Radical constructivism

Radical constructivism: a tool, not a super theory!

Siegfried J. Schmidt University of Mnster, Germany sjschmidt@gmx.net
> Problem An answer to the question of whether or not Radical Constructivism RC can or will become a mainstream endeavour is difficult, because what is called RC is a bundle of quite divergent approaches and not a homogenous (super) theory. Therefore the article concentrates upon classical RC as developed first of all by von Glasersfeld, von Foerster and Maturana and Varela. The pros and cons of their approaches are discussed and evaluated. > solution In order to overcome the most obvious problems of RC, a strict process-oriented kind of argumentation is developed that replaces is/is not assertions with descriptions of processes and their results, thus answering the question of what might reasonably be called construction. > Benefit The paper presents a way of rewriting RC, i.e., avoiding its evident problems, without abandoning the insights that RC thinkers have gained in the past. > Key words Observation, self-organization, process, construction.

PhilosoPhical concePts in Radical constRuctivism

1. introduction
it is very difficult to answer the question What is Radical Constructivism? in a strict sense, only Ernst von Glasersfelds approach, since 1974, has been and is still named radical constructivism, and he is one of the few representatives who have presented themselves as Radical Constructivists, whereas, e.g., Humberto R. Maturana always refused to be called a constructivist. The only fair procedure for my article would therefore be to talk about single authors and selected writings. as this is not possible regarding the general topic of this issue of Constructivist Foundations, i introduce an operative fiction called Radical Constructivism (RC) and keep in mind that my comments can only refer to a minority of constructivists. as far as i can see, RC in a broader sense1 has emerged from at least three rather divergent roots: von Glasersfelds philosophical-psychological approach, Heinz von Foersters second order cybernetics, and Maturana and varelas neurobiology. Followers of RC have either concentrated on one of these roots, or they have tried to
1 | Here, i refer to the papers collected in schmidt (1987).

combine these roots in some sort of coherent framework. in my view, such endeavours have yielded a heterogeneous theory-mix that has facilitated the manifold critiques of opponents in the last decades.2 For these reasons i have always emphasised that RC is not at all a homogeneous theory but an incoherent discourse with rather different voices and ramifications. This discourse is loosely tied together by common interests in topics such as selfreferentiality and self-organisation, organisational closure, autopoiesis, cognitive autonomy, neuronal networks, construction and ethical responsibility. Many RC scholars have not only been interested in modelling these concepts in their respective disciplines, but also in clarifying the epistemological and ethical consequences of them as well as consequences regarding a desirable philosophy of science. any description, analysis or critique of RC has to face the problem that in recent decades several constructivisms with different names have been constructed, e.g., social Constructivism (Kenneth J. Gergen),
2 | see, e.g., the ferocious critique of nse et al. (1991), where authors of RC are played off against one another by mixing up quotations from different publications in order to reveal incoherencies or even contradictions in the RC.

sociocultural Constructivism (siegfried J. schmidt), Constructive Realism (Friedrich G. Wallner), Reasonable Constructivism (Michael Fleischer), Cognitive Constructivism (norbert Groeben), etc., whose connections to and relations with classical RC are very divergent. so what is (Radical) Constructivism? since the late seventies, constructivist ideas and arguments have influenced a number of scholars in disciplines such as philosophy, psychology and psychotherapy, in sociology and industrial management, in educational science and coaching, linguistics and literary scholarship, in law studies, ethnology, media studies and art history.3 accordingly, one might say that RC has had and still has a remarkable interdisciplinary impact. on the other hand, it has become evident that RCs influence is restricted, i.e., RC has not (yet?) achieved a paradigmatic position in the academia. in what follows i try to discuss some pros and cons of RC in order to find out whether or not RC can become and should become a mainstream endeavour.

3 | The bibliography in schmidt (1987) provides a survey of relevant publications up to the end of 1980. a survey up to 2010 can be found in Constructivist Foundations 5(2).

