Testing The Mandate Model in Britain and The US

Testing the Mandate Model in Britain and the United States: Evidence from the Reagan and Thatcher
Eras Author(s): Terry J. Royed Reviewed work(s): Source: British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Jan., 1996), pp. 45-80 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/194013 . Accessed: 21/11/2012 09:27
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B.J.Pol.S. 26, 45-80 Printed in Great Britain
Copyright? 1996 CambridgeUniversityPress
Testing the Mandate Model in Britain and the United States: Evidence from the Reagan and Thatcher Eras
TERRY J. ROYED*
The hypothesis that parties are better able to carry out mandates in Britain than the United States is tested for the Reagan and Thatcher years. A list of specific pledges was compiled and it was determined whether or not the pledges were fulfilled. The primary finding is that more Conservative party pledges were fulfilled, compared to those of the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States. In each country policy took a conservative turn, but because more pledges were fulfilled in Britain, the 'Conservative revolution' was more thorough there than in the United States. It is suggested, in contrastto the findings of previous literature,thatinstitutional differences between the two countries are one factor that matterswhen it comes to bringing about policy change.
The past decade has seen remarkablegrowth in the number of countries that can reasonably be described as 'democratic'. In the comparative politics field this trend has been accompanied by increased interest in the consequences of adopting alternative types of democratic institutions.' In the United States, the increased frequency of divided government, combined with higher budget deficits and the widespread perception thatthe system has become 'deadlocked', has resulted in a number of studies on the institutional effectiveness of the US system.2 There are a number of criteria that might be used in order to define 'effectiveness'.3 For the US case, those who believe that the system is ineffective focus primarily on the ability of the system to 'get things done'. The charge is that, with a system of separation of powers, low party cohesion and multiple
* Departmentof Political Science, University of Alabama. This article is drawn from the author's dissertation and the author would like to thank dissertation advisers Richard Gunther, Anthony Mughan and Samuel Patterson, all of the Ohio State University, for their support of this project. In addition, thanks are due to Stephen Borrelli of the University of Alabama for his comments, and Margaret Purcell and Steven Marlowe for research assistance. ' See, for example, R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, eds, Do Institutions Matter? (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993); Sven Steinmo et al., eds., StructuringPolitics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 2 Morris P. Fiorina, 'An Era of Divided Government', in Bruce Cain and Gillian Peele, eds, Developments in American Politics (London: Macmillan, 1990); David Mayhew, Divided We Govern (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991); John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds, Can the Government Govern? (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1988); Weaver and Rockman, eds., Do Institutions Matter? 3See R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, 'Assessing the Effects of Institutions', in Weaver and Rockman, Do Institutions Matter?, for a discussion of the assessment of governmental effectiveness. The definition of 'effectiveness' used here is narrower than theirs.
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centres of power, deadlock may occur. Some of those who perceive that such deadlock exists look approvingly at the British model which allegedly enacts policy much more efficiently. Britain is often cited as the closest real-world example of a 'responsible two-party system', meaning a system in which citizens elect parties which stand for particularpolicies, and the winning party initiates those policies.4 Citizens are able clearly to identify one party as being responsible for policy change and can vote accordingly. The United States, by contrast, is generally recognized as not having this type of system - a fact that has been lamented by some.5 There is no assurance that the legislative and executive branches will be of the same party; Congress is highly fragmented; and there is little party cohesion - with obvious consequences for policy effectiveness.6 There are a number of ways that one might try to test the hypothesis that a British-style system more effectively enacts policy. One approach would be to look at policy outcomes: the more 'effective' system should have 'better' outcomes. In this vein, Weaver points out that parliamentary systems do not necessarily have lower budget deficits than the United States.7 It could be argued, however, that this comparison assumes, perhaps falsely, that deficit reduction is an equally important goal of all governments. Given that policy goals may be traded against one another, 'bad' outcomes may be tolerated or even encouraged, if they are associated with policies that produce other, more highly valued outcomes. In addition, factors beyond the control of policy makers, such as an oil crisis or naturaldips in the business cycle, have an impact on budget deficits. In other words, the ability of a system to enact laws efficiently might not ultimately matter for outcomes. For these reasons, looking at outcomes alone is unlikely to provide an accurate assessment of the 'effectiveness' of a set of institutions. Perhaps a better way to consider the 'effectiveness' of a system is simply to look at whether or not leaders enact the policies that they have pledged to enact. This is an essential component of the 'mandate theory of elections' - the idea that voters put leaders in office to enact particularpolicies and that leaders then enact them. The 'mandate theory of elections' has been tested in a number of different ways by various scholars. Thus far, there has been little directly
Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-OneCountries (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984), suggests that New Zealand has actually turned out to be more like the ideal-type 'British model' than Britain. 5 See 'Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Report of the Committee on Political Parties, American Political Science Association', American Political Science Review, supplement to Vol. 44, No. 3, Part 2 (1950). 6 In particularthis argument has been made by James L. Sundquist, Constitutional Reform and Effective Government (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1986). But, for the opposite view, see Mayhew, Divided We Govern; James A. Thurber, 'Representation, Accountability, and Efficiency in Divided Party Control of Government', PS: Political Science and Politics, 24 (1991), 653-7. 7 R. Kent Weaver, 'Are Parliamentary Systems Better?' Brookings Review 3 (Summer 1985), 16-25.
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Testing the Mandate Model
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comparative research on this topic. This study will address this paucity of comparative work through a case study of policy change in the United States and Britain during the Reagan and Thatcher years. For reasons to be discussed below, the method used will be to identify specific pledges in party platforms and manifestos and to 'test' whether or not they were fulfilled. How would one expect the fulfilment of pledges to differ in the two countries? In both the United States and Britain, a number of factors may affect the extent to which a government carries out its campaign pledges. First, in any one country, the leadership qualities of the head of government are important. The leader may be a 'programmatic' leader or not, in the sense of having a coherent set of beliefs and a specific agenda based on those beliefs; and the leader may be very skilled in manipulating the political process to attain his or her goals, or less skilled. Secondly, the government faces a variety of potential constraints which make it more or less difficult to proceed with a particular agenda. If economic circumstances are very bad (for example, during the years following the oil crisis in just about all countries), it might be argued that policy making is more constrained. The type of domestic agenda being pursued may itself be considered more or less of a constraint: it is easier to enact some kinds of public policies (such as lowering taxes) than others (raising taxes or cutting programmes). Foreign policy events can have the impact of increasing or decreasing the constraints on domestic policy making. For example, with the end of the Cold War and consequent downsizing of the military in the United States, there is talk of a 'peace dividend' - in other words, more money is potentially available for domestic programmes. Thirdly, the decision-making environment may vary in a number of ways. In the United States, there may be divided or united government. If government is divided between the president and Congress, the president may be of a different party from both houses (as in 1987-92) or may be of the same party as one of the houses (as in 1980-86). In Britain, the government may have a large majority (as in the post-war Labour government or most of the Thatcher years), a small majority (as in the Major government since 1992), or no majority at all (like the Labour government in 1974). Table 1 summarizes the possibilities. Clearly, one might expect that the fulfilment of pledges in each country would vary depending on the particular combination of circumstances. A British government with a strong leader, poor economy and a small majority will probably be very different from one with a weak leader, a flourishing economy and large majority - and so on. One thing that remains constant is the institutional difference between the countries: the presidential/parliamentary distinction. The United States can never have the equivalent of a majority government in Britain. Even when there is united government, there are still weak and incohesive parties, and an independent legislature with a strong committee system. Compared to Britain, the legislative process in the United States is an obstacle course, whether or not there is divided government.
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Factors Influencing Pledge Fulfilment
Britain Leadership Constraints 'Programmatic'leader or not; level of political skills, State of the economy; other circumstances which may act as constraint. Size of majority;or minority.
United States 'Programmatic'leader or not; level of political skills. State of the economy; other circumstances which may act as constraint. Presidentone party, Senate and Congress the other; president and one house one party, other house other party; president and both houses same party.
Decision-making environment
How would we characterize the Reagan and Thatcher administrations in terms of these variables? The argument could be made that in choosing that era we are holding more or less constant 'leadership' and 'circumstances', leaving 'decision-making environment' as the primary difference. Reagan and Thatcher had similar leadership qualities. Both had a specific set of ideological beliefs and policy proposals based on those beliefs - in fact, of course, the set of beliefs themselves were the same. They came into power at about the same time - at the end of the oil crisis, when both economies were in the throws of 'stagflation'. Due to the poor economy, the previous governing party in each country had been pretty thoroughly discredited, making it a positive environment for a new party to promote major change.8 The decision-making environments we are comparing, therefore, are the parliamentarysystem with a single party and a large majority in charge compared with the presidential system and divided government. Given this set of factors in each country, how might we expect mandate theory to apply? With strong, programmatic leaders in each country, we would expect mandate theory to be more applicable than if the reverse were the case. In terms of circumstances, the economy was very bad at the beginning of each term, but the oil crisis was over, and it is reasonable to expect that all economies would eventually rebound - thus, the circumstances were not as constraining as they had been in the 1970s. So far, both factors are favourable for
