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Articles
begining 1861
American Civil War Origins of the American Civil War Battle of Fort Sumter Battle of Fairfax Court House (June 1861) Battle of Arlington Mills Battle of Vienna, Virginia Battle of Hoke's Run Battle of Blackburn's Ford First Battle of Bull Run Eastern Theater of the American Civil War Battle of Roanoke Island Battle of Elizabeth City Battle of New Bern Siege of Fort Macon Battle of South Mills Battle of Tranter's Creek Battle of Dranesville Battle of Ball's Bluff 1 1 35 72 82 88 92 96 97 100 110 136 143 148 154 158 158 159 162 166 166 181 195 198 203 206 209 212 219 234 236 239
Battle of Garnett's & Golding's Farm Battle of Savage's Station Battle of White Oak Swamp Battle of Glendale Battle of Malvern Hill Northern Virginia Campaign Battle of Cedar Mountain First Battle of Rappahannock Station Manassas Station Operations (Stonewall Jackson) Battle of Thoroughfare Gap Second Battle of Bull Run Battle of Chantilly Maryland Campaign Battle of Mile Hill Battle of Harpers Ferry Battle of South Mountain Battle of Antietam Battle of Shepherdstown Battle of Unison Battle of Fredericksburg Mud March (American Civil War)
246 247 250 253 258 261 269 274 275 277 279 295 298 310 312 318 321 343 344 346 364 366 366 367 367 404 414 433 450 458 467 469 503 503 504
persons
Abraham Lincoln Joshua Chamberlain Stonewall Jackson Jefferson Davis Adelbert Ames Ambrose Burnside Ellis Spear Ulysses S. Grant
foreigen power
France in the American Civil War Britain in the American Civil War
512
References
Article Sources and Contributors Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors 525 535
Article Licenses
License 543
begining 1861
American Civil War
The American Civil War (18611865), often referred to as The Civil War in the United States, was a civil war fought over the secession of the Confederate States. 11 southern slave states declared their secession from the United States and formed the Confederate States of America ("the Confederacy"); the other 25 states supported the federal government ("the Union"). After four years of warfare, mostly within the Southern states, the Confederacy surrendered and slavery was outlawed everywhere in the nation. Issues that led to war were partially resolved in the Reconstruction Era that followed, though others remained unresolved. In the presidential election of 1860, the Republican Party, led by Abraham Lincoln, had campaigned against expanding slavery beyond the states in which it already existed. The Republicans strongly advocated nationalism, and in their 1860 platform they denounced threats of disunion as avowals of treason. After a Republican victory, but before the new administration took office on March 4, 1861, seven cotton states declared their secession and joined to form the Confederate States of America. Both the outgoing administration of President James Buchanan and the incoming administration rejected the legality of secession, considering it rebellion. The other eight slave states rejected calls for secession at this point. No foreign governments recognized the Confederacy. Hostilities began on April 12, 1861, when Confederate forces attacked a U.S. military installation at Fort Sumter in South Carolina. Lincoln responded by calling for a volunteer army from each state to recapture federal property, which led to declarations of secession by four more slave states. Both sides raised armies as the Union seized control of the border states early in the war and established a naval blockade. Land warfare in the East was inconclusive in 186162, as the Confederacy beat back Union efforts to capture its capital, Richmond, Virginia, notably during the Peninsular Campaign. In September 1862, the Confederate campaign in Maryland ended in defeat at the Battle of Antietam, which dissuaded the British from intervening.[1] Days after that battle, Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, which made ending slavery a war goal.[2] In 1863, Confederate general Robert E. Lee's northward advance ended in defeat at the Battle of Gettysburg. To the west, the Union gained control of the Mississippi River after the Battle of Shiloh and Siege of Vicksburg, splitting the Confederacy in two and destroying much of their western army. Due to his western successes, Ulysses S. Grant was given command of all Union armies in 1864, and organized the armies of William Tecumseh Sherman, Philip Sheridan and others to attack the Confederacy from all directions, increasing the North's advantage in manpower. Grant restructured the union army, and put other generals in command of divisions of the army that were to support his push into Virginia. He fought several battles of attrition against Lee through the Overland Campaign to seize Richmond, though in the face of fierce resistance he altered his plans and led the Siege of Petersburg which nearly finished off the rest of Lee's army. Meanwhile, Sherman captured Atlanta and marched to the sea, destroying Confederate infrastructure along the way. When the Confederate attempt to defend Petersburg failed, the Confederate army retreated but was pursued and defeated, which resulted in Lee's surrender to Grant at Appomattox Court House on April 9, 1865. The American Civil War was one of the earliest true industrial wars. Railroads, the telegraph, steamships, and mass-produced weapons were employed extensively. The practices of total war, developed by Sherman in Georgia, and of trench warfare around Petersburg foreshadowed World War I in Europe. It remains the deadliest war in American history, resulting in the deaths of an estimated 750,000 soldiers[3] and an undetermined number of civilian casualties. Historian John Huddleston estimates the death toll at ten percent of all Northern males 2045 years old, and 30 percent of all Southern white males aged 1840.[4] Victory for the North meant the end of the Confederacy
American Civil War and of slavery in the United States, and strengthened the role of the federal government. The social, political, economic and racial issues of the war decisively shaped the reconstruction era that lasted to 1877.
