over the central character of the movement thereits strength comes from binding rather than bridging, from being resilient rather than durable. Under a political process analysis of favela movements, we must consider their dual focus as a competing frame in societal discourse, and as a political force competing for power in the state system. The latter concentrates on elite-level politics where decisions are ultimately made, and the former looks first for the consensus formation of the movement frame, and then for consensus 3

mobilization wherein there are deliberate attempts to spread the views of a social actor among parts of the population (p. 113). In the PPM, the creation of a mass base is most important in terms of political leverage to be used by allies and third parties (p. 105) at times of changing opportunities for political access or reductions in repression that lower the costs of collection action, reveal potential allies, show where elites and authorities are most vulnerable, and trigger social networks and collective identities around common themes (p. 20). The life-changing aspect of social movements is important, but not as much for the way it shapes how daily lives are lived as in Liberation Theology in the previous chapter, but because this change cannot substitute organization. From the point of view of successful contention, identities must be created and adopted that facilitate action, interaction, and alliances. In order to do this, the shape of the identity must clearly identify movement members as different from the rest of society, particularly distinguishing the militants2 (p. 119). Identity, in terms of BANs that recognize the transient nature of associations, need only be enough of a priority put upon the same cause, out of numerous other causes that might be held dear at any time, to create enough commonality around a catalyzing event to bring individuals together in demand making, although the collaboration does not have to occur at the same time (i.e. it can be asynchronous).3 In addition to an identity and a frame, the PPM looks at organization as another resource for the movement in terms of a) hierarchical leadership, b) group cohesiveness when confronting the enemy, and c) connective structures that link leaders and followers, center and periphery, and different parts of a movement sector, permitting coordination and aggregation between movement
2

Tarrow uses the example of the solidarity movement in Poland to show how it was not a movement of Catholic industrial workers, but rather industrial workers using the symbols of Catholicism to create a common language and rallying point, perhaps more for its antithetical position in communist ideology and states than for the coherence of movement ideas to Catholicism (1998, p. 119). 3 This is not empirically tautological in the sense that the commonality exists if collaboration occurs, and collaboration occurs when commonality exists. The commonality is visible, even when the actors are not collaborating as will be demonstrated below.

organizations and allowing movements to persist even when formal organization is lacking (pp. 123-24). In this research BANs are discussed in terms of social capital providing both intra-group cohesiveness and inter-group commonalities for action. These networks remain interconnected without hierarchical leadership or authority because of the Darwinian evolution of movement tactics and ideologies that was strengthened over the long term by the cooptation and corruption of movement leaders. Those movement cells with vertical leadership that were either rendered powerless once accepted into the government structure, or succumbed to corruption, dissipated leaving the rest of the movement temporarily weakened, but sturdier in the end. Now, movement adherents, disenchanted with such leaders, now openly express suspicion of even the most wellmeaning organizers. Tarrows conception of cycles of contention is particularly well suited to account for the ebb and flow of the favela movement over the past four decades. The chapter above dealing with the history of favelas detailed the changing field of political opportunities involving the porousness of the state administration as well as its repressive capacity as well as the availability and sincerity of potential institutional allies. Unions of favela workers, for example, were one of the results of the turn-of-the-century vaccine revolt, however in the context of economic liberalism and later anticommunism, they were not able to win any substantive gains. The Church was the only institution ostensibly placed to continually pursue social justice worked more as an arm of the state until torture and repression led to a change of heart. But by that time, its ability to make overt challenges was effectively subdued. The effective Church action was, by necessity and by nature, different from political action, and had its biggest impact through the development of Liberation Theology and ecclesiastically based communities (CEBs) that changed the societal discourse around the poor across the socio-economic spectrum.

Describing the tension between these various forces is an appropriate use for PPM in analyzing the favela movement. However, one of the most important changes that occurred through unionizing and liberation theology was a change in the nature of the individual self worth of the poor. While the first is a struggle for solidarity against bosses or for power, the second is a path for personal transformation, and the two are mutually reinforcing. This is one mechanism in the process of demand making that is lost in the PPM model. As good of a job that the PPM does at describing the movement cycles in terms of opportunities and restraints, it purposefully is not designed to capture the important social and economic reality of the grassroots. For example, the post-dictatorship economic crisis in Brazil increased the need of poor households to self-exploit, leaving less time and energy for community participation. Additionally, the rise of Pentecostalism has substantially changed the focus away from the earthbound reality of the poor towards the heavenly possibilities that may exist for them in the afterlife. And finally, the para-statal drug gangs create a non-political obstacle for organization and contention. The PPM model provides a model for the context of the favela movement, and BANs help to explain the actual mechanism. In the favelas, network actors include residents, AMs, other neighborhood organizations, the press, NGOs , religious groups, and governmental offices. Figure 1 below portrays the important limitations in interest sharing both between residents in the favelas and between the residents and other, external institutions. The separation of the external institutions indicates that they may not share the same interest in the favela, and so will only activate on its behalf under separate circumstances. The areas of the favela residents that do not intersect with any of the other residents represents the life that they dont share with other residents, perhaps sharing only with their family, in a blinding group within the favela, earning