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2. aspects in favour of radical constructivism

i talk about aspects that in my view speak in favour of RC with the proviso that i appreciate the respective arguments but (at least in many cases) not the theoretical derivation or the legitimation supplied by RC. in what follows i shall concentrate upon those aspects that are plausible even without a RC background and that have turned out to become influential in many disciplines. Firstly, RC has reshuffled the philosophical discourse on classical subjects such as reality, truth, knowledge, norm, etc. The thesis that all these concepts are nothing but constructions has been contra-intuitive enough to provoke severe opposition and critique. although this thesis was not completely new but had precursors in the history of philosophy from democritus via immanuel Kant to Hans vaihinger (to mention but a few), the way constructivists argued in favour of this thesis and proposed a seemingly feasible biological basis for their argumentation enhanced the popularity of RC thinking. in 1990, niklas Luhmann described the situation as follows:
We have become informed about facts we already knew but this is done in a way that sheds new light on this knowledge and opens up follow-up operations whose consequences are much more radical than we expected. (Luhmann 1990: 31; my translation)

in my view the most important argument of RC is the observer-dependency of all human activities. Whatever is said is said by an observer to an observer (Maturana). observers are necessarily involved in their observations, i.e., they do not observe from a neutral objective or outside position (von Foerster).4 observers are not isolated individuals but operate in social contexts. in other words, the acquisition of knowledge is a social operation performed by socialised individuals in specific contexts. Knowledge is always operational knowl4 | The systems-theoretical constructivist Luhmann emphasises that observation is never possible as an isolated event without a past and a future (Luhmann 1990: 9).

edge. The evaluation of knowledge, too, must be realised by observers according to the criteria that are relevant to a specific social group and context. it follows from these arguments that it is equally implausible and unnecessary to postulate or to deny the existence of a reality and an objective truth outside or independent of observers. accordingly, epistemology has to be reformulated in the format of a theory of knowledge. Consequently the worlds we live (in) can be described as experiential worlds. Thus, RC shifts the epistemological orientation from the objects of knowledge to the knowledge of objects. RC emphasizes that sciences, too, do not reveal objective truths, but instead solve problems of researchers (= observers) in a methodological way. They produce facts that, according to the cultural homogeneity of the researchers, can reach the status of (potential, not always actually realised) intersubjectivity, which should not be confounded with objectivity. a sympathetic but nevertheless problematic argument of RC reads that due to the refutation of observer-independent objectivity and absolute truth we ourselves are responsible for the state of our experiential or life-worlds. We produce them by and through our activities, and we can change them if we agree that this is necessary. since nobody disposes of an absolute truth, RC condemns any kind of fundamentalism or truth terrorism. Both arguments are, of course, postulates and they seem to be rather contra factual regarding the state of our society. nevertheless i appreciate that RC especially von Glasersfeld, Maturana and their followers are convinced that their theory can and should help to establish a more humane and a more peaceful world without repression. an important hypothesis of RC avers the cognitive autonomy of individuals. apart from its neurobiological foundation this hypothesis simply says that cognitive systems can only operate according to their specific acting conditions no matter how they are described and how they have been acquired. Consequently, cognitive systems cannot be intentionally and causally geared by other systems from outside. This argu-

ment has two important consequences: (i) communication can no longer be modelled as a transfer of meaning from one cognitive system to another; (ii) the production of meaning in communication processes exclusively happens inside the cognitive systems. The acceptance of this argumentation has yielded remarkable consequences. it has, e.g., changed literary hermeneutic studies or media and communication theory (see, e.g., Merten, schmidt & Weischenberg 1994; schmidt 1991, 2000a). Literary studies have become oriented towards literary processes in the social systems literature and thus overcome the fixation on literary texts. and communication is no longer modelled only in terms of information transfer from one person to another, but has been described as a social process based on the principles of reflexivity and self-organisation (see, e.g., schmidt 2008b). another aspect that in my view clearly speaks in favour of RC is its emphasis upon self-referential and self-organisational processes in cognition and communication. von Glasersfeld has repeatedly explained that, e.g., learning is performed as a self-organising process of cognitively autonomous individuals and not as an information transfer or an implementation of knowledge into the pupils cognitive systems (see, e.g., Glasersfeld 2001). Finally, following Maturana and von Glasersfeld, RC replaces the pursuit of truth and objective knowledge with the question of the problem solving capacity of concepts, models and theories. are they helpful or not, and what kind of problem are they expected to solve or to resolve? Yet this manoeuvre is problematic because the definition of problems, as well as of criteria for their sufficient solution, is often questionable. nevertheless, the advantage of this proposal can be seen in that it abandons the concentration on identities and concentrates its interest upon processes, their conditions and results. More than anyone else, von Glasersfeld has repeatedly expressed the view that RC is but a proposal or a model that has to be checked regarding its viability and not its truth.

