Professional Documents
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MONASTERY GRACANICA
YEAR VIII, ISSUE 259 MARCH 2008 ISSN 1451-1266
Dr. Peter Scholl-Latour bombarding the city from up in the hills and destroying it. I was never interested in reports in which everybody kept repeating the same thing. Was I going to parrot what others were writing? I was too experienced, particularly as a war reporter, to believe such nave stories. I have been reporting since the Vietnam War, from the time the French were in Hanoi, and right up to the invasion of Iraq. I immediately found suspicious all that anti-Serb hysteria of the Western media. There is nothing black and white, even in private lives, let alone in politics and civil wars. There has never been a case where only one side was guilty, and that was why I went to Bosnia to see it all with my own eyes. And Mostar presented the most convincing picture of the degree to which the Western politicians and the media were onesided and unconvincing. Here was a city razed to the ground, and Serbs had nothing to do with it. I, too, happened to be there at the time
Protesters in Mitrovica...
...and Gracanica.
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both Davio and Levy are Jewish. Had it come to that, I am sure that Davio would have come out of it a victor. I dont have a particularly high opinion of Levy and his followers either. They are not great lovers of truth, nor are their morals anything to boast about. Leon Davio speaks highly of the American journalist Flora Lewis. She was the first to discover that the US secretly supplied Bosnian Muslims with arms. You were in Belgrade in December 1993 Scholl-Latour: Whenever I am in Belgrade I must go to Kalemegdan and enjoy the unique and beautiful view of the Danube, Sava and the Citadel. The new Church of Saint Sava by its immensity reminds one of Saint Sophia in Istanbul. Belgrade is not a beautiful city, but it has a soul. Travelers from the West are fascinated by its looks and its charm. It is not of the West, but not entirely of the East either. I first visited Belgrade in 1951. It was summer. The presence of Titos Secret Police could be felt everywhere. People were very poor, their lives hard. I lived at the Hotel Moskva. I learned my first lessons on Yugoslavia in 1944. I was twenty years old, lying in a prison hospital bed in Graz. Not far from my bed lay a solder of General Milan Nedi. During the war Serbia and Greece were the only Balkan countries under German occupation. Other Balkan countries were German allies. General Nedi was a sort of Serbian Petain; he tried to save the lives of as many Serbs as possible. I was in Belgrade in September 1961 for the conference of the non-aligned nations. December 1993 was the time of sanctions Scholl-Latour: I flew to Budapest and from there took a train to Belgrade. Hungarian customs officers addressed me in German and the Serbs in English. Both were polite. In Budapest I met Tibor Varadi. He left an excellent impression on me. He spoke several languages perfectly. He told me that the Hungarian government had made a big mistake in allowing Croatia to be supplied with arms through the Hungarian territory. He described the Serbs in these terms: The Serbs are the strongest and the most dynamic factor in the Balkans. Its a simple fact. Its a fact no one can ignore. When I asked him about Bosnia and the language problem, he said: I speak Serbo-Croatian as well as my native Hungarian and, believe me, the differences in the dialects you encounter between Split and Ni are not as great as those between Munich and Hamburg. Speaking about Miloevi he said tht he was a political realist. Had he been serious about Kosovo, he would have settled all Serbs who had been exiled from Bosnia and Croatia in Kosovo. Yet he did not do it. You also had meetings at the Serbian Academy Scholl-Latour: Yes, I met with Milorad Ekmei. Some Germans were surprised. What? You want to speak with that great Serbian chauvinist? I had a long, vigorous and interesting talk with him. And I wasnt sorry. He was lucid and consistent. I asked every Serb I got to know a bit better the following question: If you could choose between Croats and Muslims, whom would you choose for your political ally? Like the majority of the Serbs I asked, Ekmei member of the Serbian Academy, said: the Croats, of course! As regards the defense of Serbian national interests Professor Ekmei was clear and uncompromising. Yet, with it all, his explication was attractive, relaxed and witty. Belgrade was not the only city you visited? Scholl-Latour: I also went to Novi Pazar. I had a very long and interesting talk with a monk in the Monastery Studenica. In general, I was surpised to note that although a foreigner I was unbelievably free and could travel without police supervision around entire Serbia. Before my departure for Serbia, my acquaintances had told me quite a different story. Novi Pazar is another world. There are eighteen mosqs in the town and Muslims make up 80% of its population. There was no tension that I could feel. And what were your impressions of Kosovo? Scholl-Latour: From Novin Pazar I went to Pritina. Kosovo Albanians did not live in misery as the American journalist Robert Kaplan described them. The presence of Serbian policemen and military personnel was not particularly noticeable. Here also I noticed very clearly that Pritina streets were full of people, and mostly young people at that. As is the case of other Muslim countries, the birth-rate of Albanians is very high. Demography is the most deadly weapon of Islam and represents the greatest danger for the West. I was in Kosovo also in June 1999. I
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about professional, mostly young, agitators who, like some traveling circus, wander around the world to teach half savages which way to go if they want to save their sinful souls. Their ideology is irresistibly reminiscent of the seventeenth century Christian missionaries in Africa, or among the Indian tribes of South America. They also have similarities with professional Bolshevik revolutionaries from 1917. Non-government organizations have special camps in Poland and Lithvania. Their chief instructors are either still active or retired CIA agents. In contrast to Slobodan Miloevi, Lukashenko understood exactly where the danger lay. As early as March 1997, he banned all work of Soros Foundation which openly stated that its chief objective was to bring down the government in Minsk. Whoever is well acquainted with the biography of the financial speculator Soros can understand well this move on Lukashenkos part. What is the guiding idea of an NGO? Scholl-Latour: It is all about the strange behavior of Washington in international politics. Under the guise of freedom and democracy, it has created a chain of foundations from which NGOs and the independent media get their funding. At the same time they go about openly breaking international agreements and all norms of behavior by meddling in internal affairs and politics of foreign countries. Publicly and arrogantly they break the laws of other countries. In Belorussia, Serbia, the Ukraine and Georgia they have started numerous civic initiatives. The missionaries assignment was to Christianize the pagans, while the aim of the nongovernment organizations today is to convert the nationalists into the believers in the free market and American democracy. Their only failure is Minsk in spite of the large sums of money which the United States of America, NATO, the International Monetary Fund, OSCE and the World Bank had put at their dkisposal. The European Union, the German government, the German radio Deutsche Welle and the London BBC, they all participated in the campaigne against the Belorussian government. Surely, we can point out a series of regimes in Africa, Asia or Europe which are far from democracies, and yet the West is pointing its finger only at Lukashenko? Scholl-Latour: Of course. Look at Albania, Croatia, or Azerbaijan. The Aliev dynasty rules in Baku with no respect for any rules of democracy. And yet no protests were raised against Azerbaijan by anyone in the European Union or America. Look at the results of the orange revolution. For several decades you have worked as a journalist who always used his own head, relied on personal encounters and your own impressions, always reading, always learning. But who has time for that today? Scholl-Latour: There are still people like that. Very few, I admit. And there lies the greatest danger for modern media. You are given, for instance, two minutes in which to explain on camera the substance of and the reasons for the conflict, lets say, between the Suni and the Shiite in Iraq. Two minutes for Eritrea or Palestine, Kurdistan or Georgia, Quebec or Catalonia, Iraq or Bosnia? Everything is possible, of course, one could do this too. But surely it would be at the cost of solidity and truth. Electronic media and television cameras facilitate to a great extent the work of propaganda and contribute to superficial dissemination of information. It is difficult to see the whole extent of the damage done by that kind of superficiality. Damage certainly was done by the useless attempts of the West to create secular states and democracies in the Islamic world. Scholl-Latour: That attempt of the West has completely failed. That applies also to Turkey. Kemalism is nothing but a faade. The Islamic element in Turkey is stronger today than it was in Kemal Ataturks time. Instead of turning towards Washington or London, as was expected, the attitude in Muslim countries is: For us the West is neither the source nor the right way. Islam, on the other hand, is in the ascendant even in the United States. The media in the West continually point out that there are about twenty million Muslims in Russia. But they forget to tell us how many of them live in London, in Germany, France, Italy and Spain. It is interesting that in spite of all the differences between you two, you support Sarcosy in his opposition to allow Turkey to join the European Union. Scholl-Latour: Naturally. Turkey has no business with the European Union. I hope that he will be able to continue in his opposition because the
