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Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ( ( 3 3 4 ) 2 2 9 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r .

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA


OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013

1110439

Town o f Gurley v. M & N M a t e r i a l s , Inc.

1110507

M & N M a t e r i a l s , Inc. v. Stan Simpson, i n d i v i d u a l l y and as mayor o f the Town o f Gurley, and Town o f Gurley Appeals from Madison C i r c u i t (CV-05-731) Court

1110439, 1110507 PARKER, In appeals Justice. case the no. 1110439, trial court's t h e Town of Gurley in favor ("the Town") of M & N

judgment

Materials,

I n c . ("M

& N " ) , on M & N's

inverse-condemnation

c l a i m a g a i n s t t h e Town. and N

We r e v e r s e t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t I n c a s e no. 1110507, M & judgment i n f a v o r o f t h e We affirm.

r e n d e r a j u d g m e n t f o r t h e Town. the t r i a l court's

cross-appeals

Town a n d S t a n S i m p s o n on o t h e r c l a i m s . I.

F a c t s and P r o c e d u r a l H i s t o r y t i m e t h e s e p a r t i e s have b e e n b e f o r e Simpson, 36 So. 3d 15 ( A l a . 2009)

This i s not the f i r s t this Court. I n Ex p a r t e

("Simpson I " ) , t h i s C o u r t c o n s i d e r e d p e t i t i o n s f o r t h e w r i t o f mandamus f i l e d by the p a r t i e s based on t h e same f a c t s that

create the basis f o r the present

appeals.

We s e t f o r t h t h e

f o l l o w i n g p e r t i n e n t f a c t s i n Simpson I : "M & N was f o r m e d i n 2003. A t t h a t t i m e , M & N a c q u i r e d 160 a c r e s o f m o u n t a i n p r o p e r t y t o be u s e d as a r o c k q u a r r y i n an u n i n c o r p o r a t e d a r e a o f M a d i s o n C o u n t y . By June 2004, i t h a d purchased approximately 109 additional acres i n the u n i n c o r p o r a t e d area f o r use i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e q u a r r y . F o r c o n v e n i e n c e , we w i l l r e f e r t o t h e 269 a c r e s as ' t h e p r o p e r t y . ' The p r o p e r t y was l o c a t e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y one m i l e f r o m t h e r e s i d e n c e o f S t a n Simpson.

1110439, 1110507 " I n J u l y 2003, more t h a n a y e a r b e f o r e h i s e l e c t i o n as mayor o f t h e Town, S i m p s o n became t h e c h a i r p e r s o n o f a g r o u p o f r e s i d e n t s o f t h e Town known as t h e C i t i z e n s f o r a B e t t e r G u r l e y ('the CBG'). B e t w e e n J u l y 2003 a n d November 23, 2004, t h e CBG a c t i v e l y o p p o s e d t h e o p e r a t i o n o f a r o c k q u a r r y on t h e M & N p r o p e r t y . On J u l y 17, 2003, t h e Town c o u n c i l a d o p t e d R e s o l u t i o n no. 216, w h i c h s t a t e d , i n pertinent part: "'WHEREAS, t h e Town C o u n c i l o f t h e Town o f G u r l e y h a s o b t a i n e d i n f o r m a t i o n from the Alabama Department of E n v i r o n m e n t a l Management t h a t a c o r p o r a t i o n by t h e name o f M & N, I n c o r p o r a t e d , h a s a p p l i e d f o r a permit t o operate a rock q u a r r y near the c o r p o r a t e l i m i t s of the Town o f G u r l e y , a n d "'WHEREAS, t h e Town Council has s e r i o u s concerns r e g a r d i n g t h e e f f e c t s such a rock quarry w o u l d have on (1) a i r q u a l i t y , (2) damage f r o m b l a s t i n g t o homes and businesses, (3) l a r g e v o l u m e s o f t r a f f i c on G u r l e y P i k e ( t h e m a i n s e r v i c e road f o r Madison County Elementary S c h o o l ) , (4) damage t o e x i s t i n g s t r e e t s b y h e a v y t r u c k s a n d (5) damage t o t h e Town's w a t e r s t o r a g e t a n k l o c a t e d on G u r l e y P i k e , "'NOW, THEREFORE, be i t r e s o l v e d t h a t t h e Town o f G u r l e y o p p o s e s t h e l o c a t i o n o f a rock q u a r r y near the c o r p o r a t e l i m i t s of t h e Town.' "Simpson s p o k e o f t e n a t Town c o u n c i l m e e t i n g s i n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e q u a r r y . A l s o , t h e CBG c o n t a c t e d S t a t e Senator L o w e l l B a r r o n and S t a t e R e p r e s e n t a t i v e A l b e r t H a l l t o e n l i s t t h e i r a i d i n opposing the q u a r r y . Simpson and R e p r e s e n t a t i v e H a l l c o l l a b o r a t e d on House B i l l 170, a b i l l t h a t R e p r e s e n t a t i v e H a l l i n t r o d u c e d i n t h e Alabama L e g i s l a t u r e d u r i n g t h e 3

1110439, 1110507 2004 l e g i s l a t i v e s e s s i o n . The b i l l , w h i c h became l a w on F e b r u a r y 26, 2004, s e e A c t No. 2004-19, A l a . A c t s 2004, a u t h o r i z e d t h e Town t o annex M & N's p r o p e r t y on t h e b a s i s o f a m a j o r i t y v o t e o f t h e Town's residents i n a special annexation referendum. A c c o r d i n g t o Simpson, t h e purpose o f t h e a n n e x a t i o n was t o g i v e t h e Town c o n t r o l o v e r t h e u s e o f t h e p r o p e r t y . The r e f e r e n d u m was c o n d u c t e d on A p r i l 13, 2004, a n d t h e a n n e x a t i o n p r o p o s a l p a s s e d b y 191 v o t e s t o 23 v o t e s . "On A p r i l 2 1 , 2004, M & N a p p l i e d t o t h e Town f o r a b u s i n e s s l i c e n s e . The a p p l i c a t i o n was d e n i e d . On May 4, 2004, t h e Town i m p o s e d 'an i m m e d i a t e m o r a t o r i u m on t h e a c c e p t a n c e o f a p p l i c a t i o n s f o r u s e permits, building permits, right-of-way permits, zoning c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , variances, special exceptions or b u s i n e s s l i c e n s e s r e l a t i n g t o ' t h e p r o p e r t y . [ ]
1

" I n a p p r o x i m a t e l y A p r i l 2004, S i m p s o n b e g a n a c a m p a i g n f o r t h e o f f i c e o f mayor o f G u r l e y . D u r i n g h i s c a m p a i g n , he p l e d g e d t o ' f i g h t a g a i n s t t h e r o c k q u a r r y . ' He was e l e c t e d on A u g u s t 24, 2004, a n d assumed t h e d u t i e s o f t h e o f f i c e on O c t o b e r 4, 2004, s e r v i n g a s , among o t h e r t h i n g s , a v o t i n g member o f t h e Town c o u n c i l . " M e a n w h i l e , on J u l y 12, 2004, M & N e n t e r e d i n t o an agreement w i t h V u l c a n Lands, I n c . ('Vulcan L a n d s ' ) , w h e r e b y V u l c a n L a n d s a c q u i r e d an o p t i o n t o p u r c h a s e t h e p r o p e r t y f o r $3.75 m i l l i o n . The o p t i o n was t o e x p i r e on November 15, 2004. V u l c a n L a n d s f a i l e d t o e x e r c i s e i t s o p t i o n , a c c o r d i n g t o M & N, The Town's m o r a t o r i u m on t h e a c c e p t a n c e of the a p p l i c a t i o n s f o r use p e r m i t s , b u i l d i n g p e r m i t s , r i g h t - o f - w a y permits, zoning c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , variances, special exceptions, o r b u s i n e s s l i c e n s e s r e l a t i n g t o M & N's p r o p e r t y was f o r 90 d a y s a n d was t o a l l o w t h e Town t i m e t o c o n d u c t a s t u d y t o d e t e r m i n e t h e b e s t u s e f o r t h e l a n d . A t t h e e x p i r a t i o n o f 90 d a y s , on A u g u s t 3, 2004, t h e Town e x t e n d e d t h e m o r a t o r i u m f o r an a d d i t i o n a l 90 d a y s .
1

1110439, 1110507 b e c a u s e o f M & N's f a i l u r e t o a c q u i r e a b u s i n e s s l i c e n s e f r o m t h e Town. N e v e r t h e l e s s , on November 23, 2004, M & N s o l d t h e p r o p e r t y t o V u l c a n L a n d s . "On t h a t d a y , M & N e x e c u t e d two d o c u m e n t s r e l a t i n g t o t h e d i s p o s i t i o n o f t h e p r o p e r t y . One document was a g e n e r a l w a r r a n t y d e e d b y w h i c h M & N s o l d t h e p r o p e r t y t o V u l c a n L a n d s f o r an u n d i s c l o s e d amount. I n an i n t e r r o g a t o r y a n s w e r , M & N s t a t e d : 'Vulcan backed out [ o f t h e o p t i o n p r i c e ] because o f no C i t y o f G u r l e y [ b u s i n e s s ] l i c e n s e . T h i s r e a s o n [ i s t h e ] s o l e r e a s o n [ t h a t w a s ] q u o t e d f r o m ... V u l c a n ... a s t o why V u l c a n w o u l d n o t c l o s e . ' The w a r r a n t y d e e d c o n t a i n e d no r e s e r v a t i o n s o f r i g h t s o r ownership. " T h a t same d a y , M & N e n t e r e d i n t o a r o y a l t y agreement ('the agreement') with 'Vulcan Construction M a t e r i a l s LP, a Delaware Limited P a r t n e r s h i p , by and through i t s Southern & Gulf C o a s t D i v i s i o n ' ( ' V u l c a n M a t e r i a l s ' ) . The a g r e e m e n t provided, i n pertinent part: "'WHEREAS, c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s l y w i t h t h e e x e c u t i o n and d e l i v e r y o f t h i s Agreement, V u l c a n [ M a t e r i a l s ] ( o r i t s a f f i l i a t e s ) and [M & N ] a r e e x e c u t i n g o t h e r a g r e e m e n t s whereby, among other understandings, [Vulcan Lands] w i l l acquire title to a p p r o x i m a t e l y 269 a c r e s o f r e a l p r o p e r t y n e a r [ t h e Town] i n M a d i s o n C o u n t y , A l a b a m a , heretofore owned by [M & N] ("the Property"); "'WHEREAS, Vulcan [Materials] i s engaged i n the business of mining, crushing, producing, distributing, transporting, and m a r k e t i n g of crushed stone products used i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n industry ("Quarrying O p e r a t i o n s " ) ;

1110439, 1110507 "'WHEREAS, V u l c a n [ M a t e r i a l s ] i n t e n d s to enter i n t o a l e a s e arrangement w i t h Vulcan [Lands] t h a t w i l l allow Vulcan [ M a t e r i a l s ] t o conduct Quarrying Operations on t h e P r o p e r t y ; a n d "'WHEREAS, t h e p a r t i e s d e s i r e t o s e t forth their understanding concerning payment o f r o y a l t i e s t o [M & N] a n d o t h e r terms related to the sale by V u l c a n [Materials] of crushed stone c o n s t r u c t i o n aggregates ("Stone") r e c o v e r e d from t h e Property. "'NOW, THEREFORE, for and in c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the mutual execution of this Agreement and t h e covenants and c o n d i t i o n s c o n t a i n e d h e r e i n , a n d o t h e r good and v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , t h e r e c e i p t a n d sufficiency of which is hereby a c k n o w l e d g e d , t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o do a g r e e as f o l l o w s ' " ( E m p h a s i s added.) "Under t h e a g r e e m e n t , V u l c a n M a t e r i a l s was t o pay M & N ' e a r n e d r o y a l t i e s , ' w h i c h were ' e q u i v a l e n t t o 5% o f t h e A v e r a g e A n n u a l S a l e s P r i c e ... o f S t o n e q u a r r i e d , s o l d a n d removed f r o m t h e P r o p e r t y ( t h e "Earned R o y a l t y ( i e s ) " ) d u r i n g each C o n t r a c t Year o f t h e Term.' The a g r e e m e n t p r o v i d e d f o r a 'minimum r o y a l t y payment' i n t h e f o l l o w i n g t e r m s : " ' I f the t o t a l of a l l Earned R o y a l t i e s p a y a b l e by V u l c a n [ M a t e r i a l s ] by t h e end o f a C o n t r a c t Year i s l e s s than F i f t y Thousand D o l l a r s ($50,000) ( t h e "Minimum"), V u l c a n [ M a t e r i a l s ] s h a l l p a y [M & N] an a d d i t i o n a l royalty payment equivalent to the d i f f e r e n c e between t h e Earned R o y a l t i e s with respect to that Contract year and $50,000, which amount i s hereinafter 6

