G.R. No.

160261

November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents. JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003 SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZON-ABAD, petitioners, ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003 ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-in-intervention, vs. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003 FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAON, JR., CECILIA CARREONJALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,

JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003 HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003 SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003 LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003 PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners, vs. HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003

ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003 INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003 CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003 U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZORAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. respondents. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003 FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003 NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner, vs. HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003 VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEA, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003 IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003 PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003 DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents. CARPIO MORALES, J.: There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the determination by the independent branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers where the Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution. Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one such today involving the legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon. There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy subject of the instant petitions whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a political crisis of conscience. In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.

In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people. At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they are to insure that governmental power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and coordination among these branches where the delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex. Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides: ARTICLE XI Accountability of Public Officers SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. (2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof. (3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded. (4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed. (5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. (6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. (7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law. (8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:

11TH CONGRESS RULES

12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES

RULE II INITIATING IMPEACHMENT Section 2. Mode of Initiating Impeachment. Impeachment shall be initiated only by a verified complaint for impeachment filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof or by a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment filed by at least onethird (1/3) of all the Members of the House.

RULE V BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL Section 16. Impeachment Proceedings Deemed Initiated. In cases where a Member of the House files a verified complaint of impeachment or a citizen files a verified complaint that is endorsed by a Member of the House through a resolution of endorsement against an impeachable officer, impeachment proceedings against such official are deemed initiated on the day the Committee on Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or resolution against such official, as the case may be, is sufficient in substance, or on the date the House votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the said Committee that the verified complaint and/or resolution, as the case may be, is not sufficient in substance. In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the case may be, by at least one-third (1/3) of the Members of the House, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of the filing of such verified complaint or resolution of impeachment with the Secretary General.

RULE V BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT Section 14. Scope of Bar. No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within the period of one (1) year.

Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment Proceedings. Within a period of one (1) year from the date impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as such, can be initiated against the same official. (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, 2 sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." 3 On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 8 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads: Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. 10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint 11 was filed with the Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives. 13 Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year." In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress," 14 posits that his right to bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint. In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial. In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second impeachment complaint. In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional. In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of the legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be declared null and void. In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right to be protected against all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint. In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature is, that the filing of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint. In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint. In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional. In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from conducting further proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary. In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due course. In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)." In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofilea, alleging that as professors of law they have an abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void. In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that the House of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void. In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the filing of the second impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any proceedings thereon. In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment trial. Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the eighteen which were filed before this Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional. Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate. Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to participate. Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition, this Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render the petitions moot. Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its corespondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution."22 Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003. On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of Representatives. On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination. On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention." On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-inIntervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310. The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention were admitted. On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit: Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time. In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up: a) locus standi of petitioners; b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);

c) political question/justiciability; d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment; e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment; f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original) In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim. Judicial Review As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint. This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution: SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied) Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed: x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof. As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution. The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the

Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied) As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable."26 Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit: It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank. Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.28 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied) In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts. 29 And as pointed out by noted political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative branches of our government in fact effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit: Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied) As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them." 33 To him, "[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation or instrument of intervention of the judiciary in that balancing operation."34

To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion: xxx The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says: The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. I suppose nobody can question it. The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain. Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government. Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime. x x x xxx Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature. This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied) To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction. First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared: We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum. 37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38 in this wise:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. MelencioHerrera, it declared: x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared: x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document. 43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that: It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together. In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory. 45 (Emphasis supplied) If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded: While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential application of the power of judicial review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review. Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.47 For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine constitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings.49

In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside the scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers' decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief. 51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases of impeachment. Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings. Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs."53 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord." The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride."56 But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,57"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support of the argument that the impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of judicial review. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another."67 Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution. Essential Requisites for Judicial Review As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government. 68 (Italics in the original) Standing Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 69 Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends. Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public interest 70 and transcendental importance,71 and that procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing. There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure73 while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest. The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas. Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." xxx On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'" 76 (Citations omitted)

While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal profession which were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives. In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court. When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. 77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest. In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.80 At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained. 81 This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds. As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.83 While an association has legal personality to represent its members,84 especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests,85 the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.86It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it. In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the suit, 88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under theres judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether or not they were before the court.89 Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since petitioners additionallyallege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand. The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing. There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance. In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public.91 Such liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does not thus have standing. With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While

intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention.92 In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and the same standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of Representatives is successful," this Court found the requisites for intervention had been complied with. Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of transcendental importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional issue of whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution. Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene were hereby granted. Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue. Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit: x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protection against abuses of legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted) In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing. Ripeness and Prematurity In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with. Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are premature. Amicus curiaeformer Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should first be exhausted. Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of ongoing attempts to encourage signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming that the

Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss. The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries. Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it. Justiciability In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term "political question," viz: [T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.99 (Italics in the original) Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the political question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial review. 100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political question, it being a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity. The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial review and its application on issues involving political questions, viz: MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual comment that the judiciary is the weakest among the three major branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or commands except the power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God, and is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with the body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary. The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says: The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. I suppose nobody can question it. The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain. Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government. Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of

political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced on September 22, although the proclamation was dated September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in its publication was that the administration had apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So that when martial law was announced on September 22, the media hardly published anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish any story not only because our main writers were already incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal threat of being the object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of them was our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by representatives of Malacaang. In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was presented to the President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling a plebiscite which suspended the operation of some provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited discussions, much less public discussions of certain matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a free discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word famous by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft of the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that Malacaang felt the danger of its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and announced that he would consult the people in a referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15. But the questions to be submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated as "citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays came into existence. The questions to be propounded were released with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum should be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of the referendum be suspended. When the motion was being heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation of the President declaring that the new Constitution was already in force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the session room where the case was being heard. I then informed the Court and the parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973 Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in force. A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and void. The main defense put up by the government was that the issue was a political question and that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case. xxx The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified of any referendum in their respective places of residence, much less did they participate in the alleged referendum. None of them saw any referendum proceeding. In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the members of the Court felt that there had been no referendum. Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference between a referendum and a plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political question. Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is not the only major case in which the plea of "political question" was set up. There have been a number of other cases in the past. x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was clearly justiciable. xxx x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the following questions: What is judicial power? What is a political question? The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as such are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot

force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity." This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that: Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable . . . The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of government, the Supreme Court has, also another important function. The powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice. Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature. This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question. I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied) During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial power, thus: MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in other lower courts as may be created by law. MR. CONCEPCION. Yes. MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example? MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference. MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"? MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but where there is a question as to whether the government had authority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide. xxx FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme Court according to the new numerical need for votes. On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political question doctrine? MR. CONCEPCION. No. FR. BERNAS. It is not. MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . . FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away with the political question doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not. When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice it says, "judicial power includes" and the reason being that the definition that we might make may not cover all possible areas. FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the political question doctrine. MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political questions are beyond the pale of judicial power.104 (Emphasis supplied) From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature. As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political following the effectivity of the present Constitution. In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held: The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide.106 x x x In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared: The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled: In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.) Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political questions and non-justiciable political questions, however. Identification of these two species of political questions may be problematic. There has been no clear standard. The American case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some: x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or thepotentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.112 (Underscoring supplied) Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present.

The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial review is radically different from our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue. In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present controversy. These petitions raise five substantial issues: I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution. II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution. III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary. IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution. V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution. The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.113 Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII. Lis Mota It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this Court held: x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied] The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,117 where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit: It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself.118[Emphasis supplied] Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy. As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second impeachment complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of

adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied."119 In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from a Resolution120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of the judiciary. 121 Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in support of their petition which would not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling. En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz: The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides: The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not be compelled to testify against one's self.123 In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the second impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution which reads: Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed. They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all the Members of the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have verified the same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the "Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that: "We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x"124 Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in order for said second impeachment complaint to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not having complied with this requirement, they concede that the second impeachment complaint should have been calendared and referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz: Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least one Member whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint. While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the instant consolidated petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts presented by the other petitioners as well. Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the determination of the instant cases is made easier by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision. In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution. Judicial Restraint Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings. On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to impeachment." 125 But this argument is very much like saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of the House of Representatives are subject to them. The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty." Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the authority to do so. 128 On the occasion that this Court had been an interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in [his] office." 130 The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been settled in the case ofAbbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced the Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-Members whose disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This Court held: Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators. To our mind, this is the overriding consideration that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.

It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senatorselect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively. Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest. More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that: Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing short ofpro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Justices. 133 (Italics in the original) Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its power of judicial review. In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows: 1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.' 2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.' 3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.' 4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground. 5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens. 6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits. 7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided (citations omitted).

The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories: 1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case 2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case 3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground 4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute 5. that the parties are not in estoppel 6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality. As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of judicial review: 1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power 2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement 3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity 4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136 Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the possibility that "judicial review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith in the judiciary. Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis. Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act. x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not only juridical effects but also political consequences. Those political consequences may follow even where the Court fails to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent and validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows." 138 Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the end there were not enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way for the establishment of the martial law regime. Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate branches of the government would behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the branches of government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of the land. Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine in People v. Veneracion, towit:141 Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public officers], under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of

Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.142 Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure for Impeachment Proceedings adopted by the 12th Congress Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it. The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in order. That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it. "Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the first action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise: Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice. Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records: MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the substantive provisions on impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these would need some time for Committee action. However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been furnished the Members of this body. This is borne out of my experience as a member of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government which took charge of the last impeachment resolution filed before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the information of the Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the impeachment proceedings starting with initiation, action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate. xxx MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the body.

As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging these words because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record. xxx MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States regarding impeachment. I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment proceedings"and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded." I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of the United States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you, Madam President.143 (Italics in the original; emphasis and udnerscoring supplied) This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers.144 It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus curiaebrief, Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."145 Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving. During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word "initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz: Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. xxx (5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied) refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding." Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The object in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a

conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court. Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow. The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary toinitiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.146 Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the present Constitution. Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it. To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulisby equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding." From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral. In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal opinions (referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this Court's our deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly recorded utterances of debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this Court likened the former members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know more about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced perspectives and disinterestedness.148 Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are at present only two members of this Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal opinions now given by members of the Constitutional Commission, but has examined the records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.

Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced. Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz: Section 3. (1) x x x (2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof. (3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded. (4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed. (5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum. In Osmea v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either House of Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of what constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all matters of method are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz: With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators. Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. It held: "x x x "The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules: Rule XV 3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to

the Speaker with the names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890) The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal." Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e, whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method had a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of separation of powers.154 xxx In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the political question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts "x x x to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis--vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of government.155 xxx The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other branches of government despite their more democratic character, the President and the legislators being elected by the people.156 xxx The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of justice. . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis--vis the other branches of government. This provision was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. x x x xxx In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary.Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress this Court is mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do but what itmust do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present. I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will not

be true to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the experience of foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring supplied) Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the violation of private rights and the Constitution are involved. Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as basis for arguing that this Court may not decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that "the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to the House of Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard to impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised. The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing." Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period. Conclusion If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon that takes the center stage of our individual and collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have proven to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively believe to be the correct position or view on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or against the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of society - from the business, retired military, to the academe and denominations of faith offered suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the official relations of the governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived resulting instability upon areas of national life. Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the House of Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the subject respondent public official. When the present petitions were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference was made through what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move that may have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings. This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained, the Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or

problem that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on. The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law. This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law. It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held and been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions. This Court has dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions just because it is the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a government branch's official act as tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur. No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life. The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once again by this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in search for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it went through this crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve differences without the use of force and aggression upon each other. WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution. SO ORDERED.

MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ Petitioner,

G.R. No. 193459

Present: - versus CORONA, C.J., CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, OF VELASCO, JR.,*

THE

HOUSE

REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA HONTIVEROSBARAQUEL, DANILO D. LIM, FELIPE PESTAO, EVELYN PESTAO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER MARY JOHN MANANZAN, COCHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS, SECRETARYGENERAL OF KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY. EDRE OLALIA, ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLES LAWYERS (NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE, CHAIRPERSON, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE); and JAMES TERRY RIDON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), Respondents. FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., Respondent-Intervenor.

NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, MENDOZA, and SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated: February 15, 2011

x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner), challenges via petition for certiorari and prohibition the Resolutions of September 1 and 7, 2010 of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice (public respondent). Before the 15th Congress opened its first session on July 26, 2010 (the fourth Monday of July, in accordance with Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution) or on July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe and Evelyn Pestao (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint[1] against petitioner, upon the endorsement of Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.[2] A day after the opening of the 15th Congress or on July 27, 2010, Atty. Marilyn Barua-Yap, Secretary General of the House of Representatives, transmitted the impeachment complaint to House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr.[3] who, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.[4] On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed another impeachment complaint[5] against petitioner with a resolution of endorsement by Party-List Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares, Teodoro Casio, Rafael Mariano, Luzviminda Ilagan, Antonio Tinio and Emerenciana de Jesus.[6] On even date, the House of Representatives provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress. By letter still of even date,[7] the Secretary General transmitted the Reyes groups complaint to Speaker Belmonte who, by Memorandum of August 9, 2010,[8] also directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business. On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of the Committee on Rules,[9] instructed Atty. Artemio Adasa, Jr., Deputy Secretary General for Operations, through Atty. Cesar Pareja, Executive Director of the Plenary Affairs Department, to include the two complaints in the

Order of Business,[10] which was complied with by their inclusion in the Order of Business for the following day, August 11, 2010. On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to public respondent.[11] After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same time. Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published on September 2, 2010. On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the September 1, 2010 Resolution of public respondent. Public respondent refused to accept the motion, however, for prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner to await the notice for her to file an answer to the complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish copies of her motion to each of the 55 members of public respondent. After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,[12] sufficient in substance. The determination of the sufficiency of substance of the complaints by public respondent, which assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of whether valid judgment to impeach could be rendered thereon. Petitioner was served also on September 7, 2010 a notice directing her to file an answer to the complaints within 10 days.[13] Six days following her receipt of the notice to file answer or on September 13, 2010, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition with application for injunctive reliefs. The following day or on September 14, 2010, the Court En Banc RESOLVED to direct the issuance of a status quo ante order[14] and to require respondents to comment on the petition in 10 days. The Court subsequently, by Resolution of September 21, 2010, directed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file in 10 days its Comment on the petition The Baraquel group which filed the first complaint, the Reyes group which filed the second complaint, and public respondent (through the OSG and private counsel) filed their respective Comments on September 27, 29 and 30, 2010.

Speaker Belmonte filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene dated October 4, 2010 which the Court granted by Resolution of October 5, 2010. Under an Advisory[15] issued by the Court, oral arguments were conducted on October 5 and 12, 2010, followed by petitioners filing of a Consolidated Reply of October 15, 2010 and the filing by the parties of Memoranda within the given 15-day period. The petition is harangued by procedural objections which the Court shall first resolve. Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition. They argue that public respondent was not exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two impeachment complaints as it was exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature,[16] and that its function is inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary investigation.[17] These same arguments were raised in Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives.[18] The argument that impeachment proceedings are beyond the reach of judicial review was debunked in this wise:
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and

the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride." But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr, "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. xxxx There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Taada v. Angara, in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda, this Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra, it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson, it held that the act of the House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Taada v. Cuenco, it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly. Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as

a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.[19] (citations omitted; italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

Francisco characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty which, as the expanded certiorari jurisdiction[20] of this Court reflects, includes the power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.[21] In the present case, petitioner invokes the Courts expanded certiorari jurisdiction, using the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition as procedural vehicles. The Court finds it well-within its power to determine whether public respondent committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of its functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the Court. Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in this instance, but simply upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will.[22] Respondents do not seriously contest all the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review, as they only assert that the petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of the proceedings before public respondent. Public respondent argues that when petitioner filed the present petition[23] on September 13, 2010, it had not gone beyond the determination of the sufficiency of form and substance of the two complaints. An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the requisite of ripeness.[24] The question of ripeness is especially relevant in light of the direct, adverse effect on an individual by the challenged conduct.[25] In the present petition, there is no doubt that questions on, inter alia, the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on the need to publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for immediate interpretation.

The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable officer within a period of one year. And so the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issue whether public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its two assailed Resolutions. Petitioner basically anchors her claim on alleged violation of the due process clause (Art. III, Sec. 1) and of the one-year bar provision (Art. XI, Sec 3, par. 5) of the Constitution.

Due process of law Petitioner alleges that public respondents chairperson, Representative Niel Tupas, Jr. (Rep. Tupas), is the subject of an investigation she is conducting, while his father, former Iloilo Governor Niel Tupas, Sr., had been charged by her with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. To petitioner, the actions taken by her office against Rep. Tupas and his father influenced the proceedings taken by public respondent in such a way that bias and vindictiveness played a big part in arriving at the finding of sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints against her. The Court finds petitioners allegations of bias and vindictiveness bereft of merit, there being hardly any indication thereof. Mere suspicion of partiality does not suffice.[26] The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body itself. So GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunications Phils.[27] teaches:
First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming from the rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution or decision.

Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He alone does not speak and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body x x x.[28]

In the present case, Rep. Tupas, public respondent informs, did not, in fact, vote and merely presided over the proceedings when it decided on the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints.[29] Even petitioners counsel conceded during the oral arguments that there are no grounds to compel the inhibition of Rep. Tupas.
JUSTICE CUEVAS: Well, the Committee is headed by a gentleman who happened to be a respondent in the charges that the Ombudsman filed. In addition to that[,] his father was likewise a respondent in another case. How can he be expected to act with impartiality, in fairness and in accordance with law under that matter, he is only human we grant him that benefit. JUSTICE MORALES: Is he a one-man committee? JUSTICE CUEVAS: He is not a one-man committee, Your Honor, but he decides. JUSTICE MORALES: Do we presume good faith or we presume bad faith? JUSTICE CUEVAS: We presume that he is acting in good faith, Your Honor, but then (interrupted) JUSTICE MORALES: So, that he was found liable for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, does that mean that your client will be deprived of due process of law? JUSTICE CUEVAS: No, what we are stating, Your Honor, is that expectation of a client goes with the Ombudsman, which goes with the element of due process is the lack of impartiality that may be expected of him. JUSTICE MORALES:

But as you admitted the Committee is not a one-man committee? JUSTICE CUEVAS: That is correct, Your Honor. JUSTICE MORALES: So, why do you say then that there is a lack of impartiality? JUSTICE CUEVAS: Because if anything before anything goes (sic) he is the presiding officer of the committee as in this case there were objections relative to the existence of the implementing rules not heard, there was objection made by Congressman Golez to the effect that this may give rise to a constitutional crisis. JUSTICE MORALES: That called for a voluntary inhibition. Is there any law or rule you can cite which makes it mandatory for the chair of the committee to inhibit given that he had previously been found liable for violation of a law[?] JUSTICE CUEVAS: There is nothing, Your Honor. In our jurisprudence which deals with the situation whereby with that background as the material or pertinent antecedent that there could be no violation of the right of the petitioner to due process. What is the effect of notice, hearing if the judgment cannot come from an impartial adjudicator.[30] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner contends that the indecent and precipitate haste of public respondent in finding the two complaints sufficient in form and substance is a clear indication of bias, she pointing out that it only took public respondent five minutes to arrive thereat. An abbreviated pace in the conduct of proceedings is not per se an indication of bias, however. So Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice[31] holds:
Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. For ones prompt dispatch may be anothers undue haste. The orderly administration of justice remains as the paramount and constant consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each case.

