Military Expansion of West Papua

TNI & POLRI FORCES IN
Restructuring & Reasserting Sovereignty

Matthew N. Davies1
CONTENTS Summary...........................................................................................................2 Acronyms, abbreviations & terms / main military symbols.............................3 Introduction...................................................................................................... 4 The bigger picture: national military expansion............................................5 Restructure & expansion for West Papua field units........................................7 Counterterrorism: new anti-guerrilla mode & Trojan horse......................12 Overlaps & anomalies: territorial base command restructure........................15 Streamlining & priority: appointments in intelligence & strategy..................21 The Merauke case: operations & perceptions.................................................32 Harvest time: Pak Ogah Arafuru & phoney infowar......................................36 Figures 1 TNI primacy: structural overlap of military seniority..................................16 2 Restructure of Indonesian Army territorial commands, West Papua..............17 3 Career background of senior TNI territorial officers, West Papua 20056..20 4 West Papua- and Merauke-focused command & intelligence, Jan. 2006......22 5 Relationship diagram: key army command & staff, West Papua...................25 6 Fast tracks: executive-level posting duration...............................................27 Maps 1 TNI commands, bases and deployed units in West Papua.................................8 2 POLRI commands, bases and deployed units in West Papua..........................10 3 Mixed events & perceptions: the Merauke area, 20046...............................35 Appendices I Identified TNI key territorial leadership, West Papua 20026.......................42 II Identified POLRI territorial chiefs, West Papua 20026................................43 III Estimated Indonesian force strengths, West Papua 2006.................................44
WEST PAPUA
Linguist and former Australian Dept of Defence (Army) intelligence analyst. Author of Indonesias War over Aceh: Last stand on Meccas porch, Routledge Politics in Asia series, 2006, and Indonesian Security Responses to Resurgent Papuan Separatism: an Open Source Intelligence case study, Strategic & Defence Studies Centre (SDSC), Australian National University (ANU), 2001. This paper was researched from April to August 2006, here based largely on a briefing given to the Indonesia Study Group (ISG) at the ANU on 14 June 2006. The author thanks ISG attendees who contributed questions and criticism, which became further consideration in this papers draft.
1
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TNI & POLRI Forces in West Papua
p. 2
Summary Since the Aceh peace agreement of mid-2005, Indonesian military planning and operations in and around West Papua2 revealed that areas priority and emphasis in defence and internal security. Upon the voyage of 43 asylum seekers to Australia in January 2006, West Papuas situation also took renewed prominence in bilateral diplomacy with Indonesias southern neighbor. The confrontational IndonesiaAustralia diplomatic posturing from early 2006 occurred amid a nationwide Indonesian plan for military expansion. Publicly available detail confirmed much of the general planning, and major parts of its achievement, where changes appeared in locally based and deployed force composition, territorial structure and senior command and staff appointments. New local infantry formations reduced the dependency on centrally deployed units, while new special operations forces paralleled concurrent developments in other sites of Indonesian counterinsurgency. The issue of counterterrorism facilitated much of the political and bureaucratic means crucial for renewed TNI dominance of Indonesias polity. Recent events surrounding the 43 asylum seekers voyage by to Australia indicated sophisticated TNI-run psychological operations combining strategic-level concerns with past methods of infiltration and manipulation into West Papuan resistance groups and their sympathizers. Arrangements in command and control, alongside key officers operational expertise and record, further indicated a TNI campaign to penetrate the Australian Governments leadership elites decision cycle, or its basic, driving cognitive and decision-making processes, around informal migration to Australian shores. Beneath the Indonesian militarys planned ambitious and expensive, ongoing build-up and renewal, that most recent episode in Indonesian Australian diplomacy indicated the Jakarta leadership elites strategic-level success in West Papua operations. Such success would likely see West Papua become the table on which Indonesian leaders could bargain for the most beneficial results of a restored bilateral security treaty with Australia. Melbourne August 2006
This paper uses the conventional name West Papua simply to cover both Indonesian provincial entities of Papua and West Irian Jaya (Irjabar).
2
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ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS & TERMS

BAIS BAKORINDA BIN BKBPM BRIMOB DEPDAGRI Irjabar kabupaten kesbangpol KODAM KODIM KOMINDA KOPASSUS KOREM KOSTRAD LANTAMAL OPM POLDA POLRES POLRESTA POLRI PSYOPS SARA satbanintel satgas taipur TNI Badan Intelijen Strategis Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Daerah Badan Intelijen Negara Badan Kesatuan Bangsa dan Perlindungan Masyarakat Brigade Mobil Departemen Dalam Negeri Irian Jaya Barat kesatuan bangsa dan politik Komando Daerah Militer Komando Distrik Militer Komunitas Intelijen Daerah Komando Pasukan Khusus Komando Resort Militer Komando Cadangan Strategis Pangkalan Utama Angkatan Laut Organisasi Papua Merdeka Kepolisian Daerah Kepolisian Resort Kepolisian Resort Kota Kepolisian Republik Indonesia suku, antar-golongan, ras, agama satuan bantuan intelijen satuan tugas pengintai tempur Tentara Nasional Indonesia Strategic Intelligence Agency Regional Intelligence Coordinating Body State Intelligence Agency National Unity & Community Protection Agency* Police 'Mobile Brigade' Interior Ministry West Irian Jaya (Province) regency national unity & politics (agency)* Military area command Military district command Regional Intelligence Community (Army) Special Forces Command Military sub-area command Army Strategic Reserve Command Primary Naval Base Free Papua Organization Police Region Police Precinct Municipal / Urban Police Precinct Indonesian Police Force psychological operations tribal, class, racial & religious (divisions) intelligence support force task force combat reconnaissance Indonesian Defence Force
* May be interchangeable in reporting; probably distinguishable by hierarchical level in formal references
MAIN MILITARY SYMBOLS 3 HQ Unit planned / being raised

Level of command Level of strength X X Parent formation Deployment / Sub-unit establishment identity detail Unit type
KODAM / POLDA HQ KOREM / POLWIL HQ KODIM / POLRES HQ
Infantry Recon Special forces Brigade Battalion Company Combined 'Black' PSYOP / disinformation
Police Navy / marines Unit / appointment rotation
3 This study uses a hybrid of Indonesian and past NATO-standard military symbology. Maps used the following sources: KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, General Election Commission), Peta Pemilu Provinsi -Daerah Pemilihan Anggota DPRD, 20 November 2003. Online: <http//:www.kpu.go.id> (accessed November 2005), and ANU West Papua Project series. Online: <http//:www.papuanet.org/gb/peta/index.html> (accessed April 2006. This excellent resource also includes saved KPU maps from 2003).
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Introduction This papers research began in mid-April 2006 as Australian political, media, academic and activist circles continued their renewed interest in West Papua as a regional security issue. That broader public interest followed an unusual incident in January when 43 West Papuan asylum seekers made a voyage to Australias mainland, proclaimed their unambiguously pro-independence sympathies since arrival, then successfully applied for refugee status. From that straightforward factual background to the resurgence in public attention to West Papua, this study aimed to contribute to such wider discussion of the subject, but with particular emphasis on that areas ongoing status as a scene of Indonesian counterinsurgency operations. Given the prominent role of Indonesias military (TNI) in West Papua, and the Indonesian security forces direct relevance to issues of West Papuan independence struggle and considerations of regional security, this paper intended to add to an earlier contribution by updating 20001 research presented in the ANU SDSC working paper: Indonesian Security Responses to Resurgent Papuan Separatism. In particular, this study strove to avoid publicity only indirectly related to Indonesian forces in West Papua i.e., where bilateral diplomacy and local partypolitical debate concerned a proposed bill amending Australian territoriality in cases of informal, unauthorized migration. Such publicity seemed to overwhelm this studys own non-conformist appearance in the Australian media,4 where mention of findings from research here was all but lost under a domestic discussion preoccupied with adversarial debate in Canberra about the migration bill and the accompanying display of parliamentary democracy. Note on sources An underlying motive for this paper was therefore to shift attention to the available detailed information sourced closer to Indonesian security forces activity and events in West Papua itself. Primary importance was accorded textual sources originating as close as possible to events and protagonists as defined in the title i.e., IndonesianMalay language reports from official statements, journalism and resistance activists. That research process was far from exhaustive, instead aiming to identify detail most indicative of major changes since the 20001 study. The priority was public domain, or open sources, in order to demonstrate the materials wider accessibility, and to encourage its further exploration, while keeping to the 2001 studys underlying open source intelligence (OSINT) agenda. By contrast, anonymous sources and claimed needs for protection of sensitive sources would contribute to cults of secrecy and other exclusive mystique starkly at odds with both the spirit of public debate and the very notion of research open to review, criticism and further inquiry. In most of the detail presented here, factors of repetition, direct quotation from officials, public exposure, and long-term confirmatory redundancy all lent solid credibility to primary source material where depicting straightforward factual matters. Assessment based on contrary, critical treatment of primary sources e.g., in cases of assessed black psyops disinformation, are explained by reason of plausibility. This studys sensitive subject matter and timing meant that it appeared beside other accounts hastily compiled out of apparent Australian institutional needs to deflect public attention from unsettling facts. During this period the subject seemed to attract unusually high attention from pseudonymous authors and sources, sometimes resorting to blatant fabrication, in a delicate political atmosphere unlikely to stabilize for the foreseeable future.
4
The Sunday Age, Indonesian strategy defeats Australia, 13 August 2006.
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The bigger picture: national military expansion All three TNI services embarked on significant post-2002 increase in headquarters (HQ), units and bases throughout Indonesia, with particular emphasis on West Papua and other areas with international boundaries. Army, navy and air force enacted and publicized initiatives in force growth and ongoing plans for greater institutional scale, equipment upgrade, and both counterinsurgent and conventional warfighting strength. The TNI and other state agencies publicized much detail about plans for force increases and such plans progressive realization. The most obvious, implicit purpose of such TNI intentions was the reassertion of national sovereignty internally i.e., in a message to separatist and disaffected populations. TNI expansion and modernization made a clear public depiction of the states improved ability to project repressive forces to the outer, border provinces. By explicit contrast, presidential instructions in 2005 specified the high-priority TNI (and police - POLRI) mission to assert sovereign national boundaries secure from infiltration, combined with procurement and modernization programs to help achieve that aim.5 That presidential directives emphasis was also a concession to foreign pressure urging Indonesia to apply its military more as a defence and deterrent against potential external threats, or at least to be seen doing so, especially where decentralizing those units and commands holding higher command seniority and deployment readiness. However, such programs consistently most discrete aspects were their great cost, and their funding sources, whether for TNI expansion already realized or the yet more expensive units, facilities and equipment still in planning and procurement stages. As presidential instructions indicated, the Defence Department (Dephan) was to become increasingly involved in TNI procurement, refurbishment and construction works for the TNIs ambitious expansion plans.6 As foreign donors and Indonesias government strove to boost and regulate TNI budgets under greater Dephan control and oversight, the challenge of meeting the forces higher costs of a TNI-initiated build-up became a major factor in Indonesias politics and diplomacy, if not also an actual TNI operational objective in some cases of international brinkmanship. Ground forces The TNIs most obvious growth appeared in its army, traditionally a state priority for the near-constant counterinsurgency tasks since Indonesias birth; the army continued as the TNIs overwhelmingly most numerous and politically influential service. The TNIs essential ground force elements i.e., its infantry, expanded by an additional ten new army battalions from 2003, with at least another four army infantry battalions to be raised, or so underway at the time of writing. Across the TNIs three services in the brief period from late 2002, the TNI raised, or began the process of raising, a total of at least seventeen infantry battalions, most of them reportedly over-strength i.e., comprising nearly twice the hitherto standard number of soldiers for such units.7 Based on the new units planned strengths, infantry expansion calculated up to 16,000 extra TNI troops i.e., not counting the concurrently planned and raised combat support
Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 39 Tahun 2005 tentang Rencana Kerja Pemerintah Tahun 2006, (Perpres No. 39 2005 RKP 2006), Appendix p. 3941, 434. 6 ibid. p. 378, 41. 7 Reports indicated that many of the battalions over-strength status was to cover operational tasks previously performed by two or more battalion entities i.e., routine static point and route security tasks alongside mobile rapid-reaction functions. Infantry expansion was ongoing, so this study did not confirm the exact total achieved by the time of writing. For comparison, the TNIs total additional infantry battalions troops would roughly triple the Australian Armys standing line infantry component; many of the new battalions scale resembled that set for the abortive Australian pentropic battalions (and US pentomic divisional battlegroup equivalents) from the late-1950s.
5
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p. 6
units (armor, engineers, artillery, etc.) or new territorial command formations with their additional hierarchy of HQ staff and smaller, co-located sub-units. Planned new territorial-based brigade formations accompanied the TNIs strengthened infantry, especially in the countrys outer border provinces. Reporting all but officially confirmed plans for brigade HQ in Aceh, Kalimantan, West Timor and West Papua, with another two, probably Java-based, to complement the two, hitherto only, territorial infantry brigades (1 and 15 infantry brigades on western Java).8 TNI amphibious forces - the navys Marine Corps - already raised new infantry battalions from 2002. By mid-2005, all three new marine battalions, based in southern Sumateras Lampung area, were combat experienced from Aceh deployments. Both the army and marines concurrently embarked on acquisitions of new small arms, artillery, armor and other equipment often allocated as complementary additions for the new TNI infantry and combat support units. Unlike army territorial counterparts, the centrally commanded marines placed their new infantry battalions into a brigade formation immediately upon completing those units establishment. A related development from 2003 was the intensive Raider conversion training and re-designation for ten TNI infantry battalions: two from KOSTRAD (Army Strategic Reserve Command) and the rest from eight of the armys territorial military area command (KODAM) high-readiness strike (pemukul) battalions. A new East Java-based infantry battalion was raised to replace one such unit retrained and redesignated Raider9. Indonesian Jakarta-based observer Aris Santoso stated that the Raider battalions would require that new units be raised to replace the previously designated battalions in territorial KODAM formations;10 if accurate, up to seven more additional territorial infantry battalions could so raise in coming years. Air & maritime forces Publicity trumpeted increased TNI aerial surveillance and planned basing of fighter aircraft for patrolling East Timor and Australian borders from Kupang.11 Airpower upgraded via gradual barter acquisitions of Sukhoi SU-29 and -31 fighter jets, and army aviations upgraded MI-35 Hind-series attack helicopters. Potentially important for TNI operations in West Papuas airspace, the high-profile upgrades were less significant than more defensive additions and plans for local ground-based air defence. A new radar unit raised at Biak within a national expansion, restructure and renumbering of TNI ground-to-air early-warning and intercept capability (see Map 1, p. 8). Radar assets in Biak were to prepare the new Air Defence Sector Command IV as the node for planned units including Jayapura, Timika and Merauke sites.12 Indonesias notoriously neglected maritime forces attracted scrutiny in TNI
See, for example: Pos Kupang, TNI tempatkan pasukan brigade di perbatasan, 28 May 2004. Online: <http://www.indomedia.com/poskup/2004/05/28/edisi28/2805uta1.htm> (accessed May 2006), Gatra.com, Hingga 2009, TNI AD akan Tambah 19 Makodim dan 3 Makorem, 22 March 2005, and Jawa Pos, TNI-AD Siap Perkuat Perbatasan, 27 March 2005. 9 Bojonegoro Regency Goverment web site, Batalyon 507 Untuk Bojonegoro, 14 September 2005. Online: <http://www.bojonegoro.go.id/nando007/lengkap.php?IDBerita=579> (accessed April 2006). 10 Republika, Divisi Infanteri di Papua, 25 March 2006. 11 Tempointeraktif.com, Amankan Pulau-Pulau Terluar Indonesia di NTT, 9 March 2005, and Tempointeraktif.com, TNI AU Tempatkan Satu Kompi Paskhas di Kupang, 6 April 2005. 12 Puspen TNI, KOHANUDNAS Terus Kembangkan Sistem Deteksi Dini, 10 February 2006. Online: <http://www.tni.mil.id/news.php?q=dtl&id=113012006110644> (accessed April 2006), Puspen TNI, Satuan Radar 242 Tanjung Warari Biak Resmi Beroperasi, 4 April 2006. Online: <http:// www.tni.mil.id/news.php?q=dtl&id=113012006110928> (accessed April 2006), and Detiknet.com, DPR Minta TNI AU Tingkatkan Sistem Radarnya, 9 June 2006. For previous study of earlier reported ground-based air detection units restructure and upgrade plans: cf fn 1 - Davies, Indonesian Security Responses..., op cit., p. 22, 257.
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p. 7
and Defence Department planning, with the navys fleet modernization and restructure made a major part of force expansion and upgrade. New primary naval bases (LANTAMAL) were planned for the Padang, Merauke and Tarakan areas: navy chiefs publicized their intention to have those first two new lantamal X & XI - underway in 2006. The Indonesian Navys simple two-fleet structure would obviously be unbalanced by the new bases, so the naval expansion was set to form three new fleet commands as replacement. Like corresponding army and mooted further marine corps growth, this new fleet structure would concentrate more maritime power in outlying areas at Tanjung Pinang, Makassar and Sorong. Surabaya would assume its logical role as the national fleet command centre.13 The projected Sorong-based Eastern Fleet planned for a deepwater capability, including plans for up to twelve new submarines, including at least two contracted by the time of writing. Other major purchases and refurbishment, and some bilateral projects, brought energetic Indonesian defence negotiations within a wide choice of prospective and established partners, including Russia, South Korea, Japan and the Netherlands. Restructure & expansion for West Papua field units Compared with other regional Indonesian military expansions and plans, West Papua caught the greatest attention for build-up and projected cost. Local force restructure plans for the longer term (to 2019) would ensure previous levels of troop deployments in West Papua were far exceeded by the shift to new locally based units. By the time of writing, new army territorial units either filled the gap from reduced outside deployments, or increased troop numbers in some areas. As elsewhere in Indonesia, local TNI infantry expansion was intended to reduce Jakartas reliance on rotated unit deployments of non-local infantry to high-priority areas, especially in the areas of the Freeport mining complex, remote highland centres of insurgency, and along the generally porous IndonesiaPNG border. However, infantry and restructured special forces from outside of West Papua continued to deploy there for this period. Three over-strength territorial infantry battalions added to the three (751, 752 and 753) already based in West Papuas two provinces: that plan was already official by at least May 2003.14 In March 2004, KODAM XVII Trikora Chief Major-General Nurdin Zainal announced that the new West Papua-based infantry battalions would be fully raised during 20046; outside KODAMs infantry-run recruit training centres (rindam) already contributed 260 troops by that early stage, though the local Jayapurabased rindam would certainly contribute some, if not most, of its own locally recruited trainees. Posting over 1,000 troops each, the new battalions apparently used a less tenured system of individually contracted recruitment, while pre-existing local battalions reportedly prepared for increases to the over-strength scale. 15 Initial use of such territorial troops in Aceh and West Papua revealed their greater
Berita TNI-AL, TNI AL Rencanakan Miliki 12 Kapal Selam, 21 April 2006, Puspen TNI, Kasal Harapkan 2008 Tiga Komando Wilayah Terealisasi, 15 May 2006, and Cenderawasih Pos, KSAL: Armada Butuh 5000 Personel, 3 July 2006. 14 Palagan, Jenderal TNI Ryamizard Ryacudu: Rakyat Minta Komando Kewilayahan Dipertahankan, October 2003 (citing then Army Chief Ryamizard in a pre-Aceh Military Emergency speech). 15 Cenderawasih Pos, Tahun 2006, 3 Batalyon Baru Terbentuk, 5 March 2004. Several sources early reported the over-strength status for territorial infantry battalions in Aceh, Papua and elsewhere: cf fn 1 - Davies, Indonesias War... op cit., p. 63. Some later specific references included: Sinar Harapan, Kostrad Bangun Markas di Papua, 26 March 2005, and Batam Hot, 140 Prajurit Infantri Amankan Karimun Telah Tiba, 28 July 2005. Online: <http://www.b atamhot.com/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=59&Itemid=40> (accessed March 2006). For an anecdotal, though detailed, description of such new units sub-contract-style recruiting in Aceh, see: acehkita.com, Tentara Kontrak, 23 December 2003.
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Map 1 NORTH MALUKU Indonesian military (TNI) commands, bases and deployed units in West Papua
XVII
WEST IRIAN JAYA