8 Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 8, suggests that a 'repeated pairing of dismal failure with stunning success is one of the more striking patterns in presidential history'. His argument that failure sets the stage for a 'reconstruction' of politics seems generalizable to other countries.
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mandates being carried out. In Britain, the decision-making environment was the best possible one for carrying out pledges: a large majority, which became even larger in Thatcher's second term than the first. In the United States, there was divided government - not the most favourable policy-making environment for a president trying to carry out pledges. Yet Reagan did have at least the Senate on his side until after 1986. Overall, then, the Thatcher era presents a set of factors which make for the best possible chance for mandate theory being borne out: a strong, programmatic leader, not overly constraining circumstances, and a positive decision-making environment. For the United States, the picture is mixed. There was a strong, programmaticleader and not overly constraining circumstances, combined with a decision-making environment that was not as favourable as united government, but not as unfavourable as completely divided government. What would we predict about the pace of policy change during the period being considered? In the United States, we would expect the Reagan 'revolution' to be most successful in the early years, and then lose steam. One reason for this expectation is the 'honeymoon' period that presidents experience early on in their terms; a second reason is the Republicans' loss of the Senate majority after 1986.9 In Britain, it is less easy to make generalizations about changes in prime-ministerial power over time. Bruce-Gardyne and Lawson suggested in 1976 that it tends to decline over time, but later they, along with King, suggest that Thatcher may have been an exception.10 While size of the opposition in the legislature is obviously less important than it is in the United States, the larger a prime minister's majority, the more likely it is that there will be enough support for more dramatic or 'radical' policy changes. In the 1983 election, the Conservatives increased their parliamentarymajority from 53.4 per cent of seats to 61.1 per cent of seats. Thus, in contrast to the United States, we would expect the Thatcher 'revolution' to escalate over time.
APPROACHES TO TESTING MANDATE THEORY
A number of people have applied different variations of a platform-testing or manifesto-testing approach to the cases of Britain and the United States. The available literature provides a starting point. Traditional wisdom says that the mandate theory of elections, in which candidates make pledges and carry them out once elected, is not a good description of how the US system operates in the real world. In particular,party
9On presidential 'honeymoons', see Paul C. Light, The President's Agenda (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), and Richard Rose, The Postmoder President, 2nd edn (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1991). 10Jock Bruce-Gardyne and Nigel Lawson, The Power Game: An Examination of DecisionMaking in Government(Hamden, Conn.: Arcon Books, 1976); Jock Bruce-Gardyne,Mrs Thatcher's First Administration (London: Macmillan, 1984); Anthony King, 'MargaretThatcher:The Style of a Prime Minister', The British Prime Minister (London: Macmillan, 1985).
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platforms are not viewed as predictive of future policy action.11 The same argument has been made for the British case - for example, Anthony King has alleged that party manifestos are 'empty and meaningless' documents having a 'virtually random' relationship to what a party will do in office.12 Various writers have provided evidence on the ability of the parties in Britain and the United States to follow through on policy pledges. All use the simple method of counting pledges in the party platforms and manifestos, and then analysing legislative and other records to determine how many of the pledges have been redeemed. Rose finds that 'the great bulk' of British party pledges were fulfilled.13 Eighty per cent of the Conservative party's pledges were acted upon during 1970-74. For another 10 per cent of pledges, action was ambiguous. The Labour government of 1974-79 acted upon 54 per cent of promises, with ambiguous action on 19 per cent. Rallings finds that an average of 63.7 per cent of British party manifesto pledges were implemented over the 1945-79 period.14 Pomper and Lederman's study of policy pledges in the United States covers the period 1944-76.15 They find that for the years 1944-66, 72 per cent of all pledges were fulfilled in some manner. For 1968-78, fulfilment was lower, at 63 per cent. They tested fulfilment of pledges for both parties, and the percentages are averages for both parties. Pomper and Lederman find that, while winning the presidency generally helps a party to fulfil its promises, this is not always the case when the party which wins the presidency has a minority in Congress. During the first Nixon term, Democrats in Congress were successful in redeeming 66 per cent of their platform pledges, while the Republicans redeemed only 65 per cent, even with control of the White House. The Rose, Pomper and Lederman, and Rallings studies were undertaken separately, and each has slightly different definitions of 'pledge' and 'fulfilment'. As a result, the figures cited above cannot be used to make valid comparisons between the United States and Great Britain. However, if we take these studies as a preliminary way to compare fulfilment of promises in the two countries, we have the interesting finding that, at least for some time periods, more promises are fulfilled in the United States than in Britain. This conflicts with the view that Britain is closer to the 'responsible two-party system' model.
IA strong statement of this view is made by M. Ostrogorski (Democracy and the Organization Political Parties, Volume II: The United States (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), pp. 138-9), of who refers to platforms as 'a farce' with 'little significance for Congress'. Similarly, E. E. Schattschneider (Party Government (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1942), p. 567) argues that 'party platforms are fatuities; they persuade no one, deceive no one, and enlighten no one'. 12 Cited in Richard Rose, Do Parties Make a Difference? (Chatham, Mass.: Chatham House Publishers, 1984), p. 56. 13Rose, Do Parties Make A Difference? p. 65. 14Colin Railings, 'The Influence of Election Programmes:Britain and Canada 1945-1979', in Ian Budge, David Robertson and Derek Hearl, eds, Ideology, Strategy and Party Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 15 Gerald Pomper with Susan Lederman, Elections in America (New York: Longman, 1982).
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It is also the case that the summary remarks provided by the various authors conflict with what one might expect for each country. Rose argues that the reason for a relatively high level of fulfilment of pledges in Britain is that the parties pledge themselves to manageable goals, which are fairly easy to fulfil but which, when fulfilled, do not make much difference to ultimate policy outcomes. He notes that 'British parties are not the primary forces shaping the destiny of British society; it is shaped by something stronger than parties'.16 In contrast, the basic thrust of Pomper and Lederman's argument is that platforms are more important in the United States than is commonly believed. They are frequently cited for this conclusion.17 Budge and Hofferbert use a different methodology from those cited above. Rather than looking at actual action on actual pledges, they correlate general content of platforms with spending data.18 They conclude in no uncertain terms that the US case ... offers a tough test for mandatetheory. It has passed the test... It is an importantaspect of our models' success thatthey go againstMarxistor Marxian critiques of 'bourgeois democracy' as a sham, where electoral endorsementsand party governments serve to mask the predominanceof a socioeconomic or power elite ... partygovernmentin the US works largely as mandatetheories say it should, that is, responsively to electoral endorsementsof party policy emphases.19 In their later work using the same methodology they arrive at a similar conclusion for the British case: British public expenditurepriorities reflect the differential issue saliency written
into party election programmes ... This finding is ... central to democratic theory democratic.20
itself - to the much-debatedquestion of whetherbourgeois democraciesreally are
Thus, their studies find no importantdifferences between the United States and Britain as far as the applicability of mandate theory is concerned: 'the constitutional differences between Britain and the United States seem less consequential for their policy-making processes than are relatively neglected similarities in the functioning of their party systems'.21
16
See for example,JohnP. Bradley,'Party Platforms PartyPerformance and Social Concerning as Security',Polity, 1 (1969), 337-58; Paul T. David, 'PartyPlatforms NationalPlans',Public Administration and Review,31 (1971), 303-15; and MarkJ. Wattier,'PartyPlatforms Electoral Politics:Communication Democratic of PlatformPromisesin the 1988 Presidential Campaign' at PoliticalScienceAssociation,1989). (presented the AnnualMeetingof the American 18Ian Budge and Richard 'Mandates Policy Outputs: PartyPlatforms and US and Hofferbert,
Federal Expenditures', American Political Science Review, 84 (1990), 111-32; and Richard I. and Government Spending in Britain, 1948-85', British Journal of Political Science, 23 (1992),
17
Rose, Do Parties Make A Difference? p. 142.
Hofferbert IanBudge, 'ThePartyMandate the Westminster and and Model:ElectionProgrammes 151-82. 19 BudgeandHofferbert, 'Mandates Policy Outputs', 129-30. and pp. 20 Hofferbert Budge, 'ThePartyMandate the Westminster and and Model',p. 181. 21 Hofferbert Budge, 'ThePartyMandate the Westminster and and Model',p. 181.