Causes of secession
The causes of the Civil War were complex, and have been controversial since the war began. The issue has been further complicated by historical revisionists, who have tried to improve the image of the South by lessening the role of slavery.[5] Slavery was the central source of escalating political tension in the 1850s. The Republican Party was determined to prevent any spread of slavery, and many Southern leaders had threatened secession if the Republican candidate, Lincoln, won the 1860 election. Following Lincoln's victory, many Southern whites felt that disunion had become their only option. While not all Southerners saw themselves as fighting to preserve slavery, most of the officers and over a third of the rank and file in Lee's army had close family ties to slavery. To Northerners, in contrast, the motivation was primarily to preserve the Union, not to abolish slavery.[6] Abraham Lincoln consistently made preserving the Union the central goal of the war, though he increasingly saw slavery as a crucial issue and made ending it an additional goal.[7] Lincoln's decision to issue the Emancipation Proclamation angered both Peace Democrats ("Copperheads") and War Democrats, but energized most Republicans.[8] By warning that free blacks would flood the North, Democrats made gains in the 1862 elections, but they did not gain control of Congress. The Republicans' counterargument that slavery was the mainstay of the enemy steadily gained support, with the Democrats crushed at the 1863 elections in Ohio when they tried to resurrect anti-black sentiment.[9]
Slavery
The slavery issue addressed not only the well-being of the slaves (although abolitionists raised the issue) but also the question of whether slavery was an anachronistic evil that was incompatible with American values or a profitable economic system protected by the Constitution. The strategy of the anti-slavery forces was to stop the expansion and thus put slavery on a path to gradual extinction. To the white South this strategy trampled their Constitutional rights.[10][11] Slavery was banned in the Northwest Territory with the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. By 1804 all the Northern states (states north of the Mason-Dixon line) had passed laws to abolish slavery gradually. Congress in 1807 banned the international slave trade. Slavery faded in the border states and urban areas but expanded in highly profitable cotton states of the Deep South. Despite compromises in 1820 and 1850, the slavery issues exploded in the 1850s. The new Republican Party angered slavery interests by demanding the end to its expansion. Republicans believed that without expansion slavery would eventually die out. Abraham Lincoln argued this in his 1858 House Divided Speech.[12] Much of the political battle in the 1850s focused on the expansion of slavery,[13][14] since most assumed that if slavery could not expand, it would wither and die.[15] As early as 1845, Lincoln argued that slavery could die a natural death if contained.[16] With tobacco and cotton wearing out the soil, the South believed it needed to expand slavery,[17] and many wanted to reopen the international slave trade.[18] Southern and northern resentments brought the crisis to a head in the late 1850s. Disagreements with Abolitionists caused the Whig and "Know-Nothing" parties to collapse, and new ones to arise. In 1860, the last national political party, the Democratic Party, split along sectional lines. Northerners ranging from the abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison to the moderate Republican leader Lincoln[19] stressed that all men are created equal. Almost all the inter-regional crises involved slavery, starting with the Constitutional Convention of 1787. The invention of the cotton gin increased by fiftyfold the quantity of cotton that could be processed and greatly increased the demand for slave labor in the South.[20] There was controversy over adding the slave state of Missouri to the Union that led to the Missouri Compromise of 1820. A gag rule prevented discussion in Congress of petitions for ending slavery from 18351844, while Manifest Destiny became an argument for gaining new territories, where
American Civil War slavery could expand. The acquisition of Texas as a slave state in 1845 along with territories won as a result of the MexicanAmerican War resulted in the Compromise of 1850.[21] The Wilmot Proviso was an attempt by Northern politicians to exclude slavery from the territories conquered from Mexico. The popular anti-slavery novel Uncle Toms Cabin (1852) by Harriet Beecher Stowe greatly increased Northern resentment of slavery.[22][23] The 1854 Ostend Manifesto was an unsuccessful Southern attempt to annex Cuba as a slave state. The Second Party System broke down after passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854, which replaced the Missouri Compromise ban on slavery with popular sovereignty, allowing the people of a territory to vote for or against slavery. The Bleeding Kansas controversy over the status of slavery in the Kansas Territory led pro-South Presidents Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan to attempt to admit Kansas as a slave state. Buchanan supported the pro-slavery Lecompton Constitution.[24] Violence over the status of slavery in Kansas erupted with the Wakarusa War,[25] the Sacking of Lawrence,[26] and the caning of Republican Charles Sumner by the Southerner Preston Brooks,[27][28] the Pottawatomie Massacre,[29]. The 1857 Supreme Court Dred Scott decision allowed slavery in the territories even where the majority opposed slavery. The Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858 included Northern Democratic leader Stephen A. Douglas' Freeport Doctrine. This doctrine was an argument for thwarting the Dred Scott decision that, along with Douglas' defeat of the Lecompton Constitution, divided the Democratic Party between North and South. Northern abolitionist John Brown's raid at Harpers Ferry Armory was an attempt to incite slave insurrections in 1859.[30] The North-South split in the Democratic Party in 1860 due to the Southern demand for a slave code for the territories completed polarization of the nation between North and South.
John Brown being adored by an enslaved mother and child as he walks to his execution on December 2, 1859.