171 752 XVII
KHAS
173 1703
SUPIORI
(1)
242 1709
172
751
p. 8
1704
Sorong 1703 MANOKWARI Manokwari Biak TELUK BINTUNI 1706 FAK-FAK 1703 Nabire KAIMANA 1706 NABIRE 171 173 YAPEN Serui TELUK WAROPEN WONDAMA SORONG SELATAN 1704 SORONG BIAK NUMFOR
1708
IV U Kohanudnas
1701
(- )
XVII
10
XVII
RAJA AMPAT
Satgasbanintel
PAPUA
WAROPEN 172 SARMI
P
1705 753
1709 1705 PANIAI 173 PUNCAK JAYA TOLIKARA
(1)
(- )
(- )
1704
Jayapura
V XVII
173
1706 Fak-fak
Vanimo
432 Dec 05? 411
(- )
JAYAPURA
KOSTRAD
KEEROM 1701
MALUKU
1706
1710
MIMIKA
171 Timika
JAYAWIJAYA Wamena 171 174
1702
1702 756
(+)
(- )
YAHUKIMO
KODAM XVII
172
PEG. BINTANG
XVII 711 Dec 05? 509 1710

(- ) ASMAT
VII
( - )?
174
1711 ?
KOSTRAD
( - )?
431 3 (- ) Aug 05 501 18 <?Jul 06
1712 ?
(- )
BOVEN DIGOEL MAPPI
643
VI
408
3 754
XVII
(+)
Jan 06 512 XVII
IV
? ?
KOSTRAD
MERAUKE (+) Area Command (KODAM) Resort Command (KOREM) District Command (KODIM) Province (propinsi)
174
mid-2005>
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Arafura Sea
(1) Local non-organic assets subordinated to KODAM if needed (2) Boundaries as depicted in several primary sources - not necessarily agreed / legally recognized
Regency (kabupaten)
Merauke
1707 755 XVII
PNG
XI
P
0 100 200 km
(2)
AUSTRALIA
Torres Strait
DAVIES
p. 9
unit flexibility for commanders. Some of these organic territorial battalions subunits worked as Raider and Rajawali companies in more aggressive strike roles hitherto reserved for externally deployed, non-organic infantry.16 The TNIs most ambitious plans for local ground forces expressed in TNI executives wish for unprecedented projection of rapid-reaction KOSTRAD and marine brigades. After the Marine Corps near-thirty per cent increase in infantry and other amphibious elements from 2002, any ongoing corps growth would signal a conspicuously radical shift in TNI force structure. It was more in optimism than determination that the Corps executives proposed the raising of 3rd Marine Force (Pasmar 3) at Sorong, West Irian Jaya, as mooted in Gus Durs presidency.17 Not surprisingly by contrast, army publicity about its similar plans reflected institutional confidence as a more powerful service, and a greater certainty in planning for future West Papua operations. The long-mooted 3rd KOSTRAD infantry division18 would become an eastern node of deployment-ready troops covering bases from Sulawesi, to West Papuas Sorong and Jayapura. The new KOSTRAD divisions first stage was announced with the planned brigade base for northern Sulawesis Gorontalo Province - the first of three such new KOSTRAD brigades - over the strategic medium-term (five-year) plan to 2009.19 Consistent with the new emphasis on border defence and force expansion, KOSTRAD Chief Lieutenant-General Hadi Waluyo confirmed in March 2005 that the TNI had a mobilization of volunteers for new battalions and deployment to border areas, such as the belatedly recognized Ambalat Island in the long-disputed SipadanLigitan area of East Kalimantans Malaysia border.20 POLRI units made modest increase to their own infantry force in the BRIMOB (Mobile Brigade) Corps: its battalion-level Sorong detachment reflected the Papua Police Regions (POLDA) upgraded status from the period of Gus Durs presidency. But police expansion in West Papua concentrated most on the POLDAs subordinate territorial commands, where newly raised precincts matched many new regency and municipality boundaries. Formal seniority in decrees of civil emergency government (PDSD, darsip / darurat sipil), and routine primary responsibility for public order did not impair continued TNI command in counter-insurgency and border security tasks, where army-led operations maintained an effective TNI institutional autonomy. However, a significant local change to TNI seniority appeared in Mimika Regencys Freeport complex, where official security responsibility reportedly transferred to local POLRI command.21 It was unclear how both the based and deployed BRIMOB units would subordinate in practice with the new co-located army brigade HQ, itself reported (probably incorrect) report as a KOSTRAD command.22 West Papua (and Aceh) precedent showed troops normal function in patrols, posts and checkpoints run as joint TNIPOLRI sub-units (see also Map 2 and Appendix III).
Puspen TNI, 198 Mantan Separatis Nyatakan Setia Kepada RI, 6 February 2006. Online: <http://ww w.tni.mil.id/news.php?q=dtl&id=113012006110608> (accessed April 2006). Aceh showed some companies in raider functions from 2004: Raider and Rajawali infantry performed similar mobile / strike roles, standardized in KOPASSUS-led training. See: Davies, Indonesias War..., p. 63, 769. 17 cf fn 1 - Davies, Indonesian Security Responses..., op cit., p. 245, and (for example) Marinir, 113 Perwira Remaja Perkuat Korps Marinir, November 2005. 18 Lowry, Bob (1993) Indonesian Defence Policy and the Indonesian Armed Forces, Canberra Paper on Strategy & Defence No. 99, p. 83, 110. Indonesian sources mentioned 1980s proposals also. 19 Gorontalo Provincial Goverment, Pembangunan Brigif Segera Dimulai, 9 May 2006. Online: <http://www.gorontalo.web.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=811&Itemid=2> (accessed August 2006), and RRI Online, TNI Bangun Brigade Infanteri di Gorontalo, 18 May 2006. 20 Gatra, Satuan Kostrad Siap Diterjunkan ke Perbatasan, 9 March 2005. 21 Infopapua.com, 600 Personel Polisi Resmi Dikirim ke PT Freeport, 4 July 2006. 22 Kompas, Pembangunan Markas Kostrad di Timika Meresahkan Masyarakat, 4 April 2005.
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Map 2 NORTH MALUKU Indonesian police (POLRI) commands, bases and deployed units RAJA in West Papua
WEST IRIAN JAYA

Sorong
(- )
d
p. 10
d d
Papua
d SUPIORI
Biak YAPEN Serui
A d Sulsel B Feb 06
d d
Manokwari
2005>
d BIAK d NUMFOR
d d
AMPAT
Sorong
SORONG MANOKWARI BINTUNI FAKFAK d

2004>
TELUK WONDAMA
2005> 2005>
JAYAPURA
(- )
PAPUA
WAROPEN YAPEN WAROPEN d WAROPEN d d NABIRE PANIAI PUNCAK
Papua
SORSEL
d
2005>
Nabire
Jayapura
Jayapura SARMI JAYA 2004> 2004>