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platformcontent and government spending, using data from a content analysis of US platforms for 1948-84, and British manifestos for 1948-85. The data are derived from a large comparative study of party programmes in nineteen countries. For that study, each sentence in the party programmewas coded into one of fifty-four substantivecategories.22The US study considered seven of these categories; the British study considered six. In both studies, the percentage of the platformor manifesto devoted to each category was the independentvariable.The dependent variable was expenditure, broken down into broad categories of spending. Budge and Hofferberttested for a relationship between emphasis on a particular policy area and spending in that area. They suggested that this constituted a test of mandate theory: if emphasis on one policy area increased, spending should increase, based on the assumption that 'topics emphasized by party platforms constitute implicit commitments to greater effort in the area if elected to government, at the expense of issues downgraded in the platform'.23 There are a number of problems with using this method as a test for mandate theory. First, Budge and Hofferbertsuggest that the seven policy areas used were chosen on the basis of both 'substantive relevance' and 'experimental The categories were not chosen because they contained the most computations'.24 specific policy statements, or statements most clearly related to spending. For example, the category 'social justice' (which includes general statements about the need for fair treatment for all) is used while the categories 'social service expansion: positive' and 'social service expansion: negative' are not used though the latter seem to be more directly related to spending. How would the analysis be affected if all of the fifty-four areas which pertain in some way to social services were used as the predictor for social service spending? A more general limitation with the Budge-Hofferbert method is that the percentage of sentences in a platform which are devoted to a particularpolicy area can be a very imprecise indicator of party intentions. First, it tells us nothing about the extent to which specific pledges - as opposed to rhetorical statements - are made. The 1984 Republican platform had 1,380 sentences but only eighty-nine firm pledges by the definition used here. Of the remaining sentences, some were clearly policy-related but some were not. The BudgeHofferbert approach gives rhetorical statements the same weight as pledges; in fact, it seems, as noted above, that more general statements about social welfare were chosen over more specific ones as the best predictor of social services spending. But what happens to the more specific pledges? Are they carried out or not? If may very well be the case, for example, that left-wing parties have more rhetoric on social welfare in their programmes and also tend to spend more in that area - but what about enactment of specific programmes that are pledged? This is important for mandate theory.
thoroughly described in Budge, Robertson and Hearl, Ideology, Strategy and Party Change. 23 Budge and Hofferbert, 'Mandates and Policy Outputs', p. 114. 24 Budge and Hofferbert, 'Mandates and Policy Outputs', p. 115. Categories are described in their Appendix B.
22This data is
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Secondly, the relationship between number of sentences and intent with regard to spending is very uncertain. Budge and Hofferbert indicate that generally more sentences should imply more spending, but that with some areas such as 'government efficiency', more sentences imply an intent to spend less. But another possibility is that in a given category, some sentences may favour more spending, and some may favour less. Thus, for example, the Republicans in 1984 talked about cutting back on 'excessive' environmental regulations, while at the same time they pledged federal assistance to the states for disposal of wastes. It is clear, then, that devoting a given percentage of a platform to policy x could mean that more spending on x is proposed, that less is proposed, or that more will be spent in some areas and less in others, leaving overall spending unchanged. This suggests that positive, negative or no correlations between platform emphasis and spending could all be quite consistent with mandate theory. Another problem lies with using broad spending categories as the independent variable. Aggregate spending figures can hide policy changes. If eligibility rules for a programme are changed, there is no guarantee that this change will be reflected in a change in total annual spending in that area. A change in the economy could itself change the number of people eligible for benefits and conceal the impact of the change in the rules of eligibility. Lack of impact on an aggregate level, though, would not mean that the change in eligibility rules had not been an important one. Setting aside these objections, what happens if we accept the basic finding that there is a relationship between policy emphasis in platforms and manifestos and spending on policy areas? Finding this relationship does notjustify the broad conclusions that mandate theory is vindicated for both the United States and Britain, that there are no significant differences between the countries regarding how mandates are carried out, and that Marxist or other critiques of the system are discredited. Surely, in order to draw such conclusions, one must look at the substance of what is pledged and what is or is not actually undertaken. It is possible for a general relationship between platforms and spending to exist even though important pledges go unfulfilled. This finding might lead to different implications for democratic theory than that suggested by Budge and Hofferbert. And testing specific pledges might conceivably lead to a different conclusion regarding how the United States and Britain compare. In the 'Controversy' section of a recent American Political Science Review, Gary King and Michael Laver test a revised specification of Budge and Hofferberts's US model, using the same data.25They argue that once previous government spending trends are taken into account, there is little or no relationship between platform emphasis and government spending. Given the problems discussed above, this seems to be a reasonable conclusion. However,
Gary King and Michael Laver, 'Party Platforms, Mandates, and Government Spending', American Political Science Review, 87 (1993), 744-7.
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in respecifying the same model, King and Laver appear to be accepting without question the basic assumption that if 'mandate theory' were true, one would expect the number of sentences in each policy area to be positively related to spending in that area. Thus, they conclude that their findings are 'consistent with considerable prior research about the diffuse nature of American political parties'.26 Yet they stop short of saying 'that there is no connection between party positions and federal priorities', arguing instead that 'the connection probably does exist: it is just far weaker and more subtle than could be perceived with these data and methods'.27 Given the problems outlined above, one could argue that the connection need not be 'weak' or 'subtle' to avoid detection by these methods, and that the findings may actually tell us very little about the 'nature of American political parties'. In the light of the above discussion, it seems reasonable to suggest that the best way to 'test' the mandate theory of elections is to look only at firm pledges, and to determine whether or not each pledge has indeed been redeemed. While the Budge-Hofferbert approach makes feasible the analysis of a large number of platforms across countries, the result is at best only a very rough estimate of the relationship between party programmatic commitments and policy action. This study analyses the Thatcher and Reagan years, using manifesto pledges of the Conservative and Labour parties in Britain for the years 1979 and 1983, along with platform pledges for both parties in the United States for 1980 and 1984.28 One could argue that the 'mandate theory' can be tested in Britain by looking at just the Conservative party. If many pledges are carried out, mandate theory is vindicated. But a response to this could be that 'mandate theory' implies not just that the governing party's pledges are carried out, but also that what gets done is different from what would have been done if the other party had won. These are two separate points. It is possible that the governing party could carry out a large proportion of its pledges, yet outcomes might be similar to those which would have obtained if the other party had won and carried out its pledges. Rose seems to suggest that this is precisely what happened in the 1970s.29 Therefore, to fully 'test' mandate theory we will look not just at the number of Conservative party pledges fulfilled, but the substance of those pledges, and the number and substance of Labour pledges fulfilled. For the United States, we clearly need to analyse pledges and action on pledges for both parties, since during most of the Reagan years support from a majority of both parties was
King and Laver, 'Party Platforms', p. 746. King and Laver, 'Party Platforms', p. 746. 28 The third Thatcher term is not included in the analysis because the change of leaders in 1988 in the United States complicates the pictures. We would no longer be comparing two 'revolutionaries', but ratherone revolutionary and one more moderate successor to a revolutionary. 29 Rose, Do Parties Make A Difference?
27
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needed to pass any legislation. For both countries, the focus will be on domestic policy alone, excluding foreign and defence policy.30
PARTY PLEDGES AND POLICY ACTION
To begin with, specific definitions of 'pledge' and 'pledge fulfilment' are obviously needed. Determining which of many sentences are specific enough to be pledges and then determining which are fulfilled are not clear-cut decisions. The method used here is discussed in the Appendix. Tables 2 and 3 provide an overview of all of the parties' domestic policy pledges, broken down by the type of change being pledged. In the light of the discussion above regarding the expenditure approachto testing mandate theory, it is interesting to note that only a minority of pledges of all parties are clear pledges to do things which will increase expenditure. A much smaller number involve action which will cut expenditure. The parties differ fairly predictably with regard to expenditure pledges, with the Democratic and Labour parties having many more expansionary pledges than their conservative counterparts. The Republicans are the only party in either country with a somewhat significant number of pledges to cut spending. For all the parties in both countries, 'change' is the largest single category of pledge (i.e., pledges to change the status quo in some way which will have no impact or an unclear or unpredictable impact on spending or taxing). Status quo pledges take up no more than 18.8 per cent of any one party's platform. Turning to analysis of pledges by policy area (Tables 4 and 5), all of the parties give social welfare and economic policy pledges heavy emphasis in all years. The Republicans and Conservatives consistently emphasize economic policy more than the Democrats and Labour. Interestingly, there is very little difference in emphasis on social welfare policy between the Democrats and Republicans or between the Conservatives and Labour. With regard to civil rights and liberties, the Democrats emphasize these issues by far the most of all parties, while the Republicans, Conservatives and Labour all place less emphasis on this issue area. The greater emphasis by the Democrats than the Republicans is certainly consistent with the Democratic party's image as a champion for minority rights. Given the larger minority population in the United States it is perhaps not surprising that, on average, both US parties emphasize these issues more than the British parties. But the Conservatives' 1979 platform emphasizes these issues more than that of the Labour party. However, this does not reflect greater concern with minority rights: almost all of these Conservative pledges are specific pledges to make immigration rules more strict. Clearly, it cannot be assumed that a large number of pledges in an
Domestic policy is the area that most voters care the most about, and thus it could be argued that it is most relevant for 'mandate theory'. In addition, domestic policy has been the primaryfocus of previous studies on mandatetheory, including Rose, Do Parties Make a Difference ? and the Budge and Hofferbert pieces.