The presumption of regularity includes the public officers official actuations in all phases of work. Consistent with such presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to present contradictory evidence other than a mere tallying of days or numerical calculation. This, petitioners failed to discharge. The swift completion of the Investigating Panels initial task cannot be relegated as shoddy or shady without discounting the presumably regular performance of not just one but five state prosecutors.[32] (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner goes on to contend that her participation in the determination of sufficiency of form and substance was indispensable. As mandated by the Impeachment Rules, however, and as, in fact, conceded by petitioners counsel, the participation of the impeachable officer starts with the filing of an answer.

JUSTICE MORALES: Is it not that the Committee should first determine that there is sufficiency in form and substance before she is asked to file her answer (interrupted) JUSTICE CUEVAS: That is correct, Your Honor. JUSTICE MORALES: During which she can raise any defenses she can assail the regularity of the proceedings and related irregularities? JUSTICE CUEVAS: Yes. We are in total conformity and in full accord with that statement, Your Honor, because it is only after a determination that the complaint is sufficient in form and substance that a complaint may be filed, Your Honor, without that but it may be asked, how is not your action premature, Your Honor, our answer is- no, because of the other violations involved and that is (interrupted).[33] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Rule III(A) of the Impeachment Rules of the 15th Congress reflects the impeachment procedure at the Committee-level, particularly Section 5[34] which denotes that petitioners initial participation in the impeachment proceedings the

opportunity to file an Answer starts after the Committee on Justice finds the complaint sufficient in form and substance. That the Committee refused to accept petitioners motion for reconsideration from its finding of sufficiency of form of the impeachment complaints is apposite, conformably with the Impeachment Rules. Petitioner further claims that public respondent failed to ascertain the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints on the basis of the standards set by the Constitution and its own Impeachment Rules.[35] The claim fails. The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is an exponent of the express constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the House of Representatives which committed such determinative function to public respondent. In the discharge of that power and in the exercise of its discretion, the House has formulated determinable standards as to the form and substance of an impeachment complaint. Prudential considerations behoove the Court to respect the compliance by the House of its duty to effectively carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any contravention of the minimum constitutional guidelines. Contrary to petitioners position that the Impeachment Rules do not provide for comprehensible standards in determining the sufficiency of form and substance, the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that there must be a verified complaint or resolution,[36] and that the substance requirement is met if there is a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee.[37] Notatu dignum is the fact that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is made necessary. This requirement is not explicitly found in the organic law, as Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution basically merely requires a hearing.[38] In the discharge of its constitutional duty, the House deemed that a finding of sufficiency of form and substance in an impeachment complaint is vital to effectively carry out the impeachment process, hence, such additional requirement in the Impeachment Rules.

Petitioner urges the Court to look into the narration of facts constitutive of the offenses vis--vis her submissions disclaiming the allegations in the complaints.

This the Court cannot do. Francisco instructs that this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. x x x x Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a nonjusticiable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power[.][39] Worse, petitioner urges the Court to make a preliminary assessment of certain grounds raised, upon a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the complaints, which involve matters of defense. In another vein, petitioner, pursuing her claim of denial of due process, questions the lack of or, more accurately, delay in the publication of the Impeachment Rules. To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on August 3, 2010, public respondent provisionally adopted the Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress and thereafter published on September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules, admittedly substantially identical with that of the 14th Congress, in two newspapers of general circulation.[40] Citing Taada v. Tuvera,[41] petitioner contends that she was deprived of due process since the Impeachment Rules was published only on September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise tacks her contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section. Public respondent counters that promulgation in this case refers to the publication of rules in any medium of information, not necessarily in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation.[42]

Differentiating Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations[43] which held that the Constitution categorically requires publication of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, public respondent explains that the Impeachment Rules is intended to merely enable Congress to effectively carry out the purpose of Section 3(8), Art. XI of Constitution. Blacks Law Dictionary broadly defines promulgate as
To publish; to announce officially; to make public as important or obligatory. The formal act of announcing a statute or rule of court. An administrative order that is given to cause an agency law or regulation to become known or obligatory.[44] (emphasis supplied)

While promulgation would seem synonymous to publication, there is a statutory difference in their usage. The Constitution notably uses the word promulgate 12 times. [45] A number of those instances involves the promulgation of various rules, reports and issuances emanating from Congress, this Court, the Office of the Ombudsman as well as other constitutional offices. To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms promulgate and publish, the case of the Judiciary is in point. In promulgating rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the Court has invariably required the publication of these rules for theireffectivity. As far as promulgation of judgments is concerned, however, promulgation means the delivery of the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication.[46] Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution contains a similar provision directing Congress to promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates in the presidential and vice presidential elections. Notably, when Congress approved its canvassing rules for the May 14, 2010 national elections on May 25, 2010, [47] it did not require the publication thereof for its effectivity. Rather, Congress made the canvassing rules effective upon its adoption. In the case of administrative agencies, promulgation and publication likewise take on different meanings as they are part of a multi-stage procedure in

quasi-legislation. As detailed in one case,[48] the publication of implementing rules occurs after their promulgation or adoption. Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understoodthat is, to make known. Generalia verba sunt generaliter inteligencia. What is generally spoken shall be generally understood. Between the restricted sense and the general meaning of a word, the general must prevail unless it was clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be used.[49] Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict promulgation to publication, the former should be understood to have been used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication. It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to promulgate when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The Court is in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution. Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is but one avenue for Congress to make known its rules. Jurisprudence emphatically teaches that
x x x in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. In the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.[50] (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it could have stated so as categorically as it did in the case of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, per Neri. Other than promulgate, there is no

other single formal term in the English language to appropriately refer to an issuance without need of it being published. IN FINE, petitioner cannot take refuge in Neri since inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution is the sole instance in the Constitution where there is a categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of procedure. Significantly notable in Neri is that with respect to the issue of publication, the Court anchored its ruling on the 1987 Constitutions directive, without any reliance on or reference to the 1986 case of Taada v. Tuvera.[51] Taada naturally could neither have interpreted a forthcoming 1987 Constitution nor had kept a tight rein on the Constitutions intentions as expressed through the allowance of either a categorical term or a general sense of making known the issuances. From the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, then Commissioner, now retired Associate Justice Florenz Regalado intended Section 3(8), Article XI to be the vehicle for the House to fill the gaps in the impeachment process.
MR. REGALADO. Mr. Presiding Officer, I have decided to put in an additional section because, for instance, under Section 3 (2), there is mention of indorsing a verified complaint for impeachment by any citizen alleging ultimate facts constituting a ground or grounds for impeachment. In other words, it is just like a provision in the rules of court. Instead, I propose that this procedural requirement, like indorsement of a complaint by a citizen to avoid harassment or crank complaints, could very well be taken up in a new section 4 which shall read as follows: THE CONGRESS SHALL PROMULGATE ITS RULES ON IMPEACHMENT TO EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES THEREOF. I think all these other procedural requirements could be taken care of by the Rules of Congress.[52] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The discussion clearly rejects the notion that the impeachment provisions are not self-executing. Section 3(8) does not, in any circumstance, operate to suspend the entire impeachment mechanism which the Constitutional Commission took pains in designing even its details.
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional

conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that . . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered selfexecuting rather than non-self-executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.[53] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does not nullify the proceedings taken prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in cases where impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the mandated periods under Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution would already run or even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the 15-day period of publication prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House would already violate the Constitution for its inaction on the impeachment complaints pending the completion of the publication requirement. Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the rules on impeachment is aimed at effectively carry[ing] out the purpose of impeachment proceedings, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion when the House deemed it proper to provisionally adopt the Rules on Impeachment of the 14th Congress, to meet the exigency in such situation of early filing and in keeping with the effective implementation of the purpose of the impeachment provisions. In other words, the provisional adoption of the previous Congress Impeachment Rules is within the power of the House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the avowed purpose.

Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, merely aid or supplement the procedural aspects of impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they may be given retroactive application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.[54] In the present case, petitioner fails to allege any impairment of vested rights. It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of legislation where the rights of witnesses are involved, impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the punishment of the offender.[55] Even Neri concedes that the unpublished rules of legislative inquiries were not considered null and void in its entirety. Rather,
x x x [o]nly those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and effective.[56] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner in fact does not deny that she was fully apprised of the proper procedure. She even availed of and invoked certain provisions[57] of the Impeachment Rules when she, on September 7, 2010, filed the motion for reconsideration and later filed the present petition. The Court thus finds no violation of the due process clause.

The one-year bar rule

Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent. On the other hand, public respondent, respondent Reyes group and respondent-intervenor submit that the initiation starts with the filing of the impeachment complaint and ends with the referral to the Committee, following Francisco, but venture to alternatively proffer that the initiation ends somewhere between the conclusion of the Committee Report and the transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. Respondent Baraquel group, meanwhile, essentially maintains that under either the prevailing doctrine or the parties interpretation, its impeachment complaint could withstand constitutional scrutiny. Contrary to petitioners asseveration, Francisco[58] states that the term initiate means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.[59] The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking initial action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice. Petitioner misreads the remark of Commissioner Joaquin Bernas, S.J. that no second verified impeachment may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action[60] which contemplates a situation where a first impeachment complaint had already been referred. Bernas and Regalado, who both acted as amici curiae in Francisco, affirmed that the act of initiating includes the act of taking initial action on the complaint.
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third[61] of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.[62] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Court, in Francisco, thus found that the assailed provisions of the 12th Congress Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings Sections 16 [63] and 17[64] of Rule V thereof clearly contravene Section 3(5) of Article XI since they g[a]ve the term initiate a meaning different from filing and referral.[65]

Petitioner highlights certain portions of Francisco which delve on the relevant records of the Constitutional Commission, particularly Commissioner Maambongs statements[66] that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. Petitioner fails to consider the verb starts as the operative word. Commissioner Maambong was all too keen to stress that the filing of the complaint indeed starts the initiation and that the Houses action on the committee report/resolution is not part of that initiation phase. Commissioner Maambong saw the need to be very technical about this, for certain exchanges in the Constitutional Commission deliberations loosely used the term, as shown in the following exchanges.
[67]

MR. DAVIDE. That is for conviction, but not for initiation. Initiation of impeachment proceedings still requires a vote of one-fifth of the membership of the House under the 1935 Constitution. MR. MONSOD. A two-thirds vote of the membership of the House is required to initiate proceedings. MR. DAVIDE. No. for initiation of impeachment proceedings, only onefifth vote of the membership of the House is required; for conviction, a twothirds vote of the membership is required. xxxx

MR. DAVIDE. However, if we allow one-fifth of the membership of the legislature to overturn a report of the committee, we have here Section 3 (4) which reads:
No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.

So, necessarily, under this particular subsection, we will, in effect, disallow one-fifth of the members of the National Assembly to revive an impeachment move by an individual or an ordinary Member. MR. ROMULO. Yes. May I say that Section 3 (4) is there to look towards the possibility of a very liberal impeachment proceeding. Second, we were ourselves struggling with that problem where we are faced with just a verified complaint rather than the signatures of one-fifth, or whatever it is we decide, of the Members of the House. So whether to put a period for the Committee to report, whether we should not allow the Committee to overrule a mere verified complaint, are some of the questions we would like to be discussed. MR. DAVIDE. We can probably overrule a rejection by the Committee by providing that it can be overturned by, say, one-half or a majority, or one-fifth of the members of the legislature, and thatsuch overturning will not amount to a refiling which is prohibited under Section 3 (4). Another point, Madam President. x x x[68] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

An apparent effort to clarify the term initiate was made by Commissioner Teodulo Natividad:
MR. NATIVIDAD. How many votes are needed to initiate? MR. BENGZON. One-third. MR. NATIVIDAD. To initiate is different from to impeach; to impeach is different from to convict. To impeach means to file the case before the Senate. MR. REGALADO. When we speak of initiative, we refer here to the Articles of Impeachment. MR. NATIVIDAD. So, that is the impeachment itself, because when we impeach, we are charging him with the Articles of Impeachment. That is my understanding.[69] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Capping these above-quoted discussions was the Commissioner Maambong delivered on at least two occasions: [I]

explanation

of

MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the body. As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging the words because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.[70] (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

[II] MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only with keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States regarding impeachment. I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of its provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: to initiate impeachment proceedings and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word resolution the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter i in impeachment and replace the word by with OF, so that the whole section will now read: A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of impeachment OF the committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of the United States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words Articles of Impeachment are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified complaint of one-third of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank supplied) you, Madam President.[71] (emphasis and underscoring

To the next logical question of what ends or completes the initiation, Commissioners Bernas and Regalado lucidly explained that the filing of the complaint must be accompanied by the referral to the Committee on Justice, which is the action that sets the complaint moving. Francisco cannot be any clearer in pointing out the material dates.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.[72] (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

These clear pronouncements notwithstanding, petitioner posits that the date of referral was considered irrelevant in Francisco. She submits that referral could not be the reckoning point of initiation because something prior to that had already been done,[73] apparently citing Bernas discussion. The Court cannot countenance any attempt at obscurantism.

What the cited discussion was rejecting was the view that the Houses action on the committee report initiates the impeachment proceedings. It did not state that to determine the initiating step, absolutely nothing prior to it must be done. Following petitioners line of reasoning, the verification of the complaint or the endorsement by a member of the House steps done prior to the filing would already initiate the impeachment proceedings. Contrary to petitioners emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution mentions is impeachment proceedings. Her reliance on the singular tense of the word complaint[74] to denote the limit prescribed by the Constitution goes against the basic rule of statutory construction that a word covers its enlarged and plural sense.[75] The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles the candle of impeachment proceedings. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick. Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is important is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle. A restrictive interpretation renders the impeachment mechanism both illusive and illusory. For one, it puts premium on senseless haste. Petitioners stance suggests that whoever files the first impeachment complaint exclusively gets the attention of Congress which sets in motion an exceptional once-a-year mechanism wherein government resources are devoted. A prospective complainant, regardless of ill motives or best intentions, can wittingly or unwittingly desecrate the entire process by the expediency of submitting a haphazard complaint out of sheer hope to be the first in line. It also puts to naught the effort of other prospective complainants who, after diligently gathering evidence first to buttress the case, would be barred days or even hours later from filing an impeachment complaint. Placing an exceedingly narrow gateway to the avenue of impeachment proceedings turns its laudable purpose into a laughable matter. One needs only to

be an early bird even without seriously intending to catch the worm, when the process is precisely intended to effectively weed out worms in high offices which could otherwise be ably caught by other prompt birds within the ultralimited season. Moreover, the first-to-file scheme places undue strain on the part of the actual complainants, injured party or principal witnesses who, by mere happenstance of an almost always unforeseeable filing of a first impeachment complaint, would be brushed aside and restricted from directly participating in the impeachment process. Further, prospective complainants, along with their counsel and members of the House of Representatives who sign, endorse and file subsequent impeachment complaints against the same impeachable officer run the risk of violating the Constitution since they would have already initiated a second impeachment proceeding within the same year. Virtually anybody can initiate a second or third impeachment proceeding by the mere filing of endorsed impeachment complaints. Without any public notice that could charge them with knowledge, even members of the House of Representatives could not readily ascertain whether no other impeachment complaint has been filed at the time of committing their endorsement. The question as to who should administer or pronounce that an impeachment proceeding has been initiated rests also on the body that administers the proceedings prior to the impeachment trial. As gathered from Commissioner Bernas disquisition[76] in Francisco, a proceeding which takes place not in the Senate but in the House[77] precedes the bringing of an impeachment case to the Senate. In fact, petitioner concedes that the initiation of impeachment proceedings is within the sole and absolute control of the House of Representatives.[78] Conscious of the legal import of each step, the House, in taking charge of its own proceedings, must deliberately decide to initiate an impeachment proceeding, subject to the time frame and other limitations imposed by the Constitution. This chamber of Congress alone, not its officers or members or any private individual, should own up to its processes. The Constitution did not place the power of the final say on the lips of the House Secretary General who would otherwise be calling the shots in forwarding or freezing any impeachment complaint. Referral of the complaint to the proper committee is not done by the House Speaker alone either, which explains why there is a need to include it in the Order of Business of the House. It is the House

of Representatives, in public plenary session, which has the power to set its own chamber into special operation by referring the complaint or to otherwise guard against the initiation of a second impeachment proceeding by rejecting a patently unconstitutional complaint. Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those motions that shall be decided without debate, but any debate thereon is only made subject to the five-minute rule.[79] Moreover, it is common parliamentary practice that a motion to refer a matter or question to a committee may be debated upon, not as to the merits thereof, but only as to the propriety of the referral.[80] With respect to complaints for impeachment, the House has the discretion not to refer a subsequent impeachment complaint to the Committee on Justice where official records and further debate show that an impeachment complaint filed against the same impeachable officer has already been referred to the said committee and the one year period has not yet expired, lest it becomes instrumental in perpetrating a constitutionally prohibited second impeachment proceeding. Far from being mechanical, before the referral stage, a period of deliberation is afforded the House, as the Constitution, in fact, grants a maximum of three session days within which to make the proper referral. As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an impeachment proceeding deals with deadlines. The Constitution states that [a] verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter.

In the present case, petitioner failed to establish grave abuse of discretion on the allegedly belated referral of the first impeachment complaint filed by the Baraquel group. For while the said complaint was filed on July 22, 2010, there was yet then no session in Congress. It was only four days later or on July 26, 2010 that the 15th Congress opened from which date the 10-day session period started to run. When, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, Speaker Belmonte directed the Committee on Rules to include the complaint in its Order of Business, it was well within the said 10-day session period.[81] There is no evident point in rushing at closing the door the moment an impeachment complaint is filed. Depriving the people (recall that impeachment is

primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic) of reasonable access to the limited political vent simply prolongs the agony and frustrates the collective rage of an entire citizenry whose trust has been betrayed by an impeachable officer. It shortchanges the promise of reasonable opportunity to remove an impeachable officer through the mechanism enshrined in the Constitution. But neither does the Court find merit in respondents alternative contention that the initiation of the impeachment proceedings, which sets into motion the oneyear bar, should include or await, at the earliest, the Committee on Justice report. To public respondent, the reckoning point of initiation should refer to the disposition of the complaint by the vote of at least one-third (1/3) of all the members of the House.[82] To the Reyes group, initiation means the act of transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.[83] To respondentintervenor, it should last until the Committee on Justices recommendation to the House plenary.[84] The Court, in Francisco, rejected a parallel thesis in which a related proposition was inputed in the therein assailed provisions of the Impeachment Rules of the 12thCongress. The present case involving an impeachment proceeding against the Ombudsman offers no cogent reason for the Court to deviate from what was settled in Franciscothat dealt with the impeachment proceeding against the then Chief Justice. To change the reckoning point of initiation on no other basis but to accommodate the socio-political considerations of respondents does not sit well in a court of law.
x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. This doctrine, which is really "adherence to precedents," mandates that once a case has been decided one way, then another case involving exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same manner. This doctrine is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions. As the renowned jurist Benjamin Cardozo stated in his treatise The Nature of the Judicial Process: It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between another. "If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement,

material and moral, of my rights." Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed administration of justice in the courts.[85]

As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.[86] Allowing an expansive construction of the term initiate beyond the act of referral allows the unmitigated influx of successive complaints, each having their own respective 60-session-day period of disposition from referral. Worse, the Committee shall conduct overlapping hearings until and unless the disposition of one of the complaints ends with the affirmance of a resolution for impeachment or the overriding[87] of a contrary resolution (as espoused by public respondent), or the House transmits the Articles of Impeachment (as advocated by the Reyes group),[88] or the Committee on Justice concludes its first report to the House plenary regardless of the recommendation (as posited by respondentintervenor). Each of these scenarios runs roughshod the very purpose behind the constitutionally imposed one-year bar. Opening the floodgates too loosely would disrupt the series of steps operating in unison under one proceeding. The Court does not lose sight of the salutary reason of confining only one impeachment proceeding in a year. Petitioner concededly cites Justice Adolfo Azcunas separate opinion that concurred with the Francisco ruling.[89] Justice Azcuna stated that the purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: to prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to do its principal task [of] legislation, with main reference to the records of the Constitutional Commission, that reads:
MR. ROMULO. Yes, the intention here really is to limit. This is not only to protect public officials who, in this case, are of the highest category from harassment but also to allow the legislative body to do its work which is lawmaking. Impeachment proceedings take a lot of time. And if we allow multiple impeachment charges on the same individual to take place, the legislature will do nothing else but that.[90] (underscoring supplied)

It becomes clear that the consideration behind the intended limitation refers to the element of time, and not the number of complaints. The impeachable officer should defend himself in only one impeachment proceeding, so that he will not be precluded from performing his official functions and duties. Similarly, Congress should run only one impeachment proceeding so as not to leave it with little time to attend to its main work of law-making. The doctrine laid down in Francisco that initiation means filing and referral remains congruent to the rationale of the constitutional provision. Petitioner complains that an impeachable officer may be subjected to harassment by the filing of multiple impeachment complaints during the intervening period of a maximum of 13 session days between the date of the filing of the first impeachment complaint to the date of referral. As pointed out during the oral arguments[91] by the counsel for respondentintervenor, the framework of privilege and layers of protection for an impeachable officer abound. The requirements or restrictions of a one-year bar, a single proceeding, verification of complaint, endorsement by a House member, and a finding of sufficiency of form and substance all these must be met before bothering a respondent to answer already weigh heavily in favor of an impeachable officer. Aside from the probability of an early referral and the improbability of inclusion in the agenda of a complaint filed on the 11th hour (owing to pre-agenda standard operating procedure), the number of complaints may still be filtered or reduced to nil after the Committee decides once and for all on the sufficiency of form and substance. Besides, if only to douse petitioners fear, a complaint will not last the primary stage if it does not have the stated preliminary requisites. To petitioner, disturbance of her performance of official duties and the deleterious effects of bad publicity are enough oppression. Petitioners claim is based on the premise that the exertion of time, energy and other resources runs directly proportional to the number of complaints filed. This is non sequitur. What the Constitution assures an impeachable officer is not freedom from arduous effort to defend oneself, which depends on the qualitative assessment of the charges and evidence and not on the quantitative aspect of complaints or offenses. In considering the side of the impeachable

officers, the Constitution does not promise an absolutely smooth ride for them, especially if the charges entail genuine and grave issues. The framers of the Constitution did not concern themselves with the media tolerance level or internal disposition of an impeachable officer when they deliberated on the impairment of performance of official functions. The measure of protection afforded by the Constitution is that if the impeachable officer is made to undergo such ride, he or she should be made to traverse it just once. Similarly, if Congress is called upon to operate itself as a vehicle, it should do so just once. There is no repeat ride for one full year. This is the whole import of the constitutional safeguard of one-year bar rule.