1110439, 1110507 referenced Shortfall."' as the "Earned Royalty

" A c c o r d i n g t o M & N, t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r t h e s a l e o f t h e p r o p e r t y was a c t u a l l y $1 m i l l i o n , p l u s t h e r o y a l t y payments a n d o b l i g a t i o n s due u n d e r t h e agreement. had "The a g r e e m e n t a l s o s t a t e d t h a t V u l c a n M a t e r i a l s 'no o b l i g a t i o n t o m i n e ' : "'[M & N] acknowledges that Vulcan [ M a t e r i a l s ] s h a l l have t h e r i g h t , b u t n o t the obligation, t o conduct Quarrying O p e r a t i o n s on t h e P r o p e r t y ... d u r i n g t h e Term, i t b e i n g a g r e e d t h a t t h e payment o f the Earned Royalty Shortfall ... a n d c o n s i d e r a t i o n p a i d by V u l c a n [ M a t e r i a l s ] a t the time o f conveyance o f t h e P r o p e r t y i s made i n l i e u o f any s u c h o b l i g a t i o n . ' " ( E m p h a s i s added.) " F i n a l l y , t h e a g r e e m e n t p r o v i d e d t h a t V u l can c M a t e r i a l s w o u l d be ' r e l i e v e d f r o m t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o make any p a y m e n t s t o [M & N ] ' i f p r e v e n t e d 'by operation o f law' from 'conducting Quarrying Operations on t h e P r o p e r t y . ' In p a r t i c u l a r , i t s t a t e d : 'Vulcan [ M a t e r i a l s ' ] o b l i g a t i o n s t o perform ... s h a l l be s u s p e n d e d d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d i t i s so prevented from c o n d u c t i n g Quarrying Operations. Vulcan [Materials], i n i t s sole d i s c r e t i o n , s h a l l d e t e r m i n e what a c t i o n ( i f any) s h a l l be u n d e r t a k e n t o l i t i g a t e , oppose o r o t h e r w i s e c h a l l e n g e an e v e n t c o n s t i t u t i n g O p e r a t i o n o f Law.' (Emphasis added.) 'Operation of law' i n c l u d e d condemnation, t h e e x e r c i s e o f t h e r i g h t o f eminent domain, and z o n i n g or such other land-use restrictions. In that c o n n e c t i o n , t h e agreement f u r t h e r p r o v i d e d : "'In the event of a Taking of the P r o p e r t y ... , [M & N] h e r e b y a s s i g n s t o 7

1110439, 1110507 Vulcan [Materials] i t s claim, i n t e r e s t , or r i g h t ( i f any) i n any a w a r d t h a t may be made i n s u c h p r o c e e d i n g . F u r t h e r , [M & N] a g r e e s t h a t V u l c a n [ M a t e r i a l s ] s h a l l have the s o l e r i g h t and o b l i g a t i o n t o seek c o m p e n s a t i o n a n d r e t a i n damages c a u s e d b y the Taking.' " ( E m p h a s i s added.) "On J a n u a r y 18, 2005, V u l c a n M a t e r i a l s a p p l i e d t o t h e Town f o r a l i c e n s e t o o p e r a t e t h e b u s i n e s s o f ' Q u a r r y i n g and P r o c e s s i n g C o n s t r u c t i o n A g g r e g a t e s ' on t h e p r o p e r t y . T h a t same n i g h t , t h e Town c o u n c i l a d o p t e d O r d i n a n c e no. 2004-284, w h i c h d e s i g n a t e d t h e p r o p e r t y as an a g r i c u l t u r a l z o n e . S i m p s o n , as mayor, subsequently sent Vulcan M a t e r i a l s a l e t t e r denying the application, stating, i n pertinent part: ' " Q u a r r y i n g and P r o c e s s i n g C o n s t r u c t i o n A g g r e g a t e s " is n o t a use p e r m i t t e d under t h e A g r i c u l t u r a l [zoning] classification now applicable t o the p r o p e r t y i n q u e s t i o n . ' S i m p s o n a d m i t s t h a t he was directly involved i n t h e d e c i s i o n t o deny t h e license a p p l i c a t i o n o f V u l c a n M a t e r i a l s . As a consequence o f t h e d e n i a l o f p e r m i s s i o n t o operate t h e r o c k q u a r r y , V u l c a n M a t e r i a l s h a s p a i d M & N no royalties. " S u b s e q u e n t l y , M & N s u e d t h e Town a n d S i m p s o n . A l s o named as d e f e n d a n t s i n M & N's c o m p l a i n t were (1) V u l c a n L a n d s , (2) V u l c a n M a t e r i a l s , a n d (3) V u l c a n M a t e r i a l s Company ( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o collectively as 'the V u l c a n entities'). The complaint a l l e g e d that a t a l l times relevant t o the claims against h i m 'Simpson was a c t i n g i n h i s individual capacity and/or his representative c a p a c i t y on b e h a l f o f t h e Town.' The c l a i m s a g a i n s t Simpson i n c l u d e d interference with business or contractual relations and negligence and/or wantonness and sought d e c l a r a t o r y and/or i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f . The c l a i m s a g a i n s t t h e Town i n c l u d e d i n v e r s e

1110439, 1110507 condemnation[ ] and n e g l i g e n c e [ ] and a l s o d e c l a r a t o r y and/or i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f .


2 3

sought

"The V u l c a n e n t i t i e s were named 'by v i r t u e o f t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f A l a . Code 6-6-227 ( 1 9 7 5 ) , w h i c h r e q u i r e s t h a t a l l p e r s o n s s h a l l be made p a r t i e s who have o r c l a i m any i n t e r e s t w h i c h w o u l d be a f f e c t e d by t h e d e c l a r a t i o n . ' The V u l c a n e n t i t i e s have f i l e d a ' m o t i o n t o be e x c u s e d f r o m p a r t i c i p a t i o n a t t r i a l . ' I n t h a t m o t i o n , t h e y ' a g r e e [ d ] t o be b o u n d by any j u d g m e n t e n t e r e d w i t h r e g a r d t o [M & N's] d e c l a r a t o r y judgment c l a i m . ' "Simpson a n d t h e Town e a c h moved f o r a summary j u d g m e n t . S i m p s o n a r g u e d , among o t h e r t h i n g s , t h a t M & N i n i t i a l l y brought i t s inverse-condemnation claim under both the F i f t h Amendment to the United States C o n s t i t u t i o n a n d t h e A l a b a m a C o n s t i t u t i o n . B a s e d on M & N's r e l i a n c e upon t h e F i f t h Amendment t h e Town removed t h e c a s e t o the U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t Court f o r t h e N o r t h e r n D i s t r i c t of Alabama based upon federal-question jurisdiction. In r e s p o n s e , M & N v o l u n t a r i l y d i s m i s s e d i t s F i f t h Amendment c l a i m a n d f i l e d an amended c o m p l a i n t i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t m a k i n g no r e f e r e n c e t o t h e F i f t h Amendment. Instead, M & N alleged t h a t t h e Town's a c t i o n s v i o l a t e d A r t . I , 23, A l a . C o n s t . 1901, A r t . X I I , 2 3 5 , A l a . C o n s t . 1 9 0 1 , a n d 18-1A-1 e t s e q . , A l a . Code 1975.
2

On November 27, 2006, t h e Town f i l e d a m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s s e v e r a l o f M & N's c l a i m s a g a i n s t t h e Town. The Town a r g u e d t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g c l a i m s o f M & N's a g a i n s t t h e Town were due t o be d i s m i s s e d : t h e w r o n g f u l - i n t e r f e r e n c e - w i t h - c o n t r a c t u a l o r - b u s i n e s s - r e l a t i o n s c l a i m ; a l l wantonness c l a i m s ; and t h e n e g l i g e n t h i r i n g , r e t e n t i o n , and s u p e r v i s i o n c l a i m . M & N f i l e d a response.
3

On M a r c h 16, 2007, t h e t r i a l c o u r t g r a n t e d t h e Town's motion t o dismiss i n p a r t , t h e r e b y d i s m i s s i n g M & N's f o l l o w i n g c l a i m s a g a i n s t t h e Town: w r o n g f u l i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h contractual or business relations; negligent hiring, r e t e n t i o n , and s u p e r v i s i o n ; and a l l wantonness c l a i m s . 9

1110439, 1110507 he was e n t i t l e d t o a b s o l u t e i m m u n i t y f o r any a c t i o n s he t o o k r e l a t i n g t o t h e p r o p e r t y , e i t h e r b e f o r e o r a f t e r he became mayor. The Town c h a l l e n g e d M & N's s t a n d i n g t o b r i n g t h e a c t i o n . The Town a l s o a d o p t e d Simpson's summary-judgment m o t i o n and b r i e f i n support o f the motion. I n o p p o s i t i o n t o the motions, M & N presented, among o t h e r things, evidence i n d i c a t i n g t h a t S i m p s o n h a d , many y e a r s ago, p l e a d e d guilty t o two m i s d e m e a n o r c r i m i n a l charges i n T e n n e s s e e . On A p r i l 16, 2009, t h e t r i a l c o u r t d e n i e d the motions. "Simpson f i l e d h i s p e t i t i o n on May 8, 2009, i n c a s e no. 1 0 8 0 9 8 1 ; t h e Town f i l e d i t s p e t i t i o n on May 11, 2009, i n c a s e no. 1081027. B o t h petitions challenge M & N's standing to prosecute the u n d e r l y i n g a c t i o n . A l s o , t h e Town's p e t i t i o n a s s e r t s the defense o f a b s o l u t e immunity a g a i n s t the c l a i m b a s e d on S i m p s o n ' s a l l e g e d n e g l i g e n c e . S i m i l a r l y , Simpson's p e t i t i o n a s s e r t s the defense o f a b s o l u t e immunity a g a i n s t t h e c l a i m s a l l e g i n g a g a i n s t him interference with business or c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s and negligence and/or wantonness. Each petition s e e k s a w r i t o f mandamus ( 1 ) d i r e c t i n g t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o v a c a t e i t s o r d e r o f A p r i l 16, 2009, d e n y i n g S i m p s o n ' s a n d t h e Town's summary-judgment m o t i o n s , and ( 2 ) o r d e r i n g i t t o e n t e r a j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f t h e movant." S i m p s o n I , 36 So. 3d a t 19-22. We c o n c l u d e d the i n Simpson I t h a t M & N h a d s t a n d i n g t o sue t h a t had o c c u r r e d both

Town a n d S i m p s o n b a s e d on e v e n t s and a f t e r

before ("the

t h e s a l e o f t h e 269 a c r e s

owned b y M & N that M & N

p r o p e r t y " ) t o Vulcan Lands.

In determining

had s t a n d i n g t o sue t h e Town a n d S i m p s o n b a s e d on p r e - s a l e a n d p o s t - s a l e e v e n t s , we a l s o n o t e d t h a t M & N may n o t be t h e r e a l 10

1110439, 1110507 party i n i n t e r e s t pursuant we refused t o Rule 17, A l a . R. C i v . P.