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TABLE 2
Distribution of Party Pledges by Type of Change Pledged: Britain* Conservatives 1979 % % 1.1 11.4 5.7 67.0 14.8 1983 %
(Number) (3) (9) (11) (57) (6) (6) (92)
(Number) (1) (10) (5) (59) (13) (0)
Cutt Expandt Tax? Changem Status quo** Reviewtt Total pledges
3.3 9.8 12.0 62.0 6.5 6.5 100.1
28.7 4.1 45.9 18.8 2.4 99.9
100.0
(88)
Numbers not alwaysaddup to 100 percent becauseof rounding. do undetermined. or spending. proposeto reducegovernment tPledgeswhichspecifically indirectly or spending. proposeto increasegovernment :Pledgeswhichspecifically indirectly to ?Pledgesreferring tax changes. to [Pledges changethe statusquo in some way otherthanthe threecategoriesabove. for the to proposals change. **Pledges continue statusquo and/oropposethe opposition's or to a ttPledges to appoint committee/commission 'study'a problem; to otherwisereviewa policy probl
*Tables 2-5 showing 'distributionof party pledges' include all pledges for each party in each country, incl
TABLE
Distribution of Party Pledges by Type of Change Pledged: United State Republicans 1980 % (Number) (12) (9) (29) (60) (23) (1) (134) % 10.1 4.5 20.2 49.4 15.7 99.9 1984 (Number) (9) (4) (18) (44) (14) (0) (89) % 0.4 31.2 4.3 44.4 18.4 1.3 100.0
19
Cut Expand Tax Change Status quo Review Total pledges
9.0 6.7 21.6 44.8 17.2 0.8 100.1
of *See Table2 forexplanation terms.
TABLE
Distribution of Party Pledges by Policy Area: Britain Conservatives 1979 % (Number) (20) (35) (9) (8) (5) (7) (8) (92) % 23.9 42.0 1.1 13.6 4.5 6.8 8.0 99.9 1983 (Number) (21) (37) (1) (12) (4) (6) (7) (88) % 27.0 27.0 4.9 13.9 2.5 1.6 23.0 99.9
Social welfare Economic Civil rights/ liberties Natural resources Education Crime Other Total pledges
21.7 38.0 9.8 8.7 5.4 7.6 8.7 99.9
TABLE 5
Distribution of Party Pledges by Policy Area: United States Republicans 1980 % (Number) (30) (51) (11) (22) (6) (4) (10) (134) % 14.6 38.2 12.4 11.2 6.7 10.1 6.7 99.9 1984 (Number) (13) (34) (11) (10) (6) (9) (6) (89) % 21.8 25.2 19.7 20.5 3.4 4.3 5.1 100.0
19
22.4 38.0 8.2 16.4 4.5 3.0 7.5 100.0
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area implies anything in particular about the kind of change being pledged in that area. This article began with several hypotheses: that because of the different institutional contexts in the two countries, there would be greater pledge fulfilment in Britain than the United States; that the policy 'revolution' would escalate over time in Britain; and that the policy 'revolution' in the United States would diminish over time. Tables 6-9 suggest that these hypotheses were confirmed for most areas: different decision-making environments do matter, and in a predictable way. The pledge fulfilment rate of the Conservative party (including pledges receiving a rating of 'yes' or 'partial') increased from 80.8 per cent for 1979 pledges to 88.6 per cent for 1983 pledges. (Completely fulfilled pledges rose from 62.8 per cent for 1979 to 79.0 per cent for 1983.) In contrast, 32.7 per cent of 1979 Labour party pledges were carried out in the first Thatcher term, in spite of their complete exclusion from power. This figure was halved, though, for 1983 pledges. Thus, for the first Thatcher term, the gap between Conservative 'success' and Labour 'success' is 48.1 per cent; this increases to 73.5 per cent for the second term. Labour's shift to the left is no doubt largely responsible for this change in Labour party 'success'.31 What can we say about the types of pledges which were 'fulfilled' for each party? The Conservatives' worst performance is with pledges to cut spending. However, there were only four of these (for both years) and so they had little effect on the overall fulfilment rate. In the largest category of pledges 'change' - the Conservatives averaged 82.9 per cent fulfilment for the two years. The Labour party, by contrast, was also able to fulfil 30 per cent of its 1979 'change' pledges, declining to 12.7 per cent for 1983 pledges.32 On the US side, there is relatively little change in overall pledge fulfilment from the first to the second Reagan term. The Republicans do better than the Democrats for both terms, although the gap narrows slightly from 13.2 per cent
31 At this point, a comment is in order regarding the rate of 'testing' of pledges in each country. As noted in Table 2, not all pledges were determined to have been carried out or not; these 'untested' pledges are then excluded from the analysis. There are more US pledges 'tested' (96.8 per cent compared to 88.4 per cent for Britain) simply because information on policy action, even obscure action, is more readily available to the researcher for the United States. Since the objection could be made that this could affect the findings, the author looked at what would happen if all of the untested British pledges were unfulfilled. This assumption would stack the deck against what we expect to find - that is, more pledge fulfilment in Britain. It was determinedthat even with this 'worst case' scenario, the Conservatives still significantly outperform the Republicans, particularly when comparing Reagan and Thatcher's second terms and particularlywhen status quo and review pledges are excluded. More detailed information is available upon request from the author. 32 If status quo and review pledges (i.e., those pledges which are fulfilled by doing nothing, or by simply forming a commission to 'study' a problem) are eliminated, overall fulfilment rates are reduced to 78.6 per cent and 85.5 per cent for the Conservatives and 28.7 per cent and 10.7 per cent for Labour. The 'gaps' between success of the two parties then become 49.9 per cent for the first term, and 74.8 per cent for the second - about the same as when all pledges are included. In other words, eliminating the most easily achieved pledges does not much change the overall fulfilment rates for each party.
TABLE
Rate of Fulfilment of Party Pledges by Type of Change Pledged: Britain Conservatives 1979 Percentage fulfilled Percentage fulfilled 0% 70.0% 100% 88.9% 85.5% 100% 88.6% 1983 Percentage fulfilled 28.1% 20.0% 30.0% 28.7% 55.0% 0% 32.7%
19
(Number) (3) (6) (9) (52) (70) (5) (3) (78)
(Number) (1) (10) (4) (54) (69) (12) (0) (81)
Cut Expand Tax Change Subtotal Status quo Review Total pledges
66.7% 83.3% 88.9% 76.9% 78.6% 100% 100% 80.8%
of *SeeTable2 forexplanation terms. Tables6-9, showingfulfilment different of of categories pledges,inclu weredefinitively to determined havebeenfulfilledornot.Thepercentages shownarethosepledgesrated'yes' o in parentheses the number testedpledgesin the category. of is
TABLE 7
Rate of Fulfilment of Party Pledges by Type of Change Pledged: Republicans 1980 Percentage fulfilled 1984 Percentage fulfilled 55.6% 50.0% 44.4% 52.3% 50.7% 100.0% 58.4%
United
(Number) (12) (9) (26) (58) (109) (23) (1) (129)
(Number) (9) (4) (18) (44) (75) (14) (0) (89)
Percentage fulfilled 100.0% 41.7% 80.0% 32.3% 39.6% 85.7% 33.3% 48.0%
Cut Expand Tax Change Subtotal Status quo Review Total pledges
66.7% 44.4% 57.5% 51.7% 56.0% 91.3% 100.0% 61.2%
of *See Table2 for explanation terms.
TABLE
Rate of Fulfilment of Party Pledges by Policy Area: Britain Conservatives 1979 Percentage fulfilled 1983 Percentage fulfilled 84.2% 86.1% 100.0% 88.9% 66.6% 100.0% 100.0% 87.6%
(Number) (17) (32) (8) (7) (4) (6) (4) (78)
(Number) (19) (36) (1) (9) (3) (6) (7) (81)
Percentage fulfilled 34.4% 24.1% 20.0% 35.7% 33.3% 50.0% 40.0% 32.7%
88.2% 84.4% 50.0% 57.1% 100.0% 83.3% 100.0% 80.8%
TABLE 9
Rate of Fulfilment of Party Pledges by Policy Area: United States Republicans 1980 1984
Percentage Percentage fulfilled (Number) (Number) fulfilled Social welfare Economic Civil rights/ liberties Natural resources Education Crime Other Total pledges 66.7% 64.6% 36.4% 55.0% 33.3% 50.0% 90.0% 61.2% (30) (48) (11) (20) (6) (4) (10) (129) 53.8% 55.9% 63.6% 70.0% 16.7% 77.8% 66.7% 58.4% (13) (34) (11) (10) (6) (9) (6) (89)
Percentag fulfilled 41.2% 48.2% 45.6% 53.2% 71.4% 55.6% 45.4% 48.0%
65
for 1980 pledges to 8.1 per cent for 1984 pledges. If we eliminate status quo and review pledges, as with Britain, we again find lower fulfilment rates for both parties and both years. This time, though, the fulfilment 'gap' between the parties changes somewhat, to 16.4 per cent for 1980 pledges and 3.2 per cent for 1984 pledges. This is mainly because fulfilment of status quo and review pledges exaggerated the 'success' of Republicans with 1984 pledges and Democrats with 1980 pledges more so than the others. In other words, when only those pledges which specify some sort of change are considered, party performance does change from the first Reagan term to the second: Republican performance declines and Democratic performance improves, as one would expect. Thus far, we have not addressed an important question: to what extent might the parties actually agree on policy pledges? That is, if we say that the Democrats fulfilled ten pledges and the Republicans fulfilled ten, is that twenty different pledges which have been fulfilled, or could it be only ten? Tables 10 and 11 show the extent to which parties either directly agree or directly disagree with one another.33
TABLE
10
Direct Agreement/Direct 1979
Disagreement: 1983 397 6 (3.0%) 6/6 = 100% 18 (9.1%) 18/18 = 100% 0
Britain 1979 + 1983 611 15 (4.9%) 15/15 = 100% 25 (8.2%) 24/25 = 96.0% 1/25 = 4.0%
Total pledges Agreement* Yes/partialt Disagreement Conservatives yes/ partial; Labour not Both no?
214 9 (8.4%) 9/9 = 100% 7 (6.5%) 6/7 = 85.7% 1/7 = 14.3
*There were nine instances of agreement between the parties in 1979; this means that nine Conservative pledges were the same as nine Labour pledges, making a total of eighteen pledges which are in agreement. The percentage shown in parentheses then is this eighteen as a percentage of the total 214 pledges in 1979. t'Agreement' pledges which were rated 'yes' or 'partial'; i.e., those pledges which were at least partially fulfilled. t'Disagreement' pledges for which the Conservatives received a 'yes' or 'partial' and Labour received a 'no'. ?'Disagreement' pledges for which both parties received a 'no'.
3 'Direct agreement' and 'directdisagreement' were defined strictly as taking the same or opposite stands on a specific policy: for example, in 1980 both the Republicans and Democrats pledged to oppose taxation of Social Security; and the Democrats pledged to oppose a subminimum wage for youth, while the Republicans pledged to enact one.
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The first important finding revealed is that both direct agreement and direct disagreement are relatively infrequent occurrences in the two countries. This is consistent with the findings of both Rose and Pomper and Lederman. In the United States, on average the parties agreed on only 7.7 per cent of pledges; thus, when ten Republican pledges are fulfilled, and ten Democratic pledges are fulfilled, it generally means that about eighteen different pledges were fulfilled. What happens when the parties directly disagree about a particular policy question? For Britain, the answer is what one would expect: the party in power 'wins'. In only one instance was this not the outcome; in that case, neither party 'won' - i.e., the Conservatives did not fulfil their pledge but this lack of fulfilment did not mean that Labour fulfilled theirs. In the United States, on average, during the Reagan years the Republicans 'won' 41.9 per cent of the time in cases of direct disagreement; the Democrats managed a victory 25.8 per cent of the time; but for about one-third of such pledges, neither party won. In the United States, even when the parties directly agree, there is no guarantee that pledges will be fulfilled: on average 87.5 per cent of such pledges were carried out.
TABLE 1 1
Direct Agreement/Direct Disagreement: United States* 1980 1984 254 5 (3.9%)

