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SPRINGFIELD, VA.

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February 1-2, 1967 Manned. Spacecraft Center Houston, iexas


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AERO-NAU~ICSAND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
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N6 8-1494 1

GEMINI
SUM MARY CONFERENCE
/- February 1-2, 1967
Manned Spacecraft Center
Houston, Texas

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-_ Washington, D.C.
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Color illustrations reproduced in


black and white. - -

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GEMINI SPACECRAFT FLIGHT HISTORY
I

MISSION . DESCRIPTION LAUNCH MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS


DATE
Gemini , Unmanned Apr. 8, Demonstrated structural integrity, and Iaunch
I 64 orbits 1964 vehiclo systems performance.
G . Qualification

Gemini > 1
.
Unmanned Jan. 19, Demonstrated spacecraft systems performance.
I1 SuborbitaI 1965
Quit i f i c i t i o n

Gemini Manned Mar. 23, Demonstratedmanned qualification of the Gemini


111 ; 3 wbits 1965 spacecraft.
, ...
. Q w l ification.
, .. ' > .
Gemini . Manned Juna 3, Demonstrated spacecraft systems performance
IV 4days . 1965 and crew capability for 4 days in space, and
. L Long duration demonstrated extravehicular activity.

Aug. 21, Demonstrated long-duration flight, demonstrated


rendezvous radar capability, and rendezvous
maneuvers.
c

Gomini . Manned Oct. 25, Demonstrated. dual countdown procedures (Ge-


VI *. .,. 2 dayI 1965 . mini Atlas-Agena Target Vehicle and Gemini
*-.Rmdszvous Launch Vehicldspacecraft), and flight per-
-
-.' ' (Canceled.aft6
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.A- formance of tho Target Launch Vehicle and
. ;
.,
f a i l w e of flight readinorr of the Gemini Agena Target
e . .
C.

G m i n i Agena Vehiclr secondary propulsion system.


.. .
Torget Vehicle)

Gomini Manned Doc.4, Demonstrated 2-weok duration flight and station


VI I 14 dayr 1965 keeping with Gemini Launch Vehicle Stage II,
Long duration ovalwtad shirt-sleeve environment, acted as
tho rondezvour target for Spacecraft 6, and
, demonrtrated controlled reentry to within 7
milos of planned landing point.

Doc. 15, Demonstrated on-time launch procedures, closed-


1965 loop rendezvous capability, station-keeping
technique with Spacecraft 7.

(Continued inside back cover)

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FOREWORD

The Gemini Summary Conference was held on February 1 and 2, 1967,


a t the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, Tex. The conference
emphasized the highlights of the Gemini Program and especially the flight
results of the last five missions. This report contains the 21 technical papers
presented a t the conference as well as an introduction by George E. Mueller
and concluding remarks by George M. Low.
The technical papers are divided into five sections: the first describes
the rendezvous, docking, and tethered-vehicle operations involving the
spacecraft and a target vehicle; the second presents various aspects of
extravehicular activity ; the third concerns the operational support of the
missions; the fourth covers the experiments conducted during the missions ;
and the fifth compares the astronaut flight and simulation experiences and
relates the Gemini results to the Apollo Program.
......... .- ........ - ......

CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1
By George E. Mueller

Space Orbital Maneuvering

2. SUMMARY O F RENDEZVOUS OPERATIONS ............................................ 7


By W. Bernard Evans and Marvin R. Czarnik
3. GROUND CONTROL AND MONITORING O F RENDEZVOUS .................... 21
By Edward L. Pavelka, E d g a r C. Lineberry, and Warren J. Kennedy
4. ONBOARD OPERATIONS FOR RENDEZVOUS ............................................ 27
By Paul C. Kramer, Edwin E. Aldrin, and William E. Hayes
5. OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS O F T H E DOCKED
CONFIGURATION ................................................................................................ 41
By Homer W. Dotts, Roger K. Nolting, Wilburne F. Hoyler,
John R. Havey, Thomas F. Carter, Jr., and Robert T. Johnson
6. OPERATIONS W I T H T E T H E R E D SPACE V E H I C L E S ................................ 55
By David D. Lang and Roger K. Nolting

Man's Activities in Space

7. L I F E SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY ........ 67


By Harold J. McMann, Elton M. Tucker, Marshall W. 'Horton,
and Frederick T. B u m s
8. BODY POSITIONING AND RESTRAINTS DURING
EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY .................................................................... 79
By David C. Schultz, Hilary A. Ray, Jr., Eugene A. Cernan, and
. Antoine F. Smith
9. EXTRAVEHICULAR MANEUVERING ABOUT SPACE V E H I C L E S ...... 91
By Harold I. Johnson, William C. H u b r , Edward H. White, 11,
and Michael Collins
10. MEDICAL ASPECTS O F GEMINI EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITIES .... 107
By G. Fred Kelly, M.D.,and D. Owen Coons, M.D.
11. SUMMARY O F GEMINI EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY ........................ 127
By Reginald M. Machell, L a r r y E. Bell, Norman P. Shyken, and
James W. Prim I11

Operational Experience

12. RADIATION ENVIRONMENT AT HIGH ORBITAL ALTITUDES ............ 149


By Peter W. Higgins, Joseph C. Lill, and Timothy T. White
.:. 13. CONTROLLED R E E N T R Y .................................................................................... 159
By David M. Box, Jon C. Harpold, Steven G. Paddock,
Neil A. Armstrong, and William H. Hamby
14. LAUNCH AND TARGET VEHICLE SUPPORT BY T H E
DEPARTMENT O F D E F E N S E ........................................................................ 167
By Alfred J. Gardner
15. MISSION SUPPORT BY T H E DEPARTMENT O F D E F E N S E .................. 185
By Royce G. Olson
.

V
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..... . . ..
VI GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

16. PRE-GEMINI MEDICAL PREDICTIONS V E R S U S GEMINI F L I G H T


R E S U L T S ................................................................................................................ 197
By Charles A. Berry, M.D., and Allen D. Catterson, M.D.

Gemini Onboard Experiments

17. GEMINI E X P E R I M E N T S PROGRAM SUMMARY ........................................ 221


By Norman G. Foster and Olav Smistad
18. SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY ........................................................................................ 231
By Richard W. Underwood
19. SCIENCE E X P E R I M E N T S SUMMARY ............................................................ 291
By Jocelyn R. Gill and Willis B. Foster
20. DOD/NASA GEMINI E X P E R I M E N T S SUMMARY ........................................ 30'7
By Wilbur A. Ballentine

Gemini Summarization

21. ASTRONAUT F L I G H T AND SIMULATION E X P E R I E N C E S .................... 321


By Thomas P. Stafford and Charles Conrad. dr.
22. GEMINI R E S U L T S AS R E L A T E D TO T H E APOLLO PROGRAM ............ 329
By Willis B. Mitchell, Owen E. Maynard, and Donald D. Arabian
23. CONCLUDING REMARKS ..................................................................................... 337
By George M. Low

APPENDIXES
A P P E N D I X A-NASA C E N T E R S AND O T H E R GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES .............................................................................................................. 34 1
A P P E N D I X B-CONTRACTORS, SUBCONTRACTORS, AND VENDORS 343
1. INTRODUCTION
By GEORGEE. MUELLER.Associate Adriiiriis/ralor 10,. il/lnrincil Space Flight, \ r A S A

The Gemini Program is over. The papers proficiency in manned space flight. The very
in this report summarizing the program were successful flight program of the United
prepared by some of the people who con- States has provided vivid demonstration of
tributed to the overall success. In each case. the achievements in each of these objective
the authors were actual participants and pro- areas.
vide a cross section of what may be called the The long-duration flight objective of Gemini
Gemini team. As is true in any undertaking was achieved with the successful completion
of this magnitude, involving many diverse of Gemini VI1 in December 1965. The pro-
organizations and literally thousands of peo- gressive buildup of flight duration from 4
ple, a vital element of the Gemini success may days with Gemini IV, to 8 days with Gemini
be traced t o teamwork. In the purest defini- V and 14 days with Gemini VII, has removed
tion of the word, wherein individual interests all doubts, and there were many. of the capa-
'and opinions are subordinate to the unity and bility &f the flight crew% and spacecraft to
efficiency of the group, the Gemini team has function satisfactorily for a period equal to
truly excelled. that needed to reach the lunar surface and
Much has already been written concerning return. Further, ,this aspect of Gemini pro-
the Gemini achievements, and many of the \Tides high confidence in flight-crew ability
achievements are presented again in greater to perform satisfactorily on much longer
depth within this report. By way of introduc- missions. The long-duration flights have also
tion, and to set the stage for the following provided greater insipht into, and apprecia-
papers, a few words are necessary to assess tion of, the vital role played by the astro-
the achievements in the context of the goals nauts, the value of flexibility in mission
of the national manned space-flight program. planning and execution, and the excellent
Only in this way is it possible to evaluate the capability of the manned space-flight control
significance of the Gemini accomplishments. system. As originally conceived, the Gemini
The Gemini Program was undertaken for Program called for completion of the long-
the purpose of advancing the United States duration flights with Gemini VII, which was
manned space-flight capabilities during the accomplished on schedule.
period between Mercury and Apollo. Simply One of the more dramatic achievements
stated, the Gemini objectives were to conduct has been the successful development of ;I
the development and test program necessary variety of techniques for the in-orbit ren-
to (1) demonstrate the feasibility of long- dezvous of two manned spacecraft. The prep-
duration space flight for a t least that period aration for this most complex facet of Gemini
required t o complete a lunar landing mission ; missions was more time consuming than any
(2) perfect the techniques and procedures other. That it was performed with such per-
for achieving rendezvous and docking of two fection is a distinct tribute to the Gemini
spacecraft in orbit ; ( 3 ) achieve precisely team that made it possible: the spacecraft
controlled reentry and landing capability ; and launch-vehicle developers and builders,
(4) establish capability in extravehicular ac- the checkout and launch teams. the flight
tivity; and (5) achieve the less obvious, but crews and their training support. and the
no less significant, flight and ground crew mission-planning and mission-control people.

1
2 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

The ability to accomplish a rendezvous in pressing of launch schedules. In addition and


space is fundamental to the success of Apollo, perhaps more importantly, operational pro-
and rendezvous was a primary mission ob- ficiency means the ability to respond to the
jective on each mission after Gemini VII. unexpected, to prepare and execute alternate
Ten rendezvous were completed and seven and contingency plans, aiicl to maintain flexi-
different rendezvous modes or techniques bility while not slackening the drive toward
were employed. Nine different dockings of a the objective. Time and again Gemini re-
spacecraft with a target vehicle were sponded to such a situation in a manner that
achieved. Eleven cliff erent astronauts gained can only be described as outstanding.
rendezvous experience in this most important A few comments are in order on what the
objective. Several of the rendezvous were de- Gemini accomplishments mean in terms of
signed to simulate some facet of an Apollo value to other programs. There is almost no
rendezvous requirement. The principal focus facet of Gemini that does not contribute in
of the rendezvous activities was, however, some way to the Apollo Program. Aside from
designed to verify theoretical determinations the actual proof testing of such items as the
over a wide spectrum. Gemini developed a manned space-flight control center, the
broad base of knowledge and experience in manned space-flight communications net, the
orbital rendezvous and this base will pay development and perfection of recovery tech-
generous dividends in years to come. niques, the training of the astronauts, and
A related accomplishment of singular many others which apply directly, the Gemini
importance to future manned space-flight Program has provided a high level of confi-
programs was the experience gained in per- dence in the ability to accomplish the Apollo
forming docked maneuvers using the target- Program objectives before the end of this
vehicle propulsion system. This is a striking decade. The Apollo task is much easier now,
example of Gemini pioneering activities-the due tc? the outstanding performance and ac-
assembly and maneuvering of two orbiting complishments of the Gemini team.
space vehicles. Similarly, the Apollo Applications Pro-
The first attempt at extravehicular activity gram has been inspired in large part by the
during Gemini IV was believed successful, Gemini experiments program, which has
and although difficulties were encountered sparked the imagination of the scientific com-
with extravehicular activity during Gemini munity. In addition to the. contributions to
IX-A, X, and XI, the objective was achieved Apollo hardware development which provide
with resounding success on Gemini XII. This the basis for the Apollo Applications Pro-
in itself is indicative of the Gemini Program gram. it has been discovered, or rather
in that lessons learned during the flight pro- proved, that man in space can serve many
gram were vigorously applied to subsequent extremely useful and important functions.
missions. The extravehicular activity on These functions have been referred to as
Gemini XI1 was, indeed, the result of all that technological fallout, but it is perhaps more
had been learned on the earlier missions. accurate to identify them as accomplish-
The first rendezvous and docking mission, ments-that is, accomplishments deliberately
although temporarily thwarted by the sought and achieved by the combined hard
Gemini VI target-vehicle failure, was ac- labor of many thousands of people. Some of
complished with great success during the these people have reviewed their work in this
Gemini VIL‘VI-A mission. This mission also report.
demonstrated the operational proficiency The Manned Orbiting Laboratory Pro-
achieved by the program. The term “opera- gram has been undertaken by the Depart-
tional proficiency” as applied to Gemini ment of Defense for the purpose of applying
achievements means far more than just the manned space-flight technology to national
acceleration of production rates and com- defense and is making significant use of the
INTRODUCTION 3

Gemini accomplishments. This may be con- important instrument in international rela-


sidered a s a partial repayment for the marve- tions and vitally influences this country's
lous support that NASA has received and dealings with other nations involving peace
continues to receive from the DOD. The and freedom in the world. Political realities
success of the NASA programs is in no small which can neither be wished away nor ig-
measure due to the direct participation of the nored make the capability to explore space
DOD in all phases of the manned space-flight a matter of strategic importance as well as a
program. This support has been, and will challenge to the scientific and engineering
continue to be, invaluable. ingenuity of man. This Nation can no more
The combined Government 'industry 'uni- afford to falter in space than it can in any
versity team that makes up the manned earthly pursuit on which the security and
space-flight program totals about 240 000 future of the Xiition and the world depend.
people. In addition, thousands more are em- The space effort is really a research and
ployed in NASA unmanned space efforts, and development competition, a competition for
in programs of the Department of Defense, technological preeminence which demands
the Department of Commerce, the Atomic and creates the quest for excellence.
Energy Commission, antl other agencies in- The Mercury program, which laid the
volved in total national space endeavors. groundwork for Gemini and the rest of this
These people, in acquiring new scientific Nation's manned space-flight activity, ap-
knowledge, developing new techniques, antl pears a t this point relatively modest. How-
working on new problems with goals ever ever, Mercury accomplishments at the time
enlarged by the magnitude of their task, were as significant to national objectives as
form the living, growing capability of this the Gemini accomplishments are today antl
Nation for space exploration. a s those that are planned for Apollo in the
For the last quarter century, this Nation years ahead.
has been experiencing a technological revo- That these programs have been, and will
lution. Cooperative efforts on the part of the be, conducted in complete openness with a n
Government, the universities, the scientific international, real-time audience makes
community, and industry have been the prime them all the more effective. In this environ-
movers. This cooperation has provided tre- ment, the degree of perfection achieved is
mendous capability for technological research even more meaningful. Each person involved
and development which is available now and can take richly deserved pride in what has
which will continue to grow to meet national been accomplished. Using past experience as
requirements of the future. The influence of a foundation, the exploration of space must
this technological progress and prowess is, continue to advance. The American public
and has been, a deciding factor in keeping will not permit otherwise, or better yet, his-
the peace. Preeminence in this field is an tory will not permit otherwise.
SPACE ORBITAL MANEIJVERING

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2. SUMMARY OF RENDEZVOUS OPERATIONS
By W. BERNARDEVANS.Ofice o/ Vehicles and Missions, Gemini Program Ofice, NASA Manned Spacecrafl
Center; and MARVINR. CZARNIK,Dynamics Group Engineer, McDonnell Aircraft Corp.

Introduction attributed to the implementation of an ex-


tensive analysis, simulation, and training
One of the major objectives of the Gemini program leading first t o the Gemini VI-A
Program was to develop and to demonstrate rendezvous mission, and subsequently to
techniques for the rendezvous and docking more complex missions. During the Gemini
of space vehicles. This objective is of vital I11 mission, the spacecraft propulsion sys-
importance since rendezvous and docking is tem and the guidance and control system
mandatory for success in many future were evaluated. On the Gemini IV mission, a
manned space-flight programs. For example, plan was developed and an attempt was made
lunar orbital rendezvous has been selected as to station keep and rendezvous with the spent
the primary mode for the Apollo lunar-land- second stage of the launch vehicle. 'During
ing mission which requires one rendezvous Gemini V, a phantom rendezvous and a space-
and two dockings. Other programs requiring craft radar-to-ground transponder tracking
. rendezvous a r e planetary missions, manned test were performed. The phantom rendez-
space stations, and unmanned satellite in- vous involved a series of maneuvers based
spection and repair missions. upon ground tracking and computations, and
During the Gemini Program, the following precisely duplicated the maneuver sequence
types of rendezvous techniques were evalu- and procedures planned for the midcourse
ated : fourth orbit ( M -.=4 ) , third orbit phase of the Gemini VI-A mission.
( M = 3 ) , first orbit ( M -== 1 ) , optical ren- Sufficient data were obtained from the
dezvous, rendezvous from above, stable orbit spacecraft radar tracking test during the
rendezvous, and optical dual rendezvous. Gemini V mission to adequately flight-
These techniques were used successfully in qualify the radar for the Gemini VI-A flight.
the completion of 10 rendezvous oper-'1 t'ions Even though the rendezvous operations
(table 2-1). A major factor in achieving planned for the first three manned Gemini
success during these operations can be flights were not all successful, they were ex-
tremely valuable to the program since they
TABLE2-I.-Mi~.wion Suvtmary provided flight experience and indicated
areas requiring further analysis, simul. t'ion,
Gemini mission I Type of rendezvous and training.
On December 15, 1965, the Gemini VI-A
crew, using the Gemini VI1 spacecraft a s the
VI11 ........................ Fourth orbit ( M= 4 ) target vehicle, completed the first space ren-
IX-A ...................... Third orbit ( M = 3 )
Optical re-rendezvous
dezvous operation. Although this mission did
Re-rendezvous from above not include a docking, it was successful and
after lift-off proceeded almost precisely as
planned. On the following mission, the Gem-
XI ............................ First orbit ( M = 1 ) ini VI11 crew successfully performed the first
Stable orbit
rendezvous and docking with a Gemini Agena
Target Vehicle. Subsequent, more complex,

Preceding page blank 7


8 GEMINI SUM MARY CONFERENCE

rendezvous operations were successfully per- +Y

formed during the Gemini IX-A,' X, XI, and - I


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1
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I +x
XI1 missions. These successes have provided
confidence in the ability to accomplish such
operations. However, rendezvous must still
be recognized as a highly precise operation Horizontal displacement
that is rather unforgiving of errors which la) Lower c i r c u l a r orbit.
occur during the final approach, details of
which will be discussed in this paper. +Y
T

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+X
I I I I

Review of Rendezvous Operations


Development
An explanation of rendezvous can be
greatly simplified by a description of the
relative-motion concept. Figure 2-1 shows a
Horizontal displacement
coordinate system centered on the target ve-
hicle in a circular orbit with the x- and Ibl Lower elliptical orbit.

Y-axes in the target orbital plane. The Y-


axis rotates with the target vehicle and is
positive radially upward: the X-axis is
c u r v i l i n e a r a n d positive opposite the d i r e c - -X
tion of motion. The out-of-plane parameter Horizontal displacement
is the Z-axis, which completes the right-hand
Hiqher c i r c u l a r orbit.
IC)
coordinate system. The motion of the space-
craft with respect to this reference is illus-
trated in figure 2-2.. FIGURE
2-2.-Motion 'relative to a target-centered
coordinate system.
Figure 2-2(0) shows the spacecraft in i t
lower circular orbit. I t should be noted that the radial displacement 1- is constant while
the trailing displacement ,Y decreases with
time, since the spacecraft in the lower orbit
has a higher angular rate. Figure 2 - 2 ( b )
shows a lower elliptical orbit. As can be ex-
Target _. pected, this orbit has ;I catchup r a t e ; how-
-
vehicle -=
ever, the radial (lisplacement also changes,
with' the low points representing perigees,
and the high points, apogees. Figure 2-2(c)
illustrates ;i spacecraft in a circular orbit
hir.her than the target orbit. The radial dis-
tance is constant. :is in the case of the lower
circular orbit ; however, in this case the trail-
i n g displacement changes since the target
now has the higher angular rate. The follow-
ing paragraphs use this coordinate system in
describing the Gemini rentlezvous oper ;I t'ions.
The development of the operational ren-
dezvous missions required extensive analyses
FIGURE2-l.-Tarpet- ..tered coordinate system. its previoiisly described in reference 1. For
S U M M A R Y OF RENDEZVOUS OPERATIONS 9

Gemini VI, many concepts were evaluated Description of Initial Rendezvous


and three were selected a s candidates for the Operations
Gemini VI mission. The first was the tan-
gential concept which included the tangential Gemini VI-A, VIII. and X
approach of the spacecraft to the target ve- Figures 2-3 and 2 4 present typical rela-
hicle following four orbits of ground-con- tive trajectory plots of the fourth-orbit ren-
trolled midcourse maneuvers. The second dezvous conducted on Gemini VI-A, VIII,
concept had a similar catchup sequence, ex- and X. On each mission, the spacecraft was
cept that the final midcourse maneuver inserted into an orbit essentially coplanar
established a coelliptical approach trajectory, with the target vehicle. The first orbit was
and the spacecraft closed-loop guidance sys- left free of rendezvous maneuvers to allow
tem was then used to establish a collision the crew sufficient time to verify satisfac-
course. A third concept featured rendezvous tory spacecraft operation. A number of mid-
a t first spacecraft apogee. Following a tan- course corrections were performed before
gential approach of the spacecraft to the completing the rendezvous during the fourth
target, the spacecraft would be inserted on spacecraft orbit near the end of the fourth
a collision course with the target, and the darkness period. At the first spacecraft peri-
spacecraft closed-loop system would be used gee, an apogee height-adjust maneuver N U
to correct insertion dispersions. was performed to correct for in-plane inser-
After the three concepts had been selected, tion dispersions. At the second apogee, a
analyses were performed t o determine the phase-adjust maneuver N,., was performed
concept best suited for the Gemini VI mis- to raise the perigee, thus providing the
sion. In. June 1964, prior to the flight of catchup rate required for proper phasing of
Gemini 11, the coelliptical rendezvous con- the terminal-phase initiation near the fourth
cept, was selected for the Gemini VI mission. darkness entry. An out-of-plane correction

,Velocity match ITPFJ


(I AV = 42 fpS .
111 05:36:28
,Terminal-ohase initiation

v <
'~ 40

I \ 01:35:01, \ 1 1 1 > 5 1 ,I'


nn.nn.n

Spacecralt g.e.1. 00:10---


-og I I I I I -I
160 0 160 320 480 640 800 960 1120
Ahead+Behind
Horizontal displacement, n. mi.

FIGURE2-3.-Typical relative trajectory of spacecraft from insertion to rendezvous in tarpet-vehicle


curvilinear coordinate system. Gemini VI-A, VIII, and X missions.
10 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

target vehicle, in order to optimize the light-


ing. These factors were evaluated, and a
130. transfer was selected.
The selection of the nominal coelliptical
W
,--Look angle to differential altitude of 15 nautical miles was
)II target vehicle 40" based upon a tradeoff between two consid-
34
1 9 ,Velocity match (TPF) AV = 42 fps: 05:36:28
..-33.6" correction
erations. First, the range to the target at the
terminal-phase-initiation point had to be
small enough to assure visual acquisition.
angle = 27" wt - 130".
Second, a large differential altitude was re-
quired to minimize the effect of insertion dis-
persions and catchup maneuver errors on the
AV * 5 fps; 05:16:& location of the terminal-phase-initiation
-"4 0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 point. For example, a differential altitude of
Ahead+Eehind 15 nautical miles resulted in a 3-sigma dis-
Horizontal displacement. n. mi. persion of 2 8 minutes in the timing of the
terminal-phase-initiation maneuver. Early
FIGURE24-Typical relative trajectory of space- error analysis indicated a cl5-minute vari-
craft from terminal-phase initiation to rendezvous
in target-vehicle curvilinear coordinate system.
ation in terminal-phase-initiation timing f o r
Gemini VI-A, V I I I , and X missions. a differential altitude of 7 nautical miles.
Flight experience demonstrated that the
P,.was applied a t t h e nodal crossing after t h e launch vehicle and spacecraft guidance sys-
second apogee to correct out-of-plane inser- tems accuracies, crew procedures, and
tion dispersions. At the third spacecraft ground-tracking accuracy were better than
apogee, a coelliptical maneuver N.,./: was per- had been expected; as a result, the altitude
formed to produce a constant altitude dif- differential was reduced to 5 and 7 nautical
ferential of 15 nautical miles. The onboard miles in the later rendezvous opera t ions.
'
system then provided solutions for the
terminal-phase-initiation ( T P I ) maneuver, Gemini IX-A and XI1
which would occur when the line-of-sight ele- A second primary rendezvous technique
vation angle reached the nominal value of w a s utilized on Gemini IX-A and XI1 (figs.
27". Two vernier corrections followed a t 12- 2-5 and 2-6). This technique resulted in ren-
minute intervals. Finally, braking (terminal- dezvous in the third spacecraft orbit near
phase finalization (TPF) ) and line-of-sight the end of the third spacecraft darkness
rate control were effected by a manual op- period. A phase-adjust maneuver Ai,., was
eration based upon radar and visual data. performed a t first spacecraft apogee to pro-
The transfer trajectory was selected to vide the correct phasing a t the second apogee.
satisfy several of the mission requirements Approximately three-fourths of an orbit
in the area of onboard procedures. First, in later, the first of a set of two maneuvers was
order to provide a backup reference direction performed : a combination -phasing, height-
for the terminal-phase-initiation maneuver adjust, and out-of-plane correction. The first
in case of a guidance-system failure, the
maneuver N,.,., combined with the following
maneuver had to be performed along the
line of sight to the target. The second re- coelliptical maneuver, provided a fixed ren-
quirement was a low terminal line-of-sight dezvous time with minimum propellant
angular rate and a low closing rate. Finally, usage. The out-of-plane portion of the first
the terminal-phase-initiation point had to be maneuver established a node a t the following
below and behind the target vehicle; and the coelliptical maneuver point. The coelliptical
final apnroach, from below and ahead of the maneuver N..!; eliminated the out-of-plane
S U M M A R Y OF RENDEZVOUS OPERATIONS 11

Gemini XI

The third primary rendezvous conducted


during the program was the first-orbit tech-
nique used for Gemini XI (figs. 2-7 and 2-8).
The limited time available to conduct the
first-orbit rendezvous prohibited the multi-
correction catchup phase and coelliptical ap-
proach used on other missions. Instead, a
correction was made at spacecraft insertion
to remove out-of-plane motion and to adjust

Ahead-Behind
Horizontal displacement, n. mi.
1. Spacecraft insertion;
00:06:21
2. Phase adjustment
.
4. Coelliptical maneuver
N 2, AV 52.7 fps;
02:20:32
9
.-
e -
= IO-minute time marks
N = 1, AV = 53.4 Ips; 5. Terminal-phase initiation ,--Velocity match (TPF)
00:59:39
3. Corrective combination
N = 1.75, AV 0.8 fps;
9
AV 32.4 Ips;
9

03:27:07, wt 130'-
6. Velocity match (TPF)
AV = 25.5fps
/ g.e.1. = 01:14:52
01:57:00 AV 41.6 fps: 03:59:52 ,,Terminal-phase initiation
90 seconds before apogee
FIGURE
2-5.-Typical relative trajectory. Gemini.
9. e. t. = 00:49:43
IX-A and XI1 missions.
-

% 0 40 80 120 160 200 240


, L a angle to target vehicle 40" Ahead+ Behind
111 Velocity match ITPF) Horizontal displacement, n. mi.
,' AV 11.6 fos A = 5-minute time
marks begin-
n i n g at 03:30:00 FIGURE
2-7.-Relative trajectory. Gemini XI mission.
___---33.6 ' correction
AV = 4 fps. 03:51:07

Ahead+ Behind
Horizontal displacement, n. mi.
0
A
,/' 9. e. 1.
-
- 01:'19:52
- 5 m i n u t e time marks

FIGURE
Z-&-Typical relative trajectory, terminal
phase. Gemini IX-A and XI1 missions.
AV - 131.2 Ips

motion and established coelliptical orbits


with an altitude differential that varied
within certain limits. The terminal phase of 4 0 4 8 12 16
this technique was the same as the fourth- Ahead +Behind
Horizontal displacement, n. mi.
orbit technique, except that procedural
changes were necessary to accommodate the FIGIIRE
%X.--Kelative trajectory, terminal phase.
variable altitude differential. Gemini XI mission.
12 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

apogee height and phasing. This correction was applied based upon the time the line of
was based upon onboard navigation infor- sight to the target vehicle crossed the local
mation obtained from the spacecraft guidance horizontal. The time and the magnitude of
system. At 90' after insertion, a second out- the terminal-phase-initiation maneuver were
of-plane correction, also based upon onboard determined from visual angle observations,
information, was performed. Terminal-phase and an 80' transfer was initiated when the
initiation occurred just prior to first space- Sun was nearly overhead. Two vernier cor-
craft apogee with the spacecraft 10 nautical rections also based upon visual angle meas-
miles below and 15 nautical miles behind the urements were applied, and rendezvous
target vehicle. A 120' transfer was used k i t h occurred just prior to sunset. I t was a re-
two vernier corrections at 12-minute inter- quirement that the spacecraft be in a station-
vals after the terminal-phase initiation. keeping mode prior to entering darkness
After a manual braking and line-of-sight with a passive target.
phase, rendezvous was completed within the A second re-rendezvous technique (figs.
'

first orbit. 2-10 and 2-11) was developed to evaluate a


terminal-phase condition with an E a r t h back-
ground. Two midcourse maneuvers were used
Description of Re-Rendezvous and Dual to insert the spacecraft into a coelliptical
Rendezvous Operations orbit 7.5 nautical miles above the target ve-
hicle. Except for a reversal in approach di-
The first of three re-rendezvous techniques. rection, the terminal phase was identical to
was an optical rendezvous from an equiperiod that employed on the earlier coelliptical ap-
orbit and was conducted on the Gemini proach from below. Experience gained during
IX-A mission (fig. 2-9). The purpose of this this rendezvous indicates that the probability
rendezvous was to evaluate the optical ren- of success would be very low in case of a
dezvous procedures, and particularly the radar guidance system failure because of the
terminal-phase lighting, required for the extremely poor target visibility.
dual rendezvous scheduled for Gemini X. An During the Gemini XI mission, a third re-
upward radial velocity change was used to rendezvous exercise was performed. This
separate the spacecraft from the target ve- rendezvous was ground controlled except that
hicle into an equiperiod orbit. Approximately the terminal braking and line-of-sight con-
one-half orbit after separation, a correction trol phases were performed by the crew using
visual observations (no r a d a r ) . After the
r--- Radial separation A = 5-minute time marks initial separation maneuver, the spacecraft
.g 4r '
:i I
AV = 20 fps; 004GOO
;Darkness
beginning at GO4680 was in a nearly circular orbit at the same
altitude as the target vehicle, but with a trail-
ing displacement of approximately 25 nauti-
cal miles. Since the relative motion of the
vehicles in this configuration was approxi-
mately zero, the rendezvous was referred to
as a stable-orbit rendezvous (fig. 2-12). A
ground-computed maneuver was performed
which placed the spacecraft on a trajectory
41 I I I I I I I
to intercept the target vehicle in 292" of tar-
2 0 2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2
Ahead +Behind get orbital travel. With 34 of orbital travel
Horizontal displacement, n. mi. remaining, a second and final ground-com-
FIGURE2-9.-Relative trajectory of spacecraft for
puted maneuver was applied. The rendezvous
(equiperiod) re-rendezvous in tarKet vehicle curvi- was then completed by the flight crew using
linear coordinate system. Gemini IX-A mission. visual cues. The terminal-phase portion of
SUMMARY OF RENDEZVOUS OPERATIONS 13
V - 1-hour time marks

Sequence of events
1. Phasing maneuver
2. Height maneuver
VI
U
3. Coelliptical maneuver
4. Terminal-phase initiation
"

-
.-
e 5. Terminal-phase finalization

%I
8 II 1

to
-
B
0
W
v v v v B

m
I I I 1 I I I 1 I
80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 10
Horizontal displacement, n. mi. Ahead +Behind

FIGURE2-l0.-Relative trajectory profile for re-rendezvous from above. Gemini IX-A mission.

lor - ,Terminal-phase initiation,


Av 16. fDS: I i/isual braking 1:13:10
c Intercept maneuver 0:W
W
E

'F
2 t
.
Terminal-phase
AV 23.3 fOS:
. .
k:32:50- ...-
----_
u 5
.n
.-
e
W
L
> I
34O Correction 1:04:40

I I 1 I I
5 0 5 10 15 20 25
Ahad -I- Behind
'\6 14 12 10 8 6 24 0 2 Horizontal disolacement. n. mi.
Ahead4Behind
Horizontal displacement, n. mi. FIGURE
2-12-Gemini XI stable orbit re-rendezvous.

FIGURE2-1 1.-Relative trajectory re-rendezvous


from above. Gemini IX-A mission. propellant consumption for the braking phase
can vary widely. The reason is that, for
this rendezvous had the same characteristics most cases, the spacecraft will end up ap-
as the tangential concept previously de- proaching the target from above, resulting in
scribed. Theoretically, the propellant re- poor target visibility. This type of ren-
quired is small when compared with the dezvous generated considerable interest in
coelliptical approach ; however, with minor its application to certain rendezvous opera-
dispersions at the intercept maneuver point, tions. particularly where a highly precise
the lighting conditions, approach angles, and ground-tracking system is used to provide
14 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

the terminal-phase maneuvers. The commit- the out-of-plane displacement relatively small
ment to conduct such a rendezvous reflected for a long period of time (fig. 2-13). By
the confidence that was established during varying the launch azimuth so that the space-
Gemini in the capabilities of the 'ground- craft would be inserted parallel to the tar-
tracking, computation, and control facilities. get-vehicle orbital plane, the out-of-plane
In addition to the primary and re-rendez- displacement of the launch site at the time of
vous missions, a dual rendezvous was per- launch becomes the maximum out-of-plane
formed by the Gemini X crew. The target displacement between the two orbit planes.
vehicle launched during the Gemini VI11 mis- The out-of-plane displacement could also be
sion was left in orbit and was the passive minimized by using the variable launch-azi-
target for the dual operation. One problem muth technique with guidance in yaw during
encountered during the development of the second-stage powered flight. This is accom-
Gemini X mission was obtaining precise plished by biasing the launch azimuth of the
state vectors for the passive target vehicle, spacecraft so that the launch azimuth is at
and making accurate predictions f a r enough an optimum angle directed toward the tar-
in advance to find acceptable launch windows. get-vehicle orbital plane (fig. 2-14). As a
Because of the inaccuracies in drag predic- rewlt, the out-of-plane distance would be re-
tion, it was necessary for launch date, lift-off duced prior to the initiation of closed-loop
time, and catchup sequence to be flexible. guidance during the second-stage flight. This
The catchup sequence included a series of technique would effectively use the launch-
maneuvers by the docked Gemini X space- vehicle performance capability to control the
craft and Gemini X target vehicle for gross out - of - plane displacement. Sufficient per-
catchup, and another series of maneuvers by formance capability existed in the Gemini
the undocked spacecraft for fine catchup. The Launch Vehicle to control the out-of-plane
capability for large changes in altitude dur- displacement to within k0.55" (table 2-11).
ing the gross catchup sequence allowed a n The maximum allowable wedge angle of
acceptable wide variation in the initial-phase t 0 . 5 5 was not needed on any of the rendez-
angle. The terminal approach was coelliptical vous missions. By selecting an inclination qf
with an altitude differential of 7 nautical
miles ; the terminal-phase guidance employed
was the same as for the optical rendezvous
conducted on Gemini IX-A.
I
FLaunch window
,Launch-site

Rendezvous Considerations and F I ig ht


Results
Ly

In developing the rendezvous missions,


many factors were considered, primarily
launch procedures, system requirements, and ---- iDirection of rotation-----
I
\ I
crew procedures.

Launch Procedu res


Development of the launch procedures re-
quired extensive analyses to define methods
of controlling out-of-plane displacement,
establishing launch-window length. and de-
veloping a countdown method.
A Point where target plane crosses launch site
resulting in zero displacement
Selecting a target orbit inclination slightly
above the latitude of the launch . e makes FIGURE
2-1X-Variable azimuth launch technique.
SUMMARY OF RENDEZVOUS OPERATIONS 15

TABLE2-III.-Genzini Launch Perf ormarice


---
- Unbiased
trajectory
Biased
trajectory
Mission
Launch
attempts ~ Launch date
Launch-
time
deviation

I ..................1................ Apr. 8, 1964


~
On time
I1 ................ 2 ................ Jan. 19, 1965 -4 min
---_ I11 ..............

1 1
1................ Mar. 23, 1965 -24 min
IV .............. 1................ June 3, 1965 -16 min
V ................I12 ................ Aug. 21, 1965 On time
Target V I ..............1 1................ -
vehicle VI-A .......... ' 2 ................ Dec. 15, 1965 On time
VI1 ............ II
~

orbit 1................ 1 . Dec. 4, 1965 On time


plane;
2................I Mar. 16, 1966 On time
j
IX .............. 1................I (")
IX-A ..........j 2 ................I June 3, 1966
-
On time
X ................/ 1................1 July 18,1966 On time
FIGURE2-l4.-Typical Gemini rendezvous launch. XI .............. 2 ................ Sept. 12, 1966
~
On time
Biased launch azimuth and Stage I1 yaw steering. XI1 ............1 3 ...... Nov. 11, 1966 On time
I
a Target-vehicle failure.
TABLE
2-II-Ynir Steeling Slcm?na?*y

I---
" Target launch-vehicle failure.

Targeted out-of-plane
Gemini mission displacement, deg that rendezvous operations, booster perform-
ance permitting, are operationally feasible
VI-A ...................................................... 0.20
a t any orbital inclination.
VI11 ............................ .............................. 21 Initial analyses of countdown methods
IX-A ...................................................... -.50
X ............................................................ -.077 indicated that the highest probability of mis-
XI ............................ i ............................ -.131
XI1 .......................................................... -.16 sion success could be achieved by simultane-
ously counting down both vehicles. Even
though simultaneous countdowns have been
28.87", 0.53' above the launch-site latitude, used extensively in Gemini, nothing in the
and by using a variable launch-azimuth tech- results clearly indicates that this is a neces-
nique, the out-of-plane displacement could be sity.
controlled to within 0.53' for 135 minutes.
Systems Requirements
During the early planning phases of the
Gemini Program, a relatively large launch A primary consideration in the develop-
window (table 2-111) was considered man- ment of the rendezvous operations was the
datory ; however, later experience indicated area of systems requirements. The require-
that reliable countdown procedures could be ments for the systems design were based
developed, and it is now the general opinion upon design-reference missions. As the de-
that large launch windows are not required. signs became established, however, the op-
Since Gemini V, the launches have either erational missions were developed to exploit
been essentially on time, or the launch has the systems capabilities, and. of course, the
been scrubbed. By suitable planning. minor missions were ultimately limited by the sys-
launch delays can be easily absorbed in the tems capabilities. For example, a desired
count, and if major problems occur, large objective during the Gemini XI1 mission
launch-window lengths a r e not particularly planning was to complete a rendezvous tlur-
helpful. An on-time launch capability pro- ing the second orbit ( M -= 2 ) . Accomplish-
vides a tremendous potential in planning op- ing this objective within acceptable disper-
erational rendezvous missions and indicates sions would have required a trajectory cor-
16 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

rection based on radar range a t a point out- The need for lighting conditions (fig.
side the spacecraft radar-range capability. 2-15) compatible with backup procedures
As a result, the second-apogee rendezvous affected all the rendezvous missions. The de-
plan was eliminated. sired lighting situation for a n active target
was that the crew (1) see the target by re-
Crew Procedures flected sunlight prior to and at terminal-
Further requirements were imposed to phase initiation, ( 2 ) see the target acquisi-
achieve workable crew procedures. The ma- tion lights against a s t a r background during
jor requirements in this area were the fol- the terminal transfer, and (3) see the target
lowing : by reflected sunlight for docking after exit
(1) Sufficient time for the crew to com- from darkness. This lighting situation en-
plete the necessary activities abled the crew to maintain target visibility
. ( 2 ) Approach trajectories which are rea- throughout the terminal-rendezvous opera-
sonably insensitive to insertion dispersion tions, and established the capability f o r mak-
and to errors in midcourse maneuvers ing inertial line-of-sight angle measurements
(3) Lighting conditions which a r e com- in the event of a guidance platform failure.
patible with backup procedures The lighting requirement was a factor in se-
( 4 ) Low terminal-approach velocities and lecting the location of the terminal-phase-
line-of-sight angular rates initiation point, the central angle of the
(5) Backup procedures for guidance-sys- transfer, and the terminal-approach angle.
tems failures The desirable lighting conditions f o r ren-
The requirement to allow sufficient time
dezvous with a n active target were different
for crew procedures had an effect on several
than for rendezvous with a passive target
of the .Gemini missions. For example, the
first orbits of the Gemini VI-A and VI11 mis- (fig. 2-16). Since a passive target would not
sions were free of rendezvous maneuvers, After terminal-phase ,Prior to and at terminal-phase
allowing the crew sufficient time to verify the initiation (target ,e' initiation (target visible in
satisfactory operation of all spacecraft sys- lights visible),. reflected sun I ight)
tems. The Gemini X primary rendezvous Stars,
was changed from a third-orbit to a fourth-
orbit rendezvous to allow the crew sufficient
time 'to conduct the heavy procedural work-
load required by the star-horizon onboard
orbit determination.
The second procedural requirement, ap- Earth \ II .Sun
proach trajectories which a r e reasonably in-
sensitive to insertion dispersion and errors
in midcourse maneuvers, was also important
i n the development of the fourth-orbit ren-
dezvous. An objective was to develop a mis-
sion which could effect a near-nominal ter-
minal-approach trajectory notwithstanding
insertion dispersions, spacecraft equipment Docking (target visible
in reflected sunlight1
degradation, or ground tracking and compu-
tation errors. This objective established the T - Target vehicle
need for the development of backup termi- S - Spacecraft
nal-phase procedures in the event of a guid- FIGURE%15.-Desired lighting situation for
ance-component failure. primary rendezvous.
SUMMARY OF RENDEZVOUS OPERATIONS 17

Desired sun direction at


terminal-phase initiation
rendezvous mission, a problem with the radar
Sun direction for Sun direction for late system developed just prior to the final ter-
early terminal- terminal-phase initiation minal-phase midcourse correction. . Even
phase initiation
though a backup solution for this maneuver
was computed and applied, rendezvous could
have been accomplished without the correc-

/
tion, since the correction required in this
Darkness ----Line-of-sight particular instance was small (2 ft/sec) .
However, on Gemini XII, a failure of a pri-
Spacecraft orbit-- mary guidance-system component required
the use of the backup procedures. The radar
system failed prior to the terminal-phase-
FIGURE2-16.-Desired lighting situation for
initiation maneuver on this mission, and
passive rendezvous.
backup procedures were employed through-
out the terminal phase to complete the ren-
be visible in darkness, the terminal-phase dezvous.
portion of the Gemini X dual optical rendez- The terminal phase of a rendezvous opera-
vous was conducted entirely in daylight. The tion involves precision maneuvers and care-
desired terminal-phase initiation occurred f u l control of closing and line-of-sight rates.
near the midpoint of the daylight period. Table 2-IV compares fuel expenditures en-
Earlier initiations would have placed the countered during terminal-phase operations
sunline too near the line of sight to the target, with the theoretical minimum. A consider-
thereby obscuring target visibility. Later able variation exists between the ratio of
initiations would not have allowed adequate actual-to-minimum propellant for various
time in daylight for completing the rendez- types of terminal-phase conditions, and also
vous. Gemini experience has shown that for different flights using the same or similar
lighting is not a major constraint for an ac- terminal-phase conditions. This variation
tive rendezvous provided the spacecraft reflects the critical nature of the task, in that
guidance system does not fail during the ter- fairly small velocity vector errors can cas-
minal approach ; but lighting is a major con- cade to high propellant consumption or fail-
straint for an optical rendezvous. ure to complete the rendezvous. The braking
The fourth requirement was that the ter- operation is particularly critical. Braking
minal trajectory allow a low terminal-ap- too soon will increase line-of-sight control
proach velocity and low line-of-sight angular requirements, and require more time to con-
rate. The requirement was important in se- trol the spacecraft during the closing se-
lecting the trajectory parameters for the quence. .
coelliptical and the first-orbit rendezvous An additional comparison of rendezvous
plans. The 130 transfer utilized on several performance is shown in table 2-V where
of the missions was chosen primarily because the actual terminal-phase vernier corrections
of the low line-of-sight angular rate near are compared with the preflight minimal pre-
intercept. The biased apogee approach was dicted. This comparison provides a n espe-
selected for Gemini XI because the direct cially good measure of guidance-system per-
tangential approach would have resulted in formance, since the maneuvers were nomi-
a high closing velocity. nally very small and became large only with
Throughout the Gemini Program, there degradation of guidance-system performance
was a question of the level of effort to be or with control difficulties.
applied to the development of backup pro- A number of terminal-phase rendezvous
cedures to accommodate guidance-system operations were satisfactorily completed
failures. During the Gemini XI first-orbit during the Gemini Program by using optical
18 GEMINI SUM MARY CONFERENCE

TABLE2-IV.-Rendezvous Propellant Usage -

I I Propellant usage, lb
Gemini mission I Type of rendezvous Conditions at start of
terminal phase I Actual 1 Minimum Ratio

VI-A ..........
I
' M =4 .................... A h = 15 n. mi.
A X = 25 n. mi.
..................................
....................
130
I...............81 ..............1.60

VI11 ...................... I' M =4 ....................


Coelliptic :
Ah = 15 n. mi. .................................. 160 .............. 79 .............. 2.02
II A X = 25 n. mi. .......... I
____~_ -
-i - Coelliptic :
A h = 12 n. mi. .................................. 113 ............. 68 ..............1.66
A X = 22 n. mi. ..........
___- -
-

.................................. 61 ............... 20 ..............3.05


Ah = 2.5 n. mi.
..................
A X = 3.5 n. mi.
I -I
A h = -7.5 n. mi. 137 .............. 39 ..............3.51
A X = -10 n. mi. ................
- -- I- ----I-
Coelliptic:
X .......................... M=4 ..................... A h = 15 n. mi. 360 .............. 84 ..............4.28
A X = 30 n. mi. ....................
- I I
I Coelliptic :
X .......................... Optical dual ......... A h = 7 n. mi. 180 .............. 73 ..............2.46 -
A X = 12 n.- mi. ..........
-I I
Spacecraft at apogee of
87/151 orbit:
XI ......................... M =1 ..................... Ah = 10 n. mi. ................................. 290 ..............191 .............1.52
A X = 15 n. mi. ..........
-
XI ........................ Stable orbit ........... AS^ = 0 n. mi. ................................... 87 .............. 31 ..............2.81
A X = 25 n. mi. ..........
- __ I-I -

! I
Coelliptic :
XI1 ........................ M =3 ..................... A h = 10 n. mi. .................... ..............112 .............. 55 .............2.04
A X = 20 n. mi. ....................

I I
i First Second First Second
!
VI-A
VI11
..........................II ..................................
............................ 1 .................................
11
15
I .................................
i .................................
7
9
................................. 1 ' .................................... 2
I,
.................................................................... 0

X ................................................................. 20 ................................. 23 ................................. 2 .................................... 3


X I ............................................................... 6 .................................................................. 0 ................................... 2
XI1 ................................................................
I
2 II ................................. 25 1Ii................................. 2 ................................... 3
SUMMARY OF RENDEZVOUS OPERATIONS 19

techniques alone (no closed-loop radar-com- is operationally feasible with an active or a


puter operation). Optical rendezvous requires passive target. It has also been demonstrated
careful control of lighting conditions, and a that the operation can be performed using
stabilized reference such as an inertial plat- onlv onboard guidance information after
I

form is highly desirable. During simulations, li&ff ; using only ground-supplied informa-
rendezvous have been effected without plat- tion; or by using a of onboard
form information ; however, the probability
and ground-supplied
of success is relatively low.

Conc 1ud ing Remarks Reference


The rendezvous operations conducted on 1. A N O N .: Gemini Midprogram Conference, Includ-
Gemini have demonstrated that rendezvous ing Experiment Results. NASA SP-121, 1966.
3. GROUND CONTROL AND MONITORING OF RENDEZVOUS
By EDWARD L. PAVELKA. Flight Control Divisiorr, I'ASA Manned Spncecraft Center; EDGARC. LINEBERRY,
Mission Plarrriirig arid Arralysis Division, NASA Martried Spacecraft Center; arid WARRENJ. KEN-
NEDY, Project Engineer-Gernirri Ageria, Lockheed h!i.ssi/es & .$pace c o .

Summary a ground-support standpoint, the primary


rendezvous missions as well as the re-rendez-
This paper discusses the ground control vous operations which may be conducted
and monitoring function performed in sup- during a flight.
port of the Gemini rendezvous missions.
Included are discussions of the support Gemini Rendezvous Missions
philosophy adopted for Gemini ; the resulting
influence upon mission design ; and compari- The ground support of a rendezvous mis-
sons between predicted and actual flight sion was planned so that all information that
results. the flight crew would nominally request, plus
additional backup information, would be
Introduction available a t an optimum time in the flight
plan. Once the basic mission plan was devel-
The concepts adopted for the ground sup- oped, a large number of final details had to
port of Gemini were in keeping with the basic be refined in simulations of the mission with
mission-design criterion of maximizing the the actual flight-crew personnel. The primary
probability of achieving rendezvous. A flex- maneliver updates from the Mission Control
ible ground system was developed to permit Center-Houston had to be scheduled at a
the flight-control team to react to anomalous time that would afford maximum radar track-
situations routinely, while still preserving ing history in the mission computers at the
standardized conditions for the terminal- Manned Spacecraft Center. Houston. The
phase rendezvous. Since the possibility ex- Gemini rendezvous missions were separated
isted for a multitude of anomalous situations, into two distinct mission phases, the mid-
a real-time mission-planning capability was course maneuver and the terminal rendez-
implemented in the Mission Control Center- vous. For the midcourse phase, the flight-
Houston. This capability consisted of com- control team was the primary source for the
puter-driven displays which permitted the maneuver computations. The purpose of
flight controllers to assess current conditions, these maneuvers was to effect a rendezvous
and to select a maneuver sequence compatible between the spacecraft and a point in space
with mission constraints. In effect, the role that would result in the desired spacecraft
-of the flight controllers was to provide a displacement and velocity with respect to
series of midcourse maneuvers which the target vehicle. To accomplish this, pre-
achieved a particular relative separation and established maneuver points were selected
velocity between the spacecraft and the tar- so that the propellant requirements for this
get vehicle. Following the final midcourse mission phase were minimized, and sufficient
maneuver, the role changed more to monitor- network tracking was available for maneuver
ing the onboard-computed intercept maneu- updates. Of course, the first rendezvous mis-
ver and the final terminal-phase operations. sion, Gemini VI-A, had the most uncertain
The following discussion will compare, from conditions. Consequently, for this mission, a

21
Preceding page Hank
22 GEMINI SUM MARY CONFERENCE

plan was selected which afforded rendezvous maneuver was a phase adjustment which oc-
in the fourth spacecraft revolution with the curred at the second spacecraft apogee. Out-
following salient features : of-plane errors were removed with a maneu-
(1) The Gemini Launch Vehicle was tar- ver at the common node following the second
geted to provide the desired altitude differ- apogee. Subsequent radar-tracking informa-
ential between the target and spacecraft tion indicated the need for an additional
orbits at spacecraft apogee. Also, a dogleg adjustment to the altitude differential a t
launch trajectory was flown in order to insert spacecraft apogee. This maneuver was per-
the spacecraft into the plane of the target formed at perigee near the end of the second
orbit. revolution. The final midcourse translation
(2) The first spacecraft orbit was fr'ee of was a coelliptic maneuver performed at the
rendezvous activity so the crew could make third apogee. The purpose of this maneuver
the necessary systems checks, and the ground was to place the spacecraft orbit at a con-
controllers could determine the precise space- stant altitude difference below the target-
craft orbit. vehicle orbit. The same basic mission plan
(3) Preestablished maneuver points were was also successfully used on Gemini VIII.
selected to account for expected dispersions For the Gemini IX-A mission, the mid-
in lift-off time and spacecraft insertion con- course-maneuver sequence had the additional
ditions. requirement to more nearly duplicate the
(4) The site chosen to update a maneuver Apollo time line and midcourse phase planned
had acquisition so that adequate time re- for the lunar rendezvous operations. This led
mained for the crew to orient the spacecraft to rendezvous in the third spacecraft revolu-
to the maneuver attitude. tion with a somewhat different maneuver se-
The midcourse maneuver sequence can be quence (fig. 3-2). The phase-adjustment
seen in figure 3-1. Tracking during the first maneuver was performed a t the first space-
revolution indicated that the altitude differ- craft apogee. Since the phasing maneuver
ential at spacecraft apogee exceeded the ac- uas based upon a minimal amount of track-
ceptable tolerance ; thus, the initial mid- ing. a second midcourse maneuver designed
course translation was a height adjustment to achieve phasing, height, and plane require-
performed a t spacecraft perigee near the end ments was scheduled in the second revolu-
of the first revolution. The second midcourse tion. The location of this maneuver was

I ,Velocity match A = 10-minute time marks

,.Terminal-phase initiation ,.Phase adjustment ,,Apogee

-
CL
$ 40-
-"
m
.-
L

Ahead+ Behind
Horizontal displacement, n. mi.

FIGURE3-l.-Relative trajectory of spacecraft froni insertion to three-revolution rendezvous in target-centered


curvilinear coordinate system.
GROUND CONTROL A N D MONITORING OF RENDEZVOUS 23

TABLE3-L-Dual Rendezvous Planning


!
GeminiX
target-vehicle

~

I launch time,
Gemini VI11 Greenwich
target-vehicle mean time, Required
vector hr :min :sec apogee, n. mi.
- I
-
.3 60 -
L
0)
3/19/66 ..............................
3/30/66 .............................
3:40:58 ........................
i
3 :40:54 ........................
226
246
>
4/25/66 ............................. 3 :37:30 .........................
8080 0 8b Iko 2iO 3iO 4bo
5/16/66 .............................. 3 :37:30 ........................
470
400
Ahead+ Behind
6/ 9/66 .............................. 3:46:30 1........................ 390’
Horizontal displacement. n. mi.
5/24/66 ............................. .)..41:55 ........................
.) 360
1. Spacecraft insertion 00:06:21 4. Coelliptical combination
6/20/66 .............................. 3 :40 :26 ........................ 420
2. Phase adjustment OO:59:39 5. Terminal-phase initiation
3. Corrective combination 7/18/66 ............................. 3 :39:46 ........................ 409
6. Velocity match

FIGURE3-2.-Relative trajectory of spacecraft from ‘Column shows dates when the passive Gemini
insertion to two-revolution rendezvous in target- VI11 targct vehicle was in proper position for lift-off
centered curvilinear coordinate system. of the Gemini X mission to accomplish dual rendez-
vous.

selected to afford a maximum amount of target vehicle, they initiated midcourse ma-
tracking over the continental U.S. stations. neuvers (fig. 3-3) to achieve desired condi-
The final maneuver in this sequence provided tions for the terminal phase of rendezvous
a constant altitude differential between the with the passive Gemini VI11 target vehicle.
two orbits, and also placed the Gemini space- The Gemini X target-vehicle propulsion sys-
craft in the plane of the target vehicle. tem was used to perform these maneuvers
The initial rendezvous maneuver sequence while-the spacecraft and target vehicle were
utilized on Gemini X was identical to that of docked ; the spacecraft propulsion system was
Gemini VI-A. However, the ground control- user1 after undocking.
lers had the additional tasks of evaluating
onboard maneuver calculations based upon 240 r
star measurements and upon the Inertial
Guidance System ascent vector; and of giv-
ing a go-no-go decision on these solutions
based upon retaining acceptable terminal-
phase conditions. The flight plan also included
a rendezvous between the spacecraft and the
passive target vehicle, which had been
launched during the Gemini VI11 mission
and then placed in a higher parking orbit.
This plan created a n additional complexity, as Ahead +Behind
compared with the earlier rendezvous mis- Horizontal displacement. n. mi.
sions, and necessitated an on-time launch for 1. Phasing maneuver, 4. Coelliptic maneuver,
both the target vehicle and the spacecraft. 9. e. 1. 07:38:34 9. e. 1. 22:37:54
2. Height maneuver, 5. Terminal-phase
Table 3-1 shows the variation during the 9. e. 1. 20:21:02 initiation,
4-month period preceding flight in lift-off 3. Plane change, 9. e. 1. 47:30341
time required of the Gemini X target vehicle, g. e. 1. 2130349
as well a s the required aponee altitude for
FIGURE:L::.-Rclative trajectory of Gemini X dual
dual rendezvous phasing. After the crew com- rendezvous in target-centered curvilinear coordi-
pleted the initial clocking with the Gemini ,Y nate system.
24 G E M I N I S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

The ground support of the first-orbit ren- nal-phase-initiate maneuver to serve as a


dezvous during the Gemini XI mission (fig. comparison between the onboard closed-loop
3-4) was approached in a considerably differ- and backup solutions. In addition, supple-
ent manner than during prior rendezvous mental information, such as the variation in
missions. The only midcourse maneuver altitude differential, was passed to the crew.
scheduled was a plane-change maneuver to
account for insertion dispersions. The loca- Re-Ren d ezvous Operations
tion of this maneuver was approximately a Three re-rendezvous operations were in-
quarter of a spacecraft revolution after in- cluded in the Gemini Program to increase
sertion. The major role of the flight control- the rendezvous experience. These exercises
lers for this mission was to evalute the investigated such factors as variation in
predicted relative conditions a t the time of lighting and terminal-approach conditions.
the terminal intercept maneuver, and to give The equiperiod re-rendezvous of the Gemini
a go-no-go decision for the first-orbit ren- IX-A mission was used to study proposed
dezvous. The basis for the go-no-go decision lighting conditions for the dual rendezvous
was dependent on the resultant propellant of Gemini X. The second re-rendezvous of
cost for the terminal-phase operations, and Gemini IX-A investigated a terminal ap-
on the relative conditions which would pre- proach from ahead and above the target ve-
clude the use of onboard backup charts re- hicle in support of future Apollo rendezvous
quired in the event of degraded systems operations. The re-rendezvous of Gemini XI
performance. In addition to providing a was a totally different technique from any
go-no-go decision, a contingency maneuver previously flown. The spacecraft mas given
plan was computed in the event that the de- phasing maneuvers from the ground such
cision was no-go. This plan was based upon that no relative phase rate existed between
rendezvous in the third revolution. the two vehicles prior to the intercept ma-
For the Gemini XI1 initial rendezvous, the neuver. In this configwration. the spacecraft
midcourse maneuver sequence was identical trailed the target vehicle bv approximately
to that of the Gemini IX-A mission. The 25 nautical miles in the same orbit (fig.
additional complexity involved for this misr 3-5). The vehicles remained in this configu-
pion included ground evaluation of the on- ration for approximately 12 hours, at which
board-computed plane-change maneuver and time a ground-computed intercept maneuver
the final maneuver to establish the constant was applied. with the final terminal-phase
altitude differential.
control performed visually by the crew. This
Following the final midcourse maneuver technique was flown to compare the propel-
update, the ground provided a backup termi-
lant cost with that required for long-term.
.-. P close-range station keeping.
E 8, M r I Velccitv match (TPF) .2 0
-= 10 -minute time marks E "Visual braking Intercept maneuver,'
----Terminal-ohase initiation & 01:13:10 0o:Oo
Spacecraft
insertion
".
.-
'34" correction
U

+Behind
q .+;
L

Ahead I 1 I 1
Horizontal displacement. n. mi. 5 10 15 20 25
Ahead Behind
FIGURE
34-Relative trajectory of Gemini XI from Horizontal displacement. n. mi.
insertion to rendezvous in tarpet-vehicle curvi-
linear coordinate system. FIGURE
R-5.-Gemini X I stahle orhit re-rendezvous.
GROUND CONTROL AND MONITORING OF RENDEZVOUS 25

Flight Results normally consisted of correcting the memory


system and configuring the target docking
The effectiveness of the ground-computed equipment for the rendezvous by real-time
midcourse maneuvers can best be evaluated commands. The target vehicle was further
by the propellant required for midcourse commanded to an orientation of -90' from
maneuvers, and how accurately the condi- the flight path (docking adapter to the
tions for terminal-phase initiation were met. north) in order to present a larger target to
As shown in table 3-11, the lighting condi- the spacecraft radar system and to provide
tions obtained were within desired limits ; a larger target for visual acquisition in sun-
above-nominal midcourse propellant usage light exposure.
was largely due to dispersions in insertion From target-vehicle lift-off to spacecraft
conditions. The variation in altitude differ- rendezvous, three major parameters were
ential following the coelliptic maneuver was evaluated to assure a safe target. The pro-
well within the limits for the use of onboard pellant-tank differential pressure was of
backup charts on all flights. The ground- prime concern because a reversal pressure
computed terminal-phase solutions were con- would cause the loss of the target vehicle.
sistently in very close agreement with both The battery temperature was continuously .
onboard solutions for all missions. evaluated to predict a rate of change, since
the target would be lost if the temperature
Gemini Agena Target Vehicle became excessive. The Attitude Control Sys-
tem pressure was evaluated t o assure a non-
Prior to spacecraft launch and subsequent leak condition which would provide adequate
rendezvous operations, the Gemihi Agena control to preclude vehicle instability and
Target Vehicle was monitored and evaluated associated unsuitability for docking.
to insure proper configuration for use as a
passive target. Of prime concern, other than
Conclusion
total electrical failure, was the verifica t'ion
of insertion into the proper orbit. Any sig-
Effective ground support and control has
nificant error in insertion would require cor-
rection by a plane-change maneuver from been demonstrated in the successful accom-
the target-vehicle propulsion system. plishment of the rendezvous missions of the
Upon achieving a nominal insertion, com- Gemini Program. Of key importance in this
plete checkout of vehicle performance and success was the flexible real-time planning
attitude conditioning was accomplished by capability which afforded the necessary re-
the target-vehicle flight controllers. This sponse to a variety of mission situa t'ions.

