-1Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila FIRST DIVISION NILO PADRE, Petitioner, - versus Present: G.R. No.

165423

FRUCTOSA BADILLO, CORONA, C. J., Chairperson, FEDILA BADILLO, VELASCO, JR., PRESENTACION CABALLES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, EDWINA VICARIO (d) DEL CASTILLO, and represented by MARY JOY PEREZ, JJ. VICARIO-ORBETA and NELSON BADILLO, Promulgated: Respondents. January 19, 2011 x-------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION DEL CASTILLO, J.: A void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.1[1] This petition for review on certiorari assails the Orders dated July 21 and September 20, 20042[2] issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Allen, Northern Samar, Branch 23 in Special Civil Action No. A-927, which affirmed the ruling of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Isidro, Northern Samar that it has jurisdiction to try Civil Case No. 104. Factual Antecedents On October 13, 1986, the RTC of Allen, Northern Samar, Branch 23, rendered judgment3[3] in Civil Case No. A-514 for Ownership and Recovery of Possession with Damages in favor of therein plaintiffs Fructosa Badillo, Fedila Badillo, Edwina Badillo, Presentacion Badillo and Nelson Badillo and against therein defendants, including Consesa Padre. The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads: WHEREFORE, on preponderance of evidence, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, declaring and ordering as follows: 1. That the herein plaintiffs are the lawful owners of the five-sixth (5/6) portion of Lot No. 4080, Pls-54, registered in Original Certificate of Title No. 736, more particularly, the said five-sixth portion is described, delineated and/or indicated in the Sketch Plan which is now marked as Exhibit B-1; 2. That the said five-sixth (5/6) portion which [is] herein adjudged as being owned by the herein plaintiffs, include the portions of land presently being occupied by defendants x x x, Concesa Padre, x x x; 3. Ordering the defendants mentioned in No. 2 hereof to vacate x x x the lots respectively occupied by them and restore to [the herein plaintiffs] the material possessions thereof; 4. Condemning and ordering each of the same defendants herein above-named to pay plaintiffs the amount of P100.00 per month, as monthly rental, starting from January 19, 1980, until the lots in question shall have been finally restored to the plaintiffs; and 5. Condemning and ordering the herein defendants named above to jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs the amount of P5,000.00 representing attorneys fees and P2,000.00 as litigation expenses, and to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.4[4]

This Decision became final and executory on November 5, 1986.5[5] On December 29, 1997, the Badillo family filed another complaint against those who occupy their property which included some of the defendants in Civil Case No. A-514.6[6] The case was filed with the MTC of San Isidro, Northern Samar and was docketed as Civil Case No. 104.7[7] As Consesa Padre had already died in 1989, her heir, Nilo Padre (Nilo), was impleaded as one of the defendants. While some of the defendants filed their respective answers, Nilo was one of those who were declared in default for failure to file their answer to the complaint.8[8] Although denominated as one for Ownership and Possession, the Badillo family alleged in their complaint in Civil Case No. 104 viz: 4. That plaintiffs are the joint owners of Lot No. 4080. Pls-54, with a total area of 10,167 square meters, covered by OCT No. 736 in the name of Eutequio Badillo, deceased husband of plaintiff Fructosa Badillo and father of the rest of the other plaintiffs, covered by Tax Declaration No. 9160 and assessed at P26,940.00; 5. That plaintiffs in Civil Case No. A-514, entitled Fructosa Badillo versus Celso Castillo, et. al., were the prevailing parties in the aforesaid case as evidenced by the hereto attached copy of the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the above-entitled case and marked as Annex A and made integral part of this complaint; 6. That after the judgment in the above-mentioned case became final, the same was executed as evidenced by a copy of the writ of execution hereto attached as Annex B and made integral part hereof;

7. That despite the service of the writ of execution and vacating the properties x x x illegally occupied by the afore-mentioned defendants, [said defendants] re-entered the property in 1990 after the execution and refused to vacate the same [thereby] reasserting their claims of ownership x x x despite repeated demands; 8. That all attempts towards a peaceful settlement of the matter outside of Court to avoid a civil suit, such as referring the matter of the Brgy. Captain and the Brgy. Lupon of Brgy. Alegria, San Isidro, N. Samar were of no avail as the defendants refused to heed lawful demands of plaintiffs to x x x vacate the premises[. I]nstead, defendants claimed ownership of the property in question [and] refused to vacate the same despite repeated demands [such] that having lost all peaceful remedies, plaintiffs were constrained to file this suit. Certificate to file Action is hereby attached and marked as Annex C and made integral part hereof;9[9] (Emphasis supplied.)

Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court

The MTC rendered judgment10[10] on July 17, 2003. Interpreting the suit of the Badillo family as an action to revive the dormant judgment in Civil Case No. A-514, the court recognized the right of the plaintiffs to finally have such judgment enforced. The MTC disposed of the case as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is ordered reviving the previous judgment of the Regional Trial Court there being, and still, preponderance of evidence in favor of plaintiffs, as follows: 1. That the herein plaintiffs are the lawful owners of the five-sixth (5/6) portion of Lot No. 4080, Pls-54, registered in Original Certificate of Title No. 730, more particularly x x x described, delineated and/or indicated in the Sketch Plan which is now marked as Exhibit B-1; 2. That the said five-sixth portion which is herein adjudged as being owne[d] by herein plaintiffs, includes the portions of land presently being occupied by defendants Victor Eulin, Consesa Padre, Celso Castillo, Leo Atiga, Santos Corollo, Iego Armogela, Salustiano Millano, Milagros Gile, Pusay Enting, Galeleo Pilapil, more particularly indicated in Exhibit B-1 and marked as Exhibits B-3, B-4, B-5, B-6, B-7, B-8, B-9, B-10, B-11, B-12, and B13, respectively; 3. Ordering the defendants mentioned in No. 2, hereof and THOSE PRESENTLY NAMED AS PARTY-DEFENDANTS IN THIS REVIVAL OF JUDGMENT AND THOSE ACTING IN PRIVITY to vacate from the lots respectively occupied by them and restore [to] the herein plaintiff x x x the material possession thereof; 4. Condemning and ordering each of the same defendants named in the previous civil case and those NAMED ANEW to jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs the amount of P5,000.00, representing attorneys fees, and P2,000.00 as litigation expenses; 5. CONDEMNING ALL DEFENDANTS HEREIN TO PAY EXEMPLARY DAMAGES FOR OBSTINATELY VIOLATING THE DECISION OF THE COURT JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY X X X THE AMOUNT OF P5,000.00, and to pay the costs of the suit. SO ORDERED.11[11] Nilo thereafter appeared and moved to reconsider12[12] the MTC judgment. He argued that the MTC is without jurisdiction over the case, opining that the action for revival of judgment is a real action and should be filed with the same court, i.e., the RTC, which rendered the decision sought to be revived. Or, assuming arguendo that the MTC has jurisdiction over real actions, it must be noted that the subject property is assessed at P26,940.00, an amount beyond the P20,000.00 limit for the MTC to have jurisdiction over real actions, in accordance with Republic Act (RA) No. 7691.13[13] Nilo also contended that the action is dismissible for a) lack of certificate of non-forum shopping in the complaint and b) prescription, the complaint for revival of judgment having been filed beyond the 10-year reglementary period14[14] from the time the judgment sought to be revived became final and executory in November 1986. The MTC denied the motion for reconsideration.15[15] It held that the case is an action for revival of judgment and not an action for ownership and possession, which had already long been settled. To the MTC, the former is a personal action under Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court which may be filed, at the election of plaintiffs, either at the court of the place where they reside or where the defendants reside. The court found excusable the absence of the certification against forum shopping, justifying that the action filed before it is merely a continuation of the previous suit for ownership. Moreover, the counsel for the Badillo family, a nonagenarian, may not yet have been familiar with the rule when Civil Case No. 104 was filed. To it, this mistake should not prejudice the Badillo family who deserve to possess and enjoy their properties. Ruling of the Regional Trial Court By way of a special civil action for certiorari, Nilo elevated the case to the RTC to question the MTCs jurisdiction,16[16] reiterating the same grounds he had raised before the MTC. The case was docketed as Special Civil Action No. A-927. On July 21, 2004, however, the RTC dismissed said petition17[17] on the ground that it was filed late. Moreover, the RTC upheld the MTCs jurisdiction over the case, affirming the MTCs ratiocination that an action for enforcement of a dormant judgment is a personal action, and hence may be filed either at the court of the place where plaintiffs reside or where the defendants reside. In his Motion for Reconsideration,18[18] Nilo contended that his petition with the RTC was timely filed as shown by the registry receipt dated March 1, 2004,19[19] stamped on the mailing envelope he used in filing said petition. He argued that this date of mailing is also the date of filing. He also contended that the RTCs Decision was bereft of any explanation as to why it ruled that the case is a personal action. He further alleged that the RTC failed to discuss the issues of prescription and non-compliance with the rule against forum shopping. In its Order dated September 20, 2004, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration. It said: Assuming that the date of posting was March 1, 2004, as shown in the registry receipts, still the 60-day reglementary period had already lapsed with December 30, 2003 as the reckoning period when petitioner received the December 9, 2003 Order of Hon. Judge Jose A. Benesisto. With the month of February, 2004 having 29 days, it is now clear that the petition was filed sixty one (61) days after; hence, there is no timeliness of the petition to speak of.

Civil Case No. 104 is an ordinary action to enforce a dormant judgment filed by plaintiffs against defendants. Being an action for the enforcement of dormant judgment for damages is a personal one and should be brought in any province where the plaintiff or defendant resides, at the option of the plaintiff. As regards prescription, the present rule now is, the prescriptive period commences to run anew from the finality of the revived judgment. A revived judgment is enforceable again by motion within five years and thereafter by another action within ten years from the finality of the revived judgment. There is, therefore, no prescription or beyond the statute of limitations to speak [sic] in the instant case. Petitioners contention must therefore fail. It is but proper and legal that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 514 of which they are the prevailing parties to institute for the enforcement of a dormant judgment [which right] they have failed to exercise x x x for more than a decade. Being an ordinary action to enforce a dormant judgment, not even testimonial evidence is necessary to enforce such judgment because the decision had long obtained its finality. x x x x20[20]

Hence, this petition. Petitioners Arguments Nilo finds the RTCs adverse ruling as wanting in sufficient explanation as to the factual and legal bases for upholding the MTC. He also highlights the failure of the Badillo family to attach to their complaint a certificate of non-forum shopping. Petitioner also argues that the date of mailing of his petition with the RTC is the date of his filing. He stressed that the filing of his petition on March 1, 2004 was well within the prescriptive period. As the 60th day from December 30, 2003 fell on a Saturday, he maintains that the Rules of Court allows him to file his petition on the next working day, which is March 1, 2004, a Monday. As have already been raised in the courts below, Nilo mentions the following grounds for the dismissal of the action against him before the MTC: a) The MTC lacks jurisdiction. Nilo reiterates that the prime objective of the Badillo family in Civil Case No. 104 is to recover real property, which makes it a real action. Citing the case of Aldeguer v. Gemelo,21[21] he contends that this suit must be brought before the RTC of Allen, Northern Samar. Besides, the assessed value of the land in controversy, i.e., P26,940.00, divests the MTC of jurisdiction. b) Prescription. Nilo claims that the Badillo familys suit had already lapsed as they allowed 11 years to pass without resorting to any legal remedy before filing the action for revival of judgment. Although the Badillo family moved for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. A-514, the same did not interrupt the running of the period to have the judgment enforced by motion or by action. Respondents Arguments While impliedly acknowledging that Nilo seasonably filed his petition for certiorari with the RTC, the Badillo family note that he should have filed an appeal before the RTC. They claim that they properly filed their case, a personal action, with the MTC of San Isidro, Northern Samar as they are allowed under Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court to elect the venue as to where to file their case. Granting that their action is considered a revival of judgment, the Badillos claim that they filed their suit within the 10-year period. They contend that in filing Civil Case No. 104 in December 1997, the prescriptive period should not be counted from the finality of judgment in Civil Case No. A-514, but should be reckoned from August 22, 1989, when the RTC issued an Order that considered as abandoned the motion to declare the defendants in default in the contempt proceedings. Issue The question that should be settled is whether the RTC correctly affirmed the MTC ruling that it has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 104. Our Ruling Indeed, [t]he existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes a resort to certiorari.22[22] The court a quo could have instead dismissed Nilos petition on the ground that this question should have been raised by way of an appeal.23[23] This rule is subject to exceptions, such as when the writs issued are null and void or when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.24[24] As will be later on discussed, the RTC, although it ultimately erred in its judgment, was nevertheless correct in entertaining the special civil action for certiorari. The exceptions we mentioned apply in the case at bar, as it turns out that petitioners jurisdictional objection has compelling basis. Timeliness of the petition for certiorari The petition for certiorari before the RTC was timely filed. If the pleading filed was not done personally, the date of mailing, as stamped on the envelope or the registry receipt, is considered as the date of filing.25[25] By way of registered mail, Nilo filed his petition for certiorari with the RTC on March 1, 2004, as indicated in the date stamped on its envelope. From the time Nilo received on December 30, 2003 the MTCs denial of his motion for reconsideration, the last day for him to file his petition with the RTC fell on February 28, 2004, a Saturday. Under the Rules, should the last day of the period to file a pleading fall on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, a litigant is allowed to file his or her pleading on the next working day,26[26] which in the case at bar, fell on a Monday, i.e., March 1, 2004. Jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 104 We shall now look into the core argument of Nilo anent the MTCs lack of jurisdiction over the case and the alleged prescription of the action. [W]hat determines the nature of the action and which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.27[27] In their complaint in Civil Case No. 104, some of the allegations of the Badillo family, which petitioner never opposed and are thus deemed admitted by him, states: 4. That plaintiffs are the joint owners of Lot No. 4080. Pls-54, with a total area of 10,167 square meters, covered by OCT No. 736 in the name of Eutequio Badillo, deceased husband of plaintiff Fructosa Badillo and father of the rest of the other plaintiffs, covered by Tax Declaration No. 9160 and assessed at P26,940.00; 5. That plaintiffs in Civil Case No. A-514, entitled Fructosa Badillo versus Celso Castillo, et. al., were the prevailing parties in the aforesaid case as evidenced by the hereto attached copy of the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the above-entitled case and marked as Annex A and made integral part of this complaint;

