0 1114452 B E C 78

F I AYSYBASSY T?HRAN CY:CV\AASB

10 S E C S T A T E hrASHDC N I A C T I M M E D I A T E 2140
RT CLEAR: NONE
YO H F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 12102 D I S T R ~ O L - ^ ~ ^ ^ PCM
OR ADM SY-2
E.O. 12065: GDS 12-11-84 (NAAS.C.W.1 OR-M A F O S I PM S H I P
TAGS:, P I N S , P I N T , I R T A B E DAO E C 2
SUBJ: SECURITY/POLITICAL SITUATION REPCRT, EEC.
1. A S O F 18B0, S I T U A T I O N . I N TEHRAN I S GENERALLY Q U I E T .

2. WE HAVE hUMBER O F R E P O R T S T N 4 T L E T T ARE 2 H O ' - E I N I FORCES I R R I -

T A T E E AN! F R - J S T R A I E I BY P E A C E A B L E MATURE O F I E V O N S T S A T I O N S I E C .
1 1 ANDARE U R S I N ? T R I M DAY O F A C T I O f F0.1 D S C . 12 I N H O P E O?
C A U S I N G C O N F R C K T A T I O N . SAME S O U R C E S HAVE T O L D US THAT L E A D I N G
CLERGY F I G U R E S HAVE E I S A S S O C I A T E E T H E f S E L V E S FROM T H I S CALL T O
A C T I O N AND A R E P A R T I C U L A R L Y ANNOYED BY A T T E M P T O F EXTREY! L E F T
TO S T I P U P V I O I E N C E .
3. AMBASSADOR ZAKEDI T O L D AMBASSADOR T H A T HE DOUBTS E X T B E I I S T S
WILL B E ABLE T O G E T MUCH GOING ON E E C . 12. H E A L S O S A I I THAT
A F T E R CURFEW T O N I G H T T H E M I L I T A R Y FORCES W I L L MOTE BACÇ I N T O
T H E I R NORMAL P L A C E S I N T H E C I T Y . M I L I T A R Y S O U R C E .IAS COMFIRMED
THAT T H I S I S CURBENT I N T E N T I O N O F M A R T I A L LAW A U T H O H I T I F S .
4. FMBASSY W I L L B E OPEN P E C . 12. V E A R E I S S U I N Z FOLLOWING
A D V I S O R Y T O AMERICAN COMMUNITY:
'A. TOIAY'S EEMONSTRATIONS WERE P E A C E F U L , B U T T E N S I O N S ARE H I G H .
B. T H E R E MAY B E MORE P O L I T I C A L A C T I V I T Y TOMORROW.
C. E X E R C I S E EXTREME C A U T I O N I N ANY MOVE1ENT OUXSI-EE YOUR
R E S I E E N C E S DURING COURSE O F T H E DAY T O M R 2 O W . S U L L I V A N
BT
#2102

NNNN
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 12102
 C O N P I D E N
0 1314012 DEC 7 8 CHPGE: ST4TE 12/12/78
FM AWEMEASST TEHRAN APPRV : DCI: CWNAAS
TO RUEEC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE DRTTD: POL;JDSTEMPEL;LA6
INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DKABI 179 CLBAR :1. FOLiSBLAMSItK
RUQMGU/AMEMEASSY ANKARA 4178 2.ECON; C T H L O R ( C ~ T B
RUEHCR/USINT BAGHDAD 0839 IB)
RUFHOL/4MEMBASSY BOhN 12'27 3. SRF(D3AFT)
RUQMDH/AMCONSUL EHAHRAN 1908 DISTR: ¥EOt- AMB DCf
RUQMOD/AMEMBiSSY DOHA 0638 ECOH-2 PM USICÃ
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI OR ADMIN ST2
RUSBQD/ACiEMBASST ISLAMABAD 3637 AFOSI DAO SMiR.
RUQMRA/AMSMBASST JIDDA 3866 740R ISFA
RUSBLK/AMEPBASST KABUL 5024
RUQMKM/AMEMEASSY KHARTOUM 0264 RF//9
RUQMSW/AMEMBASST KCWAIT 4753
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4065
RUQMAM/AMEMBASST MANAMA 1196
RUEHMO/AMEPBASSY MOSCOW 1301
RLIQMMI/AMEMBASST MUSCAT 0629
,RUSBAE/AMEMBASST NEW DELE1 3289
YRUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3495
RUMJPG/USLO PEKING 0191
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY HOME 1172
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0791
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN G E
BT
C 0 N N I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 TEHRAN 12167
S.O. 12065: GDS 12-13-84 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINT, I S
SUBJECT: WHERE WE ARE HOW: OPPOSITION PROGRAM AND

REP: TEHRAN 12096

SUMMARY: BOTH OPPOSITION AND 301 ASSESSING THEIR RESPEC-
TIVE POSITIONS AMIDST M U D EUPHORIA OF RELIEF TEAT ASHURA
D I D NOT PRODUCE EXPECTED VIOLENT CONFRONTATION. KEY
QUESTIONS VILL BE HOW GOVERNMENT HANDLES ANNOUNCED REIN-
STATEMENT OF MARTIAL LAW, AND WHETHSR OPPOSITION CAN A5RES
AMONG SELVES ON CABINET PROPOSAL AND THEN REACH AGREEMENT
WITH SHAH ON HI3 CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE AND CONTROL OF THE
ARMY. OFPOSITIOK SI-ETING TO DEVELOP SITUATION WHERE IT
COULD EISCRBETLT EISTAVCS ITSBLF ?R01 SHOMI-1141 WITHOUT
E ~ S A V O W I ~ ~G I M . POTENTIAL FOR VIOLEXE BY BISCONTENTED
RADICALS REMAINS DISTINCT POSSIBILITY. END SUMMARY.
1 . SUMMART OF 17-POINT OPPOSITION PB03RAM GIVEN RSYTSL
D O E S NOT INCLUDE NUANCES OF TULL PRESENT.ITIOH, SOME O?
WHICH MAT SE IMPORTANT IN SUtSEQUENT MANEUVSRIN5. MAN'IFSSTO
WAS APPkRENTLT DRAFTED FOR DEC 10 MAICH. BUT WAS FULLY
PROCLAIMED AT DEC 11 EVENT. TSANSLATION OF MAIN POINTS
FOLLOWS: 1. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI IS Oil!? LBADES, WHATEVSS KE
ASKS WE WILL CAR9-f OUT. THIS PARCH IS A VOTE O? CO!!r"ir?vCE
I N KROMEIII: 2. TH3APPAEATUS OF Ti-S GOVEBHt-iii!ii'4L DICTATC!R-
SEI'P MUST EE OVEBTHROWN AVD POWER TIANSFERRFD TO THF ??0?LEi
3. T H S R U L E OF ISLAMIC SOCIAL AND I:J?I'/IDUAL JL'STICE ?',LIST
BE ESTASLISHED ON THE BASIS OF THE TOTES OF !?;" PSOPI,?.
I
 C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 1 2 1 6 7 / 1
(NOTE: T H I S I S NOT RPT NOT A CALL FOB AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC
PER REFTEL.); 4 . THIS I S HUMAM RIGHTS DAY. WE ASK FOR THE
HUMAN RIGHTS WHICH OUR STRUGGLE EAS SOUGHT; 5. THE IMPERIA
ISM OF EAST AND VEST MUST BE REMOVED. THE IRANIAN PEOPLE
K I L L CONTINUE AND EXTIND THEIR RELATIONS WITH OTHER NATIONS.
,(NOTE; T H I S DOES NOT CALL FOR ELIMINATION OF MILITARY

!s
OVEENMENT PER BEFTSL.)! 6. RELIGIOUS MINOSITIES AND C I T I -
ENS OF OTHSR COUNTRIES MAY CONTIN'JS TO STAY IN IRAN I F
HEY RESPECT ISLAMIC LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS; 7 . THE REAL
RSECOM AND RIGHTS OF WOMEN WILL BE ESSPECTED. WE SHALL
S E ALL THE POWER TEAT WOMEN IN IRAN CAN GIVE; 8. THE
BIGHTS OF WORKERS AND AGRICULfURAL WORKERS SHOULD BE
RESPECTED AND THEY SHOULD BENEFIT FROM WORK IN IRAN; 9.
PEOPLE SHOULD NOT MAXE MONEY FROM MONEY. THE EXPLOITATION
OF HUMAN BEINGS BY OTHERS SHOULD BE STOPPED. THE COLLECT-
ION OF WEALTH IN TH3 HANDS OF SOME PEOPLE AND THE PROPSRTY
O F OTHERS SHOULD BE REDISTRIBUTED; 1 0 . AGRICULTURE MUST BE
REFORMED AND IRAN'S ECONOMY MUST BE INDEPENDENT OF FOREIGN
INFLUENCE; 11. WE SUPPORI THE STRIKERS BOTH IN THE GOVERN-
MENT AND PRIVATE SECTORS. STRIKERS ARE A BLOW TO THE
REGIME. THEY HAVE NOT DAMAGED L I F E IN IRAN; 1 2 . PEOPLE
SHOULD COOPERATE FOR THEIR ESSENTIAL NEEDS AND TO PREVENT
PRICE INCREASES AND SHORTAGES; 13. BRINGING THE ARMY INTO
THE STREETS AND FLACING I T IN IRONT OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE
I S HIGH TREASON. WE ASK THE ARMY TO BE WITH THE PEOPLE
AND NOT AGAINST TEEM. (NOTE: NOTHING S A I D ABOUT SHOOTING
AT DEMONSTRATORS PSR REFTEL); 14. THE PROPAGANDA AND CLAIMS
O? THE REGIME ABOUT INTERNATIONNL COMMUNISTS INFLUENCING
THE STRUGGLE 0 7 THE IRANIAN PEOPLE I S FALSE. THE RUINING
OF PLACES WAS BEING DONE BY THE GOVERNMENT; 15. WE SALUTE
THE MARTYRS 0 7 THE IRANIAN STRUSGLE; 16. WE DEMAND HELEASE
OF ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS AND RETURN OF ALL THOSE WHO HAVE
LEFT THE COUNTRY ESCAUSE OF LACE OF ?REEDOM; 17. WE WILL
CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE UNTIL VICTORY. (NOTE; IN THE ORAL
EXPLANATION WHICH ?OLLOWED THE MULLAH'S READING T H I S LAST
POINT. THE STATEMENT WAS MADE THAT THE STRUGGLE WOULD

2. D E F I N I T I V E ASSESSMENT OF PAST TWO DATS I S NOT RPT NOT

BT
02167
NNNN
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 1 2 1 6 7 / 1
 C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 12167/2
0 1314012 DEC 78
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
T O R U E H C / S E C S T A T E WASBDC I M M E D I A T E 2179
I N F O ,RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1800
RUOMGU/AMEMBASST ANKARA 4179
R U E H C R / U S I N T BAGHDAD 0640-
~ ~ P E O T . / A ~ . E M B A S S BT O M N 1208
~UQMDH/AMCONSUL'DHAHRAN 190s
RUOMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0639
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU H I
OTSBQD/AMEMBASST ISLAMABAD 3638
RUQMRA/AMEMBASST J I D D A 3867
RUSBLK/AMEMBASST KABUL 5025
RUQMiiM/AMEMBASST KHARTOUM 0265
RUOMKW/AMEMBASSTKUWAIT 4754
R U D T C / A M E M B A S S Y L O N D O N 4066-
RUOMAM/AMEMIASST MANAMA 1197
MOSCOW
MUSCAT
,RUS'BAE/AMEMBASSTNEW D E L H I 3290
RUFNPS/AMSMBASST P A R I S 3496
HUMJPG/USLO P S K I N I 0192
SUFHRO/AKEMBlSSY ROME 1173
R U E K O / A M E M B A S S T TOKYO 0792
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN G E
IT
'KO N F I D E N T I A L S E C T I O N 02 TEHRAN 12167
Y E T P O S S I B L E . BUT I N I T I A L I M P L I C A T I O N S A R E C L E A R ; 4 ) AVOID-
ANCE O F V I O L E N C E ON TWO MARCH DAYS I S D E F I N I T E T R I U M P H FOR
T H O S E ON BOTH G O 1 AND MODERATE O P P O S I T I O N S I D E WHO COUNSELED
RESTRAINT. BOTH S I D E S B E L I E V E THEY " W O N . B ) RADICAL
F A C T I O N S WERE U P S E T T H A T T H E R E WAS V I R T U A L L Y NO V I O L E N C E
AND MAY MOVE T O CREATE SOME. V I R T U A L S I E 3 E S T A T E I N
I S F A H A N I S NOT R P T NOT ENCOCRAGING I N T H I S REGARD. C ) MASS
T E H R A N RALLY WAS NEARLY E N T I R E L Y P O L I T I C A L W I T H MERE L I P
S E R V I C E TO R E L I G I O N . I T WAS IMPRESSIVEDISPLAY OF MASS
' O R G A N I Z A T I O N A L S K I L L S O F NATIONAL F R O N T ( I N F ) AND S U R P R I S E D
IMOST OBSERVERS. D ) F A C T BLOODY CONFRONTATION D I D NOT R P T
' N O T OCCUR HAS BOUGHT T I M E F O R R E G I M E . G O 1 HAS S A I D I T W I L L
E N F O R C E M A R T I A L LAW "WITH D E T E R M I N A T I O N . E ) OPPOSITION I S
NOW G O I X G BACK T O I N T E R N A L B A S G A I N I N G T A B L E T O TRY AND
'HAMMER OUT C A B I N E T AND REGENCY C O U N C I L P R O P O S A L S A S A B A S I S
FOR N E G O T I A T I O N W I T H G O I . F ) ON T H E OTHER HAND, M A S S I V E
W H O WERE NOT AWARE OF BREADTH A N D DEPTH OF ANTI-SHAH
F E E L I N G S . SOME O F T H E S E WERE A L S O D I S P L E A S E D THAT GOVT
CHOSE TO P R O T E C T ONLY A P O R T I O N O F THE C I T Y W I T H T H E ARMY.
L E A V I N G O T H E R S T O T X E I R OWN D E V I C E S .
I
3 . THERE ARE SEVERAL MAJOR QUESTIONS A N D "IFS" FOR THE
I M M E D I A T SFUTURE. WILL GOI REINSTATE M A R T I A L LAW W I T H
H E A V Y HAND OR L I G H T TOUCH? I T I S C L E M G O 1 MUST MOVE T O
G E T S T R I K E R S B A C I T O WORK, C H I L D R E N BACK I N S C V O O L S , AND
R E G A I N CONTROL O F S T R E E T S . I ? T H I S CAN B E DONE W I T H F I R M -
NESS A N D FINESSE. SHAH'S S E A R C H TOR COALITION C O M B I N A T I O N
CAN GO FORWARD. MORE A Z G R E S S I V E A C T I O N COULD PROVEKE
R A D I C A L S T O MORE V I O L E N T CONPRONTATIOM. MANY M I L I T A R Y MEN
0 131401Z DEC 78
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
T O RUEHC/SBCSTATE WASHDC IMMEDI ATE 21
INFO HUQMBI/AMEMBASST ABU DHABI 1805
RUQMGU/AMEMBASST ANKARA 4183
RUEHCR/USINT B A G H U D 3843
RUFHOL/AKEfBtSST BONN 1210
RUQMDH/AMCONSUL EHAERAN 1912

RUQMKW/AMEMBASST K U W A I T 4 7 5 7
RUDTC/AMEMBASST LONDON 4071
RUQHAM/AMEMBASST MANAYA 1200
RUEHMO/AMEMEASST Moscow 1304
RUQMMT/AMEMBASST MUSCAT a633
RCSBAE/AMEMBASST NEW DELHI 3292
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3 5 0 0
RUMJPG/USLO PE<I Nd 5 1 M
RUFHRO/AMEMBASST ROVE 1176
RUEHKO/AMEMBASST TOKYO 0?9S
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VhIEINCEN G E
BT
C 0 N N I D E M T I A L SECTION 0 3 'TEHRAN 12167
COOL. EVEN I F THIS CAN BE DONE, HOWEVER, I T WILL NOT
ALLEVIATE SHORT R U N DISLOCATIONS, BOTH ECONOMIC (SEE
SEPTEL) AND POLITICAL. STRIKES CONTINUE. BANIING SYSTEM
IS IN SHAMBLES, OIL PRODUCTION REMAINS DOWN, AND EVEN I F
OPPOSITION PUTS FORWARD PROPOSALS, FlIRLT EXTENDED NEGOTIA-
TIONS WOULD HAVE TO ENSUE IF THEBE IS T O BE A FIT. SEEN
I N A B O V E CONTEXT. OPPOSITION m o m n IS INTERESTING
PROPOSAL. DESPITE RITUAL R E I T E R A T I O N THAT KHOMEINI IS
LEADER, PRG3RAM ITSELF IS CLEABLT MODERATE DOCUMENT WHICH.
WITH ONE EXCEPTION- DOES NOT R P T NOT CALL FOR EXTR!?.MIST

