Decision Making and Emotions

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Cognition & Emotion

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The influence of discrete emotions on judgement and decision-making: A metaanalytic review

Amanda D. Angie , Shane Connelly , Ethan P. Waples & Vykinta Kligyte
a b a a b c
Department of Psychology, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, USA
Department of Management, University of Central Oklahoma, Edmond, OK, USA

c
Development Dimensions International (DDI), Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Version of record first published: 15 Apr 2011.
To cite this article: Amanda D. Angie, Shane Connelly, Ethan P. Waples & Vykinta Kligyte (2011): The influence of discrete emotions on judgement and decision-making: A meta-analytic review, Cognition & Emotion, 25:8, 1393-1422 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2010.550751
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COGNITION AND EMOTION 2011, 25 (8), 13931422
The inuence of discrete emotions on judgement and decision-making: A meta-analytic review

Amanda D. Angie1, Shane Connelly1, Ethan P. Waples2, and Vykinta Kligyte3
1 2
Department of Psychology, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, USA Department of Management, University of Central Oklahoma, Edmond, OK, USA 3 Development Dimensions International (DDI), Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Downloaded by [94.67.99.234] at 11:21 22 October 2012
During the past three decades, researchers interested in emotions and cognition have attempted to understand the relationship that affect and emotions have with cognitive outcomes such as judgement and decision-making. Recent research has revealed the importance of examining more discrete emotions, showing that same-valence emotions (e.g., anger and fear) differentially impact judgement and decision-making outcomes. Narrative reviews of the literature (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Pham, 2007) have identified some under-researched topics, but provide a limited synthesis of findings. The purpose of this study was to review the research examining the influence of discrete emotions on judgement and decision-making outcomes and provide an assessment of the observed effects using a meta-analytic approach. Results, overall, show that discrete emotions have moderate to large effects on judgement and decision-making outcomes. However, moderator analyses revealed differential effects for study-design characteristics and emotion-manipulation characteristics by emotion type. Implications are discussed. Keywords: Emotions; Judgement; Decision-making; Meta-analysis.
During the past three decades, researchers interested in emotions and human cognition have attempted to understand the complex relationship that affect and emotions have with different cognitive outcomes such as judgement and decision-making (JDM; Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). Many early studies on this topic focused on examining the impact of general positive and negative affective states on decision-making processes, treating affect and emotions as unidimensional and bipolar (e.g., positive/negative or happy/sad)
constructs (Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Forgas, 1995; Raghunathan & Corfman, 2004; Schwarz, 1990). Isen and colleagues have produced a corpus of research on the influence of global positive affect on cognitive outcomes such as cognitive organisation and flexibility, problem solving, decision-making, and risk taking (Isen & Labroo, 2002). Overall, their investigations and others have shown that affect does play a role, with positive affect having a facilitative influence and negative affect demonstrating more mixed results (Isen, 2001; Martin, Ward, Achee, &
Correspondence should be addressed to: Amanda D. Angie, 247 Tennessee Ave., Alexandria, VA 22305, USA. E-mail: Amanda.d.angie@gmail.com # 2011 Psychology Press, an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business http://www.psypress.com/cogemotion
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Wyer, 1993; Schwarz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991). However, recent research has revealed the importance of examining how discrete emotions influence human cognition, showing that same-valence emotions (e.g., anger and fear) impact JDM outcomes in different ways (DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, & Rucker, 2000; Garg, Inman, & Mittal, 2005; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Raghunathan & Trope, 2002). To date, narrative reviews of the emotions and decision-making literature (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Pham, 2007) have identified some topics in need of additional study, but in general have provided a limited synthesis of overall findings. In particular, these reviews tend to focus on only a small subset of discrete emotions and thus do not integrate the variety of JDM studies conducted using discrete emotions (e.g., economic decisionmaking, persuasion, likelihood judgements, etc.). The primary purpose of this study was to review the research examining the influence of discrete emotions on JDM outcomes using a metaanalytic approach. It should be noted, however, that due to the range of empirical research and advancements in theory development in this area the literature includes a variety of cognitive outcomes (e.g., endowment effect, risk judgements, choice to buy a product, etc.) as well as a wide range of hypotheses attempting to explain the effects of discrete emotions on JDM (e.g., cognitive appraisals of dimensions of emotion, depth of processing, activation of active and passive responses, etc.). This array of outcomes and hypotheses makes it difficult to establish a normative method for assigning positive or negative values to the effect sizes. Thus, the current meta-analysis uses the absolute values of the effect sizes coded from the eligible studies. While this method limits some of the conclusions that can be drawn from the results of the metaanalysis (i.e., positive or negative effects of specific emotions), it still provides a synthesis of the magnitude of effect that discrete emotions have on JDM and has implications for theoretical and methodological considerations in future research. In addition, research studies investigating emotions have adopted different methods of
manipulation, measurement, and evaluation of their effects on JDM. These methodological factors may play a role in the effects seen across various studies. Therefore, the secondary purpose of this study was to examine the influence of potential moderator variables.
Emotions and cognition

Early circumplex models of emotion (Plutchik, 1991; Russell, 1980; Watson & Tellegen, 1985) viewed emotional experience as being comprised of arousal and valence. This conceptual representation was used as a framework for studying relationships of emotions to cognitive and behavioural outcomes. However, discrepancies in findings began to emerge for cognitive outcomes such as JDM, pointing to the need for a more finegrained approach to describing and accounting for differences seen within these dimensions. Researchers have begun to focus on contrasting different discrete emotions (e.g., fear and happiness) in an attempt to better understand their influence on cognitive outcomes.
Discrete emotions. Discrete emotions are considered to be short-lived, intense phenomena that usually have clear cognitive content that is accessible to the person experiencing the emotion (Clore et al., 1994). In contrast to affect, discrete emotions are specific feeling states that arise from stimulus events, which refers to both events that happen and to prevailing situations (Frijda, 1986). The events or situations have attributes that uniquely trigger the experience of specific emotions while the emotions themselves have distinct action tendencies or behavioural outputs. It is this emphasis on the cognitive aspects of the experience and expression of discrete emotions that makes them particularly relevant to more cognitively oriented outcomes. Much of the research conducted on discrete emotions has focused on contrasting anger and fear, noting that their patterns of appraisal tendencies are opposite from one another on several dimensions and therefore each will impact
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EMOTIONS AND COGNITION META-ANALYSIS
JDM outcomes somewhat differently (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). In particular, anger has been in the spotlight of a lot of research both within and outside the emotions literature. Anger has been described as one of the most frequently experienced emotions (Averill, 1982), as having unique attention-focusing properties for the individual experiencing it (Solomon, 1990; Tavris, 1989), and as commonly carrying over from past situations (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). All of these attributes make anger a particularly influential emotion. Several studies focusing on anger and fear have shown that fearful and angry participants give different assessments of the likelihood of future negative events (e.g., fear activates higher estimates of the likelihood of risky events occurring while anger activates the opposite) and make different choices between risky alternatives (e.g., fearful individuals tend to choose the sure thing while angry individuals choose the opposite; Lerner & Keltner, 2001). In addition, angry individuals are more likely to stereotype targets, make heuristically based judgements, and show automatic prejudice toward an out-group than sad or neutral individuals (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Susser, 1994; Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; DeSteno, Dasgupta, Bartlett, & Cajdric, 2004). Likewise, happiness has been shown to have similar effects as anger where both angry and happy individuals estimate a higher probability of positive events than negative events (Garg, 2004). In a study comparing positive and negative emotions, Chuang and Kung (2005) found that individuals experiencing happiness tend to choose the safe option more often than those experiencing sadness. In contrast, the emotion of sadness has been associated with feelings of loss as well as the tendency to engage in thoughtful and more detail-oriented processing of cognitive tasks (Garg, 2004; Semmler & Brewer, 2002), possibly as a way to avoid thinking about the emotion-eliciting situation (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). As discussed previously, anger tends to lead to more heuristic processing in judgement whereas sadness tends to lead to more effortful and detailed processing in judgements. Early work by Bless,
Bohner, Schwarz, and Strack (1990) found that when presented with both strong and weak persuasive messages, happy individuals were equally persuaded by both strong and weak messages whereas sad individuals were more persuaded by strong than weak messages. In another set of studies, Lerner, Small, and Loewenstein (2004) examined the effects of sadness and disgust on everyday economic transactions. Participants were either endowed with an object and were asked at what price they would be willing to sell it back (sell condition), or endowed with nothing and asked whether they would prefer to receive the object or receive a specific cash amount for it (choice condition). Results showed that individuals in the sadness condition decreased selling prices and increased choice prices as opposed to those in the neutral condition. Individuals in the disgust condition reduced both choice and sell prices. This phenomenon is called the endowment effect (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991) and is supported by robust findings in the economic literature where individuals endowed with an object tend to overvalue it (i.e., ask for a higher amount to sell; Lerner et al., 2004). However, the influence of specific emotions reversed the effect (i.e., the sadness condition) or completely eliminated it (i.e., the disgust condition). Two general theoretical approaches dominate this research. One approach views emotion as a system of discrete categories (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 2001). Research within this approach focuses on discrete emotion states (e.g., anger, fear, sadness) and examines various appraisal dimensions underlying these emotions (e.g., control, responsibility, certainty, etc.) that differentiate them (Lazarus, 2001; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Studies investigating differences on these dimensions across emotions support this idea. For example, Tiedens and Linton (2001) demonstrated the differential influence of appraisals of certainty on judgement tasks, where emotions high on the dimension of certainty (i.e., anger and contentment) led to individuals being more
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persuaded by a message than emotions low on certainty (i.e., worry and surprise). In addition, the emotions of anger and fear carry opposite appraisal patterns for the dimension of control, where anger is associated with a sense of individual control and fear is associated with a sense of situational control (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Thus, when asked to attribute negative events to specific causal agents, assess past and present risk, or choose policies to address social issues, angry individuals were more likely to cite human factors, perceive lower levels of past and present risk, support more punitive policies toward social issues, and decrease welfare assistance. In contrast, fearful individuals were more likely to cite situational factors, perceive higher levels of past and present risk, and prefer more protective policies while sad individuals increased welfare assistance (Fischhoff, Gonzalez, Lerner, & Small, 2005; Gault & Sabini, 2000; Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003; Nabi, 2003; Small & Lerner, 2008). Based on the issues discussed above, several hypotheses were generated: H1a. Comparisons between anger and fear, and comparisons between anger and sadness will have moderate to large mean effect sizes, both for judgement outcomes and decision-making outcomes. H1b. Comparisons between anger and happiness will have small to moderate effect sizes both for judgement outcomes and decision-making outcomes. H2. Comparisons between fear and sadness will have small mean effect sizes, both for judgement outcomes and decision-making outcomes. H3a. When compared to a control group, anger will have moderate mean effect sizes for risk seeking and policy choice. H3b. When compared to a control group, fear and sadness will have small mean effect sizes for risk seeking and policy choice.
Another approach examines the underlying dimensions associated with the generation of emotions (i.e., direction and intensity; Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999). Research has described these dimensions in terms of a motivational system where emotions evolve from action tendencies that directly reflect activation of aversive or appetitive responses (Lang, 1995; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990, 1992). Specifically, discrete emotions can be associated with decreases in activation, no change, or increases in activation (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Bernston, 1999). The outputs of the evaluative processors comprising this system are then combined in order to compute preferences and organise action (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999). Appetitive tendencies are associated with more approach responses or a positivity disposition whereas aversive tendencies are associated with more withdrawal responses or a negativity disposition. This concept of activation is similar to the idea of action readiness in the appraisal approach in that emotions shape the preparation or impulse to respond in some form to reach a goal (Frijda, 1986; Roseman, 1984). In other words, high levels of activation may motivate preferences and actions, ultimately impacting outcomes to a greater degree than low levels of activation (Waples & Connelly, 2008). It is suggested that, based on research in this area, the experience of certain emotions results in more passive or active types of responses that go beyond increased states of internal arousal (Connelly, Gaddis, & Helton-Fauth, 2002). For example, emotions like anger, which arise from events or people threatening/thwarting ones efforts with negative outcomes for the self/others, motivate a person to take some action against the causal agent (i.e., high level of activation). Another example would be the emotion of fear, which leads to escape, serving the function of protection (Seitz, Lord, & Taylor, 2007). On the other hand, emotions like disappointment, which arise from events resulting in personal loss, lead to withdrawal from the situation or other people (i.e., low level of activation). Therefore, some types of events or situations may have a stronger probability than others of triggering
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certain emotions (Connelly et al., 2002). In turn, these emotions may have a stronger probability of leading to certain outcomes or consequences. H4a. When compared to a control group, anger and fear will have moderate mean effect sizes, both for judgement outcomes and decision-making outcomes. H4b. When compared to a control group, sadness will have small mean effect sizes, both for judgement outcomes and decision-making outcomes.
Potential moderators of emotional influence