6. That after the judgment in the above-mentioned case became final, the same was executed as evidenced by a copy of the writ of execution hereto attached as Annex B and made integral part hereof; 7. That despite the service of the writ of execution and vacating the properties x x x illegally occupied by the afore-mentioned defendants, the latter re-entered the property in 1990 after the execution and refused to vacate the same [thereby] reasserting their claims of ownership over [the disputed properties] and refused to vacate the same despite repeated demands; 8. That all attempts towards a peaceful settlement of the matter outside of Court to avoid a civil suit, such as referring the matter of the Brgy. Captain and the Brgy. Lupon of Brgy. Alegria, San Isidro, N. Samar were of no avail as the defendants refused to heed lawful demands of plaintiffs to x x x vacate the premises[. I]nstead, defendants claimed ownership of the property in question refused to vacate the same despite repeated demands [such] that having lost all peaceful remedies, plaintiffs were constrained to file this suit. Certificate to file Action is hereby attached and marked as Annex C and made integral part hereof;28[28] (Emphasis supplied.)

Under paragraph 6 of their complaint, the Badillos alleged that judgment in Civil Case No. A-514 had become final and had been executed. Further, in paragraph 7, they alleged that in 1990, the defendants re-entered the property and despite repeated demands they refused to vacate the same. Thus, the Badillos were not at all seeking a revival of the judgment. In reality, they were asking the MTC to legally oust the occupants from their lots. The Badillo family would have been correct in seeking judicial recourse from the MTC had the case been an action for ejectment, i.e., one of forcible entry under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court wherein essential facts constituting forcible entry29[29] have been averred and the suit filed within one year from the time of unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, as the MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over such suit.30[30] However, as the alleged dispossession occurred in 1990, the one-year period to bring a case for forcible entry had expired since the Badillos filed their suit only in December 1997. We thus construe that the remedy they availed of is the plenary action of accion publiciana, which may be instituted within 10 years.31[31] It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.32[32] Whether the case filed by the Badillo family is a real or a personal action is irrelevant. Determining whether an action is real or personal is for the purpose only of determining venue. In the case at bar, the question raised concerns jurisdiction, not venue. Although the Badillo family correctly filed a case for accion publiciana, they pleaded their case before the wrong court. In civil cases involving realty or interest therein not within Metro Manila, the MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction only if the assessed value of the subject property or interest therein does not exceed P20,000.00.33[33] As the assessed value of the property subject matter of this case is P26,940.00, and since more than one year had expired after the dispossession, jurisdiction properly belongs to the RTC.34[34] Hence, the MTC has no judicial authority at all to try the case in the first place. A decision of the court without jurisdiction is null and void; hence, it could never logically become final and executory. Such a judgment may be attacked directly or collaterally.35[35] Based on the foregoing discussion, it is not anymore necessary to discuss the issue raised concerning the failure to include a certification of non-forum shopping. Although we are compelled to dismiss respondents action before the MTC, they are nonetheless not precluded from filing the necessary judicial remedy with the proper court. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated July 21 and September 20, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Allen, Northern Samar, Branch 23 in Special Civil Action No. A-927 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Municipal Trial Court of San Isidro, Northern Samar is DIRECTED to dismiss Civil Case No. 104 for lack of jurisdiction. SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice Chairperson SECOND DIVISION RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC., Petitioners, - versus HON. JANSEN R. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6, JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME CHENG, MERCEDES IGNE AND LUCINA SANTOS, substituted by her son, EDUARDO S. BALAJADIA, Respondents. G.R. No. 192828 Present: CARPIO, J.,

BRION, PEREZ, ARANAL-SERENO, and REYES, JJ.

