Article 6

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I CASE DIGESTS
ARTICLE 6: Legislative Department CASE 33. GARCIA v COMELEC, G.R. No. 111230, September 30, 1994 KEYWORDS Peoples Initiative Art 6. Sec 1 & 32 of the 1987 Constitution Petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 which included the Municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accordance with the RA No. 7227 (Bases Conversion Development Act of 1992). However, no action was taken w/in 30 days thus petitioners resorted to their power of initiative. Transcendental Constitutional Issue 2 Kinds of Legislative Power: 1. Original possessed by sovereign people 2. Derivative delegated by soverieng people to delegate legislative bodies and is subordinate to the original power of the people Act an expression of will or purpose . . . it may denote something done . . . as a legislature, including not merely physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgments, resolves, awards, and determinations . . . Initiative is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose. 3 systems of initiative: a.1.Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution. a.2.Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and a.3.Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. Referendum is the power of the electorate to approve or reject legislation through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely: 1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and 2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies. Resolution is used whenever the legislature wishes to express an opinion which is to have only a temporary effect Ordinance is intended to permanently direct and control matters applying to persons or things in general. Thus, resolutions are not normally subject to referendum for it may destroy the efficiency necessary to the successful administration of the business affairs of a city. WON Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan is the proper subject of an initiative. (other: GAD on COMELEC ex parte decision on petition of VM De leon) Qualifications of a Senator or a Congress Representative Article 6. Sec 3 Constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of (g)candidates for public office, (c)students of secondary and tertiary schools, (d)officers and employees of public and private offices, and (f)persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue. Petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the HELD/DOCTRINE YES. The Solicitor Generals argument that a resolution cannot be the subject of local initiative because of Section 120, Chapter 2, Title XI, Book 1 of the Local Government Code of 1991 states: Local Initiative Defined Local initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. Is a narrow and literal reading of the above provision for it will collide with the Constitution. It can not be argued that the subject matter of the resolution of the municipality of Morong merely temporarily affects the people of Morong for it directs a permanent rule of conduct or government. The inclusion of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone has far reaching implications in the governance of its people. Considering the lasting changes that will be wrought in the social, political, and economic existence of the people of Morong by the inclusion of their municipality in the Subic Special Economic Zone, it is but logical to hear their voice on the matter via an initiative. It is not material that the decision of the municipality of Morong for the inclusion came in the form of a resolution for what matters is its enduring effect on the welfare of the people of Morong. (i.e paying taxes - gross income shares, business, security, investments, exports) Finally, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioners were denied due process. They were not furnished a copy of the letter-petition of Vice Mayor Edilberto M. de Leon to the respondent COMELEC praying for denial of their petition for a local initiative on Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. Worse, respondent COMELEC granted the petition without affording petitioners any fair opportunity to oppose it. This procedural lapse is fatal for at stake is not an ordinary right but the sanctity of the sovereignty of the people, their original power to legislate through the process of initiative. Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
34. Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 161658, November 3, 2008

Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For (1)The provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. (2)The provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. (3) A person's constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions. On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator. The principal issues: (1)Do Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution? and (2)Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of legislative power? Party-list System - Art 6. Sec 5(2) The Party-list method of representation under this system, any national, regional or sectoral party or organization registered with the Commission on Elections may participate in the election of party-list representatives who, upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in the House of Representatives as regular members. In effect, a voter is given two (2) votes for the House one for a district congressman and another for a party-list representative. (Art 6. Sec 5) Petitioners are assailing (1) the October 15, 1998 Resolution of the Commission on Elections (Comelec), Second Division, in Election Matter 98-065; and (2) the January 7, 1999 Resolution of the Comelec en banc, affirming the said disposition. The assailed Resolutions ordered the proclamation of thirty-eight (38) additional party-list representatives "to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided under Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941. The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had hurdled the two percent vote requirement "will mean the concentration of representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives to thirteen organizations representing two political parties, three coalitions and four sectors: urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry . . . It further alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory for only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House. Parameters of Party-list System: Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881), Republic Act No. 7941 1. The twenty percent allocation the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list. 2. The two percent threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the Legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators. WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 (Pimentel v COMELEC) and declares Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 (SJS v DDB & PDEA) and 158633 (Laserna vs DDB & PDEA) by declaring Sec. 36 (c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36 (f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are, accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36 (f) and (g) of RA 9165. No costs.
35. Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 136781, October 6, 2000
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Comelec are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of the fourteen (14) sitting party-list representatives two for APEC and one each for the remaining twelve (12) qualified parties are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. Ratio: 1. It will be shown presently that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress. The mechanics by which it is to be filled up has been left to Congress. In the exercise of its prerogative, the legislature enacted RA 7941, by which it prescribed that a party, organization or coalition participating in the party-list election must obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the system in order to qualify for a seat in the House of Representatives. The Constitution DOES NOT require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all circumstances 2. In imposing a 2% threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress. Congress set the seat-limit to (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled th3 2% vote

party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives; The three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats. Proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes." threshold. Such 3 seat limit ensures the entry of various interestrepresentations into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House. 3. a. Rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party. b. Determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes. (If the proportion of votes received by the 1st party without rounding it off is equal to at least 6% of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the 1st party shall be entitled to 2 additional seats or a total of 3 seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than 4%, but less than 6%, then the 1st party shall have 1 additional or a total of 2 seats. And if the proportion is less than 4%, then the 1st party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.) c. Solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. [(No. of votes of concerned party / Total no. of votes of 1st party) * no. of seat(s) entitled to 1st party]. No rounding-off necessary. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x. Section 3 expressly states that a party is either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties. A distinguished member of the Constitutional Commission declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give genuine power to our people in Congress. The
3. 4.
ISSUES 1. Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the 20% allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time? 2. Are the 2% threshold requirement and the 3 seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional? 3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
36. Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, et al. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001
Art 6. Sec 5 Transcendental Constitutional Issue; Social Justice Petitioners Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party challenges the Omnibus Resolution No. 37851 issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the nonmarginalized or overrepresented. Political party as an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. Issues: 1. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.

2. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors and organizations. foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like in accordance with law or as may be provided by law; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become members of the House of Representatives. Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms. The marginalized and unrepresented groups are that the sector include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. The formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term proportional representation, this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations. The remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from dominating the party-list elections. We cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any
37. Banat v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179295, April 21, 2009
Party-lists system of computation different from that of Veterans Federation v Comelec. Art 6. Sec 5 Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives The Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution filed by the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT). Declared Moot and Academic by COMELEC. The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re "In the Matter of the Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System During the May 14, 2007 National and Local. It resolved among others that the total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results". Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system. (b)A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties. (c)A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region. (d)A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of their sector, (e)A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or

characteristics, employment, interests or concerns. (f)A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes. party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above. However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Wherefore, we partially grant the petition, we set aside the resolution of COMELEC as well the resolution of NBC. We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional partylist seats. Major political parties are disallowed from participating in party-list elections. We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives". The contentions are devoid of merit. The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Title, necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49. To the effect that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws. The present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." If Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional. As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
38. Tobias v. Abalos, , G.R. No. L-114783, December 8, 1994
Art. 6 Sec 5(1) & (2), & 26 of the 1987 Constitution Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." A plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect. Petitioner argues that Article VIII, Section 49 of RA 7675, contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the Constitution. That such proviso has 2 principal subjects: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. The 2nd aforestated subject is not germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law. Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5 (1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements. And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5 (4).

39. Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995 Art 6. Sec 5(3) Petition assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati." Involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds: 1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code; 2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the 'three consecutive term' limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. 3.Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for: (a)it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every census; (b)the increase in legislative district, was not expressed in the title of the bill; and (c)the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000." Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of the House of Representatives, have a term of three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more than three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate existence, Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously serve by them. In particular, petitioners point that Section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already served for two (2) consecutive terms. Principle of equality of representation: Section 5 (composition of the House of representatives) The Petitioner Cirilo Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 issued by the COMELEC redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte. The ground for annulment of said resolution is that it violates the principle of equality of representation. The province of Leyte is comprised of five legislative districts. Under R.A. No. 2141, Biliran which located in the third district of Leyte, was made its sub-province. When the Local Government Code took effect, the sub-province of Biliran became a regular power under Section 462 which states: Existing sub-provinces are hereby converted into regular provinces upon approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be held in the sub-provinces and the original provinces directly affected. The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved as required. As a result of the conversion, the eight municipalities of the Third District composed the new province of Biliran. Consequently, the composition of the third district was reduced further to only five municipalities. This created an inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in Leyte. In order to remedy the situation, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2736, transferring certain municipalities from one district to another. WON the exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting and reapportionment (of the municipalities in Leyte) is valid or not?
The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be reelected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same post in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction. Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.
40. Montejo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118702, March 16, 1995
The deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission shows that COMELEC was denied major power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. COMELECs power of redistricting was derived from the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. Section 2 of the Ordinance states: Sec.2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment herein made. COMELEC is only empowered to make minor changes. Likewise, the same ordinance did not give COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another. According to the debates of the Constitutional Commission, transfer of one municipality to another district is not a minor change but a substantive one. Minor changes do not include allowing the change in allocations per district. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated Section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736. Thus, said section is annulled and set aside. The petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District is denied. It is true that the Court can strike down an unconstitutional reapportionment. However, it cannot itself make the reapportionment as being prayed for by the petitioner.

41. Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995 SECTION 6: QUALIFICATIONS OF DISTRICT AND PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES: Domicile and Residence Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, applied as a candidate to contest elections to the House of Representatives in the district of Leyte. The incumbent representative of the constituency of Leyte, Cirilo Roy Montejo (a candidate for the same position) applied to Commission on Elections [COMELEC] to have Imelda Romualdez-Marcoss application rejected on the grounds that it did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. (the candidate must have resided in the location for which they are standing for a period of one year or more this is to prevent the possibility of strangers or newcomers who were unacquainted with the needs of a community standing for office.) ISSUES Whether or not petitioner met the 1yr residency qualification for election purposes. Whether or not COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction before and after the elections. Mandatory vs. Directory provision Difference lies on grounds of expediency; less injury results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law Statute is construed to be merely directory when the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act. 1. Qualification on 1 yr. residency WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte. 1st Issue SC said that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous to domicile. She has never lost her domicile, It was further decided that when her husband died, the return to her original domicile was as if there was no interruption. 2nd Issue The contention of the petitioner is that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House Representatives in accordance with Art. VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution Doctrine: a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory, so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result, it would have clearly indicated it. WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar. The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be thesole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution). In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court. The respondent was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship in spite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old. Upon parents demise, he became the co-owner of their properties. It is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile.
42. Co v. House Electoral Tribunal, G.R. Nos. 92191-92, July 30, 1991
Art 6. Sec 17: Qualifications of HRET & SET members (Sub: Citizenship & Residence) The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The petitioners alleged HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion. (failure to present original evidence of documents Best evidence rule) He did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.(CPA & worked in CB) ISSUE 1. 2. 3. JURISDICTION CITIZENSHIP RESIDENCE ~ To own property (assuming he does not own any) in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run.

43. Bengzon v. Cruz, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001 SECTION 6: QUALIFICATIONS OF DISTRICT AND PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection. Issue: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen. Prohibition on Riders in Appropriation Bill Art 6. Sec 26(1) RA 9006 (Fair Election Act) - An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices The petitioners is alleging in the main that SECTION 14 OF REP. ACT NO. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. Sec 14 in Rep. Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act) primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006. They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy. The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that "[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval" is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it becomes effective. WON Section 14 of RA 9006 violates the one subject-one title rule. Doctrine: A natural born Filipino took an oath of allegiance was made to the US without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines will reacquire his original nationality/citizenship as if he never lost it and regain his natural born state through repatriation. Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides: Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. The legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them. Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Rep. Act No. 9006, which deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the "one subject-one title" rule. The Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.
44. Farias v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387, December 10,