In addition to the discrete emotion types, there are also some key potential methodological moderators that may help to further explain the relationship between emotions and JDM (Parrott & Hertel, 1999). These factors include: (1) type of cognitive task; (2) emotion-manipulation characteristics; and (3) study-design characteristics.
general, individuals tend not to have clear and well-organised preferences. Rather, these preferences are assembled during the decision-making process and this assembly is heavily influenced by the nature and context of the decision. Research in this area has uncovered that psychological characteristics of decision makers, including discrete emotions, do influence outcomes (Bell, 1982; Hsee, 1996; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999; Shafir, 1993, 1995; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1983; Tversky & Shafir, 1992; Tversky, Slovic, & Kahneman, 1990). Observed differences among these two types of cognitive tasks (i.e., judgement and decisionmaking) may be related to the different ways in which individuals combine desires (i.e., utilities, goals, personal values) and beliefs (i.e., expectations, knowledge, means) to choose a course of action (Hastie, 2001). For this reason, they will be analysed separately. Emotion-manipulation characteristics. This factor is comprised of study-design characteristics that are directly related to the emotional components of the studies. First, the setting in which the emotion is manipulated can have implications for the influence of those emotions on subsequent cognitive outcomes. In particular, those participants who received an emotion induction in a group setting as opposed to alone may be susceptible to, for example, additional factors such as contextual influences or attentional biases leading to smaller observed effects. Second, the relatedness of the emotion manipulation to the cognitive outcome (i.e., incidental and integral) can also exert some influence. Incidental emotional states are those whose source is unrelated to the object of judgement or decision and include current emotions not caused by the target object, pre-existing mood states, and enduring emotional dispositions such as chronic anxiety (Bodenhausen, 1993; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Pham, 2007). In some instances incidental emotion may be strong enough to focus and direct thought on tasks unrelated to initial emotion triggers (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). In contrast, integral emotional responses are those
Type of cognitive task. The type of cognitive task may have implications for differences in the observed effects of emotions and includes the distinction between the JDM criteria. Judgements, in general, are often comprised of attributes that need to be combined into a single rating such as estimates about some object(s) of interest (Shafir & LeBoeuf, 2002). These can include estimates of intuitive probabilities, likelihoods (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982) or the accuracy of predictions of future events (Dunning, Griffin, Milojkovic, & Ross, 1990; Pulford & Colman, 1996). Studies have consistently shown that individuals are not good at weighting attributes within situations and thus are not good at combining these attributes to make a final judgement (Shafir & LeBoeuf, 2002). It is this combination of fallible intuitions and uncertainty that leaves room for the influence of discrete emotions. Decision-making is made up of preferences that depend on the subjective utilities of anticipated outcomes that are weighted, overall, by their probabilities (Shafir & LeBoeuf, 2002). In
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experienced in relation to the object of judgement or decision (i.e., emotions and feelings that are elicited by features of the target object). It has been demonstrated that when cognition is emotion related it may interrupt pre-existing cognitive processes and direct ones attention and judgement to address the emotion-eliciting event (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1992; Lazarus, 1991, Schwarz, 1990). Third, a variety of techniques are used to induce emotions in participants. However, there are several ways in which different induction methods may impact outcomes. In particular, one concern is the duration of the resulting mood or emotion, which under some conditions may be relatively brief (Chartier & Ranieri, 1989). Another concern is the generalisability of the induced emotional state in terms of its correspondence to everyday experience (Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988). It is also important to note that the emotion induction itself may influence participants to perform cognitive tasks in particular ways resulting in differential results among studies (Parrott & Hertel, 1999). In this case, differences in effect sizes may be observed across induction methods. Lastly, research that incorporates emotional states into the design requires that some measurement of the level at which participants are experiencing that emotion is made. Whether or not studies employ these manipulation checks can have implications for the strength and quality of those inductions as well as for the internal validity of the study in general (Parrott & Hertel, 1999). Study-design characteristics. The design features of the study may have an important impact on emotional influences (Parrott & Hertel, 1999). For example, studies in which the cognitive task is administered in a group setting versus an individual setting may have implications for the way in which emotions continue to influence task performance (i.e., the stability of the effect in context). In addition, the nature of the sample, whether it be undergraduates, community volunteers, predominantly male, or predominantly female may have implications for the
generalisability of findings outside of these populations. Another potentially important variable is the format of the measure (i.e., multiple choice versus open-ended), which may introduce bias or demand characteristics into the assessment of performance (Parrott & Hertel, 1999) leading to differences. Research has shown that evaluations of prospects are better when they are made in the context of alternative courses of action rather than in isolation (Hsee, Loewenstein, Blout, & Bazerman, 1999; Read, Loewenstein, & Rabin, 1999). Lastly, a design characteristic that may not be considered a moderator as such but that has been identified as a general issue in emotions research is the use of a control condition as a comparison group (Parrott & Hertel, 1999). There is a fairly even split across the emotions and JDM literature as to the number of studies that employ control conditions as part of their experimental design. In terms of the analytic aspects of the current study, this discrepancy in study design requires that the studies comparing emotion groups to control groups be analysed separately from the studies comparing only emotion groups. Based on the issues raised in the preceding section, this study addressed the following research questions: R1. How do emotion-manipulation characteristics moderate the influence of discrete emotions on JDM tasks? For example, will observed effect sizes vary based on the induction method for studies that induce sadness? It should be noted that because we expected these characteristics to differ as a function of the discrete emotion, we broke down these moderators by emotion type. R2. How do study-design characteristics moderate the influence of discrete emotions on JDM tasks? For example, will observed effect sizes vary based on the composition of the sample (i.e., undergraduates, community volunteers, etc.) for studies that induce anger? It should be noted that these moderators were also broken down by emotion type.
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METHOD Literature search