TOLIKARA
Vanimo
Fak-fak
2003>
2006>
2005>
d KAIMANA d
KEEROM MIMIKA
Timika
MALUKU
JAYAWIJAYA JAYAWIJAYA Wamena
d d ? d
(- )
YAHUKIMO
POLDA
PEG. BINTANG
2006?>
ASMAT
? 2006?> ?
B
d
2006?>
Papua
(+)
d DEOPS 11 Jul 06
d ?
MERAUKE d ?
MAPPI
BOVEN DIGOEL
PNG
MERAUKE
early 2006
Region (POLDA) Precinct (POLRES) Interim (persiapan) SORONG Precinct Sorong Urban precinct Province (propinsi) Regency (kabupaten)
d
Arafura Sea
N.B. - Sources uncharacteristically deficient on detail for non-Papua BRIMOB unit deployments during the period
Merauke
DAVIES
BRIMOB (police mobile 'brigade')
100
200 km
* Boundaries as depicted in several primary sources - not necessarily agreed / legally recognized
AUSTRALIA
Torres Strait
DAVIES
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Special operations & counterintelligence Among post-2002 perception-management measures around the assassination of West Papuan activist leader Theys Eluay, and the shooting of US and Indonesian civilians near Tembagapura, the local KODAMs then chief Major-General Mahidin Simbolon announced in February 2003 a permanent withdrawal from West papua of the KOPASSUS unit implicated or reported as instigator and/or pepretrator in those scandalous killings. Mahidin Simbolons statement referred to KOPASSUS covert warfare SGI task force (satgasintel, or satuan gabungan intel joint intelligence unit), known much earlier as Satgas Maleo, later standardized as Tribuana for Aceh, East Timor and Papua deployments,23 and last re-named Satgas Cenderawasih in West Papua. Mahidin himself said: If for example we regard our Intelligence Detachment (deninteldam) sufficient then we can temporarily cover [the loss of the SGI from Papua]. To that effect, KODAM Trikoras intelligence detachment raised its strength with 65 more troops. Mahidin also stressed that observers must not confuse the role of the officially non-military State Intelligence Agency (BIN) with the TNIs duties in Papua.24 At least on that point, reported details of higher-level intelligence coordination would confirm Mahidins sincerity. However, Mahidin seemed much more guarded about other specific and further-reaching changes to his formations special operations and counterintelligence effort against Papuan resistance.25 Checks of junior officer identities on operations revealed that both KOSTRAD and KOPASSUS substituted much of the old SGI covert warfare force in West Papua, contrary to earlier publicity that KOPASSUS was out of Papua. The primary means for that restructure was KOSTRADs combat reconnaissance platoons (tontaipur) raised since 2000 under specialist KOPASSUS training. Deployments since then repeatedly indicated KOPASSUS, including its Unit 81 counterterrorist (Gultor) veterans, operating alongside KOSTRADs new, agile taipur units. Not that Gultor necessarily predominated among those tasked from KOPASSUS: one member of 12 Para-Commando Battalion was posted into the armys local territorial apparatus,26 whether in the expanded KODAM Intelligence Detachment or otherwise specially assigned. Taipur officer tours alternated between Papua and Aceh much as KOPASSUS Tribuana predecessors did. Combined with a cadre of KOPASSUS and other
cf fn 1 - Davies, Indonesian Security Responses..., op cit., pp. 1617. Kalau misalnya Den Intel ini kita nilai cukup maka untuk sementara kita bisa mengcover mereka, in: Sinar Harapan, Kopassus Ditarik dari Papua, 25 February 2003. Online: <http://www.geocities.co m/batu_capeu/sinarharapan260203.htm> (accessed May 2005), and Cenderawasih Pos, Ditarik ke Mabes, Tugas-Tugas Kopassus di Papua Dilaksanakan Kodam XVII/ Trikora, 26 February 2003. 25 One ISG participant questioned this studys use of counterintelligence as the function of Indonesian special forces intelligence units in West Papua. The conventionally valid counterintelligence definition matched past official Australian usage i.e., action against enemy intelligence processes, and the prevention and interdiction of enemy subversion, espionage, and sabotage. This study asserts that TNI doctrine and practice has embedded counterintelligence into its operational methods of agenthandling and PSYOPS (including deception), suiting insurgencys internal challenge as an otherwise conventional counterintelligence matter, thereby overcoming the terms definitional ambiguity in counterinsurgency apparent in historical Australian doctrinal sources. See: Army HQ, The Division in Battle: Intelligence (Pamphlet No. 9), Box Hill, 1965, p. ix, 59, and Army HQ, The Division in Battle: Counter Revolutionary Warfare (Pamphlet No. 11), Box Hill, 1965, pp. 545. However, the point correctly identified such usages potential to mislead the conventionally schooled by seeming to negate those forces continued reconnaissance, surveillance, collection, analysis and assessment i.e., defining basic intelligence processes against a defined enemy. 26 Cenderawasih Pos, Di Argapura, Seorang Ibu Muda Nyaris diperkosa, Tersangka Diduga Oknum Anggota TNI, 11 August 2004. Online: <http://www.westpapua.net/news/04/08/110804-di_argapura__ seorang_ibu_muda_nyaris_diperkosa__-5504.html> (accessed April 2006).
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special forces, Aceh deployments depicted these units as part of the Cakra Detachment, within command and control by the predominantly KOPASSUS Satgasbanintel, or Intelligence Support Task Force.27 Unsurprisingly, KOSTRADs taipur troops included the black garb and counterterrorist lan of their KOPASSUS colleague-mentors. In West Papua, these units operated mainly in the highland and border areas. From such details it appeared that KOPASSUS attached officers as a leadership cadre to KOSTRADs brigade-level taipur companies, rotated between Aceh and Papua in much the fashion of SGI task forces of years earlier. Despite higher commands more vague references, detail from operations in Aceh, Maluku and West Papua revealed how the deployed KOSTRADKOPASSUS specialist joint forces incorporated elements of those commands old and new unit types with a tandem flexibility in the field. Lower-level identities inadvertently compromised the new arrangement, where separate reporting confirmed KOSTRAD officers Bahtiar S and Mufakher as deployed taipur field commanders, both operating in the same task force against resistance in West Papuas highland Tiom District, May 2003.28 The subsequently promoted Bahtiar appeared later with his taipur company in North Aceh, September 2004.29 Both officers parent unit, KOSTRADs 1st Infantry Division, was confirmed in publicized work by a photojournalist and TV crew nearly a year later.30 During the West Papua Tiom area operations, the two above-named junior officers were locally commanded by KOPASSUS Major Ontang Sitindaon, himself appearing as an SGI company commander in Ambon, September 2000. In his Ambon tour Major Ontang served under Colonel Asis Wanto, who later took territorial command over that same area in West Papua (see Figure 5, p. 25).31 In West Papua, Ontangs unit was the satbanintel (intelligence support unit, also known by the unwieldy satgasbanintel, intelligence support task force). Counterterrorism: new anti-guerrilla mode & Trojan horse Another important part of West Papuas force restructure and expanded TNI units mission was terrorism response, an area hitherto normally confined to special action forces of the armys KOPASSUS and police counterparts. Nationwide the TNI spread newly empowered anti-terror and counterterrorist (CT) duties to many different units. Even uniform style and equipment advertised such a trend to project an image of forces legitimacy as guardians of public safety. In West Papua from 2003, this CT fashion combined with the actual retention of KOPASSUS troops in force restructure, despite their claimed withdrawal. Avowed CT priorities would help to ensure KOPASSUS continued presence while expanding the red berets influence into less specialized, less exclusive infantry units and the territorial KODAM apparatus. New, ostensibly CT responsibilities and appointments covered all West Papuas levels of military and police command, as well as the civil administration.
Kompas, TNI Sergap OPM, 10 Tewas, 6 November 2003. The reported support units context and membership made implausible any normally defined combat support or service support functions. 28 Cenderawasih Pos, Dua TPN/OPM Tewas Setelah Terjadi Kontak Senjata Dua Kali di Kuyawage Wamena, 17 May 2003. 29 Modus, 15 Anggota Pemberontak GAM Tembaki dan Bakar Rumah Warga Afdeling-V, 14 September 2004. Online: <http://modus.or.id/polkam/afdeling.html> (accessed February 2005). 30 Yuwono, Frank Bambang, Bersama id-photographer di Cilodong dan Studio Alam TVRI, 4 September 2005. Online: <http://biawak.multiply.com/photos/album/20> (accessed April 2006). 31 Siwalima Report 47, Diduga, KM Anda 2 Di [sic] Dor Tiga Oknum BRIMOB, 21 September 2000. Online: <http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/2000/09/24/0028.html> (accessed April 2006), Sinar Harapan, Laporan Perjalanan dari Papua: Mengikuti Pengejaran OPM di Jayawijaya, 3 May 2003 (Soehendarto), cf fn 28 - Cenderawasih Pos, Dua TPN/OPM Tewas..., 17 May 2003, op cit., and Suara Merdeka, Dua Tewas dalam Kontak Senjata di Koyawage, 17 May 2003.
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More obvious, superficial changes expressed the political and bureaucratic means used to promote the TNIs and POLRIs increasingly claimed counterterrorist priorities, whether as pretext, exaggeration, or even redefinition for the term counterinsurgency too.32 KOPASSUS influence and institutional aura were the trends origin: KOSTRADs taipur platoons early adopted the CT style and lan as proxy imitators in this sense. The high-profile Presidential Guard (Paspampres) unsurprisingly exhibited the trend in its state VIP escort and close protection duties: all-black uniform and field garb, anti-ballistic attire, heavy close-range armament, and personal anonymity from sunglasses. More anonymous, impersonal appearance in TNI self-advertisement spread the frequent display by black-garbed KOPASSUS Unit 81 into imitations by the armys ten new Raider infantry battalions, converted from 2003 under KOPASSUS-led training. The TNIs executive level nicknamed eight of the Raider battalions the KODAMs own KOPASSUS, repeating official publicity about Raiders as new CT assets with triple the combat power of normal infantry.33 The black uniform and ski mask / balaclava were previously almost exclusive to KOPASSUS, and detachments in the Air Force (Bravo 90), the navys Marines (Jala Mangkara), and POLRIs dispersed Gegana and Detachment 88. The TNI publicized its claims of wider CT capability from 2003, but troops so designated were still primarily tasked and deployed for counterinsurgency. Stealthy, often faceless CT trappings appeared much in exercises, parades and other routine, but the forces kept their main commitments in the anti-guerrilla campaigns of Aceh and West Papua. From the highest levels of state, the new CT fashion combined with organizational changes to official command duties overseeing such rapid-response, ostensibly anti-terror, capabilities. The Security Minister (MENKOPOLHUKAM)34 and Interior Minister took on parallel anti-terror bureaux for liaison with all state institutions and agencies. The TNIs institutional gain from these changes was subtle, not an explicit, direct or formal takeover of civilian intelligence and related CT functions. The Security Minister supervised national-level coordination of multiple branches of civil government apparatus through various regional civilian anti-terror desks, but ministerial supervision covered TNI coordination more as a facilitative, intermediary function than a potentially interventionist authority. By contrast, the Security Ministers authority ran directly into the Interior Ministry (DEPDAGRI) hierarchy via its National Unity and Politics Branch (Dinas Kesbangpol), which oversaw compulsory civilian programs of militia (siskamling, pamswakarsa) and reporting (wajib lapor). In this seeming hierarchical overlap the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) supervised coordination of all defined (and negotiated) non-terror intelligence processes beside the separate National Unity functionary chain. But the Security Ministers enhanced formal authority and reach into the Interior Ministry effectively circumvented the previously attained official responsibilities of POLRI in such sensitive and powerful state functions. As if to demonstrate an example of the TNIs stealthy political use of the new anti-terror hierarchy in West Papua, ex-Chief
A similar trend was arguably an international or global phenomenon at the time of writing. Redefinition of counterinsurgency too seemed part of contemporary US-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq: official statements often described resistance forces as terrorists, while publicity made much of shadowy terrorist figures in the context of vague reports about ground-launched bombing atrocities. 33 For just one example of then Army Chief Ryamizards strident promotion of Raider battalions as CT troops, see: Bali Post, Indonesia Miliki Pasukan Khusus Terbesar di Dunia, 21 December 2003. Online: <http://www.balipost.co.id/balipostcetak/2003/12/21/n4.html> (accessed May 2006). A more explicit demonstration was 500 Raider Infantry Battalions counterterrorist exercise in Surabaya, March 2006, as given detailed photographic coverage by Jawa Pos, 11 March 2006. 34 The offices full expansion is Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs.
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of Biaks KODIM 1708 Lieutenant-Colonel Harri Partono civilianized to almost immediately become head of Jayawijaya Regencys National Unity & Politics office at its lower level in Jayawijaya Regency.35 The interceding National Unity hierarchy, with its separate paramilitary Satpol PP (Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja), spelt the TNIs accompanying nationwide reassertion in state intelligence functions. This gradual process was first apparent in the Aceh Military Emergency measures declared from 2003 and, over a year later, after then presidential favorite Susilo Bambang Yudhoyonos (SBY) birthday and its bombing outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta.36 Alongside TNI advertisement of CT fashion and related claims about various units tactical specialization, the antiterror desk concept carried much further to effectively restore nationwide de facto TNI supremacy via the National Unity shell and its regional intelligence community coordinating bodies (KOMINDA, formerly BAKORINDA) at provincial and lower government levels (see Figure 4, p. 22). Earlier, pre-reformasi New Order practice with BAKORINDA gave army territorial hierarchies formal authority over all liaison between civilian agencies involved in their variously specialized, more limited intelligence processes. In Gus Durs presidency, police often assumed BAKORINDA supervision, followed by expanded police CT and other internal security responsibility. The TNIs indirect return to all-of-government intelligence dominance began from presidential edict in 2002 and local systemic changes gradually re-naming the networks KOMINDA, first in the capital Jakarta and its western Java surrounds avowedly responding to local threats from Acehs GAM resistance (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Free Aceh Movement).37 West Papuas KODAM XVII Trikora established its own, National Unitycompatible anti-terrorism desk by late 2005, with a separate, elite training cadre preparing local territorial troops for new roles and operational methods.38 Around the same time, KOREM 173 Chief Colonel Tri Assunu donned characteristically black CT-style garb in a parade ground address.39 The anti-terror desk function carried into additional infantry-based rapid-response sub-units directly commanded from KOREM-level HQ. Despite the new company-minus units standard, specific title,
Papua Post, Pengamanan Pemilu Dibutuhkan 5.497 Tenaga Hansip, 3 March 2004. Online: <http:// www.westpapua.net/news/04/03/030304-pengamanan_pemilu_dibutuhkan_5.497_tenaga_hansip-4826. html> (accessed July 2006). 36 Many questions still surround that bombing, especially where Indonesian journalism revealed such anomalies as: an apparent murder at the Australian police attachs residence less than two weeks earlier; an SMS warning to outside BRIMOB guards; claims of a suicide bombing when the detonation vehicle clearly stayed mobile and not on a course of direct, most effective attack, and; signs of severe pressure on POLRI in its investigators event reconstruction and in sudden changes affecting the duties of veteran detective and anti-terror chief Gorries Mere. 37 Kompas, Bakorinda Direfungsionalisasi, 10 June 2005, Jawa Pos, Pamswakarsa Diaktifkan Lagi, 11 June 2005, and Jawa Pos, Bisa Membantu Tugas Kepolisian, 16 November 2005. For detailed examples showing the subtle shifts between BAKORINDAKOMINDA, see: Suara Karya, Antisipasi GAM, Muspida DKI Bentuk Kominda, May 2003. Online: <http://www.suar akarya-online.com/news.html?id=63580> (accessed October 2004), Pikiran Rakyat, Wali Kota Cimahi Kukuhkan Kominda, 12 Juni 2004, Institut Dayakologi, Waspada, Anda Diintai!, 2004. Online: <http://www.dayakology.com/kr/ind/200 4/108/daerah3.htm> (accessed November 2004), and KOMINDA Kukar. Online: <http://kominda-kukar.tripod.com/> (accessed November 2004). 38 Mabesad (Indonesian Army HQ), Bentuk Desk Antiteror, Pangdam XVII Trikora Buka Latihan, 8 December 2005. Online: <http://www.mabesad.mil.id/beritatniad/081205dam171.htm> (accessed April 2006), and Puspen TNI, Pangdam XVII/Trikora Tutup Latihan Antiteror, 23 January 2006. Online: <http://www. tni.mil.id/news.php?q=dtl&id=113012006110543> (accessed April 2006). 39 SCTV Liputan6 (TV news), 29 January 2006.
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command and staff at KOREM 171 described the actual anti-guerrilla context for its own anti-terror units primary task. Paraphrasing General Ryamizards earlier claim about KODAMs raider battalions, 171s Chief of Staff unsurprisingly nicknamed the high-readiness 752 Infantry Battalion sub-unit the KOREMs own KOPASSUS.40 In its surrounding context of force expansion and upgrade, the TNI (and to different, less certain extents POLRI) trend towards a counterterrorist image and justification was a clear manifestation of institutional growth and reassertion. The TNIs confident publicity around its anti-terror initiatives in West Papua showed no trace of conscious irony: possibly the areas most significant, recent terrorist bomb incident, for example, occurred in suspicious, even sinister circumstances of a corruption scandal, where a serious investigation of timber racketeering apparently brought a police precinct chief under extreme pressure and national scrutiny.41 Less ambiguous was the TNIs newly ratified means to use separate and largely autonomous anti-terror hierarchy both for wider intelligence supervision and in rapidresponse, KOREM-level military units in West Papua (and elsewhere). But whatever the extent of TNI manipulation in the anti-terror issue, its value was obvious as a vehicle for resurgent political dominance by its traditional bases of institutional power i.e., specialized intelligence functions and their related surveillance assets in the armys geographically comprehensive territorial apparatus.42 Overlaps & anomalies: territorial base command restructure As a military organization very different from normal or conventional combat and support units, the Indonesian Army territorial apparatus of KODAM hierarchies had less direct relevance to the TNI program of force increase and upgrade. Territorial commands made routine liaison and coordination between TNI and service HQ, and central KOSTRAD and KOPASSUS commands, especially in preparing deployments and in planning for new bases and units. For KODAM Trikora, covering West Papua, the greatest and most immediate change from force expansion was to the KODAMs base regiment (rindam), where a likely increased demand for recruit training was offset by contributions from outside KODAMs in formal postings into the newly raised territorial infantry battalions and other units. As a separate administrative mechanism embedded among Indonesias population, the territorial hierarchy itself did not necessarily become part of such institutional expansion, except where incorporating anti-terror roles. However, conspicuous changes to the TNIPOLRI territorial systems in West Papua called attention to particular geographical and operational priorities within those systems. Due to the TNIPOLRI territorial systems political importance, certain political priorities were also apparent where those systems reflected both institutions relative power and influence in the adjoining civilian government apparatus.43
Rakyat Merdeka, Antisipasi Teroris, Desk Anti Teror Intensifkan Latihan, 3 May 2006. Online: <http://www.rakyatmerdeka.co.id/nusantara/print.php?id=1002> (accessed May 2006). 41 See for example: Infopapua.com, Barang Bukti Hilang, Polres Sorong Berang, 20 May 2003. The point is not meant to assume the POLRI officers guilt in that corruption case: a bomb scare could have plausibly originated from another party most at risk from the POLRI officers reasonably assumed ability to expose others to prosecution or scandal from the timber racket case. Other pressure on the precinct chief - Deputy Chief Commissioner Faisal Abdoel Nasser - appeared in reports that his wife had written pleas to the President, and to many other institutional and departmental executives. 42 Return of TNI primacy in KOMINDA came with publicity of revived babinsa (village guidance NCO) functionaries, announced with sophist-style ambiguity: the institutions had never died. 43 For an explanation of the normalized Indonesian de facto martial law, and comparison with the Aceh territorial structure: cf fn 1 - Davies, Indonesias War... op cit., pp. 569.
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TNI territorial command & sub-divided civilian administration TNIPOLRI territorial commands typically overlapped at certain hierarchical levels, especially in routine executive governance by the leadership triumvirate system (TRIPIDA) and its coordinating (consultative, musyawarah) leadership councils. In such manner did many senior TNI territorial commanders (and less so their police counterparts) often assume de facto seniority over two or more areas of civil government, ensuring force priorities, or a security approach, almost by default. Figure 1 TNI primacy: structural overlap of military seniority
TNI - KODAM (military area command) XVII / Trikora KOREM (military resort command) 171 / Praja Wira Tama Sorong KODIM (military district command) 1704 / Sorong POLRI - POLDA (police region) Papua POLRES (police precinct) level (POLRESTA) Sorong Sorong Sorong Selatan 1706 / Fakfak 1703 / Manokwari Fakfak Kaimana Manokwari Bintuni 1710 / Mimika 172 / Praja Wira Yakti Jayapura 1701 / Jayapura Mimika Jayapura Sarmi Keerom 1702 / Jayawijaya Jayawijaya DEPDAGRI propinsi (province) Irjabar* Papua kabupaten (regency) level Sorong (municipality)* Sorong* Raja Ampat* Sorong Selatan* Fakfak* Kaimana* Manokwari* Teluk Wondama* Teluk Bintuni* Mimika Jayapura Sarmi Keerom Jayawijaya Tolikara Yahukimo Pegunungan Bintang 173 / Praja Wira Braja Biak 1709 / Yapen Waropen 1705 / Nabire 1708 / Biak Numfor Biak Numfor Supiori Yapen Waropen Biak Numfor Supiori Yapen Waropen Waropen Nabire Paniai Puncak Jaya 174 / Anim Ti Waninggap 1707 / Merauke Merauke Merauke Nabire Paniai Puncak Jaya Merauke Boven Digoel Mappi Asmat
(POLRESTA) Jayapura Jayapura (municipality)
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Security forces privileged position in the territorial apparatus gave them a de facto supervisory role and governmental seniority, perhaps most apparent at formative stages of civil government sub-division, when TNIPOLRI chiefs could oversee new civil administrative entities from the point of their gestation. The overlaps of TNI POLRI seniority were obvious at KODAMprovincial level since West Papuas division into two provinces; legislation from November 2002, and inauguration by April the next year, enacted 14 lower-level regency (kabupaten) administrations in West Papua.44 The TNI exerted particularly broad overlapping boundaries over these new entities, with the notable exception of the already heavily militarized KODIM 1710 in Mimika Regency, site of the Freeport mining vital national asset (obvitnas). New HQ: hierarchical anomalies of KOREM 174 / Anim Ti Waninggap Overlapping TNIcivil apparatus in West Papua was more conspicuous from 2004 5, when army territorial hierarchy restructured in extraordinary deviation from normal TNI practice. With KODIM 1707 its only sub-unit upon inauguration, KOREM 174 ran against all normal concept of hierarchical military command and control. The unprecedented structural oddity in West Papuas KODAM Trikora hierarchy appeared in the reported establishment of KOREM 174 in Merauke, mid-2005, publicized as a plan over a year earlier.45 The appointment of its first chief, KOPASSUS specialist and West Papua veteran Colonel Joy Sihotang, highlighted the exceptional quality of what would otherwise seem a redundant, even inconsequential, territorial HQ entity. Figure 2 Restructure of Indonesian Army territorial commands, West Papua KODAM XVII Trikora (KODAM VIII 198599) KOREM 171 KODIM
1703 1704 1706 1710 1701 1702 1707 1705 1708 1709
(1996)
172
173
174 Pattimura
(198599)
XVII 171 172 174
June 2005 173
(2000) XVI Pattimura