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3. on some cons of radical constructivism

in schmidt (2008a) i presented an extended report on Josef Mitterers critique of RC. in this chapter i will therefore just repeat as an example the main arguments he developed in his books (Mitterer 1992, 2001) because they not only refer to Maturana and von Glasersfeld but to many other constructivists as well. Mitterers central argument reads as follows: Like all other variants of dualistic philosophy, RC, too, questions neither its basic presuppositions in terms of allegedly objective neurobiological findings nor its basic assumption that there exists a beyond of discourse (diskursjenseits). Many representatives of RC base their argumentation on neurobiological hypotheses such as: The operational closure of the nervous system. autopoiesis as the necessary and sufficient explanatory mechanism for life. The cognitive construction of reality instead of its (allegedly) impossible representation. The assumption that cognitive systems transform unspecific inputs from their environment into systems-specific states of order serves as unquestioned scientific knowledge from which epistemological consequences are directly derived. a naive faith in science that supports conservative and old fashioned tendencies. However: according to Mitterer (2001), constructivists fail to construe the presuppositions upon which their whole theoretical building is based. in other words, they fail to apply their own principle, viz. that everything is a subject-dependent construction, to their own constructions. Constructivists tend to universalise their own principles and to proscribe all other philosophical approaches, just as realist philosophers do. Constructivists still adhere to a dualistic style of philosophy because they keep up the distinction between a constructed experiential actuality (Wirklichkeit) and an inaccessible and unknowable reality (Realitt) behind actuality, as well

as the dichotomy between language and a language independent world. von Glasersfelds idea of viability clearly shows that the hidden reality is still regarded as operating as an arbiter that separates valid from invalid operations in the actual world, but is unable to explain who or what is responsible for their failure. Further critical objections can be summarized as follows: although constructivists claim that our knowledge can never be objective, will never represent the reality, and as a consequence will never arrive at the truth, their argumentation does not differ in principle from dualistic strategies regarding the problem of truth. The RC version of biology is treated as true scientific knowledge and is thus (at least implicitly) universalised.5 The RC conviction that scientific assertions are consensual assertions that are only valid in the community that produces them says nothing more than the triviality that scientific assertions are valid only for those who accept them, that is to say, who advocate them themselves. Mitterer points out that realist scientists are no more or less successful than constructivist ones. and regarding the results of scientific endeavours, it doesnt matter whether they are labelled as discoveries or inventions. as mentioned above, many constructivists hold the view that tolerance is a necessary consequence of the constructivist epistemological assumptions. Mitterer questions this argument. He emphasises that critical realists and rationalists, too, claim the/a postulate of tolerance simply because men fall prey to errors. in addition, it is highly problematic to derive ethical consequences directly from epistemological assumptions. Finally, Mitterer sums up, the realist as well as the constructivist models of thinking are nothing else but manifestations of a technique of argumentation by which arbitrary assumptions can be presented as true or false. on the whole, Mitterers critique of constructivism is devastating. in his view, RC is not at all a new paradigm. it is no more
5 | of course, constructivism is a realistic epistemology that makes use of empirical arguments. (Luhmann 1990: 15; my translation)

than a prevailing fashion among competing philosophical approaches. The reason for its success can be seen in the fact that after the collapse of progress-oriented concepts of science initiated by Fleck, Kuhn and Feyerabend a bio-constructivism that re-establishes the faith into ones own activities for which we are responsible and for which we have nothing to fear except self-critique is very welcome (Mitterer 1992: 149). 3.1 My own critique of RC started in (schmidt 1994). The main arguments read as follows: Classical or mainstream RC is concentrated on the individual and neglects the enormous role language,6 communication and culture play in all construction processes. as a consequence, the strict reference to the observer (which i regard as very important, see above), which neglects his respective socio-cultural acting conditions in the societal framework, leads to a classical subjectivism that is not questioned by RC. as a result, it is now the part of the subject that becomes ontologised instead of that of the object. For this reason many critiques regard RC to be a variant of idealism. RC is fixed on cognition and neglects emotions, action and interaction, i.e., it has a pragmatic deficit. Peter Janich (1992) has repeatedly remarked that RC neglects goal oriented poietic activities; but men work not only with their mouths and brains, but also with their hands and bodies. They solve problems together and through the use of language, and their activities can succeed or fail. notably enough, the central concept in the constructivist discourse, viz. construction, remains rather vague, even though the critics of RC have evidently concentrated upon this deficiency. does construction solely denote cognitive processes, or are material constructions also included? What are the presuppositions and regulations of constructions and what are the criteria for success or failure? to what degree must constructions be performed consciously, and
6 | in schmidt (2000b) i have tried to reconstruct von Glasersfelds comments on language, which are scattered throughout a large number of articles and conference papers.