income, or bridging outside of the favela. The small area of intersection of the three favela residents indicates the difficulty that interests shared by many or all residents have in competing with the other demands or opportunities for individuals time. Figure 1: Overlapping interests external and internal to the favela

The Communities Speak: Data from the Study If these ephemeral networks of favela residents, favela groups, and external institutions exist, they should be apparent in a number of ways. NGOs may have information about projects in the favelas in their reports or on their websites, they may be appointments on the books between AM, church, or NGO leaders and governmental officials, and the beneficiary favelas should receive treatment in the media that is different from the other favelas. Community leaders may also have a relationship with individuals from these external institutions. Even though the entire network may not be visible at one time, it is possible to assemble the threads of the action web in order to get a good idea of how the connections work. The process of the BANs demands on policy output requires a different study of local, state, and federal politics. But the process outputs are often

more important than the process itself when considering the convoluted practices of legislation in a system as rife with unrelated amendments and riders as that of the US. As outputs, the evidence is clear which favelas have benefitted from those policies and which have not4. The evidence presented below comes from two sources: the medias perception of 50 favela communities between 1993 and 2000, and the residents own reports of their living conditions from a 1998 census of the same communities. The PCBR and PCEBR are censuses of favelas complied from individual interviews in the various communities about their perceptions of the favela around them. The Conflict Database is a collection of thousands of articles culled by a team of researchers from five different sources. The O Globo database comes from searching for each favela individually in the newspaper electronic archive, and then collating, cleaning and coding thousands of articles by a single researcher5.As described in a previous chapter, there is a high correlation between related terms in the various data sets, which gives great confidence in the construct validity of social capital as used in this research, as well as confirms the coding for the 164 conflicts from the conflict database, the PCBR and the PCEBR surveys, and the original contextual analysis of more than 2,600 articles about the communities in the study. The initial evidence presented uses correlations to confirm the relationships that are hypothesized to be integral in augmenting the demand making of favela residents in the context of a still-consolidating democracy. This chapter ends with the results of three models of a regression equation linking social capital to group-level favela quality measures such as sewage, water delivery, street quality, sports facilities, recreation opportunities, and facilities for basic health care.
4

I worked for three years trying to uncover the detailed governmental budget that would list the resources that were invested in each favela in this study to no avail. There appears to be a purposive effort to obscure the final destination for funding related to urban development in Rio de Janeiro, regardless the origin. Pursuing the trail, I was advised three times, once by an AM president, once by a office assistant in the SMH, and once by a lawyer friend that if you do end up finding out, youll never return home to see your family. 5 Although I originally employed a research assistant to help with the coding, in the end I went back and checked or recoded every article personally. I do wish to give thanks to the efforts of my assistant.

NGOs The link between NGOs6 and favelas may exist for the simple reason that NGOs budgets are paid by the government and international aid, so they go to the poor communities in order to attract money that is then turned into salaries for the NGO employees, and potentially not much else. Interviews with numerous individuals in the larger favelas in Rio confirms that this type of exploitation of misery is not unusual. They even have a name for the large NGOs (organizao no-governemtal, ONG) that are known to have lots of input and little to no outputKing kONGs (king-ee kong-ees). At the same time, there are many small NGOs that do meaningful work in the favelas and mid-sized NGOs that specialize in demand making on the favelas behalf. One example is ________ which is a grassroots police watchdog organization that bears witness and files actions on behalf of the favelas they are involved with. But with over 800 favelas in the city of Rio de Janeiro, it is impossible for this, or any other organization, to work with them all. The hypothesis of this research is that communities with higher levels of social capital will be successful in attracting and working with NGOs, and that these favelas are better off than those that dont. Indices of both passive social capital7 (r = .635, p = .066, n = 9) and those of active social capital8 (r = .723, p = .018, n = 10) are highly positively correlated with the presence of international NGOsC. And NGOs (domesticC and internationalC) are directly linked to all measures
6