Maluku Maluku Utara
1703 1704 1706 1710
1701 1702
1707
Merauke area
1705 1708 1709
Cenderawasih Pos, Peresmian Kabupaten Pemekaran, 11 April, 7 April 2003. Sinar Harapan, Kodam Trikora Bentuk Korem Baru di Merauke, 24 March 2004. Online: <http://w ww.sinarharapan.co.id/berita/0403/24/nas08.html> (accessed April 2006), Puspen TNI, Pangdam Trikora Resmikan KOREM 174/1TW [sic], 2 Jun 2005. Online: <http://www.t ni.mil.id/news.php?q=dtl&id=1011> (accessed April 2006), and Puspen TNI, KODIM 1707/Merauke Resmi Dibawah [sic] KOREM 174/Anim Ti Waninggap, 5 September 2005. Online: <http://www.tni.mil.id/news.php?q=dtl&id=1301> (accessed April 2006).
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Operational needs for control of field units did not explain KOREM 174s birth: outside-deployed infantry battalions rotated through the Merauke area much as before (see Map 3, p. 33). Established local precedent of KODIM 1707s inclusion in sector commands proved the areas pre-existing manageability for counterinsurgency operations.46 The newly raised battalion (755 Yalet) too did not justify the KOREMs creation: it imposed no greater strain of coordination, control or logistics than that experienced in many other sites of territorial infantry expansion, where new territorial battalions added to Kalimantan and Sumatera KOREMs, for example. Meraukes odd KOREM did not meet normal criteria for precedents in separate, mission-specific task force commands (satgas) either, where extremes of distance, diplomatic sensitivity, or deployed force numbers compelled extra, non-territorial HQ, as seen in contemporary cases of Aceh, and border areas of West Timor and Kalimantan. KOREM 174s deficiency in functioning subordinate commands should have immediately prompted serious scrutiny. Precedent in other new KOREM formations, and comments by senior TNI officers, confirmed that KOREM 174s lack of sub-unit commands was no Indonesian military peculiarity, but a military anomaly by any standard. One year of preparation was enough time at least to begin subordinate KODIM formations on an interim, preparatory basis (KODIM persiapan), as done in 1996 for KODIM 1710 in neighboring KOREM 171, for example, or in counterpart police cases in POLDA Papuas new precincts. But two new KODIM formations were to be in place only by 2008: three years after KOREM 174s official creation, when a new KOREM chief would almost certainly already occupy command, unless the formation was scrapped.47 174s only KODIM - 1707 - kept responsibility for handling events in the areas more remote (and new) Boven Digoel Regency in late-2005,48 despite claims that KOREM 174 led a cadre HQ element of 30 troops to prepare a new subordinate KODIM in that area. Only one such possible KODIM appeared by June 2006.49 By stark contrast, earlier proposals for new KOREMs in the new provinces of Riau Archipelago, BangkaBelitung and North Maluku indicated a minimum pre-existing need for at least two subordinate KODIMs. In the BangkaBelitung case, the KODAM chief himself explained that even two pre-existing subordinate KODIM commands were a deficiency, causing delay to the planned new local KOREM.50 For most practical purposes then, the West Papua Trikora territorial restructure rendered the single-stacked KODIM 1707KOREM 174 a de facto independent KODIM
For analysis of past sector commands and their relationship to organic KODAM and other forces: cf fn 1 - Davies, Indonesian Security Responses..., op cit., pp. 1416, 27. 47 Cenderawasih Pos, 2006, Kodim Akan Dibentuk di Boven Digoel dan Asmat, 17 December 2005. Online: <http://www.infopapua.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=3589& mode=thread&order=0&thold=0> (accessed June 2006), and SPMNews, Korem 174/ATW Merauke Akan Kembangkan Struktur Terotorialnya [sic], 11 January 2006. Online: <http://www.melanesianews.org/spm/publish/article_1616.shtml> (accessed January 2006). 48 Cenderawasih Pos, Di Merauke, Seorang Warga Tewas Tertembak Setelah Berusaha Merampas Senjata Oknum Anggota TNI, 2 December 2005. Online: <http://www.cenderawasihpos.com/Lintas/Li ntas.2.1.html> (accessed April 2006). 49 Tempointeraktif.com, Anggota Ekpedisi [sic] Jejak Petualang TV7 Hilang, 9 June 2006. Online: <ht tp://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/nasional/2006/06/09/brk,20060609-78648,id.html> (accessed August 2006). 50 Republika, Provinsi Babel Bentuk Korem dan Polwil, 19 April 2001. Online: <http://www.republik a.co.id/koran_detail.asp?id=25006&kat_id=61&kat_id1=119&kat_id2=> (accessed August 2005), Infomaluku.com, Korem akan dibentuk di Maluku Utara, 2 October 2002 (citing Media Indonesia). Online: <http://www.infomaluku.com/arc/02/m021002id.html> (accessed October 2004), and Riau Pos, Karseno, Danrem 031/Wirabima di Ujung Jabatan, 4 March 2005. Online: <http://www.ria upos .com/web/content/view/4861/61/> (accessed December 2005).
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(BS, berdiri sendiri), like the more politically delicate, high-priority KODIMs on metropolitan Java like 0501 / Central Jakarta. 1707 thus sat alone outside of its normal subordination (to Jayapura-based KOREM 172), but with the co-located appendage of a more senior HQ commander, Colonel Sihotang, and his chief of staff Lieutenant-Colonel Surono equal-ranked with the KODIM 1707 Chief. Police restructures too contradicted the Merauke areas vertical growth in KOREM 174. Precinct command remained in just one POLRI territorial formation, making POLRES Merauke the largest in Papua Police Region (POLDA) until interim precincts appeared in mid-2006.51 Most other precincts already multiplied in subdivision, except those of highest operational priority: Mimika with its Freeport mining complex and; Jayawijayas more remote central highland and border area. The police territorial precinct structure expanded in accordance with much of the new civil administration, but the large Merauke area again stood out in the POLDA organization (see Map 2, p. 10). To the time of writing, several years of precedent allowed for informed observation of such post-reformasi changes, where security forces major territorial restructures appeared in Aceh, Maluku, and even the national capital Jakarta. Anomalous post-2004 organizational circumstances in Merauke Precinct and its TNI KOREM 174 counterpart indicated an unusual, temporary focus on that area.52 Recent TNI territorial command & staff appointments First examination could leave an unremarkable impression from the posting background of post-2005 senior territorial officers in West Papua. Their patterns of operational experience and specialization were generally consistent with colleagues in similar appointments elsewhere in Indonesia: a leavening of Aceh, East Timor, Ambon and West Papua operational tours, with a normally high proportion of KOSTRAD and KOPASSUS background. However, one other obvious commonality among recent appointees past service was experience in the territorial bases (resimen induk KODAM, rindam). The latest command and staff positions in West Papua possibly required a higher-than-usual familiarity with matters of recruitment and training, especially as they applied to the expansion of locally based infantry battalions i.e., intensified activity in drawing on and managing local and transferred recruits, selection and induction of suitable NCOs and officers, and infantry training. Another conspicuous aspect of recent appointees more common background was a past regional association from southern Sumatera postings i.e., in KODAM II Sriwijaya. Possibly relevant to senior officers high Sriwijaya-related representation in West Papua was its demographic and operational familiarization for planned transmigrant programs.53 Lampung Province, covered by KODAM II, was known for ethnicity-based transmigrant settlements of separate Javanese, Balinese or Madurese
cf fn 49 - Tempointeraktif.com, Anggota Ekpedisi..., and Gatra, Polisi Gagalkan Pengiriman Amunisi di Bandara Sentani, 28 July 2006. Online: <http://www.g atra.com/artikel.php?id=96615> (accessed August 2006). 52 The authors earlier (2001) study prematurely anticipated army territorial restructure upon more limited and less precedented sub-division of civil administration: cf fn 1 - Davies, Indonesian Security Responses..., op cit., pp. 1314, 27. One ISG participant (separate discussion, 14 July 2006) reasonably mooted KOREM 174s possible inclusion of KODIM 1710, which would make logistical and hierarchical sense, while maintaining political overlap with an earlier-planned third, Central Irian Jaya province (Irjateng). However, reports showed KODIM 1710s continued subordination to KOREM 171 long after 174s raising. See: Cenderawasih Pos, Satgaspam Diminta Selalu Waspada - Yonif Linud 501/Kostrad Resmi Bertugas di Area PTFI, 20 August 2005, and Puspen TNI, Negosiasi Aparat TNI dan Polisi dengan Pendulang Emas, 23 February 2006. Online: <http://www.tni.mil.id/news.php?q=dtl&id=113012006110725> (accessed April 2006). 53 Detikcom, Mulai 2007, Transmigrasi di Perbatasan & Pulau Terluar, 12 March 2006.
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Figure 3 Career background of senior TNI territorial officers, West Papua 2005-6*
SESKO KOSTRAD /Lemhanas KOPASSUS DAM II/SWJ MabesAD DAM IM-I/BB DAM VI/TPR Aceh (DIA / NAD)
attach
DAM IX/UDY
DAM VIIIXVII/TKR DAM Jaya West Papua
DAM XVI/PTM Ambon
Rindam Rindam
East DAM VII/WRB Timor
Aceh SUMUT
Instructional / training role Operational area Student role Unit / territorial command / staff
SUMSEL Kalimantan Sulawesi Bali,NTB Maluku Papua Jakarta Jambi NTT,Tim2 IRJABAR Raya Lampung RINDAM: Resimen Induk KODAM Bengkulu
- KODAM base (training) regiment
* Covering 1995-2005. Approx. 12 more appointments unidentified Not including new appointments from mid-2006
townships. That area often preserved ethnic identities in the transplanted communities and trading networks into the provinces interior. Close TNI monitoring of such populations, and enlistment and supervision of their members for militia and other internal security tasks, would be very relevant experience for West Papuas transmigrant nodes and, yet more important, where it could aid local recruitment for the increase in KODAM XVII Trikora-based territorial infantry battalions. Another aspect of some officers Sriwijaya background, though more tentative, was its possible indication of political considerations in certain appointments i.e., where loyalty and some personal vested interest may have determined recent West Papua command postings. As is widely known, President SBYs only territorial command from provincial levels was in 19967, for KODAM II Sriwijaya. Of course, this aspect of recent West Papua appointments could be mere coincidence, but any remote presidential connection may prompt better understanding where such possible influence on recent postings concerned the areas significantly higher operational and diplomatic priority. The closest parallel in this regard was the temporal association between recently appointed KODAM Trikora Chief MajorGeneral George Toisutta and SBYs KODAM Sriwijaya command in southern Sumatera. Given SBYs risen political fortunes since, any such connections would likely survive SBYs earlier tenure when he had the most direct influence on appointments and links within the civilian community. The other two senior West Papua commanders with identified KODAM Sriwijaya background were there after SBYs KODAM tenure: KOPASSUS veterans Colonel Tri Assunu at Biaks KOREM 173, and; Colonel Joy Sihotang at Meraukes odd, new KOREM 174.54 As ex-Chief of Aceh Operations Command (Pangkoops) and West Papuas recent KODAM Trikora Chief, Major-General Toisutta obviously reflected the TNIs priority in West Papua operations since the Aceh peace settlement; continuity in such high-profile postings confirmed Toisuttas proven record as a reliable and responsible commander. Elsewhere in KODAM Trikora, and in its Merauke area in particular,
In response to more abbreviated presentation of associated detail than that listed here, Harold Crouch rejected this studys assessed indication of possible presidential-level considerations in recent West Papua appointments. Less reliable than the clearer circumstantial indicators of other Lampung links on p. 40, the point is not to pretend conclusive substance, but rather grounds for further inquiry.
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command and staff appointments showed clearer professional connections where officers posting background and operational experience were significant for the restructured territorial command apparatus and its new, expanded local sub-units in the field. Further contradicting earlier claims to have ceased KOPASSUS activity in West Papua, several senior career KOPASSUS officer postings showed that commands disproportionately strong influence and seniority in TNI planning, operations, and unit training (including for anti-terror and other rapid-response roles). Other significance from the new Merauke-based KOREM 174 was apparent in concurrent appointments and events involving related activities of KOPASSUS specialization i.e., intelligence, counterintelligence, and PSYOPS. Streamlining & priority: appointments in intelligence & strategy The above-described organizational changes in planned and realized force expansion, rapid-response mechanisms for exaggerated (if not redefined) terrorist threats, new state intelligence processes, and territorial rezoning were all followed by related changes in key senior TNI officer appointments. At operational- and strategic-level positions since 2005, the TNI discernibly sharpened its focus on West Papua operations and related command and staff positions. TNI and army HQ concentrated certain influential, West Papua-experienced intelligence and special forces figures into the same specific chain of command and reporting, from West Papuas regions up to the national level. High-priority and new West Papua-related positions increasingly converged by late 2005, with greater significance to special intelligence functions. National-level intelligence promoted the experience of recent West Papua KODAM Chief Major-General Nurdin Zainal into the TNI Chief of General Staffs Assistant for Intelligence (asintel kasum TNI) then, just five months later, extra office as Chief of BAIS (TNI Strategic Intelligence Agency). Not since the 1980s had an officer held both senior TNI intelligence positions together. Nurdin Zainal had some three years of continuous duty as KODAM Trikora Chief and Chief of Staff before overseeing the TNIs entire intelligence apparatus: his previous BAIS exposure was as attach a few years earlier in the Netherlands, with its relatively large population of Indonesian (covering West Papuan, Acehnese, etc.) migrs and activists.55 Apart from protracted duty in West Papua command, Nurdins overseas intelligence experience indicated his proven record in Indonesian diplomatic circles. He graduated as an officer in 1974, along with: the Security Ministers Papua Desk Head Setia Purwaka;56 Trikora Chief and Chief of Staff colleagues Mahidin Simbolon, Getson Manurung and Sudarmaidy Subandi (see Appendix I); ex-Army Chief Ryamizard Ryacudu, and; KOPASSUS luminaries Prabowo Subianto and Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin.57 Brigadier-General Hotma Marbun, like Nurdin, entered the KODAM Trikora executive circle after a term as Army Deputy Security Assistant (Waaspam KSAD). An obvious advantage from both Nurdins and Hotmas previous internal security roles was their continuity in restricting access to sensitive matters. The KODAM
It was highly probable that BAIS experience covered part of the unidentified past postings of recent KODAM Trikora senior officer appointees, especially where gaps arose in publicity about officers recently assigned as Trikora KOREM chiefs and chiefs of staff (see also Figure 3, p. 20). BAIS secretive role limited this studys findings to Nurdin Zainals initial and current BAIS postings. 56 Suara Karya, TNI Tingkatkan Pengawasan di Garis RI-Papua, 3 April 2006. Online: <http://www.s uarakarya-online.com/news.html?id=139910> (accessed April 2006). 57 See: apakabar, posting 27 August 2001: Akademi Militer Magelang Lulusan AKMIL Tahun 1974. Online: <http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/2001/08/27/0010.html> (accessed August 2003). Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin became Defence Department Secretary-General in this period (see Figure 6, p. 27). Sjafries PSYOPS-related agent handling background, and direct interest in force expansion budgetary concerns, suggested his informal influence in deliberations on recent TNI West Papua operations.
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Chief of Staff was well placed to pay particularly strict attention to limiting certain operational detail to a minimum among commanders and staff, in a conventional counter-intelligence role preventing mission compromise. Streamed as a career KOPASSUS officer, Hotma took up his new post as Trikora Chief of Staff just after that office created its own rapid-response forces for anti-terror and its formal reach into militia and civil surveillance via the officially autonomous, but lower-ranked National Unity & Community Protection Agency (BKBPM, kesbanglinmas). From Nurdin Zainals above-mentioned army academy colleagues came a special ministerial-level appointment for presidential oversight of West Papua operations in the same way President SBY created facilitative roles when Security Minister coordinating Aceh operations. Just as the anti-GAM campaign from 2003 brought an Aceh Desk under SBYs protg and election campaign staffer Lieutenant-General Sudi Silalahi, a similar Papua Desk arose in reporting by early 2006. That desks head, Major-General Setia Purwaka, was reportedly another of SBYs long-term confidantes. TNI Chief and Chief of Staff posts also indicated attempts at presidential oversight: those senior officers graduated from their academy training in 1973: the same year as the President himself. Of course, such executiveand ministerial-level positions took no direct part in intelligence functions, but their responsibilities included approval for assigning officers and units to intelligencerelated posts for West Papua operations. Figure 4 West Papua- and Merauke-focused command & intelligence, Jan. 2006
Routine subordination / coordination Reporting / intelligence coordination
Presiden LTGEN (rt) SBY Menkopolhukam MENDAGRI (etc.) ADM (rt) Widodo Desk Anti-Terror 'Papua Desk' KABIN
MENSESNEG KAPOLRI
Panglima TNI AM Djoko Suyanto KASUM TNI ASINTEL TNI KABAIS LTGEN Endang S. MAJGEN Nurdin Zainal
MAJGEN (rt) IRGEN A. M'bai MAJGEN Setia P. Syamsir Siregar
BAIS
XVII
MAJGEN George Toisutta
Desk Anti-Terror KASDAM ASINTELDAM
(Multiple hierarchies)
POLRI (Intelkam) (Bina Mitra)
(provinces X 2)
Desk Anti-Terror KESBANGPOL
Gubernur
Papua
BRIGGEN Sudarmaidy S. COL Kaharudin Wahab
174
COL K. J. Sihotang
DENINTELDAM ?
TNI KOMINDA BIN DEPDAGRI KAJATI (etc.)
POLRI
'Wajib Lapor'
'Wajib Lapor'
(regencies X 4)
Desk Anti-Terror BKBPM
Desk Anti-Terror KASREM TIMINTELREM
Bupati Merauke John Gluba Gebze
LTCOL Totok Surono CAPT Akmal
KOMINDA
Kamswakarsa
RES
1707 PASIINTELDIM
LTCOL Didi Suswandi Ramil ? Babinsa (NCOs)
(districts) BKBPM KOMINDA (villages) Satpol PP
Polsek
Siskamling
Babinmas NCOs
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The army territorial apparatus overlap of civilian bodies was crucial to the TNIs reaffirmed lead throughout state intelligence (including counterintelligence). Figure 4 locates key TNI officers as appointed by new year 2006, but within an altered state intelligence and army territorial apparatus already in place by mid-2005.58 Although abbreviated to show only the main, relevant bureaucratic links and specializations, the reconstruction here could still easily baffle observers familiar with simpler, more conventional hierarchical models. Despite superficially apparent interlocking hierarchies and duplication of effort, such reconstructions should be regarded as both organizational chart and network diagram i.e., not a normal layout of separate organizations vertical seniority. De facto TNI authority and greater, routine lateral coordination indicated in Figure 4 were the means by which the Indonesian state system coerced a security approach onto civil government: overlapping the territorial commands onto cadastral civilian zoning; weakening of POLRI powers by the National Unity hierarchys separate Satpol PP; ensuring practical TNI seniority over POLRI and civilian colleagues, and; a solid BAISKOPASSUS and army territorial intelligence apparatus almost entirely beyond non-TNI scrutiny. The security approach meant that army territorial chiefs could expect the civilian apparatus to cooperate in surveillance and information, but without the reciprocal or reverse process beyond TNIPOLRI tasking for information and advisory briefings on threat. The system was characterized more by its networked and militarized rather than departmental and civilian qualities, reinforced in civil agencies de facto military supervision by TNI retirees or serving specialists under the Security Minister, BIN and DEPDAGRI, and closer civilianpolice structural and practical alignment. POLRIs weakened status in these arrangements could seem unclear: after all, a senior policeman Inspector-General Ansyaad Mbai headed the National Unity Anti-Terror Desk. However, his authority extended only to the Interior Ministrys Satpol PP: more a token force of ministerial security guards or pseudo-police than a means of deploying armed power against identified or claimed threats. In a more specific, situational sense whether in Central Java, Aceh or West Papua - the army placed its new KOREM-based anti-terror units of higher-readiness local infantry almost invariably at higher positions covering wider territory. By those same means could TNI intelligence functions preempt and counter any potential bureaucratic rival, whether from POLRI, the Chief Prosecutor (Kajati), BIN, or the Security Ministers interceding National Unity & Community Protection chain itself. Although Figure 4s most conspicuous anti-terror changes applied across Indonesias provinces, the armys Trikora restructure with KOREM 174 accentuated effects of TNI intrusion, influence, and control in that systems post-2005 West Papua transformation. KOREM 174 added an extra layer of command in the Merauke area to shift pre-existing command and staff into a lower-level concentration from the regencies onto districts and villages. Reports indicated a chief of staff and an intelligence officer as the only other functionaries in Colonel Joy Sihotangs Merauke KOREM HQ. That limited detail possibly reflected a coincidence of source deficiency in this study, but the previously mentioned (and confirmed) anomaly of KOREM 174s lack of subordinate KODIMs further suggested the extraordinary nature of Colonel Sihotangs tasks. One report showed that KOREM 174 directly commanded a timintelrem (KOREM Intelligence Team);59 another of that commands anomalies
Note that Figure 4 applies less to Martial Law (Military Emergency, darurat militer) patterns of subordination, which formally delegate direct authority to the TNI chain of command. 59 Cenderawasih Pos, Di Merauke, Seorang Warga Tewas Tertembak Setelah Berusaha Merampas Senjata Oknum Anggota TNI, 2 December 2005. Online: <http://www.cenderawasihpos.com/Lintas/Li ntas.2.1.html> (accessed April 2006).
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given the TNIs established territorial hierarchy for intelligence staff and units. Normal subordination from the KODAMs detachment (denintel) descended to a KOREMs tonintelrem (platoon) to the next-lower KODIM levels smaller section (siinteldim), sometimes also termed the timintel.60 Intelligence commanders used the title of chief or head (kasiintel) at KOREM, with direct command of KODIM sections by a section intelligence officer (pasiintel). In these details too KOREM 174s intelligence chain overtook KODIM 1707: further to its unusual team status, KOREM 174s intelligence head held the same rank (captain, not a KOREMs normal major) as the previously noted KODIM 1707 counterpart: Captain Mandjakala. Thus did Colonel Sihotangs KOREM add an extra specialist layer (or merely take on some KODIM staff). Just as anomalous, its single KODIM command and staff almost certainly concentrated their efforts at the lower sub-district commands (KORAMIL). Some changes merely formalized processes already underway from 2003, when the civil government apparatus became the vehicle for a major increase in detailed information on local civilian activity and indications of activist or guerrilla links. As the routine coal face operator among the lower levels of civil government apparatus, POLRI used appeals to Christian piety when calling on West Papuan resistance (OPM) members to surrender. The technique combined with TNIPOLRI supervision of compulsory militia-style surveillance and reporting, publicly described as volunteer self-defence networks, or a system of grass roots vigilantes (siskamswakarsa).61 Both tactics closely resembled contemporary TNIPOLRI activities in Aceh under the syariah (Islamic Law) decrees and mobilization of siskamling conscription for night watch (jaga malam) in populated areas. One apparent result came from the KOREM commands, especially 172 at Jayapura and 173 at Biak, reporting an increased yield of surrendered OPM resistance guerrillas and supporters by early 2006: TNI organs publicized detail of several hundred claimed victories in that regard.62 Missing from such trumpeted counterinsurgency successes were details about the methods often used i.e., surveillance and interrogation from within the civilian populace itself to identify resistance supporters. As seen from parallel militiaterritorial operations in Aceh, guerrillas could be compelled into surrender when aware that TNIPOLRI and / or militia cadres had detained family members as virtual hostages (though detained ostensibly for their own protection against loyalist anger). Such were the intended results of a pervasive counterintelligence network and its militia proxies. But at lower levels too, officers career progression and past associations were useful background information when analyzing new intelligence appointments for any unusual changes. Colonel Sihotangs posting to the new KOREM 174 highlighted the
Tanter, R. (1989), The Totalitarian Ambition: Intelligence Organisations in the Indonesian State in Arief Budiman (ed.), State and Civil Society in Indonesia, Clayton: Monash U.P., 1994, p. 228, Davies, M., The ABRI Intelligence Apparatus: a corps of many lanyards, in Australian Defence Force Journal, JanuaryFebruary 1999, and Suara Pembaruan, TNI Tolak Berdialog Dengan GAM, 16 August 1999. 61 ElshamNewsService, Semua Warga Biak yang Terlibat Separatis OPM Diancam Menyerah Sebelum Batas waktu yang Ditetapkan Berakhir, 29 July 2003 (reproducing Biak-Numfor Police Precinct letters Biak 67/VII2003/BinaMitra and B/867/VII/2003/BinaMitra. Online: <http://www.westpapua.net/news/ 03/07/290703-semua_warga_biak_yang_terlibat_separatis_opm_dia-3171.html> (accessed July 2006). 62 Puspen TNI, Tahun 2006, Pertahanan Negara di Papua Semakin Baik?, 3 January 2006 (G. T. Situmorang). Online: <http://www.tni.mil.id/news.php?q=dtl&id=1837> (accessed May 2006), cf fn 16 - Puspen TNI, 198 Mantan Separatis..., 6 February 2006, op cit., Puspen TNI, Di Marauke [sic], Tiga Mantan Separatis Serahkan Sepucuk Senjata, 10 February 2006. Online: <http://www.tni.mil.id/news.php?q=dtl&id=113012006110647> (accessed April 2006), MetroTV News, Puluhan Anggota Separatis Papua Menyerahkan Diri, 20 April 2006. Online: <http:// www.metrotvnews.com/berita.asp?id=15174> (accessed May 2006).
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Figure 5 Relationship diagram: key army command & staff, West Papua
2003-5 XVII MAJGEN Nurdin Zainal 2002-3: KASDAM 2000-1: Dam XVI/PTM 2001-2: Waaspam KSAD 2005> 172 COL Asis Wanto 2000-1: Sektor I/Ambon
KOPASSUS LINK PREVIOUS POSTING / DEPLOYMENT LINK