45. Codilla v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 150605, December 10, 2002 Jurisdiction over member of HRET: of Art 6. Sec 17 Petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., filed the present Petition for Mandamus and Quo Warranto directed against respondents Speaker Jose De Venecia and Secretary-General Roberto P. Nazareno of the House of Representatives to compel them to implement the decision of the Commission on Elections en banc by (a) administering the oath of office to petitioner as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, and (b) registering the name of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, and against respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin for usurping, intruding into, and unlawfully holding and exercising the said public office on the basis of a void proclamation. The HRET has no jurisdiction over a petition for declaration of nullity of proclamation which is based not on ineligibility or disloyalty, but by reason that the candidate proclaimed as winner did not obtain the highest number of votes; that the petition for annulment of proclamation is a pre-proclamation controversy and, hence, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to Section 242 of B.P. Blg. 881 and Section 3, Article IX (C) of the Constitution; that respondent Speaker De Venecia himself recognizes the finality of the COMELEC decision but has decided to refer the matter to the Supreme Court for adjudication; that the enforcement and implementation of a final decision of the COMELEC involves a ministerial act and does not encroach on the legislative power of Congress; and that the power to determine who will sit as Member of the House does not involve an exercise of legislative power but is vested in the sovereign will of the electorate. * The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53,447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before the Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory. 46. Tolentino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 148334, January 21, 2004 SECTION 9: FILLING-IN VACANCIES In Feb 2001, a Senate seat for a term expiring on June 30 2004 was vacated w/ the appointment of then Sen. Guingona as Vice President of the Philippines (Erap was overthrown then Gloria was appointed as president having no VP, Guingona took place as propose by GMA and elected by the Congress)The Senate then adopted Resolution No. 84 which: 1) certified the existence of a vacancy in the Senate; 2) called the COMELEC to fill up the said vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously w/ the regular election on May 14 2001, and; 3) declared the senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Sen. Guingona. The special election was held on the scheduled May 14 2001 regular elections. A single canvassing of votes for a single list of senatorial candidates was also done. By virtue or COMELEC resolution NO. 01-005 providing the election of 13 senators and the 13th placer to serve the remaining 3years term left by Guingona then COMELEC Res. 01-006 declaring the ranking in the previous resolution final Honasan landed 13th therefore serving the remaining 3 yrs. Petitioners (as exercising their right to suffrage and paying tax w/c was used in the election) assailed the manner by which the special election was conducted for violating the precedents set by the 1951 & 1955 special elections, both of which were held simultaneously & yet distinctly w/ the regular general elections. Thus, they pray that the Court declare that: NO special elections were held & that 2) Comelecs Resolutions that proclaim the Senatorial candidate who obtained the 13 th highest number of votes as a duly elected be declared NULL&VOID. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Mandamus is granted. Public Speaker of the House of Representatives shall administer the oath of petitioner EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Public respondent Secretary-General shall likewise register the name of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives after he has taken his oath of office. This decision shall be immediately executory. No sufficient proof was presented(as to alleged vote buying of petitioner). Moreover, under R.A. 6646 it is said that the COMELEC can only suspend a proclamation if the winning candidates guilt is strong. Again the same was not proven by evidence. In a democracy, the first self-evident principle is that he who has been rejected by the people cannot represent the people. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment."The administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents. Doctrine: Failure to give notice of time of special election does not invalidate the election unless it is proven that the failure to give notice was meant to mislead the people. Petition lack Merit. YES, a special election to fill a vacant 3-yr term Senate seat was validly held on May 14 2001. Although COMELEC DID NOT COMPLY w/ the requirements of RA 6645, either strictly or substantially, it does NOT invalidate the special election. A) Because although no calls for special election were made by COMELEC, Sec 2 of RA 6645, as amended by RA 7166 already provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously w/ the next succeeding regular election. The law already charges the voters w/ knowledge of this statutory notice & COMELECs failure to give additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election much less invalidate it.