4

However,

t o make a d e t e r m i n a t i o n

on t h a t

issue

b e c a u s e n e i t h e r t h e Town n o r S i m p s o n h a d r a i s e d t h a t a r g u m e n t . S i m p s o n I , 36 So. 3d a t 25. C o n c e r n i n g t h e i s s u e o f i m m u n i t y , we c o n c l u d e d


5

that

" t h e N o e r r - P e n n i n g t o n d o c t r i n e [ ] a f f o r d s Simpson absolute immunity for h i s pre-election conduct o p p o s i n g t h e r o c k q u a r r y . A l s o , Simpson i s e n t i t l e d to absolute legislative immunity for his
4

R u l e 17 p r o v i d e s ,

i n pertinent

part:

"(a) Real Party i n I n t e r e s t . Every action s h a l l be p r o s e c u t e d i n t h e name o f t h e r e a l p a r t y i n interest. An e x e c u t o r , administrator, guardian, b a i l e e , t r u s t e e o f an e x p r e s s t r u s t , a p a r t y w i t h whom o r i n whose name a c o n t r a c t h a s b e e n made f o r the b e n e f i t o f a n o t h e r , o r a p a r t y a u t h o r i z e d by s t a t u t e may s u e i n t h a t p e r s o n ' s own name w i t h o u t j o i n i n g t h e p a r t y f o r whose b e n e f i t t h e a c t i o n i s b r o u g h t . No a c t i o n s h a l l be d i s m i s s e d on t h e g r o u n d t h a t i t i s n o t p r o s e c u t e d i n t h e name o f t h e r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t u n t i l a r e a s o n a b l e time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement o f t h e a c t i o n by, o r j o i n d e r o r s u b s t i t u t i o n o f , t h e r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t ; and such r a t i f i c a t i o n , j o i n d e r , o r s u b s t i t u t i o n s h a l l have t h e same e f f e c t as i f t h e a c t i o n h a d b e e n commenced i n t h e name o f t h e r e a l party i n interest." As e x p l a i n e d i n S i m p s o n I , t h e N o e r r - P e n n i n g t o n d o c t r i n e , under which p r i v a t e c i t i z e n s a r e a f f o r d e d immunity under c e r t a i n circumstances, i s s e t f o r t h i n Eastern Railroad P r e s i d e n t s C o n f e r e n c e v. N o e r r M o t o r F r e i g h t , I n c . , 365 U.S. 127 ( 1 9 6 1 ) , a n d U n i t e d M i n e W o r k e r s v. P e n n i n g t o n , 381 U.S. 657 (1965) .
5

11

1110439, 1110507 p o s t - e l e c t i o n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the passage of z o n i n g O r d i n a n c e no. 2004-284. As t o t h e s e i m m u n i t y b a s e s f o r t h e e n t r y o f a summary j u d g m e n t , t h e p e t i t i o n s of S i m p s o n a n d t h e Town a r e g r a n t e d and w r i t s a r e issued. "Simpson is not, however, entitled to l e g i s l a t i v e immunity f o r h i s r o l e i n denying V u l c a n M a t e r i a l s ' a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a b u s i n e s s l i c e n s e . To [the] e x t e n t t h e p e t i t i o n s o f S i m p s o n a n d t h e Town a s s e r t l e g i s l a t i v e i m m u n i t y as t h e b a s i s f o r t h e e n t r y o f a summary j u d g m e n t a g a i n s t M & N on i t s claim a r i s i n g out of the d e n i a l of Vulcan M a t e r i a l s ' l i c e n s e a p p l i c a t i o n , the p e t i t i o n s are denied." S i m p s o n I , 36 So. 3d a t 3 1 . F o l l o w i n g S i m p s o n I , t h e Town a n d S i m p s o n s o u g h t t o amend t h e i r a n s w e r s t o a s s e r t t h e a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e t h a t M & N was n o t t h e r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t u n d e r R u l e 17. motion & N M & N filed a

t o s t r i k e t h e Town's a n d S i m p s o n ' s amended a n s w e r s ; M argued that defense the Town and Simpson had waived based the

affirmative

of r e a l

party i n interest

on t h e

f a c t t h a t t h e case had been p e n d i n g f o r over f o u r y e a r s b e f o r e t h e Town and Simpson s o u g h t t o r a i s e t h e d e f e n s e . 3, 2010, f o l l o w i n g a hearing, the t r i a l On F e b r u a r y

court granted the answers; of

Town's a n d S i m p s o n ' s m o t i o n s f o r l e a v e t o amend t h e i r the trial court entered i t s judgment "[a]fter

review

[Simpson

I ] , a r e v i e w o f a l l r e l e v a n t and a p p l i c a b l e law, t h e

12

1110439, 1110507 f i l e and t h e r e c o r d i n i t s e n t i r e t y , and h a v i n g c o n s i d e r e d t h e arguments and r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s The 14, made b y counsel." on F e b r u a r y

case proceeded t o a j u r y t r i a l b e g i n n i n g

2011.

The Town a n d S i m p s o n f i l e d m o t i o n s f o r a j u d g m e n t

as a m a t t e r o f l a w ("JML") p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 50, A l a . R. C i v . P., a t t h e c l o s e o f M & N's e v i d e n c e . other apply things, and that Art. M & N I , 23, A l a . could The Town a r g u e d , among Const. 1901, d i d n o t i t s inverse-

that

not maintain

c o n d e m n a t i o n c l a i m b a s e d on t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a n d r e g u l a t o r y a c t i o n s t a k e n b y t h e Town b e c a u s e s u c h a r e g u l a t o r y claim i s unsustainable u n d e r 235, A l a . C o n s t . "takings" 1901. The

Town a n d S i m p s o n renewed t h e i r m o t i o n s f o r a JML a t t h e c l o s e of a l l the evidence. The t r i a l court granted t h e Town's

r e n e w e d m o t i o n f o r a JML i n p a r t JML i n p a r t ; the t r i a l court

and Simpson's motion f o r a to the j u r y M & N's

submitted

i n v e r s e - c o n d e m n a t i o n c l a i m b a s e d upon 235, A l a . C o n s t . 1 9 0 1 , against t h e Town and M & N's wrongful-interference-withclaim against Simpson.

contractual-or-business-relations Before the matter was submitted

to the jury,

however, t h e

p a r t i e s a n d t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i s c u s s e d w h e t h e r M & N's i n v e r s e -

13

1110439,

1110507 c l a i m was m a i n t a i n a b l e u n d e r 235. objection: The Town's

condemnation

counsel entered the following

"And t h e Town o f G u r l e y o b j e c t s t o a n y j u r y c h a r g e s r e l a t i n g t o i n v e r s e condemnation, the recovery, the damages, any j u r y charge related to inverse condemnation. Because, as t h e C o u r t correctly s t a t e s , we d o n ' t t h i n k t h a t [] 235 o r t h e S t a t e o f A l a b a m a -- l a w o f A l a b a m a r e c o g n i z e s a regulatory t a k i n g , w h i c h i s what [M & N] h a s c o n t e n d e d t h a t t h e y a r e making i n t h i s case. "Any r e g u l a t o r y t a k i n g i s c a l l e d f o r u n d e r t h e U.S. C o n s t i t u t i o n , [ b u t M & N h a s ] d i s m i s s e d a n y c l a i m s r e l a t e d t o t h e F i f t h Amendment a n d F o u r t e e n t h Amendment o f t h e U.S. C o n s t i t u t i o n . " T h e r e h a s been no p h y s i c a l t a k i n g o r i n j u r y t o t h e p r o p e r t y as d e f i n e d u n d e r A l a b a m a l a w t h a t w o u l d a l l o w an i n v e r s e c o n d e m n a t i o n c l a i m t o go t o t h e jury." The Town a l s o reasserted jury i t s objection charge after to the t r i a l the jury court's had been

inverse-condemnation charged. On favor

F e b r u a r y 22, 2 0 1 1 , t h e j u r y of M & N and a g a i n s t the jury plus t h e Town awarded 6%

returned on M M

a verdict i n & N's inverse-

condemnation amount returned & N's

claim;

& N damages i n t h e The jury also

o f $2,750,000,

interest.

a v e r d i c t i n f a v o r o f Simpson a n d a g a i n s t claim of wrongful interference Simpson. 14 with

M & N on M or

contractual

business r e l a t i o n s against

1110439, 1110507 On A u g u s t 5, 2 0 1 1 , t h e t r i a l the jury's v e r d i c t ; the t r i a l court entered a j u d g m e n t on

court

amended i t s j u d g m e n t on

A u g u s t 1 1 , 2 0 1 1 . The t r i a l c o u r t ' s amended j u d g m e n t p r o v i d e s , in pertinent part: "On F e b r u a r y 14, 2 0 1 1 , t h e t r i a l of the afore-referenced cause commenced. P r i o r to the commencement o f s a i d t r i a l , t h e p a r t i e s c o n s e n t e d t o p e r m i t t h i s C o u r t t o hear and decide t h e i s s u e o f l i t i g a t i o n e x p e n s e s due t o [ M & N ] i n t h e e v e n t [ M & N ] p r e v a i l e d on i t s i n v e r s e c o n d e m n a t i o n c l a i m . On F e b r u a r y 22, 2 0 1 1 , t h e j u r y f o u n d i n [ M & N ' s ] f a v o r on t h e i n v e r s e condemnation c l a i m and a s s e s s e d damages against t h e [ T o w n ] i n t h e amount o f $2,750,000.00, p l u s 6% i n t e r e s t . " S u b s e q u e n t t h e r e t o , a h e a r i n g was h e l d on [ M & N's] c l a i m f o r l i t i g a t i o n expenses. Having c a r e f u l l y reviewed a l l b r i e f s , supplements t h e r e t o and a l l caselaw c i t e d by t h e p a r t i e s , r e l e v a n t o r o t h e r w i s e , t h i s C o u r t h e r e b y awards [ M & N ] l i t i g a t i o n e x p e n s e s in t h e amount o f $1,200,169.20 ( c o n s i s t i n g o f $1,158,969.00 f o r a t t o r n e y s ' f e e s a n d $41,200.26 [ s i c ] f o r expenses).
"

by

" T h e r e f o r e , i t i s ORDERED, ADJUDGED a n d DECREED t h e C o u r t as f o l l o w s :

" 1 . The v e r d i c t o f t h e j u r y h a v i n g b e e n made i n open c o u r t , j u d g m e n t be a n d i s h e r e b y e n t e r e d i n f a v o r o f t h e p l a i n t i f f , M & N M a t e r i a l s , I n c . , and a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t , The Town o f G u r l e y , A l a b a m a , i n t h e amount o f $2,750,000.00, p l u s 6% i n t e r e s t beginning April 14, 2005, i n t h e amount o f $966,493.15 t o t a l i n g $3,716,493.15 a n d t h e c o u r t costs a s s o c i a t e d w i t h these proceedings, f o r which e x e c u t i o n may i s s u e . 15

1110439, 1110507 "2. The p l a i n t i f f , M & N M a t e r i a l s , I n c . , i s h e r e b y a w a r d e d l i t i g a t i o n e x p e n s e s i n t h e amount o f $1,200,169.20, f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n may i s s u e . "3. The v e r d i c t o f t h e j u r y h a v i n g b e e n made i n open c o u r t , judgment be and i s h e r e b y e n t e r e d i n f a v o r o f t h e d e f e n d a n t , Mayor S t a n S i m p s o n , as t o a l l c l a i m s a g a i n s t him. "4. The c l a i m s f o r d e c l a r a t o r y r e l i e f a r e h e r e b y d i s m i s s e d w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e i n view of the v e r d i c t . " (Capitalization in original.) M & N's request f o r injunctive 19, 2011, The t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t r u l e on relief. motion f o r same

On A u g u s t

t h e Town f i l e d a renewed C i v . P.

a JML p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 0 ( b ) , A l a . R. motion, the

In that

Town r e q u e s t e d a l t e r n a t i v e

postjudgment On November 17, the p a r t i e s on

relief 2011,

p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 9 ( e ) , A l a . R. C i v . P. p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 59.1, A l a . R. C i v . P., to extend the 90-day and to period the for trial on On

consented Town's order

ruling court the

the

postjudgment retaining

motion,

e n t e r e d an

jurisdiction

rule 2011.

