The Constitutional Commissions (Art.

IX)
1. 2. Independence Salaries

3. Disqualifications (Sec. 2) 4. 4. Staggering of Terms: they will not resign all the time. The rationale behind is that the appointing authority is the President. Independence will be violated where a sitting President simultaneously appoint all the members. Requisites: Republic v. Imperial 1. The original members of the Commissions shall begin their terms on a common date. 2. Any vacancy occurring before the expiration if the term shall be filled only for the balance of such term. Designation of Acting Comelec Chairman Brillantes vs. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358 Facts: The President designated Associate Commissioner Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide. Brillantes challenged the act of the President as contrary to the constitutional provision that ensures the independence the Commission on Elections as an independent constitutional body. Issue: Whether or not the President may designate the Acting Chairman of the COMELEC in the absence of the regular Chairman. Held: NO. In n no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. The Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as independent. They are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution. The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines. The choice of the Acting Chairman the choice of the Acting Chairman

Sol Gen as Acting Comelec Commissioner NP vs. Bautista, 85 Phil 101 Facts: Petitioner Nacionalista Party brought this action praying that a writ of prohibition issue commanding the respondent Solicitor General to desist forever from acting as acting member of the Commission on Elections under the designation rendered to him by President Quirino, unless he is legally appointed as regular member of the said Commission on Elections. Held: The SG could not be appointed acting member of the COMELEC. The revocable nature of his appointment, coupled with the fact that as a SG he was subject to the Presidents constitutional power of control, would impair his independence in the election body. Ruling: Ad interim appointment is not covered. This appointment is Dissent: Ad interim appointment is covered Ad interim Appointment: Appointment when Congress is not in session Acting Appointment (not subjected to the confirmation of COA and no security of tenure) impairs the independence of Constitutional commission in a way that the term of office is dependent on the discretion of the President. o o 5. Facts: Republic vs. Imperial, 96 Phil 770 Facts: The prohibition extends to acting appointment. Ad interim appointment is covered It has to be permanent appointment so that it will not violate on the constitutional provision of independence. Staggering of Terms of Office Reappointment NP vs. De Vera, 35 Phil 126

6.

Other Prerequisites Proceedings: formalities & procedure

7.

The Constitutional Commissions 7.1. Civil Service Commission (Art. IX-B) o Composition and (Sec. 1) Chairman and two (2) Commissioners o Qualifications: o Natural-born citizens of the Philippines o at least thirty-five years of age at the time of their appointment o with proven capacity for public administration o Must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment. Sec. 1 [2] Outline: The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments

the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. Chairman: o Scope of Civil Service [Sec. 2 (1)] o The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Corporation with original charters are those created by special law enacted by legislature, e.g., GSIS, SSS Corporations which are subsidiaries of these chartered agencies are not covered by civil service, created in accordance with Corporation Code: Manila Hotel There is a need to know in order to know the scope of Civil Service in cases of dispute Classification: career service and non-career service Scope of Civil Service NHA vs. Juco, 134 SCRA 172 Facts: Jugo is an employee to NHA Held: Under 1973, All GOCC, regardless of their manner of creation, were covered by the Civil Service. NSC vs. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122: Prevailing Facts: Held: Under the 1987 Constitution, the GOCC included in the Civil Service are only those created by special law, or granted legislative charters, and not organized under the Corporation Code. Their subsidiaries, if organized under the general corporation law, are not covered. Subsidiary is not included in Civil Service because they are not created by special law. Character of Career Service 1. Entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination 2. Opportunity for advancement to higher career positions 3. Security of tenure o Appointments [Sec. 2 (2)] o Permanent Appointment: shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of laws, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereof. o Temporary Appointment: In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes necessary in the public interest to fill in the vacancy, a temporary appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil service eligibility, provided that such TA shall not exceed 12 months, but he may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available.

Exceptions: The following are removed by the President at his own discretion. Policy determining: one who is charged with laying down of principal or fundamental guidelines or rules, such as that of a head of department. primarily confidential: A primarily confidential position is one which denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which ensures freedom from intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. highly technical positions: requires the appointee thereto to possess technical skill or training in the supreme or superior degree.