This chapter relies on six different data sources (see appendix A for complete descriptions): two are from a single census of 50 favelas of Rio de Janeiro, PCBR and PCEBR, the third is a database of more than 2,600 articles from O Globo directly related to the same 50 favelas, the fourth is a database of conflicts reported in the news from 19932000, the fifth is a series of 15 semi-structured interviews conducted with presidents of favela residents associations, and the sixth is from a municipal database of favelas (IPP). It makes for awkward reading and writing in this chapter to continually report the data in the exact terms that the data sources allow (the relationship between a higher percentage of articles about social capital and portion of the favela population made of longer-term residents for example). In order to make this more readable but take nothing away from the transparency of the science behind the writing, each statistic is marked by a superscript letter indicating its origin: A = PCBR, B = PCEBR, C = O Globo Articles, D = Conflict Articles, E = Interviews, and F = IPP. 7 Membership in any neighborhood associationA + moved to favela because of friendsA + percentage of clients of businesses within the favela who are also from the favelaB 8 participation in the AMA + favela improved because of residentsA + water connections made by self-help groupA

of life qualityA in the favelas where r > .5 and p =< .000 (n = 34). A reading of the articles that include international NGOs reveals that they include the Inter-American Development Bank (Banco Inter-Americano do Desenvolimento, BID) that co-financed the largest in situ favela urbanization project in Rio de Janeiro, Favela-Bairro, that had been implemented to some degree or another in 155 favelas by 2000. Other international NGOs made the news during the time of this study for opening art schools in poor communities, providing language classes, contributing to Escolas de Samba, and even coordinating the visit of Prime Minister Tony Blair of England. Fulano de Tal9, the president of a South Zone AM, admits that both international and local NGOs have helped improve the quality of life there, however he complained that they are more interested in publicity and news coverage than actually helping. The NGOs apparently control the contact with the media, even preventing reporters from talking with residents and community leaders so that the NGO does not get associated with just one community. As the methodology for gathering these O Globo articles was to search by community name, the NGOs included in this study are not of that type to any large extent. Whether NGOs are attracted by communities where there are already strong social networks, or whether the presence of the NGO helps to create the social capital is not certain. The hypothesis of this study is that NGOs are the product of social capital rather than the opposite. There is a strong association between favelas with NGOsC and favelas with social capital in the newsC (r = . 398, p = .013, n = 38) despite that there are only two of 65 (3.07%-- 39 ONGs, 26 social capital) articles that include both social capital and NGOs. Counter to the BAN hypothesis, that bridging or binding to external institutions should not negatively affect the social capital levels or quality within the community, participation in the AM is inversely correlated with NGOs (r = -.294, p = .

As promised in the pre-interview release, names have been changed and locations are not exact to prevent identification of sources.

10

069, n = 39). On the other hand, three indices10 of active social capital are positively correlated (r = 1).721, 2).723, 3).635, p = .019, .018, .066, n = 10, 10, 9), and none of the other variables in these indices have significant correlations with NGOs . Controlling for NGOs in first-order partial correlations helps clarify the picture of where they fit in to community organization. The results of relating the social capital measures to measures of favela quality reveal that without NGOs there is less organization11 around the problem of sewage (r = .393, r1st =.395; p = .004, p1st= .381; n = 51, n1st= 5) and recreation (r = . 574, r1st= .727; p = .013, p1st= .064; n = 18, n1st= 5) taking NGOs out of the equation. In other words, NGOs have a augmentative effect on the organization in favelas that have problems with sewage and recreation. Although, because the data on infrastructure is not longitudinal, it is not possible to know what the results of this organizing effect are. On the other hand, the links between both active and passive social capital and the quality of life in the favela have already been demonstrated, so it is fair to suggest that the organizing effect of the NGOs on favelas will eventually produce positive outcomes. The presence of NGOs has a suppressing effect on the association between AM membership and trash collection, at least where the collection is good. That is, there is a higher correlation between trash collection rated good and AM membership (r = .508, r1st= .846; p = .031, p1st= . 016; n = 18, n1st= 5) and participation (r = .407, r1st= .795; p = .094, p1st= .032; n = 18, n1st= 5), as well as with participation in other favela organizations (r = .490, r1st= .832; p = .039, p1st= .020; n = 18, n1st= 5) when controlling for the presence of NGOs. In this case, NGOs reduce both the size of the correlation as well as the probability that the relationship between the variables is not by chance. Trash collection, however, is a special case among the government services to favelas as
10

1) AM participationA, better b/c residentsA, water by groupA, and protestsC, 2) AM participation, better b/c residents, water by group, and 3) AM participation, better b/c residents, protests 11 AM membership, AM participation, any other bairro association.