Applicability of the Rules on Criminal Procedure On another plane, petitioner posits that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own Impeachment Rules, the same rules she earlier chastised. In the exercise of the power to promulgate rules to effectively carry out the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution, the House promulgated the Impeachment Rules, Section 16 of which provides that the Rules of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court shall, as far as practicable, apply to impeachment proceedings before the House. Finding that the Constitution, by express grant, permits the application of additional adjective rules that Congress may consider in effectively carrying out its mandate, petitioner either asserts or rejects two procedural devices. First is on the one offense, one complaint rule. By way of reference to Section 16 of the Impeachment Rules, petitioner invokes the application of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which states that [a] complaint or information must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses. To petitioner, the two impeachment complaints are insufficient in form and substance since each charges her with both

culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust. She concludes that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own rules. Petitioner adds that heaping two or more charges in one complaint will confuse her in preparing her defense; expose her to the grave dangers of the highly political nature of the impeachment process; constitute a whimsical disregard of certain rules; impair her performance of official functions as well as that of the House; and prevent public respondent from completing its report within the deadline. Public respondent counters that there is no requirement in the Constitution that an impeachment complaint must charge only one offense, and the nature of impeachable offenses precludes the application of the above-said Rule on Criminal Procedure since the broad terms cannot be defined with the same precision required in defining crimes. It adds that the determination of the grounds for impeachment is an exercise of political judgment, which issue respondentintervenor also considers as non-justiciable, and to which the Baraquel group adds that impeachment is a political process and not a criminal prosecution, during which criminal prosecution stage the complaint or information referred thereto and cited by petitioner, unlike an impeachment complaint, must already be in the name of the People of the Philippines. The Baraquel group deems that there are provisions[92] outside the Rules on Criminal Procedure that are more relevant to the issue. Both the Baraquel and Reyes groups point out that even if Sec. 13 of Rule 110 is made to apply, petitioners case falls under the exception since impeachment prescribes a single punishment removal from office and disqualification to hold any public office even for various offenses. Both groups also observe that petitioner concededly and admittedly was not keen on pursuing this issue during the oral arguments. Petitioners claim deserves scant consideration. Without going into the effectiveness of the suppletory application of the Rules on Criminal Procedure in carrying out the relevant constitutional provisions, which prerogative the Constitution vests on Congress, and without delving into the practicability of the application of the one offense per complaint rule, the initial determination of which must be made by the House[93] which has yet to pass upon the question, the Court finds that petitioners invocation of that particular rule of Criminal Procedure does not lie. Suffice it to

state that the Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with each charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the Articles of Impeachment.[94] It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one impeachable offense. The second procedural matter deals with the rule on consolidation. In rejecting a consolidation, petitioner maintains that the Constitution allows only one impeachment complaint against her within one year. Records show that public respondent disavowed any immediate need to consolidate. Its chairperson Rep. Tupas stated that [c]onsolidation depends on the Committee whether to consolidate[; c]onsolidation may come today or may come later on after determination of the sufficiency in form and substance, and that for purposes of consolidation, the Committee will decide when is the time to consolidate[, a]nd if, indeed, we need to consolidate.[95] Petitioners petition, in fact, initially describes the consolidation as merely contemplated.[96] Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon motion, did not yet order a consolidation, the Court will not venture to make a determination on this matter, as it would be premature, conjectural or anticipatory.[97] Even if the Court assumes petitioners change of stance that the two impeachment complaints were deemed consolidated,[98] her claim that consolidation is a legal anomaly fails. Petitioners theory obviously springs from her proceeding = complaint equation which the Court already brushed aside.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010 of public respondent, the House of Representatives Committee on Justice, are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on September 14, 2010 is LIFTED. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. Nos. 120681-83. October 1, 1999]

JEJOMAR C. BINAY, petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and the DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,respondents.

[G.R. No. 128136. October 1, 1999]

MARIO C. MAGSAYSAY, FRANCISCO B. CASTILLO, CRISTINA D. MABIOG, REGINO E. MALAPIT, ERLINDA I. MASANGCAY and VICENTE DE LA ROSA, petitioners, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, HON. OMBUDSMAN and its PROSECUTOR WENDELL BARERRAS-SULIT and STATE PROSECUTORS ERIC HENRY JOSEPH F. MALLONGA and GIDEON C. MENDOZA, respondents. DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

Pursuant to Section 4, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, Presidential Decree No. 1486 created an Anti-Graft Court known as the Sandiganbayan. Since then the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has under gone various changes,[1] the most recent of which were effected through Republic Act Nos. 7975[2] and 8249.[3] Whether the Sandiganbayan, under these laws, exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving municipal mayors accused of violations of Republic Act No. 3019[4] and Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code[5] is the central issue in these consolidated petitions. In G.R. Nos. 120681-83, petitioner Jejomar Binay seeks to annul, among others, the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to refer Criminal Case Nos. 21001, 21005 and 21007 to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati and declaring that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over said cases despite the enactment of R.A. No. 7975. In G.R. No. 128136, petitioner Mario C. Magsaysay, et al. assail the October 22, 1996 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, reversing its Order of June 21, 1996 which suspended the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 23278 in deference to whatever ruling this Court will lay down in the Binay cases. The facts, as gathered from t he records, are as follows:

G.R. Nos. 120681-83 On September 7, 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan three separate informations against petitioner Jejomar Binay, one for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code,[6] and two for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.[7] The

informations, which were subsequently amended on September 15, 1994, all alleged that the acts constituting these crimes were committed in 1987 during petitioners incumbency as Mayor of Makati, then a municipality of Metro Manila. Thereafter, petitioner moved to quash the informations. He contended that the six-year delay from the time the charges were filed in the Office of the Ombudsman on July 27, 1988 to the time the informations were filed in the Sandiganbayan on September 7, 1994 constituted a violation of his right to due process. Arraignment of the accused was held in abeyance pending the resolution of this motion. On March 29, 1995, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners motion to quash. Petitioners motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the prosecution, was likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan. The resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, however, was issued before the petitioner could file a reply to the prosecutions opposition to the motion for reconsideration. In the meantime, on March 31, 1995, the prosecution filed a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite. The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated April 25, 1995, granted the motion and ordered the suspension of petitioner for ninety days from receipt of the resolution. The court ruled that the requisites for suspension pendente lite were present as petitioner was charged with one of the offenses under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019[8]and the informations containing these charges had previously been held valid in the resolution denying the motion to quash and the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner thus filed before this Court a petition for certiorari,[9] to set aside the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, claiming that he was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan ordered his suspension pendente lite before he could file a reply to the prosecutions opposition to his motion for reconsideration of the resolution denying the motion to quash. In a Resolution dated April 28, 1995, the Court directed the Sandiganbayan to, among other things, permit petitioner to file said reply. After allowing and considering petitioners reply, the Sandiganbayan, on June 6, 1995, issued a Resolution reiterating the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to quash. On the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued another resolution reiterating the order suspending petitioner pendente lite. Meanwhile, R.A. No. 7975, redefining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, took effect on May 16, 1995.[10] On June 13, 1995, petitioner filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to refer his cases to the proper court for further proceedings, alleging that when the two Resolutions, both dated June 6, 1995, were issued by the Anti-Graft Court, it had already lost jurisdiction over the subject cases. The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated July 4, 1995, denied petitioners motion, holding thus:

There is no question that Municipal Mayors are classified as Grade 27 under the compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989. Since, at the time of the commission of the offenses charged in he above-entitled cases, the accused Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor, although in an acting or interim capacity,

the Sandiganbayan, has, under Section 4 (e) 5, original jurisdiction over the cases therein filed against him. The allegation that Mayor Binay ought to have been classified with a salary grade lower than Grade 27, because at the time of the commission of the offenses charged he was paid a salary which merits a grade lower than Grade 27 does not hold water. In 1986 when the herein offenses were committed by the accused, the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989 was not as yet in existence. From the very definition of he very Act itself, it is evident that the Act was passed and had been effective only in 1989. The Grade classification of a public officer, whether at the time of the commission of the offense or thereafter, is determined by his classification under the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989. Thus since the accused Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor at the time of the commission of the offenses and the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989 classifies Municipal Mayors as Grade 27, it is a conclusion beyond cavil that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the accused herein. As of July 1, 1989, when Republic Act No. 6758 took effect, Municipal Mayor Jejomar C. Binay had begun receiving a monthly salary of P15,180.00 which is equivalent to Grade 28 under the salary scale provided for in Section 27 of the said Act. Under the Index of Occupational Services, the position titles and salary grades of the Compensation & Position classification system prepared by the Department of Budget and Management pursuant to Section 6 of Republic [A]ct No. 6758, the position of Municipal Mayor had been classified as Grade 27.[11]
On July 7, 1995, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over Criminal Case Nos. 21001, 21005 and 21007. He prayed, among others, that the Court annul and set aside: (1) the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 6, 1995 reiterating the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the motion to quash; (2) the Resolution of the same court also dated June 6, 1995 reiterating the order suspending petitioner pendente lite; and (3) the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated July 4, 1995 denying the motion to refer case to the RTC. Petitioner also asked that the Court issue a temporary restraining order preventing the suspension and arraignment of petitioner. The Court on July 7, 1995, resolved, among others, to issue the temporary restraining order prayed for. On July 14, 1995, petitioner filed an Addendum to Petition (To allow the introduction of alternative reliefs), praying that, should this Court hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the cases, the criminal cases filed against him be dismissed just the same on the ground that the long delay of the preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman prior to the filing of the informations, deprived him of his right to due process; and that, moreover, there was no probable cause to warrant the filing of the informations.

G.R. No. 128136

Petitioner Mario Magsaysay is the Mayor of the Municipality of San Pascual, Batangas. Save for petitioner Vicente dela Rosa, all of Mayor Magsaysays co-petitioners are officials of the same municipality. In a complaint dated April 16, 1994, Victor Cusi, then Vice-Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas, charged petitioners along with Elpidia Amada, Jovey C. Babago, and Brigido H. Buhain, also officials of San Pascual Batangas, with violation of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. The complaint charged the respondent municipal officials of overpaying Vicente de la Rosa of TDR Construction for the landscaping project of the San Pascual Central School. This was docketed in the Office of the Ombudsman as OMB-1-94-1232. In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, Graft Investigation Officer Lourdes A. Alarilla recommended the filing of an information for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, against petitioners with the Sandiganbayan. Director Elvis John S. Asuncion concurred in the resolution, and Manuel C. Domingo, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, recommended approval of the same. The resolution was approved by then Acting Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa with the following marginal note:

Authority is given to the deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to cause the preparation of the information and to approve the same for filing with the proper court.[12]
On August 11, 1995, an Information for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) was filed against petitioners and Jovey C. Babago, not with the Sandiganbayan per the June 14, 1995 Resolution, but with the RTC of Batangas City. The information was signed by a Lourdes A. Alarilla, the same Graft Investigation Officer who recommended the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan. In the meantime, a group denominated as the Concerned Citizens of San Pascual, Batangas filed a complaint before the Ombudsman against petitioners, and Elpidia Amada and Brigido Buhain, with violations of R.A. No. 3019. The complaint also alleged, among others, the overpricing of the landscaping project of San Pascual Central School. The case was docketed as OMB-0-94-0149. In a Resolution dated July 27, 1995, Graft Investigation Officer Ernesto M. Nocos recommended the filing of an information charging petitioners with violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended with proper court. The resolution, which was recommended for approval by Nicanor J. Cruz, OIC-Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, and approved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, adopted the findings and conclusions in the resolution in OMB-1-94-1232 that the landscaping project was overpriced. On February 9, 1996, another Information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, was filed against petitioners for the overpricing of the landscaping project, this time before the Sandiganbayan. The information was subsequently amended on May 17, 1996. Except for the date the alleged crime was committed, the information charged essentially the same inculpatory facts as the information filed in the RTC. The case was docketed in the Sandiganbayan as Crim. Case No. 22378. On June 1, 1996, the accused filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the information in Crim. Case No. 22378 on the following grounds: that the Sandiganbayan had no

jurisdiction over the case; that the accused were charged with the same offense in two informations; and that the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan would expose petitioners to double jeopardy. The Sandiganbayan denied the accuseds motion to quash in a Resolution dated June 21, 1996. The court, however, suspended proceedings in the case until the Supreme Court resolved the question of the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction involved in the Binay petition. Meanwhile, on June 7, 1996, Prosecutor Eric Mallonga filed a motion before the RTC to refer the R.A. No. 3019 case pending therein to the Sandiganbayan, arguing that under R.A. No. 7975 the Sandiganbayan, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over the case. On July 3, 1996, the RTC issued an order holding in abeyance the resolution of the motion to refer the case since the issue of jurisdiction was pending before the Sandiganbayan. Back at the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution, on July 24, 1996, filed a motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayans Order dated June 21, 1996. On August 2, 1996, filed their own motion for the reconsideration of the same order. On October 22, 1996, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution and set the case for arraignment. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the October 22, 1996 Resolution ordering their arraignment, which motion was denied on February 17, 1997. On February 27, 1997, the accused filed the present petition. On October 1, 1997, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order to prevent respondents from further proceeding with Crim. Case No. 23278 of the Sandiganbayan. The petition raises the following issues:
I

Had the Sandiganbayan been ousted of its jurisdiction over the case of municipal mayor after the passage of Republic Act No. 7975, coupled with the filing earlier of an information for the same offense before the Regional Trial Court having territorial jurisdiction and venue of the commission of the offense?
II

Are the respondents Ombudsman and the prosecutors estopped by laches or waiver from filing and prosecuting the case before respondent Sandiganbayan after the filing earlier of the information in the proper court, thereafter repudiating it, seeking another court of the same category and finally to respondent court?
III

Whether or not the filing of two (2) informations for the same offense violated the rule on duplicity of information?
IV

Whether or not the trial to be conducted by respondent court, if the case shall not be dismissed, will expose the petitioners who are accused therein to double jeopardy?
V

Under the circumstances, are the respondent Ombudsman and the prosecutors guilty of forum shopping?[13]
On October 6, 1997, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 128136 (the Magsaysay petition) with G.R. Nos. 120681-83 (the Binay petition). In resolving these consolidated petitions, the Court shall first address the common question of the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.
I

The Court rules that it is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the subject cases. The informations against Mayor Binay were filed in the Sandiganbayan on July 7, 1994, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1606,[14] as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1861,[15] the pertinent provisions of which state:

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise: (a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; (2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
xxx. On May 16, 1995, R.A. No. 7975 took effect. At this time, Mayor Binay had not yet been arraigned in the Sandiganbayan. On the other hand, R.A. No. 7975 was already in effect when the information against Mayor Magsaysay et al., was filed on August 11, 1995 in the RTC of Batangas City.

Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 amended Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 to read as follows:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving: a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; (b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; (e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations; (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office. c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
xxx. While the cases against petitioners were pending in this Court, congress enacted R.A. No. 8249, again redefining the jurisdiction of the Anti-Graft Court. This law took effect, per Section 10 thereof, on February 23, 1997, fifteen days after its complete publication on February 8, 1997 in the Journal and Malaya, two newspapers of general circulation. As further amended by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 now reads:

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at he time of the commission of the offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the position of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; (b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher; (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of he Constitution; and (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to heir office. d. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided inBatas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
Petitioners contend that they do not come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because:

(1) At the alleged time of the commission of the crimes charged, petitioner municipal mayors were not classified as Grade 27. (2) Municipal mayors are not included in the enumeration in Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975. (3) Congressional records reveal that the law did not intend municipal mayors to come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

A In support of his contention that his position was not that of Grade 27, Mayor Binay argues:

xxx. The new laws consistent and repeated reference to salary grade show[s] an intention to base the separation of jurisdiction between the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts on pay scale. Grades are determined by compensation. The essence of grades is pay scales. Therefor, pay scales determine grades.[16]
Mayor Binay, thus, presented a Certification[17] from the City Personnel Officer of Makati stating that petitioner as mayor received a monthly salary of only P10,793.00 from March 1987 to December 31, 1988. This amount was supposedly equivalent to Grade 22 under R.A. No. 6758. Mayor Magsaysay, for his part, submitted a similar Certification[18] from the Municipal Treasurer of San Pascual, Batangas, stating:

x x x that the basic monthly salary received by Mario C. Magsaysay, Municipal Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas with Salary Grade 27 is ELEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT PESOS (P11,828.00) per month as of November 3, 1993 equivalent only to Grade 25, Step 5 of RA 6758, the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. Section 444(1) (Grad[e] 27) of RA 6758 is not as yet implemented due to budgetary constraints. This certification is issued to Mayor Mario C. Magsaysay this 30th day of May 1996 at San Pascual, Batangas for whatever legal purpose and/or purposes it may serve.
The Court does not subscribe to the manner by which petitioners classify Grades. The Constitution[19] states that in providing for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, Congress shall take into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions, thus:

The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with

original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions.
Corollary thereto, Republic Act No. 6758[20] provides in Section 2 thereof that differences in pay are to be based upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. In short, the nature of an officials position should be the determining factor in the fixing of his or her salary. This is not only mandated by law but dictated by logic as well. Consistent with these policies, the law employs the scheme known as the grade defined in Presidential Decree No. 985[21] as including

xxx all classes of positions which, although different with respect to kind or subject matter of work, are sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work to warrant the inclusion of such classes of positions within one range of basic compensation.[22]
The grade, therefore, depends upon the nature of ones position -- the level of difficulty, responsibilities, and qualification requirements thereof -- relative to that of another position. It is the officials Grade that determines his or her salary, not the other way around. It is possible that a local government officials salary may be less than that prescribed for his Grade since his salary depends also on the class and financial capability of his or her respective local government unit.[23]Nevertheless, it is the law which fixes the officials grade. Thus, Section 8 of R.A. 6758 fixes the salary grades of the President, Vice-President, Senate President, Speaker, Chief Justice, Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, as well as the Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions. Section 8 also authorizes the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to determine the officials who are of equivalent rank to the foregoing officials, where applicable and to assign such officials the same Salary Grades subject to a set of guidelines found in said section. For positions below those mentioned under Section 8, Section 9 instructs the DBM to prepare the Index of Occupational Services guided by the Benchmark Position prescribed in Section 9 and the factors enumerated therein. To determine whether an official is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, therefore, reference should be made to R.A. No. 6758 and the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades. Salary level is not determinative. An officials grade is not a matter of proof, but a matter of law of which the Court must take judicial notice.[24] As both the 1989 and 1997 versions of the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades list the municipal Mayor under Salary Grade 27, petitioner mayors come within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner mayors are local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, under the catchall provision, Section 4a(5) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975. More accurately, petitioner mayors are [o]fficials of the executive branch occupying

the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, under Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975.[25]

B Petitioners, however, argue that they are not included in the enumeration in Section 4a(1). They invoke the rule in statutory construction expressio unius est expressio alterius. As what is not included in those enumerated is deemed excluded, municipal officials are excluded from the Sandiganbayans exclusive original jurisdiction. Resort to statutory construction, however, is not appropriate where the law is clear and unambiguous.[26] The law is clear in this case. As stated earlier, Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975, speaks of [o]fficials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. The Court fails to see how a different interpretation could arise even if the plain meaning rule were disregarded and the law subjected to interpretation. The premise of petitioners argument is that the enumeration in Section 4a(1) is exclusive. It is not. The phrase specifically including after [o]fficials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 necessarily conveys the very idea of non-exclusivity of the enumeration. The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply where other circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive,[27] or where the enumeration is by way of example only.[28] In Conrado B. Rodrigo, et al. vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division), supra, the Court held that the catchall in Section 4a(5) was necessary for it would be impractical, if not impossible, for Congress to list down each position created or will be created pertaining to grades 27 and above. The same rationale applies to the enumeration in Section 4a(1). Clearly, the law did not intend said enumeration to be an exhaustive list. Should there be any doubts as to whether petitioner mayors are under the category of Grade 27, Section 444(d) of the Local Government Code settles the matter:

The municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly compensation corresponding to Salary Grade twenty-seven (27) as prescribed under R.A. No. 6758 and the implementing guidelines issued pursuant thereto.
In the Courts Resolution in Rodrigo dated July 2, 1999 denying the motion for reconsideration, we treated the above provision as confirmatory of the Salary Grade assigned by the DBM to Municipal Mayors.

Petitioner Binay cites previous bills[29] in Congress dealing with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. These bills supposedly sought to exclude municipal officials from the Sandiganbayans exclusive original jurisdiction to relieve these officials ,especially those from the provinces, of the financial burden brought about by trials in Manila. The resort to congressional records to determine the proper application of the law in this case is unwarranted in this case for the same reason that the resort to the rule of inclusio unius est expressio alterius is inappropriate.

Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible to interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v. CA., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).[30]
Thus, in Rodrigo, petitioners therein argued in their motion for reconsideration:

x x x that the inclusion of Municipal Mayors within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan would be inconvenient since the witness in their case would come from Baguio City and San Nicolas, Pangasinan. This, according to petitioners, would defeat one of the purposes of R.A. No. 7975, that is, the convenience of the accused.
The Court, in denying the motion for reconsideration, held, among others, that:

The legislature has nevertheless chosen the mode and standard by which to implement its intent, and courts have no choice but to apply it. Congress has willed that positions with Grade 27 and above shall come within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and this Court is duty-bound to obey the congressional will.
Petitioner Binay also quotes the Sponsorship Speech of Senator Roco, stating:

Since February 1979, when the Sandiganbayan was established up to the present, the Court has been confronted with the problem of those accused who are of limited means who stand trial for petty crimes, the so-called small fry -- the barangay officials, the municipal officials and employees, postal clerks and letter carriers and

the like -- who are involved with nickel-and-dime cases and money-related cases such as malversation, estafa and theft. xxx
xxx xxx xxx

Senate Bill No. 1353 modifies the present jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan such that only those occupying high positions in Government and the military fall under the jurisdiction of the court.[31]
It is not clear, however, whether Senator Roco meant that all municipal officials are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. In any case, courts are not bound by a legislators opinion in congressional debates regarding the interpretation of a particular legislation. It is deemed a mere personal opinion of the legislator.[32] Such opinions do not necessarily reflect the view of the entire Congress.[33]

D From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the cases against petitioner Binay cannot be referred to the regular courts under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975, which provides:

Sec. 7. Upon effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
In construing the correct import of Section 7, it may be helpful to refer to the guidelines in determining jurisdiction laid down in Bengzon vs. Inciong:[34]

The rule is that where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of the statute.
R.A. No. 7975, by virtue of Section 7, belongs to the exception rather than the rule. The provision is transitory in nature and expresses the legislatures intention to apply its provisions on jurisdiction to criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan. To this extent, R.A. 7975 is retroactive. Such a transitory provision is not peculiar to R.A. No. 7975; similar provisions are found in other laws reallocating the jurisdiction of the courts.[35] There is no reason why Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 should be any different.

The term proper courts, as used in Section 7, means courts of competent jurisdiction, and such jurisdiction is defined in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975. The former should not be read in isolation but construed in conjunction with the latter. The term proper courts as used in Section 7, therefore, is not restricted to regular courts, but includes as well the Sandiganbayan, a special court. If the intent of Congress were to refer all cases the trials of which have not begun to the regular courts, it should have employed the term proper regular courts or regular courts instead of proper courts. Accordingly, the law in the third paragraph of Section 4 P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, uses the term regular courts, not proper courts:

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of regular courts where all the accused are occupying positions lower than salary grade 27, or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration. [Underscoring supplied.]
Construed thus, the effects of Section 7 may be summarized as follows:

1. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has already begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 7975, R.A. No. 7975 does not apply. 2. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has not begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 7975, then R.A. No. 7975 applies. (a) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case before it, then the case shall be referred to the Sandiganbayan. (b) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case before it, the case shall be referred to the regular courts.
The trial of the cases involving Mayor Binay had not yet begun as of the date of the approval of R.A. 7975; consequently, the Anti-Graft Court retains jurisdiction over the said cases. In any case, whatever seeming ambiguity or doubt regarding the application of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 should be laid to rest by Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, which states:

Sec. 7. Transitory Provision. - This Act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.
The latter provision more accurately expresses the legislatures intent and in any event should be applied in this case, R.A. No. 8249 having superseded R.A. No. 7975.

In Panfilo M. Lacson vs. The Executive Secretary, et al.,[36] The Court explained the purpose of the foregoing provision.

x x x it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of [Sandiganbayans] jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. x x x. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court. x x x. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (RA 8249). [Emphasis in the original.]
The possible disruptive effect of the amendments to the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction on pending cases was, therefore, not lost on the legislature. Congress has, furthermore, deemed the commencement of the trial as the crucial point in determining whether a court retains a case pending before it or lose the same on the ground of lack of jurisdiction per the provisions of R.A. 8249. The law obviously does not want to waste the time and effort already devoted to the presentation of evidence if trial had already begun. On the other hand, not much disruption would be caused if the amendment were made to apply to cases the trials of which have not yet to start. The ramifications of Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 may be stated as follows:

1. If trial of the cases pending before whatever court has already begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 8249, said law does not apply. 2. If trial of cases pending before whatever court has not begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 8249, then said law applies. (a) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case pending before it, then it retains jurisdiction. (b) If the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case pending before it, the case shall be referred to the regular courts. (c) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case pending before a regular court, the latter loses jurisdiction and the same shall be referred to the Sandiganbayan. (d) If a regular court has jurisdiction over a case pending before it, then said court retains jurisdiction.
Thus, under both R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8429, the Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction over said cases.
II

Petitioner Binay avers in his Addendum to Petition that his right to speedy disposition has been violated by the inordinate delay in the resolution of the subject cases by the Ombudsman. Article III of the Constitution provides that:

Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings.[37] Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.[38] However, the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, [39] is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.[40] Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.[41] The concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.[42] A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient.[43] In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.[44] In Tatad vs.Sandiganbayan,[45] the Court held that the length of delay and the simplicity of the issues did not justify the delay in the disposition of the cases therein. The unexplained inaction[46] of the prosecutors called for the dismissal of the cases against petitioner Tatad. In Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan,[47] the Court also ruled that there was no violation of the right to speedy disposition. The Court took into account the reasons for the delay, i.e., the frequent amendments of procedural laws by presidential decrees, the structural reorganizations in existing prosecutorial agencies and the creation of new ones by executive fiat, resulting in changes of personnel, preliminary jurisdiction, and the functions and powers of prosecuting agencies. The Court likewise considered the failure of the accused to assert such right, and the lack of prejudice caused by the delay to the accused. In Santiago vs. Garchitorena,[48] the complexity of the issues and the failure of the accused to invoke her right to speedy disposition at the appropriate time spelled defeat to her claim to the constitutional guarantee. In Cadalin vs. POEAs Administrator,[49] the Court, considering also the complexity of the cases (not run-of-the-mill variety) and the conduct of the parties lawyers, held that the right to speedy disposition was not violated therein.

In petitioner Binays case, the Court finds that there was no undue delay in the disposition of the subject cases. The proceedings conducted before the Office of the Tanodbayan, and later with the Office of the Ombudsman, adequately explains the length of the delay:
1. That on July 27, 1988 Bobby Brillante filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan an affidavitcomplaint charging, Jejomar Binay, Sergio Santos, Roberto Chang, Delfin Almeda, Nelson Irasga, Nicasio Santiago, Feliciano Basam, Maria Chan, Romeo Barrios, Azucena Diaz, Virgilio Clarete, Godofredo Marcelo, Armando San Miguel, Salvador Pangilinan and John Does of the following offenses: (a) Massive Malversation of Public Funds; (b) Multiple Falsification of Public Documents; (c) Usurpation of Official Functions; (d) Violation of Election Law; and (e) Violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019. 1.1. Brillantes complaint was based on the initial findings and observations of the COA on the examination of the cash and accounts covering transactions from April 1, 1987 to January 4, 1988 and Post-Audit of Selected Accounts for the last quarter of 1987 of the Municipality of Makati contained in its Report dated January 11, 1988. The COA furnished the Tanodbayan a copy of this report on August 1, 1988 upon request of the latter. 1.2. In the letter of the COA transmitting a copy of the report, the Tanodbayan was informed that this COA audit report of January 11, 1988 is not yet released since the Mayor of Makati was given thirty days within which to explain/clarify the findings in the report and is subject to change or modification depending upon the explanation/clarification to be submitted by the Mayor of Makati. Because of this information from the COA the preliminary investigation was held in abeyance until the submission of the final report. 1.3. On March 1, 1989, the first part of the Final Report on Audit of Makati was received by the Office of the Ombudsman and was transmitted for purposes of the ensuring preliminary investigation to the Tanodbayan which received the same on March 22, 1989. 1.4. This first part of the Final Report contained the fifteen (15) adverse findings, above elsewhere stated as the basis of Bobby Brillantes complaint. 1.5. Eleven (11) COA auditors participated in the documentation and analysis of its findings and preparation of the final report. 1.6. The first part of the final report was followed by a Supplemental Report on Findings No. 1 and 3. This Supplemental Report is dated July 3, 1989. 2. After securing machine copies of the voluminous documents supporting the COA findings, Pros. Margarito Gervacio, Chairman of the Panel of Prosecutors, issued the corresponding subpoena directing the respondents to submit their respective counter-affidavits. 2.1. In compliance with the subpoena, Mayor Jejomar Binay submitted his counteraffidavit on May 18, 1990, Marissa Chan, Feliciano Bascon, Nicanor Santiago, Jr. on June 19, 1990, Renato Manrique on June 4, 1990, Alfredo Ignacio on June 6, 1990, Roberto Chang on August 27, 1990. Feliciano Bascon submitted his Supplemental Affidavit on November 22, 1990. 2.2. Thereafter, clarificatory examinations were conducted on September 27, 1990, October 26, 1990, November 8, 9, 14, 22, 1990.

3. On January 15, 1991 Mayor Jejomar Binay submitted a copy of this Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 92380 which he and the municipality of Makati filed with the Supreme Court against COA Chairman, Eufemio Domingo and the Commission on Audit, with a manifestation that said petition is submitted to support Binays stand as regard COA Finding No. 9 aforestated. 4. On April 2, 1992 respondent Marissa Chan filed an affidavit containing allegations incriminating Jejomar Binay; 5. Upon being ordered to comment on the said April 2, 1992 affidavit of Marissa Chan, Jejomar Binay submitted his comment thereto on April 30, 1992. 6. On August 4, 1993, the Investigation Panel submitted to the Deputy Special Prosecutor its Resolution disposing the preliminary investigation of the case. 6.1. On August 10, 1993 the said Resolution was approved by the Special Prosecutor, who forwarded the same and the entire records to the Office of the Ombudsman for review and/or final action. 6.2. On August 16, 1994, the Review Panel of the Ombudsman submitted to the latter its review action for approval. 6.3. On August 19, 1994, the Ombudsman approved some of the recommendations of the Review Panel and directed the preparation and filing of the informations.[50]

Furthermore, the prosecution is not bound by the findings of the Commission on Audit (COA); it must rely on its own independent judgment in the determination of probable cause. Accordingly, the prosecution had to conduct it s own review of the COA findings. Judging from said findings, we find that the cases were sufficiently complex, thus justifying the length of time for their resolution. As held by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated March 29, 1995 denying the Motion to Quash:
2. Ten charges are involved in these cases and the prosecution, unable to rely on the raw findings of the Commission on Audit in 15 reports caused the investigation and examination of thousands of vouchers, payrolls, and supporting documents considering that no less than the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, assisted by a team supervisor and 10 team members had to take part in the conduct of a final audit consisting of evaluation and analysis of the initial findings in the 15 raw reports, the cases must have involved complicated legal and factual issues which do warrant or justify a longer period of time for preliminary investigation.

xxx
5. In the TATAD case, the preliminary investigation was resolved close to three (3) years from the time all the counter-affidavits were submitted to the Tanodbayan, notwithstanding the fact that very few documentary and testimonial evidence were involved. In the aboveentitled cases, the preliminary investigation of all ten (10) cases was terminated in merely two (2) years and four (4) months from the date Mayor Binay filed his last pleading, on April 30, 1992.[51]

Petitioner claims that the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan ordering his suspension pendente lite is unwarranted since the informations charging him were not valid. This contention, however, must fail in view of our pronouncement that there was no delay in the resolution of the

subject cases in violation of his right to speedy disposition. Accordingly, the informations in question are valid an petitioners suspension pendente lite must be upheld. Finally, whether or not there is probable cause to warrant the filing of the subject cases is a question best left to the discretion of the Ombudsman. Absent any grave abuse of such discretion, the Court will not interfere in the exercise thereof.[52] Petitioner in this case has failed to establish any such abuse on the part of the Ombudsman.
III

Having ruled that the criminal case against petitioners in G.R. No. 128136 is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the Court will now dispose of the following issues raised by them: (1) The Sandiganbayan was ousted of its jurisdiction by the filing of an information alleging the same facts with the Regional Trial Court. (2) Respondents are estopped from filing an information before the Sandiganbayan considering that they had already filed another information alleging the same facts before the Regional Trial Court. (3) jeopardy. The filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan constitutes double

The Court tackles these arguments successively then deals with the questions of duplicity of information and forum shopping. Petitioners invoke the rule that the jurisdiction of a court once it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of such character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.[53] They claim that the filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan was a subsequent happening or event which cannot oust the RTC of its jurisdiction. This rule has no application here for the simple reason that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction never attached to the RTC. When the information was filed before the RTC, R.A. No. 7975 was already in effect and, under said law, jurisdiction over the case pertained to the Sandiganbayan. Neither can estoppel be successfully invoked. First, jurisdiction is determined by law, not by the consent or agreement of the parties or by estoppel.[54] As a consequence of this principle, the Court held in Zamora vs. Court of Appeals[55] that:

It follows that as a rule the filing of a complaint with one court which has no jurisdiction over it does not prevent the plaintiff from filing the same complaint later with the competent court. The plaintiff is not estopped from doing so simply because it made a mistake before in the choice of the proper forum. In such a situation, the only authority the first court can exercise is to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. This has to be so as a contrary conclusion would allow a party to divest the competent court of its jurisdiction, whether erroneously or even deliberately, in derogation of the law.

It is true that the Court has ruled in certain cases[56] that estoppel prevents a party from questioning the jurisdiction of the court that the party himself invoked. Estoppel, however, remains the exception rather than the rule, the rule being that jurisdiction is vested by law.[57] Even in those instances where the Court applied estoppel, the party estopped consistently invoked the jurisdiction of the court and actively participated in the proceedings, impugning such jurisdiction only when faced with an adverse decision. This is not the case here. After discovering that a similar information had earlier been filed in the RTC, respondents promptly asked the trial court to refer the case to the Sandiganbayan, which motion was followed by a motion to resolve the previous motion. There was no consistent invocation of the RTCs jurisdiction. There were no further proceedings after the filing of the information save for the motion to refer the case precisely on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and the motion to resolve the earlier motion. Finally, the trial court had not rendered any decision, much less one adverse to petitioners. Second, petitioners cannot hold respondents in estoppel for the latter are not themselves party to the criminal action. In a criminal action, the State is the plaintiff, for the commission of a crime is an offense against the State. Thus, the complaint or information filed in court is required to be brought in the name of the People of the Philippines.[58] Even then, the doctrine of estoppel does not apply as against the people in criminal prosecutions.[59] Violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, like attempted murder,[60] is a public offense. Social and public interest demand the punishment of the offender; hence, criminal actions for public offenses can not be waived or condoned, much less barred by the rules of estoppel.[61] The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan did not put petitioners in double jeopardy even though they had already pleaded not guilty to the information earlier filed in the RTC. The first jeopardy never attached in the first place, the RTC not being a court of competent jurisdiction. There can be no double jeopardy where the accused entered a plea in a court that had no jurisdiction.[62] The remedy of petitioners, therefore, was not to move for the quashal of the information pending in the Sandiganbayan on the ground of double jeopardy.[63] Their remedy was to move for the quashal of the information pending in the RTC on the ground oflack of jurisdiction.[64] The contention that the filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan violated the rule against duplicitous informations is patently unmeritorious. That rule presupposes that there is one complaint or information charging not one offense, but two or more offenses. Thus, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. - A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribed a single punishment for various offenses.
Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117:

Sec. 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

xxx

(e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses;
xxx Here, petitioners are faced not with one information charging more than one offense but with more than one information charging one offense. The Court does not find the prosecution guilty of forum-shopping. Broadly speaking, forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.[65] We discern no intent on the part of the State, in filing two informations in two different courts, to gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Obviously, respondents got their signals crossed. One set of officials, after investigating a complaint filed by the Vice-Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas charging petitioners of overpricing, filed the information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the RTC. Another set of officials investigated another complaint from the Concerned Citizens Group accusing petitioners of, among others, overpricing the same project subject of the previous complaint. Finding probable cause, the second set of officials instituted the criminal action, charging the same offense and alleging essentially the same facts as the first, this time in the Sandiganbayan. Later learning of the procedural faux pas, respondents without undue delay asked the RTC to refer the case to the Sandiganbayan. WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby DISMISSED. Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Purisima, Pardo, Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur. Panganiban, J., see separate opinion. Davide, Jr., C.J., joins J. Panganiban in his separate opinion. Quisumbing, J., concurs with J. Panganibans separate opinion.
G.R. No. 110503 August 4, 1994 ANTONIO M. BOLASTIG, petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Panganiban, Benitez, Parlade, Africa & Barinaga Law Office (Pablaw) for petitioner.