Support for secession was strongly correlated to the number of plantations in the region.[33] States of the Deep South, which had the greatest concentration of plantations, were the first to secede. The upper South slave states of Virginia, North Carolina, Arkansas, and Tennessee had fewer plantations and rejected secession until the Fort Sumter crisis forced them to choose sides. Border states had fewer plantations still and never seceded.[34][35] As of 1860 the percentage of Southern families that owned slaves has been estimated to be 43 percent in the lower South, 36 percent in the James Hopkinson's Plantation. Planting sweet potatoes. ca. 1862/63. upper South and 22 percent in the border states that fought mostly for the Union.[36] Half the owners had one to four slaves. A total of 8,000 planters owned 50 or more slaves in 1850 and only 1,800 planters owned 100 or more; of the latter, 85% lived in the lower South, as opposed to one percent in the border states.[37] According to the 1860 U.S. census, 393,975 individuals, representing 8 percent of all US families, owned 3,950,528 slaves.[38]
Ninety-five percent of African-Americans lived in the South, comprising one third of the population there as opposed to one percent of the population of the North, chiefly in larger cities like New York and Philadelphia. Consequently, fears of eventual emancipation were much greater in the South than in the North.[39] The Supreme Court decision of 1857 in Dred Scott v. Sandford escalated the controversy. Chief Justice Roger B. Taney's decision said that slaves were "so far inferior that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect".[40] Taney then overturned the Missouri Compromise, which banned slavery in territory north of the 3630' parallel. He stated, "[T]he Act of Congress which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning [enslaved persons] in the territory of the United States north of the line therein is not warranted by the Constitution and is therefore void."[41] Southern Democrats praised the Dred Scott decision, but Republicans branded it a "willful perversion" of the Constitution. They argued that if Scott could not legally file suit, the Supreme Court had no right to consider the Missouri Compromise's constitutionality. Lincoln warned that "the next Dred Scott decision"[42] could threaten Northern states with slavery.
Scars of whipped slave. This famous 1863 photo was distributed by abolitionists to illustrate what they saw as the barbarism of Southern [31] society. The victim likely suffered from keloid, according to Kathleen Collins, making the scars [32] more prominent and extensive.
Lincoln said, "This question of Slavery was more important than any other; indeed, so much more important has it become that no other national question can even get a hearing just at present."[43] The slavery issue was related to sectional competition for control of the territories,[44] and the Southern demand for a slave code for the territories was the issue used by Southern politicians to split the Democratic Party in two, which all but guaranteed the election of Lincoln and secession. When secession was an issue, South Carolina planter and state Senator John Townsend said that, "our enemies are about to take possession of the Government, that they intend to rule us according to the caprices of their fanatical theories, and according to the declared purposes of abolishing slavery."[45] Similar opinions were expressed throughout the South in editorials, political speeches and declarations of reasons for secession. Even though Lincoln had no plans to outlaw slavery where it existed, whites throughout the South expressed fears for the future of slavery. Southern concerns included not only economic loss but also fears of racial equality.[46][47][48][49] The Texas Declaration of Causes for Secession[50][51] said that the non-slave-holding states were "proclaiming the debasing doctrine of equality of all men, irrespective of race or color", and that the African race "were rightfully held and regarded as an inferior and dependent race". Alabama secessionist E. S. Dargan warned that whites and free blacks could not live together; if slaves were emancipated and remained in the South, "we ourselves would become the executioners of our own slaves. To this extent would the policy of our Northern enemies drive us; and thus would we not only be reduced to poverty, but what is still worse, we should be driven to crime, to the commission of sin."[52] Beginning in the 1830s, the US Postmaster General refused to allow mail which carried abolition pamphlets to the South.[53] Northern teachers suspected of any tinge of abolitionism were expelled from the South, and abolitionist literature was banned. Southerners rejected the denials of Republicans that they were abolitionists.[54] The North felt threatened as well, for as Eric Foner concludes, "Northerners came to view slavery as the very antithesis of the good society, as well as a threat to their own fundamental values and interests."[55] During the 1850s, slaves left the border states through sale, manumission and escape, and border states also had more free African-Americans and European immigrants than the lower South, which increased Southern fears that
American Civil War slavery was threatened with rapid extinction in this area. Such fears greatly increased Southern efforts to make Kansas a slave state. By 1860, the number of white border state families owning slaves plunged to only 16 percent of the total. Slaves sold to lower South states were owned by a smaller number of wealthy slave owners as the price of slaves increased.[56] Even though Lincoln agreed to the Corwin Amendment, which would have protected slavery in existing states, secessionists claimed that such guarantees were meaningless. Besides the loss of Kansas to free soil Northerners, secessionists feared that the loss of slaves in the border states would lead to emancipation, and that upper South slave states might be the next dominoes to fall. They feared that Republicans would use patronage to incite slaves and antislavery Southern whites such as Hinton Rowan Helper. Then slavery in the lower South, like a "scorpion encircled by fire, would sting itself to death."[57] Historians such as Eric Foner have argued that no two people held the same motivations during the civil war. He argues that while some were motivated mainly by slavery, most were motivated by some mixture of politics, culture, nationalism, honor, or any other number of motivations.[58] Other historians, such as Chandra Manning, argue that both Union and Confederate soldiers who did the actual fighting believed slavery to be the cause of the Civil War. He argues that a majority of Confederate soldiers fought to protect slavery, which they viewed as an integral part of southern society. Further, he argues that Union soldiers believed the primary reason for the war was to bring emancipation to the slaves, though many Union soldiers did not fully endorse this. Manning stated that the primary debate in Confederate states over secession was not over state rights, but rather "the power of the federal government to affect the institution of slavery, specifically limiting it in newly added territories."[59]