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our type of parliamentary democracy. After all, Gobachev and Yeltsin tried it. And what has the perestroika achieved? The result of the reforms of Gorbachev and Yeltsin was that a large part of the Russian population practicaly overnight became abysmally poor; there was chaos; the state virtually ceased to function. Democratic reforms and the free market economy destroyed the Russian state. Russia found herself literally on the edge of the abyss. Yeltsin gave huge natural wealth to a few tycoons, speculators, oligarchs as the Russians call them.They still exist today. But today they are not taking the money out of Russia but are investing it in the Russian economy. Those who did not agree to the deal ended up like Kodorkovsky. When one talks about such things one should first put oneself into the position of an ordinary Russian. Ask yourself: How did an average Russian live under Gorbachev and Yeltsin and how does he live today? Many peole believe that Putin was lucky because... C because right then the price of gas reached record heights. That is a fact. This gave Moscow the resources with which to govern again like a great power and to establish order within the country. But it is a question of not just luck but also of Putins ability. I believe he would have succeeded even if gas prices had not risen as they have. In that case, the recovery of Russia would not ave been this fast, but there would certainly have been big changes in foreign and domestic policies of the country. In 2007 I had an occasion to talk with President Putin for fully three hours. One ought to know something about the history of the country. The Tsar was popular because he gave the people a certain measure of protection against the arbitrariness of the boyars. Today Putin gives protection to the broadest masses of the Russian people against the arbitrariness of the oligarchs. He is, if may say so quintessentially Russian. He knows the Russian mentality well. The claims of some Western experts that the Russians are crazy about democratic reforms are devoid of all reality. In Moscow, they must have been speaking only to some not particularly significant intellectuals or non-government organizations which receive money from the West and tell them what these experts what they want to hear. But it is certain that they do not represent the authentic voice of the Russian people. What is your impression of Putin? Scholl-Latour: There is no president in the West who could compare to Putin. At least 70% of Russians stand behind him. No leader in the West has this sort of backing. Putin introduced order in the country and gave back to the Russians their self-confidence and their pride. No one there would dream of experimenting again with perestroika. What were Gorbachevs and Yeltsins biggest mistakes in foreign policy? Scholl-Latour: When Gorbachev signed the end of the Warsaw Pact and Yeltsin on his part confirmed it when he recognized the independence of former Soviet republics, it never occurred to either of them to make it a condition that NATO can never station its troops on the territory of the former Warsaw Pact. They simply moved their chess pieces as mere dilettantes. It seems that each country should find for itself what the best form of government is in accordance with its traditions. What would be best for Russia? Scholl-Latour: Russia was led by autocrats for centuries. Its simply the nature of that country. The West will have to part with the idea that the entire world must follow its model of democracy. This applies also to human rights. We can be proud of these achievements, but it is not possible to transplant them blindly, mechanically into other cultures. In any case, these days democracy isnt faring very well in the West either. It is at risk of turning into plutocracy. Your book, Russia squeezed between NATO, China and her own Muslim Population was published two years ago. Which of these three represents the most serious danger for Russia? Scholl-Latour: At this moment, the United States of America are the greatest danger for Russia. Washington is trying to encircle and isolate Russia, and according to me this policy is entirely senseless and a great mistake. It is proof of a total absence of any grasp of the situation. In fact, America has every reason to make an ally of Russia.Washington and Moscow have so many interests in common!
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Peking. This has led to joint Russo-Chinese military manoeuvres. Officially, these are described as a defense against possible terrorist threat, but in reality the objective of these manoeuvres is to prevent America from penetrating into the area of Central Asia. What are the prospects for a Moscow-Peking alliance? Scholl-Latour: That will depend almost entirely on Washingtons future policy. As long as Americans, through NATO , keep trying to isolate Russia, as long as they keep spy planes in Estonia in the immediate vicinity of Saint Petersburgh, so long as they keep trying to get the Ukraine and Georgia to join NATO, the Russians will maintain close relations with the Chinese. One asks oneself: what is the sense of this kind of policy of the United States of America? Is it possible that they want a war with the Russians? Or with the Chinese? But what is catastrophic in all this is the fact that the German policy and the German press wholeheartedly support this fatal course Wash ington has chosen to follow. Our politicians and our journalists see to it that we are in the front line of this anti-Chinese policy. You have only to remember the visit of the Dalai Lama to Berlin. This is another example which shows that after World War II we Germans do whatever Americans want us to do. Do you believe that it was a mere coincidence that the Head of Tibetan Buddhists was received in the White House and by Angela Merkel? Why is this so? Scholl-Latour: Because German foreign policy does not exist, nor do longterm plans for the defense of the country. You have said publicly that you dont think much of western politicians who warn Peking, whenever they visit China, that it must respect human rights, introduce democratic reforms... Scholl-Latour: I am against this attitude because it is insincere, twofaced, selective and ridiculous. At the same time, peoples heads are cut off in Saudi Arabia in accordance with shariat law, and no one in America, or Europe says a word against it. It is unbelievably hypocritical! The same is true about democratic principles. We had democratic elections in Palestine. And what happened? Hamas won, but the West refused to accept its victory. Or what about Washingtons current efforts to rehabilitate Ghaddafi? It has been proved that Ghaddafi had helped terrorists. But we made a deal with Ghaddafi. Lybia has renounced her nuclear program and agreed to sell oil to the West. How do you see the future of N? Scholl-Latour: That military organization is an anachronism in our times. The Warsaw pact no longer exists. The Soviet Union has disintegrated. As NATO still continues to exist, many members of that military alliance must ask themselves: are we allies or American vassals? Here, too I must repeat my assertion: Germany is not a sovereign state either actually or mentally. One of the most important topics in Europe today is the problem of the installation of American rockets in Poland... Scholl-Latour: Since we are talking about it, people in the West have forgotten that in 1990 the Russians withdrew their rockets to a thousand kilometers east of Europe. And what did they get in return? The ring around Russia is increasingly being tightened by NATO. The Russians have every right to regard the placing of American rockets in Poland as provocation. One simply must ask oneself: what purpose do these rockets serve? When you speak of the tightening circle do you mean Georgia? Scholl-Latour: Exactly. I have in mind what is happening in that country. The media in the West talk about the democratic revolution and so forth. Rubbish. America organized a putch and installed Saakashvili, an extremely dubious person. He now rules like a dictator. So nothing has changed in Georgia. One dictator was replaced by another. The only difference is that Saakashvili does American bidding. Washington also organized a putch in Kirghisia and caused a civil war. While Berlin endorses all American moves witout demur. In your last book, Between Two Fronts you criticize the wishywashyness of Europeans, their lack of will to stand up and defend their identity. According to you, this is the fundamental problem in Europe today. That will has simply disappeared in the West; it has withered away.