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must actors be able to report on their constructions consciously? The allegation Everything is a construction, is a trivial generalisation that says everything and nothing. only in the case of self-application might it become important but in that case there is nothing left that might be either asserted or refuted. The way RC criticises other approaches such as, e.g., realism, behaviourism or cognitive psychology is rather biased. Therefore many critics have objected to this with the critique that nearly no representative of realistic positions advocates the view he is accused of by RC scholars. Contemporary cognitive psychology, e.g., does not compare mental representations with an objective reality, but instead with other kinds of representations. and the structuralist concept of theory (J. d. sneed) is fully compatible with the constructivist one. Fleischer (2005) has argued that aspects of evolution are neglected in favour of aspects of function. as a consequence, the evolutionary development of our present biological equipment is overlooked. in addition, RC also overlooks the fact that processes in the physical, biological, social and cultural domains proceed at different times and in different spaces. von Glasersfelds concept of viability, which proposes usefulness and practical success as criteria, is highly problematic since these criteria are related to the cognitive operations of individuals and not to facts in the environment. in addition, what does viability mean regarding cognitive structures or communication processes? Janich (1998) has argued that von Glasersfelds RC suffers from three deficits: a language-philosophical one, a pragmatic one and a culturalistic one. all of them are caused by his faith in the scientific results of, e.g., Ernst Mach, Jean Piaget, Charles darwin or norbert Wiener. He makes use of central concepts borrowed from these authors, viz. fact (Mach), action (Piaget), experience (in an empiricist reading) and meaning (PiagetWiener), without scrutinising their compatibility with his RC theory.

4. Rewriting radical constructivism?7

4.1 if constructivists take these and similar critical arguments seriously they have to delve into efficient ways out of their dilemma. But how can they escape? My first suggestion is to dispense completely with the debate on existence and nonexistence. How can or cannot we know whether reality exists or not? and what does the assertion of its existence contribute to our experiences and descriptions? such assertions irritate us because they are either trivial or unanswerable from an epistemological point of view. in addition, contrary to the RC credo of abandoning all ontological assertions, assertions as well as negations due to their referential linguistic nature (we want to talk about something and not about nothing) at least implicitly raise ontological claims. a RC theory must become much more sensitive to the language problems of any theory. Giving up ontological assertions presupposes avoiding ontologising questions and distinctions and concentrating on observations of observations. in my view, talking about the reality means talking about a discourse product that has no empirical reference because it has been produced by an unmotivated transformation of adjectives, verbs and pronouns into substantives. We can talk about the reality, but we cannot live in it; instead, we live in our life-world, in acting and communicating communities that dispose of efficient criteria for what is (regarded to be) real or not. The adjective real is used in communication in a reasonable way. it denotes something we have experienced and described as real for us according to our hitherto acquired knowledge and to socio-culturally confirmed criteria. We probe into reality by living it. The same argumentation holds water for the truth or the good, as well as for action or communication. We hold something to be true, good or bad; we act and we communicate. although talking about the truth is implausible and unnecessary, we need concepts of true and
7 | i have elaborated proposals for rewriting constructivism in schmidt (2007, 2008a, 2010).

false in our life-world for the regulation of actions and communications. in other words, my proposal recommends concentrating our argumentation strictly on processes instead of objects or identities. all processes necessarily combine an agency, the performance of the process, and its result(s). Processes are modelled as dynamic three-part relations where none of the three components can be omitted. a process-oriented argumentation attracts our attention to the fact that what we call object results from a process. Perception, description, communication, action: all these are real processes that result in experiences that are real-forus for good reasons, and that means because they prove their mettle. a consequent orientation on processes allows for a resolution of the nasty problems, representation and reference. Processes do not represent reality; instead they produce real-for-us-results. Without these results there is nothing that could be represented or referred to. The coupling of process results and their evaluation as real for must be socially accepted: i.e., without others there is no certainty. That means that experiencing something as real presupposes acting and communicating communities. We live our life-worlds together with others. 4.2 talking about reality means talking about observers and the distinctions they apply in order to observe and describe something as something. since observerorientation plays such an important role in RC, the way this concept is modelled is crucial for all RC argumentations. i propose to replace the very one-sided RC observer concept by a more complex one. That is to say, the RC concentration on brain and cognition should be extended to body, emotion, language, communication and culture in order to respect not only the biological but also the socio-cultural acting conditions of human observers. This extension can be legitimated by the fact that observers are enmeshed in social communities and their respective cultural conditions. The process-orientation i have recommended above equally applies to the observer. Whatever he performs is performed in terms of three-part relations,