TABLE
3-II.-Re~ndezvous Midcourse Phase Swn.jna r.tt
~- __~___._
!
i Variation in
Velocity
-~terminal-phase Variation in
Gemini mission
1 initiation time, altitude differential,
~~~

,--------

, Nominal, ft/sec Actual, ft/sec ! min n. mi.

VI-A ........................................................
~ 117 .............................. I
159 i ........................... 1
2.1 ................................ 1.1
VI11 ..........................................................
I
117 .............................. 150 ........................... 9.7 / ................................ 1.2

a Positive values indicate late terminal-phase initiations.


4. ONBBARD OPERATIONS FOR RENDEZVOUS
By PAULC. KRAMER. Flight Crew Support Division, N A S A Mariner1 Spacecraft Center; EDWINE. ALDRIN,
Astronaut, Astronaut Ofice, X A S A Manned Spacecrall Center; and WILLIAME. HAYES, Dynamics
Engineer, McDonnell Aircraft Corp.

Introduction toring, and backup procedures. Primary pro-


cedures were the crew tasks necessary to
An overall plan for onboard rendezvous define and execute any given maneuver. Mon-
operations for the Gemini missions was de- itoring and backup procedures were used to
veloped in parallel with the mission plan. The assess the operation of the system and to
purpose of this plan was to make optimum complete the mission in contingency situa-
-use of crew time in orbit to maximize the tions.
probability of a successful rendezvous. The
evolution of the plan began with a prelimi- f’rimary Procedures
nary time line of events based upon the The spacecraft onboard operations were
known guidance-equipment requirements and broadly categorized into insertion correc-
upon the estimated crew timing. A prelimi- tions, midcourse or catchup-phase correc-
nary set of flight charts was developed to tions, terminal-phase closed-loop correc-
aid thetcrew with primary and backup pro- tions, and braking and line-of-sight control.
cedures and to establish a backup guidance Since these basic operations were common to
capability. These charts, which consisted of most missions, each category is described
a few simple graphs and tabulation sheets, first as it applies to a general rendezvous
enabled the crew to calculate accurate solu- mission. Then, the rendezvous operations on
tions for the terminal maneuvers even with specific missions are discussed.
an inoperative guidance-equipment compo- Insertion corrections.-An insertion cor-
nent. As such, the charts significantly con- rection based upon onboard navigation in-
tributed to the probability of mission formation was computed and displayed to
success. Following the development of the the crew by the Insertion Velocity Adjust
charts, a n engineering evaluation was con- Routine ( W A R ) . This correction was de-
ducted on a realistic man-in-the-loop simula- signed to achieve the planned apogee altitude
tion. During this evaluation, the procedures and to eliminate the out-of-plane velocity.
and charts were subjected to the expected Although providing a very early opportunity
equipment errors and trajectory dispersions, to reduce trajectory dispersions, the correc-
and revisions were made as necessary to im- tion could possibly include significant navi-
prove effectiveness. The resulting plan was gation errors ; therefore, the application of
presented to the flight crew ; the charts were the maneuver was not always advantageous.
evaluated during a period of training on the For missions with relatively long catchup
simulator. The crew spent several weeks times, it was usually preferable to omit the
training on both the primary procedures and correction, or to apply only the in-plane com-
on the various failure modes. ponent and then use the ground-tracking in-
formation that was available later to deter-
General Rendezvous Operations mine a more accurate correction. Conversely,
The operation of the guidance system for when an early rendezvous was desired, both
rendezvous was divided into primary, moni- components of the correction were applied,

27
Preceding page blank
28 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

and a third component was manually com- that the height-adjust maneuver usually per-
puted and applied. This third component was formed a t second perigee was replaced by a n
a radial correction based upon a computer insertion correction. The crew procedures
readout of downrange travel, and was de- for onboard determination of the midcourse
signed to correct the phasing a t first apogee. maneuvers involved a sequence of computer
One of the procedural problems related to the and sextant usage. The first maneuver was
insertion correction was a method for avoid- made a t insertion. After this correction, a n
ing recontact with the launch vehicle after auxiliary tape memory module containing
separation and for applying the Insertion the mathematical flow f o r the orbit determi-
Velocity Adjust Routine maneuver. The prob- nation, navigation, and prediction modes of
lem was resolved by prohibiting a certain operation was entered into the onboard com-
band of velocity changes most likely to result puter. First, the orbit determination mode
in recontact, and by establishing visual con- was selected and initialized, and a series of
tact with the launch vehicle before making s t a r measurements was made and entered
retrograde corrections. into the computer. After processing these
Midcourse phase.-The onboard opera- data, the computer produced a n updated state
tions required f o r the catchup phase of a vector which was used in the orbit prediction
rendezvous mission basically consisted of de- mode to predict the spacecraft velocity at the
termining and applying the midcourse ma- following maneuver point, and the position
neuvers. Other onboard operations during a t the following apogee if no maneuver was
this phase were routine procedures such a s made. With the aid of the flight charts, this
platform alinements and system checks. For information was used to predict the desired
most of the rendezvous missions, the mid- velocity a t the next maneuver point-thus the
course maneuvers were computed by the velocity change. The other maneuvers were
ground complex and transmitted to the determined in a similar manner, and all of
spacecraft. The crew tasks in this case con- the solutions were compared with the corre-
' sisted only of achiev'ing the correct attitude sponding ground computer values. If the d i E
and of applying the thrust a t the proper ferences were within the bounds established
time. A typicaI sequence of catchup maneu- before flight, the onboard-determined ma-
vers is shown in figure 4-1. neuvers would be applied ; if not, the ground-
To demonstrate a n onboard navigation supplied maneuvers would be applied.
capability, t h e Gemini X mission procedures Several problems arose in connection with
required the flight crew to compute catchup these procedures. For example, a group of
maneuvers using the onboard orbit determi- stnr-to-horizon angle measurements from a n
nation and prediction capability. The same earlier mission indicated t h a t the apparent
basic maneuvers were computed a s on the altitude of the E a r t h horizon changed with
earlier four-orbit rendezvous mission, except time, possibly as a result of varying moon-
light conditions. These variations were large
enough to have a significant effect on the ma-
neuver solutions, and a series of measure-
-E
c
ments was required to calibrate the horizon.
-
a
l
40- A second problem was the definition of a
measurement schedule for orbit. determina-
tion. The timing, as well as the type and the
580 I I I 1
direstion, of the measurements had to be
izoo 1000 800 600 400 200 o established. Studies revealed that the meas-
Behind--( urements should be spaced over two darkness
Trailing distance, n. mi.
periods, and that n variety of directions
FIGURE4-1.-Typical midcourse maneuvers. should be used. The selected schedule con-
ON BOARD OPERATIONS FOR RENDEZVOUS 29

sisted of four in-plane and two out-of-plane puted a t regular intervals and displayed to
measurements, but the crew timing require- the crew. The time of the transfer and the
ments and the inaccuracy of the resulting number of vernier corrections were mission-
out-of-plane orbit determination led to the planning options. Generally, based on a tra-
decision to use dummy out-of-plane measure- jectory that would result in an intercept in
ments. The effect was that the out-of-plane 130" of orbit travel ( d= 130'), a transfer
component of the vector was not updated. time of about 30 minutes was selected with
Terminal phase.-The terminal-phase ren- two vernier corrections.
dezvous operations employed the onboard Brakiiig a d line-of-sight coutrol phase.-
computer in conjunction with the inertial The braking and line-of-sight control phase
platform and radar. In the rendezvous mode, which followed the final vernier correction
the computer gathered radar and platform was manually controlled. Simply stated, line-
data, and operated on the data in the sequence of-sight rate control was achieved by deter-
outlined in figure 4-2. Initially, data were mining the direction of the rate and thrust-
sampled and stored a t a crew-optional fixed- ing normal t o the line of sight to null this
time interval ; both 60 and 100 seconds were rate. The direction of the motion could be
used. After sufficient data had been stored, determined by either of two methods. The
a n estimate of the total velocity change re- first method was to fix the attitude of the
quired for a two-impulse rendezvous transfer target vehicle with respect to a body-fixed
was computed and displayed to the crew. The reticle. When movement was apparent,
estimate was updated with each succeeding thrust was applied radially in the direction
data point for use a s an aid in determining of motion. The second method, which could
the best point to initiate the transfer. The be employed when stars were not visible,
crew initiated the maneuver sequence by de- made use of the Flight Director Attitude In-
pressing the START COMP button on the dicators in an inertial mode. After the com-
instrument panel. A t this time, the velocity mand pilot had boresighted on the target,
change (in components along the three body the pilot entered a logic choice into the com-
axes) for terminal-phase initiation was dis- puter which centered the flight director indi-
played to the crew, along with the proper cator needles and subsequently deflected
attitude for application of the thrust. The them proportionately to spacecraft inertial-
maneuver was achieved when the command attitude changes. The command pilot was
pilot depressed the maneuver controller un- then able to hold the attitude that would keep
til the displayed velocity change counted -the needles centered, and to observe the tar-
down t o zero. Since equipment and applica- get drift with the optical sight. Nulling the
tion errors could produce significant disper- target motion was then accomplished in the
sions in the resulting transfer trajectory, same manner as the first method.
vernier corrections t o the transfer were com-
Monitorinl: and Backup T e c h n i q u e s

One important crew function during ren-


dezvous was to monitor the performance of
Time, min Backup data the guidance system to assure that the trans-
lational maneuvers were accurately computed
thrust and applied. Monitoring can be defined as the
assessment of guidance-systems operation to
COMP thrust
_- the extent necessary for detection and iden-
n n n o o o o o o ~
AV display TPI = Terminal-phase initiation tification of performance degradation in suf-
ficient time for corrective action. During
FIGURE4-2.-Terminal-phase computer sequence. rendezvous, monitoring was accomplished by
30 GEMINI SUM MARY CONFERENCE

sampling basic flight data at specified points where


in the trajectory, and by calculating with the LR was the increment in velocity along the
aid of charts and graphs a solution to each target line of sight required to transfer to
maneuver for comparison with the closed- the desired intercept trajectory
loop and/or ground solution. XI,,,, was the range rate of the desired t r a -
Backup charts.-The data used for moni- jectory a t the point of data sampling
toring and backup are shown in table 4-1. immediately prior to terminal-phase ini-
The use of sensor information varied, de- tiation, and was defined by target elevation
pending upon the maneuver to be calculated. angle and range for the type trajectory de-
A typical case was illustrated by the terminal- sired
phase initiation procedure. The spacecraft RA,.Twas the actual range rate a t the point
attitude was maintained in zero roll and bore- of data sampling immediately prior to
sighted on the target using the optical sight. terminal-phase initiation
This alined the X-axis to the target line of
A typical terminal-phase trajectory is one
sight. The radar and platform data could
which intercepts in 130" of target orbit
then be used to calculate velocity increments
travel. Figure 4-3 shows the relationship of
A V along and normal to the target line of
sight. The AV along the line of sight was ob-
RnE,, a t terminal-phase initiation with pitch
angle 0 and range for this transfer. The rela-
tained in terms of relative range rate R by
tionship is nearly independent of the target
the equation
AR - R,,, -RAm
orbit: thus, figure 4-3 is valid f o r altitudes
within 20 nautical miles of t h e nominal.

TABLE
4-L-Monitoring Data
Display
Data Units ! ' Sensor
Prime Backup

Range ............ 0.01 n. mi. ................. Radar ..................... Manual data unit .. Analog page

Range rate ............... ft/sec ......................... Radar ..................... Manual data unit .. Analog gage

Pitch angle ............... 0.1" ........................... Inertial measuring Manual data unit .. Flight director
unit. attitude
indicator,
stars

Yaw angle ............... 0.1" ............................ Inertial measuring -Manual data unit .. Flight director
unit. attitude
indicator,
stars

Roll angle .................. 0.1" ........................... Inertial measuring Manual data unit .. Flight director
unit. attitude
I indicator,
stars

1 Optical sight ......I


Visual ....................... -
Target boresight ...... 0.1" ........................... Radar ..................... Flicht director
indicators
ON BOARD OPERATIONS FOR RENDEZVOUS 31

and approach conditions. Crew procedures


approaching terminal-phase initiation were

:i:g.
e
i
m
E
= 20
M
to track the target and observe the increase
in elevation angle. Pertinent data were re-
corded on logging sheets at each interval as
sampiis were taken by the computer for the
computation of the closed-loop solution for

21.4", certain samples were utilized for the


The AI' in-plane, normal to the line-of-
terminal-phase initiation monitoring and
sight increment in velocity, defined in terms
backup solutions. The significant data points
of line-of-sight angular rate A and range R
were labeled A , B, C, and D, a x \ are defined
by the equation
as follows :
lvs= < ~ R E Q ~ ' A C TR> A = Data point immediately prior to 21.4'
where target elevation
l V s was the in-plane, normal to the line- B = First data point after 21.4"; first
of-sight increment in velocity required to used to calculate the bacbup solution
transfer to the desired intercept trajectory
C = Next data point after B ; (:sed to ini-
fl,,,,, was the in-plane line-of-sight angular tiate the closed-loop sequc I ce for ter-
rat'e of the desired trajectory at the point minal-phase initiation
of data sampling immediately prior to ter-
minal-phase initiation, and was defined by
D =Next point after C ; providtid the final
target elevation for the trajectory desired data for the backup solutions for ter-
minal-phase initiation
was the actual line-.of-sight rate at the
data sampling point immediately prior to Figure 4-4 illustrates the sequence for ob-
terminal-phase initiation taining a backup solution to terminal-phase
R was range to the target a t the measure- initiation. Range and pitch angles were re-
ment point corded each 100 seconds until 8 exceeded
Since could not be measured directly with 21.4'. This angle was designated point 13 and
sufficient accuracy, an increment in 8 over a recorded. After the next sampling point .C,
measured time interval was used. the START COMP button was depressed to
initiate the closed-loop sequence for terminal-
phase initiation. Range, range rate, and pitch
angle for the second point beyond B, point
where D, completed the information needed to cal-
8, and 8- were target elevation at the be- culate the backup solution. The pl*ocedures
ginning and end of the measuring interval, for obtaining the backup solution are as
respectively follows :
At,: was the measurement time interval
(1) Boresight on target
For use in flight, the equations for l R and
LVs were mechanized graphically (fig. 4-4). (2) Monitor 8, R, and R every minute
This chart was part of the onboard data pack- (3) When 19>_21.4~, record data for point
age for Gemini IX-A. The technique used B on terminal-phase initiation chart
throughout the Gemini Program was to ini- ( 4 ) Push START COMP button after next
tiate terminal-phase initiation at a reference data point
target elevation angle. This provided a stand- ( 5 ) Record data at point D
3? GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

FIGURE
4-4.-Terminal-phase initiation.

( 6 ) Enter terminal-phase initiation chart nations of partial and complete failures were
to calculate AR,1 V s , and terminal-phase ini- too numerous to permit specific training for
tiation time each. Therefore, procedures were developed
( 7 ) Compare AR and A V with~ closed loop only f v - total failure of each of the three ma-
and Manned Space Flight Network jor guidance system components : radar,
computer, and platform. Partial failures
A similar technique was used for midcourse were then handled by utilizing whatever
corrections except that measurements were
valid data were available from the degraded
triggered on time after terminal-phase ini- component.
tiation rather than on pitch angle. For total failure of any guidance compo-
Fnilzire modes.-Throughout the Gemini ' nent, the closed-loop solution would no longer
Program, manual techniques were utilized be available. In this case, it was necessary t o
wherever practical to maximize the proba- rely on the ground or backup solution ob-
bility of mission success. Thus, the crew was tained by a1tern:ite methods. For all failures,
prepared at all times to continue the mission procedures were designed to obtain a maneu-
with degraded or failed systems components. ver solution in components along and normal
This required frequent reference to monitor- to the target liiie of sight. Table 4-11 sum-
ing c; a and substitution of alternate sources marizes the sensors used for the significant
whei: Lailures occurred. The different situa- failures. For radar failures, a redundant
tions that could exist for all possible combi- source of range information was not avaii-
ON BOARD OPERATIONS FOR RENDEZVOUS 33

TABLE4-II.-FaiEure Modes the change of the target line-of-sight angle as


measured against the s t a r background. At the
Up/down, s t a r t of an incremental angle measuring in-
Failure AV source AV source
terval, the reticle pattern of the optical sight
None .................. Closed-loop Closed-loop would be fixed against the star background
guidance guidance with the target a t the top of the reticle. Dur-
ing the measuring interval, the pilot would
Radar ................. Manned Space Manual data attempt to maintain the attitude relative to
Flight Net- unit, 8 , Ae the stars. At the end of the measurement
work or time, noting the position of the target on the
nominal
reticle provided the delta angle needed for
Computer ........... Analog gage, Flight director calculating the up/down incremental ve-
attitude indi- locity.
cator, e , ~e
Mission Results
Inertial meas- Manual data Sextant nomi-
uring unit unit, R,R nal, 8 ,
stars A 8
During the Gemini Program, a total of
10 rendezvous was accomplished (table
4-111) , providing a s broad a spectrum of ter-
able and only up/down maneuvers could usu- minal-phase conditions as possible. On sev-
ally be calculated on board. One exception eral missions more than one rendezvous was
was the first-orbit rendezvous on Gemini XI performed. This allowed a rapid development
where a terminal-phase initiation correction of the rendezvous technology, including prob-
along the line of sight could be based on the lems, tradeoffs, and solutions. The guidance
insertion vector obtainable from the Inertial and navigation system proved versatile, as
Guidance System. The computer failure case rendezvous plans were shuffled within weeks
would not cause loss of information in either of launch, and as lessons learned on each
axis, but would result in less accurate maneu- mission were incorporated on the next. Since
vers because the readout on the Flight Di- the rendezvous plans and procedures were
rector Attitude Indicator and radar analog functions of mission objectives, each type of
gage was less accurate than from the com- rendezvous and its characteristics are 'treated
puter readout. separately in the following paragraphs.
In training, the platform failure proved
t h e most difficult to resolve because accurate Itendezvous in the Second. Third, and
Fourth Orbits
attitude angles could not be obtained late in
the terminal phase. Fortunately, this failure The terminal phase of many of the Gemini
was not encountered in flight. On most mis- mission rendezvous followed a set pattern :
sions subsequent to Gemini VI-A, a hand-
(1) Approach to terminal-phase initiation
held sextant was prcvided for determining
through a nominally circular catchup
time of arrival a t terminal-phase initiation
in case the Inertial Measuring Unit had orbit, below and behind the target
(2) Tjme of terminal-phase initiation de-
failed. The time could be determined by not-
termined approximately by phasing
ing the time when the angle between the tar-
maneuvers prior to the circular
get and horizon lines of sight corresponded to catchup orbit, then fixed precisely by
the planned pitch angle a t point B . For the observation of target elevation above
platform failure case, the up/down velocity the local horizontal
increment for terminal-phase initiation and (3) The intercept orbit traveled 130" cen-
vernier corrections could be calculated from tral angle not including braking
34 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFEXENCE

TABLE&III.-Gemini Rendezvous Summary


Separation Orbit
altitude, travel,
Mission Target

VI-A .............................................. 1 Gemini VI1 spacecraft ..I Below I


................................. 15 !.................... 130

IX-A: Initial rendezvous ............ Augmented target dock- 1 Below ................................. 12.5 .......... 130
ing adapter.

!
I

No. 2 re-rendezvous ............ Above ................................... 7.5 .......... 130


~ ~~~

X: Initial rendezvous .................. Gemini X target vehicle ...... Below ................/I .................15 !....................130

Re-rendezvous ...................... Gemini VI11 target vehicle.. Below ................. 5 1.......... 80

Rerendezvous ...................... Stable orbit 0 .................... 292

XI1 ................................................. 1 Gemini XI1 target vehicle ..I Below I 10 1 ....................


.................................. 130

(4) Two vernier corrections a t fixed times establishing a time for the terminal-phase
after terminal-phase initiation initiation were number of phasing orbits de-
(5) An approach from below and slightly sired and sunlight conditions. Three phasing
ahead of the target through a series orbits were required for the early flights of
of braking maneuvers at fixed ranges Gemini VI-A and VIII. As ground and on-
along an inertially fixed line board operations evolved, the number was
The major variables available for mission decreased to two for the later flights, Gemini
planning purposes can be summarized as fol- IX-A and XII. A further decrease in total
lows : time to rendezvous required modification of
(1) Time of terminal-phase initiation terminal-phase procedures on Gemini XI.
(2) Target elevation angle a t terminal- Terminal-phase lighting tradeoff s centered
phase initiation around the following :
(3) Orbit travel between terminal-phase (1) Target visibility a t termifid-phase
initiation and terminal-phase finali- initiation in reflected sunlight
zation (2) Availability of siars during braking
( 4 ) Time between vernier corrections phage t o aid line-of-sight control
(5) Braking schedule. (3) Approach to docking in sunlighc
, (6)- Altitude dif€exe,.tizl between target These considerations placed the terminal-
and spacecraft phase initiation time near sunset with mid-
The time of terminal-phase initiation was course corrections and line-of-sight control
grossly controlled by lift-off time and by phas- during the night period.
ing maneuvers prior to the circular catchup Figure 4-5 depicts the lighting conditions
orbit, with phasing maneuvers determined for the typical rendezvous from below the
on the ground. Primary considerations in target vehicle. Elevation angles of the target
ON BOARD OPERATIONS FOR RENDEZVOUS 35

Sun maintaining the collision course. With the


LOS TPI
-20 min terminal-phase initiation near sunset, the
sun
spacecraft would pass the last braking gate
at a range of 3000 feet a t sunrise. The tar-
get, in perspective, indicated approach angle
and closing velocity.
Careful selection of the orbital travel from
terminal-phase initiation to terminal-phase
finalization and the target elevation at termi-
nal-phase initiation provided an approach
Sun First that had a line-of-sight angular rate of nearly
LOS TPI
// 1
vernier., LOS. Line-of -siqht
TPI = Terminal-phase
initiation
zero and terminal-phase initiation maneuver
along the line of sight. The small line-of-sight
drift rate after the last vernier correction
FIGURE
4-5.-Terminal-phase lighting conditions.
assisted the crew in maintaining a simple and
efficient collision course which helped to
vehicle and Sun are shown. With the longi- minimize propellant usage. The spacecraft
tudinal axis of the target 'vehicle controlled roll axis was boresighted on the target
to 90" out of plane, the target vehicle was throughout the terminal phase. Selecting a
easily visible in reflected sunlight during the trajectory for which the terminal-phase ini-
time period when the critical measurements tiation angle coincided with the target ele-
for terminal-phase initiation were made. vation angle allowed the maneuver to be per-
Thus, the flashing acquisition lights were not formed nominally along the roll axis with no
relied upon for visual sighting at the longer attitude deviation. Dispersions in the catchup
ranges. As the terminal phase progressed, the
orbit and guidance system errors appeared
Sun etevation and the target line of sight ro-
tated counterclockwise (fig:4-5). After sun- at terminal-phase initiation as maneuver
set, motion of the target vehicle in relation components normal to the line of sight, and as
to the stars provided confidence in the tra- deviations from the planned forward impulse.
jectory status. After the last vernier correc- Table 4-IV summarizes the terminal-phase
.. tion, the star field was also useful for initiation and the midcourse maneuvers for

Closed-loop guidance and applied maneuvers"

Mission Terminal-phase initiation, fps 1st vernier, fps I d vernier, fps


.____
Nominal, Actual,
forward forward
Up,
down 1 left 1 aft 1
Right, Forward, Up,
down
Right, Forward, UP,
left aft down
1 Right,
left
-- __-_ - -

VI-A 32 31 4u 7F 7u SL 4F 3u 6R
VI11 32 25 3u 12F 6U 1R 4F 7u 3R
IX-A 27 (27) .(1U) 2A 2U 3R 3F 2D OR
26 8U
x ...... .. .......
. . 32 41 (OU) 15A (14D) 1R (OF) 25D 5R
1u 22D 1F
XII.......... 22 (OU) (2U) (OR) (SA) (OR)

Parentheses indicate applied maneuvers when different from closed-loop solutions.


36 GEMINI SUM MARY CONFERENCE

the Gemini IV, VIII, IX-A, X, and XI1 mis- available for the 'first-orbit rendezvous mis-
sions. The times of vernier corrections were sion, the multiorbit midcourse corrections
selected to be compatible with crew loading and circular catchup orbit could not be used.
and the anticipated accuracy of the guidance As a result, the flight plan included onboard
system. Vernier corrections 12 and 24 min- operations capable of absorbing the expected
utes after terminal-phase initiation allowed insertion dispersions in a relatively short
sufficient time for crew activities, such as time. The trajectory plan selected for the
system monitoring and platform alinement first-orbit rendezvous had a terminal ap-
v h e r e necessary, but were close enough to proach similar to the approach employed on
prevent appreciable trajectory divergence. the coelliptical rendezvous missions. How-
The relatively low deceleration capability ever, it appeared that insertion dispersions
of the Gemini spacecraft (approximately would radically affect this approach as shown
1 ft'sec2) dictated that closing velocity be in figure 4-6. Terminal-phase initiation oc-
reduced in several stages to enable the crew curred near the first spacecraft apogee with
to devote proper attention to line-of-sight a 120" central angle of transfer.
control. Early training simulations indicated In providing a capability f o r absorbing the
that braking to a maximum closing rate of insertion dispersions, several procedural
40 f t 'sec at a range of 2.5 nautical miles, and methods were required which were not em-
then down to 5 to 10 ft/sec a t a range of 0.5 ployed on previous missions. At insertion, the
nautical mile, represented a simple and effi- horizontal and out-of-plane velocity changes
cient schedule. . . were planned as usual. These corrections,.
The separation altitude selection was a however, did not remove the trailing dis-
tradeoff between total propellant and sensi- placement error at first spacecraft apogee
tivity of time of arrival a t terminal-phase resulting from downrange and flight-path
initiation to dispersions in' the catchup orbit. angle errors at insertion. This error could
As previously discussed, there were advan- have had a serious effect on the terminal-ap-
tages to certain sunlighting conditions dur- proach trajectory; to reduce the error, the
ing the terminal phase; and for a given error pilot read (from the computer) the navi-
in the catchup orbit, the dispersion in arrival gated downrange angle traveled a t insertion.
time decreased as separation altitude in- From this angle, a required value of altitude
creased. However, propellant requirements rate was determined and compared with the
for the terminal phase increased in propor-
tion to differential altitude. (An altitude dif-
ferential of 15 nautical miles was selected
for Gemini VI-A.) As knowledge of lighting
conditions was gained, and as the capability
TPI - Terminal-phase initiation

for ground tracking evolved, the altitude dif- iri-

ferential was varied (table 4-111). D i sper sed h i g y )

Rendezvous in the First Orbit Nominal .. I

The first-orbit rendezvous accomplished


during the Gemini XI mission was more de-
manding of onboard operations than previous
rendezvous missions. The previous missions 60 I I I I I I
utilized several orbits of ground tracking and 80 60 40 20 0 20
computation to eliminate the effects of in-
Behind +Ahead
Trailing displacement, n. mi.
sertion dispersions on the terminal-approach
trajectory. Because of the very short time FWURE
4-6.-First-orhit rendezvous trajectory.
ON BOARD OPERATIONS FOR RENDEZVOUS 37

actual altitude rate read from the computer. transfer. The backup computation of these
The velocity difference was applied along maneuvers was significantly different than
the local vertical to achieve a n altitude rate for previous missions because the variation
resulting in the desired trailing displacement from the planned position of the spacecraft
a t the terminal-phase initiation point. Al- a t terminal-phase initiation was taken into
though this correction required split-second account. For example, with a radar failure,
timing on the part of the crew, it was very the earlier charts assumed a planned range
effective. in computing the correction instead of using
The second onboard-computed maneuver a predicted range based upon the actual
was an out-of-plane correction to be per- spacecraft position a t terminal-phase initia-
formed 90" after insertion. Since the maneu- tion. The use of predicted values provided
ver a t insertion was to eliminate the out-of- better accuracy for large dispersions. Table
plane velocity at that point, the node oc- 4-V is a summary of the maneuvers for the
curred 90" of orbit travel later. By observing first-orbit rendezvous.
the out-of-plane displacement a t insertion,
the pilot computed the required maneuver. Rendezvous From Above the Target Vehicle
At the expected time of the node, the cor-
rection was applied. A re-rendezvous was conducted on the
Although the .primary procedures for the Gemini IX-A mission to simulate the trajec-
terminal phase of the first-orbit rendezvous tory of a Lunar Module following abort dur-
were similar to the procedures for previous ing powered descent. The trajectory was
rendezvous missions, the effect on the larger similar to that utilized on the fourth-orbit
terminal-phase dispersions had a significant rendezvous mission except that the spacecraft
impact on the design of the backup and the approached the target from ahead and above.
monitoring procedures. The backup pro- The procedures for rendezvous from above
cedures utilized measurements of range and were very similar to the procedures for a
line-of-sight angle changes over a fixed time fourth-orbit rendezvous : the only significant
interval. These measurements were used differences were in the backup measurements
with flight charts to determine the velocity used in the event of a platform failure. Since
changes and the relative position of the the spacecraft approached the target from
spacecraft a t the time of the terminal-phase above, there was no star background during
initiation maneuver. Gemini XI was the first the terminal phase. As a result, the hand-held
mission to utilize a backup capability -"lor an sextant would have been used to make angle
out-of-plane correction a t terminal-phase ini- measurements with respect to the E a r t h
tiation. The correction reduced the disper- horizon. These measurements, like those with
sions caused'by navigation errors during the respect to the star background, required
earlier corrections. visual acquisition of the target.
Two vernier corrections were scheduled a t A significant lesson was learned from the
12-minute intervals during the terminal rendezvous from above ; the terminal-phase

TABLE
4-V.-Gemini X I Rendezvous Maneuvem

Insertion Velocity Plane change AV, Terminal-phase


Adjust Routine AV, fps fPS initiation IV, Ips 1st vernier AV, fps Zd vernier AV, fps
---- -__ -__

39 forward 0 140 forward 1 forward 1 forward


5 down 0 27 down 4 UP
1 left 3 left 5 left 4 right
I
38 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

lighting conditions were more critical than Rendezvous With B Passive Target
for rendezvous from below. During the early
Gemini IX-A mission planning, i t was de- After the initial rendezvous on Gemini X,
cided that terminal-phase initiation should an exercise was undertaken to intercept the
occur after sunset so t h a t the flashing lights passive target vehicle that had been in orbit
on the target vehicle could be used for visu- since the Gemini VI11 mission. This rendez-
ally acquiring the vehicle against the dark vous with a completely passive target pre-
E a r t h background. It was believed that sun- sented several unique problems, and was
set was preferable to an early morning ter- more demanding of the crew than any other
minal-phase initiation, with acquisition terminal phase. For the exercise, there was
using reflected sunlight (over-the-shoulder no closed-loop guidance and no radar or ac-
lighting) because of the bright E a r t h back- quisition lights ; the terminal-phase maneu-
ground. However, during the Gemini IX-A vers had to be based on backup charts and
flight, the nose shroud on the target vehicle observation of the target in reflected sun-
(Augmented Target Docking Adapter) did light. Approximately 27 minutes of favorable
not completely separate, and i t was believed lighting time were available in each orbit
that the acquisition lights located in the (from about spacecraft noon until sunset),
shroud region might not be visible. The time and the entire terminal phase, including a r -
of terminal-phase initiation was then changed rival dispersions, braking, and stabilizing
from after darkness to early morning to per- position f o r formation flight through the
mit reflected light viewing. Actually, the tar- night period, had to take place within about
get was nut visible a t long range against the 108" of orbit travel. Position was maintained
bright E a r t h background, and could not be after darkness using the docking light on the
tracked visually until the range had de- spacecraft. a s a source of illumination. The
creased to 3 nautical miles. If the radar had light had a cone angle of about 6" and was
failed during this exercise, terminal-phase effective up to a distance of 300 feet. The
corrkctions would not have been possible. short period of visibility indicated that orbit
Furthermore, the rapidly moving terrain travel between t h e initiation and the finali-
background made control of the line of sight zation of the terminal phase would have to
more difficult than with a star field or even be reduced considerably from the 130" used
with a dark Earth. This experience demon- on previous rendezvous. An orbit travel of
strated the importance of terminal-phase 80" and a differential altitude of 7 nautical
lighting, and pointed out the value of the miles were selected. The terminal-phase tra-
flashing acquisition lights a s a backup to the jectory is shown in figure 4-7. This combina-
r a d a r for target tracking. A summary of the tion had several advantages in addition to a
terminal-phase maneuvers f o r the rendezvous
from above is shown in table P V I .
c- -
.--m
-In2
TABLE&VI.-Terminal-Phase Maneuvers
f o r Rendezvous from Above
-
.-
Terminal-phase
Terminal-phase 1st vernier AV,
initiation AV, fps
2d vernier AV, 3
.-
c 6 - initiation,,
fps fPS c

--__ I I 1 I I I I

19 forward 4 aft 2 forward 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0


10 down Behind+
4 down 1 UP Trailing distance, n. mi.
2 left 5 left 7 right
FIGUREI-'l.-Passive target rendezvous trajectory.
ON BOARD OPERATIONS FOR RENDEZVOUS 30

short terminal phase. The 80" orbit travel based on the ground track of the spacecraft
intercept was a relatively high-energy trans- during the crew sleep period. A terminal-
fer trajectory and, therefore, was less sensi- phase trajectory covering 292" was selected,
tive to initial-condition dispersions and resulting in an elevation time history identi-
errors in maneuvers. This was particularly cal to the familiar 130" transfer. Thus, the
significant because no vernier corrections backup charts from a previous mission could
could be calculated along the line of sight be used for trajectory monitoring. The radar
without radar information. Second, the re- was not operative during this exercise ;
duced differential altitude assisted 'vis- therefore, onboard corrections along the line
ual acquisition and, combined with the 80" of sight were not possible. However, an up/
terminal phase, resulted in closing rates down vernier correction of zero was calcu-
about the same level as the 130" intercept lated, which agreed with the up down
with lbnautical-mile separation. Thus, simi- component of the ground solution. The
lar braking schedules could be used on both ground-computed maneuver was applied,
rendezvous planned for the mission. The time and braking was accomplished while track-
factor was extremely critical during the ing the target vehicle in reflected sunlight.
braking maneuver ; at sunset, all visual con-
tact would suddenly be lost beyond the range Conclusions
of the docking light. Because of the time-
critical nature of the exercise, the flight The Gemini experience has led to a num-
charts included the capability to perform ber of significant conclusions with respect to
terminal-phase initiation for a range of ele- onboard rendezvous operations.
vation angles covering a time period of 10 ( 1 ) The extensive participation of the
minutes on either side of the nominal. The flight .crew in rendezvous operations is feas-
plan was based upon the nominal elevation ible. They are capable of directing the pri-
angle being used if term:nal-phase initiation mary operations of the guidance system and
occurred between visual acquisition and 25 of performing certain phases of the mission
minutes before sunset. A solution was sent without the guidance system. In addition,
from the ground in case visual acquisition they can detect and identify system malfunc-
occurred too late for an onboard solution. tions and take action to assure the success
of the mission.
Stable Orbit Rendezvous ( 2 ) The crew can monitor the perform-
ance of the guidance and navigation system,
During the Gemini X I flight, a small posi- and determine and accomplish all rendezvous
grade separation maneuver was made, fol- maneuvers with the following basic flight in-
lowed later by a retrograde maneuver of the formation: ( a ) range to the target, ( b )
same magnitude. The purpose of these range rate, ( c ) body-attitude angles meas-
ground-computed maneuvers was to estab- ured from horizontal in-plane references. and
lish a trailing position about 25 nautical ( d ) means for tracking the target (visual or
miles behind the target vehicle and in the radar).
same orbit. This location enabled the crew ( 3 ) Fliaht charts can be developed which
to perform experiments and to sleep while provide the crew with the ability to compute
maintaining a position for a simple, economi- solutions for the terminal maneuvers in spite
cal re-rendezvous. Since the re-rendezvous of an inoperative guidance-equipment com-
was initiated from a point in equilibrium ponent. These charts can be macle simple to
relative to the target, the plan was called the use and can provide accuracies comparable to
Stable Orbit Plan. The maneuver to transfer the primary system.
from the stable orbit to an intercept trajec- (4) The onboard operations c;m be simpli-
tory was sent from the ground, and was fied by the proper selection of approach tra-
40 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

j ectories and lighting conditions. A terminal tracking of the target is a backup t o the
approach is desirable, which is insensitive to radar, and the s t a r background is a valuable
trajectory dispersions and equipment errors. aid for maintaining a collision course in the
The lighting conditions determine the visi- braking phase.
bility of the target vehicle and the s t a r back- ( 6 ) A comprehensive program of proce-
ground, thus affecting backup procedures. dural planning, evaluation, and training is
( 5 ) Visibility through the spacecraft win- necessary to the success of the mission. Man-
dow is an important consideration in termi- in-the-loop simulation is a n important p a r t
nal-phase rendezvous operations. Visual of crew training.
5. OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DOCKED
CONFIGURATION
By HOMERW. DOTTS.Deputy Manager, O.@ce 01 Spacecraft Marragemertt, Gemini Program Ofice, N A S A
Manned Spacecraft Center; ROGERK. NOLTING,Dynamics Eirgineer. McDonnell Aircraft Corp.; WIL-
BURNE F. HOYLER,Ofice of Spacecraft Management. Gemini Program Ofice, VASA lk'anned Space-
craft Center; J O H N R. HAVEY,Aerodynamics Group Emqineer, McDonnell Aircraft Corp.; THOMAS F.
CARTER.JR.. Mission Planninp and Analysis Division. W A S A i?lnnnt.tl Sprccecmtl Cenler : r i n d ROBERT
T. JOHNSON, Chief Systems Engineer, Gemini Agerta, Locliheed Missiles R- Space Co.

Introduction ing orbital maneuvering dynamics, be


achieved? How should the propulsion system
In addition to a successful rendezvous be- on the target vehicle be controlled? How
tween the Gemini spacecraft and the target could positive separation of the spacecraft
vehicle, one of the primary objectives of the from the target vehicle be guaranteed? How
Gemini Program was to accomplish a dock- could remotely actuated structural attach-
ing maneuver to join the two vehicles as a ments be provided on the spacecraft without
single spacecraft configuration. The next ob- disturbing the reentry heat-protection con-
jective was to evaluate the characteristics of figuration ?
the control system on each vehicle in con- By systematic evaluation, it was concluded
-.
trolling the combined vehicle. A further goal that the docking maneuver must be made
was the use of the Primary Propulsion Sys- with the spacecraft facing the target vehicle,
tem of the target vehicle to enlarge the so that the flight crew could adequately con-
manned spacecraft maneuvering capability. trol the differential impact velocities and at-
These objectives were all determined feasible, titudes. This was not the best configuration
and this paper will describe the implemen- for orbital maneuvering because of the
tation of the plan and the achievement of the backward acceleration of the crew, and be-
successf u 1 results. cause the structural arrangement was stress
limited in the middle. However, these consid-
Development of the Docking System I Collision course I Noncollision course

The initial effort in the development of the


Gemini docking system was the evaluation of
the numerous classical concepts and also of
the designs generated during the various
studies (fig. 5-1). Each concept raised new Probe and d r o g u e w
questions which had to be studied and re-
solved. Should the vehicles come together on
a collision course or a noncollision course?
Should the front end or a f t end of the space-
craft be joined to the target vehicle? What
differential velocities, mismatch angles, and
distances should be considered ? How could
structural continuity, capable of withstand- FIGURE
5-l.-Gemini docking concepts.

41
42 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

erations were secondary when compared with feature. The electrical and the primary me-
the advantage gained by providing a full view chanical power devices were installed on the
of the target vehicle prior to and after dock- target vehicle because this vehicle was less
ing. With this advantage, impact velocities weight critical than was the spacecraft.
and attitudes became reasonable values and The prime contractor for the spacecraft
were determined through simulation exer- was selected to manufacture the docking
cises. Also, implementation of all target-ve- adapter to be mounted on the target vehicle.
hicle control and status display and electrical An interface plane was chosen so t h a t the
disconnects was simplified ; however, the adapter contained all equipment directly as-
structural mechanical attachment was some- sociated with docking. Only electric power,
what more complicated because of limited telemetry data, and command system signals
bending stiffness. crossed the interface. A simple butt joint,
The evolution from concept to design and consisting of mating skin-former angles and
the analysis of results from further simula- tension bolts, provided easy attachment of
tions resulted in the following design cri- the docking adapter to the target vehicle.
teria: closing velocity of 1.5 ft'sec, angular The final docking approach (fig. 5-2) was
misalinement of lo'.', and centerline displace- entirely visual, with the target vehicle pow-
ment of 1 foot with the requirement for ered up and stabilized. Visual cues were pro-
multiple docking capability. vided to indicate the status of the target
vehicle for nighttime as well as daylight
TarKrt Dockin* Adapter docking. Docking was accomplished when
three latches in the target-vehicle docking
A general arrangement of the selected con- cone engaged corresponding fittings on the
figuration is shown in figure 5-2. The se- spacecraft. Engagement of the latches com-
pleted a circuit that automatically secured
lected collision-course maneuver was similar
the cone against the rigid structure ; this was
to a jet pilot's experience in refueling opera- the rigidized mode. Undocking was the re-
tions, was the simplest design approach, and verse of this procedure, with provisions f o r
was acceptable from a control and safety emergency undocking furnished by pyro-
standpoint. For similar reasons, the probe technic devices which would dislodge the
and drogue design was chosen and a docking three spacecraft fittings.
bar was installed to provide the indexing Figure 5-3 shows some of the major com-
ponents of the Target Docking Adapter.
Seven dampers were clustered a t three loca-
tions and damped relative motion in all three
axes ; they also returned the cone to the ready
configuration. A small electric motor pro-
vided the power to retract the cone by means
of a torsion cable drive to three-gear motors
which operated the overcenter bellcrank and
linkage devices. Final motion caused the
latches to close down on the spacecraft fit-
tings, effecting a rigid connection. Undocking
Discharge fin+
Approach \- was simply a reversal of this sequence. Some
of the other major components were the tar-
get-vehicle status display indicators, acquisi-
FIGURE
&2.-Docking and rigidizinp sequence. tion lights, and spiral and dipole antennas.
Acquisition light

Dipole antenna*
5
:,
OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DOCKED CONFIGURATION

s
1, Spiral antenna

,;Target vehicle status


*"
,&q&
I
x,-0

Before impact
43

,// display indicators


' -v I

After impact
I
1 I I I I I I I I
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Mass ratio, M,IM,

FIGURE
5-4.-Two-degree-of -freedom energy
requirements.

closing velocity of 0.5 ft/sec, the system


would absorb only about 15 ft-lb of energy.
The 2-degree-of-freedom model also deter-
mined the type of shock absorbers that should
be used. The following design objectives were
utilized : (1) minimum peak load, (2) mini-
mum rebound characteristics; ( 3 ) reusa-
bility, and ( 4 ) maximum reliability. Con-
Spiral antenna sequently, the 'longitudinal members con-
sisted of a spring for reusability and relia-
FIGURE
=.-Target Docking Adapter assembly.
bility. and of an orifice damper in parallel.
The spring and the instroke orifice sizes
Characteristics ut' t h e Docking System were matched to produce minimum peak load
on the instroke. On the outstroke, the damper
The basic characteristics of the docking fluid was metered through a much smaller
system were determined with a simple 2- orifice which minimized rebound. Since the
degree-of-freedom model (fig. 5 - 4 ) . By ap- longitudinal springs were sufficient t o return
plying the conservation of momentum and the docking cone t o the extended position,
energy laws, the energy absorbed by the springs were not necessary in the lateral
docking system to provide for an inelastic members.
impact is shown to be After the basic design of the shock ab-
sorber had been determined, the analytical
study was extended to include all the 8 de-
(1) grees of freedom of a pitch-plane rigid-body
where system, consistent with the constraint of the
spacecraft being-in contact with the target-
vehicle docking cone. The 8 degrees of free-
and V,,is the initial relative velocity between dom included the following :
vehicles, M, is the spacecraft mass, and M , ( 1) Target-vehicle horizontal translation,
is the target-vehicle mass. Roughly, the ratio vertical translation, and pitch
of masses for spacecraft and target vehicle (2) Docking-cone horizontal translation,
is 1; therefore, about half of the kinetic vertical translation, and pitch
energy associated with the relative motion of ( 3 ) Spacecraft pitch and translation along
the vehicles must be absorbed. For a typical the surface of the docking cone
44 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

Initially, no control-system effects were in- from the program. The maximum single-
cluded. This model permitted detailed investi- point contact load between t h e vehicles was
gation of the forces and motions which oc- determined to be approximately 800 pounds,
curred during free docking. and occurred when the spacecraft impacted
Figure 5-5 presents a set of typical re- on the bottom side of the docking cone ap-
sponse parameters plotted against time for proximately 1 foot from the latch plane.
the case of the spacecraft impacting the Figure 5-6 shows the effect of having the
docking cone with a horizontal relative-ve- stabilization systems of both vehicles on dur-
locity component of 1.5 ft/sec and a vertical ing docking. This case has the same initial
relative-velocity component of 0.5 ftlsec, the conditions a s the previous case when the
design-limit velocities. The initial point of stabilization systems were off. The main dif-
impact a t time 0 is near the leading edge of ference in vehicle response between the two
the top inner surface of the docking cone, cases is that the spacecraft attitude r a t e is
26 inches along the docking-cone surface now reduced to the 0.2 deg/sec deadband
from the latch plane. The motion of the space- level instead of maintaining the 3.5 deg./sec
craft-leading edge down the cone surface to level shown in figure 5-5. The target vehicle, .
the latch plane is represented by the curve on the other hand, acquires a slightly higher
labeled D. The force F between vehicles attitude rate with the systems on. The higher
varies from a peak of nearly 300 pounds for rate occurs because the spacecraft system is
this case, to a small grazing valde after the more powerful and, in stabilizing the
about 0.4 second. The figure also shows the spacecraft, i t overpowers the stabilization
inertial angular rates produced by F for each attempts of the target-vehicle system. Conse-
vehicle; these rates were initially zero. A t quently, by the time the spacecraft reaches
about 1.5 seconds the spacecraft reaches the the latch plane, larger angular eccentricities
base of the docking cone, and the mathemati- between the vehicles result with the stabili-
cal model no longer applies. The impact zation systems on rather than off and assum-
essentially has 2-degree-of-freedom charac- ing the same errors at initial contact. This
teristics after this point. The damper strokes becomes less important when the ease with
a r e not shown on the figure but a r e available which the pilot can control initial errors in

.-e a - P
ai
v d
c u
, " B
b'

0-
0 .a .a 1.2 1.6
.. .
Time, sec Time, sec

FIGURE5-5.-Typical response with stabilization FIGURE5-6.-Typical response with stabilization sys-


systems off. Initial conditions : horizontal ve- tems on. Initial conditions : horizontal velocity =
locity = 1.5 ft/sec; vertical velocity = 0.5 ft/sec; 1.5 ft/sec; vertical velocity = 0.5 ft/sec; D = dis-
D = distance traveled by spacecraft leading edge tance traveled by spacecraft leading edge along
along the dockina cone ; 8 Q = spacecraft inertial the docking cone; 80 = spacecraft inertial angular
angular rate; 8 A = target-vehicle inertial angular rate; 8 , = target-vehicle inertial angular rate;
rate; F = force between the spacecraft and target F = force between the spacecraft and target ve-
vehicle. hicle.
OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DOCKED CONFIGURATION 45

the stabilized mode is compared with the un- TABLE5-I.-Docking Model Scale Factors
stabilized mode. Simulator training showed I
better pilot control when docking in the
spacecraft rate-damping mode (the stabi-
Parameter i model/prototype
~ Scale factor,

lized case) than in the direct mode (the Assigned :


unstabilized case). Length ....................................... i
~

1/4
While the 8-degree-of-freedom study was Time ........................................... I 1/4
Mass ............................................ moo
being made, a docking test was conducted
with a lh-scale dynamic model. The objec-
Derived :
Velocity .....................................
i
~ 1/1
tives were to confirm the design of the dock- Acceleration ............................... 4/1
ing system by providing the following Spring rate ............................... , 4/25
Kinetic friction .......................... I 1/25
information :
Preload force ............................. 1/25
(1) Stability of the shock-absorbing Moment of inertia ................... 1/1600
modes Angular velocity ........................ 4/1
(2) Maximum loads in shock-absorbing Angular acceleration ...............
Velocity-squared damp
' 16/1
system components constant. 1/25
( 3 ) Time histories of the accelerations of ~

each vehicle in all rigid-body 6 degrees of


freedom dom required for simulating the orbital
( 4 ) Angular and linear misalinement lim- condition.
iting values for latching the two vehicles The tests confirmed the docking-system de-
(5) Adequacy of the proposed spring and sign in every aspect. The 8-degree-of-f reedom
damper characteristics of the shock-absorb- analytical model was verified. This was de-
ing system sirable before the equations of motion were
(6) Adequacy of the mathematical model extended to include the stabilization systems
used in the analytical studies of the vehicles, since a model test with active
Each vehicle was represented by a %-scale stabilization systems was not practical. The
model with a rigid-body mass and moment- test indicated that angular eccentricities be-
tween the vehicles of about 5" a t the latch
of-inertia simulation. Other scale factors
plane would permit automatic latch.
used in designing the models are listed in
The final development test of the docking
table 5-1.
system was a full-scale test using a Target
The kinematics of the model's shock-at- Docking Adapter and a spacecraft Rendez-
tenuation system closely duplicated the kine- vous and Recovery Section of the normal pro-
matics of the full-scale system, and the duction configurations. The test setup was
springs and dampers were dynamically similar to the 1h-scale test except that zero
scaled. The docking-cone surface was coated spring-rate suspension mechanisms were not
with the same dry-film lubricant planned for used. Each vehicle was suspended as a simple
use on the full-scale system; similarly, the pendulum 57 feet in length, the maximum
leading edge of the Rendezvous and Recov- working height available. Also, the Target
ery Section of the spacecraft model was cov- Docking Adapter contained a n operational
ered with a layer of fiber glass. rigidizing mechanism which automatically
' Each model was supported at the center of actuated when all three docking-cone latches
gravity by a low-friction gimbal device sus- engaged the spacecraft. All systems per-
pended by a 30-foot cable from a zero spring- formed satisfactorily during the test and
rate mechanism. The device provided each favorably agreed with previous analytical
model with the rigid-body 6 degrees of free- and 1/k-scale-model studies.
46 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

Design Considerations f o r Maneuvering the


Docked Vehicle

During maneuvers, the critical loading


condition on the docked vehicle was the bend-
ing moment a t the spacecraft/targebvehicle
latch joint. Two separate conditions pro-
duced design-limit loads. The first was the
target-vehicle Primary Propulsion System
engine performing a hard-over gimbal mo-
tion and remaining in the hard-over position.
This malfunction produced the maximum
bending moment a t the latch joint, 117 500
inch-pounds. The bending moment, combined
with the associated axial load of 11 000
pounds due to engine thrust, defined the de-
sign-limit load for the compression load paths
of the docking:adapter structure and also for
some stringer structure in the spacecraft
Rendezvous and Recovery Section.
The second design condition resulted from
terminating the Primary Propulsion System
thrust a t various times after initiation of the
hard-over movement, and then. determining
the- thrust termination time that yielded
maximum bending a t the latch joint with
FIGURE
5-'7.-Maneuvering loads qualification test.
thrust completely terminated. The maximum
bending moment (97000 inch-pounds) with
no accompanying axial load defined the de- Starting from zero loading, limit axial and
sign-limit load for the tension linkages in the shear loads were applied. Limit bending mo-
'. mooring structure. ment was applied, in increments of 10 per-
Using the test setup shown in figure 5-7, cent, about the horizontal axis to place the
the Target Docking Adapter and the space- bottom docking fitting in compression. The
craft Rendezvous and Recovery Section were axial and shear loads were then increased to
qualified for ultimate load levels correspond- ultimate levels. Finally, the bending moment
ing to the limit loads previously described. was increased to failure. Failure, in the form
Instead of the usual 1.36 factor of safety for of buckling of two stringers adjacent to the
defining ultimate loads from limit loads, a bottom docking fitting on the spacecraft Ren-
factor of 1.5 was employed to account for the dezvous .and Recovery Section, occurred a t
possible use of heavier spacecraft later in the 227 percent of limit bending moment. This
Gemini Program. loading qualified the compression load paths
of the Target Docking Adapter and the Ren-
A bending moment was applied in incre- dezvous and Recovery Section.
ments from 10 percent to ultimate about the
Considering that the Gemini spacecraft
horizontal axis, so that the bottom docking would be a rather awkward payload for an
latch was placed in tension ; no axial load was Agena, it was reasonable to expect that the
applied. The loading qualified the tensioii original Agena control system might be un-
linkages in the dockir --adapter mooring satisfactory. Based upon an initial estimate
structure. of 5 cycles per second for the first body bend-
OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DOCKED CONFIGURATION 47

ing frequency of the moored configuration, ground vibration test was conducted using
stability studies indicated that a n inadequate the test setup shown in figure 5-9. The space-
gain margin existed in this mode. The Agena craft was moored to a Target Docking
autopilot system was modified by adding a Adapter bolted to a target-vehicle forward
5-cycle-per-second attenuation filter to the auxiliary rack that was cantilevered from the
electrical compensation networks. Later esti- laboratory floor. Data from this cantilevered
mates, however, indicated that the actual configuration were then related to the actual
first bending frequency was considerably spacecraft /target-vehicle free-free configura-
lower than the estimated 5 cycles per second tion, which could not be conveniently simu-
and was closer to 3 cycles per second. This lated in the laboratory. Various axial load
seriously affected the performance of the and clocking-adapter bending-moment condi-
newly designed control system. tions were simulated to correspond with in-
As shown in figure 5-8, the new control puts from the target-vehicle Primary
system failed to provide a minimum desir- Propulsion System. The data of primary im-
able gain margin of 6-dB and 25" phase mar- portance were those needed in the Primary
gin in the dominant rigid-body mode for the
Propulsion System stability study-minimum
applicable damping values of the first bend-
first bending-mode frequency and damping,
ing mode of the system. As computed here,
gain margin is 10 times the common loga- and maximum cross-axis coupling. The mini-
rithm of the ratio of the upper critical gain mum first free-free bending-mode frequency
to the lower; that is, a ratio of 4 gives 6 dB. was determined to be 3.3 cycles per second.
The upper critical gain corresponded to in- The damping ratio (C'C,.) of the first mode
stability of the first bending mode, and the varied considerab!y with test conditions from
lower gain corresponded to rigid-body in-
- stability. The clashed portions of the figure
a r e extrapolated values obtained from the
actual damping regime that was studied. To
improve the gain margin available, the con-
trol system was modified by altering the con-
figuration of the lead-lag network to
accommodate the 3-cycle-per-second first
bending frequency. The gain margins were
significantly increased.
To determine the structural dynamic char-
acteristics of the docked configuration, a
16 r

/*-- /---
U /-- Modified control system
.-c */
Minimum desirable gain margin..
c
Standard control s y s t e m y - - -
*e--*
1 I I 1 I I I 1
0 .5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
First bending mode damping ratio, percent

FIGURE5-8.-Primary Propulsion System stability FIGURE 5-X-Moored configuration ground vibration


study. test.
48 GEMINI SUMMARY 'CONFERENCE

a minimum of nearly 3 percent to a maxi- tions. The accelerometer signals were trans-
mum of almost 5 percent. A minimum damp- mitted through the spacecraft telemetry
ing ratio of 2.34 percent was used in the system to a ground network station. The net-
study to account for possible high-tempera- work station relayed the signals, in real time,
ture effects on the docking-adapter dampers. to the Manned Spacecraft Center where the
The cross-axis response in the test configura- data were evaluated prior to t h e first firing
tion was frequently 50 percent of the in-axis of the target-vehicle Primary Propulsion
response, indicating that spring coupiing System.
coefficients of 3 to 6 percent should be in- Table 5-11 compares the inflight test data
cluded in the stability study equations of with corresponding data from the cantilever
motion. Inclusion of the spring coupling ground test. The first bending-mode fre-
effect in the study showed it to be only quency was 4 cycles per second and was about
slightly destabilizing ; this effect is included 10 percent higher than the frequency indi-
in figure 5-8. cated from the ground test at corresponding
amplitudes of vibration. Due to the thrusters
Inflight Bending-Mode Test firing, the moored vehicle was bent through
an angle of 1 minute a t the docking-adapter
When i t became apparent that the original latch. The observed damping ratios varied
Agena control system was going to perform from approximately 4.5 t o 6.5 percent and
marginally during the docked Primary Pro- were considerably higher than the ground-
pulsion System firings, a simple test was de- test value of about 3 percent. The differences
vised to determine inflight values of the first could have been caused by low temperatures
bending-mode frequency, damping, and that sharply increased the contribution of
cross-axis coupling. Determination of these the dampers to the total damping of the first
parameters under actual flight conditions
bending mode. The temperature of the
would have increased the confidence in the
gain margins for this system (fig. 5-8). dampers was unknown. Cross-axis coupling
When the decision was made to replace the was evident and was approximately the same
standard control system with a modified sys- level a s indicated in the ground test. Since
tem, the inflight bending-mode test was re- all measured values of frequency and damp-
tained in the flight plan as a final check on ing were higher than the predicted values,
the docked configuration structural param- and cross coupling was equal t o the predicted
eters. values, the configuration was considered safe
The test was performed during the Gemini for maneuvers using the target-vehicle Pri-
X mission. After the spacecraft and target mary Propulsion System.
vehicle were docked and rigidized, the com-
mand pilot fired a pair of spacecraft pitch- TABLE5-II.--Comparison of Inflight Data
plane attitude thrusters for 3 seconds; this With Ground-Test Data
was immediately followed by a 3-second fir-
'
I I
I I
ing of the opposing pair of pitch-plane i
I Frequency,
thrusters. The procedure produced three I percent ' coefficient,
separate sets of vibrational motions for the percent
first bending mode of the vehicles. Each set
Ground 3 (Ambient 3 to 6
contained about 10 cycles. The same pro- temperature )
cedure was repeated in the yaw plane of the I
docked vehicles. Accelerometers having full- Inflight I
I
4.0 I 4.6 to 6.5
1 (Temperature
I p 3 t 0 6
scale values of 0.02g were located in the i
I unknown)
spacecraft adapter section to sense the vibra- I I
OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DOCKED CONFIGURATION 49

Target-Docking Simulatioiie and Training the systems in the target vehicle, and of the
The next evaluation of the target-docking mooring system of the Target Docking
systems was simulator training by the flight Adapter. Visual observation of the target-
crews to develop proficiency for the docking vehicle status display (fig. 5-10), located
and docked maneuvering phases of the actual above the docking cone, provided this infor-
flight. The first training phase was performed mation. Figure 5-10 shows a normal system
on the Translational and Docking Simulator condition as observed before docking. Green
which provided a full-scale simulation of DOCK and PWR lights indicate that the
close-in formation flying and docking maneu- mooring system is satisfactory for docking.
vers. The target-vehicle systems are verified by the
green MAIN light, indicating that the hy-
Differences' in orbit-plane positions be-
draulic system pressure and the differential
tween the two vehicles were provided by
pressure between fuel and oxidizer a r e nor-
lateral translation of the spacecraft mockup.
mal; by the green SEC HI and SEC LO
A displacement of 22 feet either side of the
lights, indicating that the Secondary Propul-
center position was available. Differences in
sion System is in a satisfactory condition;
orbit altitude were represented by the verti-
and by the green ATT light indicating that
cal movement of the target-vehicle mockup
the target-vehicle colcl-gas attitude system is
with a total displacement capability of 33
activated. Upon clocking, the green DOCK
feet. Closing or opening rates were simu-
light is deenergized; when the vehicles a r e
lated by moving the target vehicle toward or
rigidized a green RIGID light is observed.
away from the spacecraft along a 125-foot
The second training phase was directed
horizontal track. Docking, latching, and
toward utilizing the target-vehicle systems,
rigidizing were accomplished with hardware
principally for attitude and translational
similar to that to be used on the flight ve-
maneuvers of the combined vehicles. This
hicle. Relative attitudes of both vehicles
training was performed on the Gemini Mis-
were provided by the ability of the spacecraft
sion Simulator a t the Manned Spacecraft
to move in all three axes: 45" to either side
Center. The flight-crew control of the target
in yaw. 45' to either side in roll, and 40
vehicle and of the mooring system was
down and 50- up in pitch.
through the encoder and docking-adapter
The realism of the docking simulator was controls, as illustrated on the spacecraft in-
successfully demonstrated by comparing the strument display in figure 5-11. The docking-
conditions observed through the window of adapter controls on the center control panel
the trainer with those observed during the
actual flights. The simulated closing and
docking sequence started from a position
slightly left of and below the target vehicle.
The command pilot first maneuvered the
spacecraft to aline the two vehicles, then
translated forward with a relative velocity
of approximately 1 ft,;sec. The docking cone
and docking bar adjusted for small aline-
ment errors a t impact and the docking cone
absorbed the impact loads. After impact
oscillations were damped, the spacecraft and
target-vehicle mockups were rigidized and
prepared for combined maneuvers.
Another part of the docking training was
crew recognition of the status and safety of FIGURE
5-10.-Tar~etet-vchicle status display panel.
50 GEMINI SUM MARY CONFERENCE

electrical power systems. Approximately 100


commands could be sent to the target vehicle,
and the sequence of the commands was sig-
nificant.; consequently, this phase of training
was a major task.
Table 5-111 shows a n example of the se-
quence of commands required to perform a
posigrade maneuver with the Primary Pro-
pulsion System. Before this sequence could
be initiated, the spacecraft had to be con-

v
Docking
Adapter figured for the maneuver. The spacecraft and
H2 control target vehicle were then maneuvered to the
* U T O I P u L S E

Encoder
proper heading ; the Attitude Control System
was adjusted for a Primary Propulsion Sys-
FIGURE
5-11.-Spacecraft instrument display. tem firing and for the desired velocity input ;
and the engine was activated. Sixteen seconds
were utilized for backup to the automatic after the command to fire the Primary Pro-
rigidizing sequence and encoder-commanded pulsion System, the Secondary Propulsion
unrigidizing signal. The crew used the en- System fired to establish the proper ullage
coder (located below the right-switch/cir- configuration. The Primary Propulsion Sys-
cuit-breaker panel) to send commands to the tem initiate would not occur until 84 seconds
target-vehicle propulsion, guidance, and after the PPS ON command, with automatic

TABLE&III.-Posigrade Maneuvey With the Primary Propulsion SzJstem

Spacecraft
commandno.
I, Command title Function

Time = translation minus 30 min


361 Geocentric rate normal Establish proper heading f o r posi-
310 Roll horizon sensor to yaw grade maneuver
Inertial Reference Package ON
321 HoGzon sensor to yaw
I n phase

' 460 Attitude Control System gain low Establish necessary attitude con-
310 Roll horizon sensor to yaw trol for Primary Propulsion Sys-
Inertial Reference Package ON . ter firing

370 Attitude Control System pressure low


460 Attitude deadband narrow
271 Power relay reset

Time = translation minus 3 min

041 Record d a t a Final system commands to lockout


471 Attitude Control System gain high, docked Target Docking Adapter, and
371 Attitude Control System pressure high prepare status display panel
271 Power relay reset
201 Agena status display on bright
- I I
OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DOCKED CONFIGURATION 51

TABLE5-III.-Posigrade Maneuver With the Primamj Propulsion System-Concluded

Spacecraft
command no.
1 Command title
I

I
Function
I

Time = translation time

501 1 Primary ~ropulsionSystem ON I


I
i
Time = translation plus 16 sec I Secondary Propulsion System ON
occurs
I
Time = translation plus 84 sec Primary Propulsion System ini-
tiate occurs
~

When inertial velocity indicator zeros:


ENGINE,STOP Primary Propulsion System shut-
down, backup to automatic shut-
ii down

Time = end of translation plus 2 sec

500 I Primary Propulsion System cutoff ' Disable the Primary Propulsion
460 1 Attitude Control System gain low System and reset attitude con-
370 1 Attitude Control System pressure low trol for nonthrusting operation
451 Attitude Control System deadband wide
271 Power relay reset I

shutdown occurring after the desired velocity gree of proficiency. Gemini VI11 was the first
was achieved. A backup to the engine shut- mission in which a Gemini Agena Target
down was performed by the flight crew by Vehicle was placed in orbit. After a success-
placing the engine switch to STOP. After ful rendezvous and final station keeping, the
shutdown the Primary Propulsion System following events occurred. The spacecraft
was deactivated and the Attitude Control was maneuvered to a position directly in line
System was transferred to a nonthrusting with the Target Docking Adapter at a dis-
configuration. tance of approximately 3 feet. The spacecraft
Crew training for the rendezvous and attitude control system was in the rate com-
docking portions of the Gemini X, XI, and mand mode. After the command pilot had in-
XI1 missions consumed an average of 89 spected the status panel, the docking cone,
hours per mission. This time would be ap- and the latches, he initiated the final ap-
proximately doubled if i t included the docked proach by firing the aft-firing maneuver en-
maneuvering simulation training a t Kennedy gines. Contact occurred with less than 2
Space Center. inches of linear displacement, and with very
little angular misalinement a t a velocity of
Docking and Undocking Flight Experience about :y$ft/sec. Onboard sequence pictures
of the event show a smooth operation with no
Actual flight experience with docking and evident reaction by the target vehicle. The
undocking of the spacecraft and target ve- latches appeared to engage immediately, fol-
hicle demonstrated that the design was lowed by cone retraction and illumination of
sound, t h a t testing had been adequate, and the rigid light. The Target Docking Adapter
that crew training had provided a high de- data indicate accelerations less than l g
52 G E M I N I S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

peak-to-peak in the horizontal and vertical curred but the hardline command was not
axes, and less than 1/lzg in the longitudinal used for the remaining undockings on this
axis. About '12 hour later, a spacecraft atti- flight.
tude-control problem caused a n unscheduled On all missions, while in the docked con-
emergency undocking. Although the com- figuration, attitude control was excellent
bined vehicle rates a t this time were 3 deg/ when using the various modes provided by
sec in pitch, 2.5 deg/sec in yaw, and 5 deg/ both vehicles. Spacecraft rate command was
sec in roll, the undocking was smooth and used for random maneuvers when relatively
orderly. fast operation was desired ; very precise, but
With one minor exception, all docking and slow, cardinal-heading changes were made
undocking operations during the Gemini X, using the target-vehicle gyrocompassing ma-
XI, and XI1 missions were equally smooth neuver. Spacecraft fixed-attitude control
and uneventful. The exception was the second modes, such as platform or platform with
docking during Gemini XII. Flight-crew ob- orbital rate, provided good general control
servations, onboard sequence pictures, and of the vehicles. However, for very precise
telemetry data indicate that the following pointing of the docked vehicles such as was
probably occurred during this docking. Final required during photography, the target-
approach of the spacecraft to the Target vehicle Attitude Control System in the iner-
Docking Adapter was a t a low velocity, and tial mode was f a r superior to anything ob-
the point of contact was somewhat low. These tainable from the spacecraft systems. Be-
factors caused the bottom docking latch to cause of the constant need to conserve space-
engage: however, the relative motion be- craft propellants for later phases of t h e mis-
tween the two vehicles stopped and the upper sions, the target-vehicle control system was
two latches did not engage. Sensing this, the used whenever possible.
command pilot immediately fired the aft- . One of the most exciting aspects of the
firing engines : but because the two vehicles entire Gemini Program, and the primary rea-
were in contact, the thrust was insufficient to son for rendezvous and docking, was the
complete the dock. After about 40 seconds of capability to utilize the target-vehicle pro-
unsuccessful maneuvers, a pitchup maneuver pulsion systems to greatly increase the
coupled with forward-firing engines caused maneuvering potential of the manned ve-
successful separation. This condition had hicle. This capability was not exercised on
been encountered during tests and i t was Gemini VI11 because of the spacecraft con-
recognized t h a t it could occur in flight; how- trol problem However, Gemini X made very
ever, tests demonstrated that maneuvers, good use of this capability. First, as previ-
such a s successfully employed in this case, ously stat.-rl. a n inflight test was performed
would either separate the vehicles or would to assurc that the dynamic characteristics of
complete the dock, and no design changes the docked configuration would permit safe
were made. use of the target-vehicle Primary Propulsion
An unexplained anomaly occurred after System. Three Primary Propulsion System
the second undocking maneuver during the maneuvers and three Secondary Propulsion
Gemini XI mission. The undocking was ac- System maneuvers were performed on
complished by direct hardline signal from the Gemini X. The maneuvers were all part of
spacecraft. Postseparation telemetry data in- 1114 highly successful and spectacular dual
dicated t h a t the latches of the Target Dock- rendavous of the docked vehicles with the
ing Adapter had not reset; this was con- Gemini VI11 passive target vehicle which had
firmed by crew observation. The crew re- been in orbit 4 months. Table 5-IV outlines
cycled the unrigidized sequence usinrr 3 the purposes of these maneuvers, the in-
radiofrequency command, and proper re creased velocities realized, and the resulting
setting followed. No further difficultie~ oc- orbital changes. It should be noted that the
OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DOCKED CONFIGURATION 53

actual velocities gained during the Gemini X The vehicle excursions represent the normal
firings were greater than the command val- control-loop linear response in the presence
ues. The error was caused by a characteristic of center-of-gravity offsets. A typical atti-
of the target-vehicle velocity meter that al- tude response is presented in figure 5-12. The
lowed velocity errors to build up when the target vehicle for the Gemini VI11 mission
meter was activated for relatively long had particularly large yaw center-of-gravity
periods ( 4 minutes) of time prior to a firing. offsets because running light batteries were
On subsequent flights, the velocity meter was added to assist in-orbit visual sighting by the
activated only 20 seconds prior to a firing and flight crew. In-plane and out-of-plane velocity
was set with a positive null torque instead of errors resulted from attitude transients
a negative value. caused by Primary Propulsion System firing
The modified lead/lag stabilizing networks and from affected orbital maneuvering accu-
of the target vehicle were first utilized in the racies.
Gemini VI11 mission. Larger-than-expected On missions subsequent to Gemini VIII.
initial yaw-attitude transients were noted the center-of-gravity offset problem was
during the undocked Primary Propulsion minimized by adding ballasts on the target
System firings. The transients, in conjunc- vehicle to locate the center of gravity a t the
tion with the slow response of the autopilot, approximate intersection of the lateral geo-
were directly related to the offset angle be- metric alinement axes. Offsets were reduced
tween the vehicle center of gravity and the to within alinement and center-of-gravity
geometric alinement axes measured from the location uncertainties of the system. From
engine gimbal point. Relatively large vehicle target-vehicle insertion firing data, the mag-
displacements and rates were required to nitude of the heading errors resulting from
position the engine so that the thrust vector alinement uncertainties could be approxi-
would pass through the center of Eravity. mated to provide inflight programing correc-

TABLE
5-IV.-Dockcd Manewers D W n g Gerni/riX

Maneuver Desired Actual orhit


velocity. velocity. apqgee '
ftlsec ft :set perigee,
n. mi.
- ___ - --

-[
.-_._ -. .. -

Phase adjust, N ~ A I Primary 7 ::ix :34 13 1zo.o 423.6


Propulsion

Height adjust, N C A Z
System
Primary
I '70:20:1? 0 340.0 346.2
Propulsion i
System
Circularization, N n R Primary ~ 22:37:06 X'L.2
Propulsion
System
Phase adjust, N ci Secondary 22:4.5:36 :0 7.7 9.7
Propulsion i I
System I I
Plane change, N Pr Secondary i 11:04:26 18 i 14.8 16.0
Propulsion I
System i
Phase adjust. N ci Secondary ! 41::15:50 4.4
Propulsion
System
54 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

As full engine operation was reached, visible


light was almost completely extinguished.
Upon termination of the firing, the engine
tailoff produced a display as spectacular as
L I the ignition phase.
g 6
m

Concluding Remarks

From the experience in the Gemini Pro-


V I I I I I gram relative to the operational characteris-
0 5 10 15 M 25
Firing time, sec tics of the docked configuration, several sig-
nificant conclusions are apparent.
FIGURE5-12.-Typical docked attitude response (1) The maneuvering and subsequent
during tiring. docking of spacecraft in orbit is practical and,
when a proper design exists, is a relatively
tions for subsequent firings. Vehicle dynamic easy task.
performance and the stabilizing influence (2) The joining of manned vehicles to un-
which the modified leadl'lag compensation manned craft containing large propulsion
network had upon the first body bending units can provide large maneuver capability
mode were a s predicted in early stability where launch payload constraints prevent a
studies. Except for the slow response, the combined launch.
maneuvers were satisfactory in all respects. ( 3 ) The development of docking and
The crew reported that the experience of docked maneuvers of the Gemini spacecraft
accelerating backward produced no discom- and theGemini Agena Target Vehicle was in
fort, and described the maneuvers as very many respects a remarkable example of en-
thrilling. Table 5-V shows the three Primary gineering success. It was a venture into a n
Propulsion System maneuvers that were per- entirely new area of operation. No prior tech-
formed during Gemini XI to achieve the nology was applicable. It had all the impedi-
high-altitude apogee of 742 nautical miles. ments and interfaces of a combined effort by
It should be noted that the modified velocity several large prime contractors, their sub-
meter procedures resulted in very accurate contractors, and several Government agen-
velocities on this flight. cies. Yet, most of the potential problems
Onboard sequence pictures of the long were eliminated in the drafting room, a few
firing to achieve the high altitude confirmed were discovered and corrected during test,
the crew description of visual effects of fir- and some were removed at the conference
ing the Primary Propulsion System. The en- table. The efforts were culminated during the
gine start was characterized by sparks, a flight operations when all design parameters
yellow glow, and considerable visible flame. were easily met and problems were few.

__- -

Initiation of
maneuver Length of Desired Actual Resulting orbit
Effect of maneuver ground elapsed firing, velocity, velocity, apogee/perigee,
time, hr:min:sec sec It /sec ft /sec n. mi.
-- __--__--- __ - - - - _- -
Plane change 4:28:48 3 110.0 109.8 164.2/154.6
Raise apogee 40:30:15 "5 920.0 919.6 741.5h56.3
Lower apogee 4352355 22.5 920.0 919.47 164.2A54.6
6. OPERATIONS WITH TETHERED SPACE VEHICLES
By DAVIDD. LANG,Flight Crew Support Division, N A S A Manned Spacecraft Cenler; and ROGER K.
NOLTING,Dynamics Engineer, McDonnell Aircrall Corp.

Introduction was a general exploration of the properties


of tethered-vehicle dynamics. The second
Basically, two modes of tethered space- phase consisted of an analysis of the specific
vehicle operations were explored in the spacecraft 'target-vehicle tethered configura-
Gemini Program. One mode of operation tion of the Gemini XI and XI1 missions. Pri-
consisted of intentionally inducing an angu- marily, the analytical studies were made
lar velocity in the tethered system by trans- using a 12-degree-of-freedom digital com-
lational thrusting with the spacecraft pro- puter program. This program numerically
pulsion system. The other mode involved integrated the equations of motion of two
tethered, drifting flight during which the rigid bodies, each having 6 degrees of free-
effect. of gravity gradient on the motion of dom and connected by a n elastic tether. The
the system was of'interest. These two modes program allowed the bodies to have arbitrary
of tethered-vehicle operation will be indi- mass properties, and the tether attachment
vidually discussed. points to be arbitrarily specified. The tether
was mathematically described as a massless
Rotating Tethered Vehicles spring obeying a linear force-elongation re-
lationship, and a s exhibiting a linear dash-
The tether evaluation in the rotational pot-type damping property. Since a model
mode was accomplished during the Gemini for the dynamic behavior of the tether was
XI mission. This exercise was to evaluate the not included in the analysis, tether motions
basic feasibility of rotating tethered-vehicle were not predictable from these studies. In
operations as the operations might apply to this particular analysis, it was assumed that
generating artificial gravity or to station the only significant external forces o n the
keeping. The exercise consisted of connect- system were control forces exerted by the
ing the spacecraft and target vehicle with ii spacecraft control system. This assumption
100-foot Dacron tether, and then using the eliminated g r a v i t y forces which were shown
translational thrusting capability of the
spacecraft propulsion system to induce a mu-
tual rotation. The result of this mutual rota-
tion was that the vehicles essentially
maintained a constant separation at the ends
of the tether. Figure 6-1 is an illustration of
the spacecraft /target-vehicle tethered con-
figuration.

Analytical Studies

The analytical studies made in support of


the rotating tethered-vehicle exercise con- FIGUREti-1 .-Gemini spacecraftltarKet-vehicle
sisted of two distinct phases. The first phase tethered confieuration.

s5
56 GEMINI SUM MARY CONFERENCE

to have negligible effect on short-term tether oscillation was relatively insensitive to tether
operations such as spinup and despin ma- damping.
neuvers. These studies predicted the dynamic Figure 6-3 illustrates the effectiveness of
behavior of tethered-system response to ini- tether damping in eliminating a slack,'taut
tial conditions and to simple, digitally simu- tether mode of oscillation. This run started
l a t d , control-system inputs ; however, there with an initially slack tether that quickly be-
was need for a study to reflect the interaction came taut, causing the slack: taut tether
of man with the tethered system. oscillation. A time history of the distance be-
To supplement the digital studies, a 12- tween tether attachment points is provided.
degree-of-freedom, real-time, man-in-the- Since the unstretched tether length was 100
loop simulation of the tether problem was
implemented. This simulation was used to
---Without damping
study the effects of pilot real-time inputs into -With damping
the motion of a tethered-vehicle system by 8:
V

means of an attitude and translational con- ": *Or


trol system. Information about the dynamic
behavior of the tethered system was obtained
from manual attempts to spin up the system,
to control oscillations, and to despin the
system.
P?.operties of tQthcred-vehicle d?jwamics.-
The first study phase resulted in the estab-
lishment of the basic feasibility of the
tethered-vehicle exercise. Two ricid bodies
connected by a single elastic tether were
found to have no alarming dynamic charac-
teristics. The tethered system, however, was
found to exhibit oscillational motions that
were very complex and peculiar but which I I I 1 I
could be controlled to some extent with the 0 50 100 150 200
lime, sec
spacecraft attitude-control system. The most
interesting results of the first phase of the FIGURE
fi-Z.-Effc.ct of tether damping on the
study were that tether damping was not very attitude oscillations of tethered systems.
effective for reducing the attitude oscillations
of a rotating tethered system, a n d that tether
damping was quite effective in eliminating
a slack/taut tether oscillational condition.
These two properties of tethered-system mo-
tion a r e illustrated in figures 6-2 and 6-3.
Figure 6-2 illustrates two spinup starts
which were identical, except that damping
was present in the tether in one case, and no Slack tether
damping was present in the other case. The Unstretched tether length = 100 ft
figure also presents :i time history ( - f tension a
c
U

in the tether, and the yaw angle of the space- .- 100 150 200
craft relative to the target vehicle. it can be n Time, sec
seen that while the tension in the tether was FIGURE
fi-:i.-Effect of tether datnpmK on slack/taut
strongly affected by damping, the attitude oscillations.
OPERATIONS WITH TETHERED SPACE VEHICLES 57

feet in this run, any time the distance be- studied analytically to determine specific dy-
tween the tether attachment points was less namic behavior.
than 100 feet the tether was slack. It is ap-
parent from figure 6-3 that with no tether Operational Aspects
damping, the slack, taut condition continued
throughout the run ; but with tether damping, The operational procedure for spinning up
the slack/taut condition was quickly con- the tethered spacecraft/target-vehicle sys-
trolled and resulted in a constantly taut tether tem consisted of backing the spacecraft away
condition. from the target vehicle until the tether was
Spacecraft tni*get-vehicle tethered config- almost taut, then firing the translational
tiration.-The second phase of the analytical thrusters to provide thrust on the spacecraft
study involved choosing a specific configura- normal to the line between the vehicles. This
tion for the spacecraftltarget-vehicle teth- imparting of angular momentum to the
ered system. The selection of a specific con- tethered system generally resulted in a net
figuration primarily involved the hardware change in velocity of the center of mass of
and operational aspects. This freedom of the system, and subsequently changed the
choice was possible because the first phase orbit of the vehicles. This effect would not
study verified that a rotating tether-system have been present if the system spinup had
operation was feasible and safe; besides, at been accomplished with a pure couple; how-
this point in time, any possible configuration ever, due to the passiveness of the target ve-
could be thoroughly studied. The tether hicle in the exercise, the spinup moment on
length was specified as 100 feet as a compro- the system had to be supplied solely by the
mise between maintaining safe separation of spacecraft translation-control system.
the spacecraft and the target vehicle and for The first complication associated with the
minimizing fuel usage to obtain a given angu- operational implementation of the spinup
lar rate for the system. The tether size and tether exercise involved the fact that the
material were dictated by an early program spacecraft lateral translation thrusters had
objective of producing significant artificial a significant component of thrust in the for-
gravity effects (high tether loads). The ward longitudinal direction. As a result, an
tether spring rate of 600 pounds per foot was attempt to spin u p the system by firing only
intentionally high so the tether could be the lateral thrusters resulted in a significant
broken by impact loading as a backup means closing rate between the vehicles. This clos-
of jettisoning the tether and the. target ve- ing rate produced an appreciable period of
hicle if the primary jettisoninn procedure tether slackness. culminating in an extensive
should fail. Dacron webbing with a breaking slack taut tether oscillatory mode. The
strength of 6000 pounds was chosen as the alternatives to this spinup procedure were to
tether material. The tether attachment points orient the spacerraf+4') that its lateral thrust
on the two vehicles were determined on the vector was. in fact. .iormal to the line be-
basis of minimum hardware implication on tweeri the vehicle:. or to simultaneously
the Gemini Program. Attaching the tether t o thru.:t aft a n d latwvill*h,thus holding the
the spacecraft docking bar also provided a tether in tension durinp the spinup maneu-
convenient scheme for jettisoning the tether. ver. Both methnds h a d merit, depending upon
After it was decided that large artificial the der.ree of spin rate desired for the sys-
gravity effects would not be attempted in the tem. Siiice the later:,I 2nd aft firing technique
Gemini Program, an 800-pound break link was ;tpplicable in ; i l l cases and was opera-
was installed in the tether to lower the re- tionally simple. it Y . Y . ~ chosen as the opera-
quirements on the spacecraft propulsion sys- tional technique for spinup of the system.
tem for impact breaking. of the tether. The For lona-duration spinups, the aft thrusting
final tethered-vehicle configuration was then could be terminated eventually, because the
58 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

tether would remain taut during the re- native despin procedure involved applying