2006 (KASDAM) BRIGGEN Hotma Marbun 2005-6: Waaspam KSAD 2003-5: Wadanjenpassus 2001: Pusdikpassus
? ?
2005> 174 COL Kitaran Joy Sihotang 2004-5: Rindam II/SWJ 2000-1: Asopsdam XVII/TKR 1999: SESKO Susreg Ang XXVI 1996-7: Satgas Maleo Dam VIII (inc. West Papua)
2005> 173 COL Ervi Tri Assunu 1999: SESKO Susreg Ang XXVI 1998-9: Asopspassus 1997?: Satgas Tribuana Rem 011 (Dam I/BB)
2003-4 MAJ Ontang Sitindaon 2003-4: Satgasbanintel Dam XVII/TKR 2000-1: SGI Dam XVI/PTM
2005> 171 COL Kristian Zebua 2004-5: Aslogdam II/SWJ 2002-3: Kazidam II/SWJ
* Sources available to this study did not indicate KOPASSUS background for Nurdin Zainal, though such streaming was a more plausible precursor to BAIS appointments.
priority and focus seen from the appointments of Nurdin, Hotma and Setia Purwaka. Joy Sihotangs West Papua experience was recent enough: his previous time there was as KODAM Trikora Operations Assistant some four years earlier. Another career KOPASSUS officer, Sihotangs record included an Army Command & Staff School instructional position (19989) and, before KOREM 174, command of the KODAM Sriwijaya Base Regiment. His most specialized past role, and probably greatest career success, was as commander of the KOPASSUS Sandi Yudha (Covert Warfare) Maleo Task Force in its tour of West Papua over the drawn-out 1996 Mapenduma Geselama hostage siege.63 In that mission, Maleo was fundamental to activities of reconnaissance, agent-handling and infiltration into OPM circles, where the task forces influence was critical, especially when the case became an international issue due to the several foreign hostages taken allegedly on the orders of regional OPM veteran chief Kelly Kwalik. It would not be far-fetched to conclude that Sihotangs
Suara Pembaruan, Kasum ABRI Kunjungi Timika - Pangdam: Penyandera Akan Dikejar Terus Sampai Dapat, 28 August 1996. Online: <http://www.suarapembaruan.com/News/1996/08/280896/He adline/pangdam/pangdam.html> (accessed January 1999), and Kompas, Sandera di Irja Tinggal Tiga Orang, 1 September 1996. Online: <http://www.kompas.com/9 609/01/UTAMA/sand.htm> (accessed January 1999).
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success in Maleo brought him institutional prominence, if not fame, in discrete KOPASSUS and army circles: then KOPASSUS Chief Prabowo Subianto directly contributed by adding a local higher-level field command, with CT (Gultor) and other troops in a separate strike role. However, Joy Sihotangs force had the most significant presence in the siege, though it was far more discrete in news reporting. A parallel appointment to Sihotangs was that for KOPASSUS colleague Colonel Ervi Tri Assunu, posted to command the pre-existing KOREM 173 at Biak from the same time i.e., mid-2005. Ervi Tri Assunu also had previous Covert Warfare experience from command of the Tribuana Task Force (the standardized succeeding title for Maleo and similar missions in West Papua, Aceh and East Timor). Available sources specified Tri Assunus tour of Aceh in that function, but the nature of such missions probably saw his rotation in a deployment cycle covering West Papua too. However, unlike Sihotangs role, Tri Assunus did not imply the same level of professional accomplishment which would apply from a case such as the 1996 Mapenduma siege; neither did it involve a new, anomalous command like KOREM 174 in Merauke. From the available detail on senior post-2005 army West Papua officer appointments, Joy Sihotang appeared to hold almost central importance in a less formal sense. Past links and experience, quite apart from formal authority and function, depicted Sihotang as an esteemed hub in West Papuas KODAM Trikora hierarchy from mid-2005, deemed most suitable for allocation to a command with the TNIs highest priority among all of West Papuas KOREMs (see Figure 5, p. 25). Colonel Sihotangs return to West Papua operations occurred on the same time scale covering the premature birth of his KOREM 174 command (or HQ shell) in Merauke, as well as outgoing Trikora Chief Nurdin Zainals ascension to the TNIs joint BAIS-asintel peak and those executive intelligence functions combination in a single appointment. At the next-higher executive level above Joy Sihotang, the Indonesian Army expressed its own operational priority in West Papua by posting George Toisutta to command KODAM Trikora: Toisutta was earlier entrusted with the Aceh campaigns counter-offensive phase from the start of 2004. In the same brief period from mid-2005 to early 2006, publicly available reporting confirmed the fully transferred national priority from Aceh operations to West Papua, as the Security Ministers Papua Desk replicated the previous Aceh-focused counterpart activating greater all-of-government discipline and coordination. Another striking aspect of some executive-level officer appointments was their abnormally short duration. Certain critical but briefly occupied positions concentrated between late 2005 and early 2006, indicating a surge for that periods West Papua operations. Factors of timing, continuity from previous posts, and prominence in experience and reliability all pointed to mission-specific coordination and intensified internal security. Like the converging chain of West Papua, special forces and intelligence background in the inter-related postings from 2005, several of those same appointees ended their terms in the West Papuaintelligence command and staff chain in a conspicuous contrast with the overwhelming bulk of other officers rotating through the normal posting cycle (mutasi jabatan) of approximately two years (or longer). Although KODAM appointees in 2006 reaffirmed West Papuas operational priority Zamroni and Geerhan Lantara earlier held prominent Aceh commands outgoing officers George Toisutta and Hotma Marbun had both been in their KODAM Trikora positions very briefly, at between three to twelve months. Their extraordinarily short tenure in West Papua was not possibly due to failure, but rather an emphatic confirmation of success. Toisutta moved on to take command of the armys premier heartland KODAM Siliwangi in western Java, the most prestigious territorial post beside KODAM Jayakarta in the political centre of Jakarta. Upon
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Figure 6 Fast tracks: executive-level posting duration

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 >
PANGDAM XVII / TKR (KODAM Chief)

Mahidin Simbolon Nurdin Zainal George Toisutta
Zamroni >
KASDAM XVII / TKR (KODAM Chief of Staff)

> Agustadi Sasongko Purnomo K. A. Ralahalu Nurdin Zainal Getson Manurung
Hotma Marbun Geerhan Lantara Sudarmaidy Subandi > Eddi Budianto > Syafnil Armen Nurdin Zainal >
ASINTEL KASUM TNI (Intelligence Assistant for TNI Chief of General Staff)
> Yoost F. Mengko Mochammad Luthfie Witto Dadi Susanto Eddy Yusuf (interim) Nurdin Zainal
KABAIS (Chief of TNI Strategic Intelligence Agency)