Chairperson,

Promulgated: November 28, 2011 x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION REYES, J.: The Case Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari36[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the December 14, 2009 Decision37[2] and July 8, 2010 Resolution38[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 99856. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the petition filed in this case and AFFIRMING the assailed Orders dated March 15, 2007 and May 16, 2007 issued by the respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, in Manila in Civil Case No. 02-105251.39[4] The assailed Resolution denied the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. The Factual Antecedents Sometime between November 25, 2002 and December 3, 2002,40[5] the respondents filed a Complaint41[6] against the petitioners and Stronghold Insurance Company, Global Business Bank, Inc. (formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del Pilar, Asia Atlantic Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds of Manila and Malabon, and all persons claiming rights or titles from Ramon Ching (Ramon) and his successors-in-interest. The Complaint, captioned as one for "Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for [the] Issuance of [a] Temporary Restraining Order and [a] Writ of Preliminary Injunction," was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-105251 and raffled to Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC). In the Complaint, the respondents alleged the following as causes of action: First Cause of Action. They are the heirs of Lim San, also known as Antonio Ching / Tiong Cheng / Ching Cheng Suy (Antonio). Respondents Joseph Cheng (Joseph) and Jaime Cheng (Jaime) are allegedly the children of Antonio with his common-law wife, respondent Mercedes Igne (Mercedes). Respondent Lucina Santos (Lucina) claimed that she was also a common-law wife of Antonio. The respondents averred that Ramon misrepresented himself as Antonio's and Lucina's son when in truth and in fact, he was adopted and his birth certificate was merely simulated. On July 18, 1996, Antonio died of a stab wound. Police investigators identified Ramon as the prime suspect and he now stands as the lone accused in a criminal case for murder filed against him. Warrants of arrest issued against him have remained unserved as he is at large. From the foregoing circumstances and upon the authority of Article 91942[7] of the New Civil Code (NCC), the respondents concluded that Ramon can be legally disinherited, hence, prohibited from receiving any share from the estate of Antonio. Second Cause of Action. On August 26, 1996, prior to the conclusion of the police investigations tagging Ramon as the prime suspect in the murder of Antonio, the former made an inventory of the latter's estate. Ramon misrepresented that there were only six real estate properties left by Antonio. The respondents alleged that Ramon had illegally transferred to his name the titles to the said properties. Further, there are two other parcels of land, cash and jewelries, plus properties in Hongkong, which were in Ramon's possession. Third Cause of Action. Mercedes, being of low educational attainment, was sweet-talked by Ramon into surrendering to him a Global Business Bank, Inc. (Global Bank) Certificate of Time Deposit of P4,000,000.00 in the name of Antonio, and the certificates of title covering two condominium units in Binondo which were purchased by Antonio using his own money but which were registered in Ramon's name. Ramon also fraudulently misrepresented to Joseph, Jaime and Mercedes that they will promptly receive their complete shares, exclusive of the stocks in Po Wing Properties, Inc. (Po Wing), from the estate of Antonio. Exerting undue influence, Ramon had convinced them to execute an Agreement43[8] and a Waiver44[9] on August 20, 1996. The terms and conditions stipulated in the Agreement and Waiver, specifically, on the payment by Ramon to Joseph, Jaime and Mercedes of the amount of P22,000,000.00, were not complied with. Further, Lucina was not informed of the execution of the said instruments and had not received any amount from Ramon. Hence, the instruments are null and void. Fourth Cause of Action. Antonio's 40,000 shares in Po Wing, which constitute 60% of the latter's total capital stock, were illegally transferred by Ramon to his own name through a forged document of sale executed after Antonio died. Po Wing owns a ten-storey building in Binondo. Ramon's claim that he bought the stocks from Antonio before the latter died is baseless. Further, Lucina's shares in Po Wing had also banished into thin air through Ramon's machinations. Fifth Cause of Action. On October 29, 1996, Ramon executed an Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate45[10] adjudicating solely to himself Antonio's entire estate to the prejudice of the respondents. By virtue of the said instrument, new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) covering eight real properties owned by Antonio were issued in Ramon's name. Relative to the Po Wing shares, the Register of Deeds of Manila had required Ramon to post a Surety Bond conditioned to answer for whatever claims which may eventually surface in connection with the said stocks. Co-defendant Stronghold Insurance Company issued the bond in Ramon's behalf. Sixth Cause of Action. Ramon sold Antonio's two parcels of land in Navotas to co-defendant Asia Atlantic Business Ventures, Inc. Another parcel of land, which was part of Antonio's estate, was sold by Ramon to co-defendant Elena Tiu Del Pilar at an unreasonably low price. By reason of Ramon's lack of authority to dispose of any part of Antonio's estate, the conveyances are null and void ab initio. Since Ramon is at large, his wife, Belen Dy Tan Ching, now manages Antonio's estate. She has no intent to convey to the respondents their shares in the estate of Antonio. The respondents thus prayed for the following in their Complaint:

1. x x x a temporary restraining order be issued restraining the defendant RAMON CHING and/or his attorney-in-fact Belen Dy Tan Ching from disposing, selling or alienating any property that belongs to the estate of the deceased ANTONIO CHING; xxx 4. x x x a.) Declaring that the defendant RAMON CHING who murdered his father ANTONIO CHING disqualified as heir and from inheriting to (sic) the estate of his father; b.) Declaring the nullity of the defendant RAMON CHING transfer (sic) of the six [6] parcels of land from the name of his father ANTONIO CHING to his name covered by TCT No. x x x; c.) Declaring the nullity of the AGREEMENT and WAIVER executed by plaintiffs x x x in favor of x x x RAMON CHING for being patently immoral, invalid, illegal, simulated and (sic) sham; d.) Declaring the nullity of the transfer of the shares of stocks at (sic) PO WING from the names of ANTONIO CHING and LUCINA SANTOS to the defendant ANTONIO CHING's name for having been illegally procured through the falsification of their signatures in the document purporting the transfer thereof; e.) Declaring the nullity and to have no force and effect the AFFIDAVIT OF SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE executed by x x x RAMON CHING for being contrary to law and existing jurisprudence; f.) Declaring the nullity of the DEED OF SALES (sic) executed by x x x RAMON CHING (i) over two (2) parcels of land x x x to defendant ASIA ATLANTIC BUSINESS VENTURES, Inc.; and (ii) one (1) parcel of land x x x sold to x x x ELENA TIU DEL PILAR for having illegally procured the ownership and titles of the above properties; x x x.46[11] The petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss47[12] alleging forum shopping, litis pendentia, res judicata and the respondents as not being the real parties in interest. On July 30, 2004, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order48[13] denying the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss. The respondents filed an Amended Complaint49[14] dated April 7, 2005 impleading Metrobank as the successor-in-interest of co-defendant Global Bank. The Amended Complaint also added a seventh cause of action relative to the existence of a Certificate of Premium Plus Acquisition (CPPA) in the amount of P4,000,000.00 originally issued by PhilBank to Antonio. The respondents prayed that they be declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA and that it be immediately released to them. Alternatively, the respondents prayed for the issuance of a hold order relative to the CPPA to preserve it during the pendency of the case. On April 22, 2005, the petitioners filed their Consolidated Answer with Counterclaim.50[15] On October 28, 2005, the RTC issued an Order51[16] admitting the respondents' Amended Complaint. The RTC stressed that Metrobank had already filed Manifestations admitting that as successor-in-interest of Global Bank, it now possesses custody of Antonio's deposits. Metrobank expressed willingness to abide by any court order as regards the disposition of Antonio's deposits. The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration filed to assail the aforecited Order was denied by the RTC on May 3, 2006. On May 29, 2006, the petitioners filed their Consolidated Answer with Counterclaim to the respondents' Amended Complaint. On August 11, 2006, the RTC issued a pre-trial order.52[17] On January 18, 2007, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss53[18] the respondents' Amended Complaint on the alleged ground of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Complaint. The petitioners argued that since the Amended Complaint sought the release of the CPPA to the respondents, the latter's declaration as heirs of Antonio, and the propriety of Ramon's disinheritance, the suit partakes of the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action for declaration of nullity. Hence, jurisdiction pertains to a probate or intestate court and not to the RTC acting as an ordinary court. On March 15, 2007, the RTC issued an Order54[19] denying the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss on grounds: In the case at bar, an examination of the Complaint would disclose that the action delves mainly on the question of ownership of the properties described in the Complaint which can be properly settled in an ordinary civil action. And as pointed out by the defendants, the action seeks to declare the nullity of the Agreement, Waiver, Affidavit of ExtraJudicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title, which were all allegedly executed by defendant Ramon Ching to defraud the plaintiffs. The relief of establishing the status of the plaintiffs which could have translated this action into a special proceeding was nowhere stated in the Amended Complaint. With regard [to] the prayer to declare the plaintiffs as the rightful owner[s] of the CPPA and that the same be immediately released to them, in itself poses an issue of ownership which must be proved by plaintiffs by substantial evidence. And as emphasized by the plaintiffs, the Amended Complaint was intended to implead Metrobank as a co-defendant. As regards the issue of disinheritance, the court notes that during the Pre-trial of this case, one of the issues raised by the defendants Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties is: Whether or not there can be disinheritance in intestate succession? Whether or not defendant Ramon Ching can be legally disinherited from the estate of his father? To the mind of the Court, the issue of