Town's

postjudgment 13, 2011, The the Town

motion u n t i l trial

December 19,

December

c o u r t d e n i e d t h e Town's p o s t j u d g m e n t m o t i o n . On J a n u a r y 24, 2012, as M & N filed a appellees.

appealed.

cross-appeal,

n a m i n g t h e Town and S i m p s o n

16

1110439,

1110507 13, 2012, upon m o t i o n of the p a r t i e s , this

On F e b r u a r y

C o u r t e n t e r e d an o r d e r i n b o t h t h e a p p e a l and t h e c r o s s - a p p e a l s t a t i n g that the t r i a l final court's order appealed f r o m was n o t a

judgment i n t h a t i t f a i l e d t o d i s p o s e o f t h e c l a i m f o r As a r e s u l t , we a remanded t h e c a s e t o t h e ruling on the claim for court

injunctive relief. trial court

f o r i t "to enter On F e b r u a r y follows:

injunctive

relief."

15, 2012,

the t r i a l

e n t e r e d an o r d e r , as

"On F e b r u a r y 13, 2012, t h e Supreme C o u r t o f A l a b a m a remanded t h i s m a t t e r t o a l l o w t h i s C o u r t an opportunity to dispose of M & N M a t e r i a l s , Inc.'s ('M & N') c l a i m f o r i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f o r o t h e r w i s e make t h e j u d g m e n t on t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t f i n a l . A h e a r i n g on t h i s m a t t e r was h e l d on F e b r u a r y 15, 2012. I t i s h e r e b y ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED b y the Court t h a t i n l i g h t of the j u r y ' s v e r d i c t , M & N's claims for injunctive relief are hereby dismissed without prejudice. In light of the d i s m i s s a l o f t h e d e c l a r a t o r y and i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f , i t i s f u r t h e r o r d e r e d t h a t V u l c a n M a t e r i a l s Company, V u l c a n C o n s t r u c t i o n M a t e r i a l s , L.P., and V u l c a n Lands, I n c . are hereby d i s m i s s e d w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e as p a r t i e s t o t h i s a c t i o n . " (Capitalization in original.) II. Standard of Review

D i f f e r e n t standards of review apply i n our d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the claims before us. In a d d r e s s i n g t h e Town's appeal, for a

which

challenges the t r i a l

c o u r t ' s d e n i a l of i t s motion

17

1110439, 1110507 JML on t h e i n v e r s e - c o n d e m n a t i o n c l a i m , we a p p l y t h e f o l l o w i n g standard of review: "In A m e r i c a n N a t i o n a l F i r e I n s u r a n c e Co. v. Hughes, 624 So. 2d 1362 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) , t h i s C o u r t s e t out t h e s t a n d a r d t h a t a p p l i e s t o t h e a p p e l l a t e r e v i e w o f a t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g on a m o t i o n f o r a JML: "'The s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w a p p l i c a b l e t o a r u l i n g on a m o t i o n f o r JNOV [now r e f e r r e d to as a r e n e w e d m o t i o n f o r a JML] i s i d e n t i c a l t o t h e s t a n d a r d used by t h e t r i a l court i n g r a n t i n g or denying a motion f o r directed verdict [now r e f e r r e d t o as a m o t i o n f o r a J M L ] . Thus, i n r e v i e w i n g t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g on t h e m o t i o n , we review the evidence i n a light most favorable t o t h e nonmovant, and we determine whether t h e p a r t y w i t h the burden of p r o o f h a s p r o d u c e d s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e to r e q u i r e a j u r y d e t e r m i n a t i o n . ' "624 So. 2d a t 1366 ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) . F u r t h e r , i n C e s s n a A i r c r a f t Co. v. T r z c i n s k i , 682 So. 2d 17 (Ala. 1996), t h i s Court h e l d : "'The motion f o r a J.N.O.V. [now r e f e r r e d t o as a r e n e w e d m o t i o n f o r a JML] i s a p r o c e d u r a l device used t o c h a l l e n g e the s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t the j u r y ' s v e r d i c t . See, R u l e 5 0 ( b ) , [ A l a . ] R. C i v . P.; L u k e r v. C i t y o f B r a n t l e y , 520 So. 2d 517 ( A l a . 1 9 8 7 ) . O r d i n a r i l y , t h e d e n i a l o f a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t [now r e f e r r e d t o as a JML] o r a J.N.O.V. i s p r o p e r where the nonmoving party has produced substantial evidence t o support each e l e m e n t o f h i s c l a i m . However, i f p u n i t i v e damages a r e a t i s s u e i n a m o t i o n f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t o r a J.N.O.V., t h e n t h e 18

1110439, 1110507 " c l e a r and c o n v i n c i n g " s t a n d a r d a p p l i e s . Senn v. A l a b a m a Gas C o r p . , 619 So. 2d 1320 (Ala. 1993).' "682 So. 2d a t 19 ( f o o t n o t e o m i t t e d ) . ' [ S ] u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e i s e v i d e n c e o f s u c h w e i g h t and q u a l i t y t h a t f a i r - m i n d e d persons i n the e x e r c i s e of i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t can r e a s o n a b l y i n f e r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e f a c t s o u g h t t o be p r o v e d . ' West v. F o u n d e r s L i f e A s s u r a n c e Co., 547 So. 2d 870, 871 ( A l a . 1 9 8 9 ) . See 1 2 - 2 1 - 1 2 ( d ) , A l a . Code 1975." Cheshire In v. Putman, 54 So. M 3d 336, & N 340 ( A l a . 2010). the trial court JML to

i t s cross-appeal,

argues t h a t

e r r e d by g r a n t i n g t h e as to c e r t a i n claims

Town's and and by

Simpson's motions f o r a the Town's m o t i o n i t , see

granting

dismiss 3.

c e r t a i n o f M & N's

claims

against

supra note by

C o n c e r n i n g M & N's

arguments t h a t the t r i a l

court erred we

g r a n t i n g t h e Town's and the standard of review

S i m p s o n ' s m o t i o n s f o r a JML, set f o r t h above.

apply & N's the of

Concerning M

argument t h a t t h e t r i a l

c o u r t ' s judgment g r a n t i n g i n p a r t apply the f o l l o w i n g standard

Town's m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s , we review:

"'On appeal, a d i s m i s s a l i s not e n t i t l e d to a p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o r r e c t n e s s . The a p p r o p r i a t e s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w u n d e r R u l e 1 2 ( b ) ( 6 ) [ , A l a . R. C i v . P . ] , i s w h e t h e r , when t h e a l l e g a t i o n s o f t h e c o m p l a i n t are v i e w e d most s t r o n g l y i n t h e p l e a d e r ' s favor, i t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e p l e a d e r c o u l d p r o v e any s e t o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t w o u l d e n t i t l e [him] t o r e l i e f . I n making t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n , t h i s C o u r t does not 19

1110439, 1110507 consider whether the p l a i n t i f f will ultimately p r e v a i l , b u t o n l y w h e t h e r [he] may p o s s i b l y p r e v a i l . We n o t e t h a t a R u l e 1 2 ( b ) ( 6 ) d i s m i s s a l i s p r o p e r o n l y when i t a p p e a r s b e y o n d d o u b t t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f can p r o v e no s e t o f f a c t s i n s u p p o r t o f t h e c l a i m t h a t would e n t i t l e the p l a i n t i f f t o r e l i e f . ' " C.B. v. Bobo, 659 So. 2d 98, 104 ( A l a . 1995) ( q u o t i n g Nance v. M a t t h e w s , 622 So. 2d 297, 299 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) ) . III. Discussion

A. Case No. 1110439 First, claim, taken t h e Town a r g u e s t h a t M & N's i n v e r s e - c o n d e m n a t i o n upon administrative and/or regulatory under actions

based

b y t h e Town,

i s not maintainable

235, A l a . as

C o n s t . 1901, b e c a u s e , i t says, compensable a regulatory

A l a b a m a does n o t r e c o g n i z e M & N does n o t

"taking."

dispute

t h a t i t s i n v e r s e - c o n d e m n a t i o n c l a i m i s b a s e d upon t h e Town's a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and/or r e g u l a t o r y claim i s maintainable Section by m u n i c i p a l part: "Municipal and other corporations and i n d i v i d u a l s invested with the p r i v i l e g e of taking property for public use, shall make just c o m p e n s a t i o n , t o be a s c e r t a i n e d as may be p r o v i d e d by law, f o r the property taken, injured, or 20 actions and argues t h a t i t s

u n d e r 235. f o r p u b l i c use i n pertinent

235, e n t i t l e d " T a k i n g o f p r o p e r t y and other corporations," provides,

1110439, 1110507 d e s t r o y e d by t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o r enlargement o f i t s works, highways, o r improvements, which compensation shall be p a i d before such t a k i n g , i n j u r y , or destruction. The p a r t i e s have n o t d i r e c t e d t h i s any upon precedent i n which a regulatory Court's attention to based was

an i n v e r s e - c o n d e m n a t i o n c l a i m by a m u n i c i p a l corporation

"taking"

b r o u g h t i n v o k i n g 235. language injured, of 235 --

The Town a r g u e s t h a t , u n d e r t h e p l a i n that the property must be "taken,

or destroyed

by t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n

or enlargement of

i t s w o r k s , h i g h w a y s , o r i m p r o v e m e n t s ..." ( e m p h a s i s added) - an inverse-condemnation regulatory claim based of upon a municipal i s not

corporation's sustainable. essentially maintain that

"taking" that

property

The Town a r g u e s

under

235 t h e r e a r e to

two r e q u i r e m e n t s t h a t

must be met i n o r d e r The p a r t y to

an i n v e r s e - c o n d e m n a t i o n c l a i m : has been first, taken that

alleging inverse has been

i t s property

pursuant

condemnation "taken,

must p r o v e ,

the property

i n j u r e d , or destroyed"

and, second, t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y

has b e e n p h y s i c a l l y d i s t u r b e d . The Mobile, Town d i r e c t s o u r a t t e n t i o n 240 A l a . 523, i n support 199 of So. t o Thompson v. C i t y o f (1941), that among an other actual

862

authorities,

i t s argument 21

1110439,

1110507 o r i n v a s i o n o f t h e p r o p e r t y must o c c u r i n

physical disturbance order This

t o s u p p o r t an i n v e r s e - c o n d e m n a t i o n c l a i m u n d e r 235. C o u r t s t a t e d i n Thompson: " I n o u r r e c e n t c a s e o f A l a b a m a Power Company v. C i t y o f G u n t e r s v i l l e , 235 A l a . 136, 177 So. 332, 339, 114 A.L.R. 181 [ ( 1 9 3 7 ) ] , a f t e r a f u l l r e v i e w o f many a u t h o r i t i e s as t o what c o n s t i t u t e d a t a k i n g , injuring or destroying of property w i t h i n the meaning o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s which r e q u i r e t h a t j u s t c o m p e n s a t i o n s h a l l be f i r s t made to the owner f o r such taking, injuring or destroying, we adopted the f o l l o w i n g rule of l i a b i l i t y , v i z : 'That j u s t c o m p e n s a t i o n must be made by m u n i c i p a l c o r p o r a t i o n s a n d o t h e r c o r p o r a t i o n s a n d i n d i v i d u a l s invested with the p r i v i l e g e of t a k i n g p r o p e r t y f o r p u b l i c u s e , when, by t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n or enlargement of " i t s " works, highways, or i m p r o v e m e n t , t h e r e w i l l be o c c a s i o n e d some d i r e c t p h y s i c a l disturbance of a r i g h t , e i t h e r p u b l i c or p r i v a t e , w h i c h t h e owner e n j o y s i n c o n n e c t i o n with his property, and w h i c h g i v e s i t an a d d i t i o n a l v a l u e , a n d t h a t b y r e a s o n o f s u c h d i s t u r b a n c e he h a s s u s t a i n e d some s p e c i a l damage w i t h r e s p e c t t o h i s p r o p e r t y i n e x c e s s o f t h a t s u s t a i n e d by t h e g e n e r a l public.'"