11

COMLURB has been proactive in trying to prevent urban pollution from the favelas since 1989 when they implemented and funded the gari communitrio program. For most (66%) of the AM presidents interviewed for this study, the monthly stipend for the local garis is the only money they receive, and for 100% of them, it is the only state money they receive. The result has been symbiotic in that the program solves the access problem that was plaguing COMLURB, improved the health of the favelas and the surrounding neighborhoods, and strengthened the AMs by giving them authority, albeit limited, in the community and a raison dtre. As such, NGOs are not necessary and apparently dont interfere where there is no need. The suppressing effect of NGOs in this case is due to NGOs associating with favelas where the trash collection isnt good. That suggests that NGOs play an important part in favela BANs, working and drawing resources to where there is necessity rather than wherever is easiest. The same can be said for favelas in which the water delivery is clean and constant: there is a suppressing effect of NGOsC on the correlation of AMsA that have already been successful with this resourceA . A second-order partial correlation with AMs, controlling for both NGOs and ageF of the favela shows that age also affects the delivery of water (r = -.097, r2nd = .860; p = .498, p2nd = .028; n = 18, n2nd = 4). In other words, AMs have a strong positive correlation on their own that becomes obscured when considering the age and presence of NGOs in the favels. Controlling for favela age alone, also reveals the suppressing effect of the year of occupation on the relationship between AMs and the quality of trash pickup (r = .508, r1st= .894; p = .031, p1st= .007; n = 18, n1st= 5). Removing AMs, on the other hand, shows that older favelas tend to have worse trash pickup (r1st = -.817, p1st = .025, n1st = 5), worse sewage (r1st = -.792, p1st = .034, n1st = 5), and worse streets (r1st = -.698, p1st = .081, n1st = 5). Favelas with more AM membership, then, are a

12

mitigating factor in the quality of group-level infrastructure, and therefore an important element of the BAN. Churches in the Favelas and BANs The previous chapter examined the role of Catholic base communities (CEBs) in fostering the capacity for favela residents to work together, and additionally carrying their voice12 to the government through the developed institution of the Church and its longstanding involvement with the government13. This is one example of an external link that can bring about real change, not only in the government, but also in the social discourse. However, as Catholicism has given way to Evangelicals whose focus is more heavenward than to present conditions on Earth, the Churchs power has diminished as a movement leader. That religious institutions have taken a step back from politics does not affect their position as a social actor in a BAN for any given favela. The historic relationship between churches and the favelas, coupled with the religiosity of the Brazilian culture, has created a generalized trust around them. Additionally, the evangelical services that popularize their religion through music and socializing create space for civil discourse within a bonding context. The role of the churches in the favela movement is to foster the creation, strengthening and maintenance of social capital. The leadership of the church is also a link outside of the favela, providing the resource of contacts and, potentially, influence. There is a strong correlation between favela residents reporting that their community was improved by religious organizationA and the number of articlesC produced about that community suggesting a potential network connection between the church or church groups and catching the
12

At some point, a discussion should be taken up as to how authentic Liberation Theology represents the peoples voice. From a rational choice frame, because it is a preferential option for the poor, it certainly makes sense that that is what the poor would support. At the same time, for millennia around the globe, religions have been successful at keeping the poor quiescent to the will of the rich drawing Marx to call religion the opiate of the masses. I mention this here only to indicate that, in the discussion about the authenticity of the voice of the people, neither Liberation Theology nor Evangelicals message has been questioned in the public arena. 13 Although the Church supported the military regime at the start, a decade of violent repression, particularly against the poor, drove it to take up the cause of defending them in the early 1970s.

13

attention of the press. It appears that the variable representing favela improvement by religious organizationsA suppresses the relationship between protestsC and articles about religionC. In a partial correlation controlling for better because of religion, a strong relationship appears (r = . 821, p = .000, n = 12) that did not exist before (r = .177, p = .231, n = 39). The lack of correlation (r = .140, p = .396, n = 39) between the total number of articlesC and the number of articles linking religion and favelasC indicates that the former relationship is not a side product of reporting on an church in the favela and picking up on another story. Still controlling for religionA, communities with more articles about religion are associated with more articles about environmental problems (r = .711, p = .004, n = 12), threats of removal (r = .759, p = .002, n = 12), legal cases (r = .495, p = . 072, n = 12), and NGOs working in the community (r = .930, n = .000, p = 12). This fits the hypothesis that the churches in favelas are a part of getting their voice out, not directly in this case, but by creating the civil space for bonding, organizing, and reaching out. Thinking of a BAN as a series of branches or links between other networks, the high correlation (r = .693, p = .038, n = 9) between religious organizations improving the favelaA and the index of passive social capitalA described above suggests that the complete mechanism starts with the residents, passes through the AM and local churches to the press. To complete the process, the press would have to attract governmental attention. Testing this hypothesis, that the press is most active In articles that were coded as providing a positive frame for the favelas, residents reported that clinics (r = .513, p = .002, n = 33) and crches (r = .549, p = .001, n = 33) were on the very good end of the scale. Also, streets (r = .553, p = .001, n = 33), sewage (r = .286, p = .003, n = 108) and trash collection (r = .500, p = .003, n = 33) as well as sports (r = .474, p = .006, n = 33) and recreation activities (r = .472, p = .006, n = 33) were likely to be rated as very good by the