To meta-analyse the relationship between discrete emotions and JDM outcomes, an extensive literature search was conducted. First, an initial manual search was done on prior issues of the following journals because of their focus on publishing research on discrete emotions and cognitive outcomes: Emotion, Cognition and Emotion, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, and Judgement and Decision-Making. Second, a more complete review of relevant databases was conducted. This search consisted of an examination of PsycInfo, PsycArticles, Academic Search Elite, Communication and Mass Media Complete, Communication Abstracts, Lexis Nexis, ERIC, SocINDEX, Business Source Elite, EconLit, and ABI/ Inform using the key words emotions, discrete emotions, affect, decision making (or decisionmaking), judg(e)ment, cognition, and risk. Theses and dissertations that examined discrete emotions and JDM were identified through a search of Dissertation Abstracts. Third, the reference sections of previously located articles and any relevant review articles were physically examined by the authors to identify additional studies that met the inclusion criteria but were not identified in the initial database searches. When locating studies for inclusion in metaanalytic reviews, the file drawer problem, which refers to the potential bias of meta-analytic results due to non-significant studies not being published is an important issue to address (Rosenthal, 1979; Rosenthal & DiMatteo, 2001). Because published studies on average have been shown to have larger mean effect sizes (Lipsey & Wilson, 1993) than unpublished studies, two steps were taken to obtain additional data. First, an announcement soliciting any unpublished data relevant to the current study was posted on the listserv of an academic group comprised of those individuals who conduct emotions research or are interested in emotions research (e.g., EMONET). Second, a manual search of published abstracts and proceedings from several relevant annual conferences was
conducted that included the Society for Industrial Organizational Psychology, Academy of Management, Association for Psychological Science, American Psychological Association, and Society for Judgement and Decision-Making. No restrictions for inclusion were placed on the year of publication for either the database search or for conference proceedings (i.e., all years for which studies were available on emotions and cognition were examined and considered for inclusion). Through the literature search and solicitation of unpublished studies via listserv and conference proceedings, 240 studies were identified as candidates for inclusion in the meta-analysis.
Inclusion and exclusion criteria for relevant studies

In order to address the research questions posed previously, four inclusion criteria were developed to identify the most relevant studies. First, the study was required to focus expressly on the influence of discrete emotions (e.g., anger, fear, happiness, etc.) on JDM. Thus, studies that examined affect (e.g., global positive or negative orientation of mood or disposition, mixed emotions, etc.) or did not examine discrete emotions directly were not considered. Second, the study was required to employ an experimental design where discrete emotions were manipulated and emotion groups were compared on some judgement and/or decision-making task. Third, the judgement and/or decision-making task(s) of interest in the study had to be measured following a manipulation of discrete emotions. Fourth, the relevant article was required to be available in English and provide either the descriptive (i.e., means and standard deviations) or inferential (i.e., F, t, x2) statistics needed to calculate Cohens d statistic. Studies providing only global summaries of findings were eliminated. In addition, studies that did not use a control comparison group but compared two discrete emotions were retained for a separate analysis from the studies comparing a discrete emotion group and a control group. Citations for these studies are provided in the reference list where they
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are indicated by an asterisk (*). Studies that did not report sufficient numerical data (e.g., no standard deviations) but met the remaining inclusion criteria were not eliminated immediately. The authors of these articles were each contacted individually to obtain additional information and the studies were included if the requested data was submitted. Electronic-mail addresses were obtained from the articles contact information, authors academic institutions web directory, or from a Google search. The first authors of 13 articles were contacted. Of those authors who were contacted, 2 (15%) provided usable data, 5 (39%) did not respond, and 6 (46%) could not access their data anymore. Application of these criteria yielded 61 effect sizes drawn from 31 empirical studies containing 4,864 participants for the treatment control sample and 52 effect sizes drawn from 45 empirical studies containing 5,786 participants for the treatmenttreatment sample.
Description of variables
The variables coded in the meta-analysis consisted of the cognitive task used in the study, and a number of potential moderators of JDM effect sizes including: (1) type of cognitive task; (2) emotion-manipulation characteristics; and (3) study-design characteristics.
Judgement and decision-making tasks. Based on a review of the emotions and JDM literature, the cognitive tasks used in these studies were grouped into two general rubrics: (1) judgement outcomes (e.g., risk perceptions, information assessment, and social perceptions); and (2) decision-making outcomes (e.g., risk-seeking behaviour, risk-aversion behaviour, policy choice, and consumer behaviour). These criteria were collapsed into these two broad categories because of the limited number of effect sizes available for analysis. Emotion-manipulation characteristics. The information coded in this section included study-design variables that were specifically associated with the emotions under investigation and included: (1) whether the emotion manipulation was task related or task unrelated (i.e., integral vs. incidental); (2) what manipulation procedures were used; (3) the setting in which the emotion manipulation took place; and (4) information regarding the use of an emotion-manipulation check and whether it was significant. Study-design characteristics. These characteristics consisted of both methodological and individualdifferences types of moderators. Specifically, the methodological moderators included: (1) funding status of the study (e.g., no or yes, if yes private, federal, or internal); (2) the setting in which the cognitive tasks were administered (i.e., individual vs. group); (3) cognitive task measure type (e.g., objective or subjective); and (4) cognitive task measure format (e.g., multiple choice or open ended). The individual differences moderators examined the individual attributes of the sample. These variables included: (1) nature of sample (e.g., undergraduates, MBA students, grad students,
Content coding procedures

To examine the influence of discrete emotions, emotion-manipulation characteristics, and studydesign characteristics on JDM, a content analysis of all studies was conducted. Three psychologists familiar with the emotions and JDM literature coded the studies. Each coder received approximately 20 hours of training in coding procedures and the variable set to be coded and were instructed to only provide a rating if the material was explicitly discussed in the study, or could be reasonably inferred from the information provided. In specific cases where there was not enough information available, coders were instructed to provide a missing data code. Any discrepancies in ratings were resolved through consensus. To demonstrate the accuracy of coders prior to consensus, agreement analyses were conducted on the coding dimensions. Because categorical decisions were made for all of the dimensions coded, percent agreement was utilised to assess reliability (Arthur, Bennett, & Huffcutt, 2001; Cooper & Hedges, 1994). Overall, the average agreement was high (90%).
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professionals, community volunteers, and mixed); and (2) gender make-up (e.g., predominantly male, predominantly female, and equal).
Computation of effect-size estimates

The present study used Cohens d statistic as the common effect-size metric. Forty (35%) of the 113 data points were computed using means and standard deviations or test statistics (i.e., t statistics, F statistics, x2) from formulas recommended by Arthur et al. (2001) and Lipsey and Wilson (2001). The remaining 73 (65%) data points were computed from proportion values (e.g., the proportion of individuals who chose a risky option vs. those who chose a neutral option) by calculating an oddsratio statistic using an arcsine transformation to adjust for the dichotomisation (i.e., the difference between the arcsine transformed treatment group proportion and the arcsine transformed control group proportion) as recommended by Lipsey and Wilson (2001). This method of calculating d results in a more conservative effect-size estimate than other comparable transformations (e.g., logit and probit) and is approximately equivalent to the standardised mean difference (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). It should be noted that absolute values were computed for each of the mean effect sizes because no normative rules exist for determining whether or not certain judgements or decisions are better or worse. The mean effect sizes used in the analysis represent only the magnitude of difference between a discrete emotion group and a control group or two discrete emotion groups. All d calculations were conducted by the first author. To establish reliability, half of the studies were recoded by the first author resulting in a percent agreement of 92%. Prior to these calculations, though, the independence of data points was considered. It was first determined if the effect size computed was independent of other effect sizes produced from the same dataset. Thus, if a study measured both probability estimates of risk and actual risk choices and the effect sizes were computed for both cognitive tasks from the same dataset, they were considered independent. Second, it was then
determined if the effect sizes from each study represented one construct or multiple constructs. For example, if a study reported multiple effects for choice behaviour within the same emotion comparison, such as two assessments of risk taking for the comparison of anger and a control group, these effects were combined to avoid problems caused by data dependency.
Data analyses
Preliminary analyses. Sample-weighted mean effect sizes were calculated using random-effect procedures recommended by Arthur et al. (2001) based on the meta-analytic approach by Hunter and Schmidt (1990). This approach allows for statistical artefacts, such as sampling error and unreliability, to be corrected. Confidence intervals were also calculated to provide an assessment of the accuracy of the mean effect sizes (Arthur et al., 2001). Finally, an analysis was conducted to determine if publication bias may have influenced the magnitude of the results. Because of the upward bias of effect sizes in published studies versus unpublished studies (Lipsey & Wilson, 1993) and because published studies are easier to obtain than unpublished studies, it is important for meta-analysts to investigate this phenomenon (Rosenthal, 1979). To check for possible bias, two steps were taken. A funnel plot of the effect sizes (x-axis) by the number of participants per study (y-axis) was generated and inspected, and a systematic examination of funnel plot asymmetry was conducted using linear regression (Egger, Smith, Schneider, & Minder, 1997). It should be noted that because the absolute values of the mean effect sizes were used in the analysis, a funnel plot of the effect sizes could not be calculated without negative values. Thus, each effect size was mean centred (the mean of all effect sizes was subtracted from each individual effect size) and then included in the two analyses. Moderator analyses. The decision to test for moderator variables can either be empirically driven, where the presence of one or more moderators is suspected when sufficient variance
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remains in the corrected effect size, or theoretically driven. In this particular study, the decision to test for moderators was empirically driven. The homogeneity statistic, Q, and percentage of variance accounted for by sampling error were calculated. The Q statistic assesses the extent to which there is variance beyond sampling error variance and when significant, indicates a lack of homogeneity (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990, 2004). However, the homogeneity statistic tends to have low power unless the moderator effect is very large so the 75% rule-of-thumb method suggested by Hunter and Schmidt (2004) was also employed when the Q statistic was significant. This method states that if 75% or more of the variance can be accounted for by sampling error, then the conclusion may be reached that all of the variance in the observed effects is due to artefacts (Arthur et al., 2001; Hunter & Schmidt, 1990). For moderator analyses, it is suggested that a minimum number of cases (i.e., k!10) be required for analysis and interpretation of results (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). The decision was made, however, to be as inclusive as possible allowing for the minimum number of cases to be set at two. While still consistent with Arthur et al.s (2001) recommendations, an important caveat that should be noted is that meta-analytic procedures based on too few cases are relatively unstable and results should be interpreted with caution (Rosenthal, 1991, 1995).
RESULTS Overall effects