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United States of America, so that America could better counter the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Benazir Buto was recently killed in Pakistan. Where is that country going? Scholl-Latour: Pakistan will remain unstable for a long time. That, of course, was no fault of Benazir Buto. She was a woman of great personal courage, but not the right person for the job. She had already been tried and found guilty of corruption. It was Washingtons intention to bring her into power in order to limit somewhat the power of todays President Musharaf. Washington had hoped that, with the help of Benazir Buto, Pakistan would be more decisive in its war against Islamic militants. Uder the pressure from the United States of America Musharaf was forced to abandon his post as the commander of the army. He also is a loyal ally of Washington. He began by fighting the radical Muslims very decisively and clla borated closely with America. This made him unpopular both with the broad masses of the population and with the army. Many officers sympathize with the guerilla who are fighting against Americans in Afganistan. In the meantime, the army is the only institution in Pakistan which is holding the country together. Pakistan has an atom bomb. Scholl-Latour: That is a great problem for Wasington. But at the moment it is still under control. Pakistan made its own bomb primarily because of India which is both economically but also militarily far stronger than Pakistan. When speaking about current world crises it is impossible not to mention the Middle East, a topic with which you are very famliar. What is the future of Israel? Scholl-Latour: I also believed for a long time that the creation of a Jewish state would be a successful project. However, after the events which have taken place in recent years, I have become a pessimist. I am not thinking a bout todays situation. I am taking a long-term view of Israel. Why have you become a pessimist? Scholl-Latour: Israel is surrounded by hosile Muslim states. It must fight on several fronts simultaneously. And another thing. Take a close look at the demographic development. We are witnessing an explosion of population on the Arab side, the Palelstinian side. Even if a Palestinian state were to be created it would consist of a number of enclaves: one on the West Bank and the other is the Gaza strip. Such a state would not be able to offer better living conditions to the numerous young population. The new Palestinian state would simply be forced to demand from Israel to make ever more territorial concessions. So we are in a vicious circle, and I see no way out. If a new Palestinian state were to include significant historical territories, those from before the first Israeli occupation in 1967, that would constitute an existential danger for Israel. Negotiations have just begun. They are at the embryonic stage. There have been no talks yet about the status of Jerusalem and so on. I should add that the last Israeli incursion into Lebanon was not at all successful. The Israeli themselves admit this. Israel paid in heavy human losses for those few kilometers of Lebanese land. This was the first time that an armed Arab formation could successfully resist an Israeli attack, and Israel has one of the best equipped armies in the world. I am talking a bout the Shiite guerrilla fighters. It is very important for the Arab moral. For the first time they showed in action that the Israeli are not invincible. The bombing of Lebanon by the Israeli airforce also failed to bring any military successes. Why did Israel attack Lebanon anyway? Scholl-Latour: The most important reason was the plan to destroy the Shiite guerilla fighters, the Hesbolah. But they were not destroyed. Lebnon is an unusual country. Half of their soldiers are Muslims but Shiite. I see no quick solution for that state. A brief survey of its history would make that clear. A national agreement was reached by the principal political parties in 1943. Land was divided along the lines of religious affiliation. At that time Cristians, mostly Maronites, represented one half of the population. The Sunis were the next most numerous and most influential part of the population. Today, the situation is different. The demographic picture has changed. The Shiite constitute nearly fifty percent of Lebanons population. The time has come for the country to sign a new agreement and write a new constitution. NIN, January 31, 2008, Belgrade Peter Scholl-Latour
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Plato, supports neo-Kantianism and follows Jrgen Habermas. Now m y philosophical knowledge is rusty but is it not somewhat difficult to reconcile Kant with Marxism? Or is Habermas perhaps admired because he belongs to idealist-interventionists? (p. 221) Ramet believes that even Jean Bodin is on her side when she attacks Serbia as an ilegitimate state since the sixteenth century French jurist held that there is no such thing as sovereignty except where the authority acts in accord with Natural Law and Divine Law. (p. 222)
Aleksa Djilas Ramet's random not to mention bizzare eclecticism in matters philosophical is so great that it makes her position not only vague but ridden with contradictions. Nor does she clearly demonstrate how her historical and political analyses are aided by philosophical exegesis . Weirdly they hover above historical and political reality, their only recognizable purpose being to confer an aura of authority upon Ramet's strident and unfair judgements. At the same time, her style of writing could be defined as post-modern rococo. No, not because it is gentle and pretty but because of its boundless artificiality, unseemly levity and its absence of earnestness. At one point, Ramet suddenly and most unexpectedly dons the robes of Miss Manners and chastises Sumantra Bose, professor of International and Comparative Politics at the London School of Economics and Political Science, for being in his book Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention, published in 2002, unacquainted with customary rules of etiquette in academic debate and for writing parts of it in a state of uncontrollable anger. (p. 191) She then quotes the expressions he uses when criticizing the work of other scholars: ludicrous, academic ivory tower, dogmatism, breezy, tendentious, superficial. Sumantra Bose has written several books on sovereignty and selfdetermination. He is a comparativist who roams freely from India to Ireland and from Pakistan to Bosnia, and he argues that while a unified Bosnia might be preferable, the integrationists' insistence on it being reassembled as soon as possible is dogmatic. It simply does not take into account that the overwhelming majority of Bosnia's Serbs and Croats reject such instant unity. Such moral righteousness actually harms the prospects of reconciliation among Bosnia's three constituent groups. Needless to say, Sabrina Ramet is for the directive approach to statebuilding in Bosnia, that is, for the Western powers simply to abolish the federal structure agreed at Dayton. I wonder if it is because of her radical integrationism that she sanctimoniously reproaches Bose for his proclivity towards name-calling (p. 192) Noel Malcolm shares her commitment to complete revision of Dayton, as well as most of her other political sentiments, disguised and undisguised, and is probably the most quoted author in her book. So naturally, he receives praise for offense s similar to
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also critically presented, from financial loans and weapons sales to diplomatic intrigues. Lampe further explains that during the twentieth century progress in the Balkans was limited but real, and that the influence of Europe, while mostly beneficial, was sometimes harmful, not least in exacerbating nationalist conflicts. Nor were Balkan national ideologies in their essential characteristics un-European. Emil Cioran, P arisian philosopher of Romanian descent, announced with typical Balkan modesty that through his metaphysics he wanted to ask God questions which God would not be able to answer. Cioran died in 1995 and may now know how successful he was in his endeavor. Students of the wars of Yugoslav disintegration, whether from the Balkans or not, are much less ambitious. But we do know that these wars posed to the Europeans questions to which they had no answer. And still do not. How do you prevent or halt ethnic wars and ethnic cleansings? Who, and under what conditions, has a right to separate and create a state? How should we decide where to draw borders and how to protect minorities? These and many other only slightly less important questions, about religion and culture, language and identity remain unresolved after our recent bloodletting. Europeans are further embarrassed by their ignorance because many regions of the world encounter similar problems and look to them for advice and guidance. Balkans into Southeastern Europe: A Century of War and Transition is a step forward in the search for answers, regional and global. It provides us with a rich and sophisticated narrative as well as important insights and mature judgments. Although quite realistic, it successfully avoids frequent depictions of violence and cruelty, so typical of Western writing about the Balkans, which is in general permeated with its own breed of Orientalism in the sense of Edward Said's eponymous book. We should also be grateful to Lampe for his enlightened attitude and optimistic tone. Lampe is a dedicated comparativist and he juxtaposes and contrasts Balkan countries whether discussing u rban