Buena,

Gonzaga-

MENDOZA, J.: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the resolution, dated March 18, 1993, of the Sandiganbayan, granting the motion of the Special Prosecution Officer to suspend the accused from office pendente lite and the resolution, dated March 29, 1993, denying reconsideration of the first resolution.

Petitioner Antonio M. Bolastig is governor of Samar. On August 31, 1989, an information was filed against him and two others for alleged overpricing of 100 reams of onion skin paper in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019). The Information alleged: That on or about June 24, 1986, in the Municipality of Catbalogan, Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused ANTONIO M. BOLASTIG, PEDRO ASON and PRUDENCIO MACABENTA, all public officers, duly appointed and qualified as such, being the OIC Governor, Provincial Treasurer and Property Officer respectively, all of the Province of Samar, and being members of Bids and Awards Committee responsible for the purchase of office supplies for the Provincial Government of Samar and while in the performance of their respective positions, confederating and mutually helping one another and through manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully enter into a purchase contract with REYNALDO ESPARAGUERRA, a private citizen, for the purchase of certain office supplies, namely: one hundred (100) reams of Onion Skin size 11" x 17" at a unit price of Five Hundred Fifty pesos (P550.00) or a total price of Fifty-Five Thousand Pesos (P55,000.00), which contract was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government as the prevailing unit price for said item was only Fifty-Five Pesos (P55.00) or a total price of Five Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P5,500.00), thereby causing undue injury to the government in the total amount of Forty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P49,500.00). CONTRARY TO LAW. Petitioner was arraigned on January 5, 1993, whereupon he entered a plea of "not guilty." On January 25, 1993, Special Prosecution Officer III Wilfredo Orencia moved for petitioner's suspension, citing sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 which provides in part: Sec. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property, whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Petitioner opposed the motion, arguing inter alia that: 2. Upon a bare invocation of the foregoing provision, the prosecution would have this Honorable Court issue an Order suspending the accused, as if suspension of a public officer is a mindless and meaningless exercise, and is imposed without regard to the spirit and intent of the law upon which it is based.

3. Indeed, it cannot be simply assumed that laws are enacted and followed without a particular purpose to be served, especially when a mechanical application shall injure not only the public official concerned, but the entire electorate as well.
1

The Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's argument and ordered the suspension of petitioner from office for a period of 90 days. It held that preventive suspension is mandatory under sec. 13, of Rep. Act No. 3019, pursuant to which all that is required is for the court to make a finding that the accused stands charged under a valid information "for any of the above-described crimes for the purpose of granting or denying the sought for suspension." 2 Implementation of the resolution was held in abeyance to allow petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration, which the Sandiganbayan, however, eventually denied on March 29, 1993. Hence, this petition. It is contended that the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its discretion in issuing its resolution (a) despite the failure of the prosecution to show any public interest to be served, or injury to be prevented, or any other compelling factual circumstance which justifies the preventive suspension of petitioner; and (b) despite the injury not only upon petitioner but also upon the people of Samar whose political rights are trenched upon by the suspension for no valid reason of their duly elected Governor. To the Solicitor General's contention that upon the filing of a valid information suspension pendente lite is mandatory as held in several decisions of this Court, 3 petitioner replies that, while the Sandiganbayan has the power to order preventive suspension, there is a "need [for the Sandiganbayan] to go further, beyond the filing of the information, to a determination of the necessity of the preventive suspension in accordance with the spirit and intent of the Anti-Graft Law." Petitioner explains:

In other words, when the Anti-Graft Law gave the courts the authority to order the preventive suspension of the accused, it never intended to impose a mindless and meaningless exercise. The exercise of such authority must always be within the confines of the legislative intent, for to go beyond it would be to exceed the bounds of the law. Preventive suspension should therefore be ordered only when the legislative purpose is achieved, that is, when "the suspension order . . . prevent(s) the accused from using his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him." Corollarily, when the legislative purpose is not achieved, preventive suspension is improper and should not be decreed."
4

The petitioner's contention has no merit. It is now settled that sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer against whom a valid information charging violation of that law, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property is filed. 5 The court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to determine whether preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in office. The presumption is that unless the accused is suspended he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. The law does not require the court to determine whether the accused is likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction of the court. It is indeed true that in some of our decisions 6 the expression "the maximum period of ninety (90) days" is used. But that is only for the purpose of emphasizing that the preventive suspension therein involved, which were for more than ninety (90) days, were excessive and unreasonable. It is to be noted that the ninety-day period of preventive suspension is not found in sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 but was adopted from sec. 42 of the Civil Service Decree (P.D. No. 807), 7 which is now sec. 52 of the Administrative Code of 1987. This latter provision states: Sec. 52. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. When the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service: Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. The duration of preventive suspension is thus coeval with the period prescribed for deciding administrative disciplinary cases. If the case is decided before ninety days, then the suspension will last less than ninety days, but if the case is not decided within ninety days, then the preventive suspension must be up to ninety days only. Similarly, as applied to criminal prosecutions under Republic Act No. 3019, preventive suspension will last for less than ninety days only if the case is decided within that period; otherwise, it will continue for ninety days. The duration of preventive suspension will, therefore, vary to the extent that it is contingent on the time it takes the court to decide the case but not on account of any discretion lodged in the court, taking into account the probability that the accused may use his office to hamper his prosecution. Indeed, were the Sandiganbayan given the discretion to impose a shorter period of suspension, say, 80, 70 or 60 days, as petitioner asserts, it would lie in its power not to suspend the accused at all. That, of course, would be contrary to the command of sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019. Our holding that, upon the filing of a valid information charging violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or fraud upon government or public property, it is the duty of the court to place the accused under preventive suspension disposes of petitioner's other contention that since the trial in the Sandiganbayan is now over with respect to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution there is no longer any danger that petitioner would intimidate prosecution's witnesses. The fact is that the possibility that the accused would intimidate witnesses or otherwise hamper his prosecution is just one of the grounds for preventive suspension. The other one is, as already stated, to prevent the accused from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office. Finally, the fact that petitioner's preventive suspension may deprive the people of Samar of the services of an official elected by them, at least temporarily, is not a sufficient basis for reducing what is otherwise a mandatory period prescribed by law. The vice governor, who has likewise been elected by them, will act as governor. 8Indeed, even the Constitution authorizes the suspension for not more than sixty days of members of Congress found guilty of disorderly behavior, 9 thus rejecting the view expressed in one case 10 that members of the legislature could not be suspended because in the case of suspension, unlike in the case of removal, the seat remains filled but the constituents are deprived of representation.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that in ordering the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan acted according to law. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur. G.R. Nos. L-50508-11 October 11, 1985 VICENTE S. ORAP, petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN represented by HON. JUSTICES MANUEL R. PAMARAN BERNARDO P. FERNANDEZ, and ROMEO M. ESCAREAL, et al., respondents. Benigno M. Gubatan for petitioner.

ESCOLIN, J.: The issue posed in this petition for certiorari and prohibition may be postulated thus: has the Tanodbayan the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation of a complaint charging a municipal judge and his clerk of court with violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 and, upon a finding of prima facie case, proceed to file the corresponding information before the Sandiganbayan and prosecute the same? The respondent Sandiganbayan ruled that the Tanodbayan has such authority. We affirm. The antecedent facts are undisputed. Three informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan by Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor Rodolfo B. Aquino, charging petitioner Vicente S. Orap Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Mangatarem, Pangasinan, with violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The information, duly approved by Hon. Juan A. Sison, then Chief Special Prosecutor of the Tanodbayan, were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. SB-020, 021 and 022. Likewise charged under Criminal Case No. 020 was Melanio B. Fernandez, petitioner's Clerk of Court. On April 17, 1979; a fourth information, docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-189, was filed against petitioner, also for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019. The gravamen of all these charges was to the effect that the accused on different occasions unlawfully and feloniously received and took various sums of money from several persons in connection with Criminal Case No. 2032 of the Municipal Court of Mangatarem entitled, "People vs. Pepito F. Iglesias", for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide, serious physical injuries and damage to property. Before his scheduled arraignment, petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations on the ground that the officer who signed the same had no authority to do so and that, corollarily, the Sandiganbayan did not acquire jurisdiction over the offenses charged. After due hearing, the respondent court denied petitioner's motion to quash. Petitioner verbally moved for the reconsideration of the order but the relief sought was denied. Hence, the instant recourse. It is the petitioner's position that the Tanodbayan has no power to conduct preliminary investigations, file informations and prosecute criminal cases against judges and their appurtenant judicial staff. In support of the thesis, he invokes the provisions of Section 9 in relation to Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1607, otherwise known as the Tanodbayan decree. These sections read as follows: SEC. 9. Definitions.As used in this Decree, the term (a) "Administrative agency" means any department or other governmental unit including any government-owned or controlled corporation, any official, or any employee acting or purporting to act by reason of connection with the government but it does not include (1) any court or judge, or appurtenant judicial staff; (2) the members, committees or staffs of the National Assembly except members thereof performing executive functions; (3) the President or his personal staff; and (4) the members of the Constitutional Commissions and their personal staffs.

(b) "Administrative act" refers to any action including decisions, omissions, recommendations, practices, or procedures of an administrative agency. (c) "Failure of justice" refers to the defeat of a particular right, or the failure of reparation for a particular wrong, from the lack of inadequacy of a legal remedy for the enforcement of the one or the redress of the other. SEC. 10. Powers.The Tanod bayan shall have the following powers: (A) He may investigate, on complaint by any person or on his own motion or initiative, any administrative act whether amounting to any criminal offense or not of any administrative agency including any governmentowned or controlled corporation; (b) He shall prescribe the methods by which complaints are to be made, received. and acted upon; he may determine the scope and manner of investigations to be made; and, subject to the requirements of this Decree, he may determine the form, frequency, and distribution of his conclusions and recommendations; (c) He may request and shall be given by each administrative agency the assistance and information he deems necessary to the discharge of his, responsibilities; he may examine the records and documents of all administrative agencies; and he may enter and inspect premises within any administrative agency's control, provided, however, that where the President in writing certifies that such information, examination or inspection might prejudice the national interests. the Tanodbayan shall desist. All information so obtained shall be confidential. unless the President, in the interest of public service, decides otherwise; (d) He may issue a subpoena to compel any person to appear, give sworn testimony or produce documentary or other evidence the Tanodbayan deems relevant to a matter under his inquiry; (e) He may undertake, participate in,or cooperate with general studies or inquiries, whether or not related to any particular administrative agency or any particular administrative act; if he believes that then, may enhance knowledge about or lead to improvements in the functioning of administrative agencies. It is submitted by petitioner that under the aforequoted Section 9(a) of the Tanodbayan Decree, the courts, judges and other appurtenant judicial staff, among others, are beyond the reach of the Tanodbayan, and that only administrative acts of agencies of the government, whether or not criminal in character, are within the powers of said official. We do not fully agree with the petitioner's view. Quite obviously the argument overlooks the fact that under the decree, the Tanodbayan functions not only as an ombudsman, but as prosecutor as well. As ombudsman, his investigatory powers are limited to complaints initiated against officers and personnel of administrative agencies, as defined in Section 9(a) of the law. To that extent, we agree with the petitioner's interpretation of the law that insofar as administrative complaints are concerned, the courts, judges and their appurtenant judicial staff are outside the Tanodbayan's investigatory power. The reason for such exclusion is quite evident: under Section 6, Article 10 of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court that exercises administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel and, therefore, is the proper forum to which an administrative complaints involving judges and the court's personnel should be lodged, As prosecutor, however, the authority of the Tanodbayan is primary and without exceptions. His powers are defined in Sections 17 and 19 of P.D. 1607, as follows: SEC. 17. Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor.There is hereby created in the Office of the Tanodbayan an Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor composed of a Chief Special Prosecutor, an Assistant Chief Special Prosecutor, and nine (9) Special Prosecutors, who shall have the same qualifications as provincial and city fiscals and L who shall be appointed by the President; ... The Chief Special Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief Special Prosecutor and the Special Prosecutors shall have the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable, by the Sandiganbayan: to file informations therefor and to direct and control the prosecution of said cases therein Provided, however that the Tanodbayan may upon recommendation of the Chief Special Prosecutor, designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as Special Prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan who shall not receive any additional compensation except such allowances, per diems and travelling expenses as the Tanodbayan may determine in accordance with existing laws, rules and regulations. xxx xxx xxx SEC. 19. Prosecution of Public Personnel or Other Person.If the Tanodbayan has reason to believe that any public official employee, or other person has acted in a manner warranting criminal or disciplinary action or

proceedings, he shall cause him to be investigated by the Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor who shall file and prosecute the corresponding criminal or administrative case before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or before the proper administrative agency. In case of failure of justice, the Tanodbayan shall make the appropriate recommendations to the administrative agency concerned. Section 17 of the Decree, in unequivocal term, confers upon the Tanodbayan, through the Chief Special Prosecutor and the Special Prosecutors, the exclusive authority to "conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, to file informations therefor, and to direct and control the prosecution of said cases therein." If, as petitioner contends, judges, and other court personnel lie outside the investigatory power of the Tanodbayan, then no judge or court employee could ever be brought to justice for crimes and offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, for lack of proper officer or entity authorized to conduct the preliminary investigation on complaints of such nature against them. This absurd situation the law could never have intended, considering that the Office of the Tanodbayan was purposely created to "give effect to the constitutional right of the people to petition the government for redress of grievances and to promote higher standards of integrity and efficiency in the government service." 1 We have scrutinized the informations in question and we find the same to have complied with the substantial and formal requirements of the law. They carry the certification of the investigating prosecutor as to the existence of a prima facie case. They also bear the approval of the Chief Special Prosecutor, as required by Section 11 of PD 1606. 2 As petitioner is charged with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which are within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as defined under Section 4 of P.D. 1606, 3 the said court validly acquired jurisdiction over the informations in question. WHEREFORE, petition is hereby dismissed, with costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED: Makasiar, CJ., Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas, Alampay and Patajo, JJ., concur. Teehankee, J., reserve his vote.

[G.R. No. 125213. January 26, 1999]

MILAGROS L. DIAZ, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents. DECISION

VITUG, J.:

Milagros L. Diaz, erstwhile postmistress of Tandag, Surigao del Sur, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of malversation of public funds defined by Article 217, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code, in a decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan on 15 March 1996 in Criminal Case No. 11295. The Sandiganbayan adjudged:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby finds the accused Milagros L. Diaz GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of malversation of public funds as described and penalized in Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code for the amount of P9,813.99, and after considering the mitigating circumstances of full

restitution in her favor and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences her to suffer the following penalties: (a) imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from a minimum of six (6) years and one day of prision mayor to a maximum of ten (10) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal; (b) fine in the amount of P9,813.99, the amount equal to the amount malversed; and (c) perpetual special disqualification for public office. She is likewise ordered to pay the Bureau of Posts the amount of P6.70 only to complete the restitution made by the accused.
SO ORDERED.[1] In her petition for review before this Court, Milagros Diaz assails her conviction by the Sandiganbayan and continues to profess her innocence. The case against petitioner sprung from the implementation of Office Order No. 83-15, dated 03 March 1983, issued by Provincial Auditor Diosdado Lagunday, Surigao del Sur, that directed Auditor II Dominico L. Quijada and Auditing Examiners I Victor B. Tecson and Zenaida C. Cueto to examine the cash and other accounts of petitioner Milagros L. Diaz, then postmistress of Tandag, Surigao del Sur. The following day of 04 March 1983, Quijada required petitioner Diaz to produce all cash, treasury warrants, checks, money orders, paid vouchers, payrolls and other cash items that she was officially accountable for. Petitioner, who was bonded for P100,000.00, was found to have made cash payments in the total amount of six thousand one hundred seventy-one pesos and twenty three centavos (P6,171.23), hereunder itemized: Nature of Claims Telephone Rental Office Rental, S. Haguisan TEV, Milagros L. Diaz Spare Parts, Phil. Mail Gasoline, Phil. Mail Spare Parts, Phil. Mail Spare Parts, Phil. Mail Repair, Phil. Mail Repair, Phil. Mail Registration Fee, Phil. Mail Date Nov. 1980 Mar. 1981 Dec. 1980 Jun. 1979 Aug. 1979 Dec. 1979 Jan. 1980 Oct. 1980 Dec. 1980 Dec. 1980 Amount P 250.00 570.00 385.20 50.50 1,020.20 684.80 353.55 64.00 46.00 25.50

Office Rental, S. Haguisan TEV, Milagros L. Diaz Repair, Phil. Mail Mail Carriage, Postmaster Gasoline, Phil. Mail Mail Carriage, Postmaster Gasoline, Phil. Mail Fare, Pedro D. Sindo TEV, Milagros L. Diaz Salary, Carlos M. Acevedo TOTAL

Aug. 1981 Nov. 1981 Jan. 1982 Jan. 1982 Sept. 1982 Feb. 1982 Feb. 1982 Oct. 1982 Nov. 1982

640.00 468.50 32.00 6.00 228.44 12.50 238.95 5.00 250.50 839.59 P6, 171.23[2]

The audit team also found petitioner to have sold postage stamps in the sum of P8,020.40 which she had failed to record in her cash book, and since Quijada neither considered the cash items in the aforesaid amount ofP6,171.23 as having been validly disbursed, he reported that petitioner had incurred a total cash shortage of P14,191.63. He then referred the matter to the Regional Director of the Bureau of Posts. In a letter, dated 15 April 1983, Quijada asked petitioner to explain why criminal and administrative charges should not instituted against her. Petitioner did not respond. On 24 May 1985, Quijada executed an affidavit attesting to the incurrence by petitioner of a cash shortage of P14,191.63 and her failure to make a restitution thereof. On 05 March 1986, an information for malversation of public funds was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan; it read;

That on March 4, 1983 or for sometime prior thereto, in the Municipality of Tandag, Province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused Milagros L. Diaz, a public officer being then the Postmaster III of the Bureau of Posts of Tandag, Surigao del Sur and as such is responsible and accountable for the public funds entrusted to her by reason of her position, with grave abuse of confidence and taking advantage of her public position as such, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, embezzle and take from said public funds the amount of P14,191.63, Philippine Currency, which he (sic) appropriated and converted to her own personal use, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3] Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan. On 24 March 1986, she posted bail in the amount of P20,000.00; she was forthwith ordered release from custody by the Regional Trial Court of Tandag, Surigao del Sur, Branch XXVII.