240 A l a . a t 527, 199 So. a t 865

( f i n a l emphasis added).

See

a l s o J e f f e r s o n C n t y . v. S o u t h e r n N a t u r a l 1282, 235 1286-87 claim (Ala. only 1993)

Gas Co., 621 So. 2d resolve direct v. a

( h o l d i n g t h a t a j u r y may there i s evidence City of

"where

o f some

physical Patterson,

injury

to the p r o p e r t y " ) ;

Tuscaloosa

534 So. 2d 283, 285-86 ( A l a . 1988) ( n o t i n g t h a t , i n

a c l a i m b r o u g h t p u r s u a n t t o 235, t h e r e must be p r o o f t h a t a 22

1110439, 1110507 government p r o j e c t "causes a d i r e c t p h y s i c a l d i s t u r b a n c e right, enjoys Co. 339 either public or with private, that the and 143, ... property Alabama 177 So. of a owner Power 332, just other

i n connection

his property"); A l a . 136, rule

v. C i t y o f G u n t e r s v i l l e , 235 (1937) ("We think the

proper

i s , that and

c o m p e n s a t i o n must be made by m u n i c i p a l corporations and individuals invested f o r p u b l i c use,

corporations with the the

p r i v i l e g e of or

taking property enlargement of will be

when, by

construction

' i t s ' works, highways, or some or direct physical

improvement, disturbance

there of a in

occasioned either public

right,

p r i v a t e , which ").

the

owner e n j o y s

connection We stated (Ala.

with his property the

find

Town's a r g u m e n t p e r s u a s i v e . C o u n t y v. Weissman, that 69

As So.

this 3d 827,

Court 834 and

in Jefferson 2011): "We

are

cognizant

the

long-settled

fundamental r u l e b i n d i n g of the text."

t h i s Court i n construing

provisions the not

c o n s t i t u t i o n i s adherence t o the p l a i n meaning of Within t h e p l a i n m e a n i n g o f i t s t e x t , 235 " t a k i n g s " by does

make c o m p e n s a b l e r e g u l a t o r y vested As set with

an e n t i t y o r

person use.

the p r i v i l e g e of t a k i n g p r o p e r t y in our long-standing

for public the

forth

precedent,

taking,

23

1110439, 1110507 i n j u r y , or d e s t r u c t i o n of property invasion or disturbance construction corporations'] or must be t h r o u g h a p h y s i c a l specifically municipal or "by t h e other

of the property, of [a

enlargement

works, highways, or improvements," not merely acts.

through a d m i n i s t r a t i v e or regulatory

M & N e n c o u r a g e s us t o l o o k t o f e d e r a l c a s e l a w c o n c e r n i n g regulatory "takings" under the f i n a l clause of the Fifth

Amendment t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n , o f t e n r e f e r r e d t o as the "Just Compensation Clause," i n i n t e r p r e t i n g 235.

However, t h e l a n g u a g e u s e d i n t h e J u s t C o m p e n s a t i o n C l a u s e i s not s i m i l a r t o t h e l a n g u a g e i n 235. that "private property just The J u s t [shall Compensation n o t ] be t a k e n Therefore, the

Clause provides for public

use w i t h o u t

compensation."

p r e c e d e n t i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e J u s t C o m p e n s a t i o n C l a u s e does n o t aid o u r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t 235. We a l s o n o t e t h a t M & N c o u l d have a s s e r t e d i t s inverse-

c o n d e m n a t i o n c l a i m , w h i c h i s b a s e d upon t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a n d regulatory actions of the Town, pursuant to the Just

Compensation Clause. Tahoe Reg'l Planning

See T a h o e - S i e r r a P r e s . Agency, 535 U.S.

C o u n c i l , I n c . v. (2002)

302, 306 n.1

("[The J u s t C o m p e n s a t i o n C l a u s e ] a p p l i e s t o t h e S t a t e s as w e l l

24

1110439,

1110507 C h i c a g o , B. & Q.R. Co. v. C h i c a g o ,

as t h e F e d e r a l Government.

166 U.S. 226, 239 ( 1 8 9 7 ) ; Webb's F a b u l o u s P h a r m a c i e s , I n c . v . Beckwith, asserted 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980)."). M & N initially

i t s c l a i m as a f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c l a i m , b u t i t that claim i n order M & N, t o keep of this i t s any

l a t e r v o l u n t a r i l y dismissed case i n the state chose trial to have

court.

as m a s t e r

complaint, relief

forgo, been

for strategical entitled to under

purposes, the

i t may

federal

Constitution. B a s e d on o u r h o l d i n g inverse-condemnation t h e Town, we r e v e r s e t h a t 235 does n o t s u p p o r t M & N's asserting a regulatory court's t a k i n g by

claim

the t r i a l

judgment i n f a v o r o f M

& N on i t s i n v e r s e - c o n d e m n a t i o n c l a i m a n d r e n d e r a j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f t h e Town. Our c o n c l u s i o n p r e t e r m i t s the other issues

r a i s e d b y t h e Town i n c a s e no. 1110439. B. Case No. 1110507 First, granting M & N argues that the t r i a l court's judgment

i n part

t h e Town's

motion

f o r a JML

and t h e r e b y

d i s m i s s i n g M & N's 23, A l a . C o n s t . 1 9 0 1 , c l a i m was i n e r r o r . The trial court determined that, pursuant to Willis v.

25

1110439, 1110507 U n i v e r s i t y o f N o r t h A l a b a m a , 826 So. 2d 118 ( A l a . 2 0 0 2 ) , 23 was n o t a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e Town's a c t i o n s . Section 23, e n t i t l e d "Eminent domain," provides:

"That t h e e x e r c i s e o f t h e r i g h t o f eminent domain s h a l l n e v e r be a b r i d g e d n o r s o c o n s t r u e d as to p r e v e n t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e from t a k i n g t h e p r o p e r t y and franchises of incorporated companies, and s u b j e c t i n g them t o p u b l i c u s e i n t h e same manner i n which t h e p r o p e r t y and f r a n c h i s e s o f i n d i v i d u a l s a r e taken and s u b j e c t e d ; b u t p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y s h a l l n o t be t a k e n f o r , o r a p p l i e d t o p u b l i c u s e , u n l e s s j u s t c o m p e n s a t i o n be f i r s t made t h e r e f o r ; n o r s h a l l p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y be t a k e n f o r p r i v a t e u s e , o r f o r the use o f c o r p o r a t i o n s , other than municipal, w i t h o u t t h e c o n s e n t o f t h e owner; p r o v i d e d , h o w e v e r , t h e l e g i s l a t u r e may b y l a w s e c u r e t o p e r s o n s o r c o r p o r a t i o n s t h e r i g h t o f way o v e r t h e l a n d s o f o t h e r persons o r c o r p o r a t i o n s , and by g e n e r a l laws p r o v i d e f o r and r e g u l a t e t h e e x e r c i s e by p e r s o n s and corporations of the r i g h t s herein reserved; but j u s t c o m p e n s a t i o n s h a l l , i n a l l c a s e s , be f i r s t made t o t h e owner; a n d , p r o v i d e d , t h a t t h e r i g h t o f e m i n e n t domain s h a l l n o t be so c o n s t r u e d as t o a l l o w taxation or forced s u b s c r i p t i o n f o r the benefit of r a i l r o a d s o r any o t h e r k i n d o f c o r p o r a t i o n s , o t h e r t h a n m u n i c i p a l , o r f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f any i n d i v i d u a l or a s s o c i a t i o n . " Further, power this Court set forth the f o l l o w i n g concerning i n Gober the v.

o f eminent

domain

and i t s l i m i t a t i o n s ( A l a . 1996):

S t u b b s , 682 So. 2d 430, 433-34

"The power o f e m i n e n t domain does n o t o r i g i n a t e i n A r t i c l e I , 23. I n s t e a d , i t i s a power i n h e r e n t i n e v e r y s o v e r e i g n s t a t e . S e c t i o n 23 m e r e l y p l a c e s c e r t a i n l i m i t s on t h e e x e r c i s e o f t h e power o f eminent domain. T h i s C o u r t s t a t e d i n S t e e l e v. 26

1110439, 1110507 County Commissioners, 762 (1887): 83 A l a . 304, 305, 3 So. 761,

"'The right of eminent domain a n t e d a t e s c o n s t i t u t i o n s , and i s an i n c i d e n t o f s o v e r e i g n t y , i n h e r e n t i n , and b e l o n g i n g to every sovereign State. The only q u a l i f i c a t i o n of the [ i n h e r e n t ] r i g h t i s , t h a t t h e use f o r w h i c h p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y may be taken shall be public The c o n s t i t u t i o n [ o f o u r S t a t e ] d i d n o t assume t o c o n f e r t h e power o f e m i n e n t d o m a i n , b u t , recognizing its existence, [further] l i m i t e d i t s e x e r c i s e by r e q u i r i n g t h a t j u s t c o m p e n s a t i o n s h a l l be made.' " I n o r d e r f o r an e x e r c i s e o f e m i n e n t domain t o be v a l i d u n d e r 23, two r e q u i r e m e n t s must be met. See J o h n s t o n v. A l a b a m a P u b l i c S e r v i c e C o m m i s s i o n , 28 7 A l a . 417, 419, 252 So. 2d 75, 76 ( 1 9 7 1 ) . F i r s t , t h e p r o p e r t y must be t a k e n f o r a p u b l i c use and, w i t h one e x c e p t i o n i n a p p l i c a b l e h e r e , i t c a n n o t be t a k e n f o r t h e p r i v a t e use o f i n d i v i d u a l s o r c o r p o r a t i o n s . T h i s f i r s t r e s t r i c t i o n i s no more t h a n a r e s t a t e m e n t of a requirement inherent i n a sovereign's very r i g h t t o e x e r c i s e e m i n e n t d o m a i n . See S t e e l e , 83 Ala. at 305, 3 So. at 762. Second, 'just c o m p e n s a t i o n [must be p a i d ] f o r any p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y t a k e n . ' J o h n s t o n , 287 A l a . a t 419, 252 So. 2d a t 7 6." (Footnotes In street Alabama parking parking omitted.) a property owner owned p r o p e r t y the across the North

Willis,

from a p a r k i n g ("UNA"). UNA

l o t owned by built

U n i v e r s i t y of

a m u l t i l e v e l p a r k i n g d e c k on i t s that the of construction the property of the

l o t ; i t was deck reduced

assumed the

value 27

owner's

1110439, 1110507 property. As a r e s u l t , t h e p r o p e r t y a c t i o n a g a i n s t UNA, his property " owner " f i l e d an inverse-

condemnation UNA 'took'

b a s e d on t h e a l l e g a t i o n t h a t 'just compensation,' This in

without

v i o l a t i o n o f 23 that even though

826 So. 2d a t 119.

Court held injured,

the property

owner's p r o p e r t y

was

" s i n c e no p o r t i o n o f W i l l i s ' s p r o p e r t y was to public use by UNA, 826 UNA was not

'taken,' to

or a p p l i e d compensate to

required Also

W i l l i s u n d e r 23." the h o l d i n g

So. 2d a t 121.

significant

i n W i l l i s was 676

the o v e r r u l i n g of c e r t a i n So. 2d 303

holdings

i n Foreman v. S t a t e ,

( A l a . 1 9 9 5 ) , as f o l l o w s :