Before describing the results regarding the effects of discrete emotions on JDM outcomes, characteristics of the studies included in the meta-analysis are provided. Tables 1 and 2, in alphabetical order, report qualitative descriptions of study content for the treatmentcontrol and treatmenttreatment samples, respectively: (1) author(s), year of publication (and study number if applicable); (2) number of participants (n); (3) the emotioninduction procedure used; (4) type of emotion groups compared and which group had a higher
level on the cognitive outcome (denoted by an asterisk *); (5) a brief description of the cognitive task and whether it was a judgement (j) or decisionmaking (dm) task; and (6) the corresponding absolute value of the unweighted effect-size estimate (d). An examination of the effect sizes presented in the summary tables shows some notable patterns. In terms of the judgement outcomes for both samples, the larger effect sizes are observed for judging the likelihood of future events (i.e., risk perceptions) and indicating preference for different types of information or preference for desirable tasks (i.e., information assessments). Only a few opposing effects are seen for the treatmentcontrol sample where in one study the anger group had indicated a higher unfavourable attitude toward an out-group target and in another study the control group indicated a higher unfavourable attitude toward an outgroup target. In terms of the decision-making outcomes for both samples, many of the larger effect sizes were seen for risk-taking behaviour (i.e., risk seeking and risk aversion) and consumer behaviour (i.e., choosing consumer products or setting buying/selling prices on objects). Again, a few opposing effects are seen for the treatmentcontrol sample where in one study the sadness group was less risk averse than the control group but in another study the control group was more risk seeking. In general, mean effect sizes were small to moderate. The results of the meta-analysis for the JDM criteria for the treatmentcontrol samples by emotion group comparison are presented in Table 3. Each table contains: (1) the number of data points for each effect-size estimate (k); (2) the number of participants (N); (3) the absolute values of the average sample-weighted Cohens d; (4) standard deviations of effect-size estimates (SD); (5) standard errors of effect-size estimates (SE); (6) percent of variance accounted for by sampling error (PVA); (78) 95% upper (U) and lower (L) bound confidence intervals (CI); and (9) the Q statistic (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990). Cohens (1988) interpretation of effect-size magnitude was used to interpret the results (i.e.,
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Table 1. Study information and effect sizes for treatmentcontrol sample Emotion induction Film clips Film clips Film clips Recall an emotional event Recall an emotional event Recall an emotional event Recall an emotional event Read an article Read an article Recall of emotional event Recall of emotional event Recall of emotional event Recall of emotional event Recall of emotional event Recall of emotional event Recall of emotional event Recall of emotional event Recall of emotional event Effect size (d) 0.10 0.05
Study Bless et al., 1996 (Study 2) Bless et al., 1996 (Study 2) Cryder et al., 2008 DeSteno, Dasgupta et al., 2004 (Study 1) DeSteno, Dasgupta et al., 2004 (Study 1) DeSteno, Dasgupta et al., 2004 (Study 2)
n 41 41 33 43
Comparison groups Sadness vs. control* Happiness* vs. control Sadness* vs. control Anger* vs. control
Dependent variable Recognition of typical items j Recognition of typical items j
Buying price for an arbitrary productdm 1.40 Unfavourable attitude toward out-group target j 0.01
44
Sadness vs. control*
Unfavourable attitude toward out-group target j 0.07
40
Anger vs. control*
DeSteno, Dasgupta et al., 2004 (Study 2) DeSteno, Petty et al., 2004 (Study 1) DeSteno, Petty et al., 2004 (Study 1) Fessler et al., 2004
41
69 69 79
Sadness vs. control* Sadness* vs. control Anger* vs. control
Favourable attitude toward emotion-congruent message j Intention to vote for an emotion-congruent proposaldm Risk seekingdm
0.67 0.68 0.06
Fessler et al., 2004
79
Disgust vs. control*
Risk seekingdm
0.03
Gangemi & Mancini, 2007 (Study 1) Gangemi & Mancini, 2007 (Study 1) Gangemi & Mancini, 2007 (Study 2) Gangemi & Mancini, 2007 (Study 2) Gangemi & Mancini, 2007 (Study 3) Gangemi & Mancini, 2007 (Study 3) Garg, 2004 (Study 1)
99
Guilt* vs. control
Choice to buy a cardm
0.84
106
Anger vs. control
Choice to buy a cardm
0.00
113
Guilt* vs. control
Choice to repair an old cardm
1.45
114
Anger* vs. control
Choice to repair an old cardm
0.03
121
Guilt* vs. control
Choice of medical professionaldm
0.66
123
Anger vs. control*
Choice of medical professionaldm
0.24
69
Happiness* vs. control
Judgements of the likelihood of life events j
0.01
(continued)
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Table 1. (Continued) Emotion induction Recall of emotional event Recall of emotional event Recall of emotional event Recall of emotional event Recall of emotional event Film clips Film clips and music Film clips and music Recall of emotional event Recall of emotional event Recall of emotional event Film clips Film clips Film clips Recall of emotional event Recall of emotional event Film clips Read an article Read an article Rate emotion words Rate emotion words Effect size (d) 0.00
Study Garg, 2004 (Study 1)
n 69
Comparison groups Anger vs. control
Dependent variable Judgements of the likelihood of life events j
Garg, 2004 (Study 2)
87
Happiness* vs. control Anger vs. control
0.03
Garg, 2004 (Study 2)
87
0.00
Garg et al., 2005
115
Anger vs. control*
Choice of the status quodm
0.49
Garg et al., 2005
123
Choice of the status quodm
0.31
` Harle & Sanfey, 2007 Innes-Ker & Niedenthal, 2002 (Study 2) Innes-Ker & Niedenthal, 2002 (Study 2) Isbell et al., 2005
79 61 61 46
Sadness vs. control* Sadness* vs. control Happiness* vs. control Happiness* vs. control Anger* vs. control
Choice of monetary offerdm Judgements of the similarity of words j Judgements of the similarity of words j Information preference j
0.30 0.16 0.18 0.76
Leith & Baumeister, 1996 (Study 3) Leith & Baumeister, 1996 (Study 4) Leith & Baumeister, 1996 (Study 5) Lerner et al., 2004 Lerner et al., 2004 Liersch et al., 2007 (Study 4) Liersch et al., 2007 (Study 4) Maner & Gerend, 2007 (Study 3) Nabi, 2002 Nabi, 2002 Nabi, 2003 Nabi, 2003
25
Risk seekingdm
1.24
25
Anger* vs. control
Risk seekingdm
1.12
22 133 113 64
Sadness vs. control Sadness vs. control* Disgust vs. control* Sadness vs. control*
Risk seekingdm Choice of selling price for a productdm Choice of selling price for a productdm Risk aversiondm
0.00 0.51 0.59 0.14
64
Happiness vs. control* Fear vs. control* Anger vs. control* Fear* vs. control Anger* vs. control Fear vs. control*
Risk aversiondm
0.38
112 155 153 107 108
Judgements of the likelihood of positive events j 0.02 Perceived argument strength j Perceived argument strength j Choice of retributive solutionsdm Choice of retributive solutionsdm 0.01 0.03 0.22 0.02
(continued)
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Table 1. (Continued) Emotion induction Effect size (d) 0.24 0.19 0.35
Study Nabi, 2003 Nabi, 2003 Raghunathan & Corfman, 2004 (Study 1) Raghunathan & Corfman, 2004 (Study 1) Raghunathan & Corfman, 2004 (Study 1) Raghunathan & Corfman, 2004 (Study 1) Raghunathan & Pham, 1999 (Study 1) Raghunathan & Pham, 1999 (Study 1) Raghunathan & Pham, 1999 (Study 1) Raghunathan & Pham, 1999 (Study 1) Raghunathan & Pham, 1999 (Study 2) Raghunathan & Pham, 1999 (Study 2) Raghunathan & Pham, 1999 (Study 2) Raghunathan & Pham, 1999 (Study 2) Raghunathan et al., 2006 (Study 1) Raghunathan et al., 2006 (Study 1) Raghunathan et al., 2006 (Study 2) Raghunathan et al., 2006 (Study 2) Semmler & Brewer, 2002 Small & Lerner, 2008 (Study 1) Small & Lerner, 2008 (Study 1)
n 112 109 62
Comparison groups
Dependent variable Judgements of societal causes j Judgements of societal causes j Preference for completing an enjoyable task j
Rate emotion Anger vs. control* words Rate emotion Fear* vs. control words Scenarios Fear vs. control*
62
Scenarios
Sadness* vs. control
Preference for completing an enjoyable task j
0.44
62
Scenarios
Fear vs. control*
Choice of completing an enjoyable task firstdm
0.52
62
Scenarios
Sadness* vs. control
Choice of completing an enjoyable task firstdm
0.28
56 58 56 58 50 48 50 48 99 99 109 109 102 76
Scenarios Scenarios Scenarios Scenarios Scenarios Scenarios Scenarios Scenarios Scenarios Scenarios Scenarios Scenarios
Fear vs. control* Sadness* vs. control Fear vs. control* Sadness* vs. control Fear vs. control* Sadness* vs. control Fear vs. control* Sadness* vs. control Fear vs. control* Sadness* vs. control Fear vs. control* Sadness* vs. control
Preference for low probability/high payoff 0.06 gamble j Preference for low probability/high payoff 0.06 gamble j Choice of low probability/high payoff gambledm 0.30 Choice of low probability/high payoff gambledm 0.14 Preference for high pay/low job-security job j Preference for high pay/low job-security job j Choice of high pay/low job-security jobdm Choice of high pay/low job-security jobdm Choice of a comforting gamedm Choice of a comforting gamedm Choice of a prescription drugdm Choice of a prescription drugdm Preference for a guilty verdict j Choice to decrease assistancedm 0.13 0.07 0.49 0.47 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.49
76
Tape-recorded Sadness vs. control scenario Recall of Anger* vs. control emotional event Recall of Sadness* vs. control emotional event
Choice to increase assistancedm
0.47
Notes: n 0total sample size; *denotes which comparison group had a higher level on the dependent variable; j 0judgement task; dm 0decision-making task; d 0the absolute value of the unweighted effect-size estimate.
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Table 2. Study information and effect sizes for treatmenttreatment sample Effect size (d) 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.07 0.40 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.40 0.34 0.06 0.00 0.85 1.42 0.90 0.00 0.03 0.18 0.02
Study Bless et al., 1996 (Study 1) Bless et al., 1996 (Study 2) Bless et al., 1996 (Study 3) Brinol et al., 2007 (Study 1) Brinol et al., 2007 (Study 2) Brinol et al., 2007 (Study 3) Chua, 2006
Emotion induction
Comparison groups Sadness vs. happiness* Sadness vs. happiness* Sadness vs. happiness* Sadness vs. happiness* Sadness* vs. happiness Sadness vs. happiness* Regret* vs. disappointment Sadness vs. happiness* Sadness vs. happiness* Sadness* vs. happiness Sadness* vs. happiness Sadness* vs. happiness Sadness vs. happiness* Anger* vs. sadness
Dependent variable Recognition of typical items j Recognition of typical items j Recognition of typical items j Favourable attitude toward a policy proposal j Favourable attitude toward a policy proposal j Favourable attitude toward a policy proposal j Risk seekingdm Choice of a safe optiondm Choice of a safe optiondm Choice of the status quodm Choice switchingdm Choice of a productdm Choice of the compromise optiondm Unfavourable attitude toward out-group target j Unfavourable attitude toward out-group target j Choice to buy a cardm Choice to repair an old cardm Choice of medical professionaldm
