Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

L-39999 May 31, 1984 ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA, petitio ners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent. Sisenando Villaluz, Sr. for petitioners. The Solicitor General for respondent. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals' decision whic h reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction and acquitted the petitioner s of the crime of grave coercion on the ground of reasonable doubt but inspite o f the acquittal ordered them to pay jointly and severally the amount of P9,000.0 0 to the complainants as actual damages. The petitioners were charged under the following information: The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, PEPITO BEDENIA, Y OLLY RICO, DAVID BERMUNDO, VILLANOAC, ROBERTO ROSALES, VILLANIA, ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE ORTEGA, JR., RICARDO CELESTINO, REALINGO alias "KAMLON", JOHN DOE alias TAT O, and FOURTEEN (14) RICARDO DOES of the crime of GRAVE COERCION, committed as f ollows: That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, in the municipality of Jose Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and w ithin the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, Roy Pa dilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo, Villanoac, Roberto Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo Celestino, Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, by confed erating and mutually helping one another, and acting without any authority of la w, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats , force and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brut ally demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures therein by axes an d other massive instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise, to the damage and prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and his family in the a mount of P30,000.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and moral damages, and further the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages. That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their public posit ions: Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accu sed being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Pan ganiban, Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident premeditation. The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth Judicial District rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states that: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Roy Padilla, Filomeno Gald onez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an imprisonm ent of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay ac tual and compensatory damages in the amount of P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly and severally, and all the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the p roportionate costs of this proceedings. The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon', David Bermundo, Christopher Villan oac, Godofredo Villania, Romeo Garrido, Roberto Rosales, Ricardo Celestino and J ose Ortega, are hereby ordered acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for thei r criminal participation in the crime charged. The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. The y contended that the trial court's finding of grave coercion was not supported b

y the evidence. According to the petitioners, the town mayor had the power to or der the clearance of market premises and the removal of the complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a nuisance per se. The petitioners stated that the lower court erred in finding that the demolition of the complainants' stall was a violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners sevent y two (72) hours to vacate the market premises. The petitioners questioned the i mposition of prison terms of five months and one day and of accessory penalties provided by law. They also challenged the order to pay fines of P500.00 each, P1 0,000.00 actual and compensatory damages, P30,000.00 moral damages, P10,000.00 e xemplary damages, and the costs of the suit. The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals state s: WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment appealed from in the sense that the app ellants are acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt. but they are ordered to pay jointly and severally to complainants the amount of P9,600.00, as actual damage s. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the defendants-appellants as to criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil liability. The Court of Appeals denied the motion holding that: xxx xxx xxx ... appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt whether the crime of coe rcion was committed, not on facts that no unlawful act was committed; as their t aking the law into their hands, destructing (sic) complainants' properties is un lawful, and, as evidence on record established that complainants suffered actual damages, the imposition of actual damages is correct. Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil action, contending that: I THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRE TION IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONERS PAYMENT OF DAMAGES TO COMPLAINANTS AFTER ACQUI TTING PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME CHARGED FROM WHICH SAID LIABILITY AROSE. II THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER 26, 1974 THAT SINCE APPELLANTS' ACQUITTAL WAS BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT, NOT ON FACTS THA T NO UNLAWFUL ACT WAS COMMITTED, THE IMPOSITION OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IS CORRECT. III THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL INCONSISTENCY, IF NOT PLAIN JUDICIAL ERRO R, IN HOLDING IN ITS APPEALED RESOLUTION THAT PETITIONERS COMMITTED AN UNLAWFUL ACT, THAT IS TAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR HANDS, DESTRUCTING (sic) 'COMPLAINANTS' P ROPERTIES', AFTER HOLDING IN ITS MAIN DECISION OF NOVEMBER 6,1974 THAT THE ACTS FOR WHICH THEY WERE CHARGED DID NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE COERCION AND THEY WERE NOT CHARGED OF ANY OTHER CRIME. IV THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS HEREIN, APPELLANTS IN CAG.R. NO. 13456CR, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, TO PAY COMPLAINANTS P9,600.00 IN SUPPOS ED ACTUAL DAMAGES. The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnit y to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge. Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is included i n the criminal action is that arising from and as a consequence of the criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil liability a rising from the criminal case), no civil liability arising from the criminal cha rge could be imposed upon him. They cite precedents to the effect that the liabi lity of the defendant for the return of the amount received by him may not be en forced in the criminal case but must be raised in a separate civil action for th e recovery of the said amount (People v. Pantig, 97 Phil. 748; following the doc trine laid down in Manila Railroad Co. v. Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar, 49 O.G. 38 74; Pueblo contra Abellera, 69 Phil. 623; People v. Maniago 69 Phil. 496; People v. Miranda, 5 SCRA 1067; Aldaba v. Elepafio 116 Phil. 457). In the case before