> Ian Santoso Perdanakusuma Mochammad Luthfie Witto Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin Secretary-General, Dephan Aceh tsunami Dadi Susanto Director Strategy, Dephan
(other senior appointments in text)
KOREM chiefs 1714 Christian Zebua Asis Wanto Ervi Tri Assunu K. Joy Sihotang
the close of that same short period (and just after the Merauke voyage), the TNIs intelligence peak (BAISasintel Kasum TNI) reverted to its normal dual executive liaison separation in two officers together replacing Nurdin Zainal.64 The narrow concentration of postings between late 2005 and early 2006 showed the careful and deliberate preparation for the execution phase of a West Papua mission: career continuities in certain key officer appointments confirmed such emphasis. However, earlier unusual strategy- and budget-related postings indicated greater coordination with Indonesias Defence Department (Dephan) and very highlevel approval for planning. In advance of the surge in specialist appointments both in West Papua and Jakarta, two senior Dephan postings in late April 2005 seemed to occur at very short notice. Both Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin and Dadi Susanto 65 simultaneously vacated their respective Information Centre and Intelligence Assistant posts to their deputies: not the normal, more direct handover (sertijab) process observing military etiquette and routine where incoming and outgoing appointees together attended briefings, parades, speeches recognizing service, etc. Those two 30year-plus veterans probably well knew the symbolic triviality of such strenuous, prosaic politesse, while their new postings would likely offer much more formal acknowledgment in due course; that sudden late-April transition instead pushed more pressing national priorities onto the two generals in their careers twilight.
For reports containing detail of the unusual posting cycles, see for example: Kompas, Posisi Kapuspen TNI Masih Diserahkan ke Wakapuspen, 25 April 2005. Online: <http://ww w.kompas.com/utama/news/0504/25/212614_.htm> (accessed July 2006), Kompas, Jabatan Kapuspen Diserahkan kepada Panglima TNI, 26 April 2005. Online: <http://www.k ompas.com/utama/news/0504/26/102908.htm> (accessed July 2006), Mabesad, TNI Mutasi 119 Perwira, 9 May 2006 (citing Antara). Online: <http://www.mabesad.mil.id/ beritatniad/090506ad2.htm> (accessed July 2006), and Pikiran Rakyat, Toisutta Gantikan Sriyanto, 11 August 2006. Online: <http://www.pikiran-rakyat.com /cetak/2006/082006/11/0104.htm> (accessed August 2006). 65 Apparently two of the most mis-spelt TNI officers in Indonesian and outside sources.
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Perhaps most remarkable of the shorter spans in officer appointments was that for KODAM Trikora Chief of Staff. The first brief tenure was under Nurdin Zainal, whose fast track was marked by relatively early rise to KODAM Chief, during which term he was mooted to become the new BAIS Chief around a year before that actual appointment. Brigadier-General Sudarmaidy Subandi had the posts next brief tenure, first covering the strange restructure with KOREM 174s addition, ending with the asylum seeker voyage from Merauke and the ensuing diplomatic issues. The briefest Trikora chief of staff posting came after, by KOPASSUS one-star general Hotma Marbun. Hotmas tenure was so fleeting around three months that it seemed his role was more a special assignment combined with the positions authority: the time span would barely establish familiarity and routine with the staff officer HQ assistants and KOREM chiefs. Given Hotmas previous official post as Army Security Deputy, it appeared that his Trikora posting covered a task suited to the procedural restrictions, discretion and trust in the armys separate security assistant staff. In the context of West Papuas diplomatic, strategic and operational priority, Hotma Marbuns role seemed more that of supervisor for an internal security survey, or audit, to check the integrity of personnel and information within KODAM XVII Trikora HQ. Mission for a veteran West Papua PSYOPS specialist Indications of West Papuas strategic priority and intensified operational tempo were obvious from related postings of generals, the concentration of their appointments, and their brief time span. But the specific nature of TNI intentions became clearer at the lower operational level, on the ground in the particular Merauke area emphasized by the strange new KOREM 174. Details of HQ staff composition, force structure and precedent elsewhere in Indonesia all depicted KOREM 174 as an anomaly probably tasked with a special, unusual mission: Colonel Sihotangs KOREM indicated an abnormal superimposition of a more senior officer to a formation that did not really exist at least upon his appointment and for many months later. For a well-known historical comparison, though much smaller in scale, his Merauke posting seemed similar to George S. Pattons dummy US army group in Britain, used as deception prior to the 1944 D-Day invasion of occupied Normandy in Fortress Europe. Sihotangs Maleo background in special tasks pointed to other operational peculiarities, or achievements, which better explained his new Merauke assignment in the same context of psychological operations (PSYOPS) deception as Pattons example. Agent-handling, infiltration, deception and associated PSYOPS were major distinguishing characteristics of such KOPASSUS Covert Warfare troops tasks in operational areas like West Papua. In the last, more general category of PSYOPS, the TNI had no monopoly on the complex practice of trying to destabilize elusive guerrilla enemies and their support base. PSYOPS methods involved intrigues of deception and disinformation, including fabricated scenarios and spoiling tactics, to disrupt guerrilla leadership and spread publicity favorable to Indonesias government and security forces. Precedent from Australian counterinsurgency doctrine specified some basic PSYOPS goals and techniques thus:
b. Create dissension and distrust within the insurgent organization. c. Undermine confidence in insurgent leadership. d. Secure the defection of groups or individuals... Insurgent leaders, whose general locations and appointments are known, can be effectively neutralized through cleverly worded news releases or by planted rumors which reveal supposed cooperation with government forces. This technique is most effective immediately after a successful military operation. Names of insurgent leaders should not be mentioned but other facts should be revealed that leave little doubt as to the identity of the man in question.
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That early (1965) source betrayed an underdeveloped, even formative, quality by introducing the topic with a caveat all but admitting its unsophisticated level of understanding about counterinsurgency PSYOPS, stating that such techniques: ... are limited only by the imagination and creativity of the psywar operator or his commander.66 The TNI however was no newcomer to counterinsurgency and counterrevolutionary PSYOPS, having for years exercised its creative energies to practise such sinister warfare from East Timor, Aceh, and West Papua into metropolitan Java. Many Indonesian sources detailed specific cases of state repression where the TNI resorted to destabilization and infiltration of separatist resistance and other dissident targets, using techniques developed from local application since the early 1960s, if not earlier. The Indonesian Army inadvertently revealed KOPASSUS familiarity with sophisticated operational-level PSYOPS techniques in a formal army administrative instruction which survived East Timors 1999 sacking.67 Indeed, PSYOPS seemed the officially preferred TNIPOLRI weapon in more remote and sparsely-populated West Papua, with its resistance often tenuously united between severe topographical divides, many different languages, tribal sub-ethnicities and poor communications infrastructure. TNI special action forces retained such covert warfare capabilities in West Papua through rapid adjustments to its deployed force structure. But from its various, longer-term changes in stealthy bureaucratic chicanery claiming exaggerated anti-terror responsibilities, Indonesias military was arguably better placed than ever to wage its own preferred PSYOPS-led anti-guerrilla war i.e., via volunteer militia cadres within a large conscripted civilian base of sentryproxies. That counterintelligence and agent-handling effort would be overseen by special forces in training mentoring roles and de facto field leadership over an expanded base of line infantry. Creative PSYOPS deception could twist many intriguing permutations to misrepresent targeted resistance leaders loyalties, motives and even identities, but simple approaches apparently sufficed in most cases. The harsh central highland terrain, so tactically favorable to guerrillas, also favored disinformation campaigns by TNIPOLRI counterintelligence veterans whose easier access to communications and mass media afforded them almost uncontested information dominance i.e., a situation in which Indonesian command could not only predominate in the quantity of disseminated information but even in the very initiation of scenarios designed to convey images of enemy mendacity, incompetence, disunity, etc. The highland interior therefore became the arena for a shadow war of perceptions, or black information operations, with two prominent cases useful for retrospective consideration. The first case was the 1996 Mapenduma hostage siege; the second in the smaller 2001 kidnapping in the nearby Ilaga area. The targets in both cases were the legendary and staunchly committed local OPM field commanders Kelly Kwalik and Titus Murib.68
cf fn 25 - Army HQ, Counter Revolutionary Warfare, op cit., p. 59, 70. Buku Petunjuk Pembinaan tentang Sandhi Yudha TNI AD (Administrative Guidebook on Army Covert Warfare), Nomor: 43-B-01, 30 June 1999 (signed: Dankodiklat MAJGEN Sumardi; covering letter LTGEN Lumintang). Relevant scanned excerpts of the Army Administrative Instruction first appeared publicly on the East Timor Action Network (ETAN) website: the author thanks Andrew Plunkett for his communication of that valuable primary source in 2002, which was later published in: Kingsbury, D., Power Politics and the Indonesian Military, RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, pp. 99101. 68 For references indicating recent intrigues depicting the pair as surrenders or defectors, see: Banjarmasin Post, Warga Tangkap Kelly Kwalik, 26 January 2005. Online: <http://www.indomedi a.com/bpost/012005/26/nusantara/nusa3.htm> (accessed August 2005), and SPMNews, Yosep Makonama Menyerah: Karena Sadar atau karena ada Konflik Internal?, 17 February 2005. Online: <http://www.melanesianews.org/spm/publish/article_363.shtml> (accessed April 2006). Intrigue over the Mapenduma case survived into an early 2005 surrender, where the
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It was no mere speculative digression to recall these events as case studies into TNI counter-insurgency PSYOPS: Colonel Joy Sihotangs official functions were most closely relevant to the conduct of each deception operation, first as the fielddeployed Covert Warfare Maleo Chief and later as the KODAM Trikora Assistant for Operations. Reports of both kidnapping incidents spread the impression of serious OPM disunity (factionalism), as though Titus Murib opportunistically misrepresented himself as Kelly Kwalik. Tenuous anecdotal detail, rumor and some unclear photographs gave the story credibility among local and foreign journalists and other observers. Indonesians and foreigners alike repeated the impressions of permanent OPM internecine strife and callous opportunism as apparent in the doubledeception of the perpetrator/s account: there was little other information in either case, while thorough, third-party investigation would likely only further endanger the hostages. Nonetheless, KODAM Chief Nurdin Zainal himself later flatly contradicted those divisive intrigues when stating that Kelly and Titus ran a joint command in the successful OPM raid on Wamenas KODIM 1702 armory.69 Where paid and/or coerced proxies kidnapped foreign journalists, aid workers, researchers, etc., a layer of plausible deniability protected the TNIs public image. Veteran KOPASSUS militia sponsor and Trikora Chief Mahidin Simbolon could compound the deception to put neutral third parties on the defensive, even feigning magnanimity and fairness towards the OPM. According to Mahidin, the two Belgian journalists in 2001 had not been kidnapped at all but had voluntarily joined up with an OPM band, then falsified a letter addressed to then President Gus Dur, complete with a simple, bombastic extortion demand for West Papuan independence.70 Although these PSYOPS activities were generally obvious when considered in hindsight, they had high counterinsurgency value at the time. Their resulting wide cast of suspicion and confusion: harmed morale among OPM guerrillas and their supporters; endangered them through lures of false contacts posed by planted agents; disturbed or even severed their crucial, mutually sustaining links, and; seriously discredited West Papuan resistance in outside perceptions, while depicting the TNI as a necessary, stabilizing guardian. In other words: disruption, destabilization and, most sought of all, entrapment of genuine dissidents, sympathizers and guerrillas, in politically motivated publicity favorable to Indonesias military and police. West Papua PSYOPS deception appeared to shift emphasis from 2003, showing less direct effort at discrediting OPM leaders, instead providing cover for expanded recruitment and infiltration involving TNIPOLRI agents and other proxies. Intensified surveillance from compulsory civilian siskamling sentry and
mysterious Menase Telenggeng formally turned in to POLRI as that earlier kidnappings Kelly Kwalik. The oddity of that surrender, including its congenial non-TNI handling, more plausibly depicted a withdrawal by a demoralized and scared fake OPM band pressed into going on record. See: Cenderawasih Pos, Mereka Terlibat Kasus Mapnduma - Kemarin, Giliran Kapolda Besuk 7 Tersangka TPN/OPM, 5 April 2003. Online: <http://www.melanesianews.org/spm/publish/article_228.shtml> (accessed July 2006). 69 Tempointeraktif.com, TNI Kerahkan Dua Kompi untuk Kejar Penyerang Kodim Jayawijaya, 5 April 2003. Online: <http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/nasional/2003/04/05/brk,20030405-07,id.html> (accessed July 2006). 70 Committee for the Protection of Journalists (CPJ), Philippe Simon, documentary filmmaker IMPRISONED. Johan van Den Eynde, documentary filmmaker IMPRISONED, 7 June 2001, Detikcom, Pembebasan Sandera Belgia (3): Batal, Karena Larangan Agum, 27 August 2001. Online: <http://www.detik.com/peristiwa/2001/08/27/2001827-120437.shtml> (accessed July 2006), and Christian Science Monitor, Violence, a US mining giant, and Papua politics, 3 September 2002. Online: <http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0903/p01s04-woap.html> (accessed July 2006). The author thanks the ANUs Chris Ballard for his critical feedback where an earlier draft of this paper showed face-value acceptance of genuine OPM kidnapping in other cases.
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night watch (jaga malam) duties provided TNIPOLRI commanders greater coercive means to detain and co-opt assessed guerrilla relatives and other close supporters spotted in apparent courier or supply tasks from populated areas. From that point, staged and rumored separatist surrenders aimed to later increase the rate of genuine surrenders and the chance to compel and/or entice full defection, or turning of guerrillas into cooperative proxies for special operations. Such shadowy activity was never explicit, but its indications stood out among more routine accounts. From the northern coasts Sarmi Regency, TNI Information Centre (Puspen TNI) composed a triumphal early 2006 claimed surrender / defection by 198 guerrillas. Half a year earlier, local resistance sources identified Daniel Buriyan (also Buriam) as a previous, more isolated case of a TNI-claimed surrendered separatist: OPM Combat Area Command II Chief Hans Yoweni described Daniel as member of a fake OPM (OPM gadungan) with earlier paramilitary status as an army territorial auxiliary.71 Even less clear than the Daniel BuriyanSarmi case was the TNIs claimed defection by southern Merauke area OPM chief Yosep Makonama, whose very existence was in doubt after his own earlier complaints about concentrated efforts against his life by paid assassins.72 The Makonama case suggested the potentially fictitious extremes in such counterintelligence activity, whereby an actually assassinated target could live on as an agents cover-name where deemed useful to infiltration or manipulation of resistance sympathizers normally removed from the very limited, cautious and discrete OPM networks. Like Colonel Sihotangs new command, that subtly different PSYOPS technique, or approach, appeared limited to the Merauke area. The temporal and situational confluence in new forces, plans, restructure and key appointments all suggested a deliberate and extraordinary campaign with much wider and bigger objectives than previous West Papua counterinsurgency operations. Additional factors prominent in reports from 20035 were an emphasis on professionally specialized intelligence and special forces background in key positions, the anomalous new Merauke command, internal population surveillance and coercion, beside indications of various related PSYOPS techniques. These developments aimed not only to comprehensively destabilize, demoralize and marginalize the West Papuan resistance as a regional threat to the Republic of Indonesias Unitary State (NKRI, Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia); the militarized Indonesian State and its traditionally aggressive guardian in the TNI sought also to attain, opportunistically, any institutional advantage from its new priority mission. Although most indicators were crystal clear about West Papuas new priority, many questions were unanswered about Sihotangs strange Merauke command. In pursuing those questions, the TNI state leadership priority and intensified effort on West Papua located their more recent activities to a higher, strategic- and diplomatic-level campaign.
Translation (unidentified author) from Jayapura Pos: No longer a part of the OPM for some time but was afraid to report, 26 May 2005. Online: <http://www.kabar-irian.com/pipermail/kabar-irian/2005-M ay/000656.html> (accessed July 2006), and SPMNews, Daniel Buriyan Adalah Bukan [sic] Anggota TPN/OPM Mabes Pantai Timur Tetapi Anggota Masyarakat Biasa yang Selama ini Menjadi Mata-Mata TNI/POLRI di Wilayah Kabupaten Sarmi, 2 June 2005. Online: <http://www.melanesianews.org/spm/publish/printer_700.shtml> (accessed May 2006). 72 cf fn 68 - SPMNews, Yosep Makonama Menyerah...?, 17 February 2005, op cit.
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The Merauke case: operations & perceptions The Merauke area, covered by KOREM 174KODIM 1707 and POLRIs Merauke Precinct, was not exceptional by the standard measures of TNIPOLRI counterinsurgency from 2003 to the time of writing. Infantry battalions made border patrols and routine support to the territorial apparatus in the interior, before rotating after year-long deployments from outside KODAMs. Local territorial infantry indicated a steady increase over years past when Merauke was long home to C Company, 751 Battalion (HQ Jayapura): the new 755 Battalion began to establish on Merauke towns edge in part of the vast Wasur National Park (see Map 3, p. 33). Some reports specified troops in wanton shootings of civilians most frequently cited was a case involving West Kalimantans 643 Battalion; other reports of varied detail described sexual assaults against indigenous female civilians. The areas main repressive activity was characteristic of intensified counterinsurgency throughout West Papua i.e., the post-2003 activation of compulsory civilian sentry duty under militia cadres. Unofficial TNIPOLRI economic activity in the area appeared to continue much as before in logging- and fisheries-related sectors, though some public relations effort from 2003 pointed to internal POLRI corruption investigations and fewer (mostly non-army) TNI cases. In the latter sense, publicity from that time began to depict the army as a protector of forestry, where separate West Papua-wide operations strove for public perceptions of a more regulated local timber industry. Merauke, however integral to routine TNIPOLRI operations against OPM guerrillas, was nonetheless a contrast to activity in the other PNG-border areas. The more mountainous OPM heartland eastward from Paniai reported many more combat incidents and atrocity cases. The most prominent examples of the OPMs central highland areas warfare were in 2003: an overwhelming assault on a Military SubDistrict (KORAMIL) and occupation of a local township and airstrip in the centre, and the lower-scale but equally significant and successful Wamena area armory raid. Also exceeding Merauke were cases in the adjoining north coast area to Jayapura, recorded many more recorded cases of arbitrary detention, interrogation, killings, and combat surrounding the activist hotbed of Papua Provinces harbor capital. Recent demonstrations, reprisals and OPM raids in the Jayapura area from late 2005 were another contrast with the Merauke at the opposite, southern coastal lowlands.73 Apart from the March 2004 announcement to create the new KOREM 174, mid-2004 saw the earliest indication of unusual, exceptional activity in the Merauke region. From that time, several reports consolidated impressions of a Merauke-based, TNI-led PSYOPS campaign to provoke and deceive local OPM resistance sympathizers into revealing their anti-Jakarta sympathies. The tactic was subtle in that the actual OPM support base, much less OPM members and leadership, could not be feasibly lured by the methods applied. Rather than better-known PSYOPS targeting OPM leadership, for example, the apparent campaign had a more gradual and modest aim i.e., to excite enough popular dissent against outlandish official statements so that local fellow traveller dissidents could be identified and cultivated for later manipulation. Such intrigue, almost defining a combination of counterintelligence work with PSYOPS deception as a case study, was the only plausible explanation for the immoderate but clearly deliberate public statements by senior Merauke-based TNI POLRI officers from that time. The first aspect of the extraordinary official approach would easily categorize within the Indonesian States mnemonic acronym SARA, denoting social divisions
For a usefully succinct, referenced summary of those events (and earlier background), see: Chauvel, R., Australia, Indonesia & the Papuan crises, 27 April 2006 (Austral Policy Forum 06-14A).
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along categories defined as ethnic-tribal, class, racial and religious (suku, antargolongan, ras, agama). Local indigenous catholics protested after Meraukes KODIM and Precinct chiefs held repeated official and unofficial meetings with the newly appointed non-indigenous (possibly ethnic Javanese or Chinese) Bishop Nico Adisaputra and a select group of non-indigenous members of the laity. Instead of any accommodating measures for the offended West Papuan laity, authorities inflamed the situation by alleging protesters to be separatists, provocateurs and racists. Even the state-owned RRI broadcast the inflammatory allegations,74 all but confirming a deliberately sanctioned approach by the TNIPOLRI chiefs from their coordination meetings with other government agencies (MUSPIDA), if not also with select local religious leaders. There was no reported resolution to that ensuing discontent when, over a year later, chief of the new KOREM 174 Colonel Joy Sihotang publicized a claim that Bishop Adisaputra aided his TNI mission via fruitful cooperation, crediting his formations success to support by community leaders including the Bishop.75 Contrary to the attention on other contemporary events in West Papua, from violent Jayapura and Timika protest and repression to sporadic, yet more intensely violent guerrilla warfare and reprisal in the highlands, developments in the Merauke area confirmed its greater, unusual predominance of PSYOPS and related counterintelligence activity during the period. A resistance source seemed uncannily accurate when linking the new (then pending) Merauke-based KOREM 174 with local TNI claims to have turned OPM commander Yoseph Makonama. Whether genuine, or another identity groomed for a future covert role posing as the OPM commander, the subject defector was kept under close, but apparently comfortable TNIPOLRI watch. Makonama was reportedly targeted several months earlier by missions which pointed to other, indigenous SARA intrigue enlisting agents from the areas Marind people.76 Like the new KOREM 174 formation, the Makonama defection did not seem the typical surrender case where Indonesian nationalist publicity could advertise a responsible, repentant ex-guerrilla seeking a normal life. Further abnormal PSYOPS arose just after Joy Sihotang officially took charge of Meraukes new, odd KOREM 174. Resistance sources themselves seemed baffled by the new provocation, drawing no conclusions beyond the simplest and worst expectations of intensified violent TNIPOLRI repression. Staff from KODIM 1707 and Merauke Police Precincts Intelligence & Security (Intelkam) disseminated news of an impending East TimorINTERFET-style deployment to usher in West Papuan independence.77 The territorial apparatus continued such bizarre disinformation six months later farther away in the areas Boven Digoel interior.78 The otherwise bombastic effort would be regarded a cynical TNIPOLRI joke at the expense of West Papuas resistance, except when considered within the local context of
WPNews, Teror Terhadap Kaum Katolik Papua Maroke, 24 June 2004. Online: <http://www.papua independent.com/kabar/publish/article_903.shtml> (accessed April 2006). 75 Infopapua.com, Danrem: Keberhasilan Kami Tidak Lepas dari Dukungan Masyarakat, 3 October 2005. Online: <http://www.infopapua.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid= 3261&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0> (accessed April 2006). 76 cf fn 68 & 72 - SPMNews, Yosep Makonama Menyerah...?, 17 February 2005, op cit., and cf fn 62 - Puspen TNI, Tahun 2006, Pertahanan Negara...?, 3 January 2006, op cit. Another Puspen TNI release made the incorrect passing reference locating the Makonama defection to Manokwari: cf fn 16 & 62 - Puspen TNI, 198 Mantan Separatis..., 6 February 2006, op cit. 77 SPMNews, Di Merauke, TNI/POLRI Bilang Pasukan Asing Sudah Tiba di Jayapura untuk Amankan Kemerdekaan Papua Barat Tanggal 15 Agustus 2005, 25 July 2005. Online: <http://www.melanesiane ws.org/spm/publish/article_817.shtml> (accessed May 2006). 78 SPMNews, Tentang Papua Merdeka, Para Penjilat Pantat Penajajah Tipu Rakyat Papua Boven Digoel, 12 January 2006. Online: <http://www.melanesianews.org/spm/publish/article_1621.shtml> (accessed June 2006).
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topography, ethnic division, and poor civilian communications exacerbated by a pervasive fear of military, police and covert counterintelligence surveillance through eavesdropping and infiltration. Like the blatant SARA provocation of indigenous catholics in the Merauke Diocese, the deliberate INTERFET news PSYOPS tactic was no desperate nave attempt to snare OPM leaders, rank-and-file members, or their clandestine and covert networks: that cautious, active minority - dependent upon reliable internal communication for their lives - knew far better than to respond to such tall stories. In that case, Indonesian troops in the Merauke area rather sought the easiest catches in the guerrillas pond i.e., the more nave, uncritical types among the mass of indigenous resistance sympathizers, otherwise safely disconnected from genuine resistance networks which had very little safe means of countering the TNI POLRI ruse. But after exciting enough nearby questioning and speculative talk, the forces agents could make their approaches to sympathizers as part of a covert fake OPMactivist (OPMaktivis gadungan) recruitment drive. Another incident from the Merauke area added impressions of that areas exceptional situation in the period. Cenderawasih Pos reported that local fishermen had discovered an adult female corpse in the direction of the Arafura Seas Indonesia Australia maritime boundary, or some 80 nautical miles from Merauke. The local precinct chief said his HQ was ready to facilitate a visit by Australian forensic staff still in Bali for investigations into the second major terrorist bombing there: the body was to be disinterred in Merauke (it was claimed that burial was made after transfer to Meraukes hospital) and examined with DNA testing to determine whether the woman was an Australian citizen. The unusual report gave further description of the corpse (height, estimated age, clothing, and a distinguishing wrist tattoo), but mentioned no possible cause of death, or even any autopsy.79 Such news would normally attract scrutiny for any possibly sinister background to the womans death and her probable Australian origin (Indonesian sources would hardly mistake one of their own citizens in such assessment). In West Papua and Merauke from 2005 however, the incident should have attracted serious attention in light of KODAM XVIIs apparently heightened internal security, and senior TNI statements months later alleging foreign espionage via non-government organizations in West Papua. Later Merauke-related events took much greater, international public attention. Forty three West Papuan asylum seekers made a voyage from Merauke to the Australian mainland at Cape York, displaying a prominent pro-independence banner replete with OPM Morning Star (Bintang Kejora) flag. Their departure area seemed oddly close to concentrations of TNIPOLRI HQ, troops and other facilities, including the Merauke Naval Base. On the other hand, security by Indonesias PNG border had reportedly intensified,80 probably due to the presence of a near-established and over-strength 755 Territorial Infantry Battalion available as a local cadre for border surveillance and interception patrols. Upon close examination of the area up until that time, the voyage from Merauke indicated a deliberate manipulation by TNI PSYOPS veterans, buffered by proxy agents for strict deniability both to OPM resistance circles and to those at the destination: Australian citizens and their government.81
Cenderawasih Pos, Tim Labfor Australia Akan Ambil DNA, 31 October 2005. Louise Byrne of the Australia West Papua Association (AWPA) relayed West Papuan explanations that the IndonesiaPNG border, long-renowned as a porous, frequently-crossed boundary, had become harder to penetrate. See: The Torres News, West Papuan asylum seekers on Cape York, 18 January 2006 (Corey Bousen and Damian Baker). Online: <http://www.torresnews.com.au/index.php?option=co m_content&task=view&id=72&Itemid=1> (accessed January 2006). 81 Beside discussion about the firm indications of associated covert PSYOPS, this studys assessment is in no way meant to contradict or diminish the 43 West Papuan asylum seekers claims for visa status.
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Map 3 Mixed events & perceptions: the Merauke area, 20046
174 Jun 05 1707

Sota
VI Oct 03 Banintel -Taipur 631 VI Nov 04 643 VI Jan 06 512 V

(+)
PNG
623
SARA
8 1 9 6
?
3
Merauke
2
Weam
KAT
755
?
INDONESIA
XVII 2004-6
Arafura Sea
0 100 200 km
Torres Strait AUSTRALIA