82 Scenarios 40 Film clips 80 Film clips 92 Recall of emotional event 89 Recall of emotional event 79 Scenarios 31 Gambling task 104 Read a story 78 Recall of emotional event 107 Recall of emotional event 107 Recall of emotional event 148 Recall of emotional event 75 Recall of emotional event 58 Recall of emotional event
Chuang & Kung, 2005 Chuang & Lin, 2007 (Study 1) Chuang & Lin, 2007 (Study 2) Chuang & Lin, 2007 (Study 3) Chuang & Lin, 2007 (Study 4) Chuang & Lin, 2007 (Study 5) DeSteno, Dasgupta et al., 2004 (Study 1) DeSteno, Dasgupta et al., 2004 (Study 2) Gangemi & Mancini, 2007 (Study 1) Gangemi & Mancini, 2007 (Study 2) Gangemi & Mancini, 2007 (Study 3) Garg, 2004 (Study 1) Garg, 2004 (Study 2) Garg et al., 2005 Innes-Ker & Niedenthal, 2002 (Study 2) Isbell, 2004 (Study 2) Isbell et al., 2005 Keller et al., 2003 (Study 1)
54 Recall of emotional event Anger vs. sadness 105 Recall of emotional event Anger vs. guilt* 115 Recall of emotional event Anger vs. guilt* 121 Recall of emotional event Anger vs. guilt* 70 Recall of emotional event Anger vs. happiness
Judgements of the likelihood of life events j 88 Recall of emotional event Anger* vs. happiness Judgements of the likelihood of life events j 118 Recall of emotional event Anger vs. sadness* Choice of the status quodm 62 Film clips and music Sadness vs. Judgements of the similarity of happiness* words j 157 Recall of emotional event Sadness vs. happiness* 68 Recall of emotional event Sadness vs. happiness* 83 Recall of emotional event Sadness* vs. happiness Information preference j Information preference j Risk aversiondm
0.02 0.10 0.08
(continued)
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Table 2. (Continued) Effect size (d) 0.07 0.81 0.65 0.23 0.20 0.57 0.00 0.24 0.55 0.18 0.08 0.24 0.43 0.82 0.81 0.19 0.45 0.19 0.96 0.10 0.43 0.13 0.15 0.44 0.94
Study
Emotion induction
Comparison groups
Dependent variable Risk perceptions j Judgements of the likelihood of a mishap due to others j Judgements of the likelihood of negative events j Risk assessments for self j Choice of effective social policiesdm Judgements of the likelihood of risky events j Choice of selling price for a productdm Risk aversiondm Choice of selling price for a productdm Choice of selling price for a productdm Favourable attitude toward a plan j Choice of retributive solutionsdm Judgements of societal causes j Preference for completing an enjoyable task j Choice of which task to complete firstdm Preference for low probability/ high payoff gamble j Choice of low probability/high payoff gambledm Preference for high pay/low jobsecurity job j Choice of high pay/low jobsecurity jobdm Preference for high risk/high reward j Choice of low probability/higher rewarddm Choice of a comforting gamedm Choice of a prescription drugdm Preference for an active choice j Choice to decrease assistancedm
j
Keller et al., 2003 (Study 83 1) Keltner et al., 1993 (Study 56 2) Keltner et al., 1993 (Study 68 4) Lerner et al., 2003 648 Lerner et al., 2003 Lerner & Keltner, 2001 (Study 4) Lerner et al., 2004
Recall of emotional event Sadness vs. happiness* Recall of emotional event Anger* vs. sadness and physical pose Recall of emotional event Anger vs. sadness* and physical pose Recall of emotional event Anger vs. fear* and film clips 648 Recall of emotional event Anger* vs. fear and film clips 60 Film clips Anger* vs. fear 132 Film clips Sadness vs. disgust
Liersch et al., 2007 (Study 64 Recall of emotional event Sadness* vs. 4) happiness Lin et al., 2006 160 Recall of emotional event Sadness vs. happiness* Lin et al., 2006 240 Film clips Sadness vs. happiness* Nabi, 2002 164 Read an article Anger vs. fear* Nabi, 2003 105 Rate emotion words Nabi, 2003 109 Rate emotion words Raghunathan & Corfman, 62 Scenarios 2004 (Study 1) Raghunathan & Corfman, 62 Scenarios 2004 (Study 1) Raghunathan & Pham, 52 Scenarios 1999 (Study 1) Raghunathan & Pham, 52 Scenarios 1999 (Study 1) Raghunathan & Pham, 48 Scenarios 1999 (Study 2) Raghunathan & Pham, 48 Scenarios 1999 (Study 3) Raghunathan & Pham, 93 Scenarios 1999 (Study 3) Raghunathan & Pham, 93 Scenarios 1999 (Study 2) Raghunathan et al., 2006 98 Scenarios (Study 1) Raghunathan et al., 2006 110 Scenarios (Study 2) Rucker & Petty, 2004 83 Read an article Small & Lerner, 2008 76 Recall of emotional event Anger* vs. fear Anger vs. fear* Fear vs. sadness* Fear vs. sadness* Fear vs. sadness* Fear vs. sadness* Fear vs. sadness* Fear vs. sadness* Fear vs. sadness* Fear vs. sadness* Fear vs. sadness* Fear vs. sadness* Anger* vs. sadness Anger* vs. sadness
Notes: n 0total sample size; *denotes which comparison group had a higher level on the dependent variable; dm 0decision-making task; d 0the absolute value of the unweighted effect-size estimate.
0judgement task;
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Table 3. Overall results for treatmentcontrol sample on judgement and decision-making outcomes by emotion group comparison 95% CI k TC j Anger Fear Sadness Happiness TC dm Anger Fear Sadness Disgust Guilt N d SD SE PVA L U Q
6 6 9 5 10 6 13 2 3
535 542 553 304 862 484 975 192 333
0.06 0.11* 0.18* 0.17* 0.26*** 0.18*** 0.33*** 0.36*** 0.98***
0.09 0.11 0.22 0.26 0.29 0.19 0.28 0.27 0.34
0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.04
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 58.69 100.00 71.02 59.06 34.85
(0.04 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.16 0.08 0.21 0.28 0.90
0.16 0.21 0.32 0.31 0.36 0.28 0.45 0.44 1.06
1.16 1.54 6.66 4.83 17.04* 4.44 18.31 3.39 8.61*
Notes: TC j 0treatmentcontrol judgement sample; TC dm 0treatmentcontrol decision-making sample; k0number of effect-size estimates; N0sum of participants; d0average sample-weighted effect-size estimate using Cohens d; SD0standard deviation of effect-size estimates; SE 0standard error of effect-size estimates; PVA0percent of variance accounted for by sampling error; 95% CI 0 95% confidence interval; Q0Q statistic (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990). *p B.05; **p B.01; ***p B.001.
d 00.20 is considered small, d 00.50 is considered medium, and d 00.80 is considered a large effect). In the overall treatmentcontrol judgement sample by emotion group comparison, effect sizes for discrete emotion groups are relatively small (Anger: d 00.06, SD 00.09; Fear: d 00.11, SD 00.11; Sadness: d 00.18, SD 00.22; Disgust: d 00.17, SD 00.26). In the overall treatment control decision-making sample by emotion group comparison, effect sizes for discrete emotion groups are small to large (Anger: d 00.26, SD 00.29; Fear: d 00.18, SD00.19; Sadness: d 00.33, SD00.28; Disgust: d 00.36, SD 00.27; Guilt: d 00.98, SD 00.34). These findings do not support H4a, which states that when compared to a control group, anger and fear will have moderate mean effect sizes both for judgement outcomes and decision-making outcomes, or H4b, which states that when compared to a control group sadness will have small mean effect sizes, both for judgement outcomes and decision-making outcomes. In fact, anger, fear, and sadness all have small mean effect sizes, both for judgement outcomes and for decision-making outcomes. Additionally, an examination of the Q statistic reveals non-significant values. However, the
percent of variance accounted for by sampling error in the judgement sample in all emotion group comparisons is above 75% indicating that no moderators are present in these samples. For the decision-making sample, however, the percent of variance accounted for by sampling error is below 75% for four of the five emotion group comparisons (Anger: 26%, Sadness: 67%, Disgust: 59%, and Guilt: 35%) with non-significant Q statistics indicating the need to investigate the presence of moderators in these particular samples. The results of the meta-analysis for the judgement and decision-making criteria for the treatmenttreatment samples by emotion group comparison are presented in Table 4. In the overall treatmenttreatment judgement sample by emotion group comparison, effect sizes for discrete emotion groups are small to moderate (Anger/ Fear: d 00.27, SD00.12; Anger/Sadness: d 00.41, SD 00.30; Anger/Happiness: d 00.13, SD 00.16; Fear/Sadness: d 00.31, SD 00.29; Sadness/Happiness: d 00.06, SD 00.05). In the overall treatmenttreatment decision-making sample by emotion group comparison, effect sizes for discrete emotion groups are small to large (Anger/Fear: d 00.21, SD 00.01; Anger/Sadness:
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Table 4. Overall results for treatmenttreatment sample on judgement and decision-making outcomes by emotion group comparison 95% CI k TT j Anger and fear Anger and sadness Anger and happiness Fear and sadness Sadness and happiness TT dm Anger and fear Anger and sadness Anger and guilt Fear and sadness Sadness and happiness N d SD SE PVA L U Q
5 5 3 4 10 2 2 3 6 10
1058 319 242 255 832 753 194 342 462 1166
0.27*** 0.41*** 0.13** 0.31*** 0.06 0.21*** 0.48*** 1.06*** 0.41*** 0.30***
0.12 0.30 0.16 0.29 0.05 0.01 0.37 0.26 0.29 0.13
0.02 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04
100.00 72.38 100.00 77.19 100.00 100.00 31.47 61.48 62.75 100.00
0.23 0.27 0.03 0.17 (0.04 0.19 0.40 0.98 0.31 0.22
0.31 0.55 0.23 0.45 0.16 0.23 0.56 1.14 0.51 0.38
3.54 6.91 1.49 5.18 0.46 0.34 6.36 4.88 12.75* 5.07
Notes: TT j 0treatmenttreatment judgement sample; TT dm 0treatmenttreatment decision-making sample; k 0number of effect-size estimates; N0sum of participants; d 0average sample-weighted effect-size estimate using Cohens d; SD0standard deviation of effectsize estimates; SE 0standard error of effect-size estimates; PVA0percent of variance accounted for by sampling error; 95% CI 0 95% confidence interval; Q0Q statistic (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990). *p B.05; **p B.01; ***pB.001.
d 00.48, SD 00.37; Anger/Guilt: d 01.06, SD 00.26; Fear/Sadness: d 00.41, SD 00.29; Sadness/Happiness: d 00.30, SD 00.13). These findings are somewhat in line with H1a, where mean effect sizes for comparisons between anger and fear and anger and sadness are small to moderate both for judgement outcomes and decision-making outcomes. The findings also support H1b, where mean effect sizes for anger and happiness are small for judgement outcomes; however, not enough studies were available to support conclusions regarding decision-making outcomes. Lastly, H2 was supported where the mean effect size for the comparison between fear and sadness was small, both for judgement outcomes and decision-making outcomes. While the percent of variance accounted for by sampling error in several of the JDM samples was below 75% indicating the possible presence of moderators, many of the sample sizes were small enough to preclude a meaningful analysis. In addition, the comparison of treatment group to treatment group makes interpretation of any metaanalytic findings difficult and ultimately results in limited conclusions due to the absence of a control
group; therefore, no moderator analyses were conducted on the treatmenttreatment samples.
Effects of moderating variables