ACCORDING TO THREE DIFFERENT SOURCES, PROGRAM W A S DRAFTED

BY INF COMMITTEE. AND BOTH PROGRAM AND MARCHES ACROSS IRAN
BEAR MUCH STRONGER I N F I M P R I N T THAN RELIGIOUS INPUT.
EXCEPTION ON EXTREMZ POSITION IS POINT TWO, WHICH CALLS
FOR OVERTHROW O F APPARATUS OF G O V E R N M E M A L DICTATORSHIP.
ONE EMBASST SOURCE NOTES T H A T THIS IS LESS EXTREfE THAN
KHOMEINI'S CALL FOR E V D TO SHAH. WHILE N U A N C E M A T ESCAPE
MOST, IT DOES LEAVE SLIVER OF LIGHT FOR COMPROMISE, WHICH
IS MAIN HOPE OF MODERATES. BASIC STRATEGY OF MOgE MODERATE
RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR LEADERS IS TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM
ESTABLISHED 3 Y "SUCCESS" OF PAST TWO BATS' RALLIES AND COME
U P YITH CABINET LISTS T O PRESENT TO SHAH. WITHOUT DISAVOW-
ING KHOMEIMI. THEY PAVE TO RENDER HIM ISCREASINGLY
IRRELEVANT T O ACTUAL POLITICAL CHOICE. IF THIS PROCESS
BREAKS DOVi. OR VIOLENT ACTIVITY DISBUPTS C O N F E E A C E TABLE
WORI, PERSIAN POLITICAL N O N S Y S T E M W I L L C O N T I N U E T O LIMP
ALONG, tITX PFOSPECT TEAT SHARP CONFP.O'lTP.TION V5ICH NSARLT
ALL FEARED AT ASHURA PAT MERELY HAVE BEEN POSTPONED A FEW
FATS OR WEEKS. SULLIVAN
-7-
 C O N F I D E N T I A L
WANT TOUGHER S T A N C E , W H I L E R A D I C A L C R O U P S WERE U P S E T T H A T
MODERATES WOULD KOT L E T SOME O F THSM MARCH ON DEC 1 0 AND
E V E N 11, AND THAT PARADE O R G A I I Z P R S D I D NOT S E E K GREATER
CONFRONTATION. COMBINATION O F TWO ?ACTORS COULD PROVE
VERY V O L A T I L E , P A H T I C U L A R L Y I F ARMY MOVES F O R C E F U L L Y 1 G A I N S T
CURREW V I O L A T O R S OVER NEXT FEW E V E N I N G S . ON T H E OTHER HANE,
UiMY CANNOT B E TOO S O F T OR I M P E T U S T O C O M P I O M I S E W I L b SLOW
AND O P P P S I T I O N W I L L RETURN T O EXTREME DEMANDS.
4. SECOND MAJOR Q U E S T I O N I S WHETHER O P P O S I T I O N CAN GET I T S
A C T TOGBTHER FOR A U N I F I E D APPROACH T O S H A H / G O I . THERE I S
E V I D E N C E THAT L E A E E R S O F MARCH C A L L E D F O R TWO DAYS O F NO
DEMONSTRATIONS. M E E T I N G S AMONG MAJOR O P P O S I T I O N F I G U S E S
ARE G O I N G ON TODAY, DEC 12 AND DEC 13, T O TRY HAMMERING OUT
P R O P O S E D C A B I N E T L I S T S AND NAMES TOR P R O J E C T E D REGENCY
COUNCIL. RUMOR H A E FLOWN AROUND T O d N THAT S A N J A B I R E L E A S E
DEC 7 WAS R E S U L T O F DEAL OVER P R O P O S E D C O A L I T I O N C A E I N C T ,
BUT T H I S A P P E A R S F A L S E . B A S I C PROBLEM R E M A I N S THAT O P P O S I -
T I O N S A Y S P U B L I C L Y I T DOES NOT WANT SHAH. EVEN I N C O N S T I T U -
TIONAL ROLE. P R I V A T E L Y , I N ? LEADERS A G R E E SHAH I S PROBABLY
N E C E S S A R Y , BUT T E E N D I S C I i 3 S I O N S BREAK DOWN OVER WHO CONTROLS
ARMY, S E A H OR P R O J E C T E D G O I . AT T H E MOMENT, D E S P I T E WHAT
I S COMING T O B E CALLED "TIE M I R A C L E O F MOHARRAM, OPPOSI-
T I O N AND G O 1 P O S I T I O N S S T I L L REMAIN MUTUALLY E X C L U S I V E .
NEXT FEW DAYS SHOULD O F F E R SOME H I N T S , HOWEVER, WHETHER
EVENTS O F P A S T WFEKEND M I G H T NOT H A T E D E V E L O P E D MORE
F L E X I B I L I T Y I N P O S I T I O N S O F BOTH S I D E S .

I
5 S I T U A T I O N FOR I M M E D I A T E F U T U R E T H E R E F O R E O F F E R S BOTH
DANGER AND HOPE. DANGER I S THAT R A D I C A L S W I L L I N S T I G A T E
V I O L E N T I N C I D E N T S V H I C H W I L L DRAW MODERATES A T T E N T I O N
VAT TROM RATHER P L E A S A N T F E E L I N G O F S U C C E S S AND PROVOKE
EVERE M I L I T A R Y REACTION. H O P E I S THAT O P P O S T I O N CAN G E T
N I F I E D P R O P O S A L READY T O MOVE FORWARD T O C O A L I T I O N GOVERN-
NT REASONABLY SOON ANDALL ELEMENTS CAN M A I N T A I N T H E I R
 CONFIDENTIAL
CONSULATE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Isfahan, I r a n

CONFIDiMtIAL
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Mr. Ebrahim Peshavar, Director, NIKT Isfahan

David c. McGaffey, consul, Isfahan

Date 6 Place: NIRT Isfahan; Dec.14.1978
Subject : Current Disturbances i n sfa ah an; Pro-Shah

M r . Peshavar i s newly assigned t o Isfahan; I c a l l e d on him a t our

e a r l i e s t mutual convenience. He appeared pleased t o meet me, and
discussed f r e e l y t h e current s i t u a t i o n . He i s young (about 35-40);
a graduate of c a t h o l i c u. a t Wash., D.C.;and has previously worked f o r
B I R ~i n Tehran. His English i s e x c e l l e n t , b u t a l i t t l e rusty.

He expressed h i s opinion t h a t t h e recent t r o u b l e s i n Isfahan were

well organized by a small group of Marxists, who managed t o confuse
and enflame t h e unhappy population of Isfahan. When asked, he agreed thafa
t h e general population a r e unhappy with conditions and with t h e regime,
b u t not to t h e p o i n t of violence by themselves; when violence i s
begun by t h e small groups, they a r e caught up i n mob fever and c a r r y on
t h e violence. He added," it i s t h e s e innocents who a r e caught when t h e
troops a r r i v e - t h e marxists a r e c a r e f u l t o b e gone w e l l i n advance."
I asked about t h e pro-Shah demonstrations, one of which was passing
our window a t t h e time. He commented they were mostly farmers and workera
from t h e S t e e l M i l l , brought i n f o r t h e purpose, and excited about gettjjfc
back a t t h e "snooty c i t y people", b u t s a i d t h a t they were i n f a c t saying
t h i n g s many I s f a h a n i s would say, i f they were not a f r a i d of r e p r i s a l s .
Even so, some I s f a h a n i s have joined i n , not only r e l a t i v e s o f s o l d i e r s
and government o f f i c i a l s . H e then dispatched a mobile TV-camera team t o
cover t h e demonstration. I asked i f it was t r u e t h a t h i s teams had
covered demonstration toppling t h e s h a h ' s s t a t u e s , and had provided it
t o s e c u r i t y f o r c e s f o r i n v e s t i g a t i o n . He s a i d t h a t it was covered, t h a t
SIRr had decided not t o run it on t e l e v i s i o n , and t h a t such f i l m s a r e
r o u t i n e l y shared with "other government agencies." He admitted, however.
t h a t he was concerned about p o s s i b l e r e p r i s a l s on h i s camera men a s t h i s
becomes widely known, and asked t h a t I not spread t h e word.
He then launched i n t o a broad discussion of t h e troubles, and asked,
somewhat r h e t o r i c a l l y , why t h e U.S., such a good f r i e n d of I r a n , was n o t
doing more t o help. He s a i d t h a t when he looks a t U.S. a s s i s t a n c e , he
s e e s words and m i l i t a r y programs, b u t no a s s i s t a n c e i n t h e s o c i a l f i e l d ,
which i s t h e fount of a l l I r a n ' s c u r r e n t troubles. I provided a capsule
h i s t o r y o f development a s s i s t a n c e , and spoke of U.S. involvement i n
I r a n i a n education, f i n a n c i a l planning, planning f o r land reform, s o c i a l
reform theory, and s i m i l a r programs, and pointed o u t t h a t changes throgfiy
CONFIDENTIAL . +
 CONFIDENTIAL

-2-
these programs, which perhaps d i d not take t h e I r a n i a n c u l t u r a l
c o n s t r a i n t s s u f f i c i e n t l y i n t o account, have contributed t o I r a n ' s
current turmoil. I s t a t e d t h a t recent thinking emphasizes t h a t each
country and c u l t u r e must determine i t s own solutions, and then ask
f o r technology o r o t h e r a s s i s t a n c e t o carry out t h e i r progrwr. "help"
from outside t h e c u l t u r e could,in f a c t , exacerbate problems. I assured
him, however, t h a t t h e U.S. values I r a n highly, and stands ready t o
a s s i s t when I r a n determines i t s needs. This argument appeared new t o
him, and appealing.
I then asked him about t h e f e a s i b i l i t y of an English-language
l o c a l broadcast, providing t h e t e x t o r a summary of Martial Law
announcements, l o c a l news, and film f i l l e r s on a l o c a l basis. I
pointed out t h a t with h i s command of English, he could maintain
control over t h e contents, and provide a r e a l s e r v i c e t o t h e foreign
community. After discussion, he agreed, and iiranediatly got telephone
authorization from NIBT-Tehran, on condition he accept r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .
He asked t h a t I nominate two persons, a man and a woman, t o do t h e
a c t u a l broadcasting and c o r r e c t t h e English t e x t f o r tdium and granroer
only, and suggest a time. The program i s now planned t o begin on Dec.
16, a t 7:00 p.m. d a i l y .

E m e n t : Mr. Peshavar was c l e a r l y speaking from a government position,

blaming small groups, and searching f o r some o u t s i d e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , i f
i n a f r i e n d l y manner toward t h e U.S. H i s a t t i t u d e , however, was much
more f l e x i b l e than h i s pkedecessor's, o r of o t h e r o f f i c i a l s I have spoken
t o , i n t h a t he recognized t h e extent of t h e popular discontent, and
appeared t o b e groping toward solutions, r a t h e r than j u s t relying on
blame. This new a t t i t u d e has been reported by o t h e r s recently, and to
t h e extent it i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of government f i g u r e s , i s a healthy .
development.

Dist. Eaib. TEHRAN: POL

I CA
CONS
DO*
Amconsul TABRIZ
Amconsul s h i r a z
Dept. of s t a t e : NEA/IRU
IN~RNA
IN~OIIJB

CONFIDENTIAL

-10-
 The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D C 20505

Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

Dear Bill,
I'm afraid I've been completely caught up i n the swirl
of SCC meetings on Iran since my return. However, I did
want t o take advantage of t h i s brief post-Ashura respite
to thank you, your wife, and a l l the fine members of the
Mission for the hospitality and support given t o Bob Earl
and myself during our few days with you i n Tehran. Although.
the timing of the Shah briefing was quite fortuitous. it
couldn't have come a t a better time for me t o obtain some
first-hand views of the situation.
My special thanks for your hosting the cocktail party,
which enabled me t o have some less formal conversations with
several Iranian military and SAVAK people.
Warmest regards,

? ' 5 (*.
Robert R. Bowie

The Honorable William Sullivan

American Ambassador
Tehran, Iran
ACTION:
SHIR-3
INFO:
AMB
DCM
POL-2
EC-2
PH
OR
ADM
I CA
ISF
TABR
CHRON
16lGMH

E0

SUBJECT: COitSUPTION I N IRAN

I
--
SUMMARY:
- -- C o r r u p t i o n h a s become a m a j o r p o l i t i c a l
i s s u e . P e s p i t e n u b l i c i n d i g n a t i o n , however, t h e r e
seems t o be l i t t l e mood f o r f u n d x m i . ~ n t a lre-form. .
R a t h e r , r e v e n g e a g a i n s t i h o s e p r c s i ~ r ~ e tdo b e g u i l t y ,
i s uppermost j n mind, w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e p o t e n t i a l
f o r a n e v e n t u a l r e - e m e r g e n c e and t o l e r a t i o n o f
t h e k'Ind o f c o r r u p t i o n which h a s f i g u r e d s o p r o m i -
n e h t l y i n I r a n i a n economic a c t i v i t y h e r e t o c o r e .
Ambitious p o l i t i c i a n s , n o t cxc?uding t h e S h a h , '
may b e tempted t o e x p l o i t t h i s s i t x a t i u n , b u t
w h i l e t h e i s s u e u f c o r r u p t i o n i t s e l l ' imy p r o v e
t r a n s i t o r y , i t i s not l i k e l y t o disappear without
f i r s t p r o f o u n d l y s h a k i n g I r a n ' s most b a s i c p o l i -
t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n - - t h e monarchy. ESI) SUhftdARY
c o r r u p t i o n h a s become a m a j o r p o l i t i c a l i s s u e i n I r a n
i n r e c e n t weeks, w i t h much o f t h e c r i t i c i s m of t h e Shah
b e i n g couched i n ' t e r m s o f t h e c o r r u p t a c t i v i t i e s o f
some o f h i s c l o s e s t a d v i s o r s und even :tiei:ibers o f h i s
f a m i l y . The o u t r a g e which h a s emerged a g a i n s t t h e phen-
omenon i s c e r t a i n l y w i d e s p r e a d , c u t t i n g a c r o s s - s o c i a l
a n d economic c l a s s l i n e s , and i t a n p e a r s t o h e d c e n l y
f e l t . F u r t h e r , c o r r u p t i o n , a s t h e term is u s u a l l y de-
f i n e d , h a s u n q u e s t i o n a b l y b e e n a p e r v a s i v e f a c t of- I r a n -
i a n l i f e , a n d t h e m a g n i t u d e o f some o f the, r i p - o f f s

CONHDENTIAI,
 Shiraz A-35
CONFIDENTIAL
h h i c h hiive been i n t h e neh5 o f l a t e i s i m p r e s s i v e by a n y
s t a n d a r d . I t was p e r h a p s i ~ i c vtia b l e t h a t t h e v a s t amounts
u f money i n v o l v e d i n many of t h e g r a n d i o s e p r o j e c t s u n d e r -
t a k e n i n I r a n d u r i n g t h e l a s t d e c a d e would c o n s t i t u t e temp-
t a t i o n s f o r i l l i c i t g a i n s t h a t . c o u l d n o t b e r e s i s t e d . Kone-
t h e l e s s , t h e p r o s p e c t f o r fundamcnt:il c h a n g e seems s l i g h t
although the p o l i t i c a l consequences o f c u r r e n t a n t i - c o r r u p -
t i o n s e n t i m e n t may i n d e e d p r o v e f a r - r e a c h i n g .
I t i s a <iad f a c t t h a t i t h a s n o t t h e d i s c o v e r y o f t h e e x -
i s t e n c e o f c o r r u p t i o n which prompted r e a c t i o n a g a i n s t i t ,
but r a t h e i a perception t h a t t h e f r u i t s o f corruption have
been u n e v e n l y (and t h u s presumably u n j u s t l y ) d i s t r i b u t e d .
t h a t many s e n i o r government o f f i c i a l s a n d b u s i n e s s m e n h a d
t h e i r hand'> i n t h e p u b l i c t i l l was f o r y e a r s t a k e n f o r g r a n t -
e d , b u t t h e r e was n o s i g n i f i c a n t p o p u l a r r e a c t i o n t o s u c h
a c t i v i t i e 5 a s l o n g a s t h e r e seemed t o b e p l e n t y f o r e v e r y -
o n e . J u s t a s t h e r e was l i t t l e i n c e n t i v e i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
t o do s o m e t h i n g a b o u t t h e 1 9 t h c e n t u r y r o b b e r b a r o n s w h i l e
t h e p o p u l a r myth t h a t anyone c o u l d h i m s e l f become a r o b b e r
b o r o n h a d c u r r e n c y , TOSI I r a n i a n s , h a r d l y immune t o t h e l u r e
of a f a s t r i a l , w e w f o r l o n g u n d i s t u r b e d by t h e q u e s t i o n -
a b l e f o r t u n e s t h a t were b c i n g made a r o u n d them. I n d e e d , t h e
phenomenon more o f t e n t h a n n o t was r e g a r d e d a s a h o p e f u l
o n e , a n d many I r a n i d n s t o o k a k i n d of c h a u v i n i s t i c p r i d e i n
some o i t h e i r . c o u n t r y m e n V s a b i l i t y t o g e t r i c h o v e r n i g h t .
The t u r n i n g p o i n t i n t h i s r e g a r d o c c u r e d w i t h t h e growing
r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t I r a n ' s wealth i n f a c t has l i m i t s . This be-
came i n c r e a s i n g l y a p p a r e n t toward t h e e n d o f 1977 -and i n
e a r l y 1978 a s t h o n a t i o n a l economy s l o w e d a l m o s t t o a h a l t .
I t was b r o u g h t home i n a v a r i e t y o f ways, b u t t h e p e r s i s t -
e n c y w i t h which t h e s h a r e o f most I r a n i a n s ' p e r s o n a l income
r e q u i r e d L'or b a s i c n e c e s s i t i e s t e n d e d t o r e m a i n l a r g e o r
even i n c ' r z a s c d e s p i t e s t e a d y s a l a r y i n c r e m e n t : p e r h a p s h a d
t h e most t e l l i n g e f f e c t . At t h e same t i m e , t h e p r o c l i v i t y
f o r c o n s p i c u o u s consumption among t h o s e who had p r o f i t e d
i i b s o l u t u l y a s w e l l a s r e l a t i v e l y d u r i n g t h e boom y e a r s drew
p o p u l a r a t t e n t i o n t o a c e n t r a l f a c t o f r a p i d economic d e v e l -
opment, i . e . , t h a t e v e r y t h i n g e l s e b c i n g e q u a l , e c o n o n ~ i c i n -
e q u a l i t i e s t e n d t o b e e x a c e r b a t e d by s u c h d e v e l o p m e n t . l f h e r e -
as t h e o v e r n i g h t a c q u i s i t i o n o f p e r s o n a l f o r t u n e s had o n c e
beon r e g a r d e d a s i n d i c a t i v e o f I r a n ' s economic dynamism,
s u c h f o r t u n e s a r e now s e e n a s e v i d e n c e o f t h e s y s t e m g o n e
1-,rang; p r a c t i c e s f o r m e r l y viewed a s no more t h z n s h r ? i \ d a n d *
even p e r v e r s e l y 1 a u J a t o r y . and which o f t e n I i g u r e d p r o m i -
i e n t l y i n t h e in:~kin".o f t h e s e f o r t u n e s , a r e .1ow c a l l e d c o r -
 S h i r a z A-35