4/5 = 80.0%
1980+ 1984 622 24 = (7.7%)

21/24 = 87.5%
Total pledges Agreement

Yes/partial
368 19 (10.3%)
17/19 = 89.5%
Disagreement
18 (9.8%)
13 (10.2%) 6/13 = 46.1%

2/13 = 15.4%
31 (10.0%) 13/31 = 41.9%

8/31 = 25.8%
Republicans yes/partial; 7/18 = 38.9% Democrats no Democrats yes/partial;

Republicans no 6/18 = 33.3%
Both no
5/18 = 27.8%
5/13 = 38.5%
10/31 = 32.2%
this used of *Seenotesto Table10foranexplanation themethod in constructing table. One final analysis of pledges is useful for understanding the US case. Given that the president's party does better than the other party, one might wonder to what extent pledges made in party platforms require executive control in order to be carried out. Table 12 breaks down US pledges according to the type of action required. Republican success is relatively high for 'executive' pledges, but perhaps not as high as one might expect, since clearly Congress cannot be blamed for these 'failures'. Democratic 'success' on 'executive' pledges is predictably low, and thus the existence of these pledges helps to bring down their overall fulfilment rate.
TABLE
12
Rate of Fulfilment of Party Pledges by Type of Action Required: Unite Republicans 1980 Percentage fulfilled 1984 Percentage fulfilled 46.3% 61.5% 62.5% 100.0% 58.4%
19 Percentage fulfilled 43.3% 20.0% 42.8% 85.7% 48.0%
(Number) (73) (22) (11) (23) (129)
(Number) (54) (13) (8) (14) (89)
Legislative* Executivet Ambiguoust Status quo? Total pledges
49.3% 77.3% 45.4% 91.3% 62.0%
*Pledgeswhichspecifically legislativeactionfor fulfilment. promiselegislativeactionor require Thesepledg executiveactionor require executiveactionfor fulfilment. tPledgeswhichspecifically promise of the and reforming executivebranch, implementation laws. is or Thesepledgesincludethosea tPledgesforwhichthetypeof actionpromised/requiredambiguous unclear. or eitherexecutiveor legislativecontrol(e.g., a pledgeto reduceinflation unemployment). the changesproposed the otherparty.This categoryalso appeare by ?Pledgesto continue statusquo/oppose in to (i.e., none)andthe typeof actionrequired fulfilthepledge.Although a literalsense of changeproposed one fundsfor a programme), could arguethatthis is a different (e.g., to appropriate type of actionfromleg
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MAJOR POLICY CHANGES
All of these numbers provide a basic picture of the relationship between party pledges and policy in the two countries. However, as we stated at the outset, truly to 'test' mandate theory one needs to look at the substance of what was done or not done. Tables 13 and 14 list some of the majorpledges and their outcomes.34 The major policy changes of the Reagan and Thatcher eras are well known and documented in much of the literature cited in this article; what follows are highlights relevant for the argument here, including a look at the competition between Republicans and Democrats for victory on their own pledges. It is clear that the Labour party manifestos of 1979 and 1983 present an entirely different policy agenda from those of the Conservatives in all key areas. Fulfilled Labour pledges included: those where the two parties were in direct agreement; some pledges to increase benefits (which were fulfilled simply by indexing, which was already a policy); a number of outcomes pledges, including lowering inflation; and other pledges either to maintain the status quo, or otherwise to do things which would be done by any government as a matter of course. The significant changes in almost all policy areas in Britain under Thatcher are well known. Privatization, changes in industrial relations, and tax policy were all key parts of the Thatcher economic agenda, and as Table 13 indicates, pledges in these areas were generally fulfilled. Numerous industrial-relations pledges were also carried out, with a reduction of union power being the widely agreed-upon outcome. Finally, as pledged, there were significant cuts in upper-income tax rates. With regard to social welfare policy, in Britain the sale of council housing was the most dramatic change, and a number of specific pledges related to this. With 1979 civil rights and liberties pledges, the Conservatives did unusually badly with fulfilment, as Table 8 shows. Most pledges pertained to changes in immigration rules, and it turned out that the Home Office as well as many Conservative backbenchers, along with the opposition, were opposed to some of the changes (which were viewed as being too strict). The government then dropped some of their proposals.35 Other areas of significant policy change in Britain include education policy and changes in central-local government relations. The latter area (categorized as 'other' pledges) included legislation to cap the rates of local authorities and the complete abolition of the Greater London Council and other metropolitan councils.
34Which pledges are 'major' is clearly a value judgement; pledges shown in the table were chosen because they were a significant partof the Reagan and Thatcheragendas as discussed in the literature, and because they were particularlyvisible or contentious issues. Some pledges are shown to illustrate the primary actions taken in that policy area, although they may not have been 'major' in the sense defined above. 35 Zig Layton-Henry, 'Race and the Thatcher Government', in Zig Layton-Henry and Paul Rich, eds, Race, Government and Politics in Britain (London: Macmillan Press, 1986).
69
Significant policy change also took place in the United States in all areas, but it is clear from the examples which follow that these changes tended to give both parties some of what they pledged. Looking at economic policy, we see a less dramatic change than in Britain. First, looking at economic deregulation, there was bipartisanagreement to some extent, although the Republicans emphasized it more in their platforms. Action taken included deregulation of oil (by Executive Order) and legislation partially deregulating the bus industry, banks, savings and loans, and telecommunications. In the area of social deregulation, however, the parties disagreed, and the Reagan administration had mixed success. Enforcement of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) was weakened, as pledged by the Republicans and opposed by the Democrats. In contrast, attempts to weaken enforcement of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations backfired when a scandal resulted which mobilized environmental groups. In the end, a 1984 Democratic party pledge to increase EPA spending in real terms was met, as were other Democratic environmental policy pledges, including increased funding (despite Republican foot-dragging) for a 'Superfund' to clean up hazardous waste. Like the Conservatives, the Republicans pledged income tax cuts. These were enacted early in the Reagan administration, with the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA). Then, as the deficit soared, legislation in 1982 and 1984 raised some taxes. The 1986 Tax Reform fulfilled some pledges of both parties: a true compromise. The net result of the Reagan years were tax cuts for most, but not all individuals (as preferred by the Republicans); tax cuts for corporations (but the Democrats succeeded in raising these somewhat in 1986 after they had been lowered in 1981); and a decline in the progressivity of the system. 'Deadlock' is the word used by Congressional Quarterly to describe labour policy during the Reagan years.36 The issue of the minimum wage best illustrates this point. In 1984 an administrationproposal to lower the minimum wage for teenagers (as pledged in the Republican platform) died without being brought to the floor in either house. In contrast, an attempt by Senate Democrats in 1988 to raise the minimum wage for all (as was pledged in the Democratic platform) was abandoned after a filibuster and two failed attempts to invoke cloture. In the United States, unlike Britain, significant cuts were made in social welfare programmes. Most of the cuts came with the 1981 budget reconciliation act; they affected all the major social assistance and social insurance programmes. However, at the same time expansion in some programmes occurred, fulfilling some Democratic platform pledges, as indicated in Table 7. Passage of welfare reform and a 'catastrophic' health insurance bill37 in 1988
Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1984, p. 3167. 'Catastrophichealth insurance' would cover major, long-term medical expenses for the elderly, compensating for insufficient coverage of Medicare and many private insurance plans.
37
36
TABLE
13
Major Policy Pledges and their Outcomes: Britain Conservatives
L
1 Economic Policy Yes or partial: Expand and improve job training No:
Economic Policy Yes or partial:
Cutincometaxes incomesurcharge Reducethe investment action Ensure for protection thosehurtby secondary Increase for protection those hurtby a closed shop Provide publicfundsfor postalballotsfor unionelections unionsto vote on the use of politicalfunds Require Reducethe role of WagesCouncils Sell to the privatesectorsharesin the followingindustries: telecommunications, airlines,gas oil, aerospace, Control inflation
Increase (variouss publicownership Introduce wealthtax the Expand/strengthen PriceComm Create: industrial an com democracy NationalInvestment Bank,a Dep Industrial a Re Planning, Product Council,anda foreignin Planning
No:
income Reducethe state'sshareof national Reducethe growthof moneyin circulation