14

residents in these communities. The importance of this congruence between these two different sources is that it is a basic test of the accuracy of this studys context analysis of the O Globo articles. Protests and BANs A history of protests (manifestaes) C is associated (r = .229, p = .160, n = 39) with journalistic framing of a favela as unhealthy caldrons spilling into other neighborhoodsC, as is AM membershipA (r = .285, p = .078, n = 39). There is no significant correlation between protests and AM membership (r = .150, p = .361, n = 39). Protests are also linked positively to a measure of active social capital, water connections by group self-helpA (r = .551, p = .099, n = 10), as well as an index created from this first plus participation in the AMA and residents improving the communityA (r = .571, p = .085, n = 10). Protests are positively related to a measure of passive social capital, residents as client base for favela commerceA (r = .362, p = .038, n = 33). An indication of residents political action is their tendency to take cases to court. While this was captured to some extent in the conflicts database, it can be tied directly to the communities through the database of O Globo articles. These articles include suits for regularized title to occupied land (usocapio), wrongful death suits against the police, and requests for resources based on comparative inequality. The correlations here are consistent with these motives, with a justifiable complaint about access to water (r = -.28, p = .086, n = 39) and other trash collection (r = -.72, p = .003, n = 15). Sports and recreation, a big problem in these tightly packed communities, are often developed through government construction of basketball/soccer courts and skate ramps as well as through large, off-site recreation centers known as Vilas Olmpicas. In some communities, the city pays for youth sports training. On site sports projects tend to be cheap tokens to give to a floundering community. Nevertheless, the sports (r = -.45, p = .089, n = 15)

15

and recreation (r = -.45, p = .093, n = 15) facilities reported by the residents in communities with articles about legal cases by residents tend to be poor. But because legal cases from favelas concern three main reasons, abusive police, lack of infrastructure, or land title, and favelas with both shorter- and longer-term residents suffer equally from these problems, a natural hypothesis is that these two variables would not correlate significantly. Contrary to intuition, legal cases are positively related to higher percentages of newer residents (under 10 years) (r = -.349, p = .043, n = 34). There is a two-part explanation for this phenomenon that starts with the AM being the primary source of origination of legal cases, and ends with the reluctance of longer-term residents to interact with it, as mentioned above. Media Framing and BANs In the sample of articles for this studyC, more are written about favelas that provide stories of police violenceC (r = .622, p = .000, n = 108), traficantes and bandidos (r = .498, p = .000, n = 108), whereas communities that receive positive coverageC in the press even once receive less coverage overall (r = -.379, p = .001, n = 108). Furthermore, articles about public safetyC (read favela related violence or death) are generally longer (r = .307, p = .001, n = 108) than all others. One of the consequences of this tendency to exaggerate the violent aspect of the favelas is that the media becomes its own victim, it cant sell another version of favela stories and so it is stuck with the pattern of drugs and violence. Also, and this is not to deny the real danger that can exist for strangers asking questions in favelas, reporters are nervous to enter and end up getting most of their information from the police (Arias, 2004), so they dont know the other side of the storythe side that reflects 99% of the daily life in the community14. The corollary is that, because of this fear, the media doesnt develop relationships with the AMs or small, local NGOs who could use
14

In a 1984 study, more than 13% of favela residents reported that police were discriminatory while only 3.65% of people outside of favelas felt the same way (Pedrosa et al., 1990, p. 27). In 2004, 52% of the favela residents interviewed reported similary (Perlman, 2004, p. 32).