CONFIDENTIAL 3
rupt .
While t h e p o p u l a r mood f o r t h e moment i s one o f r i g h t e o u s
i n d i g n a t i o n , i t d o e s n o t a p p e a r , however, t o be p a r t i c u -
l a r l y b e n t on r e v o l u t i o n : P o p u l a r demands a r e l e s s f r e q u e n t -
l y f o r f u n d a m e n t a l r e f o r m t h a n f o r r e v e n g e . Even a man s u c h
a s f o r m e r Prime M i n i s t e r A l i \ m i n i a p p e a r s more i n t e n t on
b l o o d t h a n s o c i a l e q u i t y i n t h e ; d i s t r i b u t i o n of ecoiiomic
w e a l t h . He r e c e n t l y s u g g e s t e d t h a t i n view o f t h e t h o u s a n d s
o f s c h o o l c h i l d r e n who had b e e n k i l l e d f o r r e a d i n g p r o s c r i b -
ed l i t e r a t u r e ( s i c ) , it. was n o t t o o much t o a s k t h a t a h u n -
drcci p l u t o c r a t s b e h a n g e d . The i m p l i c a t i o n o f h i s remark
nab t h a t i t m a t t e r e d l e s s t h a t t h e s e i n d i v i d u a l s a c t u a l l y
be g u i l t y o f wrongdoing t h a n i t d i d t h a t t h e y be u e r c e i v e d
a s b e i n g g u i l t y . I n o t h e r words, t h e p r i m a r y o b j e c t i v e o f
s u c h a n e x e r c i s e would n o t be t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f c o r r u p t i o n
b u t r a t h e r p l a c a t i n g p u b l i c i r e . I n d e e d , h i n i went on t o
add t h a t c o r r u p t i o n , l i k e t h e p o o r , may a l w a y s be w i t h I r a n .
He conceded t h a t e v e n when h e was Prime M i n i s t e r h e h a d b e e n
o n l y "50% s u c c e s s f u l " i n e l i m i n a t i n g i t , and suggested t h a t
i t m i g h t be n e c e s s a r y t o t o l e r a t e i t u p t o a u o i n t . How
e l s e , h e a s k e d , c o u l d p e o p l e l i v i n g on t h e e c r n o m i c m a r g i n
be e x p e c t e d t o make e n d s m e e t ?
The k i n d o f c o r r u p t i o n Amini a p p a r e n t l y i s p r e p a r e d t o c o n -
done i s a common f e a t u r e o f many p r e - m o d e r n economies. 1.t
i s sometimes r e f e r e d t o a s p r e h e n d a l i s n t t o d i s t i n g u i s h i t
from t h e v e r s i o n more f a m i l i a r i n f u l l y i n d u s t r i a l i z e d
s o c i e t i e s . The p r e b e n d r e p r e s e n t s t h e d i f f e r e n c e . between
t h e r e a l m a r k e t v a l u e o f a good o r s e r v i c e a n d i t s nominal
v a l u e a r b i t r a r i l y a s s i g n e d , u s u a l l y by t h e government. I n
such c i r c u m s t a n c e s , payment of t h i s d i f f e r e n c e f r e q u e n t l y
d e t e r m i n e s w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e good w i l l b e d e l i v e r e d o r
t h e s e r v i c e r e n d e r e d a t a l l , a n d t h u s may b e r e g a r d e d a s
aft i n d i s p e n s a b l e f e a t u r e o f t h e economy. I n many r e s p e c t s ,
t h i s h a s been t r u e i n I r a n where a r b i t r a r y , o f t e n u n r e a l i s -
t i c p r i c e s d e t e r m i n e d by government f i a t r a t h e r t h a n m a r k e t
f o r c e s h a v e c o n t r i b u t e d t o w i d e s p r e a d " c o r r u p t i o n . " Under-
t h e - h o a r d payments c a n and sometimes h a v e been i n t e r p r e t e d
a s m o r a l l y r e p r e h e n s i b l e a c t s , b u t t h e o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e may
have been p a r a l y s i s o f t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n s y s t e m . L a c k i n g a ,
more e f f i c i e n t mechanism, " c o r r u p t i o n " p r o v i d e d t h e l u b r i c a n t
which e n a b l e d t h e I r a n i a n economic m a c h i n e r y t o f u n c t i o n .
'rhe i m p o r t a n c e o f c o r r u p t i o n ' s once c a t a l y t i c r o l e i n t h e
I r a n i d n econoi;} i s n?h d p p a r c n t I n t h e f a c e o f t h e p u b l i c
condemnation of i t t h e r e s p o n s e o f t h o s e iiho o t h e r w i s e
COXF TDLNl'HL
 Shiraz A - .?5
CONFIDENTIAL 4

would be expected to be on the take has been to hunker down.

Virtual cessation of entrepreneurial ventures (or in some
instances transfer of such efforts out of Iran) and an even
greater degree of bureaucratic unresponsiveness than form-
erly pertained have been the inevitable results. Because
few Iranians seem genuinely interested in a critical exan-
ination of the function of corruption i n Iranian society,
prefering retribution instead, the temptation to provide
the public with symbolic culprits could prove irresistible
to ambitious politicians. In fact, the Shah himself nay be
susceptible to this temptation as indicated by his apparent
willingness to sacrifice some of his closest associates and
even to have the royal family's financial activities in-
vestigated. The Iranian public may be placated, at
least over the short term, by such an approach, but the
problem for the Shah in it. given the highly personalized
system of government in Iran, is that logic leads inexor-
ably to the monarch himself in the assignment of ultimate
blame. Thus, while corruption may prove a transitory issue,
it is not likely to disappear without first profoundly shak-
ing, if not actually overturning, Iran's most basic politi-
cal institution. Ironically, in view o f t h e current lack
of popular sentiment for fundamental reform, even that prob-
ably will not prevent corruption's eventual re-emergence as
a prominent feature of Iranian economic activity.

TOMSETH
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington. 0 C. 20520

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL
SECRET EYES ONLY
December 19, 1978

The Honorable
William H. Sullivan
American Ambassador
Tehran
Dear Mr. Ambassador:
I am sorry that the press of business here and in
Tehran has reduced the movement of letters back and
forth. A quiet moment has come and I'll use it to
bring you up to date on some very sensitive matters
that I cannot commit to the phone or cable. You,
perhaps, know more about these matters than I do, but
let me share with you.
First, there is real concern in this building
about back-channel communications from the White House
directly to the Iranians, notably the Brzezinski-Zahedi
channel. Ben Read called me about a week ago to ask
me what I knew of such communications and asked me to
keep him informed when I developed any information.
From what I hear from other sources, I gather that
his concern reflects the feeling of Mr. Christopher
and the Secretary. I am not really aware of very much
about the channel and have to rely on my Persian-produced
cynicism. I do understand that Brzezinski made a call
to Zahedi last Friday or Saturday which induced the
Ambassador to take off for Isfahan to see about his
troops there.
I met with Brzezinski myself 2 or 3 weeks ago
in a private session in which he queried me about Iran
in general and my pessimistic views of the future. I
did not tell him what I have since tried to convey
through Gary Sick: That is that I consider Zahedi
to be a-disastrouscounterpart in dealing with the
b Iranian crisis. In my view he is utterly self-serving,
lacks good judgment and is prone to act quickly on the
basis of bad information. I regret that I believe his
counsel has been one of the strongest factors working
on opinion in the White House.
SECRET
GDS 12/18/84 (PRECHT, HENRY)
 As the Ball report was sent to the Department
in one copy for Christopher's eyes only, no one else
has seen it. I met a couple of times with Mr. Ball
and I believe I understand his views fairly well. He
doesn't seem to think that the Shah has much future
and believes that we ought to begin to prepare our-
selves for the unthinkable. For my own thoughts on
that subject I enclose a copy of a memorandum I did
for Hal Saunders. I have held these thoughts for a
long time now but as we-ilfccome nearer to the day of
investigations, I have decided to put a few of them
down on paper. You may not agree with my outlook or
analysis, but the task seems to me to be one of finding
a graceful exit for the Shah while gaining a fair amount
of credit in doing so for the U.S. It doesn't strike me
as an impossible task, but it is certainly one that must
be carefully prepared, particularly with the Iranian
military. I think we have consistently underestimated
and not really evaluated our leverage with that group.
I do not think we ourselves ought to name ministers, but
our midwifery could be very active. We could, for
instance, convoke a balanced (including Xhomeini rep.)
6 - 8 man committee of notables to work out a Persian
solution which we would back. Whether that solution
were a constitutional monarchy or a regency substitute,
we should be prepared to endorse it.
I presume you are aware of the Top Secret list
of questions that was sent out over theweekend for
the Shah. I have not been shown the list, such is
level of distrust that exists in the White House to-
wards the State Department (and egotistically, I feel,
towards myself). I am afraid that we are losing val-
uable time and that events may sweep us by, depriving
the U.S. of the opportunity to recoup its position in
Iran.

SECRET
 -
SECRET
- 3-

I have probably confided more than I Should to

a piece of paper, but I doubt I have much of a future
any way. I would ask you to protect me for the sake
of the education of the young. Whatever the risks,
I believe it important to give you my frank assessment
of how things are shaping up on the Iranian front these
days.
Sincerely,

Enclosure:
7
Henry Pr

Copy of Memorandum to Mr. Saunders.

-
SECRET
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Waihlnxlan. D C. 10510

SECREH/NODIS
December 19, 1978
- Harold H. Saund rs
TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
NEA
NEA/Im - HenryG
Seeking Stability in Iran

There is general agreement that the Shah has only

a marginal chance of surviving as a constitutional
monarch. No one, to my knowledge, believes he can
return to the exercise of full power, the shah himself
has acknowledged this privately. We have come to our
conclusion slowly and reluctantly and more through
erosion of our previous position than from a "zero-
based" analysis of what the future might hold for Iran
and U.S. interests.
I believe the Shah's position has eroded more
rapidly than our perception of it. I do not think
that it is now possible to salvage even a "king of
Sweden" role for the Shah~certainly not over the long
term, e.g. one year.
The assumptions behind our preferences for the
Shah as a constitutional monarch are that: (a) his
continued presence can best ensure stability in Iran;
(b) he offers the best means of protecting U.S. interests
there; (c) the civilian alternatives are dubious on both
counts in the short run and probably only a stage to
leftist instability in the long term; and (dl the de-
parture of the Shah would be a shock to our friends in

I
the region and a boon to our critics at home. I be ieve
we should examine each of these assumptions and, if they
are not as solid as we suppose, begin quickly 60 pr pare
a new U.S. line.
A. The Shah as a Force for Stability
This argument rests principally on "the premise
that only the Shah can guarantee the unity and discicftine
of the Armed Forces. This is true, if we look at the
Armed Forces as a static group. But how is opinion
among key elements in the military likely to evolve if
(1) the Shah as a constitutional monarch has substan-
tially reduced powers, i.e., does not really lead the
Armed Forces, and (2) remains the target of opposition
rage that requires the army to suppress continued, large-
scale demonstrations? while it is highly unlikely that
General Azhari or General Oveisi would take any step
against the Shah, the sane cannot be said of the
lieutenant generals and lower ranks that have already
ventured to express doubts to us. Some moderates in
the military are not willing to see Iran suffer for the
sake of the Shah; extremists are probably supporters Of
Khomeini. Both are perceptive of the way the tide is
moving.
If the military is apt to be restive, the civilian
dissidents--strikers, the people who marched on December 10
and 11, and the terrorists-are apt to be even more assert-
ive in their unhappiness. There is a profound distrust of
the Shah and his sincerity in accepting a role of a monarch
with power. Thus, the Shah in a constitutional role could
fail to produce, tranquility and might lead to greater
turmoil.
If this analysis has merit, it seems we should be
doing three things:
1. Seeking to identify those officers (e.9.. General
Djam) who can command the respect of their subordinates
in a post-Shah Iran.
2 . Identifying those hardline officers Who would have
to be dropped in order to produce a more tractable military
establishment.
3. Designing a U.S. strategy whereby we Could in-
fluence military opinion to follow (or at least not block)
U.S. policy initiatives. This would mean formulating
what we say and to whom and deciding how we apply the
levers we have (i.e., military sales and services).
B. The Shah is the Best Protection for U.S. Interests
-Iran

This assumption based on history does not reflect

the radical changes that have occurred in Iran. A

SECRET/NODIS
weakened Shah, subject to continuing strong domestic
pressures, may not be much different in his foreign
policy orientation from an uncertain civilian govern-
ment that might replace him. Both governments would
be introspective; both, as OPEC results have shown,
would push for higher oil prices; both would be more
difficult for Israel (although a successor regime would
be more difficult than the Shah); both will be careful
with the Soviet Union (fearing an active Soviet effort
to destabilize the Iranian system); both will be forced
to cut military and large civilian contracts with the
U.S. and our allies; and both will want some public
distance between them and the U.S. so as to appear
independent. Whether either will have any reason to
be grateful or dependent on us will depend
- on events
and, in large measure, what we do.
There is not much we can do to protect 'u.s. interests
the Shah remains on the throne in a weakened position;
will be effectively boxed in by his opposition and will
have little scope for responding in ways that we desire
on important questions. To enable us to be in a stronger
position with a successor government, we should take the
following steps before such a government comes to be:
1. Enlarge our contacts with the opposition and
independent Iranians with the object of assuring them that
the U.S. Is interested in Iran and downplaying our interests
in the future of the Shah.- should be quite clear about
what our interests are in Iran and what we are not pushing
e.g., we will want Iran to be free of Soviet influence,
but we are not particularly interested in the quantity of
arms that Iran purchases from us.
2. We should extend these contacts in a discreet
way to the Khomeini factions. We should, however, keep
the Shah informed about what we are doing because he
will find it out anyway. We should not be too concerned
about his reaction. We should impress upon the Shah that
we both share the same objective, a stable and prosperous
Iran, and that he has a responsibility to do everything
possible to help bring this about.
3. We should move vigorously to promote with the
Shah and the opposition a scheme such as the "Council of
Notables" idea that will preserve a minimal role for the
Shah as constitutional monarch. We should be prepared
to fallback fairly quickly from this position, acqui-
escing in the departure of the Shah if we cannot obtain
for him a "King of Sweden" role. We should be prepared
in advance for a surprise abdication.
4. We should probably conduct our negotiations
with the Shah and the opposition on the future of Iran
through a special intermediary, e.g., George Ball, who
would embody U.S. interest and evenhandedness in a way
that would gain us substantial credit should the opposi-
tion come to power. If the U.S. intermediary role were
to fail, we would be no worse off than if we stood aside
and trusted the Shah to work out.arrangements with his
opponents.
C. The Alternatives to the Shah are Dubious and
Possibly Destabilizing in the Future
No one can really predict how a successor govern-
ment will "fit" with the Iranian public or as a com-
bination of disparate interests. There is a growing
conviction among analysts, based on conversations with
leading oppositionists, that there are moderate and
responsible groups which would be friendly towards the
U.S. and could also govern. There is also a good pro-
bability that if a civilian successor regime came in with
the blessings of most key oppositionists, including
Khomeini, it would be greeted with relief by an Iranian
public terribly fatigued by the turmoil of the past year.
Such a government could divert some energies towards the
prosecution of the corrupt and unjust in the Shah's
civilian and military hierarchy. Its biggest-problem
would be in managing the economy but there it would
probably enjoy an easier road than a government under
the Shah which would continue to be afflicted by strikes.
In the past six weeks the military government has
demonstrated failure in restoring order and restarting
the economy. Under its present leadership the military
is damned for its association with the Shah and for its
harsh methods. It will not constitute a viablechoice
for Iranian stability until its top ranks are purged.

We need a much clearer perspective on the players

in the opposition--those we can count on and those who
would serve only their own interests or interests that
are hostile to the U.S. We should not, however, delude
ourselves that we know enough about Iran to pick all
of the members of a.Counci1 of Notables or cabinet,
but we should at least know the core group of foremost
figures (independents and oppositionists) and have an
idea of the likely orientation of those persons who
might be selected in a future government.
D. The Departure of the Shah would Shock our
Friends and Please our Critics
There is probably an inevitability in this assump-
tion. It will be extremely difficult for the U.S.,
which has supported one man for three decades and daily
reaffirmed that support in the strongest terms during
the past three months, to claim victory when he is
dumped. We may simply have to take our lumps on this
one, but life will be easier for us if weproduce a
successor government that is moderate, stable and re-
sponsible.
There are certain steps that we can take to minimize
the lumps:
1. We should begin now to educate the Saudis and
others about the true nature of what the Shah's proBlen
is, e.g., a loss of support and credibility because of
corruption, harsh police methods, lack of political free-
dom, etc. We should steer them away from the conununist-
in-the-woodpile thesis for which there is little or no
hard evidence. We should describe the problem of lack
of support for the Shah, including military disaffection.
In other words, we should educate those who are worried
about the future in Iran about the real forces that are
producing that future. We realize this is not an easy
task and considerable doubt will remain, but we must
make the attempt.
2. We should keep these states fully informed of
our actions toward reaching a political solution that
is protective of Western interests. We should enlist
their support.