disinheritance, which is one of the causes of action in the Complaint, can be fully settled after a trial on the merits. And at this stage, it has not been sufficiently established whether or not there is a will.55[20] (Emphasis supplied.) The above Order, and a subsequent Order dated May 16, 2007 denying the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, became the subjects of a petition for certiorari filed with the CA. The petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 99856, raised the issue of whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss despite the fact that the Amended Complaint sought to establish the status or rights of the respondents which subjects are within the ambit of a special proceeding. On December 14, 2009, the CA rendered the now assailed Decision56[21] denying the petition for certiorari on grounds: Our in-depth assessment of the condensed allegations supporting the causes of action of the amended complaint induced us to infer that nothing in the said complaint shows that the action of the private respondents should be threshed out in a special proceeding, it appearing that their allegations were substantially for the enforcement of their rights against the alleged fraudulent acts committed by the petitioner Ramon Ching. The private respondents also instituted the said amended complaint in order to protect them from the consequence of the fraudulent acts of Ramon Ching by seeking to disqualify Ramon Ching from inheriting from Antonio Ching as well as to enjoin him from disposing or alienating the subject properties, including the P4 Million deposit with Metrobank. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such issues, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court. Furthermore, we agree with the trial court that the probate court could not take cognizance of the prayer to disinherit Ramon Ching, given the undisputed fact that there was no will to be contested in a probate court. The petition at bench apparently cavils the subject amended complaint and complicates the issue of jurisdiction by reiterating the grounds or defenses set up in the petitioners' earlier pleadings. Notwithstanding, the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint without regard to whether or not the private respondents (plaintiffs) are entitled to recover upon all or some of the causes of action asserted therein. In this regard, the jurisdiction of the court does not depend upon the defenses pleaded in the answer or in the motion to dismiss, lest the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the petitioners (defendants).57[22] Hence, we focus our resolution on the issue of jurisdiction on the allegations in the amended complaint and not on the defenses pleaded in the motion to dismiss or in the subsequent pleadings of the petitioners. In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject the action of the petitioners in a special proceeding since the nullification of the subject documents could be achieved in the civil case, the lower court should proceed to evaluate the evidence of the parties and render a decision thereon upon the issues that it defined during the pre-trial in Civil Case No. 02-105251.58[23] (emphasis supplied) The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA through a Resolution59[24] issued on July 8, 2010. The Issue The instant Petition for Review on Certiorari60[25] is anchored on the issue of: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY THE PETITIONERS ON THE ALLEGED GROUND OF THE RTC'S LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT, TO WIT, (A) FILIATIONS WITH ANTONIO OF RAMON, JAIME AND JOSEPH; (B) RIGHTS OF COMMON-LAW WIVES, LUCINA AND MERCEDES, TO BE CONSIDERED AS HEIRS OF ANTONIO; (C) DETERMINATION OF THE EXTENT OF ANTONIO'S ESTATE; AND (D) OTHER MATTERS WHICH CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED IN A SPECIAL PROCEEDING AND NOT IN AN ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION. The petitioners argue that only a probate court has the authority to determine (a) who are the heirs of a decedent; (b) the validity of a waiver of hereditary rights; (c) the status of each heir; and (d) whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or the exclusive property of the deceased spouse.61[26] Further, the extent of Antonio's estate, the status of the contending parties and the respondents' alleged entitlement as heirs to receive the proceeds of Antonio's CPPA now in Metrobank's custody are matters which are more appropriately the subjects of a special proceeding and not of an ordinary civil action. The respondents opposed62[27] the instant petition claiming that the petitioners are engaged in forum shopping. Specifically, G.R. Nos. 17550763[28] and 183840,64[29] both involving the contending parties in the instant petition were filed by the petitioners and are currently pending before this Court. Further, in Mendoza v. Hon. Teh,65[30] the SC declared that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction, is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. Besides, the petitioners, having validly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC and having actively participated in the trial of the case, are already estopped from challenging the RTC's jurisdiction over the respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint.66[31] The Court's Ruling We resolve to deny the instant petition.