Judgement and decision-making criteria. The following section reviews the results from the moderator analysis investigating JDM moderators of effect size for the treatmentcontrol samples. These results are presented in Table 5. As discussed in the previous section, only four of the five emotion group comparisons were eligible for the moderator analysis (Anger, Sadness, Disgust, and Guilt). However, because the disgust and guilt comparison groups contain so few studies (i.e., 2 and 3, respectively) they were eliminated from the analysis. Results for anger and sadness are discussed below. In each emotion-group sample, the decisionmaking task types were examined. For the anger comparison group, the largest effect size observed was for Policy choice (d 00.33, SD 00.13) with Risk seeking (d00.31, SD 00.37) and Economic choice (d 00.18, SD00.23) also small to moderate in size. For the sadness comparison group, the largest effect size observed was for Policy
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Table 5. Results for treatmentcontrol sample by decision-making outcomes by emotion group 95% CI k Anger Risk seeking Policy choice Economic choice Sadness Risk seeking Risk aversion Policy choice Economic choice N d SD SE PVA L U Q
5 2 3 4 3 2 4
344 183 3335 237 225 145 368
0.31*** 0.33*** 0.18*** 0.16** 0.13** 0.57*** 0.48***
0.37 0.13 0.23 0.16 0.10 0.11 0.31
0.06 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.05
45.16 100.00 71.96 100.00 100.00 100.00 49.25
0.19 0.23 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.45 0.38
0.43 0.43 0.26 0.30 0.23 0.69 0.58
11.07* 0.78 4.17 1.46 0.58 0.37 8.12*
Notes: k 0number of effect-size estimates; N0sum of participants; d 0average sample-weighted effect-size estimate using Cohens d; SD0standard deviation of effect-size estimates; SE 0standard error of effect-size estimates; PVA0percent of variance accounted for by sampling error; 95% CI 0 95% confidence interval; Q0Q statistic (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990). *p B.05; **p B.01; ***pB.001.
choice (d 00.57, SD 00.11) with Economic choice moderate in size (d 00.48, SD00.31). Risk seeking (d 00.16, SD00.16) and Risk aversion (d 00.13, SD 00.10) were considered small. These results are not supportive of H3a, which states that, when compared to a control group, anger will have moderate mean effect sizes for risk seeking and policy choice. However, these results are partially supportive of H3b, which states that, when compared to a control group, fear and sadness will have small mean effect sizes on risk seeking and policy choice. In fact, anger had small mean effect sizes for risk seeking and policy choice and sadness had a small mean effect size for risk seeking but a moderate mean effect size for policy choice. The results for fear did not indicate the presence of moderators for the fear sample so no results are available for that sample. Emotion-manipulation characteristics. The results with respect to the moderator analysis of emotionmanipulation characteristics for the decisionmaking sample are presented in Table 6. For the anger comparison group, when the emotion manipulation is done individually (i.e., the participant is alone; d 00.52, SD00.53) the mean effect size is moderate whereas when the emotion manipulation is administered in a group (d 00.10, SD 00.11) the mean effect size is small. In
addition, studies with significant manipulation checks (d 00.25, SD 00.34) and studies that did not use a manipulation check (d 00.28, SD 00.16) both resulted in small mean effect sizes. For the sadness comparison group, results are presented in Table 7. In particular, the studies that specified that the emotion manipulation was done individually produced a moderate mean effect size (d 00.63, SD 00.34). Some interesting differences, though, arose in the specific method of manipulating sadness. Notably, using film clips (d 00.51, SD 00.36) had a moderately sized mean effect whereas having participants recall an emotional event (d 00.31, SD00.12) or read a scenario (d00.29, SD00.13) resulted in small mean effect sizes. This finding may point to the effectiveness of certain induction methods based on the discrete emotion of interest. Lastly, studies that used a manipulation check (d 00.53, SD00.30) showed moderate mean effect sizes whereas those that did not use a manipulation check (d 00.19, SD 00.14) had small mean effect sizes. Study-design characteristics. This section reviews the results from the moderator analysis investigating study-design characteristics for the treatment control decision-making samples. The results for the anger comparison group are presented in Table 8. In this sample, whether or not a study
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Table 6. Results for treatmentcontrol sample on decision-making outcomes by anger: Emotion-manipulation characteristics 95% CI k Emotion manipulation setting Individual Group Not specified Relatedness of emotions to task Incidental Emotion manipulation method Recall of emotional event Manipulation check used Yes Significant No N d SD SE PVA L U Q
3 3 3 8 7 7 7 3
129 343 298 663 638 548 548 314
0.52*** 0.10* 0.39*** 0.29*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.28***
0.53 0.11 0.13 0.32 0.26 0.34 0.34 0.16
0.10 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04
36.28 100.00 100.00 49.33 65.84 46.92 46.92 100.00
0.32 0.02 0.31 0.19 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.20
0.72 0.18 0.47 0.39 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.36
8.27* 0.99 1.20 16.22* 10.63 14.92* 14.92* 2.05
received funding did seem to yield small mean effect sizes (Funded: d 00.21, SD00.35 and Unfunded: d 00.32, SD 00.17). Also, whether studies used undergraduate students (d 00.28,
SD 00.32) or a mix of undergraduate students and community volunteers (d 00.10, SD 00.00) mean effect sizes were small for both. Interestingly, for studies that reported gender, mean effect
Table 7. Results for treatmentcontrol sample on decision-making outcomes by sadness: Emotion-manipulation characteristics 95% CI k Emotion manipulation setting Individual Not specified Relatedness of emotions to task Incidental Emotion manipulation method Film clips Recall of emotional event Scenarios Not specified Manipulation check used Yes Significant No N d SD SE PVA L U Q
4 9 13 4 3 3 2 6 6 7
257 718 975 267 263 168 208 412 412 563
0.63*** 0.23*** 0.33*** 0.51*** 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.05 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.19***
0.34 0.15 0.28 0.36 0.12 0.13 0.02 0.30 0.30 0.14
0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.05
57.05 100.00 71.02 48.25 100.00 100.00 100.00 68.85 68.85 100.00
0.49 0.13 0.21 0.39 0.21 0.15 (0.03 0.41 0.41 0.09
0.77 0.33 0.45 0.63 0.41 0.43 0.13 0.65 0.65 0.29
7.01 3.92 18.31 8.29* 0.91 0.68 0.02 8.72 8.72 2.53
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Table 8. Results for treatmentcontrol sample on decision-making outcomes by anger: Study-design characteristics 95% CI k Study funding Yes No Sample Undergraduates Mixed Gender Predominantly female Equal Not specified N d SD SE PVA L U Q
6 4 7 2 2 2 6 2 5 3 9
472 390 615 171 117 186 559 50 529 283 755 755
0.21*** 0.32*** 0.28*** 0.10* 0.34*** 0.17*** 0.28*** 1.18*** 0.12** 0.36*** 0.27*** 0.27***
0.35 0.17 0.32 0.00 0.47 0.06 0.27 0.06 0.10 0.18 0.30 0.30
0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05
43.72 100.00 46.85 100.00 32.92 100.00 59.41 100.00 100.00 100.00 53.04 53.04
0.11 0.24 0.18 0.00 0.20 0.09 0.20 0.79 0.04 0.28 0.17 0.17
0.31 0.40 0.38 0.20 0.48 0.25 0.36 1.57 0.20 0.44 0.37 0.37
13.72* 2.67 14.94* 0.00 6.08 0.16 10.10 0.04 1.30 2.27 16.97* 16.97*
Cognitive task measurement Individual Group Not specified Cognitive task measure type Objective
Cognitive task measure format Multiple choice 9
sizes were not that sizeable with predominantly female samples (d 00.34, SD 00.47) and in samples composed of equal males and females (d 00.17, SD 00.06) the mean effect size was small. Of note also is that the setting in which the cognitive task is administered seems to impact the influence of anger on decision-making quite a bit. Similar to eliciting emotion, which was associated with a moderate mean effect size when carried out in an individual setting, a large mean effect size was found when cognitive tasks were administered in an individual setting (d 01.18, SD 00.06) and small mean effect sizes were found when the tasks were administered in a group setting (d 00.12, SD 00.10). The results for the sadness comparison group are presented in Table 9. In this sample, studies that received funding (d 00.41, SD 00.19) and studies that did not receive funding (d 00.28, SD 00.32) had small mean effect sizes. In contrast
to the results for the anger comparison group, studies that recruited community volunteers as participants (d 00.75, SD 00.43) had a moderate to large mean effect size and those that used undergraduates (d 00.28, SD 00.20) had a small mean effect size. An additional finding of note is the gender make-up of the participant pool. In particular, studies that used predominantly male participants (d 00.69, SD 00.36) had a moderate mean effect size and studies that used predominantly female participants (d 00.28, SD00.14) or an equal composition (d 00.29, SD00.16) had small mean effect sizes. Similar to the findings in the anger comparison group, for those studies that specified the cognitive task was administered on an individual basis the mean effect was moderate to large (d 00.75, SD00.46). Unfortunately, the majority of studies did not indicate one way or the other. Lastly, cognitive task measure type did have a moderate impact on the influence of sadness
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Table 9. Results for treatmentcontrol sample on decision-making outcomes by sadness: Study-design characteristics 95% CI k Study funding Yes No Sample Undergraduates Community Gender Predominantly male Predominantly female Equal Not specified N d SD SE PVA L U Q
6 7 11 2 2 5 2 4 3 9 9 4
409 566 866 109 166 303 106 400 124 718 738 237 975
0.41*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.75*** 0.69*** 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.24*** 0.75*** 0.23*** 0.31*** 0.40*** 0.33***
0.19 0.32 0.20 0.43 0.36 0.14 0.16 0.23 0.46 0.15 0.30 0.21 0.28
0.06 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.06
100.00 51.32 100.00 44.71 41.46 100.00 100.00 76.58 50.71 100.00 57.95 100.00 71.02
0.29 0.18 0.18 0.59 0.59 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.53 0.13 0.21 0.26 0.21
0.53 0.38 0.38 0.91 0.79 0.42 0.45 0.32 0.97 0.35 0.41 0.54 0.45
3.66 13.64* 8.46 4.47 4.82 1.38 0.68 5.22 5.92 3.92 15.53* 2.48 18.31
Cognitive task measurement Individual Not specified Cognitive task measure type Objective Subjective
Cognitive task measure format Multiple choice 13
on decision-making for both subjective measures (d 00.40, SD 00.21) and objective measures (d 00.31, SD 00.30).
indicated that the intercept from the analysis did not differ from zero (b 0 ( 0.16, p!.11). Both analyses suggest that publication bias does not pose an issue in the current meta-analysis.
Assessment of publication bias