planning or literacy levels, f reedom of the press or the growth of fascist movements, the struggle for women's right to vote or military strategy and tactics. It will probably shock many Serbs to learn that there was a period before the Second World war when Bulgaria was freer than the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and all Balkan nations should draw inspiration from the ascent of Greece which was often the poorest and is now the richest country of the region. It is most likely of no general relevance but still stirs my imagination that Balkan undemocratic rgime s had a propensity to put political prisoners on islands. Lampe mentions Bulgaria's Danube island Belene, (p. 186) (p. 199) Yugoslavia's Goli otok (Barren Island), (p. 201), and Greece's island camps. (p. 194) One could expand this list. Were islands merely the easiest practical solution to achieve high security or did the governments feel so unsure of themselves that they had to take extraordinary measures to isolate prisoners? After the Second World War, Greece was the only Balkan country under the direct influence of the West, in particular the United States. Academic contacts were also considerable and Lampe's treatment of Greece is therefore especially knowledgeable. It is also comprehensive with nothing painful or unpleasant omitted. We see that during the three postwar decades Greece became neither democratic nor prosperous nor was it able to point to other successes. Slav Macedonians were repressed, and both the expansion of universities and the emancipation of women were slower than in neighboring communist countries. Lampe elaborates on the internal causes of the less than satisfactory development. But what about the external ones? Should they not receive at least part of the blame? Lampe's account of the British role in Greece towards the end of the Second World War and immediately afterwards disregards British traditional naval and commercial interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, and C hurchill's instinctive imperialism and simplistic anti-communism. (p. 173-5) So we are left wondering about the motives of General Ronald Scobie when in late 1944 he used the larger part of the Security Battalions recruited by the Rallis occupation regime (p. 174) to disarm the communist-led ELAS which had been by far the largest resistance force to Germans with whom Ioannis Rallis' government collaborated. Nor is our curiosity satisfied about the real causes for the British support of the regency under the Archbishop of Athens, whom Churchill himself had
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of The New Class and the trial for it took place in 1957. After Rankovi's fall, Tito hinted that he might have planned a coup d'tat, and the official media increased its slanderous attacks on him. B ut no juridical proceedings took place. Western journalists and academics began publicly asking questions about Tito's peculiar logic of giving Rankovi-the-conspirator and his collaborators clemency and pension, while keeping Djilas-the-critic in jail. On the very last day of 1966, Djilas was released but prohibited from publishing or making any public statements for five years. He would not observe this ban. With the purge of 1966 Yugoslavia entered a period of general liberalization with the exception of the cult of Tito that continued to grow. Lampe wrongly states that Tito became the president f or life in 1953. (p. 203) Such formal conferring of absolute power would have presuppose d a personality cult which at that time neither existed nor was possible indeed, it was inconceivable. In 1974, however, Yugoslavia's fourth constitution promulgated the country as an eight-unit confederation in all but name, and its article 333 conferred upon the Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia the right to elect Josip Broz Tito president of the republic for an unlimited term of office. This is what the Assembly soon proceeded to do. The party congress immediately followed and elected Tito president for life of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The official West and especially the United States did not object to the cult of Tito. Perhaps it even welcomed it. American presidents, for example Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, were not embarassed to publicly flatter Tito, who was supposedly a wise statesman and a symbol of freedom. Nor was Britain's Margaret Thatcher parsimonious when giving him compliments. Western governments never gave open encouragement to Yugoslavia's reform-oriented communists, or its critical intellectuals and dissidents, and they rarely protested when Tito dismissed, persecuted or imprisoned them. Tito's Yugoslavia was independent from the Soviet Union and this was in the interest of the West. All else was of little importance. Am I wrong to consider such policies of Western countries to have been nationalistic? John R. Lampe's Balkans into Southeastern Europe: A Century of War and Transition is a good book which could have been better while Sabrina Ramet's book is Well, I have said enough about it already. But in spite of the enormous difference between them in approach and quality, they are both written from a distinctly Western, and in particular American, point of view. Lampe and Ramet sometimes even resemble a g ood cop-bad cop routine she attacking mercilessly, he all softness and diplomacy. Like most Americans, however, they are completely unaware of their nationalism. We in the Balkans may be more nationalistic than Americans but we also have fewer illusions about ourselves. On the 6 th of September 1943, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill gave a speech at Harvard University, stating famously that the empires of the future are the empires of the mind. One can ask, of course, why, after the Second World War, Churchill did not practice what he preached. I also think that at the time of his speech it was already too late for any kind of empire and I am certain that no imperialism has a future in the twenty first century. But I do believe that today a country or a group of countries can lead globally only if they firmly embrace high intellectual, moral, and perhaps even spiritual values. Further, I am convinced that the West and especially the United States has a right and a duty to struggle for the global triumph of liberal democracy and that this includes playing an active role in the resolution of nationalist conflicts. Finally, scholars and academics who study nationalism should be at the forefront of all such undertakings. But they cannot intellectually combat nationalist conflicts all over the world, including of course those in the Balkans, if they do not first suppress their own nationalism. Western scholars and academics and we in the Balkans too should remember a noble dictum attributed to Aristotle, another Balkan philosopher: Amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas. Instead of Plato, we all should put patria. Is it too much to expect that one day the truth will become to scholars and academics, West and East, South and North, a closer friend than their country? Let me think about it. Aleksa Djilas, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 9 , No. 3, December 2007.
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Aleksandar Mitic is he Brussels-based director of the Kosovo compromise project. Kosovo's recent unilateral separation from Serbia set off a firestorm of reaction from Belgrade and its allies, notably Moscow. Serbia withdrew its ambassadors from countries that jumped to recognize Kosovo's independence, while angry protesters sacked and burned the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade. Meantime, there has been debate about what this means for other regional tension zones, where ethnic groups may use Kosovo as a textbook for their own independence impulses. Here is a look at some of the lessons of Pristina's 17 February independence declaration: The United Nations is ignored Western recognition of Kosovo's secession is not only about the UN Charter being broken, about the UN Security Council resolution on the province's status being creatively interpreted, or about the Helsinki Final Act being violated. It is also about the West deciding to take justice into its own hands by coordinating the declaration of independence. This coordination was nothing more than a series of arrogant, unilateral acts decided by the United States, NATO, the European Union and instructed to alltoo-happy Pristina. These acts were sarcastically taken outside of the Security Council and imposed against the will of Serbia, a sovereign, democratic member of the United Nations. but it still matters. Start counting. The United States has recognized Kosovo, Russia will not. EU members Britain and Germany have recognized, Spain and Romania will not. Tiny Luxembourg did, tiny Cyprus will not. Neighboring Macedonia might, neighboring Bosnia cannot. Afghanistan did, Indonesia did not. Senegal said oui, South Africa said no. Peru and Costa Rica said si, Brazil and Argentina said no. Australia OKed, New Zealand refused. The stakes are high: the side that goes over the psychological barrier and wins recognition from the majority of the 192 UN member states will be well placed to fight ultimately for international legitimacy. Serbia and Russia have pledged not to allow Kosovo to become a UN member, and for good reason. Without UN membership, Kosovo's international legitimacy will remain in limbo. It is not only about abstract symbols, it is also about practicalities: no UN means no membership in most international institutions. The UN still matters.