Janie Ck
1. June 2004, September 2005 Religionist intrigue especially around appointment of local bishop 2. September 2004 OPMs Yosep Makonama claims assassination attempts by Merauke Regent Gebzes paid agents 3. 5 February 2005 Reported defection by OPMs Yosep Makonama to Merauke Regents residence 4. 1 June 2005 Official appointment of KOREM 174 Chief (DANREM) Colonel Kitaran Joy Sihotang 5. 25 July 2005 (Merauke), early January 2006 (Boven Digoel) Reported PSYOP tactic: news by KODIM 1707 & Merauke Police Precinct Intelligence & Security branch (Intelkam) claiming planned INTERFET-style entry to Papua 6. October 2005 Possible murder. Report claiming discovery of corpse near Indonesia--Australia sea boundary; for Merauke disinterrment & DNA test for identification of possible Australian citizenship 7. 13-17 January 2006 Voyage from Merauke by 43 West Papuan asylum seekers 8. 1 February 2006 Report citing Merauke Regency Government: evacuation of 500+ nearby coastal civilians to Merauke's TNI & regency government facilities; storm damage and locals' fear of tsunami 9. 4-5 April 2006 President SBY celebrates harvest time with Merauke community & apparatus
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Harvest time: Pak Ogah Arafuru & phoney infowar82 After public, official requests first seen in February 2006, President SBY visited Merauke in early April to join harvest celebrations.83 Certainly Merauke gave historical resonance in Indonesian nationalism: nearby Boven Digoel was a site of imprisonment for anti-colonial dissidents during the Dutch regimes later period, mythologically including a term of exile there by first president Soekarno. 84 Merauke, with Acehs Sabang Island, colloquially defined the longitudinal span of state sovereignty in the slogan: from Sabang to Merauke. But apart from the areas Indonesian nationalist symbolism, other more compelling sentiments, resentments and, above all, expansionist military planning, made Merauke in 20056 most significant for Jakartas national leadership elite, from the emotionally patriotic, nationalist stalwarts to the cynical pragmatists alike. The unusual recent incidents in the Merauke area, Colonel Sihotangs odd command and mission there, with associated TNI consolidation of political power and expansion plans, all pointed towards a sophisticated Indonesian strategic-level PSYOPS campaign: in other words, covert and clandestine use of diplomacy as war by other means. Diplomatic coercion was the most plausible explanation for West Papuas unusual recent military and security-related events, their timing, and broader Indonesian military context. The dynamic most immediately favorable to such Indonesian diplomacy was the Australian Governments own manipulation of certain SARA divisions i.e., the ethno-religious bias, especially where coalition government leaders and conservative Christian lobbies curiously allied with self-styled culture warriors (often less overt) claiming to defend a western liberalist inheritance. Australian SARA politics made the grant of visas to 43 (Christian) West Papuans almost a fait accompli, despite an initial single, token rejection on spurious legalistic grounds. From that precedent, any repeat of earlier Muslim asylum seekers mass and indefinite incarceration (or worse, of mass drowning in scandalous circumstances) would invite intense international and domestic outrage at state hypocrisy. A lost sense of political credibility and moral authority was one sure prospect, in an ironical twist echoing an earlier hypothesis by columnist Philip Adams, foreseeing potential political quandary for Australias coalition government if confronted by Christian asylum-seekers from Indonesia.85 Other risk was lost Australian diplomatic credibility due to conspicuous, practical endorsement to the political claims of West Papuan resistance while making formal pledges of support to Indonesian sovereignty. But the main risk for the Australian Government was to its domestic political standing due to the challenge any new voyages posed to its rhetorical nationalistic boasts about border protection, especially since the 2001 federal election. The most compelling dangers to the Australian side were to the ruling Canberra elites wider corporate party interests and implicit, individual self interest, in electoral security built on manipulated voter perceptions. That elite secured its border protection credentials by frequently invoking and exaggerating spirits of national mythology to advertise:
Originating from a militia-style, stand-over siskamling neer-do-well character in the 1980s Si Unyil childrens TV series, Pak Ogah was a colloquial name for extortionists in street-level opportunism, especially infamous in peak-hour Jakarta. Arafuru is the Indonesian-Malay name for the Arafura (Sea). 83 Kompas, Presiden Panen Raya di Merauke, 4 April 2006. Online: <http://www.kompas.com/utama/ news/0604/04/133934.htm> (accessed June 2006), and Kompas, Presiden Dialog dengan Masyarakat Merauke, 5 April 2006. Online: <http://www.kompas.c om/utama/news/0604/05/091659.htm> (accessed June 2006). 84 The author thanks Chris Ballard for his correction on the issue of Soekarnos Boven Digoel exile. 85 The Weekend Australian, A nice line in bigotry, 21 December 2001. Adams comment used the case of hypothetical inter-religious strife in Aceh, with its actually tiny Christian population. However, his point was prophetic about Australian SARA-based political dynamics.
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close identification with the military; related jingoistic Anzac clich; near-compulsory flag worship, and; oblique vilification of ethno-religious others. An imposing facade of patriotic pride, vigilance and prejudice lent its builders an aura of political strength; removal of its border protection base by repeated practical demonstration of failure and religious prejudice would cause the larger edifice to collapse. That prospect posed profound, longer-term risks for the leaderships reputation and nationalist selfjustification: it could even cause a wider national (and non-partisan) morale crisis. Almost immediately after the MeraukeCape York voyage, reports from Indonesia prodded Australian Government perceptions in precisely that direction of self-interested panic. By some contrast, mainstream Australian public perceptions held the January voyage by 43 asylum seekers to Cape York peninsula as exceptional, with other, smaller isolated cases reported to the August close of parliamentary debate over a new migration bill. But Australias diplomatic and intelligence apparatus would be left in little doubt about Indonesian messages of an impending widespread source of new seaborne arrivals. Further such unusual events in the Merauke area were depicted shortly after the attention-grabbing voyage of the 43. Sinar Harapan claimed from official sources that authorities had evacuated 505 West Papuans from a coastal township in Merauke District, citing storms, tidal turbulence and strange local rumors of an impending tsunami danger. According to the report, Meraukes air force base, KOREM 174 HQ and Interior Ministry properties sheltered the half-thousand evacuees (see Map 3, p. 35).86 That odd report seemed to tally with other sources reaching Australia, as Melbournes The Age reported in the next month that some 500 West Papuans planned a similar exodus pending the results of the group of 43s applications for Australian political asylum.87 From the same time shortly after the Cape York voyage, but farther to Meraukes west on Balis neighboring Lombok Island, came another mooted plan to seek asylum from persecution. This time the reported intention involved members of the latter-day Ahmadiyah Islamic sect, denounced as heretics by many influential Indonesian Muslims. An Ahmadiyah exodus would supposedly flee Lombok and elsewhere in eastern Indonesia to seek Australian sanctuary, though Jakartas Foreign Ministry presented itself as an official counter to such plans. But in that February the nationalist, state-affiliated Indonesian Muslim Clerics Council (MUI) backed the Ahmadiyah wish for asylum.88 In the same period, West Papuans also reportedly planned to seek asylum directly at Australias Jakarta Embassy. Meanwhile, Jakartas normally anti-communist press made an uncharacteristically favorable report of Cubas Fidel Castro in Media Indonesia, celebrating the anniversary of his Bay of Pigs victory.89 One Australian letter-writer made the Merauke cases more explicit and pertinent Cuba connection in Melbournes HeraldSun, alluding to Castros success decades earlier when evicting criminals and dissidents to the mainland USA.
Sinar Harapan, Antisipasi Tsunami Ratusan Warga Merauke Diungsikan, 2 February 2006. Online: <http://www.sinarharapan.co.id/berita/0602/02/sh02.html> (accessed April 2006). 87 The Age, Jakarta Retaliates, and More to Flee, 25 March 2006. 88 As if confirming the issues domestic political sensitivity, most Australian and other English language sources seemed very late reporting the Ahmadiyah wish for Australian asylum. See for example: Tempo Interaktif, Anggota Ahmadiyah Tak Bisa Mencari Suaka Politik, 5 February 2006. Online: <http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/nasional/2006/02/05/brk,20060205-73470,id.html> (accessed April 2006), Jawa Pos, Ahmadiyah Rencanakan Minta Suaka Politik ke Negara Lain, 6 February 2006, Suara NTB, MUI Sambut Baik Rencana Ahmadiyah Lakukan Suaka Politik, 7 February 2006. Online: <http://www.suarantb.com/2006/02/07/wilayah/Mataram/xdetil5.htm> (accessed May 2006), and Radio Australia, Muslim group appeals for Australian support, 28 July 2006. Online: <http://www. abc.net.au/ra/asiapac/programs/s1698957.htm> (accessed August 2006).. 89 Media Indonesia, Castro Tetap Menantang dan Tidak Gentar Hadapi AS, 20 April 2006.
86
DAVIES
p. 38
Executives of Jakartas defence and civil government had their main window of opportunity during this critical time, when bilateral negotiation over security issues aimed at a restored AustraliaIndonesia defence treaty. Amid the several mooted sources of migrant waves, Indonesian defence leaders and diplomats held the trumps for costly TNI expansion: the conveniently projected upgrade for a Merauke Primary Naval Base appeared as a symbolic tender in this sense, offering one means for countering a migrant threat; both nations navies had already increased maritime patrols in that area after the Merauke-sourced voyage across the Arafura boundary.90 Negotiations with Australia to restore a security treaty would yield very discrete, if not secret, results. The previous 1995 pact under Prime Minister Keating was shielded from public scrutiny: Keatings successor was unlikely to veer from that precedent by proffering transparency with negotiation terms this time. Official Australian defence matters were probably the easiest, traditional path to state secrecy over various issues bearing only indirect or even no risk to national security. Thus did Jakartas networks of counterinsurgency veterans appear to devise the most compelling circumstances for a restored security treaty with Australia, but one best suited to their own interests and plans. For a military HQ, the Australian Governments border protection and opportunistic mining of that unconscious SARA well presented a centre of gravity i.e., a critical unifying element or dynamic giving the target its driving purpose, justification and/or energy.91 The foreign military could present a looming challenge to Australian Government policy, its public boasts, and electoral future, by sending impressions of many more unauthorized migrants ready to arrive in boats to discredit the border protection success and its implicit claims of domestic security. By contrast with the TNIs nearsilence or bland statements on the issue, Indonesias Foreign Ministry (DEPLU) played bad cop in diplomatic brinkmanship, issuing vehement, formal protests and recalling its ambassador from Canberra. A delegation from the national Peoples Representative Council (DPR) added its weight to the diplomatic and psychological pressure of moralistic protest, consolidating public impressions that the West Papuans January voyage was somehow quite beyond Merauke security forces knowledge or powers of interdiction. Jakartas campaign was a holistic, intermeshed or integrated military-civil operation (operasi terpadu): a term used for Aceh counterinsurgency from 2003, but now more obviously on a national and international scale. The diplomatic posturing revealed the campaigns confident and aggressive quality, because these other representations went beyond a security treatys discrete bargaining over TNI costs in maritime patrols, base construction, procurement, etc. Diplomacy followed through, aiming to seal the practical victory by exerting influence on the Australian Governments migration policy and the adverse implications on Australian sovereignty by a newly proposed, but regressive, Migration Act. The proposed act in mid-2006 was largely a sideshow to the main contest centred on mutual cooperation in bilateral defence agreements, especially in the area of discretionary budget expenses. The bill had domestic importance however, especially due to its implicit ability to seal off much of the electoral danger from future seaborne migrant influx from Indonesia. In that sense, its submission was not part of a genuine effort: opposition and dissident parliamentarians could not possibly consent to rescinding amendments achieved the year before. Some avowedly
It would be interesting to discover whether the planned Merauke naval base upgrade was a false proposal, especially among the expansion plans for other sites with greater strategic justification. 91 For definition and some relevant sources on the terms broader, multi-level application in counterinsurgency, and conventional and information warfare: cf fn 1 - Davies, Indonesias War... op cit., p. 42, 242 fn26.
90
DAVIES
p. 39
Christian politicians too many mute if not not compliant on incarceration of MidEast and South Asian Muslims - now suddenly realized their conscientious objection since the West Papuan exodus. The Migration Act proposal, submitted in the bad faith of reasonable foreknowledge of its rejection, was a process of political cauterization for a major diplomatic wound. Until that time of its formulation and parliamentary process though, the coercive political danger from unauthorized migration would have achieved its strategic aim: an Indonesian military victory surpassing many others in that nations history. The TNI success was not one that allowed more explicit celebration, because it was attained on a field of diplomatically unspeakable duplicity. Jakartas campaign was at least part-driven by perceptions of past Australian Government duplicity and opportunism. Whatever the protests and diplomatic posturing, threatened commercial boycott for Australian goods, canine-inspired newspaper cartoons, black-listing, and other symbolism arising from the fast Australian grant of temporary protection visas to 42 West Papuans, the phoney war across the Arafura arose from more base material concerns. The return of a bilateral security treaty was to restore formal mechanisms Jakarta repealed in consternation over (belated) Australian efforts in mobilizing an international force to supervise and enforce East Timors 1999 transfer from Indonesia to the UN before formal independent East Timorese sovereignty. Indonesias leadership perceived a cynical Australian betrayal over its loss of rights to East Timors offshore fossil fuel reserves, division of which had been agreed after lengthy and costly negotiation. In that same period, another example of Jakartas major financial loss to Australia appeared in the flight of Hendra Rahardja to Australia after misappropriating state reserves to the value of billions in US dollars. Hendra lived in Australia (variously Sydney, Melbourne or Perth, according to press reports) until reported dead in early 2003 amid one of the greatest money-laundering cases in world history, and unsuccessful Indonesian attempts at extradition after his conviction in absentia. In that fiscal context, Indonesias projected military build-up was to impose an unusually severe long-term cost on the states existing defence budget and separately sourced TNI finances, at a time when international donors demanded more regulation in that sector through budgetary control by Indonesias civilian-led Defence Department. But opportunity presented itself to Jakartas leadership in several potentially safe and lucrative channels. The Australian Government had pledged much aid after the tsunami and earthquake devastation of Aceh and Nias; that money was to be cleared for release at Canberras discretion, avowedly to ensure no Indonesian misappropriation. Another possible source was the Australian Wheat Board which, besides contentious dealings with proxy businesses of Iraqs former Saddam Hussein regime, had also reportedly made anti-competitive payments to Indonesian bodies. A possibly greater opportunity was the bilateral security treaty itself: secrecy provisions of national security could impose draconian restrictions on public scrutiny over any financial transactions the treaty deemed essential for regional stability. After all, defence forces on both sides of the Arafura were notorious for large, mysterious expenses and mark-ups, whether explained as mismanagement, project cost over-runs, or simply left as public-sector accounting holes. It could seem misleading, and politically nave, to focus on the indirectly related Australian parliamentary debates on border protection bills, revised coastline status in unauthorized migration, and bureaucratic offshore processing for asylum seekers. Although those aspects reflected some Indonesian diplomatic pressures, the real effects would likely be far more substantial, though discrete, with no such implicit promotion of liberaldemocratic formalities and their advertisement of participation and openness.
DAVIES
p. 40
Cognitive dissonance & a different military culture That TNI planners could conceive and execute such a strategy would cause some Australian perceptions cognitive dissonance i.e., responses of delayed decision, stress and even more panic due to realitys blunt contradiction of preconceived understanding or assumptions about Indonesians and their military. On that more personal level for many Australians, especially those in the leadership elite, the cases facts together indicated conclusions in many ways unthinkable. Due to the Indonesian security forces major reliance on self-funding via non-military business activity, many western circles disregarded the TNI as a credible military force. TNIPOLRI budgeting was unconventional by many standards, but that situation brought assumptions in widespread, conventional critique of the TNI in particular, which was often assumed to be deficient or incompetent in its core military fields of training, organization, and operational methods and techniques i.e., the basic definitions of military professionalism. Energy spent in non-military business would certainly distract TNI members, but it would also encourage an unusually higher mercenarystyle business acumen. Like keen entrepreneur-opportunists, networks of astute and experienced Indonesian military executives could sense opportunities for their own enterprises. Complex TNI-based networks of intelligence and special operations, meshed with nominally civilian departments, needed no solitary, brilliant mind to achieve their aims. Serving officers and civilianized veteran-colleagues could (and mostly did) act collectively in institutional blocs. As in any state, such machinery could also seem reptilian: the predatory business-minded Indonesian type was perhaps like the locally iconic komodo dragon, which could smell open wounds of other komodos prey from several kilometres, in a kind of mutually supporting network. Just as most specific detail was unavailable for this study, severe source limitations hampered reconstruction of TNI command and staff processes in this case. Nonetheless, reasonable timeline-based assumptions may be useful for subsequent study, or for alternative assessment. Based on this studys detail however, TNI HQ probably conceived the campaign no later than early 2004. From that national strategic level, conduct likely defined lower-level operations into four phases: first establishing covert links and proxies in resistance and religious circles; secondly cultivating further-removed proxies of resistance sympathizers and religious dissidents; execution of the Merauke exodus operation, with particular attention to internal security, and; lastly, follow-up involving all-of-government and stateaffiliated national bodies to reinforce the actions coercive political-diplomatic pressure in the international arena of perception-management. The likely earliest phase assessed here probably ended by April 2005, with preparations confirmed in order to schedule appointments of key command and staff for the campaigns crucial West Papua operations. An apparent circumstantial lead was the early 2005 LEMHANAS (National Defence Institute) Internal Strategic Studies Course, where some senior officers could liaise in advance, at least on an initially discrete and informal basis, to ensure smooth coordination and no serious personality or other clashes. Coinciding with his appointment as KODAM XVII Trikora Chief of Staff, Brigadier-General Sudarmaidy Subandi was a course student visiting Lampung, site of Colonel Sihotangs post as KODAM II base regiment chief. Another course visitor was then LEMHANAS instructor and possibly the man appointed months later as KOREM 174s Chief of Staff: Major Totok Surono, likely due for promotion-onposting (to lieutenant-colonel) as KOREM 174 Chief of Staff.92
Such detail is not meant as conclusive, but as an indicator of informal senior TNI networking. See: POLDA Lampung Public Relations, Kunjungan Rombongan Peserta SSDN KSA XIII LEMHANAS di POLDA Lampung Tgl 27 April 2005. Online: <http://www.lampung.polri.go.id/External_ActualInf
92
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p. 41
Both by real actions and (at least) purported action in publicity, Jakartas leadership showed a canny ability to penetrate the Australian Governments decision cycle93 i.e., to attain favorable results by predicting Australian Government responses around unauthorized migrants, their religious affiliation, and the potential for a larger, ongoing exodus to Australian territory. In light of Indonesias far-reaching and expensive military restructure, procurement, and expansion, it was likely that those recent events would bring enormous cost to Australia. The Australian Government had all but locked in to such policy to appease major constituencies: SARA prejudices played a part there too, as many Indonesians knew, about an area of political manipulation Indonesias military knew better than most. If viewed as a sophisticated psychological operation in a wider infowar campaign publicly expressed in diplomacy, the most significant strategic Indonesian result achieved from the 43 West Papuans voyage from Merauke was destabilization of a large Australian target via a profound effect of cognitive dissonance, both in the Australian Government itself and its constituents.94 Retired Australian army officer and diplomat Bruce Haigh identified the same likelihood of calculated Indonesian and TNI manipulation of Australian policy over informal migration, although Haigh did not cover the specific complexities around the West Papua military situation.95 Like the TNIs steadily achieved restoration of more numerous KODAM formations as announced from April 1999, the military presence in West Papua was set to substantially increase in accordance with its own plans. Indonesias apparent diplomatic victory from Merauke probably gave the TNI yet greater scope for expansion. Therefore, the Merauke cases most enduring irony could be that Australia helped Indonesian military expansion not in the historically common areas of Southeast Asian strategic contest and sovereignty dispute, but rather in that part of Indonesia closest to the land mass of Australia itself.
o/attachments/LEMHANAS.doc> (accessed April 2006). 93 Commonly understood by the famous acronym OODA: observe, orientate, decide, act. For record, explanation and discussion of the now-standard military doctrinal concept, especially applicable to collective cognitive processes of command and staff, including those used in information warfare, see: John R. Boyd OTS Military Leader (resource with documents and discussion). Online: <http://www .au.af.mil/au/aul/school/ots/boyd.htm> (accessed July 2006). 94 Recalling past meetings with TNI officers in Australia, an ISG participant questioned whether the TNI had the sophistication to predict Australian responses in this case. In fact, recent Australian border protection policy and action was rarely missed in Indonesian journalism, while their underlying origins appeared with profound, almost iconic prominence in Australian history as the White Australia policy, yellow peril xenophobia, and fears of Russian invasion at the time of the Crimean War. The latter was unintentionally memorialized by cannon at Queenscliff, Victoria, where many TNI officers took courses at the Victorian-era fort-cum-command and staff college. At least as widely known, or fresher in public consciousness, was the coalition governments reliance on such historically profound phobia to excite wide constituent support underpinning a decade of electoral success. Ratih Hardjonos well-known book White Tribe of Asia is a striking example of thorough and detailed Indonesian discussion of historical Australian immigration policy and race issues, all the more remarkable because it was specially written for Indonesian beginner readers interested in Australia, while published and widely marketed as a mainstream text in metropolitan Indonesia. See: Hardjono, R., Suku putihnya Asia: perjalanan Australia mencari jati dirinya, Gramedia Pustaka Utama, Jakarta, 1992, p. xi, 12180. However, the subject of Australian race relations and ethnic identities permeates the entire text, including its treatment of defence issues. Another prominent example of the mainstream Indonesian access to such detailed Australian issues was the translated work of Australian writers, but also prominently available in Indonesian bookshops: Chauvel, R. (ed), Budaya dan Politik Australia, Yayasan Obor Indonesia, Jakarta, 1992. 95 The Canberra Times, Why trying to appease Indonesia doesnt work, 29 June 2006. Online: <http:// canberra.yourguide.com.au/detail.asp?class=your say&subclass=general&story_id=490822&category= Opinion&m=6&y=2006> (accessed July 2006). A previous article by Haigh rather focused on the more widely accepted assumption of an exclusively West Papuan resistance-driven voyage.
DAVIES
p. 42
Appendix I Identified key TNI territorial leadership, West Papua 20026