47. People v. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875-76, Feberuary 3, 2000 SECTION 11: IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES (Privilege from Arrest) The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts1is pending appeal. The accusedappellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense. The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases. WON membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? Section 11: Immunities and Privileges (Parliamentary Freedom of Speech and Debate) Cabangbang, a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense, was sued by herein petitioner for causing the publication of an alleged libelous letter. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the questioned letter is not libelous and as a member of the Congress he is immune from suit considering their privileged communication. The letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the unnamed persons therein alluded to as "planners", and that, having been handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs "probably belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique", it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that "it is of course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge". Issue: Is the alleged libelous letter protected by Article VI Section 11 which states [a] senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof. Doctrine: Privilege to be free from arrest applies only if the offense is punishable by less than 6 years of imprisonment. The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others. Doctrine: Communication is only privileged if it was done in performance of an official duty, either as a member of congress or a member of any committee thereof. NO. Said expression (pertaining to the provision) refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question. The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged. The act of Valencia was against the privilege of speech and debate of the plaintiff. Two requirements must concur in order that the privilege can be availed of by the member of the Congress. The remarks must be made in connection with the discharge of official duties, and that such statements be made while the legislature is functioning. Where the defendant was silent upon the release of the allegations, it may be presumed that he admitted that whatever was stated in the publication was properly quoted. Malice in law was also presumed given the defamatory and libelous nature against honor, integrity and reputation of the plaintiff.
48. Jimenez v. Cabangbang, G.R. No. L-15905, August 3, 1966
49. Antonino v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-26526, May 27, 1974
Section 11: Immunities and Privileges (Parliamentary Freedom of Speech and Debate) Gaudencio Antonino was a Liberal party senator and the LP Head in Davao. Brigido Valencia was the incumbent secretary of Public Works and Communication. During the November 1963 local elections, official candidate Sarmiento lost to the Nacionalista Party standard bearer Vicente Duterte. Defendant sabotaged or double-crossed the party; its official candidate would have won. On 1964, plaintiff filed a formal request with the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee thru his privileged communication to investigate the anomalous acquisitions of the defendant as the Secretary of the department. A press release was issued by the office of the defendant on six metropolitan papers. In the article, he said that the senator had been telling lies against him. He also said that the plaintiff abused his power and he alleged high anomalous activities of the senator in the exercise of his duty. Issue: Was the act of the defendant a violation against the privilege of speech and debate of the plaintiff?
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50. Liban b. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009 Art 6. Sec 13 Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution. WON the office of the PNRC Chairman is a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution The following are proof that PNRC is not a GOCC. 1. The PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from Congress. The PNRC is financed primarily by private contributions 2. The PNRC is not controlled by the government. Under its charter, only 6 of the 30 members of the board of governors are appointed by the President. The PNRC board of governors elects the Chairman and all of its officer. Gordon was elected, as all PNRC Chairmen, were elected, by a private sector controlled PNRC Board. 3. The PNRC chairman not an official or employee of the Philippine Government. Not being a government official or employee, the PNRC chairman as such, does not hold government office or employment.\ 4. The PNRC boards decisions or actions are not reviewable by the president. it is the Board that can review, reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the Chairman. This proves again that the office of the Chairman is not a private office, not a government office. Hence, Article 6, Section 13 could not apply to Gordons case, in accepting the position in the PNRC. Doctrine: Direct or indirect appearance as counsel of lawyer legislators before any administrative body is prohibited. That which the constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirect means. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naivet. He would still appear as counsel indirectly. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited. The intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC. No. 1747 falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution(Section 13 and 14 of Art. VI of the present constitution). Doctrine: Parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression before the courts or any other forum, but it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. Osmeas petition is dismissed.
51. Puyat v. De Guzman, Jr, 113 SCRA 31 (1982)
SECTION 14: PROHIBITIONS LAWYER LEGISLATORS / CONFLICT OF INTERESTS An election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI), a private corporation, was held. A quo warranto proceeding was subsequently instituted with the SEC, wherein Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, appeared as counsel for respondent Acero. Puyat objected on constitutional ground than an assemblyman cannot appear as counsel before any administrative body, like SEC as reflected inSection 11, Article VIII of the Constitution(Section 13 and 14 of Art. VI of the present constitution). Thus, Fernandez withdrew his appearance, but later, he purchased ten IPI shares and then filed a motion for intervention on the basis that he is a shareholder in said corporation. ISSUE: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI may intervene in the SEC case
52. Osmea v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960)
SECTION 16: OFFICERS AND INTERNAL BUSINESS (Internal Rules and Discipline) Congressman Osmea took the floor on the one-hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled A Message to Garcia wherein said speech contained serious imputations of bribery against the President. Being unable to produce evidence thereof, Osmea was then found to be guilty of serious disorderly behaviour by the House of Representatives. Osmea argues that the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned. In respondents capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution 59. WON said disciplinary action by the House is in violation of Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution.
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53. Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 118364, August 10, 1996
Suspension of a Member of Congress RA 3019
On 23 Jan 1990, Gelacio, the then vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur filed a case against Paredes (who was then the governorof the same province), Atty. Sansaet (counsel of Paredes), and Honrada (the clerk of court). The three allegedly conspired to falsify a copy of a Notice of Arraignment and of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in fact, no arraignment has ever been issued against him in a criminal proceeding against him. Gelacio was able to produce a certification from the judge handling the casehimself that the criminal case against him never reached the arraignment stage because the prosecution was dismissed. Atty. Sansaet on his part maintained that there was indeed a Notice of Arraignment but he later retracted his testimonies. Paredes claimed that Sansaet onlychanged his side because of political realignment. Subsequently, the Office of the Ombudsman recommended that Paredes et al be charged with Falsification of Public Documents. Paredes appealed but was eventually denied by the Sandiganbayan. ISSUE: WON Paredes, now a member of Congress, be suspended by order of the Sandiganbayan. SECTION 16: OFFICERS AND INTERNAL BUSINESS (Duty to Keep Journals and Records) The present controversy revolves around the passage of House Bill No. 9266, which became Republic Act 4065, "An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila." When the bill was discussed for second reading, substantial amendments were introduced by Sen.Tolentino which were approved in toto by the senate. The amendment of Sen Roxas did not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as having acted upon. The enrolled bill that was authenticated by the president included the amendments of Sen Roxas instead of Sen. Tolentinos. Because of this the Senate President, and consequently the President of the Philippines withdrew their signatures on HB 9266. Subsequently, Mayor Antonio villegas issued circulars to the offices of the city government of manila and other business establishments to disregard the provisions of RA 4065, and recalled five members of the city police force who had been assigned to the vice mayor presumably under authority of RA 4065. Reacting to these steps taken by the Mayor, the then Vice Mayor Astorga filed a petition for mandamus, injunction and /or prohibition with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction to compel the respondents to comply with the provisions of RA 4065, having his main contention that the signatures of the presiding officers of both houses signify the enactment of the enrolled bill. SECTION 17: SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (Jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunal) Jose A. Angara (P) filed for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua (R) another respondent, against the election of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas. P won the elections but R filed for a Motion of Protest before the Electoral Commission against Ps election. P responded with a petition to dismiss the protest since R was out of the prescribed period of filing complaints under Resolution 8 of the Nat. Assembly. However, R stated that the resolution was not yet in force during the making of the Electoral Commission. Furthermore, the Solicitor-General stated that the Electoral Commission is an extension of the Legislative branch so it is out of control of the Judicial branch and could make quasi-judicial decisions. ISSUE: a. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative?
54. Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974)
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of congress. The SC ruled: Petitioners invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which deals with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and suspend or expel a Member by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED Doctrine: An enrolled bill ceases to be conclusive evidence when the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of representatives withdraws his signature. It is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential, as Article VI Sec. 20 (1) (now Sec 27 (1) expressly states every bill passed by the Congress, shall before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. The court acknowledges the error manifested between the enrolled bill and the bill contained in the journal proceedings and respects the rectification made by the withdrawal of the signature of the Senate President and the chief executive and declares the RA 4065 as not having been duly enacted and therefore did not become a law.
55. Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 134 (1936)
Doctrine: The purpose of the electoral commission is to give all the powers exercised by the assembly referring to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, and shall decide w/n decision is contested. Petition Denied and Costs against P. a. No. The Electoral Commission is clearly independent from the executive, judicial, and legislative branch. It was created as a separate constitutional organ under the 1935 Constitution has specific powers & functions that are free from the other branches influence. The Judicial Branch only has the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution. b. Yes. The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by R against the election of P and that the resolution of the National Assembly of can not in
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b. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly? any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe. The purpose of such an institution would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting elections. Doctrine: The house retains the authority to change its representation in the COA to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in political alignments of its membership. Changes must not be temporary. As provided in the constitution, there should be a Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives elected by each House respectively on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein, this necessarily connotes the authority of each house of Congress to see to it that the requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also subsequently thereto NOT the court.
56. Daza v. Singson, 180 SCRA 496 (1989)
SECTION 18: COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS COMPOSITION, NATURE, FUNCTIONS The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting to a political realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which consisted of the original members except Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza questioned such replacement. The respondent argues that the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. He also maintains that he has been improperly impleaded, the real party respondent being the House of Representatives which changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments and removed the petitioner. Finally, he stresses that nowhere in the Constitution is it required that the political party be registered to be entitled to proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments. ISSUE: Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly changes the composition of the Commission on Appointments. SECTION 21: LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS (Power or Inquiry) This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injuective relief, to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon committee from requiring the petitioners to testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group in thirty-six (36) or thirty-nine (39) corporations. Respondent Committee claims that this court cannot properly inquire into the motives of the lawmakers in conducting legislative investigations, much less can it enjoin the Congress or any its regular and special commitees like what petitioners seek from making inquiries in aid of legislation, under the doctrine of separation of powers, which obtaines in our present system of government. WON the Senate Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry has valid legislative purpose as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 21 SECTION 21: LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS (Power to Punish a Person Under Investigation) Former President Cory issued EO No. 1 creating the PCGG (Presidential Commission on Good Governance). She entrusted upon this body the task of recovering the ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the deposed President Marcos and his close associates. To ensure the PCGGs unhampered performance of its tasks, Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 provides that: No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance. Twenty years later, the Senate invited PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio to be one of the resource persons in a Senate investigation. However, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation invoking Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1. ISSUE: May Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 be invoked by Chairman Sabio to justify non-appearance on legislative investigations?
57. Bengzon, jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, G.R. No. L-89914, November 20, 1991
Doctrine: Because there was no mention of a contemplated legislation in Enriles Speech to look into a possible violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The purpose of the inquiry was to find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Romualdez to the Lopa group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. This matter appears to be more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature, the SC ruled the investigation was not in aid of legislation. Doctrine:The power of contempt is implied in the power of inquiry conferred by the Constitution No. Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 is declared REPEALED by the 1987 Constitution. The Congress power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish. Article VI, Section 21 grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees.
58. Sabio v. Gordon, G.R. No, 174177, October 17, 2006
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59. Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee, G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007 Petitioner, Standard Chartered Bank, is an institution incorporated in England with limited liability licensed to engage in banking, trust, and other related operations in the country. It violated RA 8799 (Securities and Regulation Code) for selling unregistered foreign securities. Petitioner-Bank also prays that judgment be rendered annulling the subpoena ad testificandum and duces tecum issued to them and prohibit the Committee from compelling them to appear and testify in the inquiry being conducted pursuant to the Resolution. Stressing their position that there were cases already pending in court which involved the same issues that the respondent is subjecting to legislative inquiry. WON respondent committee acted without jurisdiction and/or acted with graveabuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, purportedly in aid of legislation SECTION 22: CONGRESS AND HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional. In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP). The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the socalled Gloria gate Scandal. Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. ISSUE: Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional? Sec 21. Power of Inquiry TOPICS COVERED: Executive privilege, investigations in aid of legislation, Senate Rules on investigations in aid of legislation. Issue stemmed from the NBN-ZTE Controversy. Sec 25. Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty who was reversed to inactive status. He filed an action for mandamus to compel the DND and AFP to reinstate him to active service and readjust his rank and pay emoluments. Garcia claims that his reversion to inactive status is violation of RA 1600 which prohibits the reversion of officers with at least 10 years of service. On the other hand, the AFP and DND contend that the said provision of RA 1600 has no relevance or pertinence to the budget in question or to any appropriation item therein. (RA 1600 was an appropriation law for 1956-57). Respondent, Judge Mata, declared paragraph 11 of the Special Provisions for the AFP in RA No. 1600 which was the Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1956-57 unconstitutional and therefore invalid and inoperative.Hence, this petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CFI ISSUE: WON RA 1600 is valid Petition DISMISSED Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation. No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
60. Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006
61. Neri v. Senate Committee, G.R. No, 180643, September 4, 2008 62. Garcia v. Mata, 65 SCRA 517 (1975)
A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a precise and certain reason for preserving their confidentiality The SC held that the said provision used by Garcia as a basis was a RIDER* (see note) because Constitution provides that no provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill UNLESS it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein (Art. VI, Section 25(2)). RA 1600 appropriated money for the operation of the Government for the fiscal year 1956-1957, the said paragraph 11 refers to the fundamental governmental policy matters of the calling to active duty and the reversion to inactive status of reserve officers in the AFP. It clearly shows that the paragraph in question does not relate to the appropriation. Such provision shall be no effect. In legal contemplation, it as though as it has never been passed. A non-appropriation item cannot be inserted in a general appropriations act.
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63. Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208 (1987) Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment. Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not Par 1, Sec 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional. Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. Par 1 of Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void. HOWEVER, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in the GA Act may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is notransfer from one department to another here. It cannot be successfully argued that the PD contains an undue delegation of legislative power. The grant in Sec 11 of the PD of authority to the Board to solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made. Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the Board to solicit such assistance is for a fixed and limited period with the deputized agencies concerned being subject to the direction and control of the Board. That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the PD as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law. The SC ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need is the high expense allotted to the judiciarys franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be sustained in contending that the removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut
64. Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208 (1987)
Tio is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The PD was also reinforced by PD1994 which amended the NationalInternal Revenue Code. The amendment provides that there shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready forplayback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax. The said law was brought about by the need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to themovie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly lessen the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Tio countered that there is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the vast powers conferred upon him by the Amendment and that there is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President.
65. Phil. Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993