The arraignment of petitioner scheduled for 15 May 1986 was reset to 16 June 1986 due to petitioners illness and later to the following month at her request. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation with the Sandiganbayan contending that the Acting Provincial Fiscal of Tandag, Surigao del Sur, who had conducted the preliminary investigation ultimately recommended the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that petitioner was able to fully account for the alleged shortage of P14,191.63. The motion was granted. The Tanodbayan reinvestigated the case. On 24 April 1987, Mariflor Punzalan-Castillo, the investigating prosecutor, issued an order dismissing the complaint on the basis of her finding that there was no showing of bad faith on the part of the accused when she defrayed the expenses subject of the audit;[4] that the shortage was incurred to defray operational expenses for the Tandag post office; and that the shortage in cash should instead be blamed on the failure, or delay, of the Regional Office of the Bureau of Posts in replenishing the amount spent for office operation. The investigating prosecutor said:

Only the amount of P1,786.89 has so far been replenished by the Regional Office. The accountant of the Regional Office, Bureau of Post, Davao City, issued a certification that the amount of P4,384.34 representing claims of Mrs. Diaz were listed in the statement of payables but unbooked in their book of accounts due to lack of funds. The remaining shortage in the amount of P9,807.29 was paid by the accused also pending replenishment from the Regional Office.
Lastly, the new Postmaster of Tandag, Surigao del Sur issued a certification that Mrs. Milagros Diaz has already been cleared of her money accountability.[5] The prosecutor thereupon filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to withdraw the information against petitioner from which the Commission on Audit (COA), through its General Counsel, excepted when directed by the Sandiganbayan to comment. On 19 August 1987, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to withdraw the information and held that the restitution made by petitioner would not exculpate her from liability. On 01 December 1987,[6] petitioner was arraigned. She pleaded no guilty to the indictment. A pre-trial was conducted on 03 December 1987 during which petitioners counsel informed the Sandiganbayan that the Regional Office of the Bureau of Posts had reimbursed the entire amount for which petitioner was held accountable thereby confirming that the assailed disbursements were truly legitimate. On 18 December 1987,petitioner wrote Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena a letter[7] submitting to the Sandiganbayan a carbon copy of the certification of Eduardo F. Cauilan, Chief of the Finance Section of Region XI of the Bureau of Posts to the following effect:

CERTIFICATION To Whom It May Concern: This is to certify that according to the records of this office, the following expenses forming part of the accountability of former Postmaster Milagros L. Diaz of Tandag,

Post Office, Tandag, Surigao del Sur, were legitimate expenses having to do with postal operations of said post office all incurred in the exigencies and interest of public service, which were all considered and taken cognizance by this office, details of which are listed in separate statement forming a part of this certification covering the total amount of P14,503.31. This certification is issued upon request and representation by said Milagros Diaz for whatever legal purpose it may serve on her behalf.
Issued this 18th day of December, 1987 at Davao City, Philippines.

(Sgd) EDUARDO F. CAUILAN Chief, Finance Section NOTED: (Sgd) DIOSCORO A. GELITO Asst. Regional Director
Officer-In-Charge[8] The statement referred to in the certificate indicated that the expenses incurred had, in fact, been liquidated. On 08 February 1988, Special Prosecutor Fidel D. Galindez informed the Sandiganbayan of the advice he had received from the Bureau of Posts that the questioned items were appropriate expenses by the Bureau.[9] On 22 March 1988, the prosecutor manifested that with the aforequoted certification of the Chief of the Finance Section of Region XI of the Bureau of Post, holding to be legitimate expenses the amount covered by the supposed shortage incurred by petitioner, there was no prima facie case of malversation. The motion drew observation from COA, through Assistant Director Jose G. Molina, that the statement of petitioners total accountability of P14,503.31 was inaccurate. On 17 June 1988, the Sandiganbayan again denied the motion to withdraw the information and ruled that the withdrawal of the information was not justified because petitioner had already been arraigned and that the resolution of the conflict on the propriety of the disbursements made by petitioner was a matter of evidence that should instead be threshed out during trial. Trial ensued with the prosecution and the defense presenting their respective version of the case.

On 15 March 1996, following the submission of evidence, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its decision convicting petitioner of the crime of malversation. Touching base on the evidence of petitioner that the expenses she had incurred were office related, the Sandiganbayan said that the ruling in Villacorta vs. People[10] where such expenses were held to be payments made in good faith, thus destroying in these instances the presumption of peculation in Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code, would only give the accused the benefit of the doubt by allowing her to show that the expenses were indeed office related expenses, and thus valid cash items requiring thereby for presentation at audit of the required receipts accompanied by the duly accomplished and approved vouchers, as well as a demonstration that these claims had not been reimbursed and were still outstanding at the time of audit. Conceding that the amounts of P1,081.00 and P3,296.64, or a total of P4,377.64, were allowable, the Sandiganbayan said that petitioner was still short of funds by P9,813.99 which petitioner would be presumed to have malversed x x x there being no satisfactory proof presented to substantiate the legitimate disbursement thereof. In tackling the claim of petitioner that she had liquidated rather than restituted the cash items, the Sandiganbayan explained: The distinction between liquidation and restitution, of course, is important. A liquidation of cash item means the validation of the transaction, while restitution means that the accountable officer had to dig from his or her private resources to cover the amount involved. The amount paid by the accused as evidenced by the official receipts she presented in court represented the amounts which she had already received but she never turned over until long after the audit. This only meant that she has paid these amounts to cover her cash shortage. Thus, these items do not represent liquidation but restitution.[11] It likewise noted that restitution is merely recognized in jurisprudence (to be) a mitigating circumstance in malversation cases.[12] In her petition for review before this Court, petitioner insists that she did not appropriate or convert to her personal use the final sum of P9,813.99 held by the Sandiganbayan to have been malversed by her; that the amount has been used to defray the expenses for office rentals, telephone rentals, spare parts, gasoline and registration fees, and that she did have the corresponding authority to pay those items of expenses. The crime of malversation for which petitioner has been indicted is defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code; its pertinent provisions read:

ART. 217. Malversation of public funds or property Presumption of malversation Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation of malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
x x x xxx xxx

4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled. The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing fund or property to personal uses.
The felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is committed through dolo or culpa the law makes it punishable and prescribes a uniform penalty therefor. Even when the information charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation through negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves that mode of commission of the offense.[13] The elements of malversation of public funds are that (a) the offender is a public officer, (b) he has custody or control of the funds or property by reason of the duties of his office, (c) the funds or property are public funds or propertyfor which he is accountable, and, most importantly, (d) he has appropriated, taken, misappropriated or consented, or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.[14] Concededly, the first three elements are present in this case. It is the last element, i.e., whether or not petitioner really has misappropriated public funds, where the instant petition focuses itself. In convicting petitioner, the Sandiganbayan cites the presumption in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code that the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly forthcoming any public funds with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses. The presumption is, of course, rebuttable. Accordingly, if the accused is able to present adequate evidence that can nullify any likelihood that he had put the funds or property to personal use, than that presumption would be at an end and theprima facie case is effectively negated. This Court has repeatedly said that when the absence funds is not due to the personal use thereof by the accused, the presumption is completely destroyed; in fact, the presumption is deemed never to have existed at all.[15] The prosecution, upon whose burden was laden the task of establishing by proof beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had committed the offense charged, mainly relied on the statutory presumption aforesaid and failed to present any substantial piece of evidence to indicate that petitioner had used the funds for personal gain. The evidence submitted, just to the contrary, would point out that not a centavo of the so-called missing funds was spent for personal use, a matter that was later acknowledged by the Special Prosecutor who thereupon recommended the withdrawal of the information earlier filed against petitioner. The alleged shortages in the total amount of P14,191.63 claimed by Auditor Quijada had been explained by

petitioner. On the day of the audit, she presented a list of cash items showing that she had spent the amount of P6,171.23 for telephone and office rentals, spare parts of the vehicle being utilized for the delivery of mails, registration and repair of that vehicle, gasoline, fare of an employee, the salary of another employee and petitioners travel expense voucher.[16]The auditor disallowed these cash items only because at the time of the audit, these payments were not yet approved by the Regional Office.[17] The records, nevertheless, would show that petitioners use of the cash in her possession for operational expenses was founded on valid authority. COA Circular No. 7637 allowed postmasters to make payments for gasoline, spare parts and minor repairs of vehicles subject to reimbursement by the Regional Office. She advanced payments of salaries of employees on the basis of the Circular No. 82-21 issued by the Postmaster General. The Regional Office, through the chief of the finance section, certified that all the payments made by petitioner were legitimate operational expenses. Exhibit 7-a, attached to the certificate of 18 December 1987, disclosed that thirty-two items of the operational expenses were later approved and liquidated with checks bearing dates between 07 November 1982 and 28 February 1983. It would appear that somehow the Sandiganbayan failed to consider the fact that, on 20 November 1982, petitioner had to vacate her post upon her promotion. Notably, while the thirty-two checks were issued prior to the audit, there was nothing to suggest that she already had the checks in her possession at the time. Liquidation of obligations incurred by accountable public officials involves a long process; pertinent government accounting principles, require the (a) preparation of the disbursement voucher, (b) processing of the request for allotment supported by such documents as payrolls, disbursement vouchers, purchase/job orders, requisitions for supplies/materials, etc., and (c) issuance of the corresponding check.[18] Each time, when accomplished, the corresponding amount is debited or deducted from the available funds of the agency which would then consider the claim settled and paid although there may have yet been no actual transfer of cash involved from the government to the payee of the check. The term to liquidate means to settle, to adjust, to ascertain or to reduce to precision in amount.[19] Liquidation does not necessarily signify payment,[20] and to liquidate an account, can mean to ascertain the balance due, to whom it is due, and to whom it is payable;[21] hence, an account that has been liquidated can also mean that the item has been made certain as to what, and how much, is deemed to be owing.[22] It would indeed be a folly and too restrictive a usage to construe the word liquidated as being solely the receipt of checks by petitioner or encashment of the check by petitioner, and to thereby conclude that she should be held to have malversed the amount of P5,600.84 merely for her failure to transfer the sum either to her successor the day she was promoted or to the auditor on the day the audit was made.[23] The defense evidence, the authenticity and genuineness of which were not controverted by the prosecution, would show that the Regional Office issued thirty checks bearing dates between 07 November 1982 and 21 March 1984. The checks were not issued forthrightly. The probability that ineptitude on the part of the personnel taking charge of the issuance of the checks, not to mention the commonly-experienced long trail of red tape in government transactions, had engendered delay in such issuance should not be discounted. According to petitioner, again not contested by the prosecution, after substantiating her claim that the shortage represented legitimate operational expenses, she followed up the approval of the case items with the Regional Office. Upon finally receiving the thirty-three checks, with her as payee, she encashed them and immediately turned the cash over the Bureau

of Posts of Tandag.[24] Forthwith, on 01 July 1983, petitioner paid the amount of P5,652.15 to the Bureau of Posts under O.R. No. 6645668[25] which amount, incidentally, is even slightly over the total amount ofP5,600.84 found by the Sandiganbayan. The payment by postal employees who made vales from petitioner were deposited by her to the account of the Bureau of Posts of Tandag under O.R. No. 6645670, dated 06 July 1983, in the amount ofP4,155.14. Petitioner explained that this sum was P294.69 less that the total amount of salaries due the employees because the employees did not always make vales for the full amount of their salaries.[26] While this Court would consider the practice of disbursing public funds under the "vale" system to be unmeritorious were the disbursing officer had not been authorized to grant vales or to make advances of salaries,[27] in this case, however, the conditions appended to the authority granted by the Postmaster General to advance salaries of employees under Circular No. 82-21 sanctioned the practice. The conclusion made by the Sandiganbayan that the amounts paid by petitioner to the Bureau of Posts under O.R. No. 6645668 and No. 6645670 were restitutions would seem to be less than accurate. The amounts were replenishment[28] coming from the Regional Office in checks issued out in petitioners name which she paid, after encashment, to the Bureau of Posts. The sum of P9,807.29 that was replenished, when added to the ten items certified to accounts payable and to two items replenished by the checks issued after 04 March 1983, approved as operational expenses in the amount of P4,377.64, totalled P14,284.43, or evenP92.80 more than the supposed shortage of P14,161.63. While it was not made clear which of the office expenses had been taken from the proceeds of the postage stamp sales, the fact still remained, nevertheless, that the Regional Office cleared petitioner of such accountabilities, indicating at the very least that she did not spend the amount for personal use. The Court had heretofore recognized situations that could necessitate the use by accountable public officials of cash on hand for pertinent expenditures in the conduct official business. In Bugayong vs. People,[29] the Court acquitted an accused government physician for malversation for a shortage in cash account upon audit examination because the collections in the hospital were found to have been used as its revolving fund for such official expenditures. In Palma Gil vs. People,[30] where donated logs were disposed of to construct municipal projects, the Court held that if funds or property entrusted to a public officer were validly used for public purposes he should not be held liable for malversation. The Sandiganbayan noticeably depended on the recommendations of COA in convicting appellant. The Court could not help but observe that upon being informed that the Bureau of Posts had reimbursed the entire amount alleged to be her shortage, Auditor Quijada opined that his audit report had to be altered to reflect that fact. Auditor Quijadas acquiescence to the alteration of his report to conform to the advice would somehow manifest that the audit was not conducted with sufficient thoroughness. In Tinga vs. People,[31] the Court said:

At this juncture, it may not be amiss to state that considering the gravity of the offense of Malversation of Public Funds, just as government treasures are held to strict accountability as regards funds entrusted to them in a fiduciary capacity, so also should examining COA auditors act with greater care and caution in the audit of the accounts of such accountable officers to avoid the perpetration of any injustice. Accounts should be examined carefully and thoroughly to the last detail,

with absolute certainty in strict compliance with the Manual of Instructions. Special note should be taken of the fact that disallowances for lack of pre-audit are not necessarily tantamount to malversation in law. Imperative it is likewise that sufficient time be given examined officers to reconstruct their accounts and refute the charge that they had put government funds to their personal uses. Access to records must be afforded them within a reasonable time after audit when disbursements are still fresh in their minds and not years after when relevant official records may no longer be available and the passage of time has blurred human memory.[32]
In Dumagat vs. Sandiganbayan[33] where the ruling in Tinga was reiterated, the Court added:

Since the audit examination left much to be desired in terms of thoroughness and completeness as there were accounts which were not considered, the same cannot be made the basis for holding petitioner liable for malversation.[34]
Hopefully, the Court is not being pertinent if it were to urge COA, in the exercise of its awesome powers, to act with extreme care and judicious consideration of all attendant circumstances in order to ensure that innocent public officials may not have to undergo the trial and the pains that always go with an indictment for an offense. Generally, the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this Court but there are established exceptions to that rule, such as, sans preclusion, when (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly an error or founded on a mistake; (3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and (5) the findings of fact are premised on a want of evidence are contradicted by evidence on record.[35] In these instances, this Court is bound to review the facts in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The case at bar, as may be gleaned from the foregoing disquisition, is one such instance. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Sandiganbayan appealed from is SET ASIDE, and petitioner Milagros Diaz ACQUITTED of the crime of malversation of public funds for insufficiency of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED. Romero, (Chairman), Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 106719 September 21, 1993

DRA. BRIGIDA S. BUENASEDA, Lt. Col. ISABELO BANEZ, JR., ENGR. CONRADO REY MATIAS, Ms. CORA S. SOLIS and Ms. ENYA N. LOPEZ, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY JUAN FLAVIER, Ombudsman CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, and NCMH NURSES ASSOCIATION, represented by RAOULITO GAYUTIN, respondents. Renato J. Dilag and Benjamin C. Santos for petitioners. Danilo C. Cunanan for respondent Ombudsman.

Crispin T. Reyes and Florencio T. Domingo for private respondent.

QUIASON, J.: This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Principally, the petition seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman dated January 7, 1992, directing the preventive suspension of petitioners, Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda, Chief of Hospital III; Isabelo C. Banez, Jr., Administrative Officer III; Conrado Rey Matias, Technical Assistant to the Chief of Hospital; Cora C. Solis, Accountant III; and Enya N. Lopez, Supply Officer III, all of the National Center for Mental Health. The petition also asks for an order directing the Ombudsman to disqualify Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, of the Office of the Ombudsman, from participation in the preliminary investigation of the charges against petitioner (Rollo, pp. 2-17; Annexes to Petition, Rollo, pp. 19-21). The questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed with the Ombudsman (OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the private respondents against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. According to the petition, the said order was issued upon the recommendation of Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de VillaRosero, without affording petitioners the opportunity to controvert the charges filed against them. Petitioners had sought to disqualify Director Arnaw and Investigator Villa-Rosero for manifest partiality and bias (Rollo, pp. 4-15). On September 10, 1992, this Court required respondents' Comment on the petition. On September 14 and September 22, 1992, petitioners filed a "Supplemental Petition (Rollo, pp. 124-130); Annexes to Supplemental Petition; Rollo pp. 140-163) and an "Urgent Supplemental Manifestation" (Rollo, pp. 164-172; Annexes to Urgent Supplemental Manifestation; Rollo, pp. 173-176), respectively, averring developments that transpired after the filing of the petition and stressing the urgency for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. On September 22, 1992, this Court ". . . Resolved to REQUIRE the respondents to MAINTAIN in the meantime, theSTATUS QUO pending filing of comments by said respondents on the original supplemental manifestation" (Rollo, p. 177). On September 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion to direct respondent Secretary of Health to comply with the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 (Rollo, pp. 182-192, Annexes, pp. 192-203). In a Resolution dated October 1, 1992, this Court required respondent Secretary of Health to comment on the said motion. On September 29, 1992, in a pleading entitled "Omnibus Submission," respondent NCMH Nurses Association submitted its Comment to the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Urgent Supplemental Manifestation. Included in said pleadings were the motions to hold the lawyers of petitioners in contempt and to disbar them (Rollo, pp. 210-267). Attached to the "Omnibus Submission" as annexes were the orders and pleadings filed in Administrative Case No. OBM-ADM-0-91-1051 against petitioners (Rollo, pp. 268-480). The Motion for Disbarment charges the lawyers of petitioners with: (1) unlawfully advising or otherwise causing or inducing their clients petitioners Buenaseda, et al., to openly defy, ignore, disregard, disobey or otherwise violate, maliciously evade their preventive suspension by Order of July 7, 1992 of the Ombudsman . . ."; (2) "unlawfully interfering with and obstructing the implementation of the said order (Omnibus Submission, pp. 50-52; Rollo, pp. 259-260); and (3) violation of the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of unprofessional and unethical conduct "by foisting blatant lies, malicious falsehood and outrageous deception" and by committing subornation of perjury, falsification and fabrication in their pleadings (Omnibus Submission, pp. 52-54; Rollo, pp. 261-263). On November 11, 1992, petitioners filed a "Manifestation and Supplement to 'Motion to Direct Respondent Secretary of Health to Comply with 22 September 1992 Resolution'" (Manifestation attached to Rollo without pagination between pp. 613 and 614 thereof). On November 13, 1992, the Solicitor General submitted its Comment dated November 10, 1992, alleging that: (a) "despite the issuance of the September 22, 1992 Resolution directing respondents to maintain the status quo, respondent Secretary refuses to hold in abeyance the implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension; (b) the clear intent and spirit of the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is to hold in abeyance the implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension, the status quo obtaining the time of the filing of the instant petition; (c) respondent Secretary's acts in refusing to hold in abeyance implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension and in tolerating and approving the acts of Dr. Abueva, the OIC appointed to replace petitioner Buenaseda, are in violation of the Resolution dated September 22, 1992; and

(d) therefore, respondent Secretary should be directed to comply with the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 immediately, by restoring the status quo ante contemplated by the aforesaid resolution" (Comment attached toRollo without paginations between pp. 613-614 thereof). In the Resolution dated November 25, 1992, this Court required respondent Secretary to comply with the aforestated status quo order, stating inter alia, that: It appearing that the status quo ante litem motam, or the last peaceable uncontested status which preceded the present controversy was the situation obtaining at the time of the filing of the petition at bar on September 7, 1992 wherein petitioners were then actually occupying their respective positions, the Court hereby ORDERS that petitioners be allowed to perform the duties of their respective positions and to receive such salaries and benefits as they may be lawfully entitled to, and that respondents and/or any and all persons acting under their authority desist and refrain from performing any act in violation of the aforementioned Resolution of September 22, 1992 until further orders from the Court (Attached to Rollo after p. 615 thereof). On December 9, 1992, the Solicitor General, commenting on the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Supplemental Manifestation, stated that (a) "The authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend suspension and he has no direct power to suspend;" and (b) "Assuming the Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a government official or employee, there are conditions required by law for the exercise of such powers; [and] said conditions have not been met in the instant case" (Attached to Rollo without pagination). In the pleading filed on January 25, 1993, petitioners adopted the position of the Solicitor General that the Ombudsman can only suspend government officials or employees connected with his office. Petitioners also refuted private respondents' motion to disbar petitioners' counsel and to cite them for contempt (Attached to Rollowithout pagination). The crucial issue to resolve is whether the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees. In upholding the power of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend petitioners, respondents (Urgent Motion to LiftStatus Quo, etc, dated January 11, 1993, pp. 10-11), invoke Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which provides: Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charge would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. Respondents argue that the power of preventive suspension given the Ombudsman under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 was contemplated by Section 13 (8) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the Ombudsman shall exercise such other power or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law." On the other hand, the Solicitor General and the petitioners claim that under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only recommend to the heads of the departments and other agencies the preventive suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted by his office. Hence, he cannot order the preventive suspension himself. They invoke Section 13(3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the Office of the Ombudsman shall haveinter alia the power, function, and duty to: Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. The Solicitor General argues that under said provision of the Constitutions, the Ombudsman has three distinct powers, namely: (1) direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against public officials or employees at fault; (2) recommend their removal, suspension, demotion fine, censure, or prosecution; and (3) compel compliance with the recommendation (Comment dated December 3, 1992, pp. 9-10).