Publication bias was assessed using a funnel plot display and Egger et al.s (1997) regression test of funnel plot asymmetry. It is expected that if publication bias is present, then the funnel plot will show small-sample studies reporting small effect sizes disproportionately absent because these are the studies that will not have reached statistical significance and thus will not have been published and retrieved (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). Visual inspection of the funnel plot showed that the data points were widely dispersed across both small and large effect sizes of low sample size. In addition, the results of the regression test
DISCUSSION
Meta-analytic procedures were applied to the existing emotions and cognition literature to provide a quantitative estimate of the influence of discrete emotions on JDM outcomes and also to investigate the moderating relationship of emotion-manipulation characteristics and studydesign features. Overall, the results indicate that emotions have small to large effects on these cognitive outcomes that vary based on the emotion type and the type of cognitive task. In addition, several methodological factors moderate the
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relationship of emotions with decision-making outcomes. These results are discussed below.
Overview of main effects

Type of cognitive task. In the treatmentcontrol sample, the sample-weighted mean effect sizes ranged from 0.06 to 0.18 for judgement and 0.18 to 0.98 for decision-making, which are considered small effects and small to large effects, respectively (Cohen, 1988). As discussed previously, individuals in general are not good at combining attributes to make a final judgement (Shafir & LeBoeuf, 2002) so this deficit in their ability to make assessments and inferences about the situation is relatively unchanged with the introduction of discrete emotions. It is the overall decision that is impacted much more. In the treatmenttreatment sample, the sample-weighted mean effect sizes ranged from 0.06 to 0.41 for judgement and 0.21 to 1.06 for decision-making, which are considered small to moderate and small to large effects, respectively. However, for this sample the larger range of effect sizes may be due more to the comparison type (i.e., differences between two emotions and not between an emotion group and a control group) and should be interpreted as such. Indeed the magnitude of the effects in both samples is similar to, and in some instances larger than, those reported for comparable JDM literatures. Specifically, Schwenk (1990) reported mean effect sizes ranging from 0.13 to 0.64 for devils advocacy and 0.16 for dialectical inquiry on decision-making. Gordon (1996) reported a mean effect size of 0.20 for ingratiation on judgements and evaluations. In addition, Hart et al. (2009) reported a mean effect size of 0.36 for information preference when the information supported the individuals beliefs. Discrete emotions. In the treatmentcontrol sample, the sample-weighted mean effects were fairly different depending on the type of cognitive task. Overall, though, sadness, disgust, and guilt emerged as some of the most influential emotions for decision-making (i.e., d 00.33, d 00.36, and d 00.98, respectively). Again, the magnitude of
these effects is similar to, and in some instances smaller than, those reported for comparable emotions literatures. In particular, Lyubomirsky, King, and Diener (2005) reported mean effect sizes of 0.54 (r0.26) for the relationship between happiness and prosocial behaviour, 0.82 (r 0.38) for happiness and physical well-being, and (0.65 (r 0(.31) for sadness and creativity. In addition, Kaplan, Bradley, Luchman, and Hayes (2009) reported mean effect sizes of 0.32 (r 0.16) and (0.26 (r 0(.13) for the relationship between positive affectivity and task performance and negative affectivity and task performance, respectively. Lastly, Carlson, Charlin, and Miller (1988) reported a mean effect size of 1.29 (r 0.54) for the relationship between positive mood and helpfulness. When examining the emotion group comparisons of the treatmenttreatment sample it is again clear that specific emotions do differ from one another in their effects on cognitive outcomes. Specifically, it seems that anger differs the most from fear and sadness in both JDM contexts. However, considering the decision-making sample alone, the largest effect size observed was between anger and guilt. This set of findings is consistent with the results of many studies investigating anger (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). From an appraisal theory perspective, anger and guilt have opposite appraisals on responsibility for negative events where angry individuals tend to blame others while guilty individuals attribute responsibility to themselves (Neumann, 2000). Fear and sadness also differ from anger in several ways. Fear is associated with a sense of situational control and uncertainty about what has happened. Sadness is associated with a perception that outcomes are under the influence of the situation, attributing responsibility for an event to situational factors (Keltner et al., 1993). From an activation perspective, anger, sadness, and fear also differ in a number of distinct ways. Anger arises from events/people threatening/ thwarting ones efforts with negative outcomes for the self/others, motivating a person to take some action against the causal agent (i.e., high level of activation). On the other hand, fear is
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experienced in the context of immediate danger or harm leading to high levels of motivation to escape or avoid the threatening object (Lang et al., 1990; Seitz et al., 2007). Sadness is produced from the loss of an object of interest (Lazarus, 2001; Russell & Barrett, 1999). The motivational tendency involved is to stop movement toward a stimulus with a moderate retreat or avoidance of the stimulus (Roseman & Smith, 2001).
Moderator variables
Anger. The within-emotion-type analysis revealed some interesting results for decision-making studies. In line with much of the research on anger, the largest effects were seen for policy choice and risk seeking. This does not seem surprising given that anger has been found to evoke more riskseeking choices, and lead to more support for punitive policies toward social issues because of its association with appraisals of individual control and a strong motivational tendency to act against the responsible party (Gault & Sabini, 2000; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Lerner et al., 2004; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Additional moderating effects were found for an emotion-manipulation characteristic and a study-design characteristic. Individuals induced with anger individually had moderate effects and those induced in groups of two or more had a small effect. This finding is not surprising and could be interpreted in the context of emotional display rules. This notion was initially introduced by Ekman and Friesen (1969) to explain observed cultural differences in the ways in which individuals express emotions, but has been found in organisational settings as well. Anger, specifically, is considered a powerful emotion and is viewed as functional as long as it is expressed in socially appropriate ways (Eid & Diener, 2001). However, appropriateness of emotional displays has been shown to vary based on the interaction partner where individuals tend to feel more comfortable with expressing emotions to in-group members of their social network versus out-group members
(Safdar et al., 2009; Triandis, 1994). Differences seen in the current study may be due to individuals in a group setting attempting to regulate their experience and expression of anger in the presence of others whereas those who were induced alone did not. Another finding that emerged was in studies in which participants were given the choice task individually. The mean effect size was large whereas for studies in which participants were given the cognitive task in a group the mean effect size was small. This is an interesting result and may point to the tenuous nature of induced emotions such as anger. Unlike the real world, emotions studied in the laboratory are relatively weak and short lived, thus making them susceptible to outside influences such as methodological design (Small & Lerner, 2008). Perhaps having other individuals present, although not interacting, at the time of engaging in a choice task diminished the influence of anger. Sadness. The within-emotion-type analysis for sadness revealed some similar results to the anger sample for decision-making studies. The largest mean effects were seen for policy choice and economic choice. These findings are not surprising based on the research that is available for sadness. In particular, individuals induced to feel sad attribute circumstances to situational factors resulting in protective policy choices or increasing welfare assistance (Small & Lerner, 2008) and tend to increase the price of a choice object because it represents an opportunity to change circumstances (Cryder, Lerner, Gross, & Dahl, 2008; Han, Lerner, & Keltner, 2007). Overall, sadness had small to moderate mean effects on policy choice and risk seeking. Additional moderating effects were found for several emotion-manipulation characteristics and study-design characteristics. Differential effects were seen in the manipulation method with film clips having a moderate mean effect size. This result has some support in the literature measuring both the subjective experience of emotion and the physiological or neurobiological activations of emotions. In particular, films are capable of
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eliciting mild or strong emotional responses and tend to rival or exceed the response strength of other procedures (Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007). This is also true for their ability to activate response systems associated with emotions and points to the utility of carefully crafted film clips for the successful and potent induction of discrete emotions. In addition, according to appraisal theories, because emotions are presumed to be elicited by current appraisals, those stemming from remembered or imagined events can be different from and less salient than the original experience (Roseman & Smith, 2001). This induction procedure seems to hold promise for emotions research and from the current results it is clear that it has implications for the effects of sadness on decision-making outcomes. Lastly, studies that used a manipulation check that was significant had a moderate mean effect size whereas studies that did not use a manipulation check had a small mean effect size. This result may indicate differences in quality of research design where those studies with more rigorous designs are likely to produce significant results. It is recommended that researchers employ manipulation checks because of the necessity of confirming the effectiveness of the manipulation rather than potentially drawing the conclusion that the treatment itself has no effect on the decision task if differences are not observed. It also seems to provide evidence that the use of a manipulation check does not diminish the effects of sadness on decision-making outcomes. Also of interest is the composition of the sample where studies that used community volunteers had a moderate to large mean effect size and studies using undergraduate samples had a small mean effect size. One explanation for these results could have to do with the likelihood that community volunteers are older than college age and have more experience with certain types of decisions such as policy choice or decisions involving risk. These individuals may be more apt to make choices that are consistent with their goals or prior beliefs allowing the experience of emotions to obscure more rational channels of decision-making (Mishra, 2007). It should be
noted that decisions made on the basis of probability assessments derived from experience differ from those made on the basis of stated probabilities (Weber, Shafir, & Blais, 2004). In addition, predominantly male samples had a moderate mean effect size and predominantly female or mixed samples had small mean effect sizes. This is an interesting finding, but should be interpreted with caution because only two studies made up this category. Additional research into gender differences in emotions is needed to understand this finding more fully.
Limitations
This review has some limitations that should be noted. First, and foremost, the result of any metaanalysis is dependent upon the studies it includes. The quality, methodology, and research design of each individual study influences the outcome of any meta-analysis (Cooper, 1998; Cooper & Hedges, 1994). The relative quality of each study was not assessed prior to inclusion in order to be as comprehensive as possible because of the already small number of studies available. However, the limitations of these individual studies can have an effect on overall results. This should be kept in mind when interpreting findings. Second, the number of studies included in this meta-analysis was relatively small. This was partially due to the fact that more than half of the studies included did not use a control group as a comparison to the treatment. In addition, the data presented in some studies was insufficient for calculating an effect-size estimate. Therefore, it should be noted that some relevant studies are not present in the current meta-analysis. Third, the absolute values of the effect-size estimates calculated for each study were included in the current analysis. This was due to the lack of normative criteria for coding JDM outcomes as better or worse (i.e., positive or negative). Unfortunately, analysing the absolute values of the effect-size estimates limits the conclusions that can be drawn about the specific ways in which discrete emotions impact JDM outcomes. However, the results of the current meta-analysis do
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still allow conclusions to be made about the degree to which different emotions affect JDM outcomes. Thus, this consideration should be taken into account when interpreting these results. Fourth, the current study does not have an exhaustive list of moderators. This is due to several factors. In many of the studies, there was a lack of available data. Specifically, variables such as gender make-up of the sample or other demographic characteristics were difficult or impossible to assess in some instances because of a tendency for studies to report aggregate data. In addition, other, possibly influential, variables (e.g., individual decision-making style) are not yet examined in this literature. An attempt was made, though, to focus on a core set of variables that are consistent throughout the literature because of the small number of studies that were included.
Implications for future research