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i.e., in terms of processes. accordingly, observers live in the world they live, which results from their presupposition-rich suppositions (setzungen) in terms of real processes. Perhaps this might be plausibly called construction. 4.3 i subscribe to the critique concerning the naturalistic epistemology of RC and recommend a farewell to the latter for several reasons. neurobiology, and especially Maturana and varelas version, is but one biological theory among others. Like any other theory, it is produced by observers in a specific situation and in a specific scientific context. accordingly, it cannot serve as the irrefutable basis of an epistemology. in addition, RC simply needs no biological foundation for the elaboration of its pros (see above). it would become less contraintuitive and less feasible if it presented itself as von Glasersfeld has repeatedly emphasised as a theory under construction that has to be evaluated according to its proven problem-solving capacity. such modesty would facilitate a productive analysis and evaluation of rivalling theories, including realistic ones, instead of strictly refuting them as wrong. RC must become open to discussion. an independent stance towards neurobiology would reduce the RC belief in natural sciences and improve a pragmatic view of theories (including RC) as instruments for problem solving, not as true concepts. in this way the observer-orientation could become much more convincing and more attractive for other scholars. The demand for tolerance and a better world does not depend upon a biological theory or a special epistemology. it is a demand that has to be deliberately made by observers; and only the observers can try to realise this request, and only they are responsible for respective results and consequences. 4.4 RC should continue to resolve classical philosophical and scientific problems in the fields of ontology, truth theory or ethics. By giving up its, at least partially, dogmatic core, RC would be stimulated to improve its argumentative clarity and complexity and to concentrate on its main subjects (e.g., observer, self-organisation, and construction processes in various domains).

5. conclusion
Modern times have gone. Postmodernism has declared the end of all master narratives. RC as well as deconstructivism have been regarded as theories especially affiliated to postmodernism; and both have at least proclaimed the finality of transience. after all, the question of whether or not RC could or should become a mainstream endeavour can be answered as follows: in its present state, RC is not able to escape substantial critique. in a revised format RC will become too modest and self-critical to claim a mainstream position in academia. instead, RC might become an efficient instrument for a second-order-observation competence that enhances critical distinction management as well as for our treatment of contingency. Presumably this will become our main task in the coming future. after all, i basically contradict von Foersters prognosis uttered in 2000 where he claimed that the RC style of thinking [] will initiate, and then dominate, the third millennium. (2000: Xi) isnt that an overstatement? i say: no! i say: Yes! What could, what should scholars of RC do to improve their position and their acceptance in the years to come? apart from my suggestions in Chapter 4, i would like to recommend that constructivist scholars: strengthen systematically the pro aspects of RC, as discussed in Chapter 2; improve self-observation in order to detect the blind spots in constructivist thinking and argumentation; become more receptive to critiques; improve their strategic orientation, i.e., participate in the non-constructivist academic discussion instead of sitting on the fence and criticizing all other positions as inadequate; prove its practical usefulness in solving clear cut problems in various disciplines; realize the insight into the finality of transience: the times of master narratives have gone forever.