3. We should make the same effort with the Congress

and the U.S. press.
4. We should not react in panic to bolster Turkey,
Pakistan, or other states, but should proceed in a calm
manner to do what is necessary under ordinary circum-
stances to ensure that those states have adequate de-
fenses and reasonable means for economic development.
Conclusion
This paper proposes that we begin to move now
with definite steps towards a post-Shah future in Iran.
To delude ourselves that we can get something better
in the short run that will be useful for the U.S. in
the long run could be seriously destructive to the
remaining position we have in Iran. That position
has been seriously weakened during the past three
months because of our delayed perceptions, hesitancy
to take hard choices, our unwavering support for the
Shah and the anti-Americanism that has flourished. We
must move fast to recoup our position.
 CONFIDENTIAL

COUNTRY T E A M 1 2 / 2 7 / 7 8

T H E AMBASSADOR O P E N E D T H E M E E T I N G B Y R E V I E W I N G T H E R A T H E R
D I S T U R B I N G E V E N T S W H I C H TOOK P L A C E Y E S T E R D A Y I N I R A N .
A G E N C E F R A N C E PRESSE, A S W E L L A S O T H E R SOURCES, R E P O R T T H A T
A YOUNG U N I V E R S I T Y P R O F E S S O R WAS K I L L E D B Y A SHOTGUN WOUND.
T R O O P S H A V E B L O C K E D O F F E I S E N H O W E R A V E - ONTO S H A H R E Z A A V E .
MR. L A M B R A K I S A D D E D T H A T T H E P R O F E S S O R WAS SHOT FROM A L O N G
D I S T A N C E B Y A S N I P E R W H I L E H E S P O K E T O CROWDS O F S T U D E N T S
FROM A B A L C O N Y . T H E AMBASSADOR F E E L S T H I S S H O O T I N G W I L L
T O U C H O F F A L A R G E C O N F R O N T A T I O N B E T W E E N D E M O N S T R A T O R S AND
S E C U R I T Y FORCES. AMBASSADOR S U L L I V A N I S WORRIED ABOUT T H E
S A F E T Y OF A M E R I C A N I N S T A L L A T I O N S I N T H E S E T R O U B L E D T I M E S .
THE ACADEMIC CENTER I S P A R T I C U L A R L Y VULNERABLE BECAUSE I T
IS L O C A T E D IN THE H E A R T O F THE UNIVERSITY AREA. MR. SHELLENBEÈGE
S A I D T H A T T H E C E N T E R H A S FOUR P O L I C E M E N * A S W E L L A S A
C L O S E L O C A T I O N T O L A R G E TROOP C O N C E N T R A T I O N S . T H E ARMY I S
S T R E T C H E D T H I N A T T H I S P O I N T AND T H E Y P R E F E R TO MOVE T R O O P S
O N L Y WHEN T H E S I T U A T I O N WARRANTS I T . T H E AMBASSADOR P O I N T E D
OUT T H A T OTHER F O R E I G N D I P L O M A T S HAVE A L S O BEEN ATTACKED,
I N P A R T I C U L A R TWO WEST GERMANS AND T H E D A N I S H AMBASSADOR.
T H E D A N I S H A M B A S S A D O R E S C A P E D S E R I O U S HARM WHEN H E D I S P L A Y E D
PAPERS PROVING HE I S DANISH. AMBASSADOR S U L L I V A N SUGGESTED
T H A T D I S P L A Y I N G OUR U.S. I D E N T I T I E S P R O B A B L Y WOULD N O T H E L P .

MR. S H E L L E N B E R G E R S A I D T H A T T H E R E I S A N O T H E R C A S S E T T E A V A I L -
ABLE NOW I N W H I C H K H O M E I N I M A K E S A P L E A T O P R E S I D E N T C A R T E R
T O P U L L B A C K FROM H I S STRONG S T A N D S I N S U P P O R T OF T H E SHAH.
THERE I S A C O N T I N U I N G S I T I N S T R I K E A T THE U N I V E R S I T Y .
T H E M I N I S T R Y O F E D U C A T I O N H A S B E E N COMANDEERED B Y O P P O N E N T S
OF T H E R E G I M E . A L L S C H O O L S I N T E H R A N A R E NOW C L O S E D .
F I N A L L Y , MR. S H E L L E N B E R G E R R E P O R T E D T H A T HE, C H R I S SNOW A N D
OTHERS HAVE CONCLUDED T H A T GARY GRAFFMAN'S UPCOMING V I S I T
TO T E H R A N I S I L L A D V I S E D .

A D M I R A L C O L L I N S D I S C U S S E D H I S LONG C O N V E R S A T I O N W I T H A D M I R A L
HABIBOLAHI'I. T H E I R A N I A N N A V A L C H I E F ' S TONE WAS D E S P E R A T E
A S H E EXPRESSED H I S D I S A P P O I N T M E N T W I T H THE A Z H A R l GOVERN-
MENT'S INDECISIVENESS. H A B I B O L A H I I D I D S A Y HOWEVER, THAT
H E P E R C E I V E S T H E ARMED F O R C E S T O B E U N I F I E D ENOUGH T O
P R O V I D E SOME SORT O F S T A B I L I T Y I N T H E E V E N T O F A T O T A L B R E A K -
DOWN O F GOVERNMENT.

J O H N M I L L S S A I D T H A T OSC'O I S NOW R E A D Y T O S C A L E DOWN T H E I R

OPERATIONS TO SKELETAL LEVELS. T H E AMBASSADOR RECOMMENDED
T H A T OSCO S E N D A S E N I O R M A N T O AHWAZ. OSCO I S W I T H O U T S E N I O R
L E A D E R S H I P I N T H E WAKE O F P A U L G R I M ' S D E A T H AND GEORGE L I N K ' S
T R I P T O LONDON. MR. M I L L S A L S O R E P O R T E D T H A T I R A N A I R I S O N
S T R I K E FOR A WEEK.

CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL

COUNTRY TEAM M I N U T E S t

GEORGE L A M B R A K ~ SG A V E A D E T A I L E D REPORT ON T H E P O L I T I C A L
SITUATION. T H E HIGHLIGHTS OF C I S R E P O R T ARE A S FOLLOWS:
SOME S O L D I E R S H E R E K I L L E D B Y GRENADES AND S N I P E R F I R E TN
TFHRAN; ONE OF OUR F S N EMPLOMEES W I T N E S S E D A B R U T A L A T T A C K
ON A P O L I C E M A N B Y MOBS O f DEMONSTRATORS- I N MASHAD, ANOTHER
POLICEMAN W A S B E A T E N AND THEN M U R D E R E D WHILE HE W A S I N T H E
H O S P I T A L B E I N G T R E A T E D FOR H I S WOUNDS.
 (.
ACTION
RSO-3
NNNNVV ESBfl30BRA304 INFO:
00 RUQMHR AM6
DE RUEHC 1È7Z5 3630131 DCM
ZNI CCCCC ZZH ADM
0 2923452 DEC 78 CRUZ
FM SECSTATE WASHDC 3lGMH
TO RUQMER/AMEMBASST TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 9021
RITEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW TORK IMMEDIATE 5346
BT
/Â¥
C 0 N F I D E N T I A L STATE 327052
E.O. 12065: RDS-2 12/29/98 (MULTIPLE SOURCES-SI/CC/TAG)
TAGS: ASIC, PINS. IR
SUBJECT: (U) ALLEGED PLOTS TO &ILL U.S. CITIZENS IN IRAN
REF: (A) STATE 325494 (B) STATE 325479

2. QOOTED BELOW IS TEXT Of FBI CABLE RECEIVED 12/29/78

REPORTING INITIAL CONTACT WITH LAWYER AND CLIENT LISTED
IN BETTELS.
BEGIN QUOTED TEXT.
ON DECEMBER 28, 1978. IN THE EVENING. JACK WARBRAND AND
HIS ATTORNET, JOEL SCHWEIDEL WERE INTERVIEWED PERTAINING
TO CAPTIONED MATTER.
BOTH OF THESE GENTLEMEN SPOKE WITH AMBASSADOR PETRI.
USMUN. ON DECEMBER 27, 1978 AND SET FORTH THE FACTS"IN
THE PLOT TO KILL AMERICANS IN ?OUR IRANIAN CITIES ON
NEW TEAR'S EVE. 1978 AT VARIOUS PARTIES. MR. WARBRAND
PROVIDED TEE IDENTICAL INFORMATION TO INTERVIEWING FBI
AGENTS AS HE HAD TO AMBASSADOR PETRI. EXCEPT THAT HE
ADD-ED THAT THE SPECIFIC ANTI-AMERICAN ACTION TO TAKE
PLACE IN A B A D A N W O U L D B E A T " T H E BOAT CLUB" A N D WOULD BE
AN ATTEMPT TO POISON THE FOOD. ALSO BETWEEN
JANUARY 5TH AND 15TH. THERE WOULD BE AN ATTEMPT TO BOMB
THE ABADAN AIRPORT.
MR. WARBRAND THEN RELATED THAT THE INFORMATION FURNISHSD
BY HIM ORIGINATES WITH TEE KBAIBAR KHAN, WHO IS LITINS
IN EXILE IN LAS VEGAS, NEVADA BUT WHO MAINTAINS A VAST
NETW9Rt 0 7 CONTACTS THROUGHOUT IRAN STEMMINS FROM HIS
FAMILY CONTA'CTS OF LONG STANDING. THE KKAIBAR KHAN'S

CONFIDENTIAL
-27-
 PAGE-2 CONFIDENTIAL

MOTIVATION, AS EXPLAINED 3Y MR. WAR

TOR IRAN AND DOES NOT WANT TO SEE T
TALL INTO COM1UNIST C ~ ~ ~ T R O L .
u
MR. WARBQAND THEN EMPHASIZED HIS DESIRE TO AVOID
NEEDLESS AMERICAN DEATFS AT THE HANDS OF ANTI-SRAK
FORCES. HE FURTHER'EXPRESSED HIS STRONG OPINION THAT
THE YFAIBAR KHAN IS AN ESSENTIAL CONTACT FOR THE UNItTED
STATES GOVERNMEN* TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE VARIED
FORCFS AT WORK WITHIN IRAN. AND SPECIFICALLY IN
FURNISHING DETAILED INFORMATION RELATING TO CIPTION
PLOT AND OTHER PLOTS As THEY DEVELOP. MR. WBRANDJ
CONSIDERS THE RELIABILITY OF THE KRAIBAR KHAN AS-
D
4
"IMPECCABLE.
IT IS THE OPINION OF THE INTERVIEWINO FBI AGENTS THAT
THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY MR. WARBRAND IS-UORTHT OF
CONSIDERATION AND AN ATTEMPT SHOULD BEttApF T O FURTHER
DEVELOP THIS INFORMATION.
THE KHAIBAR KHAN EXPRESSED THROUGH MR. WARBRAND THAT HE
MUST BE ASSURED THAT THE INFORMATION HE FURNISBES TO
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT NOT BE FURNISHED TO TEE IRANIAN
GOVERNVENT.
FBI IS PLANNING BUILT INTERVIEW OF KHAN.
END QUOTED TEXT.
3. DEPARTMENT SECURITY OFFICER IS PROCEEDING THIS DATE
TO LAS VEGAS TO JOINTLY INTERVIEW KHAIBAR KHAN
(GOODARZIAN) TOGETHER WITH LAS VEGAS FBI FIELD OFFICE
- - - -- - -
IN THE COMPANY OF LAWYER SCHWEIDEL. INTERVIEW WILL NOT
LL NOT
COMMENCE UNTIL EARLY A.M. OF DECEMBER 30. RESULTS WILL
BE PROVIDED BY MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS. NEWSOK
BT
1È705
CONFIDENTIAL
Following questions provided to Major General Gast by
lit Rencral Smith, Assistant to Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff, via secure phone 18 Dccc-mber 1973. Questions
from Admiral Turner to Mr. Duncan, who in turn asked for
our inputs. Answers to be coordinated with Embassy (SRF).

1. what would prompt Shah to leave Iran temporarily?

2. What would prompt Shah to leave Iran permanently?

3. If the Shah were to leave pemanently which irilitary

leaders would leave with him?

4. If internal security situation deteriorated badly are

there likely to be attempts by the military to take control
out of the Shah's -Azhari's hands?

5.
officer rank or colonel ranks or below
service.
-
Is dissatisfaction within military more likely in flag
comment for each

6. Who among retired military leaders are likely to be

interested in lending their names as part of opposition
coalition?

7. 1;hich military officers of stature already have linked

with onposition? List by rank, tribal association, business
or other category.

8. British saying General Azhari making all or most decisions

exclusive of Shah. Do you see evidence of this?
!t 2 2 1 -;4: I LC '
IF - ÈÈTMB!S TSF?AN t
/k ~ E I A / U F i C A bASYDC . - I '

I
I N T O RUEiiC/SECSTATE M S H D C ?522

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WX CAN DISSEMINATE. TO MOUNT M / J O R isi-?A-'1% 5TII'JIl b ,
ULTOTAL PROGRAMS. UNDIR THE CI^CII'-~STAN?LS, d0fJI.D h 7 FO L!
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 DEPARTMENT O F STATE
D
c WMhinitoh. D C. aOsa0
s/s
s/s-s
KE
E ,RET J a n u a r y 2, 1 9 7 9
KSfl
EA MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
EUR THE WHITE HOUSE
NEA
INR Subject: Improvements i n t h e Q u a l i t y and Relevance o f
s/P P o l i t i c a l Analysis
M/X
=:WEB The Department b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e r e a r e f o u r a r e a s
where e f f o r t s can and should be made t o improve t h e
q u a l i t y and r e l e v a n c e of p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s i s over t h e
coming months :
(1) u a l i t Control: A p o l i t i c a l i n t e l l i g e n c e
review l s Q i n p r k e s s f o r e i g h t key c o u n t r i e s where our
i n t e r e s t s would be s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t e d by unexpected changes
i n t h e p o l i t i c a l environment. A l l our d i p l o m a t i c m i s s i o n s
a r e working i n a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h t h e geographic bureaus.
Through t h i s p r o c e s s , we e x p e c t t o have much t i g h t e r
c o n t r o l over b o t h on t h e r e l e v a n c e and q u a l i t y of f i e l d
r e p o r t i n g a s w e l l a s a c l e a r e r s e n s e of t h e need f o r ( a )
s t r e n g t h e n i n g and augmenting of p o l i t i c a l r e p o r t i n g
o f f i c e r s and a n a l y s t s i n t h e Department and o v e r s e a s ,
(b) p r o v i d i n g TDY a s s i s t a n c e t o p o s t s f o r s p e c i a l r e p o r t -
i n g requirements a n d f c ) _ c a l l i n g on o u t s i d e s c h o l a r s o r
a d v i s o r s f o r supplementing i n f o r m a t i o n o r f o r a s s i s t a n c e
i n conducting independent f i e l d surveys.
(2) Resource A v a i l a b i l i t y : Over t h e l a s t few y e a r s
t h e r e h a s been a s t e a d y d e c l i n e i n t h e number of p o l i t i c a l
rev or tin^ o f f i c e r s i n t h e Foreiffn-'Service. t h e number o f
a n a l y s t s i n t h e Bureau of I n t e l l i g e n c e and Research, and
t h e funds a v a i l a b l e f o r l o c a l t r a v e l by p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e r s
and a n a l y s t s abroad. At t h e same time; t h e requirements
we h a v e p l a c e d on o u r m i s s i o n s f o r n o n - p o l i t i c a l r e p o r t -
i n g and a n a l y s i s t a s k s have c o u n t e d s t e a d i l y . I t w i l l
n o t be p o s s i b l e t o i n c r e a s e both long-term and i n - d e p t h
r e p o r t i n g and a n a l y s i s without expanding t h e r e s o u r c e s
a v a i l a b l e . We w i l l look c l o s e l y a t our a b i l i t y t o r e -
program w i t h i n p r e s e n t r e s o u r c e s b u t it may be n e c e s s a r y
t o look a t t h e requirements f o r a d d i t i o n a l r e s o u r c e s a s
-well.

SECRET
GDS 12/19/86 (KREISBERG.Paul H.1
 SECRET
(3) Long-TedShort-Term I n t e l l i g e n c e Balance: Our
p r e s e n t b a l a n c e i n b a s i c i n t e l l i g e n c e r e p o r t i n g and a n a l -
y s i s a s opposed t o immediately r e l e v a n t p o l i c y r e p o r t i n g
and a n a l y s i s began t o t a k e shape e a r l y i n t h e 1960s. At
t h a t t i m e p o l i c y r e l e v a n c e began t o t a k e i n c r e a s i n g p r e -
cedence over fundamental r e s e a r c h . The r a t i o n a l e was t h a t
t h e academic world could s t u d y t h e longer-term i s s u e s and
p r o v i d e from o u t s i d e a d a t a base f o r t h e p o l i c y a n a l y s t s
a n d r e p o r t i n g o f f i c e r s I n t h e Department and elsewhere i n
t h e Government. T h i s approach h a s worked reasonably well.
At t h e same t i m e , t h e r e has been a s t e a d y t h i n n i n g o u t o f
our i n f o r m a t i o n b a s e w i t h i n t h e Government. Academic
s c h o l a r s h i p h a s n o t always focused on t h o s e i s s u e s we a r e
i n t e r e s t e d i n a t c r i t i c a l t i m e s , n o r i s t h e q u a l i t y of
academic s c h o l a r s even. Research on a p a r t i c u l a r l y i m -
p o r t a n t s u b j e c t may, t h e r e f o r e , e i t h e r n o t have been done
a t a l l ' o r done poorly. We need t o review on an i n t e l l i -
gence community-wide b a s i s whether our a n a l y s t s have t h e
e x p e r i e n c e , t r a i n i n g , and c o n t i n u i t y of involvement on
major c o u n t r i e s and i s s u e s t o p r o v i d e t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e and
a n a l y t i c f o u n d a t i o n n e c e s s a r y f o r b o t h s h o r t term and
l o n g e r t e r n a n a l y s i s . We w i l l a l s o be reviewing what
f u r t h e r emphasis on b a s i c p o l i t i c a l , s o c i o l o g i c a l , c u l -
t u r a l and economic background i n f o r m a t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y ,
n o t only f o r our longer-term i n t e l l i g e n c e b a s e , b u t s o
we a r e a b l e t o a s s e s s t h e r e a s o n s f o r p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l
t u r b u l e n c e when it o c c u r s and make sounder judgments on
where i t may l e a d a n d w h a t we might do about i t . We w i l l
a d d r e s s t h i s i s s u e i n reviewing our Embassies' s i x month.
r e p o r t i n g programs d e s c r i b e d i n (1) above.
(4) Completeness of Information: We have f o r many
y e a r s , i n many c o u n t r i e s , and f o r many r e a s o n s , p e r m i t t e d
our Missions t o r e s t r i c t t h e c o l l e c t i o n of i n t e l l i g e n c e
i n f o r m a t i o n from c e r t a i n s e n s i t i v e s e c t o r s of t h e l o c a l
p o l i t i c a l environment. The b a s i c r a t i o n a l e f o r t h i s h a s
been a d e s i r e t o a v o i d j e o p a r d i z i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h Govem-
ments i n power by meeting w i t h i n d i v i d u a l s o r groups op-
posing t h e governments. Usually t h e s e r e s t r i c t i o n s have
been concurred i n by r e s p o n s i b l e p o l i c y - l e v e l o f f i c e r s of
t h e Department and elsewhere i n t h e Government and o f t e n
t h e y have been necessary. We should f o c u s our a t t e n t i o n
more s h a r p l y , however, on t h e c o s t s and b e n e f i t s of such

SECRET
 SECRET
self-imposed c o n s t r a i n t s and e n s u r e t h a t wherever t h e y
e x i s t o r may i n f u t u r e be proposed, s e n i o r p o l i c y a t -
t e n t i o n i s devoted t o c o n s i d e r i n g whether -they s h o u l d be
c o n t i n u e d o r n o t . The absence o f r e l i a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n
on t h e views, a t t i t u d e s , and - p o l i c i e s of major p o l i t i c a l
segments of t h e p o p u l a t i o n of key c o u n t r i e s can under
some circumstances p o s e major problems f o r U.S. p o l i c y
a n a l y s i s and i n t e l l i g e n c e e v a l u a t i o n . Me i n t e n d t o con-
d u c t a review o f s u c h r e s t r a i n t s i n t h e n e x t monih f o r
a l l OUT m i s s i o n s .