> - continued posting by previous appointee ? - unidentified / doubtful continuation by previous appointee NA not applicable to force structure during the period N.B. - Appointment stagger in practice i.e., juxtaposition in columns not always reflecting matched terms of officers postings >2002 2006
Major-General Mahidin Simbolon Brigadier-General Nurdin Zainal Colonel F. X. Mardjono Lieutenant-Colonel Daru Cahyono Colonel Mangasa R. Saragih KASREM 171 Lieutenant-Colonel (Chief of Staff) Richard Ginting Chief KODIM 1703 Lieutenant-Colonel Chief KODAM XVII Trikora KASDAM (Chief of Staff) Asinteldam (Asst for Intelligence) Dandeninteldam (Chief Int Det) Chief KOREM 171
Triyono Surachmaji
Major-General Nurdin Zainal Brigadier-General Getson T. Manurung Colonel Winston P. Simanjuntak Lieutenant-Colonel Viktor Tobing Colonel Halasan Simanjuntak
Major-General George Toisutta Brigadier-General Sudarmaidy Subandi Colonel Kaharuddin Wahab
Major-General Zamroni Brigadier-General Hotma Marbun* Colonel Basuki
?
Colonel Christian Zebua Lieutenant-Colonel
Triyono Surachmaji
>
Lieutenant-Colonel M. Muriadi
?
Lieutenant-Colonel Brylon R. Sianturi Lieutenant-Colonel Yusmana Lieutenant-Colonel Ranto Parulian Silaban Lieutenant-Colonel Togap F. Gultom Colonel Agus Mulyadi
Chief KODIM 1704 Lieutenant-Colonel Bachtiar Chief KODIM 1706 Lieutenant-Colonel Nyoto Suparjo Chief KODIM 1710 Lieutenant-Colonel Jamaluddin Chief KOREM 172 Colonel Bambang Sumarno KASREM 172 Lieutenant-Colonel Dwi Yatmo Wahardjo Chief KODIM 1701 Lieutenant-Colonel Seno Purbo Hardoyo Chief KODIM 1702 Lieutenant-Colonel Masrumsyah Chief KODIM 1707 Lieutenant-Colonel F. X. Bangun Pratiknyo Chief KOREM 173 Colonel Soehardi P. D. KASREM 173 Lieutenant-Colonel Suryatikno Chief KODIM 1705 Lieutenant-Colonel Adi Widjaja Chief KODIM 1708 Lieutenant-Colonel Harri Partono Chief KODIM 1709
Lieutenant-Colonel Bambang Murtiyoso Lieutenant-Colonel Didied Pramudito Lieutenant-Colonel Ali Bargo Lieutenant-Colonel Himsa Siburian Colonel Asis Wanto Lieutenant-Colonel Seno Purbo Hardoyo Lieutenant-Colonel Viktor Tobing Lieutenant-Colonel Sardjono [see under 'Chief KOREM 174' below] Colonel Ervi Tri Assunu Lieutenant-Colonel Masrumsyah Lieutenant-Colonel Didiet Pramudito Lieutenant-Colonel Marsudi
> > >

Lieutenant-Colonel Gustav Irianto K.
> > > >

NA
>
Lieutenant-Colonel Daru Cahyono Lieutenant-Colonel Gustav Irianto K Lieutenant-Colonel Paulus Herpomo T. Colonel Tri Usadi Setyoko
>
Lieutenant-Colonel Djuwondo Lieutenant-Colonel Sumaidi Lieutenant-Colonel Dwiman F.
>
Lieutenant-Colonel Totok Suruno
>
Lieutenant-Colonel Yunadi NA NA NA
?
Colonel Kitaran Joy Sihotang Lieutenant-Colonel Totok Surono Lieutenant-Colonel Lieutenant-Colonel Paulus Herpomo T. Didi Suswandi
Chief KOREM 174 KASREM 174
NA NA
> >
Chief KODIM 1707 NA [see under 'Chief KOREM 172' above]
* Replaced by Brigadier-General Geerhan Lantara (see Figure 6, p. 27)
DAVIES
p. 43
Appendix II Identified POLRI territorial chiefs, West Papua 20026

> - continued posting by previous appointee ? - unidentified / doubtful continuation by previous appointee NA not applicable to force structure during the period N.B. - Appointment stagger in practice i.e., juxtaposition in columns not always reflecting matched terms of officers postings >late 2002 2006
Chief POLDA Papua Deputy Chief POLDA Papua Chief Jayapura Munic. Precinct Chief Jayapura Precinct Keerom Sarmi
Inspector-General Budi Utomo Brigadier-General H. Raziman Tarigan NA Dep. Ch. Comm. Daud Sihombing NA NA
Inspector-General Timbul Silaen Brigadier-General Tommy T. Yacobus Dep. Ch. Comm. Moh. Son Ani Dep. Ch. Comm. Totok Kasmiarto NA NA
Jayawijaya Merauke Mappi / Asmat Mimika Nabire Paniai Puncak Jaya Biak Numfor Yapen Waropen Supiori Manokwari
Dep. Ch. Comm. D. Suripatty Dep. Ch. Comm. Yoh. Agus Mulyono NA Dep. Ch. Comm. Rudi Juliantoro Dep. Ch. Comm. Hendrian Muntanzar Dep. Ch. Comm. Moh. Son Ani NA Dep. Ch. Comm. Robinsar Damanik Dep. Ch. Comm. Fachrudin NA Dep. Ch. Comm. Bambang Budi Santoso NA Dep. Ch. Comm. Totok Kasmiarto NA NA Dep. Ch. Comm. Faisal Abdoel Nasser NA
Dep. Ch. Comm. Irianto Dep. Ch. Comm. Hendrian Muntanzar NA Dep. Ch. Comm. Paulus Waterpauw
Inspector-General Dody Sumantyawan Brigadier-General F. X. Purwoko Dep. Ch. Comm. Paulus Waterpauw Dep. Ch. Comm. Robert Djoenso Comm. Robert Kennedy Comm. Kornelis Good Help Mansnembra Dep. Ch. Comm. Agung Makbul
Inspector-General Tommy T. Yacobus Brigadier-General Max Aer Dep. Ch. Comm. Taufik Pribadi Dep. Ch. Comm. Yacob Kalembang
> >
Dep. Ch. Comm. Robert Djoenso Dep. Ch. Comm. Wirawibawa
>
NA Dep. Ch. Comm. Dedy Djunaedy Dep. Ch. Comm. Moh. Son Ani Dep. Ch. Comm. Antonius Dance Comm. Hans Eduard Somnaikubun Dep. Ch. Comm. Wirawibawa
?/?
Dep. Ch. Comm. Jantje J. Tuilan Dep. Ch. Comm. Wagiyo Raharjo
?
Dep. Ch. Comm. Taufik Pribadi NA Dep. Ch. Comm. Fachrudin Dep. Ch. Comm. Nelson Panjaitan NA Dep. Ch. Comm. Johannes Prapto Wirahadi NA Dep. Ch. Comm. Syahroni NA NA
> >
Dep. Ch. Comm. Nelson Panjaitan Dep. Ch. Comm. I Made Juliadi
>
Comm. Pasero Dep. Ch. Comm. Dedi Kusnadi Comm. Piet Renmaur Dep. Ch. Comm. Petrus Wayne Dep. Ch. Comm. Matius D. Fakhiri Dep. Ch. Comm. Taufik Pribadi Dep. Ch. Comm. Ahmat Juri Comm. Wempy Batlayeri
>
Dep. Ch. Comm. Petrus Wayne Comm. G. Aris Purba
Teluk Bintuni Fakfak Kaimana Sorong Munic. Precinct Sorong Sorong Selatan
? >
Dep. Ch. Comm. Borent Dep. Ch. Comm. I Made D. Giri
>
NA
>
DAVIES
p. 44
Appendix III Estimated Indonesian force strengths, West Papua 2006

Formation / command / service KODAM XVII KOREM KODIMKORAMIL Terr inf bns (organic) Other increase to organic KODAM elms Satgasbanintel Inf bns (non-organic) Naval bases Composition by sub-category / subordinate elements HQ, Armd, Engr, Mil Pol, Sigs & Tpt elms HQ KOREM 1713 & 174 cadre KODIMs 17011710 & sub-formations 7516 inf bns (over-strength) armd cav det raised to bn; new inf bde formation KOPASSUS cadre & KOSTRAD taipur elms KOSTRAD & terr inf bns Primary Naval Base V (Jayapura), Biak, Sorong, Timika, Manokwari Depot, upgraded Merauke interim Primary Naval Base, inc. based marines Jayapura, Biak, Timika, Merauke HQ & support staff POLRES & sub-formations regencydistrict levels 3 X organic POLDA BRIMOB dets BRIMOB coy elms from DEOPS & other POLDA Troop totals 900 1,000 3,200+ 4,800+ 300 400 1,500 400+
Air & air defence bases Sub-Total TNI POLDA Papua-Irian Jaya POLRESPOLSEK BRIMOBDA Papua BRIMOB (non-organic) Sub-Total POLRI SECURITY FORCES TOTAL
300+ 12,800+ 300 8,500+ 1,300 1,000 11,100+ 23,900+
Notes Army territorial (KODAM XVII): Increases in infantry battalions (organic KODAM XVII) reflect an officially announced program for the new battalions from early 2004 up to the end of this year. Therefore, battalions are undergoing probably the second-last expansion phase at the time of writing, as the latest component companies settle in to their respective posts. As seen with Aceh and other prioritized border/insurgency areas, the TNI was even more discrete about expansions to pre-existing territorial infantry battalions (751, 752 and 753), but several Indonesian references on that aspect, and its more practical implications for command, control and planning, would all confirm its proximate inclusion in the expansion. It is unconfirmed whether that part of the expansion was concurrent with the phased steps for the newly raised battalions, or was instead set for a separate, later series of postings. KOSTRAD: The 3rd KOSTRAD Infantry Division (Divif 3) was not planned to add 15,000 troops to West Papua, but approximately 10,000 at Sorong and Jayapura, with a smaller number for divisional HQ and other assets; one of that planned divisions organic brigades was allocated to Gorontalo Province, northern Sulawesi, for which preparations already began by May 2006. Navy (inc. Marine Corps): The planned Merauke Primary Naval Base was intended as part of a fleet upgrade program commencing 2006. More tentative proposals existed for a 3rd Amphibious Force (Pasmar 3, possibly by 2024) at Sorong which would, if realized beside KOSTRAD additions, make for a total extra 15,000 West Papuabased troops, while Sorong-based fleet command would add 5,000 more (planned for 2008). As corps and navy chiefs themselves explained, Marines proposals hinged on funding availability. However, that hurdle could have been overcome via concessions from donor states, particularly Australia following its West Papua asylum-seeker controversy and bilateral security agreement. Police (POLRI): Research from early 2003 showed a serious deficiency in the authors 2001 SDSC papers estimate for POLRI numbers in West Papua. POLRI sources (Online: <www.spers.polri.go.id.s atker>, accessed from 2002early 2004) recorded a progressive increase from 8,3009,100 (allotted or establishment strength of 10,000, possibly reached or exceeded since the creation of post-2004 precincts). Those figures counted BRIMOB troops organic to POLDA Irja/Papua, while 300+ civil servants were deducted. The increase, and part of the 2001 papers under-estimation, are explained by the increased police territorial numbers since 2001. The official POLRI personnel branch source was blocked from public access since early 2004, probably by setting permissions for internal IP addresses. BRIMOB (POLRI): Locally based BRIMOB units (organic POLDA) changed their designation from battalions to the more accurate detachments (note the resulting 2001 papers probable over-estimation). BRIMOB companies deployed from outside (non-organic POLDA Papua) have been more discrete in reporting, though still continuing that pattern especially since being freed up from the heavy Aceh commitment (notwithstanding their own considerable combat and tsunami losses there).

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TNI & POLRI FORCES IN

Restructuring & Reasserting Sovereignty

TNI & POLRI Forces in West Papua

TNI & POLRI Forces in West Papua

ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS & TERMS

* May be interchangeable in reporting; probably distinguishable by hierarchical level in formal references

MAIN MILITARY SYMBOLS 3 HQ Unit planned / being raised

KODAM / POLDA HQ KOREM / POLWIL HQ KODIM / POLRES HQ

Police Navy / marines Unit / appointment rotation

TNI & POLRI Forces in West Papua

The Sunday Age, Indonesian strategy defeats Australia, 13 August 2006.

TNI & POLRI Forces in West Papua

TNI & POLRI Forces in West Papua

TNI & POLRI Forces in West Papua

WEST IRIAN JAYA

TNI & POLRI Forces in West Papua

432 Dec 05? 411

JAYAWIJAYA Wamena 171 174

XVII 711 Dec 05? 509 1710

431 3 (- ) Aug 05 501 18 <?Jul 06

BOVEN DIGOEL MAPPI

Jan 06 512 XVII

1707 755 XVII

TNI & POLRI Forces in West Papua

WEST IRIAN JAYA

SORONG MANOKWARI BINTUNI FAKFAK d

Jayapura SARMI JAYA 2004> 2004>

JAYAWIJAYA JAYAWIJAYA Wamena

BRIMOB (police mobile 'brigade')

TNI & POLRI Forces in West Papua

TNI & POLRI Forces in West Papua

TNI & POLRI Forces in West Papua

TNI & POLRI Forces in West Papua

TNI & POLRI Forces in West Papua

TNI & POLRI Forces in West Papua

(POLRESTA) Jayapura Jayapura (municipality)

TNI & POLRI Forces in West Papua

XVII 171 172 174

June 2005 173

(2000) XVI Pattimura

1703 1704 1706 1710

1705 1708 1709

TNI & POLRI Forces in West Papua

TNI & POLRI Forces in West Papua

TNI & POLRI Forces in West Papua

DAM VIIIXVII/TKR DAM Jaya West Papua

DAM XVI/PTM Ambon

East DAM VII/WRB Timor

- KODAM base (training) regiment

TNI & POLRI Forces in West Papua

TNI & POLRI Forces in West Papua

MAJGEN (rt) IRGEN A. M'bai MAJGEN Setia P. Syamsir Siregar

POLRI (Intelkam) (Bina Mitra)

BRIGGEN Sudarmaidy S. COL Kaharudin Wahab

TNI KOMINDA BIN DEPDAGRI KAJATI (etc.)

Desk Anti-Terror KASREM TIMINTELREM

Bupati Merauke John Gluba Gebze

LTCOL Totok Surono CAPT Akmal

(districts) BKBPM KOMINDA (villages) Satpol PP

TNI & POLRI Forces in West Papua

TNI & POLRI Forces in West Papua

TNI & POLRI Forces in West Papua

KOPASSUS LINK PREVIOUS POSTING / DEPLOYMENT LINK

TNI & POLRI Forces in West Papua