"Foreman v. S t a t e , 676 So. 2d 303 ( A l a . 1 9 9 5 ) , i n v o l v e d an i n v e r s e - c o n d e m n a t i o n a c t i o n i n w h i c h compensation was sought under 23 of the C o n s t i t u t i o n o f A l a b a m a o f 1901. I n Foreman, t h i s Court h e l d t h a t i n ' " i n v e r s e condemnation a c t i o n s , a g o v e r n m e n t a l a u t h o r i t y need o n l y occupy or i n j u r e the p r o p e r t y i n question."' 676 So. 2d a t 305 ( q u o t i n g J e f f e r s o n C o u n t y v. S o u t h e r n N a t u r a l Gas Co., 621 So. 2d 1282, 1287 ( A l a . 1993)) (emphasis added i n F o r e m a n ) . However, i n J e f f e r s o n C o u n t y , t h e Court was applying 235 of the Alabama C o n s t i t u t i o n , n o t 23. As we have a l r e a d y n o t e d , 235 does n o t a p p l y t o t h e S t a t e . F i n n e l l v. P i t t s , 222 A l a . 290, 132 So. 2 ( 1 9 3 0 ) . To t h e e x t e n t t h a t Foreman (and B a r b e r v. S t a t e , 703 So. 2d 314 ( A l a . 1 9 9 7 ) , w h i c h r e l i e d on F o r e m a n ) , h e l d t h a t u n d e r 23 '"a g o v e r n m e n t a l a u t h o r i t y n e e d o n l y o c c u p y o r i n j u r e the property i n question,"' those holdings a r e i n c o r r e c t and a r e h e r e b y o v e r r u l e d . "

28

1110439, 1110507 Therefore, i t i s c l e a r , u n d e r t h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f 23

and u n d e r W i l l i s , t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t p r o p e r l y h e l d t h a t 23 does n o t a p p l y not an a c t u a l i n t h i s case. taking I t i s u n d i s p u t e d t h a t t h e r e was case and t h a t M & N has actions

i n this

complained only

of administrative

and/or r e g u l a t o r y

t a k e n b y t h e Town.

W i l l i s makes c l e a r t h a t 23 a p p l i e s when i n question has o c c u r r e d . there


6

a physical taking of the property

I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , M & N does n o t a l l e g e t h a t physical taking of the property i n question.

was a

We a f f i r m t h e

The dissent discusses Alabama Department of T r a n s p o r t a t i o n v . L a n d E n e r g y , L t d . , 886 So. 2 d 787 ( A l a . 2 0 0 4 ) , w h i c h was b a s e d upon t h e " l a w o f t h e c a s e " d o c t r i n e , n o t upon an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n b y t h i s C o u r t o f 23 a l l o w i n g f o r t h e r e c o v e r y o f a r e g u l a t o r y " t a k i n g . " S e e , e.g., i d . a t 796 ("Under t h e g o v e r n i n g 'law o f t h e c a s e , ' . . . ) , 802 ("Given t h e p a r t i c u l a r p r o c e d u r a l and e v i d e n t i a r y p o s t u r e o f t h i s case, and g i v e n t h e ' l a w o f t h e c a s e ' e s t a b l i s h e d b y t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s , we c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e j u r y was e n t i t l e d t o f i n d t h a t LE p o s s e s s e d an i d e n t i f i a b l e p r o p e r t y - u s e i n t e r e s t b e f o r e t h e c o n d e m n a t i o n . I n t h a t r e g a r d , one f e a t u r e o f t h e l a w o f t h e c a s e , b i n d i n g on t h e j u r y , was t h e i n s t r u c t i o n t h a t i f i t f o u n d t o i t s r e a s o n a b l e s a t i s f a c t i o n t h a t ADOT [ t h e A l a b a m a D e p a r t m e n t o f T r a n s p o r t a t i o n ] 'by a c q u i r i n g t h e s u r f a c e above the mineral estate o f [LE] i m p r o p e r l y foreclosed the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t [LE] c o u l d r e c o v e r i t s m i n e r a l s , ' i t w o u l d be the d u t y o f t h e j u r y t o d e t e r m i n e d a m a g e s " ) , a n d 803 ( " A l t h o u g h t h e r e was t e s t i m o n y o f f e r e d b y ADOT c o n t r a r y t o some o f t h e t e s t i m o n y r e c i t e d a b o v e , u n d e r t h e a p p l i c a b l e s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w we must c o n s t r u e t h e r e c o r d i n f a v o r o f LE and l o o k t o s e e o n l y i f t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d s u p p o r t i n g t h e j u r y ' s f i n d i n g t h a t a t a k i n g , as d e f i n e d by t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s , o c c u r r e d . " ) (some e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) .
6

29

1110439, 1110507 t r i a l c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t g r a n t i n g t h e Town's m o t i o n to M & N's 23 c l a i m . Next, granting claims." M & N
7

f o r a JML as

argues

that

the t r i a l

court

"erred i n negligence forth

j u d g m e n t as a m a t t e r

o f l a w on M & N's

Although M & N c i t e s general a u t h o r i t y s e t t i n g

the elements establishing

o f a n e g l i g e n c e c l a i m , M & N c i t e s no a u t h o r i t y that t h e Town o r Simpson owed M & N a duty.

I n s t e a d , w i t h o u t c i t i n g any a u t h o r i t y , M & N g e n e r a l l y a l l e g e s t h a t t h e Town a n d i t s e m p l o y e e s "had a d u t y t o e n s u r e t h a t i t s mayor was q u a l i f i e d t o h o l d o f f i c e ... a n d t o p r o p e r l y p r o c e s s a n d i s s u e a b u s i n e s s l i c e n s e t o M & N and t o V u l c a n , t o p r e v e n t t h e a d o p t i o n o f a r b i t r a r y and c a p r i c i o u s moratoria targeting the property, to properly assign zoning to the property (including overseeing a p r o p e r l a n d use s t u d y ) , and t o p r o p e r l y a p p l y i t s e x i s t i n g zoning ordinances." Then, w i t h o u t c i t i n g the Town "breached to M & N." any f a c t s , M & N g e n e r a l l y a l l e g e s t h a t those M duties, which proximately caused without from

damages

& N a l s o g e n e r a l l y argues,

c i t i n g any f a c t s , t h a t i t " p r e s e n t e d s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e

We n o t e t h a t M & N a l s o c i t e s B l a n k e n s h i p v. C i t y o f D e c a t u r , 269 A l a . 670, 115 So. 2d 459 ( 1 9 5 9 ) , a n d O p i n i o n o f t h e J u s t i c e s No. 119, 254 A l a . 343, 48 So. 2d 757 ( 1 9 5 0 ) , i n s u p p o r t o f i t s argument r e g a r d i n g 23. However, t h o s e c a s e s are d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e i n t h a t both o f those cases i n v o l v e d a p h y s i c a l t a k i n g of p r o p e r t y , u n l i k e the present case.
7

30

1110439, 1110507 which the jury could " i n our standard-of-review when t h e s e c t i o n above, a nonmoving party of have d e t e r m i n e d that [the Town] acted

negligently As

set forth

m o t i o n f o r a JML has

i s properly denied

produced s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support each element See C h e s h i r e , supra.

the p a r t y ' s c l a i m . p a r t y b e l o w and the

M & N, t h e n o n m o v i n g the burden of

cross-appellant

h e r e , has

demonstrating that i t produced s u b s t a n t i a l evidence to support every element of i t s negligence claims. M & N has failed to

c i t e any a u t h o r i t y t o s u p p o r t i t s a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e Town owed M & N a d u t y and has failed to i n d i c a t e which facts in the

r e c o r d c o n s t i t u t e s u b s t a n t i a l evidence s u p p o r t i n g the elements of i t s negligence claims. This Court held as follows in 90 4

U n i v e r s i t y o f S o u t h A l a b a m a v. P r o g r e s s i v e So. 2d 1242, 1247-48 ( A l a . 2004):

I n s u r a n c e Co.,

" R u l e 28(a) ( 1 0 ) , A l a . R. App. P., r e q u i r e s t h a t a r g u m e n t s i n an a p p e l l a n t ' s (or c r o s s - a p p e l l a n t ' s ) b r i e f c o n t a i n ' c i t a t i o n s to the cases, s t a t u t e s , o t h e r a u t h o r i t i e s , and p a r t s o f t h e r e c o r d r e l i e d on.' The e f f e c t o f a f a i l u r e t o c o m p l y w i t h R u l e 28(a)(10) i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d : " ' I t i s s e t t l e d t h a t a f a i l u r e t o comply w i t h the requirements of Rule 28(a)([10]) requiring citation of authority for arguments p r o v i d e s the C o u r t w i t h a b a s i s f o r d i s r e g a r d i n g those arguments: 31

1110439, 1110507 "'"When an appellant fails to cite any authority for an argument on a p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e , this Court may affirm the j u d g m e n t as t o t h a t i s s u e , f o r i t i s n e i t h e r t h i s C o u r t ' s duty nor its function to perform an a p p e l l a n t ' s l e g a l research. Rule 2 8(a) ( [ 1 0 ] ) ; Spradlin v. B i r m i n g h a m A i r p o r t A u t h o r i t y , 613 So. 2d 347 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) . " " ' C i t y o f B i r m i n g h a m v. B u s i n e s s Realty I n v . Co., 722 So. 2d 747, 752 ( A l a . 1998) . See a l s o McLemore v. F l e m i n g , 604 So. 2d 353 ( A l a . 1 9 9 2 ) ; S t o v e r v. A l a b a m a Farm B u r e a u I n s . Co., 467 So. 2d 251 (Ala. 1 9 8 5 ) ; and Ex p a r t e R i l e y , 464 So. 2d 92 (Ala. 1985).' "Ex p a r t e Showers, 812 So. 2d 277, 281 ( A l a . 2001) . '[W]e cannot c r e a t e l e g a l arguments f o r a p a r t y based on undelineated general propositions u n s u p p o r t e d by a u t h o r i t y o r a r g u m e n t . ' S p r a d l i n v. S p r a d l i n , 601 So. 2d 76, 79 ( A l a . 1 9 9 2 ) . " Based on i t s failure to cite any legal authority on M & N's M & N's court or facts

d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s JML c l a i m s was Next, i n e r r o r , we M & N need not that

negligence argument. erred in and

consider the

argues

"trial

d i s m i s s i n g M & N's supervision." erroneously M

claims for negligent h i r i n g , r e t e n t i o n , & N g e n e r a l l y argues t h a t [the Town's] m o t i o n to "the trial M

court & N's

granted

dismiss

n e g l i g e n t h i r i n g , r e t e n t i o n , and 32

s u p e r v i s i o n c l a i m s , " but M &

1110439, 1110507 N does n o t p r o v i d e t h a t the t r i a l t h i s C o u r t w i t h any a u t h o r i t y d e m o n s t r a t i n g j u d g m e n t was in error. Instead, M & N lie

court's

a r g u e s t h a t "a n e g l i g e n t h i r i n g and a g a i n s t a m u n i c i p a l i t y " and t h a t i t c o u l d have no

s u p e r v i s i o n c l a i m may

t h a t t h e Town " i n c o r r e c t l y a r g u e d f o r the negligence

vicarious l i a b i l i t y

of i t s employees because of d i s c r e t i o n a r y f u n c t i o n immunity." However, M & N does n o t p r o v i d e t h i s Court with any argument was See

or a u t h o r i t y d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t ' s judgment in error. Rule Therefore, we n e e d n o t c o n s i d e r App. P., and t h i s argument.

28(a) ( 1 0 ) , A l a . R.

Progressive

Insurance,

supra. Next, excluding M & N argues that the "trial court erred in

e v i d e n c e of Simpson's p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n s . " So. 2d 972, to 974

In C i t y this

o f B i r m i n g h a m v. Moore, 631 Court held that "[t]he

( A l a . 1994), or to

decision

admit trial

exclude we of

evidence i s w i t h i n the will not reverse This

d i s c r e t i o n of the a decision

j u d g e , and an abuse

such

absent

discretion."