P e t e r Tatnoff
Executive Secretary

SECRET
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C O N F I D E N T I A L
1. (C) This memorandum p-ovides the r e s s l t s of an k?f'ISP X4.G p r e l i n i n a r y
review of the 1Jnited S t a t e s S%:-=3ty Asai6tmce & o g m f o r Ira% As a
r e s u l t of recent I r a n i m econmic d c f f L . u ~ t i e s , cash flat problen5 must
be alleviated. Conzecpentlyy the ab,iectives of this rev5ew w:
a. To analyze th3 c w r e n ~ .s t a t u s of a l l R4S progrms Yo? 3 a n . with
p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n t o major weapom systems.

Yl2C-J-
b. To i d e n t i f y f e a s i b l e reprogramming actions f o r the new t e r n which
w i l l be consistent with GO1 f i x & resourses.

a. To maintain an IIAdF force posture c n n s i s t ? x ~ d t h t h e curr:at/external

t h r e s t and a t t h e same time reco@ze the need l o r a? acceptatie degree
of risk.

2. (c/XCFO?S) Recent i n t e r n a l str5.fe i n I r a n necessitate& a ree-raluation

of the t h r e a t t o t h e sovernizy of Iran a s t h e f i r s t stepto ti?& review.
The SUfISK M.UG revised tnre3c assesment i s provided below:
 ,-,~ernmsnt t o promote seemingly l o g i c a l and beneficial progrcm3. Recent
hard-noskg of t h e government t o meet the Khomehi thi-eaz has caused f r a c t u r e s
Ln t h e N3tionol Front Crganizatim. Bahlbiar w i l l not relin@sh his psition
& dm-d, 6 f ~ Y * ~ - [ ~ L
t o & i f f s - n f A a + 3 k P +idk m - m d h i s entourage. Coupled with t h i s ?&owed neck"
A
a t t i t u d e i s the military position of bacldng the preser,t government w p CY(L @*
s d z i n g t h e s t a t 2 untila solution can be made. It appears t h a t t h e m i l i t a r y
k
' \d'
w i l l p i t i a l l y back the B a l h i a r regime . u n t i l a c l e a r path t o s t a b i l i z y

can be found. Situated bmeath the contkuln,y unrest is subveraim by

l e f t i s t elements. These elemmts w i l l continue t o plant 3eeds of discontent

most probably re=,-?: & o $ ~ ~ ' ~ n f l i cbetween

t pro and con elements. Such
a c o S l i c t w i l l f--< the
eta<,. A military takeover,
epoch of disorder, unrest and continuing communist b f l ~ ~ e n c e s .The nation
we-ld <lp.
N nozt probably face years of I n s t a b i l i t y u n t i l mutual agreements and
s u g p r t are applied t 0 . a all-out nation building effort.
- Vhile the I r m i a n .bed Forces have remabe6 t,he principal s t a b i l h i n g
im"1uence i n I r a n , there a r e indications t h a t c e n t ~ n u s dsupport by conscrj.pt

n i l i t a q personnel i s queshionable. 'lhe Iranian military i s faced with

conflictin2 l o y a l t i s s t o the chain of command and religious t i e s . This
i s m e i s camplicated by the confusion over the 12 8i.imacy of t h s current
government. Continued nnified support by the n i l i i a ~i s ess?nt:al to
overearnin2 the present i n t e r n a l s t r i f e i n Iran.
tflMFlDENTIA1
NOFORN
b. Insureenc~ - There continues t o remain a problem of t r i b a l minor-
i t i e s within Iran. National movemmts e x i s t mocg t h e Kurds in t h e narth-

west and the Ekluchis in t h e southeast. I n eazh of these case$* t h e t r i b a l

groups are spread across national frontiers. Cther groups, while cohesive
a s a t r i b e l do not have t h e developed national i d e n t i t y of the Kurds and
Baluchis, although many have regarded H. I. M. a s a father figure. In a
s i t u a t i o n of continuing tumoil within t h e country, a r i s i n g of national
aspi=at5ons could be expected, especially i f supported by an external power*
The Kurds w d d not l i k e l y be expected t o be supported by the I r a n i s who
have onlyrecently defeat& a Kurdish national movement. The Baluchi
problem i s spread m e r areas of Pakistanl and Afghanistan as well a s Iran;
therefore, it i s unlikely t h a t e i t h e r of these countries would provide

r ~ t e r n a lsupport. m e Soviet Union has never been loath t o meddle i n

national movementsl but would problbly hesitate r.9 excite t h e Kurds who
a l s o l i v e within t h e i r borders. The Baluchis, hr**-?er, represent an excellent

w r g e t f o r Soviet penetration. E-,~ablishment 02 a Baluchistan f r i e n d l y t o

t h e USSR would go a long way toxard t h e Soviet goal of a penetration t o

t h e warn water ports in the Sea of Cman, including the developing pert of
Char Eahar.

c. Conventional attack -- In t h e near term l i t t l e likeljhood i s

foreseen of a major icvasion of Iran by a foreign power. Continuing
i n s t ~ b i l i t ~however,
, creates an atnosphere wherein such action might be
tempting. Afghmistan i s s t i l l ha:ring d i f f u l t i e s i n sorting out its own
revolution. Fakistan, Smdi Arabia, and the %Crates are too weak m i l i t a r i l y
t o have a z ~ e s s i v eaims. The Soviet. Enion, b e c ~ u ~ sofe ?.ts role as a great

power, would be unlikely t o mosrel save i n s u p o r t or a !garxist. g o v e m m t

 $flNSlI!FHTlbl
i n Iran (perhaps by using the Cuban surrogates). I r a q remains t h e #&?sFoRN
t h r e a t t o Iran, short of world conflagration. Any attack by Iraq would
l r ~ e l ybe limited, with t h e o i l f i e l d s a s t h e target,. A decision t o mount
such an attack would require a weakened h n i a n military force and some
plausabls reason t o present t o world opinion.

3. (C) The methodology f o r t U s review i s discussed below:

a. &sed upon t h e abwe t h r e a t assessment t h e following p r i o r i t i e s

have been assigned t o assure maintenance of t h e r e q u i d d l i t q forces

consistent with Iranian fiscal resourses.
F'riority I: Mahtenance of i n t e r n a l s t a b i l i t y (for example: indigenous
population control, protection of l i n e s of commmication and border
surveillants).
f i i o r l t y 11: Protection against an insurgency s u p p r t e d by a t h i r d
cc >.try.

W o r t y 111: h t e c t i o n of national boundries against a conventionel

a t h c k by a major force.

b. Substantial reduction of GO1 FMS annual cash flow can be achieved

primarily by reprograming (deferment, suspension or cancellation) of new
pragrams with outyear aelivery. Consequently, program elements have been
f u r t h e r subdivided i n t o the following d e l i v e q catagories:
Catagory Aa Followon s u p p r t of delivered weapons systms/programs
( L e a F-5, WJ).

Catagov B: F'rograms i n process with deliveries scheduled p r i o r t o

2l March 19W (predicated on Iranian f i s c a l ear).
 - -

-
Catagory C:
21 March 1960.