Sectionalism
Sectionalism refers to the different economies, social structure, customs and political values of the North and South.[60][61] It increased steadily between 1800 and 1860 as the North, which phased slavery out of existence, industrialized, urbanized and built prosperous farms, while the deep South concentrated on plantation agriculture based on slave labor, together with subsistence farming for the poor whites. The South expanded into rich new lands in the Southwest (from Alabama to Texas).[62]
Status of the states, 1861. States that seceded before April 15,
However, slavery declined in the border states and 1861 States that seceded after April 15, 1861 Union states that permitted slavery Union states that banned slavery Territories could barely survive in cities and industrial areas (it was fading out in cities such as Baltimore, Louisville and St. Louis), so a South based on slavery was rural and non-industrial. On the other hand, as the demand for cotton grew the price of slaves soared. Historians have debated whether economic differences between the industrial Northeast and the agricultural South helped cause the war. Most historians now disagree with the economic determinism of historian Charles Beard in the 1920s and emphasize that Northern and Southern economies were largely complementary.[63] Fears of slave revolts and abolitionist propaganda made the South militantly hostile to abolitionism.[64][65] Southerners complained that it was the North that was changing, and was prone to new "isms", while the South remained true to historic republican values of the Founding Fathers (many of whom owned slaves, including Washington, Jefferson and Madison). Lincoln said that Republicans were following the tradition of the framers of the Constitution (including the Northwest Ordinance and the Missouri Compromise) by preventing expansion of slavery.[66]
American Civil War The issue of accepting slavery (in the guise of rejecting slave-owning bishops and missionaries) split the largest religious denominations (the Methodist, Baptist and Presbyterian churches) into separate Northern and Southern denominations.[67] Industrialization meant that seven European immigrants out of eight settled in the North. The movement of twice as many whites leaving the South for the North as vice versa contributed to the South's defensive-aggressive political behavior.[68]
Four irreconcilable doctrines emerged to answer the question of federal control in the territories, and they all claimed to be sanctioned by the Constitution.[82] The traditional or conservative position was based on Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution: The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State. From these enumerated powers, two of the four doctrines emerged, each arguing that Congress had full authority to decide the fate of slavery in the territories. The precedents of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and the Missouri Compromise of 1820 were cited by proponents of federal control. In each of these historic compromises, the legislation provided for, but did not require, a balance between free-soil and slave-soil. In all areas not placed off-limits to slavery, the institution was quickly established there.[83] Here, the two traditional or conservative doctrines parted ways. The Constitutional Union Party regarded Congressional allocation of free-soil and, implicitly, slave-soil territory as an established method of compromise. Any dispute over slavery expansion was to end in similar apportionments. The Crittenden Compromise of 1860 was an expression of this political outlook.[84] The Republican Party, which also championed federal control over territories, rejected this narrow interpretation of the precedents. They insisted that the clause conveying authority to Congress in the territories did not bind legislators
American Civil War to any particular policy; slavery could be constitutionally excluded altogether in a territory at their discretion.[84] The only caveat the Republicans issued was that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment be applied in the territories to slavery: Congress might positively prohibit slavery, but they could never establish it; to do so, according to the Republicans, would amount to a federal mandate for slavery and violate the principles of the Declaration of Independence.[85][86] Illinois Senator Stephen A. Douglas and his southern Democratic Party allies devised the third of these political theories: territorial sovereignty. By this doctrine Congress would relinquish direct federal control over the internal affairs of territories regarding slavery. In this respect, territorial sovereignty (also known as popular sovereignty") diverged sharply from the two conservative theories.[86] Douglas declared that the people of a state, a territory, or otherwise have an inalienable right to govern themselves with respect to local concerns. Among these local concerns, Douglas included slavery. When challenged to explain how territorial sovereignty trumped the role of Congress as enumerated in Article Four, he said that Congress was empowered only to confer authority into the hands of the territorial government, but never to exercise any direct control.[87] The fourth in this quartet of constitutional doctrines was that of state sovereignty (also known as states rights). Among the principles of state sovereignty was that all authority regarding the institution of slavery in the territories resided in the slave states themselves. The role of the federal government was merely to enable the implementation of slave state laws when residents of the states entered the territories.[88] As early as 1847, shortly after the introduction of the Wilmot Proviso, the ideology of state sovereignty emerged as a rebuttal to free soil claims to the Mexican Cession.[89][90] John C. Calhoun asserted that the federal government in the territories was only the agent of the several sovereign states, and hence incapable of forbidding the bringing into any territory of anything that was legal property in any state. He concluded that citizens from every state had the right to take their property to any territory.[91] State sovereignty gave the laws of the slaveholding states extra-jurisdictional effect. The slave-owner and his property would settle in a territory much as a colonist settled in early colonial America; all rights and privileges recognized in the mother country (or sovereign slave state) would be retained by the colonists in their new home (US territory). The United States federal government would be bound by law to protect the settlers sovereign "rights" and intercede on their behalf if state statutes were threatened.[88] Essentially, states rights was an ideology formulated and applied as a means of advancing slave state interests through federal authority and thwarting free state interests, by application of the same federal authority.[92] As historian Thomas L Krannawitter points out, [T]he Southern demand for federal slave protection represented a demand for an unprecedented expansion of federal power.[93] By 1860, these four doctrines comprised the major ideologies presented to the American public on the matters of slavery, the territories and the US Constitution.[94]