Court also held

i n Moore

that

" t h e mere s h o w i n g o f e r r o r i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o warrant a reversal; i t must appear that the a p p e l l a n t was p r e j u d i c e d by t h a t e r r o r . R u l e 45, [ A l a . ] R. App. P. I n d u s t r i a l Risk Insurers v. G a r l o c k E q u i p . Co., 576 So. 2d 652, 658 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) ;

33

1110439, 1110507 P r e f e r r e d R i s k Mut. Ins. 165, 167 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) . " 621 So. 2d a t 973-74. trial Co. v. Ryan, 589 So. 2d argued prior

In the present

c a s e , M & N has Simpson's

o n l y t h a t the

c o u r t e r r e d by

excluding

c o n v i c t i o n s , not t h a t the t r i a l in by doing the so.

court exceeded i t s d i s c r e t i o n prejudiced prior i t was

M & N g e n e r a l l y a l l e g e s t h a t i t was of the evidence of

exclusion but

Simpson's as t o how

convictions, prejudiced.

i t o f f e r s no failed

explanation

M & N has

to demonstrate t h a t the the evidence the

trial and, part

court exceeded i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n e x c l u d i n g thus, has

f a i l e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r on court. M & N argues that of the law the "trial on M court & N's court

of the t r i a l Lastly, granting claims

erred

in

j u d g m e n t as

a matter and

wantonness erred in

against

Simpson"

that

"trial

charging on

t h e j u r y on t h e a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e o f intentional interference claim." cite authority supporting these

justification However, M M & N & N

M & N's to

fails

arguments.

does make g e n e r a l a l l e g a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g its argument t h a t the trial court's JML

the f a c t s to support f o r S i m p s o n on i t s i t does n o t direct its

wantonness this

c l a i m was

i n e r r o r ; however, to specific 34

Court's

attention

facts

supporting

1110439, 1110507 argument. See Rule Therefore, 28(a)(10), supra.


8

we n e e d n o t c o n s i d e r A l a . R. App. P.,

these and

arguments. Progressive

Insurance,

Conclusion B a s e d on t h e f o r e g o i n g , i n c a s e no. 1110439, we h o l d that

235 does n o t s u p p o r t M & N's i n v e r s e - c o n d e m n a t i o n c l a i m t h a t is by b a s e d upon a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a n d / o r t h e Town; t h u s , we r e v e r s e regulatory actions court's taken

the t r i a l

judgment i n

f a v o r o f M & N on i t s i n v e r s e - c o n d e m n a t i o n j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f t h e Town. the t r i a l court's judgment.

c l a i m and r e n d e r a

I n c a s e no. 1110507, we a f f i r m

1110439 -- REVERSED AND JUDGMENT RENDERED. M a l o n e , C . J . , a n d W o o d a l l , S t u a r t , B o l i n , Shaw, a n d W i s e , JJ., concur. Murdock, J . , c o n c u r s i n t h e r e s u l t . 1110507 -- AFFIRMED. M a l o n e , C . J . , a n d W o o d a l l , S t u a r t , B o l i n , Shaw, a n d W i s e , JJ., concur. Murdock, J . , d i s s e n t s . We n o t e t h a t t h e Town a n d S i m p s o n a r g u e d t h a t M & N was n o t t h e r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t u n d e r R u l e 17, A l a . R. C i v . P. However, t h a t i s s u e i s i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l b e c a u s e , a s s u m i n g t h a t M & N i s t h e r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t f o r e i t h e r some o r a l l t h e c l a i m s , t h e Town a n d S i m p s o n have p r e v a i l e d .
8

35

1110439, 1110507 MURDOCK, J u s t i c e ( c o n c u r r i n g i n t h e r e s u l t i n c a s e no. 1110439 and d i s s e n t i n g i n c a s e no. 1 1 1 0 5 0 7 ) . I c o n c u r i n t h e r e s u l t i n c a s e no. 1110439; I d i s s e n t i n case no. 1110507. I write separately to explain my

d i s a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h e r a t i o n a l e o f f e r e d by t h e main o p i n i o n i n c a s e no. 1110507. The claim of inverse condemnation asserted by M & N

Materials, 1901

I n c . , under

23 o f t h e A l a b a m a C o n s t i t u t i o n o f at

was b a s e d n o t on a p h y s i c a l t a k i n g o f t h e p r o p e r t y

i s s u e , b u t upon a s o - c a l l e d " r e g u l a t o r y t a k i n g " b y t h e Town o f Gurley ("the Town"). I n c a s e no. 1110507, t h e m a i n that opinion

rejects this

c l a i m on t h e g r o u n d

" i t i s c l e a r , u n d e r t h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f 23 [Alabama C o n s t . 1901] a n d u n d e r [this Court's h o l d i n g i n ] W i l l i s [v. U n i v e r s i t y o f N o r t h Alabama, 826 So. 2d 118 ( A l a . 2 0 0 2 ) ] , t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t p r o p e r l y h e l d t h a t 23 does n o t a p p l y i n t h i s c a s e . ... W i l l i s makes c l e a r t h a t 23 a p p l i e s when a p h y s i c a l t a k i n g o f t h e p r o p e r t y i n q u e s t i o n has occurred." So. hold 3d a t . As d i s c u s s e d apply when below, although there has b e e n Willis may

that

23 d o e s

a physical

t a k i n g , i t s h o u l d n o t be r e a d as h o l d i n g t h a t t h i s i s t h e o n l y circumstance case i n w h i c h 23 a p p l i e s . from I n any e v e n t , t h e p r e s e n t Further, the p l a i n as also

i s distinguishable below,

Willis. that

discussed

I do n o t a g r e e 36

language of

1110439, 1110507 23 forecloses compensation by the the for a so-called "regulatory

t a k i n g " of p r o p e r t y I do agree

government. Court as in Willis did rely upon the the Such

that

l a c k of a p h y s i c a l t a k i n g

a basis

for ruling 826 So. 2d

against at 121.

landowner i n t h a t p a r t i c u l a r case. was that the r a t i o n a l e o f f e r e d to the Id. to The Court's the of case

C o u r t by

the

government i n government's must be to

case.

r e l i a n c e upon t h e before

rationale considered

decide

i t , however,

in light

the

juxtaposed

rationales offered

t h e C o u r t by t h e p a r t i e s . the C o u r t by in the

The

a l t e r n a t i v e p o s i t i o n offered to that governmental a c t i o n property, as opposed to No to that an a was of the

l a n d o w n e r was

resulted

a mere

" i n j u r y " to of

outright physical taking c l a i m of i n v e r s e presented

i t , was

sufficient Id.

sustain issue taking"

c o n d e m n a t i o n u n d e r 23. as to whether a

in Willis

"regulatory

p r o p e r t y by t h e g o v e r n m e n t r e q u i r e d " j u s t c o m p e n s a t i o n " t o landowner under 23.

W i l l i s i n v o l v e d t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a p a r k i n g d e c k by government plaintiff on property adjacent the to the plaintiff's. of this

the The

complained

that

presence

structure plaintiff's

r e s u l t e d i n a r e d u c t i o n i n the market v a l u e of the property and, thus, that his property 37 had

been " i n j u r e d " f o r

1110439, 1110507 p u r p o s e s o f 23. as 826 So. 2d a t 120. case, W i l l i s d i d not involve, a c t i o n by which t h e upon t h e

does t h e p r e s e n t

a regulatory

government d i r e c t l y and f o r m a l l y imposed r e s t r i c t i o n s use of the p l a i n t i f f ' s property.

Nor d i d t h e p l a i n t i f f argue ofa l l t o be

t h a t t h e government's a c t i o n s had d e p r i v e d h i s p r o p e r t y reasonable uses.


9

Accordingly,

I cannot

find

Willis

d i s p o s i t i v e o f t h e i s s u e o f t h e p o t e n t i a l a p p l i c a t i o n o f 23 in the present The case. provision shall just of 23 reads for, as follows:

applicable property

"[P]rivate public

n o t be t a k e n

or applied to made therefor to the shall I two

use, unless The

c o m p e n s a t i o n be f i r s t of the F i f t h

"Takings

Clause"

Amendment

United not see

States C o n s t i t u t i o n states that p r i v a t e property

"be t a k e n f o r p u b l i c u s e , w i t h o u t j u s t c o m p e n s a t i o n . " no material difference i n the wording of these

provisions. As this C o u r t has recognized:

I do n o t mean b y t h i s s t a t e m e n t t o s u g g e s t t h a t a r e g u l a t o r y t a k i n g n e c e s s a r i l y o c c u r s o n l y when p r o p e r t y i s deprived of a l l reasonable uses. See d i s c u s s i o n , i n f r a , o f A l a b a m a Dep't o f T r a n s p o r t a t i o n v. L a n d E n e r g y , L t d . , 886 So. 2d 787 ( A l a . 2 0 0 4 ) , n o t i n g w i t h a p p a r e n t a p p r o v a l United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t j u r i s p r u d e n c e r e c o g n i z i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a r e g u l a t o r y " p a r t i a l t a k i n g . "
9

38

1110439, 1110507 "[W]hen t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t construes the F e d e r a l C o n s t i t u t i o n and i t s a p p l i c a t i o n t o a g i v e n s i t u a t i o n , i t i s c o n t r o l l i n g on us i n s o f a r as t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n i s c o n c e r n e d . When we c o n s t r u e similar features of the State C o n s t i t u t i o n as a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e same s i t u a t i o n t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u r t , t h o u g h n o t c o n t r o l l i n g on u s [ , ] s h o u l d be p e r s u a s i v e . A d i f f e r e n t c o n c l u s i o n w o u l d produce much confusion and instability in legislative effectiveness." Pickett (1939). cases v . M a t t h e w s , 238 A l a . 542, 547, 192 So. 2 6 1 , 265-66 This Court often looks to federal constitutional

when c o n s i d e r i n g t h e m e a n i n g o f a p a r t i c u l a r w o r d i n a See, e . g . , C o l e v . R i l e y , 989 So. 2d (See, J . , c o n c u r r i n g specially);

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l context. 1001, 1009-10

( A l a . 2007)

J e f f e r s o n C n t y . v. S o u t h e r n N a t u r a l Gas Co., 621 So. 2d 1282, 1287 ( A l a . 1993) ( l o o k i n g t o U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t cases

t o draw a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n i n v e r s e c o n d e m n a t i o n a n d e m i n e n t domain). The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h a s h e l d t h a t " g o v e r n m e n t r e g u l a t i o n o f p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y may, i n some i n s t a n c e s , be so onerous that i t s effect is tantamount to a direct

appropriation or ouster may be c o m p e n s a b l e under

and t h a t such ' r e g u l a t o r y t a k i n g s ' the F i f t h Amendment." (2005). L i n g l e v. As Justice

C h e v r o n U.S.A. I n c . , 544 U.S. Holmes e x p l a i n e d

528, 537

i n h i s watershed

decision i n Pennsylvania

39

1110439, 1110507 C o a l Co. may far be v Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), "while property goes too

regulated be

to a c e r t a i n extent, a a

i f regulation

i t will

r e c o g n i z e d as insofar as

taking." taking the for "public use" land is at

Furthermore, required,

t h e r e i s no

dispute

that

z o n i n g of the as q u a r r y was the public

i s s u e h e r e i n o r d e r t o p r e v e n t i t s use the purported benefit of the Town and

done f o r at large. courts some and

Takings jurisprudence emphasizes the need

i n b o t h t h e f e d e r a l and to "bar Government

the s t a t e forcing

from

people alone to bear p u b l i c burdens which, i n a l l f a i r n e s s justice, v. United

s h o u l d be b o r n e by t h e p u b l i c as a w h o l e . " A r m s t r o n g States, 364 U.S. 89 40, Ala. 49 181, (1960); 188-89, City 7 So. Council 433, of 436

Montgomery v. (1890). This the

Maddox,

i s not

the to

first

case i n which t h i s federal of a

C o u r t has

had

opportunity

discuss context

"regulatory under 23

taking" of the

jurisprudence

i n the

claim

Alabama C o n s t i t u t i o n . v. Land Energy, L t d . , an

In Alabama Department of 886 So. 2d 787

Transportation Court of the

( A l a . 2004), the under of 23

affirmed

inverse-condemnation

award

A l a b a m a C o n s t i t u t i o n b a s e d on coal.

a "taking"

surface-mineable of law

I n so d o i n g , t h e C o u r t r e l i e d upon t h e d o c t r i n e 40

1110439, 1110507 of the case in relation to a failure of of the State

(specifically,

t h e Alabama at t r i a l

Department

Transportation that the

("ADOT")) t o o b j e c t

to a jury instruction

p l a i n t i f f was e n t i t l e d t o r e c o v e r found that the actions

f o r a "taking" i fthe jury had prevented the Indeed, that a

of the State from case

plaintiff ADOT

from m i n i n g itself occur

the coal i n that

i t s property. to a position

committed could

"taking"

f o r purposes

o f 23 b y a s o - c a l l e d this

"regulatory

taking."