The line of argument of the Solicitor General is a siren call that can easily mislead, unless one bears in mind that what the Ombudsman imposed on petitioners was not a punitive but only a preventive suspension. When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power "to recommend the suspension" of a public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to "suspension," as a punitive measure. All the words associated with the word "suspension" in said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of Noscitor a sociis, the word "suspension" should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated (Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 371 [1945]; Caltex (Phils.) Inc. v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]). Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges. Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly authorized to recommend to the appropriate official the discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or employees. In order to make an intelligent determination whether to recommend such actions, the Ombudsman has to conduct an investigation. In turn, in order for him to conduct such investigation in an expeditious and efficient manner, he may need to suspend the respondent. The need for the preventive suspension may arise from several causes, among them, the danger of tampering or destruction of evidence in the possession of respondent; the intimidation of witnesses, etc. The Ombudsman should be given the discretion to decide when the persons facing administrative charges should be preventively suspended. Penal statutes are strictly construed while procedural statutes are liberally construed (Crawford, Statutory Construction, Interpretation of Laws, pp. 460-461; Lacson v. Romero, 92 Phil. 456 [1953]). The test in determining if a statute is penal is whether a penalty is imposed for the punishment of a wrong to the public or for the redress of an injury to an individual (59 Corpuz Juris, Sec. 658; Crawford, Statutory Construction, pp. 496-497). A Code prescribing the procedure in criminal cases is not a penal statute and is to be interpreted liberally (People v. Adler, 140 N.Y. 331; 35 N.E. 644). The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers as he may need to perform efficiently the task committed to him by the Constitution. Such being the case, said statute, particularly its provisions dealing with procedure, should be given such interpretation that will effectuate the purposes and objectives of the Constitution. Any interpretation that will hamper the work of the Ombudsman should be avoided. A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution should be liberally construed for the advancement of the purposes and objectives for which it was created (Cf. Department of Public Utilities v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas. Co., 200 Ark. 983, 142 S.W. (2d) 213 [1940]; Wallace v. Feehan, 206 Ind. 522, 190 N.E., 438 [1934]). In Nera v. Garcia, 106 Phil. 1031 [1960], this Court, holding that a preventive suspension is not a penalty, said: Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. To support his theory that the Ombudsman can only preventively suspend respondents in administrative cases who are employed in his office, the Solicitor General leans heavily on the phrase "suspend any officer or employee under his authority" in Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770. The origin of the phrase can be traced to Section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code, which dealt with preventive suspension and which authorized the chief of a bureau or office to "suspend any subordinate or employee in his bureau or under his authority pending an investigation . . . ." Section 34 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2266), which superseded Section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code also authorized the chief of a bureau or office to "suspend any subordinate officer or employees, in his bureau or under his authority." However, when the power to discipline government officials and employees was extended to the Civil Service Commission by the Civil Service Law of 1975 (P.D. No. 805), concurrently with the President, the Department Secretaries and the heads of bureaus and offices, the phrase "subordinate officer and employee in his bureau" was deleted, appropriately leaving the phrase "under his authority." Therefore, Section 41 of said law only mentions that the proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend "any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation . . ." (Sec. 41).

The Administrative Code of 1987 also empowered the proper disciplining authority to "preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation" (Sec. 51). The Ombudsman Law advisedly deleted the words "subordinate" and "in his bureau," leaving the phrase to read "suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation . . . ." The conclusion that can be deduced from the deletion of the word "subordinate" before and the words "in his bureau" after "officer or employee" is that the Congress intended to empower the Ombudsman to preventively suspend all officials and employees under investigation by his office, irrespective of whether they are employed "in his office" or in other offices of the government. The moment a criminal or administrative complaint is filed with the Ombudsman, the respondent therein is deemed to be "in his authority" and he can proceed to determine whether said respondent should be placed under preventive suspension. In their petition, petitioners also claim that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he issued the suspension order without affording petitioners the opportunity to confront the charges against them during the preliminary conference and even after petitioners had asked for the disqualification of Director Arnaw and Atty. Villa-Rosero (Rollo, pp. 6-13). Joining petitioners, the Solicitor General contends that assuming arguendo that the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend erring public officials and employees who are working in other departments and offices, the questioned order remains null and void for his failure to comply with the requisites in Section 24 of the Ombudsman Law (Comment dated December 3, 1992, pp. 11-19). Being a mere order for preventive suspension, the questioned order of the Ombudsman was validly issued even without a full-blown hearing and the formal presentation of evidence by the parties. In Nera, supra, petitioner therein also claimed that the Secretary of Health could not preventively suspend him before he could file his answer to the administrative complaint. The contention of petitioners herein can be dismissed perfunctorily by holding that the suspension meted out was merely preventive and therefore, as held in Nera, there was "nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before tho charges against him are heard . . . (Nera v. Garcia., supra). There is no question that under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the Ombudsman cannot order the preventive suspension of a respondent unless the evidence of guilt is strong and (1) the charts against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (2) the charge would warrant removal from the service; or (3) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. The same conditions for the exercise of the power to preventively suspend officials or employees under investigation were found in Section 34 of R.A. No. 2260. The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining authority is given the discretion to decide when the evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which expressly left such determination of guilt to the "judgment" of the Ombudsman on the basis of the administrative complaint. In the case at bench, the Ombudsman issued the order of preventive suspension only after: (a) petitioners had filed their answer to the administrative complaint and the "Motion for the Preventive Suspension" of petitioners, which incorporated the charges in the criminal complaint against them (Annex 3, Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 288-289; Annex 4, Rollo, pp. 290-296); (b) private respondent had filed a reply to the answer of petitioners, specifying 23 cases of harassment by petitioners of the members of the private respondent (Annex 6, Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 309-333); and (c) a preliminary conference wherein the complainant and the respondents in the administrative case agreed to submit their list of witnesses and documentary evidence. Petitioners herein submitted on November 7, 1991 their list of exhibits (Annex 8 of Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 336-337) while private respondents submitted their list of exhibits (Annex 9 of Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 338-348). Under these circumstances, it can not be said that Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero acted with manifest partiality and bias in recommending the suspension of petitioners. Neither can it be said that the Ombudsman had acted with grave abuse of discretion in acting favorably on their recommendation. The Motion for Contempt, which charges the lawyers of petitioners with unlawfully causing or otherwise inducing their clients to openly defy and disobey the preventive suspension as ordered by the Ombudsman and the Secretary of Health can not prosper (Rollo, pp. 259-261). The Motion should be filed, as in fact such a motion was filed, with the Ombudsman. At any rate, we find that the acts alleged to constitute indirect contempt were legitimate measures taken by said lawyers to question the validity and propriety of the preventive suspension of their clients. On the other hand, we take cognizance of the intemperate language used by counsel for private respondents hurled against petitioners and their counsel (Consolidated: (1) Comment on Private Respondent" "Urgent Motions, etc.; (2) Adoption of OSG's Comment; and (3) Reply to Private Respondent's Comment and Supplemental Comment, pp. 4-5). A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause. The language of a lawyer, both oral or written, must be respectful and restrained in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession and with his behavioral attitude toward his brethren in the

profession (Lubiano v. Gordolla, 115 SCRA 459 [1982]). The use of abusive language by counsel against the opposing counsel constitutes at the same time a disrespect to the dignity of the court of justice. Besides, the use of impassioned language in pleadings, more often than not, creates more heat than light. The Motion for Disbarment (Rollo, p. 261) has no place in the instant special civil action, which is confined to questions of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion for the purpose of relieving persons from the arbitrary acts of judges and quasi-judicial officers. There is a set of procedure for the discipline of members of the bar separate and apart from the present special civil action. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the Status quo ordered to be maintained in the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo, Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur. Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

BELLOSILLO, J.,

concurring:

I agree that the Ombudsman has the authority, under Sec. 24 of R.A. No. 6770, to preventively suspend any government official or employee administratively charged before him pending the investigation of the complaint, the reason being that respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the prosecution of the case. However, in the case before us, I am afraid that the facts thus far presented may not provide adequate basis to reasonably place petitioners under preventive suspension. For, it is not enough to rule that the Ombudsman has authority to suspend petitioners preventively while the case is in progress before him. Equally important is the determination whether it is necessary to issue the preventive suspension under the circumstances. Regretfully, I cannot see any sufficient basis to justify the preventive suspension. That is why, I go for granting oral argument to the parties so that we can truthfully determine whether the preventive suspension of respondents are warranted by the facts. We may be suspending key government officials and employees on the basis merely of speculations which may not serve the ends of justice but which, on the other hand, deprive them of their right to due process. The simultaneous preventive suspension of top officials and employees of the National Center for Mental Health may just disrupt, the hospital's normal operations, much to the detriment of public service. We may safely assume that it is not easy to replace them in their respective functions as those substituting them may be taking over for the first time. The proper care of mental patients may thus be unduly jeopardized and their lives and limbs imperilled. I would be amenable to holding oral argument to hear the parties if only to have enough factual and legal bases to justify the preventive suspension of petitioners.

# Separate Opinions

BELLOSILLO, J.,

concurring:

I agree that the Ombudsman has the authority, under Sec. 24 of R.A. No. 6770, to preventively suspend any government official or employee administratively charged before him pending the investigation of the complaint, the reason being that respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the prosecution of the case. However, in the case before us, I am afraid that the facts thus far presented may not provide adequate basis to reasonably place petitioners under preventive suspension. For, it is not enough to rule that the Ombudsman has authority to suspend petitioners

preventively while the case is in progress before him. Equally important is the determination whether it is necessary to issue the preventive suspension under the circumstances. Regretfully, I cannot see any sufficient basis to justify the preventive suspension. That is why, I go for granting oral argument to the parties so that we can truthfully determine whether the preventive suspension of respondents are warranted by the facts. We may be suspending key government officials and employees on the basis merely of speculations which may not serve the ends of justice but which, on the other hand, deprive them of their right to due process. The simultaneous preventive suspension of top officials and employees of the National Center for Mental Health may just disrupt, the hospital's normal operations, much to the detriment of public service. We may safely assume that it is not easy to replace them in their respective functions as those substituting them may be taking over for the first time. The proper care of mental patients may thus be unduly jeopardized and their lives and limbs imperilled. I would be amenable to holding oral argument to hear the parties if only to have enough factual and legal bases to justify the preventive suspension of petitioners.

[G.R. No. 113216. September 5, 1997]

RHODORA M. LEDESMA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Quezon City, respondents. DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

When confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the secretary of justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial. While the secretarys ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. A trial court, however, commits reversible error or even grave abuse of discretion if it refuses/neglects to evaluate such recommendation and simply insists on proceeding with the trial on the mere pretext of having already acquired jurisdiction over the criminal action. This principle is explained in this Decision resolving a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals,[2] promulgated on September 14, 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. 30832 which in effect affirmed an order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City denying the prosecutions withdrawal of a criminal information against petitioner.

The Antecedent Facts From the pleadings submitted in this case, the undisputed facts are as follows:

Sometime in April 1992, a complaint for libel was filed by Dr. Juan F. Torres, Jr. against Dr. Rhodora M. Ledesma, petitioner herein, before the Quezon City

Prosecutors Office, docketed as I.S. No. 92-5433A. Petitioner filed her counteraffidavit to the complaint. Finding sufficient legal and factual basis, the Quezon City Prosecutors Office filed on July 6, 1992 an Information for libel against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104. The Information filed by Assistant City Prosecutor Augustine A. Vestil reads:
[3] [4]

That on or about the 27th day of June 1991, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, the said accused, acting with malice, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously send a letter addressed to Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Director of Philippine Heart Center, East Avenue, this city, and furnished the same to other officers of the said hospital, said letter containing slanderous and defamatory remarks against DR. JUAN F. TORRES, JR., which states in part, to wit: 27June 1991 Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral Director Subject: Return of all professional fees due Dr. Rhodora M. Ledesma, Nuclear Medicine Specialist/Consultant, Philippine Heart Center, from January 31, 1989 to January 31, 1991. Respondents: Dr. Juan F. Torres, Jr., Chief, Nuclear Medicine Section

Dr. Orestes P. Monzon, Staff Consultant Dear Dr. Cabral, This is to demand the return of all professional fees due me as a consultant in Nuclear Medicine, this Center, since January 31, 1989 until my resignation effective January 31, 1991, amounting to at least P100,000.00 for the year 1990 alone. Records in the Nuclear Medicine Section will show that from January 1989 to January 1991, a total of 2,308 patients were seen. Of these, I had officially supervised, processed, and interpreted approximately a total of 1,551 cases as against approximately 684 and 73 cases done by Dr. Monzon and Dr. Torres respectively.

Until my resignation I had received a monthly share of professional fees averaging P1,116.90/month supposedly representing 20% of the total monthly professional fees. The rest were divided equally between Dr. Monzon and Dr. Torres. There was never any agreement between us three consultants that this should be the arrangement and I am certain that this was not with your approval. The burden of unfairness would have been lesser if there was an equal distribution of labor and the schedule of duties were strictly followed. As it was, the schedule of duties submitted monthly to the office of the Asst. Director for Medical Services was simply a dummy to comply with administrative requirements rather than a guideline for strict compliance. Both consultants have complete daily time records even if they did not come regularly. Dr. Torres came for an hour every week, Dr. Monzon came sporadically during the week while I was left with everything from training the residents and supervising the Techs to processing and interpreting the results on a regular basis. I had a part time appointment just like Dr. Monzon and Dr. Torres. In the interest of fairness and to set a precedent for the protection of future PHC Nuclear Medicine Alumni I am calling your attention to the unfair and inhuman conditions I went through as a Consultant in that Section. I trust that your sense of professionalism will put a stop to this corruption. I suggest that a committee be formed to make an audit of the distribution of professional fees in this Section. At this point, let me stress that since professional fees vary according to the type of procedure done and since there was no equity of labor between us I am not settling for an equal percentage share. I demand that I be indemnified of all professional fees due me on a case to case basis. Let me make clear my intention of pursuing this matter legally should there be no favorable action in my behalf. Let me state at this point6 that the actions of Dr. Torres and Dr. Monzon are both unprofessional and unbecoming and are clearly violating the code of ethics of the medical profession and the Philippine Civil Service Rules and Regulations related to graft and corruption. Thank you. and other words of similar import, when in truth and in fact, as the accused very well knew, the same are entirely false and untrue but were publicly made for no other purpose than to expose said DR. JUAN F. TORRES, JR. to public ridicule, thereby casting dishonor, discredit and contempt upon the person of the said offended party, to his damage and prejudice.

A petition for review of the resolution of Assistant City Prosecutor Vestil was filed by petitioner before the Department of Justice pursuant to P.D. No. 77 as amended by P.D. No. 911. The Department of Justice gave due course to the petition and directed the Quezon City prosecutor to move for deferment of further proceedings and to elevate the entire records of the case.[5] Accordingly, a Motion to Defer Arraignment dated September 7, 1992 was filed by Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero before the court a quo.[6] On September 9, 1992, the trial court granted the motion and deferred petitioners arraignment until the final termination of the petition for review.[7] Without the consent or approval of the trial prosecutor, private complainant, through counsel, filed a Motion to Lift the Order dated September 9, 1992 and to Set the Case for Arraignment/Trial.[8] On January 8, 1993, the trial court issued an Order setting aside its earlier Order of September 9, 1992 and scheduling petitioners arraignment on January 18, 1993 at two oclock in the afternoon.[9] In a resolution dated January 27, 1993, then Justice Secretary Franklin M. Drilon reversed the Quezon City investigating prosecutor. Pertinent portions of Drilons ruling read:[10]

From the circumstances obtaining, the subject letter was written to bring to the attention of the Director of the Philippine Heart Center for Asia and other responsible authorities the unjust and unfair treatment that Dr. Ledesma was getting from complainants. Since complainants and respondent are government employees, and the subject letter is a complaint to higher authorities of the PHCA on a subject matter in which respondent has an interest and in reference to which she has a duty to question the same is definitely privileged (US vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 131). Moreover, in Ang vs. Castro, 136 SCRA 455, the Supreme Court, citing Santiago vs. Calvo, 48 Phil. 922, ruled that A communication made in good faith upon any subject matter in which the party making the communication has an interest or concerning which he has a duty is privileged... although it contains incriminatory or derogatory matter which, without the privilege, would be libelous and actionable. The follow-up letter sent by respondent to the director of the PHCA, is a direct evidence of respondents righteous disposition of following the rule of law and is a clear indication that her purpose was to seek relief from the proper higher authority who is the Director of PHCA. The same interpretation should be accorded the civil and administrative complaints which respondent filed against complainants. They are mere manifestations of her earnest desire to pursue proper relief for the alleged injustice she got from complainants. If she was motivated by malice and ill-will in sending the subject

communication to the Director of the PHCA, she would not have sent the second letter and filed the administrative and civil cases against complainants. Moreover, it is unbelievable that it took complainants one year to realize that the questioned letter subjected them to public and malicious imputation of a vice or omission. It is beyond the ordinary course of human conduct for complainants to start feeling the effects of the alleged libelous letter - that of experiencing sleepless nights, wounded feelings, serious anxiety, moral shock and besmirched reputation - one year after they read the communication in question. The claim that the case of Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462 is applicable to the instant case is unfounded. In the first place, the instant cases are not being reinvestigated. It is the resolutions of the investigating prosecutor that are under review. Further, the record shows that the court has issued an order suspending the proceedings pending the resolutions of the petitions for review by this Office. In the issuance of its order, the court recognizes that the Secretary of Justice has the power and authority to review the resolutions of prosecutors who are under his control and supervision. In view of the foregoing, the appealed resolutions are hereby reversed. You are directed to withdraw the Informations which you filed in Court. Inform this Office of the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
In obedience to the above directive, Quezon City Trial Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero filed a Motion to Withdraw Information dated February 17,1993,[11] attaching thereto the resolution of Secretary Drilon. The trial judge denied this motion in his Order dated February 22, 1993, as follows:[12]

The motion of the trial prosecutor to withdraw the information in the above-entitled case is denied. Instead, the trial prosecutor of this court is hereby directed to prosecute the case following the guidelines and doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration[13] was denied by the trial judge in the Order dated March 5, 1993, as follows:[14]

Finding no cogent reason to justify the reconsideration of the ruling of this Court dated February 22, 1993, the Motion for Reconsideration dated March 1, 1993 filed by the accused through counsel is hereby denied.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court. In a Resolution dated March 31, 1993, this Court referred the case to the Court

of Appeals for proper determination and disposition pursuant to Section 9, paragraph 1 of B.P. 129.[15] Respondent Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, holding that it had no jurisdiction to overturn the doctrine laid down in Crespo vs. Mogul -- once a complaint or information has been filed in court, any disposition of the case, i.e., dismissal, conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion of the trial court.[16] Hence, this recourse to this Court.