American Civil War While the South moved toward a Southern nationalism, leaders in the North were also becoming more nationally minded, and rejected any notion of splitting the Union. The Republican national electoral platform of 1860 warned that Republicans regarded disunion as treason and would not tolerate it: we denounce those threats of disunion...as denying the vital principles of a free government, and as an avowal of contemplated treason, which it is the imperative duty of an indignant people sternly to rebuke and forever silence.[99] The South ignored the warnings: Southerners did not realize how ardently the North would fight to hold the Union together.[100]
States' rights
Everyone agreed that states had certain rightsbut did those rights carry over when a citizen left that state? The Southern position was that citizens of every state had the right to take their property anywhere in the U.S. and not have it taken awayspecifically they could bring their slaves anywhere and they would remain slaves. Northerners rejected this "right" because it would violate the right of a free state to outlaw slavery within its borders. Republicans committed to ending the expansion of slavery were among those opposed to any such right to bring slaves and slavery into the free states and territories. The Dred Scott Supreme Court decision of 1857 bolstered the Southern case within territories, and angered the North.[101] Secondly the South argued that each state had the right to secedeleave the Unionat any time, that the Constitution was a "compact" or agreement among the states. Northerners (including President Buchanan) rejected that notion as opposed to the will of the Founding Fathers who said they were setting up a "perpetual union".[101] Historian James McPherson writes concerning states' rights and other non-slavery explanations: While one or more of these interpretations remain popular among the Sons of Confederate Veterans and other Southern heritage groups, few professional historians now subscribe to them. Of all these interpretations, the state's-rights argument is perhaps the weakest. It fails to ask the question, state's rights for what purpose? State's rights, or sovereignty, was always more a means than an end, an instrument to achieve a certain goal more than a principle.[102]
"Free soil" was a Northern demand that the new lands opening up in the west be available to independent yeoman farmers and not be bought out by rich slave owners who would buy up the best land and work it with slaves, forcing the white farmers onto marginal lands. This was the basis of the Free Soil Party of 1848, and a main theme of the Republican Party.[104] Free Soilers and Republicans demanded a homestead law that would give government land to settlers; it was defeated by Southerners who feared it would attract to the west European immigrants and poor Southern whites.[105]
Tariffs
The Democrats in Congress, controlled by Southerners, wrote the tariff laws in the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s, and kept reducing rates, so that the 1857 rates were the lowest since 1816. The South had no complaints but the low rates angered Northern industrialists and factory workers, especially in Pennsylvania, who demanded protection for their growing iron industry. The Whigs and Republicans complained because they favored high tariffs to stimulate industrial growth, and Republicans called for an increase in tariffs in the 1860 election. The increases were finally
American Civil War enacted in 1861 after Southerners resigned their seats in Congress.[106][107] Historians in recent decades have minimized the tariff issue, noting that few Southerners in 186061 said it was of central importance to them. Some secessionist documents do mention the tariff issue, though not nearly as often as the preservation of slavery.
Election of Lincoln
The election of Lincoln in November 1860 was the final trigger for secession.[108] Efforts at compromise, including the "Corwin Amendment" and the "Crittenden Compromise", failed. Southern leaders feared that Lincoln would stop the expansion of slavery and put it on a course toward extinction. The slave states, which had already become a minority in the House of Representatives, were now facing a future as a perpetual minority in the Senate and Electoral College against an increasingly powerful North. Before Lincoln took office in March 1861, seven slave states had declared their secession and joined to form the Confederacy.
Abraham Lincoln, 16th President (18611865)
The Lincoln Administration, just as the outgoing Buchanan administration before it, refused to turn over Ft. Sumterlocated in the middle of the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina. Jefferson Davis ordered the surrender of the fort. Union Maj. Anderson gave a conditional reply which the Confederate government rejected, and Davis ordered Beauregard to attack the fort before a relief expedition could arrive. After a heavy bombardment on April 1213, 1861 (with no intentional casualties), the fort surrendered. On April 15, Lincoln then called for 75,000 troops from the states to recapture the fort and other federal property.[109] Rather than furnish troops and access for an attack on their fellow southern states, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee and Arkansas elected to join them in secession. North and South the response to Ft. Sumter was an overwhelming demand for war to uphold national honor. Only Kentucky tried to remain neutral. Hundreds of thousands of young men across the land rushed to enlist.[110]
Secession begins
Secession of South Carolina
South Carolina did more to advance nullification and secession than any other Southern state. South Carolina adopted the "Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union" on December 24, 1860. It argued for states' rights for slave owners in the South, but contained a complaint about states' rights in the North in the form of opposition to the Fugitive Slave Act, claiming that Northern states were not fulfilling their federal obligations under the Constitution. All the alleged violations of the rights of Southern states were related to slavery.