Social Welfare Policy Yes or partial: Social Welfare Policy Yes or partial:
Sell councilhousing(a number specificpledgesin of Increasevariouslong-term benefitsi to both 1979and 1983pertained this) Devote a higher proportion of the na Putcertain No: servicesin the NHS out to competitive tendering Allow morepay bedsin the NHS Introduce new disablement a allowa Relatepensionsto actual,not estimated, Abolishall NHS charges priceincreases and Raise various benefits by specific am Bringunemployment sicknessbenefitwithinthe tax system No: Increase 50%spending local a of by Phaseout the earnings (regarding rule pensions) Improvevariousbenefitsprograms ReduceNHS staff
Civil Rights/Liberties Yes or partial:
Civil Rights/Liberties Yes or partial: No:
No:
Introduce new BritishNationality a Act rules(severalpledgeshad Tighten immigration specifics) Severalspecificpledgesregarding tightening ruleswere not fulfilled immigration
Strengthen EqualPay Act/SexDiscr
Com Strengthen EqualOpportunity the Strengthen Race RelationsAct to Appointseniorministers promot Repealthe 1981 BritishNationality Evid RepealthePoliceandCriminal
Natural Resources Yes or partial:
Natural Resources Yes or partial:
Tighten loopholeson the disposalof hazardous up waste Removeleadfrompetrol

No:
Removelead frompetrol
No:
Reducepollution riversandcanals of
Education Policy Yes or partial:
environmental impactrepo Require Stopthe Sizewell nuclearplant Introduce extendedclean-upcam

Education Policy Yes or partial: No:
No longerrequire local authorities reorganize to along lines comprehensive Createassistedplacesto restorethe directgrant
principle Crime Policy Yes or partial:
on Increase representation s parental
to s Endpublicsupport independent schools Stop selectionin secondary Abolishthe AssistedPlaces Scheme

Crime Policy Yes or partial: Provide more resources for prisons No:
Spendmoreon fightingcrime Buildmorecourtrooms, prisons Set up morecompulsory attendance centres
alternatives non-custodial Expand to Createelectedpolice authorities m Stop puttingpettyoffendersinto pri