us, the petitioners were acquitted not because they did not commit the acts stat ed in the charge against them. There is no dispute over the forcible opening of the market stall, its demolition with axes and other instruments, and the cartin g away of the merchandize. The petitioners were acquitted because these acts wer e denominated coercion when they properly constituted some other offense such as threat or malicious mischief. The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision: For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing provision, the violence must be e mployed against the person, not against property as what happened in the case at bar. ... xxx xxx xxx The next problem is: May the accused be convicted of an offense other than coerc ion? From all appearances, they should have been prosecuted either for threats or mal icious mischief. But the law does not allow us to render judgment of conviction for either of these offenses for the reason that they were not indicted for, the se offenses. The information under which they were prosecuted does not allege th e elements of either threats or malicious mischief. Although the information men tions that the act was by means of threats', it does not allege the particular t hreat made. An accused person is entitled to be informed of the nature of the ac ts imputed to him before he can be made to enter into trial upon a valid informa tion. We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been proved in accordance with law. While appellants are entitled to acquittal they nevertheless are liable for the actual damages suffered by the complainants by reason of the demolition of the s tall and loss of some of their properties. The extinction of the penal action do es not carry with it that of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a de claration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 3 (c), Rev. Rules of Court; Laperal v. Aliza, 51 OG. R. 1311, People v. Velez, 44 OG. 1811). In the instant case, the fact from which the civil might arise, namely, the demolition of the stall and loss of the prop erties contained therein; exists, and this is not denied by the accused. And sin ce there is no showing that the complainants have reserved or waived their right to institute a separate civil action, the civil aspect therein is deemed instit uted with the criminal action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rev. Rules of Court). xxx xxx xxx Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition t hat when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with it. The re is no implied institution when the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately. (Morte Sr. v. Alvizo, J r., 101 SCRA 221). The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case r efers exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Re vised Penal Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words, the civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of t he accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime. As easily as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge Bocobo in Ba rredo v. Garcia, et at. 73 Phil. 607 laid down the rule that the same punishable act or omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities against the accused a nd, where provided by law, his employer. 'There is the civil liability arising f rom the act as a crime and the liability arising from the same act as a quasi-de lict. Either one of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against t he accused, However, the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability. For instance, in cases of criminal negligence or crimes due to rec kless imprudence, Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides: Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely s eparate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or o

mission of the defendant. Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that: Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included in th e preceding section the following rules shall be observed: xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civi l, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that th e fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the perso n entitled to the civil action may institute it in the Jurisdiction and in the m anner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of th e thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might ar ise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal wh ere the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expr essly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for in stance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by ce rtain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Pe nal Code); and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based up on the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of I nternal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p . 623). Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that: When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his g uilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a prepond erance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plai ntiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious. If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is d ue to that ground. More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case would not constitute an obstacle to the filing of a civil case based on the same acts which led to the criminal prosecution: ... The finding by the respondent court that he spent said sum for and in the in terest of the Capiz Agricultural and Fishery School and for his personal benefit is not a declaration that the fact upon which Civil Case No. V-3339 is based do es not exist. The civil action barred by such a declaration is the civil liabili ty arising from the offense charged, which is the one impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Section 1, Rule III, Rules of Court.) Such a declaration w ould not bar a civil action filed against an accused who had been acquitted in t he criminal case if the criminal action is predicated on factual or legal consid erations other than the commission of the offense charged. A person may be acqui tted of malversation where, as in the case at bar, he could show that he did not misappropriate the public funds in his possession, but he could be rendered lia ble to restore said funds or at least to make a proper accounting thereof if he shall spend the same for purposes which are not authorized nor intended, and in a manner not permitted by applicable rules and regulations. (Republic v. Bello, 120 SCRA 203) There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Du e process has been accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the crim inal charged. The constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigila nt efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener aw areness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a more stud