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null, the equation is the following: a part of nil is nil, a quarter or a 10th of nil is still nil. There has always been a de-facto partition of Kosovo. It is the irrefutable reality on the ground. Just like the Kosovo Albanians in the 1990s, the Kosovo Serbs have established a parallel system in Kosovo. They feel no loyalty to Pristina's Albanian authorities and they will neither cooperate with an independent Kosovo nor with the EU mission they consider illegal. The intent of Serbia's policy is to help them continue to live in the Serbian system by providing Serbian education, investments and local administration. Coercing them under Pristina's authority would likely result in severe riots in the north, and a probable exodus from the south. If there is one lesson that Serbs should have learned from the Kosovo Albanians, it is that a fait accompli is much more irreversible than an illegal act. Aleksandar Mitic is the Brussels-based director of the Kosovo Compromise project. . http://www.tol.cz/look/ Albanians against the Serbs in the aftermath of the NATO bombing campaign and wonder why it was allowed to occur and why nothing has yet been done to bring the perpetrators to justice. They despise the Kosovo Albanians as criminals, actual terrorists or supporters of terrorism, and treacherous ingrates. -The same U.S. foreign policy establishment views Slobodan Milosevic and the extremist Serbs he encouraged and supported as the major incendiary factor leading to the violent breakup of the former Yugoslavia . It supports strongly the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and wants all the indicted war criminals, particularly Mladic and Karadzic, to be brought to The Hague. It has no sympathy for ethnic Serb efforts in Bosnia and Croatia to set up "independent" entities, believing that this was the beginning of "ethnic cleansing" during those conflicts. It finds incomprehensible that individuals such as Arkan were treated in Serbia as national heroes. The Serbian people remember that Abraham Lincoln was considered one of our greatest Presidents in large part because he fought a bloody Civil War to keep the United States together against the wishes of many states determined to secede. They feel that the Serbs were the principal victims of the breakup of Yugoslavia and that they were provoked by other ethnic groups into establishing their breakaway regions. Crimes against Serbs were consistently ignored in their view, while crimes committed by Serbs were exaggerated. The ICTY is seen as a deeply flawed and politicized body consistently prejudiced against the Serbs. Zoran Djindjic and other democratic political leaders were well aware of the gap between these viewpoints. They wanted to keep focused on the future. The problem, however, was that the past in the Balkans kept intruding on both the present and the future. Prime Minister Djindjic faced a Red Beret revolt an d ultimately was killed at least in large part because he tried to satisfy Western demands to turn Serbian war crimes indictees over to The Hague. This issue, plus Kosovo, has significantly strengthened - and emboldened - extremist, nationalistic forces in Serbia . In sum, the era of good feeling ushered in by the fall of the Milosevic government was probably doomed to fail. It is hard to see when or how this downward spiral will end or be reversed. The situation will get far worse before it gets better. Many say that the anti-American atmosphere in Serbia today is even worse than during the Kosovo bombing campaign. At least at that time, the Serbs could partially blame Milosevic.The pity is that there are a great many Serbs, probably a majority, who are watching this exercise in deja vu with a mixture of despair and frustration. But at least as of this moment, there is no one speaking for them. The political figures of moderation are conspicuous by their silence and ineffectual approach. Nationalist forces, willing and seemingly eager to forsake the European path for proud isolation (and condemning the Serbian people to a second class status in Europe) are in the ascendancy. The West takes no joy in this development, but what it should take is its fair share of the responsibility for bringing it about. William Montgomery , 2 March 2008
A FOUNDATION OF SAND
As I watched rioters attacking the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade and burning the flag hanging from its balcony, I remembered raising that same flag a little over seven years ago as we re-established the diplomatic relations broken during the Milosevic regime. In fact, as I write this column, I am staring at a "mouse pad" for my computer that we sent out by the hundreds with exactly that flag-waving image. It was a time of hope and optimism. I thought of all the work done by so many Serbs, beginning with Zoran Djindji, to re-connect Serbia with Europe and to lead the country and its citizens to a better life. And it seemed to me that all of this effort was literally going up in smoke. It was always clear that one of the major casualties of Kosovo Independence would be the bilateral relationship between the United States and Serbia . The United States of America was the driving force behind the initial NATO bombing campaign in 1999 and now the coordinated recognition of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Kosovo Albanians. But more that that, both the tone and content of the continuous public statements made by senior American officials in support of that independence even touched a nerve in many Serbs who were strong supporters of a democratic, pro-European policy. Most Serbs cannot understand why this is happening now, so long after the fall of Milosevic, when the succeeding governments have done so much to move Serbia in the right direction. The fundamental problem, however, is that the post-Milosevic relationship between the two countries has been based on a foundation of sand. The United States erroneously interpreted the fall of Milosevic as a total repudiation by the Serbian people of his policies. It assumed this meant that a majority of the Serbian people, therefore, subscribed to the American view of Balkan history. Nothing could be further from the truth. -Almost the whole foreign policy establishment (in government, Congress and the private sector) in the United States sees the Kosovo Albanians as having been treated for decades as second-class citizens, increasingly persecuted by the Milosevic regime. It sees the rise of the Kosovo Liberation Army, after years of non-violent protest led by Ibrahim Rugova, as an inevitable consequence of Serbian human rights abuses. It views the Serbian military and police response to the KLA to be massive, indiscriminant overkill. The CNN images of hundreds of thousands of fleeing Kosovo Albanians arriving in hastily erected refugee camps in Macedonia , Albania , and Montenegro was the "final straw" which sealed American opinion that independence for Kosovo for the only answer. The Serbs view Kosovo as the cradle of their civilization, which has been stolen from them through a combination of the abuse of international power and clever Kosovo Albanian distortions. They see the Kosovo Serb refugees in their midst and view them and the Serbian people as a whole as the true victims. They cite the numerous human rights abuses, including murder, destruction of churches, ethnic cleansing, and kidnapping by the Kosovo
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Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader Velupillai Prabhakaran (C) with members of his new air wing which carried out an attack against Sri Lanka's main military airbase near Colombo provinces. International Islamic Jihad is patronising the Thai Muslim rebels. These are not the only areas where the seemingly affected ethnoreligious groups can take Kosovo style action. Similar situations exist in Darfur region of Sudan and the Shan, Kachin and Rakhine (Arakan) provinces of Myanmar. What would the US and UN reaction be if these ethno-religious groups break away and declare independence? Would they come to their help, send an EU Mission, establish embassies and open up UN aid missions? This may sound filmy, but after Kosovo everything appears to be possible. If this policy of the US and its allies is accepted as part of the new global political order, the Chechens, Dagestanis and Ingusetians should also have solid international support to breakaway from Russia. Russia has already indicated that the Kosovo principle can be applied to Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh of Georgia and Armenia. These
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Los Angeles Times, The Moscow Times, and The Jerusalem Times etc have highlighted that besides Kashmir, disaffected Sikh groups, ethnic and tribal groups in the northeast are also keen to secede from India. Can India afford to cope with these insurgencies, separatist movements in addition to fighting the 'proxy war' launched by Pakistan and the marauding guerrilla actions by the Maoist groups? Would the US and EU come forward to support the NSCN, ULFA and PREPAK etc in the northeast? Why not? Kosovo has written new international laws for all the simmering separatist movements. The government of India has so far remained silent about the Kosovo developments basically out of fear that any opposing statement would erode its 'secular' image, annoy its targeted vote banks and displease its supposed friends in the comity of Muslim nations. It is time for India to stridently oppose unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo, while under UN administration. India should openly support Russia and China in the UN and ask Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to explain to the world body as to how the US and allies could bury the UN mandate and agree to the creation of another nation on ethno-religious considerations. Kosovo would not be the last, in case the Big Brothers are allowed to use the NATO as a mandated force of the neo-imperialists. Who could prevent the NATO to frog-leap to Kashmir from Afghanistan? This new world order is likely to lead to greater world-disorder. Wednesday, 05 March, 2008, SIFY (INDIA) http://sify. com/news/ fullstory. php?id=14617538