mainder of the spinup due to the motion of thrust to reduce the line-of-sight rate to zero
the system. by visual observation of the spacecraft/
During the spinup procedure, attitude con- target-vehicle line-of-sight motion. The de-
trol was required to maintain accurate thrust- spin maneuver invariably left the target
ing to establish a desired spin plane. After vehicle with residual angular rates when the
the spinup was accomplished, neither the tether eventually became slack ; however,
safety nor success of the exercise required this could be controlled by activating the tar-
further attitude control. Because tether get-vehicle control system in the despin pro-
damping did not prove to be an effective cedure. An interesting phenomenon was
means of damping attitude oscillations. ac- discovered during the operational studies of
tive attitude control was required when it the despin maneuver. Due to the location of
became desirable to rapidly reduce spacecraft the spacecraft attitude-control thrusters, and
oscillations. I t was found through simulation to the fact that attitude control of the space-
that the spacecraft control system could ef- craft caused translation (the attitude-control
fectively reduce the attitude oscillations of moments not being couples), it was possible
the spacecraft ; also, when the target vehicle to automatically despin the rotating tethered
was oscillating, those oscillations would ulti- system. By activating the rate-command atti-
mately be propagated through the tether to tude-control mode in the spacecraft and by
the spacecraft. commanding zero attitude rates, the attitude-
It was evident from the analyses that a control system would attempt to drive the
differential rolling motion of the spacecraft spacecraft body rates to zero and produce a
relative to the target vehicle would probably net translational thrust which slowly, but
be excited during the spinup maneuver. This surely, would despin the system.
mode of oscillation would be difficult to con-
trol with the spacecraft attitude-control sys- Crew Training
tem. Probably more difficult t o control would
be a rolling motion in which the target ve- The crew training in preparation f o r the
hicle and the spacecraft were rolling to- spinup tethered-vehicle exercise was pri-
gether. Stopping this latter mode would marily familiarization through simulation
require inducing a relative roll oscillation so practice. To provide a realistic simulation of
that the tether could be used as a torsional the interaction of two vehicles tethered to-
spring which, although weak, would exert a gether, a real-time simulation of the tethered-
roll moment on the passive target vehicle. vehicle system was implemented.
Since mild rolling motions would not jeop- The simulation facility consisted of a high-
ardize the tether exercise, there was no rea- fidelity crew-station mockup, a planetarium-
son for undue alarm. type projection visual display, and a
From a safety-of-operation standpoint, hybrid-computer complex. The equations of
establishment of a despin procedure was motion describing two unconstrained rigid
necessary. Such a procedure would enhance bodies ( 6 demees of freedom per body) con-
the probability of successful jettisoning of nected by a massless elastic cable were solved
the tether at the termination of the exercise. in real time on the hybrid-computer complex.
The despin maneuver was essentially the in- This mathematical model included the off-
verse of the spinup maneuver. One pro- symmetrical tether attachment points on the
cedure for despinning was to locate the spin spacecraft and target vehicle, as well as the
plane of the system, either visually or with actual inertia properties of the vehicles. Best
body-rate information available in the space- estimates of the tether-spring constant and
craft, and then apply thrust in the spin plane dampinK characteristics were used for the
and opposite the direction of spin. An alter- training simulations. Included in the solution
OPERATIONS WITH TETHERED SPACE VEHICLES 59

of the governing equations of motion was a the tether simulation, valuable engineering
simulation of the spacecraft attitude and knowledge was gained concerning the gen-
translational control system. This simulation eral behavior of the tethered systems as well
allowed real-time astronaut control inputs to as of the specific configuration selected for
properly effect the motions of the tethered Gemini. I t was possible to observe in real
vehicles. All basic flight instrumentation, as time the response of a tethered system to
well as engineering parameters, were dis- very complex forcing functions (that is, in-
played in real time in the crew station. puts by a pilot). Although not directly asso-
The visual presentation consisted of a ciated with the flight maneuvers, the
planetarium-type gimbaled Earth-scene hori- functions nevertheless yielded insight into
zon and star-field projection. The visual the system behavior. The simulation allowed
presentation of the target vehicle consisted the design engineer to personally intervene
of two spots of light from dual-target pro- in the scientific solution of the tether motion
jectors. The two spots represented the ends by way of a control system. The simulation
of the target vehicle. This presentation al- was used to determine system response to
lowed a visual recognition of maneuvering control thrusters stuck in the ON position.
relative to the target vehicle, as well as ob- Before the Gemini XI mission, the simula-
servation of the attitude oscillations of the tion was used to determine the effects of a
target vehicle. In flight, the tether would degraded thruster prior to and in support of
supply a visual cue concerning the separation the actual spinup. Fuel usage for the spinup
distance between the two vehicles ; however, procedures was also determined in this train-
in simulation, visual representation of the ing simulator.
tether was not possible and the cue was sup-
plied by a display in the crew station. Flight Itesults
The training simulations usually began
with the spacecraft undocked, but close to During the Gemini XI mission, a total
the target vehicle. The astronaut was then lateral thrusting of approximately 13 seconds
required to translate away from the target was applied to the tethered system and re-
vehicle to a tether-extended position where sulted in a system spin rate of approximately
the spinup maneuver would be initiated. 0.9 degree per second. Slack taut tether
After the system achieved the desired spin oscillations were induced during the spin
rate, the astronaut was free to observe the following the termination of a f t thrusting.
subsequent motions and obtain a feel for the This was due primarily to the fact that the
behavior of the tethered system. Attitude tether tension associated with the low spin
control could be attempted in a direct, pulse, rate was smaller than the tether tension in-
or rate-command mode of attitude control. duced by thrusting a f t ; hence, a t termin at'ion
Typical training exercises consisted of in- of aft thrusting, the tether simply catapulted
tentionally inducing large attitude oscilla- the vehicles toward one another. After
tions in the spacecraft by means of the approximately 1 orbits of the Earth, the
attitude-control system, and subsequently spinup operation was terminated with a
reapplying control moments to reduce these despin type of maneuver and the tether was
oscillations. Following these maneuvers, the jettisoned.
astronaut could finish the exercise by prac- The results of the rotating tethered-vehicle
ticing the despin procedure. Practice in maneuvers during the Gemini XI mission
breaking the tether with impact loading was were essentially as anticipated. By compar-
also possible, since tether tension levels re- ing the motion pictures of the maneuver
sulting from various maneuvers were dis- taken during the mission with the observa-
played to the astronaut. tions in the training simulation, it is evident
In addition to the crew training usage of that the simulation was quite accurate in
60 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

predicting the general behavior of the ceed into a constantly taut tether configura-
tethered system. The flight crew found that tion and the tethered system would be
the active damping of oscillations with the captured by the gravity gradient. This cap-
spacecraft attitude-control system was easier tured behavior would be manifested by
in flight than in the training simulation. This oscillation of the system about the local
effect was probably due to the degraded sen- vertical.
sory information available to the astronaut
in the simulation as compared with the actual Analytical Studies
flight. It was observed that cable slack/taut
oscillations damped out more rapidly in Analytical studies of the gravity-gradient
flight than in the simulation. This discrep- tether exercise ranged from simple feasi-
ancy was traced to a conservative value for bility studies to fairly sophisticated analyses.
the tether damping constant which corre- While the operational feasibility of gravity-
sponded to a room-temperature tether rather stabilized satellites was well established, the
than a cold tether which would have a higher stability of two rigid bodies tethered to-
damping constant. As anticipated by analy- gether in orbit was questionable. Therefore,
sis, the differential roll motion between the analytical studies were first aimed at ex-
vehicles did, in fact, occur and was approxi- ploring the basic behavior of a tethered
mately to the extent predicted. system in a gravity field, and then at estab-
An interesting event occurred during the lishing the operational aspects of obtaining
deployment of t h e tether. Near t h e end of a gravity-gradient-stabilized tethered sys-
deployment, a cable-dynamics phenomenon tem.
known as the skip-rope effect became signifi- The first feasibility studies were conducted
cant. This behavior, although obviously pop;-' using a mathematical model that consisted of
sible, had not been predicted by the .tether two point masses (each with 3 degrees of
analyses employed in the design of the tether freedom) subject to an inverse-square cen-
maneuver, since the studies did not include tral force field. The two point masses were
tether degrees of freedom. After the skip- assumed to be connected by an elastic tether
rope mode of oscillation subsided, the spinup which satisfied a linear force-elongation re-
maneuver was successfully conducted with lationship. The equations describing this sys-
no evidence of significant cable-dynamics tem were numerically integrated in a digital
effects, thus confirming the analytical as- computer program to yield time histories of
sumption t h a t cable dynamics were not sig- the significant parameters in the analysis.
nificant in the rotational behavior of this This phase of the analytical study established
particular tethered system. that at least two point masses could be
tethered together and gravity gradient sta-
Gravity Gradient bilized. This study, of course, had applica-
bility to the actual situation since it could be
The gravity-gradient tether exercise was argued that two rigid bodies connected with
accomplished during the Gemini XI1 mission a tether of sufficient length would exhibit
to study the feasibility of using gravity- particle-like behavior. Since there was no
gradient effects in the stabilization of effective damping mechanism in the pro-
manned spacecraft. The exercise consisted posed tethered system, and since the gravity-
of tethering the orbiting vehicles together, gradient exercise could continue over but a
then arranging the vehicles one above the few orbits, the success of the exercise was
other at the ends of the extended tether (that strictly a matter of giving the tethered sys-
is, along a local vertical). By imparting the tem the proper initial conditions. This being
proper relative velocities to the vehicles in the case, the first phase of the study consisted
this arrangement, the vehicles would pro- of determining the response of the tethered
OPERATIONS WITH TETHERED SPACE VEHICLES 61

system to various combinations of initial attitude response of the spacecraft and the
conditions. target vehicle during the gravity-gradient
The initial conditions for a perfect start exercise, and to confirm the validity of the
were established ; these included a slightly cor,clusions drawn from the point mass
taut tether, and a relative velocity of about analysis. From the results of this rigid-body
0.138 ft/sec for a 100-foot tethered space- study, it was found that ( 1 ) there was good
craftbarget-vehicle combination. The per- agreement between the rigid body and the
fect start, of course, also included an initial particle analysis concerning capture limits
alinement along a local vertical and an ap- and tolerance to starting perturbations ; and
proximately circular orbit for the system. ( 2 ) there could be considerable rigid-body
Response to the perfect start consisted of rotation of the target vehicle and the space-
continued alinement of the two point masses craft during the gravity-gradient exercise.
along the local vertical and of a constantly Figure 6-5 illustrates a typical time history
taut tether. Perturbations to this perfect provided by the planar rigid-body analysis.
start involved off-nominal relative velocities Of importance was the determination that
which were not compatible with continued the capture sensitivity of the system was
motion along the local vertical, or a n initially not significantly related to the rigid-body-
slack tether with or without range rate be- attitude initial conditions. This fact was
tween the bodies. The tethered point masses certainly welcome from the operational
were found to be reasonably tolerant of off- standpoint of setting up a captured system.
nominal starting conditions. For small per- On the other hand, the large rigid-body ex-
turbations, the solutions to the motions of the cursions of the vehicles would. have an op-
tethered point masses were in agreemert erational implication on such things as
with linearized dumbbell-satellite theory. observation of the total system motion during
This point-mass analysis was eventually the gravity-gradient exercise. While this
modified to include an oblate earth as the at- rigid-body study provided valuable informa-
tracting force on the point masses. This tion, there were still a few questions concern-
change was found to have negligible effect on ing the rigid-body response of the vehicles
the behavior of the tethered system. From and the stability of the system with all de-
the first phase of study, it was concluded that grees of freedom present.
gravity-gradient stabilization could possibly To answer these questions, a final study
be obtained with the spacecraft and target phase was implemented. The final phase con-
vehicle in the tethered configuration. Figure
6 4 illustrates typical results obtained from
the point-mass analysis on the sensitivity of
the system motion to initial relative velocity m
---
-------
Velocity error = 0.015 ftlsec
Velocity error = .060 ftlsec
Velocity error = .150 ftlsec
4-Q
between the point masses. 401-
The second phase of the analytical studies
was conducted using a mathematical model
consisting of two rigid bodies in planar mo-
tion subject to an inverse-square central
force field, and connected by an elastic tether.
The equations of motion describing this
mathematical model were integrated numeri-
cally in a digital computer program to pro-
vide time histories of significant parameters. l i m e , sec

This phase of the study was implemented to FIGURE&&--Effect of off-nominal relative velocity
answer questions concerning the rigid-body on motion of gravity-gradient tethered system.
GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

to devise an operational technique t o provide


the proper initial conditions for the tethered
system.

Operational Aspects

The objective of the gravity-gradient-


stabilized tethered-vehicle exercise was t o
d
orient the vehicles one above the other (along
a local vertical), and to provide proper start-
-40 ing conditions so that the subsequent motion
40 r would, at worst, be a limited amplitude
oscillation of the system about a local verti-
cal, and, at best, a continued perfect orienta-

L
-4oL

0)

50
L
* k t ; u t n e s ; I , I
I114 orbit
,
tion along a local vertical. The proper
starting conditions consisted of a slightly
slack tether and a relative velocity of 0.138
ft/sec. Although it was relatively easy to
position one vehicle directly over the other
2 Slack tether region with a slightly slack tether, it was much more
z -2
0 200 400 600 800 loo0 1200 1400 1600 difficult to obtain a relative velocity of 0.138
Time, sec f t sec between the vehicles. A deviation of
more than 0.23 ft/sec from the perfect rela-
FIGURE 6-5.-Effects on rigid-body attitutlc responsr
during gravity-gradient motion due to initial
tive velocity would mean that the gravity-
- tether slackness of 1 foot. gradient torque on the system could no longer
contain the oscillations of the system around
sisted of solving the equations of motion de- the local vertical: the system would then
scribing two rigid bodies (each with 6 cartwheel, or be spun up.
degrees of freedom) in an inverse-square The problem of obtaining the correct rela-
central force field and connected by a linear ti\re velocity between the spacecraft and the
elastic tether. This study confirmed the ap- target vehicle was approached as follows.
plicability' of the lesser analyses that had The perfect initial relative velocity corre-
been performed, in that good comparisons of sponded to that relative velocity which would
capture limits and response to perturbat'ions exist between the separated bodies if they
were obtained. As expected, the results of were both attached to the same radius vector
the final study indicated that a captured sys- from the center of the Earth and rotating at
tem would still be likely to have large rigid- orbital rate. It was decided to make use of
body-attitude excursions : however, of even this fact in the starting procedure. The capa-
more significance, was the finding that there bility existed on board the spacecraft to pro-
were no unforeseen instabilities in the be- vide information to the flight crew from
havior of the proposed gravity-gradient ex- which the longitudinal axis of the vehicle
ercise. This final phase of study was primarily could be made to coincide at all times with the
concerned with the spacecraft./target-vehicle local vertical direction. By positioning the
configuration which would be used in the spacecraft directly above the target vehicle
mission. with the longitudinal axis of the spacecraft
This concluded the analytical study phase maintained continuously along a local verti-
of the tethered-vehicle gravity-gradient ex- cal, deviations from the perfect relative-ve-
periment. With the theoretical validation of locity conditions would be manifested as drift
the exercise completed, the problem then was of the target vehicle relative to the space-
OPERATIONS WITH TETHERED SPACE VEHICLES 63

craft. This drift could be detected quantita- rapid recovery of the system from, a n ini-
tively by the flight crew using the optical tially slack tether. The gravity-gradient ef-
sight, and could be converted to a n equiva- fects would soon draw the tether taut (this
lent drift rate. From the drift rate, the being the stable configurations for the tethered
deviation in relative velocity from the perfect system) for the remainder of the operation.
start could be determined; hence, an appro- The penalty paid for an initially slack tether
priate velocity correction could be applied was an increase in the angle of oscillation of
with the spacecraft translational thrusters. the system relative to a local vertical.
A perfect relative-velocity start would result
in a zero-drift rate of the target vehicle rela- ('rcw Training
tive to the spacecraft, as long a s the longi-
tudinal axis of the spacecraft was continu- Crew training for the gravity-gradient
ously along a local vertical. Figure 6-6 shows tether exercise consisted of briefings and
a flight chart from which the flight crew simulator exercises. The significant flight-
could take quantitative drift measurements control task involved measuring the drift of
(as angular drift in the optical sight) over the target vehicle in the optical sight, then
a measured period of time and find the applying the proper translational thrust to
equivalent drift rate in the form of a relative- correct the relative velocity of the vehicles.
velocity correction. The flight chart indicates The training was accomplished in the Gemini
the expected maximum oscillation of the sys- Mission Simulator, which had the capability
tem from a local vertical for a given error in to start a flight simulation run with the
relative velocity. After the flight crew had spacecraft docked with the target vehicle.
ascertained that a n acceptable initialization The simulation exercise could then proceed
had been accomplished, the flight plan re- with the undocking, followed by a maneuver
quired t h a t all thrusting be terminated and to reach a position approximately 100 feet
the drifting system observed to determine above the target vehicle. From this position,
the success of the initialization. While a per- the use of the flight chart for the gravity-
fect starting condition dictated a very gradient starting procedure could be prac-
slightly taut tether, it was operationally more ticed. The mission simulator did not include
feasible to s t a r t the system with a definitely tether dynamics or a visual simulation of the
slack tether, and a zero-closure rate. This tether. This deficiency did not greatly hinder
was due to the minimal perturbation to, and training for the gravity-gradient exercise',
since the cable was not supposed to be taut
tlurinn the startinn procedure. The signifi-
Half amplitude
cant task t o be practiced in training was t o
I

molion after 112 min maintain a local vertical with the aid of the
spacecraft instrumentation, and to detect and
remove target-vehicle drift rates relative to
the spacecraft.

F l i Kht Itcsu I t s

There were three orbits allotted to the


gravity-gradient tether exercise on the
Gemini XI1 mission. Approximately half of
0 2 4 6 a 10 12 this orbit time was used in establishing the
Target vehicle drift in reticle. deg
starting conditions for the exercise. The re-
FIGURE6-6.-Starting procedure chart for Gemini mainder of the allotted time was spent ob-
XI1 gravity-gradient tether exercise. serving the subsequent motion of the system.
64 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

The initialization of the system consisted of The initialization of the gravity-gradient


various translational and attitude thrusting exercise was greatly hampered because some
maneuvers by the spacecraft, and an active of the control thrusters on the spacecraft
stabilization of the target vehicle using the were malfunctioning. Attitude control had
target-vehicle control system. After the flight degraded to the extent that the preflight
crew had ascertained that acceptable initial planned procedure for setting up the gravity-
conditions had been achieved, the crew de- gradient exercise coulcl not be accomplished.
activated the target-vehicle control system Despite this handicap, the crew was able to
and terminated all spacecraft thrusting. The devise a backup procedure consisting of ju-
resulting motion was one of limited ampli- dicious use of’ remaining thrust capability to
tude oscillations relative to local vertical. It provide initial conditions for a successful
was evident that the system was indeed cap- gravity-gradient capture.
tured by the gravity gradient. After initial The simulation training for the gravitv-
perturbations, the tether became constantly
gradient exercise was adjudged by the crew
taut, and the attitude oscillations of the
spacecraft were of sufficiently limited ampli- to present a more difficult problem than the
tude that the crew were able to view the tar- actual’ flight situation. The crew concluded
get vehicle almost continuously. Under these that, with a properly functioning control
conditions, the target vehicle was never ob- system, the gravity-gradient-capture initial
served to rise toward the horizon by more conditions could have been accomplished with
than approximately 60” from local vertical. relative ease and certainty.
MAN’S ACTIVITIES IN SPACE

b 5-
7. LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR EXTRAVEHICULAR
ACTIVITY

Introduction simulated space environment, temperature


cycling, and shock. In some instances, tests
The Gemini Program has provided the were performed on a single life-support sys-
U S . Space Program with the initial steps in tem element to fulfill some special require-
the study of manned extravehicular activity. ment. For example, the space suits were
Extravehicular activity was planned for G tested for their ability to retain integrity
of the 10 manned Gemini flights and was during seat ejection tests.
actually performed during 5 flights. One pre- The manned test series was performed at
requisite for attempting extravehicular op- the Manned Spacecraft Center and a t the
erations was a reliable life-support system spacecraft contractor facilities. Qualification
to provide the extravehicular pilot with a tests for demonstrating the adequacy of
-
habitable environment while outside the pro- metabolic heat rejection under induced work-
tective confines of the spacecraft. The life- loads up to 2400 Btu h r were performed in
support system consisted basically of ;I space high-altitude and space simulation chambers.
suit, a portable environmental control sys- Operation of the self-contained oxygen sup-
tem, and an umbilical link with the space- plies of the Gemini IV and Gemini VI11
craft. This paper will trace the development through XI1 chest packs was verified a s a
of the suits, the environmental control sps- suitable emergency mode should the extra-
tem, the umbilical, and the related compo- vehicular crewman lose the spacecraft oxy-
nents from the original concepts through the gen supply. The crews practiced the various
modifications imposed by specific missions. steps required to return t o the spacecraft En-
vironmental Control System in a decom-
Testing pressed cabin environment. This type of
testing was performed in ;I viiciiiim chamber
All elements of the extravehicular life- equipped with operational 1i fe-si1pport sys-
support systems were subjected to compre- tem gear and ;I boilerplate Gemini spacecraft.
hensive unmanned and manned testing.
Unmanned testing was performed individ-
Space Suits
ually on the space suits, the portable envir-
onmental control systems, and the umbilicals,
During an extravehicular mission the space
and most manned testing concentrated on
end-to-end tests. These manned tests included suit becomes, in effect, a small, close-fitting
operation with the flight spacecraft for final pressure vessel which has to maintain a
verification of satisfactory performance. structurally sound pressure environment and
The unmanned tests included humidity, vi- provide the pilot with metabolic oxygen and
bration, explosive decompression, accelera- thermal control. The space suit must also
tion, oxygen compatibility, exposure to provide the body-joint mobility necessary for

Preceding page blank 67


68 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

the pilot t o perform the assigned extrave- sors, neck dam, wrist dams, parachute har-
hicular tasks. ness, and stowage pockets for the flight-data
The basic Gemini space suit was a multi- books and charts (fig. 7-1). Equipment
layer fabric system generally consisting of a added to the space suit for extravehicular
comfort liner, a gas bladder, a structural re- missions included : (1) extravehicular cover-
straint, and an outer protective cover. To layer, ( 2 ) pressure thermal gloves, (3) visor
permit easy donning and doffing of the suit temperature-control coating, and (4) sun
and components, quick disconnects were lo- visor.
cated a t the wrists for glove connections, at
the neck for helmet connections, and at the (;ernini IV Mission
waist for ventilation-gas connections. Suit
entry and body waste management were pro- The Gemini IV mission objectives included
vided by a structurally redundant pressure- short-duration extravehicular activity and
sealing zipper. Internal to the suit, a gas dis- evaluation of the basic extravehicular equip-
tribution system directed a flow of oxygen ment. The basic (G3C Series) Gemini suit
to the helmet area for metabolic use and was adapted for extravehicular use (fig.
thermal control, and over the limbs and body 7-2) by incorporating the following :
for thermal control. (1) The extravehicular coverlayer con-
Accessories provided on the suit included sisted of nylon felt material f o r micrometeo-
handkerchiefs, pencils, survival knife, scis- roid protection, seven layers of aluminized

/-

----Neckdam stowage

-- --Parachute harness--

--__ Handkerchief and


‘“--+encil stowage

._. -,. .- --::.


-2
‘-.Flinht nlan ctmuano
1

FIGURE
7-l.-Gernini G4C extravehicular space suit.
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY 69

Gemini l
S! coverlayer Gem in i3rm cove rlayer
construct ion construction

HT-1 Nylon outer


-___ H T - I Nylon outer
protective layer

HT-1 Nylon
/I _____------
------protective layer

__--______----
Superinsulation
micrometeoroid ___------
absorber _----------
-_-_--_-_ Coated Nylon inner

w
Super insulation --------- -_-_ micrometeoroid
--
____________________I. stopper layers
/---

HT-1 Nylon inner


micrometeoroid ___---__--
stopper layers-&--------------------
----

Total weight = 33.9 ozlyd


2 Total weiqht = 26.3 ozhd 2
Total thickness = 0.200 in.
Total thickness = 0.037 in.

r- -*.-
' >
2
\ ' i t 1
J w
FIGURE
7-2.--Gcmini 1V anti VI11 e x t r x v e h i c u l a r SPIICC' suit.

Mylar superinsulation, and an outer cover- pressure-visor surface temperature a t the


ing of high-temperature nylon cloth. proper level
(2) The extravehicular visor was a two- ( 4 ) The adequacy of the pi-essurized suit
lens assembly with the outer lens providing mobility t o permit the pilot to egress and in-
visible and infrared energy attenuation, and gress the spacecraft
the inner lens providing impact protection ( 5 ) The need for reduced coverlayer bulk
and thermal control. to improve unpressurizetl suit comfort
(3) Thermal overgloves were provided
for protection from conductive heat transfer. (;c.mini VI11 Mission

During the Gemini IV mission, no difficul-


ties were experienced with any of the space- The space s u i t (fig. 7-2) used for the
suit equipment. The mission tlemonstratetl (kmini VI11 mission was basically the same
the following : a s the s u i t provided for the Gemini IV mis-
sion, with the following exceptions :
(1) The adequacy of the micrometeoroitl (1 ) The micrometeoroid protective layer
and thermal protection of the coverlayer was improved to provide significant retluc-
(2) The acceptability of the visible light tions in coverlayer bulk (fig. 7-2).
attenuation of the sun visor ( 2 ) The thermal protection for the gloves,
( 3 ) The adequacy of the thermal-control previously ii part of the overglove, was in-
coating on the impact visor to maintain the corporated into the basic pressure glove to
70 GEMINI SUM M A R Y CONFERENCE

provide integrated thermal-conduction pro- flight required only minor modifications t o


tection. the suits. These missions continued to expose
The Gemini VI11 extravehicular equipment man to the extravehicular environment, and
was not evaluated in flight due to early ter- each exposure offered areas for improve-
mination of the mission. ment of the space-suit equipment.

Gemini IX-A Mission


Environmental Control Systems
The Gemini IX-A mission imposed some
Two different portable environmental con-
very difficult requirements upon the space-
trol systems were developed for use in Gem-
suit assembly. To use the Astronaut Ma-
ini extravehicular activity. These included *
neuvering Unit in conjunction with the space
the open-loop system used on Gemini IV and
suit, it was necessary to redesign the lower
the semi-open-loop system used for Gemini
portion of the extravehicular coverlayer to
VI11 through XII. The basic functions of
protect the pilot from the high-temperature
both systems were identical : (1) to provide
(1300" F) impingement by the thruster
metabolic oxygen within the suit, ( 2 ) to pro-
plume of the Astronaut Maneuvering Unit.
vide the necessary controls to maintain suit
The suit was modified as follows:
pressure a t the proper level, ( 3 ) to provide
(1) To afford protection from the high-
ventilation gas for carbon-dioxide washout,
temperature plume, the extravehicular
coverlayer in the leg areas included a stain- ( 4 ) to provide a means of removing the ther-
less-steel fabric outer covering to provide mal load generated by the extravehicular
thermal energy distribution and erosion pro- pilot, and ( 5 ) to provide an emergency oxy-
tection. A high-temperature superinsulation gen supply to assure pilot safety in case of
was used below the outer cover ; the superin- loss of the primary oxygen supplv. The
sulation consisted of alternate layers of Gemini IV Ventilation Control Module Sys-
double aluminized film and lightweight fiber tem was composed of a Ventilation Control
glass. Module, two multiple gas connectors, a 25-
(2) To further protect the visor from im- foot umbilical, and a restraint system.
pact damage, the plexiglass pressure visor The Gemini VI11 through XI1 Extrave-
was replaced with a coated polycarbonate h k u l s r Life-support System consisted of a
pressure visor. This modification also per- chest pack. two multiple gas connectors, two
mitted the use of a single-lens sun visor. hoses connecting the multiple gas connectors
Due to fogging of the pressure visor dur- to the inlet and outlet ports of the chest pack,
ing the latter portion of the extravehicular and a restraint system. In addition, an um-
activity, the Astronaut Maneuvering Unit bilical was an integral part of the system
experiment was not completed ; consequently, when operating from the spacecraft supply
the plume protection provided for the? legs systems. For Gemini VIII, IX-A, and XII.
could not be evaluated. However, the mission ;I %-foot umbilical and an electrical cable

indicated the need for an inflight application were utilized. For Gemini X and XI, a 50-
of antifog solution to preclude visor fogging. foot and a 30-foot umbilicnl. respectively,
performed the combined function of the elec-
Gemini S. XI. and XI1 Missinns trical cable and &foot umbilical.

The space suits for the Gemini X, XI, and Vcntilrtion Chntrol Module System
XI1 missions were generally of the same con-
figuration as the suits provided for the The Ventilation Control Module (fig. 7-3),
Gemini VIII and IX-A missions. The spe- flown on Gemini IV, was mounted on the
cific experiments and operations of each pilot's chest by Velcro straps attached to the
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY

Communications and
r-- bioinstrumentation
I connector
I
I
I
I
I ;.-Tether
\’--z..=-.L..z+:

n i b a - : ‘ repressurization valvt?

Spacecraft
oqgen tank

J
FICURE
‘i-X-Geniini IV Exti.avehicul;iy L i f e - S u p p o r t System.

parachute harness, and was connected t o the Extravchicular I,ife-Suppurt System Chest Pack
suit-ventilation outlet fitting through a
multiple gas connector. The Ventilation Con- The Extravehicular Life-support System
trol Module was an open-loop system; the chest pack (fig. 7-4) was flown-on the Gem-
gas was not recirculatetl throukh the system. ini VI11 through XI1 missions. This system
In operation, oxygen flow of approximately was designed to provide greater heat-rejec-
9 lb/hr was supplied to the suit to provide tion capability than the Gemini IV system,
ventilation and for oronasal carbon-dioxide while requiring no more oxygen makeup flow
washout for metabolic rates not greater than from the spacecraft. The chest pack was se-
1000 Btu ‘hr. The oxygen was supplied from cured hy Velcro straps attached to the para-
the primary spacecraft oxygen supply chute harness. a n d wis connected to the suit
through a %-foot umbilical and a flow re- ventilation inlet and outlet fittings through
strictor. The exhaust flow from the suit was two multiple gas connectors. The chest pack
controlled by a demand regulator so that suit was ;I semi-open-loop system : approximately
pressure was maintained a t approximately 75 percent of the ventilation gas was recir-
4 psia. The emergency oxygen supply in the culatetl through the system (fig. 7-5). The
Ventilation Control Module was capable of chest pack was designed to xcommodate
supplying oxygen for 7.5 to 9 minutes. The average metabolic rates of 1400 Btu h r with
pilot could have activated an emergency peaks of 2000 Btu hr. Tests showed that the
system II.‘;LScapable o f higher heat loads, piw-
oxygen valve to initiate oxygen Bow directly
vitlecl the higher loads were not imposed at
into the helmet by means of an adapter in-
startup. Normally, oxygen was supplied at
stalled in the helmet feed port. If a leak had approximately 90 psig from the spacecraft
developed in the suit, a makeup flow of oxy- through i i quick-tliscoiinect titting ;ittached
gen, sufficient to maintain suit pressure, to the cabin repressurization valve ; however,
would have been initiated automaticall,v from the Extravehicular Support Package and the
the emergency supply. Astronaut Maneuvei.ing IJnit backpacks c a ~ -
72 GEMINI SUM MARY CONFERENCE

.Chest pack restraint straps

-----Oxygensupply fitting

Umbilical

*.- .

FIGURE
74-Gernini VI11 through XI1 life-support system.

spacecraft oxygen system. The primary oxy-


ipacecrafl gen was supplied through a three-position
oxygen
umbilical flow-selector valve to an ejector where the 90
psig gas expanded to 4 psia. The gas expan-
I .
sion drove the recirculated secondary vent
gas through the heat exchanger of the chest
pack. The flow-selector valve permitted the
‘Backpack pilot to select a medium o r high flow (18 to
oxygen 22 acfm) depending on cooling requirements.
line
In case of blockage in the ejector, or if addi-
tional cooling or carbon-dioxide washout
were required, the primary oxygen flow could
e!! , ‘\Suit outflow
be bypassed around the ejector through a
33, Suit out control valve valve. Suit pressure was maintained at a
FIGURE7 - 5 . P e m i n i VI11 through XI1 Extra- nominal 3.7 psig by a poppet-type outflow
vehicular Life-support System. valve. An acceptable carbon-dioxide level
was maintained by dumping overboard
ried a self-contained oxygen supply for chest- through the outflow valve an amount of vent
pack use, which would permit the extrave- gas equal to the amount of primary oxygen
hicular pilot to maneuver detached from the introduced to the system through the ejector.
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY 73

If a leak in the suit loop had developed and overheated. The Ventilation Control Module
caused the suit pressure to drop below 3.4 System operated within the specified limits ;
psig, makeup primary oxygen would have however, high metabolic heat loads could not
been automatically metered to the system be sustained because of the inherent limited
through a demand regulator to maintain suit rate of heat rejection.
pressure. The semi-open-loop system was flown on
The majority of the cooling for the Extra- Gemini VI11 ; however, because of the early
vehicular Life-Support System was provided termination of the mission, extravehicular
by the recirculating ventilation gas from the activity was not conducted. Gemini IX-A
suit passing through an evaporative heat ex- was the first mission to evaluate the perform-
changer. In the condenser portion of the heat ance of the semi-open-loop Extravehicular
exchanger, the gas was cooled to approxi- Life-support System. Due to the formation
mately 45" F by the evaporation of stored of fog on the visor and the resulting reduced
water. Since the gas from the suit was about visibility, the planned extravehicular activity
85" F with a relative humidity of 85 percent was not completed. Higher-than-expected
(nominal), this cooling removed the water workloads were evident throughout the 2
vapor by condensation. The condensate was hour 7 minute extravehicular period. The
then wicked to the evaporative portion of the chest pack was designed for a nominal
heat exchanger to provide additional evapo- metabolic rate of 1400 Btu/hr and a maxi-
rative water. This type of boiling-condensa- mum of 2000 Btu/hr for short periods.
tion-reboiling technique is called bootstrap- Medical data, crew comments, and metabolic
ping. simulations all indicated that much higher
If the normal oxygen flow to the chest workloads were experienced. Tests after the
pack had been interrupted, decreasing pres- mission showed that visor fogging occurred
sure in the umbilical would have automati- a t metabolic rates above 2400 Btu/hr, al-
cally actuated a 30-minute emergency though no fogging occurred a t lower rates.
supply of oxygen. A visual and audio warn- The high rates, in effect, overpowered the
ing system on the chest pack indicated when capabilities of the evaporator-condenser.
oxygen was being used from the emergency Even in medium flow the cooling capability
supply. Visual and audio warning also de- for physiological comfort was adequate, but
noted decreasing suit pressure. A special the evaporator-condenser could not overcome
regulator acted to maintain suit pressure the thermal load sufficiently to prevent fog-
above 3.3 psi in the event of a suit leak, and ging. Visor fogging was further induced by
the supply to this regulator was arranged high respiration rates (30 t o 40 breaths per
such that makeup flow could be drawn from minute) which humidified 55 t o 75 percent
the spacecraft, the self-contained emergency of the total gas flow to the helmet to near
supply, or simultaneously from both sources. saturation. This high humidity raised the
Additional warning devices were available dewpoint enough so that visor fogging oc-
if the Astronaut Maneuvering Unit had been curred even at normal operating tempera-
used. tures. The pilot commented that the only time
he became uncomfortably warm was during
Mission Itesults and Implieatinns
ingress. From this statement and from post-
flight examination of the evaporator-con-
The Gemini IV extravehicular activity
lasted 36 minutes, and the pilot reported good denser, it was evident that the evaporator-
thermal control except during high work condenser performance was degraded due to
periods such as ingress. Ingress into the dryout at some period during the extrave-
spacecraft and closure of the hatch were dif- hicular activity. That period probably oc-
ficult tasks, and caused the pilot t o become curred very close to ingress.
74 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

The Gemini X extravehicular activity was ments have also indicated the desirability of
terminated early because of spacecraft prob- eliminating bulky packages from the chest
lems unrelated to the Extravehicular Life- area, and of reducing the volume of self-con-
Support System. Comments by the pilot and tained life-support systems. Umbilicals from
the biomedical data gathered during the 39- the spacecraft permit the use of smaller life-
minute extravehicular activity indicated that support packages, and the use of umbilical
the Extravehicular Life-support System op- systems should be considered for future ex-
erated completely within specifications. travehicular applications.
The Gemini XI extravehicular activity was
prematurely concluded after 33 minutes. The I Jm hi 1icals
pilot stated that the Extravehicular Life-
Support System provided adequate cooling : Several types of umbilicals have been used
however, the pilot stated that he was fa- in accomplishing the Gemini extravehicular
tigued after a relatively brief period of ac- activities. These include the %-foot umbilical
tivity outside the spacecraft. Because of a used on Gemini IV, IX-A, and X I I ; the 50-
problem in securing the sun visor during the foot umbilical used on Gemini X ; and the
preparations for the extravehicular activity, 30-foot umbilical used on Gemini XI. Except
the pilot experienced high workloads and for the Gemini IV umbilical, which inter-
profuse perspiration. After egress, difficul- faced directly with the space suit, all um-
ties involved in the pilot's attempts to attach bilicals were designed to interface with the
the extravehicular camera and the space- Extravehicular Life-support System chest
craft/target-vehicle tether resulted in high pack.
respiration rates and rapid fatigue. It is be- The 25-foot umbilical (fig. 7-6) used for
lieved that the chest pack was saturated with Gemini IX-A and XI1 supplied gaseous oxy-
warm, moist gas before proper evaporator- gen, either directly to the space suit or
condenser operation could reduce the tem- through the Extravehicular Life-support
peratures resulting from the problems before System. The 50-foot and 30-foot umbilicals
egress. (fig. 7-7) supplied gaseous oxygen only
During the 2 hours 8 minutes of Gemini through the Extravehicular Life-support
XI1 extravehicular activity, the Extra- System and supplied gaseous nitrogen to the
vehicular Life-support System operated Hand Held Maneuvering Unit. The gaseous
completely within specifications. The prob- oxygen was supplied from the spacecraft pri-
lem of excess workload was resolved by the mary supply a t a nominal flow rate of 8 to
use of improved restraints for body position- 9 l b ' h r at 90 psia and 65" F. The gaseous
ing and frequent rest periods. This mission nitrogen was supplied from tanks in the
proved that at workloads within the design spacecraft adapter section ( a t the inlet to
limits, the Extravehicular Life-support Sys- the Hand Held Maneuvering Unit) a t a nom-
tem would function normally, and would pro- inal flow rate of 2 lb 'min at 75 psia and 0" F.
vide a comfortable suit environment. During the standup extravehicular ac-
In summary, the Ventilation Control tivity, short hose extensions connected the:
Module System operated satisfactorily within pilot's space suit to the spacecraft Environ-
the design capabilities. Other than the pos- mental Control System. In this closed-loop
sible depletion of heat-exchanger water at operation, no interface with the Extrave-
the end of Gemini IX-A extravehicular ac- hicular Life-support System was required,
tivity, the Extravehicular Life-support and the normal spacecraft ventilation flow
System performed exceptionally well. It is rates were provided.
evident, however, that future systems of this All of the umbilicals were of similar ma-
type will require increased cooling and meta- terials and of the same basic design. Each
bolic heat-rejection capabilities. Crew com- umbilical consisted of wire-reinforced, sili-
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY 75

-1132x6 (11 ft)-

Note: All dimensions in inches


unless specified otherwise.

Suit end Spacecraft end

FIGU!E 7-G.-Extravehicular Lifc-Support System, %foot umbilical.

-
cone rubber-lined hose ; a 1000-pound test tethers were designed so that during the
nylon structural tether : and wiring for voice worst conditions of stretch under applied
communication, electrical power, and meas- load, no strain was imposed on the oxygen
urements of heart and respiration rates. For and nitrogen hoses, or on the electrical wir-
the %-foot umbilical, the oxygen hose was ing antl connections. In all umbilical designs,
3/16-inch inside diameter. For the 50-foot the load was transmittetl to the spacecraft
and 30-foot umbilicals, the oxygen hose was through ii tether attachment point located on
%-inch inside diameter antl the nitrogen hose the egress hantlle just inside the cabin. The
Yn inch. loads were applied through the parnchute
The umbilicals utilized multilayers of My- harness of the extravehicular pilot. The 25-
lar superinsulation for thermal protection. foot umbilical was attached by ;I hook to the
The temperature of gaseous oxygen supplied upper part of the parachute harness ; the 50-
to the Extravehicular Life-support System foot antl 30-foot umbilicals were attac*hetl to
had t o be maintained above -15.' F to pre- the parachute h:irness a t the pilot's hip.
vent freezing in the ejector. Because of the The extensive test program for the 25-foot
proximity of the cold nitrogen line t o the umbilical contributed to the development of
oxygen line, thermal control was more criti- the 50-foot and 30-foot umbilicals. The i w i -
cal for the 50-foot and 30-foot umbilicals terials and the design experience gainetl
than for the 25-foot umbilical. from the development of the 25-foot umbili-
The umbilicals were covered with nylon cal were used extensively in the fabrication
fabric, and chafing protection was provided of the longer umbiliculs. Based upon the pre-
where required, particularly in the area vious experience, the test program was re-
where the umbilical emerged from the cabin tlucetl to Pressure-temperwtu1.e perforni;ince,
and contacted the hatch sill. The structural leak tests. electromagnetic interference, ant1
GEMINI SUM MARY CONFERENCE
Spacecraft end Suit end
Nitrogen umbilical

connect assembly
(mates Hand Held
Maneuvering Unit)

‘s\ h a t e s chest pack)

‘.Electrical connector
(males chest pack)

parachute harness)

Note: All dimensions i n inches


unless specified otherwise.
Section A-A

FIGURE
7-’7.--Extravehicular Life-Support System, 30-foot umbilical.
The 50-foot umbilical is similar.

static and dynamic structural tests. As in the Gemini spacecraft, umbilical size may not be
case of the %-foot umbilical, extensive un- a problem ; however, excessive length would
manned altitude-chamber tests were con- still be undesirable. The donning of the um-
ducted, as well as several manned chamber bilicals proved quite easy and allowed a
tests for end-to-end con-firmation of the um- complete system checkout prior to the extra-
bilical and the interface with other equip- vehicular activity. Incorporation of the pro-
ment. pulsion system supply proved satisfactory ;
The Gemini Program has shown that ex- this has many possible future uses, such ;is a
travehicular activity with umbilicals is a power supply for tools.
useful, operational mode. The umbilical pro- The umbilical concept is particularly ap-
duced no unfavorable torques or forces on the plicable to near-vehicle operations o r opera-
extravehicular pilot; in fact, the pilot was tions in close quarters where the bulk of a
hardly aware of the umbilical. Because of self-contained life-support pack would be un-
the length and bulk, some difficulty was ex- desirable. Umbilical-based life-support sys-
perienced with the !%foot umbilical during tems would be less useful for operations that
ingress. Therefore, any umbilical should be involved approaching a tumbling vehicle.
kept as small as practicable. Assuming that However, the ease of development and the
future spacecraft will be larger than the successful utilization of umbilicals during the
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY 77

Gemini Program indicate a promising ap- similation of information from preceding


proach to extravehicular activity for future flights into a comprehensive program for sys-
space programs. tem testing and flight-crew training. The
input t o this program from the NASA/In-
Conclusion dustry Life-support System Team aided in
the generation of extravehicular tasks within
The success of the Gemini XI1 extrave- a planned time, mobility, and workload en-
hicular activity was largely due to the as- velope.
8. BODY POSITIONING AND RESTRAINTS DURING
EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY
By D ID C. SCIIULTZ. Flight Crew Siipporl Division, V A S A Manr~erlSpacecraft Center; HILARYA. RAY,
Jfi Ofice 01 Spacecrall Managemenl. Gemini Program Ofliicc., t%'ASA Manned Spacecraft Center;
ELGENEA. CERNAR,4stronau~,Artronaul Ofice, N A S A Manned Spacecraft Center; and ANTOINEF.
S M I T H . Flighf Crew Support Division, N A S A Manned Spzcecralt Center

Summary equipment were provided for extravehicular


body restraint in contrast to the 9 pieces of
One of the foremost conclusions obtained body-restraint equipment provided for Gem-
from the experience with extravehicular ac- ini IX-A extravehicular activity.
tivity during the Gemini Program was that
man's capability t o perform work was dras- Control of I h d y Position
tically reduced without the proper restraint
provisions. Howelier, with the proper re- Foot ltes t raints
straint provisions his capability was quite The first major work task attempted dur-
. comparable to his ig capability. ing Gemini extravehicular activity was the
checkout and donning of the Astronaut Ma-
Introduction neuvering Unit on Gemini IX-A. The origi-
nal restraint provisions for this task were
This paper describes the body positioning two handbars and a horizontal footbar. Vel-
and restraint problems encountered during cro on the footbar was intended to mate with
extravehicular activity in the Gemini Pro- Velcro on the pilot's boots ; however, the need
gram, and the types of restraint equipment for additional body restraint for this task
which were used. was demonstrated in the zero-g airplane (fig.
The requirement for body restraints dur- 8-1). A pair of foot restraints was added to
ing extravehicular activity was indicated on the horizontal footbar, and on subsequent
Gemini IV. After depletion of the propellant fliahts in the zero-g airplane, checkout of the
in his maneuvering unit, the pilot evaluated Astronaut Maneuvering Unit was easily ac-
the umbilical as an aid in body positioning complished (fig. 8-2). The pilot would force
and in moving through space. It was con- his feet into the restraints, and the frictional
cluded that the umbilical was reliable only force would contain his feet, allowing him to
as a n aid in moving to its origin, and that have both hands free for working.
handholds would be required for other extra- However, during the Gemini IX-A extra-
vehicular maneuvers. The significance of the vehicular activity, the pilot was not able to
requirement was emphasized when body-re- maintain body position using only foot re-
straint problems contributed to the prema- straints. The attempts at two-handed tasks.
ture termination of the Gemini IX-A and primarily the tether connections, were ex-
Gemini XI extravehicular activities. The ceedingly difficult because every few seconds
Gemini XI1 mission verified that, with ade- the pilot had to stop working and use his
quate restraint provisions, man can perform hands to regain proper body position. The
a great variety of tasks, some of considerable foot restraints were even less satisfactory
complexity. On Gemini XII, 44 pieces of when unstowing the Astronaut Maneuvering

Preceding page blank 79


80 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

Unit controller arms. When the pilot bent for-


ward and applied a downward force to the
controller arm, he created a moment which
forced his feet out of the restraints. The in-
adequacy of the foot restraints caused the
pilot to exert a continuous high workload to
maintain control of body position, in addition
to the work involved in performing t h e tasks.
Heat and perspiration were produced at a
rate exceeding the removal capability of the
life-support system, and fog began accumu-
lating on the space-suit visor. This fogging
progressed until the pilot's vision was almost
totally blocked, forcing him to abandon his
attempts to don and use the Astronaut Ma-
neuvering Unit.
As a result of this experience during Gem-
ini IX-A, new requirements for foot re-
straints were developed and the investigation
FIGUREg-l.-Donning of Astronaut Maneuvering of underwater simulation of zero-g was ini-
Unit without foot restraints.
tiated. Numerous equipment modifications
were also incorporated t o simplify t h e extra-
vehicular activity tasks on subsequent mis-
sions.
Analysis of the Gemini IX-A body-re-
straint problem resulted in the following cri-
teria for design of new foot restraints: mo-
tion must be restrained in all 6 degrees of
freedom, and restraint of the feet must in-
volve no mechanical devices. Molded fiber-
glass foot restraints incorporating these fea-
tures were designed f o r the Gemini XI and
XI1 spacecraft. The restraints were custom
fitted to the pilot for each flight, and were
mounted on a platform attached t o the inside
surface of the spacecraft adapter equipment
section (fig. 8-3). During the zero-g airplane
training, the Gemini XI and XI1 flight crews
used and evaluated the foot restraints and
found them completely adequate f o r all tasks
envisioned. The Gemini XI1 flight crew also
trained with the restraints in the under-
water zero-g simulation facility with the
same results.

Underwater Zero-Gravity Simulation

FIGURE8-2-Donning of Astronaut Maneuvchring


The initial evaluation of the underwater
Unit using foot restraints. zero-g simulation was conducted by the
BODY POSITIONING AND RESTRAINTS DURING EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY 81

task because the handrail provided for re-


straint did not properly deploy. The tasks
were accomplished with one hand, while the
other hand was used for restraint.
For the Gemini XI mission, the tether for
the spacecraft/'target-vehicle tether evalua-
tion was assembled and stowed so that the
pilot could attach it to the spacecraft dock-
ing bar with one hand. With the other hand,
the pilot could use one of the three hand-
holds on the back surface of the docking cone
for maintaining his position. However, the
pilot had trained to have both hands free, and
he had been able to wrap his legs around the
FIGURE
8-3.-Foot restraints used during Gemini spacecraft nose and wedge his legs into the
XI1 extravehicular activity. docking cone. The pilot could force himself
into position by arm force using the hand-
Gemini IX-A pilot shortly after the mission. holds provided. In the zero-g airplane, the
The configuration of the mockup equipment task was so easy that the pilot was able to
was similar to that of the Gemini IX-A move from the hatch, force himself into the
spacecraft, and the pilot. repeated the Astro- . restrained position, and make the complete
naut Maneuvering Unit- checkout and don- tether hookup in a single parabola (about 30
ning procedures previously attempted in seconds). In flight, however, the restraint
flight. The pilot concluded that the under- technique proved extremely difficult, and the
water zero-g simulation very nearly dupli- pilot expended a great deal of energy during
cated the actual weightless condition and the the 6 minutes that were required to move
accompanying problems experienced in from the hatch and make the tether hookup.
flight. The extravehicular tasks planned for This was the major factor in his inability to
Gemini X, XI, and XI1 were then performed continue the flight plan for the extravehicu-
in the underwater zero-g simulation, and lar activity. As in the case of the Gemini
recommendations were made concerning the IX-A pilot, the prime expenditure of energy
required restraints and the feasibility of pro- by the Gemjni X I pilot was the continuous
posed tasks. Underwater simulation of zero-g struggle to maintain body positiop in order
has great applicability to extravehicular ac- to perform the required tasks. Apparently,
tivities, particularly to the problems of borlv t h e frictional forces exerted by the pilot in
positioning and restraints. wedging his legs into the docking cone were
not sufficient t o overcome the tendency of the
Handhnlds and Tether 'Devices pressurized suit to expand and push him out
of the docking cone.
Several restraint problems were encoun- As n result of this experience, it was de-
tered during Gemini X extravehicular ac- cided that the Gemini XI1 flight crew would
tivity, but performance of the planned tasks include underwater zero-B simulation in the
was not seriously affected. The pilot had diffi- training for extravehicular activity. As a re-
culty controlling his body position while us- sult of the problems encountered during
ing the edge of the target-vehicle docking Gemini extravehicular activities, the extra-
cone as a handrail to move to the area of the vehicular objective for Gemini XI1 was
Experiment SO10 Agena Micrometeorite changed to an evaluation of body restraints
Collection package. Attachment of the um- instead of the evaluation of the Astronaut
bilical nitrogen fitting was also a difficult Maneuvering Unit. The objective of the re-
82 GEMINI S U M MARY CONFERENCE

straint evaluation was to determine what pit to the a f t end of the spacecraft. The lim-
type of restraints were required for repre- ited suit mobility and interference by the
sentative extravehicular tasks. life-support system chest pack required the
pilots to traverse the handrail by moving the
Restraint Equipment hands one after the other to the side, rather
than hand over hand. The Gemini X pilot used
The use of restraint devices for extrave- the handrail to travel from the hatch to the
hicular activity on the Gemini Program is end of the adapter retrograde section and re- .
summarized in table 8-1. Descriptions of turn, and then a s a handhold while making
these devices and results of their use follow. and breaking the nitrogen connection on the
50-foot umbilical. Comments by the pilots
Rectangular Handrail indicated that the configuration of this hand-
rail was the best for travel between two
Two rectangular handrails (fig. 8-4) were points on the spacecraft surface. A rectan-
installed along the spacecraft adapter section gular, rather than a cylindrical, cross section
to assist the extravehicular pilot in moving
from the cockpit to the adapter equipment
section where various tasks were to be per-
formed ; for example, donning the Astronaut
Maneuvering Unit. The handrails. were flush
Equipment
with the spacecraft surface a t launch, and ada ple r
were 1.5 inches above the spacecraft surface handrail
when deployed. The a f t handrail deployed automatically
automatically when the spacecraft separated deployed
from the launch vehicle. The forward hand-
rail was manually deployed by the extrave-
hicular pilot. Retroadapter handrail
manually deployed
The Gemini IX-A and XI1 pilots used the
handrails to travel the 8 feet from the cock- FIGURD
8-4.-Extendable handrails.

TABLE8-I.-Restraint Devices Used During Gemini Extravehicular Activities

Restraint device configuration I .- ~.


Gemini mission
__

Rectangular handrail X ;I x
Large cylindrical handrail (1.38 in. dia) ' x
Small cylindrical handrail 10.317 in. dial Ix
Telescoping handrail ix
Fixed handhold X / X
Rigid Velcro-backed portable handhold X
Flexible Velcro-hacked portable handhold
Waist tethers X
Pip-pin handhold/tether-attach device X
Pip-pin antirotation device X
U-bolt handholdhether-attach device X
Foot restraints
Standup tether ?(
Strap.. on space-suit leg X
BODY POSITIONING A N D RESTRAINTS DURING E X T R A W H I C U L A R ACTIVITY 83

was preferred because the rectangular shape torques required to position their feet in the
offered more resistance to rotation for a given foot restraints. The diameter (1.38 inches)
hand force, and allowed better control of body of the cylindrical handrails was the most
attitude. In a pressurized Gemini suit, the favorable size.
width of the rectangular handrail (1.25
inches) was a good size for gripping. Small Cylindrical Handrails

Large Cylindrical Handrails There were two segments of small cylin-


drical handrails (figs. 8-6 and 8-7) rigidly
A pair of large cylindrical handrails (fig. mounted on the forward surface of the cy-
8-5) w;is furnished in the adapter equipment lintlrical portions of the Target Docking
section to permit the pilot to move from the Adapter on t h e Gemini XI1 target vehicle.
rectangular handrails to the work area, and The handrails were small enough to be used
to provide restraint while positioning his feet its waist tether-attach points, as well a s for
in foot restraints or while working. The two handholds. Although the handrail was not .
handrails were symmetrically located on each evaluatccl extensively, the configuration was
side of the work station. Although the pilots iisable its a handhold, and the pilot considered
indicated a preference for rectangular cross the size ;t good feature since it permitted
section, they were able to use the cylindrical direct attachment of the waist tethers.
handrails to introduce the significant body

-. . . -.
. I

FIGIJREI8-5.-Handrails and foot restraints in the


Gemini IX-A spacecraft adapter equipment sec-
tion. FIWJRE
8-L-Handrail on left side of target vehicle.
84 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

FIGURE
B-'l.-Handrail on right side of target vehicle.

Telescoping Cylindrical Handrail

The Gemini IX-A and X I pilots used the


spacecraft Reentry Control System thrusters
FIGURE
8-9.-Telescopin~ handrail attached to
as handholds for travel from the spacecraft vehicles.
hatch to the spacecraft nose; however, the
thrusters were neither well located nor easy
depressurized and the hatch was opened for
to use for that purpose. On each of these
standup extravehicular activity, the pilot un-
missions, the extravehicular pilot went over
stowed and manually extended the handrail.
the top of the docking bar on his first attempt
The pilot then installed the small end of the
to propel, himself from the thrusters to the
handrail in a special receptacle in the target-
spacecraft nose.
vehicle docking cone. antl the large end on a
During Gemini XII, the telescoping hand-
mounting bolt in the spacecraft center beam,
rail (figs. 8-8 and 8-9) solved the problem
between the hatches. During the umbilical
of travel from the spacecraft hatch to the
extrzivehicular activity, the pilot used this
spacecraft nose. The telescoping handrail was
handrail for two round trips between the
stowed in the compressed condition near the
spacecraft hatch and the spacecraft nose,
hinge of the right hatch, located above the
antl iis a handhold for several changes in body
pilot's right shoulder. After the cabin was
;ittitide. The nonrigidity of the handrail was
...Tether attach ring considered undesirable by the pilot; when
the hantlrail flexed, the pilot no longer had
al)solute control of body position and attitude.
While attaching the spacecraftjtarget-vehicle
tether, the pilot also used the ring on the
telescoping handrail for a waist tether-attaih
point. At the conclusion of the umbilical
cxtravehicular period, the pilot removed and
FIGURE8-8.-Telescoping handrail compressed. jettisoned the handrail.
BODY POSITIONING A N D RESTRAINTS DURING EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY 85

Fixed Handhold N4..,.


~ ~

\
Three fixed handholds (fig. 8-10) were ft - -4 -4
provided on the back of the docking cone on
the Gemini XI target vehicle to provide re-
straint for the spacecraft/target-vehicle
tether attachment. Two identical handholds
were provided on the back of the docking
cone on the Gemini XI1 target vehicle. The
_- "'8"'
-

handholds proved very useful in flight, and


the friction coating was a good feature.

Flesible Velcro-Backed Portable Handhold FIGURE8-ll.-Flexible Velcro-backed portable


handhold.
Flexible Velcro-backed portable handholds
(fig. 8-11) were evaluated as restraints and Rigid Velcrn-l<acked I'nrtable Handhold
as maneuvering aids during the Gemini IX-A
mission. Two fabric-backed nylon Velcro pile For Gemini XII, four trowel-shaped, rigid,
pads were carried in the spacecraft. The Velcro-backed, portable handholds (fig. 8-12)
pilot attached the pads to his gloves with an were installed in the extravehicular work
elastic strap wrapped around the palms of areas. The handholds were coated with re-
the hands. There were about 80 patches of silient material, with a tether-attach ring at
. nylon Velcro hook on the surface of the space- one end. Two of the handholds had about 9
craft to engage the pile handholds. Some of square inches of nylon-pile Velcro, and two
the significant results included the following : had about 16 square inches of polyester-pile
(1) the elastic attachment was not adequate, Velcro. The handholds were stowed for
as one of the handholds was pulled off his launch on a.surface of hook Velcro and fur-
glove; ( 2 ) the contact forces were not suffi- ther restrained by a pip-pin device. Four
cient to accommodate controlled maneuver- ilrens of polyester hook Velcro on built-up
ing or control of body attitude, but were suffi- flat surfaces were located on the target ve-
cient for station keeping ; ( 3 ) the unprotected hicle to engage the Velcro on the handholds.
Velcro hook on the spacecraft nose was de- Polyester Velcro has greater adhesive force
graded by launch heating. than nylon Velcro, and does not require pro-
tection from launch heating.
Detailed e v a l u a t i o n s of the rigid Velcro-
I,acked portable handholds were not included
in the flight plan for Gemini XI1 extrave-
hicular activity. Analyses and simulntioiis
indicated it number of limitations concerning
Tether altach ring

FIGURE
8-lO.-Target vehicle extravehicular work FIGURE8-12.-Rinid Velcro-backed portable
station and handhold. handhold.
86 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

the usefulness of the devices. For example, the tethers in the spacecraft adapter section
best utilization requires that the Velcro be and on the target vehicle. The pilot used
placed in shear rather than tension, and this about six different pairs of tether-attach
complicates the usage. Also, the restraint points which had been selected during train-
force should be significantly greater than the iny. At one time, because of the lack of good
required applying force; this is not true of control of body attitude, the Gemini XI1 pilot
nylon Velcro. Polyester Velcro is better, but experienced a slight difficulty in moving a
has not been evaluated as thoroughly as the tether to a new attach point. With one hand
nylon. The use of steel Velcro would make occupied in making a waist tether attach-
these devices feasible, but the potential haz- ment, the pilot had to use the other hand to
ard to the space suit is not tolerable at this control body attitude. Therefore, a pair of
time. handholds or other restraints near each pair
of tether-attach points was desirable. Also,
Waist Tethers it was determined that the waist tether-
attach points should be a s f a r apart as pos-
The Gemini XI1 waist tethers (fig. 8-13) sible, consistent with the pilot’s reach in the
were made of stiff nylon webbing with a pressurized suit. The attachments were
length-adjustment buckle and a large hook easier to make when the attach points were
for attachment to the various tether-attach located a t the pilot’s sides rather than di-
rings. The waist tethers were looped around rectly in front of him: and torques were can-
the pilot’s parachute harness and were fas- celled hetter with widespread tether-attach
tened with two large snaps. A large fabric points. The pilot observed that few adjust-
tab was provided to facilitate opening the ments were required to the tether length;
snaps of a pressurized suit. A D-shared ring consequently, provisions for adjustments
was provided for making length adjustments, coiild be eliminated from future body tethers.’
and was used several times by the pilot. The With only the waist tethers for restraint,
adjustment buckle, a conventional single-loop the pilot was able to use a conventional torque
huckle, allowed length adjustment between wrench to install and tighten a bolt to about
approximately 32 and 21 inches. 200 inch-pounds on the spacecraft adapter
The tether attachment to the pilot, slightly section work station (fig. 8-14). Again, with
!!elow waist level, was considered well located only the waist tethers for restraint, the pilot
hy the pilot. A special device, consisting of a was able to pull nylon Velcro pile strips 4
thin metal plate with a ring on each end for
attaching the waist tether hooks, was pro-
vided to restrain the waist tethers while not
in use. The device was slightly longer than
the front width of the life-support system
chest pack and was attached with Velcro. The
pilot used a variety of devices for attaching

Hook
Adjustment
buckle
Y 1 _ /_- 12 inches - I

FIGURE8-14.-Gemini XI1 extravehicular adapter


FIGURE8-13.-Waist tethers. work station.
BODY POSITIONING AND RESTRAINTS DURING EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY 87

inches long and 5 inches wide from both nylon drifting into an unknown and uncontrolled
and steel Velcro hook, and to disconnect and body position, while performing work or
reconnect three electrical connectors. The while resting. The waist tethers permitted
pilot also made a variety of hook and ring the Gemini XI1 pilot to relax completely dur-
connections, including hooks and rings of the ing the designated rest periods and a t any
same sizes which had proved impossible for other desired time. During previous umbilical
the Gemini IX-A pilot to connect. extravehicular activity, the pilots had been
The waist tethers, when attached to the required to hang on with one or both hands
tether-attach points on the target vehicle and rest, as well as possible, in this condition.
(fig. 8-15), provided the required restraint Of course, the work required to control body
for the Gemini XI1 pilot to attach the space- position eliminated the I:,~ssibilityof com-
craft/target-vehicle tether : activate the Ex- plete rest.
periment SO10 Agena Micrometeorite Col-
lection package ; and disconnect and connect l’ip-Pin Handhnld/Tether-Attach Devices
fluid connectors and a n electrical connector.
The pilot used the Apollo torque wrench to Seven pip-pin handhold, tether devices
exert greater than 100 inch-pounds of torque ; (fig. 8-16) were used during Gemini XII.
he concluded that man’s capability is even These devices used a conventional pip-pin
greater, and could be determined in the mechanism with ball detents for attachment
underwater zero-g simulation. The pilot was to the spacecraft. The T-shape of the pip-pins
able to perform these tasks with one waist facilitated their use as handholds, and a loop
tether attached and one hand on a handhold, M‘LLS installed for tether attachment. The pilot
and then to repeat the tasks without using iised the devices as handholds during changes
waist tethers. He strongly-‘ recommended, in body position and as waist tether-attach
however, that body tethers be included in the points during some of the work tasks on the
restraint systems for future tasks involving tnrjret vehicle.
torque. It is probable that body tethers will The T-shaped pip-pins were a convenient
provide a greater capability for applying shape and size for hand gripping. When the
torque; minimize the effort required in con- rotational freedom of the devices was re-
trolling body position; and, if a tool should moved, the devices made excellent handholds,
slip, eliminate the possibility of ‘it drifting ilntl allowed complete control of body atti-
away. tude. The elimination of rotational freedom
One of the best features of body tethers is also made waist tether attachment much
the elimination of the constant anxiety of easier.

Tether attach rim

FIGURE
&15.-Tarmt vehicle extravehicular work
station. FIGURE
8-16.-Pip-pin device.
88 GEMINI SUM MARY CONFERENCE

Pip-Pin Antirotation Devices

The pip-pin antirotation devices (fig. 8-17)


were installed over 11 of the pip-pin attach-
ment holes. Without the antirotation device,
the pi.p-pins were free to rotate, and would
do so when given any small torque. Experi-
ence during Gemini XI1 showed that the anti-
rctation devices were valuable when the pilot
applied torque to the pip-pins, such as per-
forming most tasks while tethered. However,
with the antirotation device in place, the
pip-pins had to be installed in one of eight FIGURE8-18.-ExtravehicuIar restraint provisions
on target vehicle docking cone.
specific orientations, which complicated the
installation. Therefore, if pip-pin devices of
this type are to be used, antirotation devices two of the U-bolts installed in the spacecraft
a r e very desirable, but the requirement for adapter as waist tether points during the
such precise alinement is undesirable. work without foot restraints, but the close
proximity (about 4 inches) to the bolt plat-
U-Bolt HandholdITether-Attach Devices form caused some incmvcnience during the
Nine U-bolt handhold/tether-attach devices bolt torquing. The pilot found the U-bolts on
(fig. 8-18) were installed in the extravehicu- the target vehicle useful for waist tether
lar work areas on Gemini XII. The pilot used attachment and as handholds during work
tasks and position changes.

Foot Restraints

The Gemini IX-A foot restraints (fig. 8-5)


were not adequate for body restraint even in
the absence of external forces. The molded
foot restraints on the Gemini XI1 spacecraft,
however, were considered by the pilot to be
f a r superior to all other restraint devices he
evaluated. With his feet in these restraints
(fig. 8-19), the pilot was able to nearly dupli-
cate his l g proficiency in performing tasks.
He applied torques in excess of 200 inch-
pounds, and performed alinement (fluid con-
nector) and cutting .operations. In addition
to performing work tasks, the Gemini XI1
pilot evaluated the body-attitude constraints
imposed by the foot restraints. The pilot was
able to force himself backward (pitch up)
about 90" ; however, a significant effort was
required to maintain that position. He was
able to roll +45", and his yaw capability was
FIGUR~
8-17.-Pip-pin and Velcro attachment points. almost r 9 0 " .
BODY POSITIONING AND RESTRAINTS DURING EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY 89
‘m?

FIGURE
8-l9.-Gemini XI1 adapter provisions for
extravehicular activity.

Standup Tether

To prevent stressing the pilot’s oxygen and


electrical connections with the spacecraft,
standup tethers (fig. 8-20) were used during
the standup extravehicular activity on Gem-
ini X, XI, and XII. The standup tethers were FIGURE
8-21.-Space-suit leg strap.
attached to the extravehicular pilot’s para-
chute harness and to the left side of the pilot’s
seat. The tethers were constructed of thin (in the calf area) of‘the pilot’s space suit.
nylon webbing and had a conventional single- When not in use, the strap was folded inside
loop adjustment buckle. The command pilot ;L Velcro pocket on the space suit. During the
held the free end of the tether and usually iimbilical extravehicular activity, with the
performed the required adjustments, al- pilot standing in the seat, the command pilot
though on Gemini XI1 the extravehicular opened the Velcro pocket and pulled out the
pilot was also able to make adjustments. strap. The strap was intended to serve the
same purpose during umbilical extravehicu-
Space-Suit Leg Straps
lar activity that the standup tether served
during the standup extravehicular activity.
For Gemini XI, a strap (fig. 8-21) about On the Gemini XI1 mission, identical straps
9 inches in length was sewed on the left leg were sewed on both legs of the pilot’s space
suit. The straps were not used, however, be-
cause the command pilot found it easier t o
hold the pilot’s foot to secure him.

Concluding Remarks
Adjustment buckle
-_ 1
I .
.li

L.\
Provision of adequate body restraints is
one of several factors which can assure the
FIGURE
8-20.-Standup tether. siiccess of a n extravehicular activity mission.
90 G E M I N I S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

Based on the extravehicular experience accu- satisfactory during the Gemini Program in-
mulated in the Gemini Program, it was con- cluded :
cluded that thorough analysis and detailed (1) Gemini XI1 foot restraints, for rest
training for extravehicular activity must be and localized work
continued, and that the body-restraint re- ( 2 ) Gemini XI1 waist tethers, for rest and
quirements indicated by the analysis and the localized work
training must be met. During the extra- ( 3 ) Rectangular handrail, for translating
vehicular activity, restraints must be pro- ~ L C I W S :I spacecraft surface
vided for rest as well as for work tasks. ( 4 ) Pip-pin devices, for combination
The restraints that were found to be most tether-attach points and handholds
9. EXTRAVEHICULAR MANEUVERING ABOUT SPACE
VEHICLES
By HAROLDI. JOHNSON, Flight Crew Support Divisiort, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; WILLIAMC .
HUBER,Engineering Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; EDWARDH. WHITE11, Astronaut,
Astronaut Ofice, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; and MICHAELCOLLINS,Astronaut, Astronaut
Ofice, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center

Introduction Gemini Extravehicular Maneuvering Units

The purpose of this report is to summarize Prior to the development of the Hand Held
what has been learned from the Gemini Pro- Maneuvering Unit utilized on the Gemini IV
gram concerning extravehicular maneuver- mission, several experimental hand-held gas-
ing in the near vicinity of the spacecraft. expulsion devices were evaluated at the Air
Maneuvering with the Hand Held Maneuver- Bearing Facility, Manned Spacecraft Center.
ing Unit was scheduled for the Gemini IV, While working with the early Hand Held
17111, X and XI missions, and with the Astro- Maneuvering Units, some preconceived ideas
naut Maneuvering Unit for the Gemini IX-A were abandoned and some new ideas were
and XI1 missions. generated. The following were learned from
The evaluations of the maneuvering equip- the early concepts:
ment planned f o r Gemini VIII, IX-A, X, and (1) For translating, the tractor mode was
XI were not completed because of problems inherently stable and easiest to control.
with spacecraft equipment before the evalua- (2) Tractor nozzles placed f a r apart and
tions were scheduled. Because of increased parallel provided much less yas-impingement
emphasis on the evaluation of body-restraint loss than nozzles placed side by side and
problems, the Astronaut Maneuvering Unit canted outward.
was not carried on Gemini XII. (3) Due to lack of finger dexterity in pres-
Even though only limited extravehicular surized gloves, the trigger operating the
maneuvering was accomplished during the pusher and tractor valves had to be operated
Gemini Program, a number of significant by gross movements of the hand as opposed
maneuvering systems were readied for flight to finger or thumb manipulation.
and were actually carried into space. One pur- ( 4 ) Because of the constraints placed on
pose of the first portion of this report is to arm and hand movement by the pressurized
describe, in general, the maneuvering equip- suit, together with the need to easily aline
ment used for extravehicular activity during the thrust with the operator's center of yrav-
the Gemini Program. The second portion de- ity, the handle of the space gun had to be on
scribes the ground training equipment and top, and certain angles had to be built into
the methods used in preparing the flight the Hand Held Maneuvering Unit to insure
crews for extravehicular maneuvering. The easy aiming of thrusters when the pilot's
third portion recounts the brief, but interest- arm anti the hand were in a natural hard-suit
ing, flight results obtained with the Hand position.
Held Maneuvering Unit during Gemini IV ( 5 ) Precise attitude control was enhanced
and Gemini X, and draws a comparison be- by utilizing a proportional thrust system,
tween flight performance and ground train- rather than a n off-on system, for controlling
ing indications. thrust level.

91
92 GEMINI S U M MARY CONFERENCE

Tractor
Gemini IV Hand Held Maneuvering Unit
nozzle,
Pusher Handle
The configuration for the Gemini IV Hand valve,\ assembly\
valve
Held Maneuvering Unit (fig. 9-1) was Pressure
evolved from early concepts, mission require-
ments, and available qualified components.
The 4000-psi storage tanks were the same as
the emergency bailout bottles used in the
Gemini ejection seat. The pressure regulator
had been used in the Mercury Environmental
Control System.A summary of the operating
characteristics of the Gemini IV maneuvering
unit is provided in table 9-1, and a cutaway
drawing is shown in figure 9-2.
---Fill valve
Mission requirements dictated that the Shutoff
Hand Held Maneuvering Unit be stowed in- - valve
side the spacecraft cabin. This required the
FIGURE
9-2.-Cutaway drawing of Gemini IV
selection of a propellant gas which would not Hand Held Maneuvering Unit.
contaminate the spacecraft atmosphere if
leakage occurred : oxygen in the gaseous form
TABLE9-I.-Gemini ZV Haqrcl Held
was chosen as the propellant. Since very lim-
Ma,reuve?.ing U n i t Characteristics
ited storage space was available, the Hand
Held Maneuvering Unit was stowed in two Thrust, Ib .............................................................. 0 to 2
sections: the handle assembly and the high- Total impulse, Ib x sec .......................................... 40
Total available l V ,ft/sec .................................... G
pressure section. The two sections were
Trigger preload, lb .............................................. 15
joined by connecting a coupling at the regu- Trigger force at maximum thrust, Ib .............. 20
lator and inserting a pin adjacent to the Storage-tank pi~essure, psi ................................ 4000
pusher nozzle (fig. 9-2). Regulated pressure, psi ...................................... 120
Nozzle-area ratio .................................................. 50:l
Empty weight, Ib ................................................ 6.8
Oxygen weight, Ib ................................................ 0.7
Gross weight, lb .................................................... 7.5

After gaseous oxygen left the 4000-psi


storage tanks (fig. 9-2), it passed through a
manifold to a shutoff and fill valve. When
this valve was opened, the oxygen entered a
pressure regulator which reduced the pres-
sure to 120 psi. The low-pressure oxygen en-
tered the handle of the Hand Held Maneu-
vering Unit and passed through a filter to
two valves. The valve located at the rear of
the handle permitted the gas to flow through
the trigger' guard to the pusher nozzle. The
valve located at the forward end of the unit
FIGUREg-l.-Gemini IV Hand Held Maneuvering
ported gas through a swivel joint, then
Unit showing hand position for tractor thruster through two arms to the tractor nozzles. The
application. arms of the tractor nozzles folded back f o r
EXTRAVEHICULAR MANEUVERING ABOUT SPACE VEHICLES 93

compact storage. The pusher and tractor onds), its density was almost three times a s
valves were actuated by depressing the trig- great, therefore providing more total im-
ger. The amount of force applied to the pulse for a slight increase in total mass. This
pusher or tractor valve determined the thrust can be illustrated by the following calcula-
level. A force of 15 pounds applied to the tions :
valve poppet initiated gas flow to the nozzle :
as the force was increased to 20 pounds, the 7 lb 0, x 59 lb x sec,/lb =
thrust level increased proportionately from 413 lb x sec total impulse
0 to 2 pounds.
The gas storage tanks held only 0.7 pound 18 lb Freon 14 x 33.4 Ib X sec/lb =
of oxygen. This provided a total impulse of GOO lb x: sec total impulse
40 lb x sec, or 2 pounds of thrust for 20 sec-
onds. If used continuously, this total impulse The calculations indicate a 45-percent in-
would accelerate the extravehicular pilot and crease in total impulse for Freon 14 over
the life-support system (215 pounds) to a oxygen a t the same maximum tank pressure
velocity of 6 ft/sec. (5000 psi). Inasmuch as the weight of the
extravehicular pilot with all gear except pro-
Gemini VI11 Hand Held Maneuvering Unit pulsion gas was about 250 pounds, the use
of Freon 14, rather than oxygen or nitrogen,
In the Gemini VI11 mission, the total im- was an excellent tradeoff as f a r as the
pulse was increased to 600 lb x sec (15 times change-in-velocity capability was concerned.
more than the Gemini IV unit). A summary
of the Gemini VI11 maneuvering system char-
acteristics is given in tabl’e 9-11. Eighteen
pounds of Freon 14 gas were’stored at 5000
psi in a 439-cubic-inch tank. The tank was
mounted in a backpack (fig. 9-3) which also
housed a n identical tank filled with 7 pounds
of life-support oxygen. Freon 14 was chosen
a s a propellant because, even though its spe-
cific impulse (33.4 seconds) was lower than
oxygen (59 seconds) . or nitrogen (63 sec-

TABLE
9-II.-Gemiiii VZZZ H a n d Held
Maneuvering Unit Characteristics

Propellant, gas ............................................ Freon 14


Thrust, Ib ......................................................
0 to 2
Specific impulse (calculated), sec ............ -33:4
Total impulse, Ib x sec .............................. 600
Total available A V , ft/sec .......................... 54
Trigger preload, Ib ...................................... 15
Trigger force at maximum thrust, Ib ...... 20
Storage-tank pressure, psi ........................ ‘5000
Regulated pressure, psi .............................. 110215
Nozzle-area ratio ........................................ 50:l
Weight of propellant, lb ............................ 18
Weight of Hand Held Maneuvering
E’IWRE !)-:;.-Gemini VI11 Hand Held Maneuvering
Unit, lb ...................................................... 3
-
Unit, backpack, and chest pack.
94 GEMINI S U M M 4 R Y CONFERENCE

The expansion of the Freon 14 from 5000


psi to 110 psi resulted in temperatures of
approximately -150" F in the Hand Held
Maneuvering Unit handle assembly. The low
temperatures caused the poppet valves to
stick open when actuated. To make the valves
operable at -150" F, Teflon cryogenic seals
were used in place of the elastomer seals
which had been satisfactory for the Gemini %.i.-Genlini X Hand Held ManeuvevinE
FIGURE
Unit configuration.
.IV Hand Held Maneuvering Unit. Even
though qualification testing demonstrated
that the redesigned poppet valves would op- ther modified by sloping the handle to pro-
erate at low temperatures, two shutoff valves vide easier movement of the pilot's hand from
were incorporated in the system. One of the pusher to tractor actuxtion. Grooves were
valves (fig. 9-4) was located immediately cut in the handle to accommodate the re-
upstream of the coupling, antl was designed straint wires in the palm of the scit glove.
to prevent the gas from escaping in case the The singlo rocking trigger was replaced with
poppet valves failed to close. The other shut- two shorter triggers pivoted a t the erld. This
off valve was located in the backpack, up- modification reduced the actuation forces
stream of the flexible feedline antl was de- from between 15 and 20 pounds to between 5
signed to shut off the gas flow in the event and 8 pounds, and also reduced the distance
of an accidentally severed hose. The extra the hand had to be shifted to go from pusher
precautions were taken t o reduce the possi- to tractor mode or vice versa.
bility of uncontrolled gas escaping from the On the Gemini X flight, the propellant was
system and causing the extravehicular pilot stored in two 439-cubic-inch tanks in the
to tumble. The handle of the Hand Held Ma- spacecraft adapter section and was fed to the
neuvering Unit was also modified to provide
Hand Held Maneuvering Unit through a 50-
the pilot with a better grip (fig. 9-4). foot dual umbilical (fig. 9-6). One hose in
(;rrnini S Hand Held ManeuverinE [:nit
the umbilical provided life-support oxvgen
and the other hose provided nitrogen gas to
For Gemini X, the handle of the Hand the Hand Held Maneuvering Unit. Nitrogen
WRS selected ;IS a propellant to reduce slightly
Held Maneuvering Unit (fig. 9-5) was fur-
some of the low-temperature problems en-
countered with Freon 14. The two nitrogen
tanks provided a total impulse of 677 Ib y

FIGURE 9-6.-Fifty-foot dual umldical used in


FIGURE
94-Shutoff valve upstream of couplinp of Gemini X shown connected to Estravchicular Life-
Gemini VI11 Hand Held Maneuvering Unit. Arms Support Spsceiii antl Hand Held hlancuveiing
in near folded position. Unit.
EXTRAVEHICULAR MANEUVERING ABOUT SPACE VEHICLES 95

/‘
sec, amounting to 84 ft/sec change in velocity
of the extravehicular pil9t. A list of other
pertinent characteristics is provided in table
9-111. ,

TABLE9-III.-Gemini X and XI Hand


Held Maneztvehg Unit Chamcteristics

Propellant ................................................ Nitrogen gas


Thrust, Ib ................................................ 0 to 2
Specific impulse, sec .............................. 63
Total impulse, Ibxsec .......................... 677
Total available AI’, ft/sec .................... 84
Trigger preload, Ib ................................ 5
Trigger force at maximum thrust, lb.. 8
Storage-tank pressure, psi .................. 5000
Regulated pressure, psi ........................ 125k15
FIGURE!)-i.--Gemini XI Hand Held Maneuvering
Nozzle-area ratio .................................... 50:1
Unit in inverted position showing quick-discon-
Weight of usable p~opcllant,Ib ............ 10.75
nect coupling.
Weight of Hand Held Maneuvering
Unit, Ib ................................................ 3
Weight of extravehicular pilot, Ib ...... 260 hicular pilot had t o perform this operation
with one hand in a limited access area and in
A hardline was routecl from the tank in- a pressurized suit. Several features were in-
stallation in the spacecraft atlapter section corporated in the push-on coupling to provide
to a recessed panel behind the hatch. The immediate interchanging of the Hand Held
hardline was clamped to the adapter-section Maneuvering Unit with a gas-powered tool
-
structure at numerous points to provide heat for possible future maintenance and assem-
shorts for warming the cooled gas (due to bly operations in space.
adiabatic expansion during use). The propellant gas storage-tank installa-
After connecting the life-support side of tion for Gemini XI was identical to the
the dual umbilical to the oxygen system in Gemini X configuration ancl provided the
the pressurized spacecraft and making the same operational characteristics (table 9-
proper connections to the Extravehicular 111). A 30-foot dual umbilical was employed
Life-support System chest pack, the pilot rather than the 50-foot dual umbilical used
egressed the cabin and moved to a recessed on Gemini X.
panel behind the hatch. The pilot connected
the Hand Held Maneuvering Unit propellant Astronaut IIancwwrinrr [’nit
side of the dual umbilical to the nitrogen sup-
ply by means of a push-on connector and a The Air Force Astronaut Maneuvering
shutoff valve provided on the recessed panel. Unit (fig. 9-8) was scheduled for evaluation
on the Gemini IX-A and the Gemini XI1
missions. Pertinent characteristics of the
Astronaut Maneuvering Unit are listed in
In the Gemini XI mission, the Hand Held table 9-IV.
Maneuvering Unit was stowed in the space- The Astronaut Maneuvering Unit back-
craft adapter section rather than in the pack contained hydrogen peroxide, nitrogen,
cabin. The screw-on coupling was changed to and oxygen tanks; two sets of rate gyros;
a quick-disconnect coupling (fig. 9-7) to twelve 2.3-pound thrust chambers with asso-
simplify connecting the Hand Held Maneu- ciated solenoid-operated valves; self-con-
vering Unit to the umbilical. The extrave- tained radio and telemetry equipment; and
96 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

vering Unit, 168 pounds, included a 19-pound


oxygen bottle which held 7 pounds of gaseous
oxygen for the Extravehicular Life-support
System. The nitrogen in the Astronaut Ma-
neuvering Unit was used to expel the hydro-
gen peroxide through the catalyst beds and
then through the reaction nozzles.

TABLEg-IV.-Gemini ZX-A Astronaut


Marieuveiing Uuit Characteristics
Propellant .................... 90 percent hydrogen peroxide
Total thrust (fore-and-aft or
up-and-down) , Ib ................................ 4.6
Pitch moment, in.-lb .............................. 63.5
Roll moment, in.-lb ................................ 44.2
Yaw moment, in.-lb .............................. 47.7
Specific impulse, sec .............................. 169
Total impulse, Ibxsec ............................ 3100
Total available AV, ft/sec .................... 250
Controller characteristics :
Breakout:
Fore-and-aft, Ib ...................... 4.5
Up-and-down, Ib ...................... 4.5
Pitch, Ib ............................... :.... 4.0
Roll, Ib ...................................... 4.0
Yaw .......................................... Small
Maximum force :
Fore-and-aft, Ib ...................... 9.75
Up-and-down, Ib ...................... 9.75
Pitch, Ib .................................... 10.5
Roll, Ib ...................................... 10.5
Yaw, in.-lb .............................. 13.0
Maximum deflection, deg:
Fore-and-aft ............................ 6
Up-and-clown .......................... (i
FIGURE
9-8.-The Air Force Astronaut Maneuvering 6
Unit as configured for Gemini IX-A. Extravehicu- Roll ............................................ 6
lar Life-support System (chest pack) also shown. Yaw .......................................... 4.5
Attitude-limit cycle periods, sec:
Pitch .................................................. 50
other miscellaneous equipment. The back- Roll .................................................... 50
pack was designed to provide attitude con- Yaw .................................................. 3.2
trol and stabilization about the yaw, pitch, Attitude deadband. d e r ........................ (:: axes) 2 2 . 4
and roll axes, a s well a s translation in the Maximum contiml rates, dep/sec :
Pitch .................................................. 18
fore-and-aft and up-and-down directions. At- Roll .................................................... 27
titude control could be achieved either by Yaw .................................................. 18
using the thrusters in a direct manual on- Maximum nitropen tank pressure, psi 3500
off mode or in a rate-command mode. t i e p l a t e d hydrogen peroxide
pressure, psi ........................................ 455
The Astronaut Maneuvering Unit was Nozzle-area ratio .................................... 40:l
capable of providing a change in velocity of Weight of propellant, Ib ........................ 24
about 250 feet per second f o r an all-inclusive Weight of Astronaut Maneuvering
extravehicular pilot weight of 407 pounds. Unit, Ib ................................................ 168
Wcipht o f extravchicular pilot, I h ...... 407
The gross weight of the Astronaut Maneu-
EXTRAVEHICULAR MANEUVERING ABOUT SPACE VEHICLES 97

Ground Training for Estravehicular this case is pointed forward a s it must be


Maneuvering when considering the tractor mode. Assume
that a disturbance occurs and causes a rota-
Hand Held \lanruvering Unit Control Logic tion to the right. indicated by the curved
A number of different procedures could be velocity arrow labeled ‘‘+<,,.’’ To eliminate
used successfully to move from one point to t h i s tlistui~l~;ince,
the Hand Held Mnneuver-
another in space with a Hand Held Maneu- ing Unit must he moved laterally toward the
vering Unit. Figure 9-9 illustrates the par- right side; however, the thrust line of the
ticular procedures selected for use with the Hand Held Maneuvering Unit must be
Gemini systems. The figure illustrates tractoi. pointed tlii-ectly a t the target. By pointing
thrusting for either f o r n w t l or backward directly a t the target at all times, the opera-
translation. as well a s pusher thrusting, m t l tor (1) insures that he will eventually arrive
applies to any of the three possible rotational exactly at the target. ( 2 ) maximizes the de-
control axes : yaw, pitch, o r roll. For cxample. sired control moment. and ( 3 ) minimizes the
in fixure 9-9(a) assume that the illustra- amount of fuel required for attitude control.
tion refers t o the yaw axis so that our view The third rule on the illustration refers to
of the man is from directly above; that is, phase lead and states that the control motions
the label “MAN” refers to the end of a line should lead the disturbances if the rotational
running from the operator’s head to foot, motions a r e to Le completely damped. If, in-
The Hand Held Maneuvering Unit is held stead of IeadinK the rotational motions, the
in front of the man’s center of gravity a t the control motions remain exactly in phase with
position of the label “FORCE.” The force in the rotational motions, the result is a con-
*

-.’.

I
Velocity
I
Velocity
’-Target

1 / 1
I
tu
1- +d -t -I -d I--
tu

Always point at target Always point at tarqet


Displace device in same direction Displace device in opposite direction
as rotation l+d for +u) as rotation I-d for +u)’

Lead the rotations by the control Lead the rotations by the control
displacements in order to displacements in order to
eliminate the rotations eliminate the rotations

(a) Tractor mode. lb) Pusher mode.

FIGURE9-9.-Rules for attitude control during translation with Hand Held blanvuvcring Unit.
98 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

stant-amplitude snaking oscillation as the erally facing the target, thrust is applied to
operator translates toward or away from the produce a forward velocity proportional to
target. the range to be flown. As soon as this ve-
The foregoing procedures first appear com- locity is achieved, yaw 90” away from the
plicated and overly sophisticated. In actual original attitude and coast toward the tar-
practice, the pilot never consciously thinks of get. The line-of-sight drifts of the target can
the rules while using the Hand Held Ma- be eliminated by using the up-and-down and
neuvering Unit. Application of the pro- fore-and-aft translational thrusters. Just
cedures may be compared with the actions prior to ar‘riving at the target, yaw back to
and reactions required to ride a bicycle. The the original attitude facing the target and
skilled operator of the Hand Held Maneu- apply braking thrust.
vering Unit looks directly at the target. The This control procedure involves only two
control loop is closed directly from the target discrete yaw rotations and no roll o r pitch
motion to the eyes and brain of the operator, rotations. The control procedure minimizes
with resulting error signals feeding the op- attitude-control fuel requirements because
erator’s muscular command system. The con- the inertia of the extravehicular pilot is a t a
trol system of the Hand Held Maneuvering minimum about the yaw axis. Also, the con-
Unit is a personal adaptive control system. trol procedure is probably the simplest f o r a
The accuracy of this system in space with all maneuvering unit that does not have lateral-
the 6 degrees of freedom active is not yet translation cnpability.
known, inasmuch as the planned Gemini
flight evaluations did not cover this point. ,\ir-lkariiiK Traininf Equipment
On the 3-degree-of-freedom air-bearing fa-
cility, using any one of the three rotational The most important requirement for an
axes and two translation axes, the accuracy air-bearing facility, and the most difficult to
of a skilled operator is within less than 1 inch achieve antl maintain, is a flat, hard, smooth
of the intended target (from distances of floor. The floor of the Air-Bearing Facility a t
approximately 25 feet). A t longer ranges, the Manned Spacecraft Center consists of 21
the same degree of accuracy could be main- cast-steel machinist’s layout tables each 3
tained because the control logic is a termi- feet wide l)y 8 feet long. Each table weighs
nal-guidance type. Also, the operator’s axis about 2200 pounds and is flat to within ap-
svstem does not have to be alined with the proximately 0.0002 inch. The pattern is
direction of motion while using the Hand seven tables wide antl three tables long com-
Held Maneuvering Unit. The operator must prising a total floor area of 21 by 24 feet.
physically see the target and point a t the tar- After leveling, the joints between adjacent
get while keeping the thrust force through tables are x c u r a t e to about 0.0004 inch, and
his center of gravity. With reg:ird to ease of the overall floor is estimated to be flat within
use, the Hand Held Maneuvering Unit was approximately 0.002 inch. The 1eveling.pro-
designed so that when held in the operator’s cedure must be repeated about every 6
right hand with the thrust line along the op- months. due to settling of the building foun-
erator’s X-axis. the muscles in the right arm dation. This degree of floor accuracy allows
and hand are in ;I completelv unutrained free movement of simulators with a i r cush-
position. ions approximately 0.001 inch thick. Such
low flight altitudes a r e desirable because the
Astronaut Mancwvering Iiiiit Contrnl Lopic required airflow is quite low, and the atten-
dant possible turbine-blade ( j e t propulsion)
The control logic preferred by the pilots effect resulting from iineven eshaust of the
of Gemini IX-A and Gemini XI1 follows. air from the air bearings is negligible. This
From an initially stabilized position, gen- turbine-blade effect is extremely untlesirable
EXTRAVEHICULAR MANEUVERING ABOUT SPACE VEHICLES 99

because i t confuses the results produced by


low-thrust jets such as those of the Hand
Held Maneuvering Unit.
Figures 9-10 to 9-13 show some of the
air-bearing simulators utilized for extra-
vehicular training during the Gemini Pro-
gram. Figure 9-10 shows the Gemini X pilot
on a yaw training simulator in preparation
for that mission. In this particular case,
compressed air for the Hand Held Maneuver-
ing Unit, for the pressurized suit, and for
floating the air-bearing equipment flowed
from a 130-psi service air supply through a
dual umbilical identical to the one used in the
Gemini X flight. A skilled technician was
employed to minimize the effect of the um-
bilical drag during training.
Figure 9-11 shows the Gemini VI11 pilot
during a yaw training session prior to the
mission. The Extravehicular Support Pack-
age was supported by metal legs; three sup-
porting air pads were utilized for the
necessary added stability because of the large
combined mass and volume of both the Ex-

FIGURE9-11.-Three-pad air-bearing simulator for


yaw-axis training with backpack-supported ma-
neuvering devices.

FIGURE g-lO.--Sinc.le-pad air-hearing simulator for FIGURE !)-12.-Three-pad air-lwarina simulator dur-
yaw-axis training with Hand Held Maneuverina ina pitch-axis trainina with Hand IIcld Manru-
Unit. w r i n g Unit.
100 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

looking a t the ceiling while translating to the


side. The latter case is important because in
normal use of the Hand Held Maneuvering
Unit, rolling velocity should be kept at zero
while translating and looking forward.

Types of Training Runs

The following is a representative list of


the types of training runs made on the air-
bearing equipment in preparation for extra-
vehicular activity maneuvering. The runs
were made in the yaw and pitch modes; most
were also made in the roll mode.
FIGURE
9-13.-Three-pad air-bearing simulator dur- ( 1 ) Familiarization with air bearing.
ing roll-axis training with Hand Held Maneuver-
( 2 ) Use of muscle power to control atti-
ing Unit.
tude.
( 3 ) With Hand Held Maneuvering Unit in
travehicular Support Package (backpack) hand, control attitude while being towed to
and the Extravehicular Life-support System tu rge t.
(chest pack). In the simulator, compressed ( 4 ) With hip-kit compressed-air bottle
air for floating the platform is carried in an :ind no umbilical, translate from point A to a
oxygen bottle mounted on the platform ; and collision with point B. The points A and 8
compressed air for the Hand Held Maneu- itre any two specific points in the training
vering Unit is carried in a high-pressure are21.
bottle located inside the Extravehicular Sup- ( 5 ) Repeat preceding step, but completely
port Package ( a s on Gemini VIII). No um- stop 1 foot in front of point 8.
bilical or tether was utilized. This simulator ( 6 ) With initial rotational velocity a t
was also used in training for the Astronaut point A , stop rotation, proceed to point R, and
ManeuverinK Unit. stop completely 1 foot in front of point B.
Figure 9-12 shows the Gemini X pilot in ( 7 ) With both initial r;tndom rotation and
pitch-axis training on a different type of translation in vicinity of point A. stop both
Simulator. The cot is made of lightweight initial rotation and translation. proceed to
aluminum tubing which does not appreciably point B, and stop completely 1 foot in front
change his inertia in pitch. Three pads a r e of point B.
used to provide satisfactory tipping sta- (8) Starting from rest at point -4, inter-
bility. The compressed a i r needed to power crpt ;i target moving with constant velocity
the Hand Held Maneuvering Unit, to pres- a t right angles to the line of sight.
surize the suit, and to float the air-bearing ( 9 ) Make precision attitude changcs of 45
equipment is supplied by the service air sup- and 90 , stopping any translation existing a t
ply through the :I.;:-inch-insitle-diameter um- end of run.
bilical (fig. 9-12). This umbilical contains ( 10) Without the Hand Held Maneuvering
small air-bearing supporters which allow IJnit, practice pushing off from simulated
more accurate simulation of the in-space spacecraft and stopping completely by gently
effect of a similar umbilical. snubbing the umbilical.
Figure 9-13 shows the Gemini X pilot in ( 11) Practice hand walking the umbilical
roll-axis 'raining on the same simulator. buck to the simulated spacecraft, being care-
Roll-axis training was practiced by looking f u l not to generate excessive translational
at the target while translating to it, and by velocity.
EXTRAVEHICULAR MANEUVERING ABOUT SPACE VEHICLES 101

(12) ' Investigate elasticity and wrap-up


tendencies of umbilical by hitting end of
umbilical with various initial translational
and rotational velocities.

Amount of Training

Air-bearing training received by the prime


pilots of Gemini IV, VIII, TX-A, X, and XI
follows :

Training,
Missiov hr
IV .............................................................. ..12
VI11 ............................................ i ...............20.5
IX-A .......................................................... 3
X ................................................................ 13.25
XI ................................................................ 20

The 6-Degree-of-Freedom Simulator

In addition t o the 3 hours of air-bearing


training with the Astronaut Maneuvering
Unit in preparation for Gemini. IX-A extra-
vehicular activity, the pilot completed ap-
proximately 11 hours of training on the
Manned Aerospace Flight Simulator (fig.
9-14). This simulator consisted of a produc- FI(:UI~E
9-14.-The Manned Aerospace Flight Siniu-
lator used during traininn with the Astronaut
tion-type Astronaut Maneuvering Unit with Maneuvering Unit.
conti*ols wired into a hybrid computer fa-
cility. The simulator provided the subject
Inertia <'oul)liiig Training-Aid Model
with small-amplitude pitch, roll, and yaw
rotntions and up-and-down translation ac- L)u 1-iiig the Gemini VI11 ext rave hiculai.
celeration cues which later were damped out. ti-aining, the question arose its to whether
The visual display simulated clouds over an controlled rotations about one axis of an ex-
ocean, and a horizon with blue and red dots travehicular pilot might lead to uncontrolletl
representing the front and rear ends of a rotations about the other two axes due to
target vehicle. These were all projected on inerti:i coupling or 1,roduct-of-inerti~teffects.
the inner surface of a spherical screen To gain ii qllitlitative iden of the possible
mounted about 8 feet in front of the pilot. seriousness of these effects, ;I 140-4.5 scale
model of the Gemini VI11 pilot was con-
The dots varied in size to represent a target
structed and mounted in a set of extremely
vehicle at ranges from approximately 250 light giml)ds. The model (fig. 9-15) was
feet to essentially zero range. The object of bitsed upon three-view scale photographs of
most training runs was to aline the two ends the pilot in ;I pressurized suit, and carved
of the spacecraft (superimpose the dots), f i m i wood. The scale weight m t l center-of-
and to move in to it simulated arrival posi- gixvity ] w i t i o n of the pilot, the Extrave-
tion with respect to the target. hiculai. Support Package, and the Extra-
102 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

‘A?

FIGURE9-15-1nertia coupling training-aid model.

Lrehicular Life-support System were closely


duplicated, although no attempt was made t o ‘ J
measure and tluplicate the moments of inertia
of these items, The gimbal arrangement is
shown in figure 9-16. The yaw axis is at the
top; the half-pitch gimbal is next; innermost
is the roll gimbal, which consisted of two ball
bearings inside the body of the model. The
yaw and pitch gimbals were also mounted on
ball bearings. The gimbal weight n.m only F I ~ U R%16.-Inertia
E coupling training-aid model
about 0.2 that of the model. showing gimbal suspension system.

Investigations of inertia co~iplingeffects


were conducted l)y rotating the model about tion;il velocity (because of gimbal-bearing
one of the mijoi. axes while holding the other friction) without exhibiting inertia coupling
two axes fixed, then by suddenly releasing tentlencies of a n y kind.
the two fixed giml):ils. The following results ( 3 ) Following ;i I)iit-eroll rotational input,
were observed. release of the pitch and yaw gimbals imme-
( I ) Following a pure yaw rotational in- tliately i*esultcd i n i t confused pitching, y a ~ v -
put, when the pitch and roll gimbals were ing, m t l rolling tumbling motion.
released, slow up-and-down changes in pitch The behavior of the model was obviously
attitude resulted. A s the motion slowed due i i i conson;incc with the observed shape of the
to gimbal-bewing friction, the model rotated model. For example, the mass distribution of
90 in roll so that the original yawing motion thtb model, and also of ;in exti-:ivehicul:ir pilot,
became a pure pitching motion. This attitude ;ire almost symmetrical about the I’Z plane;
then was stable because no coupling was evi- therefore, practically no rolling or yawing
denced if the model wits again spun about the moments ;tt*e generated due to the effects of
original axis of rot- t’ion. centrifucal force acting upon local mass
( 2 ) Following a pure pitch rotational in- ;!symmetry when the model is pitched. How-
put, the model merely slowed to zero rotit- ever, the model with I)ilckp;ick and chest pack
EXTRAVEHICULAR MANEUVERING ABOUT SPACE VEHICLES 103

is considerably asymmetrical about the YZ Hand Held Maneuvering Unit Flight


plane: therefore, it is not surprising that Performance m d Comparison With
large pitching and yawing moments resulted Ground Training
from pure roll.
The tests performed with the model re- G e m i n i I V E x t m v e h i c a l u r Activity
sulted in adoption of the following simple The Gemini IV pilot made the first powered
maneuvering rules for the extravehicular extravehicular maneuvering in history. Fig-
pilot. The rules are designed to eliminate or ure 9-17 is one of the many photographs
reduce greatly the chance of encountering taken by the command pilot and shows the
inertia coupling effects. extravehicular pilot in the perfect posture
(1) Never roll. Always establish the atti- for maneuvering with a Hand Held Maneu-
tude toward the target by yawing, then pitch- vering Unit. The pilot described h i s experi-
ing. Never roll while translating. ences with the Hand Held Maneuvering Unit
(2) In case inertia coupling effects a r e en- and with the umbilical as follows:
countered, always stop the rolling velocity I left [the spacecraft] entirely under the influ-
first, the yawing velacity second, and the ence of the gun, and it carried me right straight out,
pitching velocity last. a little higher than I wanted to go. I wanted to
maneuver over to your [command pilot’s] side, but
In connection with possible inertia cou-
I maneuvered out of the spacecraft and forward
pling effects, two final comments should be and perhaps a little higher than I wanted to be.
made. First, the extravehicular pilots were When I got out to what I estimate as probably one-
not unique in being subject to inertia coupling half or two-thirds the way out on the tether. I was
effects. Airplanes and spacecraft are also sub- out past the nase of the spacecraft. I started a yaw
ject to such coupled motions. Second, it is to the left with the gun and that’s when I reported
that the gun really worked quite well. I believe t h a t
difficult to understand how these effects could I stopped t h a t yaw, and I started translating back
be encountered by a n extravehicular pilot at toward the spacecraft. I t was either on this trans-
the end of an umbilical o r tether. In such a lation or the one following this t h a t I got into a bit
case, the umbilical or tether should effectively
eliminate all large rotations other than those
about the axis of the umbilical or tether. This
observation strongly suggests that tether and
umbilical reels, controlled by the extravehicu-
lar pilot, should be developed as soon as pos-
sible. Air-bearing tests indicate that body
rotations which can cause umbilical wrap-up
about the subject tend to be eliminated rap-
idly by the umbilical as long as the subject
does not already possess translational velocity
toward the spacecraft umbilical attach point.
The reason for this action is that the rota-
tional energy causing wrap-up has to be con-
verted to translational kinetic energy in order
for wrap-up to continue. The proportionality
factor for energy transformation in this di-
rection is qualitatively very low. Therefore,
the practice of always operating at the end
of a straight umbilical may help eliminate
undesirable angular rotations about the two FIGURE 9-17.-Extravehicular activity during Gem-
body axes not coincident with the axis of the ini IV. Note classic posture exhibited by pilot f o r
umbilical. maneuvering with Hand Held Maneuverinc Unit.
104 G E M I N I S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

of a combination of pitch, roll, and yaw together. was mounted on a plane oblique to the angle in
I felt that I could have corr’ected it, but I knew t h a t which I wanted to translate. I remember from our
i t would have taken more fuel than I had wanted to air-bearing work t h a t every time you got a n angle
expend with the gun, so I gave a little t u g on t h e from the perpendicular where your tether w a s
tether and came back in. This is the first experience mounted, i t [the tether] gave you a nice arching
I had with tether dynamics and it brought me right trajectory back in t h e opposite direction. You’re
back to where I did not want to be. I t brought me actually like a weight on the end of a string. If you
right back on top of the spacecraft, by the adapter push out in one direction and you’re at a n angle
section. from the perpendicular, when you reach t h e end of
This is the first time it had happened. I said [to a tether, i t neatly sends you in a long a r c back in
command pilot]: “ A l l right, I’m coming back out the opposite direction. Each time this a r c carried me
[to front of sparecraft] again.” This is one of the right back to the top of the adapter, to t h e top of
most impressive uses of the gun t h a t I had. I started the spacecraft, in fact, toward the adapter section.
back out with the gun, and I decided t h a t I would One thing though t h a t I’ll say very emphatically-
fire a pretty good burst too. I started back out with there wasn’t any tendency to recontact the spacecraft
the gun, and I literally flew with the gun right down in anything but very gentle contacts. I made some
along the edge of the spacecraft, right out to the quite interesting contacts. I made one t h a t I recall
f r o n t of the nose, and out past the end of the nose. on the bottom side of the right door in which I had
I then actually stopped myself with the gun. T h a t kind of rolled around. I actually contacted the bot-
was easier than I thought. I must have been fairly tom of the spacecraft with the back of my head. I
fortunate, because I must have fired i t right through was faced away from the spacecraft. and I j u s t
my cg. I stopped out there and, if niy memory serves drifted right up against i t and just very lightly con-
me right, this is where I tried,a couple of yaw ma- tacted it. I rebounded off. As long as the pushoffs
neuvers. I tried a couple of yaw and a couple of a r e slow, there just isn’t any tendency to get in a n
pitch maneuvers, and then I started firing t h e gun uncontrollable attitude.
to come back in [to t h e spacecraft]. I think this was
the time t h a t the gun ran out. And, I w a s actually Gemini S Extravehicular Activity
able to stop myself with i t out there t h a t second
time too. The longest firing time t h a t I put on t h e
gun was t h e one t h a t I used to start over the doors It was intended that the Gemini X pilot
up by the adapter section. I started back out then. 1)erform an extensive evaluation of the H a d
I probably fired i t for a I-second burst or somethink Held Maneuvering Unit induding precise
like that. I used small bursts all the time. You could anjwlar attitude changes and translations.
put a little burst in and the response was tremen- However, the flight plan for the extravehicu-
dous. You could s t a r t a slow yaw or a slow pitch.
I t seemed to be a rather efficient way to operate. I
lar activity required a number of other ac-
would have liked to have had a &foot bottle out tivities prior to this evaluation. One of the
there-the bigger the better. It was quite easy to planned activities \vas to translate to the
control. twwt vehicle at very short range using
The technique t h a t I used with the gun was t h e manual forces alone and to retrieve the Ex-
technique t h a t we developed on the air-hcaring plat-
form. I kept my left hand out to the side [fig. 9-17]
periment SO10 Agena Micrometeorite Col-
and t h e gun as close to my center of gravity as I lection package attached near the docking
could. I think t h a t the training I had on the air- cone. The pilot described the use of the Hand
bearing tables was very representative especially in Held Mmeuvering Unit a t this time ;is fol-
yaw and pitch. I felt quite confident with t h e gun lows :
in yaw and pitch, but I felt a little less confident in Okay. we’re in this EVA. I got back and stood up
roll. I felt t h a t I would have to use too much of iny in thc. hatch and checkrd out the gun and made sure
fuel. I felt t h a t i t would he a littlr more difficult to it was squirting nitrogen. That’s the only gun check-
control and I didn’t want to use my fuel to take out out I did. In the nirantinie. John maneuvered the
my roll combination with the yaw. spacecraft over toward thc end of the TDA, just as
As soon as m y gun ran out [of fuel] I wasn’t able we hitd planned. He got in such a position t h a t my
to control myself the wuy I could with the Eun. With hcwl wits 4 to 5 feet from thc docking cone. I t was
t h a t gun, I could dccidc to yo to ii part of a spncr- upward a t about a 45” angle. just as we planned.
craft and very confidently go. I I)elieve a t one time there you said you had trouhle
Now I was working on taking sonie pictures and seeing it, and I gave you [command pilot] some in-
working on the tether dynamics. I immediately rea- structions iil)out “forwnrtl. forward.” “stop, stop.”
lized what was wrong. I realized that our tether So I actually sort of talkcd .John into position.
EXTRAVEHICULAR MANEUVERING ABOUT SPACE VEHICLES 105

I translated over by pushing off from the space- ward pitching moment. So I did damp out the pitch.
craft. I floated forward and upward fairly slowly I converted t h a t downward pitch moment into a n
and contacted the Agena. I grabbed hold of the dock- upward pitching moment, and then I w a s able t o
ing cone as near as I can recall, at about t h e 2 o'clock stop my pitch entirely. But in the process of doing
position. If you call the location of the notch in it, that, I developed a n inadvertent up translation,
the 12 o'clock, I was to the right of that-at about which nearly caused me to miss the Agena. AS a
the 2 o'clock position and I started crawling around. matter of fact, 1 came very close to passing over
No, I must have been more about the 4 o'clock posi- the top of the Agena; and I was just barely able to
tion, because I started crawling around at the dock- pitch down with the gun and snag a hold of the
ing cone counterclockwise, and the docking cone docking cone as I wrnt by the second time.
itself, the leading edge of the docking cone, which
is very blunt, makes a very poor handhold in those During further technical debriefings, the
pressure gloves. I had great difficulty in holding on Gemini X pilot made several other comments.
to the thing. And, as a mattzr of fact, when I got Concerning the response characteristics of
over by the SO10 package and tried to stop my mo- the Hand Held Maneuvering Unit, he stated
tion, my inertia [the inertia of] my lower hody, kept that the thrust levels of 0 to 2 pounds were
me right on moving and my hand slipped and I fell
about right. These levels provided adequate
r?ff the Agena.
When I fell off, I figured I had either one of two translational response without making the
things to do. I could either pull in on t h e umbilical rotational response seem overly sensitive. The
and get back to the spacecraft, o r I could use the Gemini I V pilot made the same comment.
gun. And I chose to use the gun. I t was floating free With respect to ability to transfer the con-
at this time. I t had come loose from the chestpack. trol skills acquired on the 3-degree-of-free-
So, I reached down to my left hip and found the
nitrogen line and started pulling in on i t and found
dom air-beafing simulators to the 6 degrees
the gun, and unfolded the a r m s of the gun and o f freedom existing in space, the Gemini X
started looking around. I picked up the spacecraft pilot stated that the transfer was easy and
in view. I was pointed roughly toward the space- natural. He WLLS, perhaps, a little surprised
craft. The spacecraft was forward and below .me on that the pitch degree of freedom gave more
my left. The Agena was just about over my left
shoulder and below me, or down on my left side and
control troihle than the yaw-degree of free-
below me. I used the gun to translate back to the dom. Due to ;i very low hotly inertia about the
cockpit area. Now, I was trying to thrust in a yaw axis, yawing motions generated with the
straight line from where I was back to the cockpit, Hand Held Maneuvering Unit are naturally
but in leaving the Agena I had developed some tan- much faster than either pitch or roll motions.
gential velocity, which was bringing me out around
the side and the rear of the Gemini. So what hap-
Finally. in answer to the question of
pened was, i t was almost as if I was in a n airplane whether he had acquired any rolling motions
on down wind for a landing, and in making a left- during brief periods of maneuvering with
hand pattern I flew around and made a 180" left the Hand Held Maneuvering Unit, the Gemini
descending turn, and flew right into t h e cockpit. I t X pilot stated that no rolling motions what-
was a combination 'of just luck, I think, being ablc
to use t h e gun. A t a n y rate, I did return to the
ever had heen experienced. This is sipnificant
cockpit in t h a t manner, and John again maneuvered fr)r two reasons:
the spacecraft. When I got to the cockpit, I stood ( 1 ) Rased upon indications of the inertia
up in the hatch and held on to the hatch. John ma- coupling model, and upon the Gemini IV ex-
neuvered the spacecraft again up nc-xt to the Apena. ti*avchicul:ir activity, the Gemini X pilot had
This time we were, I think. slightly f a r t h e r away,
because I felt t h a t rather than trying to push off 1 t rained speci tic:tlly to avoid rolling motions,
would use the gun and translate over. And I did, in and to stop them immediately if they should
fact, squirt the gun up, depart the cockpit and trans- occur.
late over to the docking cone using the gun as a ( 2 ) If rolling motions can he totally elimi-
control device. The gun pot me there. It wasn't ex- nated. then control with the Hand Held Ma-
tremely accurate. What happened was, as I w a s
qoing over, I guess in leaving the cockpit, I some- ueuvrring Unit is rctliicetl practically to a
how developed a n inadvertent pitch-down moment, siml)le ::-tlegree-of-freedom situation involv-
and when I corrected this out with the gun, I de- i n g yawing and pitching rotations, and linear
veloped a n upward translation as well as a n up- t i*anslations.
106 G E M I N I S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

. Concluding Remarks As a result of work with a gimbal-mounted


scale model of an extravehicular pilot, i t ap-
Based upon the short periods of extra- pears that confused tumbling motions due to
vehicular maneuvering during two Gemini inertia coupling effects a r e likely to occur
missions, the Hand Held Maneuvering Unit during extravehicular maneuvering if exces-
is a simple device suitable for translating sive simple rotational velocities (especially
easily between selected points on a spacecraft rolling velocities) are attained. Therefore, i t
or anywhere in the general vicinity of the is recommended that until additional extra-
spacecraft. Thrust values ranging from 0 to vehicular maneuvering experience has been
2 pounds are desirable for present-day Hand gained, rolling velocities be maintained close
Held Maneuvering Units. Controlled move- to zero during extravehicular maneuvering,
ment about a spacecraft on a fixed-length and the extravehicular pilot mass distribu-
umbilical without a maneuvering device is tion be kept nearly symmetrical.
difficult, if not impossible. However, such Three-degree-of-f reedom air-bearing simu-
maneuvering does not appear to result in lators are satisfactory devices for extra-
uncontrollable attitudes if care is taken t o vehicular maneuvering ground training. A
avoid large translational velocity inputs when minimum of 10 hours of such training is
leaving the spacecraft. recommended.
10. MEDICAL ASPECTS OF GEMINI EXTRAVEHICULAR
ACTIVITIES
By G . FREDKKLLY.M.D., Medical Operations Ofice, N A S A Mnnned Spncecrn/t Cknter: and D. OWEN
COONS,M.D., Medical Operations Ofice, N A S A M m i i i e d Spacecra// Center

Introduction Medical Evaluation of Extravehicular


Activities
The medical aspects of Gemini extrave-
hicular activities are principally concerned During the extravehicular portions of
with the physiological responses to high Gemini IX-A and XI, excessive workload
workloads, high thermal stresses, and low appeared to be a limiting factor. An evalua-
fatigue tolerance. Analysis of physiological tion of flight data indicated that there may
have been an excessive thermal load imposed
instrumentation data. from extravehicular
upon the extravehicular pilot during these
flights and training operations contributed activities. The high respiration rates encoun-
significantly to the understanding of extra- tered during Gemini XI indicated that a
vehicular workloads and the means of con- 1)uildup in the carbon-dioxide level may have
trolling these worklo.ads. been a problem. Since there were no actual
data on thermal conditions, oxygen, o r car-
Background hon-dioxide levels, and no direct measure of
metabolic load, a quantitative evaluation of
The success of the Gemini I V extravehicu- the potential problem areas was not possible.
lar activity provided the initial confidence Although there was no direct measure of
that man could accomplish extravehicular metabolic load, the electrocardiogram and
operations easily and with a minimum of impetlance pneumogram provided some use-
physiological constraints. The Gemini IV f u l information, but only if certain limita-
mission also tended to indicate that elaborate tions and inaccuracies were considered. These
physiological instrumentation would not be parameters have been monitored during a
required. Accordingly, medical instrumenta- great many physiological and psychological
tion requirements for future extravehicular tests under widely varying conditions. This
activities were kept to a minimum. The re- information reconfirms that heart rate re-
quirements included one lead for a n electro- sponds to psychological. physiological, and
cardiogram and one lead for obtaining respi- p;ithological conditions. There is considerable
ration rate. Because the pilot was able to individual variation in these responses. How-
monitor the suit pressure, this measurement ever, in the absence of a more scientific ap-
was deleted for Gemini IX-A and subsequent pro;ich to the problem. and because a quan-
flights. Other instrumentation which would titative indication of the workload actually
have been desirable included carbon-dioxide experienced in flight appeared to be of pri-
concentration and body temperatures ; how- m;iry importance, the feasibility of using
ever, feasible means of measuring these pa- heart rate ;is ;I quantitative indication of
rameters were not readily available. workload was investigated.

107
108 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

On Gemini IX-A, X, XI, and XII, preflight time lines during simulations and preflight
and postflight exercise tests using the bicycle planning. The use of heart-rate and respira-
ergometer were performed on the pilots. tion-rate data, when coupled with voice con-
During the tests, the subject performed a tact and a n understanding of programed
measured amount of work in increasing in- activities, proved a n extremely important and
crements while heart rate, blood pressure, useful method for real-time monitoring of
and respiration rate were monitored ; peri- extravehicular pilots.
odic samples of expired gas were collected The major factors which apparently pro-
for analysis. The data were translated into duced the highest workload prior t o Gemini
oxygen utilization curves antl heat-energy XI1 were high suit forces, insufficient bocly-
plots (fin. 10-1). Using the plots and the position restraints, and thermal stress. This
heart-rate (lata obtained during each flight was intlicutecl when the Gemini XI pilot ex-
(figs. 10-2 antl IO-?,), ;in approximate work- pentled an exceptionally high effort in attach-
load curve \vas plotted against the time line i n g t h e spacecraft 'target-vehicle tether to
for the extravehicular activity. The derived the docking bar. Difficulties in maintaining
data were not entirely believable, since there I)ody position in the weightless environment
is no method to account for the effect on heart made the task much more difficult than had
rate resiiltinx from thermal o r other environ- Iwen expected.
mental variations. Also, the psychogenic ef- The pilot used the larne torso and leg
fect of a new and different environment could muscles in attempting to straddle the space-
certainly increase the heart rates without it craft nose and found that he had to work
corresponding change in metabolic rate. The ;tgainst the pressurized space suit in order t o
plots were useful in evaluating the workloads force his legs into a n unnatural position. The
for the Gemini XI1 extravehicular activity. h i g h workload subjectively described by the
The accuracy of the plots may be expected to Ijilot was con firmed by heart and respiration
increase as the oxygen consumption increases rates (fig. 10-2 ( d ) ) . The high respiration
toward maximum oxygen utilization. This rates also indicate the possibility of increased
value varies with individuals and with the ciirhon-dioxide level. The Extravehicular
degree of physical conditioning, and is de- life-Support Systt!m was not designed t o
pendent upon the amount of oxygen which handle workloads of the magnitude indicated
can be transported from the environment to t)v these rates i n terms of either thermal con-
the body tissues. trol or carbon-dioxide removal. It is probable
The area of major interest in evaluating that the thermal antl carbon-dioxide buildup,
\vorkloads during extravehicular activities is along with psychogenic factors which were
during high workload periods. Furthermore, certainly present, contributed to the high
any error introduced by unknown factors heart rates recortletl. However, this would
would increase the ohserved heart rate f o r mxkc heart rate and respiration rate data no
a given workload level. This tends to increase less useful in the real-time monitoring of it
the usefulness of such it plot for preflight C I W V during flight if stress or potential dan-
planning antl for inflight monitoring of extra- cer wore in fact present.
vehicular activities. When (lata from previous I n planning for Gemini XII, it was deemed
flights, altit utle chamher tests. 1c walk-
important to avoid workloatls which uwiild
t h yo ugh s, a ntl 11ntle rwa t e r zero-g si m 111atio 11s
t~xceetl the capacity of the Extravehicular
;ire examinecl in t h i s manner, ii quantitative
indication may I)e derived of work expended 1.i fc-Si1plm-t System. It had been determined
O R various tasks (fig. 1 0 4 ) . This is impor- that the Estrnvehicular 1,ife-Support System
tant in the postflight assessment of the rela- wis c:ipal)le of handling 2000 Btu h r while
tive physiological cost of various tasks, and maintaining ;t carbon-dioxide level equal t o
in determining acceptable tasks and realistic iil)l)ro?timately6 mm of mercury. During the
MEDICAL ASPECTS OF GEMINI EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITIES 109

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110 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

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MEDICAL ASPECTS OF G E M I N I EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITIES 111

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MEDICAL ASPECTS OF GEMINI EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITIES 113

ized space suit. Both arms were brought from


the neutral position to the sides of the helmet
once each second for 60 seconds. An attempt
was made to correlate heart rate during these
inflight exercise periods with preflight exer-
cise tests (tig. 10-5). When compared in this
manner, there appeared to be no significant
difierence between the heart-rate data f o r
the exercises performed before flight and
those performed in flight. Only qualitative
c(\ricliisions, hotvever. c;tn be drawn from
t!iese t1at:i. Quuntitative and scientifically
\,alitl conclusions must await the results of
mere detailed and pi*ecisely implemented in-
fiight metlicnl ex1)erimentation in which con-
Btulhr
tiwlled conditions ;we pohsible and adequate
( e ) Gemini I S - A through XI1 preflight studies. (lata collection is fwsible.
Certain other factors a r e considered sig-
I+'IIX~IN I O-l.--Concludetl
niticant in the medical aspects of the Gemini
extravehicular activities. One of these fnc-
preflight ergome!, studies (fig. 10-51, ?he tors, the ai.1 of conserving energy. has been
pilot heart rate \I .i 122 beats per minute Ijrietiy mentioned. i i n t l was demonstrated by
when the worklo: was 2000 Btu hr. It the pilot of Gemini XII. The pilot of Gemini
should be noted th: ;t total heat capacity S I 1 was able to condition himself to relax
higher than 2000 I ! ' I I i1r was possible for completely within the neutral position of the
short periods of timcb ::iitl that sustained heat suit. He consciously trietl to determine when
dissipation of it ptwl-titage of thermal load ii zroiip of muscles WIS found to be tense
produced by higher le\-els of work was also \\hilt! perfoi-minx i i o iiseful work, and then
within the capabi!ities of the Extr;ive'hicular t i.it.tl to su1)jectively relax these muscles. All
Life-Support System. Because of these and movements we1.e slow and deliberate. When
other factors which a r e known to cause in- small movement of the tingers was sufficient
creases, heart rates h o v e 122 beats per to perform i t task, thc pilot used only the
minute were expected a n d observed diiriiig ncccssary muscles. If a i-estritint strap would
the planned extravehiculat. activities on Gem- su1)stitiite lor muscle action, the pilot would
ini XII. Figure 10-3(e) is ii graph of heart i ~ l yon t h e restnilit strap to maintain posi-
rate related to events during the G4Jmini XI1 t ioii. :itid \voiild r c h s the muscles which
umbilical extravehicular activity. Only once \voultl othci*\vise ha\ e been required for this
did the pilot's heart rate exceed expected task.
levels. This occurred during ii period of un- ('hi-oiiic f a t igiie mid tlegratletl physical con-
scheduled activities when psychogenic factors tlitioii may havr 1)een ;t problem during extra-
contril)uted heavily to the heart rate. When \ chiciihr activity. Sleep during the first night

the pilot was asked to decrease the activities, of each fight was inatleqiiate, and prel)itra-
heart rates returned to ;i resting level in less tion activities for t~strnvehiculnrmaneuvers
than 1 minute. U * ( ~ I Y - tletitiled and fatiguing. Furthermore,
During each period of standup extrnve- thc p:tc.c of pi-eflight activities aiid the pres-
hicular activity in Gemini XII, two sessions si!l*es of plitiining, tritining, :tnd prepnration
of programed exercise were performed. The to meet i t tlight schedule predisposed the crew
exercises consisted of moving the arms to fatigue. During the tinal weeks of prepa-
against the restrictive forces of the pressur- I*ittionfor i t flight, each crew found that time
114 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

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MEDICAL ASPECTS OF GEMINI EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITIES 115

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( b ) Gemini XI1 pilot.


FIGURE 10-2.-Continued,
llG GEMINI SUM MARY CONFERENCE

r Egress
Move to Target .
Move to target vehicle
7 c
Work on adapter tasks
Target vehicle work
tasks without tether

I-
Docking Adapter
7 rest ringress

- 400

120 - Target vehicle task - 300


0- c 0
C L
E c
-Zooad%
$i
-100 .

60 1 I I 1 I I I I I I I I I I I - 0
%-
f3
3 94-
0
F"."
0

.-
;
Y
92-
cn
90 I I I I I I 1 I 1 I I I 1 I I I

EI 2 0 -
Z C
tv-
10-
z- I 1 I I 1 I I I I I I I I I 1 1

( c ) Gemini XI1 pilot.


FIGURE10-2.--Concluded.
MEDICAL ASPECTS OF G E M I N I EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITIES 117

-Heart
lwr-----
rate
Respiration rate r:t:2 mation which will be invaluable in planning
future missions. There have been no indica-
tions that the efficiency of miin during extra-
vehicular activities is significantly altered.

"I
The major factor.; which appear to have pro-
duced the highest workload during the extra-
vehicular activity a r e high suit forces, insuffi-
10
0 cient I)ody-position aids, and thermal stress.
The success of Gemini S I 1 conclusively tlem-
701
0
'
10
'
20
'
30 40
' 50
I '
60 70
'
80
'
90 onstrated that these factors can be minimized
Elapsed time, min through careful planning. Evaluation of
physiological factors during the cxtrnvehicu-
( a ) Gemini I V pilot. liir activitv has h t w significnntl! compro-
FIGURE
10-3.-Physiological (lata during umbilical mised by the lack of arleqtiate instrumentit-
extravehicular activity. tion. Much can Iw leai.nctl about the physi-
ological responses to csti*;ivehicular act i\.ities
for rest, relaxation, and even physical condi- from simu1ation.s i i i the zcro-g aircraft ant1
tioning was a t a premium, and often these i n m tincler\\atci* mockul). Without sllecitic
activities were omitted. knowledge of the thermal and environmental
The possibility exists that hematological or contlitions. howe\w, ;I realistic simulation of
cardiovascu1;ir changes observed i n weight- estix\~ehiciilai.activities will he incomplete
less flight decrease the metabolic efficiency of ;I IN1 1 )ossihl y m is leild i ng.
man during the extravehicular activities re- 'l'hti s~ic.cessfiilcoml)letion of thti Gemini
quiring a relatively high workload. Until
c~stt.avrhicitl~ti. activities indicates that life-
more detailed information is available from
support planning has heen essentially sound.
well-founded medical experimentatioii during
flight. the relative importance of such factors The sticcess of Gemini XI1 indicates that
cannot be assessed. w i t h i n the limitations of the experience
gained. timc lines and work tasks can be
Conclusions tailoi.ec1 so that flight objc1ctivt.s can be accom-
plishetl. 7'hei.c itre no medical contrainctica-
The experience gninc?d from the Gemini tions to presently planned estravehicular
extravehicular activities has provided infor- xtivities.
11s GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

Visor reported fogged


Astronaut Maneuvering Unit no-go

Depressurize cabin r Move to adapter


Sunset Sunrise
7
Reconnect spacecraft electrical
umbilical

r
Open hatch
r Extravehicular
Life Support System
to high flow
Remove docking-bar mirror

200
Deploy handrails; sunrise: r c h e c k i n g Attronaut
u mbil ical evaluation Maneuverinq Unit
,-Return to cabin
180

160
.-Ec
--
VI
m
a
l
n

-
&
m
L
140

120
f
Io
W

30

20 100
‘%Respirationrate
.L
a
10
W
I I I I I I I I I
20 43 63 80 103 120 140 160 180
Elapsed time, min

( h ) Gemini IX-A pilot.


FIGURE
10-3.-Continued.
MEDICAL ASPECTS O F GEMIKT EXTRAVEHICUL.4R ACTIVITIES 119

180
Extravehicular
Factivity
terminated
. :ti clo~ef

Hatch open, Pilot translates to y Restin; "7+ f 5SCr;;t ~dD1'

160
Fpilot- egress target vehicle 1 .', \
(.
- Pressiire
' 5.6 Dsia
FDepressurize cabin F Experiment SOK
package retrieval
/
I
r Experiment SO12 retrieved
i

100 "Heart rate

,,Respiration rate

80

I 1 I I
60
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Elapsed time, min

( c ) Gemini X pilot.

10-3.-Continued.
FIGURE
120 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

Move to nose of spacecraft CReturned to cockpit

Experiment SO09 retrieved


7 Hatch closed

( d ) Gemini XI pilot.
FIGURE10-3.-Continued.
MEDICAL ASI'ECTS OF GEMINI EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITIES 121

0
m

m
c
E
c
0
.-
amd
L
.-n
m
Ln
LT
GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

120 r
110 -
I I
--I-Post-exercise -
.- Preflight exercise
- loo-
E
(D

.a
6 90
-
L

m
L

7
m
80 -
G I
I I

'-c--
110 -
C
._ First inflight exercise I
I
,E 100 -
v)

-
ai I
I
I
I
I
I I
l l l l l l l l l l ~ l Il I I I ,
60

-
L
I I
X
70- I I
I I
I I ! I l l 1

FIGUREl0-4.-Preflight and inflight exercise test, Gemini XI1 pilot.


MEDICAL ASPECTS OF GEMINI EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITIES 123

Experiment M410 jettisoned


130
Nasal stuffiness,
eyes watering no irritation

.-c
E

e:I
-e 70 -
a-

,, Respiration rate

10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Elapsed time. min

( u ) Gemini X pilot.

FIGURE
10-5.--Physiolo~ical (lata during standup extravehicular activity.

Cabin Jumper cable


depressurized

Hatch
7
Camera

installed 7
pictures

Of Houstonl
Crew napping
Taking star pictures
I
- ngress
disconnect 7

,-,Taking
pictures

I
---- -
'- /- - -- /'- - - -'--
I I I I I I I I I
J
6o0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Elapsed time, min

( b ) Gemini XI pilot.
FIGURE
10-&-Continued.
124 G E M I N I S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

5
L

.-W
'A .c
'D

W
W
x
W -
0
'A

u
c
0
U L
W

m
W
L

5
U

-(0
L

3
.-U
f
-e
W
-IU
L

-c
'A

.-n
c
'D
U
W
.-L-
N

3
'A
'A
W
L
n
W
n
L
EXTRAVEHICULAR MANEUVERING ABOUT SPACE VEHICLES 125

FCabin depressurized FThird exercise Fourth exercise


Repressurize cabin
r Sunset
Jettison Extravehicular Life Support System
Fs’ nriSe F
Ultraviolet photography of sunrise
130

110

90
-
.-c
E
v)

H
-e
6 70

L
L

Elapsed time, min

( d ) Second standup extravehicular activity of the Gemini XI1 pilot.


FIGURE
l0-5.-Concluded.
11. SUMMARY OF GEMINI EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY
By REGINALDM. MACHELL,Ofice of Spacecraft Management, Gemini Program Ofice, N A S A Manned
Spacecraft Center; LARRYE. BELL, Crew Systems Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center;
NORMAN P. SHYKEN, Senior Engineer, McDonnell Aircraft Corp.; and JAMES W. PRIMIll, Ofice of
Spacecraft Management, Gemini Prograrn Oflice, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center

Introduction procedures by which the workload and the


metabolic rates could be maintained within
The Gemini Program has provided the first the desired limits.
experience in extravehicular activity in the One of the most difficult aspects of develop-
US. manned space effort. The original objec- ing a n extravehicular capability was simu-
tives included the following: lating the extravehicular environment. The
(1) Develop the capability for extra- combination of weightlessness and high vac-
vehicular activity in free space. uum was unattainable on Earth. Zero-gravity
( 2 ) Use extravehicular activity to increase aircraft simulations were valuable but occa-
the basic capability of the Gemini spacecraft. sionally misleading. Neutral buoyancy sirnu- .
( 3 ) . Develop operational techniques and lations underwater ultimately proved to be
evaluate advanced equipment in support of the most realistic duplication of the weight-
extravehicular activity for future programs. less environment for body positioning and
In general, these principal objectives have restraint problems. The novel characteristics
been met. Some of the problems encountered of the extravehicular environment and the
during the equipment evaluation caused the lack of comparable prior experience made
emphasis to be shifted from maneuvering intuition and normal design approaches occa-
equipment to body-restraint devices.
sionally inadequate. The accumulation of
The initial Gemini design guidelines con- flight experience gradually led to a n under-
templated missions with 30 to 60 minutes of standing of the environment and the tech-
extravehicular activity with very low work- niques for practical operations.
loads and metabolic rates (500 Btu/hr).
Various ground simulations subsequently in- Extravehicular Mission Summary
dicated the need for longer periods of extra-
vehicular activity and greater heat-dissipa- Extravehicular activity was accomplished
tion capabilities if significant useful results on 5 of the 10 manned Gemini missions. A
were to be obtained. The design criteria for total of 6 hours 1 minute was accumu-
the extravehicular life-support equipment lated in five extravehicular excursions on a n
were ultimately set at a mission length of umbilical (table 11-1). An additional 6 hours
140 minutes with a normal metabolic rate of 24 minutes of hatch-open time were accu-
1400 Btu/hr and a peak rate of 2000 mulated in six periods of standup extra-
Btu/hr. The flight results indicated that in vehicular activity including two periods for
several instances this metabolic rate was un- jettisoning equipment. The total extravehicu-
intentionally exceeded. The final mission, lar time for the Gemini Program was 12
Gemini XII,demonstrated the equipment and hours 25 minutes.

Preceding page blank 127


128 GEMINI SUM MARY CONFERENCE

TABLE11-I.-Summary of Gemiui Extravehicular Activity Statistics

Umbilical Standup Total


extravehicular time, extravehicular
device activity time, hr:min activity time,
hr:min hr:min
1

IV 1 I'LM
I

I 25
I
Hand Held
-Maneuvering
036 None 0:36

Unit
VI11 ELSS, ESP Hand Held Nonc None None
Maneuvering
Unit
IX-A ELSS, .-\MU I 2 .i Astronaut 2:07 None 2:07

X ELSS
r Maneuvering
Unit
30 Hand Held 0%) 0:50 1 :"9
iManeuvering
Unit
XI ELSS 30 Hand Held 0:3Y 2:lO ?:A3
I Maneuvering
I
I Unit
XI1 ELSS I 2 5 None . 2:06 324 5:30
I
I
6:Ol I 122.5
1

Includes mission equipment jettison time.

Gemini IV propulsinn without artificial stabilization was


tentatively indicated. although the 20 seconds
Two of the objectives of the Gemini IV of available thrust were not enough for a de-
mission were to establish the initial feasi- tiiiled stability and control evaluation. The
'bility of extravehicular activity and to eval-
uate a simple maneuvering device. The life-
support system was a small chest pack called
the Ventilation Control Module, with oxygen
supplied through a . %-foot umbilical hose
assembly (fig. 11-1). The Hand Held Maneu-
vering Unit was a self-contained, cold-gas
propulsion unit which utilized two 1-pound
tractor jets and one 2-pound pusher jet. The
G4C space suit was worn with an extra-
vehicular cover layer for micrometeorite and
thermal protection. While outside the space-
craft, the pilot also wore a special stin visor
designed for visual p i Aection.
The Gemini IV pilot was outside the space-
craft for 20 minutes and followed the time
line shown in figure 11-2. The results proved
the feasibility of simple extravehicular ac-
.
tivity without disorientation. The utiiity of
the Hand Held Mmeuvering Unit for self- FIGURE11-1.-Gemini IV extravehicular system.
S U M M A R Y O F GEMINI E X T R A V E H I C U L A R ACTIVITY 129

Day after completion of the extravehicular


Night period ; however, no continuing aftereffects
Ground elapsed time
were noted. Because of the previous hatch-
lr
- M:15 closing problems, the hatch was not opened
-
- Hatch open for. jettisoning the extravehicular equipment.
- Install 16-mm camera
-Cd:ZO Install umbilical guard The inflight experience showed that sub-
- stantially more time and efYort were required
-
- to prepare for the extravehicular activity
-
--- 0425 Standing in seat. Preparing Hand Held
Maneuvering Unit
than had previously been anticipated. The
increased hazards of extravehicular activity
- dictated meticulous care in the inflight check-
- J Egress from spacecrafl using Hand Held
-
- M:30 HandManeuvering Unit out before the spacecraft was depressurized.
Held Maneuvering Unit evaluation
- The flight crew found the use of detailed
-- checklists a necessary part of the prepara-
Hand Held Maneuvering Unit out of propellant
- - M:35 tions for extravehicular activity. The Gemini
- Umbilical evaluation IV mission proved that extravehicular ac-
-- tivity was feasible, and indicated several
--- 01:4 Smeared command pilot's window areas where equipment performance needed
improvement.
-
-
--
-
0445
Standing on spacecraft surface
Gemini VI11
-
- The next extravehicular activity was
-
- 0450 Standing in seat, starting ingress planned for the Gemini VI11 mission and was
--- intended to evaluate the Extravehicular Life-
- 0465
Hatch closed
Day
Support System. This system was a chest
pack with a substantially greater thermal
capacity than the Ventilation Control Module
FIGUREll-Z.-Gernini IV extravehicular tiine line.
used during Gemini IV, and had an increased
extravehicular pilot evaluated the dynamics reserve oxygen supply. In addition, the extra-
of a %-foot tether, and was able to push from vehicular activity was intended to evaluate
the surface of the spacecraft under grpss con- the Extravehicular Support Package, a back-
trol. The umbilical tether caused the pilot to pack unit containing an independent oxygen
move back in the general direction of the supply for life support: a larger capacity
spacecraft. The tether provided no means of propellant supply for the Hand Held M L U I ~ L I -
body positioning control other than as a dis- vering Unit ; and an ultrahiah-frequency
tance-limiting device. Ingress to the cockpit radio package for independent voice corn-
and hatch closure was substantially more munications. A detailed evilluation was also
difficult than anticipated because of the high planned on the Hand Held Maneuvering Unit
forces required to pull the hatch fully closed. while the pilot was on a 75-foot lightweight
The hatch-lacking mechanism also malfunc- tether. The extravehicular equipment is
tioned, complicating the task of ingress. shown in figure 11-3. The Gemini VIII mis-
Efforts by the extravehicular pilot in coping sion \vas terminated before the end of the
with the hatch-closing problems f a r exceeded first dav because of a spacecraft control-sys-
the cooling capacity of the Ventilation Con- tem malfunction. and no extravehicular ac-
trol Module. The pilot was overheated at the tivity was accomplished.
completion of ingress, although he had been Equipment design became very complicated
cool while outside the spacecraft. Several (luring preparation for the Gemini VI11 mis-
hours were required for the pilot to cool off sion because of the need to provide the pilot
130 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

communications. The mission 1


for the extravehicular activity
lar to the profile intended for
The hatch was to be opened a
daylight period when good cc
could be established with the
tions in the continental Unite
first daylight period was to
familiarization with the envirr
performance of preparing simi
and experiments. The succ
period was to be spent in the :
ment section of the spacecraft
and donning the Astronaut
Unit. The second daylight per
spent evaluating the Astronaut
Unit. At the end of this period
to return to the cockpit, disca
naut Maneuvering Unit, coml:
scientific photographic experii
gress. The equipment f o r extr:
tivity during Gemini IX-A is
ures 11-4 -and 11-5.
The Gemini IX-A extravehi
FIGURE
11-3.-Gemini VIII extravehicular system. proceeded essentially as planne
daylight period, and is indicatt
with connections to a chest pack, a backpack, line of figure 114. The pilo-
several oxygen and communication lines, and higher forces than expected i;
a structural tether. Acceptable designs and hatch in the partially open pos
procedures were established ; however, the condition did not cause any in-.
handling procedures were more difficult than culties. While outside the SI:
was desirable. Although the Gemini VI11 pilot discovered that the familia
extravehicular equipment was not used in and evaluations required more
orbit, its use in training and in preparation fort than the ground simulatic
for flight provided initial insight into the minor difficulties were experit
problems of comp1ic:ited equipment connec- trolling body position. Prior t o
tions. first orbital day, the pilot p r c ~
spacecraft adapter ant1 began
(;cmini I?(-A tions for donning the A S ~ ~ Q ~ ; ; I ;
ina Unit. The task of preparii-
The prime objective of the Gemini IX-A naut Maneuvering Unit requir
extravehicular activity was to evaluate the work than had been anticipate,
Extravehicular Life-support System and the because of the difficulties in mail
Air Force Astronaut Maneuvering Unit. The position on the foot bar and t h
Astronaut Maneuvering Unit was a backpack At approximately 10 minutes
which included a stabilization and control the visor on the extravehicular 1
system, a hydrogen-peroxide propulsion sys- began to fog. The fogging incrl
tem, a life-support oxygen supply, and a n eyage and severity until the crev
ultrahigh-frequency radio package for voice to discontinue the activities wit!
SUMMARY OF GEMINI EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY 131

. FIGURE
11-5.-Gemini IX-A adapter provisions f o r
extravehicular activity.

Postflight evaluation indicated that the


Extravehicular Life-support System func-
tioned normally. It was concluded that the
Astronaut Maneuvering Unit preparation
tasks and the lack of adequate body re-
FIGURE
11-4.-Gemini IX-A extravehicular system. straints had resulted in high workloads
which exceeded the design limits of the Ex-
naut Maneuvering Unit. After sunrise, the travehicular Life-support System. Visor fog-
fogging decreased slightly, but increased ging was attributed to the high respiration
again when the extravehicular pilot expended rate and high humidity conditions in the hel-
any appreciable effort in his tasks. Although met. The pilot reported that he was not ex-
the -Astronaut Maneuvering Unit was finally cessively hot until the time of ingress. It was
donned, the extravehicular activity was concluded that the performance of the Extra-
terminated early because of the visor fog- vehicular Life-support System heat ex-
ging, and the Astronaut Maneuvering Unit changer map have been degraded a t this time
was not evaluated. The pilot experienced because the water supply of the evitporator
further difficulties in moving the hatch in became depleted.
the intermediate position ; however, the As it result of the problems encountered
forces required to close and lock the hatch during the Gemini IX-A extravehicular ac-
were normal. The overall time line for the tivity, several corrective measures were ini-
Gemini IX-A extravehicular activity is tiated. To minimize the susceptibility to visor
shown in figure 11-6. fogging, it WiIS determined that a n antifog
132 G E M I N I S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

solution should be applied to the space-suit for the type of body restraints required and
helmet visors immediately prior to the extra- the magnitude of the forces involved. An
vehicular activity on future missions. Each overshoe type of positive foot restraint wits
extravehicular task planned for the succeed- installed in the spacecraft adapter and was
ing missions was analyzed in greater detail tlesigned to be used for the extravehicular

Ground elawed time


F 4920 +* Ground elapsed time
-
-
50:25 Stopped work on tether hook. Astronaut
Maneuvering Unit inspection
Hatch open -- Unstow attitude control arm
Stand in seat Unstow translational control arn,
- 50:30
--
Reported visor fogged. Rest
Equipment jettisoned. Deploy handrail
Retrieve Experiment SO12 package. Sunrise Unstwv oxygen hose
Position debris cutters --
Opening oxygen supply
- -
5&35
Oxygen valve open. Release nozzle extensions
Mount 16-mm camera - Back into Astronaut Maneuvering Unit. Visor
-- fogged. Rest
70-mm pictures
-
-- 50:40
Switch to Astronaut Maneuvering Unit
-- electrical cable
Attach docking bar mirror
--- 50:45
Umbilical evaluation
-
-
Velcro hand-pad evaluation --- 50.50
-
-
Return to cabin -
- 50:55
Rest
- Sunrise
--
Hand 16-mm camera in
- 51:oO Astronaut Maneuvering Unit activities termin-
Install 16-mm camera -- ated. Waiting for visor to clear
-
Stand in seat -
-
- 51:05 Switch back to umblllcal
- Pilot out of Astronaut Maneuvering Unit
Close hatch
- Pilot back at hatch. Resting
-
Move to adapter. Release handbars
-
- 51:lO
-
-
Standing on foot bar
Position mirrors
Unstow penlights
Connect black tether hoolc
51 20 Visor fogging increased. Taking pictures
Pilot reported hot spots Ingress started
Rest
Connect orange tether hook
51:25
Sunset. High flow on Extravehicular Life
Support System
3ay
51:30 Hatch closed INight

FIGURE
ll-(i.--Gernini IX-.A cxtravehicular time line.
S U M M A R Y OF G E M I N I EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY 133

tasks planned for Gemini XI and XII. The in stowage volume over the %-foot single
analysis showed that all extravehicular tasks umbilical assembly used on Gemini VI11 and
planned for the Gemini X, XI, and XI1 mis- IX-A. The extravehicular equipment for
sions could be accomplished satisfactorily. Gemini X is shown in figure 11-7. For the
As another corrective step, underwater sim- standup extravehicular activity, short exten-
ulation was initiated in a n attempt to dupli- sion hoses were connected to the spacecraft
cate the weightless environment more accu- Environmental Control System to permit the
rately than did the zero-gravity aircraft pilot to stand while remaining on the space-
simulations. craft closed-loop system. The pilot also used
a fabric-strap standup tether to take any
Gemini X loads required to hold him in the cockpit.
The standup activity commenced j u s t after
The prime objective of the Gemini X extra- sunset a t an elapsed flight time of 23 hours
vehicular activity was to retrieve the
Experiment SO10 Agena Micrometeorite
Collection package from the target vehicle
that had been launched for the Gemini VI11
mission. The package was to be retrieved
immediately after rendezvous with the Gem-
ini VI11 target vehicle, and the umbilical
extravehicular activity was to last approxi-
mately one daylight period. In addition, it
was planned to continue the evaluation of the
Hand Held Maneuvering Unit; to retrieve
the Experiment SO12 Gemini Micrometeor-
ite Collection package from the spacecraft
adapter ; and to conduct several photographic.
experiments. Photography was scheduled for
1% orbits during a period of standup extra-
vehicular activity. r===
The extravehicular equipment included the
Extravehicular Life-support System, the im-
proved Hand Held Maneuvering Unit, and
the new tio-foot dual umbilical. One hose in
the umbilical carried the normal spacecraft -
.1. . - .
If
oxygen supply to the Extravehicular Life-
Support System. The other hose carried
nitrogen for the Hand Held Maneuvering
Unit. The umbilical was designed so that the
Hand Held Maneuvering Unit and all oxygen
fittings could be connected before the hatch
was opened; however, the nitrogen supply
for the Hand Held Maneuvering Unit had to
be connected outside the spacecraft' cabin. -.
The configuration and operation of this um-
bilical were simpler than the complicated
connections with the Gemini VI11 and IX-A
equipment. The 50-foot umbilical had the dis-
advantage of requiring a substantial increase FIGURE
L
ll-:.-Gemini X extravehicular system.
134 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

24 minutes, and proceeded normally for the crew elected to terminate the standup.activity
first 30 minutes (fig. 11-8). The pilot was a t this time.
well restrained by the standup tether, and The eye irritation subsided gradually after
since there were no unusual problems with ingress and hatch closure. The cause of the
body positioning, ultraviolet photographs of eye irritation was not known, but was be-
various star fields were taken with no diffi- lieved to be related to the simultaneous use
culty. Immediately after sunrise, both crew- of both compressors in the spacecraft oxy-
members experienced vision interference gen-supply loop to the space suits. The crew
caused by eye irritation and tears, and the verified that, prior to the umbilical extrave-
hicular activity, no significant eye irritation
was experienced when only one suit com-
pressor was used while the cabin was de-
compressed.
The Gemini X umbilical extravehicular ac-
tivity was initiated at an elapsed flight time
Sunset of 48 hours 42 minutes, immediately after
Hatch open
23:25 Equipment jettisoned rendezvous with the Gemini VI11 target ve-
Experiment SO13 camera mounted
IPilot standing in open hatch
hicle. The sequence of events is indicated in
Experiment SO13 photography
figure 11-9. The pilot retrieved the Experi-
ment SO12 Gemini Micrometeorite Collection
Left shoulder strap restraining pilot
package from the exterior of the spacecraft
Pilot feeling warm adapter, then moved outside to connect the
23:35 nitrogen umbilical supply line for the Hand
Held Maneuvering Unit. The pilot then re-
Eight exposures for Experiment SO13 turned to the cockpit. Meanwhile, the com-
2340 mand pilot was flying the spacecraft in close
Pilot starts to cool off
formation 'with the target vehicle (fig.
11-10). With the docking cone of the target
23:45 Twelve out of twenty Experiment SO13
photographs obtained
vehicle approximately 5 feet away, the pilot
pushed off from the spacecraft and grasped
Body positioning no problem the outer lip of the docking cone. In movinp
LmO

I
around the target vehicle to the location of
the Experiment SOlO Apena Micrometeorite
Collection package, the pilot lost his hold on
23:55
the smooth lip of the docking cone and drifted
Sunrise
Experiment SO13 completed away from the target vehicle. He used the
24:OO
Hand Held Maneuvering Unit to translate
Experiment SO13 camera handed to command pilot approximately 15 feet back to the spacecraft.
Pilot lowered sun visor and received The pilot then used the Hand Held Maneu-
Experiment M410 color plate vering Unit to translate to the target vehicle.
24:05
Photographeo color plate On h i s second attempt to move around the
Eye irritation first reported tlockinF: cone, the pilot used the numerous
Color plate discarded
24: 10 wire bundles and struts behind the cone as
Experiment Sa13 bracKet discarded hantlholds, and was able to maintain satis-
Hatch closed factory control of his body position. Re-
0 Day
24:15 INight trieval of the Experiment SOlO Agena
Micrometeorite Collection package was ac-
FIGUREll-8.--Gemini X standup extravehicular complished without difficulty. While carrying
time line. the package, the pilot used the umbilical to
SUM MARY OF GEM IN1 EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY 135

I ’.
‘,Experiment SO10
package

FIGURE11-10.-Beginning of the Gemini X


extravehicular transfer.

-
- Pilot checked out Hand Held Maneuvering Unit hatch was then closed normally. Fifty min-
- lPilot pushed off from spacecraft to target vehicle utes later the crew again opened the right
-- IPilot let go of target vehicle. Translated to space-
1 craft with Hand Held Maneuvering Unit (15 feet)
hatch and jettisoned the Extravehicular Life-
- 49:Oo Extravehicular Life Support System on high flow Support System, the umbilical, and other
- XTranslated to target vehicle with Hand Held miscellaneous equipment not required for the
- Maneuvering Unit (about 12 feet)
-
- remainder of the mission.
- 49:05 Experiment SO10 removed from target vehicle During the umbilical extravehicular ac-
-- Hand-over-hand return using umbilical tivity, the pilot reported the loss of the 70-mm
- Loss of TO-mm still camera reported
- still camera. The camera had been fastened
-
-
49:lO to the Extravehicular Life-support System
Hand Held Maneuvering Unit nitrogen line
- disconnected near hatch with a lanyard, but the attaching screw came
- Ingress commenced
r loose. It was also discovered that the Experi- .
49:15 Pilot untangling umiiilical ment SO12 Gemini Micrometeorite Collection
package had been accidentally thrown out

i
4920 Hatch Closed
or had drifted out of the hatch. The package
had been stowed in a pouch with an elastic
top, but appeared to have been knocked free
49:25 while the 50-foot umbilical was being un-
tangled.
Sunset
0 Day The principal lessons learned from the ex-
49:30 Night . travehicular phase of this mission included
the following:
FIGURE11-9.-Gemini X umbilical extravehicular (11 Preparation foi- extravehicular ac-
time line.
tivity was an important task for which the
full-time attention of both crewmembers was
pull himself back to the cockpit. At this time, desirable. Combining a rendezvous with a
the spacecraft propellant supply had reached passive target vehicle and the extravehicular
the lower limit allotted for the extravehicu- activity preparation caused the crew to be
lar activity and the station-keeping opera- rushed, and did not allow the command pilot
tion, and the extravehicular activity was to give the pilot as much assistance as had
terminated. been planned.
During the first attempt to ingress, the ( 2 ) The tasks of crew transfer and equip-
pilot became entangled in the 50-foot umbili- ment retrieval from another satellite could
cal. Several minutes of effort were required be accomplished in a deliberate fashion with-
by both crewmembers to free the pilot from out excessive workload. Formation flying
the umbilical so that he could ingress. The with another satellite could be accomplished
136 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

readily by coordination of thruster operation


between the command pilot and the extra-
vehicular pilot.
( 3 ) Equipment not securely tied down
was susceptible to drifting away during ex-
travehicular activity, even when precautions
were being taken.
( 4 ) The bulk of the 50-foot umbilical was
a greater inconvenience than had been an-
ticipated. The stowage during normal flight
and the handling during ingress macle this
length undesirable.

Gemini XI

The prime objectives of the Gemini XI


extravehicular activity were to attach a 100-
foot tether between the spacecraft and the
target vehicle, and to provide a more exten-
sive evaluation of the Hand Held Maneuver-
ing Unit. In addition, several experiments,
including ultraviolet photography, were
scheduled for standup extravehicular ac-
tivity. ,The umbilical extravehicular activity
was scheduled for the morning of the second
day: so that the spacecraft/target-vehicle
tether evaluation could be accomplished later
in that same day.
The equipment (fig. 11-11) for the Gem-
ini XI extravehicular activity was the same
as for the Gemini X mission, except that the
dual umbilical was shortened from 50 to 30
feet to reduce the stowage and handling
problems. An Apollo sump-tank module was
FIGURE11-11.-Gemini S I extravehicular system.
mounted in the spacecraft adapter section,
and incorporated two sequence cameras de-
signed for retrieval during extravehicular camera. After the camera was secured, the
activity. The Hand Held Maneuvering Unit pilot indicated that he was fatigued and out
was also stowed in the adapter section. A of breath. The pilot then moved to the front
molded overshoe type of foot restraint was of the spacecraft, and assumed a straddle
provided for body restraint while perform- position on the Rendezvous and Recovery
ing tasks .in the spacecraft adapter (fig. Section in preparation for hoo!ting up the
11-12). , spacecraft/'target-vehicletether. While main-
The Gemini XI umbilical extravehicular taining position and attaching the tether, the
activity was init?atecl at an elapsed flight
~
pilot expended a high level of effort f o r sev-
time of 24 hours 2 minutes. Almost imme- eral minutes. After returning to the cockpit
diately, there were indications of difficulty. to rest, the pilot continued to breathe very
The first significant task after egress was to heavily and was apparently fatigued. In view
position and secure the external sequence of the unknown effort required for the re-
SUMMARY OF GEMINI EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY 137

Day
Night
Ground elaDSed time
24:OO Seven minutes after sunrise
-
- Hatch open
-
- Standing in hatch
-
- 24:05 Handrail deployed
Experiment SO09 retrieved
-
-- Extravehicular camera mounted
-
- 24:10
Pilot at spacecraft nose
Resting
-- Attaching spacecraftltarget-vehicle tether
- Tether on
--- 24:15 Tether secured
Return to hatch
- Resting
FIGUREll-l2.-Foot restraints installed in the -
adapter section for Gemini XI and XI1 missions.
--- 24:20 Start film change

-- Film change complete


maining tasks, the crew elected to terminate -- 24:25 Resting while standing in hatch
the extravehicular activity prior to the end --
of the first daylight period. Ingress and -
hatch closure were readily accomplished. The --
--
2430
time line for the umbilical extravehicular ac-
Extravehicular camera demounted
tivity is shown in figure 11-13. Ingress complete
The Gemini XI standup extravehicular ac- 24:35 W a t c h closed
tivity was initiated a t an elapsed flight time
of 46 hours 6 minutes, just prior to sunset.
The cre.w began the ultraviolet stellar. pho- k- 24:40 Seven minutes before sunset
0 Day
Night

tographi as soon a s practical after sunset, FIGURE11-iX-Gemini XI umbilical extravehicular


and the photography of s t a r patterns was time line,
readily accomplished. The extravehicular
pilot operated a t a very low work level, since
he was well restrained by the standup tether. hiculw environment to demonstrate the dif-
As in the Gemini X standup extravehicular ficulties of the initial extravehicular tasks.
activity, the crew had little difficulty with the ( 3 ) The requirement to perform a mis-
standup tasks. After completing the planned sion-critical task immediately after egress
activities (fig. 11-14), the pilot ingressed did not allow the pilot an opportunity to be-
and closed the hatch without incident. come accustomed to the environment. This
Discussions with the crew and analysis of factor probably caused the pilot to work
the onboard films after the flight revealed faster than was desirable.
several factors which contributed to the high ( 4 ) The high workloads may have re-
rate of exertion during the umbilical activity sulted in a concentration of carbon dioxide
and the subsequent exhaustion of the pilot. i n the space-suit helmet high enough to cause
The factors included the following : the increased respiration rate and the appar-
(1) The lack of body restraints required a ent exhaustion. Although there was no meas-
high level of physical effort to maintain a urement of carbon-dioxide concentration in
straddle position on the nose of the space- flight. there was a n indication of a n increase
craft. in concentration at high workloads during
(2) The zero-gravity aircraft simulations testing of the Extravehicular Life-support
had not sufficiently duplicated the extrave- System. For workloads far above design lim-
138 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

Oav
Night Night
Ground elapsed time 4 Ground elapsed time
V '
I
r 46:OO
F 47:10

Hatch open Standing by for sunset

Standing in hatch

Experiment SO13 camera installed


Sunset

Experiment SO13 photography


Pictures of Shaula

Crew napping

Looked for stars. Not visible


Sunset

Pictures of Antares
Agena Attitude Control System on

Pictures of Orion
Pictures of Shaula

Sighted fires in Australia

Sunrise

Pictures of Orion

Pictures of Houston

Experiment SO13 photography completed


General photography
Hatch closed

0 Day
Sunrise INight

FIGURE
11-14.-Geinini XI standup est rnvchicular tinw line.
SUMMARY OF GEMINI EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY 139

its, this concentration could reach values that


would cause physiological symptoms, includ-
ing high respiration rates and decreased
work tolerances.

Gemini XI1

The results of the Gemini XI mission


raised significant questions concerning man's
ability to perform extravehicular activity
satisfactorily with the existing knowledge of
the tasks and environment. The Gemini X
umbilical activity results had established
confidence in the understanding of extrave-
hicular restraints and of workload ; however, FIGUREll-l6.-Gemini XI1 extravehicular work
the Gemini XI results indicated the need for station on Target Docking Adapter.
further investigation. The Gemini XI1 extra-
vehicular activity was then redirected from
a n evaluation of the Astronaut Maneuvering The flight-crew training for the Gemini
Unit to a n evaluation of body restraints antl XI1 extravehicular activity was expanded to
extravehicular workload. Attachment of the include two periods of intensive underwater
spacecraft 'target-vehicle tether and ultra- simulation and training (fig. 11-18). Dur-
violet. stellar photography were other objec- ing these simulations, the pilot followed the
tives. The extravehicular equipment for the intended flight procedures, and duplicated
Gemini XI1 mission included a new work the planned umbilical extravehicular activity
station in the spacecraft adapter (fig. 11- on an. end-to-end basis. The procedures and
15), a new work station on the Target Dock- times for each event were established, antl
ing Adapter (fig. 11-16), and several added were used to schedule the final inflight task
body restraints and handholds. The pilot's sequence. The underwater training supple-
extravehicular equipment (fig. 11-17) was mented extensive ground training and zero-
nearly identical to that of Gemini IX-A. gravity aircraft simul.<\ t'ions.
To increase the margin for success and to
provide ii suitable period of acclimatization
to the environment before the performance
of any critical tasks. the standup extrave-
hicular activity was scheduled prior to the
umbilical activity. The planned extravehicu-
lar activity time line was intentionally
interspersed with 2-minute rest periods. Pro-
cedures were also established for monitoring
the heart rate and respiration rate of the
extravehicular pilot; the crew were to be
advised of any indications of a high rate of
exertion before the condition became serious.
Finally, the pilot was trained to operate a t it
moderate work rate, and fliaht and grountl
personnel were instructed in the importance
ll-l5.-Gemini XI1 adapter provisions for
FIGURE of workload control. '

extravehicular activity. The first standup extravehicular activity


140 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

FIGURE
ll-l8.-Underwater simulation of Gemini
XI1 extravehicular activity.

FIGURE
ll-l'i.--Gemini XI1 estravchiculai~system.
The umbilical extravehicular activity prep-
arations proceeded smoothly, and the hatch
was very similar to that of the two previous was opened within 2 minutes of the planned
missions. As indicated by the time line in time (fig. 11-20). The use of waist tethers
figure 11-19, the ultraviolet stellar and the during the initial tasks on the Target Dock- .
synoptic terrain photography experiments ing Adapter enabled the pilot t o rest easily,
were accomplished on a routine basis. During to work without great effort, and to connect
the standup activity, the pilot performed sev- the spacecraft /target-vehicle tether in a n
eral tasks designed for familiarization with expeditious manner. In addition, the pilot
the environment and for comparison of the activated the Experiment SO10 Agena Micro-
meteorite Collection package on the target
standup and umbilical extravehicular activi-
vehicle for possible future retrieval. Prior t o
ties. These tasks included mounting the ex- the end of the first daylight period, t h e pilot
travehicular sequence camera and installing moved to the spacecraft adapter where he
an extravehicular handrail from the cabin evaluated the work tasks of torquing bolts,
to the docking adapter on the target vehicle. making and breaking electrical and fluid con-
The standup activity was completed without nectors, cutting cables and fluid lines, hooking
incident. rings and hooks, and stripping patches of
SUMMARY OF GEMINI EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY 141

5
Day
Night F;m15elapsed time

r-
-
20:45

-
Hatch open -
19:30 - 20:50
Install Experiment SO13 camera -
-
Evaluate standup dynamics -
-
19:35
-- 2035
-
-
-
19:40 - 21:oo
-
-
-
Sunset -
-- 21:05
- Retrieve extravenicular camera

- 21:lO
-
Experiment SO13 photography - Sunset
-

Sunrise
Install extravehicular camera
Deploy handrail
Take down Experiment SO13 camera for
grating change

Ketrieve Experiment SO12 micrometeorite package

Install handbar to Target Docking Adapter cone


- 21:50
Install Experiment SO13 camera
-
-
-
-- 21:55
-
Retrieve Gemini Launch Vehicle contamination discs - Hatch closed
-
General photography -
- 22:oo

FICURE
ll-l9.-G(mini
1 -
-
-
-22:05
XI1 first standup estravc.hicular time line.
0 Day
INight
7 42 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

0
N It Night
Ground elapsed time Ground elapsed time
$ 42:35 43:45

Disconnecting and connecting


electrical connectors
43:50 Rest

t Removing cutters from pouch


Cutting wire strands and fluid hose
4355
Sunrise
Loosening Saturn bolt
Hatch open. Extravehicular Life j Removed feet from foot restraints.
Support System in high flow 44:oO Evaluating waist tethers
Standup familiarization Saturn bolt removed
Rest
Evaluate extravehicular camera installation
Saturn bolt installed
Rest Saturn bolt tight
Evaluating hooks and rings
Rest
Move to nose on handrail
Attach waist tether to handrail. Evaluate rest position Pulling Velcro strips
Hookup spacecraftltarget-vehicle tether Connecting electrical connectors

Feet in foot restraints


Tether hookup complete
Retrieve adaDter camera. Sunrise

Activate Experiment SO10 micrometeorite Move to cockpit


on target vehicle
Install extravehicular camera
Prepare Target Docking Adapter work stati'on Move to Target Docking Adapter
and hookup waist tethers

Rest

Observing hydrogen vent outlet Disconnect and connect electrical


Return to hatch area and rest and fluid connectors
Evaluate Apollo torque wrench
Hand extravehicular camera to command pilot
Pick up adapter camera from command pilot
Move to adapter section Disconnect one waist tether and evaluate
Position feet in fixed loot restraints. bolt torquing task
Install adapter extravehicular activity camera Jettison waist tethers and handholds
Evaluate torquing task with no waist tethers
Rest and general evaluation of foot restraints
Wiping command pilot's window
Return to cockpit
Unstow pen Iights Observing thrusters f i r i n g

Start ingress
Sunset Day
Torquing bolthead with torque wrench Hatch closed Night

FIGURE
11-20.-Gemini XI1 umbilical extravehicular time line.
S U M M A R Y OF GEMINI EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY 143

Velcro. The tasks were accomplished using missions demonstrated the ability to control
either the two foot restraints or the waist the extravehicular workload and to maintain
tethers, and both systems of restraint proved the workload within the limits of the life-
satisfactory. support system and the capabilities of the
During the second daylight period of the pilot. Standup and umbilical extravehicular
umbilical activity. the pilot returned to the operations were accomplished during eight
target vehicle and performed tasks a t a small
work station on the outside of the docking
cone. The tasks were similar to those in the
spacecraft adapter and, in addition, included t
Ground elapsed time
an Apollo torque wrench. The pilot further
evaluated the use of two waist tethers, one Hatch open
waist tether, and no waist tether. At the end
of the scheduled extravehicular activity, the Equipment jettisoned
pilot returned to the cabin and ingressed
without difficulty.
A second standup extravehicular activity Sunset
was conducted (fig. 11-21). Again, this ac-
tivity was routine and without problems. The
objectives were accomplished, and all the 6620
attempted tasks were satisfactorily com- Ultraviolet photography of stars
pleted.
The results of the Gemini XI1 extravehicu- 6625
lar activity showed that all the tasks at-
tempted were feasible when body restraints
Exercise
were used to maintain position. The results 66:30
also showed that the extravehicular workload
could be controlled within desired limits by
the application of proper procedures and in-
doctrination. The final, and perhaps the most
significant, result was the confirmation that
the underwater simulation duplicated the
actual extravehicular environment with a
high degree of fidelity. I t was concluded that
any task which could be accomplished readily
in a valid underwater simulation would have -
a high probability of success during actual -
extravehicular activity. -
- 6650
-
-
Extravehicular Capabilities Demonstrated -
-
- 66:55
In the course of the Gemini missions, a -
-
number of capabilities were demonstrated -
67:oO
which met or exceeded the original objectives Hatch closed
of extravehicular activity. The basic feasi- 0 Day
bility of extravehicular activity was well es- I Night
67:OS
tablished by the 11 hatch openings and the
more than 12 hours of operations in the en- FICIJRE
11-21.--Gemini XI1 second standup extra-
vironment outside the spacecraft. The Gemini vehicular time line. I
144 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

separate nighttime periods to confirm the ties on three missions and the extravehicular
feayibility of extravehicular operations a t sequence photographs taken with the camera
night. mounted outside the spacecraft cabin.
The need for handholds for transit over The dynamics of motion on a short tether
the exterior surface of the spacecraft was were evaluated on two missions. The only
shown, and the use of several types of fixed tether capability that was demonstrated was
and portable handholds and handrails was for use as a distance-limiting device.
satisfactorily demonstrated. The requirements for body restraints were
The capability to perform tasks of varying established, and the capabilities of foot re-
complexity was demonstrated. The character straints and waist tethers were demonstrated
( J f practical tasks was shown, and some of the i n considerable detail. The validity of under-
factors that limit task complexity and diffi- water simulation in solving body restraint
culty were identified. problems and in assessing workloads was
Several methods were demonstrated for demonstrated in flight and further confirmed
crew transfer between two space vehicles and by postflight evaluation.
include : (1) surface transit while docked. ( 2 ) In summary, the Gemini missions demon-
free-floating transit between two undocked strated the basic techniques required for the
vehicles in close proximity, ( 3 ) self-propul- imxluctive use of extravehicular activity.
sion between two undocked vehicles, and ( 4 ) Problem areas were defined sufficiently to
tether or umbilical pull-in from one undocked indicate the preferred equipment and proce-
vehicle to another. All of these methods were diires for extravehicular activity in future
accomplished within a maximum separation space' programs.
distance of 15 feet.
The Hand Held Maneuvering Unit was Extravehicular Limitations and Solutions
evaluated briefly, but successfully, on two
different missions. When the maneuvering While most of the Gemini extravehicular
unit was used, the extravehicular pilots ac- activities were successful, several areas of
complished the maneuvers without feeling significant limitations were encountered.
disoriented and without loss of control. Space-suit mobility restrictions. constituted
Retrieval of equipment from outside the one basic limitation which affected all the
spacecraft was demonstrated on four mis- mission results. The excellent physical capa-
sions. One equipment retrieval was accom- bilities and conditions of the flight crews
plished from an unstabilized passive target tended to obscure the fact that moving
vehicle, which had been in orbit for more around in the Gemini space suit was a sig-
than 4 months. nificant work task. Since the suit design had
Gemini X demonstrated the capability for already been established for the flight phase
the command pilot to maneuver in close prox- of the Gemini Program, the principal solu-
imity to the target vehicle while the pilot was tion WRS to optimize the tasks and body re-
outside the spacecraft. The close-formation straints to be compatible with the space suits.
flying was successfully accomplished by coor- For the 2-hour extravehicular missions, glove
dinating the thruster firings of the command mobility and hand fatigue were limiting fac-
pilot with the extravehicular maneuvers of tors, both in training and in flight.
the pilot. No damage nor indication of immi- The size and location of the Extravehicular
nent hazard occurred during the operation. Life-Support System chest pack was a con-
Photography from outside the spacecraft stant encumbrance to the crews. This design
was accomplished on each extravehicular \‘:as selected because of space limitations
mission. The most successful examples were within the spacecraft, and the crews were
the ultraviolet stellar spectral photographs continually hampered by the bulk of the
taken during standup extravehicular activi- chest-mounted system.
SUMMARY OF GEMINI EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY 145

The use of gaseous oxygen a s the coolant Equipment retention during extravehicular
.
medium in the space suit and Extravehicular activity was a problem for all items which
Life-Support System was a limiting factor were not tied down o r securely fastened. By
in the rejection of metabolic heat and in pilot extensive use of equipment lanyards, the loss
comfort. The use of a gaseous system re- of equipment was avoided during the last two
quired the evaporation of perspiration as a missions.
cooling mechanism. At high workloads, heavy
perspiration and high humidity within the Concluding Remarks
suit were certain to occiIr. These factors were
evident on the missions where the workloads The results of the Gemini extravehicular
exceeded the planned values. As in the case activity led to the following conclusions :
of suit mobility, the cooling system design (1) Extravehicular operation in free space
was fixed for the Gemini Program; hence, is feasible and useful for productive tasks if
any corrective action had to be in the area adequate attention is given to body restraints,
of controlling the workload. task sequence, workload control, realistic sim-
Work levels and metabolic rates could not ulations, and proper training. Extravehicular
be measured in flight; however., the flight re- activity should be considered for use in future
sults indicated that the design limits were missions where a specific need exists, and
probably exceeded several times. Inflight where the activity will provide a significant
work levels were controlled by providing
contribution to science o r manned space
additional body restraints, allowing a gen-
erous amount of time for each task, and flight.
establishing programed rest periods between ( 2 ) Space-suit mobility restrictions were
tasks. These steps, coupled with the under- significant limiting factors in the tasks which
water simulations techniques, enabled the could be accomplished in Gemini extravehicu-
Gemini XI1 pilot to control the workload well lar activity. For future applications, priority
within the design limits of the Extravehicular efforts should be given to improving the mo-
Life-support System. tility of space suits, especially a r m and glove ,
The Gemini XI results emphasized the mobility.
limitations of the zero-gravity aircraft simu-
(2) The Extravehicular Life-support Sys-
lations and of ground training without
weightless simulation. These media were use- tem performed satisfactorily on all Gemini
f u l but incomplete in simulating all extra- missions. The necessity for a chest-mounted
vehicular tasks. The use of underwater simu- location caused some encumbrance to the
lation for development of procedures and for extravehicular pilots. The use of gaseous