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the public voice to speak to the government. This is one of the reasons that so much of the political action of favela residents must take place on the streets outside of the community. It is the only place where they will be noticed and have their story heard. Across the interviews with AM presidents in this study, they were consistent about the difficulty of going through channels and waiting in the lobbies of the public ministries, secretariats, and politicians. At the same time, an index of active social capital15 is also highly correlated with the number (r = .662, p = .037, n = 10), average length (r = .628, p = .052, n = 10)16, and positive frame (r = . 316, p = .050, n = 39) of O GloboC articles during the time of this study. This suggests the potential for active groups to somehow gain the attention of the press. There is a strong, positive correlation (r = .450, p = .008, n = 34) between favelas with violence as their main problemA and newspaper articles about police violence. This confirms the findings from the database of conflictsF where public safety in the favelas is almost exclusively a concern about police violence. O GloboC, on the other hand, frames public safety around favelas from the point of view of the asfalto where traficantes (r = .680, p = .000, n = 39) and bandidos17 (r = .855, p = .000, n = 39) leave the favelas to attack members of the surrounding community. When O Globo articlesC were framed to show favelas as sources of environmental problems (pollution, erosion, problems of sanitation, deforestation), the PCBR dataA concurs that those identified are less likely to be connected to city sewage (r = -.428, p = .007, n = 39) more likely to use an uncontained sewage runoff area (r =.486, p = .002, n = 39) or a nearby river (r = .368, p = . 021, n = 39). Also, the water connectionA to the homes is more likely to have been constructed by individuals (r = 0.720, p = .019, n =10). This measure, the opposite of active social capital, is
15 16

participation in the AMA + favela improved because of residentsA + water connections made by self-help groupA There is no significant correlation (r = .064, p = .698, n = 39) between number of articles and average length of the articles, which strengthens the argument that it is the intervening variable of active social capital that is responsible for the high correlation above. 17 Literally drug dealers and bandits

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actually quite telling as it is strongly related to a bad image of the favelas infrastructureC (r = .692, p = .027, n = 10), and more reports about sanitationC (r = .667, p = .035, n = 10). Getting the Goods: Governmental Resources In those favelas where governmental housing programs were reportedC, all measures of collective goods such as sportsA (r = .660, p = .007, n = 15) and recreationA (r = .640, p = .01, n = 15); streetsA (r = .691, p = .004, n = 15), sewageA (r = .547, p = .000, n = 39), and trash collectionA (r = .561, p = .030, n = 15); crchesA (r = .719, p = .003, n = 15) and clinicsA (r = .699, p = .004, n = 15) were strongly skewed towards the very good end of the five-point Likert scale. Rightly then, there is a strong feeling (r = .495, p = .061, n = 15) that the favela improved because of the governmentA where the BID-financed Favela Bairro program made the newsC. There is not such a relationship (r = -.132, p = .603, n = 18) with all of the locations in which it was implemented by 1998, the year of the survey, however. This is surely due to the legendary disconnect between allocation and availability of government funds mentioned in the previous chapter. It is interesting to note that the program similar to Favela Bairro that was designed for smaller and less populous favelas, Favela Bairrinho, doesnt share the same relationship to residents reporting that their communities improved due to other (r = .624, n = 013, p = 15), not the government, not residents , and not religious organizations. There are many public complaints regarding the top-down style of implementation in the larger Bairro program even though the design called for including residents in the planning and construction phase in each favela. These same complaints are not as typical for the smaller program, perhaps because it was easier to include and employ a representative sample of residents in the smaller community for the group opinion to be satisfied. On the other hand, the Bairrinho project has a significant association to the articles mentioning clientelistic practices in the favelas (r = .700, p = .000, n = 39). This supports the 18

speculation that the Bairrinho program was begun in communities with an understanding that they were the beneficiaries of a single politicians good will. Further support is the 36.4% of the AM presidents (100% response rate) who reported that they knew their community had received resources from the government in exchange for votes during the period of this study. The real percentage is likely higher as the average of the 75% of those who responded suggests that more than 85% of favelas have exchanged votes for government resources. Clientelism tends to provide particularistic rather than general benefits as the politicians, although they like to be seen in favelas around election time, prefer to deal with a broker who usually includes his own fee on top of what he must promise the community. Clientelistic relationships could be counted as a logical aspect of BANs as the exchange requires a certain amount of solidarity on the part of the residentsI was given numbersF between 33-50% solidarity among the community as the going rate for these brokered exchanges. But, as this study is looking to the BAN model to help describe democratic participation from the grassroots, clientelism will have to be considered as a non-democratic subset of external connections. The regular patron or pastor of the communities should also fall into this non-democratic category. These are the contacts within the government who the AM presidents can call when they need something. Around a third of the favelas in this study have such a relationshipF, however, only three (20%) indicated that it was a stable, long-term relationship. In addition to infrastructure upgrades and sports programs, government services must be counted as benefits that can be courted through BANs. Police and security service is not always negative in the favelas, but it is rare to hear more than equivocal support for the police as an institution. The data in this study, unfortunately, has only negative associations to report.