886 So. 2d a t 799. A c c o r d i n g l y ,

Court provided that case,

t h e f o l l o w i n g e x p l a n a t i o n o f ADOT's p o s i t i o n i n to the present of federal case because of i t s

helpful

instructive jurisprudence:

discussion

"regulatory

taking"

"ADOT ... s t a t e [ s ]

that

" ' t h e r e a r e two d i s t i n c t k i n d s o f t a k i n g : p h y s i c a l t a k i n g s and r e g u l a t o r y t a k i n g s . A physical taking requires a physical invasion or occupation of the property or t h a t t h e owner be o t h e r w i s e d i s p o s s e s s e d o f the p r o p e r t y . A r e g u l a t o r y t a k i n g occurs where t h e owner r e t a i n s t h e p r o p e r t y , b u t i t s u s e i s now r e g u l a t e d t o s u c h a d e g r e e that i t i s the legal equivalent of a t a k i n g . See L u c a s v . S o u t h C a r o l i n a C o a s t a l C o u n c i l , 505 U.S. 1003 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . ' "ADOT further asserts that the 'takings jurisprudence o f t h e U.S. Supreme Court has recognized two t y p e s o f compensable regulatory 41

1110439, 1110507 t a k i n g s : C a t e g o r i c a l and p a r t i a l . ' I t contends t h a t a categorical taking i s one i n which a l l e c o n o m i c a l l y v i a b l e use, meaning a l l economic v a l u e , has b e e n a b s o r b e d b y t h e r e g u l a t o r y i m p o s i t i o n . By process of e l i m i n a t i o n , i t concludes that the a l l e g e d t a k i n g i n t h i s c a s e must be a n a l y z e d a s a ' p a r t i a l ' taking that i s 'regulatory i n nature' b e c a u s e LE's c l a i m , w h i c h r e l a t e s o n l y t o 'a p o r t i o n of t h e m i n e r a l e s t a t e , i . e . , t h e s u r f a c e mineable c o a l , p r e v e n t s any c o n c l u s i o n t h a t a c a t e g o r i c a l t a k i n g o f t h e 120-acre m i n e r a l e s t a t e occurred.' Thus, i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e l e g a l p o s i t i o n ADOT h a s s t a k e d o u t , t h i s C o u r t must c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r t h e r e was s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e f r o m w h i c h t h e j u r y c o u l d r e a s o n a b l y have c o n c l u d e d t h a t e i t h e r a f u l l o r a partial taking occurred. Citing Penn Central T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Co. v . C i t y o f New Y o r k , 438 U.S. 104, 130-31, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , ADOT a r g u e s t h a t ' [ t ] h e p o i n t a t w h i c h r e g u l a t i o n becomes a p a r t i a l t a k i n g does n o t p r e s e n t a b r i g h t l i n e t e s t , b u t r a t h e r an a d h o c b a l a n c i n g test focused on (1) distinct investment backed expectations, (2) t h e n a t u r e o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t a c t i o n , a n d (3) t h e e c o n o m i c i m p a c t on t h e p r o p e r t y owner.'" Land Energy, 886 So. 2d a t 797. The C o u r t a l s o n o t e d that,

" ' [ w ] i t h r e s p e c t t o ' r e g u l a t o r y t a k i n g s , ' ADOT r e f e r r e d i n i t s trial brief to citing 'a g r o w i n g b o d y o f f e d e r a l l a w i n v o l v i n g t h e six decisions of the United States Supreme

issue,'

C o u r t , i n c l u d i n g Penn C e n t r a l , s u p r a ; Coastal 798 Council,

Lucas v. South C a r o l i n a 2886, 120 L.Ed. Council, Inc. 2d v.

505 U.S. 1 0 0 3 , 112 S.Ct. Preservation

(1992);

and T a h o e - S i e r r a Planning

Tahoe R e g i o n a l 152 L.Ed.

A g e n c y , 535 U.S. 302, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 886 So. 2d a t 798. 42 Further, citing

2d 517 ( 2 0 0 2 ) . "

1110439, 1110507 Lucas, ADOT t o o k the p o s i t i o n that "'[a] regulatory taking

o c c u r s where t h e owner r e t a i n s t h e p r o p e r t y ,

b u t i t s use i s

now r e g u l a t e d t o s u c h a d e g r e e t h a t i t i s t h e l e g a l e q u i v a l e n t of a t a k i n g . ' " The follows: " I n Penn C e n t r a l , s u p r a , the United States Supreme C o u r t a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t i t h a d t h e r e t o f o r e been unable t o develop any s e t f o r m u l a f o r determining when c o m p e n s a t i o n for a regulatory t a k i n g was due f r o m t h e g o v e r n m e n t , e x p l a i n i n g t h a t t h e c a s e s on p o i n t h a d e n g a g e d i n ' e s s e n t i a l l y a d hoc, f a c t u a l i n q u i r i e s . ' Among t h e f a c t o r s p r i o r caselaw had identified as having particular s i g n i f i c a n c e i n t h e a n a l y s i s was ' [ t ] h e e c o n o m i c i m p a c t o f t h e r e g u l a t i o n on t h e c l a i m a n t a n d , p a r t i c u l a r l y , t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h t h e r e g u l a t i o n has interfered with distinct investment-backed e x p e c t a t i o n s . ' 438 U.S. a t 124, 98 S . C t . 2646. I n Lucas, the Court acknowledged t h a t i t s caselaw had p r o d u c e d some ' i n c o n s i s t e n t p r o n o u n c e m e n t s . ' 505 U.S. a t 1016 n. 7, 112 S . C t . 2886. The C o u r t p o i n t e d o u t t h a t i t h a d s a i d on numerous o c c a s i o n s '[that] the Fifth Amendment i s v i o l a t e d when land-use r e g u l a t i o n ... " d e n i e s an owner e c o n o m i c a l l y v i a b l e use o f h i s l a n d . " ' 505 U.S. a t 1016, 112 S . C t . 2886 ( q u o t i n g A g i n s v . C i t y o f T i b u r o n , 447 U.S. 255, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 65 L.Ed.2d 106 (1980)) ( e m p h a s i s added i n L u c a s ) . ... "In Tahoe-Sierra P r e s e r v a t i o n C o u n c i l , supra, the Court explained that '[t]he Penn Central a n a l y s i s i n v o l v e s "a c o m p l e x o f f a c t o r s i n c l u d i n g t h e r e g u l a t i o n ' s e c o n o m i c e f f e c t on t h e l a n d o w n e r , the e x t e n t t o which t h e r e g u l a t i o n i n t e r f e r e s w i t h r e a s o n a b l e i n v e s t m e n t - b a c k e d e x p e c t a t i o n s , and t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t a c t i o n . " ' 535 U.S. a t 43 Id. i n L a n d E n e r g y went on t o e x p l a i n as

Court's opinion

1110439,

1110507

315 n. 10, 122 S . C t . 1465 ( q u o t i n g P a l a z z o l o v. Rhode I s l a n d , 533 U.S. 606, 616, 121 S.Ct. 2448, 150 L.Ed.2d 592 ( 2 0 0 1 ) ) . The p h r a s e a c t u a l l y u s e d i n Penn Central was 'distinct investment-backed e x p e c t a t i o n s . ' Penn C e n t r a l c i t e d G o l d b l a t t v. Town o f Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594, 82 S.Ct. 987, 8 L.Ed.2d 130 ( 1 9 6 2 ) , as t h e s o u r c e o f t h i s f a c t o r , b u t no p h r a s i n g s i m i l a r t o i t i s u s e d a t t h e page c i t e d o r anywhere e l s e i n t h e G o l d b l a t t o p i n i o n . The r e l e v a n t s t a t e m e n t s t h a t a p p e a r on t h e page c i t e d f r o m G o l d b l a t t a r e s i m p l y t h a t ' [ t ] h e r e i s no s e t f o r m u l a t o d e t e r m i n e where r e g u l a t i o n ends a n d t a k i n g begins'; t h a t a 'comparison of values before and after is relevant,' but 'by no means c o n c l u s i v e ' ; and t h a t '[h]ow f a r r e g u l a t i o n may go b e f o r e i t becomes a t a k i n g we n e e d n o t now d e c i d e , f o r t h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e i n t h e p r e s e n t r e c o r d w h i c h even r e m o t e l y s u g g e s t s t h a t p r o h i b i t i o n o f f u r t h e r mining w i l l reduce the value of the l o t i n q u e s t i o n ' (footnote omitted).
3

II

" P e n n C e n t r a l commented t h a t ' [ i ] t i s , of c o u r s e , i m p l i c i t i n G o l d b l a t t t h a t a use r e s t r i c t i o n on r e a l p r o p e r t y may c o n s t i t u t e a " t a k i n g " ... p e r h a p s i f i t has an u n d u l y h a r s h i m p a c t upon t h e owner's u s e o f t h e p r o p e r t y . ' 438 U.S. a t 127, 98 S.Ct. 2646."
3

L a n d E n e r g y , 886 So. 2d a t 798. The extensive landowner's investment." it concluded Court ended of i t s analysis the trial of the issue with to an the on

review

testimony of

relevant a

"reasonable

expectation

return

866 So. 2d a t 799-803. B a s e d on t h i s that the landowner had been

evidence, of an

deprived

" i d e n t i f i a b l e property-use i n t e r e s t " w i t h i n the context of the

44

1110439, 1110507 regulatory-taking jurisprudence So. 2d a t 802-03. Although jurisprudence we a r e n o t bound by the federal regulatory I am a p p l i c a b l e t o that case. 866

relied

upon b y t h e C o u r t i n L a n d E n e r g y ,

p e r s u a d e d t h a t we s h o u l d a p p l y some f o r m o f i t t o 23 c l a i m s , given the v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l State language of t h a t s e c t i o n o f our

c o n s t i t u t i o n a n d o f t h e F i f t h Amendment t o t h e U n i t e d I t h e r e f o r e r e s p e c t f u l l y d i s s e n t i n case i s ample evidence from which the j u r y

States C o n s t i t u t i o n . no. 1110507. There

c o u l d have c o n c l u d e d t h a t for mining the stone

the property

was s u i t e d p r i m a r i l y and n o t f o r t h e Accordingly, been

beneath

i t s surface

agricultural this is a

p u r p o s e f o r w h i c h i t was z o n e d . case i n which a not only and

has t h e landowner "reasonable action also

deprived

of

"distinct

investment h a s h a d an

expectation,"

b u t t h e government's

" u n d u l y h a r s h i m p a c t upon t h e owner's u s e o f t h e p r o p e r t y . "

45