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The wild propaganda of genocide and tales of mass graves were as false as the later claims that Iraq had and was preparing to use "weapons of mass destruction." Through war, assassinations, coups and economic strangulation, Washington has succeeded for now in imposing neoliberal economic policies on all of the six former Yugoslav republics and breaking them into unstable and impoverished ministates. The very instability and wrenching poverty that imperialism has brought to the region will in the long run be the seeds of its undoing. The history of the achievements made when Yugoslavia enjoyed real independence and sovereignty through unity and socialist development will assert itself in the future. * Sara Flounders, co-director of the International Action Center , traveled to Yugoslavia during the 1999 U.S. bombing and reported on the extent of the U.S. attacks on civilian targets. She is a co-author and editor of the books: "Hidden Agenda?U.S./NATO Takeover of Yugoslavia" and "NATO in the Balkans." Homepage: http://www.iacenter.org/balkans/kosovo022308/ www.indymedia.org.uk ( original location here ) 01.03.08
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redraw the boundaries of smaller ones without recourse to the United Nations. They view the claim that Yugoslavias crimes in Kosovo justify doing so as unreasonable; Yugoslavia has dissolved, and the Serbian state is run by different people. The Russians view the major European powers and the Americans as arrogating rights that international law does not grant them, and they see the West as setting itself up as judge and jury without right of appeal. This debate is not trivial. But there is a more immediate geopolitical issue that we have discussed before: the Russian response. The Russians have turned Kosovo into a significant issue. Moscow has objected to Kosovos independence on all of the diplomatic and legal grounds discussed. But behind that is a significant challenge to Russias strategic position. Russia wants to be seen as a great power and the dominant power in the former Soviet Union (FSU). Serbia is a Russian ally. Russia is trying to convince countries in the FSU, such as Ukraine, that looking to the West for help is futile because Russian power can block Western power. It wants to make the Russian return to great power status seem irresistible. The decision to recognize Kosovos independence in the face of Russian opposition undermines Russian credibility. That is doubly the case because Russia can make a credible argument that the Western decision flies in the face of international law and certainly of the conventions that have governed Europe for decades. Moscow also is asking for something that would not be difficult for the Americans and Europeans to give. The resources being devoted to Kosovo are not going to decline dramatically because of independence. Putting off independence until the last possible moment which is to say forever, considering the utter inability of Kosovo to care for itself thus certainly would have been something the West could have done with little effort. But it didnt. The reason for this is unclear. It does not appear that anyone was intent on challenging the Russians. The Kosovo situation was embedded in a process in which the endgame was going to be independence, and all of the military force and the bureaucratic inertia of the European Union was committed to this process. Russian displeasure was noted, but in the end, it was not taken seriously. This was simply because no one believed the Russians could or would do anything about Kosovar independence beyond issuing impotent protestations. Simply put, the nations that decided to recognize Kosovo were aware of Russian objections but viewed Moscow as they did in 1999: a weak power whose wishes are heard but discarded as irrelevant. Serbia was an ally of Russia. Russia intervened diplomatically on its behalf. Russia was ignored. If Russia simply walks away from this, its growing reputation as a great power will be badly hurt in the one arena that matters to Moscow the most: the FSU. A Europe that dismisses Russian power is one that has little compunction about working with the Americans to whittle away at Russian power in Russias own backyard. Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko who, in many ways, is more anti-Western than Russian President Vladimir Putin and is highly critical of Putin as well has said it is too late to sing songs about Kosovo. He maintains that the time to stop the partition of Kosovo was in 1999, in effect arguing that Putins attempts to stop it were ineffective because it was a lost cause. Translation: Putin and Russia are not the powers they pretend to be. That is not something that Putin in particular can easily tolerate. Russian grand strategy calls for Russia to base its economy on the export of primary commodities. To succeed at this, Russia must align its production and exports with those of other FSU countries. For reasons of both national security and economics, being the regional hegemon in the FSU is crucial to Russias strategy and to Putins personal credibility. He is giving up the presidency on the assumption that his personal power will remain intact. That assumption is based on his effectiveness and decisiveness. The way he deals with the West and the way the West deals with him is a measure of his personal power. Being completely disregarded by the West will cost him. He needs to react. The Russians are therefore hosting an informal CIS summit in Moscow on Friday. This is not the first such summit, by any means, and one was supposed to be held before this but was postponed. On Feb. 11,
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creates the option for Russia to signal to Washington that the price it will pay for Kosovo will be extracted elsewhere. Apart from increased Russian support for Iran which would complicate matters in Iraq for Washington there are issues concerning Azerbaijan, which is sandwiched between Russia and Iran. In the course of discussions with Iranians, the Russians could create problems for Azerbaijan. The Russians also could increase pressure on the Baltic states, which recognized Kosovo and whose NATO membership is a challenge to the Russians. During the Cold War, the Russians were masters of linkage. They responded not where they were weak but where the West was weak. There are many venues for that. What is the hardest to believe but is, of course, possible is that Putin simply will allow the Kosovo issue to pass. He clearly knew this was coming. He maintained vocal opposition to it beforehand and reiterated his opposition afterward. The more he talks and the less he does, the weaker he appears to be. He personally cant afford that, and neither can Russia. He had opportunities to cut his losses before Kosovos independence was declared. He didnt. That means either he has blundered badly or he has something on his mind. Our experience with Putin is that the latter is more likely, and this suddenly called summit may be where we see his plans play out. George Friedman, Stratfor, February 20, 2008
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov
tried to focus on BMD, specifically Washingtons plans to build BMD installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. The United States plans seem all but guaranteed to proceed, especially after a meeting between Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Bush on March 10 during which Tusk publicly signed off on the plans if the United States agreed to help Warsaw upgrade its military. Though the United States maintains that the BMD installations have nothing to do with Russia, they will push the West further up on Moscows doorstep. But any meaningful discussion on the BMD issue is dead, and each side
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The second tactic is attacking civil and judicial institutions that legitimize the current status, which is seen as favoring Kosovo. Burning the U.S. Embassy in Serbia was one example of this tactic, though not the most effective use of it. Targeting U.N. or EU institutions with direct jurisdiction over Mitrovica is much more likely to have the desired effect. The Serbs recognize the need to strike at the symbols of law and order in Kosovo, as revealed by the recent incidents at the U.N. court in Mitrovica. Serb demonstrators can claim to have won this battle, since peacekeepers were not able to detain many of them. The incident also gives insight into how future sabotages of the same kind could be carried out. The Serbs who orchestrated the takeover of the U.N. court had been employees and clerks in the court before the 1999 NATO war. While civil institutions are vulnerable to plots by those familiar with their inner workings, insiders are not necessary for Serbia to continue to succeed on this front.
The third tactic for the Serbs to achieve the partition of Kosovo is to disrupt Mitrovicas borders. Just after Kosovo declared independence, about 1,000 Serb Kosovars lashed out at two border crossings March 19. But the Kosovar Albanian police force was not strong enough to block the action. Border posts are sparse along Mitrovicas borders, making it easier for Serbs to claim this area. Also, the natural border formed by the Iber The Serbs want to wrest the Mitrovica district from Kosovo and bring it River means Serbias control of the Mitrovica district seems inevitable. back into Serbia proper. This would create a new Serbian-Kosovar border Closing off the major bridge across the river would alone accomplish a de along ethnic boundaries. Recovering Mitrovica would serve as a facto partition. consolation prize for Belgrade after losing Kosovo. It would deliver an NATO and EU forces would have to institute draconian measures to early blow to Kosovos pride over independence and demonstrate to the preserve this territory for Kosovo and block Serb ambitions, something Kosovars that Serbia is still calling some of the shots. Losing Mitrovica they are not willing to do. But to fully achieve the partitioning of Mitrovica also would harm Kosovo economically, since the regions mines are the from Kosovo, the Serbs will have to sustain these tactics. Otherwise their fledgling states only source of income other than foreign aid. small and sporadic victories will easily be reversed over time, as Western To this end, the Serbs have employed three tactics, all leading to initial influence strengthens the status quo and as Serb fury over Kosovar successes. The first is civil disobedience, a natural response to the recent secession gradually ebbs. While partition seems like a natural outcome, events that have so angered many Serbs. The persistence of massive the Serbs will have to work to make it happen. protests has further energized popular resistance and could lead to Stratfor. March 17, 2008 material changes in the Kosovo situation.