The petitioners failed to comply with a lawful order of this Court directing them to file their reply to the respondents' Comment/Opposition to the instant Petition. While the prescribed period to comply expired on March 15, 2011, the petitioners filed their Manifestation that they will no longer file a reply only on October 10, 2011 or after the lapse of almost seven months. Further, no reversible errors were committed by the RTC and the CA when they both ruled that the denial of the petitioners' second motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 02-105251 was proper. Even without delving into the procedural allegations of the respondents that the petitioners engaged in forum shopping and are already estopped from questioning the RTC's jurisdiction after having validly submitted to it when the latter participated in the proceedings, the denial of the instant Petition is still in order. Although the respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint sought, among others, the disinheritance of Ramon and the release in favor of the respondents of the CPPA now under Metrobank's custody, Civil Case No. 02-105251 remains to be an ordinary civil action, and not a special proceeding pertaining to a settlement court. An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.67[32] A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.68[33] It is distinguished from an ordinary civil action where a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.69[34] To initiate a special proceeding, a petition and not a complaint should be filed. Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected only through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. This Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that while the respondents in their Complaint and Amended Complaint sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's disinheritance, Civil Case No. 02-105251 does not partake of the nature of a special proceeding and does not call for the probate court's exercise of its limited jurisdiction. The petitioners also argue that the prayers in the Amended Complaint, seeking the release in favor of the respondents of the CPPA under Metrobank's custody and the nullification of the instruments subject of the complaint, necessarily require the determination of the respondents' status as Antonio's heirs. It bears stressing that what the respondents prayed for was that they be declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA which was in Mercedes' possession prior to the execution of the Agreement and Waiver. The respondents also prayed for the alternative relief of securing the issuance by the RTC of a hold order relative to the CPPA to preserve Antonio's deposits with Metrobank during the pendency of the case. It can thus be said that the respondents' prayer relative to the CPPA was premised on Mercedes' prior possession of and their alleged collective ownership of the same, and not on the declaration of their status as Antonio's heirs. Further, it also has to be emphasized that the respondents were parties to the execution of the Agreement70[35] and Waiver71[36] prayed to be nullified. Hence, even without the necessity of being declared as heirs of Antonio, the respondents have the standing to seek for the nullification of the instruments in the light of their claims that there was no consideration for their execution, and that Ramon exercised undue influence and committed fraud against them. Consequently, the respondents then claimed that the Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Antonios estate executed by Ramon, and the TCTs issued upon the authority of the said affidavit, are null and void as well. Ramon's averment that a resolution of the issues raised shall first require a declaration of the respondents' status as heirs is a mere defense which is not determinative of which court shall properly exercise jurisdiction. In Marjorie Cadimas v. Marites Carrion and Gemma Hugo,72[37] the Court declared: It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the matters to be consulted. In sum, this Court agrees with the CA that the nullification of the documents subject of Civil Case No. 02-105251 could be achieved in an ordinary civil action, which in this specific case was instituted to protect the respondents from the supposedly fraudulent acts of Ramon. In the event that

the RTC will find grounds to grant the reliefs prayed for by the respondents, the only consequence will be the reversion of the properties subject of the dispute to the estate of Antonio. Civil Case No. 02-105251 was not instituted to conclusively resolve the issues relating to the administration, liquidation and distribution of Antonio's estate, hence, not the proper subject of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person under Rules 73-91 of the Rules of Court.
The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the RTC may not be strategically sound, because a settlement proceeding should thereafter still follow, if their intent is to recover from Ramon the properties alleged to have been illegally transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the RTC, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained from taking cognizance of respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint as the issues raised and the prayers indicated therein are matters which need not be threshed out in a special proceeding. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The petitioners' (a) Opposition to the respondents' Motion to Admit Substitution of Party;73[38] and (b) Manifestation74[39] through counsel that they will no longer file a reply to the respondents' Comment/Opposition to the instant petition are NOTED. SO ORDERED. BIENVENIDO L. REYES Associate Justice

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 182902 : October 05, 2011] VIRRA MALL TENANTS ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER, VS. VIRRA MALL GREENHILLS ASSOCIATION, INC., LOLITA C. REGALADO,

ANNIE L. TRIAS, WILSON GO, PABLO OCHOA, JR., BILL OBAG AND GEORGE V. WINTERNITZ, RESPONDENTS. DECISION SERENO, J.: Before us is a Petition for Review of the 21 May 2007 Decision [1] and 14 May 2008 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing the Complaint-in-Intervention and denying the Motion for Reconsideration both filed by petitioner. Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership (Ortigas) is the owner of the Greenhills Shopping Center (GSC). On 5 November 1975, Ortigas and Virra Realty Development Corporation (Virra Realty) entered into a Contract of Lease (First Contract of Lease) over a portion of the GSC. The 25-year lease was to expire on 15 November 2000. Pursuant thereto, Virra Realty constructed a commercial building, the Virra Mall Shopping Center (Virra Mall), which was divided into either units for lease or units whose leasehold rights were sold.[3] Thereafter, Virra Realty organized respondent Virra Mall Greenhills Association (VMGA), an association of all the tenants and leasehold right holders, who managed and operated Virra Mall. In the First Contract of Lease, VMGA assumed and was subrogated to all the rights, obligations and liabilities of Virra Realty.[4] On 22 November 2000, VMGA, through its president, William Uy (Uy), requested from Ortigas the renewal of the First Contract of Lease.[5] VGMA secured two insurance policies to protect Virra Mall against damage by fire and other causes. However, these insurance coverages expired simultaneously with the First Contract of Lease on 15 November 2000.[6] Subsequently, on 13 March 2001, VGMA acquired new sets of insurance policies effective 10 January 2001 to 31 December 2001.[7] On 5 May 2001, Virra Mall was gutted by fire, requiring substantial repair and restoration. VMGA thus filed an insurance claim through the insurance broker, respondent Winternitz Associates Insurance Company, Inc. (Winternitz). Thereafter, the proceeds of the insurance were released to VMGA. [8] On 3 September 2001, Ortigas entered into a Contract of Lease (Second Contract of Lease) with Uy effective 2 November 2001 to 31 December 2004. On 11 September 2001, the latter assigned and transferred to petitioner Virra Mall Tenants Association (VMTA) all his rights and interests over the property. [9] On 7 February 2003, Ortigas filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages and Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment against several defendants, including herein respondents. It accused them of fraud, misappropriation and conversion of substantial portions of the insurance proceeds for their own personal use unrelated to the repair and restoration of Virra Mall. To secure the subject insurance proceeds, Ortigas also sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against herein respondents. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 69312, and raffled to the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Pasig City, Branch 67 (RTC Br. 67), which issued a Writ of Preliminary Attachment on 12 February 2003. [10] On 17 February 2003, VMTA filed a Complaint-in-Intervention.[11] It claimed that as the assignee or transferee of the rights and obligations of Uy in the Second Contract of Lease, and upon the order of Ortigas, it had engaged the services of various contractors. These contractors undertook the restoration of the damaged area of Virra Mall amounting to P18,902,497.75. Thus, VMTA sought the reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred in relation thereto. [12] RTC Br. 67 admitted the Complaint-inIntervention in its Order dated 8 January 2004. [13] On 5 March 2004, herein respondents moved for the dismissal of the Complaint-in-Intervention on the ground that it stated no cause of action.[14] In its Omnibus Order dated 2 August 2005, RTC Br. 67 denied this Motion to Dismiss. [15] The trial court based its Decision on the grounds that (a) by filing the said motion, herein respondents hypothetically admitted the truth of the facts alleged in the Complaint-in-Intervention, and (b) the test of sufficiency of the facts alleged was whether or not the court could render a valid judgment as prayed for, accepting as true the exclusive facts set forth in the Complaint.[16] Thus, RTC Br. 67 held that if there are doubts as to the truth of the facts averred, then the court must not dismiss the Complaint, but instead require an answer and proceed to trial on the merits.[17] On a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion, the CA reversed the ruling of RTC Br. 67 and dismissed the Complaint-in-Intervention on the following grounds: (a) VMTA failed to state a cause of action; (b) VMTA has no legal interest in the matter in litigation; and (c) the Complaint-in-Intervention would cause a delay in the trial of the action, make the issues more complicated, prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties, stretch the issues, and increase the breadth of the remedies and relief.[18] The relevant portions of the Decision read: Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. Its essential elements are as follows: 1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; 2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and 3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises, giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. (Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161135, April 8, 2005, 455 SCRA 175, 183). If these elements are absent, the complaint is dismissible on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. What VMTA actually seeks in filing a complaint-in-intervention is the reimbursement of the cost of the restoration and rehabilitation of the burned area of the Virra Mall building. And VMTA believes that such reimbursement must be made from the fire insurance proceeds released to VMGA. Such position cannot be sustained. ... ... ... Firstly, We find that the complaint-in-intervention fails to state a cause of action against the petitioners. The material averments of the complaint-in-intervention belie any correlative obligation on the part of herein petitioners vis- -vis the legal right of VMTA for reimbursement. The petitioners are not the proper parties against whom the subject action for reimbursement must be directed to. On the contrary, since "x x x plaintiff Ortigas, as owner of the building, has ordered intervenor VMTA to undertake with dispatch the restoration and rehabilitation of the burned area or section of the Virra Mall buiding x x x" (par. 7 of Complaint-in-Intervention), VMTA's recourse would be to file and direct its claim against ORTIGAS who has the obligation to pay for the same. The complaint-in-intervention is not the proper action for VMTA to enforce its right of reimbursement. At any rate, VMTA's rights, if any, can be ventilated and protected in a separate action. The complaint-in-intervention is therefore dismissible for failure to state a cause of action against the petitioners. Secondly, VMTA has no legal interest in the matter in litigation. It is not privy to the Contract of Lease between ORTIGAS and VMGA. It came into the picture only after the expiration of the said contract. Finally, Section 1, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: Section 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of the property in the custody of the court or of an offices thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding. As a general guide in determining whether a party may intervene, the court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding (Sec. 2(b), Rule 12; Balane, et al. vs. De Guzman, et al., 20 SCRA 177 [1967]). The complaint below is primarily on the issue of specific performance. The relief being sought by the VMTA in its complaint-in-intervention is the reimbursement of expenses incurred by it for the repair/restoration of the Virra Mall Building. VMTA's cause of action has a standpoint which is unique to itself. New, unrelated, and conflicting issues would be raised which do not concern the petitioners herein, or VMTA as intervenor. Inevitably, the allowance of the intervention will not only cause delay in the trial of the action, make the issues even more complicated, and stretch the issues in the action as well as amplify the breadth of the remedies and relief. Thereafter, VMTA filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in the assailed Resolution dated 14 May 2008.[19] Hence, the instant Petition raising the following issues: I.