Jefferson Davis, the only President of the Confederate States of America (18611865)
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Secession winter
Before Lincoln took office, seven states had declared their secession from the Union. They established a Southern government, the Confederate States of America on February 4, 1861.[111] They took control of federal forts and other properties within their boundaries with little resistance from outgoing President James Buchanan, whose term ended on March 4, 1861. Buchanan said that the Dred Scott The Union: blue, yellow (slave); decision was proof that the South had no reason for secession, and that The Confederacy: brown the Union "was intended to be perpetual", but that "the power by force *territories in light shades; control of Confederate territories disputed of arms to compel a State to remain in the Union" was not among the [112] "enumerated powers granted to Congress". One quarter of the U.S. Armythe entire garrison in Texaswas surrendered in February 1861 to state forces by its commanding general, David E. Twiggs, who then joined the Confederacy. As Southerners resigned their seats in the Senate and the House, Republicans were able to pass bills for projects that had been blocked by Southern Senators before the war, including the Morrill Tariff, land grant colleges (the Morill Act), a Homestead Act, a transcontinental railroad (the Pacific Railway Acts), the National Banking Act and the authorization of United States Notes by the Legal Tender Act of 1862. The Revenue Act of 1861 introduced the income tax to help finance the war.
The Confederacy
Seven Deep South cotton states seceded by February 1861, starting with South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas. These seven states formed the Confederate States of America (February 4, 1861), with Jefferson Davis as president, and a governmental structure closely modeled on the U.S. Constitution. Following the attack on Fort Sumter, President Lincoln called for a volunteer army from each state. Within two months, an additional four Southern slave states declared their secession and joined the Confederacy: Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina and Tennessee. The northwestern portion of Virginia subsequently seceded from Virginia, joining the Union as the new state of West Virginia on June 20, 1863. By the end of 1861, Missouri and Kentucky were effectively under Union control, with Confederate state governments in exile. Among the ordinances of secession passed by the individual states, those of three - Texas, Alabama, and Virginia specifically mentioned the plight of the 'slaveholding states' at the hands of northern abolitionists. The rest make no mention of the slavery issue, and are often brief announcements of the dissolution of ties by the legislatures,[113] however at least four states - South Carolina,[114] Mississippi,[115] Georgia,[116] and Texas[117] - also passed lengthy and detailed explanations of their causes for secession, all of which laid the blame squarely on the influence over the northern states of the movement to abolish slavery, something regarded as a Constitutional right by the slaveholding states.[118]
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Border states
The border states in the Union were West Virginia (which separated from Virginia and became a new state), and four of the five northernmost slave states (Maryland, Delaware, Missouri, and Kentucky). Maryland had numerous pro-Confederate officials who tolerated anti-Union rioting in Baltimore and the burning of bridges. Lincoln responded with martial law and sent in militia units from the North.[122] Before the Confederate government realized what was happening, Lincoln had seized firm control of Maryland and the District of Columbia, by arresting all the prominent secessionists and holding them without trial (they were later released). In Missouri, an elected convention on secession voted decisively to remain within the Union. When pro-Confederate Governor Claiborne F. Jackson called out the state militia, it was attacked by federal forces under General Nathaniel Lyon, who chased the governor and the rest of the State Guard to the southwestern corner of the state. (See also: Missouri secession). In the resulting vacuum, the convention on secession reconvened and took power as the Unionist provisional government of Missouri.[123] Kentucky did not secede; for a time, it declared itself neutral. When Confederate forces entered the state in September 1861, neutrality ended and the state reaffirmed its Union status, while trying to maintain slavery. During a brief invasion by Confederate forces, Confederate sympathizers organized a secession convention, inaugurated a governor, and gained recognition from the Confederacy. The rebel government soon went into exile and never controlled Kentucky.[124]
After Virginia's secession, a Unionist government in Wheeling asked 48 counties to vote on an ordinance to create a new state on October 24, 1861. A voter turnout of 34% approved the statehood bill (96% approving).[125] The inclusion of 24 secessionist counties[126] in the state and the ensuing guerrilla war[127] engaged about 40,000 Federal troops for much of the war.[128] Congress admitted West Virginia to the Union on June 20, 1863. West Virginia provided about 20,00022,000 soldiers to both the Confederacy and the Union.[129] A Unionist secession attempt occurred in East Tennessee, but was suppressed by the Confederacy, which arrested over 3000 men suspected of being loyal to the Union. They were held without trial.[130]
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Overview
Over 10,000 military engagements took place during the war, 40% of them in Virginia and Tennessee.[131] Since separate articles deal with every major battle and many minor ones, this article only gives the broadest outline. For more information see List of American Civil War battles and Military leadership in the American Civil War.