Primarily confidential positions De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil 289 Facts: Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on July 16, 1946, by the President, appointment which was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on August 6, and on the 23rd of that month, he qualified for and began to exercise the duties and functions of the position. On June1, 1950, Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad interim appointment by the President to the same position, after which, on June 3, the Undersecretary of the Department of Public Works and Communications directed Santos to report to the Bureau of Public Works for another assignment. Santos refused to vacate the office, and when the City Mayor and the other officials named as Mallare's co-defendants ignored him and paid Mallare the salary corresponding to the position, he commenced these proceedings. ISSUE: Whether or not the President may remove a city engineer, a position that is neither confidential, policy determining nor highly technical at pleasure. HELD: No. Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. A primarily confidential position is one which denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which ensures freedom from intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. Nor is the position of city engineer policy-determining. A city engineer does not formulate a method of action for the government or any its subdivisions. His job is to execute policy, not to make it. With specific reference to the City Engineer of Baguio, his powers and duties are carefully laid down for him be section 2557 of the Revised Administrative Code and are essentially ministerial in character. Finally, the position of city engineer is technical but not highly so. A city engineer is not required nor is he supposed to possess a technical skill or training in the supreme or superior degree, which is the sense in which "highly technical" is, we believe, employed in the Constitution. There are hundreds of technical men in the classified civil service whose technical competence is not lower than that of a city engineer. As a matter of fact, the duties of a city engineer are eminently administrative in character and could very well be discharged by non-technical men possessing executive ability.

Nevertheless, the President may not remove the city engineer at pleasure as Section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code which authorized the same was repealed when the Constitution took effect. Ruling: He cannot be removed at will by the President but only by (1) a just cause and (2) the removal must be in accordance to the procedural due process. Salazar vs. Mathay, 73 SCRA 275 Facts: On January 20, 1960, petitioner Melania C. Salazar was appointed by the Auditor Generals confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor General, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Her appointment was noted by the Commissioner of Civil Service. On March 28, 1962 and on February 12, 1965 she was extended another appointment by way of promotion, as confidential agent in the same office. On March 18, 1966, petitioner received a notice from the Auditor General that her services as confidential agent have been terminated as of the close of office hours on March 31, 1966. On March 31, 1966, the Auditor General upon favorable recommendation of Mr. Pedro Encabo, Auditor of the GSIS issued an appointment to petitioner as Junior Examiner in his office which was approved by the Commission of Civil Service. On the same day, petitioner assumed the position. On December 27, 1966, petitioner wrote the Commissioner of Civil Service requesting that she be reinstated to her former position as confidential agent. However, no action was taken on said letter. Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with the Supreme Court to compel the Auditor General to reinstate her to her former position but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition without prejudice to her filing the proper action to the Court of First Instance. Issue: (1) Whether or not the position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential or not. (2) Whether or not the services of petitioner as confidential agent was validly terminated on the alleged ground of loss of confidence, and if not, whether or not she could still be reinstated to said position after accepting the position of Junior Examiner in the same office. Held: (1) The position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential. There are two instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential: (1) When the President upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service (now Civil Service Commission) has declared the position to be primarily confidential; or (2) In the absence of such declaration when by the nature of the functions of the office, there exists close intimacy between the appointee and appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgiving or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. In the case before us, the provision of Executive Order No. 265, declaring ...confidential agents in the several department and offices of the Government, unless otherwise directed by the President, to be primarily confidential brings within the fold of the aforementioned executive order the position of confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS, as among those positions which are primarily confidential. (2) Yes. Her position being primarily confidential, petitioner cannot complain that the termination of her services as confidential agent is in violation of her security of tenure, primarily confidential positions are excluded from the merit system, and dismissal at pleasure of officers or employees therein is allowed by the Constitution. This should not be misunderstood as denying that the incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure only of the appointing power. Important: It should be noted, however, that when such pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not removed or dismissed from office his term merely expires, in much the same way as officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of the fixed term for which he had been appointed or elected, is not and cannot be deemed removed or dismissed therefrom, upon the expiration of said term. The main difference between the former the primarily confidential officer and the latter is that the latter's term is fixed of definite, whereas that of the former is not pre-fixed, but indefinite, at the time of his appointment or election, and becomes fixed and determined when the appointing power expresses its decision to put an end to the services of the incumbent. When this even takes place, the latter is not removed or dismissed from office his term has merely expired. But even granting for the sake of argument, that petitioner's position was not primarily confidential and that therefore her removal from said position for loss of confidence was in violation of her security of tenure as a civil service employee, yet by her acceptance of the position of Junior Examiner in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS on April 1, 1976, she was deemed to have abandoned former position of confidential agent in the same office.