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Despite these obstacles, during his visits to Kiev and Bucharest Bush intendsto throw a Hail Mary in the game over Ukraine not only against Russia, but large swathes of Europe. Bush is not likely to make significant headway in bringing Ukraine and Georgia into NATO in the long term, but there is another big issue in play that worries Moscow -- namely, U.S. plans to install ballistic missile defense (BMD) in Central Europe. And Russia can do little about this U.S. move. The Czechs already are confirming details on where and when to sign the treaty for installing the defense system, while the Poles are looking to see if the United States will throw in any last-minute sweeteners before finalizing the deal. Much to Russias chagrin, the BMD plan is now down to a matter of dotting Is and crossing Ts. While the NATO discussions continue to drag out beyond the upcoming NATO summit, the United States will be installing hardware behind the old Iron Curtain to hedge in the Russians -and that alone is a decent outcome from the U.S. perspective. Washington may not be headed for a royal flush as far as beating back the Russians on NATO expansion, but it still has a flush in hand with BMD. Stratfor, 1 Apr 2008
The interests of the United States are obviously different from those of Europe. We are increasingly coming to the conclusion that the events in the Balkans developed in such a way so that Washington could establish a dominant presence in the region, which was not the case after 1945. We should not lose sight of the fact that it was precisely Germany that started this unfortunate game, championing ethnically-based national states in the region. We should remember that Germany was the first to recognize Slovenia and Croatia. What still remains to be solved is why the Americans subsequently took up the German ethnic strategy. I might say that, in the case of Germany, there was a sort of an aggressive laziness to genuinely deal with the situation in Yugoslavia and the Balkans. The cause probably lies in the simple fact that, in this way, without truly delving into the genuine state of affairs, people were able to, quite easily, without much effort, establish who was friend and who was foe. In addition, there is no doubt at all that the United States decided very early on to support the Albanian side. This is also born out by the fact that Washington established its Information Office in Pristina [the provincial capital of Kosovo trans. note] in 1997, contrary to the will of Belgrade. Here we should also remember the long years of activity on the part of Republican senator Bob Dole.
At the end of April 2000, I personally attended a conference in Bratislava, where the highest American officials discussed their future strategy in the Balkans. The conference organizers were the American State Department and the Republican Party's elite American Enterprise Institute. Among the conference participants were prime ministers, foreign ministers and defense ministers of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, and the personal representative of the NATO commander. Among these was a future American Assistant Secretary of State [Daniel Fried trans. note]. The following was clearly stated there: First point. The reason why we are in the Balkans today lies in our missed opportunity after 1945, when General Eisenhower made a mistake and did not station American land troops in that part of Europe. Now we must correct that error at all cost. Why? The reason lies in the very nature of land troops. The complete control of a territory is possible only if our land troops are present. Full control cannot be established with
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not Washington 's present aim identical, namely, to interfere with European efforts at creating an autonomous, independent European policy? Finally, some mention should be made here of the relations between Western Europe and Russia. In the case they are normal and good, then that would raise the question of NATO's continued existence. The Americans invented the conflict in the Balkans in order to prevent the Europeans from thinking that NATO is no longer needed. There are people at important positions in the EU who think that there is a constant in American, and possibly British, policy, that, within the European Union as well as Turkey power must never come into the hands of people who might bring into question Washington's direct influence on Europe. Former member of the German Bundestag, ex-German Deputy Defense Secretary and ex-Vice President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
Interview with Willy Wimmer * (excerpt) The Americans are Recommending Themselves as the Successors of Rome
(Bltter fr deutsche und internationale Politik),September, 2001 integrity is best protected by signing an SAA with the EU; a stance that was reaffirmed throughout the recent Presidential campaign. These elections will provide another stern test for the European perspective in the western Balkans. Though much was made of Tadic's re-election as a clear choice for a European future, early elections are likely to provide a clearer picture of Serbia's current national sentiment.
IAN BANCROFT
While Olli Rehn, the EU's commissioner for enlargement, continues to insist that, "a great majority of Serbian people consistently support EU membership" and that "it should be a realistic expectation that the Serbian government listens to this silent majority", a recent opinion poll shows that although 67% of Serbian citizens support EU integration, 74% would not trade further integration for recognition of In response, the Serbian president, Boris Tadic, has agreed to call an Kosovo's independence. It is therefore highly questionable as to whether early general election, scheduled to take place on May 11 alongside the "silent majority" of which Rehn speaks actually exists in light of the municipal elections, as the most "democratic way to overcome the political widespread recognition of Kosovo's independence by EU member states. crisis". Serbia's education minister, Zoran Loncar, recently called on Rehn to Tadic has consistently reiterated that Serbia can "best defend our Kosovo from independence precisely with membership in the European Union" and therefore confirmed that he would "sign the stabilization and association agreement (SAA) with the EU immediately if offered". clarify whether or not the EU observes Serbia's "internationally recognized borders", which would include Kosovo. Instead, the EU has merely acknowledged Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence and left individual member states to decide on recognition in line with their own national procedures. The EU's functional incapacity to recognise states, combined with the lack of a unified stance on Kosovo's status among member states, means that Rehn cannot possibly provide the clarification demanded.
For Kostunica, however, "all parties want Serbia to join the EU, but the question is how - with or without Kosovo". With respect to the SAA that Serbia initialled in November, Kostunica queries how EU member states that have recognized Kosovo's independence can possibly accept an agreement whose text reaffirms that " Serbia is a whole state with Kosovo On the basis of parliamentary election results from January 2007 and in its borders". political developments since then, the SRS will likely benefit most from The forthcoming election battle will be primarily framed around this key new elections. Tadic and the Democratic party face the formidable issue and articulations of Serbia's future direction. The DS, G17 Plus and challenge of convincing the Serbian electorate that their dual approach of the Liberal Democrats (LDP), the main advocates of EU membership, EU integration and opposition to Kosovo's independence is not beset by believe that the issues of Kosovo and further EU integration are unrelated, inherent contradictions, but instead constitutes the strongest path for Serbia to follow. In the prevailing political climate, however, such a and have therefore vehemently opposed the SRS's resolution. strategy and discourse will be severely tested. If the EU again chooses to In an attempt to articulate this dual course of deeper EU ties whilst implicitly support Tadic and Serbia's more pro-European voices, as it did upholding Serbia's territorial integrity, Tadic has speculated how, as an EU prior to February's presidential run-off, then it should tread extremely member, Serbia could possibly prevent other countries from becoming carefully. members, i.e. "we could prevent Kosovo from joining". Such remarks are consistent with the Democratic Party's stance that Serbia's territorial http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/ian_bancroft/2008/03/ serbias_next_move.html