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In April 1861, Lincoln announced the Union blockade of all Southern ports; commercial ships could not get insurance and regular traffic ended. The South blundered in embargoing cotton exports in 1861 before the blockade was effective; by the time they realized the mistake it was too late. "King Cotton" was dead, as the South could export less than 10% of its cotton.[143] British investors built small, fast, steam-driven blockade runners that traded arms and luxuries brought in from England through Bermuda, Cuba and the Bahamas in return for high-priced cotton and tobacco.[144] When the Union Navy seized a blockade runner, the ship and cargo were usually condemned as a Prize of war and sold with the proceeds given to the Navy sailors; the captured crewmen were mostly British and they were simply released. The Southern economy nearly collapsed during the war. Shortages of food and supplies were largely caused by the blockade, the failure of Southern railroads, the loss of control of the main rivers, foraging by Northern armies, and the impressment of crops by Confederate armies. The standard of living fell even as large-scale printing of paper money caused inflation and distrust of the currency. By 1864 the internal food distribution had broken down, leaving cities without enough food and causing bread riots across the Confederacy.[145] On March 8, 1862, the Confederate Navy waged a fight against the Union Navy when the ironclad CSS Virginia attacked the blockade. Against wooden ships, she seemed unstoppable. The next day, however, she had to fight the new Union warship USS Monitor in the Battle of the Ironclads.[146] Their battle ended in a draw. The Confederacy lost the Virginia when the ship was scuttled to prevent capture, and the Union built many copies of Monitor. Lacking the technology to build effective warships, the Confederacy attempted to obtain warships from Britain. Northern technology achieved another breakthrough on April 1011, 1862, when a joint Army-Navy expedition reduced a major masonry fortification at Fort Pulaski guarding Savannah, Georgia. Employing the Parrott rifle cannon made masonry coastal defenses obsolete overnight. The Federals left a small garrison, releasing troops and ships for other blockading operations.[147] The Union victory at the Second Battle of Fort Fisher in January 1865 closed the last useful Southern port and virtually ended blockade running.
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When the Emancipation Proclamation went into effect in January 1863, ex-slaves were energetically recruited by the states, and used to meet the state quotas. States and local communities offered higher and higher cash bonuses for white volunteers. Congress tightened the law in March 1863. Men selected in the draft could provide substitutes or, until mid-1864, pay commutation money. Many eligibles pooled their money to cover the cost of anyone drafted. Families used the substitute provision to select which man should go into the army and which should stay home. There was much evasion and overt resistance to the draft, especially in Catholic areas. The great draft riot in New York City in July 1863 involved Irish immigrants who had been signed up as citizens to swell the machine vote, not realizing it made them liable for the draft.[149] Of the 168,649 men procured for the Union through the draft, 117,986 were substitutes, leaving only 50,663 who had their personal services conscripted.[150] North and South, the draft laws were highly unpopular. An estimated 120,000 men evaded conscription in the North, many of them fleeing to Canada, and another 280,000 Northern soldiers deserted during the war,[151][152] along with at least 100,000 Southerners, or about 10% all together.[153] However, desertion was a very common event in the 19th century; in the peacetime Army about 15% of the soldiers deserted every year.[154] In the South, many men deserted temporarily to take care of their families,[155] then returned to their units.[156] In the North, "bounty jumpers" enlisted to get the generous bonus, deserted, then went back to a second recruiting station under a different name to sign up again for a second bonus; 141 were caught and executed.[157]
Alarmed at the loss, and in an attempt to prevent more slave states from leaving the Union, the U.S. Congress passed the Crittenden-Johnson Resolution on July 25 of that year, which stated that the war was being fought to preserve the Union and not to end slavery. Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan took command of the Union Army of the Potomac on July 26 (he was briefly general-in-chief of all the Union armies, but was subsequently relieved of that post in favor of Maj. Gen. Henry W.
Union soldiers in trenches before storming Marye's Heights at the Second Battle of Fredericksburg, Virginia, May 1863.
American Civil War Halleck), and the war began in earnest in 1862. Upon the strong urging of President Lincoln to begin offensive operations, McClellan attacked Virginia in the spring of 1862 by way of the peninsula between the York River and James River, southeast of Richmond. Although McClellan's army reached the gates of Richmond in the Peninsula Campaign,[160][161][162] Johnston halted his advance at the Battle of Seven Pines, then General Robert E. Lee and top subordinates James Longstreet and Stonewall Jackson[163] defeated McClellan in the Seven Days Battles and forced his retreat. The Northern Virginia Campaign, which included the Second Battle of Bull Run, ended in yet another victory for the South.[164] McClellan resisted General-in-Chief Halleck's orders to send reinforcements to John Pope's Union Army of Virginia, which made it easier for Lee's Confederates to defeat twice the number of combined enemy troops. Emboldened by Second Bull Run, the Confederacy made its first invasion of the North. General Lee led 45,000 men of the Army of Northern Virginia across the Potomac River into Maryland on September 5. Lincoln then restored Pope's troops to McClellan. McClellan and Lee fought at the Battle of Antietam[163] near Sharpsburg, Maryland, on September 17, 1862, the bloodiest single day in United States military history.[165] Lee's army, checked at last, returned to Virginia before McClellan could destroy it. Antietam is considered a Union victory because it halted Lee's invasion of the North and provided an opportunity for Lincoln to announce his Emancipation Proclamation.[166] When the cautious McClellan failed to follow up on Antietam, he was replaced by Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside. Burnside was soon defeated at the Battle of Fredericksburg[167] on December 13, 1862, when over 12,000 Union soldiers were killed or wounded during repeated futile frontal assaults against Marye's Heights. After the battle, Burnside was replaced by Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker.