The results of the present meta-analysis provide evidence for the influence of emotions on JDM tasks. However, within the moderator analysis several important findings emerged. First, guilt appeared to be one of the most influential emotions in decision-making. Research on moral emotions has defined guilt as a self-focused emotion that increases ones concerns about responsibility and the potential for future guilt (Gangemi & Mancini, 2007, Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009). This acts as a motivator for one to invest time and energy to reconcile actions against another person and alleviate feelings of guilt (Frank, 2004). In the realm of decision-making, guilt has been shown to focus individuals on what is explicitly represented in the decisional task and restrict the search for alternatives, making it a particularly interesting emotion for future research (Gangemi & Mancini, 2007). Also, the current study allowed a detailed analysis of anger and sadness, highlighting the extent to which these two same-valence emotions influence decision-making tasks, as well as differences in the extent to which induction methods and cognitive-task settings moderate these effects.
In conclusion, we identified discrete emotion types and emotion manipulation and study-design characteristics and then used meta-analytic procedures to empirically assess their relationships with JDM tasks. Our results suggest that discrete emotions that are of the same valence (e.g., anger, sadness, fear, etc.) differ in the extent to which they influence JDM as predicted by more finegrained approaches (i.e., appraisal theories) to the study of emotions and cognition. In addition, emotion type drives differences in effect sizes associated with how emotions are manipulated and in what setting, the gender composition, use of a manipulation check, and the setting in which the cognitive task is administered. These findings have some implications for emotion theories such that patterns of effects lend some support to differences between emotions that are seemingly opposite on specific appraisal dimensions (e.g., anger compared to sadness and guilt, and fear compared to sadness). The small effects observed for specific emotions when compared to a control group are somewhat in line with activation theories and the existing research on emotions (e.g., small to moderate effects are pretty typical). However, for emotions such as anger, more moderate effects may be expected based on its status as an approach emotion. This study also points to the importance of the moderating design variables investigated in the application and interpretation of results.
Manuscript received 9 January Revised manuscript received 16 January Manuscript accepted 20 December First published online 15 April 2009 2010 2010 2011
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Cognition & Emotion

The influence of discrete emotions on judgement and decision-making: A metaanalytic review

Department of Psychology, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, USA

Department of Management, University of Central Oklahoma, Edmond, OK, USA

Development Dimensions International (DDI), Toronto, Ontario, Canada

Version of record first published: 15 Apr 2011.

COGNITION AND EMOTION 2011, 25 (8), 13931422

The inuence of discrete emotions on judgement and decision-making: A meta-analytic review

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Emotions and cognition

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COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2011, 25 (8)

EMOTIONS AND COGNITION META-ANALYSIS

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COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2011, 25 (8)

EMOTIONS AND COGNITION META-ANALYSIS

Potential moderators of emotional influence

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COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2011, 25 (8)

EMOTIONS AND COGNITION META-ANALYSIS

METHOD Literature search

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Inclusion and exclusion criteria for relevant studies

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Content coding procedures

COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2011, 25 (8)

EMOTIONS AND COGNITION META-ANALYSIS

Computation of effect-size estimates

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RESULTS Overall effects

COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2011, 25 (8)

EMOTIONS AND COGNITION META-ANALYSIS

Dependent variable Recognition of typical items j Recognition of typical items j

Sadness vs. control*

Unfavourable attitude toward out-group target j 0.07

Anger vs. control*

Unfavourable attitude toward out-group target j 0.03

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Sadness vs. control*

Unfavourable attitude toward out-group target j 0.03

Sadness vs. control* Sadness* vs. control Anger* vs. control

0.67 0.68 0.06

Fessler et al., 2004

Disgust vs. control*

Guilt* vs. control

Choice to buy a cardm

Anger vs. control

Choice to buy a cardm

Guilt* vs. control

Choice to repair an old cardm

Anger* vs. control

Choice to repair an old cardm

Guilt* vs. control

Choice of medical professionaldm

Anger vs. control*

Choice of medical professionaldm

Happiness* vs. control

Judgements of the likelihood of life events j

COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2011, 25 (8)

Study Garg, 2004 (Study 1)

0.06 0.11* 0.18* 0.17* 0.26* 0.18* 0.33* 0.36* 0.98***

0.31* 0.33* 0.18* 0.16 0.13 0.57* 0.48***

0.52*** 0.10* 0.39* 0.29* 0.26* 0.25* 0.25* 0.28*