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euros paid to the families of "martyrs" (families with more than one martyr receive 40 per cent more per martyr); one-time payments of 40 euros to injured veterans; and free hospital services with no other benefits to speak of, for the rest. That, at least, is what the veterans' compensation law promises, though only 70 per cent of the funds have been paid out to date-leaving more than 15,000 ex-fighters in Kosovo without work, without money and in many cases without homes. What they do have, said Klinaku, is a sense of betrayal and anger that what they fought and died for won neither the absolute sovereignty they craved nor the Greater Albania that they ultimately seek, but rather an Ahtisaari compromise called supervised independence- which, to hell with what the Serbs say, doesn't go far enough. "We fought for freedom and independence of Kosovo. But now a new EU mission is on its way in to replace the UN one. You can give it the name independence, but independence it is not," he said. "Independence is when you have an army, when you have a seat at the UN, when you have guarantees of your security." At the end of the day it is "an Albania for all Albanians"- that eventual fusion of Kosovo with Albania and parts of Montenegro and Macedonia-that the KLA hardliners seek. And judging by Klinaku's cool, almost sinister tone, the willingness of Kosovo's retired rebels to return to battle isn't such a far-off fantasy. "We're not afraid of Serbia. If we have to fight them again, we're ready," he said and smiled knowingly. "Weapons aren't hard to find. Albania is close by." In the new world order that is a U.S.- and a partially EU-recognized independent Kosovo, the current disruptions coming out of Belgrade which withdrew ambassadors from the U.S. and elsewhere - and from the raucous Kosovo Serbs in the street, who have already exploded bombs and destroyed UN border installations, is nothing to sneer at. Indeed, things could get a lot worse on the Serb side in the coming days. Not to mention Russia, which hasn't even taken its gloves off. But looking ahead-if such a thing is even possible in this part of the world, at this chaotic time-the deeper challenge facing Thaci and his nascent government will be to not get too bogged down in the coming months (as many expect he will) resolving a range of delicate, internationally supervised post-status issues, that he forgets about the poverty and desperation brewing in his own backyard. Yes, he needs to work on building stable institutions, decentralizing power throughout Kosovo's 30 municipalities, complying with U.S./EU demands for inter-ethnic safety measures and reconciliation between Albanians and Serbs, and the like. But let the ex-KLA leadership that is now steering an "independent" though still an overwhelmingly dependent - Kosovo not forget where it came from, and the threats from inside that it faces. This is a nation of clan law where mobsters and men with guns rule the roost. If those men with guns, and the experience of using them, don't get delivered out of their economic misery soon, they could become the powder keg which, with enough Serb pushing, destabilizes and devolves this region into violence once again. There's a lot of work ahead - not only in lifting war veterans out of unemployment and poverty, but in providing enough opportunities to prevent the next generation of street-side warriors from developing. "Young people here today need opportunities and they're lacking them. They're sitting all day in the cafes doing nothing," said the journalist Gashi. He told me about a running joke in Kosovo these days: "Contribute something to the country-emigrate. " Not all that funny, he said, when you think of the reality of this place. "If we fail to educate our young people properly-to engage them, to integrate them-they'll be the biggest problem. If they remain uneducated they'll remain jobless. And that's quite dangerous." http://www.counterp unch.org/ levitin02212008. html COUNTERPUNCH (USA) Feb 21, 2008 Michael Levitin is a freelance journalist living in Berlin. He has written for Newsweek, The Financial Times, Los Angeles Times and other publications and can be reached at malevitin@yahoo. com
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U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance (by anyone's measure one of this country's most experienced diplomats and most honorable public servants) and his British colleague, Lord David Owen. Upon taking office, however, many members of the Clinton Administration immediately began criticizing the VOPP for allegedly rewarding aggression and for not providing suitable guarantees for Bosnia 's survival. The reality was quite different; in fact, the Clinton Administration's own agreement ending the Bosnian war some two and a half years later, the Dayton Peace Accords of November 1995, left Bosnia far weaker than it would have been under the VOPP. In the interim, tens of thousands of people had been killed, including the thousands of Bosnian Muslim men and boys executed by Serb forces in the Srebrenica massacres of July 1995. Hundreds of thousand of others were driven from their homes. As Owen notes, It is rare for history to show within a few years the folly of government's decisions, but by August 1995 it was painfully apparent how damaging the US decision to ditch the VOPP in May 1993 had been. The Bosnian Muslims had now been ethnically cleansed from Zepa and Srebrenica and the Croatian Serbs from the Krajina. There was no longer any talk, or hope, of reversing ethnic cleansing. Former NATO deputy commander Charles G. Boyd took a similar view, noting that the contradictory nature of U.S. policy in the Balkans actually prolonged the war in Bosnia rather than ending it. Current Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt, one of Europe's most experienced Balkan hands, likewise argued that confusion in Washington significantly hurt the search for peace in Bosnia . Unfortunately, by the time the United States changed course and agreed to compromises in Bosnia already accepted by the Europeans and Russia , Srebrenica had already happened. Such a dysfunctional and counterproductive Balkan policy was again in
evidence in the mismanagement of the Kosovo war in 1999. The Clinton Administration went into the war thinking it would be over in a matter of days. On the first day of the bombing campaign (March 24) Madeleine Albright said "I don't see this as a long-term operation." Just eleven days later, however, Albright would say "We never expected this to be over quickly." Moreover, far from preventing the mass expulsion of tens of thousands of Albanians from Kosovo, the NATO bombing campaign in many ways provoked it; as Balkan historian Misha Glenny has noted, "Instead of preventing a h u m a n i t a r i a n catastrophe, NATO's decision [to bomb Serbia] contributed to a flood of biblical proportions." And as the war dragged on, the Clinton team appeared increasingly disengaged from reality; Clinton 's appointment as NATO Supreme Commander, Wesley Clark, ordered his British subordinate General Sir Michael Jackson to confront the Russians at Pristina airport. Jackson calmly refused a direct order from his immediate superior in the chain of command, telling Clark I'm not going to start WWIII. ( Clark was essentially fired from his job some three months later.) And, of course, the Clinton Administration did nothing to prevent the reverse forced expulsions of tens of thousands of Serbs, Roma and other ethnic minorities from Kosovo after NATO and the Kosovo Liberation Army moved in. In both the U.S. involvement in the Balkans and the subsequent tragedy in Iraq , the basic process by which so much of American foreign policy is formulated is evident: interest groups and ethnic lobbies, often led by Ahmad Chalabitype charlatans, forge alliances with ideologues in government, be they neocons or liberal interventionists. These are then joined by journalists eager for sensational headlines and sympathetic (but by no means objective, balanced, well-informed or independent) academics who lend their scholarly support to their own preferred policy. And just as often, individuals who know the true costs of war and who have put their lives on the line for their country, such as Colin Powell, Eric Shinseki or William Fallon, get marginalized or forced out of office for questioning whether such political and military adventurism is worth American blood and treasure. If Hillary Clinton claims U.S. Balkan policy in the 1990s as a positive line on her CV, it does not bode well for U.S. foreign policy in a potential second Clinton administration. Both the Balkans and Iraq show that many aspects of the way in which U.S. foreign policy is formulated are clearly broken. Whether a President Obama or a President McCain would have the courage, intelligence and strength to fix them remains to be seen. But it is hard to imagine that a second President Clinton would. Gordon N. Bardos is assistant director of the Harriman Institute at Columbia University 's School of International and Public Affairs. 13.03.2008 The National Interest
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recognize it as a border. There's no easily negotiable solution, is there? No, there's no easily negotiable solution. For the last year, year and a half, the international community brokered negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade, and it became quite apparent that there was no common ground whatsoever. And that's why we came on February 17 to a unilateral declaration of independence despite Belgrade 's opposition. And therefore, it's quite hard to imagine that some kind of consensual agreement is going to emerge after Belgrade has been dealt this blow. It's possible that, were the north to secede from the rest of Kosovo, Belgrade would take some satisfaction in that development. But that development is more likely to occur come what may than because there is a negotiated move in that direction. But overall, you think this was a good move by the international community to go ahead with the independence of Kosovo? It was the best of a whole set of very bad options. And I'm troubled by the fact that there was no UN support and that, as a result, this separation occurs in a legally shaky way. But I do think that, from the perspective of pragmatismthat is to say, what scenario is most likely to bring lasting peace to the Balkans?it makes more sense to separate Kosovo from Serbia, and to try to bring a close to the continuing dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, than to leave Kosovo inside Serbia and wait for what would probably be yet another round of ethnic conflict. http://www.cfr.org/publication/15688/pragmatism_on_kosovo.html? breadcrumb=/ Charles A. Kupchan March 10, 2008
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peace in Kosovo and stability in the Balkans. Kosovo can be settled if the Bush administration returns to the United Natios and engages in honest negotiation with the Serbs and the Russians. More fundamentally, stability in the international system can only be restored when the United States once again honors the fundamental principles of international law that it violated by attacking Iraq in 2003, and in recognizing Kosovo in 2008. (Robert M. Hayden is professor of anthropology, law and public & international affairs and director of the Center for Russian & East European Studies at the University of Pittsburgh.) http://www.upi. com/Internationa l_Security/ Emerging_ Threats/ Analysis /2008/03/ 20/outside_ view_bushs_ failed_kosovo_ policy/6106/ print_view/