-( -+k-- P-~
L
~~~N~ID~NT~~~JSJO
Programs in process with deliveries scheduled after

">W While this analysis is oriented on major programs, the proposals

will also consider significant individual TMS cases that may offer significant
cost savings.

d. The AEMISH M U G reconmended reprograming actions are predicated

upon maintaining a balanced force to counter each of the pet-ceived threats,
with the highest risk accepted for Briority I11 requiremento.

e. The ARMIS3 MAAG recommended reprograming actions are focused on

cost savings in the near term. In-country DOD and contractor levels of
personnel support have been reviewed to identify possible reductions and.
consideration has bsen given to reduction of stockage leve%to a minimum
consistent with tt J threat.
 Reprogrannnfng Action

Program Service

Case

&in& Orizinal S's -

Revised a Cost reduction

(a) Summary o f Proposed Changes by FHS case line numbers:

(b) Revised program milestones and objectives ha3ed on proposed changes!

(0) Rational to Include threat risk factor:

(d) Implementation Plans

 0 "9 "45'7 JtM 79
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FTCSTCTE VASHPC
TO APKMDASSY TFHPPN IPMEDIATE 9 3 3 5
BT
C 0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 8 1 O F 05 STATE W 5 3 6 6 / f l
S A PI S

F.0. 12065: GDS 1 / 8 / 8 5 (PPECHT, HEW)

TAGS: IR ACTION

SUBJECT: DPAFT HIPAN RIGHTS REPORT

INFO
1. FOLLOWING I S TEXT OF PPPTIALLY CLFARFD PPAFT VWW AM8
RTGHTS REPORT WHICH WE A':TICIPATE UILL B F DFLIVEPFP TO DCM
CONGRFSS E W " F J A U W H I I'VC! P S S I F I F P FOP". WE W U L P PM
PPPPFCIATF YOUP COPMENTS AID ANY SUGGESTIONS FOR CHAWFS ECON
BY OOB WASHINGTON TIME, JANUARY 11. CRU 2 M 8

2. BFCIN TEXT: OVER THE LAST 3 C YGPRS IRAN HAS ENGAGFD

IN A PPOBPAP OF PAPID ECONOMIC POPrRNIZATIOY VHICH H f S
TRAHSFOPf'ED THE L I V E S O F MOST C I T I Z E N S AMD SVAPPLY
AFFECTVJ THE NATION'S SOCIAL STPUCTlIPE AND TPAPITIOHAL
I N S T I T l ~ T I O N S . THF DFVELOPMFNT OF RFPRESENTATIVF POLITICAL
INSTITIITIONS, HOKFVER, DID NOT KEFP PACE WITH THGSF S I G -
NIFICANT CHANGES. AS A CPfSFPDE'JCE, AND PFCAIISF OF SKEWED
ECONOVIC P R I O P I T I F S , T H I S YrAP HAS REFN PPPKI-" BY SFPIOL'S
AND OFTEN VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS O F POPULAR DISCONTENT.
3. SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAF 11, THF IRANIAP C O V F R V M m
HAS FELT ENDANGERED BY EXTERNAL THREATS AND INTERNAL St%-
VEPSIOM. UNTIL ROUGHLY 1 9 7 7 THE GOVERNMENT RELIED ON A
RIGID PATTERN O F CONTROLS TO DEAL WITH THE PERCEIVED DANGER
OF IMTF-PNAL SI!RVERSION. THESE CONTROLS WCTE OFTEN IMPIS-
CWIPIRATELY APPLICT AND, AS A CONSSOUENCF, VIOLATIONS O F
HIMAN F I G H T S BY SECURITY FORCES WEPE A F P I P L Y COVON-PLACE
OCCIPRFNCE. T H I S PATTEPt' PEBAN TO CHANGE GPAPllALlY I H
RECENT YEARS AND PARTICULWLY S I N C E 1 9 7 7 , AS THC COVERWENT
UNDERTOOK TO L I B E R b L I Z E THE POLITICAL SYSTFV. I N EARLY
1 9 7 7 -THE GOVER?lPE1lT ENPEP THE SYSTEMATIC USE OF TORTURE
I I P P I S O N S AND LPTEP SUPSTANTIAL NIIYREPS O F POLITICAL
PRISONERS WERE RELEASED. IJBTIL THE GROW1 MP UÈIPU LFP TO
THE IMPOSITION O F f P P T I A L I N SEPTETPER STEPS W@E
ANNOIIMCFD TO OFFER GREATEP DUE PPOCESS'PROT':'CTION~,TO L I F T
CENSORS HI^' PND T.0 PERMIT CPEATER POLIT NAL EXPRESSION.
4. IN ADDITION, PL'RING 1 9 7 8 , PARTICULARLY 1K THE SFCOKD
HALF OF THE YEAR, THE SHAH PEGAN TO SHARE WITH OTHER
GROUPS H I S ALfOST EXCLUSIVE CONTFOl. OVER r<CiKIP GI?VFF'l"7.NX
XCISTPMS. 1NCREf.SINGLY. THS CAPI'ET. THE P P L I A V E V T PVD
V L I T A c Y YARTIAL LPW AlfTHOPTTIES APPECPCT TO PLflY A PAP?
IN IWWPTfrMT GOVER'IVERT DECISIONS. OÈ Al'GIIST 5 , 1.979, THE
S W A"'IOPUCED THAT THE P L P L I A W T A P Y FLFCTIC.'JS ¥IF/ YFAP
WOt!L.D F E IF54 PFRCEKT F P Z " AND P P n f I S F P F W F n O P R F THE
PRESS, SPEECH, .W PEACEFUL A S S V S L Y . THY SPA!! PL?P
P R O ~ I SFURTHER
~ R F F ~ P ~ Os F THE N P I C I A L FYSTFY. CONFIDEMTIAL
 5 . OFSPIT17 T H I S COW'JTUEW?, AS IlfPEST rOh~TI"llFl', COVFFK-
V * ~ T SFCUPITY FOPCSS POUETIFS L'SED FXTPFPF VIOLF'TF I NCON F ~ D E ~ ~ T
HA'TLING llHfF^ED V Y O v S T P t - ' r a P S , ADBITPAI'Y A P P r q T P OCCURPFn
A T PFSTPl"CTIOH1; OV YAlY C I V I L A'lP POL'TICAL I.IFrRTIFS
CP'ITIVLlFD. THVSF TACTICS COHTRIBUTEP TO OH AT"O?PHFRE OF
CONFRONTATIO?I AMP CONFLICT.
p^ 2,
P I A
6. THE I P P O S I T I O N OF M U T I A L LAP I K q E P T F f B F P O'fn I T S a /u
PfCO"PAWY1NG SEVFPF rOMTPOLS l^?E ROTH "PrCEPFD AMP FOL-
L n I ' r P BY PFPIODS OF CPFATLY rrLAXSD F F S T P I C T I O P S ON
"I'qLIC PFPATE.
COtJFPWFNT I N EAPLY VOVFWVP, &
VITH T F APPOIV "" "T OF A MILITARY-LFO
Y b P T I f i L LA14 CONTPOLS
ON <LL POLITICAL ( T T I V I T Y (TAI'I E R E FNrORC?D, Rill WIPE-
SPDrAD PPOTESTS PGAIKST THE P r G I l T HAVE CONTINUFP
7. THESE O F W S T P A T I O V S VEPF MET BY AriÈE FOPCF. AS THE
SECURITY OPGPNS O F THF GOVE
NPFMT SOUGHT TO BAN PUSLIC
PROTEST ACTIVITY. POSSIBLY SFVFUAL THOlFANP P F P c O W WERE:
KILLED, SC-VFRPL T I Y F S THAT Nl'WFP INJI1P'"D, ?UBSTANTIAL
DAi-OGS DAS POKE TO PROPERTY--PV BOTH PPO- AMP AVTI-SHAH
FOPCFS. CI.P'FROlIS APRFSTS WWF YAnE, AMP THFF!' WAS A RE-
CIJPPEVCF O F REPOPTS OF P'ISTPFATKENT OF P E T A I W F S .
1. RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY O F THE PERSON, INCLUDING
FREEDOM FROY:
A. TORTURE
THC IRANIAN PFNAL COPE P F P H I P I T S TOFTCPE AND PROVIPES
SFVEPE PFKALTIES FOP VIOLATOPS. HOW-VFR, T H I S PROHIBITION
WAS FRFOIF'!TLY IGNORED BY SFCUPITY F-OPCES I N THE PAST.
Al.^OST TWO YF.ARF W O , THF SHAH ANWI'VCFn THAT TORTURE
VDHLDNP LONGER P E I'SEP 11 THE INTEPROPATION O F PRISOMERS.
I T S SYST?fATIC IL'SE C1.Efr'i.Y EMPED 11 PPISOME. tIOWFVEP,
CHARHES CRMTISIIE THAT TORTIIPE I S BEING HS?P D I P I T I t l I T I A l .
PITFPPOGATTOMS I " POLICE STATIONS, "AWTIC1ILAPLY ? d T S I P F
TI-"PA?). AYNESTY IPTEPMATIV'AL REPORTFP THAT A MISSION I T
HW SENT TO IRAN I f '!OVE'-PF? YEAFD P r P O R T S O F "IWEROlfS
Y'cfPLFS OF TORTI.F'E' I'SFD PllPI'IG I M T E P P O c A T I ~ ~OKD ~ OS
P'I'l1SHr"-'IT FOR PPI.ITICAL A C T I V I T I E S . THESF IMSTAICES OF
TOQTIIRF ^ 0 TOT A P P W TO FAVF HIGH GOVER'!MENT SPVCTION AMP
TU?IP OCCllFPEKCE f,4Y PFFLFGT A': FROSIO'J OF D I S C I P L I N E .
T K G ~ O V F P Y Y F V TH A S n i w I s s v O F C - I C I A L SO F S A V A K , THF SECFET
POLICF, PFPORTEDLY FOR, USING TORTURE I!I THE PAST;

THrQF HPVE "FEN MLtwEPOLfS I'lSTARCES OF 'iAPSH, OFTSM PPIITAI

TPTATirEi'lT PY SECI'PITY FOPCES O F DE^OMSTPATPPS PPPTESTIKG
 -
C - 0 N F I D S N T I A L SECTION a 2 O F f 5 STATE W 5 3 M / P 2

AGAINST TH'7 GOVEPWFFT. THEPE HAVE ALSO BEEN PPllTAL AS- 3

SftllLTS BY OpPOSITIOt! GPOUPS ON GOVERNYENT O F F I C I A L S .
THESE KIÈD O F INCIDENTS, W I C H BECAUE 1'OPF FPEPHFNT AT
THE END OF THE YEkP, OCCURREP VAINLY I N FTPFFT CLASHES,
WO
SFTWEEP GOIIFPHVENT FOPCES A"? OPPOSITION SLIPPOPTEPS. NO'
PPECISE ESTIVATE OF' THOSE KILLED I N SUCH CLASHES I S YET
AlIAILAPLE; BOUGH EST!'-ATES FOP THE ENTIPE YFAP PANGE BE-
T W E S OMf TWUSANO TO OVES SEVEN THOIlSAW KILLEn WITH A
SIPSTANT1A.Ll.Y KIPHEP UUrABER OF PERSONS I N J [ l P T . THE IN-
FORPATIOM t.VbLLAPL= TO THE DFPARTVENT OF STATE PFGAPPING
THC CONPITIn'iS IIHPE? WHICH FPLITICAL PPISONEP? hPE HELD IS
SCANTY. TH?PE E P E P ' T O P T S (SOME OF THE" RASED 0 1 IHTER-
VIF:VS WITH SFVFPCL FOPVER PRISONERS) THAT COVPITIONS
S ~ S T A N T I ~ ~ LIwFiov?:n
LY D ~ I R I N G THE YEAP. NEVERTHELESS, A N
EXTT'IDEP S T P I K E 11 T I E SPRING BY PEPSOHS HELP I N A PRISON
1FAP TEHRAN TOOK PLACE:, SUGCFSTIMB THAT THE PROCESS I S NOT
YET COPPLTTF. PORFOVEP, AWNESTY INTERNATIONAL I N THE
PFPOPT RASED OM I T S t1OVEMBEP YISSIOM NOTED "INDI,SCRIMINATE
POl.1C.E RRIJTALITY FOl.LOVING APPEST OR DETENTION. THIS
APPFARS TO HAVE 9EEfI OFTEN THE CASE.
C. ARBITRARY APREST OR ~ ~ ' P R I ' S O N N E N T
TH? S E R I E S O F APHESTIES WHICH PECAN I N 1 9 7 7 CONT.INSED
TK?OI!GH 1 9 7 8 . AT. THE BEGINNING O F 1 9 7 8 , / - , 358.-53s
2,2'"? /5-53 3 : 7 4 8 5 6 PA89.34 43.-8,3$ 8, - 8 ) . YOST FOR
2,?.?"' STATE SECURITY PRISOBEPS REGAINED I N J A I L , YOST FOR
Hfl1'iDG COi-KITTFD CPIi>TS O F "IOLENCF OR FOP CONSPIRACY TO
W I T VIOLF'ICEPC XAS TENSIONS GREZ W R I O T S PKCAKE PORE
FREWIENT, LAPGE-SCA1.F ARPESTS WERE MADE. BUT, AT THE SAPE
T i Y ? THERS ITCRF FPFPUFNi ANMOIlMCFi-FMTS O F THE RELEASE OF
PBIWIEPS. FOLLOWI'IP THE I C P O S I T I O H OF MARTIAL LAW I N
SEPTEfPEP, IJAPRPHTS TOR THE APREST O F l,tVPI PEFSONS WFPE
ISSUED: YA'IY O F THFSE WFPE MITHPPAWN WITHIN A WEEK AND PY
TK7 E'lD OF SI::PTEv^'l:-P ONLY If" b F THESE: R W A I N W UKDER DE- J
TWION. IN DECEIVE?, THE GOVEPW'E?IT AtJMOllNCED THAT ALL <
POLITICAL HRISOPEPS HAD BEEh' PELEASEP WITH THE EXCEPTION O F
JIIST. OVEI? 2W PERSOKS lWO HAP REEN C O W I C T F W F C R I f E S OF I-
V T ~ L E M C F , A AMY I N TPT C O W I S S I O N O F TTRPPRIST PCTS. CPPI- 2
VATc Hllf.1" FIGHTS P P 0 U P S RELIEVE THE MHwPFR TO P.F S I P P I I F I - ill
C.È6'TL HTBHFP.) TIT. COVEPVEVT ALSO A!lYOll"CF? THAT I T WAS
-0
?P'JIFVING THE F I L F S OF F W Y P ?CLITICAL P P I S O S E P S WITH A
Vi?t,' TO GPk"TIHG A Y F S T I E S AiD REHAPILITATING THEY.
C ? S ? I T F TYF S T A T 9 1HTE:NTIOH C F THE oOYE'P'!YE>IT TO REINFOPCF
-0
k

Jl'PICIAL P?CTFCTIOh' O F ACCUSEPD"Â¥SSONS PAVAK PTI1.L APPFAPS

TO f'OYBI?? THF F[!?!CTInNS OF PCTH POLICE /¥¥'F7AU1VI!10 0
?'.icISTR/iTF". P E T C I N F S HAVE PF""1) DEflJEn COl!?'FFl. FOP EX-
T F ' T F P PFFIODS AHPSO'".?:TIr'ES P??i-ITTFn ONLY S r V U F L Y
PFcT?ICTF"?O RBO COk'TAKT UITH FPVTLY )'ID FRIFI'IPS.
-46- $
 CONFIDENTIAL
C I V I L AND C P I W I \ I A L C P V S . WITH T U F FXCFPT Oh' OF THO^"
I'WOlVING S T F T F S'TIJPITY, APF T P l ^ n 1'4 A f I V I L I A h 1 fClfRT
CTSTFM I N WHICH C I V I L "IGHTS A"" FULLY ClIi?PCHT"Fn. "FP-
3 Ã ˆ ) CHAPGFP (.'.TTK POI I T I r f i L P W ""Cl'PITV P ' T F P S F " "$RF UN-
TTL 1 9 7 8 T ? I r n I V P I 1 I T t P V COUPT?. TP=' ACCI'SFP HOP '10
FTTEDOM TO cHPOSE~ COIIMSl-L O W TKr PPOrFfnl"G1; TOOK PLCC'"
IN CAWFPA. ^A?LV I N 117'5, THE rOVGPVMFVT AVUOU"Crn Q F -
FOPWS WHICH I?ffLL!nEn T P I A I S 1'1 C I U I L I A V POIlPTS "0" P O L I T I -
CAL OFFFNDEPS fh'D FAVF GPFPTFP FRi-rPCY I N Ti"- CHOJCf O F
COUNSEL. WKILF W T FIILLY I P H L E P V I T E P , TH?: W R E P OF
POLITICAL OFFCWANTS T P I F P AND Sli!7SFPl!FMTLY ICPllITTFri I N -
CREASED. TKF EFFECTIVENESS O F THE REFOPYF I S O P P I TO
=ME OIIESTIOM, HOVEVEP. I N PAHAQAD DlWIfG THF SllV"'l-?, 38
PERSONS WFPE APPESTED FOP A POLITICAL O F F F f ' F , T P I r I l I N A
C I V I L I A N COURT AND ACRI'ITTED. TPFY WEPE Sl!ESF~llF'!TLY
SEIZED PY SAVfK AND PPDEPFO TO STA'lD TPIAI. I I A "Il.ITARY
COURT. FIFTFEN O F THOSE APPESTF!) APPEAR TO P V A I V I N
DETENTION. It1 PDDUTIOS. THE I'iTFP'lATIOtJPL. I.KAGIIE OF KIW'AP
F I G H T S REPORTED THAT I T S f " I S ? l n " TO ?PA&' H W REVFAl.V THAT
POLITICAL OF'FFWERS CONTIKIIE TO BE: TRIED "" fI121TA?Y
CODPTS, THE PrFClRP'S WTl,~ITKSTAMPIYG. WOnFOVFR, NlRI'lC
THE STRIKE O F O I L F A C I L I T I E S W I C H OCCI'RPF'P I N THT FALL,
THE G O V E R H W T ANNOUNCW THAT S T P I K I W !dORVFPS VHO PFFIIRTO
TO PETURN TO KIRK W011LD PE CHWCER ftJIT!i RAnOTAPF. At1" TPIFI'
BEFORE A "SPECIAL TRIRUHPL"; THK DEPAPTWMT OF' STATE HAS
NO FURTHER INFOR1"ATIOY REPAPOIKG T H I S nEVELOP'-'ENT.
E. INVASION O F HONE
I P A I ' S COt'STJTlITIONAL I AW O F 19*7 STATI-'I, "VFPYO'IE'S HOIl?F
KW DWFLLIKC I S PROTFCTEP A W SAF'-GllPPPrn?" NO Of"- PAY FN-
TFP FORCIPI Y INTO ANY D Y L L I N G V C F D T PY OPPi-P OF AND I N
CONFORMITY IIITH THF LAV. I N NOPYPL PPACTICI-, "OLI(Â¥'
"IIST APPLY TO A LOCAL P'AGTSTPATE FOR A VAQPAUT I F THEY
WISH TO SFAFCH A HOUSE.
SECURITY S - L T E V T S HAVE ACTED I N W E ISFTA'ICFS WITHOUT A
';'AWANT. IN FAY, FOi? EXAPPLE, !?AN! At' S O L P I F P S FORCED
THEIR HAY IMTO A RELIGIOUS LEP,OFP'S HOf1: A W K1LI.T' TWO
PERSONS S E E K I W REFUGE THERE. THE GOVFPt,lr'FYT I V F n T A T F L Y
APOLOGIZED FOP T H I S A C T I O N A W A S S E P T E ~ T K A T I T W ~ cS e m m
OUT BY IKKXPERIEtfCE9 TPOOPS WHO WERE D I P C I P L I N T FOR T H I S
VIOLATION O F HUMAN RIGHTS.
EARLIFR I N THE YEAR, B W ? S WERE PLACCTi OllTSlPE THF H O W S
PT CORFIDERTIAL
f 5 366
 ..
,,.ATE
-- SFPVICF ~ ' 3 w CONFIDENTIAL. - ij 3- -.
.-+ L! &

0 " 9 W 4 8 Z .!AM 79
7' X C S T A T F IJASHPC
TC AMETRASSY TEHRAN Ir't'E@IATE 93.37
AT

0'- P I S S I P E H T LEADERS ASD S!=VEPAL VFRF SEATED P P THPFATEWD

1'TTH VIO1.FMCF. W I L E THE YALSFftCTOPS t!ER!? NEVEP I P S M T I -
FTFP, THTY VFRE SIISPKCTED TO RE LINKED TO THE PECIIPITY
POLICE.
2. GOVEPNYFVT P O L I C I E S RE1 A T I W TO THC FULFILLPFÈI OF
S'lCH VITAL NFEDS AND FOOD, SHELTER, HFALTH CARE AND
EDITATION
THE IRANIAN POVEIWENT HAS EI"PHPS1ZFD PPCGPAPS RESIGNED TO
FULFILL THF ECONOPIC A'lD SOCIAL NEFPS OF THC JRCKIAM
PEOPLE, P V n K I S T PAPTICULAPLY THE POOP, FOP POPE THAI' TWO
D E M P E S , LAQGl; SCALE FCOWlVIC AND SOCIAL PFVFLOPfOIT
PLA'IS HAVE PEEN PURSUFD SINC? THE EARLY 1 9 1 W . BL'T THE
f/i,lOR IMPETUS TO PWFLOPYEHT HAS COMF S I V C F 1 9 7 ' IWHEl THE
DRAPAATIC IWCPEASE I n O I L P R I C E S EMAQLFP THE GOVFPKMEMT TO
I f l E S T YORF HEAVILY I?! D E V F L O P W T M . A C T I V I T I F S . THE
GOVXPiWEf'T HAS ALLOCATED THO-THIRDS O F PUPPETAPY OUTLAYS
TO ' - C O W I C P?VKLOPYE.'IT ANP SOCIM. I~IELFPF'E PPOGPAMS.
PEP. CAPITA INCOÈ- HAD ?=ACHED ATCHIT I:?,-'""' PY THC PEGIN-
N I W O X 7 9 7 ~ . T H E r'b,lpR LA^ PI-FORM P R O P R A P P F G N V THE
19';-S TOT RMLY EHDFP I P A I ' S FF'TAl. TF?IItPTAL S Y S T P OUT
? ! ? F F J T T S P A THIPD O F T H F PPPllLATJOH "IPt-?TLY AVP A'lPTHER
3" P'TCEfJT IUnIRECTLY. HEALTH S T V I C E S H4VF PE!?H = x ~ ~ B n r n
TO PI'RAL AREAS AtlD FEPIC'1'S FFFOPTS TO P T l ' C V ILLITFRACY
H A F ?!?El2 Il^'@"-PTAK':Â¥'l L I F E FXPI-CTANCY HAS B P E S RAISED
.TO%' 4 1 TO 5 3 YFARS.
T W ACHIEVtT-F'lTS TO nATF HAVE MOT YFT 3F"! SIIFFICTEVT
 IVF^!.!iTIFS I N ITALTH, I'ICOME A % OPPPFTC'!TTY HAVE .".LI=K-
ATFP YOUTH W THE I *T5l.l.IPE:'~TS? A. P?F?U?S COQ?!~PTIOf! HBS
t PO"? AS YIICH AS AYY OT1J7R FACTnFi TO EPCr"" THE A P V P L I S H -
W " T S O F PV'FI-OPMFNT. P'AKY IQA:!JflMS QFl.TFVE THfT I T HAS
?7?'! l.lIDYSPPFflO, PFf,C!?T"G INTO TV? HIGtJrST l.F\l':LS OF THE
(-rÈlFY(!MFMT THEPS HAUF PF?' S @ P 7 S T S T F FC?VFP CPcTçlC'