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Police violenceC is inversely related to membershipA in the associaes de moradores (r = -.269, p = .098, n = 39). One of the two possibilities that come from the qualitative part of this research is that because the AM doesnt have the power of the masses behind it, it is not able to effectively negotiate with the police, and the favela suffers as a consequence. A second possibility is that the low AM membership is due to the active presence of drug gangs that attract the police whose encounters often involve shootouts. Removing the effect of drugs in the favelaC the partial correlation coefficient between police violence and AM membership is no longer significant (r = -.350, p = .506, n = 5) suggesting that the second possibility is more likely correct. Almost half (46.3%) of the 82 articles that were coded as pertaining to public health issues were also marked as having positive framing for the favela, which explains the positive relationships with measures of health-related infrastructure. Clinics (r = .85, p = .000, n = 15) and crches (r = .83, p = .000, n = 15) in or accessible to these communities skew strongly towards the high end of the five-point Likert scale. Potential public-health-related spillovers are less likely because, although there is less likelihood of the communities in this group being connected to the city sewage lines (r = -.35, p = .027, n = 39), they are quite likely to have enclosed septic tanks (r = .57, p = .000, n = 39), which are considered equally sanitary, and trash collection is also reported positively (r = .86, p = .000, n = 15). Unrelated to the topics in the articles that were coded as pertaining to public health, streets also tend towards very good (r = .82, p = .000, n = 15) as well as sports (r = .83, p = .000, n = 15) and recreation opportunities (r = .45, p = .093, n = 15). These correlations must be due to an intervening variable such as location or government funds. Competing Hypotheses Age and Size and Location as Determinants The ages of the favelas in this study were determined by either their official history maintained by the AM that reports the year of occupationE,F, or by an official entry in the municipal 20

registry that was opened in 1981F, or the first year of legalization of tenure of at least one parcel in the favelaF. In most cases in this study, all three dates were obtained. The age of the favela as measured from the date of foundingF definitely plays a role in the types of problems that the favelas confront. For example, the older favelas are inversely related to reports of infrastructure problemsC (r = -.330, p = .046, n = 37), as are South Zone and city-center communitiesF (r = -.422, p = .007, n = 39). This geographic measure of inequality is particularly vivid in light of the relative freedom these two fashionable areas have from raw sewage in the aquiferA (r = -.391, p = .005, n = 51). Age and infrastructure are conceptually related to the lack of governmental projectsC in the younger favelasF (r = .291, p = .085, n = 36). Newer favelas also have to worry more about being targets for removalE,F (r = -.437, p = .007, n = 37), and the perception in the news trends away from positive framingC (r = .429, p = .009, n = 36), which suggests they should receive less sympathy from society at large. In terms of size, there is a direct relationship between the area occupied by the favelaF and the populationA (r = .639, p = .000, n = 49)18, which is only surprising in the face of the vertical growth and increasing population density in the older and more urban favelas. The large population creates a profitable market base for drug gangs, and the large area makes hiding from police raids easier, consequently police violenceC is higher (r = .39, p = .016, n = 38), and is confirmed by the residentsA (r = .874, p = .000, n = 17). As sex and violence make for good entertainment, which is enough of a reason that the more violent favelas get more coverage. Larger favelas are not only more violent, they are also more likely to be visible from the street and known by name. This familiarity to the medias audience is another reason that there are more articles written about the more populous favelas (r = .90, p = .000, n = 38).
18

The relationships of all of the following correlations provided parenthetically are reported consistently with age, population, size, and percent all having the same directionality. I have tried to use a more natural language to describe the relationships such as reporting that newer favelas tend to be smaller, which is an inverse relationship between size and age and the r-value is presented as a negative number.

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The chapter on the history of favelas described the growth pattern of the communities as moving from the center of the city and port area to the South Zone and then populating the North Zone as jobs drew workers in that direction. The favela removals in the 1960s and 1970s started the move into the West Zone and eradicated most of the South Zone and some of the central favelas. There is currently a patchwork of founding dates across the map of Rio, so the statistical relationship between the year of founding of the community and geographic zone are not significant. Long-term versus Short-term Residents The time of residence in a community is important for many reasons, and the collection of the benefits and drawbacks due to the distribution of individuals time in residence help shape the character of the community. The percentage of residents who have lived in the same favela for 1 to 3, 3 to 5, 5 to 10, and more than 10 yearsA is directly linked to its ageF and populationA (r = .275, p = .064, n = 46). Probably due to this, the more residents in a community with long periods of residence live with less fear of removalA,E (r = -.381, p = .026, n = 34), better water deliveryA (r = . 279, p = .060, n = 46), and better conditions overallC (r = -.347, p = .021, n = 34). The common sense explanation, that older favelas have had more opportunity to be developed bears out under statistical investigation. Newer favelasE tend to have shorter term residentsA (r = -.394, p = .007, r = 46) whereas the longer term residentsA (10 years or more) can just as distinctly be found in the older ones (r =.384, p = .008, r = 46). This becomes important when social capital is introduced to this explanation as the natural expectation is that in communities with longer-term residents would have more social capital built through the repeated interactions of daily life (r = .264, p = .076, n = 46), more time to be picked up by the newsC and turned into a household name (total articles: r = .306, p = .078, n = 34), and more chances for institutionalized external relationships . Of course, there are some 22