Besa vs. PNB, 33 SCRA 330 Facts: Tomas Besa was appointed Chief Legal Counsel with the rank of Vice President of PNB. By virtue of a resolution by PNB president Roberto Benedicto, he became Consultant on Legal Matters. Conrado Medina took over his position. PNB justified by saying that: The position of Chief Legal Counsel carries a special confidential relationship of lawyer and client and thus they have the prerogative to designate or change its lawyer. The transfer was made by the Board in the exercise of its powers, upon recommendation of the PNB president. Resolution No. 1053: by BOD: shifted Besa to Office of President as Consultant on Legal Matters, without change in salary and other privileges Issue: WON Besas transfer was illegal Held: NO Ratio: 1.The position of Chief Legal Counsel was a highly confidential position and such positions term depends upon the will of the appointing power. 2. Removal without just cause as a defense applies only to officers and employees enjoying a fixed term. 3. According to Chief Justice, a primarily confidential officer cannot be removed. His term merely expires according to nature of job. Reyes says tenure of confidential officers ends upon loss of confidence. 4. Court also ruled that the position of Chief Legal Counsel is primarily confidential and secondarily technical .Petition Dismissed.

o Security of Tenure [Sec. 2 (3)] o It must be done with good faith

Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 Facts: Dario: Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs March 25, 1986, Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3 DECLARING A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE, PROTECTING THEIR BASICRIGHTS, ADOPTING A PROVISIONALCONSTITUTION, AND PROVIDING FOR ANORDERLY TRNASITION TO A GOVERNMENTUNDER NEW CONSTITUTION EO 127, Reorganization Program, was also issued. Several acts and rules were issued to comply with the proclamation. January 6, 1988, Mison issued a memorandum for employees where the latter shall be: Informed of their reappointment, or Offered another position in the same department or agency, Informed of their termination. As a result, Dario was one of the many whose services were terminated subject to normal clearances and possible receipt of retirement benefits under existing laws, rules, and regulations. Hereafter, the Civil Service Commission reinstated hundreds of employees who were separated by Mison. Mison charged the CSC with grave abuse of discretion, a case that could be subject to judicial review without prejudice to the powers of CSC to have the final say to cases involving its employees and officers. Dario invoked security of tenure. Issues: 1.Is it constitutional to separate career civil service employees not for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation 3 dated March 25m 1986? Yes. Under Section 16 of Article18: Transitory Provisions of the Constitution. It also applies to separations as results of reorganization after the ratification of the Consti. 2.Was there a valid reorganization in the Bureau of Customs occurring at that time which would validate Darios and several others separation from office? NO. NO change in the staffing pattern prescribed by Section 34 of EO 127 wasmade even after Mison took office. Mison separated 394 Customs personnelbut replaced them with 522. This wasproof that such separations were notmade to improve the bureaucracy andmake them more efficient. It was also a defiance of Presidentsdirective to halt further lay-offs as aconsequence of reorganization. Mison did not follow procedures laid downby EO 127 regarding lay-offs.3.Could Mison remove Cesar Dario fromoffice?No. Dario was a presidentialappointee and thus Mison had noauthority to terminate Dario.Reinstated to positions Mendoza vs. Quisumbing, 186SCRA108 Issue: Was it done on good faith? Held: No. There should be a promotion of simplicity, efficiency, economy.

o Prohibition Against Partisan Political Activity [Sec. 2 (3)] Santos vs. Yatco, 106 Phil 745
Facts: Cailles vs. Bonifacio, 65 Phil 328 Facts: Right to Self-Organization [Sec. 2 (5)] o The right to strike is included in the right to self-organize o Government employees shall not stop to work only for petition SSSEA vs. CA, 175 SCRA 686 Facts: MPSTA vs. Laguio, 200 SCRA 323 Facts: o Temporary Employees [Sec. 2 (6)] Delector vs. Ogayan, 123 SCRA 774 Facts: o Disqualifications (Sec. 7)