crew training proved effective for Gemini cooling is undesirable for the increased work-
XII. loads which may be encountered in future
The sequence in which extravehicular extravehicular activity. ~

events were scheduled seemed to correlate ( 4 ) Underwater simulation provides a


with the ease of accomplishment. There ap- high-fidelity duplication of the extravehicular
peared to be a period of acclimatization to environment, and is effective for procedures
the extravehicular environment. The pilots
development and crew training. There is
who first completed a standup extravehicular
activity seemed more a t ease during the strong evidence indicating t h a t tasks which
umbilical activity ; therefore, it appears that can he' readily accomplished in a valid under-
critical extravehicular tasks should not be water simulation can also be accomplished in
scheduled until the pilot has had an oppor- orbit. Cnderwater simulation should be used
tunity to familiarize himself with the en- f o r procedures development and crew train-
vironment. ing for future extravehicular missions.
146 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

(5) 1,oose equipment must be tied down at capabilities or limitations of this equipment.
ill1 times dining extravehicular activity to Further evaluations in orbital flight should
avoid loss. be conducted.
( 6 ) The Hand Held Maneuvering Unit is ( 7 ) The Gemini Program has provided a
pi-omising as a personal transportation device foundation of technical and operational
i l l free space: however, the evaluations to knowledge on which to base future extra-
date have beeii too brief to define the f u l l vehicular activity in subsequent programs.
OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE
12. RADIATION ENVIRONMENT AT HIGH ORBITAL
ALTITUDES
By PETERW. HICCINS.Space Physics Division, Science nnd Applications Directorale, N A S A Manned Space-
cralt Center: JOSEPH C . LILL, Sprrce Physics Division. Science iind Applicntions Directorate, NASA
Manned Spacecrall Center: and T I M O T H Y T. Wi I ITE. Space Physics Division, Science arid Applica-
tiorrs Directorate, .KAS.4 Manned Spacecmfl Center

Introduction electrons has been decaying. The decay fol-


lows the relationship
The Gemini X and XI space flights were @t/r (1)
highlighted by high-altitude apogees achieved where ~t is the elapsed time in days from the
by firing the Primary .Propulsion System of test, and T is the decay parameter. The energy
the Gemini Agena Target Vehicle. In both of these trapped electrons ranges from sev-
flights, the docked spacecraft1target-vehicle eral thousand to several million electron volts,
combinations were carried much higher into but with a fast dropoff in intensity with
the Van Allen trapped radiation belt than evergy. The electrons are especially hazard-
ever before in manned space flight. ous to lightly shielded spacecraft.
This paper deals with the radiation envi- Figure 12-2 shows the spacial distribution
ronment at these altitudes and the effect of of protons. These protons result from natural
the environment on the two missions. An causes and seem to remain relatively constant
attempt will be made to describe the premis- in intensity with time. The energy of the pro-
sion radiation planning for the flights, the tons ranges from a few thousand electron
inflight radiation measurements, the results volts to hundreds of million electron volts.
of the postflight data analysis, and the pre-
liminary conclusions.
.. ’ August 1W; omnidirectional flux,
elec/cm*/sec: energy > O.5MeV
Mission Planning Radiation Analysis

Environment Model

The radiation environment at the altitudes


under consideration was previously mapped
by unmanned satellites. The environment is
composed of electrons and protons trapped in
the Earth’s magnetic field. Figure 12-1 shows
the electron distribution. A large portion of
the electrons were injected into space by a
high-altitude nuclear test conducted by the
United States in July 1962. These electrons
augmented the natural electrons by several
orders of magnitude and produced a dan- 3.0’0 1.10 210 3:O 4.10 5.10 6.;
gerous radiation environment in near-Earth
space. It has been observed that, fortunately, FIGURE12-1.-Electron distribution in the Earth’s
the intensity of these artificially injected field.

Preceding page blank 149


150 GEMINI SUM MARY CONFERENCE

Belore Sept. 23. 1963; omnidirectional flux


protons/cm*/sec. energy s34 MeV / i
------_____

Sohh
Atlantic

FIGURE
12-3.--South Atlantic anomaly diagram.
.4 .8 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.8 3.2
-

FIGURE
12-2.-Proton distribution in the Earth’s the tilt of the dipole rotates the region of
field. close q ~ p r o a c hsouthward from the equator
to the general vicinity of the South Atlantic.
The higher energy protons are quite pene- Since the Earth’s magnetic field rotates with
trating and would contribute a radiation the Earth, the region remains in this loca-
within almost any spacecraft. tion, and has been named the “South Atlantic
Electron and proton intensities and spectra wnomaly.” In this location, the radiation belt
for near-Earth space have been carefully ana- extends to the top of the atmosphere. Figure
lyzed and all of the recent satellite data have 12-4 shows the South Atlantic anomaly as
I)een assembled into an environmental model viewed on a constant altitude contour of 160
(refs. 1 and 2 ) . Since the electrons are time nautical miles.
dependent, the environment was presented The radiation fluxes and associated spectra
a s that which would have existed in August of the trapped electrons and protons in the
1964. With the use of equation ( l ) ,this envi- South Atlantic anomaly have been measured
ronment can be modified to apply to other by the following experiments flown aboard
times. several Gemini flights :

South Atlantic Anomaly Experi-


ment no. Subject Mission

Although the spacial distribution of the M404 .........I Proton-electron IV, VI1
trapped radiation is generally symmetrical spectrometer
M406 ......... Tri-axis magnetometer IV,VII, X,XI1
in azimuth, the exception to this is quite M408 ......... Beta spectrometer x, XI1
important at lower altitudes. I t should be M409 .........1 Bremsstrahlung x,XI1
spectrometer
i.ecalled that the magnetic field of the Earth -.
is approximately that which may be described
l)y a dipole magnet at the center of the Earth These experiments measured the exterior
(fig. 12-3). Actually, this idealized dipole spacecraft radiation environment during all
magnet is both displaced from and tilted with four flights and the interior cabin radiation
respect to the rotational axis of the Earth. environment during Gemini X and XII. The
Recause of the displacement of the imaginary p~.eliminaryresults of these experiments pro-
dipole location, a region of trapped radiation duced a valuable description of the radiation
(indicated by dots in fig. 12-3) is closer to levels in the South Atlantic anomaly a t Gem-
the Earth’s surface on one side. In addition, ini altitudes. At these altitudes the previous
RADIATION ENVIRONMENT AT H ICH ORBITAL ALTITUDES 151

FIGURE12-4.-Location of radiation fluxes in the South Atlantic anomaly for 1G0-nautical-mile altitude, 28.5"
orbital ground track.

satellite model environments relied on very al)out ii point on the body of a crewman intro-
limited (lata and were consequently inaccu- dtrces another error factor into the calcula-
rate. tions. I n the case in point, the shielding atten-
The experiment results obtained duri.ng iiiiticn protluced by the Gemini spacecraft,
Gemini IV and VI1 were used in the pre- Ihe shielcling geometry is quite complex. The
mission planning of the Gemini X and XI .<hielcling description resulting from a n ex-
flights to define it realistic time rate of artifi- ;!mination of the Gemini spacecraft mechani-
cial electron belt decay. cal drawings is estimated to be accurate only
to within ii factor of 2 in the siibseyiient cal-
culatioii of txtliation dose within. Fina!ly,
al'tei- assumption of' an environment and the
Katliation-dose calculations itre made hy de- :ttteilLtiltion of the environment by the space-
term i ni ng the ratliu t ion environment within craft shielding, ii proLd~leerror i*esiilts in
the spaceci*aft and its i.esult:tnt effect on the the c~ilculationof ii tissue close to it men.-
c i ~ wThe
. exterior environment, the attenua- mt.ml)et.. The' error arises from the iincer-
tion by the spacecraft, and the. response of tttinty t h a t i t s an individual piwton or elec-
the body to the i*;ttli;ition must till he con- ti.on 1)rogresses into t h e h u m m body, it will
sitletwl in the c:tlculiitions. In practice. the deposit its energy in ii certiiin volume of the
c:tlculaiion of ratli:ttion (lose is performed a t tissue, and from the uncertainty that the
intervals itlong the spacecr;ift trajectory and l i s s i i c b will respond in it precise biological way
then summed to expi'ess it total close. to the dose. The conversion from tlux a t the
A 1)recise calculatiori of radiation dose re- (lose point to dose i n the Gemini calcul.'1 t'10ns
ceived by ii ciwvmitn is prohibited by the is also estimatetl to I)e :tccut*ate to within ii
ti 11certain facto rs i n the calculations. The fitctol. of 2 o r :3.
tlefinition of the radiation environment used The uncertainties just described rarely add
is cwtimatetl to represent the actual environ- a t the same point in the ca1cul:ition. Instead,
ment only to within ii factor of 2 or :: each uncertainty may Le treated a s a mathe-
when the variations of particle flux, energy. mutical distribution with the factor men-
and tlii.ection of motion itre considered. In tioned a s it deviation from the mean. I n any
addition, the description of the shielding oiie calculation for an individual particle, the
152 GEMINI S I I M M A K Y CONFERENCE

i.esiiltaiit error ;ipproxim:ites a random sam- lhc Gemini X projected (lose was within the
])ling from each of th(1 three distributions. ;illouablc ixtfiation limits f o r space flight.
I n the end. all the uncertainties mentioned The !)i*edicted dose for the two-revolution
r-onibiiie to prodi1c.c an uncertainty factor of high-altitude portion of the Gemini XI mis-
;tl)oiit 3 i n the published dose. sioii \vas less than 1 millirad, and indicated
I n figure 12-5, the 1)refiirht estimate of the that the Gemini XI high-altitude passes
radiation tlose per revolution is i i function of would subject the flight c r e u to an insirsnifi-
oi'bital position for 21 160-nautical-mile cir- c;itit amount of radiation. This seemed rea-
culm orbit. The dashed curve represents the son;il)le since the Gemini XI flight would
dose using the A i i g ~ i s t 1964 model without :ichie\.o ;tpogee away from the anomaly, but
consideration of' decay : the solid line shows not high eiiough to penetrate the intense
the dose dec;iyed to time of flight. The orbits i*egionsof' ti*apl)eclrtitliation.
are identified l)y ii symbol \vhich is used again
t o denote the dose per revolution foi- each P r o t e c t ion o f SOO!) Experiment Package
i.evolution. The effect of the South Atlantic
;tnomaly is clearly indicated. At this altitude, 'I'hca high-altitude excursion of Gemini XI
vii*tualIy a11 of' the i*atli;ition dose is received MYIS not exlbected to pose a crew safety prob-
during the six orbits passing through the lem sincc the radiation doses were anticipated
anomaly. 1 ( I Le \.el.\' loa. ; however, the exterior flux of
The preflight estimate of the radiation dose piwt ons at these high altitudes presented a
per revolution is shown in figure 12-6 for the t h i w t to an importmt onboard experiment
Gemini X high-altitude orbits. The dose a s of' i);tck:igv. The I)ackaze w a s t h e Gotldard Space
August 1964 and the dose decayed t o the time Flight Center/ Naval Research Laboratories
of flight tire plotted. Figure 12-6 illustrates cosmic-ray tletectoi. designated as scientific
the dramatic increase in dose diie to achieving Eslwriment. Soon, Nuclear Emulsions. If the
high altitudes in the anomaly. In this case, c>xperiment werc successful, an unshielded,
the decayed dose increased by a factor of up time-differentiated, nuclear emulsion would
to 50 in comparable revolutions : however, h e exposed ;it several magnetic latitudes out-

FIGURE
12-5.-Variation in radiation dose in South Atlantic anomaly. Circular orbit, 160 nautical miles.
RADIATION ENVIRONMENT AT HIGH ORBITAL ALTITUDES 153

FIGURE12-6.-Variation in radiation dose in the South Atlantic anomaly for Gemini X. Orbit, 160 by 400
nautical miles.

side the Earth’s atmosphere for the first time. in the Southelm Hemis1)hei.e over Australia)
Subsequent identification of the cosmic rays satisfied the minimum protqn flux condition
recorded in the emulsions was considered of and the flight-plan constraints. The numerical
prime scientific importance in determining results of t h i s analysis are indicated in figure
-
the composition of cosmic rays. Therefore, it 12,7. A third revolution was considered as a
was. considered imperative. that the high- safety factor, i n the event that descent to a
altitude excursion of Gemini XI not jeopard- lower altitude had to be postponed for one
ize the success of this experiment by exposure two1ution.
to the higher fluxes of Van Allen belt protons The electrons were not expoctetl to produce
(fig. 12-2) present at the higher altitudes. i i hackground in the emulsion because .the
These protons could have rapidly ruined the. experiment package, located on the exterior
emulsion in the experiment by producing an surface of the spacecr;ift atllipter, was to be
intense background from which the charac-
~ i*etrioved 1j.v the extixvehicu1;il- pilot and
teristic cosmic-ray tracks could not have been placed in the crew ntatioii footwell before t h e
distinguished. high-apogee orbits. The i*elatively heavy
In establishing the flight plan for Gemini shielding pi*ovitled by the footwell would
XI, many possible locations for firing the screen the lightly penetrating electi*ons, but
target-vehicle Primary Propulsion System to woultl not completely attenuate the protons.
achieve the high-altitude orbits were exam-
ined for potential proton exposure. The high- lnfligh t Measurements
altitude damage threshold of the Experiment
SO09 package was established us 2 x 10; During the Gemini X tincl X I missions, ;in
proton/cm2 within the emulsion. Upon exami- active radiation dosimeter was utilized to
nation, most of the possible locations for enhance flight safety by providing ii real-
initiating the firing had to be discarded. The time measurement of the r:idiation-dose anti
result of this analysis showed that initiating (lose rate. and to take :itlvnnt;ige of the high-
the high-altitude maneuver over the Canary :tltitutle portio11 of the flight to obtain valu-
Islands (so that the apogee would he achieved dile r:itli;ition tltita. This instrument (fig.
GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

Orbit 28
(2.6 X lo5 )

West + East
Longitude, deg

FIGURE lZ-'i.--Proton flux for Gemini XI

12-8). which was designated the Gemini


Rit (1 i ati on Monitoring System, w a s designed.
tle\.elopetl, ant1 fabricated z i t the Manned
Spacecraft Center especially for these flights.
The Gemini Ratli;ition Monitoring System
consisted of two separate dosimeters sharing
the same package. Each dosimeter had an ion
chamber, electronics, ;ind batteries. One closi-
meter sensed the (lose rate between 0.1 and
700 rads 'hr and the reading was indicated
on the large meter face. The other dosimeter
was an integrating sensor that accumulated
the dose in rads with time. This reading was
indicated on the small register and ranged
from 0.01 to 99.99 rads. The switch in the
center was used to snub the dose-rate meter
needle to prevent launch vibration damage
to the delicate meter movement. The readings
from the Gemini Radiation Monitoring Sys-
tem approximated the skin dose at the loca-
tion of the instrument. No direct measure-
ment of the depth (lose was made in real time. FIGURE
12-8.-Gemini Radiation Monitoring System.
RADIATION ENVIRONMENT AT HIGH ORBITAL ALTITUDES 155

During the two high-altitude flights, the presents the inflight crew radiation reports .
Gemini Radiation Monitoring System was of the readings from the Gemini Radiation
stowed aboard the spacecraft until shortly Monitoring System. In neither mission did
before the maneuver for attaining the high- the readings have any influence on the flight,
apogee orbits. After the Gemini Radiation since the reported values were well below
Monitoring System was unstowed, it was the preplanned mission allowable dose limits.
placed a t head height between the crewmen Passive dosimeters have been worn by
on the Gemini X mission, and was affixed to crewmembers on all manned Gemini flights.
the inside of the left hatch on the Gemini XI The passive dosimeters were packaged in
mission. In either case, the instrument was plastic (fig. 12-9) and contained : thermal
read before the high-altitude excursion in luminescent powder which, when heated, ra-
order to establish a baseline reading. Subse- diates visible light proportionate to the radia-
quent readings were made near the high tion absorbed ; and various nuclear emulsions
apogees, and the dose values were reported which, under microscopic analysis, determine
to the ground flight controllers. Table 12-1 the extent of radiation exposure. The meas-

Mission
Greenwich mean
time, hr:min
Ground elapsed
time, hr:min Reading netwnrk station
I
. Dose, rad

X 3:34 654 Rose Knot Victor 0.00


4:49 8:OS Rose Knot Victor .04
459 8:20 Rose Knot Victor .I8
597 8:37 Tananarive 23
1453 18:14 .78
Postflight .91
XI 19:49 29:09 Rose Knot Victor .oo
752 41:14 Carnarvon .0'2
10:02 4323 Carnarvon .02
Postflight

I1
.03
(After background
removed)
I

ured doses approximated a normal skin dose


a t the location of the dosimeter. A summary
of the measurements f o r all manned Gemini
Hights is provided in table 12-11.

Postflight Analysis of Radiation Data

The Gemini IX-A readings (table 12-111)


are representative of Gemini missions not,
attaining the high altitude. The table con-
trasts the increase in dose due to t h e Gemini
X high-altitude passes through the South At-
lantic anomaly with the negligible doses re-
FIGURE12-9.-Gemini passive dosimeter. ceived on Gemini XI after a much higher
156 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

TABLE12-II.-Passiwc~ Dosimeter Results The proton environment calculated f o r t h e


f o r Ge,>niisi Ma.)rned Flights high-altitude orbits of Gemini XI could not
be confirmed by inflight measurements. The
Dose to left chest proton spectrometer data required f o r this
Mission Ihralion of of command pilot,
mission rad comparison were not obtained on the Gemini
X I flight. However, the Experiment SO09
111 3 revolutions 0.020
package indicated that the background of
IV 4 days .040 protons in the emulsion was within toler-
V 8 days .l!jO ance limits.
VI-A 1 day .025
VI1 14 days .192
VI11

IX-A
X
11 hours

3 days
3 days
All dosimeters
read less than
0.010
.018
.770
10’t
r I
Undecayed dose

7
Electron dose decayed
XI 3 days .025 to 7/17/66
XI1 4 days .015

altitude flight opposite the anomaly in the


Southern Hemisphere.
FI Decayed dose
Figure 12-10 is a comparison of Gemini
X inflight readings from the Gemini Radia-
0
tion Monitoring System with the decayed and
undeca yed calculational model. The dose read-
ings were made by the crew during t h e first
and seventh high-altitude revolutions. The
readings in the first revolution established 0 = Gemini radiation
0 measuring system
that the environment a t t h a t altitude would readings
not endanger the mission, and the crew was
advised to begin a sleep period. After awak-
ening, the crew reported the reading for the
seventh revolution. Because of the lack of
d”l ; ; h ; dRadiation dose

fi ; b o; 1;
Time after initation of high-altitude maneuver, h r
1’2

data, i t is difficult to reach any definite con- FIGURE


12-10.-Comparison of the Gemini X Radia-
clusion based upon the relationships shown tion Monitoring System readings and t h e calcu-
in figure 12-10. lation model.

I Calculated Measured

Mission Aug. 1964 estimate,


rad 1 Decayed estimate,
rad
Passive dosimeter,
rad
I
I
Gemini. Radiation
Monitormg System,
rad

IX-An 0.30 0.090 0.018 Not applicable


X h 17.3 1.4 .770 0.910
XI .303 .091 .025 .030
II I I

Readings based upon 161-n.-mi. circular orbit f o r 3 days.


I,Readings based upon 161- by 400-n.-mi. orbit f o r 12 hours, and 161-n.-mi. circular orbit f o r 2 % days.
‘ Readings based upon 161- by 750-n.-mi. orbit f o r 3 % hours, and 161-n.-mi. circular orbit for 2 % days.
RADIATION ENVIRONMENT AT HIGH ORBITAL ALTITUDES 157

Conclusions calculations and the measured values of ra-


diation dose. The differences are explained
One of the most important results of the when the uncertainties of making these cal-
high-altitude flights of Gemini X and XI is culations a r e considered. It is anticipated
that manned space flight a t higher altitudes that the shielding breakdown description for
is possible with a minimum of radiation dose. the Apollo missions will be more accurate
This is due to the confirmed continuing de- than the description used f o r Gemini. An
cay of the artificially injected electrons and operational environment sensor is to be in-
to careful planning of the trajectory. Extra- cluded on the Apollo missions ; consequently,
vehicular activity, for example, would be the radiation calculation should agree more
possible during many high-altitude orbits if closely with the measured values. As a result,
not performed while the spacecraft is pass- greater confidence is provided for further ex-
ing through the South Atlantic anomaly. ploration of the relatively unknown radiation
Gemini X demonstrated the effect of the environment in space.
South Atlzntic anomaly on the rapidly in-
creasing dose rate a t the higher altitudes of References
approximately 400 nautical miles. On the
other hand, Gemini XI attained the highest 1. VETTE,JAMES1.; Models of the Trapped Radiation
apogee, 742 nautical miles, over Australia Environment. Vol. I : Inner Zone Protons and
Electrons. NASA SP-3024, 1966.
and was still free from significant radiation
2. VETTE, JAMES I.; LUCERO,ANTONIO B.; and
doses.
WRIGHT,JON A.: Models of the Trapped Ra-
Another important result is the reasonable diation Environment. Vol. 11: Inner and Outer
amount of agreement between the preflight Zone Electrons. NASA SP-3024, 1966.
13. CONTROLLED REENTRY
By DAVIDM. BOX.iMissiorr Planning arid Analysis Divisiorr, .\ASA Mariner1 Spacecraft Center;
JON C . HAR.
POLD,Mission Planning and Analysis Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; STEVEN G.
PADDOCK.Dynarnics Engineer, McDonnell Aircralt Corp. ; NEILA. ARMSTRONG.Astronaut, Aslronaut
O#ke, NASA iliatilied Spacecraft Center; and WILLIAMH. H A M R I .O,@ce o/ Spacecraft Management.
Geniirri Program Oflice, A'ASA Manned SpacecraJt Center

Summary sate for dispersions caused by unpredicted


retrofire maneuvers, by atmospheric varia-
One of the primary objectives of the tions, and by uncertainties in the aerody-
Gemini Program has been successfully namic characteristics of the spacecraft. Fur-
achieved, that of controlling the landing ther, trajectory control greatly minimized
point by modulating the direction of the in- the recovery task for emergency reentries
herent lift vector of the spacecraft during such a s occurred on Gemini VIII.
reentry. The program has utilized two re- This paper describes the results of the re-
entry guidance techniques which provided' entry phase of each Gemini mission. How-
steering commands based upon a logical as- ever, a brief review of the aerodynamic
sessment of current and predicted energy characteristics of the spacecraft and the
conditions. This paper presents a brief de- guidance logic used during Gemini will be
scription of these two sets of reentry guid- helpful in understanding the reentry results
, ance logic, and a detailed description of the of each flight.
results obtained from each Gemini spacecraft
reentry. During the Gemini Program, suc- Aerodynamic Characteristics
cessful landing-point control has been ac-
complished from E a r t h orbits varying from Aerodynamic lift is established on a sym-
a n apogee,/perigee of 110 by 45 nautical metrical body, such as the Gemini vehicle,
miles to an apogee/perigee of 215 by 161 by placing the center of gravity so t h a t the
nautical miles. The Gemini spacecraft has resultant trim angle of attack provides the
been flown with an average lift-to-drag ratio desired lift characteristics. To maintain the
of approximately 0.19. This has resulted in least amount of aerodynamic heating on the
an average reentry maneuver capability of spacecraft hatches and windows during re-
300 nautical miles downrange and lr27 nauti- entry, the spacecraft was flown inverted with
cal miles crossrange. The average footprint the center-of-gravity offset toward the pilots'
shift due to the retrofire maneuver has been feet (fig. 13-1). In'this inverted position, the
25 nautical miles, and the average navigation spacecraft was rolled to the bank angle re-
accuracy has been 2.2 nautical miles. quired to utilize the lift vector for downrange
and lateral range-control capability. The
Introduction range control, or touchdown footprint, pro-
vided with the Gemini reentry center of
One of the major objectives of the Gemini gravity was approximately 300 nautical
Program was to demonstrate accurate touch- miles down range and 50 nautical miles
down-point control through the use of tra- lateral range. When the maximum range was
jectory-shaping techniques during reentry. desired, the spacecraft maintained a heads-
This trajectory control was used to compen- down or zero-degree bank angle (fig. 13-1).

Preceding page Mank 159


1GO GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

Based on
On track full-lift
reentry Altitude. thousands of feet
290 250 210 190 150 100 %!

Range
extension

Fly to left

Time from retrofire, min


No range
extension for effective FIGURE13-2.-Reentry maneuver capability as 8
zero lift function of elapsed time from retrofire.

FIGURE13-l.-Reentry control concepts.


the effective lift portion of the trajectory in
order to achieve accurate touchdown control.
Minimum range was obtained with either a A qualitative summary of the stability char-
90” bank angle or a rolling reentry to null acteristics of the spacecraft indicated that
the effects of the lifting force. good static and dynamic stability were pres-
The responsiveness of the spacecraft to ent in the region of most significance. A t
the required maneuvers for accurate touch- lower Mach numbers, the stability charac-
down on ‘the target point was dependent teristics were from marginal to unstable, but
upon the static and dynamic stability of the the range errors were minimum. The drogue
spacecraft in the reentry region where the parachute was deployed a t 50000 feet to
range-control capability was most significant. , avoid the unstable dynamic stability charac-
When a stable vehicle was not provided, the teristic. Results of the first few Gemini re-
correct bank angle could not adequately be entries raised questions concerning the
maintained for the correct response, and accuracy of the aerodynamics ; however, the
thereby created touchdown errors. The most analysis of the last seven flights indicated
significant amount of range-control capa- reasonably consistent aerodynamic charac-
bility existed while the spacecraft was in the teristics for the Gemini reentry configuration.
upper reaches of the atmosphere (fig. 13-2) ;
80 percent of the range-control capability ex- Guidance Logic
isted between an altitude of approximately
250 000 and 170 000 feet. The total reentry Two different reentry steering techniques
time from start of retrograde to deployment were developed and used during the Gemini
of drogue parachute varied from 29.0 min- Program, a rolling reentry technique and a
utes for Gemini VI-A to 32.5 minutes f o r constant bank-angle technique. Both utilized
Gemini XII, and depended on the particular a predicted range computed from the range-
retrograde orbit of each flight. Only 2.5 min- to-go of a reference trajectory, and from the
utes were available for utilizing the lift capa- range contribution that was realized from
bility to accurately adjust the reentry the deviation of navigated flight conditions
trajectory. The necessity for accurate com- from corresponding reference quantities.
mands and spacecraft responses during t h a t The reference ranges and the range-to-flight
time was clearly indicated. condition sensitivity coefficients were stored
It was essential t h a t the spacecraft ex- in the onboard computer memory as a func-
hibit good stability characteristics during tion of a parameter relating navigated
CONTROLLED REENTRY 161

velocity and measured acceleration. Figure the target ; RC is the crossrange component;
13-3 illustrates the rolling reentry technique and RP is the predicted zero-lift range. A
employed during the Gemini Program; this bank angle BC is commanded based upon the
technique was based on a zero-lift reference ratio of RC EN-RP. The control technique
trajectory. The control logic commanded the simultaneously nulls the downrange and
direction of the spacecraft lift vector neces- crossrange trajectory errors by continuously
sary to steer to a zero-lift trajectory which updating BC based upon the ratio of range
would terminate at the target. A lifting pro- errors, until the predicted zero-lift range
file was flown until a zero-lift trajectory co- R P is equal to the downrange distance to the
incided with the target point. At this point target RN. At this point, if the crossrange
a constant roll rate was commanded to error is greater than a 1-nautical-mile dead-
neutralize the effect of the inherent lifting band, a 90. bank angle is commanded, the
capability of the spacecraft. direction depending on the sign (plus o r
Figure 13-4 illustrates the guidance logic minus) of the crossrange error. When the
for the rolling reentry technique where RN crossrange error is within the deadband, a
is the downrange component of the total zero-lift trajectory is initiated by command-
range between the spacecraft position and ing a constant roll rate. The rolling portion
of the trajectory is interrupted occasionally
,,Roll initiation in order to command any additional lift
necessary to steer back to the zero-lift tra-
jectory. The predicted zero-lift trajectory is
purposely biased early in the reentry to
always place the spacecraft in a n undershoot
condition, thereby eliminating the need f o r
negative lift in order to reach the target.
This guidance logic was used on Gemini 111,
TV, VITI, TX-A, X, XI, and XII.
Figure 13-5 illustrates the constant bank-
ansle reentry technique. This technique is

I
iarget.
...J I ,-
Range Maneuver
I- capability 4
FIGURE
13-3.-Gemini rolling reentry technique.

I Present position
; of spacecraft

FIGUREl3-5.--Gemini constant bank angle reentry


FIGURE 13-4.-RoIling reentry widance logic. technique.
1G2 G E M I N I SUMMARY CONFERENCE

based upon a half-lift reference trajectory. Retrofire Performance


The control logic commands a constant bank
angle which results in a lift profile that will In order for the guidance system to steer
provide the proper longitudinal range for the spacecraft to a desired landing point, a n
lantling a t the trrget point. This is accom- accurate deorbit maneuver had to be per-
plished by determining the difference be- formed. The spacecraft retrofire system con-
tween the range to the target and the half- sisted of four solid-propellant retrorockets
lift reference-trajectory range, and by com- which produced a velocity increment for de-
paring the difference with a set of stored orbit of approximately 320 f t 'sec. The space-
reentr?--maneuver-capability data in the craft attitude was manually held at a pre-
spacecraft computer. determined constant inertial-pitch attitude
Figure 13-6 shows the guidance logic used throuxhout the maneuver, while the rates
by the constant bank-angle reentry tech- about the pitch, roll, and yaw axes were
nique. In this technique. RN is defined as the clamped by the automatic control system.
downrange component of the total range be- Excellent retrorocket performance was
tween the spacecraft position and the target: achieved on each of the missions, and the
RC is again the crossrange component: but crew was able to hold the pitch attitude
R P is now the predicted half-lift range. A within approximately 2".
bank command is generated depending upon
the value of RN-RP. If R N is equal to RP, Reentry Summary
a constant 60" bank angle is commanded ; if
R N is greater than R P . a more shallow bank The Gemini Program accomplished 11
angle is commanded: and if RN is less than successful reentries and showed that con-
R P , a steeper bank angle is commanded. The trolled reentry was an operational capability
magnitude of this bank angle is determined (fig. 13-7 and table 13-1). No reentry was
by the stored downrange-extension capabil-- attempted during the Gemini I unmanned
ity of the spacecraft, AR. The crossrange orbital flight. Gemini 11 was an unmanned
error is controlled by reversing the direction suborbital flight designed as a spacecraft
of the bank angle when the crossrange error heating test and as a check of the guidance
RC is equal to the crossrange capability of and navigation system. The rolling reentry
the spacecraft. The crossrange capability is guidance logic was programed into the com-
again based upon the stored maneuver- puter ; however, this logic was bypassed and
capability data. This guidance system was the reentry was flown open loop by continu-
flown on Gemini V, VI-A, and VII.

Present position
-6
/ of spacecraft
Gemini
-9nc
L r: 20 m,,' Planned tarqet

, 'Target
Half-lift - -.

point -5
m
301 '
100 90
' I
80 70 60 50 40
' I
30 20
I I
10 0 10
I

-
E West 4 East
Impact landing distance from target, n. mi.
FIGURE13-6.-Constant bank angle reentry
guidance logic. FIGURE
13-'i.-Relative landing points.
CONTROLLED REENTRY 163

TABLE13-I.-Gemini Reentry Summary

Mission Miss distance, Navigation error, Significant comments


n. mi. n. mi.

I1
111
IV
1 14
60
44
1.2
.8
Footprint shift
Lift-drag reduction
Footprint shift, inoperative computer
V 91 Invalid position update
VI-A 7 ~ 4742.5 No radar below 180 000 ft
VII.. 6.4 2.3 I Lift-drag reduction
VI11 1.4 Emergency reentry
IX-A .38 2.2
X 3.4 4.2
XI 2.65 4.0 i Automatic reentry
XI1
i 2.6 2.4 1 Automatic reentry

ously rolling the spacecraft from the point the downrange or crossrange error was
of 0.05 g until an altitude of 80 000 feet was nulled, the crew would fly the commands
attained. The zero-lift point shifted 14 nauti- generated by the spacecraft computer. The
cal miles due to the retrofire maneuver, and Gemini I11 spacecraft experienced a de-
the spacecraft landed 14 nautical miles from crease of approximately 35 percent in the
the planned' touchdown point. The footprint lift-to-drag ratio, resulting in a loss of ap-
shift was caused by a combination of a pitch- proximately 160 nautical miles in the down-
attitude error of 3.2" during retrofire and a range maneuver capability. The loss in capa- o

retrograde-velocity- increment 'that was 1.1 bility, combined with the shift of the foot-
.percent low. Postflight analysis showed that print due to the tleorbit maneuver, caused the
the navigation accuracy at guidance termi- target to be on the edge of the maneuver
nation was 1.2 nautical miles. envelope of the spacecraft. Following the
The first manned mission of the Gemini planned procedure, the hpacecraft landed GO
Program was Gemini 111, a three-orbit mis- nautical miles from the target. Postflight
sion. To assure spacecraft reentry in case of analysis indicated that if the crew had fol-
retrorocket failure, a preretrofire orbit ma- lowed the commands Kenerated bv the space-
neuver was performed with the spacecraft craft computer during the entire reentry, a
propulsion system. This maneuver was com- miss distance of a p p r o x i m a t e l y 3 nautical
pleted 1.2 minutes before retrofire and re- miles would have occurred. Navigation ac-
sulted in a vacuum perigee of 45 nautical curacy on this mission was 0.8 nautical mile.
miles. The combined retrofire and preretro- Gemini TV was ii 4-day mission. A planned
fire maneuver resulted in a footprint shift of preretrofire maneuver was to he followed 12
48 nautical miles. The retrofire maneuver minutes later I)y a normal retrofire. Rased
accounted for 24.9 nautical miles of this upon the results of Gemini 111, it was planned
shift. Before the deorbit maneuver, the tar- for the crew to use the rolling reentry guid-
get point was situated on the 60" contour ance logic and to manudly follow the com-
line of the footprint, and was offset from the mands from the spacecraft computer during
centerline approximately 10 nautical miles the entire reentry. However. hecause of an
toward the south. The planned guidance inoperative computer, it was necessarv to
technique was to fly the backup bank angle, flv open loop by manually rolling the space-
which would simultaneously null the cross- craft throuchout reentry. The preretrofire
range and downrange errors. When either orbit manenver and the retrofire produced
164 G E M I N I S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

a footprint shift of 50 nautical miles, 10 update was sent to Gemini V, the range
nautical miles resulting from the retrofire angle was in error by 7.9". This caused a
maneuver. The spacecraft was to be rolled navigation error in the Gemini V computer
at a rate of 15 deg sec ; however, because the of approximately 474 nautical miles. There-
roll-rate gvro had been turned off, the yaw fore, throughout the reentry the computer
thruster produced an acceleration in the roll displayed erroneous range data, and by the
direction which was not damped. This caused time the crew determined that the computer
the roll rate to build to a maximum of 60 was in error, the spacecraft did not have the
deg sec; the spacecraft was still rolling maneuver capability to steer to the target.
more than 50 deg sec at drogue parachute The spacecraft landed approximately 91
deployment. With the open-loop reentry, nautical miles from the target. Postflight
there was no way to compensate for the pre- analysis indicated that after compensating
retrofire and retrofire errors ; thus, the space- for this initial-condition error, the naviga-
craft landed 44 nautical miles from the in- tion accuracy was 2.5 nautical miles. The
tended landing point. footprint shift due to retrofire was only 5
Gemini V was a n %day mission and was nautical miles. The velocity increment pro-
the first mission scheduled to use the con- duced by the retrorockets was 0.2 percent
stant bank-angle reentry guidance logic. As lower than predicted.
stated previously, the constant bank-angle Gemini VI-A was a l-dag rendezvous mis-
logic commands were based upon a compari- sion ; the constant bank-angle guidance logic
son of the range differences (actual range was used in the same manner as on Gemini
minus predicted half-lift range) with a set V. Retrofire occurred in approximately a
of stored maneuver-capability data. Because 161-nautical-mile circular orbit with a re-
of the large reduction in the lift-to-drag sultant footprint shift of 22 nautical miles.
ratio experienced by the Gemini spacecraft, The shift was due to a 0.6-percent high in-
the set of stored data was no longer valid; crement in the retrorocket velocity. The
therefore, errogeous commands were gen- spacecraft landed 7 nautical miles from the
erated by the spacecraft computer. Because target, and postflight evaluation indicated
of the short time between missions, it was the navigation accuracy was approximately
impossible to update the constants in the 2.5 nautical miles.
program.for Gemini V and VI-A. However, Gemini VI1 was a 14-day mission t h a t em-
the computer calculations of the range errors ployed the constant bank-angle logic. Modi-
( R C and RN-RP) were displayed to the
fications made to several of the guidance
crew and, as a result of preflight training,
the crew could interpret these calculations constants improved the usefulness of the
to obtain the correct bank angle needed to bank command generated by the spacecraft
attain a small miss distance. Therefore, i t computer; however, the primary crew dis-
was planned for the crew to modulate the play was still the range-error display. Retro-
spacecraft lift verior based upon the display fire occurred in approximately a 161-nauti-
of these range errors. cal-mile circular orbit with a resultant foot-
The Gemini spacecraft normally required print shift of 41 nautical miles. The space-
a navigation update before retrofire. This craft touched down approximately 6.4 nauti-
consisted of a n Earth-centered inertial posi- cal miles from the target, and the navigation
tion and velocity vector, and a range angle accuracy was 2.3 nautical miles. A 40-nauti-
through which the Earth had rotated from cal-mile loss-of-maneuver capability was due
the initial alinement of the Earth-centered to an overprediction of the movement of the
inertial system (midnight before lift-off) to center of gravity during the 14 days of the
the time that the vector was valid. Wher, -he mission.
CONTROLLED REENTRY 165

Gemini VIII, a scheduled 3-day rendezvous 215 nautical miles. The footprint shift was
mission, was terminated by a n emergency re- approximately 43 nautical miles, and the
entry into a secondary landing area. The spacecraft landed 3.4 nautical miles from the
reentry was ordered after the flight crew target with a navigation accuracy of 4 2
were forced to use the propulsion capability nautical miles. The rather large navigation
of the Reentry Control System to stop a high error was caused by a yaw misalinement in
roll rate caused by a yaw-thruster anomaly the inertial platform.
in the primary spacecraft propulsion system. Gemini XI, a 3-day rendezous mission, was
Because of the requirement for the propul- the first to use the automatic mode of the
sion capability of the Reentry Control Sys- attitude-control system coupled with the
tem to control the spacecraft attitude during guidance commands to steer the spacecraft
reentry, one of the mission rules required to the target. Using the rolling-reentry logic,
that activation of the Reentry Control Sys- the spacecraft landed 2.65 nautical miles from
tem would require spacecraft reentry in the the planned target with a navigation ac-
next planned landing area. The Gemini VI11 curacy of 4 nautical miles. A comparison of
spacecraft landed in the Western Pacific zone the bank-angle profile flown by the automatic
(area 7-3) in the seventh revolution. system on Gemini XI with the profile man-
The rolling-reentry logic was used for ually flown on Gemini VI11 and X showed
Gemini VI11 and all subsequent Gemini only minor differences. The automatic sys-
flights, and enabled the crew to manually fly tem responded immediately to any change in
the bank-angle commands generated by the the direction of the bank angle commanded
spacecraft computer. Retrofire occurred by the spacecraft computer, whereas a time
from approximately a 161-nautical-mile cir- lapse occurred between command and re-
cular orbit and caused a 12-nautical-mile sponse when the flight crew manually flew
footprint shift. The spacecraft computer cal- th;! bank commands. This time lapse, how-
culated that the spacecraft was 1.4 nautical ever, had no noticeable effect on the final
miles from the planned target a t drogue landing point of the spacecraft.
parachute deployment, and the spacecraft The last flight in the Gemini Program,
was sighted on the main parachute by the Gemini XII, was a 4-day rendezvous mission.
recovery aircraft. Because of the area in Gemini XI1 used the rolling-reentry logic
which the spacecraft was forced to land, no and was the second mission that employed
reentry tracking was possible : therefore, no automatic reentry. The spacecraft landed
navigation accuracy was determined for this approximately 2.6 nautical miles from the
flight. planned target, with a navigation accuracy
Gemini IX-A, a %day rendezvous mission, of 2.4 nautical miles. For the fifth time dur-
used the rolling-reentry logic. The retrofire ing the Gemini Program, the spacecraft
maneuver produced a footprint shift of ap- descending on the main parachute was
proximately 55 nautical miles. The rather sighted by the recovery forces.
large footprint shift was caused by a retro-
rocket velocity that was 1.06 percent high Concluding Remarks
and by a spacecraft pitch-attitude error of
2.3". The crew manually flew the bank-angle The reentries performed during the
Gemini Program have shown the following:
commands generated by the spacecraft com-
( 1 ) The guidance technique had to be de-
puter and landed 0.38 nautical mile from the
signed to be insensitive to large changes in
target. Postflight evaluation showed a navi- spacecraft lift capability. The use of the con-
gation accuracy of 2.2 nautical miles. stant bank-angle guidance technique was
Gemini X was a %day rendezvous mission. dependent on an accurate estimate of maneu-
Retrofire occurred from an orbit of 161 by ver capability. It W;IS, therefore, ineffective
1G(i GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

for ;I mission of long duration whe~.ea large error did occur, as on Gemini X, the effect
center-of'-gr;t\.it~, \.ariation Uas present o r of the error on touchdown miss distance was
where spacecraft aerodynamic character- small, because navigation errors built up
istics were uncertain, it:; on Gemini VII. The slowly before the region of maximum load
r~lliiig-reentr\~ guidance technique dit1 not factor, then increased sharply; at the same
require a knowledge of the spacecr;tft lift time, the maneuver capability decreased to a
capability, and \vould steer to a plirticular small fraction of the total near-maximum
target as long its that .target was within the load factor. Although the control commands
footprint. were incorrect late in reentry, because of
(2) Displays h u l to I)e available so the large navig;ttion errors, the commands could
crew could evaluate the performance of the not disperse the trajectory to a great extent
guidance and navigation system, and back- because of the small maneuver capability. In
up procedures hiid to be developed to assure addition, the computer navigation equations
safe reentry and accurate landing in the and integration techniques had been judici-
event of a guidance-system failure. These ously selected to he compatible with digital
displays had to provide enough information computer operation.
to the crelv to permit an intelligent evalu- ( 4 ) Reentry of the Gemini spacecraft was
ation of the primary guidance system. If the successfully controlled both manually and
e\-;duation indicated ;I failure of the primary automatically. The ability of the pilot to ade-
system, then backup procedures had t o be quately control the spacecraft under high
available to meet the following criteria : ( ( 1 ) load-factor. conditions after long periods of
assure safe capture, ( 1 ) ) avoid violatiiig weightlessness was demonstrated. The de-
heating and / o r load-factor limits, and ( c ) sirability of manual versus automatic control
function with a degree of accuracy such that was dependent upon the severity of the con-
the recovery of the spacecraft could be ac-
trol-accuracy requirements, the frequency of
complished in a reasonable amount of time.
thecontrol commands, and the complexity of
( 3 ) Consistently accurate navigation
could be accomplished during reentry be- the control limits imposed for crew safety.
cause of a navigation-system design which Reentry from Earth orbit required some de-
performed adequately in the presence of ex- gree of control accuracy but did not require
pected inertial-measurement-system uncer- an immediate response to displayed com-
tainties. Even when a large inertial-platform mands.
14. LAUNCH AND TARGET VEHICLE SUPPORT BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
By ALFREDJ. GARDNER.Program Director, Ceniini Tnrgel Vehicle. Hendqcinrrers Space Systems Division,
Air Force Space Systeriis Coinmaiid

Introduction appointed to recommend a detailed manage-


ment and operational plan “clearly indicat-
Cooperation between the National Aero- ing the division of efforts between NASA
nautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the DOD (Air Force). . . .” The NASA-
and the Department of Defense (DOD) , and DOD Operational and Management Plan for
more specifically the Department of the Air the Gemini Program (December 1961), with
Force ( U S A F ) , is based on long historical subsequent revisions, became the basis for
precedent and achievement. Many years of the Air Force support of the program. The
exchange of concepts, equipment, and experi- Space Systems Division of the Air Force
mental activities between the National Ad- Systems Command was designated to estab-’ .
visory Committee for Aeronautics and the lish the necessary relationships with the
Air Force and its organizational predeces- appropriate NASA organizations to provide .
sors laid firm ground for later years. The €or development. procurement. and launch
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, of the required launch and target vehicles.
providing the responsibility for the direction Program offices were established in Los
of the aeronautical and space activities of Angeles a t the Space Systems Division of the
the United States, further stipulated one of Air Force Systems Command to manage the
the duties of the President, “. . . provide for Gemini Launch Vehicle, it modified Titan I1
effective cooperation between the National Intercontinental Ballistic Missile ; and the
Aeronautics and Space Administration and Gemini Agena Target Vehicle, a modified
the Department of Defense. . . .” From the Agena upper-stage booster. The launch ve-
earliest days, €he new NASA and the USAF hicle for the target vehicle, :i modified Atlas
cooperated in numerous formal and informal standard launch vehicle (SLV-3). was pro-
ways. Air Force support of Project Mercury vided by an esisting Iwogram office of this
established many of the mechanisms. tech- vehicle.
niques, and fundamental requirements for The management of the integration of the
Department of Defense support of the Gemini three vehicles into the over;ill Gemini Pro-
Program. The lessons learned by both agen- gram was a function of the Gemini Program
cies in exchange of funds. selection of per- Office, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center.
sonnel, procurement of vehicles, pilot safety. Within the Gemini Program Office, the prin-
assurance of mission success, :ind launch cipal point of contact with the Air Force
support provided ;I tested foundation for Space Systems Division program offices was
effective Air Force support of Gemini. the Office of Vehicles ;ind Missions. A co-
In late 1961, when the decision was made ordinating committee system was established
to proceed with what ultimately hecame the to maintain liaison, orgmiz:ition, and direc-
Gemini Program, an ad hoc group comprised tion between \.iiriolls Government organi-
of NASA and Air Force represent a t‘ives was zations and contractors.

167
168 GEM i N I SUM M A R Y CONFERENCE

Highlights of Air Force Technical Support every known vehicle charact,eristic, and every
operational plan was primarily viewed
One of the most difficult aspects of system against the framework of a formal pilot-
program management is the need to freeze safety program plan prior to any other con-
designs in order to produce hardware on sideration of the change. This primary con-
schedule versus the ever-present need to in- sideration resulted in other studies and
troduce changes. Reliability, time, and econ- chanfes.
om>' depend upon strict control of configura-
(iemini Launch Vehicle
tion and maximum standardization of
production items. However, program evolu-
Within the Air Force Space Systems Divi-
tion invariably leads to changing or cx-
sion, the Gemini Launch Vehicle Program
panded mission requirements. I n anything
Office was assigned the responsibility for de-
but a pure production contract, unexpected
veloping and procuring the Titan I1 as a
and difficult design problems and technical
launch vehicle and for the technical super-
difficulties a r e encountered. In addition,
vision (under a NASA Launch Director) of
attractive and desirable improvement areas
the launches of these vehicles. In this func-
a r e developed a s the base of program knowl-
lion, the Air Force Space Systems Division
edge broadens a n d progresses. All of these
akted as a NASA contractor, and established
sources of change are excecdinnly difficult or
the necessary agreements and contracts t o
impossible to predict or schedule, and often provide all of the necessary services, equip-
require significant expenditures of resources. ment, and vehicles.
Program histories. however, support the
premise that one of the keys to program suc- The objectives of the Air Force program
cess is the manner of administrative and office, based upon the requirements outlined
technical response to such changes. The by the NASA statement of work, were ex-
organization must incorporate a flexibility t o panded and established as the basis for all
change emphasis and absorb tasks. Technical resulting agreements and contracts. The fun-
talents must be available. Financial support damental objective was to exercise maximum
management and technical control to strictly
must be timely and of sufficient magnitude.
minimize changes to the basic Titan I1 ve-
Skillful schedule planninR must introduce
hicle. Changes were to be limited to those in
the changes to provide maximum realization
the interest of pilot safety, to those necessary
of improvements with minimum impacts on
to accommodate the Gemini spacecraft as a
reliability, manufacture, test, and training.
payload, and to those necessary to increase
Finally, the motivation of all concerned must
the probability of mission success. Implicit in
be adequately planned in order to define and
the basic objective were economy, high reli-
maintain desired goals and purposes. During
ability, maintenance of schedule, and maxi-
the development of the Gemini hardware, all
mum cooperation with the NASA Gemini
of the typical change influences were en-
Program Office.
countered and dealt with within the frame-
work of the basic Gemini objectives. Some During the early months of the program,
extensive and intensive studies, analyses, and
influences never progressed beyond the
tests were conducted to firmly identify all
analysis and study stage, while others were
required changes to the basic Titan 11; t o
translated into actual hardware configura- identify all tests, procedures, and experi-
tion changes, and still others were expanded mental programs; and to provide the basis
into major programs having critical effects for a set of detailed, comprehensive specifica-
on the overall program. tions for the vehicle.
Throughout the development of the Gemini In February 1962, a Technical Operating
Launch Vehicle, every potential change, Plan was coordinated between the Space Sys-
~

LAUNCH .4ND TARGET VEHICLE SUPPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT O F DEFENSE 169

tems Division and the Aerospace Corp. The pleted, culminating in a combined systems
plan outlined areas of effort and responsi- test of the vehicle. After the spacecraft was
bilities of the Aerospace Corp. support of the mated with the launch vehicle, a series of
Space Systems Division by providing general joint tests was completed, including joint
systems engineering and technical direction guidance and flight controls, simulated par-
of the Gemini Launch Vehicle Program. tial countdown and launch ascent, tanking
As part of the established mission, func- exercise, and, for missions involving the tar-
tion, and organization, the 6555th Aerospace get vehicle, simultaneous launch demonstra-
Test Wing is a n extension of the Space Sys- tion.
tems Division at Cape Kennedy and the East-
ern Test Range. The Wing represented the Gemini Launch-Vehicle Payload Margins
Air Force in the launch-site acceptance, test-
ing, data evaluation, and launch of various Drvolopwwit of pa!jload capability and
vehicles. In addition, the Wing provided man- t i v jcvdoi*!l prediction twhniques.-At the be-
agement control of the various vehicle con- ginning of the Gemini Program, all trrtjec-
tractors, and integrated contractor and Gov- tory and payload performance predictions
ernment efforts, and assured Range support were based upon nominal values for all pa-
and data during the checkout and launch se- rameters. Therefore, all launch vehicles had
quences. In support of the Gemini Launch the same payload capability except for varia-
Vehicle, various reliability, crew-safety, op- tions due to mission differences. As vehicle
erational, and other committees and working parameters became available they were in-
groups were organized o r supported. One corporated, and frequently created substan-
of the outstanding achievements of the tial changes in predicted payload capability.
Gemini Program was the scheduling and ac- Each parameter update was incorporated as
complishment of the Gemini Launch Vehicle soon as available in order to maintain the
turnaround required for the Gemini VI1 and most up-to-date prediction possible. This was
VI-A missions leading to the historical first tlrsii*ed to keep NASA continually informed
rendezvous of two manned space vehicles of the payload capability margin for each of
(December 1965). Reference 1 contains a the vehicles, so that mission changes could
brief review of the development of the Gem- he made to improve capability or to take
ini Launch Vehicle ant1 of the flight results advantage of excess capability. I t was also
of the first seven Gemini missions. '
desired to show the necessity of making per-
formance improvement changes to the Gem-
Typical Gemini Launch-Vehicle Test ChronoloKy ini Launch Vehicle. A number of performance
improvements were considered f o r t h e Gem-
After final assembly of the Gemini Launch ini Launch Vehicle during the early and mid-
Vehicle at the Baltimore plant of the Martin- phases of t h e program.
Marietta Corp., the propulsion and hydraulic Figure 14-1 illustrates the changes in pre-
systems \\'ere checked for leaks, and the elec- dicted Gemini Launch Vehicle minimum pay-
ti-ical system WLS checked for continuity. The load capabilities compared with time, and the
vehicle was then tested in the Baltimore Ver- ch ;Ln ges i n spacecraft weights, without ex-
tical Test Facility; this included a series of periments, compared with time. Since experi-
cwntdowns antl simulated launches. All oper- ment weight averaged about 1GO pounds, the
ations were either performed or accurately actual margins between predicted capabilities
simulated and recorded. and sp:icecraft weights were less than those
The two stages of the vehicle were trans- shown. Near the end of the Gemini Program,
ported by a i r to Cape Kennedy, erected, antl it was common for the predicted payload
asseml,letl on Launch Complex 13. A detailed capability margin to be negative. The worst
checkout m t l verification test series was com- case was -282 pounds for Gemini IX-A.
170 G E M I N I S U M MARY CONFERENCE

capability which would be equaled or ex-


Average minimum ceeded 99.87 percent of the time. This per-
centage was shifted to 99.4 percent in the
payload ca pabiI lty,
latter part of the Gemini Program.
Gemini Launch Vehicle dispersion analyses
were initially performed by determining the
payload capability effects of dispersions in a
.large number of key vehicle parameters. The
parameter dispersions that were used were
the 3-sigma dispersions baaed upon test data
and theoretical analyses. Throughout the
Gemini Program, attention was directed to
refining estimates of 3-sigma parameter dis-
persions. Particular attention was given to
the parameters with the most significant
FIGURE14-1.-History of spacecraft weight and effects upon trajectory and payload capa-
predicted Gemini Launch Vehicle minimum pay- bility performance. From the beginning of
load capability. the Gemini Program, it was obvious that a
very good estimate of the overall 3-sigma dis-
As with a n y launch vehicle, the Gemini persion could be determined by considering
Launch Vehicle was constrained to remain the variations of a limited number of key
within specified limits throughout the flight parameters. These parameters were those
envelope. In particular, the vehicle was con- which most affected the shape of the vehicle
strained by aerodynamic heating, aerody- trajectory in the pitch plane. The following
namic loads, axial acceleration, guidance- parameters were selected early and used
radar look angles, guidance-radar elevation throughout the program for simplicity and
angle, dynamic pressure and angle of attack continuity :
at staging, Stage I hydraulic-actuator hinge
moment, and spacecraft abort criteria. Stage I Stage I1
Studies early in the Gemini Program quanti-
tatively established limits in the constraint Thrust ................................. Thrust
areas. Maximum or limiting values of some Specific impulse ............... Specific impulse
Outage ................................. Outage
parameters were selected for nominal trajec- Dry weight ....................... Dry weight
tories such that, if the nominal trajectory Usable propellant weight Usable propellant weight
remained within these bounds, dispersed tra- Pitch programer error ...
jectories would remain within the true Pitch gyro drift ...............
launch-vehicle and guidance-system capa- Winds .................................
bilities.
Although the nominal payload capability
for each Gemini Launch Vehicle was of con-
siderable importance, the predicted minimum
payload capability was of even greater im- Pei*formance improvement program. -
portance. The minimum payload capability Since the inception of the Gemini Program,
was the weight of the spacecraft t h a t could be a vigorous performance improvement pro-
put into the desired orbit even under the gram wak pursued to meet the ever-increas-
most disadvantageous launch-vehicle per- ing requirements of payload capability.
formance. Most disadvantageous was defined Initially, the total weight of the spacecraft,
for the Gemini Launch Vehicle as the minus including experiments, was estimated at
3-sigma payload capability, or that payload about 7000 pounds for the long-duration mis-
LAUNCH AND TARGET VEHICLE SUPPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 171

sions and 7250 pounds for the rendezvous dow under dispersed propellant temperature
missions. It quickly became apparent that conditions also resulted in performance de-
these weights would be exceeded. The early creases. For certain missions the require-
spacecraft-weight growth rate was approxi- ments for high initial apogees and for launch
mately 35 to 40 pounds per month, and not azimuths considerably less or greater than
until deletion of the paraglider configuration 90" degraded the payload capability. Finally,
was some relief obtained. Increase in the size the requirement to have the launch vehicle
of the spacecraft propellant tanks provided steer out as much as 0.55" of wedge angle to
another impetus in the search for higher increase the availability of spacecraft pro-
launch-vehicle payload capability. Ultimately, pellant reduced the probability of achieving
the spacecraft weights increased to the point the desired insertion conditions. Propellant
where predicted launch-vehicle performance temperature-conditioning equipment was in-
margins relative to the minimum (99.4 per- cluded in the areospace ground equipment so
cent probability) payload capability were that launch-vehicle propellants could be
consistently negative. Comparison between chilled to 20" F for oxidizer and 26" F for
actual spacecraft weights and achieved pay- fuel before loading. This chilling would allow
load capabilities is shown in figure 14-2. greater propellant masses to be loaded in the
. In addition to spacecraft-weight increases, fixed tank volumes, thus increasing payload
changes in mission requirements had a sig- capability. Attention was also given to the
nificant effect on launch-vehicle payload capa- performance gain available by reducing the
bility. On early flights a 5-hour launch-win- minimum ullages in the propellant tanks
dow requirement was imposed, necessitating from the values used on the Titan 11 weapon
large ullage volumes in the propellant tanks system. Structural studies and engine start
to allow for propellant temperature increases. tests at reduced ullages were incorporated in
This meant fewer propellants loaded and a the Gemini Propulsion System Test Program.
reduced .payload capability. Optimizing the Early in 1963, the Martin Co. proposed a
mixture ratio for the worst case in the win- study of the feasibility of removing the low-

I
PT-A
c Final predicted payload capability range, minimum to maximum. --A Actual normalized postflight payload capability.
E Final normalized predicted minimum payload capability. +SC Actual spacecraft launch weight.

FIGURE14-2.-Comparison of normalized predicted and achieved payload capabilities.


172 GEM IN1 SUM MARY CONFERENCE

level propcl1;int shutdown sensors from the impulse biases were incorporated into the
shutdown circuits 011 both launch-vehicle Gemini IV launch-vehicle preflight predic-
stages. Removing these sensors would elimi- tions, the added efficiency of Stage I resulted
nate the large possibility of premature shut- in overlofting of the Stage I trajectory. This
downs due to faulty level seiisor operation was disadvantageous for two reasons: first,
and would also incre:ise payload capability high-dispersed trajectories could result in
by reducing the amount of trapped propel- pitch look angles which exceeded the exist-
lants. Data from exhaustion shutdowns on ing allowable limits ; and second, overlofting
the test stand and on the Titan I1 flights indi- caused excessive gravity losses and Stage I1
cated that such shutdowns (lid not noticeably pitch maneuvering. Because of these consid-
jeopardize mission success. The shutdown erations, a new pitch program, developed
function of the sensors was eliminated, al- for Gemini IV, eliminated the over-lofting
though the>- were retained for instrumenta- and resulted in an improvement in the pay-
tion purposes ant1 for closed-loop operation load capability.
if later found desirable. M issio it -depc It d e t?t perf o i.?nancechaiig es .-
Changing the Tit;in I1 engi.ne target mix- Correct predictions of trajectory and pay-
ture ratios on acceptance tests from 1.93 for load capability also had to be based on dif-
Stage I and 1.80 for Stage I1 to approxi- ferences and changes in the Gemini missions.
mately 1.05 and 1.84 would have allowed For example, if the apogee were changed for
complete filling of both oxidizer and fuel a specific Gemini mission, it was necessary
tanks to ullage limits when the engines were to adjust the predicted launch-vehicle pay-
operated in t h e anticipated flight environ- load capability accordingly. Similarly, if the
ment. However, as the mixture ratio in- launch azimuth and/or yaw steering were
creased. the specific impulse decreased for changed, the payload capability effects were
both stages. Some of the other areas investi- computed and. incorporated in the predicted
gated were : ( 1 ) engine effects, such as heat launch-vehicle capability. F o r each of the
transfer and combustion stability: ( 2 ) pos- rendezvous missions, i t was also necessary
sible mission changes; and ( 3 ) impact of to determine payload capabilities for the
other potential performance improvement alternate missions which would be attempted
items, such as further reduced minimum if the primary mission could not be com-
ullages and constant temperature propellants. pleted.
As a result of these studies, the Stage I1 Flight-test perfoivntawce.-0btaining ac-
engine mixture ratio change was eliminated curate preflight predictions and postflight
because there was no payload advantage. The analyses of vehicle propulsion performance
Stage I engine target mixture ratio was was of great importance throughout the
changed to 1.945, effective for the Gemini Gemini Program. The launch-vehicle payload
IV launch vehicle. capability and trajectory performance were
Titan I1 and launch-vehicle engine per- highly dependent on the propulsion param-
formance data were monitored throughout eters of mixture ratio (the major contributor
the Gemini Program. By May 1965, sufficient to propellant outage), specific impulse, and
data had been accumulated to indicate that thrust for both stages of the vehicle. Propel-
significant changes in the form of biases were
lant outages for Stage I and Stage I1 were
likely to occur between acceptance test and
flight. This analysis included the results of the two largest factors in payload capability
10 Stage I flights and 16 Stage I1 flights. For dispersion allowances. Postflight analysis of
Gemini IV through X, the biases indicated each Gemini Launch Vehicle trajectory was
by the analysis were included in preflight conducted to define the reasons f o r deviations
trajectory and performance predictions. from nominal and to determine changes to
When the Stage I thrust bias and specific be made in predictions for subsequent ve-
.' LAUNCH AND TARGET VEHICLE SUPPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 173

hicles. Table 14-1 compares predicted with revealed similar occurrences on seven Titan
achieved payload margins for all missions. I1 flights. The same anomaly oc'curred dur-
ing the Gemini XI1 mission; however, this
Gemini Launch Vehicle Stage I Tank Staging Anomaly occurrence was followed by the apparent
rupture of the Stage I fuel tank and the
High-speed long-range camera coverage of breakup of Stage I just forward of the Mar-
the Gemini X launch vehicle showed a large tin/Aerojet interface. The results of the
orange-red cloud appearing from Stage I study and a review of all available Titan I1
shortly after staging and indicating a pos- and Gemini flight data showed no detrimental
sible breakup of the stage. A detailed review effect on mission success or crew safety due
of the films revealed that the oxidizer tank to this event.
vented approximately 1.2 seconds after Stage
I1 ignition. A study of Stage I1 telemetry Gemini Launch Vehicle Switchover/Switchback
data revealed no indication of this event. Studies
Stage I telemetry was inoperative a t this
time, having been disabled 0.7 second earlier. With the incorporation of a redundant
A thorough study of the tank rupture iso- flight control system, a detailed system eval-
lated the following as the most probable uation was conducted to reassess the vehicle
causes : ( 1 ) Stage I turning after separation, airframe, the switchover logic, and the sen-
resulting in the Stage I1 engine sub- sor limits. The evaluation indicated. that the
assembly exhaust impingement and burn- initial selection of sensor limits, structural
through of oxidizer tank barrel; (2) break- safety factor, and switchover logic did not
ing of the ablative coating on the oxidizer result in optimum switchover capability. It
tank dome, due to dome flexing caused by became apparent that a switchover during
dome overheating and subsequent structural Stage I flight from a loss of hydraulic pres-
failure, resulting from high local pressures sure would result in the secondary flight con-
a t Stage I1 engine s t a r t ; and (3) dome or trol system being used throughout Stage I1
tank barrel penetration by transportation flight. This could have resulted in discarding
section debris. A review of the staging films a good, reliable, primary flight control system

-__ - ___.

Payload capability margin


_ _ . _ _ _ _ ~ _ ~ _...
!
I
Mission Predicted, lb Difference, Ib
... i Achieved, Ib
.-I
1
-
Minimum Nominal
1 .....

1
~~

I ............................ .... , , 508 1017 1171 154


I1 .....................................
I11 .......... .................... I 336
577
1025
1199
1
1066
1396
41
197
i
, ,

IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - 62 593 767 174


v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . , ... - 135 526 I 374 -152
VII. ....................... 69 700 I 786 77
VI-A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VI11 . . . . . . . .......... , -
265
162
I 891
492
I
!
778
471
-113
- 22
IX-A.......................... -282 372 638 266
x. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -217 416 571 I 155
XI ................................. , . -175 497 528 I 31
XI1 ................................. - 51 619 869 j 2 50
I I I I
174 G E M I N I S11M MARY CONFERENCE

during Stage I1 flight. To alleviate this situ- consisting primarily of newly developed
ation, thc capiil~ilityof slvitching back to the \,om\) pulsing techniques derived t o estab-
primary system was incorlmr;itd. It \\'iis lish inst;ibility triggering thresholds. The
planned that s\Yitchback \voultl only be xtu- selected prototype injectors were then tested
;itetl i n the ci.ent the s ~ ~ i t c h o ~\vas
. c i *initi;itcvl i i t the engine level for system compatability.
by loss 01' hytlraulic pressure ant1 \voultl 1w A finiil cantlitl;ite injector then underwent a
activated I)etween staging ant1 guitlancc modified qu;ilification test program which
en a b1e. was integrated into a n engine improvement
The s\vitcho\.ey flight loatls during the high progr:im verification test series. To provide
niasimum dynamic pressure region were furthei. ;tssur;ince of the adequacy of this in-
found to be in excess of the structural design jector for m;innetl flight, it was flight tested
criteria. ('onsequently, the concept was op- I)? ;I Titan I J l C vehicle, and subsequently in-
timized bj. selecting the sensor limits that corporated into the Gemini VI11 launch ve-
masimizetl crew safety. A corresponding hicle.
hardware change was made t o reduce the
angular rate slyitch settings. The structural Gemini Agena Target Vehicle
loatl-carrying capability was reevaluated in
the light of probability considerations, which A s with the Gemini Launch Vehicle, the
resulted i n a reduced factor of safety for Air Force Space Systems Division was the
switchover from 1.25 to 1.10. A deliberate NASA contractor for the development and
flight-test switchover IYW discussed ; how- procurement of the Gemini Atlas-Agena Tar-
ever, because of difficulty in initiating the get Vehicle system. However, an attempt
switchover, and the significance of the lim- was m a l e to add the effort t o an existing
ited results, it was decided not to perform A F 'NASA organizational arrangement al-
the test. ready established for the procurement and
launch of the Atlas-Agena combination f o r
Gemini Launch Vehicle S t a g e I1 EnKine Stability other programs. Accordingly, NASA con-
Improvement Program tinued t o use the Marshall Space Flight Cen-
ter in the ". . . role of procurement contractor
One of the major concerns in man rating ant1 technical advisor t o the Project Office in
the Titan I1 vehicle was the possibility of the development, procurement and launch of
combustion instability during the Stage I1 Atlas 'Agena Target Vehicles f o r the Project
start transient. The ground-test history of Gemini Rendezvous Missions. . . ." The Air
the original Stage I1 engine utilizing the pro- Force added the development, procurement,
duction quadlet injector gave rise t o certain and systems integration of the target-vehicle
dynamic combustion stability questions for system to an existing program office charged
man-rating requirements. The quadlet in- with procurement and payload integration of
jector had a demonstrated instability inci- Agena vehicles for other NASA programs.
dent rate of about 2 percent during ground In March 1962, the target-vehicle program
tests. Even though this rate was extremely was initiated by NASA-Defense Purchase
low, the effect of an instability during Request H-30247 with the details of the ob-
manned flight caused concern and resulted in jectives and statement of work t o be evolved
the A F NASA decision to develop a more in working sessions.
dynamically stable Stage I1 injector, one t h a t In January 1963, the Manned Spacecraft
would be capable of accepting limited puls- Center assumed direct control of the Space
ing without instability. The development of Systems Division effort with the withdrawal
the new injector required evaluation of sev- of Marshall Space Flight Center from the
eral injector types. These injectors were program. At the same time, organizational
screened by thrust-chamber assembly tests realinements began at the Space Systems
LAUNCH AND TARGET I'EHICLE SUPPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 175

Division to provide a program office solely Typical Target-Vehicle (.'hronology


concerned with the target-vehicle effort. This
objective was not finally achieved on a basis The target vehicle was initially manufac-
comparable to the Gemini Launch Vehicle tured. assembled, and tested on the standard
office until J ~ l y1965. However, certain as- Agena production line, and certain items
pects of the initial oyganizational arrange- unique to the target vehicle necessarily had
ment. for both procurement and technical to be incorporated as part of the initial as-
develc rllent, once established, could never sembly prior to final modification and systems
be con jletely changed. test. These unique items included the Model
The objectives of the Air Force program 8247 engine m:inufnctured by Bell Aircraft
office were evol\.ed ;is a result of joint work- Corp., a 17-inch auxiliary forward equip-
ing sessions based upon Gemini mission ment rack, additional helium Ras capacity,
ground rules, objectives, and requirements. antl similar items.
The fundamental objective was to modify After delivery of the basic vehicle to the
the basic Agena vehicle to provide the re- Air Force, certain installations required ad-
quired accuracies, command and control, tlitional modifications by Lockheed because
pilot safety, reliability, and docking- capa-- of the peculiar requirements of the target
bility consistent with the mission to be iic- vehicle. The changes were mainly confined
complished. to electrical and electronic packages antl
To simplify the overall Agena vehicle pro- harnesses. After final assembly, the target
curement and launch services. the unmodified vehicle w;is moved to the final systems test
basic Agena S-O1E vehicles and the neces- area antl completely tested using ;I simulator
sary launch-site level of effort were procured for the Target Docking Adapter, when neces-
through the existing Space Systems Division sary, and for shroud electrical connections.
- Agena Program Office. The modification of After airlift to Cape Kennedy the vehicle
the basic Agena to a target vehicle was man- w i s inspected, checked, anrl alinetl. High-
aged by ti separate program office group a t pressure checks, which for safety reasons
the Air Force Space Systems Division. could not be accomplished a t the factory.
In March 1962. a contract was issued to were completed. The Secondary Propulsion
the Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. to provide System modules ant1 heat shields were in-
a vehicle to be used a s an in-orbit target for stalled and alinetl. A complete series of inter-
rendezvous with ti manned spacecraft. The face tests was xcomplishetl, follo\vetl by
orbiting vehicle could be controlled by com- loading of ancillnry fluids and gases. (All *

m a n d s from the ground or from the manned pyrotechnics, propellants, and batteries were
spacecraft. The vehicle also had to be capable inst:illetl ;it the launch stantl.) The vehicle
of maneuvering a s part of the spacecraft was then erected with the Atlas Target
after docking. Launch Vehicle. The major remaining tests
In late 1964. it Technical Operating Plan were the .Joint Flight Acceptance Composite
Test m ~ the l Simultaneous Launch Demon-
for the Target Vehicle Program had been
established, ant1 the responsibility for prn- stration. The vehicle wiw then ready f o r F-1
day, precoiint. ant1 final coiii1t tests.
viding technical surveillance of the Lockheetl
contract was assigned t o the Aerospace Corp. For the actual launch of the Gcmini *4geni1
In keeping with the norm:il relationships m t l Target Vehicle. the role o f e w h coutr:ictol.
operations of the Space Systems Division and inclutletl the following :
the 6555th Aerospace Test Wing a t Cape ( 1 ) Lockheed Missilvs S: Sp;ice C o . f u t * -
Kennedy, the target-vehicle launch responsi- tiisheti thc (kmini Agcqi:i Tatyet Vehicle.
bilities were assigned to the SLV-3 Director- ;ind :issoci:itetl reference trajectory, range-
ate of the Wing. safety package. a n r l f l i ~ h t - t e r m i ~ ion
l : ~ t sys-
176 ( , E M IN1 SI1M MARY CONFERENCE

tem report, and u ~ i the


s integrating contrac- Test requirements were established to verify
tor for the ascent guidance effort. ;idcquacy of the design changes and t o dem-
( 2 ) General Dynamics 'Convair furnished onstrate flightworthiness of the modified en-
the Atlas Lnui.ch Vehicle (SLV-3) and the gine configuration. Results of the symposium
associated flight-termination system report on hypergolic ignition indicated that one sig-
and flight-test results, and conducted ii com- nificant test requirement had not been in-
prehensive preflight data e x c h ~ i g ewith the cluded in the original XLR 81-BA-13 engine
integrating contractor. tlevelopment and the associated P E R T pro-
( 3 ) TRW Systems furnished ascent guid- gram. The requirement was engine testing
~ I I I Cequations
~ and associated documentation at an altitude which properly simulated the
Sor the Gemini Atlas-Agena Target Vehicle, hard-vacuum space environment. An engine
and provided Burroughs Corp. with tray- modification and a test program were
wiring data. planned, which required reliable ignition
( 4 ) General Electric C o . furnished guid- demonstration during hard-vacuum simula-
ance canisters for the Gemini Atlas-Agena tion tests above 250 000 feet before the Gem-
Target Vehicle, iInd operated the General ini VI11 launch date. An Air Force,
Electric Model 111 System a t Cape Kennedy Aerospace Corp., NASA, and industry team
during launches ;ind all associated testing. effort spearheaded by a high-level Super-
(5) Burroughs Corp. furnished wired Tiger Team, as well as maximum priorities,
ascent guidance trays for the Gemini Atlas- were necessary to accomplish and manage
Agena Target Vehicle, and operated the com- the engine modification and test program on
puters i n Guided Missile Computer Facility an accelerated, maximum-success schedule.
no. I a t Cape Kennedy during launches and The activity was designated Project Sure
all associated testing. Fire and was initiated in November 1965.
Testing was initiated immediately on the
(;emiiii Tarset Vehicle Project Surc Firc turbine pump assembly. These tests provided
the preliminary engine-transient perform-
On October 25, 19G5, Gemini Ageiia Target ance values, defined the initial detailed
Vehicle 5002 was launched from the Eastern design-change requirements, verified satis-
Test Range as part of the scheduled Gemini factory operating characteristics of the pro-
VI mission. After separation from the launch posed modified configurations prior to
vehicle, the engine malfunctioiied destruc- initiating engine-level testing, and verified
tively during the starting sequence, and the expected operating characteristics with vari-
target-vehicle pressurization system de- ous imposed malfunction conditions. A total
stroyed the vehicle. of 75 turbine pump assembly tests was ac-
Corrective action requirements were gen- complished between November 1965 and
erated based upon the results of the post- March 1966.
flight analysis, the propulsion system and ve- A total of 37 gas-generator/start-system
hicle a f t rack design review, and the tests was conducted from November 1965
symposium on ignition of hypergolic propel- through March 1966. During these tests,
lants. The engine design change recommenda- which were conducted a t sea level and at a
tions were to convert the Gemini-peculiar 240 000-foot simulated altitude, reliable pas-
engine (XLR 81-BA-13) to a thrust-cham- generator ignition was achieved throughout
ber oxidizer-lead start sequence similar to the range of predicted flight operating con-
the basic Agena engine (YLR 81-BA-11) ; ditions, as well as for conditions normally
to incorporate shock mounting for certain considered conducive to producing adverse
engine electrical control components ; and to ignition characteristics. In addition, reliable
disable the electronic-gate shutdown capa- ignitions were demonstrated after a gas-gen-
bility during ascent maneuver operation. erator/start-system had simulated a 28-day
LAUNCH AND TARGET VEHICLE SUPPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 177

pad hold period and a subsequent 5-day alti- engine ignition had been gained from the 27
tude coast storage period. Phase I and Phase I1 altitude tests completed
A pressure switch relay box was designed by March 4, 1966, to assure flightworthiness
for the initially proposed configuration, and of the Gemini VI11 target vehicle and to
the development and flightworthiness dem- allow commitment of the modified engine de-
onstration tests were conducted on this com- sign to flight. Significantly, the postulated
ponent in December 1965 and January 1966. target-vehicle flight failure mode was con-
Vibr;, ion, shock, humidity, acceleration, firmed during the altitude malfunction tests ;
altituc:?. and electrical tests were conducted. antl showed that a fuel lead on the XLR
A rela:- failure occurred during development 81-BA-13 engine would produce hard starts
vibration tests ; and after a subsequent re- when tested a t the proper altitude and that
liability analysis, the relay was removed and a reasonably high probability of hardware
the relay box w a s converted to ti junction damage existed. Reevaluation of the Gemini
box. VI data indicated that the engine damage
The proposed engine modification involved incurred during the flight was similar to that
the addition of two pressure switches in the observed during the last fuel-lead test. In
engine control circuit to provide the required addition to the successful flightworthiness
thrust chamber oxidizer-lead start sequence. demonstration of the modified engine, the
Turbine pump assembly test results indi- altitude tests provided data on altitude ig- .
cated a high-frequency actuation-tleactuation nition characteristics over a temperature
cycling characteri4c of the backup oxidizer range from 100 F to below zero.
feed pressure switch during a normal engine- An unexpected destructive hard start oc-
s t a r t sequence. Pwssure-switch durability curred during a checkout firing early in the
and vacuum tests were conducted, with no altitude test program. Post-test data analysis
observed degradation of the microswitch con- antl testing showed that excessive water and
tacts, successfully demonstrating switch dcohol contamination (approximately 85
operational capability at the Gemini mission percent) was introduced into the engine fuel
altitude for a minimum 5-day period. system during the prefire propellant loading
Vibration, shock, and hot-fire tests were operation. The fuel system became contami-
conducted as part of the engine sea-level nated with water during test-cell downtime
flightworthiness demonstration program. for instrumentation and hardware repair.
Satisfactory structural design of the new antl An abbreviated isopropyl-alcohol flush pro-
modified component installations was veri- cedure was conducted to remove water from
fied. The 42 hot-fire tests demonstrated satis- the engine: however, the water antl alcohol
factory operation and sequencing of the were not completely removed from the fa-
modified engine configuration, and verified cility fuel system, resulting’ in entry of the
successful implementation and checkout of contaminated fuel load into the engine. Full-
the modified engine test and servicing pro- scale and subscale thrust-chamber ignition
cedures. tests were instituted to evaluate the effects
A total of 42 engine flightworthiness tests of fuel contamination. Results showed that
a t simulated altitudes ranging from 257 000 significant increases in ignition delay antl
to 453 000 feet, and two checkout firings a t peak pressures occur as the quantities of
85 000 feet, were conducted. The ignition-con- alcohol and water in the fuel a r e increased.
fidence, simulated-mission, low-temper.<it ure. Further analysis antl tests clearly supported
antl malfunction tests at an average simu- the conclusion that the checkout test failure
lated altitude of 356 000 feet successfully was caused by contaminated fuel.
demonstrated the high-altitude flightworthi- Further ignition tests invest i giitetl thrust-
ness of the modified XLR 81-BA-13 engine. chamber ignition characteristics with fuel,
Sufficient confidence in the reliability of the oxidizer, and simultaneous propellant leads
1‘78 GEMINI SllMMARY CONFERENCE

ovel- ii range of ol)er;iting iempcratures and possc~sscs moiiol)ropell:int charxteristics.


altitutles (iimhient pressures) . Considerable ‘I’hc rcsu1t;int niisturci beconies the source of
rlat;i 1vei.e reliitiible to the XLR 81-BA-13 the iitltlitioniil energy which produces the
engine thrust chamber, and usable a s ;in aid hiird star1 \vhen ignition occurs. In the XIAR
i n explaining the tlifferences in ignition char- 81-]:A-7 2 thrust chiiml)cr, iitlditio11iil tlam-
acteristics i n the main thrust chamber with ;ige \viis incurred I)cc:tuse the residence time
fuel ;inti oxidizer leads. When subjectetl to \vas such that ii ~*e;ict;il)lemixture accumu-
the s;inie test conditions, the XLIL XI-EA-13 Iiited downstream o f tho throat during the
engine thrust chanibei. produced signific:intly long ignitioii tleliiy. causing the nozzle over-
different ignition chiiriicteriStiCS f o r i i fuel- Itressurc’ whei! ixnitiori occurred.
leiid stiirt sequence ~ompiiretlt o ; i n oxidizer Although thc g a s gelieriitor operates re-
leal. Therefore. a coml):\riiti~eewiluation of 1iiil)ly \vith ;i fuel Iciitl, this reliability is
the diffei.ences in ignition chariicteristics ;ittril)utahle to: (1) the relatively very large
\viis made, l)iisetl 011 test (lati1 ~ O I * the full- \.olumt. o f t h r gas gencriitor ’turlline mani-
scale (engine) thrust chamber, the subscale fold iisseml)ly, which read i 1y accommodates
thruster, and the engine g a s generator as- thv energv stoiwl a t ignition; iind ( 2 ) a
sembly. The h;irtlnxre design factors which Ilrcignition pressurc rise, which indicates
can affect ignition were reviewed ; antl the that ii preigniter prol)al)ly exists, similar to
dependent conditions existing in the chamber thc main thrust ch;iml)er oxidizer-lead s t a r t
iit ignition (such ;is mixture ratio, density, sequence.
ignition delay, and ignition chemistry) were The followins significant conclusions were
recorded or del-ivetl as t h e test variables of derived from Project Sure Fire:
altitude, temperature, antl propellant lead
(1) Flightworthiness of the modified
were changed. The proper pressure antl tem-
S I X 87-EA-] 2 engine configuration was
perature must be generated in the. fuel-oxi-
successfully demonstrated.
dizer mixture during the induction period
just prior to ignition, and a sufficient amount (2) An oxidizer-lead start sequence is
of oxidizer must be present (luring induction optimum for the XLR 81-BA-13 engine
to prevent long ignition delays or quenching thrust chaml)er, antl provides low and ae-
of the reaction. cel)t;ible ignition shock levels over the range
of required operating conditions.
Based on analysis of the design factors and
conditions in the full-scale and subscale thrust (2) Significant differences exist between
chambers a t ignition, it appeared that the oxidizer-lead and fuel-lead ignition char-
chemistry of the ignition \vas involved i n acteristics in the XLR 81-BA-13 thrust
producing the hard s t a r t experienced in the chamber.
main thrust chamber with the fuel-lead ( 4 ) The conclusion indicated by the flight-
start sequence. When oxidizer \vas not pres- failure analysis of the Gemini VI target
ent in sufficient yuantities (luring the induc- vehicle, that an engine hard start occurred,
tion period, a suitahle oxidation reaction did was proven correct ; and the postulation t h a t
not occur to overcome thz effects t h a t the the engine hard start was due to a fuel-lead
hard vacuum produces during t h e propellant start sequence was also correct.
pre-flow and/or mixing period. Thus, proper (.5) Fuel-lead hard starts yield high prob-
pressures and temperatures were not devel- ability of damage to the thrust chamber
oped and a long ignition delay resulted, dur- assembly. Reevaluation of Gemini VI data
ing which secondary reactions probably oc- indicates that an oxidizer line break oc-
curred. producing high energy intermediate curred in the same area as t h a t observed
compounds. A highly reactable mixture is during the last fuel-lead test a t Arnold Engi-
formed, iiicluding the unsymmetrical di- neering Development Center. No reactions
methyl hydrazine (UDJBH) fuel which or adverse pressures were detected in any of
LAUNCH AND TARGET VEHICLE SUPPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 179

. the thrust chamber manifold cavities during tests must be conducted as final proof that
the fuel-lead starts a t Arnold Engineering complete simulation of all factors affecting
Development Center. The hard-start re- the ignition process for a specific configura-
actions occurred in the combustion chamber tion have been demonstrated.
and divergent nozzle. Results of Project Sure Fire were positive
( 6 ) The fuel-lead hard-start mechanism and on March 17, 1966, the engine was com-
appears to involve the chemistry of the re- mitted to launch. The engine performed as
action during the induction period. Lack of desired through all phases of the mission, in-
an excess of oxidizer apparently prevents a cluding demonstrations of multiple starts
satisfactory oxidation reaction from occur- and maneuver capability.
. ring relative to that for an oxidizer-lead
start sequence. A very long ignition delay Gemini Target Vehicle Stability During Docked
occurs, allowing an accumulation of a re- Engine Firing
actable oxidizer-fuel mixture which probably
contains high-energy intermediate com- The target-vehicle control system was
pounds formed during this delay. originally designed to provide stable flight
for an Agena vehicle with a conventional
(7) The XLR 81-BA-13 engine gas gen-
erator assembly provides reliable ignition payload. For Gemini, the control system was
with a fuel-lead start sequence within the required to provide stability during Primary
range of operating requirements. Low peak Propulsion System firings while in the
pressure and very slow pressure rise rates docked configuration. The original system
a r e always obtained. These characteristics was designed to filter all Agena body-bending
appear to be due to the large volume of the modes greater than 8 cycles per second. The
gas generator assembly, to the low potential system could be modified by a gain change to
energy in the chamber at ignition, and, per- handle frequencies as low as 5 cycles per sec-
haps most important, to a preignition pres- ond. However, the docked spacecraft "target
sure buildup probably attributable to a pre- vehicle had a fundamental body-bending
igniter oxidizer flow. mode with a frequency between 2 and 4
cycles per second. A lend-lag circuit was de-
(8) Testing a t the proper simulated alti-
signed by Lockheed to cope with this mode,
tude to determine engine ignition reliability
and stabilitv studies were performed to
is a necessary and extremely important
check out the modified system.
phase of space-flight engine development.
The fundamental mode in question in-
(9) Propellant triple-point (phase) data
provide a reliable guideline for defining the volved rigid-body motion of the spacecraft,'
target vehicle with ii flexible spring, the
minimum altitude test requirements. Further
Target Docking Adapter. connecting them.
studies on the relation of phase data, propel-
Preliminary stiffness data showed both in-
lant injection. and expansion dynamics a t
hard vacuum, and presence of excess fuel or plane and out-of-plane response when incor-
oxidizer, are recommended in order to ad- porated in the model. and indicated the in-
vance the state of the art. ability of the modified system to provide
(10) Existing ground-test technology is stability. A dynamic response test was per-
more than sufficient to properly simulate re- formed to provide better data for the analy-
quired altitude conditions for medium-size sis and resulted in considerably more out-of-