confounding circumstances such as the larger populationA, area, and violenceA,C associated with longer-term residents, as well as clientelismC associated with governmental projectsC (r = .745, p = .000, n = 3919). These variables should detract from social capital. All the same, the larger the percentage of long-term residentsA in a favela, the higher the correlation with measures of social capitalAC, which makes sense given the discussion on how social capital is formed in the preceding chapter. More iterated interactions between individuals means greater predictability of future interactional outcomes at the very least. It also allows time for individuals with similar interests to find each other and create friendships or familiarities. Turning to the individual-level data, there is a strong, positive relationship between the amount of time an individual resides in a favelaA and belonging to some community organizationA other than the AM (r = .363, p = .000, n = 13131). No significant correlation was found between AM membership and length of residence in the favela, although from qualitative interviews, longerterm residents expressed a marked lack of sympathy for the games of the AM.

19

Based on coding from the O Globo articles for this study.

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Another Take on Size of Effect: Three Regression Models Table 1: Regression Models Relating Social Capital and NOGs to an Index of Infrastructure Quality in the Favelas
Std. Error 0.945 1.105 0.208 0.869 0.419 R Square 0.951 1.469 1.729 1.407 0.219 R Square 0.848 1.549 1.818 0.340 1.386 R Square 0.835 Collinearity Statistics Toleran ce VIF 0.596 0.505 0.644 0.945 1.678 1.981 1.554 1.058 Sig. 0.007

B Model 1 Constant Pct. Clients are ResidentsB Pct. Articles re. Soc CapC Pct. Any Org w/in FavelaA Pct. Soc Cap: Move b/c FriendA -2.882 3.966 0.508 3.200 -1.346 R 0.975 Model 2 Constant Pct. Clients are ResidentsB Pct. Any Org w/in FavelaA Local NGOC -3.044 3.814 3.921 0.359 R 0.920 Model 3 Constant Pct. Clients are ResidentsA Pct. Articles re. Soc CapC Pct. Membership in AMA -3.176 4.002 0.460 3.594 R 0.914

Beta 0.513 0.380 0.507

t -3.049 3.590 2.445 3.683

Sig. 0.038 0.023 0.071 0.021

-0.365 -3.214 0.032 Adjusted R Square Std. Error 0.903 0.091 -2.072 2.206 2.787 1.640 0.093 0.078 0.039 0.162

0.494 0.621 0.408 Adjusted R Square Std. Error 0.757 0.144 -2.051 2.202 1.356 2.593

0.606 0.612 0.491

1.649 1.635 2.038 Sig. 0.017

0.518 0.344 0.580 Adjusted R Square Std. Error 0.736 0.150

0.096 0.079 0.233 0.049

0.597 0.512 0.661

1.676 1.954 1.514 Sig. 0.021

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Dependent Variable = pct. Sewer goodA + pct. Recreation goodA + pct. Trash goodA + pct. Clinic goodA

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References Cited:

Arias, Enrique Desmond. 2004. "Faith in Our Neighbors: Networks and Social Order in Three Brazilian Favelas." Latin American Politics and Society 46 (1):1-38. . 2006. "The Dynamics of Criminal Governance: Networks and Social Order in Rio De Janeiro." Journal of Latin American Studies 38:293-325. Junior, Jos. 2006. Da Favela para o Mundo: A Histria do Groupo Cultural Afro Reggae. Rio de Janeiro: Ediouro Publicaes SA. Pedrosa, Fernanda, Francisco Luis Noel, Luarlindo Ernesto, and Srgio Pugliese. 1990. A Violncia que Oculta a Favela. Porto Alegre: L&PM. Perlman, Janice. 2004. "Marginality: From Myth to Reality in the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro, 19692002." In Urban informality : transnational perspectives from the Middle East, Latin America, and South Asia, ed. A. Roy and N. AlSayyad. Berkeley: UC Berkeley. Tarrow, Sidney G. 1998. Power in movement : social movements and contentious politics. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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