'Other' Policy Yes or partial: No:
'Other' Policy Yes or partial:
Holda vote on the creation a new select committee of system local authorities consultlocal representatives to Require of industry beforesettingtheirrates Abolishthe Metropolitan Councilsandthe Greater Council London
Irel Initiatediscussionson Northern controlson live animale Strengthen
Abolishthe Houseof Lords RepealTorylegislationon rate-cap variouspublicartsbodies Establish
TABLE 14
Major Policy Pledges and Their Outcomes: United States Republicans
Economic Policy Yes or partial: Cut certain taxes (various specific pledges) Deregulation (reduce stringency of OSHA regulations; in general, use cost-benefit analysis when deciding on new regulations) Reduce inflation Enact enterprise zones (1984) Enact 'comprehensive' tax reform No: Enact enterprise zones (1980) Youth minimum wage Cut overall government spending as a percentage of GNP Constitutionalamendment to balance the budget Reduction of payroll tax rates Social Welfare Policy Yes or partial: Tighten food stamp eligibility Reform Medicare (specific proposal) Reform Medicaid (specific proposal) Expand health programmesfor veterans Combine duplicative welfare programmes under state administrationinto block grants to states No: Transferall welfare functions to the states Oppose the taxation of Social Security Supportprogrammesallowing public housing tenants to buy their homes Repeal the Social Security earnings limitation
Economic Policy Yes or partial: Oppose the subminimum w Close loopholes which skew Curb tax deductions such a Ensure that there is a 15% No: Increase the minimum wag Enact plant closing notifica Reduce high unemploymen
Social Welfare Policy Yes or partial: Expand Medicaid eligibility Create special assistance pr in distressed industries Expand certain Medicare se Allow AFDC for two-paren unemployed Enact a short-rangerespons No: Expand unemployment cov the long-term unemploye Enact National Health Insu Oppose efforts to raise the Enact a comprehensive chil
Civil Rights/Liberties Yes or partial: Appoint judges who oppose legal abortion Restrict the use of taxpayers' dollars for abortion Resist quota systems (as a form of affirmative action) No: Supporta 'Human Life Amendment' making abortion unconstitutional
Civil Rights/Liberties Yes or partial: Oppose a Constitutional a No: Strengthen the Office of C Support Medicaid funding Amend civil rights legisla
Natural Resources Policy Natural Resources Policy Yes or partial: Yes or partial: Decontrol oil prices Enact a strong 'Superfund Simplify regulations on mining and coal Increase 'Superfund' reso Make more federal land available for multiple use Strengthen the Clean Wat Decontrol natural gas Increase EPA spending in Utilize cost-benefit criteria with environmental regulations No: No: Strengthen the Clean Air Eliminate the Department of Energy Increase funding for vario Support a less stringent Clean Air Act Repeal the windfall profits tax (on oil companies) Accelerate the use of nuclear energy Education Policy Education Policy Yes or partial: Yes or partial: Replace the 'crazyquilt' of programmes administered Increase support for teach by states with a system of block grants Increase support for the N Support 'Family Education Accounts', allowing tax Supplement community p deferred savings for low- and middle-income back to school families to pay for higher education Increase support for traini No: Eliminate the federal Department of Education Create tuition tax credits (giving tax credits for parents who pay tuition to private schools) Convert the present grant system to vouchers, giving poor parents the ability to choose schools
TABLE
14
Continued
Republicans Crime Policy Yes or partial: Increase the penalties for drug traffickers Change bail proceduresto allow detention of dangerous criminals
No:
Crime Policy Yes or partial: Pass legislation to provi Pass legislation on comp Establish a federal-state driving
No:
Modify the exclusionary rule
Establish a federal victim Enact restraints on the sa
'Other' Policy Yes or partial: Appoint federal judges with a commitment to decentralized government and judicial restraint
No:
'Other' Policy Yes or partial: Oppose the Reagan adm public broadcasting
No:
Repeal campaign finance laws
Lower contribution limit (1980) End Political Action Com (1984) Support public financing Allow voter registration
75
were significant legislative achievements; the latter was mentioned in the Democratic platform, but not the Republican. The welfare reform ended up giving both the Democrats and Republicans their key preferences: Reagan threatened a veto of any bill which did not include a work requirement, while the Democrats had long wanted to make Aid to Families with Dependent Children-Unemployed Parent (AFDC-UP) programmes mandatory for all states.38The compromise was that AFDC-UP would be mandatory,but that one parent in each eligible family would be required to work. All welfare recipients were not required to work, as would have been the Republican preference. Turning to civil rights, the Reagan administration, by all accounts, did everything it could to reduce enforcement of laws.39 This helps explain the Democrats' particularly poor performance in both the first and second Reagan terms in this area. Winning the presidency was a prerequisite for many of their pledges to be carried out. They had to do with strongly enforcing laws, with appointing particular kinds of individuals to government, or otherwise taking executive action. With civil liberties policy, the most prominent issue in the US platforms was abortion. The Republicans succeeded in getting conservative ('prolife') judges appointed, and in prohibiting Medicaid funding of abortion, but they failed to get a constitutional amendment against abortion passed. Thus on the abortion issue, there was a conservative gain in areas under executive control, and a stand-off in Congress. The area of natural resources provides a good example of 'stalemate' in the United States: the Democrats and Republicans had pledged to amend the Clean Air Act in different directions, and their inability to come to a compromise agreement meant failure for both parties on these pledges.40 By contrast, the Democrats managed to do quite a bit better with education pledges than the Republicans, primarily because many of the Republican pledges seemed to come from the party's right, and did not have enough support in Congress: eliminating the Department of Education, prayer in school, tuition tax credits, and education vouchers. The Republicans successfully pledged to reorganize education grants to the states (this was accompanied by overall cuts in funding, something not specifically pledged in the platform).
CONCLUSION
Our original question was whether or not institutional differences between the United States and Britain 'matter' in terms of policy effectiveness. Do leaders
38 The AFDC-UP programme allows two-parent families to qualify for welfare as long as the primary wage-earner was unemployed. At the time of the debate, some states had AFDC-UP programmes, some did not. The programme was strongly opposed by the Reagan administration, because it would add more people to the welfare payment rolls. 39Herman Schwartz, Packing the Courts (New York: Charles Scribner Sons, 1988); Tinsley E. Yarbrough, ed., The Reagan Administration and Human Rights (New York: Praeger, 1985). 40 The Clean Air Act was finally amended during the Bush administration.
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carry out the policy pledges they make? There has been a lack of clarity in the debate about 'mandate theory' and its applicability in the United States and Britain. Analysis has been hampered by a tendency towards either/or kinds of arguments: either mandate theory is 'true' and parties really do carry out pledges; or it is not 'true': parties either don't carry out their pledges, or, if they do, it doesn't really matter much because their pledges are not about real policy change. First, this study has shown that many important substantive policy pledges were made and carried out in both countries during the Reagan and Thatcher eras, bringing real policy change. As would be expected, in Britain, pledge fulfilment for the Conservatives was higher than for the Republicans in the United States. A conservative agenda affecting just about all policy areas was begun in the first Thatcherterm, and continued and escalated in the second term. Virtually all of the Conservatives' economic and social agenda as stated in the manifestos was enacted. The British parties during the 1980s do not seem to have been 'consensus' parties, as Rose suggests for the parties of the 1970s, and the party in power did carry out their policy agenda, which resulted in significant policy change.41 For the United States, the results have confirmed that there is a relationship between platforms and policy change, and major policy change can take place, even under divided government.42 Reagan was able to leave his mark on policy: by the end of the decade, social programmes were probably receiving less money than they would have had there been a Democratic president. States were receiving less money as well. Income taxes were lower by the end of the decade than they would have been with a Democratic president, at least for upper income groups and corporations. The federal courts, especially the Supreme Court, became more conservative in the 1980s. This had an impact on a number of policy areas, including regulatory policy, civil rights and civil liberties. Yet it has been shown that many conservative changes which were proposed in the Republican platforms never became policy during the eight years of the
41 Rose, Do Parties Make a Difference? The difference in findings is certainly at least partly due to real changes in the parties: the Conservative party under Thatcher took a more programmatic, neo-liberal turn;the Labourparty by 1983 had clearly shifted to the left. But the difference in findings is also due to a difference in methodology: we have looked at specific pledges and their fate, and 'policy change' is measured primarily in terms of legislative or other action taken. Rose focused his discussion of policy change on an analysis of aggregate data on government spending, interest rates, economic growth, etc. As we pointed out earlier, legislative and other action may or may not have a clear impact on such aggregate indicators;lack of impact is not proof that 'significant' policy change has not occurred. 42 The results confirm the findings of Mayhew, Divided We Govern. But the difference from Mayhew's approachis that the focus has been not just on the extent to which 'significant' legislation passed, but on the relationship between pledges and action, and the pledge fulfilment rate of each party. Looking at both pledges and legislation (and other action) allows us to look at what does not get done, as well as what does.
77
Reagan administration. The primary reason for these 'failures', of course, is Congress, especially (but not only) Democrats in Congress.43 Congressional Democrats had an impact not only in terms of blocking a true 'revolution', but occasionally in terms of advancing their own agenda (particularlyafter the 1986 election). Welfare reform contained provisions Democrats insisted on, and catastrophic health insurance was in the Democrats' platform but not the Republicans'. There was an increase in spending on environmental policy by the end of the period, despite Republican opposition. Education and trade legislation enacted in 1988 was pushed primarily by Democrats.44We have also seen that the Democrats had their own list of failed pledges. Major changes in the United States (such as the 1986 tax reform, Social Security reform and social welfare reform) fulfilled some pledges of both parties. Compromises were worked out in which both sides received some, but not all, of what they wanted. For Reagan's first term, the split in overall pledge fulfilment was approximately 61-48 per cent in the Republicans' favour. For his second term, it was 58-50 per cent. The relevant question for voters might be: which 60 per cent or 50 per cent was accomplished? The findings here suggest a predictable answer. The bigger the change being proposed, the less the likelihood of its being accomplished. Looking at the substance of the unfulfilled pledges for each party shows that for both parties, some proposals for very significant change never saw the light of day. Some of the literature suggests that voters like things this way - that they choose 'divided government' on purpose.45One argument is that voters want two parties in power so that they can 'keep one another in line' and extreme policy change will be avoided. This study suggests that at least in the area of social welfare policy, if this theory is true, voters are getting what they want. The potential 'downside' in the United States is that 'deadlock', in the sense that each side is fighting for the opposite kind of change from the status quo,
43 David Stockman, The Triumphof Politics (New York: Harperand Row, 1986), describes very well the reluctance of some Republicans, both in the administrationand Congress, to agree to cuts in specific programmes. 44 All of this is not to imply that more of a 'revolution' happened in Britain than in the United States solely because of institutional differences which allow policy agendas to be carried out more effectively in Britain. Given that much of the 'revolution' was about reducing the role of the government in economic affairs, it is importantto remember that the two countries had very different starting lines in the race to a 'free market'. Given that there was already relatively little government ownership and government spending in the United States, there was less room for reducing the government's role in the economy. 45 Thurber, 'Representation, Accountability, and Efficiency', discusses the literatureon why we have divided government; he looks at three categories of explanation. Some evidence does support the explanation that voters make a deliberate choice. Fiorina and Ladd have shown that American voters prefer divided government because it is seen as a way of checking power (Fiorina, 'An Era of Divided Government'; Everett C. Ladd, 'Public Opinion and the "Congress Problem" ', Public Interest (Summer 1990), 66-7). For another discussion of voters and divided government, see Gary C. Jacobson, 'Explaining Divided Government: Why Can't the Republicans Win the House? PS: Political Science and Politics, 24 (1991), 640-6.
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can occur. This in turn results in no change from the status quo - even though no one is happy with it. Another 'downside' is that in a situation where 'both parties win', an important feature of the mandate model is lacking: accountability. When 50 per cent of what the Democrats pledged gets done, and 50 per cent of what the Republicans pledged gets done, who can be blamed when things go wrong? For this reason, using the mandate model to describe the United States is problematic. The United States is not unique in having this blurred accountability: countries with coalition governments face similar circumstances. We have clearly demonstrated that there are differences between the United States and Britain which have significance for 'mandate theory'. When the system is set up to allow one cohesive party to have control over policy making, that party can carry out major, even 'revolutionary' changes. Some of the 'out' party's pledges may be fulfilled along the way, but not in a way that blocks the government party's agenda. When a leader with a 'revolutionary' agenda must share power with another party, and when parties are less cohesive, policy change is predictably more limited. In the United States, the party which is shut out of the presidency is able to succeed on some parts of its policy agenda by controlling one or both houses of Congress; it is also able to block the most objectionable parts of the other party's agenda. The terminology used thus far has tended to imply that there are shortcomings to the US system. We have said that Reagan did not achieve as much 'success' as Thatcher, and that the 'mandate theory of elections' does not fit as well for the United States as for Britain. Clearly, there is a flip side to this argument. The fact that Reagan did not have complete 'success' means that the majority of people who voted to put Democrats in the House did have some success. More voices get heard in the US system, and policy results end up being some sort of compromise among all participants. This point becomes especially relevant when it is noted that Margaret Thatcher was elected by a minority of voters in all three of her terms; in fact, she received a successively smaller share of the votes in each of the 1979, 1983 and 1987 elections.46 Meanwhile, the 'revolution' marched on. We could say that once a government is elected in Britain, they can 'get things done', but we might add: whether 'the people' want them done or not. Perhaps there is a trade-off between 'democracy' and 'effectiveness', and this comparison of the attempts at 'revolution' in the two countries has explicitly illustrated this trade-off. As a final note, we should discuss the generalizability of the findings. We have compared the United States and Britain during a particular decade, under particularcircumstances. As discussed earlier and indicated in Table 1, different combinations of circumstances are likely to change pledge fulfilment in both
46 The Conservatives received 43.9 per cent in 1979, 42.4 per cent in 1983, and 42.3 per cent in 1987.
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countries. The cases examined gave us the advantage of looking at two very similar leaders during the same time period - thus holding some factors constant. We have seen that the difference in decision-making environment between the countries does matter for policy change. Clearly, though, different combinations of circumstances might very well lead to different results, and this is a fruitful topic for future research. Even in the relatively brief period examined here, changes in the decision-making environment over time within each country made a difference for pledge fulfilment. We would expect the differences between the two countries to matter least when comparing Britain under the worst possible conditions (a weak leader with a small or non-existent majority) and the United States under the best (a strong leader, booming economy and united government). Even then, it could be argued that the institutional structure in Britain is more conducive to mandates being carried out. A British government with a small majority, or even (unusually) a minority, does not face the legislative obstacle course that confronts every US president.
APPENDIX: DEFINING AND TESTING PLEDGES
Defining Pledges A fairly strictdefinitionof 'pledge' was used: 'real' pledges are defined as a commitmentto carryout some action or producesome outcome, where an objective estimationcan be made as to whetheror not the action was indeed taken or the outcome produced.If a party seems to committo some sortof change, andone could equally stronglyarguethatit was carriedout, and that it was not, then the 'pledge' is consideredtoo vague or value-ladento be considered a 'real' pledge. Instead,it is consideredprimarilya rhetoricalstatement.Examplesare given below. The process for isolating such real 'pledges' from other sentences was the following: first, every sentence in the platformsand manifestos which seemed to be making some sort of pledge was marked.Secondly, these initial choices were re-examinedand coded according to the scheme below and final 'pledges' were thus chosen. Reliability was tested by having two graduate assistants independently choose pledges, one from a manifesto, the other from a platform.These choices were comparedwith the author'sfinal choices. Agreement was reached 84 per cent of the time. The discrepancywas due primarilyto the fact that some potential'pledges' were droppedby the authoronly when the stage of testing fulfilment was reached,and it became clear thatthe task was not objectivelypossible (further discussion below). A potential'pledge' generallyhas two clauses:(1) a phraseindicatingcommitment/support: we will/we support/we oppose/we will work for, etc. (2) the action or policy for which commitmentis indicated.The first clause can indicate either a 'firm' commitment(we will) or a 'soft' commitment('we support',or 'softer' still, 'we must, we should'). The decision was made to treatboth 'hard'and 'soft' commitmentsas potentialpledges, with the action or outcome being proposed (in the second clause) being the final determinant. The action or outcome for which commitmentis indicatedmay be quite specific, or it may be ambiguous. For each potential pledge, the action indicated was put into one of three categories: (a) Definitive. Definite action is promised, and determining fulfilment is clear-cut. The action/outcomeeither happensor it does not.
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(b) Difficult definitive. Definite action is promised, and theoretically fulfilment can be objectively determined, but testing is difficult-for example, testing involves not just determining if legislation was or was not passed, but what the detailed provisions of legislation were, and whether they are likely to result in the outcome promised. Action is promised,but it is impossible to determineobjectively (c) Judgmental/rhetorical. whetheror not the promise has been fulfilled. Adjectives are used which imply a value judgement-for example, 'the benefits system will be more fairly administered' or 'measureswill be taken to reduce the poverty and unemploymenttraps'. How can we determineif a system has become morefairlyadministered? Whatexactly arethe 'poverty andunemployment traps'andhow will we know whenthey have been reduced?Rhetorical pledges are untestable. 'Pledges' were then ratedfrom 1 to 3 as follows: 1 = hardor soft judgemental/rhetorical e.g. see above. 2 = hard or soft/difficult definitive- e.g., 'We shall continue our programme to expose state-ownedfirmsto real competition'.It is possible to determineif marketshave become more competitive, but it is not an easy, clear-cutdetermination. 3 = hard or soft/definitive- e.g., 'We will gradually reduce the growth of money in circulation',or 'We shall endeavourto bring inflationlower still'. Categories2 and 3 are defined as real 'pledges'. Occasionally,when the time came to actuallydeterminewhethera pledge had been carried out, it became clear that something originally rated as a '2' was really too ambiguous or value-ladento determineif it had been carriedout. Such 'pledges' were ultimatelyeliminated from the analysis. It shouldbe notedthateach specificpledge to enact a policy is countedonly once, regardless of how many times it is repeated.This differs from Pomperand Lederman'sapproach.47 of Space prohibitsa full discussion of coding of policy areasand determination fulfilment. All coding was done by the author,with graduatestudentsassisting with reliabilitychecks. Intercoder reliabilitywas 94.6 per cent for coding of policy areas,84.7 per cent for coding of (US pledges only). In terms type of changepledged,and 83 percent for type of actionrequired of 'testing' pledges for fulfilment,in orderto be considered 'fulfilled', a pledge needed to be or acteduponwithinthe following government administration. outcomes, Pledgeson particular such as 'we will reduceunemployment' inflation,deficits,interestrates,overallgovernment (or spending,etc.) raise the question of how to determinefulfilment.The decision was made to (inflation,deficits, etc.) in the previousgoverment/adminiscompareaverageunemployment trationwith the averagefor the termafterthe election. A moredetaileddiscussionof the coding and testing of pledges is available upon request from the author.
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Pomper and Lederman, Elections in America.