References
Fleischer M. (2005) der Beobachter dritter ordnung. ber einen vernnftigen Konstruktivismus. athena, oberhausen. Foerster H. von (2000) Preamble. in: steffe L. P. & Thomson P. W. (eds.) Radical constructivism in action. Building on the pioneering work of Ernst von Glasersfeld. Falmer, London: xixv. Glasersfeld E. von (2001) Was heit Lernen aus konstruktivistischer sicht? in: schmidt s. J. (ed.) Lernen im Zeitalter des internets. Pdagogisches institut, Bozen: 3344. Janich P. (1992) die methodische ordnung von Konstruktionen. der Radikale Konstruktivismus aus der sicht des Erlanger Konstruktivismus. in: schmidt s. J. (ed.) (1992) Kognition und Gesellschaft. der diskurs des Radikalen Konstruktivismus 2. suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main: 2441. Janich P. (1998) Radikal halbherzig. die Wissenstheorie E. v. Glasersfelds. Ethik und sozialwissenschaften 9(4): 535537. Luhmann N. (1990) soziologische aufklrung. Konstruktivistische Perspektiven. Westdeutscher verlag, opladen. Merten K., Schmidt S. J. & Weischenberg S. (eds.) (1994) die Wirklichkeit der Medien. Westdeutscher verlag, opladen. Mitterer J. (1992) das Jenseits der Philosophie. Wider das dualistische Erkenntnisprinzip. Passagen, vienna. Mitterer J. (2001) die Flucht aus der Beliebigkeit. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main. Nse R., Groeben N. , Freitag B. & Schreier M. (1991) ber die Erfindung/en des Radikalen Konstruktivismus. deutscher studien verlag, Weinheim. Schmidt S. J. (ed.) (1987) der diskurs des Radikalen Konstruktivismus. suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main. Schmidt S. J. (1991) Grundri der Empirischen Literaturwissenschaft. suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main. Schmidt S. J. (1994) Kognitive autonomie und soziale orientierung. suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main. Schmidt S. J. (2000a) Kalte Faszination. Medien Kultur Wissenschaft in der Mediengesellschaft. velbrck Wissenschaft, Weilerswist. Schmidt S. J. (2000b) Ernst von Glasersfelds philosophy of language: Roots, concepts, perspectives. in: steffe L. P. & Thomson P. W. (eds.) Radical constructivism in action. Routledge Falmer, London: 2333.

5.1 Radical constructivism as mainstream?

PhilosoPhical concePts in Radical constRuctivism

5.2 some modest recommendations

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siegfRied J. schmidt

was born in 1940. He was university professor at the universities of Karlsruhe, Bielefeld, Siegen and Mnster for philosophy, linguistics, literary studies and media studies from 1971 to 2006 and is now professor emeritus. In the 1980s he played a leading role in establishing radical constructivism as a new paradigm in the German-speaking academic landscape.

Schmidt S. J. (2007) Histories & discourses. Rewriting constructivism. imprint academic, Exeter. originally published in German as: schmidt, s. J. (2003) Geschichten & diskurse. abschied vom Konstruktivismus. Rowohlt, Reinbek bei Hamburg. Schmidt S. J. (2008a) so far from now on. Josef Mitterers non-dualistic critique of radical constructivism and some consequences.

special issue The non-dualizing philosophy of Josef Mitterer, edited by a. Riegler & s. Weber, Constructivist Foundations 3(3): 163171. available at http://www. univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal/3/3/163. schmidt Schmidt S. J. (2008b) die selbstorganisation der menschlichen Kommunikation. in: Breuninger R. (ed.) selbstorganisation. interdiszi-

plinre schriftenreihe Humboldt-studienzentrum universitt ulm, ulm: 7794. Schmidt S. J. (2010) die Endgltigkeit der vorlufigkeit. Prozessualitt als argumentationsstrategie. velbrck Wissenschaft, Weilerswist. Received: 16 april 2010 accepted: 21 october 2010

of Related InteReSt histoRies & discouRses for several years now, Siegfried J. Schmidts work has provided an important complement to the field, as it bases constructivism in a philosophical and socio-cultural context. With his new book, he develops this approach, striving to overcome simplistic models that fail to specify how human constructions come into being, to challenge traditional dualistic models, and to show how social systems emerge and function the book provides an important, prolific and strong case for constructivism as a theory of communication. for a detailed review see: Knoop C. a. (2007) Beyond dualism: on S. J. Schmidts attempt to rewrite constructivism. Review of: Siegfried J. Schmidt (2007) Pour une rcriture du constructivisme. Constructivist foundations 3(1): 55.

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of Related InteReSt the finality of temPoRaRity How real ist reality? Can we obtain a secure access to the reality? and how are we to assess the truth and the objectivity of this access? Which role does language play when dealing with the reality? Is the process of knowledge acquisation dominated by the subject or by the object? Is there anything outside at all, or is everything only our construction? In ever newer attempts of description the author tries to make plausible connections among topics from the broad field of reality debates. as Hilary Putnam and other used to say, it is about descriptions and redescriptions, and for that we need to design an epistemologically much more relaxed way of argumentation.

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