rocket engines. plane coupling in the fundamental mode than
(11) Sea-level and altitude subscale igni- had been expected. The frequency of this
tion tests, and full-scale sea-level ignition mode was between 2.5 ;uid 3.0 cycles per sec-
tests can be a valuable adjunct to full-scale ond. depending on the weight condition.
altitude testing. However, full-scale altitude Structural damping varied between 2.0 and
180 G E M I N I S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

5.0 ~ ) e ~ * e e In
n t . the course of evaluating the cv-is accuracies when making out-of-plane
test data, errors in haiidling the out-of-plane orbit changes. This yaw-heading error was
response were discovered in the model. With due to a combination of yaw center-of-
the model corrected and with the use of lower gravity off set, slow control-system response
bound t1;iniping v;ilues, the lead-lag niodifi- time, and vehicle dynamics. The yaw center-
cation proposed by Lockheed M';N shown to of-gravity offset was approximately twice
provide a(1equ;ite stability. The modification that of the standard Agena due to the added
w i s f l o ~oni the Gemini VI11 and subseyuent weight resulting from the addition of two
Gemini Agena Target Vehicles. running light batteries. The slow control-
As soon as the modal response of the system response time was caused by the re-
docked sl);iceci.aft target vehicle had been design of the flight-control electronics pack-
established by studies at the Massachusetts age. The redesign had been reyuired to
Institute of Technology iind the results ac- provide stable control-system operation dur-
cepted by the contractors affected, the flight ing the docked mode.
control electronics compensation was estab- Orbital altitude errors ranged to approxi-
lished. Previous studies by Lockheed had mately 120 miles during Primary Propulsion
shown that a modification to the lead-lag System operation. The errors were much
shaping network already in existence could more pronounced when the vehicle was in a
handle both the ascent dynamics and the +90" configuration and a plane change was
docked dynamics with a minor change in loop
attempted. This was due to the offset being
gain between two flight modes. The simula-
tion of t h e vehicle was increased t o include in the yaw direction and the velocity compo-
the flight control system, and the potential of nent error combining directly with the orbi-
the'revised lead-lag was confirmed. tal velocity. These errors greatly exceeded
Lockheed proceeded. to mechanize and 3-sigma values derived in prior error anal-
optimize the lead-lag design with the use of yses and on-orbit guidance computations.
a single-axis digital computer simulation. Various solutions to the center-of-gravity
Hardware components and tolerances were problem were investigated. These consisted
evaluated. The most difficult development of removing batteries, realining the engine,
item in the change was the perfection of the adding ballast, off-loading the Secondary
temperature-stabilized operational amplifier. Propulsion System propellants, and prepar-
Actual breadboard parts were tied into the ing correction tables for use in trimming out
single-axis simulator for temperature tests potential dispersions. A parametric study
as well as system performance evaluations. was performed which related pitch-and-yaw-
This phase was also used to perfect test pro- attitude errors to center-of-gravity offsets
cedures and tolerances that would insure for the target vehicle during Primary Pro-
proper system performance. pulsion System operation. Attitude errors
were determined as a function of firing time,
Gemini Target Vrhiclr Center-of-Gravity
OBsrt Problem vehicle center-of-gravity offsets, and vehicle
weight. Results were plotted as a family of
A major problem occurred on the Gemini curves to provide programed attitude cor-
VI11 target vehicle during undocked, in- rection data for desired orbit changes. Aver-
orbit, Primary Propulsion System powered age attitude error and actuator position for
flight. A significant vehicle yaw-heading various times of Primary Propulsion System
error existed ; the resulting velocity vector firings. along with transient attitude and
error affected the orbital guidance computa- actuator position response curves, were pre-
tions and resulted in adverse orbital ephem- sented.
LAUNCH AND TARGET VEHICLE SUPPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT O F DEFENSE 181

Atlas SLV-3 Target Launch Vehicle vehicle booster adapter. Space Systems Divi-
sion was also required to perform the soft-
The basic planning of the Gemini Program ware work necessary to place the Aug-
directed the use of the Air Force Atlas mented Target Docking Adapter into orbit,
SLV-3 as the launch vehicle for the Gemini using only SLV-3 boost capability.
Agena Target Vehicle. The overall develop-
ment of the Gemini Atlas-Agena Target Program Requirements
Vehicle system was assigned to the Air
Force Space Systems Division. The target- The Augmented Target Docking Adapter
vehicle program office used the existing inter- was originally designed as a backup vehicle
nal Space Systems Division management for the Gemini VII’VI-A rendezvous mis-
*
structure for the procurement of the SLV-3 sion and for the Gemini VI11 mission. At
vehicles. The SLV-3 contracts covered neces- first, it was not known if the hard start ex-
sary services and equipment from General perienced by the Gemini VI target vehicle
Dynamics/Convair, Rocketdyne, Acoustica, could be corrected before the Gemini VI11
General Electric, Burroughs, and the Aero- mission. The Manned Spacecraft Center re-
space Corp. Seven Atlas SLV-3 vehicles quested a vehicle that would permit docking
were procured and launched during the even though it would have no maneuver
Gemini Program. capability. The Augmented Target Docking
After final assembly-at the factory, the Adapter consisted of a target-vehicle shroud,
tanks were mated to the engine section; a Target Docking Adapter, an equipment
various subassembly kits were installed and section, a Gemini spacecraft Reentry Con-
tested prior to a final composite test of the trol System module, and a battery section.
complete vehicle. The vehicle was then The insertion conditions required a near-
shipped to Cape Kennedy where the SLV-3 circular orbit of 161 nautical miles with dis-
underwent inspection and final installations persions no greater than 7t20 nautical miles
in the hangar prior to erection. After the and a n inclination angle of 28.87”. The steer-
vehicle was erected on Launch Complex 14, ing mode was to be the crossing of the
the principal tests were the SLV-3 Flight ascending mode. A 2500-pound payload was
Acceptance Composite Tests and the overall used for planning.
Atlas-Agena Target Vehicle system test
(Joint Flight Acceptance Composite Test). Gemini At las-Aigena Target Vehicle
Finally, an SLV-3 tanking test was accom- Launch History .
plished to establish flight readiness of the
launch vehicle. Gemini VI Mission

Augmented Target Docking Adapter Since the Gemini VI mission was to be the
Program first Gemini rendezvous mission, the primary
objective was the rendezvous and docking of
Program 1)euelopment the Gemini spacecraft with the Gemini
Agena Target Vehicle. Another objective in-
In December 1965, the Manned Spacecraft volved checkout of the target vehicle while
Center delineated the Air Force Space Sys- docked, and included commands from the
tems Division and contractor support re- spacecraft to the target vehicle, determi-
quirements €or the Augmented Target Dock- nation of target-vehicle safety status, and
ing Adapter mission. The Air Force Space test of target-vehicle attitude maneuver
Systems Division was to supply the follow- capability. A small Secondary Propulsion
i n g hardware: an SLV-3 vehicle, ;i Gemini System firing in the docked configuration
target-vehicle shroud, and a Gemini target- was also planned, although no docked Pri-
1x2 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

niiii’y 1’rol)ulsion SJxteni firi iig \vas p1;innetl. )il;inr miineuver, or iiiclination-adjust ma-
This mission ]viis also the first simultaneous ner~ver,antl ayrrain resulted in ii Inrge in-plane
countdown for the 1:iuncIi of two vehiclcs velocity coml)onent. I t was later determined
( t h e Gemini A t l a s - A ~ e n a Titrget Vehicle that thesc errors were caused by ;I large
; i i i t l , 101 minutes later, thc Gemini Launch (.(.nler-of-gi’avity offset from the centerline,
Vehicle iinti sp;icecr:ift) . ant1 hy the dyniimic response of the guidance
The Gemini Atl;is-Agena Target Vehicle and control system being too slow to correct
for thc Gemini VI mission iviis launchetl :it for cc~titei.-of-Rni\rit?‘errors. It was decided
10 a.m.. eiisterii st;intlii~*tltime, October 25, that :idtlitioniil out-of-plane maneuvers
1963. The ascent Imrtion of the flight was ivoultl not be made.
~iormiil u i i t i l tinic for the target-vehicle An in-plnne r e t r o ~ r a d emaneuver resulted
Primary P~*opulsionSystem to firc Cor the i n lowering the ;ipogee to 200 nautical miles,
insertion rniiiiiwver : thc c i i K i n c s suffered ;I ant1 the results were nrarly perfect. The yaw
haid s t a r t ;uid sul)sc~luentcisl)losion, lind the o f f 4 w a h again noted, hut the firing was
vehicle failetl to achieve orbit. short ; slight yaw-heading errors have much
less effect on the resulting orbit when the
miineuver is performed in-plane. Based upon
this success, two more in-plane maneuvers,
The Gemini A tlas-Agena Target Vehicle dwell initiate and dwell terminate, were per-
for the Gemini VI11 mission was launched a t formed to deplete some of the propellants
10 :O: :On a.m., eastern standard time, March and to achieve ti circular orbit of 220 nauti-
7 6. 1966. Thcb ascent ph;ise was very close t o cal miles. These maneuvers were very suc-
nomimil lvith insertion into an orbit 161.4 by cessful ant1 accurate, although the yaw off-
1 G l . i n;iutic;il miles. The insertion param- set was noted during each firing. The center-
. eters were as follows: of-gravity offset problem was the only major
system problem during the mission. -
Semimajor axis, n. mi. .................... ::602.0.5
Inclination a n ~ l e d. c ......................
~ 28.86 Operation of the Secondary Propulsion
Eccentricity ........................................ 0.0006 System was desired until the propellant was
Period, min ........................................ !)0.47 depleted ; however, because of the excessive
Folloiving undocking and reentry of the control-gas usage during the spacecraft mal-
spacecraft. eight orbital firings were per- function, only 15 pounds of Attitude Control
formed by the target-vehicle Primary Pro- System gas remained when the first Sec-
ondary Propulsion System firing was to be
pulsion System during Gemini VIII. The
initiated. The operation was planned f o r 20
duration ranged from the 0.85-second mini-
seconds to provide the first actual in-orbit
mum-impulse firing to a 19.6-second plane
operation of the Secondary Propulsion Sys-
change, with the majority between 1 and 3
tem antl to verify control-gas usage rates.
seconds. Of the eight firings, five utilized the
The first Secondary Propulsion System Unit
short 22-second A-ullage sequence, and the
11 operation occurred over Grand Canary
other three used the 7-second C-ullage se-
Island in revolution 41. The firing was per-
quence. Based upon the iiv-ailable data, the
formed using flight control mode FC-7 t o
Primary Propulsion System performed nor-
mally during all eight firings. During the reduce velocity-vector errors caused by cen-
19.6-second out-of-plane maneuver, a major ter-of-gravity offset. Over the Eastern Test
systen: anomaly became apparent. The ve- Range during revolution 42, the second op-
hicle attitude in yaw was considerably off the eration of the Secondary Propulsion System
intended heading. resulting in a large in- was performed at the existing heading of
plane velocity component. This same heading -90 . This maneuver was also performed
offset was also noted on the second out-of- with clocked gains to reduce thrust-vector
LAUNCH AND TARGET VEHICLE SUPPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 183

errors caused by center-of-gravity offset. The was launched from Cape Kennedy a t
maneuver appeared nominal, except that 5 10 :00 :O2 a.m., eastern standard time, June
pounds of control gas were expended. The 1, 1966. The Target Launch Vehicle was
target-vehicle orbit after the final Secondary steeretl into ii predetermined coast ellipse and
Propulsion System firing was 220 by 222 nodal crossing. The insertion orbital ele-
nautical miles with a 28.867 i n c h a t’ion
~ ments were as follows:
angle. Xpogce altitude, n. mi. .......................... lIi7. I
During the Gemini VI11 mission, 5439 PeriKee altitude, n. mi. ........................ l!il.O
commands to the target vehicle were sent, Period. tnin .............................................. !10..50
accepted, and executed. The Gemini Atlas- Inclination, d e r .................................. 28.87
Agena Target Vehicle was launched within
1 second of the scheduled lift-off time.

Gemini IS Mission The Gemini Atlas-Xgena Target Vehicle


for the Gemini X mission was launched at
The Gemini Atlas-Agena Target Launch : :49 :46 p.m.. eastern standard time, July 18.
Vehicle for the Gemini IX mission was 19(i(j. The insertion parameters were as fol-
- launched May 17, 196G. A normal countdown lO\VS :
and lift-off occurred. After 120.6 seconds of Seniimajoi. axis. n. mi. .................... ::GO::
flight, the vehicle experienced a loss-of-pitch Inclination anrrlc, dca ........................ 28.85
control in one booster engine. Tracking film Eccentricity ........................................ 0.0008
showed that after the loss-of-pitch stability, Pcviocl. inin .......................................... :)0.46
the vehicle pitched downward in excess of The ascent phase wis nominal with inser-
180 , and changed in azimuth toward the left tion into an orbit of 162.4 by 159.0 nwutical
(northward). Flight control data also indi- miles. The largest tlispersion noted in the
cated that the vehicle pitched downward ; ascent guitlance equations u’as 1.5 sigma.
extrapolated and integrated data revealed The target vehicle w;is commanded into tlock-
that the vehicle pitched down 216” from the ing configuration from the ground. Prior to
67 reference at 120.6 seconds. Radar data docking, the Gemini spacecraft had a higher-
from the Grand Bahama Island station a t th;in-l)retlictetl us;ige of propellnnts. This
436 seconds. approximately 136 seconds after alteretl the flight pl;in and resulted in more
vernier engine cutoff, placed the vehicle tlocketl time, more reliance on the target ve-
about 103.4 nautical miles from the launch hicle, ant1 more maneuvers using target-
site, headed in ii northerly direction a t vehicle capability.
97 000 feet in altitude, and descending. These
data correlated well with a set of radar im-
pact coordinates which placed vehicle impact
107 miles from the launch site in a north- The Gemini XI AtlilS-Agenii Target Ve-
easterly direction. The exact reason for the hicle \viis I:iunchetl a t 8 :05 :01 a.m.. eastern
loss of the engine pitch control is unknown, stantlai.d time, September 12, 19Ci6. The
but the data indicate that ;i short-to-ground ascent phiise nxs iiomin;il n i t h insertioii into
occurred in the circuit for the servoamplifiw ;iii orbit of lG5.7 by lN.2 nuuticd miles. The
output-command signal. This short-to-grountl iiisertion piir:imeters were iis follo~vs:
may have been caused by cryogenic le:ik:ige Seniiiiiujor axis, n. mi. ........................ ::(;02..5
in the thrust section. Inclination anKlr. tlcg .......................... 2S.S.l
Eccentricity .......................................... 0.001:;
(ktiiiiti 1x4 Mirsioti l’ct~iotl, t i i i n ............................................ !)O.M

The Gemini IX-A Target Launch Vehicle The launch wiis origiiidly schetluled for
with the Augmented Target Docking Adapter September 9, 1966 : however. it i v a s tlelayetl
184 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

1 day due to an oxidizer leak in the Gemini Sciniinajor axis, n. mi. ........................ :160:1.0
Launch Vehicle. The second scheduled launch Inclination angle, dcg ........................ 28.86
Eccentricity .......................................... 0.0009
on September 10, 1966, was scrubbed at Period, min ............................................ 90.56
T--140 minutes due to a suspected autopilot
m;ilfunction in the Target Launch Vehicle. The launch was originally scheduled for
During the ascent I’rimwy Propulsion Sys- November 9, 19GG; however, the launch was
tem firing, it was determined that the magni- delayed 2 days due to a malfunction in the
tude of the center-of-gravity offset problem secondary autopilot of the Gemini Launch
encounteretl during Gemini VI11 had been Vehicle. During the target-vehicle ascent ma-
successfully eliminated. The target-vehicle neuver, an apparent anomaly occurred 140
command system responded properly to all seconds after Primary Propulsion System
ground and spacecraft commantls- during the initiation. At this time a 30-psi drop occurred
mission. in thrust-chamber pressure for approxi-
mately 1 second, then returned to normal for
the remaining 42 seconds of the firing. This
did not affect the Gemini Atlas-Agena Ve-
hicle insertion conditions. The docked posi-
The Gemini Atlas-Agena Target Vehicle grade Primary Propulsion System maneuver
for the Gemini XI1 mission was launched at originally planned was canceled due to un-
2 :07 :59 p.m., eastern standard time, No- certainties about the significance of the
vember 11, 1966. The ascent phase was nomi- chamber-pressure-drop anomaly.
nal with insertion into an orbit of 163.6 by
159.0 nautical miles. This was the most ac- Reference
curate insertion for the target vehicle in the
Gemini Program. The insertion parameters 1. ANON.: Gcmini Midpro~ramConference, Includ-
were : ing Experiment Results. NASA SP-121, 1966.
15. MISSION SUPPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Rs ROYCEG . OLSON.Director, Departrrient o/ Delense Manned Space Flight Support Ofice, Patrick Air
Force Rase, Florida

Introduction pants) and, on most mi:- ions, the Gemini


Agena Target Vehicle. I rie global tracking
The Secretary of Defense designated the and reentry network established for Project
Commander of the National Range Division, Mercury and modified for the Gemini Pro-
Air Force Systems Command, Lt. General gram was a joint NASAIDOD venture. The
Leighton I. Davis, as the Department of De- network was developed by integrating exist-
fense Manager for Manned Space Flight Sup- ing DOD range resources with stations estab-
port Operations. This designation, organiza- lished and operated by NASA at strategic
tionally under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sites around the- world. In addition, the
emphasized DOD support of the Gemini Pro- Australian Weapons Research Establishment
gram. General Davis was given the responsi- operated two stations for NASA. Figure 15-1
bility and authority to insure complete and shows the location of the tracking sites in
responsive support to NASA’s needs. the standard configuration for the Gemini
Through the National Range Division, he di- rendezvous missions. The locations of the
rected the longzrange planning for the design tracking ships varied somewhat as specified
and acquisition of supporting resources such by individual mission needs.
as range ships and aircraft, high-quality
communications, and range instrumentation. D01) Support
The DOD Manager established a small sup-
porting joint staff which was the single point DOD support to the Manned Space Flight
of contact for the final coordination and Network was provided by several agencies.
marshaling of all supporting resources prior Easteiw Tost Ranqe.-The Eastern Test
to each mission. These officers served as the Range (US.Air Force) facilities were used
operational control staff during mission in the launch and the orbital phases of the
periods when the DOD Manager assumed op- missions. Standard launch-site and instru-
erational control of all committed DOD re- mentation support were provided as neces-
sources. The areas of support responsibility sary for the launching and performance eval-
included launch, network, recovery, com- uatior. of the Gemini Launch Vehicle. The
munications, ground medical, meteorological, services included propellants, pad safety,
public affairs, and miscellaneous logistics. range safety, metric and optical tracking,
telemetry, and communications, as well as
Launch and Network Support command and control support.
Certain selected facilities a t Cape Kennedy
]Manned Space Flight Network and at Eastern Test Range downrange sta-
tions also comprised a part of the network
The responsibility of the Manned Space for tracking the target vehicle and the space-
Flight Network during the Gemini Program craft during orbit and reentry. The facilities
was to control, to communicate with, and to included: C-band radars for tracking the .
observe by electronic methods the perform- spacecraft and target vehicle and S-band
ance of the spacecraft (systems and occu- radars for tracking the target vehicle; tele-

185
186 GEM IN1 SUM MARY CONFERENCE

FIGURE
15-l.-Gemini network stations.

metry recording and display equipment ; to relay flight-crew voice communications


command and control equipment ; ground from the landing area to the Mission Control
communications, both voice and teletype ;and Center-Houston. The resources of the East-
spacecraft voice communications. The sta- ern Test Range were augmented, on a mis-
tions designated for orbital support were sion-by-mission basis, by such facilities as
Cape Kennedy and Grand Bahama, Grand the C-band radar at Pretoria, South Africa,
Turk, Antigua, and Ascension Islands. and instrumented ships.
In addition to the land-based stations, two Pacific Missile Rnwge.-The Pacific Missile
Eastern Test Range ships, the Coastal S e n t q Range (US.Navy) facilities provided track-
Quebec and the Rose Knot Victor, were an ing ship support and voice-relay telemetry
integral p a r t of the network. These ships aircraft for the Eastern Pacific landing area.
provided telemetry, command and control, Early in the Gemini Program, the Pacific
and communications coverage. The Eastern Missile Range operated the Hawaii, Canton
Test Range also positioned JC-130 aircraft Island, and California tracking sites. Later
in the primary Atlantic Ocean recovery area the National Range Division and the West-
to record terminal spacecraft telemetry, and ern Test Range were established, and the
MISSION SUPPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT O F DEFENSE 187

national range resources were realined. As dures with the Manned Space Flight Coordi-
a result, the operations of the Hawaii and the nator and with NASA to assure proper
Canton Island sites were transferred to integration of the DOD stations with the
NASA; and the operation of the California Manned Space Flight Network.
site, to the Western Test Range. Twenty-four hours prior to launch, the
Westew Test Ra?ige.-The Western Test DOD Manager assumed operational control
Range (U.S. Air Force) facilities operated of all DOD forces supporting the mission.
the California tracking site. Although not The Assistant for Network was part of the
considered a Gemini network station, the operational staff and provided the DOD Man-
U.S. Navy ship Rnnge T)m3cer participated ager with network-readiness reports, and
in the Gemini 111 through Gemini X missions assured that the DOD stations operated in
with radar, telemetry, and communications. accordance with the plans and procedures
White Sands Missile Rauge.-The White specified for that mission.
Sands Missile Range (U.S. Army) facilities The entire integrated network during the
provided C-band radar support throughout mission was controlled by the network con-
the Gemini Program. trollers on the staff of the NASA Flight Di-
Air Proving G1*ourid Center.-The Air rector at the Mission Control Center-
Proving Ground Center (U.S.Air Force) fa- Houston. They conducted the network count-
cilities provided C-band .radar support down, conducted premission simulations and
throughout. the Gemini Program. tests, and issued last-minute instructions.
NoTth Ame?.ican Ail. Defense Command.- They also directed network activities during
The North American Air Defense Command the flight,. as necessary, to assure that the
support to manned space flight began with required network support for the mission
Project Mercury. T h e ability to skin track was provided to the flight controllers. The
and catalog orbiting objects, and to compute network controllers were assisted by a joint
impact data and separation distances, was Goddard Space Flight Center/DOD Network
beneficial to the Gemini Program. The North Support Team. This team of specialists in
American Air Defense Command assisted each major category of network instrumend
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center in com- tation served as technical advisors to the
puting launch-vehicle impact points ; pro- network controllers.
vided ephemeris information on the Gemini During Project Mercury, and f o r the first
Agena Target Vehicles left in orbit; and pro- portion of the Gemini Program, the network-
vided the capability t o skin track the space- control function was performed solely by
craft. DOD. After relocation of the Mission Control ~

Center function from Cape Kennedy to


Organization
Houston, the network-control staff was aug-
mented by NASA personnel from the Manned
During the coordinating (premission)
Spacecraft Center and from the Goddard
phase, management of the DOD portion of
the Gemini network was the responsibility Space Flight Center. The network-control
of the individual range or organizational function was then brought under the direct
commander. In planning DOD network sup- control of the Manned Spacecraft Center.
port, the DOD Manager and his staff coordi-
nated with the Manned Space Flight Mission Highlights
Coordinator who was responsible for plan-
ning, arranging, and coordinating the re- Genzirri I.-For Gemini I, an unmanned or-
sources of his individual range. The Assistant bital mission, the network was in a proper
for Network to the DOD Manager coordi- configuration for the Gemini Program. The
nated network plans antl operating proce- ships, R o w Knot Victor antl Cocistnl Sonti-!/
188 GEM IN1 SUM MARY CONFERENCE

Quebec, were not required to support this mission was terminated during the seventh
mission. orbit because of a spacecraft control-system
G m i n i ZZ.-Gemini I1 was unmanned and malfunction after docking. The U.S. Navy
ballistic, requiring only Eastern Test Range ship Kingsport was added for this mission.
tracking facilities. The Rose Knot Victor was Excellent network support was available
located up range under the ground track ; the throughout the spacecraft emergency and the
Coastal Sentry Quebec was located near the reen try.
landing point. The Antigua radar tracked Gemini IX-A through Gemini XZZ.-Gem-
the spacecraft through the communications ini IX-A was a 3-day rendezvous mission
blackout period. with the Augmented Target Docking
Gemini ZZZ.-Gemini I11 was manned and Adapter. Both Gemini X and XI were 3-day
orbital and was the first exercise of the entire rendezvous missions with the Gemini Agena
network. The US. Navy ship Rnnye Tracker Target Vehicle. Gemini XI1 was a 4-day ren-
was added to the network. The communica- dezvous mission with the Gemini Agena Tar-
tions from the Coastal Seatry Quebec were get Vehicle.
augmented by the US. Navy ship Kingsport The Gemini IX-A through Gemini XI1
and the SYNCOM I1 satellite. This was the missions required identical network support.
first time NASA and DOD recovery commu- Network tracking was excellent ; failures
nications augmented one another. All radars were a t a minimum and had no effect on the
that had been committed to the spacecraft missions. On Gemini IX-A and X, the Com-
reentry phase obtained track. puter Acquisition System allowed the Eastern
Gemini ZV.-Gemini I V was a 4-day, Test Range radars to acquire and to track the
manned, orbital mission and used the same spacecraft on reentry. On Gemini XI, a com-
network configuration as Gemini 111. An puter was made available a t the Western Test
Eastern Test Range subcable break was suc- Range, and a vector was sent from the Real
cessf ully bypassedby using alternate routes. Time Computer System at the Eastern Test
Telemetry monitoring of launch-vehicle re- Range to the California site for acquisition.
entry and breakup was available through Tracking data were returned t o the Real Time
radar tracking from Patrick Air Force Base Computer System for computing acquisition
and Kennedy Space Center. information for the Eastern Test Range
Gemitti V.-Gemini V was a n %day, radars.
manned, orbital mission and full network
support was provided. The North American Summary of Network Support
Air Defense Command successfully tracked
and provided impact prediction on the second Significant progress was realized during
stage of the launch vehicle. the Gemini Program not only in improving
Gemini VI-A and Gemini VZZ.-Gemini basic tracking and data transmission, but
VI-A and Gemini VI1 used combined flight also in streamlining operation and test pro-
plans. Gemini VI1 was a 14-day manned mis- cedures to assure more efficient use of the
sion; Gemini VI-A was a 2-day, manned, available equipment. Network problems, such
rendezvous mission. Full network support as communications failures, inadequate radar
was provided. The ship Wheeling was sub- tracking, and difficult troubleshooting t h a t
stituted for the ship Range Tracker. No sig- occurred during Project Mercury, were re-
nificant network failures occurred during t h e duced so t h a t a fully operative network be-
14-day mission. The performance of the came a routine occurrence at launch time and
remote-site data processor was superior to throughout the mission.
that obtained during previous missions. Modifications and improvements to the
Gemini VZZZ.-Gemini VI11 was planned as C-band radars provided more accurate track-
a 3-day rendezvous mission; however, the ing, easier acquisition, and more rapid proc-
MISSION SUPPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 189

essing of the radar data. Using pulse code run on subsequent missions. Refinements
modulation, the Telemetry System allowed a were made and by the time of the Gemini
much greater volume of spacecraft data to IX-A mission, data from the White Sands
be transmitted and displayed a t one time. The radar, processed by the Real Time Computer
Digital Command System allowed more com- System, allowed the Eastern Test Range
plex and a greater number of commands to radars to acquire and track the spacecraft
be sent to the spacecraft; by computer proc- during reentry, proving the advantage of the
essing, a fail-safe system was provided to system. Additional computers will be made
assure that the proper command was, in fact, available a t the DOD ranges to add to the
transmitted. The more extensive use of com- system so that the final configuration can be
puters, both on site and at the Mission Con- realized.
trol Centers, provided for near real-time The Impact Predictor System was a n out-
transmission, reduction, and display of the growth and refinement of a capability that
volumes of data made available by the net- had existed a t the Eastern Test Range since
work. The Gemini Program provided the first the Real Time Computer System became oper-
real operational testing of many of these new ational. This system used radar data from
systems and the improvements of older sys- other DOD ranges and the downrange East-
tems. The Digital Command System and ern Test Range sites. The data were processed
Telemetry System, for instance, are gradu- by the Real Time Computer System and pro-
ally replacing older systems on the national vided a near real-time plot of the spacecraft
ranges. ground track during reentry. The spacecraft
The Computer Acquisition System was one drag factor and the maneuvering information
result of the Gemini network support de- were not entered in the computer program,
veloped on the DOD ranges. The reentry pro- but the quantity of available downrange data
file and the primary landing area of the offset this deficiency in the terminal phase
- of reentry.
Gemini spacecraft were such that, to provide
adequate radar tracking during reentry .for
landing-point computation, the radars had Recovery Support
to acquire during the blackout period. With-
out highly accurate acquisition information, The primary mission of DOD recovery
this was almost a n impossible task ; however, forces during the Gemini Program was to
the means were devised to solve the problem. ‘locate and to retrieve the flight crew and
Prior to blackout, radar-track data were pro- spacecraft, and to deliver them to NASA pro-
vided to a central computer that had been gram managers. This responsibility began
programed for reentry. These data could be with the launch of the spacecraft and ended
. translated into a n accurate driving signal to with the delivery of the recovered spacecraft
be fed to the radar which would acquire the to NASA.
spacecraft during blackout. The accuracy of Planning for the spacecraft-location func-
the data enabled the radar to follow the actual tion assumed that information would be
spacecraft track and to find the weak beacon available from several sources. One source in
signal through the ion shield. By use of com- computing a probable landing point was the
puters associated with each radar, data could information obtained from the ground track-
be fed in both directions, and the radars could ing stations. In addition, the spacecraft was
operate independently. A lack of equipment equipped with a high-frequency radio beacon
a t the DOD ranges precluded early imple- which enabled the worldwide DOD high-
mentation of the system. Using the Real Time frequency direction-finding network to pro-
Computer System at Cape Kennedy, a suc- vide fixing information. The spacecraft was
cessful test of the theory was accomplished also equipped with a n ultrahigh-frequency
on the Gemini V mission ; further tests were radio beacon which could be received by air-
190 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

borne forces. The airborne forces used elec- The use of functionally descriptive call
trouic homing for all Gemini missions. An signs for the recovery forces was instituted
additional electronic source of information during Gemini VI-A and VII. This procedure
not originally anticipated was shipboard aided the clarity of recovery force com-
radar. Radar information from ships sta- munications and was used in all subsequent
tioned in the Primary Landing Area was missions.
~)articularlyvaluable ; and a contact in excess
of 300 miles was reported by the primary Recovery Areas
recovery ship during recovery of the Gemini
\T 11 spacecraft. Since recovery planning was concerned
Location p l m n i n ~also provided for visual with all conceivable landing situations, the
search if electronic means failed. The space- most effective approach was to orient the
craft was provided with a sea dye marker to planning about certain geographical areas.
aid in daytime visual location and with a These were the Launch Site, Launch Abort,
high-intensity blinking light for nighttime Contingency, Secondary, and Primary Areas.
search. During the later missions, the loca- All except the Contingency Area were con-
tion task was qimplified when the spacecraft, sidered planned landing areas.
descending on the main parachute, was visu- Lauiich Site Area.-The Launch Site Area
ally sighted. (fig. 15-2) was that area where a landing
Retrieval of the flight crew was accom- would occur following a n abort in the late
plished by helicopter on all but two missions. stages of the countdown or during early
The Gemini VI-A and Gemini IX-A flight flight. For planning purposes, the area was
crews elected to remain in the spacecraft for centered on Launch Complex 19 at Cape Ken-
pickup by the recovery ship. Spacecraft re- nedy and extended 3 miles toward the Banana
trieval was accomplished by the primary re- River and 41 miles seaward, with the major
cnvery ship on all missions except Gemini axis along the launch azimuth. The actual
VIII, which landed in the West Pacific Sec- positioning of launch-site forces was oriented
ondary Landing Area. In this case, the swim- about a much smaller area, with the size and
mers were deployed from a n aircraft on the location determined by the launch azimuth
scene at spacecraft landing. The team at- and local winds.
tached the flotation collar to the spacecraft,
and the recovery was made by the destroyer
The.typical launch-site recovery force in-
cluded four C H 3 C amphibious helicopters,
supporting the area.
During Gemini I1 and Gemini 111, control
of DOD recovery forces by the DOD Manager Reduced area based on
was accomplished from the Mission Control winds at time of lift-off
Center-Cape Kennedy. For all subsequent
missions, the DOD Manager and his staff
operated from the Recovery Control Center,
Houston.
An early problem in the command and con-
trol area was the lack of real-time voice infor-
mation from the recovery scene. For Gemini
IV, procedures were developed whereby the
flight-crew air-to-ground voice circuit could
be used for on-scene recovery operations and
could be relayed to the Recovery Control Cen-
t e r ; this procedure was followed f o r all sub-
sequent missions. FIGURE15-2.-Typical launch-site recovery area.
MISSION SUPPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT..OF DEFENSE 191

four lighter amphibious resupply cargo positioned adjacent to these zones. Target
(LARC) vehicles, two M-113 personnel car- points were selected in each zone for each
riers, two landing vehicle tracked recovery time the ground track passed through the
(LVTR) , two rescue boats, and one salvage zone. These target points were then covered
vessel for in-port standby. The launch-site by the supporting ship. The aircraft were on
recovery forces were not required to effect 30-minute strip alert and ready for a n imme-
an actual recovery during Gemini. diate takeoff.
Lazinch Abort Area.-The Launch Abort The Atlantic zones were covered by the
Area was along the launch ground track be- ships and aircraft which had also provided
tween Cape Kennedy and the west coast of Launch Abort Area coverage during the
-4frica. An abort might have occurred in this launch phase of the mission. The East At-
area during the launch phase of flight prior lantic Secondary Landing Area was normally
to Earth-orbital insertion. The recovery force supported by a destroyer and a fleet oiler.
posture in the Launch Abort Area underwent For Gemini XII, the ship access-time require-
considerable change during the Gemini Pro- ment for this area was increased, and suffi-
gram as confidence in the launch vehicle and cient coverage was provided by a fleet oiler
spacecraft systems increased. For example, equipped with communications and recovery
the on-station launch-abort recovery force equipment as well as medical personnel.
for Gemini I11 consisted. of eight destroyers, The value of Secondary Landing Areas
one fleet oiler, one fleet tug, and nine fixed- and assigned forces was significantly demon-
wing aircraft. The on-station launch-abort strated on the Gemini V and VI11 missions.
force for Gemini XI1 was reduced to three During the early part of Gemini V mission,
destroyers, one aircraft carrier, one fleet the spacecraft developed electrical power-
oiler, and four fixed-wing aircraft. The source difficulties. For several revolutions
launch-abort recovery forces were 'not re- after the problem developed, the spacecraft
quired to make a n actual recovery during did not pass through the Primary Landing
Gemini. Area. However, the spacecraft did pass
Contin.gency Recovery Area.-The Contin- through the Mid-Pacific Secondary Landing
gency Recovery Area comprised the area Area where a i r and surface forces were
along the spacecraft ground tracks outside ready to provide support if necessary. The
the planned landing areas. Forces supporting problem was eventually corrected, and the
this area consisted of Air Force Aerospace mission was completed a s planned.
Rescue and Recovery Service aircraft de- The value of the Secondary Landing Areas
ployed to various worldwide staging bases. was even more evident during the Gemini
These forces were capable of reaching any VI11 flight. Following a successful rendez-
point along the spacecraft ground track vous-and-docking maneuver, the docked ve-
within 18 hours. There were no actual con- hicles developed severe gyrations. The crew
tingency-area recoveries during Gemini. was forced to take emergency action which
Secoridnry Landing Areus.-The Second- resulted in a low-fuel state in the Reentry
a r y Landing Areas which were established Control System. In accordance with pre-
for the long-duration missions consisted of planned mission rules, the decision was made
four circular zones. Each zone had a radius in this case to land the spacecraft in the West
of 240 nautical miles. The zones were located Pacific Secondary Landing Area. The sup-
in the West Atlantic, East Atlantic, West port ship and seven aircraft were alerted,
Pacific, and Mid-Pacific. Each zone was sup- and the first aircraft on the scene sighted the
ported by a destroyer o r a fleet oiler and, in spacecraft descending on the main para-
some cases, by a destroyer and a n oiler in chute. The aircraft deployed the swimmers to
company. In addition, Air Force Aerospace attach the flotation collar to the spacecraft
Rescue and Recovery Service aircraft were and to report the condition of the flight crew.
192 - GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

The destroyer arrived on the scene and re- provided. Recovery of the flight crew and
trieved the spacecraft and flight crew. Re- spacecraft was televised for all subsequent
covery was completed 3 hours 10 minutes missions except Gemini VIII. The Gemini
after landing. VI-A and VI1 missions established the DOD
P r i ~ ~ i a i yLanding Area-The Primary capability to provide recovery support for a
Landing Area was located in the West dual mission.
Atlantic, and the primary recovery ship was
assigned to this area. An Amphibious As- Planned Versus Actual Statistics
sault Ship was the primary recovery ship
for Gemini X and Gemini XI. A support air- Table 15-1 presents a compilation of the
craft carrier was used for this function in all total DOD resources dedicated to each
other missions. Gemini mission. The general trend toward
reduction of forces as the program pro-
The addition of the Amphibious Assault
gressed is shown.
Ship has provided DOD planners more
flexibility in scheduling support for manned The second column of table 15-11 indicates
space-flight missions. This type of ship the distance between the planned .target
operates more economically and does not re- point and the actual landing point of the
quire a rescue destroyer in company. The spacecraft for each Gemini mission. This
aircraft carrier has proved to be an effective table also shows the time interval between
primary recovery ship, since i t .serves as a the spacecraft landing and the arrival of the
launch and recovery platform for helicopters flight crew aboard ship. Column 4 shows the
access time established by NASA for the
and provides excellent facilities for postmis-
applicable recovery a r e a ; the access time is
sion evaluation of the flight crew. Helicopters
a r e used in the Primary Recovery Area for the principal criterion established for recov-
the 'electronic location of the spacecraft and ery-force operations. This. is the elapsed time
for the transport of the Swim teams to and from spacecraft landing until first-level
from the spacecraft. During most of the mis- medical care can be provided the flight crew.
sions, separate heIicopters were used for each Thus, a comparison of the times in columns
of these functions. In Gemini XII, the func- 3 and 4 provides a n indication of recovery-
tions were combined bv placing the swim force performance.
teams aboard the search helicopters. This
satisfactory arrangement proved economical Communications
and operational.
Communications support by DOD forces
Fixed-wing aircraft were utilized for air-
evolved from a simple network for support-
borne control of aircraft in the recovery area ing a ballistic missile launch to complex
and for providing a commentary of recovery communications networks of ships, aircraft,
operations between the recovery forces and ground stations, and worldwide recovery
shore installations. This information was re- bases and forces for supporting orbital space
layed t o the Mission Control Center-Hous- flights.
'
ton in real time through relay aircraft. The In 1960, the Air Force Eastern Test
relay aircraft provided network support Range was committed to support the first
prior to landing and provided recovery sup- flight of the manned spacecraft program,
port after landing until the flight crew were Mercury-Redstone 1 mission. Cape Kennedy
retrieved. (Cape Canaveral) and Grand Bahama
Beginning with Gemini VI-A and VII, Island, Eastern Test Range stations, were
live television broadcasts and recovery oper- the primary ground stations providing track-
ations in the Primary Landing Area were ing and telemetry support. Other stations
MISSION SUPPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 193

. were being established to form a worldwide single-sideband radio and selected ground
tracking network. The network included air- stations. The DOD communications responsi-
borne platforms for automatic voice relay bilities increased as mi.ssions progressed
from a manned spacecraft to the Mission from suborbital to orbital. The responsibil-
Control Center by means of high-frequency/ ities involved the Eastern Test Range, the

TABLE15-I.-DOD Support of Gemini Missions


-.

Launch Duration, Recovery 1 Ship making I

1
Mission date hr:min Personnel Aircraft ship spacecraft recovery Ocean
---_____ ___
I-- ~

I (unmanned) ..... Apr. 8, 1964 "5:OO 6 176 None None


1
~

I1 (unmanned) ... Jan 19, 1965 0:18 6 562 67 16 USS Lake Champlain') Atlantic
I11.................... Mar. 23, 1965 4:53 10185 82 27 USS Intrepid Atlantic
IV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . June 3,1965 97:56 10349 134 26 uss Wasp" j Atlantic
v. ....................... Aug. 21.. 1965 19055 10265 114 19 USS Lake Champlain 1 Atlantic

1I Atlantic
VI. ......................... Oct. 25, 1965 "0:OO 10125 125 16
VI1......................
VI-A,. ................... Dec. 15,1965
VI11.....................
IX-A" ....................
Dec. 4, 1965

Mar. 16, 1966


June 3,1966
x . ........:. .................. July 18, 1966
330:35
25:51
10:41
72:21
70:47
10125
10125
9 665
11301
9 072
125
125
96
92
78
16
16
18
15
13
uss Wasp"
uss Waspl1
uss Mason<'
uss Wasph
USS Gzcadukanalf .
1
I
Atlantic
Pacific
Atlantic
Atlantic
XI.. ....................... Sept. 12, 1966
XI1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nov. 11, 1966
71:17
94:35
I
8 963
9 775
73
65
13
12
USS Guam'
USS Waspti ,I Atlantic

' Tracking time, no recovery intended. Gemini I X aborted May 17 due to failure of tar-
Aircraft carrier. uet
- vehicle.
Mission aborted. ' Amphibious Assault Ship (helicopter carrier).
'Destroyer. Mission terminated in Secondary
Landing Area. USS Boxer was planned recovery
carrier.

TABLE
l&II.-Gemini Recover??Operations
I
Time from landing
Landing distance to flight crew I
from target point, aboard recovery Maximum ship I
Mission .n. mi. ship, min access time, hr 1 Remarks
__
I I -l I

i
I Unmanned No recovery intended
I1 14 Unmanned
I11 60 70 4
IV 44 57 4
V 91 89
I
4
VI-A I 7 66
I 4 Crew remained in space-

IX-A,. .......................
6.4
1.1

0.38
33
190

52
4
6

4
I
i
i
Landing in West Paciflc
Zone
Crew remained in space-
craft
x ......................... 3.4 28 4
X I ............................ 2.65 24 4
XI1 .......................... 2.6 30 4
I
194 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

Eglin Gulf Test Range, the White Sands and a vast network of dedicated, common-
Missile Range, and the Pacific Missile Range, user circuits connecting the worldwide de-
a s well as associated ships and aircraft inte- ployed forces on a near real-time basis was
grated into one network under a DOD- available for Gemini XII. This system was
designated network controller. The Air capable of supporting a s many a s 131 air-
Force Western Test Range, organized in craft, 28 surface vessels, 30 land-based sites,
1965, includes Vandenberg Air Force Base, and 5 major recovery control centers. Each
Calif.; Hawaii; Eniwetok; and ships and recovery force was given a complete test
aircraft supporting the Pacific area. prior to each mission to assure readiness to
During the Mercury and Gemini manned support nominal a s well a s nonnominal mis-
space flights, many new theories, different sions.
support and response, and mechanics of ac- Under the direction of the DOD Man-
complishing the missions were developed by ager’s Assistant for Communications, the
DOD. The transmission of high-speed radar DOD communications assets were activated
data for manned missions; the use of air- and tested approximately 7 days prior to
borne platforms for tracking, telemetry, and flight. The assets were tested for station-to-
automatic voice relay ; and the procedures station alinement procedures, alternate and
f o r integrating the DDD Service and Na- diverse routing, and equipment and man-
tional Ranges with the NASA stations were power readiness. F o r orbital support, the
improved. NASA and DOD tracking/telemetry stations
While much consideration was accorded a integrated the communication functions sys-
buildup of networks to support the orbital tems for network simulations about 15 days
portion of a flight, action was also taken to prior to flight.
provide the worldwide deployed recovery In addition to insuring that necessary cir-
forces with communications systems t h a t cuitry was available and ready to support
were allequate, responsive, and reliable. The the mission, key individuals were deployed
complete resources of DOD were made avail- by the Assistant for Communications to key
able through the facilities of the Defense communications locations. These individuals
Communications Agency, Unified and Speci- were to provide quick response to unforeseen
fied Commands, as well as through the situations, to assist field commanders with
resources of the separate commands. Progres- any communications problem that could not
sion was evident in the method of providing be resolved locally, and to insure t h a t DOD
teletype communications (written copy) serv- forces conformed to documented and last-
ice. Early in Project Mercury, the facilities of minute communication needs a s a single and
the Army, Navy, and Air Force were used to integrated system. Possible improvements to
provide teletype information to the forces communications equipment, terminal loca-
and bases under the command of each of the tions, and procedures were constantly
services. To gain operational control, to im- studied to assure t h a t the best possible s u p
prove response time, and to insure real-time port was available to manned spacecraft mis-
reaction, the Army ( F o r t Detrick, Md.) was sions.
given the responsibility for the automatic
Meteorology
relay-switching center, interconnecting the
recovery staff of the DOD Manager with the The short duration of the Project Mercury
deployed recovery forces. Voice communica- missions allowed confirmation of acceptable
tions links were also made available from the weather conditions in the recovery areas. In
Defense Communications Agency, commer- the planning stage of the Gemini Program,
cial carriers, ranges, and military commands. however, it became apparent t h a t weather
Recovery communications support increased ; conditions in the planned recovery areas
~

MISSION SUPPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT O F DEFENSE 195

would have to be monitored continuously in worldwide DOD medical support capability


order to determine the suitability of recov- and to deploy people and materiel as re-
ery areas. As a result, the National Range quested by NASA. This first Assistant for
Division staff meteorologist was designated Bioastronautics was responsible to the
the Assistant for Meteorology to the DOD 6550th US. Air Force Hospital at Patrick
Manager. Air Force Base and to the Air Force Missile
Special weather observations were made Test Center commander. I n January 1962,
from DOD ships in the recovery areas and the Assistant for Bioastronautics was desig-
from weather reconnaissance aircraft. Both nated an additional duty position for the re-
Air Force and Navy aircraft were used for designated Deputy for Bioastronautics, Air
Gemini weather reconnaissance and were Force Eastern Test Range. In March 1963,
specially equipped for hurricane and typhoon the Office of the Deputy for Bioastronautics
reconnaissance. Each of the four recovery was selected by the Surgeon General of the
zones for the Gemini missions was supported U S . Air Force to provide primary training
by one reconnaissance flight each day as that would satisfy the requirements for %he
needed. third year of residency training in aerospace
Special weather support, using balloon and medicine.
meteorological rocket-equipped instrumenta-
tion, was provided at selected locations with Public Affairs
high-level atmospheric data for postflight
analysis. The Director of Information of the Air
Force Eastern Test Range was designated
Bioastronautics as the Assistant for Public Affairs to the
DOD Manager under the DOD/NASA agree-
The Bioastronautics Operational Support ment. The areas of responsibility of the
Unit at Cape Kennedy was completed in time Assistant for Public Affairs began at Cape
to support the launch of Gemini I11 on March Kennedy and extended to Hawaii and to
23, 1965. Europe.
Bioastronautics at the Air Force Eastern The operation of the press sites, including
Test Range is one of the many complex as- fiscal management and technical organiza-
signments of a DOD organization. The tion, was also the responsibility of the As-
Director of Bioastronautics is responsible for sistant for Public Affairs. The news pools at
providing assistance to NASA as required Cape Kennedy during a launch and those at
in prelaunch evaluation of the flight crew, sea were operated under established rules.
biomedical monitoring d u r i n g orbital flight, DOD information desks were established
medical support for recovery operations, and in the two major NASA news centers ap-
postflight evaluation. proximately 5 days before the mission and
Medical support for the early Jupiter were manned until the day after spacecraft
flights that carried animal life was provided recovery. Beginning 2 hours before mission
by a joint-services team of three officers lift-off and continuing through recovery,
designated as the Aero-Medical Consultant DOD public affairs consoles in the recovery
Staff. In November 1959, NASA requested control centers were operated 24 hours a
DOD to provide the medical support team day. Manpower assistance was provided by
for Project Mercury. The DOD representa- other military commands and departments
tive f o r Project Mercury support appointed under the supervision of the Assistant for
his Staff Surgeon to the newly established Public Affairs. Of the 10100 newsmen ac-
position of Assistant for Bioastronautics to credited during the Gemini Program, nearly
manage these support activities. The func- 7000 operated in the Cape Kennedy area, and
tion of this new office was to organize a the remainder, in Houston.
16. PRE-GEMINI MEDICAL PREDICTIONS VERSUS GEMINI
FLIGHT RESULTS
By CHARLESA. BERRY,M.D., Director of Medical Research and Operations, NASA Manned Spacecraft
Center; and ALLEN D. CATTERSON,M.D., Ofice o/ Medical Research Operations, NASA Manned
Spacecraft Center

Summary some effect on almost every body system. It


is understandable that detrimental effects
' The Mercury and Gemini space flights were the ones listed, as these could have been
provided approximately 2000 man-hours of limiting factors in manned space flight. In
weightless exposure for evaluating predicted some respects, the medical community be-
effects of space flights versus actual findings. comes its own worst enemy in the attempt to
In general, the environmental hazards and the protect man against the hazards of new and
effects on man appear to be of less magnitude unknown environments. Frequently, the
than originally anticipated. The principal physician dwells upon the possible individual
physiologic changes noted were orthostatism system decrements, and forgets the tre-
for some 50 hours postflight a s measured mendous capability of the body to maintain a
with a tilt table, reduced red-cell mass ( 5 to state of homeostasis in many environments.
20 percent) , and reduced X-ray density (cal- Following the first manned space flights,
cium) in the os calcis and the small finger. some of these anxieties were reduced, al-
No abnormal psychological reactions have though most observers believed the evidence
been observed, and no vestibular disturb- was insufficient to reject any of the dire pre-
ances have occurred that were related to dictions.
flight. Drugs have been prescribed for inflight
use. The role of the physician in supporting Predicted and Observed Environment and
normal space flight is complex, requiring the Human Responses
practice of clinical medicine, research. and
diplomacy. Although much remains to be The successful and safely conducted Mer-
learned, it appears that if man is properly cury and Gemini Programs have provided
supported, his limitations will not be a bar- the first significant knowledge concerning
rier to the exploration of the universe. man's capability to cope with the environ-
ment of space. In these programs, 19 men
Introduction have flown 26 man-flights for a total weight-
less experience of approximately 2000 man-
Prior to the first expos,ure of man to orbi- hours. Three individuals have flown as the
tal space flight, the biomedical community single crewman in Mercury and as one of
expressed considerable concern over man's the two crewmen in the Gemini spacecraft;
'capability not only to perform in such an four individuals have flown twice in the
environment but even to survive in it. Since Gemini spacecraft. The flight programs a r e
weightlessness was the one unknown factor summarized in tables 1 6 1 and 1611. This
which could not be exactly duplicated in a flight experience only scratches the surface
laboratory on the ground, numerous investi- of detailed space exploration, but should pro-
gators and various committees predicted vide a sound basis for comparing the predic-

Preceding page blank 197


198 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

tions concerning man's support and response though there were also several effects noted
to this environment with the reality of the which were not predicted.
findings from the actual experience.
The space-flight environment predictions General Aspects of the Flight Program
are compared with the actual observations in
table 16-111. In evaluating the results of flight pro-
The human responses to space flight which grams, i t is important to realize t h a t man is
were predicted a r e compared with the obser- being exposed to multiple stresses and t h a t
vations in table 16-IV. There were more pre- i t is impossible at the present time to evalu-
dicted system effects than were observed, ate the stresses singly, either inflight o r post-

TABLEl&I.-Project Mercumj Manned Flights

Flight I Crew
I Launch date 1 Description
-__- -- I- -I
Duration, hr:min

I
M R-3
M I<-4
MA-6
' Shepard
Grissom
Glenn
May 5, 1961
July 21, 1961
Feb. 20, 1962
Suborbital
Suborbital
Orbital
O:l5
O:l5
4 :56
MA-7 1 Carpenter May 24, 1962 Orbital 4:56
MA-8 1 Schirra Oct. 3, 1963 Orbital 9:14
MA-9 i Cooper May 15, 1963 Orbital 34 :20

TABLE16-II-4emini Manned Space Flights


- ~- .-

Duration,
Gemini mission Crew Launch date Description day :hr :min
___-___- ---___ -

I11 Grissom Mar. 23, 1965 Three revolution manned test 0:04:52

June 3, 1965 First extended duration and extravehicular 4:00:56


activity
Aug. 21, 1965 First medium-duration flight 72256

Dec. 4, 1965 First long-duration flight 13:18:35

Dec. 15, 1965 First rendezvous flight 1 :01:53

Mar. 16, 1966 First rendezvous and docking flight. 0:10:41

June 3, 1966 Second rendezvous and docking; first ex- 3:01:04


tended extravehicular activity
July 18, 1966 Third rendezvous and docking: 2 extravehi- 2 :22 :46
cular activity periods; first docked target-
vehicle-propelled high-apogee maneuver
Sept. 12, 1966 First rendezvous and docking initial orbit; 2 :23 :17
2 extravehicular activity periods; second
docked target-vehiclepropelled high-
apogee maneuver; tether exercise

i
XI1 Lovell Nov. 11, 1966 Rendezvous and docking; umbilical and 2 3:22:37
Aldrin standup extravehicular activity periods;
tether exercise
I
PRE-GEMINI MEDICAL PREDICTIONS VERSUS GEMINI FLIGHT RESULTS 199

TABLE16-III.-Space-FZight Environme?~t TABLE 16-IV.-Human Response to Space


Flight-Concluded
Predicted Observed
Predicted 0bserved
Micrometeorite density Low micrometeorite
density Electromechanical delay None
Loss of cabin pressure- 5 psi except during in cardiac cycle
vacuum extravehicular activity Reduced cardiovascular None
Loss of suit pressure- Space suit, wear unpres- response to exercise
vacuum surized (pressurized on (a) Absolute neutrophilia
extravehicular flights) Reduced blood volume Moderate
Toxic atmosphere 100-percent oxygen Reduced plasma volume Minimal
Cabin and suit Minimal variation about (a) Decreased red-cell mass
temperature comfort zone Dehydration Minimal
Radiation levels Insignificant Weight loss Variable
Isolation None Bone demineralization Minimal calcium loss
Physical confinement Physical restraint Loss of appetite Varying caloric intake
Weightlessness Weightlessness Nausea None
Gravity loads Gravity loads, no - Renal stones None
problem with perfor- Urinary retention None
mance Diuresis None
Vibration Minimal vibration Muscular incoordination None .
Severe glare Varying illumination Muscular- atrophy None
(a) Workload higher than (a) Reduced exercise
expected capacity
- ____ Hallucinations None
a Not predicted. Euphoria None
Impaired psychomotor None
performance
Sedative need None
TABLE16-IV.-Huma~ Response to Space Stimulant need Occasionally before
Flight reentry
__ _____ __ ___... Infectious disease None

Dysbarism
Predicted
I None
Observed
Fatigue Minimal

Disruption of circadian None -. -

rhythms Not predicted.


Decreased g-tolerance None
Skin infections and Dryness, ;ncluding
breakdown dandruff flight. Man is exposed to multiple stresses
Sleepiness and s l e e p Interference (minor)
lessness
which may be summarized as: full pressure
Reduced visual acuity None suit, confinement and restraint, 100-percent
(a) Eye irritation oxygen and 5-psia atmosphere, changing
(a) Nasal stuffiness and
hoarseness
cabin pressure (launch and reentry), vary-
Disorientation and None ing cabin and suit temperature, acceleration
g-force, weightlessness, vibration, dehydra-
tion, flight-plan performance, sleep need.
alertness need, changing illumination, and
diminished food intake. Some of the stresses
High blood pressure None can be simulated in ground-based studies but
Low blood pressure None
Fainting postflight None the actual flight situation has never been
~- duplicated, and more data from additional
flight programs a r e necessary before flight
200 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

observations can be applied to the ground predictions concerning the effects of long-
situ -ion. duration flight upon man. The sensors and
I . is necessary to provide the capability to equipment should not interfere with the com-
monitor the physiologic state of man during fort and ‘ l i e function of the crew. Whenever
flight activities. A great deal of consider- possible, tie procurement of data should be
ation has been given to the definition of a set virtually automatic, requiring little or no
of physiologic indices which might be easily action on the part of the crewmen. A great
obtained in the flight situation and which deal has been learned concerning the use of
could be meaningfully monitored. Routine minimal amounts of data obtained at inter-
parameters have included measurements of mittent intervals while a spacecraft is over
a tracking station. The extravehicular crew-
voice, two leads for electrocardiogram, res-
men have been monitored by means of one
piration, body temperature, and blood pres-
lead each of electrocardiogram and of res-
sure (fig. 16-1). Other functions were added piration-rate measurement obtained through
for the experiments program, but were not the space-suit umbilical. Additional physi-
monitored in real time. The monitoring of ologic information, such as suit or body
man’s physiologic state in flight is necessary temperature and carbon-dioxide levels, could
to provide information for real-time decision not be obtained due to the limited number of
making concerning the accomplishment of monitoring leads available in the umbilical.
additional flight objectives; to assure the The medical objectives in the manned
safety of the flight crew; and to obtain ex- space-flight program are to provide medical
perimental data for postflight analysis for support for man, enabling him t o fly safely
in order .to answer the following questions :
(1) How long can man be exposed to the
space-flight environment without producing
significant physiologic o r performance decre-
ment?
(2) What a r e the causes of the observed
changes ?
(3) Are preventive measures or treat-
ment needed, and if so, what a r e best?
Attainment of these objectives will involve
tasks with different orientation. The most
urgent task is obviously to provide medical
support to assure flight safety through the
development of adequate preflight prepara-
tion and examination, as well as inflight
monitoring. The second is to obtain informa-
tion on which t o base the operational deci-
sions for extending the flight duration in a
safe manner. The third task differs from the
operational orientation of the first two in
that it implies an experimental approach to
determine the etiology of the findings ob-
served. Frequently, many things that would
contribute to the accomplishment of the last
task must be sacrificed in order t o attain the
FIGURE16-l.-Gemini biosensor harness. overall mission objective. This requires con-
PRE-GEMINI MEDICAL PREDICTIONS VERSUS GEMINI FLIGHT RESULTS 201

stant interplay between the experimental and Cabin Atmosphere


the operational medical approaches to the
missions. Reduction in cabin pressure to 5 psia,
The medical profession requires a team equivalent to a pressure altitude of 27 000
effort by personnel with varied training and feet, and the further reduction to 3.7 psia in
backgrounds in order to reach a common ob- the space suit created some concern about
jective, the preservation or the restoration the possible development of dysbarism. Be-
of health for mankind. This is no less true fore each mission, the crew was denitrogen-
in a space-flight environment where a strong ated by breathing 100-percent oxygen for 2
team effort is necessary, and a strong engi- hours ; this, coupled with the further denitro-
neering interface is imperative. If man is to genation accomplished in the spacecraft, has
be properly supported, medical requirements proved to be ample protection. There have
concerning the spacecraft environment and been no evidences of dysbarism on any of the
the equipment performance must be supplied missions.
very early in the hardware development
Cahin and Suit Temprraturc.
cycle. A very long leadtime is necessary to
. meet realistic flight schedules, and ample
The maintenance of a n adequate temper-
time must always be left for proper testing ature in the cabin and in the extravehicular
of the hardware. Flight-configured hardware pilot’s suit was also a matter o f . concern.
should be utilized to collect the baseline The temperatures were generally within the
physiologic data which will be compared comfort range around 70” F. During one
with the inflight data. mission,, the crew reported being cold when
the spacecraft W H S powered down and rotat-
*Anticipated Problems Compared with ing. The extravehicular pilots generally ha.ve
Flight Results been warm while inside the spacecraft be-
cause the extravehiculiir suit contains addi-
The review of a number of aerospace or
tional layers of material.
space medicine texts published since 1951
reveals a large number of anticipated prob- 3licrnmeteorites
lems involving man and the hardware or
vehicle in the space environment. It appears Micrometeorites are a subject heading in
logical to compare the predictions with the every book relating to space flight. They a r e
actual flight results. mentioned iis :I possible hazard to cabin in-
tegrity, to spacecraft window surfaces, and
Maintenance of Cabin I’resnurc to extravehicular crewmen. No significant
micrometeorite or meteorite density has
In regard to the vacuum of space, extrap- been observed in the flights to date. There
olating from aircraft experience led to ii has been no evidence of micrometeorite hits
prediction of difficulty with t h e maintenance on the extravehicular suits ; however, a micro-
of cabin pressure. To date, the spacecraft meteroite protective laver is provided.
have maintained a cabin pressure of approxi-
mately 5 psia throughout the manned flights. Itadiatinn
The pressurization feature of the space suits
was a backup to the cabin pressure, but was The radiation environment of space has
not required except during the planned ex- been sampled by numerous probes and has
cursions outside the spacecraft when the been calculated a t length. With one excep-
cabin was intentionally depressurized. The tion, the flights have not reached a n altitude
normal suit pressures have been approxi- involving the inner Van Allen belt, but the
mately 3.7 psia. flights have routinely passed through the
202 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

South Atlantic anomaly. The onboard radi- night. The physiological response in heart
ation measuring system and the personal rate to the regime used on the l k d a y flight
dosimeters attached to the crewmen con- is shown in figure 16-2.
firmed that the radiation intensity was at
the lower end of the calculated range. In a Gravity Load
160-nautical-mile. orbit, the crew received
approximately 15 millirads of radiation in During space flight, the increase of grav-
each 24 hours of exposure. Table 16-V indi- ity load during launch and reentry, and the
cates the total doses received on the flights to nullification of gravity load and production
date. of a state of weightlessness during actual
flight, were expected to produce detrimental
Light and Darkness effects. Actually, gravity loads during the
missions were well within man's tolerances,
Many predictions were made concerning with two 7g peaks occurring a t launch, and
the effect of the changing light and darkness with g-forces varying from 4 to 8.2g a t re-
producing a day and a night every 90 min- entry. Much concern was expressed about a
utes. It was generally predicted that this decreased tolerance to gravity following
would totally disrupt the circadian rhythms, weightless flight. No evidence of this has
producing grave consequences. Certainly no been observed; following 4 days of weight-
overt effects of the 45 minutes of day and 45 less flight, the Gemini IV crew sustained a
minutes of night were observed on the short peak of 8.2g without adverse effects.
missions. A s knowledge of sleep in the space- Weightlessness has been the subject of
fliFht environment increased, it was deter- innumerable studies and papers. It has been
mined best to arrange the work-rest cycles so produced for brief periods in parabolic
t h a t sleep occurred a t the normal Cape Ken- flight in aircraft, and simulated by water
nedy sleep time. The spacecraft was artifi- immersion and bedrest. The Gemini Pro-
cally darkened by covering the windows, and gram has produced a fair amount of evidence
a s f a r as the crew were concerned, i t was concerning the effect of the weightless space-
flight environment on various body systems.
TABLE 16V.-Radiation Doses nn Gemini
Missions' Skin

1 1
~ --_, ___ ~

Mean cumulative dose, In spite of the moisture attendant t o space-


' mrad suit operations, the skin has remained in re-
Duration, markably good condition through flights up
to 14 days in duration. Following the 8-day
I I I flight, there was some drying of the skin
111. ............... 0:04:52 <20 42f15
IV .................... 4:00:56 42f4.5 50 dz4.5 - Cape night ---- High
v .....!... .............
VI-A.. ............
VI11................
7:22:56
1:01:53
13:18:35
182f18.5
25f2
155*9
170f17
23f2
170flO
.---
0- Mean
LOW

B
VI11................ 0:10:41 4 10 10
IX-A .............. 3:01:04 17f1 22f1
x ................... 2:22:46 670*6 765*10 r40
ru .-Aifl-oft. ,,.,,., ,,,, ,.,.., ,..,, ,..,,
X I .................. 2:23:17 29fl 26+1
XII. ............... 3:22:37 4 20 <20 4 16 48 80 112 144 176 208
Ground elapsed time, hr
'.Dosimeters located in helmet, right and left
chest, and thigh. FIGURE
16-2.-Gemini VI1 pilot heart rate.
PRE-GEMINI MEDICAL PREDICTIOYS VERSIJS GEMINI FLIGHT RESULTS 203

noted during the immediate postflight period, Psychological tests have not been conducted
but this was easily treated with lotion. There as distinct entities unrelated to the inflight
have been no infections, and there has been tasks. Instead, the evaluation of total human
minimal reaction around the sensor sites. performance has provided an indication of
Dandruff has been a n occasional problem, adequate central nervous system function.
but has been easily controlled with preflight There has been no evidence, either during
and postflight medication. flight or postflight, of any psychological ab-
normalities.
Central Neri-ous System The electroencephalogram (fig. 16-3) was
utilized to evaluate sleep during the 14-day
The best indication of central nervous mission. A total of 54 hours 43 minutes
system function has been the excellent per- of interpretable data was obtained. Vari-
formance of the crew on each o f the missions. ations in the depth of sleep from Stage 1 t o
This was graphically illustrated by the de- the deep sleep of Stage 4 were noted in flight
manding performances required during the as in the groundlbased data.
aborted launch of Gemini VI-A: the ren- Numerous visual observations have been
dezvous and the thruster problem on Gemini reported by the crews involving inflight
VI11 ; the extravehicular activity on Gemini sightings and descriptions of ground views.
IV, IX-A, X, XI, and X I I ; and the many The actual determination of visual acuity has
accurate spacecraft landings and recoveries. been made in flight, as well as in preflight and

FIGURE
1F-::.-Electroencephalogram equipment.
204 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

postflight examinations. All of these tests conjunctival infection has been noted, but
support the statement that vision is not has lasted only a few hours and is believed
altered during weightless flight. to have been the result of the oxygen environ-
As previously noted, there has been much ment. During the early portions of the flights,
conjecture concerning vestibular changes in normally the first 2 or 3 days, some nasal
a weightless environment. There has been no stuffiness has been noted. This also is un-
evidence of altered vestibular function dur- doubtedly related to the 100-percent oxygen
ing any of the Gemini flights. Preflight and environment and is usually self-limited. On
postflight caloric vestibular function studies occasion, the condition has been treated 10-
have shown no change, and special studies cally or by oral medication.
of the otolith response have revealed no sig-
nificant changes. There have been ample mo- Jtenpiratory System
tions of the head in flight and during roll
rates with the spacecraft. There has been Preflight and postflight X-rays have failed
no vertigo nor disorientation noted, even dur- to reveal any atelectasis. Pulmonary function
ing the extravehicular activity with occa- studies before and after the 14-day mission
sional loss of all visual references. Several revealed no alteration. There have been no
crewmen have reported a feeling of fullness specific difficulties o r symptomatology in-
in the head similar in character to the full- volving the respiratory system ; however,
ness experienced when one is turned upside some rather high respiratory rates have been
down, allowing the blood to go to the head. noted during heavy workloads in the extra-
Hnwever, there has been no sensation of vehicular activity. Even when these rates
being turned upside down, and the impression have exceeded 40 breaths per minute, they
is that this sensation results from altered have not been accompanied by symptoma-
distribution of blood in the weightless state. tology.
To clear the record, two of the Mercury pilots
developed difficulties involving the labyrinth ; Cardiovascular System
the difficulties were in no way'related to the
space flights. One developed prolonged ver- The cardiovascular system was the first of
tigo as the result of a severe blow over the the major body systems to show physiologic
left ear in a fall, but he has completely change following flight; as a result, it has
recovered with no residual effect. The other been extensively investigated by various
crewman developed an inflammation of the means (fig. 16-4). As previously reported,
labyrinth some 3 years after his l b m i n u t e the peak heart rates have been observed at
space flight, and, while he continues to have launch and at reentry (table 16-VI) ; the
some hearing loss, there have been no further rates normally reached higher levels during
vestibular symptoms. It is interesting to note the reentry period. The midportions of all
this absolute lack of any inflight vestibular the missions have been characterized by more
symptoms, in spite of the fact t h a t a number stable heart rates a t lower levels with .ade-
of the pilots have developed motion sickness quate response to physical demands.
while in the spacecraft on the water. The electrocardiogram has been studied in
detail thoughout the Gemini missions. The
Eye, Ear. Eiose, and Throat only abnormalities of note have been very
rare, premature, auricular and ventricular
There have been two inflight incidents of contractions. No significant changes have
rather severe eye irritation. One was the re- been detected in the duration of specific seg-
sult of exposure to lithium hydroxide in the ments of the electrocardiogram.
suit circuit ; the cause of the other remains a Blood-pressure measurements obtained
mystery. In a few instances, some postflight during the Gemini VI1 mission revealed that
PRE-GEMINI MEDICAL PREDICTIONS VERSUS GEMINI FLIGHT RESULTS 205

-
FIGURE16-4.--Gemini cardiovascular evaluation techniques. .

systolic and diastolic values remained within during lift-off, reentry, and extravehicular
the envelope of normality and showed no activity. The higher values observed for the
significant changes throughout. 14 days of tl iiration of systole and for electromechanical
flight. As previously reported, this included delay in certain crewmembers suggest a pre-
the pressures taken at the time of reentry. ponderance of cholinergic influences (vagal
Some insight into the electrical and me- tone). An increase in adrenergic reaction
chanical phases of the cardiac cycle was (sympathetic tone) was generally observed
gained during the Gemini flights, The data during lift-off, reentry, and in the few hours
were derived through synchronous phono- preceding reentry.
cardiographic and electrocardiographic mon- As a further measure of cardiovascular
itoring. In general, wide fluctuations in the status, Experiment M003, Inflight Exerciser,
duration of the cardiac cycle, but within determined the heart-rate response to a n
physiological limits, were observed through- exercise load consisting of one pull per second
out the missions. Fluctuations in the duration for 30 seconds on a bungee device (force at
of electromechanical systole correlated closely f u l l extension of 12 inches equaled 70
with changes in heart rate. Stable values were pounds). The responses for one crewman on
observed for electromechanical delay (onset the Gemini V mission a r e shown in figure
of ventricular activity, QRS complexes, to 16-5. The results of the 4-day Gemini IV and
onset of first heart sound) throughout the the 14-day Gemini VI1 mission did not differ.
missions, with shorter values observed dur- This variant of the step test revealed no
ing the intervals of peak heart rates recorded physical or cardiovascular decrement after
206 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

TABLE l&VI.-Peak Heart Rates Duii/i,g tilt heart rate for each of the Gemini crews,
Launch and Reentry the postflight increases a r e from 17 to 105
__ -- __ percent greater than those exhibited pre-
Peak rates Peak rates flight. The increasing trend in these values
Gemini Crewman during during ixas evident through the 8-day mission. A
mission launch, reentry!
beats/min beats/min multiplicity of altered factors, such as better
_____ _____-- - _ __ _ diet, more exercise, desuited periods, and no
I11 CP 1v2 165 extravehicular activity, make the improved
P 120 130 postflight response to the 14-day mission very
IV CP 148 140 difficult to interpret (fig. 16-7).
P 128 126
170
For purposes of comparison, flight data
V CP 148
P 155 178 and data from bedrest studies were viewed
VI-A CP 125 125 in a like manner and show a very similar
P 150 140 trend ; however, the magnitude of the changes
VI1 CP 152 180 shows marked differences, again illustrating,
P 125 134
VI11 CP 138 130
perhaps, the influence of factors other than
P 120 90 those simulated by bedrest.
IX-A CP 142 160 When the tilt-table tests a r e considered,
P 120 126 postflight leg volume was universally greater
X CP 120 110
90
than preflight. Postmission observations
P 125
XI CP 166 120 ranged from 12 to 82 percent increase in
P 154 117 volume over premission values.
XI1 CP 136 142 The Gemini V pilot wore intermittently
P 110 137 occlusive lower limb cuffs for the first 4 days
- of the 8-day mission. The Gemini VI1 pilot
CP indicates command pilot; P indicates pilot. wore the cuffs for the entire 14-day mission;
however, his heart-rate increases and pulse-
as much as 14 days in a space-flight environ- pressure narrowing were greater than f o r the
ment. command pilot ; the cuffs seemingly did not
In contrast to the Project Mercury results, alter the variables.
orthostatism resulting from any Gemini mis- Average resting heart rates have ranged
sion has not been detectable except by means from 18 to 62 percent higher after missions.
of passive tilt-table provocation. Typically, In spite of higher resting pulse rates, the
the heart-rate and blood-pressure response changes resulting from tilt were still greater.
to a 15-minute, 70" tilt performed postflight The exception presented by the Gemini VI1
are compared with identical preflight testing crew is more apparent. The bedrest data a r e
on the same crewmen. Consistently, such test- not remarkable.
ing has demonstrated a greater increase in To date, the observations of the effect of
heart rate, a greater reduction in pulse pres- space flight on body systems have shown sig-
sure, and a greater increase in leg volume, nificant changes involving only the cardio-
as interpreted from lower limb circumference vascular, hematopoietic, and musculoskeletal
systems. Even these changes appear adaptive
gages during the preflight tilt (fig. 16-6).
in nature and a r e measured principally dur-
The changes observed in these variables may
ing the readaptive phase to the l g environ-
be most significantly illustrated by examining ment. It appears that adequate information
the heart-rate changes observed during pre- has been obtained to permit anticipation of
flight and postflight tilt-table studies. When R nominal lunar mission without being sur-
the postflight increases in heart rate during prised by unforeseen physiologic changes.
tilt a r e expressed as percent of the preflight Medical results from the U.S. space flights
PRE-GEMINI MEDICAL PREDICTIONS VERSUS GEMINI FLIGHT RESULTS 207

a First 15 sec of exercise period.


Second 15 sec of exercise period.

FIGURE
16-5.-Heart-ratc response to hungec exercise, Gemini V pilot.

appear to differ from the results reported by shown variability between flights in the same
the U.S.S.R., where there seems to be a manner as have diffecent men on the same
unique problem in the area of vestibular flight. Figure 16-8 shows the heart rates for
response. In the cardiovascular area, the one crewman during t h e launch phase of both
United States has not confirmed the U.S.S.R. his Mercury mission and his Gemini mis-
reports of electromechanical delay in cardiac sion. The two curves show little correlation
response, and the U.S.S.R. has not confirmed and could as easily have come from different
the US. findings of decreased red-cell mass. individuals. Obviously, confidence in the re-
The Gemini flights have also provided some sults and the definition of variability will be
excellent examples of human variability and improved as more information is gained on
have emphasized the necessity for care in future flights. Also, these are gross system
making deductions. In making projections findings, and much must still be accomplished
IJased on very limited results in a few people, in the laboratory and in flight if the mecha-
the current trend is to bank heavily upon nisms of the findings a r e to be understood.
comparisons in a given individual ; that is, -4lthough physiological adaptation is diffi-
differences between baseline data and re- cult to define, it might be stated as any altera-
sponses observed during and after a flight. tion or response which favors the survival of
The crewmen who have flown twice have a n organism in a changed environment. This
208 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

70"
Beain vertical End

,Gemini
al-
L

-E
L
m
al
5

I I I I I
2 4 6 8 10
Elapsed time, min

FIGURE
16-8.-Command pilot heart-rate
comparisons.

returned to normal within a 50-hour period,


regardless of the duration of exposure to the
I 1 I I I I space-fl ish t en vi ronmen t.
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28
Time, min
Blood
FIGURE16-6.-Typical tilt-table response.
Significant increases have been observed in
white-blood-cell counts manifested as an ab-
0 Command pilot first tilt
0 Pilot first tilt solute neutrophilia following most flights.
S 160r Command Dilot second tilt This condition has always returned to normal
within 24 hours. Hematologic data derived
from Gemini missions of 4, 8, and 14 days
demonstrated a hemolytic process originating
during flight. Specific data points include red-
cell mass deficits of 12, 20, and 19 percent
(command pilot) following the Gemini IV, V,
and VI1 missions, respectively (fig. 16-9).
The 12-percent Gemini IV data point is prob-
I . I I I I I 1 I
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 ably inaccurate. This 4-day point was calcu-
Mission duration, days lated from RISA-125 plasma volume and
peripheral hematocrit data, a method pre-
FIGURE
16-7.-Heart-rate tilt response compared dicted on a constant relationship between
with mission duration. peripheral and total-body hematocrit. Subse-
quent direct measurements showed t h a t alter-
definition implies a useful alteration. In the ation of the peripheral/total-body hematocrit
space-flight situation, man is adapting to a ratios do occur, thereby introducing an obvi-
weightless environment into which he has ous error into the calculations. Based upon
been.thrust in a matter of minutes and where the direct measurements, the Gemini IV cal-
he stays a variable time ; a second adaptation, culated red-cell mass deficits were reex-
required after return to the l g environ- amined and found to more closely approxi-
ment of Earth, can be measured by direct mate 5 percent. Other hematologic tests
observation. Some of the physiological corroborated this disparity ; however, t o date,
changes return to normal over a n extended no satisfactory explanation of the phe-
time; for instance, the tilt responses have all nomenon exists. Complete interpretation of
PRE-GEMINI MEDICAL PREDICTIONS VERSUS GEMINI FLIGHT RESULTS 209

of considerable importance ; however, a t this


Total point no definite incriminations can be levied
blood Plasma Red-cell
against the flight diet. A program to define
E o certain diet levels of lipid soluble vitamins
has recently been initiated. Specifically,
-20 alpha-tocopherol is a n important antilipid
oxidant and is essential in protecting the
,- w
lipid a t the red-cell plasma membrane. Immo-
.-c c
bility is effective in reducing red-cell mass
by curtailing erythrocyte production ; how-
ever, all flight observations support hemolysis
-20 as the significant event. Although not demon-
-441 -383
"r n
t419 strated by any previous studies, it is possible
that weightlessness is a contributing factor
+21
mo -43
in the hemolysis observed. Altered hemo-
dynamics, resulting in hemostasis, could re-
-201 0Command pilot U sult in the premature demise of the cell. The
Pilot role of a diluent gas (nitrogen) is not well
N o t e All values are in cubic centimeters understood ; however, some investigators
have shown significant reduction in hema-
FIGURE16-Y.-Blood-volume studies for Gemini IV,
tologic and neurologic toxicity in animals
V, and VII.
exposed to high oxygen pressure when a n
the red-cell mass deficit noted in the com- inert gas is present. Therefore, the absence
mand pilot of the Gemini VI1 also required of a n inert atmospheric diluent could be sig-
special consideration. It appears t h a t no sig- nificant a t the hyperoxic levels encountered
nificant progression of the hemolysis occurs within the Gemini spacecraft.
after the eighth day in orbit; however, this Of all the mechanisms previously stated,
may be more apparent than real. Analysis of oxygen has the greatest proven potential a s
the related mean corpuscular volume values a hemolytic agent. Basically, two modes of
shows a significant increase in this parameter oxygen toxicity are described. I t has been
during the 14-day space-flight interval. If demonstrated that red-cell plasma membrane
each individual erythrocyte increased in lipids undergo peroxidation when exposed to
volume, a measurement of the total red-cell conditions of hyperoxia. It has also been dem-
volume (red-cell mass) would not accurately onstrated that the lipid peroxides thus
reflect the actual loss of erythrocytes. Cor- formed are detrimental to the cell. Specifi-
recting for the postflight corpuscular volume cally, lipid peroxides are. known to affect
shift, a 29-percent circulating red-cell deficit enzyme systems essential for normal red-cell
is derived. The latter figure more accurately function. It is also possible t h a t peroxidation
describes the hemolytic event ; therefore, it of the erythrocyte plasma membrane lipids
is possible that the true extent of the hemo- changes this tissue to curtail erythrocyte sur-
lytic process has not yet been determined. vival. The second mode of oxygen toxicity
Possible causative factors of the red-cell expression may be more direct, for infer-
loss are hyperoxia (166-mm oxygen at the ential evidence is available showing a direct
alveolar membrane), lack of inert diluent gas inhibitory effect on some glycolytic enzymes.
(nitrogen), relative immobility of the crew, Oxygen has several documented deleterious
dietary factors, and weightlessness. Only effects on red-cell plasma membranes and
increased oxygen tension, immobility, and metabolic functions ; any combination of
dietary factors are well known to influence these effects could be operative within a
the red cell. Dietary considerations may be Gemini spacecraft.
210 GEM I NI SUM MARY CONFERENCE

liiachrmical the body is to maintain the composition of


The analysis of urine and plasma has been blood and extracellular fluid a s nearly con-
used as an indication of crew physiological stant as possible, significant changes in
status preflight, in flight, and postflight. plasma were not observed. As seen in figure
Analyses of the results obtained on all three 16-10, 48-hour pooled samples of flight urine
phases were performed on the 14-day Gemini indicate a slight reduction in the output of
1'11 flight, and essentially complete analyses sodium during flight. As indicated by the
were performed on the preflight and post- hashed bars, this is associated with some
flight phases of the 3-day Gemini IX-A increase in aldosterone excretion. Postflight,
mission. there is a marked retention of sodium. As
The first attempt at accumulation of in- espected, chloride excretion parallels the
flight 'data was essentially a shakedown and sodium excretion. Potassium excretion dur-
provided an 1) of 2, which for biological data ing flight (fig. 16-11) appears depressed, and
is insignificant. Some of the data a r e pre- in all but the command pilot of Gemini VII,
sented, but interpretation is dependent upon it was depressed immediately postflight. This
more refined techniques and upon accumula- depression could be observed in total 24-hour
tion of a sufficient number of observations output and in minute output. This anti-
to establish variabilities and trends. The high diuretic hormone appeared elevated in only
degree of individual variation should be the first postflight sample of the Gemini VI1
noted. The Gemini VI1 pilot and command pilot. The crudities of this biological assay
pilot did not always respond qualitatively or may account for the inability to observe any
quantitatively in the same way. gross changes. The retention of electrolytes
The biochemical determinations a r e is very closely associated with the retention
grouped into several profiles, each of which of water postflight.
provides information concerning the effect The second profile involves the estimation
of space flight on one or more of the physi- of the physiological cost of maintaining a
ological systems. The first profile, water an$ given level of performance during space
electrolyte balance, .is related to a n examina- flight. This could be considered a measure of
tion of. the weight loss which occurs during the effects of stress during space flight. Two
flight and the mechanisms involved in this groups of hormones were assayed: the first,
loss. To this end, the levels of sodium., potas- 17-hydroxycorticosteroids, provides a meas-
sium. and chloride in the plasma were meas- ure of long-term stress responses ; the second,
ured preflight and postflight, and the rates catecholamines, provides a measure of short-
of excretion of these electrolytes in the urine term or emergency responses. The results
were observed in all three phases of the obtained with the catecholamine determina-
study. Total plasma protein concentration
measured both preflight and postflight was 0 Urine sodium
R Aldosterone
used as a n indication of possible dehydration.
Water' intake and urine output were meas-
.ured to determine whether the primary loss
of weight was due to sweat and insensible
,200
.c
-
n n
losses or to changes in renal function. The
vasopressin (antidiuretic hormone) and aldo-
sterone hormones were measures in the urine
in a n attempt to establish the functional con-
tribution of baroreceptors in a zero-gravity
.ef Iigh t lnflight Postflight
condition.
As may be expected, since one of the prime FIGURE16-l0.-Urine sodium and aldosterone,
functions of the homeostatic mechanisms of Gemini VI1 command pilot.
PRE-GEMINI MEDICAL PREDICTIONS VERSUS GEMINI FLIGHT RESULTS 211

24-hour urine collection

FIGURE
Preflight

16-ll.-Urine
Inflight Postflight

potassium, Gemini VI1 pilot.

tions a r e anomalous and changes observed


could be considered well within the error of
the methodology. As seen in figure 16-12, the
0
2 2.5-
-
h

FIGURE
11 I
Preflight

lG-l2.-Urine
, lnflight

17-hydroxycorticosteroids,
Gemini VI1 command pilot.
Postflight

17-hydroxycorticosteroid levels are depressed


during the flight. An elevation immediately The fourth group may be related to protein
postflight may be related to the stress of metabolism and tissue status. When total
reentry and recovery. Although there may be nitrogen was related to intake during flight,
considerable speculation regarding the low a negative balance was noted.

. infliyht steroids, it must be reemphasized that