A report came in showing that available data from the Postal Service Office show that from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00. of this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service of judicial processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming from the Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The postmasters conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mail from the
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Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it. Acting from this, Prado implemented Circ. No. 9228 as the IRR for the said law. PJA assailed the said law complaining that the law would adversely impair the communication within the judiciary as it may impair the sending of judicial notices. PJA averred that the law is discriminatory as it disallowed the franking privilege of the Judiciary but has not disallowed the franking privilege of others such as the executive, former executives and their widows among others. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection before the law. expenditure by removing the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should have removed the franking privilege all at once from all the other departments. If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution. The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars. In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. RA 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Petition is dismissed. Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities (Juan Luna Subdivision vs. Sarmiento, 91 Phil. 371). Uniformity does not forfend classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class (Pepsi Cola vs. City of Butuan, 24 SCRA 3; Basco vs. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 771). What may instead be perceived to be apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative intent to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the schedular approach in the income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and large, the present global treatment on taxable corporations. We certainly do not view this classification to be arbitrary and inappropriate. Having arrived at this conclusion, the plea of petitioner to have the law declared unconstitutional for being violative of due process must perforce fail. The due process clause may correctly be invoked only when there is a clear contravention of inherent or constitutional limitations in the exercise of the tax power.
66. Tan v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 109289, October3, 1994
These two consolidated special civil actions for prohibition challenge, in G.R. No. 109289, the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7496, also commonly known as the Simplified Net Income Taxationn Scheme (SNIT), amending certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Regulations No. 293, promulgated by public respondents pursuant to said law. Petitioner intimates that Republic Act No. 7496 desecrates the constitutional requirement that taxation shall be uniform and equitable in that the law would now attempt to tax single proprietorships and professionals differently from the manner it imposes the tax on corporations and partnerships. Petitioners claim to be taxpayers adversely affected by the continued implementation of the amendatory legislation. ISSUES: 1. Is Republic Act No. 7496 a misnomer or, at least, deficient for being merely entitled, Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession (Petition in G.R. No. 109289) 2. Does Republic Act No. 7496 violate the Constitution for imposing taxes that are not uniform and equitable. 3. Did the Secretary of Finance and the BIR Commissioner exceed their rule-making authority in applying SNIT to general professional partnerships?
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67. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994 This case contains motions seeking reconsideration of court decision dismissing the petition filed these cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality of RA 7716 also known as Expanded Value-Added Tax Law because of its provisions that are contended to be unconstitutional. The motions, of which there are 10 in all, have been filed by the several petitioners in these cases, with the exception of the Philippine Educational Publishers Association, Inc. and the Association of Philippine Booksellers, petitioners in G.R. No. 115931. The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, filed a consolidated comment, to which the Philippine Airlines, Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. 115852, and the Philippine Press Institute, Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, and Juan T. David, petitioner in G.R. No. 115525, each filed a reply. In turn the Solicitor General filed on June 1, 1995 a rejoinder to the PPI's reply. Major Issue: Whether the Act is unconstitutional for its violation of Sec 24, Article VI. THE PETITION LACKS MERIT. The motions for reconsideration were denied with finality and temporary restraining order was lifted. To quote the court: We have carefully read the various arguments raised against the constitutional validity of R.A. No. 7716. We have in fact taken the extraordinary step of enjoining its enforcement pending resolution of these cases. We have now come to the conclusion that the law suffers from none of the infirmities attributed to it by petitioners and that its enactment by the other branches of the government does not constitute a grave abuse of discretion. Any question as to its necessity, desirability or expediency must be addressed to Congress as the body which is electorally responsible It is not right, as petitioner in G.R. No. 115543 does in arguing that we should enforce the public accountability of legislators, that those who took part in passing the law in question by voting for it in Congress should later thrust to the courts the burden of reviewing measures in the flush of enactment. This Court does not sit as a third branch of the legislature,much less exercise a veto power over legislation. The presidential veto referred merely to the inclusion of hotels, motels, and rest houses in the 20% caterer's tax bracket but not to the whole section. In the contention of the CTA, the President could not veto words or phrases in a bill but only an entire item. However, it was agreed by the SC, with then Solicitor General and his associates, that inclusion of hotels, motels, and rest houses in the 20% caterer's tax bracket are "items" in themselves within the meaning of Sec. 20(3), Article VI of the 1935 Constitution. Thus, the President has the power to veto since an "item" in a revenue bill does not refer to an entire section imposing a particular kind of tax, but rather to the subject of the tax and the tax rate. The Petition is granted. Sec. 191-A of RA 6110 is valid and enforceable, hence the Manila Golf and Country Club, Inc is liable for the amount assessed against it. Petition dismissed. The questioned presidential veto is constitutional The argument that the president may not veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto. The same argument also overlooks the constitutional mandate that such provision is only limited in its operation to some particular appropriation which it relates as stated in article 6 section 25 (2) of the constitution. The constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative, and in this respect it is a grant of power in the executive. The legislative has the affirmative power to enact laws; the chief executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the legislature. It follows that the chief executive must find his authority in the constitution. Thus, such act of the president is constitutional and does
68. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals, 185 SCRA 329 (1990)
69. Gonzales v. Macaraig, G.R. No. 87636, November 19, 1990
Manila Golf & Country Club, Inc. is a non-stock corporation who maintains a golf course and operates a clubhouse with a lounge, bar &dining room exclusively for its members & guests. The company claims that they should have been exempt from payment of privilege taxes were it not for the last paragraph of Section 191-A of RA No. 6110, otherwise known as "Omnibus Tax Law". By virtue of RA No. 6110, the CIR assessed the Manila Golf and Country Club fixed taxes as operators of golf links and restaurant, and also percentage tax (caterer's tax) for its sale of foods and fermented liquors/wines for the period covering September 1969 to December 1970 in the amount of P32,504.96 in which the club protested claiming the assessment to be without basis because Section 42 was vetoed by then President Marcos.CIR denied the protestation of the club, who maintained that Section 42was not entirely vetoed but merely the words "hotel, motels, rest houses" on the ground that it might restrain the development of hotels which is essential to the tourism industry. ISSUE: Does the presidential veto refer to the entire section, or merely to the imposition of 20% tax on gross receipt of operators or proprietors of restaurants, refreshment parlors, bars and other eating places which are maintained within the premises or compound of a hotel, motel or rest houses Dec 16, 1988; congress passed general appropriations bill for FY 1989. Dec 29, 1988; president signed the bill into law but vetoed 7 special provisions and section 55 which is a general provision. The reason of the president in vetoing such section is because it violates Article 6, Section 25 (5) of the constitution. Furthermore, section 55 not only nullify the constitutional and statutory authority of the president, but also the senate president, speaker of the house, chief justice, and the heads of the constitutional commissions to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. Feb 2, 1989; congress mentioned in a resolution that the veto by the president of section 55 is unconstitutional which means section 55 will be in effect. April 11, 1989; petition for prohibition/mandamus was filed. A similar provision was vetoed by the president. It appears in the general appropriations act of 1990. Instead of section 55, such provision was located in section 16 of the said bill. It must be noted that the 1989 appropriations act, the use of savings appears in section 12,separate and apart from section 55; whereas in the 1990 appropriations act, the use of savings and the vetoes provision have been comingled in section 16 only, with the vetoed provision made to appear as a condition or restriction. The petitioners cause is anchored on the following:1.The presidents