With due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave error in declaring that the complaint in intervention failed to state a cause of action against private respondents when it declared that the complaint in intervention belies any correlative obligation on the part of private respondents vis- -vis the legal right of petitioner for reimbursement. II. With due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave error in holding that private respondents are not the proper parties against whom the subject action for reimbursement must be directed to but recourse would be for petitioner VMTA to file and direct its claim against OCLP who has the obligation to pay petitioner VMTA since it was OCLP who has (sic) ordered to undertake the restoration and rehabilitation of the burned area or section of the Virra Mall Building. III. With due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals similarly committed grave error when it ruled that the complaint-in-intervention is not the proper action to enforce its right in the controversy between OCLP and private respondents since the proper remedy is for petitioner VMTA to ventilate and protect its right in a separate action.[20] The determination of whether the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the Complaint-in-Intervention filed by VMTA boils down to the sole issue of the propriety of this remedy in enforcing the latter's rights. According to VMTA, it has a legal interest in Civil Case No. 69312, which is rooted in the alleged failure of VMGA to turn over the insurance proceeds for the restoration and rehabilitation of Virra Mall, in breach of the latter's contractual obligation to Ortigas. However, the CA ruled against this position taken by VMTA not only because, in the CA's view, VMTA's Complaint-in-Intervention failed to state a cause of action, but also because it has no legal interest in the matter in litigation. We rule in favor of VMTA. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides: Who may intervene. - A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding. In Executive Secretary v. Northeast Freight,[21] this Court explained intervention in this wise: Intervention is not a matter of absolute right but may be permitted by the court when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the statute authorizing intervention. Under our Rules of Court, what qualifies a person to intervene is his possession of a legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both; or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof. As regards the legal interest as qualifying factor, this Court has ruled that such interest must be of a direct and immediate character so that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment. The interest must be actual and material, a concern which is more than mere curiosity, or academic or sentimental desire; it must not be indirect and contingent, indirect and remote, conjectural, consequential or collateral. However, notwithstanding the presence of a legal interest, permission to intervene is subject to the sound discretion of the court, the exercise of which is limited by considering "whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding."[22] (Emphasis supplied.) Applying the foregoing points to the case at bar, VMTA may be allowed to intervene, and the ruling of RTC Br. 67 allowing intervention was wrongly reversed by the CA because such a ruling does not constitute grave abuse of discretion. VMTA has a cause of action A cause of action is defined as "the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another." [23] In Shell Philippines v. Jalos,[24] this Court expounded on what constitutes a cause of action, to wit: A cause of action is the wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff.Its elements consist of: (1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff, (2) a duty on the part of the defendant to respect the plaintiff's right, and (3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of such right.To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, however, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist and not only that the claim was defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.[25] In the case at bar, VMTA, in its Complaint-in-Intervention, explicitly laid down its cause of action as follows:[26] Pursuant to and by virtue of such claim, defendant VMGA and defendant VMGA Board Members, impleaded as party defendants herein, received, at various times, from their insurance broker, and it is in their custody, the insurance proceeds arising out of such claim which, as of January 8, 2003, aggregated P48.6-Million. Having failed to deliver the said proceeds to the real beneficiary inspite of due notice and demand, plaintiff Ortigas herein instituted the present action against all the defendants to compel delivery of the said insurance proceeds which are being unlawfully and illegally withheld by all the defendant VMGA and defendant VMGA Board Members inspite of written demands made therefor. Worse, a portion of said insurance proceeds, aggregating P8.6-Million had already been disbursed and misappropriated in breach of trust and fiduciary duty. (Emphasis supplied.) It is clear from the foregoing allegations that VMTA's purported right is rooted in its claim that it is the real beneficiary of the insurance proceeds, on the grounds that it had (a) facilitated the repair and restoration of the insured infrastructure upon the orders of Ortigas, and (b) advanced the costs thereof. Corollarily, respondents have a duty to reimburse it for its expenses since the insurance proceeds had already been issued in favor of respondent VMGA, even if the latter was not rightfully entitled thereto. Finally, the imputed act or omission on the part of respondents that supposedly violated the right of VMTA was respondent VMGA's refusal, despite demand, to release the insurance proceeds it received to reimburse the former for the expenses it had incurred in relation to the restoration and repair of Virra Mall. Clearly, then, VMTA was able to establish its cause of action. VMTA has a legal interest in the matter in litigation VMTA was also able to show its legal interest in the matter in litigation -- VMGA's insurance proceeds -- considering that it had already advanced the substantial amount of P18,902,497.75 for the repair and restoration of Virra Mall. That VMTA seeks reimbursement from Ortigas is precisely the reason why intervention is proper. The main issue in Civil Case No. 69312 is whether Ortigas has a contractual right to the insurance proceeds received by VMGA. Thus, the recoupment by VMTA of the expenses it incurred in the repair of Virra Mall depends on the success of either party in the main case. VMTA therefore has an undeniable stake in Civil Case No. 69312 that would warrant its intervention therein. Further, the issuance to Ortigas of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment against VMGA puts VMTA in a situation in which it will be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of the property in the custody of the court, pursuant to the said writ. The prospect of any distribution or disposition of the attached property will likewise affect VMTA's claim for reimbursement. VMTA's intervention in Civil Case No. 69312 will avoid a multiplicity of suits Lastly, allowing VMTA to intervene in Civil Case No. 69312 finds support in Heirs of Medrano v. De Vera,[27] to wit: The purpose of intervention is to enable a stranger to an action to become a party in order for him to protect his interest and for the court to settle all conflicting claims. Intervention is allowed to avoid multiplicity of suits more than on due process considerations. [28] Thus, although the CA was correct in stating that VMTA could always file a separate case against Ortigas, allowing VMTA to intervene will facilitate the orderly administration of justice and avoid a multiplicity of suits. We do not see how delay will be inordinately occasioned by the intervention of VMTA, contrary to the fear of the CA. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 21 May 2007 and Resolution dated 14 May 2008 of the CA are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of the Complaint-in-Intervention filed by VMTA is concerned. The Complaint-in-Intervention of VMTA in Civil Case No. 69312 is allowed to proceed before RTC Br. 67. SO ORDERED. Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Perez, and Mendoza,* JJ., concur.

Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.75[29] The doctrine of res judicata is an old axiom of law, dictated by wisdom and sanctified by age, and founded on the broad principle that it is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the same parties over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated. It has been appropriately said that the doctrine is a rule pervading every well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is put upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law: the one, public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium; the other, the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for one and the same cause nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquillity and happiness.76[30] Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit.77[31] The foundation principle upon which the doctrine rests is that the parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.78[32] Yet, in order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of the subject matter, and (iii) identity of cause of action. ~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~ Case No. 7. Umale vs Canoga Park Several tests exist to ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action, such as whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and second causes of action79[23] (also known as the same evidence test),80[24] or whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other.81[25] Also fundamental is the test of determining whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint.82[26] Of the three tests cited, the third one is especially applicable to the present case, i.e., whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint and to which we answer in the negative. The facts clearly show that the filing of the first ejectment case was grounded on the petitioners violation of stipulations in the lease contract, while the filing of the second case was based on the expiration of the lease contract. At the time the respondent filed the first ejectment complaint on October 10, 2000, the lease contract between the parties was still in effect. The lease was fixed for a period of two (2) years, from January 16, 2000, and in the absence of a renewal agreed upon by the parties, the lease remained effective until January 15, 2002. It was only at the expiration of the lease contract that the cause of action in the second ejectment complaint accrued and made available to the respondent as a ground for ejecting the petitioner. Thus, the cause of action in the second case was not yet in existence at the time of filing of the first ejectment case.

No. 10 Lucas v. Lucas, GR. No. 190710: We need not belabor the issues on whether lack of jurisdiction was raised before the CA, whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent, or whether respondent waived his right to the service of summons. We find that the primordial issue here is actually whether it was necessary, in the first place, to serve summons on respondent for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the case. In other words, was the service of summons jurisdictional? The answer to this question depends on the nature of petitioners action, that is, whether it is an action in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem. An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to subject that person's interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation. A petition directed against the "thing" itself or the res, which concerns the status of a person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an action in rem.[22] In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law, or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective. [23] The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. By the simple filing of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the RTC, which undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort to the right sought to be established.[24] Through publication, all interested parties are deemed notified of the petition. If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the defendant, it is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the due process requirements.[25] This is but proper in order to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.[26] Hence, failure to serve summons will not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to try and decide the case. In such a case, the lack of summons may be excused where it is determined that the adverse party had, in fact, the opportunity to file his opposition, as in this case. We find that the due process requirement with respect to respondent has been satisfied, considering that he has participated in the proceedings in this case and he has the opportunity to file his opposition to the petition to establish filiation.

~*~*~*~*~*~*~ No. 3. Carabeo vs. Dingco Respecting the argument that petitioners death rendered respondents complaint against him dismissible, Bonilla v. Barcena83[11] enlightens:

The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) In the present case, respondents are pursuing a property right arising from the kasunduan, whereas petitioner is invoking nullity of the kasunduan to protect his proprietary interest. Assuming arguendo, however, that the kasunduan is deemed void, there is a corollary obligation of petitioner to return the money paid by respondents, and since the action involves property rights,84[12] it survives. It bears noting that trial on the merits was already concluded before petitioner died. Since the trial court was not informed of petitioners death, it may not be faulted for proceeding to render judgment without ordering his substitution. Its judgment is thus valid and binding upon petitioners legal representatives or successors-ininterest, insofar as his interest in the property subject of the action is concerned.85[13] In another vein, the death of a client immediately divests the counsel of authority.86[14] Thus, in filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioners counsel of record had no personality to act on behalf of the already deceased client who, it bears reiteration, had not been substituted as a party after his death. The trial courts decision had thereby become final and executory, no appeal having been perfected.