these results are f r o r l a single flight. and (;astruintestinal System
much more data will' be essential before a
valid evaluation is possible. The tlesign'and fabrication of foods for
The third profile constitutes a continuing conqiimption during space flights have im-
evaluation of the effects of space flight on posed unique technological considerations.
bone demineralization. Calcium. magnesium, The Lvlume of space food per man-day has
phosphate, and hydroxyproline are measured writ,(' in the Gemini missions from 130 to
in plasma and in urine obtained preflight, 162 c.Itl)ic inches (2131 to 2656 cc). Current
in flight, and postflight. This is a n attempt to menus ;iw made up of approximatelv 50 to
determine whether the status, or the changes 60 perce1-1~ rehydratables (foods requiringr the
in the status, of bone mineral are accom-
panied by alterations in plasma calcium and .21 -
-E
hydroxyproline, and by alterations in urinary .
E
PllOt
excretion of calcium, phosphate, magnesium, 1
Command pilot
0)
and hydroxyproline. The amino acid, hy-
droxyproline, is unique to collagen, and it was
presumed that an increased excretion of
hydroxyproline might accompany demineral-
ization along with dissolution of a bone ma-
trix (fig. 16-13). The first postflight plasma
c
samples following the 14-day flight show a U

a
14-
3
marked increase in the bound hydroxyproline, m
day
while larger quantities of calcium were ex- flight
creted later in the flight than during the
early phases of the flight. This is consistent FrcunE 1&13.-Bound plasma hydrosyproline,
with a change in bone structure. Gemini VII.
212 GEMINI SUM MARY CONFERENCE

addition of water prior to ingestion) ; there- TABLE16-VII.-TypicaZ Gemini Menu


fore, food packaging is required t h a t permits [Days 2, 6 , 1 0 , and 141
a method for rehydration and for dispensing Meal A : ca~o?-ies
food in zero gravity. The remaining foods Grapefruit drink .............................................. 83
a r e bite size; that is, food items which are Chicken and gravy ............................................
92
Beef sandwiches ................................................ 268
ingested in one bite and rehydrated in the
mouth. About 5@percent of the rehydratable
Applesauce ........................................................
165
Peanut cubes ......................................................
-
297
and the bite-size foods a r e freeze-dried prod-
905
ucts ; the remaining are other types of dried -
Meal B:
or low-moisture foods, some of which a r e OranEe-grapefruit drink ................................
83
compressed. A typical menu (table 16-VII) Beef pot roast .................................................. 119
has an approximate calorie distribution of Bacon and egg bites ..........................................
206
l i percent protein, 32 percent fat, and 51 Chocolate pudding ............................................ 307
percent carbohydrate. Total calories provided Strawberry cereal cubes .................................. 114
and eaten per day varied from flight to flight. 829
-
Food consumption during Gemini IV, V, and Meal C:
VI1 is summarized in figures 16-14 to Potato soup ........................................................ 220
Shrimp cocktail ................................................ 119
16-16. Food consumption during Gemini Date fruitcake .................................................. 262
IV and VI1 was very good, but weight loss Orange drink .................................................... -
83
on the short-duration Gemini IV mission was
definitely substantial. The anorexia of the . - 684
Gemini V crew is unexplained, although Total calories ................................................ 2418
many hypotheses could be presented. Al-
though weight loss has occurred on all mis- TABLE16-VIII.-Flight Crew Weight Loss
sions, it has not increased with mission dura- ,to the Nearest Half Pound
tion (table 16-VIII) . Obviously, more calo-
I I
ries and water must be consumed in flight to
maintain body weight at preflight levels.
Gastrointestinal-tract function on all mis-
Gemini mission
i
I
Command pilot
weight loss, lb
I
Pilot weight
loss, Ib

sions has been normal, and no evidence exists I11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


of excess nutrient losses due t o poor food IV . . . . . . . . .
v .......................
2700 I-
VI1 ....................
VI11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( ")
IX-A,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 13.5
x ....................... 3.0 3.0
XI ...................... 2.5 0
XI1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 7

* Not available.

difestibility during flight. Before t h e mis-


4 sions, the crews ate a low-residue diet; on a11
Mission duration, days
Command pilot - flights beginning with the Gemini V mission,
___ Average caloric intake
Provided n- board

____--
Metabolic rate based
an oral and usually a suppository laxative
*
were used within 2 days of launch. On the
0 Pilot on carbon-dioxide
_ _ _ . Average caloric intake output shorter extravehicular missions, this pre-
flight prepay :ion has generally allowed the
FIGURE
16-14.-CaIoric intake on Gemini IV. crew to avoic defecation in flight.
PRE-GEMINI MEDICAL PREDICTIONS VERSUS GEMINI FLIGHT RESULTS 213

2755 differences in density have not been observed


2800
during 30 days of complete bedrest when
2400 calcium intake of over 500 mg per day has
been adequate.
In all instances the data for the bones
examined indicate a negative change, and the
calcium-balance data collected on Gemini VI1
verify a negative balance trend. None of the
changes a r e pathological, but indicate that
further research is needed and that ameliora-
tive methods for use during long-duration
flights need to be examined.
The detailed 14-day inflight balance study
Mission duration, days revealed some loss in protein nitrogen.
Command pilot - Provided on board
___ Average caloric intake
Exercise Capacity Tests
0 Pilot - - - _-_-Metabolic rate based
___ Average caloric intake on output
Previous investigations have shown that a
FIGURE1615.-Caloric intake on Gemini V. limitation of optimal cardiovascular and
respiratory function exists when a heart rate
of 180 beats per minute is reached during a
Genitourinary System gradually increased workload. With this in
mind, an exercise capacity test was incor-
There have been no difficulties involving porated into the Gemini operational preflight
the genital system. Urination has occurred and postflight procedures in order to deter-
normally both in flight and postflight, and mine whether changes occur in crew physi-
there has been no evidence of renal calculi. ologic reaction to work.
The tests have been performed by the crew-
Musculoskeletal System members of the Gemini VI1 mission and by
the pilots of the Gemini IX-A, X, XI, and XI1
Here, again, interpretation of the informa- missions. All but one of the tested crewmen
tion gathered to date on bone and muscle exhibited a decrease in exercise capacity as
metabolism as affected by space flight must monitored by heart rate, and a concomitant
be cautious due to the very few subjects ob- reduction in oxygen consumption to a quanti-
served under varying dietary intakes and tated workload. These findings are graphi-
exposed to multiple flight stresses. cally demonstrated in figure 16-19.
In figures 16-17 and 16-18, the bone de- Additionally, the heart-rate/workload in-
mineralization (percent change in density) formation collected preflight has been of
which occurred in the os calcis (heel) and value as a very rough index of the metabolic
phalanx 5-2 (little finger) during space flight rate of crewmen during extravehicular ac-
is compared with the demineralization which tivity. I t is realized that many other stresses
occurred under equivalent periods of bedrest above and beyond the simple imposition of
and analogous intakes of calcium. As com- workload can and do affect heart rate. The
pared with bedrest, the changes were deti- heart rate as measured during extravehicular
nitely less in the 14-day flight where calcium activity is not considered a n exact index of
intake approached 1000 mg per day and the the workload being performed, but rather as
crew. routinely exercised. The phalanx ;L reflection of total physiological and psycho-
changes are remarkable because significant logical strain.
214 GEM IN1 SUMMARY CONFERENCE

2333

2000 ~n

-1
3 4 5 6 7 8 . 9 10 11 12 13 14
Mission duration, days
Command pilot - Provided on board
--- Average caloric intake
0 Pilot _---- Metabolic rate. based on
Average caloric intake carbon-dioxide output

FIGURElG-l6.-Caloric intake on Gemini 1'11.

InRight Mrtahlit Data Other Ohwrvat ions Concerning FVeightless Flight

Metabolic measurement during U.S. space The criws have never slept well on the first
flights has been limited t o the determinations night in s p i c e . and many factors other than
of the total carbon-dioside production by the iveightlessness may be active in limiting the
chemical analysis of the spent lithium- sleep oltained. regardless of flight duration.
hydroside canister. This method is of value All crewmembers have 1-eported a tendency
only in establishing the average heat-produc- to slecl) with the arms folded a t chest height
tion rate for crewmen during space flight. aiid the fingelas interlocked. The legs also teiid
Figure 16-20 shows close agreement between to iisstime a slightly elevated position. On
metabolic data from the U.S.S.R. and the return to the l g environment, the crews are
American space flights. The higher metabolic ~ ~ W I I Yof the readaptation period because
rates observed during the Mercury flights are they are an.ii1.e for a short time that the arms
explained by the fact that these were short- ant1 legs have weight and require effort to
duration flights in which the crewmen did not move. There has been some postflight muscle
sleep. stiff ness following the prolonged missions
PRE-GEMINI MEDICAL PREDICTIONS VERSUS GEMINI FLIGHT RESULTS 215

Command pilot AI- I / I


0 Pilot

-Preflight .
al
k 240r
-- Postf Iight
(D
c
V
600 tC700 3oi loo0
mg Ca mg Ca mg Ca

FIGURE16-17.-Loss of os calcis density on Gemini


IV, V, and VI1 missions.
(D

TI S C o m m a n d pilot 401 Preflight -Postflight End of test


-24 r
Y
0PllOt P$ o L -----__ Heart rate, beatslmin
Bed rest subject 1-I Blood pressure, m m Hg
.- W r
1.
e

5 3001 .-J-
g 200
0' 100
3
0
E--
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 0 2 4 6
Elapsed time, min
" 4davs a days 14 days
600 t i 7 0 0 300 lo00
mg Ca mg Ca mg Ca FIGURE16-19.-Preflight and postflight exercise
- capacity test results, Gemini IX-A.
16-18.-Change in density of hand phalanx
FIGURFI
. . Vostok
on Gemini IV, V, and VI1 missions.
0Mercury
that may be more associated with the con- Gemini
finement of the spacecraft than with weight-
lessness.
The amount of inflight exercise by the
crew has varied even on the long-duration
flights. On the 14-day mission, there were
three 10-minute exercise periods programed
and completed per day. On t h e short-duration
flights with great demands upon the crew f o r
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
rendezvous and extravehicular activity, no Mission duration, days
specific conditioning exercises have been con-
ducted. There appears to be a need for a
FIGURE
lG20,-Average metabolic rates during
definite exercise regime on long-duration actual space flight.
flights.

Crew Performance off phenomenon, had . also been predicted,


along with space euphoria. The experience to
Strange reactions to the isolation and the date has shown no evidence of the presence of
monotony of space flight were originally pre- any of these responses. There have been no
dicted. Hallucinations and a feeling of sepa- abnormal psychological reactions of a n y sort,
ration from the world, described as the break- and the flights huve been far from monoto-
216 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

nous. In the single-man flights of the Mercury disease in flight as a result of preflight ex-
series, there was always ample ground con- posure and the lack of symptoms or signs
tact and certainly no feeling of isolation or which can be detected in a preflight exami-
monotony. In the two-man Gemini flights, the nation.
same was true ;and of course there has always Quarantine of the crews for a period of
been a companion crewman, thus avoiding time preflight has been discussed, and has
isolation. The crews have exhibited remark- been rejected as impractical in the missions
able psychomotor performance capabilities, to date. The immediate preflight period is
and by performing a number of demanding very demanding of crew participation, and
tasks under stress they have demonstrated a efforts have been directed a t screening the
high level of central nervous system function. contacts insofar as possible to reduce crew
exposure to possible viral and bacterial in-
Drugs fections, particularly the upper respiratory
type. A number of short-lived flulike syn-
A number of predictions were made t h a t dromes have developed in the immediate pre-
man would require the assistance of drugs to flight period, as well as one exposure to
cope with the space-flight environment. I n mumps and one incident of betahemolytic
particular, sedation prior to launch and streptococcal pharyngitis. Each situation
stimulation prior to reentry have been men- has- been handled without affecting the
tioned. As a result of the early planning for scheduled launch and, in retrospect, the
space flight, a drug kit was made available policy of modified quarantine has worked
for inflight prescription. The crews have well. Stricter measures may have to be
been pretested to each of the drugs carried; adopted as longer flights a r e contemplated.
thus, the individual reaction to the par-
ticular drug is known. Aspirin and APC’s Fatigue
have been used in flight for occasional mild
headache and for relief of muscular discom- It was predicted t h a t markedly fatigued
f o r t prior to sleep. Dextroamphetamine sul- flight crews would result from the discom-
f a t e has been taken on several occasions by fort of flight in a suited condition, a.confined
fatigued crewmen prior to reentry. A decon- spacecraft, and inadequate rest. In review-
gestant has been used to relieve nasal conges- ing the flight program to date, it appears t h a t
tion and alleviate the necessity for frequent the crews obtained less sleep than in similar
clearing of the ears prior to reentry. The circumstances on the ground, but were not
anti-motion-sickness medication has been unduly fatigued. Intermittent periods of
taken in one instance prior to reentry to re- fatigue have resulted from the demiuiding
duce motion sickness resulting from motion mission requirements and from the fasci-
of the spacecraft in the water. -An inhibitor nation of the crew with the unique opportun-
of gastrointestinal propulsion has been pre- ity to view the universe. This has been cyclic
scribed when necessary to assist in avoiding in nature and on the long-duration flights
inflight defecation. No difficulty has been has always been followed by periods of more
experienced in the use of these medications restful sleep. No interference with per-
which have produced the desired and ex- formance has been noted due to inflight
pected effects. None of the injectors has been fatigue.
used in flight.

Inflight Disease
Medical Support

Preventive medicine enthusiasts have pre- In preparing for the medical support of
dicted the possible development of infectious manned space flights, the possibility of in-
PRE-GEMINI MEDICAL PREDICTIONS. VERSUS GEMINI FLIGHT RESULTS 217

j u r y at the time of launch and recovery was medical support area. The entire manned
carefully evaluated. A detailed plan of sup- space-flight program has required the strict-
port involving medical and surgical special- est cooperation and understanding between
ists in the launch and recovery areas was physician and engineer, and i t is believed
evolved and modified a s the program pro- that this has been accomplished. The medical
gressed. I n retrospect, it might appear t h a t management of the diverse personnel neces-
the support of surgeons, anesthesiologists, sary to provide proper niedical support for
and supporting teams in these areas has been manned space missions has provided experi-
overdone in view of the results. This is ences of great value to future progress.
always a difficult area to evaluate, however, In reviewing the flights, the orderly plan
because none of the support is needed unless of doubling man’s flight duration, and ob-
a disaster occurs. The best that can be said serving the results in relation to the next
a t the moment is that this support will be step, has been successful and effective. There
critically reviewed in the light of the experi- is no reason to alter this plan in determining
ence to date and rendered more realistic in the next increments in manned space flight.
the demands placed on highly trained medi- In general, the space environment has .
cal personnel. been much better than predicted. Addi-
When originally established, the preflight tionally, man has been f a r more capable in
and postflight examinations were aimed a t this environment than predicted, and weight-
identifying gross changes in man resulting lessness and the accompanying stresses have
from exposure to the space-flight environ- had less effect than predicted. While all
ment. The examinations have been tailored these items a r e extremely encouraging and
along standard clinical lines, and, although a r e the medical legacy of the Gemini Pro-
these techniques have been satisfactory, lit- gram, it is important to concentrate on some
tle in the way of change has been noted. The of the possible problems of very long-dura-
procedures have been modified to include tion future flights, and the application of
more dynamic tests, such as bicycle ergom- Gemini knowledge. Consideration must be
etry, and to reduce the emphasis on those given to the -following: (1) obtainifig addi-
static tests which showed little or no change. tional information on normal baseline re-
Increased use of dynamic testing should con- actions to stress in order to predict crew
tinue in the support of future manned space- response ; (2) determining psychological
flight programs. implications of long-duration confinement
and crew interrelations; (3) solving the
Concluding Remarks difficult logistics of food and water supply
and of waste management; and ( 4 ) provid-
There has been increased scientific inter- ing easy, noninterfering physiologic moni-
est in the effect of the space-flight environ- tori ng.
ment on man. The scientific requirements for The first steps into space have provided a
additional information on man’s function rich background on which to build. I n addi-
must be evaluated in regard to operational tion to the information provided for plan-
and mission requirements and the effect upon ning future space activities, benefits to gen-
future manned space flight. The input of the eral medicine must accrue as smaller and
crews and the operations planners must be better bioinstrumentation with wider appli-
weighed along with the basic medical and cability to ground-based medicine is devel-
scientific requirements, and a realistic plan oped; a s normal values are defined for
must be established to provide needed various physiologic responses in man ; and
medical answers a t the proper time and allow as ground-based research is conducted, such
projections of man’s further exposure. This as bedrest studies. These result.; should vield
has been one of the most difficult tasks in the a large amount of information applicable to
218 GEM IN1 SUMMARY CONFERENCE

hospitalized patients. I t has been observed flight environment will certainly prove to be
how the human body ciin adapt to a new and a vital laboratory, allowing study of the
hostile situation and then readapt in a sur- basic physiology of body systems, such as
prisingly effective manner t o the normal l y the vestibular system. Even incidental find-
Earth environment. Continued observation ings, such as the red-cell membrane changes
of these changes will help determine whether which are markedly applicable to hyperbaric
the space environment may be utilized for app1ic;itions in medicine, may be of benefit
any form of therapy in the future. The space- to general scientific and medical research,
GEMINI ONROARD EXPERIMENTS
17. GEMINI EXPERIMENTS PROGRAM SUMMARY
By NORMANG. FOSTER,Test arid Operations Ofice, Science a i d Applica1ion.s Directorate, NASA Manned
Spacecraft Center; and OLAV SMISTAD,Test and Operations Ofice, Science and Applications Direc-
torate, N A S A Manned Spacecraft Center

Introduction sponsored by the Department of Defense.


The field office administered a spacecraft
The Mercury Manned Space Flight Proj- integration study to define and document the
ect emphasized the basic technological objec- feasibility of incorporating 15 Department
tive of placing a man in Earth orbit and of Defense experiments into the Gemini mis-
returning him. Even during Project Mer- sions.
cury, man’s potential in supporting and en- In addition to the Department of Defense
hancing scientific activities in space was proposals, experiment proposals were also
recognized. As a start toward the exploita- collected by the Manned Space Flight Exper-
tion of man’s capabilities, a few experiments, iments Board for potential experiment inves-
mostly of a visual or photographic nature, tigations submitted by the Manned Space-
were accomplished during Project Mercury craft Center, the Office of Space Science and
(ref. 1). Based on the limited experiences Applications, the Space Medicine Office, and
during Project Mercury, experiment pro- the Office of Advanced Research and Tech-
grams of much greater scope were planned nology. The experiment proposals were trans-
for the Gemini Program. The Gemini experi- mitted to the Gemini Experiments Office of
ments were primarily additions to the basic the Gemini Program Office for a determi-
spacecraft and missions. nation of feasibility and for determination
The purpose of this paper on the Gemini of which missions could best accommodate
Experiments Program is to describe briefly the experiments. Some of the proposals were
the general aspects, the operations, the scope, for experiments which had either been flown
the integration of the experiments into the on Mercury spacecraft or had been approved
spacecraft and the mission, and selective ex- but not flown. Most of the experiments pro-
periment program summary data. posals, however, were for entirely new in-
vestigations.
General Aspects The Gemini Program Office disseminated
the proposals to other Manned Spacecraft
The selection of experiments for the pro-
Center organizations such a s Recovery Oper-
gram was based primarily on the require-
ations, Flight Crew Support, Medical Office,
ment or desirability of crew participation.
and Flight Operations. The resuIting com-
The planning phase and the management of
ments and recommendations, plus engineer-
experiment implementation at the Manned
ing studies of integration of the experiment
Spacecraft Center, Houston, progressed
through several phases of development as the hardware into the spacecraft, were included
requirement for support expanded. In 1963, in a final feasibility determination by the
the Air Force Systems Command established Gemini Program Office and subsequently
a field office at the Manned Spacecraft Cen- presented to a n Experiments Review Panel.
ter with a primary purpose of providing The Experiments Review Panel was com-
central coordination for the experiments prised of representatives from all Manned

Preceding page blank 221


222 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

Spacecraft Center organizations concerned which had been approved b u t not performed
with experiments support. The Panel re- during Project Mercury. The experiment was
viewed the block of experiment proposals and highly successful and proved t h a t communi-
the comments from each affected organiza- cation was feasible through the blackout
tion concerning the experiments. Minutes of phase during reentry. It was also evident
the panel meetings reflected the Manned from this experiment that a n increased
Spacecraft Center position of incorporating capability for real-time mission operation
each experiment studied into a particular support was necessary for successful experi-
mission. This information was presented to ment accomplishments. A second experiment
the Manned Space Flight Experiments Board was supplied by the Atomic Energy Commis-
along with the recommendations of the Office sion to determine synergism between weight-
of Space Science and Applications, the Office lessness and radiation on human blood. The
of Advanced Research and Technology, the experiment was successfully conducted as
Medical Office, and the Department of De- planned, and results seemed to indicate t h a t
fense. After reviewing the material, this synergistic effects did exist.
Board would make specific mission assign- The third experiment was conducted f o r
ments for each approved experiment. the Ames Research Center to determine
The number of experiment proposals in- effects of weightlessness on sea urchin egg
creased as the program approached the growth. The experiment utilized modified
operational phase. In recognition of the ex- equipment originally constructed for a n un-
panding workload and in order to firmly manned satellite. The manual handle manip-
aline the organizational support to the prin- ulator failed during the mission, and an
cipal investigators, in 1964 the Manned internal seal prematurely leaked fixative into
Spacecraft Center formed and staffed an some of the egg chambers. Objectives of the
Experiments Coordination Office in the En- experiment were compromised, and the fail-
gineering and Development Directorate. The ure served to realine the objectives of the
purpose of this Office was to manage the Gemini Experiments Office from integration
overall implementation of experiments into of supp€ied experiments to a more compre-
manned missions. hensive role of integrating and assuring suc-
In June 1965, the Experiments Coordina- cessful experiment operations.
tion Office and the Gemini Experiments A functional verification review of experi-
Office were combined as part of the newly ments assigned to a particular mission was
formed Experiments Program Office. The initiated and conducted prior to the par-
scope of responsibility of the Experiments ticular mission flight-readiness review. All
Program Office included the Apollo experi- affected elements of the Manned Spacecraft
ments program and future experiments pro- Center were represented in the review. After
grams and planning. The Experiments Pro- detailed evaluations of the experiment equip-
gram Office became part of the Science and ment design and test history, the functional
Applications Directorate in December 1966. verification review panel determined flight-
worthiness of the experiment or additional
Operations operations required to make the experiment
flightworthy.
The first three formal Gemini experiments Late in the preflight phase of Gemini IV,
were conducted during the first manned mis-
three Department of Defense experiments
sion, Gemini 111, on March 23, 1965. All
were canceled due to the addition of extra-
three required crew participation and real-
time communications. The Langley Research vehicular activity. Although many Gemini
Center proposed that a reentry communica- experiments were planned for two missions,
tions experiment be conducted similar to one with the second mission serving a s an alter-
GEMINI EXPERIMENTS PROGRAM SUMMARY 223

nate, it became evident that the original ob- mission, and immediate preparations were
jectives of some experiments had been ex- made to perform this activity. However, the
panded and required multiple missions. The Gemini VI-A launch was delayed, and
Gemini IV experiment cancellations in- although the capability to photograph the
creased the emphasis on successfully ac- comet was successfully accomplished, the
complishing assigned experiments. Gemini actual launch time prevented the spacecraft
IV also revealed that personnel involved with from being in the correct location for obtain-
the development of a n experiment and with ing photographs of the comet.
a detailed understanding of the objectives The Gemini VI11 mission was prematurely
must participate in real-time mission sup- terminated shortly after docking with the
port so that continuity would not be lost and target vehicle. One onboard experiment pack-
experiment objectives compromised. For the age contained live frog eggs, and much data
Gemini V mission, the Experiments Program could be retrieved if certain onboard oper-
Office increased the support to the crew- ations were conducted within a restrictive
training program, and the Flight Operations time period. Real-time operations proved
organization included the Experiments Pro- successful in relaying information to the
gram Office in the decision-making cycle for crew after the spacecraft had landed in the
the real-time mission planning related to Pacific. Much of the experiment was saved
experiments. by utilizing capabilities and supporting func-
In the final preflight phase of Gemini VII, tions established as a result of knowledge
i t was decided to incorporate equipment and gained from previous experiment missions.
crew procedures on the spacecraft to conduct Late in the Gemini XI1 preflight phase, the
a photographic study of dim-light phe- decision was made to obtain ultraviolet
nomena. Photographic equipment for such photographs of dust entering the Earth’s
a study was not readily available, and it was atmosphere, to record information on an ex-
apparent that the stated objectives were not pected meteor shower as the Earth moved
* compatible with practical crew activity. Im-
through the remains of the tail of a comet,
mediate action was taken to effect compati- and to rendezvous with the shadow of the
bility and the Gemini VI1 crew obtained the Moon a s it moved across the Earth. The
desired data. Gemini XI1 mission had previously been ex-
Experience during Gemini showed that tended from 3 to 4 days to accommodate the
late perturbations to the general flight plan, crew activity schedule. The personnel con-
to onboard equipment, and to crew activity cerned with experiments assured availabil-
should be expected: Since the nature of sci- ity of required equipment onboard the space-
entific investigations varies somewhat with craft, briefed the crew, and programed the
the calendar and with the specific days in mission for the added objectives without
orbit, many of the perturbations are more compromising previous mission planning.
directly related to the experiment-type activ- Subsequently, the launch was postponed
ity than to the basic mission, and have to be until 2 days later than had been planned;
resolved by the personnel concerned with the however, it was decided to accomplish the
experiments program. objectives as previously planned. The imme-
When Gemini VI-A was in the terminal diate and effective response by operational
phases of revised preflight planning for ren- personnel in adjusting the orbital mechanics
dezvous with the Gemini VI1 spacecraft, the displaved precision ; the intricate rendezvous
comet Ikey Seicki was discovered and was with the lunar eclipse was successful.
determined to be moving through the Sun’s No experiment was deleted from a mission
corona. It was decided to attempt to photo- because of flight equipment not being avail-
graph the comet during the Gemini V F A able a t launch time. The capability to sup-
224 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

port the experiments program was developed medical. There were 17 scientific experi-
as necessary to meet expanding support re- ments conducted during the program. The 27
quirements and was possible because of the technological experiments were conducted in
flexible structure of the Manned Spacecraft support of spacecraft development and oper-
Center organizations which allowed the ational techniques. The eight medical experi-
Center to meet the demands of the program. ments were directed toward determining
more subtle effects than might be determined
Scope of Program from the regular operational medical meas-
urements and preflight and postflight exami-
The complement of experiments in the nations.
total Gemini Program numbered 52. In gen-
eral, each experiment was flown several I’rincipal Investigators and Affiliations
times to take advantage of varying flight
conditions and resulted in 111 experiment The Gemini experiments were proposed
missions, an average of 11 experiments per from many sources including universities,
mission. The largest number of experiments, laboratories, hospitals, industry, and various
20, was carried on the 14-day Gemini VI1 Government agencies. Several investigators
mission. were often associated with a single experi-
Table 17-1 summarizes the experiments ment and they, in turn, may have had differ-
conducted during the Gemini Program. The ent affiliations. Table 17-11 presents the
large number of experiments, representing principal investigators for the Gemini ex-
many disciplines, precludes a detailed de- periments a n d their affiliations, together
scription of all experiments in this paper. with the missions for which the experiments
Reference 2 contains a brief description of were assigned.
the equipment and preliminary results of the Subsequent to the selections of the experi-
experiments conducted during the Gemini ments and the principai investigators, a very
111 through VI1 missions. close personal association was maintained
The experiments were divided into three among the experimenter, the spacecraft con-
categories : scientific, technological, and tractor, the crew, the mission planner, and
the real-time operations personnel. Of these,
TABLE
17-1 .-Experiment Program the experimenter-crew relationship was of
particular significance. The following para-
Summary graphs provide some insight into the inte-
gration of the experiments with the many
Total
Number of experiment program elements.
Sponsoring agency , experiments missions

Scientific :
Experiment Equipment Integration
Office of Space Science
and Applications ....... 17 47 The selected experiments were integrated
Technological: into the spacecraft on a minimum interfer-
Office of Advanced ence basis, based on the participation of the
Research and Tech-
......................... flight crew. Three specific examples illus-

1
nology 2 2
Office of Manned Space trate the various categories. The simplest is
Flight, Manned the stowage category ; the equipment is
Spacecraft Center ...... 10 18 stowed in one of several areas or compart-
Department of Defense 15 26
ments, and is unstowed and operated accord-
Medical ................................ -8 -.
18
ing to a preplanned schedule. Examples of
Total ........................ 52 111
this type of equipment include the hand-held
GEMINI EXPERIMENTS PROGRAM SUMMARY 225

. TABLE17-II.-Principal Investigators and Afiliations

Experiment description Principal investigator Affiliation Mission No.

Scientifie
0 t h of Space Science and
Applications:
Zodiacal light photography.. E. Ney ............................. University of Minnesota ......... V, VIII, IX-A, X
Sea urchin egg growth.......... R. Young .......................... NASA Ames............................ I11
Frog egg growth .................... R. Young ......................... NASA Ames .......................... VIII, XI1
Radiation and zero-g on M. Bender ........................ Atomic Energy Commission ... 111, X I
blood
Synoptic terrain P. Lowman ....................... NASA Goddard IV, V, VI-A, VII,
photography x , XI, XI1
Synoptic weather K. Nagler and S. Soules.. U.S. Weather Bureau IV, V, VI-A, VII,
photography x , XI, XI1
Cloudtop spectrometer........ F. Saiedy.......................... Natl. Environ. Sat. Center v, VI11
Visual acuity .......................... S. Duntley ........................ University of California v , VI1
Nuclear emulsion. ................. M, Shapiro and NRL and NASA Goddard VIII, X I
C. Fichtel
Agena micrometeorite C. Hemenway .................... Dudley Observatory................ VIII, IX-A, X, XI1
collection
Airglow horizon M. xoornen.................. NRL.. ................. IX-A, X I , XI1
photography
Micrometeorite collection. ... C. Hemenway .................. Dudley Observatory I X ~ A x, , XII
Ultraviolet astronomical K. Henize .......................... Dearborn Observatory, x , XI, XI1
camera Northwestern University
Ion wake meamarement ........ D. Medved ....................... Electro-optical Systems, Inc. x , XI
Libration regions E. Morris .......................... U.S. Geological Center XI1
' photographs
Dim sky photographs C. Hemenway .................... Dudley Observatory XI
. orthicon
Daytime sodium cloud Jacques-Emile Blamont.. . Centre Natl. de la Recherche XI1
photography Scientifique

Technological
oface of Advanced Research
and Technology:
Reentry communications...... L. Schroeder ....................... NASA Langley ............. .: . . . . [I1
Manual space navigation D. Smith and B. Creer ..... NASA Ames............................ XI1
sighting
Office of Manned Space Flight:
Electrostatic charge............... P. Laffeity......................... NASA MSC........................... rv, v
hton-electron J. Marbach ........................ NASA MSC ............................. rv, VI1
Spectrometer
Triaxis fluxgate D. Womack ....................... NASA MSC rv, VII, x , XI1
magnetometer
Optical communication......... D. Lilly............................. NASA MSC ......................... VI1
Lunar ultraviolet spectral €2. Stokes............................. NASA MSC ............................. K
reflectance
Beta spectrometer ................. J. Marbach ...................... NASA MSC............................. K, XI1
Bremsstrahlung R. Lindsey......................... NASA MSC ............................... K, XI1
spectrometer
Color patch photography ..... J. Brinkman ...................... NASA MSC ............................... K
L-color Earth's limb M. Petersen .................... Massachusetts Institute of [V
photographs Technology
Landmark contrast C. Manry ........................... NASA MSC .............................. VII. x
measurements
226 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

TABLEl7-Il.-P~incipal In 7wti.cjutors and Afiliutions-Concluded


- -- - --
Experiment description Principal investigator Mission No.

Department of Defense:
Basic object photography A F Avionics Lab Wright-Patterson AFB V
Nearby object photography A F Avionics Lab Wright-Patterson AFB V
Mass determination AFSC Field Office NASA MSC (DOD) VIII, XI
Celestial radiometry A F Cambridge Lab USAF-Hanscom Field v , VI1
Star occultation navigation A F Avionics Lah Wright-Patterson AFB VII, x
Surface photography A F Avionics Lab Wright-Patterson AFB V
Space object radiometry A F Cambridge Lab USAF-Hanscom Field v , VI1
Radiation in spacecraft A F Wwapons Lab Kirtland AFB IV, VI-A
Simple navigation A F Avionics Lab Wright-Patterson AFB IV, VI1
Ion-sensing attitude control A F Cambridge Lab USAF-Hanscom Field x , xrr
Astronaut Maneuvering AFSC Field Office NASA MSC IX-A
Unit
Astronaut visibility S. Duntley University of California v , VI1
UHF-VHF polarization NRL N RL VIII, IX-A
Night image intensification Air Development Center U.S. Navy VIII, XI
Power tool evaluation A F Avionics Lab Wright-Patterson AFB VIII, XI

Medieal:
Cardiovascular conditioning L. Dietlein NASA MSC v , VI1
Inflight exerciser R. Rapp NASA MSC IV, v , VI1
Inflight phonocardiogram R. Johnson NASA MSC IV, v , VI1
Bioassays of body fluids H. Lipscomb NASA MSC VII, VIII, IX-A
Bone demineralization P. Mack Texas Woman's University IV, v, VI1
Calcium balance study D. Whedon National Institutes of Health VI I
Inflight sleep analysis P. Kelloway -Baylor Medical School VI1
Human otolith function A. Graybiel U.S. Navy, Naval Aerospacf v , VI1
Medical Institute

cameras used to conduct the zodiacal light, radiometry experiments DO04 and D007.
weather, and terrain photography experi- Figure 17-5 shows an outline of the space-
ments. Figures 17-1 and 17-2 a r e typical ex- craft and the location of the elements of the
amples of stowage. equipment; figure 17-6 depicts the opera-
A second type of integration includes tional mission configuration of Gemini VI1
equipment mounted in the pressurized cabin as viewed from Gemini VI-A.
area during the mission. This is exemplified
by the radiation and zero-g effects on blood
cells experiment (fig. 17-3) and the f r o g egg
growth experiment (fig. 1 7 - 4 ) , both of which
were mounted on the spacecraft hatch.
The most complex type of integration
involves equipment with some o r all of
the following requirements : structurally
mounted ; automatically deployed for taking
measurements ; thermally controlled ; exten-
sive data requirements involving onboard
tape recordings of the measurement and
radiofrequency transmission during the
flight. These requirements a r e typified by the FIGURE17'-l.--Photographic equipment stowage.
GEMINI EXPERIMENTS PROGRAM SUMMARY 227

FIGURE
17-2.-Photographic equipment stowage FIGURE
174-Radiation and zero-gravity effects
compartment. on frog-egg growth experinient package.

engineering and operational specialists could


generally propose and develop alternate
techniques which allowed accomplishment of
the experiment objectives within the capabil-
ities of the crew and the spacecraft.
After the techniques were evolved f o r the
various experiments, plans for crew training
were developed. Planetarium briefings were
included, as well as flight-simulator training
with celestial backgrounds ; aircraft flights
to provide operational familiarity with hard-
ware ; zero-g aircraft flights for experiments
requiring extravehicular activity : and base-
line studies for medical and visibility experi-
FIGURE
174.-Radiation and zero-gravity effects
ments. These activities and others, coupled
on blood cells experiment package. with continued discussions between crew
and experimenters, were considered essen-
tial to the successful completion of the ex-
Crew Integration periment. An understanding by the crew, not
only of the mechanical operation of the ex-
The diversity of the experiments required periment but also of the objectives and under-
considerable training by the crew. The train- lying principles, was required to allow the
ing began with briefings by the experimenter crew to exercise their selective and visual
to explain the experiment, the proposed capabilities.
method of operation, the probable training
required, and the expected results. It was Mission Planning
often determined in such briefings that
various constraints would prevent the space- In addition to integrating the hardware
craft and/or crew from accomplishing the into the spacecraft, developing the experi-
experiment in the manner originally desired. mental technique, and training the crew, the
In these situations, either the crew or the multitude of experimental operations had to
228 G E M I N I S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

Environmental control
system module TV

Panel controls,.

Recorder

FIGURE
17-5.-Location of radiometry equipment for Experiments DO04 and DOOi.

ground patterns. The cloudtop spectrograph


experiment cloud observations and record-
ings were performed in areas where air-
planes could be deployed to make correlation
measurements. During the Gemini VI1 mis-
sion, the radiometry experiments included a
requirement for measurements a t 36 differ-
ent periods and locations. The conflicts and
the potentially damaging interactions had to
be resolved. The experimenter had a sig-
nificant role in the planning. His knowledge
of the flexibility in the experiment require-
ments maintained the integrity of the experi-
ment without compromising the overall ob-
jectives. An optimum overall flight plan was
thus achieved.

FIGURE
17-6.-Operational mission configuration for Prelaunch
Experiments DO04 and D007.
The impact of experiments on the overall
be integrated with the other primary mission mission time line and spacecraft propellants
activities. The experiments generally had a is summarized in tables 17-111 and 17-IV.
variety of requirements which often con- The experiment hardware followed the same
flicted or interacted. The zodiacal light philosophy and supported the identical per-
photography experiment was conducted only formance specifications and spacecraft
during nighttime conditions. The visual checkout schedules as the operational space-
acuity experiment required clear skies and a craft systems and crew-stowed operational
constraining inclination angle above the equipment.
GEMINI EXPERIMENTS PROGRAM SUMMARY 229

ment objectives. Previously, mission and


spacecraft integration responsibilities were
-- the definitive interface responsibilities. The
added responsibility resulted in a n additional

I
Planned Mission time
Planned total experiment planned for scope of monitoring and approval of environ-
Mission mission time, activity time, experiments,
hrn hrh percent mental testing, and of a more extensive
____--

i
checkout interface involving actual flight
111.................. 0.5 5 hardware in the spacecraft, together with
IV .................... 14; 22 16 additional bench checks.
v .................... 288 49 17
From a practical standpoint, checkout per-
VI-A,. ............ 66 8 12
VI1.................. 392 86 22 formed a t the spacecraft contractor's plant
VI11................ 90 19 21 and a t Kennedy Space Center identified
IX-A. .............

I
90 19 21 engineering problems which could affect
x .................... 90 33 37
hardware design and mission performance.
XI.................. 90 26 29
In these cases, the combined experience of
XII................
1 1377
122 37

299.5
30

22
the experimenter, the Gemini Program
Office, and the spacecraft contractor team
Total.j enabled the experiment to be conducted with
little or no change to.hardware procedures or
mission planning.

Real-Time Mission Support


TABLEl'7-IV.-Payload and Propehnts for
Experiment Activities During the mission, many of the experi-
ments required considerable real-time sup-
Total experiment Propellant allotted port by ground. personnel and the experi-
Mission weight, Ib* for experiments, Ib menter. The visual acuity experiment is a n
- -
example. The experimenter was located at
I11............................ 69 ............................ the Mission Control Center-Houston. The
Iv............................ 67 63
two ground-test sites to be viewed by the
68
........................ 26 flight crew were located near Laredo, Tex.,
VII .......................... 85 and in Australia. Special communications
49 were established between these sites and the
IX-A.. .................... 16 closest network stations, Corpus Christi.
x.............................. 78
Tex., and Carnarvon, Australia. This allowed
153
165 the experimenter to contact the sites to de-
Total............ I ~ --1643 I 703
termine weather conditions ; to direct
changes in the ground-test pattern; to re-
ceive crew reports: to perform analyses
Does not include mounting provisions or ballast. based on these inputs; and to interact with
the ground controllers, who in turn passed
information to the crew for the continuation
As previously mentioned, the inflight fail- of the experiment.
ure of equipment involved in one of the ex- In summing up the experiment integration
periments on the first manned mission re- activity and looking forward to the future,
sulted in added responsibility for the Manned i t can be concluded that the success of an
Spacecraft Center to assure confidence in the experiment is highly dependent upon the
equipment to successfully accomplish experi- participation of the experimenter in many
230 GEMI NI SUM MARY CONFERENCE

phases of the program. These phases include TABLE17-V.-Experiment Perf orrnance


design integration, mission planning, crew Statu.s
training, checkout, and real-time support of
the operation. Experiments requiring con- 3xperiments
Gemjni Number of accom- Problems
siderable amounts of integration activity mission experiments plished *
can be accommodated and successfully imple-
mented. Crew understanding is vital to I11 ................. 3 2 Experiment
achieve maximum benefit from man in space. IV ................. 11 11
v ................... 17 16 Mission
Experiment Performance VI-A ........... 3 3
VI1 ............... 20 17 Experiment
VI11 ............. 10 1 Mission
The overall success of the Gemini Experi- IX-A .............. 7 6 Mission
ments Program is indicated in numerical x ................. 15 12 Mission
values in table 17-V. If mission problems a r e XI ................. 11 10 Mission
XI1 ............... 14 12 Experiment
not considered, a remarkable success is indi-
cated. Experiment equipment problems Total.. 111 90
affected only.6 of the 111 experiments per- _~
formed on all missions. This performance 80.3 per cent accomplished overall.
was the result of the close teamwork of all 14.3 percent not accomplished due to primary
participants as well as the capability to mission problems: 5.4 percent not accomplished due
to experiment equipment problems.
readily incorporate equipment and mission
modifications up to launch time.
knowledge and experience for future manned
Concluding Remarks space-flight programs.

The success of the Gemini Experiments References


Program is measured by the new or con-
firmed information provided for engineer- 1. ANON:Mercury Project Summary, Including Re-
sults of the Fourth Manned Orbital Flight,
ing, management, and scientific disciplines. May 15 and 16, 1963. NASA SP-45, 1963.
The experience gained from the Gemini Ex- 2. ANON: Gemini Midprogram Conference, Includ-
periments Program has provided invaluable ing Experiment Results. NASA SP-121, 1966.
18. SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY
By RICHARDW. UNDERWOOD,
Photographic Technology Laboratory, N A S A Manned Spacecraft Center

Introduction such a s horizon airglow and libration


regions. The blue lens, prism, grating, and
The 10 manned Gemini flights produced a magazine system were designed to work in
series of color photographs which are 'both the ultraviolet regions, primarily to record
striking in beauty and of immense scientific stellar spectrographs. Motion-picture equip-
and academic value. Over 2400 photographs ment manufactured by J. A. Maurer, Inc., is
were secured and have demonstrated the also pictured. The 70-mm magazine espe-
value of space photography in such fields as cially built by Cine Mechanics, Inc., allow 1
geology, geography, oceanography, agricul- the Hasselblad systems to secure 65 frames
ture, hydrology, urban planning, environ- instead of the conventional 12. A second-
mental pollution control, meteorology, land generation Cine Mechanics magazine with a
management, cartography, and aerospace en- capacity of about 160 frames was used on
gineering. A representative selection of pho- Gemini XII.
tographs from the various missions, as well Table 18-1 indicates the various 70-mm
a s a short description of the informational films carried on Gemini flights. The thick-
* content, are presented in this paper. ness of the film varied from about 0.007 inch
-
to 0.0025 inch. Most of the film had emulsion
Camera Equipment . coatings and bases especially formulated to
NASA specifications. Figure 18-2 shows the
Figure 18-1 shows a selection of camera
machine manufactured by Hi-Speed, Inc., to
equipment used during the Gemini Program.
process the Ektachrome film. Great care was
The majority of the photographs were ob-
used in processing the Gemini flight film.
tained with the NASA-modified 70-mm
Prior to processing the film, the machine was
Hasselblad Camera, Model 500-C; both the
thoroughly cleaned and then checked for pre-
80-mm Zeiss Planar and 250-mm Zeiss Son-
nar lenses were used. The Super Wide-Angle cise sensitivity control ; this included checks
70-mm Hasselblad Camera, Model SWA, was of the various photographic processing
chemicals, exact temperatures, cycle dura-
used on the Gemini IX-A through XI1 mis-
tions, and chemical replenishments. The
sions. Although designed primarily as an
flight films were sent through the processor
extravehicular activity device, the Model
singly; this required a considerable amount
SWA camera recorded some of the most
of time but allowed very close surveillance.
spectacular terrain photography of the pro-
No flight film was lost due to laboratory mal-
gram. The 70-mm Maurer Space Camera was
functions.
also carried on Gemini IX-A through XI1
and permitted a unique versatility resulting
from rapid interchangeability of components. Selected Photographs
The gray 80-mm Xenotar lens and magazine

I
(50-frame capacity) secured conventional The following representative photographs
color photographs. The red f/0.95 Canon constitute about 2 percent of the total pho-
lens and magazine permitted scientific pho- tographs secured during the Gemini Pro-
tography of very low light-level phenomena gram, and contain information of value in

231
232 G E M I N I S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 233

the various geoscientific or aerospace fields. amine the entire collection in order to deter-
The serious geoscientist would have to ex- mine the total value t o his field of interest.

TABLE18-1.-Gemini 70-mm Film

-Name I I
i Mission

S.O. 217 ........................

S.O. 368 .......................


D-50 ..............................
i Ektaehrome transparency ...............................................

Ektachrome transparency (improved)................................


Anscochrome transparency..................................................
.I
I
1
111, IV, V, VI-A, VII, VIII, IX-A,
X
XI, XI1
V
8443................................ Ektachrome, infrared ............................................................. VI1
S.O. 166 (0-85) ............ Ultrahigh speed (ASA 16000) ............................................. XI, XI1
3400................................ Pan-Atomic X (ASA -80) .................................................... VI1
2475................................ High-speed (ASA = 1200).............. ..................... VI-A, VI1
103-D ............................ Spectrographic (4500 A-6100 A) ........................................ IX-A. XI
1-0.................................. Spectrographic (2500 A-5000 A) .......................................... X, XI, XI1

FIGURE
18-2.-Film processor.
234 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

Synoptic Terrain Photography


Figure 18-3 was taken from a n altitude of 110 miles during the
Gemini IV mission and has become a classic for obvious reasons. The Nile
Delta is clearly visible, as well as the Sinai Peninsula, the Dead Sea, and
the entire Suez Canal connecting the Red and Mediterranean Seas. The
horizon is about 800 miles to the east, across Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The
photograph shows both branches of the Nile River (Rosetta and Damietta)
from Cairo, across the fertile and densely populated delta, to the Medi-
terranean Sea. Note the sharp contrast between the irrigated delta lands
and the great deserts of Africa and Asia.

FIGURE
18-3.-Nile Delta.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 235

FIGURE lW.-Nile River.

Figure 18-4 shows how the geology controls the course of the Nile
River for some 200 miles in Sudan and the United Arab Republic. The
river hugs the contact zone between the black basaltic intrusives east of
the river and the sedimentary rocks to the west. Much of the area visible
in this Gemini IV photograph will be inundated when the Aswan Dam is
completed and the 400-mile-long Lake Nasser is created in the Sahara.
236 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

FIGURE 18-5.-Ras AI Hadd.

Figure 18-5 was taken during Gemini IV from an altitude of 120 miles.
The Ras A1 Hadd area of Muscat and Oman appears in fine detail ; airport
runways can also be seen at the point. Several oases a r e perceptible at the
base of the pediment where ground water reaches the surface. Long seif
dunes a t the eastern extremities of the Rub A1 Kahli (Empty Quarter)
are visible and provide information of meteorologic value.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 237

FIGURE
18-6.--Richat structure.

A view of large geologic structures can be captured in a single photo-


graph such as figure 18-6 which shows Mauritania’s Richat structure in
excellent detail. The structure was possibly formed by a large meteorite-
type impact, or possibly from the erosion of a volcanic plug or intrusion.
This Gemini IV photograph has regenerated scientific interest in the
structure in relation to the geology of the entire area.
238 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFFZENCE

FIGURE
18-'7.-FIorida Keys.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY

In figure 18-7, the Florida Keys a r e dramatically visible from the


Gemini IV spacecraft a t a n altitude of 115 miles. The entire chain from
Key Largo to Boca Chica Key is visible, thereby providing a regional study
from a single photograph. The Overseas Highway, which is never more
than 30 feet wide, can be clearly seen. Many boat wakes in the Florida
Strait are emphasized in the solar highlight. A large portion of the Ever-
glades is visible in the upper right. On the underwater reefs visible at the
right, Florida has established the .John Pennekamp State Park to preserve
the ecology of the area.
240 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

FIGURE
18-8.-Mouth of Colorado River.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 241

Figure 18-8 was photographed during the Gemini IV mission, and


shows quite clearly the mouth of the 1500-mile-long Colorado River and
the related geology. The photograph, one of 39 made in a 4-minute rapid
sequence between Baja California and centrar Texas, was taken from a n
altitude of 110 miles. The Mexican States of Baja California t o the west
and Sonora to the east, a s well a s the Gulfo de California, constitute the
extent of the photograph. A white streak to the right of the river is the
saltpan bed of the old river channel before upstream irrigation removed
most of the water volume. A qtraight line just to the right (east) of the
old channel is a portion of the San Andreas fault system. The distinct
change in topography and in geologic structure is most evident, and was
caused by the linear horizontal movement of the fault during the geologic
past. To the right of the San Andreas f a u l t a r e the sands of the Great
Sonora Desert. The line of contact between the delta sediments brought
down the river and the block-fault mountains and pediments of Baja Cali-
fornia appears near the left (west) edge of the photograph. Suspended
sediments carried down the river are clearly visible around the mouth.
242 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

FIGURE
1&9.-West Texas.

Figure 18-9 is a portion of the Edwards Plateau area of Texas photo-


graphed during the Gemini IV mission. The view is to the west and shows
the cities of Odessa, Midland, and Big Spring along the right edge. The
unique darker areas in the left and lower left show the effect of a rain
storm the previous evening, and how quickly vegetation demonstrates
growth in a semiarid area. The dendritic drainage of the upper Concho
system is quite evident due to the lush vegetation along these streams.
.. SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 243

FIGURE
18-lO.-Nile Delta.

Figure 18-10, showing a major portion of the Nile Delta, was taken
during Gemini V from an altitude of 100 miles. With the 30 million people
in the delta area and L: high population growth rate, rapid regional infor-
mation changes are most important. The photograph shows Cairo with a
population of 0ve.r 5 million; the distribution of cities and towns in the
delta; and the networks of roads, railroads, and canals.
244 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

FIGURE
l%ll.-Strait of Gibraltar.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 245

Figure 18-11, photographed by the Gemini V crew, is a classic astro-


naut view of the Earth. The Strait of Gibraltar and the continents of
Europe and Africa a r e pictured. The valley of the Guadalquivir River and
the Sierra Morena in Spain, as well as Point Europa (Rock of Gibraltar),
are clearly visible in the upper left. To the right are Morocco and Algeria.
Unique cloud formations are visible on the Atlantic side of the strait.
246 GEM IN1 SUM M A R Y CONFERENCE

FIGURE
18-12.-Southwest Africa.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 247

A Gemini V photograph (fig. 18-12), taken from a n altitude of 200


miles, clearly demonstrates the forces of wind and sea in the Namib Desert
of Southwest Africa. This is one of the driest areas of the world, and the
sole productivity is diamonds buried in the sands. The seif-type dunes
extend over. 100 miles across the southern part of the area. As the prevail-
ing winds carry the sand into the Atlantic Ocean, the strong Benguela
Current causes the northward waterborne migration of the sands and the
formation of the three very large sand hooks. The northernmost hook is
50 miles long, and the port of Walvis Bay is located on the lee side. The
area is known as the Skeleton Coast, a name that goes back nearly 500
years when early navigators in galleons attempted to use this route from
Western Europe to Asia. In order to reprovision, they had to fight strong
northward currents and prevailing winds from the mouth of the Congo
River to the Cape of Good Hope in ships which sailed poorly to windward.
Failure to reach their destination was disastrous for ship and crew. Navi-
gators such as Columbus believed that the riches of Asia could be obtained
with less hardship by sailing westward across the Atlantic.
248 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

FIGURE
1&13.-China basins.

The line of intersection of two large basins located in Szechwan P r o w


ince, China, is visible in figure 18-13. The photograph was taken during
the Gemini V mission'and shows the Yangtze River along the right edge.
The long folded sedimentary ridges with intermediate softer beds control
the drainage pattern of the area. The synoptic view from orbital altitudes
reveals much information which cannot be discerned from the lower alti-
tudes attained by airplanes.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 249

FIGURE
1&14.-Hunan Province, China.

Figure 18-24 was taken during the Gemini V mission, and shows a
large natural floodway in Hunan Province, China, with the Yangtze River
at left center. The open water of the floodway is Tung 'ting Hu, a lake about
100 miles long. The Hsiang River flows into the lake from the right and
the photograph clearly shows the relationship of the floodway system t o
the surrounding topography.
250 GEM IN1 S U M MARY CONFERENCE

FIGURE 18-15.-Mount Godwin-Austen (K-2).

The boundaries of China (Sinkiang) , India, Pakistan (Kashmir),


Afghanistan, and U.S.S.R. (Tadzhik) meet in the Karakoram Range of
'the Himalayas (fig. 18-15). The mountains a r e snow covered above 20,000
feet. The world's second highest peak, Mount Godwin-Austen (K-2) with
an elevation of 28,250 feet, is near the upper edge of the photograph and the
Indus River is located in the lower portion. The upper right shows the
basin of the distant Takla Makan Desert. The Gemini V photograph was
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 251

FIGURE
18-16.-Bahama Banks.

taken at the time of minimum snowcover, and indicates that space pho-
tography can provide data on the water runoff from snowfields of remote
and poorly explored mountain ranges.
Oceanographers a r e interested in photographs such as figure 18-16,
a view of the Great Bahama Bank taken from Gemini V. Except for the
small land areas of Great Exuma Island, Cat Island, and Long Island, all
the informational content concerns the floor of the ocean. Along the edge
of the Tongue of Ocean, which is over a mile deep, the canyons cut in the
coral banks are visible. Exuma Sound in the center drops abruptly from
rocks awash to a depth of 8000 feet. Space photography for the first time
affords a n opportunity to photograph large areas of the world’s oceans.
252 GEM IN I SUM MARY CONFERENCE

--- . -_

FIGURE
18-17.-Salton Sea.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 253

Figure 18-17, taken by the Gemini V crew, shows the southwestern


corner of the United States and portions of Baja California and Sonora
in Mexico. The frontier cutting across the Imperial Valley is easily located
due to the marked difference in the land division systems. The city of
Mexicali on the border and the All-American Canal along the frontier a r e
visible. A unique and unexplained gyre can be seen in the Salton Sea. The
overall relationships of the many basins and ranges, which a r e the pre-
dominant geologic features of the area, can easily be studied. The Colorado
River is visible from j u s t above the mouth, through the entire Grand
Canyon, to beyond Lake Powell in southeast Utah.
254 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

FIGURE18-18.-The Sudd.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 255

The area known as the Sudd, Arabic for the barrier or stopper, was
dramatically photographed (fig. 18-18) from the Gemini VI-A spacecraft
at a n altitude of 185 miles. The main feature in t h e photograph is perhaps
the world’s largest swamp; the area is larger than the State of Pennsyl-
vania. The White Nile flows out of the Great Rift Valleys of East Africa
into Sudan and loses over 80 percent of its volume in a tangled mass of
marsh, water hyacinth, and 15-foot papyrus grass. The river loses itself
in many channels which open and close at random, as-floating islands of
papyrus block old and create new channels. Lightning often causes the
grass to catch fire. The hostile terrain of this area has historically separated
the cultures of Arab Africa from Negro Africa. Continued surveillance
from manned spacecraft can provide much information on the river and
the swamp vegetation, and may lead to an eventual triumph by man.
25G G E M I N I S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

FIGURE
18-19.-Western Algeria.

The fine geologic details of the Sahara Desert in Western Algeria


(fig. 18-19) were recorded by the Gemini VI1 flight crew. The dunes are
long longitudinal ridges from 5 to 10 miles apart, 500 to 800 feet high,
and up to several hundred miles long. A long ridge of upturned sedimentary
beds is visible from the upper center to the lower right edge of the photo-
graph. A wadi, a usually dry stream bed, follows the right edge of the
ridge; just off the photograph, the wadi passes through a water gap and
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 257

F~cuRn1&2O.-Tifernine Dunes.

continues in the opposite direction down the other side of the ridge termi-
nating in a large salt flat. The photographs of this usually dry country
were made shortly after very heavy rains; the wadi is carrying surface
water and the salt flat is inundated.
Figure 18-20 was obtained with a 250-mm Zeiss Sonnar lens, and
shows the structure of a unique geologic feature, the Tifernine Dunes of
Eastern Algeria. These dunes a r e probably the world’s highest (1500 f e e t ) ,
and a r e trapped in a basin surrounded by mountains of basalt. The remote
area had been poorly photographed prior to the Gemini VI1 mission.
258 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

FIGURE
18-21.--Kennedy Space Center, Florida.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 259

The potential value of space photography to the urban planner is


represented by figure 18-21. The Gemini VI1 crew photographed the Ken-
nedy Space Center, Fla., and vicinity while directly overhead at a n aItitude
of 140 miles. Launch Complex 19, where the spacecraft was launched 2 days
before, can be clearly seen as part of Missile Row. Launch Complex 39,
which includes the Vertical Assembly Building, the crawlerways, and the
two launch pads, is partially obscured by a cloud. Other manmade features
which are clearly visible include freeways, city streets, buildings, cause-
ways, railroads, bridges, piers, runways, and taxiways. The channel of
the Intracoastal Waterway can be located beside the series of white dots
in the Indian River ; the white dots a r e small islands of spoil piles resulting
from dredging. Space photography can be utilized by urban planners to
study and make important decisions regarding the fierce competition for
land among industrial, commercial, residential, agricultural, and recrea-
tional users. Government personnel can update planning documents, such
as master plans, or tax and transportation maps, and quickly see what
changes have taken place in land use.
260 GEMINI SUM MARY CONFERENCE

FI&RE18-22.-Lake Titicaca, Peru.


SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 261

Lake Titicaca, located between Peru and Bolivia at a n elevation of


12 506 feet, was photographed (fig. 18-22) by the Gemini IX-A crew. The
photograph also shows portions of Chile and Argentina, and the Pacific
Ocean in the background. The snow-covered peaks of the Cordillera Real
(Royal Mountains) rise to over 21 000 feet and are visible in the lower
left. The high Salars or salt flats, on the left margin, a r e higher than any
point in the continental United States and a r e a s large as the Bonneville
Salt Flats. Drainage, from the lower left, is about 3700 miles down the
Amazon t.0 the Atlantic Ocean.
262 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

FIGURE
1&23.-Peru.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 263

The Cordillera Blanca (White Mountains) of Peru were photographed


(fig. 18-23) by the Gemini IX-A crew less than 1 minute prior to figure
18-22. Clearly visible is Huascaran Volcano (22 205 feet), the highest
point in Peru; the snowline is at 18 000 feet. A thin white line down the
west slope of the volcano marks the path of a destructive avalanche which
killed several thousand people in the Santa River Valley in January 1962.
Over 250 miles of the Pacific coast can be seen. The rivers in the upper
right of the photograph flow down the Amazon system for over 3500
miles to the Atlantic. In areas which still require accurate and detailed
mapping, space photography will be a valuable asset. Great effort is re-
quired to obtain accurate information on the amount of snow on these
mountains and the predicted water runoff. Space photography can reduce
the hardships encountered by topographic survey parties at altitudes in
excess of 20000 feet, and eliminate the frequent loss of life. In over 40
years of aerial photography, only a quarter of Peru has been photographed :
the Gemini IX-A crew photographed over three-quarters in 3 minutes.
264 G E M I N I S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

18-24.-Texas-Louisiana Gulf coast from Gemini XI.


FIGURE
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 265

Figure 18-24 is a very interesting study of the sources and distribu-


tion of air pollution along the Texas-Louisiana Gulf Coast. This photograph
was taken through the open hatch of the Gemini XI spacecraft shortly after
dawn. Large sources of air pollution can be seen originating from smoke-
stacks in Houston, Texas City, Freeport, and Port Arthur, Tex., and in
Lake Charles, Baton Rouge, and Bogalusa, La. As shown in the photograph,
the air pollutants in the Houston area move northeastward at the lower
levels until winds aloft carry the pollutants southward over the Gulf of
Mexico. In the future, space photography will provide a worldwide aid in
the detection of sources, and the collection and movement of airborne
pollutants.
266 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

F ~ C U R E18-26.-Texas-Louisiana Gulf coast from Gemini XII.


SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 267

Figure 18-25 was taken by the Gemini XI1 crew along the Texas-
Louisiana Gulf Coast and shows Houston, the Manned Spacecraft Center,
the Harris County Domed Stadium, the Houston Ship Channel, and many
other features of the area. Of greater geoscientific importance, the distri-
bution of very polluted water in Galveston Bay and other waterborne sedi-
ment in such passes as Bolivar Roads, Sabine, and Calcasieu can be clearly
seen. The movement of currents in the Gulf of Mexico is also quite evident,
and has afforded the oceanographer the opportunity to learn a great deal
about the movement and distribution of larval commercial shrimp so
important to area economy. The photograph also demonstrates the poten-
tial uses of space photography in the observation of causes and distribution
of polluted water.
268 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

FIGURE 18-26.-Northern half of Mexico.

During the Gemini XI1 standup extravehicular activity, a striking


panoramic series of photographs was obtained showing the entire length
of Mexico from Guatemala to Arizona. Figure 18-26 shows the northern
half of Mexico including the cities of Monterrey, Reynosa, Chihuahua, and
Ciudad Juarez. Features visible in the United States include White Sands
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 269

FIGURE
1&-27.--Southern half of Mexico.

National Monument in New Mexico and Galveston Bay in Texas. Figure


18-27 taken a few seconds later shows the southeast half of the country
including the Mexico City area (note the air pollution), the great snow-
covered volcanoes such as Popocatepetl, the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, and
the Yucatan Peninsula.
270 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
‘r
High-Apogee PhotoEraphy

A series of superb photographs was taken by the Gemini XI flight


crew while increasing the orbital altitude from 185 miles to a record 851
miles. Figure 18-28, taken approximately 200 miles above the Earth, shows
a land area of almost 1 million square miles in the Sahara countries of
Libya, United Arab Republic, Chad, Niger, Sudan, and Algeria. Clearly
visible a r e the great sand deserts separated by mountains and escarpments
of sedimentary o r igneous origins. Two large volcanic areas, the Black
Haruj and the Tibesti Mountains, a r e visible. The unique striations in rock
and sand in the upper right demand more investigation by the geologist.

FIGURE
18-28.-Sahara area.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 27 1

FIGURE
1&29.-Nile River.

Some 2 minutes later, the Gemini XI crew photographed approximately


half of the 4200-mile-long Nile River (fig. 18-29) ..Taken from a n altitude
of about 220 miles, this synoptic view permits regional studies which
cannot be accomplished by other means. The relationship of the world’s
longest river to the regional geology is clearly indicated from Bida (above
Cairo) in the United Arab Republic southward to Kosti (above Khartoum)
in the Sudan. The Red Sea and Arabia lie beyond.
272 G E M I N I S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

FIGURE
1&30.-Middle East.

Figure 18-30 was taken during Gemini XI from a n altitude of about


200 miles, and shows all of Israel and Jordan and portions of Turkey,
Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Republic. The
capitals of Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Amman, and Jerusalem, as well as
the Red Sea terminus of the Suez Canal, a r e visible. The entire Sinai Penin-
sula and such sub-sea-level lakes as the Dead Sea and Sea of Galilee a r e
visible. A break in the Trans-Arabian pipeline occurred near Badanah,
Saudi Arabia, shortly before the photograph was made, and the resulting
fire, smoke, arid shadow a r e recorded in the upper right.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 273

FIGURE18-31.-Arabia-Somali.

From an altitude of about 410 miles, the Gemini XI crew photographed


the junction of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden (fig. 18-31). Parts of
Yemen, South Arabia Federation, Saudi Arabia, and the Muscat and Oman
Sultanate are visible in the upper portions of the photograph, while parts
of Somali, Ethiopia, and all of French Somaliiand are in the foreground.
274 GEM IN I SUM MARY CONFERENCE

FIGURE 1&32.-India.

From a n altitude of about 500 miles, the Gemini XI crew recorded a


striking and beautiful view of the Indian subcontinent (fig. 18-32). The
island of Ceylon is to the lower right. The climatic difference along the
divide of the Western Ghats in India is clearly visible, with the lush jungle
to the west and the semiarid regions to the east. Much valuable information
is available concerning the meteorological conditions over such a vast-area
as the subcontinent and the adjacent Arabian Sea to the left and the Bay of
Bengal to the right.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 275

In figure 18-33, the cloud-covered Indonesian Islands were photo-


graphed during Gemini XI from about 740 miles above the Earth. The
curved horizon is over 2000 miles to the east.
276 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

FIGURE
1&34.-Australia.

Figure 18-34 was taken while the Gemini XI spacecraft was 851 miles
above the Earth, the highest altitude from which any photograph has been
taken by man. The western half of Australia with the sunlit Indian Ocean
beyond is visible. The horizon is nearly 3000 miles to the westward. The
photograph was made near sunset, and ground detail is poor due to low
light levels on the ground.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 277

FIGURE 18-36.--Sunset.

The Gemini XI crew recorded the striking photograph of a sunset


(fig. 18-35) from approximately 850 miles above the Earth. The sunset
terminator is visible over 1000 miles to the west of the spacecraft and the
Earth’s limb about 3000 miles to the west. Due to the spacecraft altitude,
however, the Sun is clearly visible well above the horizon.
278 GEM I N I SUM MARY CONFERENCE

Synoptic Weather Photography

The meteorologist has secured much valuable data from some 2000
Gemini photographs. The unmanned meteorological satellites a r e providing
H great deal of valuable information and have been supplemented with the
finer details and color of the photographs obtained from Gemini. The study
of vortices is of particular importance in that the ultimate vortex may
result in a destructive tornado, hurricane, or typhoon. Figure 18-36 was
taken during the Gemini V mission, and shows the mile-high Mexican
island of Guadalupe (200 miles off Baja California) interrupting the
orderly flow of winds to create a bowed shockwave effect in the clouds to
windward. Two vortices have developed to the lee of the island.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 279
280 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

FIGURE
18-37.-Vortex off Morocco.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 281

Figure 18-37 shows a very well developed vortex which has been
caused by windshear at the coastal prominence of Ras Rhir in Morocco.
The photograph clearly shows the eye of the vortex and the rotational
effects on the periphery. This Gemini V photograph has become a classic
example of the meteorological data which can be obtained from manned
space-flight photography. It would be difficult to provide a machine with
the ability to select and photograph phenomena of greatest value to the
scientist.
282 GEM IN1 S U M MARY CONFERENCE

F X ~ U1&38.-Typhoon
R~ in Pacific Ocean.

A large mature typhoon moving across the central Pacific Ocean was
photographed (fig. 18-38) by the Gemini V crew. The diameter of the
system was approximately 400 miles and the circular motion can be dis-
tinguished in the photograph.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 283

Near-Object Photography

Figure 18-39 is of great interest to the aerospace engineer, and shows


the first Gemini extravehicular activity. The cloud background is over the
Pacific Ocean between Hawaii and California. This is one of 16 photo-
graphs of t h e . Gemini IV extravehicular activity, and is evidence that
much can be learned not only of the pilot but also of the maneuvering unit,
camera, space suit, and umbilical cord.

FIGURE
18-J9.-First extravehicular activity.
284 GEM IN1 SUM MARY CONFERENCE

18-40.-Gemini VI1 from Gemini VI-A.


FIGURE

The historic first rendezvous of two manned space vehicles, Gemini


VI-A and VI1 spacecraft, produced a series of 117 striking and informa-
tive still photographs and several hours of motion pictures. As the two
vehicles moved through space some 185 miles above the Pacific Ocean, the
Gemini VI1 spacecraft was photographed (fig. 18-40) from a distance of
20 feet by the Gemini VI-A flight crew.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 285

FIGURE 18-41.-Gemini VI11 target vehicle.

Even though the Gemini VI11 mission was terminated early due to a
thruster malfunction, the aerospace engineering field has greatly benefited
from the motion-picture and still photographic documentation of the first
rendezvous and docking of a spacecraft with a target vehicle. In figure
18-41, the Gemini Agena Target Vehicle is approximately 50 feet from
the spacecraft. This photograph was taken just prior to the docking ma-
neuver and is one of a stereo pair which permits precise distance measure-
ments. The motion-picture footage of the difficulties encountered at the
time of undocking clearly illustrates the seriousness of the situation.
286 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

FIGURE
18-42.-Augmentod Target Docking Adapter.
Figure 18-42 shows the Augmented Target Docking Adapter during
one of three rendezvous accomplished by the Gemini IX-A crew. Docking
could not be accomplished because the ascent shroud covering the docking
adapter did not deploy after the vehicle was placed in orbit. The Gemini
IX-A crew maneuvered the spacecraft to within inches of the Augmented
Target Do :ig Adapter and secured 109 excellent photographs .of the
rendezvous ,nd station-keeping activities. The ablative effect of launch
heat on the shroud was photographed for the first time.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 287

FIGURE
18-43.-Gemini X Primary Propulsion System firing.

Figure 18-43 is a photograph of the Gemini X spacecraft docked to


the targel vehicle with the target-vehicle status display panel and erected
L-band antenna clearly visible. The glow around the target vehicle is
caused by the firing operation of the Primary Propulsion System.
288 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

FIGURE
lW.-Tethered target vehicle.

During the Gemini XI spacecraft/target-vehicle tether evaluation, a


series of photographs was taken to show the exercise from the undocking
and deployment of the tether until after the tether was jettisoned. Figure
18-44 was taken over Baja California at an altitude of about 185 miles
and shows the target vehicle and the 100-foot Dacron tether.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 289

FIGURE
18-45.-Extravehicular activity.

Figure 18-45 is one of a series of still and motion pictures taken of


the Gemini XI1 extravehicular pilot working quite effectively while tethered
to the target vehicle. This series of photographs demonstrates that man
can do valuable and constructive work while extravehicular in space if
the proper restraining devices are provided.
290 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

Concluding Remarks

The Gemini VI1 photograph of a distant full moon provides a fitting


conclusion to a discussion of the photographic accomplishments of the
Gemini Program (fig. 18-46). The 2400 exposures secured a r e all valuable,
and a large number have provided information previously denied t o the
scientist. The two most important considerations furnished by this photo-
graphic record are found in the excellent historic documentation of the
10 manned missions, and in a’clear demonstration of the feasibility of
continuing with f a r more sophisticated photographic systems specifically
designed to provide new and better information to the worldwide geo-
scientific community.

- .- .
.z
.,- -.

FIGURE
1%46.-Moon.
19. SCIENCE EXPERIMENTS SUMMARY
By JOCELYN R. GILL, Ofice of Space Science and Applications, N A S A ; and WILLIS B. FOSTER,Director,
Manned Flight Experiments, Ofice of Space Science and Applications, NASA

Introduction from earlier missions to emphasize the high-


lights of the program.
Results of the scientific experiments con-
ducted during the Gemini Program through Gemini Science Experiments
Gemini IX-A have been reported in a series
of NASA publications (refs. 1 to 4) and in Nineteen science experiments were flown
the scientific journals (refs. 5 to 7). This during the Gemini Program (table 19-1).
paper will therefore emphasize experiment The table includes the principal. investiga-
results from the Gemini X,XI,and XI1 mis- tors and their affiliations. The program was
sions, but with some reference to results interdisciplinary in character, and was com-

TABLE 19-1.4emini Science Experiments

Number Title
Principal
investigator
____
Affiliation .
...... Zodiacal Light and Airglow Photography E. P. Ney ..............: University of Minnesota
~~ ~ ~~

so01
so02 ......, Sea-Urchin E g g Growth Under Zero-G .... R. S. Young ............ NASA Ames
SO03 ....... F r o g E g g Growth Under Zero-G ................ R. S. Young ............ NASA Ames
S004' ....... Synergistic Effect of Zero-G and M. A. Bender ........ Atomic Energy Commission, Oak
Radiation on White Blood Cells. Ridge National Laboratory.
SO06 ....... Synoptic Terrain Photography .......... P. D. Lowman ........ NASA Goddard
SO06 ....... Synoptic Weather Photography .................. K. Nagleq ................ U.S. Weather Bureau
SO07 ....... Spectrophotography of Clouds .......... F. Saiedy ................ U.S. Weather Bureau and Uni-
versity of Maryland.
SO08 ....... Visual Acuity in the Space Environ- S. Q. Duntley ........ University of California, Scripps
ment. Institute.
so09 ....... Nuclear Emulsions ........................................ M. M. Shapiro and Naval Research Laboratory and
C. Fichtel. NASA Goddard
so10 ....... Agena Micrometeorite Collection ................ C. Hemenway ........ Dudley Observatory
so11 ....... Airglow Horizon Photography .................. M. J. Koomen ........
Naval Research Laboratory
so12 ....... Gemini Micrometeorite Collection .............. C. Hemenway ........ Dudley Observatory
SO13 ....... Ultraviolet Astronomical Photography ....
IC. G. Henize ..........
Dearborn Observatory
SO26 ....... Gemini Ion Wake Measurement ..................
D. Medved ..............
Electro-Optical Systems
S028' ....... Dim Light Photography ..............................L. Dunkelman ........
NASA Goddard
SO29 ....... Libration Regions Photography ................ E. Morris ................ U.S. Geological Survey
SO30 ....... Dim Sky Photography/Orthicon ................ E. P. Ney and University of Minnesota and
C. Hemenway. Dudley Observatory.
SO61 ....... Sodium Cloud Photography ........................ J. Blamont ............
Centre National de la Recherche
Scientifique.
S064' ....... Ultraviolet Dust Photography .......... C. Hemenway ........,I
Dudley Observatory
1

White blood cells and neurospora on Gemini XII.


' Flown on Gemini VI-A and VI1 as an operational experiment only.
Flown on Gemini XI1 as an operational experiment only.

291
292 GEM I N I SUMMARY CONFERENCE

prised of investigations in the fields of performed on the Gemini IV, V, VI-A, VII,
astronomy, biology, geology, meteorology, IX-A, X, XI, and XI1 missions; numerous
and physics. Over half of the experiments useful pictures were also taken during Gem-
were photographic in technique, indicating ini 111. Approximately 1400 color pictures
that the investigators wished to take advan- were obtained, and a r e usable for geology,
tage of the flight crew being available to geography, or oceanography.
guide and select the targets and to return the One of the most useful photographs (fig.
film for permanent record. A photograph 19-1), taken by the Gemini IV flight crew,
frequently clarified data which otherwise shows an area about 80 miles wide of north-
were ambiguous. e r n Baja California, Mexico. The geologic
Table 19-11 shows the flight assignments structure of this mountainous region is shown
of the science experiments and indicates t h a t with remarkable clarity. For example, the .
they were concentrated in the last half of the Agua Blanca fault is visible as the series of
Gemini Program. There were 16 experi- alined valleys at lower left in the photograph,
ments with a total of 34 flight assignments parallel t o the frame of the spacecraft win-
in the last five Gemini missions. dow. Numerous other faults, similarly ex-
pressed, a r e visible north of the Agua Blanca
Terrain and Weather Photography Experiments
fault. The great need for more geologic in-
Experiment SOOfi, Synoptic Terrain Pho- formation of this area is suggested by the
tography.-Experiment S005, Synoptic Ter- fact t h a t the Agua Blanca fault, one of the
rain Photography, was devoted to a study most prominent geologic structures in Baja
of the Earth terrain, and was successfully California, was not discovered until 1956.

TABLE19-II.-Flights of Gemini Science Experimenh'


-
Gemini mission
Experiment
I11 IV V
.
VI-A
Number of
flights

so01................................
-
........... + 4
so02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... ........ 1
.......... ......... 2
SO04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . + ....... ......... 2
SO05............................ + + + 7
SO06 ............................ + + + 7
SO07................................ .......... + 2
SO08.............................. ........... + 2
so09 .................................. ........... .......... 2
so10............................. ......... .......... 4
so11........................... .......... ........ 3
so12 ........................... ......... ...... 3
SO13.................................. ......... ......... .3
SO26................................. ......... .......... .................................... + + i ..............i 2
+ +
-i
SO28................................ ....... ....... ............................................................. 2
SO29 .................................. ....... ........... ................................................................ 1
SO30............................. ....... ......... ............................................ + .............. 1
SO51 ................................ .......... ...... ........................................................ - 1
so64 .................................... ........... .......... ............................................................ - 1

Total...................... .......... ........... ................................................................... 50

+ indicates experiment was successful; - indicates experiment was incomplete.


SCIENCE EXPERIMENTS SUMMARY 293

FIGURE l%l.-Baja California.

One of the photographs (fig. 19-2) taken Another Gemini XI1 photograph (fig.
on Gemini XI1 appears to have considerable 19-3) demonstrates the potential value of
potential value in the study of continental orbital photography in studies of recent sedi-
drift. Proponents of this theory consider t h a t mentation. The portion of the Gulf of Mexico
the Red Sea, which structurally is a large shown in the photograph has been exten-
graben o r down-dropped block, represents sively studied: and, when used in conjunc-
incipient continental drift: that is, the tion with the other photographs from space,
Arabian Peninsula is considered to be drift- may provide a n extremely useful standard
ing away from Africa and rotating. The pho- area for interpretation of similar pictures
tograph may provide new evidence on this of other near-shore areas.
possibility by providing a synoptic view of Expei-iment SOOG, Synoptic WeatheT Pho-
the regional geology. tography.-Figure 19-4 is a photograph
294 GEM IN1 SUM MARY CONFERENCE

l&2.-Arabian
FIGURE Peninsula and the Red Sea.

taken during Experiment S006, Synoptic crew. A number of thunderstorms a r e visible


Weather Photography. The view is north- along the southern coastline of Cuba. A t the
west over Camaguey Province, Cuba, and lower left of the photograph, some cumulus
was taken August 23, 1965, by the Gemini V clouds off the northern coast appear t o be
I SCIENCE EXPERIMENTS SUMMARY 295

FIGUBE
1 9 - 3 . 4 u l f of Mexico.

arranged in polygon-shaped, .open cells. Sev- relatively cool air passes over warmer water.
era1 are hexagonal with taller cumulus Air is tending to sink within the cell and to
clouds where the cell corners touch. The pat- rise near the borders where the cumulus
terns illustrate a mesoscale cellular convec- clouds have formed. These open cells would
tion system that normally develops when be undetected by a standard satellite televi-
FIGURE 19-4.-Camaguey Province, Cuba.

sion picture because the cell walls are too India and into the Bay of Bengal where a lixc
thin, and the diameter is very small (ref. 8). of convective clouds has formed several hun-
The photograph of southern India and Gey- dred miles offshore. The reason for the clear
Ion (fig. 19-5) was taken by the Gemini XI region is not entirely understood, but two
crew on September 14, 1966, with a super- possibilities have been suggested. First, the
wide-angle lens attached to a 70-mm still lack of clouds may be the result of drier air
camera. A clear zone, nearly free of clouds, subsiding offshore which would have t h e ten-
and varying from 30 t o 50 miles in width, dency to suppress any cloud development.
extends along the west coast of India. The The sea breeze, or low-level winds which
zone continues around the southern tip of move the air toward land, may have caused
SCIENCE EXPERIMENTS SUMMARY 297

the a i r to descend in the clear region. Second, ture may have been sufficiently low to inhibit
there may have been cold water welYng up the development of cumulus clouds. A surface
along the coast. Surface winds in India a r e temperature change of about lL' may be
northwesterly along the west coast and enough to accomplish this. Southwest winds
southwesterly along the east coast. The north- prevail to the east of India, and the Coriolis
west winds will transport the surface water force would act to transport the surface wa-
southeastward ; however, the Coriolis force ter in a n easterly direction. Again, this would
will tend to deflect the water toward the produce a favorable condition for water t o
southwest and away from the land. This well up near the coast. Measurements of sea-
would permit the welling up of cooler water water temperatures from ships a r e scarce,
along the coastline ; also, the water tempera- but the few available reports indicate t h a t
298 GEM IN 1 SU M MARY CONFERENCE

the coastal waters were 1"or 2" cooler than analysis within 24 hours ; therefore, refrig-
sea-water temperatures farther west in the eration was not required.
Arabian Sea. 'An identical experimental package was
Experiment S007, Spectrophotography of established as a control in a laboratory at
Clouds.-The objective of Experiment S007, Cape Kennedy. It was activated simultane-
Spectrophotography of Clouds, was to meas- ously with the package in the spacecraft and
ure cloud-top altitudes. The experiment was was maintained under similar temperature
first flown during Gemini V, and was also conditions. Air-to-ground communications
scheduled for Gemini VIII, Because of the from the flight crew verified that the experi-
early termination of the Gemini VI11 flight, ment was proceeding through the various
however, the experiment could not be accom- stages exactly as planned.
plished. As a result, the National Environ- The experiment was successfully con-
mental Satellite Center has designed a sec- ducted on the Gemini XI mission. The leuko-
ond-generation weather satellite that can cyte-chromosome analysis of the blood
measure cloud-top altitude and cloud thick- showed no increase in the chromosome-de-
ness. letion frequency in the flight samples over
Experiment ,9051, Sodium Cloud Photog- the ground control samples. The result does
mphy.-Experiment S051, Sodium Vapor not confirm the preliminary results found
Cloud, was flown on Gemini XII. The purpose on Gemini 111. Preliminary results from the
of the experiment was to measure the day- neurospora portion of the experiment carried
time wind-velocity vector of the high at- on Gemini XI indicate no increase in the fre-
mosphere as a function of altitude between quency of mutations in the flight samples.