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veto power does not Cover provisions, that she exceeded her authority when she vetoed sec 55 (FY 89) and sec 16 (FY 90) because they are provisions2.When the president objects to a provision, she cannot item-veto but instead veto the entire bill3.The item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions4.The power of augmentation in article 6, section 25 (5) of the constitution has to be provided for bylaw, which means the congress has also the power to determine restrictions The veto power of the president can be found in article 6, section 27, of the constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not the veto by the president of section 55 of the 1989 appropriations bill and subsequently of its counterpart section 16 of the 1990 appropriations bill, which are all provisions, is unconstitutional and without effect. not hamper with the legislative function. Settled is the rule that the executive is not allowed to veto a condition or restriction of an appropriation while allowing the appropriation itself to stand. For this rule to apply, conditions or restrictions should be such in the real sense of the term, not some matter which are more properly dealt with in a separatelegislation. Restrictions or conditions in an appropriations bill must exhibit a connection with money items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of expenditures. With this, section 55 (FY 89) and section 16 (FY 90) are held to be inappropriate conditions. They are general law measures more appropriate for separate legislation. They do not show the necessary connection with a schedule of expenditures. Considering that section 55 (FY 89) and section 16 (FY 90)are not really conditions, they can be vetoed by the president. If the legislature believed that the exercise of the veto powers by the executive were unconstitutional, the remedy laid down by the constitution is crystal clear. A presidential veto may be overridden by the votes of twothirds of members of congress as stated in article 6, section 27 (1) of the constitution. 1.Special Provision on Debt Ceiling *Congress provided for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation for debt service. The said provisions are germane to & have direct relation w/debt service. They are appropriate provisions & cannot be vetoed w/o vetoing the entire item/appropriation. VETO VOID 2.Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCU's * said provision allows for the use of income &creation of revolving fund for SCU's. Provision for Western Visayas State Univ. & Leyte State Colleges vetoed by the Pres. Other SCU's enjoying the privilege do so by existing law. Pres. merely acted in pursuance to existing law. VETO VALID 3.Special Provision on Road Maintenance * Congress specified 30% ratio for works for maintenance of roads be contracted according to guidelines set forth by DPWH. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. It is not an inappropriate provision; it is not alien to the subj. of road maintenance & cannot be veoted w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. VETO VOID. 4.Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. * AFP modernization, prior approval of Congress required before release of modernization funds. It is the so-called legislative veto. Any prov. blocking an admin. action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval must be subj. of a separate law. VETOVALID. 5.Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions * allows Chief of Staff to augment pension funds through the use of savings. According to the Constitution, only the Pres. may exercise such power pursuant to a specific law. Properly vetoed. VETO VALID.
70. Philconsa v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994
RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General Appropriations Bill of 1994) entitled "An Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the Philippines from January 1 to December 1,1994, and for other Purposes" was approved by the President and vetoed some of the provisions. Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category claiming that it violates Sec. 25, Art 7 of the Constitution. Issues of constitutionality were raised before the Supreme Court. PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void a.) Art 16 on the Countrywide Development Fund and b.) The veto of the President of the Special provision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of 1994.16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and Management and the National Treasurer and questions: 1.) Constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994 and 2.) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt services. Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the same respondents. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of: 1.) veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and 2.) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU's, DPWH, and National Highway Authority. B.ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the president on four special provisions is constitutional and valid?
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6.Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGU's * use of special fund for the compensation of the said CAFGU's. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior approval. It is also an amendment to existing law (PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an appropriation act cannot be used to repeal/amend existing laws. VETO VALID. 71. Gerochi v. Department of Energy, G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007 Gerochi et al seeks the declaration of Sec. 34 of RA 9136 (Electric Power Industry Refor Act of 1991-EPIRA) which imposes a Universal Charge against all electric end-users on a monthly basis, as unconstitutional on the ground of: such universal charge is a tax, which power to impose is a strictly legislative function, thus, constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power on the part of the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC). Issue: Whether the universal charge is a tax; and, whether there is an undue delegation of legislative taxing power to ERC. Both negative. 1. The conservative and pivotal distinction between power to tax and police power rests in the purpose for which the charge is made. If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax. It can be gleaned that the assailed Universal Charge is not a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the States police power. Public welfare is surely promoted. Moreover, it is a well-established doctrine that the taxing power may be used as an implement of police power. The Special Trust Fund reasonably serves and assures the attainment and perpetuity of the purposes for which the Universal Charge is imposed, i.e., to ensure the viability of the countrys electric power industry. 2. A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of nondelegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest (what has been delegated cannot be delegated). All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These requirements are denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards. The Court is not persuaded. Certainly, the framers of the Constitution did not contemplate that existing laws in the statute books including existing presidential decrees appropriating public money are reduced to mere "bills" that must again go through the legislative mill. The only reasonable interpretation of said provisions of the Constitution which refer to "bills" is that they mean appropriation measures still to be passed by Congress. If the intention of the framers thereof were otherwise they should have expressed their decision in a more direct or express manner.
72. Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, G.R. No. 94571, April 22, 1991
This is a case of first impression whereby petitioners question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget. The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and; P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while The appropriations for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports amount to P27,017,8l3,000.00. The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled "Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), "by P.D. No. 1177, entitled "Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society," and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An Act Strengthening the Guarantee
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and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose." The petitioner seeks the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees. Petitioners argue that the said automatic appropriations under the aforesaid decrees of then President Marcos became functus oficio when he was ousted in February, 1986; that upon the expiration of the one-man legislature in the person of President Marcos, the legislative power was restored to Congress on February 2, 1987 when the Constitution was ratified by the people; that there is a need for a new legislation by Congress providing for automatic appropriation, but Congress, up to the present, has not approved any such law; and thus the said P86.8 Billion automatic appropriation in the 1990 budget is an administrative act that rests on no law, and thus, it cannot be enforced. Moreover, petitioners contend that assuming arguendo that P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 did not expire with the ouster of President Marcos, after the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, the said decrees are inoperative under Section 3, Article XVIII which provides Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked. They then point out that since the said decrees are inconsistent with Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. Whereby bills have to be approved by the President, then a law must be passed by Congress to authorize said automatic appropriation (reiterated as well in Art. 27 of the constitution). Further, petitioners state said decrees violate Section 29(l) of Article VI of the Constitution which provides as follows Sec. 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation; otherwise it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in advance the amount appropriated for the debt service. ISSUE: WON the presidential decrees are inconsistent with Sections 24, 27 and 29 of Article VI of the Constitution. On October 10, 1984, President Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a Special Account in the General Fund, designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). It was designed to reimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustments and from increases in the world market prices of crude oil. Later, the OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability account," by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) 1024, and ordered released from the National Treasury to the Ministry of Energy. President Corazon C. Aquino, amending PD 1956, promulgated Executive Order No. 137, expanding the grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost under recovery incurred due to the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products, the amount of the under recovery being left for determination by the Ministry of Finance. Petitioner argues, among others, that "the monies collected pursuant to P.D. 1956, as amended, must be treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a 'trust account' or a 'trust fund,' and that "if a special tax is collected for a specific purpose, the revenue generated therefrom shall 'be treated as a special fund' to be used only for the purpose indicated, and not channeled to another government objective." Further, that since "a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing power of a State, such Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon. Equally fundamental is the principle that construction of the Constitution and law is generally applied prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated. More significantly, there is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be 'made by law,' such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed The Court, therefore, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations, unless they are repealed or otherwise amended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely complying with the duty to implement the same
73. Osmea v. Orbos, G.R. No. 99886, March 31, 1993
1. The petitioner's perceptions are, in the Court's view, not quite correct. To address this critical misgiving in the position of the petitioner on these issues, the Court recalls its holding in Valmonte v. Energy Regulatory Board, et al. The OPSF was established precisely to protect local consumers from the adverse consequences that such frequent oil price adjustments may have upon the economy. Thus, the OPSF serves as a pocket, as it were, into which a portion of the purchase price of oil and petroleum products paid by consumers as well as some tax revenues are inputted and from which amounts are drawn from time to time to reimburse oil companies, when appropriate situations arise, for increases in, as well as underrecovery of, costs of crude importation. The OPSF is thus a buffer mechanism through which the domestic consumer prices of oil and petroleum products are stabilized, instead of fluctuating every so often, and oil companies are allowed to recover those portions of their costs
20

amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to the special purpose/objective for which it was created." He also contends that the "delegation of legislative authority" to the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) violates Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution and, inasmuch as the delegation relates to the exercise of the power of taxation, "the limits, limitations and restrictions must be quantitative, that is, the law must not only specify how to tax, who (shall) be taxed (and) what the tax is for, but also impose a specific limit on how much to tax." Petitioner assumes that the Fund is formed from a tax undoubtedly because a portion thereof is taken from collections of ad valorem taxes and the increases thereon. Thus, the petitioner seeks the corrective, prohibitive and coercive remedies provided by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the powers granted to the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) under P.D. 1956, as amended, partake of the nature of the taxation power of the State. 2. Whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power to the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) of the exercise of the power of taxation which they would not otherwise recover given the level of domestic prices existing at any given time. To the extent that some tax revenues are also put into it, the OPSF is in effect a device through which the domestic prices of petroleum products are subsidized in part. It appears to the Court that the establishment and maintenance of the OPSF is well within that pervasive and non-waivable power and responsibility of the government to secure the physical and economic survival and well-being of the community, that comprehensive sovereign authority we designate as the police power of the State. In Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, this Court upheld the legality of the sugar stabilization fees and explained their nature and character, viz.: The tax collected is not in a pure exercise of the taxing power. It is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide a means for the stabilization of the sugar industry. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power of the State. Hence, it seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF is a special fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply with the constitutional description of a "special fund." Indeed, the practice is not without precedent. 2. With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that the provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the general policy of the law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates, Section 8(c) of P.D. 1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to augment the resources of the Fund. What petitioner would wish is the fixing of some definite, quantitative restriction, or "a specific limit on how much to tax." The Court is cited to this requirement by the petitioner on the premise that what is involved here is the power of taxation; but as already discussed, this is not the case. What is here involved is not so much the power of taxation as police power. Although the provision authorizing the ERB to impose additional amounts could be construed to refer to the power of taxation, it cannot be overlooked that the overriding consideration is to enable the delegate to act with expediency in carrying out the objectives of the law which are embraced by the police power of the State. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED insofar as it prays for the nullification of the reimbursement of financing charges, paid pursuant to E.O. 137, and DISMISSED in all other respects. Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently
74. Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16,
Respondents: Ombudsman (Hon.) Aniano Desierto; Deputy (Hon) Juses F. Guerrero and Nestor V. Agustin Private respondent (PV)
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1998 Relevant Provision: Article VI Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence. Petitioner Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and President of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation which was engaged in the construction business. Private respondent Nestor Agustin (PV) was the District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District. PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction projects, and private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which, private respondent gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office. When petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. Petitioner filed an administrative complaint against private respondent. The said complaint sought the dismissal of PV for violation of RA NO. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989). The Graft Investigation found him guilty and issued a resolution ordering his dismissal. Then the Ombudsman Desierto approved such resolution with modification by finding private respondent guilty of misconduct and meting out the penalty of suspension without pay for one year. After private respondent moved for reconsideration, respondent Ombudsman discovered that the former's new counsel had been his "classmate and close associate" hence he inhibited himself. The case was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero who, absolved private respondents from the administrative charges and when a respondent is absolved of the charges in an administrative proceeding decision of the ombudsman is final and unappeasable. Petitioner appealed to the SC by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. SECTION 1 . Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A person desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or Resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other court whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only question of law which must be distinctly set forth. Republic Act No. 6770 duly implements the Constitutional mandate with these relevant provisions: Sec. 14. Restrictions. - x x x No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman except the Supreme Court on pure question on law. Issue: Whether or not Section 27 of RA 6770 which provides for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the SC in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is valid. violates the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the SC. Sections of RA 6770 authorizing the appeal of Ombudsman decisions to the Supreme Court was passed without the advice or consent of the SC. As shown in the interpelation of Sen. Shahani in the deliberation of the bill when asked if such proposal of expanding the appellant jurisdiction of the SC and they did pass the bill without asking advice and consent of the SC. The revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the SC via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Sec. 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the CA on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies. Appeals or reviews for certiorari to the SC can only be made if the decision was rendered by ordinary (RTC, CA ..) and not by statutory- created body as that of Ombudsman. And according to Rule 43 decision of quasi-judicial agencies should be filed to the Court of Appeal. Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of no further force and effect. The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of Appeals for final disposition, with said petition to be considered by the Court of Appeals.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I CASE DIGESTS

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I CASE DIGESTS

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40. Montejo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118702, March 16, 1995

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48. Jimenez v. Cabangbang, G.R. No. L-15905, August 3, 1966

49. Antonino v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-26526, May 27, 1974

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51. Puyat v. De Guzman, Jr, 113 SCRA 31 (1982)

52. Osmea v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960)

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55. Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 134 (1936)

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56. Daza v. Singson, 180 SCRA 496 (1989)

58. Sabio v. Gordon, G.R. No, 174177, October 17, 2006

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60. Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006

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66. Tan v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 109289, October3, 1994

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69. Gonzales v. Macaraig, G.R. No. 87636, November 19, 1990

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70. Philconsa v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994

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73. Osmea v. Orbos, G.R. No. 99886, March 31, 1993

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