N/A to officials covered by Sec. 13, Art. VII (See. CLU vs. Executive Sec, supra)

o Standardization of Compensation (Sec. 5) Read the salient features of RA 6758 (Salary Standardization Law ) o Double Compensation (Sec. 8) Quimzon vs. Ozaeta, 98 Phil 705 7.2. The Commission on Elections (Art. IX-C) o Composition and Qualifications (Sec. 1) o Powers and Functions Enforce Election Laws [Sec. 2 (1) and 2 (6)] 1. Prudente vs. Genuino, GR L-5222, 11/6/51 2. Lacson vs. Comelec, GR L-16261, 12/28/51 3. Aguam vs. Comelec, 23 SCRA 883

4. 5. 6. 7.

Abcede vs. Imperial, GR L-13001, 3/18/59 PPI vs. Comelec, 244 SCRA 272 De Jesus vs. Pp., 120 SCRA 760 Jardiel vs. Comelec, 124 SCRA 650

Decide Election Contests [Sec. 2 (2); Sec. 3] 1. Javier vs. Comelec, 144 SCR 194 2. Flores vs. Comelec, 184 SCRA 484

Decide Administrative Qs [Sec. 2 (3)] Guevara vs. Comelec, 104 Phil 269 Deputize Law-Enforcement Agencies [Sec. 2 (4)] Register Political Parties [Sec. 2 (5)] Improve Elections [Sec. 2 (7) and 2 (9)] o Election Period (Sec. 9)

Election period vs. campaign period Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 o o Party System (Sec. 6-8) Funds (Sec. 11)

o Judicial Review of Comelec decisions 1. Luison vs. Garcia, 101 Phil 1218 2. Aratuc vs. Comelec, 88 SCRA 251 FEMS vs. Ferrer, 135 SCRA 25 Facts: In preparation for the national elections of November 11, 1969, then respondent Commissioners of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued an INVITATION TO BID CALL No. 127 on September 16, 1969 calling for the submission of sealed proposals for the manufacture and delivery of 1 1,000 units of voting booths. The COMELEC issued a Resolution awarding the contract (for voting booths) to Acme, subject to the condition, among others, that "(Acme) improves the sample submitted in such manner as it would be rust proof or rust resistant. On October 11, 1969, the COMELEC issued Purchase Order No. 682 for the manufacture and supply of the 11,000 Units of voting booths in favor of Acme. Acme accepted the terms of the On October 16, 1969, Filipinas filed an Injunction suit with the then Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 77972, against herein public respondents COMELEC Commissioners, chairman and members of the Comelec Bidding Committee, and private respondent. Filipinas also applied for a writ of preliminary injunction. After hearing petitioner's said application, the respondent Judge in an order dated October 20, 1969 denied the writ prayed for. Acting on the motion (to dismiss), the respondent Judge issued the questioned Order dismissing Civil Case No. 77972. Filipinas' motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. In the case at bar, the order of the Commission granting the award to a bidder is not an order rendered in a legal controversy before it wherein the parties filed their respective pleadings and presented evidence after which the questioned order was issued; and that this order of the commission was issued pursuant to its authority to enter into contracts in relation to election purposes. Hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts. 3. Pp vs. Delgado, 189 SCRA 715 7.3. The Commission on Audit (Art. IX-D) o Composition and Qualifications (Sec. 1) o 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. o o Powers & Functions (Sec. 2) Ynchausti vs. Wright, 47 Phil 866 Gonzales vs. Provincial Auditor, 12 SCRA 711 Lamb vs. Philipps, 22 Phil 473 Riel vs. Wright, 49 Phil 195 Matute vs. Hernandez, 68 Phil 68 Guevara vs. Jimenez, 7 SCRA 813 Pacete vs. Acting Chairman of COA, 185 SCRA 1 Prohibited Exemptions from COA jurisdiction (Sec. 3) Report (Sec. 4)