62 and 93 miles. The measurements were to This part of the experiment analysis will
be obtained from the deformation of a require more time, but there now appears to
rocket-made vertical sodium cloud. During be no observable synergism between radia-
the Gemini XI1 mission, two rockets were tion and space flight on white blood cells.
launched from Algeria. Although the second Experiment SOOS, Frog Egg Growth Under
launching was easily visible from the ground, Zero-g.-The objectives of Experiment S003,
the sodium release was not seen by the flight FYog Egg Growth Under Zero-g, were to
crew. Even though they did not have visual determine the effect of weightlessness on the
sighting, the pilots photographed the region ability of the fertilized frog egg to divide
of the firing using a 70-mm still camera with normally, and to differentiate and form a
a wide-angle lens. Unfortunately, shutter normal embryo. The experiment was per-
difficulties with the camera spoiled the ex- formed in one package mounted on the right
posed film. The experiment will be resched- hatch in the spacecraft. The package had
uled for the Apollo Program. four chambers containing frog eggs in wa-
ter with a partitioned section containing a
Biological Experiments fixative. Handles were provided on the out-
side of the package so the flight crew could
Experiment S004, Synergistic Efects of activate the experiment.
Radiation and Zero-g on Blood and Neuro- During Gemini VIII,early cleavage stages
spora.-Experiment S004, Synergistic Effect were successfully obtained ; however, the
of Zero-g on White Blood Cells, was first car- short duration of the flight did not permit
ried during Gemini 111, and was continued formation of the later cleavage and develop-
on Gemini XI with the addition of neuro- mental stages. During Gemini XII, the ex-
spora. A refrigeration unit was added to pre- periment was completely successful from a
serve the blood during the 4-day mission of mechanical standpoint, and later embryonic
Gemini XI. Gemini I11 was a three-orbit stages were obtained. The 10 embryos in the
flight, and the blood could be recovered for fixation chambers appeared to be morpho-
SCIENCE EXPERIMENTS SUMMARY 299

logically normal. The five embryos which The photograph clearly distinguishes the
were unfixed were live, swimming tadpoles cone-shaped zodiacal light from the narrow
when the chamber was opened on board the airglow layer visible just above the moonlit
recovery ship. Three of the embryos were Earth. Heretofore, only a n artist’s drawing
morphologically normal ; two were abnormal has been able t o represent the zodiacal light
(twinning). The abnormalities, however, a s i t would appear to a ground observer with-
were not inconsistent with the controls, and out the visual distractions of city lights, air-
no abnormalities can be ascribed to the flight glow, and faint sources of celestial light.
a t this time. The five surviving tadpoles died Experiment SO1 1, Airglow Horizon Pho-
several hours after recovery, and were fixed tography.-Experiment SOll, Airglow Hori-
for histological sectioning. The reason for zon Photography, was conducted during
death has not yet been ascertained : however, Gemini XI and XI1 a s well as Gemini IX-A.
all the eggs will be sectioned for histological The crews used the 70-mm general-purpose
study to determine more conclusive results. still camera in the f/0.95 configuration to
photograph the night airglow layer with the
Visual Acuity Experiment Earth’s limb. The camera was mounted so
that exposures of 2 to 50 seconds could be
Experiment 5’008, Visual Acuity.-The
obtained through the right hatch window.
ability of the flight crew to visually detect
The objective was to obtain worldwide meas-
and recognize objects on the surface of the
urements of airglow altitude and intensity.
E a r t h was tested during Gemini V and VI1
The camera filter system registered the
in Experiment S008,.Visual Acuity. Data
spectral regions of 5577 angstroms (oxygen
from .an inflight vision tester used during
green) and 5893 angstroms (sodium yellow)
these flights showed no change in the visual
side by side but separated by a vertical divid-
performance of the crews. Results from the
ing line. Filter bandwidths were 270 and 380
flight-crew observations of the ground’ site
angstroms, respectively. In figure 19-8, a n
(fig. 19-6) near Laredo, Tex., confirm that
example of the split-field photography taken
visual performance during space flight was
during Gemini IX-A is shown. This is a 5-
within the statistical range of the preflight
visual performance, and t h a t there was no second exposure looking west. The corre-
sponding s t a r field is shown in figure 19-9,
degradation of the visual perception during
and the bright stars Procyon and Sirius a r e
space flight.
visible in the airglow layer. The pictures a r e
Astronomical Photography Experiments being analyzed for possible height variations
in the two layers.
Experiment S O O l , Zodiacal Light and Air- During Gemini XI, an additional 6300-
glow Photography.-A series of excellent angstrom (red) filter with a bandwidth of
photographs for Experiment SOO1, Zodiacal 150 angstroms was provided to obtain pho-
Light Photography, was obtained during the tographs in a higher orbit ; however, no pho-
Gemini IX-A flight. A photograph of the tographs were obtained because of a camera
zodiacal light and the planet Venus is shown malfunction. On Gemini XII, the split-field
in figure 19-7. The apparent curvature of the filter was removed, and the entire field was
airglow layer is due to the nature of the lens. exposed with 40-angstrom-wide filters in
The presence of Venus points out that the alternate green and yellow bands. The 6300-
zodiacal light lies in the ecliptic plane. After angstrom filter was not used during Gemini
sunset, a ground observer can see the zodia- XI1 because a high-altitude orbit could not
cal light. However, he must wait for twilight be achieved. Much more work remains on
in order to see the dim-sky phenomena ; even airglow research, but the results obtained
then the view is never free of the airglow, from Experiment SOll have demonstrated
and not often of the glare from city lights. several useful lines of approach.
300 GEMINI SUM MARY CONFERENCE

FIGURE19-6.-Experiment SO08 visual acuity ground pattern near Laredo, Tex. The inset area is an
aerial photograph of the ground pattern.
SCIENCE EXPERIMENTS SUMMARY 301

19-10 ( b ), the blot above the airglow is due t o


the cathode tube.
Expei-iment SO29, Libration Regiorls Pho-
tog?*aph.?j.-The purpose of Experiment
S029, Libration Regions Photography, was
to investigate by photographic techniques
the libration points of the Earth-Moon sys-
tem to determine the possible existence of
clouds or particulate matter orbiting the
E a r t h in these regions. The Gemini XI1 mis-
FIGURE 19-7.-Zodiacal light and planet Venus. Air- sion was the first mission on which any libra-
glow is seen as a narrow band above the moonlit tion region was available for photography.
Earth. The 70-mm still camera with a wide-angle

Hydra
I

---

Exposure 37 (West) Approximate magnitude


Q 1.0 and Over
la3 - 0 film
OL
5 s e t f10.95
03
Experiment SO11
+4
Gemini E-A 05
June 4, 1966
. 6 and under
1 9 - 8 . 4 t a r field seen in airdow split-field
FIGURE FIGURE19-9.--Split-field
filter photography showing
filter photography. ' Procyon and Sirius (from Norton's Atlas, maps
7 and 8).
Expeiiment S030,Dim S k y Photography/
Orthicon.-Experiment SO30, Dim Sky Pho- lens was used and the results are not imme-
tography/Orthicon, was conducted during diately obvious, but appear to be less than
Gemini XI. The image orthicon system of satisfactory. Isodemitometry will be run on
Experiment D015, Night Image Intensifica- several exposures, but ut this time the study
tion, was used to obtain 415 pictures of air- is not expected to vield positive results.
glow in a 360" sweep. At times, the image
orthicon sensitivity was so great that these Micrumeleurile, Cosmic Ray, and Ion Wake
pictures were almost overexposed. There is Experiments
some indication of a splitting of the airglow
into two layers. The system had an auto- ri ) ) I o brt SO1 0, Agetm Mic)*onret eo )-itc
l3.1.p~
matic gain control with the sensitivity varv- CoIl(Jctiotr.-As part of Experiment S010,
ing constantly ; this makes calibration of the Agena Micrometeorite Collection, a package
pictures difficult and time consuming. Figure f o r recording micrometeorite impacts was
19-10 shows two sample frames. In figure installed on the Gemini VTII target vehicle.
302 GEMINI SUMMPIRY CONFERENCE

FIGURE19-l0.-Airglow photoKraphs obtained from image orthicon system. ( a ) Near Canopus ;


( b ) Near Arcturus.

After approximately 4 months in orbit, the reenter the Earth’s atmosphere before the
package was recovered by the Gemini X package can be recovered.
flight crew. Optical scanning a t the Dudley Experiwteirt Sol’, Gemini Micmmeteopite
Observatory of the four stainless-steel slides Collection.-The package for Experiment
on the outside of the box (protected from S012, Gemini Micrometeorite Collection, was
launch) have revealed at least four craters successfully recovered from the Gemini IX-A
larger than 4 microns; these appear to be spacecraft adapter section after a n exposure
hyperballistic. Figure 19-11 shows one cra- of over 16 hours. For comparison, another
ter which has a diameter of 200 microns, a package was exposed for 6 hours during the
depth of 35 microns, and a lip height of 25 Gemini XI1 flight (fig. 19-12). This experi-
microns. This crater has been named Crater
Schweickart for the astronaut who suggested
that there be a n outside collection area on
the micrometeorite package on which micro-
meteorites could impact, even though the
pilot did not open the package during extra-
vehicular activity. The Dudley Observatory
has installed a stereoscan electron microscope
which will permit scanning the surface in
the original form, thus minimizing sample
contamination. Results of this work a r e not
yet known.
During the Gemini XI1 mission, the extra-
vehicular pilot opened the package on the
Gemini XI1 target vehicle and exposed the
sensitive collection plates to the space en-
vironment. The package was intended to be
retrieved during some future mission ; how-
ever, it is expected t h a t the target vehicle will FIGURE19-ll.-Micrometeorite impact crater.
SCIENCE EXPERIMENTS SUMMARY :303

prepared on this aspect. Later, a detailed


scanning, which is expected to require 1 to
2 years to complete, will provide information
on the light nuclei. The experiment group at
the Goddard Space Flight Center is concen-
trating on detailed scanning of the emulsion
stacks in order to make progress on the analy-
sis of the light nuclei, the main objective of
the experiment.
Expeiimeiit S026, Gemirii Ion Wake Meas-
urement.-Experiment S026, Ion Wake
Measurement, was conducted during Gemini
X and XI. A great deal of ambient data were
obtained during Gemini X, and all requested
modes were performed during Gemini XI.
FIGURE19-12.-Gemini XI1 pilot retrieving micro- Reduction of the data will be a rather pains-
meteorite collection package. taking task that will necessitate coordina-
tion of all available records of times and ac-
ment had a number of guest investigators tivities during the operation. It is believed
from the United States and abroad. A full that this experiment can result in a very use-
report of the results can be made only after ful method for mapping the actual wake of
the impact craters have been carefully a vehicle.
scanned with the electron microscope. A pre- Ultraviolet Photography Experiments
liminary examination of 1 square centimeter
of the surface of the Gemini XI1 package has Expe?-imerit SOG4, Ultraviolet Diist Pho-
revealed no impacts. Much work remains to togi*aphy.-Experiment S064, Ultraviolet
be done to complete the analysis of this ex- Dust Photography, was designed to provide
periment. ultraviolet photographs of dust in the E a r t h
Experimeiit SOO9, Nuclear Entu1sions.- atmosphere, and was carried on Gemini XII.
During the extravehicular activities of the The experiment used black-and-white film in
Gemini XI mission, the pilot retrieved the the 70-mm still camera with a n ultraviolet
package for Experiment SOO9,Nuclear Emul- lens. A series of sunrise photographs was
sions, from the exterior surface of the space- made in the ultraviolet region; however, due
craft adapter section. The Naval Research to the many electrostatic marks in the film,
Laboratory has finished the initial scan of very l i t t l e i n f o r m a t i o n has been d e t e r m i n e d .
about one-fourth of the emulsion stacks, and E.rprimen t SO1 3 , Ultraviol r t Ast )wiomi-
has found about 700 tracks which must be cnl Photography.-Experiment ,5013. Ultra-
sorted according to origin (either inside or violet Astronomical Photography, used the
outside the spacecraft) during activation of 70-mm general-purpose still camera with an
the experiment. It is estimated that about ultraviolet lens. Similar but less severe trou-
200 of these tracks will belong to the experi- ble was experienced with the electrostatic
ment. If this percentage can be used throuph- marks as on Experiment S064. An ultraviolet
out the analysis of the experiment, then i t spectrum of the bright star Sirius was ob-
may be expected that between 1000 and 2000 tained on the Gemini XI1 mission (fig.
usable tracks will have been recorded. 19-13). The Balmer series of hydrogen ap-
At the present time, the experimenters a r e pears a t the right. The Mg I1 doublet a t 2800
performing a special kind of scan to obtain angstroms and several other weak, sharp
information on the appearance of the tracks lines of F e I1 appear a t the left. The exposure
in order that a preliminary report can be was 20 seconds. Figure 19-14. a spectrum of
304 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

FIGURE
19-13.-Grating ultraviolet spectrum of Sirius.

- -
Canopus
zeroorder -
I
/ --
Target'\
/' vehicle \\

1----_
- . / shadow

Elalmer
limit
limb

FIGURE
19-14.-Grating ultraviolet spectrum of Canopus.

the solar-type star Canopus, was obtained were obtained. The prism resulted in a lower
from Experiment S013, Gemini XI, frame dispersion, but provided significant informa-
98, Dearborn Observatory, Northwestern tion on a large number of stars. The photo-
University. This spectrum was especially use- graphs recorded stars of fainter magnitude
ful for calibration purposes when compared than was anticipated, and there wilI be work
with the solar spectra obtained from rockets. to be done on the ultraviolet energy curves
In addition to the two remarkable grating for many months as a result of the photo-
spectrograms, several prism spectrograms graphs. Figure 19-15 is a reproduction of a
SCIENCE EXPERIMENTS SUMMARY 305

capability of the pilot. Thus far, i t has been


possible to obtain only a few uItravioIet
stellar spectra from rocket flights. During the
three trials of this experiment during the
Gemini Program, considerable ultraviolet in-
formation was obtained and should be espe-
cially useful in planning future ultraviolet
experiments for manned flights.

Concluding Remarks

Significantly, Gemini experience has shown


much about what can be done in the area of
experiments for manned operations, and has
uncovered some of the pitfalls. In summary,
it seems clear that the same attention must
be paid to all details of the experiments, crew
procedures, and crew training that has been
devoted to spacecraft operation. When this is
possible, the return of new scientific informa-
FIGURE19-15.-Prism ultraviolet spectrogram of tion will increase. It is safe to say that scien-
Cygnus region. The spacecraft shadow is on the left. tific information has increased exponentially
since Project Mercury, and is expected to con-
prism spectrogram of Cygnus- and is typical tinue to follow an upward curve. The interest
of the exposures obtained during this experi- the flight crew and the engineers have shown
ment. in the experiments has nearly matched the
Since the spacecraft windows did not admit keen interest of the investigators, and will
ultraviolet light, the experiment would not continue to be a large factor in future
have been possible without the extravehicular manned space-flight experiments.

References

1. ANON.: Manned Space-Flight Experiments; 7. GILL, JOCELYNR.; and GERATHEWOHL, SIEG-


Gemini IX-A Mission, Interim Report. NASA FRIED J : The Gemini Science Program.
Manned Spacecraft Center, Nov. 1966. Astron. and Aeron., Nov. 1966.
2. ANON.: Gemini Midprogram Conference, Includ- 8. HUBERT, L. : Mesoscale Cellular Convection.
ing Experiment Results. NASA SP-121, 1967. Meteorological Satellite Report, No. 35. Mar.
:i. ANON.: Manned Space-Flight Experiments; 1966.
Gemini V Mission Interim Report. NASA !). A N O N . : E a r t h Photographs Fro111 Gemini 111.
Manned Spacecraft Center, J a n . 1966. IV. V. NASA SP-129, 1967.
4. ANON.:Manned Space-Flight Experiments Sym- 10. GETTYS, R. F.: Evaluation of Color Photos Ex-
posium, Gemini 111 and IV. NASA Manned posed from the Gemini (GT-4) F l i r h t over
Spacecraft Center, Oct. 1965. the Gulf of California, June 1965. Rep. T-
5. LOWMAN, PAULD., JR.: The E a r t h From Orbit. :W-65, U.S. Naval Oceanoeraphic Office, Sept.
National Geographic, Nov. 1966. 1965.
fi. NEY, EDWARDP.: Night-Sky Phenomena Pho- 11. HENIZE.KARL (;.; and WACKERLINC, LLOYDR.:
tographed From Gemini 9. Sky and Telescope, Stellar Ultraviolet Spectra From Gemini 10.
Nov. 1966. Sky and Telescope, Oct. 1966.
20. DOD/NASA GEMINI EXPERIMENTS SUMMARY
By WILBUR Space Systems Division, Air Force Systems Command, U.S. Air Force
A. BALLENTINE,

In troduetion Information
coordination
The DOD/NASA Gemini Experiments
Program consisted of 15 experiments, spon-
sored by several development agencies of the
Department of Defense. Experiments were
I Management 4I $%$
program
i

I
Management 1
selected which could be accomplished with
minimum effect on the Gemini Program, and
which would contribute to the solution of the DOD experience Experiment
evaluation of space technical development i n manned management
problems of interest to DOD. Participation in space flight experience

I
the experiments program provided a means Established Estakshed
DODRJASA organizational
for DOD elements to acquire data and opera- procedures and personnel
tions experience for evaluation of the ability relationships
of man to accomplish missions in space, and Technical results
provided a mechanism for the timely flow of
manned space-flight development informa- FIGURE20-1.-DOD/NASA Gemini experiments
program results.
tion between NASA and DOD.

Program Accomplishments Procedures and Experience

Although the technical result outwardly Implementation of the DOD/NASA Gem-


appeared to be the major program accom- ini Experiments Program required the desig-
plishment, several'other results of equal im- nation of responsibilities and development
portance were obtained during the joint procedures for joint management. Organiza-
DOD/NASA implementation of the experi- tional elements and procedures have been
ments program (fig. 20-1). established f o r future joint activity, and ex-
perience has provided a better understanding
DOD Experience in Manned Space Flight of such joint activity for future planning.
Through the experiments program, DOD Establishment of Organizational and Personnel
participation was broadened to include expe- Relationships
rience in spacecraft, crew, and operational
activities in addition to the experience ac- One of the most significant results of DOD
quired through program responsibilities for participation in the Gemini Program was the
the Gemini Launch Vehicle, the Gemini development of organization knowledge and
Agena Target Vehicle, and the DOD Range the establishment of personnel relationships
Support, The direct working association with which facilitate the flow of manned space-
the Gemini Program permitted DOD develop- flight development information between DOD
ment agencies at all levels to gain practical and NASA agencies. Active participation in
experience in manned space-flight develop- the Gemini Program provided a working-
ment. level insight which facilitated the recognition
Preceding page blank 307 I
308 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

of information significant to DOD programs ; ness can be developed only through day-to-
and provided personnel and organizational day contact with the management personnel
rapport which expedited YASA/DOD sup- HCC, vplishing the basic program.
port. The established relationships have been ‘i ,e experimenter must emphasize the sup-
most beneficial in liaison with the Apollo and port of flight-crew training. The crew must
Apollo Applications Programs. represent the experimenter at a crucial point
in what is normally a n advanced experimen-
Experiment Management Information tal process ; therefore, the crew must possess
The program has developed some specific maximum understanding of experimental ob-
conclusions related to management of experi- jectives and procedures. Training simi1!Ltions
ments conducted as secondary objectives of a using equipment identical to fi.ight hardware
basic program. Although the following con- are highly desirable. Direct contact between
clusions a r e of secondary importance as ex- the experimenter and the crew during experi-
periment program results, they a r e con- ment training is essential.
sidered significant for future management Careful consideration should be given t o
planning. scheduling the secondary experiments which
Each experiment should be scheduled on at require a large amount of crew operational
.least two flights. The probability of success- time. Because such experiments have a
ful attainment of experiment objectives on a greater probability of being affected by pri-
single attempt is too low to risk high experi- mary program contingencies, they have a
ment development cost. Because experi- lesser probability of success.
ments were considered as secondary mission Technical Results
objectives, successful experiments were
highly dependent on the accomplishment of Program technical results were good. Of
primary mission objectives. Occasions of the 15 programed experiments, 11 were suc-
higher-than-nominal fuel usage, of reduced cessfully completed (table 20-1). The four
electrical power, and of other mission prob- remaining experiments were carried on Gem-
lems resulted in the curtailment of experi- ini missions, but flight tests were not com-
ment activities and the inability to obtain pleted. Although flight test objectives of these
experiment objectives. A second experiment four experiments were not completely at-
flight was essential to success in these cases. tained, valuable data and experience were
The experiment interface with the space- acquired during experiment development.
craft should be minimized. A simplified inter- Experiments .DOOl, D002,and 0006,Basic
face will generally result in higher reliability, Object, Nearby Object, and Surface Photog-
in lower integration cost, in greater opera- ruph?j.-Photography accomplished during
tional flexibility, and in reduced effect of Project Mercury was oriented to broad
basic spacecraft hardware change. area of coverage with no specific pointing or
Colocation of the experiment manager with tracking requirements. Experiments D001,
the agency accomplishing the basic program D002, and DO06 were designed to investigate
management provides a significant advantage the ability of man to acquire, track, and
f o r all experiments, and is essential f o r those photograph objects in space and on the
experiments which have complex interfaces ground on a preplanned basis using photo-
with the basic program. Experiments a r e graphic equipment with a small field of view.
developed concurrently and interact with the Acquisition of preplanned photographs of the
basic program development, and the experi- Moon, planets, and points on the surface of
ment managers must develop detailed aware- the E a r t h clearly demonstrated the capa-
ness of basic program effects and constraints bility. The photograph of Love Field, Dallas,
to efficiently integrate the experiments. In Tex. (fig. 20-2), is representative of the data
dynamic development programs, this aware- acquired.
DOD/NASA GEMINI EXPERIMENTS SUMMARY 309

TABLE20-I.-DOD/NASA Gemini Experiments


I
Flight Result

V Complete
V Incomplete
VIII, X I Complete
v , VI1 Complete
VII, X Complete
V Complete
v , VI1 Complete
IV, VI-A Complete
IV, VI1 Complete
x , XI1 Complete
DO12 Astronaut Maneuvering Unit IX-A Incomplete
DO13 Astronaut Visibility v, VI1 Complete
DO14 UHF/VHF Polarization Measurements VIII, IX-A Incomplete
DO15 Night Image Intensification VIII, X I Complete
DO16 Power Tool Evaluatian VIII, X I Incomplete
I
310 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

Experiment 0003,Mass Determiriation.- TABLE20-II.-Manuall?~ Observed Data,


Experiment DO03 demonstrated the feasi- Astronaut Method
bility and the accuracy of determining the
mass of an orbiting object by thrusting on it
with a known thrust and measuring the re-
sulting change in velocity. The experiment
Experiment operations
T:r, I Velocity
change,
ft/sec

was conducted during the Gemini XI mission Calibration maneuver ..............


and used a Gemini -4gena Target Vehicle as Mass determination maneuver
the orbiting object. The mass a s determined
from the experiment procedure was com-
pared with the target-vehicle mass as com- 10
puted from known launch weight and expend- d o O
able usage to determine the accuracy of the 9 I---stop timing
method. ,: I (54:37:39.2261
Experiment DO03 investigated two meth-
a I Thrusters off
; I
ods of data acquisition. The Telemetry 7 d I
/ I
Method was based upon the telemetry data /’ I
from the spacecraft computer and Time Ref-
erence System. The Astronaut Method was
-=u. 65
0)

VI
‘t
i I
I
I
6 I
based upon data displayed by the spacecraft 2 ,’ I
4 : I
Manual Data Insertion Unit and the event / I
timer, and recorded by the flight crew. In 3 I ,: I
both cases, spacecraft t h r u s t was determined I+--Start
p’
timing
II
2
from a calibration firing of the spacecraft I (54:37:30.327) I
I I
propulsion system with the spacecraft and 1. I I
0 I I
target vehicle undocked. Resulting spacecraft ob1 1 1 ’ I I I I 1 I I 1
thrust F,. was computed from :28 :M 32 34 :36 :3a :oo A2 44
54:37:26 54:3746
Fr=-MoaV Ground elapsed time, hr:min:sec
At
where FIGURE2 0 - 3 . 4 a l i b r a t i o n maneuver. Experiment
Mo=mass of spacecraft, slugs D003,Mass Determination, telemetry method.
AV-measured incremental velocity, ft/sec
At =measured thrusting time interval, sec
I ,A
Data from the calibration and mass-determi- I ,,’ I
I I
nation firings for each method investigated I ,/” I
a r e shown in figures 20-3 and 20-4, and in U
lo[0 L@. I
table 20-11. Using these data, the mass of the * I I
4

* I I
target vehicle was computed from I I
I
I
. Depress Istop timing1
computer 11559.743d
where
START button 1 Thrusters I
(15555A7.243)-----1 Ofl---j
I I
MA,-target-vehicle mass, slugs
F,.-maneuvering thrust of the space- :M 34 :% A2 :50 :50 :58
1555536 l:%N
craft, Ib
Ground elapsed time, hr:min:sec
A t -measured thrusting time interval, sec
AV =measured incremental velocity, f t i s e c FIGUREIM.--Experiment D003,mass determina-
MG,-spacecraft mass, slugs tion maneuver, telemetry method.
DODINASA GEMINI EXPERIMENTS SUMMARY 311

Comparison with target-vehicle mass as com- and VI. Discrete measurements were made
puted from launch weight and known expend- on 72 subjects such as the following:
ables indicated a variation in results of 4.9
percent for the Telemetry Method and 7.6 (1) Gemini VI-A space- (9) Horizon-to-Earth
craft thruster nadir calibration
percent for the Astronaut Method (table plume (10) Large ground fire
20-111). (2) Rendezvous Evalua- (11) Night and day,
Experiment 0004/0007, Celestial Radi- tion Pod land and water
ometmj/Space Object Radiometry.-Experi- (3) Gemini Launch Ve- subjects
ment D004/D007 was conducted during the hicle second stage (12) Sunlit cloudtops
Gemini V and VI1 missions. The spacecraft ( 4 ) Moon (13) Moonlit cloudtops
carried two interferometer spectrometers (5) S t a r s (14) Lightning
and a multichannel spectroradiometer f o r ( 6 ) Sky background (15) Missile-powered
measurements of selected sources in the ( 7 ) Space void flight
bands indicated in figure 20-5. Equipment ( 8 ) Star-to-horizon cali-
characteristics are shown in tables 20-IV, V, bration

I I -
Telemetry ........................... 7268 6912 I -356 4 . 9
Astronaut ........................... I 7268 7820 552 7.6

a Computed from launch weight and usage of consumables.

I I I V I I I I I

i
5
Ultraviolet Infrared Radio
X-rays i
light light waves
b
0.39- I -0.76
I I I e l I I I 1 I

Wavelength i n microns

Radiometer, Gemini P PMT I BOLO ,


U
0.2 t o 0 . 7 ~ A 1t03r 4.3 tO.12 P

Radiometer, Gemini !
llI PMT PBS
U U
0.2 to 0.35 r 1to3r

Infrared spectrometer, Gemini P a n d m


LE25
1-3-12r

Cryogenic spectrometer, GeminiP a n d m HgGe


U
8-12r

FIGURE
SO-fi.--Experiment D004/D007equipment coverage.
312 G E M I N I S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

TABLE20-IV.-Radiomcter Instrument Parameters

Weight, Ib
Power input, watts
Field of view, deg
Optics, in. Cassegrain

Photomultiplier tube
Detectors, Gemini V UP 28) Lead sulfide Bolometer

Spectral band, p 0.2-0.6 1.0-3.0


1
1 4-15
Nominal filter width, p 0.03 0.1 0.3
Filters used, p .22 1.053 4.30
.24 1.242 4.45
.26 1.380 6.00
.28 1.555 8.0
.30 1.870 9.6
.35 2.200 15.0
.40 2.820
.50
.60
lo3 log compressed 10s log compressed

Detectors, Gemini VI1 I Photomultiplier tube


(ASCOP 541 F-05M) Lead sulfide Bolometer

Spectral band, p
1 0.2-0.35 1.0-3.0
Nominal filter width, p 0.03 0.1 .
Filters used, p .2200 1.053
.2400 1.242
.2500 1.380
.2600 1.555
.2800 1.870
.2811 1.900
2862 2.200
.3000 2.725
.3060 2.775

Dynamic range ................................. 10s in 4 discrete steps 10s log compressed


2-825 I
TABLE2Q-V.-Parameters of the Cryogenic TABLE20-VI.-Parameters of the Infrared
Interferometer/Spectrometer Spectrometer
Weight, lb ..................................... ........... 18.6
Weight (with neon), lb .......... 33.6 Power input, watts .......................................... 8
Power input, watts ............. 6 Resolution, cm-* ................................................ 40
Field of view, deg .............. 2 Field of view, deg ............................................ 2
Optics, in. Cassegrain ........... 4 Optics, in. Cassegrain ...................................... 4
Detector .............................................. Mercurydoped
Detectors Lead sulfide 1 Bolometer
germanium
Spectral band, microns .......... 8 t o 12
Dynamic range .................................. 10s automatic
gain changing
Coolant ................................................ Liquid neon
DOD/NASA GEMINI EXPERIMENTS SUMMARY 313

The measurements on items ( 2 ) , ( 3 ) , ( 5 ) , eter developed and tested during this experi-
( 7 ) , and (8) were accomplished with the ment is available for future applications.
cryogenic-neon-cooled spectrometer which
was successfully used in orbit for the first
time during this experiment. New informa-
tion was obtained on the development and the
use of cryogenically cooled sensor systems for
space application. Included in the experiment
results were the first infrared measurements
of a satellite made by a manned spacecraft
outside the atmosphere (fig. 20-6). The ex-
A

1
periment demonstrated the advantages of
using manned systems to obtain basic data
with the crew contributing identification and I I I I I I
choice of target ; choice of equipment mode ; 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
ability to track selectively ; and augmenting, Elapsed time, sec .
validating, and correlating data through on-
20-'7.-Experiment D005,Gemini X.
FIGURE
the-spot voice comments. Measurement of Vega occultation.

Experiment 0008, Radiation in Spnce-


craft.-Experiment DO08 provided a n active
tissue equivalent ionization chamber system
and passive dosimeters including thermo-
luminescent devices, film-emulsion packs, and
activation foils to record cosmic and Van
Allen belt radiation within the Gemini space-
craft. Excellent agreement was found be-
tween data from the active and the passive
dosimetry. The active dosimeter incorporated
a portable sensor to measure radiation dose
rate a t various points within the spacecraft
and about the. body of each crewman. The
FIGURE20-6.-Experiment D004/D007 measurement
of Gemini VI-A in Earth-reflected sunli~ht.
measurements indicated that the total dose
received on the Gemini I V mission was 82
millirads; the major portion was Van Allen
Experiment 0 0 0 5 , S t a r Occultation Navi- helt radiation. On Gemini VJ-A, a total dose
[jation.-Experiment DO05 was conducted to of only 20 millirads was computed. The inte-
determine the usefulness of star occultation grated dose per pass through the South At-
measurements for spacecraft navigation, and lantic anomaly is shown in table 20-VII. On
to establish a density profile for updating Gemini IV, the instantaneous dose rate
atmospheric models for horizon-based sys- reached a level of 107 millirads/hour during
tems. Data analysis has not yet been com- revolution 7 (fig. 20-8) ;the highest dose rate
pleted ; but preliminary evaluation indicates recorded on Gemini VI-A was 73 millirads/
that the atmospheric density profile is suffi- hour during a pass through the inner Van
ciently stable to provide photometer data for Allen belt. Typical cosmic radiation levels for
determining spacecraft position with a n accu- the Gemini orbits a r e shown in figure 20-9.
racy of 21 nautical mile. Typical occultation The spacecraft shielding influenced dose
data a r e shown in figure 20-7. The photom- levels by more than a factor of 2 on both
314 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

TABLE20-VII.-Radiation Dose Experienced


-
During South Atlantic Anomaly Passes

Integrated dose
'"E Portable dosimeter
--- Fixed dosimeter
per anomaly
revolution,
Mission Revolution mrad

Gemini IV ........ 6 3.0


7 8.4
8 10.45
9 3.5
21 2.87 0.1
0 4 8 12 16
22 7.10 (0938 g. e. 1.1 Elapsed time, min
23 '6.0
24 '3.0 FIGURE 20-8.-Dose rate, South Atlantic anomaly
36 3.32 pass, Gemini IV, revolution 7.
37 5.90
38 3.26
39 2.50
51 1.72
52 2.26
53 '2.0
54 2.0

1 I I I I I
Gemini VI-A .... 6 1.0 0 20 40 60 80 100
6 6.0 (6934 Q. e; t 1 ElaDsed time. min
7 5.5 1.5 1.1 1.0 11251.75 .1.75 1.251.0 1.25
I l l I I t I I I I I (
8 2.6 1.751.25 1.0 1.11.5 2.00 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.5
9 1.5 L. earth radii

Total .......... 16.5 FIGURE20-9.-Cosmic radiation dose levels within


Gemini IV as a function of orbital time and
L-values for revolution 45.

used for manual spacecraft navigation. A


space sextant was developed and tested; the
missions. Film-emulsion data, coupled with use of the sextant in an autonomous naviga-
special shielding experiments conducted using tion system proved feasible. The observable
the active dosimeters, show t h a t the doses horizon f o r sextant measurements was deter-
received on the Gemini IV and VI-A missions mined to average 14.9 miles above the mean
were predominantly a result of the energetic Earth horizon. Typical errors in star coalti-
proton component of the inner Van Allen tude determination were less than 0.10'.
belt : although radiation levels were well Measurements of angles to 51" were made
within acceptable limits, the data indicated with ease. Table 20-VI11 compares some
the problems of manned operations deeper in Gemini VI1 essential orbital elements com-
the radiation belts. Equipment developed and puted from ground track data and from sex-
tested during this experiment is available for tant data. The calculated uncertainty for the
future space applications. position determined from sextant sightings
Experiment 0 0 0 9 , Simple Navigation.- was 10.1 nautical miles along the track, and
Experiment DO09 developed data on observ- 6.3 nautical miles across the track. This com-
able phenomena and procedures which can be pared favorably with the accuracy of the
DOD/NASA GEMINI EXPERIMENTS SUMMARY 315

TABLE2 0 - V I I I . 4 r b i t Parameter Compari-


son f o r Experiment DO09

'
I

Inclination, deg
I
i Right ascension of
, ascending node, deg
F 10
-W
sir A -
// \\ Ion sensor /'
I
Star set u
.E -10-
I
~

no.
1 Ground
track Sextant
i Ground
' track
I
I
, Sextant 2
-20

4 28.90 28.71 192.03 ' 191.85 .


f .: Inertial sensor j
8 28.90 29.03 192.06 I 192.37
12 28.87 28.92 I 192.01 192.20
16 28.90 28.72 1 192.02 191.84

M:oO g. e. t. 1 Elapsed time, sec

spacecraft position computed from radar FIGURE20-ll.-Comparison of ion sensor and iner-
tracking data. A flight-qualified sextant is tial system pitch-angle measurement, Gemini X.
available for future operational use.
Experiment DO1 0, Ion-Sensing Attitude E.rperiment 0 0 1 2 , Astronaut ManeuveTiny
Control.-Experiment DO10 developed and Unit.-Experiment DO12 was not completed
tested equipment which used specially due to the inability to accomplish the planned
adapted ion sensors to indicate spacecraft flight tests on Gemini IX-A and XII. The
yaw and pitch angles relative to the flight Astronaut Maneuvering Unit was carried in
path. The flight crew confirmed that the sys- the Gemini IX-A spacecraft, but flight test-
tem provided an excellent indication of atti- ing was terminated prior to separation of
tude. Data from the ion sensors a r e compared the Astronaut Maneuvering Unit when visor
with data from the Gemini X spacecraft iner- fogging obstructed the Sision of the extra-
tial sensor in figures 20-10 and 20-11. The vehicular pilot. Preparation of the Astronaut
system has excellent possibilities for future Maneuvering Unit for donning demonstrated
attitude indication/control applications. for the first time that extravehicular work
tasks of significant magnitude could be ac-
complished, and that adequate astronaut re-
strain t provisions were required to maintain
the workload within acceptable levels. Extra-
vehicular activity evaluation through Gemini
XI indicated that progress of extravehicular
activity development was less than desired.
Therefore, the final Gemini XI1 extravehicu-
lar activity was devoted to investigation of
basic extravehicular activity tasks rather
- inertial sensor
than to testing of the Astronaut Maneuvering
Unit. Although flight tests were not com-
pleted, the experience and data acquired dur-
-201
0
I I I I I
1 M ) 2 0 0 # ) 0 4 0 0 5 0 0 6 1 M
I I I I ' ing design fabrication, testing, and training
(64.a
g. e. 1.1 will be valuable in the planning and future
Elapsed time, sec development of personal extravehicular ma-
FIGURE2O-l0.-Comparison of ion sensor and iner- neuvering units. The Astronaut Maneuver-
tial system yaw-angle measurements, Gemini X. ing Unit, the Gemini space suit, and the
316 GEMINI SUNMARY CONFERENCE

Extravehicular Life-support System (chest reported correctly on the rectangles t h a t


pack) a r e shown in figure 20-12. earlier predictions indicated they should see.
Ezperimeirt DO14, Ultr~high-Freqzlency/
Very High-Frequency Polarization Measure-
ments.-The flight test of Experiment DO14
was not completed. The experiment was
scheduled for the Gemini VI11 and IX-A mis-
sions. The experiment was not attempted
during Gemini VIII due to control problems
which forced early termination of the mis-
sion. The experiment was accomplished on
Gemini IX-A, but the number of measure-
ments was limited because of other experi-
ments and mission constraints. The success
of the experiment required a representative
number of measurements; since only a lim-
ited number were acquired, objectives were
not completely attained. Experiment equip-
ment operation was satisfactory, and experi-
ment technique was successfully demon-
strated.
Expcrimant D 0 1 5 , Night I m a g e Intensifi-
cation.-In Experiment DO15 image intensi-
fication equipment was used for the first time
on a manned spacecraft to view the E a r t h in
darkness. The crew reported that geographic
features (bodies of water, coastlines, and
rivers) were observed under starlight condi-
tions, with no Moon. Cloud patterns were
especially prominent, indicating a possibility
.FIGURE 20-12.-Thc Astronaut Maneuvering Unit, f o r mapping weather patterns a t night. The
Gemini space suit, and Extravehicular Life-Sup- experiment results provided a basis for eval-
port System.
uating future applications of image intensifi-
cation equipment in space flight.
Erperiment , 0 0 1 3 , Asti.on,nut Visibility.- Experiment DO1 6, Power Tool Evalua-
In conjunction with the scientific visual tiox.-Experiment DO16 was not completed
acuity experiment (SOOS) which investigated due to the inability to complete the planned
the effects of the space environment on visual flirht tests. Spacecraft control problems of the
acuity, Experiment DO13 confirmed a tech- Gemini VIII mission prevented evaluation
nique for predicting capability of the flight of the minimum-reaction power tool (fig.
crew to discriminate small objects on the sur- 20-14). Pilot fatigue necessitated early ter-
face of the Earth in daylight. In the experi-
mination of extravehicular activity during
ment, the crew observed and reported ground
Gemini XI, and evaluation of the power tool
rectangles of known size, contrast, and orien-
tation as shown in the photograph of the was not attempted. Although flight testing
array a t Laredo, Tex. (fig. 20-13). Simul- was not completed, development and testing
taneous measurements were taken of light of the power tool provided experience and
scattering caused by the spacecraft window data of value to future development of space
and of conditions over the array. The crew maintenance activities.
DOD, NASA GEMINI EXPERIMENTS SUMMARY 31 7

FIGURE20-l3.-Aircraft photograph of Experiment Dol:(, ground array. Laredo. Tex.

Mode selector sleeve ..A Conclusion

Overall evaluation of the DOD/NASA


Gemini Experiments Program indicates that
the program was successful. Some basic capa-
bilities of man in space which were unknown
o r uncertain at the beginning of the experi-
ments program are now understood in specific
terms. Such understanding will be valuable
in the planning of future manned space
systems.
Forward-reverse switch--->\

FIGURE 20-14.-Experirnent D016, minimum


reaction power tool.
GEMINI SUMMARIZATION

Preceding page blank 3 \q


.
21. ASTRONAUT FLIGHT AND SIMULATION EXPERIENCES
By THOMASP. STAFFORD,
Astronaut, Astronaut Ofice, NASA Manned Spncecrajt Center; and CIi \RLES
CONRAD,JR., Astronaut, Astronaut Ofice, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center

Summary and revised when necessary. After complet-


ing initial practice runs in the Dynamic Crew
This presentation will be a discussion of Procedures Simulator, the crew practiced the
the flight simulations and of the actual flight launch phase of flight a t the start of each
experiences of the Gemini Program. The pro- Gemini Mission Simulator Session. The ini-
gram has proven that precise flight-crew re- tial training was conducted in a shirt-sleeve
sponses during orbital flight is critically de- environment and later with each crewman
pendent upon the fidelity of the simulation wearing a full pressure suit. The Gemini
training received prior to flight. All crews Mission Simulator was of the exact configu-
utilized a variety of simulators in preparing ration of the spacecraft to be flown, and pro-
for their specific missions. Flight experi- vided both visual displays and sound cues
ences have shown that the majority of the (figs. 21-3 and 21-4).
simulators were of a high fidelity and that, As the training progressed, launch-abort
in most cases, the simulators produced accu- simulations were practiced with the Gemini
rate conditions of the actual flight. The few Mission Simulator integrated with the Mis-
minor discrepancies between the responses, sion Control Center. During these simula-
controls, and displays in the simulator and tions, the Mission Control Center was
in the actual spacecraft had no noticeable manned by the mission flight controllers. The
effect on flight-crew performance. majority of the later runs were conducted
with the crew suited in either training or
Introduction flight suits. A final series of runs in the Dy-
namic Crew Procedures Simulator was con-
The presentation will be categorized into ducted approximately 3 weeks prior to
specific areas of the missions, and will com- launch.
pare the fidelity of flight simulations with ac- The data displayed in the Dynamic Crew
tual flight experience. The areas will be dis- Procedures Simulator and in the Gemini
cussed in the chronological sequence in which Mission Simulator proved very realistic when
they occurred during flight. compared with the data experienced in flight.
Quantitative statistical data and qualitative
Launch flight-crew debriefings all correlated this
fact. A comparison of Gemini Mission Simu-
The launch phase encompassed powered lator and actual flight data from the pow-
flight from lift-off through orbital insertion. ered-flight phase of the Gemini VI-A mission
The first phase of training for the launch se- is shown in figures 21-5 to 21-8. An
quence was conducted by the flight crew in analysis of the plots indicates a close agree-
the Dynamic Crew Procedures Simulator lo- ment between the two sources of data. Dur-
cated at the Manned Spacecraft Center, ing the debriefing sessions after each flight,
Houston. The simulator provided sound, mo- the crews have indicated that the response
tion, and visual cues t o the crew (figs. 21-1 of the simulator controls and displays had a n
and 21-2). During this phase of training, all extremely close correlation with the re-
launch and abort procedures were exercised sponses observed in flight.

321
Preceding page blank
322 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

FIGURE
Zl-l.-Cutaway view of the Dynamic Crew Procedures Simulator.

FIGURE
21-3.-Gemini Mission Simulator console
FIGURE
21-2.--Dynamic Crew Procedures Simulator. area.
OPERATIONAL FLIGHT AND SIMULATION EXPERIENCES 322

u 4 ---Gemini l U - A Mission
Simulator data

0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400


Time from lift-off, sec

FIGURE
21-4.-Gemini Mission Simulator crew FIGURE81-'i.-Dynaniic pressure and Mach number.
station.
-G e m i n i m - A flight data
-- Gemini I l l - A Mission Simulator data
begin number I pitch program
I-- Begin number 2 pitch program II---BECO SECO---H

Spacecraft separation'

.
- GeminiPI,-A flight data
0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400
-- G e m i n i Y l - A Mission Time from lift-oti. sec
Simulator data

FIGURE
2l-d.-Coniparison of longitudinal
acceleration.
40 80 120 I@ 200 240 280 3M 360 400
Time from lift-off. sec
One simulation problem that continually
FIGURE
21-5.-Time history of altitude and range recurred tltii*ingthe e:ii*Iy phases of the Gem-
during launch phase. ini Progi-mi was that o f providing guitlance
ant1 control functions thzit were accurate and
- Gemini n - A flight data repeatable. The Gemini 111 creiv received a
G e m i n i n - A Mission Simulator data reentry simulation that appi*o;ic.hetl the tiight
I
BECO
computer outputs only 2 weeks prior to
flirht. This situation slo\vly inil)rovetl and
the Ceniini 1'1 ci*ew received ;icc.ui*atelaunch
and reentry t h t a :ipprosimately 1 month
\ / velocitv
pi-ior to tliaht. The Geniiiii 1'111 and subse-
quent crews were provided with accui'ate
guichnce and naviration simulatiolis f o r the
entire tixining period.
I I I I I I I I I 1
0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 Rendezvous
Time from lift-off, sec

21-G.-Space-fixed velocity and flight-pith


FIGURE The initial phase of the ti*niniiiy for yen-
angle. tlezvous operations w:is conducted on the
324 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE

Hybrid Simulator a t the spacecraft contrac- which provided a satisfactory inertial ref-
tor facility. The simulator contained the erence for this phase of training. Accurate
flight controls and displays of the spacecraft data on attitude and maneuver fuel were ob-
Guidance and Control System and of the Pro- tained, and indicated a close correlation with
pulsion System, with a mockup for the re- the inflight data.
mainder of the cockpit (figs. 21-9 and The training progressed to the Gemini
21-10). Procedures for normal, backup, arid Mission Simulator at the Kennedy Space
failure modes were developed during the Center where the total spacecraft configura-
early part of the training period. The crews tion was available. The runs were conducted
performed this phase of rendezvous training first in a shirt-sleeve environment and later
in a shirt-sleeve environment. Various in- progressed to the suited condition. Approxi-
structors were able t o stand alongside the mately 20 percent of the simulator runs dur-
simulator to observe and make comments ing the later phase of rendezvous training
during the run. The Hybrid Simulator visual were conducted with the crew wearing train-
disnlnv had n ranrlnm stnr-field harkvroiind ing suits and then flight suits. The rendez-
vous phases of the flight plans were also re-
fined during the runs. The third orbit
( M = 3 ) and the first orbit (M=l) rendez-
vous missions required that considerable ef-
fort be expended in practicing unstowage of
gear, and in cockpit configuration manage-
ment. This was a significant item in obtain-
ing a smooth work flow during a time-critical
period.
After the predicted launch date and time
were determined, the simulator optical sys-
tem was programed to provide the precise
star and constellation field. The d a y h i g h t
cycle was also included in this part of the
program. Flight experience indicated that the
visual simulations were extremely accurate
FIGURE
21-9.-Exterior view of Hybrid Simulator. with respect to the celestial field, but some-
what lacking with respect to the magnitude
and sharpness of the acquisition lights on the
Gemini Agena Target Vehicle. Starting with
the Gemini VI-A mission, the Gemini Mis-
sion Simulator and the Mission Control
Center were integrated for rendezvous net-
work simulations ; however, not until the
Gemini I X simulations could a satisfac-
tory rendezvous be achieved on a target gen-
erated by the Mission Control Center. While
wearing space suits, the flight crew per-
formed all of the network rendezvous simula-
tions and unstowed equipment in the same
manner as they would in flight. To facilitate
the rendezvous phase of the mission, the in-
formation obtained from the network ren-
FIGURE
fLl-lO.-Hybrid Simulator crew station. dezvous simulations frequently resulted in
OPERATIONAL FLIGHT AND SIMULATION EXPERIENCES 325

minor changes in the stowage configuration. CI -Geminin-A flight data


Basic failure modes of the guidance and 0
4 r --Geminin-A Mission Simulator data

navigation system were presented to the crew


during training, and the knowledge acquired
by the crew contributed to their confidence
in performing the entire rendezvous maneu-
ver. Several reset points were available for
specific parts of the maneuver ; for example,
.-
526.0

4
p
x 25.6

-
.-
p1
pa[ ~
6 100 Altitud
Space-f i x e d

I I
--Initiate phase-

I
adjust maneuver

I I 1

the period after the completion of the final


g25.2
v, ' 1:OO
I 2m 3:oo 4:oo
Ground elapsed time, hr:min
midcourse maneuver through the entire brak-
FIGURE
21-ll.-Altitude and space-fixed velocity
ing routine. These runs were used to perfect durinE orbit.
the pilot techniques required for specific
maneuvers.
The Gemini Mission Simulator provided
accurate trajectory and fuel data for mission
planning. Figures 21-11 and 21-12 compare
the simulator and flight data for the Gemini
U
0) =. Time marks -- GeminiXI-A Mksion
Simulator data
VI-A rendezvous mission. Figure 21-13
compares hybrid simulation, Gemini mission
simulation, and flight data for the Gemini
IX-A mission. The hybrid simulation and
the Gemini mission simulation were con-
ducted at 15 nautical miles differential alti-
tude. The flight was conducted at 12.1 Ahead+Behind
nautical miles differential altitude. The hy- Horizontal displacement, n. mi.
brid simulation incorporated system errors. FIGURE21-12.-Relative trajectory profile during
The Gemini mission simulation was nominal. terminal phase.

Transfer initiation
Hybrid Simulator
Gemini.Mission Simulator
Flight

First correction
Hybrid Simulator
Gemini Mission Simulator
Flight 111llllli
Second correction
Hybrid Simulator
Gemini Mission Simulator
Flight

Terminal phase
Hybrid Simulator
Gemini Mission Simulator
Flight
L I I 1 I I I I I I
0 10 20 3 0 4 0 50 60 70 80 90 100
Propellant consumed, Ib

FIGURE
21-13.-Gcmini IX-A rendezvous propellant comparison.
326 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENC'

Special Tasks well as maneuvers with the target-vehicle


Primary and Secondary Propulsion Systems.
Experiment Training The response of the simulated target vehicle
to the input commands accurately simulated
Training equipment identical to the actual the response of the actual target vehicle dur-
flight hardware was provided for each Gem- ing flight. Target-vehicle failure modes were
ini experiment. The indi~itlualpieces of ex- included during certain training periods to
periment hardware were .first used for provide the crew with the maximum available
training in the spacecraft mockups at the training for systems malfunction.
spacecraft contractor facility and at the The Gemini docking trainer, located at the
Manned Spacecraft Center. Later, the same Manned Spacecraft Center, provided the ma-
hardware was used for training in the Gem- jority of the actual docking-sequence train-
ini Mission Simulators. Camera equipment ing. All control modes of the spacecraft and
and other experiment hardware were often of the target vehicle were simulated in this
used by the Gemini flight crews while flying facility. The lighting configuration was va-
T-33 and T-38 aircraft. Operating the spe- ried to simulate the conditions that were en-
cific gear in this environment provided excel- countered during flight. All flight crews
lent training in the use of the individual indicated that the final contact and docking-
pieces of hardware. To accomplish specific engage maneuver was somewhat easier than
tasks for individual experiments that re- that experienced in the simulator. The con-
quired precise tracking, spacecraft pointing trol task difference was explained by the
commands and nulling of attitude rates were difficulty in simulating a dynamic B-degree-
practiced. Flight experience indicated that of-freedom motion precisely equal to the or-
the time lines and control tasks were very bital flight condition.
similar to those experienced in the Gemini
Mission Simulator. The required updating - Tether Dynamics
and engineering changes of the experiment
equipment frequently resulte'd in the flight The Dynamic Crew Procedures Simulator
crew not having the training hardware at a at the Manned Spacecraft Center was con-
specified time to complete training. In certain figured to provide a realistic simulation of
isolated instances, the actual experiment the tethered-vehicle evaluations performed
hardware was not received until just prior during the Gemini XI and XI1 missions. The
to launch. This placed a difficult workload on basic time lines and control task for the tether
the crew in trying to concentrate on new maneuver were developed on this facility.
hardware and procedures in the last few days The ability of the crew to cope with the large
prior to flight. attitude excursions can be directly attributed
to simulation training. The tether evaluation
Gemini Agena Target Vehicle Training again demonstrated that an exercise could be
generated with only a specific task involved ;
The Gemini VI11 through XI1 missions the use of this technique contributed greatly
were scheduled to include docking and vari- to the success of many of the Gemini mis-
ous maneuvers involving the .Gemini Agena sions.
Target Vehicle. The Gemini Mission Simu-
lator provided a visual target vehicle that Systems Operation
responded to commands from the Gemini
crew station and from the simulator instruc- The flight-crew training for normal and
tor station. All target-vehicle commands in emergency engineering procedures was first
both the docked and the undocked configura- practiced on the Gemini Mission Simulator
tions were available. Commands were ini- in conjunction with spacecraft systems brief-
tiated for practicing attitude maneuvers as ings at the Manned Spacecraft Center. After
OPERATIONAL FLIGHT AND SIMULATION EXPERIENCES 327

the crew moved to the Kennedy Space Center, the actual flight data for the Gemini VI-A
practice for the normal procedures was em- mission are shown in figure 21-14. The curve
phasized; and less emphasis was placed on shows a close correlation between simulation
emergency procedures in order t o concentrate and flight data. Any variances between ac-
on the planned mission. Final systems brief- tual flight data and simulation data were
ings were conducted a t the Kennedy Space considered insignificant for crew training.
Center, and training in the operation of all
spacecraft systems was accomplished in the
Gemini Mission Simulator. Network simula-
tions involving the Mission Control Center
provided practice for all types of system fail-
ures, and provided vehicle training €or both
ground ancl flight crews. A few minor simu-
lator discrepancies were noted in the (lis-
play responses when a system condition \vas
changed. The differences between the simu- -:04 Om 98 :12 :16 :20 2 4 2 8 :32 :36
lator display and the actual spacecraft re- Ground elapsed time from retrofire, h r m n
sponses were small and did not produce any
noticeable effect on the training program or FIGURE
21-l4.-Altitude during reentry.
the crew reaction in flight.
Concluding Remarks
Reentry-Phase Training
The variety of simulations available to the
The training for the reentry phase was Gemini flight crews. produced conditions that
conducted initially at the Manned Spacecraft closely approximated those encountered in
Center on the Gemini Mission Simulator, and flight. Certain simulators were of the hybrid
later a t the Kennedy Space Center. Two design and encompassed only specific sys-
types of reset points were available for train- tems. However, the simulation of the space-
ing, one just prior to retrofire, and the other craft operation of the individual systems
a t an altitude of 400 000 feet. The reset produced excellent flight-crew training to
points provided the crew considerable flexi- accomplish specific tasks such as launch, ren-
bility in perfecting procedures and tech- dezvous and docking, and reentry. The few
niques for the retrofire and reentry sequence. discrepancies between simulator and actual
The exact constellation position for the spacecraft systems had no noticeable effect
night retrofire sequence was programed for on the overall training program or orbital
each mission. This feature of the Gemini performance. The success with which the
Mission Simulator provided excellent train- flight crews accomplished each Gemini mis-
ing for the actual mission. The Mission Con- sion was ii direct result of high-fidelity simu-
trol Center simulations were performed in lation training.
both the shirt-sleeve and the suited config- Thus it can be concluded that the wealth
urations. of knowledge gained in the Gemini Program
The computer updates for reentry were will provide the simulation and training
performed by updata link ancl by voice link. guidelines for the Apollo Program. High-fi-
The exact procedures used in flight were tlelity Apollo simulations and adequate flight-
practiced many times in the simulator by the crew training can allow us to complete the
flight crews and in the Mission Control Cen- lunar landing mission with a minimum num-
ter by the flight controllers during network ber of actual space flights. The only phase
reentry simulations. of the lunar mission that has not been pre-
The Gemini Mission Simulator data and viously experienced to ii great degree in the
328 G E M I N I S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

Gemini Program is that of the lunar descent knowledge that an accurate simulation can
and landing. This phase cannot be experi- be provided to give the flight crews a realism
enced in flight until the actual landing takes that will closely approximate the actual lunar
place. Thus we can extrapolate from present landing.
22. GEMINI RESULTS AS RELATED TO THE APOLLO
PROGRAM
By WILLISB. MITCHELL,Manager, Office of Vehicles and Missions, Gemirzi Program Ofice, N A S A Manned
Spacecraft Center; OW EN E. MAYNARD. Chief, Mission Operations Division, Apollo Spacecraft Pro-
gram Ofice, N A S A Manned Spacecraft Center: and DONALDD. ARABIAN,Office of Vehicles and
Missions, Gemini Program Ofice, N A S A MnnnetE Spacecrrtll Center

Introduction and concepts. Probably the most significant


is the development and understanding of the
The Gemini Program was conceived to rendezvous and docking process. The Apollo
provide a space system that could furnish Program depends heavily upon rendeivous
answers to many of the problems in operat- for successful completion of the basic lunar
ing manned vehicles in space. It was designed mission. The Lunar Module, on returning
to build upon the experience gained from from the surface of the Moon, must rendez-
Project Mercury, and to extend and expand vous and dock with the Command and Serv-
this fund of experience in support of the ice Module. In addition, the first Apollo
manned lunar landing program and other fu- mission involving a manned Lunar Module
ture manned space-flight programs. The pur- will require rendezvous and docking in E a r t h
pose of this paper is to relate some of the orbit by a Command and Service Module
results of the Gemini Program to the Apollo placed in orbit by a separate launch vehicle.
Program, and to discuss some of the con- During the Gemini Program, 10 rendezvous
tributions which have been made. and 9 .docking operations were completed.
The objectives of the Gemini Program ap- The rendezvous operations were completed
plicable to Apollo are : (1) long-duration under a variety of conditions applicable to
flight, ( 2 ) rendezvous and docking, (3) post- the Apollo missions.
docking maneuver capability, (4) controlled The Gemini VI-A and VI1 missions dem-
reentry and landing, ( 5 ) flight- and ground- onstrated the feasibility of rendezvous. Dur-
crew proficiency, and ( 6 ) extravehicular ing the Gemini IX-A mission, maneuvers
capability. The achievement of these objec- performed during the second re-rendezvous
tives has provided operational experience and demonstrated the feasibility of a rendezvous
confirmed much of the technology which will from above; this is of great importance if
be utilized in future manned programs. These the Lunar Module should be required to abort
contributions will be discussed in three major a lunar-powered descent. During the Gemini
areas : launch and flight operations, flight- X mission, the spacecraft computer was pro-
crew operations and training, and techno- gramed to use star-horizon sightings for
logical development of subsystems and predicting the spacecraft orbit. These data,
components. While there is obvious interre- combined with target-vehicle ephemeris data,
lation among the three elements, the group- .provided a n onboard prediction of the ren-
ing affords emphasis and order to the dezvous maneuvers required. The rendezvous
discussion. was actually accomplished with the ground-
computed solution, but the data from the on-
Launch and Flight Operations
board prediction will be useful in developing
Gemini experience is being applied to space-navigation and orbit-determination
Apollo launch and flight operations planning techniques.

329
330 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

The passive ground-controlled rendezvous mary Propulsion System was used in combi-
demonstrated on Gemini X and XI is impor- nation with the Secondary Propulsion
tant in developing backup procedures for System to accomplish the dual-rendezvous
equipment failures. The Gemini XI first-orbit operation with the passive Gemini VI11 tar-
rendezvous was onboard controlled and pro- get vehicle. These uses of an auxiliary pro-
vides a n additional technique to Apollo plan- pulsion system add another important
ners. The Gemini XI1 mission resulted in a operational technique.
third-orbit rendezvous patterned after the In summary, 10 rendezvous exercises were
lunar-orbit rendezvous sequence, and again accomplished during the Gemini Program,
illustrated that rendezvous can be reliably including 3 re-rendezvous and 1 dual opera-
and repeatedly performed. tion (fig. 22-1). Seven different rendezvous
All of the Gemini rendezvous operations modes were utilized. These activities demon-
provided extensive experience in computing strated the capabilities for computing ren-
and conducting midcourse maneuvers. These dezvous maneuvers in the ground-based
maneuvers involved separate and combined computer complex; the use of the onboard
corrections of orbit plane, altitude, and phas- radar-computer closed-loop system ; the use
ing similar to the corrections planned f o r the of manual computations made by the flight
lunar rendezvous. Experience in maneuver- crew; and the use of optical techniques and
ing combined vehicles in space was also ac- star background during the terminal phase
cumulated during the operations using the and also in the event of equipment failures.
docked spacecraft 'target-vehicle configura- A variety of lighting conditions and back-
tion when the Primary Propulsion System of ground conditions during the terminal-phase
the target vehicle was used t o propel the maneuvers, and the use of auxiliary lighting
spacecraft to the high-apogee orbital alti- devices, have been investigated. The rendez-
tudes. During the Gemini X mission, the Pri- vous operations demonstrated that the com-

\.'&I-
- I

Demonstrated
Ground computations

Flight computations
Manual computations
Use of stars
Midcourse maneuvers
Experience
Total rendezvous

initial
Re-rendezvous
Dual rendezvous
Modes demonstrated
1;

3
1
7
) $
kI
Plane change
Height adjust
Phasing
Total rendezvous

FIGURE
22-l.--Rendezvous.
GEMINI. RESULTS AS RELATED TO THE APOLLO PROGRAM 33 1

putation and execution of maneuvers for type of equipment and the crew training r.e-
changing or adjusting orbits in space can be quired. The requirements for auxiliary equip-
performed with considerable precision. ment such as handholds, tether points, and
The nine docking operations during Gem- handrails have been established.
ini demonstrated that the process can be ac-
complished in a routine manner. and that the Controlled Landing
ground training simulation was adequate for
this operation (fig. 22-2). The Gemini flight From the beginning of the Gemini Pro-
experience has established the proper light- gram, one of the objectives was to develop
ing conditions for successful docking opera- reentry flight-path and landing control. The
tions. Based on the data and experience spacecraft was designed with a n offset center
derived from the Gemini rendezvous and of gravity so that it would develop lift during
docking operations, planning for the lunar- the flight through the atmosphere. The space-
orbit rendezvous can proceed with confidence. craft control system was used to orient the
lift vector to provide maneuvering capability.
A similar system concept is utilized by the
Apollo spacecraft during reentry through the
Earth atmosphere.
After initial development problems on the
early Gemini flights, the control system
worked very well in both the manual and the
automatic control modes. Spacecraft landings
Demonstrated Experience were achieved varying from a few hundred
Operation feasible Gemini EUI 1 orbit
fraining adequate Gemini E - A 1 orbit yards to a few miles from the target point
Lighting needs GeminiX 1 orbit (fig. 22-3). The first use of a blunt lifting
Gemini XI 4 orbits body for reentry control serves to verify and
GeminiXIl 3 orbits
to validate the Apollo-design -concepts. The
FIGURFI ZZ-Z.-Docking. success of the Gemini guidance system in
controlling reentry will support the Apollo
design, even though the systems differ in
Extravehicular Activity detail.

Extravehicular activity was another im- Launch Operations


portant objective of the Gemini Program.
Although extensive use of extravehicular ac- The prelaunch checkout and verification
tivity has not been planned for the Apollo concept which was originated during the
Program, the Gemini extravehicular experi- Gemini Program is being used for Apollo.
ence should provide valuable information in The testing and servicing tasks a r e very simi-
two areas. First, extravehicular activity will lar for both spacecraft, and the Gemini test-
be used as a contingency method of crew flow plan developed a t the Kennedy Space
transfer from the Lunar Module to the Com- Center is being applied. The entire mode of
mand Module in the event the normal transfer operation involving scheduling, daily opera-
mode cannot be accomplished. Second, opera- tional techniques, operational procedures,
tions on the lunar surface will be accom- procedures manuals, and documentation is
plished in a vacuum environment using auxil- similar to that used in the Gemini operation.
iary life-support equipment and consequently Much of the launch-site operational support
will be similar to Gemini extravehicular oper- is common to both programs: this includes
ations. For these applications, the results tracking radars and cameras, communica-
from Gemini have been used to determine the tions equipment, telemetry, critical power,
332 G E M I N I S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

0= Spacecraft
I I I I 1 I I I

. FIGURE
22-3.-Demonstration of landing accuracy.

and photography. The requirements for this trol of a single vehicle with no maneuvering
equipment are the same in many cases, and capability.
the Gemini experience is directly applicable. The Gemini Program involved multiple
The Apollo Program will use the same mis- vehicles, rendezvous maneuvers, and long-
sion operations organization for the launch duration flights, and required a more complex
sequence that was established during Project ground-control system capable of processing
Mercury and tested and refined during the and reacting to vast amounts of real-time
Gemini Program. data. The new mission-control facility at the
Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, was de- .
Mission Control signed to operate in conjunction with the
Manned Space Flight Network f o r direction
The Gemini mission-control operations con- and control of Gemini and Apollo missions,
cepts evolved from Project Mercury. These as well as of future manned space-flight pro-
concepts were applied during the Gemini Pro- grams. Much of this network capability was
expanded for Gemini and is now being used
gram and will be developed further during
to support the Apollo missions. Gemini has
the Apollo missions, although the complexity contributed personnel training in flight con-
of the operations will substantially increase trol and in maintenance and operation of
as the time for the lunar mission nears. The flight-support systems. As the Gemini flights
worldwide network of tracking stations was progressed and increased in complexity, the
established to gather data concerning the capabilities of the flight controllers increased,
status of the Mercury spacecraft and pilots. and resulted in a nucleus of qualified control
The Mercury flights, however, involved con- personnel.
GEMINI RESULTS AS RELATED TO THE APOLLO PROGRAM 333

The development of experienced teams of of spacecraft operation was introduced for


mission-planning personnel has proved ex- the first time in the United States during the
tremely useful in the preparation for future Gemini Program and, cooperative procedures
manned missions. Mission plans and flight- for multipilot operations were developed.
crew procedures have been developed and The Gemini Program has established that
exercised to perform the precise inflight ma- man can function normally and without ill
neuvers required for rendezvous of two ve- effect outside the spacecraft during extra-
hicles in space, and to perform flights up to vehicular operations.
14 days in duration. The techniques which
were evolved during Gemini have resulted in Crew Equipment
flight plans that provide the maximum prob-
Most of the Gemini technology regarding
ability of achieving mission objectives with
personal crew equipment is applicable to
a minimum usage of consumables and opti-
Apollo. The Block I Apollo space suit is
mum crew activity. The development of satis-
factory work-rest cycles and the acceptance basically the same as the Gemini space suit.
The Block I1 Apollo space suit, although dif-
of simultaneous sleep periods are examples
ferent in design, will have familiar Gemini
of learning which will be carried forward to
items such as suit-design concepts, locking
the Apollo planning. The mission planning
mechanisms for connectors, and polycarbo-
procedures developed for Gemini a r e appli-
nate visors and helmets. The Gemini space-
cable to future programs, and the personnel
suit support facilities at the Manned
who devised and implemented the procedures
are applying their experience to the Apollo Spacecraft Center and at the Kennedy Space
flight-planning effort. Center, plus the ground-support equipment,
will be fully utilized during Apollo.
A considerable amount of personal and
Flight-Crew Operations and Training postlanding survival equipment will be used
for Apollo in the same configuration as was
Crew Capability used for Gemini. Some items have minor
modifications for compatibility, others for
The results of the Gemini Program in the
improvements based upon knowledge result-
area of flight-crew operations have been very
ing from flight experience. Specific examples
rewarding in yielding knowledge concerning
include food packaging, water dispenser,
the Gemini long-duration missions. The medi-
medical kits, personal hygiene items. watches,
cal experiments conducted during these
sunglasses, penlights, cameras, and data
flights have demonstrated that man can func-
books.
tion in space for the planned duration of the Many of the concepts of crew equipment
lunar landing mission. The primary question
originated in Gemini experience with long-
concerning the effect of long-duration weight-
duration missions and recovery: food and
lessness has been favorably answered. Adap- waste management ; cleanliness : housekeep-
tation to the peculiarities of the zero-g envi- ing and general sanitation : and environmen-
ronment has been readily accomplished. The tal conditions such as temperature, radiation,
results significantly increase the confidence vibration, and acceleration. Although the
in the operational efficiency of the flight crew Apollo approach may differ in many areas,
for the lunar mission. the Gemini experience has been the guide.
The Apollo spacecraft is designed for coop-
erative operation by two or more pilots. Each Flight-Crew Training
module may be operated by one individual
for short periods ; however, a successful mis- The aspects of crew training important to
sion requires a cooperative effort by the future programs include preflight prepara-
three-man crew. The multiple-crew concept tion of the crews for the mission and the
334 GEM I NI SUM M ARY CONFERENCE

reservoir of flight experience derived from systems, the similarity exists in concept and
the Gemini Program. Apollo will inherit the general design. The performance of Gemini
training technology developed for the Gemini systems, operating over a range of conditions,
flight crews. The technology began with has provided flight-test data for the verifica-
Project Mercury, and was developed and re- tion of the design of related subsystems.
fined during the training of the Gemini multi- These data a r e important since many ele-
man crews. There now exists an organization ments of Apollo, especially systems inter-
of highly skilled specialists with a thorough actions, cannot be completely simulated in
understanding of the training task. Adequate ground testing. The Apollo Spacecraft Pro-
crew preparation can be assured in all areas, gram Office at the Manned Spacecraft Center,
from the physical conditioning of the indi- Houston, has reviewed a n d analyzed Gemini
vidual crewmembers to the most complicated anomalous conditions to determine corrective
integrated mission simulation. measures applicable to Apollo. The Apollo
One highly developed aspect of flight-crew Program Director has established additional
training is the use of simulators and simula- procedures at NASA Headquarters to pro-
tion techniques. A significant result of the mote rapid dissemination and application of
Gemini rendezvous experience was the 'veri- Gemini experience to Apollo equipment de-
fication of the ground simulation employed sign.
in flight-crew training. The incorporation of The Gemini missions have provided back-
optical displays in the Gemini simulations ground experience in many systems such as
was an important step in improving the train- communications, guidance and navigation,
ing value of these devices. Using high-fidelity fuel cells, and propulsion. In addition, a series
mission simulators to represent the space- of experiments was performed specifically
craft and to work with the ground control for obtaining general support information
network and flight controllers was instru- applicable to the Apollo Program.
mental in training the pilots and ground crew In the communications systems, common
as a functional team that could deal with items include the recovery and flashing-light
problems and achieve a large percentage of beacons; similar components a r e utilized in
the mission objectives. the high-frequency and ultrahigh-frequency
The Gemini Program resulted in an accu- recovery antennas. Reentry and postlanding
mulated total of 1940 man-hours of flight batteries and the digital data uplink have the
time distributed among 16 flight-crew mem- same design concepts. The major Apollo de-
bers. This flight experience is readily adapt- sign parameters concerned with power re-
able to future programs since the Gemini quirements and range capability have been
pilots are flight qualified for long-duration confirmed.
flights and rendezvous operations, and a r e In the-area of guidance and navigation,
familiar with many of the aspects of working the use of a n onboard computer has been dem-
in the close confines of the spacecraft. This onstrated and the Gemini experience with
experience is of great value to future training rendezvous radar techniques has been a fac-
programs. The experience in preparing multi- tor in the selection of this capability for the
man crews for flight, in monitoring the crew Lunar Module. The ability to perform in-
during flight, and in examining and debrief- plane and out-of-plane maneuvers and to de-
ing after flight will facilitate effective and termine new space references for successful
efficient procedures for Apollo. reentry and landing has been confirmed by
Gemini flights. The control of a blunt lifting
Technological Development of Systems and body during reentry will also support the
Components Apollo concept.
Gemini and Apollo share common hard- In the electrical power supply, the use of
ware items in some subsystems ; in other sub- the Gemini fuel cell has confirmed the appli-
GEMINI RESULTS AS RELATED TO THE APOLLO PROGRAM 335

cability of the concept. The ability of the ing, but was not isolated until the required
cryogenic reactant storage system to operate definitive data were furnished by Project
over a wide range of off-design conditions in Sure Fire on the target-vehicle engine.
flight has verified the design, which is similar In addition to medical experiments, several
for Apollo. The performance of the Gemini other types of experiments were conducted
system has provided a better understanding during Gemini and have supplied information
of the system parameters over an operating and data for use by the Apollo Program. The
range considerably in excess of the range experiments included electrostatic charge,
previously contemplated. The design of the proton-electron spectrometer, lunar ultra-
cryogenic servicing system for Apollo was violet spectrometer, color-patch photography,
altered after the initial difficulties experi- landmark contrast measurements, radiation
enced by early Gemini flights. Consequently, in spacecraft, reentry communications, man-
a fairly sophisticated system now exists ual navigation sightings, simple navigation,
which will eliminate the possibility of delays radiation and zero-g effects on blood, and
in servicing. The ability to estimate the power micrometeorite collection. Although the di-
requirements for the Apollo spacecraft equip- rect effects of these experiments on Apollo
ment is enhanced by the Gemini operational systems are difficult to isolate, the general
data. store of background data and available infor-
In the propulsion area, the ullage control mation has been increased.
rockets of the Apollo-Saturn S-IVB stage are
the same configuration as the thrusters used
for the Gemini spacecraft Orbital Attitude Concluding Remarks
and Maneuver System; the thrusters of the
Apnllo Command Module Reaction Control The Gemini Program has made significant
System are similar. Steps have been taken to contributions to future manned space-flight
eliminate the problems which occurred in the programs. Some of the more important con-
development of the Gemini thrusters, such tributions include flight-operations tech-
as the cracking of the silicon-carbide throat niques and operational concepts, flight-crew
inserts, the unsymmetrical errosion of the operations and training, and technological
chamber liners, and the chamber burn- development of components and systems. In
through. The tankage of the Reaction Con- the Gemini Program, the rendezvous and
trol System is based upon the Gemini design, docking processes so necessary to the lunar
and employs the same materials for tanks and mission were investigated ; workable proce-
bladders. The propellant control valves were dures were developed, and a r e available for
also reworked as a result of early problems operational use. The capability of man to
in the Gemini system. function in the weightless environment of
The Lunar Module ascent engine also bene- space was investigated for periods up to 14
fited from the Gemini technology: the con- days. Flight crews have been trained. and
tractor for this engine also manufactured the have demonstrated that they can perform
engines for the Gemini Agena Target Vehicle. complicated mechanical and mental tasks
Following the inflight failure of the target- with precision while adapting to the space-
vehicle engine during the Gemini VI mission. craft environment and physical constraints
a test program verified the inherent danger during long-duration missions.
in fuel-lead starts in the space environment. Additionally, the development of Gemini
Consequently, the Lunar Module ascent en- hardware and techniques has advanced space-
gine and the Gemini target-vehicle engine craft-design practices and has demonstrated
were changed so that the oxidizer would advanced systems which, in many cases, will
enter the engine before the fuel. The problem substantiate approaches and concepts for
had been indicated during ascent-engine test- future spacecraft.
33G GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE

Finally, ])robiibly the most significant con- turing, and engineering. This nucleus of ex-
tributions of Gemini have been the training perience has been disseminated throughout
of 1,ersonnel m d organizations in the disci- the many facets of Apollo and will benefit
plines of management, operations, manufac- all future manned space-flight programs.
23. CONCLUDING REMARKS
By GEORGEM. Low. Depiily Director, N A S A Marrired SpacecrnJt Center
With the preceding paper, one of the most cessful demonstration that these difficulties
successful programs in our short history of were overcome in later missions is a great
space flight has ended. The Gemini achieve- tribute to the program, to the organization,
ments have been many, and have included and to the entire Gemini team.
long-duration flight, maneuvers in space, ren- A period of difficulty exists today in the
dezvous, docking, use of large engines in program that follows Gemini, the Apollo Pro-
space, extravehicular activity, and controlled
gram. Yet, perhaps one of the most important
reentry. The Gemini achievements have also
legacies from Gemini to the Apollo Program
included a host of medical, technological, and
scientific experiments. . and to future programs is the demonstration
The papers have included discussions of that great successes can be achieved in spite
many individual difficulties that were experi- of serious difficulties along the way.
enced in preparation for many of the flight The Gemini Program is now officially com-
missions and in some of the flights. The suc- pleted.

337
APPENDIXES

Preceding page blank 3 37


APPENDIX A

NASA CENTERS AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES


This appendix contains a list of Government agencies participating in the Gemini Pro-
gram.

NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C., and Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. :


the following NASA centers : Department of the Army
Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, Department of the Navy
Calif. Department of the Air Force
Electronics -Research Center, Cam- Department of State, Washington, D.C.
bridge, Mass. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.
Flight Research Center, Edwards, Calif. Department of the Interior, Washington,
Goddard Space Flight Center, Green- D.C.
belt, Md. Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
Kennedy Space Center, Cocoa Beach, fare, Washington, D.C.
Fla. Department of the Treasury, Washington,
Langley Research Center, Langley Sta- D.C. :
tion, Hampton, Va. . U.S. Coast Guard
Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio * Atomic Energy Commission, Washington,
Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, D.C.
Tex. Environmental Science Services Administra-
Marshall Space Flight Center, Hunts- tion, Washington, D.C.
ville, Ala. U.S. Information Agency, Washington, D.C.

Preceding page blank 341


APPENDIX B

CONTRACTORS, SUBCONTRACTORS, AND VENDORS


This appendix contains a listing of contractors, subcontractors, and vendors that have
Gemini contracts totaling more than $100 000. I t represents the best effor'i possible to obtain
a complete listing; however, i t is possible that some a r e missing, such as those supporting
activities not directly concerned with Manned Spacecraft Center activities. These contrac-
tors, subcontractors, and vendors a r e recognized as a group.

Contractors General Electric Co., Syracuse, N.Y.


General Motors Corp., Milwaukee, Wis.
Acoustica Associates, Inc., Los Angeles, Calif. General Precision, Inc., Link Division, Bing-
Aerojet-General Corp., Sacremento, Calif. hamton, N.Y.
Aerojet-General Corp., Downey, Calif. General Precision, Inc., Pleasantville, N.Y.
Aerospace Corp., El Segundo, Calif. B. F. Goodrich Co., Akron, Ohio
AiResearch Manufacturing Co., division of Honeywell, Inc., Minneapolis, Minn.
Garrett Corp., Torrance, Calif. Honeywell, Inc., West Covina, Calif.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., Milwaukee, Wis. Hughes Aircraft Co., Culver City, Calif.
Analytical Mechanics Associates, Westbury, International Business Machines Corp.,
N.Y. Owego, N.Y.
Arde-Portland, Inc., Paramus, N.J. International Business Machines Corp., Be-
Avco Corp., Stratford, Conn. thesda, Md.
Bechtel Corp., Los Angeles, Calif. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., Dallas, Tex.
Beckman Instruments, Inc., Fullerton, Calif. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Sunnyvale,
"Bell Aerosystems Co., division of Bell Aero- Calif.
space Corp., Buffalo, N.Y. Martin Co., division of Martin-Marietta
Bissett-Berman Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. Corp., Baltimore, Md.
Burroughs Corp., Paoli, Pa. Martin Co., division of Martin-Marietta
CBS Labs, Inc., Stamford, Conn. Corp., Denver, Colo.
David Clark Co., Inc., Worcester, Mass. J . A. Maurer, Inc., Long Island City, N.Y.
Cook Electric Co., Morton Grove, Ill. McDonnell Aircraft Corp., St. Louis, Mo.
Cutler-Hammer, Inc., Long Island, N.Y. Melpar, Inc., Falls Church, Va.
Electro-Optical Systems, Inc., Pasadena, D. B. Milliken, Inc., Arcadia, Calif.
Calif. North American Aviation, Inc., Rocketdyne
Farrand Optical Co., Inc., Bronx, N.Y. Division, Canoga Park, Calif.
Federal Electric Corp., Paramus, N.J. North American Aviation, Inc., Space and
Federal-Mogul Corp., Los Alamitos, Calif. Information Systems Division, Downey,
General Dynamics/Astronautics Division, Calif.
San Diego, Calif. Philco Corp., Philadelphia, Pa.
General Dynamics/Convair Division, San Philco Corp., WDL Division, Palo Alto, Calif.
Diego, Calif. Razdow Lab., Newark, N.J.
General Dynamics! Convair Division, Fort Scientific Data Systems, Inc., Santa Monica,
Worth, Tex. Calif.

Preceding page blank 343


344 GEM I N 1 S U M MARY CONFERENCE

Space Labs, Inc., Van Nuys, Calif. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., Philadelphia,
Sperry Rand Corp., Sperry Phoenix Co. Di- Pa.
vision, Phoenix, Ariz. Computer Control Co., Inc., Framingham,
Sperry Rand Corp., Washington, D.C. Mass.
Texas Institute for Rehabilitation and Re- Consolidated Electrodynamics Corp., Mon-
search, Houston, Tex. rovia, Calif.
Thiokol Chemical Corp., Elkton, Md. Cook Electric Co., Skokie, Ill.
Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc., Redondo Cosmodyne Corp., Hawthorne, Calif.
Beach, Calif. Custom Printing Co., Ferguson, Mo.
Todd Shipyards Corp., Galveston, Tex. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., Los Angeles, Calif.
Western Gear Corp., Lynwood, Calif.
. De Havillnnd Aircraft, Ltd., Dovnsview, On-
Whirlpool Corp., St. Joseph, Mich. tario, Canada
Dilectrix Corp., Farmingdale, N.Y.
Sulicontractoi.s and Vendors Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc., Tulsa, Okla.
Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc., Santa Monica,
ACF Industries, Inc., Paramus, N.J. Calif.
ACR Electronics Corp., New York, N.Y. Eagle-Picher Co., Joplin, Mo.
Advanced Technology Laboratories, division Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier, Inc., Bos-
of American Radiator & Standard Corp., ton, MASS.
Mountain View, Calif. Electro,Mechanical Research, Inc., Sarasota,
Aeronca Manufacturing Corp., Baltimore, Fla.
Md. Electronics Associates, Inc., Long Branch,
AiResearch Manufacturing Co., division of N.J.
Garrett Corp., Torrance, Calif. Emerson Electric Co., St. Louis, Mo.
American Machine & Foundry Co., Spring- Emertron Information and Control Division,
dale, Conn. Litton Systems, Inc., Newark, N.J.
Argus Industries, Inc., Gardena, Calif. Engineered Magnetic Divisibn, Hawthorne,
Astro Metallic, Inc., Chicago, 111. Calif.
Autronics Corp., Pasadena, Calif. Epsco, Inc., Westwood, Mass.
Avionics Research Corp., West Hempstead. Explosive Technology, Inc., Santa Clara,
N.Y. Calif.
Barnes Engineering Co., Stamford, Conn. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., Cable
Beech Aircraft Corp., Boulder, Colo. Division, Joplin, Mo.
Bell Aerosystems Co., Buffalo, N.Y. Fairchild Controls, Inc., division of Fair-
Bendix Corp., Eatontown, N. J. child Camera & Instrument Corp., Hicks-
Brodie, Inc., San Leandro, Calif. ville, N.Y.
Brush Beryllium Co., Cleveland, Ohio Fairchild Hiller Corp., Bay Shore, N.Y.
Brush Instrument Corp., Los Angeles, Calif. Fairchild Stratos Corp., Bay Shore, N.Y.
Burtek, Inc., Tulsa, Okla. General Electric Co., Pittsfield, Mass.
Cadillac Gage Co., Costa Mesa. Calif. General Electric Co., West Lynn, Mass.
Calcor Space Facility, Inc., Whittier, Calif. General Electric Co., Waynesboro, Va.
Cannon Electric Co., Brentwood, Mo. General Precision, Inc., Link Division, Bing-
Cannon Electric Co., Phoenix, Ariz. hamton, N.Y.
Captive Seal Corp., Caldwell, N.J. General Precision, Inc., Little Falls, N.J.
Central Technology Corp., Herrin, Ill. Genistron, Inc., Bensenville, 111.
Clevite Corp., Cleveland, Ohio Giannini Controls Corp., Duarte, Calif.
Clifton Precision Products Co., Clifton Goodyear Aerospace Corp., Akron, Ohio
Heights, Pa. Gray & Huleguard, Inc., Santa Monica, Calif.
Collins Radio Co., Cedar Rapids, Iowa Gulton Industries, Inc., Hawthorne, Calif.
APPENDIX B 345

Hamilton-Standard, division of United Air- Palomar Scientific Corp., Redmond, Wash.


craft Corp., Windsor Locks, Conn. Pneumodynamics Corp., Kalamazoo, Mich.
Hexcel Products, Inc., Berkeley, Calif. Pollak & Skan, Inc., Chicago, Ill.
Honeywell, Inc., Minneapolis, Minn. Powerton, Inc., Plainsville, N.Y.
Honeywell, Inc., St. Petersburg, Fla. Radcom Emerton, College Park, Md.
Hurietron Corp., Wheaton, Ill. Radiation, Inc., Melbourne, Fla.
Hydra Electric Co., Burbank, Calif. Raymond Engineering Laboratory, Inc., X J -
International Business Machines Cnrp., dletown, Conn.
Owego, N.Y. Reinhold Engineering Co., SUI::,: i ' ~Springs,
>
Johns-Mansville Corp., Mansville, N. J. Calif.
Kinetics Corp., Solvana Beach, Calif. Rocket Power, Inc., ?,fes:- 1 - k
Kirk Engineering Co., Philadelphia, Pa. Rome Cable Corp., . - i v . . I 1 of Alcoa, Rome,
Leach Corp., Compton, Calif. N.Y.
Leach Relay Corp., Los Angeles, Calif. Rosemount E n g i ~ w - i n gCo., Minneapolis,
Lear-Siegler, Inc., Grand Rapids, Mich. Minn.
Linde Co., Whiting, Ind. Servonics Instriiments, Inc., Costa Mesa.
Lion Research Corp., Cambridge, Mass. Calif:
Maffett Tool & Machine Co., St. Louis, Mo. Space Corp., Eullas, Tex.
Marotta Valve Corp., Boonton, N.J. Sperry Rand Corp., Tampa, Fla.
I
Meg Products, Inc., Seattle, Wash. Sperry Rand Corp., Torrance, Calif.
Missouri Research Laboratories, Inc., St. Speitlel Co., Warwick, R.I.
Louis, Mo. Talley Indistries, Mesa, Ariz.
Moog, Inc., Buffalo, N.Y. Teledyne Systems Corp., Hawthorne, Calif.
Motorola, Inc., Scottsdale, Ariz. Texas Instruments, Inc., Dallas, Tex.
National Water Lift Co., Kalamazoo, Mich.
North American Aviation, Inc., Rocketdyne
Thiokol Chemical Corp., Elkton, Md.
Union Carbide Corp., Whiting, Ind. I
Division, Canoga Park, Calif.
Northrop Corp., Ventura Division, Newbury Vickers, Inc., St. Louis, Mo. I

Park, Calif. Weber Aircraft Corp., Burbank, Calif.


Northrop Corp., Van Nuys, Calif. Westinghouse Electric Corp., Baltimore, Md.
Ordnance Associates, Inc., South Pasadena, Whiting-Turner, Baltimore. Md.
Calif. Wyle Laboratories, El Segundo, Calif.
Ordnance Engineering Associates, Inc., Des Yardney Electric Corp., New York, N.Y.
Plaines, Ill. H. L. Yoh Co., Philadelphia, Pa.

<?U S. G O V E R N M E N T P l l N T l N G O F F I C E 8967-0 ZS9-131


intinued from inside front cover)

GEMINI SPACECRAFT FLIGHT HISTORY


MISSION DESCRIPTION LAUNCH MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS
DATE
Gemini Manned Mar. 16, Demonstrated rendezvous and docking with Ge-
VI11 3 days 1966 mini Agena Target Vehicle, controlled land-
Rendezvous and ing and emergency recovery, and multiple
dock restart of Gemini Agena Target '4ehicle i n
Extrovehiculor orbit.
acfivity Spacecraft mission terminated early because of
an electrical short in the control system.

Gemini Manned May 17, Demonstrated dual countdown procedures.


IX 3 days 1966
Rendezvous ond
dock
Extraveh icui ar
activity
(Canceled after
failure of
Target Launch
Veh ic I e)
Gemini Manned June 3, Demonstrated three rendezvous techniques,
IX-A 3 days. 1966 eval uated extravehicular activity with detai Ied
Rendezvous and -
work tasks, and demonstrated preci sion land-
dock ing capability.
Extravehicuior
activity

Gemini Manned July 18, Demonstrated dual rendezvous using Gemini


X 3 days 1966 Agena Target Vehicle propulsion for docked
Rendezvous and maneuvers, and demonstrated removal of ex-
dock periment package from passive target vehicle
Extravehicular duri ng extraveh icul ar activity . Evaluated
activity feasibility of using onboard navigational tech-
niques for rendezvous.

Gemini Manned Sept.12, Demonstrated first-orbit rendezvous and dock-


XI 3 days 1966 ing, evaluated extrovehicul ar activity, demon-
Rendezvous and strated feasibility of tethered station keeping,
dock and demonstrated automatic reentry capability.
Tether evaluation
Extravehicular
activity

Gemini Manned Nov. 11 Demonstrated rendezvous and docking, evalu-


f XI I 4 days 1966 ated extravehicui ar activity , demonstrated
Rendezvous and feasibility of gravity-gradient tethered-vehicle
dock station keeping, and demonstrated automatic
Tether evoluation reentry capabil ity.
ExtravehicuIar
act i v i ty

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