ied consideration by the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused wa s acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplic ation of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on th e part of all concerned. The trial court found the following facts clearly established by the evidence ad duced by both the prosecution and the defense: xxx xxx xxx (9) In the morning of February 8, 1964, then Chief Galdones, complying with the instructions contained in said Memorandum No. 32 of the Mayor, and upon seeing t hat Antonio Vergara had not vacated the premises in question, with the aid of hi s policemen, forced upon the store or stall and ordered the removal of the goods inside the store of Vergara, at the same time taking inventory of the goods tak en out, piled them outside in front of the store and had it cordoned with a rope , and after all the goods were taken out from the store, ordered the demolition of said stall of Antonio Vergara. Since then up to the trial of this case, the w hereabouts of the goods taken out from the store nor the materials of the demoli shed stall have not been made known. The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that: On the morning of February 8th, because the said Vergaras had not up to that tim e complied with the order to vacate, the co-accused Chief of Police Galdones and some members of his police force, went to the market and, using ax, crowbars an d hammers, demolished the stall of the Vergaras who were not present or around, and after having first inventoried the goods and merchandise found therein, they had them brought to the municipal building for safekeeping. Inspite of notice s erved upon the Vergaras to take possession of the goods and merchandise thus tak en away, the latter refused to do so. The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated them were: Cost of stall construction P1,300.00 Value of furniture and equipment judgment destroyed 300.00 Value of goods and equipment taken 8,000.00 P9,600.00 It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall of the complain ants Vergaras and carted away its contents. The defense that they did so in orde r to abate what they considered a nuisance per se is untenable, This finds no su pport in law and in fact. The couple has been paying rentals for the premises to the government which allowed them to lease the stall. It is, therefore, farfetc hed to say that the stall was a nuisance per se which could be summarily abated. The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that they caused the destructi on of the complainant's market stall and had its contents carted away. They stat e: On February 8, 1964, despite personal pleas on Vergaras by the Mayor to vacate t he passageways of Market Building No. 3, the Vergaras were still in the premises , so the petitioners Chief of Police and members of the Police Force of Jose Pan ganiban, pursuant to the Mayor' 6 directives, demolished the store of the Vergar as, made an inventory of the goods found in said store, and brought these goods to the municipal building under the custody of the Municipal Treasurer, ... The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code, ear lier cited, that "when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil acti on for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted." According to som e scholars, this provision of substantive law calls for a separate civil action and cannot be modified by a rule of remedial law even in the interests of econom y and simplicity and following the dictates of logic and common sense. As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco: ... if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil action but i nadequate to justify a conviction in the criminal action, may it render judgment acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt, but hold him civilly liable nonethe less? An affirmative answer to this question would be consistent with the doctri

ne that the two are distinct and separate actions, and win (a) dispense with the reinstituting of the same civil action, or one based on quasi-delict or other i ndependent civil action, and of presenting the same evidence: (b) save the injur ed party unnecessary expenses in the prosecution of the civil action or enable h im to take advantage of the free services of the fiscal; and (c) otherwise resol ve the unsettling implications of permitting the reinstitution of a separate civ il action whether based on delict, or quasi-delict, or other independent civil a ctions. ... But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the manner here suggested, Art . 29 of the Civil Code should be amended because it clearly and expressly provid es that the civil action based on the same act or omission may only be institute d in a separate action, and therefore, may not inferentially be resolved in the same criminal action. To dismiss the civil action upon acquittal of the accused and disallow the reinstitution of any other civil action, would likewise render, unjustifiably, the acquittal on reasonable doubt without any significance, and would violate the doctrine that the two actions are distinct and separate. In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seems evident that there is much so phistry and no pragmatism in the doctrine that it is inconsistent to award in th e same proceedings damages against the accused after acquitting him on reasonabl e doubt. Such doctrine must recognize the distinct and separate character of the two actions, the nature of an acquittal on reasonable doubt, the vexatious and oppressive effects of a reservation or institution of a separate civil action, a nd that the injured party is entitled to damages not because the act or omission is punishable but because he was damaged or injured thereby (Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, pp. 288-289). We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court t o grant damages despite a judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt. What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that hi s guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive pe rmissible mode of recovering damages. There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judg ment of acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. T he two can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish th e criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unles s there is clear showing that the act from which civil liability might arise did not exist. A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a trivial requirem ent, a provision which imposes an uncalled for burden before one who has already been the victim of a condemnable, yet non-criminal, act may be accorded the jus tice which he seeks. We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at th e intent of the legislator that they could not possibly have intended to make it more difficult for the aggrieved party to recover just compensation by making a separate civil action mandatory and exclusive: The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine lega l system. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, w here the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil r esponsibility is derived from the the criminal offense, when the latter is not p roved, civil liability cannot be demanded. This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and depl orable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation be tween criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from ea

ch other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party... it is just and proper that, for th e purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should b e proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the compla ining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is n ot the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by prepond erance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private becaus e the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law? (Code Commission, pp. 45-46). A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be estab lished or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been full y terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The offended part y may, of course, choose to file a separate action. These do not exist in this c ase. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellat e, and review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to req uire at this time a separate civil action to be filed. With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did no t err in awarding damages despite a judgment of acquittal. WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and dismiss the petition for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio- Herrera, P lana, Escolin, Relova and De la Fuente, JJ., concur. Aquino, J., concur in the result. De Castro, J., took no part. Concepcion, Jr. J., is on leave.