!'T"ISTZPS. T H r IMPACT C F COERUPTIOH CMP?PTS LER THF SHAH
I
TO ISSHF A COnF O F CO?!P11CT FTP T-lF POYOl. FAfILY WHICH
RAfNEO THEIR INVOLVE!"K'!T I N A;!Y I H S I P F S ? OP CHARITY.
3. PESPFCT FOR C I V I L Am!@ POLITICAL L I P E P T I F S , ItJCl.ll!'Ih'G:
A. F¡F?DO O F THOL'GHT, SPEECH, PRFSS, P F L I G I O N P T O
ASS'-vP1.Y
ll
0 B9r"248Z JAN 7 9
m TCSTCTE WPSHDC CONFIDENTIAL ^^F7
f TO t,'"ECBASSY TEHRAN I f f E D I A T E 9 3 3 8
BT
1t C 0 N F I D E N T I 4 L SECTION 04 OF 05 STATE C'(?S.W/C

t RADIO AND TFLFVISIOM PPF GOVERNWIT-OWMFD, PND TWIS

GOVPNPENT-CONTPOLLED. HOWCVER. DUPIW THF COUPSr OF 1 1 7 8 ,
1 THEY WERE ALlOWD TO CAPPY COMPFVT CRITIC?! OF THF GOVERN-
f S F T - FOR INSTANCE THE PARLIAWKTAPY DERATF IV SFPTWBER
! W I C ; WAS H I G H L I G H ~ E PY
P HIGHLY DFROGPTOPY CHAPOF'? ACAINST
t THE GOVERNMENT. WEN EFFORTS TO RE'IlT'OS^ TICHTEP CONTROL
WERF fADE IN NOVEMBER. STAFF AT THF RADIO AND T'^LrVISION
6 FACILITIES STRUCK IN REFUSAL TO ACCEPT CENSORSHIP.
STRIKES I N IRAN ARE ILLEGAL. BUT A SUBSTANTIAL MIPRFR OF
WILDCAT WALKOUTS OccuPPEn, AND I N THE LAST QUAPTEPOF
1978 1-UCH OF THF COUNTRY WAS PARALYZED BY STRIKFS IN ALL
SECTORS.
THE SHI'A SFCT OF I S 1 AM PRFDOCIVATES I N IRON PUT THE
COUMTWY HAS H A D A i n k HI'STOPYOF R E L I G I O W T O L E P ~ J T I O N
WHICH HAS ALLOWFO SUCH PFLIGIBLlS " I W P I T I E S AS CHPISTIANS,
JWS, ZOPOASTPIANS AN1 MECPERS OF THE BAHA'I SFCT TO
PFACTICE THEIR P E L I F r S OPrULY AMn TO PAPTICIPATE FUL1 Y
IN PUP1 I C LIFE. ON? C O Ã ˆ ' S E ~ ~OF ~ FTQIFF I M 1 9 7 8
~ ' CTHF
HAS f T M PRFSSUPF FPOf CONS'WATIVF SHI'A PFLIGIOl"; LXADFRS
AGAINST QAHA'IS WO APE VIElJFD BY THF FHI'AS AS HFRFTICS.
AS A RrSIILT OF THIS PPESSURE, THE GOVEPWEPT PFCOVFR
SRVCTfL OF IT'S OFFICIALS WHO AWE PAHA'IS. THEPF StVE "FEN
INSTANCFS OF PVSONAL ASSAULTS W1IMST 9<ÈHAWIBY V'nPS,
ESPECIALLY M I SHIPAZ. OTHFR W O F I T I F S CONTINU^ TO FNJOY
OFFICIAL PROTECTION AMP TOLEPATIOM: 'JFVFPTHFLESc THFY
FFAt PFRSFCUTIC"'1 UNDER C O W I T I O T OF DISOPDFP AM1 SOME
, EAP PFRSFCUTIOt; UNDER CO'lnITIONS OF DISOPnFR AND W f F
W S K BENFFITTFD SIGNIFICANTLY FFCP GOVEPWEMT PPOT'TTIOI
AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PPOPPAPS DURING THE PAST SO YEARS.

SUPVERSION, VIOLENCE OP CCWUIIST POCTPP!FS. THESE RE-

STPTCTIOIS HAVE flFEN PARTICULARLY TIGHT ON l!UVFPSITY CAP-
PUSFS AND HAVE LED PfRIO9ICALLY TO CLASHES RETW-M SFCIJRITY
FORCES AID ST'!F!:T ANO OTHER D1SSID':MTS. THF. PPOVTH OF
POPULAR DISCOh:TEVT DURItlG 1978 HAS, HOWEVEP, "APE I T
ItfCRYASINGLY DIFFICULT FOP THE GOWERWEMT A!?' I T S SECllPITY
FORCES TO PREVENT, PUCH LESS CONTROL, UMA!!TilOPIZED A S c O ^ ~ p j o ~ ,
!LIES.
 THG LAPGF P-bJOPITY O F IPA'lIAfiIS HPVF HOPwALLY F'J-IOYFn
EXTZ'ISIVF F P F T O Y O F VOVFPEHT 'b'ITHIN IRA>! AN@ /iDQPAD. '0'-F 037
P r W F F S O^ T 1 F OPPOSITIOY, HOtTVFP, PCPHbPP AS "AMY Aq IP",
I n P P O I N I N V I L ~ws A m 0 7 H F P PPI'ITS RE-
w r w t - n i i ~ ~ i - TO
IW FPOY T H E I R HOP-FS. T H E GOlFPWFM? HAS O N O C C P S I O P
DC'JIED PASSPORTS TO PEPSONS WWM I T PUSPFCTFD WODLP, WHILE
ABROAD, ENGAGE I N ANTI-GOVERKPEtIT ACTIVITIES.

DURING 1978, C FSH CPPOSITIO'! FIGGURES W- P F N I F P V I T

P^P^ITS. PUT OTHFDS VV FPEE TO LEAVF: S n i F P A L I N THE
LATTFR GROUP V I S I T E ? THE UNITED STATES Aft0 COUNTPIFS I N
E W O P E WHERE THEY PUR1.TCLY C R I T I C I Z E D THF IRAtlIAH GOVERN-
PENT.
THE: ABILITY O F THE AVWAGE CITIZEN TO TPAVFL ARPOAP WAS
P W T P I C T E D ONLY BY H I P ABILITY TO PAY A $350 EX!? TAX AND.
11' THE CASE OF WIVES AND CHILOPEN UNDER I?, THE NEED TO
OQTAIN PEPf!ISSIOP FROI- THE HLISPAMO OR FATHER. T H I S LATTER
PPO"ISI0N O F LAW REFLECTS THE STRONG I S L A P I C HFPJTAGE O F
IRAN.
TPP'IIAN LAW DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR ElfIGPATION. HOVFVER.
IoANIANS WHO ACOUIPF C I T I Z E N S H I P IN ANOTHI-R ?CUh'TRY V ~ ~ T H -
OUT PREVIOUSLY INFOPPIVG THE GC'VfRNriEh'T O r IFAH WAY APPLY
TO THE G O V F P W N T FOP R"COGh!ITION O F T H T I P MEW C I T I Z F N S H I P
STATUS. ADDROVAL O F SUCH APPLICATIONS I i NOPI-ALLY 1-XTEND-
ED. ALSO, IPAMIAN C I T I Z E N S OVER 25 YFAPS OLD WHO HAVE

THF COUNCIL O F MINISTERS.

C. FREEPOP TO PARTICIPATE I N THE POLITICAL PPOCESS
IPAK I S A CO~'STIT1ITIC""AL YONAPCHY. I T HAS A R I C A F Q A L
L F P I S I ATUPF; THE P E W E R R O F THF LOWER KOllSF, TH'- "AJLIP,
APF '"LFCTCn PY FULl ("WIT S l l F F ? b r C AS b P r OMF-HALF O F THF
WP'QFPS O F THC S F I A T F : I W RFYAIVING Of'^-HtLF APE CHOSFN
"W T H F SHAH. THE Prima O F THF I F G I S L A T H P A~ R F 1 IVTFD.
AND POKER PVD DECISION-PAKING HPVF BFFH P R I W F I L V V F S T F ~
WITH THF SHAH.
IH 1 9 7 6 , A SINGLE POLITICAL PAPTY U?ESIIPGFMCE), E M W -
PASSING ALL I R A P I A t ' S , llAS CPFATEP PY F I A T AM!) L1"TIL 1 9 7 8
W5 THE ONLY POLITICAL PARTY P E W I T T E P TO OPERATE I N IRAK.
PFS'TOEMCF Vt-S SEEN AS A FEAMS TO MO?ILIZ- SIIPPOPT FOR THE
( M W W I ' Y T * S PEVELPPI-EMT AMP r ' o n r P w I n T I n M PPOGPAVS. I K
P!r81ST, THF W W , It1 THE FACf O F G R O I i I V I'VREST, L I F T K P
T K P P O H I R I T I O f l 0 " OTHFR P O L I T I C b L PAPTI'"'-. T><G FOPVPTTON
C'O N F I D I? N T 1 A L FINAL SFCTIOM O F ?5 FTATS f'p5SSg/P5
Ip^.

ACTIVITIES.
4. G0VFRt'"EVT ATTITIJr-P A,"" FFCOPP P r P A ? D I f T IÈITrRMfiTIOk'A
ATO WM-GflUFPNfE'TAL IÈIVESTIPATIO O r ALLFGEO VIOLATIPÈ'
OF HIICAN F I G Y T S
THE IPAVIA'! GOVF??lFEMT COOPEPATEP PIfRINP THE YEAR WITH THE
INTERtlATIO'iAL COY'ITT'?!: OF THY RED r P O S F AVD THF IN'TEPNA-
TIO'lAl, fO'"YISSIO!l O F JIIWISTS, BOTH Of !,lHICH SFUT S F P F F -
SENTATHITS TO I P P " TO INQtJJPF: IHTO HIPAP R I P P T S COWIT7OÈ1S
THE GOWRSMFtJT HAS V J - EXHIRITE@ THY SPY? ? P I P I T OF COOP-
F.RATIOM T O ' W P S ^"Â¥"MYSTIt!TTh'ATIPDAL. HOWSlTP, A D
AMNESTY Ik!T'eRMATIfl?IAL' MIFPIPH V I S I T T I R A N It! W F Y R E P <iW
WAS AQLE TO COt.4DUCT W P O l I S IVTERVI'"',!S WHICH L?." TO
CHARGES O F CO!~lTIflITflG TORTIIF": AND I P H T A L I T Y P Y IBAWIAM
SECURITY F-LF-YSHTS. A TTO-?"EWER TEA;" FROM THY IMTEPNA-
TIONAl. LFfiGIJ? FOP >!lP'P.M RIGHTS h,LSO V I S I T E P IRAM I N
N0VFYPF.R Wit.? I T FClll!lP r'ISc?EPA?lCIFS P E G A P P I W THE PK-
LEASF OF POLITICAL PRISONERS A W THC FIGHT OF POLITICAL
OFFXNDERS TO B E T R I F D PY C I V I L I A N COURTS. VA".CE
, '.US l/,/'.j (P;.:;-.I, .-.;-"(.:) ACTION
a
;; ^ ¥i., 1^ PC*; 2

 ¥p :I ;I.'- .!,-Ti'-; IUF"

,J,-C~z A ; ~ ~ r , L - ~ ;,IF
t ~ , ;,*! p~~ . y . , ' I.
A70
 CONFIDENTIAL
Country Team Minutes - Jan. 10, 1979

Tho Arnhassadorhep.an the mcoting by noting that this morning's

sensational headlines on a c11.1ngein U.S. policy are not exactly
accurate. By the same token Bernard Gwertzman's New York Times
piece is not the truth either. At any rate, the Anl?a;:.?actpris now
coiiiniiinicating by secure telephone with W;~shii>gton1:ithor thiin by
cable.
The Ambassador said that the oil and pipeline businos's is very
strange of late. It is difficult to determine which pipelines
and which refineries are open. The British 11.n-e a ship >;oing
iiilo CI'.;ihBahar which is wi 1 1 ing lo helo ::one *Â¥Ãihe I;i:ri~ifn
workers depart Iran. Mr. Bannerman said that the British had
made this offer, mainly to Brown and Root, who politely declined.
Brown and Root has its own t r a n s p o r t a t i o n c a p a b i l i t y .
.4.-ibnssadorSullivan said that he has heard many stories that Martial
Law will he lifted in Isfahan. The Amhassaodr fears that if
Rakhtiar moves too fast on this the consequences could be very
serious.
Mr. Shellenberger commented that the word "anarchy" keeps cropping
up lately. Yesterday the NIRT Director and numerous key deputies
resigned. An editor at K a ~ h a ntold Mr. Shellcnberger that there
is virtually no control on the stories being run in that newspaper.
The Technical University of Tehran may open in the next couple of
days, but only for rallying and demonstrating. Many "Khomeini
stores" are springing up in south Tehran. These sometimes mobile
outlets give away kerosene for free and sell foodstuffs for half-
price.
Mr. John Mills said that the Eeon/Commercial section is trying to
get a reading on industry in Tehran. Out of a sample of 30
companies, only 15 answered their phones. Of this IS only four
were operating (mainly food and construction entities).
Mr. Lambrakis said that ~achtiarhas asked for two months in which
to get Iran on the move again. POL heard report that massive
demonstrations are planned for January 19 and 27. 266 other
political prisoners are being released.
Mr. Neeley reported that the Austrailians delivered a shipload of
live sheep. They are probably walking to Tehran.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL/LIMX J^SP T E h R 4 N '263471
0 l n l Z l l Z JjSf 79 CJi"v: S T h T B 1/9/79
TV P 7 " E A S S Y TiBRJiN A^PQVS MIN:C iMAAS
T O S i C S I A T 1 ' WAS1DC N I A C T I M V E E I A T E 2 8 E 7 L'J?:?: Pl)T,:SSLP.Â¥-iiQA'IS:B
II CLFi": NO., ,
C 0 U F I E E N T I A L TEHtAN " 0 4 7 1 DISTi: POL-> W l DCM
ECOq ? FIY OR
LIKDI5 CHQON/lZ
E.O. 12065: KDS-4 1/9/09 (LAMBRA-CIS, 5 E 0 3 S E 3.) 7R-P
TAGS: PINS, I R
STTSJECT: F T L I G I O U S LT'ADERS F E A R D E P A R T U i r Ow SEAu
1. 'BVBbSSY " R E P S G'BTTING R S P O R T S FROV V A S I O C S S I C R C B S R A T
KCIYRAT? R E L I S I O i J S LEADSRS ARB VEBY COÈIC'ZR!dE -BY SIT'J!.TION
IFiT I S L I . O L Y TO A l I S E V d E N S H I H L E A V B S TEE COVNT5Y.
T.-'.ESE P.?E NOT V l R Y COHERENT OR % E L L REASONED, AND TI!?
KU'CI'IVS 11VOLVF.T) H i 5 NOT 4 L Ã ˆ A Y CLSHR. "iNBRAL T E A E S T E 1 S
TO SF, FOWEVEE, TEAT C O D F S A T E S INFLU'iNC1'; -!ILL 5 E S T f S P T

.
AWAY T I I Y Z F i BY I I L I T A R Y TA.;SOV?Q. 03 'BY VICTORY O F
C3"?'11MS I A H 3 LEFT-WI NG F0P.CF.S
 t
0 1 1 1 6 1 4 2 JÇ. 7 9 '"'.:¥ STATE 1 - 1 1 - 7 0
? ? A A M S ~ ' , B A S STEHRAV
Y A P P P V ~D C ~ : C Ã ‡ N A A
1 TO SECSTATT WASHDC IVMEDIIT'J Y4"? 7 5 ' ~ ~
CL'AR:
POL:
: JXTT>p^'Â¥L:T.'Â
POL:GSLA%EA : I S
DISTR: Y M B Cr'4
hCON PI-, S:{I3
1 STADIS DUMMY/CHROI/4

, 1
1
E.O. 1 2 0 6 5 : GDS 1-11-85 (STEMPEL, J.D.)
TAGS:
SUBJECT:
REF:
SKUM, I R
DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT
STATE 5366
OR-P

I 1. GIVEN EXTREMELY CHAOTIC SITTIATION I N IRAN. EMBASSY

I!
I
COMMENDS AUTHORS OF DRAFT REPORT ?OR HANDLING COMPLEX
PPOBLSMS IN AN EFFECTIVE MANNER. WE HAVE ONLY TWO
LANGUAGE CHANGW TO SUGGEST, BUT WOULF ALSO OFFER A
COCPLS OF OBSERVATIONS WHICH MIGHT EITHER BE IVCOaPOR4TED
INTO REPORT I F SOME EVENTUALITIES COME TO P A S S , OR USED
9x l
AS BACKGROUND FOR TSSTIMONY OR OT3ER PRSSWTATIONS.
2. SUGGESTED LANGUAGE CHANGES: IN PARA S I X , LAST
SENTEICB, STRIKE OUT WORD STRICT. MARTIAL LAW CONTROLS
ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY WERE IN THEORY VEIY TIGHT, BUT IN
PRACTICS Q U I T E LAX. IN FACT, MARTIAL LAW 3EGI-ME I T S E L F
HAS BEEN SO MILD AS TO ALMOST BELIE THE Â ¥ H f E DESPITE
OPPOSITION CHARGES TO TEE CONTRARY AND SOMF NOTABLE EXCEP-
TIONS TO THIS F L E X I B I L I T Y I N MASKAD AND 0 4 Z V I N OVER PAST
TWO WEEKS. UNDER PARA 7 ( 1 ) C, A R B I T ~ H 3 Y ARREST, ?INU
SENTENCE SHOULD BE REVISED TO READ: MOWOVER, DURING THU
S T R K E OF O I L F A C I L I T I E S WPICH OCC'JIRED I f 1W FALL OF
1978, THE GO1 ANNOUNCED THAT S T R K I N G WOR<'iRS WHO REFUSED
TO SETURN TO WON WOULD BE CHARGED WITH SABOTAGE AND T R I E S
BEFORE A SPECIAL TRIBUNAL. T H I S WAS I N F4CT NEVER DONE.
GO1 ANNOUNCEMENT I N T H I S CASE TURNS OUT TO HAVE BEEN
PSYWAR, AND WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF BtZARIAN AGRSEMENT I N
EARLY JANUARY, 1978, ALL PARTIES AGREE THEPE WILL -BE NO
TRIALS UNDER EARLIER ANNO'JNCEMEMT.

'
I
SEPORT OF COURSE DOES NOT GO INTO D I S I I T f d t A T I O N OF
t 6 C I A L FABRIC WHICH HAS TAXEN PLACE IN IRkU OVEa P4ST
TFREE--FOUR MONTHS. NOR S*OUL? I T . NEVI">TFELFSS. ETFFCT
! 01- U N Q A V E L I N G ' O FAUTHORITY HAS R E E N ERBA<DOWN I N A D W I N -
ISTEATION OF J U S T I C E ANF SOME INEVITABLf KAPHAZARDUZSS
1 IN JL'DICIAL ADMINISTRATION OF A SYSTEM <HICK WAS AL'?l^lM
U M 2 R STVFHE STRAIN.. LARGSLY DUE TO EFFORTS 0 7 RECENT
S T MINISTER MAJAFI, S I T i U T I O N H I S P t E N R0UGrl.Y
CONTROLLED. NFW BAYHTIAR J U S T I C E MINISTER. YAhYA SHDEO-
IV A Z I R I , ALSO A RBSPZCTED J U R I S T , WILL HAV! INEVIT4Bl.T
1.PROPiTMS GETTING H I S 1CT ORSANIZED IN S?VI-RE11OLUTION4RY
SITUATION--IF HE LASTS IN O F F I C E LONG ENOUGH TO TRY.

. 0 I L L EE COMPLICAT-iD BY FACT I K 4 T CAMPAIGN % $ 4 I N S T

FTION I S SINGLE BIGGEST POLITICAL I S S U E TACIh'G CO'JNTRY,
I L L P7 F I P S T ONE PRIM3 MINISTER B l ' H T I l I P S S'lTE:)
TAC'Ll: WHFN C O M F I V F E . 1 0 0 3 OF ( Â ¥ ? I V T Q Y ACCORDING
'?Y LAVYWRS AID LE1AL TI;.iCÂ¥'"-:S "'I I T 5 PlJ5 ' ;!)I 1\71
 S h W TRIALS & POLITICAL REPRSSENTATITES O?. FOBMSR REGIME
I 01 CORPWPTION AND OTHER CHARGES. NUMBER OT IRANIANS WHO
1 ITAVll3SEN CH-ITICAL OF IMPÈC OF U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY
WILL' BE W A ~ C H I N GVERY CASE?ULLY TO SEE IT usc
i AS STRONG
IN DEFENSE OF PIGHTS OF EX-ESTABLISHMENTARIANS3S IT WAS
1 FOR'IESLY IN DEFENSE Of OPPOSITIONISTS.
5. FORTUNATELY. LOW-tEY USG APPROACH TAKEN TO DATE IN IRAN
ON HUMHN RIGHTS QUESTIONS WILL LEND ITSELF TO PRIVATE
EXPRESSIONS OF CONCSRV, SHOITLD THIS BECOME NECESSARY, IN
OOARTVS WBIC3 MAY BE HELPFUL IN AVOIDING OR AT LEAST
PUTINS EXCESS 3. CONVERSELY, SINCE PRIVATE GROUPS HtVE
PREVIOUSLY ddN VOCAL.IN SUPPORT OF RJGHTS FOR OPPOSITION
FIGURES. IT WOULD 3E USEFUL TO irf I F T1EY KEPT UP INT'TSST
IN IRANIAN DUE PROCESS. REGARDLSSS 0; 'fflO DEFENDANTS MIGHT
HAPPEN TO BS. GIVSN SOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITIOV SENSITIVITY
TO THEST GROUPS THIS COULD ALSO EXESCISE CONSTRUCTIVE
PRESSURE AGAINST LEGAL FXTRE~ISW. IN THIS CONNECTION,
IT MItHT BE MOI,ED T1AT COMMITTEE TOR DSTEVS"'; O? HUMAN RI5HTS
AND FREEDOM ( C M R F ) HIS NO&' IGRXED TO "COOPERUTE WITH"
JUSTICE M.INISTRT IN ESTABLISHMENT OF FULL JUDICIAL RIGHTS
FOR PEOPLE. SULLIVAN
IT
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CONFIDENTIAL/STADIS TEHRAN
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 -- iPiiIr'iL
---- SPI?.,J^~?I.~L
1'1 i+ISTl;?f B A K H T I A R ;
R E S I D E N T O F 1112 S E N A T E S A D J A D I ; PAGE TWO 6
PEAKER O F TEE MAJLES SAID;
S E C R E

---- YWMGHAiiWiD
CCURT MINISTER A R D A L A N ;