The Issues For unexplained reasons, petitioner failed to make an assignment of errors against the appellate court. Her counsel merely repeated the alleged errors of the trial court: [17]

I. The Orders, dated February 22, 1993 and March 5, 1993, of respondent Judge Asuncion relied solely on the Crespo vs. Mogul (151 SCRA 462) decision. It is respectfully submitted that said case is not applicable because: 1. It infringes on the constitutional separation of powers between the executive and judicial branches of the government; 2. It constitutes or it may lead to misuse or misapplication of judicial power as defined in the Constitution; 3. It goes against the constitutional proscription that rules of procedure should not diminish substantive rights; 4. 5. 6. 7. It goes against the principle of non-delegation of powers; It sets aside or disregards substantive and procedural rules; It deprives a person of his constitutional right to procedural due process; Its application may constitute or lead to denial of equal protection of laws;

8. It deprives the secretary of justice or the president of the power to control or review the acts of a subordinate official; 9. It will lead to, encourage, abet or promote abuse or even corruption among the ranks of investigating fiscals; 10. It does not subserve the purposes of a preliminary investigation because -

(10.a) It subjects a person to the burdens of an unnecessary trial, specially in cases where the investigating fiscal recommends no bail for the accused; (10.b) It subjects the government, both the executive and the judiciary, to unnecessary time and expenses attendant to an unnecessary trial; (10.c) 11. II. It contributes to the clogging of judicial dockets; and It has no statutory or procedural basis or precedent. On the assumption that Crespo vs. Mogul is applicable, it is submitted that -

1. Respondent Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, when he denied the Motion to Withdraw Information since he had already deferred to, if not recognized, the authority of the Secretary of Justice; and 2. The facts in Crespo vs. Mogul are different from the instant case. Hence, respondent Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, when he relied solely on said case in denying the Motion to Withdraw Information.
In sum, the main issue in this petition is: Did Respondent Court commit any reversible error in affirming the trial courts denial of the prosecutions Motion to Withdraw Information? The Courts Ruling The petition is impressed with merit. We answer the above question in the affirmative.

Preliminary Matter Before discussing the substance of this case, the Court will preliminarily address a procedural matter. Prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on July 1, 1997, Section 2 of Rule 45, which governed appeals from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court, provided:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition.The petition shall contain a concise statement of x x x the assignment of errors made in the court below x x x.

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 requires a concise statement of the errors committed by the Court of Appeals, not of the trial court. For failure to follow this Rule, the petition could have been dismissed by this Court motu proprio, considering that under Section 4 of the same Rule, review is not a matter of right but of sound discretion. We take this occasion to stress the need for precision and clarity in the assignment of errors. Review under this rule is unlike an appeal in a criminal case where the death penalty, reclusin perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed and where the whole case is opened for review. Under Rule 45, only the issues raised therein by the petitioner will be passed upon by the Court, such that an erroneous specification of the issues may cause the dismissal of the petition. We stressed this in Circular No. 2-90, entitled Guidelines to be Observed in Appeals to the Court of Appeals and to the Supreme Court, as follows:

4.

Erroneous Appeals. x x x x

e) Duty of counsel.It is therefore incumbent upon every attorney who would seek review of a judgment or order promulgated against his client to make sure of the nature of the errors he proposes to assign, whether these be of fact or of law; then upon such basis to ascertain carefully which Court has appellate jurisdiction; and finally, to follow scrupulously the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, ever aware that any error or imprecision in compliance may well be fatal to his clients cause. FOR STRICT COMPLIANCE.
Be that as it may, the Court noting the importance of the substantial matters raised decided to overlook petitioners lapse and granted due course to the petition per Resolution dated July 15, 1996, with a warning that henceforth petitions which fail to specify an assignment of errors of the proper lower court may be denied due course motu proprio by this Court.

Determination of Probable Cause Is an Executive Function The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is judicially recognized as an executive function and is made by the prosecutor. The primary objective of a preliminary investigation is to free a respondent from the inconvenience, expense, ignominy and stress of defending himself/herself in the course of a formal trial, until the reasonable probability of his or her guilt has been passed upon in a more or less summary proceeding by a competent officer designated by law for that purpose. Secondarily, such summary proceeding also protects the state from the burden of unnecessary expense and effort in prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding trials arising from false, frivolous or groundless charges.[18]

Such investigation is not a part of the trial. A full and exhaustive presentation of the parties evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. [19] By reason of the abbreviated nature of preliminary investigations, a dismissal of the charges as a result thereof is not equivalent to a judicial pronouncement of acquittal. Hence, no double jeopardy attaches. In declaring this function to be lodged in the prosecutor, the Court distinguished the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest or a search warrant from a preliminary investigation proper in this wise:[20]

xxx Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from a preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. xxx The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper--whether xxx there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether xxx he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial-is the function of the prosecutor. We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecutors job. The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly called preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge.
Sound policy supports this distinction. Otherwise, judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. The Separate Opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa in Roberts, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals stressed that the determination of the existence of probable cause properly pertains to the public prosecutor in the established scheme of things, and that the proceedings therein are essentially preliminary, prefatory and cannot lead to a final, definite and authoritative judgment of the guilt or innocence of the persons charged with a felony or a crime.[21] In Crespo vs. Mogul,[22] the Court emphasized the cardinal principle that the public prosecutor controls and directs the prosecution of criminal offenses thus:

It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or information, follow or not follow that presented

by the offended party, according to whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. It cannot be controlled by the complainant. Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by law, not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to the evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of their office. They have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation they become convinced that the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
In the same case, the Court added that where there is a clash of views between a judge who did not investigate and a fiscal who conducted a reinvestigation, those of the prosecutor should normally prevail:[23]

x x x x The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscals discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not prudent or even permissible for a Court to compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an information, if he finds that the evidence relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction. Neither has the Court any power to order the fiscal to prosecute or file an information within a certain period of time, since this would interfere with the fiscals discretion and control of criminal prosecutions. Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that grant the same commit no error. The fiscal may re-investigate a case and subsequently move for the dismissal should the re-investigation show either that the defendant is innocent or that his guilt may not be established beyond reasonable doubt. In a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the fiscals should normally prevail. x x x x.
Appeal as an Exercise of the Justice Secretarys Power of Control Over Prosecutors Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings. Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Section 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of the Code gives the secretary of justice supervision and control over the Office of the Chief Prosecutor and the Provincial and City Prosecution Offices. The scope of his

power of supervision and control is delineated in Section 38, paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of the Code:

(1) Supervision and Control. Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; xxxx.
Supplementing the aforequoted provisions are Section 3 of R.A. 3783 and Section 37 of Act 4007, which read:

Section 3. x x x x The Chief State Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief State Prosecutors, the Senior State Prosecutors, and the State Prosecutors shall x x x perform such other duties as may be assigned to them by the Secretary of Justice in the interest of public service.
xxx xxx xxx

Section 37. The provisions of the existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, whenever a specific power, authority, duty, function, or activity is entrusted to a chief of bureau, office, division or service, the same shall be understood as also conferred upon the proper Department Head who shall have authority to act directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify, or revoke any decision or action of said chief of bureau, office, division or service.
Supervision and control of a department head over his subordinates have been defined in administrative law as follows:[24]

In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform such duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency should be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts. As a rule, only after administrative remedies are exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed.

Appeal to the Secretary of Justice Is Not Foreclosed by the Ruling in Crespo In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals,[25] the Court clarified that Crespo[26] did not foreclose the power or authority of the secretary of justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases. The Court recognized in Crespo that the action of the investigating fiscal or prosecutor in the preliminary investigation is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor. Thereafter, it may be appealed to the secretary of justice. The justice secretarys power of review may still be availed of despite the filing of an information in court. In his discretion, the secretary may affirm, modify or reverse resolutions of his subordinates pursuant to Republic Act No. 5180, as amended,[27] specifically in Section 1 (d):

(d) x x x Provided, finally, That where the resolution of the Provincial or City Fiscal or the Chief State Prosecutor is, upon review, reversed by the Secretary of Justice, the latter may, where he finds that no prima faciecase exists, authorize and direct the investigating fiscal concerned or any other fiscal or state prosecutor to cause or move for the dismissal of the case, or, where he finds a prima facie case, to cause the filing of an information in court against the respondent, based on the same sworn statements or evidence submitted without the necessity of conducting another preliminary investigation.
Pursuant thereto, the Department of Justice promulgated Circular No. 7 dated January 25, 1990 governing appeals in preliminary investigation. Appeals under Section 2 are limited to resolutions dismissing a criminal complaint. However, Section 4 provides an exception: appeals from resolutions finding probable cause upon a showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion are allowed, provided the accused has not been arraigned. In the present case, petitioners appeal to the secretary of justice was given due course on August 26, 1992 pursuant to this Circular. On June 30, 1993, Circular No. 7 was superseded by Department Order No. 223; however, the scope of appealable cases remained unchanged:

SECTION 1. What May Be Appealed. -- Only resolutions of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor dismissing a criminal complaint may be the subject of an appeal to the Secretary of Justice except as otherwise provided in Section 4 hereof. Appeals from the resolutions of provincial/city prosecutors where the penalty prescribed for the offense charged does not exceed prisin correccional, regardless of the imposable fine, shall be made to the Regional State Prosecutors who shall resolve the appeals with finality, pursuant to Department Order No. 318 dated August 28, 1991 as amended by D.O. No. 34 dated February 4, 1992, D.O. No. 223 dated August

11, 1992 and D.O. No. 45 dated February 2, 1993. Such appeals shall also be governed by these rules. SEC. 4. Non-Appealable Cases; Exceptions.--No appeal may be taken from a resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor finding probable cause except upon showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion. Notwithstanding the showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, no appeal shall be entertained where the appellant had already been arraigned. If the appellant (is) arraigned during the pendency of the appeal, x x x appeal shall be dismissed motu proprio by the Secretary of Justice. An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause, however, shall not hold the filing of the information in court.
Apart from the foregoing statutory and administrative issuances, the power of review of the secretary of justice is recognized also by Section 4 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 4. Duty of investigating fiscal.--x x x x

xxx xxx xxx

If upon petition by a proper party, the Secretary of Justice reverses the resolution of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the fiscal concerned to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information.
This appeal rests upon the sound discretion of the secretary of justice arising from his power of supervision and control over the prosecuting arm of the government, not on a substantial right on the part of the accused as claimed by petitioner.

Appeal Did Not Divest the Trial Court of Jurisdiction Where the secretary of justice exercises his power of review only after an information has been filed, trial courts should defer or suspend arraignment and further proceedings until the appeal is resolved. Such deferment or suspension, however, does not signify that the trial court is ipso facto bound by the resolution of the secretary of justice. Jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution by the secretary of justice to withdraw the information or to dismiss the case.

Judicial Review of the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice Judicial power is defined under the 1987 Constitution as the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. Such power includes the determination of whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.[28] Under this definition, a court is without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the President. It may, however, look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion. Judicial review of the acts of other departments is not an assertion of superiority over them or a derogation of their functions. In the words of Justice Laurel in Angara vs. Electoral Commission:[29]

x x x [W]hen the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument sources and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed judicial supremacy which properly is the power of the judicial review under the Constitution. x x x.
It is not the purpose of this Court to decrease or limit the discretion of the secretary of justice to review the decisions of the government prosecutors under him. In Crespo, the secretary was merely advised to restrict such review to exceptionally meritorious cases. Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, which recognizes such power, does not, however, allow the trial court to automatically dismiss the case or grant the withdrawal of the information upon the resolution of the secretary of justice. This is precisely the import of Crespo, Marcelo, Martinez vs. Court of Appeals[30] and the recent case of Roberts, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, which all required the trial court to make its own evaluation of the merits of the case, because granting the motion to dismiss or to withdraw the information is equivalent to effecting a disposition of the case itself.

The Marcelo and Martinez Cases Are Consistent In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals,[31] this Court ruled that, although it is more prudent to wait for a final resolution of a motion for review or reinvestigation from the secretary of justice before acting on a motion to dismiss or a motion to withdraw an information, a trial court nonetheless should make its own study and evaluation of said motion and not rely merely on the awaited action of the secretary. The trial court has the option to grant or deny the motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal, whether before or after the arraignment of the accused, and whether after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of

the secretary who reviewed the records of the investigation; provided that such grant or denial is made from its own assessment and evaluation of the merits of the motion. In Martinez vs. Court of Appeals,[32] this Court overruled the grant of the motion to dismiss filed by the prosecuting fiscal upon the recommendation of the secretary of justice because such grant was based upon considerations other than the judges own assessment of the matter. Relying solely on the conclusion of the prosecution to the effect that there was no sufficient evidence against the accused to sustain the allegation in the information, the trial judge did not perform his function of making an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case. Despite the pronouncement in Marcelo that a final resolution of the appeal to the Department of Justice is necessary, both decisions followed the rule in Crespo vs. Mogul: Once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its continuation rests on the sound discretion of the court. Trial judges are thus required to make their own assessment of whether the secretary of justice committed grave abuse of discretion in granting or denying the appeal, separately and independently of the prosecutions or the secretarys evaluation that such evidence is insufficient or that no probable cause to hold the accused for trial exists. They should embody such assessment in their written order disposing of the motion. The above-mentioned cases depict two extreme cases in complying with this rule. In Marcelo, the dismissal of the criminal action upon the favorable recommendation of the Review Committee, Office of the City Prosecutor, was precipitate in view of the pendency of private complainants appeal to the secretary of justice. In effect, the secretarys opinion was totally disregarded by the trial court. In contrast, in Martinez the dismissal of the criminal action was an erroneous exercise of judicial discretion as the trial court relied hook, line and sinker on the resolution of the secretary, without making its own independent determination of the merits of the said resolution.

No Grave Abuse of Discretion in theResolution of the Secretary of Justice In the light of recent holdings in Marcelo and Martinez; and considering that the issue of the correctness of the justice secretarys resolution has been amply threshed out in petitioners letter, the information, the resolution of the secretary of justice, the motion to dismiss, and even the exhaustive discussion in the motion for reconsideration all of which were submitted to the court -- the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to withdraw the information, based solely on his bare and ambiguous reliance on Crespo. The trial courts order is inconsistent with our repetitive calls for an independent and competent assessment of the issue(s) presented in the motion to dismiss. The trial judge was tasked to evaluate the secretarys recommendation finding the absence of probable cause to hold petitioner criminally liable for libel. He failed to do so. He merely ruled to proceed with the trial without stating his reasons for disregarding the secretarys recommendation.

Had he complied with his judicial obligation, he would have discovered that there was, in fact, sufficient ground to grant the motion to withdraw the information. The documents before the trial court judge clearly showed that there was no probable cause to warrant a criminal prosecution for libel. Under the established scheme of things in criminal prosecutions, this Court would normally remand the case to the trial judge for his or her independent assessment of the motion to withdraw the information. However, in order not to delay the disposition of this case and to afford the parties complete relief, we have decided to make directly the independent assessment the trial court should have done. The petitioner has attached as annexes to the present petition for review the information, which contains a complete and faithful reproduction of the subject letter, the resolution of the secretary of justice, the prosecutions motion for reconsideration of the trial courts Order of February 22, 1993, and even the private complainants opposition to said motion. The records below have been reproduced and submitted to this Court for its appreciation. Thus, a remand to the trial court serves no purpose and will only clog the dockets. We thus proceed to examine the substance of the resolution of the secretary of justice. The secretary reversed the finding of probable cause on the grounds that (1) the subject letter was privileged in nature and (2) the complaint was merely a countercharge. In every case for libel, the following requisites must concur:

(a) it must be defamatory; (b) (c) (d) it must be malicious; it must be given publicity; and the victim must be identifiable.

At the preliminary investigation stage, these requisites must show prima facie a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused probably committed it. A cursory reading of the information immediately demonstrates a failure on the part of the complainant to establish the foregoing elements of libel. Every defamatory imputation, even if true, is presumed malicious, if no good intention or justifiable motive for making it is shown. There is malice when the author of the imputation is prompted by personal ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person who claims to have been defamed. [33] In this case however, petitioners letter was written to seek redress of proper grievance against the inaccurate distribution and payment of professional fees and against unfair treatment in the Nuclear Medicine Department of the Philippine Heart Center. It is a qualified privileged communication under Article 354(1) of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

ART. 354. Requirement of publicity. -- Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases: 1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
xxx xxx The rule on privileged communication is that a communication made in good faith on any subject matter in which the communicator has an interest, or concerning which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contains incriminatory matter which, without the privilege, would be libelous and actionable. Petitioners letter was a private communication made in the performance of a moral duty on her part. Her intention was not to inflict an unjustifiable harm on the private complainant, but to present her grievance to her superior. The privileged nature of her letter overcomes the presumption of malice. There is no malice when justifiable motive exists; and in the absence of malice, there is no libel. We note that the information itself failed to allege the existence of malice. Thus, we agree with the ruling of the secretary of justice:[34] xxx

x x x (T)he subject letter was written to bring to the attention of the Director of the Philippine Heart Center for Asia and other responsible authorities the unjust and unfair treatment that Dr. Ledesma was getting from government employees, and the subject letter is a complaint x x x on a subject matter in which respondent has an interest and in reference to which she has a duty to question the same is definitely privileged (US vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 131). Moreover, in Ang vs. Castro, 136 SCRA 455, the Supreme Court, citing Santiago vs. Calvo, 48 Phil. 922, ruled that a communication made in good faith upon any subject matter in which the party making the communication has an interest or concerning which he has a duty is privileged although it contains incriminatory or derogatory matter which, without the privilege, would be libelous and actionable. The follow-up letter sent by respondent to the director of the PHCA, is a direct evidence of respondents righteous disposition of following the rule of law and is a clear indication that her purpose was to seek relief from the proper higher authority xxx. The same interpretation should be accorded the civil and administrative complaints which respondent filed against complainants. They are mere manifestations of her earnest desire to pursue proper relief for the alleged injustice she got from complainants. If she was motivated by malice and ill-will in sending the subject

communication to the Director of the PHCA, she would not have sent the second letter and filed the administrative and civil cases against complainants.
In Alonzo, the settled rule is that, when a public officer, in the discharge of his or her official duties, sends a communication to another officer or to a body of officers, who have a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of the communication, such communication does not amount to publication within the meaning of the law on defamation.[35] Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after it has been written, known to someone other than the person to whom it has been written. [36] The reason for such rule is that a communication of the defamatory matter to the person defamed cannot injure his reputation though it may wound his self-esteem. A mans reputation is not the good opinion he has of himself, but the estimation in which others hold him.[37] In this case, petitioner submitted the letter to the director of said hospital; she did not disseminate the letter and its contents to third persons. Hence, there was no publicity and the matter is clearly covered by paragraph 1 of Article 354 of the Penal Code. Further, we note that the information against petitioner was filed only on July 27, 1992 or one year after June 27, 1991, the date the letter was sent. It is obviously nothing more than a countercharge to give Complainant Torres a leverage against petitioners administrative action against him. Ineluctably, Judge Asuncions denial of the motion to withdraw the information and the reconsideration thereof was not only precipitate but manifestly erroneous. This is further compounded by the fact that he did not explain his grounds for his denial inasmuch as he did not make an independent assessment of the motion or the arguments in the resolution of the secretary of justice. All in all, such rash action did not do justice to the sound ruling in Crespo vs. Mogul upon which, ironically, he supposedly rested his action, or to the directive in Marcelo and Martinez where this Court required trial courts to make an independent assessment of the merits of the motion. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Motion to Withdraw the Information dated February 17, 1993 filed before the trial court is GRANTED. No costs. SO ORDERED.