Testing The Mandate Model in Britain and The US

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Testing the Mandate Model in Britain and the United States: Evidence from the Reagan and Thatcher

B.J.Pol.S. 26, 45-80 Printed in Great Britain

Copyright? 1996 CambridgeUniversityPress

Testing the Mandate Model

Factors Influencing Pledge Fulfilment

Testing the Mandate Model

Testing the Mandate Model

itself - to the much-debatedquestion of whetherbourgeois democraciesreally are

Rose, Do Parties Make A Difference? p. 142.

Testing the Mandate Model

Testing the Mandate Model

(Number) (3) (9) (11) (57) (6) (6) (92)

(Number) (1) (10) (5) (59) (13) (0)

Cutt Expandt Tax? Changem Status quo** Reviewtt Total pledges

3.3 9.8 12.0 62.0 6.5 6.5 100.1

28.7 4.1 45.9 18.8 2.4 99.9

Cut Expand Tax Change Status quo Review Total pledges

9.0 6.7 21.6 44.8 17.2 0.8 100.1

of *See Table2 forexplanation terms.

21.7 38.0 9.8 8.7 5.4 7.6 8.7 99.9

22.4 38.0 8.2 16.4 4.5 3.0 7.5 100.0

(Number) (3) (6) (9) (52) (70) (5) (3) (78)

(Number) (1) (10) (4) (54) (69) (12) (0) (81)

66.7% 83.3% 88.9% 76.9% 78.6% 100% 100% 80.8%

(Number) (12) (9) (26) (58) (109) (23) (1) (129)

(Number) (9) (4) (18) (44) (75) (14) (0) (89)

66.7% 44.4% 57.5% 51.7% 56.0% 91.3% 100.0% 61.2%

of *See Table2 for explanation terms.

(Number) (17) (32) (8) (7) (4) (6) (4) (78)

(Number) (19) (36) (1) (9) (3) (6) (7) (81)

88.2% 84.4% 50.0% 57.1% 100.0% 83.3% 100.0% 80.8%

Testing the Mandate Model

Direct Agreement/Direct 1979

Disagreement: 1983 397 6 (3.0%) 6/6 = 100% 18 (9.1%) 18/18 = 100% 0

214 9 (8.4%) 9/9 = 100% 7 (6.5%) 6/7 = 85.7% 1/7 = 14.3

Direct Agreement/Direct Disagreement: United States* 1980 1984 254 5 (3.9%)

1980+ 1984 622 24 = (7.7%)

Total pledges Agreement

13 (10.2%) 6/13 = 46.1%

31 (10.0%) 13/31 = 41.9%

Republicans yes/partial; 7/18 = 38.9% Democrats no Democrats yes/partial;

19 Percentage fulfilled 43.3% 20.0% 42.8% 85.7% 48.0%

(Number) (73) (22) (11) (23) (129)

(Number) (54) (13) (8) (14) (89)

Legislative* Executivet Ambiguoust Status quo? Total pledges

49.3% 77.3% 45.4% 91.3% 62.0%

MAJOR POLICY CHANGES

Testing the Mandate Model

Major Policy Pledges and their Outcomes: Britain Conservatives

Economic Policy Yes or partial:

income Reducethe state'sshareof national Reducethe growthof moneyin circulation

Civil Rights/Liberties Yes or partial:

Civil Rights/Liberties Yes or partial: No:

Strengthen EqualPay Act/SexDiscr

Natural Resources Yes or partial:

Tighten loopholeson the disposalof hazardous up waste Removeleadfrompetrol

environmental impactrepo Require Stopthe Sizewell nuclearplant Introduce extendedclean-upcam

on Increase representation s parental

to s Endpublicsupport independent schools Stop selectionin secondary Abolishthe AssistedPlaces Scheme

Spendmoreon fightingcrime Buildmorecourtrooms, prisons Set up morecompulsory attendance centres

alternatives non-custodial Expand to Createelectedpolice authorities m Stop puttingpettyoffendersinto pri

'Other' Policy Yes or partial:

Irel Initiatediscussionson Northern controlson live animale Strengthen