VAR)STEH, A F O S i S R ~ M I M I S T E R ;
+ Y Y C 9 J A L L A L r  £ H E R A N I A FORMER S E N A T O R ;
i G C P u L S I DENT E l i T E Z A M ;
+
- DS RC St ~~ {A~XBED.OFLHOSZYN
G E N E R A L G H A R A 3 A G I ; AND
ALIABAD, A JUDGE.

-t L S O AF? ?ROi1 T HRAM R E P O R T S T H E F O R M A T I O N O F T H E C O U N C I L

, B U T H A S f i h F E R E N T N I N T H NAME, T H A T O F S U P R E M E
c o i i r i r c!i S : J U S T I C E Y E G n A N E H , I l m E A D O F DR. A L I A B A D . T H E
c o : ; m r J ~ oif ~D O E S I w E E D C A L L F O R I N C L U S I O N oIF T H E C H I E F -
/

JUSTICE
A S S Y JUDGES A C O U N C I L O F T H I S C O M P O S I T I O N VOULD
: P I A B L E TO. I W O R T A U T E L E M E N L S O F T H E O P P O S I I I O N ,
Xi U S Did- N A T I O I I A L F R O N T AND T H E L I 3 S R A T I O N PiOVEMENT
( L t i I ) , E L A U S E I T C O S T A I N S T O O MANY " E S T A B L I S ' i ! 4 E N T n
FICUi? S 1 I T H E O P P G S I T I O H WAS A S K E D ABOUT F I L L I N G P O S T S O N
YhL C I U t l G I L B U T HAD T U R N E D DOWN T H E I N Q U I R I E S -

CFi J-i'$T;OS WOULD S E E K TO. R E P L A C E OR M O D I F Y T!lE C O U N C I L

Ii!l'O A i C O U N C I L O F N A T I O N A L R E C O N C I L I A T I O N " W H I C H W O U L D
,
~ ~ > . ' l B ~ h Ai i C A B I M E T A C C E P T A B L E T O K H O M Z I N I S U P E R V I S E A
n E F E R E N D U i ' 1 Oil T H E P A K L A V I DYNASTY. AND O V E R S E E i L E C H O N S
FOR A NEW C O S S T I T U T I O N A L ASSEMBLY.
--13L.A:':!!K H O : ~1I 'NV OI L UATNINOOH UA RHYC E DC TODAY THE F O R M A T I O N I N RAN OF A N
O U M C I L , W I T H O U T REVEAL TI!^ NAl'ES,
A..D T E R h Z i l T H E S H A H ' S REGENCY C O U N C I L " I L L E G A L . "
- KKCI."::!i H A S B E E N I N T S R V I Â £ W E FOR C B S ' ?"FCC T H E NATION"
[ ' K I A W I L L A P P E A R J A N U A R Y 14. E X C E R P T S WERE C A M I E D
c'f C H S J f i ' i U A R Y 12. K K O M C I N I S A I D :
AH IS1 ::/if. S T A T E I N I R A K IS V E R Y C L O S E ;
/\ M.' ' J O V E R H ~ G N T WOULD 3E A N N O U N C E D " P R O B r t V L Y I N A
*,....
---
..G,!'SAYS";
ti; V O ' J L D A P P O I N T T H E GOVERNMENT;
& I'!..IULD " S U P E R V I S E AND D I R E C T T H E G0VER;lMC:IH";
-- 11; EF.::.C'C H i WOULD B E T H E STRONGMAN O F 1 R A : l ;
IF 11 C A i Z T O A C I V I L WAS I t l E M A S S E S WOULD F I G H T F o r t
I.'.LI'$LLATIGN O F AN I S L A M I C R E P U B L I C .
- AN OFFICSR Or' T H E IWZRIAl. I R A N I A U iAVY (1 r 4) HAS 1OLD
OUR UAO THAT I F THE WROWG G O V E R N M E N T ~ S R ETO T A K E POVR
T H E I I H fc3ULD TAKE I T S S H I P S AND DEPART I R A U , 1.1; THi:l:GS PAGE THREE 8
CA; T C i ? i I S P A S S , T H E NL!I~BER O F S H I P S I N V O L V i J UOULD BZ S E C R E T
ASOUT 25. I F T H E FORMER I FALIAN L I H E R I Z C H E L A I ' ~ E L O
iOhIiEDi,AtlD B E I N G U S S D BY T H E U N T O P R O V I D E N&L'ED
B I L L E i I i . ' G S P A C E A T BANDAR A 3 3 A S ) WERE I M C L U D E O A C O N S I C E R -
ABLE NUHJ&R O F U N P E R S O N t l E L COULD BE I N C L U D E D .
- THE d ~ <F)U R T H E R R E P O R T S THE RECENT C A N C E L I . A l I O N BY 1'HE -
F O R I H C Q ~ ~ I , UNSCHEDULED
N~~ AT S E A P E R I O D . ADDITIONALLY, ALL

THE P O H I
ajl
I I N H A ~ P O MISSILESHAVE B E E N LOADED ON T O LAUNCHERS
WARD AND EXTRA HEAVY S E C U R I T Y HAS B E E N n z P o R T E D I N
A S O F BANDAR A B 3 A S AND BUSHEHR. A SIGNIFICANT
(STAINED VISAS FOR THEIR FAMILIESTO TRAVEL TO T H E U.S.
I d O F F I C E R S HAVE B E E N T R A I N E D I N OXHI':''! F O R E I G N
UCH A S T H E UK AND I T A L Y , FOR WHICH E N r R Y
E I R W I V E S AND C H I L D R E N A R E S O T R E Q U I H E D . VANCE
3r S E C R E T
571 1
 DEPARTMENT OF S w à ‘
NFO AMCONSULS ISFAHAN AND TABRIZ (VIA iNTERbAL POUCH),
- -I
FROM:
12065
E.O. 11652: GDS-1/17/85 (SKUD, TIMOTHY E.) OR-M
TAGS: PINS, PINT, SEDU, IR
SUBJECT: EDUCATION VS .. REVOLUTION

I
Shiraz's International CcanmunitySchool is affiliated
with Pahlavi University, with classes for grades kinder-
garten through twelve. Instruction is in English. The
school is intended to provide education for the Eng-
lish-'speakingchildren of the staff at the university.
Approximately 4 0 % of the,children are the products of
marriages between Iranian professors at the university
and foreig-crs (predominently American). The rest are.
sons and daughters of Iranians who either have been
exposed to English from a very early age, usually be-
cause their parents were pursuing degrees aoroad, or
whose parents wish them to be educated in English. Many
want eventually to send their children-abroad to study
and feel that an early start in English will give them
a leg up.
Public schools throughout Iran have been closed vir-
tually since the beginning of the academic year four
months ago, and tionsequently the Community School may
have been the only school open in the country. Security
considerations (rumors were that the school was "tar-
geted" because it alone was onen) and the inpending
loss of some expatriate teachers who will be departing
Iran prompted a recent Parent-Teachers* Association
neeting to decide the fate of the school.
 C O W :LYTIAL 2
The first speaker was a dean of one of the faculties at the
university, and he emphasized three points: The first K.IS
security. tie argued that since the school was the only one
in Iran remaining o p n and because of the foreign influences
it exhibits, it was a logical target for demonstrations or
even terrorist attacks. His second point concerned the qual-
ity of education. Because the school had maintained only a
partial schedule in recent weeks and the departure of some
of the staff was imminent, he felt it possible that the qual-
ity of instruction could suffer further if the school was
kept open. His third point dealt with solidarity. He won- ,
dered if the Comnunity School's students should not show
their support for the "cause" by closing the school. After
all, he contended, every other school in Iran was closed,
and nearly every business and industry was idled. It would
s e e m a slap in the face of the movement for their school to
remain open.
One mother rose to ask about partial refund of the sizable
tuition (over $2,000 per year) if the school closed. Her
question was met with general contempt as being irrelevant.
The next speaker, a medical doctor and professor at the
school of medicine, readd'ressed the security question. He
said, "There are now guerrillas in town who are trying to
discredit the revolution. An attack on a school would be an
ideal way to paint an unfavorable picture of *he movement
in the eyes of the international press." A small minority
greeted his remarks with disapproval.
The American wife of an Iranian professor suggested that t o
keep the school open it be held in various homes, thereby re-
ducing the threat to the children's security. Another parent
protested that theanti-cause guerrilla operations were so
pervasive that they would soon learn where each class was
being held.
An Iranian mother then rose. She said that the kids could
learn more from participation in the revolution than by
attending school. She felt that the children should be out
in the streets with the people. This mother, whose own brood
is enrolled at the Community School, also complained that
by attending an English-language, international school, the
children could never get to know their own culture (sic)!
An Iranian father, a medical doctor, then took the floor. He
felt that they would be holding back both the revolution and
CONFIDENTIAL
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 Tehran, I r a n
January 2 4 , 1979

Lt. General Anir Hossein Rabii

Comander
Imperial I r a n i a n A i r Force

Dear General Rabii:

I aro d e e p l y concerned by t h e a p p a r e n t f a i l u r e of Southern
A i r T r a n m o r t t o o b t a i n nropcr c l e a r a n c e f o r i t s f l i q h t
i n t o Khittami Air Force Base on January 21. A t my r e q u - s t ,
t h e Oepartnent of S t a t e h a s u r g e n t l y looked i n t o t h e
m a t t e r and it appears t h a t Southern A i r T r a n s p o r t believed--
i n c o r r e c t l y , a s it t u r n e d o u t - - i t i n f a c t had c l e a r a n c e .
Southern A i r T r a n s p o r t Company, u n f o r t u n a t e l y , d i d n o t
check w i t h us on t h i s m a t t e r s o t h a t i t could be informed
t h a t f l i q h t s t o Khatami A i r Force Base a s w e l l a s e l s e -
where i n t h e c o u n t r y a r e now c o n t r o l l e d by t h e IIAF. The
company h a s assured u s t h a t it had no i n t e n t i o n s t o
v i o l a t e c l e a r a n c e r u l e s and procedures.
I s i n c e r e l y r e g r e t t h e problems t h i s f l i g h t has caused you
and wish t o a s s u r e you t h a t we a r e doing e v e r y t h i n g p o s s i b l e
h e r e t o work with you and your c o l l e a g u e s t o l e s s e n t h e
burden and t o p r o v i d e f o r t h e smooth and o r d e r l y o p e r a t i o n
of a i r c h a r t e r s .
Sincerely,

William H. S u l l i v a n
Ambassador
 S E C R E T

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S r U I T G A R T F O R E L G , CAPETOWN FOR E M B A S S Y
L.O. 12065: G D S 1 / 2 4 / 3 5 (MARTIN, R03ERT)
TAGS: PINS, I R
SUBJECT: (J). I R A N S I T R E P NO. Ill, 1/24/79, 0 4 0 0 HOURS E S T
A L L ADDECS T A K E FOR A C T I O N IMMEDIATE

. 1.
UdY.
(S-ENTI?S TEXT)
T S n R A . ' S A I R P O R T WAS C L O S E D T H I S I O R V I N G 3 Y T H E RIL:-
l h E I d L I i A ' i Y i.JVl.Bf<OB d F T E r i f i A t ~ AH'i0U;JCl.D CHAT T H E
. ~ . t l i O N F O R T I E C L O S b S Z WAS I 3 F O S M A T I O N LriAT " O P P O B l U M I S f
.LHZNTS" 1 1 T Z N D E J T O B E E T AT T r f E A I R P O ~ T TODAY AND " C R E A T E
D I S O R D E R A'ID TROU3LE." T H U S , T H E A I R P O R T WAS C L O S E D T O
i T H E H E S P O A S I S I L I T Y OF H A I H T A I N I I J G O R D E R A N 3 CALM. IT
4 A S A L S 3 A.lNOU.'!CSO T H A T "AS A R E S U L T O F BAD W E A T H E R A L L
FLIGHTS TODAY WILL BE CANCELLED U N T I L FURTHER H ~ T I C E . "
3 . T H E EMBASSY H A S H E A R D T H A T T H E O P P O S I T I O N I N r E N D E D T O
/->;%'/d
,
/ -5
-
HAVE A N I R A N A I R P L A N E L E A V E T H I S MORNING F O R P A R I S T O
PICK UP KHONEINI. A S P A R T O F T H I S A GENERAL I N V I T A T I O N
WAS E X T E N D E D F O R P E O P L E T O J O I N A Y A T O L L A H T A L E G H A N I T O S E E
THE P L A N E OFF. I T S E E M S MOT U N L I K E L Y T H A T T H I S WAS T H E
"DISORDER" THAT THE MILITARY ACTION T O CLOSE THE AIRPORT
WAS I N T E N D E D T O A V O I D .

4. T H E E N G L I S H LANGUAGE P R E S S I N T E H R A N T H I S N O R N I N S
C A R R I E S C O W E T I H G I N T E R V I E W S W I T H P M i A K H T I A R (HE IS
D E T E R M I N E D T O R E M A I N ) AND L I B E R A T I O N KOVENENT L E A D E R
BAZARGAN C B A K H T I A R A N D T H E GOVERNMENT MUST R E S I G N ) W H I C H
CONTINUE T O UNDERSCORE THE CONFRONTATION/NO DEAL S I T U A T I O N
5 . TWO S I L L S WERE I N T R O D U C E D I N T H E N A J L I S , O N E T O
A B O L I S H SAVAK AND T H E O T I E S T O E S T A B L I S H S P E C I A L C O U R T S
TO TRY THOSE B E I N G HELD FOR P o s s I a L E C O R R U P T I O N .
6. T H E E D I T O R O F E T T E L A ' A T , W H I C H WAS R E C E N T L Y V I S I T E D
BY i4.iSLIM S T U D E N T S P R E S S I N G T H E NEED F O R P R O P E R R E P O R T I N S
ABOUT T H E V I C T O R I O U S R E V O L U T I O N , H A S C O M K E H T E D T H A T I T IS
D I F F I C U L T T O P U T O U T A NEWSPAPER UNDER P R E S S U R E FROM T H E
KHOKEI N I FORCES.
7. T H E E L I T E B R I G A D E O F T H E I M P E R I A L GUARD P U T ON A
HIGHLY P U 3 L I C I Z E D DEMONSTRATION O F I T S M I L I T A R Y S K I L L S
AND T O U G H N E S S Y E S T E R D A Y . T H E COMMANDER MADE A S T A T E K E N T
T H A T E V E R Y MAN WAS P R E P A R E D T O S H E D T H E L A S T DROP O F H I S
B L O O D F O R T H E SHAH.
8. OUR CCINSIII I N I S F A H A N T A L K E D W I T H T H E KHATAMI A F S

9. S C A T T E R E D G R O U P S O F C L U B B E R S H A V E B E E N A F O O T AROUND
ISFAHAN T H I S HORSING. MANY RUMORS A R E A L S O A F O O T T H E R E ,
I M C L U D I N G ONE ABOUT A MAJOR PRO-GOVERNMENT D E M O N S T R A T I O N
L A T E R TODAY. P A R T O F T H A T L A T T E R RUKOR I N C L U D E S T H E P O I N T
T H A T T H E HOMOFAR-LED GROUP T H A T C L O S E D KHATAMI Y E S T E R D A Y
MAY L E A D T H E R U h O R E D PRO-GOVERNKENT D E M O N S T R A T I O N I N TOWN
TODAY. VANCE
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T.4 S: PINS, 84

2. ..l~ . I T I C A L / ~ ? C U R I T Y : A M A U T H O R I T A T I V E S O U R C E H A S J U S T
I i FC: .'; T H E E:'Ll':SSY T!lAi KKCKEI!:! E X P E C T S T O T A K E O F F FHOM
~ f t - ~ : , .'"IS ~ v. ' ?1- '* A::D T O A R R I V E IN TEHRAN A i O U T tSSS HOURS
L O C A L 1:KE JA:.'~r.'il' 31.
3. VW.V S :'.E.?OZT D I D R E O P E N T O D A Y A1:D R E S U M E D C C f l M E R C I A L
A ' i l ~ ' ~ !V1TlJ.A
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S I X i,:'J.-H: M A J L I S D Z P U T I E S HAVE h E S I G N E D ,
T%E .'Ñ.'.:ik;ATIO., F I f i L ' R r O V A 25. THLKE IS A
i:::PORT TI!::T TI!:: i C . ? ' T I G K fI; I X t i Y U I L L iS C L O S i D U N T I L
SfiTUR!:AY, T% ;-~'~:L,''!.,:THAS 'ti1 EZ£ AS YET COi'TIfiNED.
T K L E F K ' .: "Gl'.?Li; :Â :..'Â At.;.!. J"Ci0 THAT T H E Y W I L L S H U T DOWN
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6. S E C Z I T Y OF A!l'RICANS: TODAY'S MAC F L I G H T S WERE USED

G Y C E P A i . i -i:\:C A ^ h I C t l ' S TO C A P A C I T Y . TOKORROV T H E R E W I L L
EE A H EVS:; L W G E R l.ijtIEEfi O F MAC F L I G H T S .
7. I S Â ; ; I L I i A t ? Y (TWO GEHEKALS) HAVE Fii'OVIDED A S S U R A N C E S
A 3 0 U T It!? E G C U d I T Y O F T H E E K A S S Y COi'TOUND A?:D ASKED
F-r'-iSOW. 1.Y T O B E ALE:?TED I F THERE ARE AW PRULLEMS. OUR
COXSUL I;! I S F A H A N A J I T H E B H I EMPLOYEE Y E R E EADLY P S A T E N
i Y T H E C;;C','DS FOLL@'..'IKG Y E S T E R D A Y ' S I N C I D E N T E U T ARE
f.LL R I G K T . T H E COMSUL I S T H Y I C G T O V C R X OUT A v ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
V A t.'CE
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