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Rioters attacking a building on Lexington Avenue during the New York City draft riots of 1863
Hooker, too, proved unable to defeat Lee's army; despite outnumbering the Confederates by more than two to one, he was humiliated in the Battle of Chancellorsville[168] in May 1863. Gen. Stonewall Jackson was mortally wounded by his own men during the battle and subsequently died of complications. Gen. Hooker was replaced by Maj. Gen. George Meade during Lee's second invasion of the North, in June. Meade defeated Lee at the Battle of Gettysburg[169] (July 1 to July 3, 1863). This was the bloodiest battle of the war, and has been called the war's turning point. Pickett's Charge on July 3 is often Confederate dead behind the stone wall of considered the high-water mark of the Confederacy because it signaled Marye's Heights, Fredericksburg, Virginia, killed the collapse of serious Confederate threats of victory. Lee's army during the Battle of Chancellorsville, May 1863 suffered 28,000 casualties (versus Meade's 23,000).[170] However, Lincoln was angry that Meade failed to intercept Lee's retreat, and after Meade's inconclusive fall campaign, Lincoln turned to the Western Theater for new leadership. At the same time the Confederate stronghold of Vicksburg surrendered, giving the Union control of the Mississippi River, permanently isolating the western Confederacy, and producing the new leader Lincoln needed, Ulysses S. Grant.
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The Peacemakers (1868) by George P.A. Healy. Aboard the River Queen, March 28, 1865, General William T. Sherman, General Ulysses S. Grant, Lincoln, and Admiral David Dixon Porter discuss military plans for final months of the Civil War.
Union forces in the East attempted to maneuver past Lee and fought several battles during that phase ("Grant's Overland Campaign") of the Eastern campaign. Grant's battles of attrition at the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor[180] resulted in heavy Union losses, but forced Lee's Confederates to fall back repeatedly. An attempt to outflank Lee from the south failed under Butler, who was trapped inside the Bermuda Hundred river bend. Grant was tenacious and, despite astonishing losses (over 65,000 casualties in seven weeks),[181] kept pressing Lee's Army of Northern Virginia back to Richmond. He pinned down the Confederate army in the Siege of Petersburg, where the two armies engaged in trench warfare for over nine months. Grant finally found a commander, General Philip Sheridan, aggressive enough to prevail in the Valley Campaigns of 1864. Sheridan was initially repelled at the Battle of New Market by former U.S. Vice President and Confederate Gen. John C. Breckinridge. The Battle of New Market would prove to be the Confederacy's last major victory of the war. After redoubling his efforts, Sheridan defeated Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early in a series of battles, including a final decisive defeat at the Battle of Cedar Creek. Sheridan then proceeded to destroy the agricultural base of the Shenandoah Valley,[182] a strategy similar to the tactics Sherman later employed in Georgia.
Generals William T. ShermanSherman, Ulysses S. GrantGrant & Phil SheridanSheridanUS Presidents on US postage stamps#Ulysses S. GrantArmy Issue of 1937
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Meanwhile, Sherman maneuvered from Chattanooga to Atlanta, defeating Confederate Generals Joseph E. Johnston and John Bell Hood along the way. The fall of Atlanta on September 2, 1864, guaranteed the reelection of Lincoln as president.[183] Hood left the Atlanta area to swing around and menace Sherman's supply lines and invade Tennessee in the Franklin-Nashville Campaign.[184] Union Maj. Gen. John Schofield defeated Hood at the Battle of Franklin, and George H. Thomas dealt Hood a massive defeat at the Battle of Nashville, effectively destroying Hood's army. Leaving Atlanta, and his base of supplies, Sherman's army marched Confederate dead of General Ewell's Corps who with an unknown destination, laying waste to about 20% of the farms attacked the Union lines at the Battle of in Georgia in his "March to the Sea". He reached the Atlantic Ocean at Spotsylvania, May 19, 1864. Savannah, Georgia in December 1864. Sherman's army was followed by thousands of freed slaves; there were no major battles along the March. Sherman turned north through South Carolina and North Carolina to approach the Confederate Virginia lines from the south,[185] increasing the pressure on Lee's army. Lee's army, thinned by desertion and casualties, was now much smaller than Grant's. Union forces won a decisive victory at the Battle of Five Forks on April 1, forcing Lee to evacuate Petersburg and Richmond. The Confederate capital fell[186] to the Union XXV Corps, composed of black troops. The remaining Confederate units fled west and after a defeat at Sayler's Creek, it became clear to Robert E. Lee that continued fighting against the United States was both tactically and logistically impossible.
Confederacy surrenders
Lee surrendered his Army of Northern Virginia on April 9, 1865, at the McLean House in the village of Appomattox Court House.[187] In an untraditional gesture and as a sign of Grant's respect and anticipation of peacefully restoring Confederate states to the Union, Lee was permitted to keep his sword and his horse, Traveller. On April 14, 1865, President Lincoln was shot by John Wilkes Booth, a Southern sympathizer. Lincoln died early the next morning, and Andrew Johnson became Map of Confederate territory losses year by year president. Meanwhile, Confederate forces across the South surrendered as news of Lee's surrender reached them.[188] President Johnson officially declared a virtual end to the insurrection on May 9, 1865.[189] On June 23, 1865, Cherokee leader Stand Watie was the last Confederate general to surrender his forces.[190]
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Since the Emancipation Proclamation was based on the President's war powers, it only included territory held by Confederates at the time. However, the Proclamation became a symbol of the Union's growing commitment to add emancipation to the Union's definition of liberty.[205] Lincoln also played a leading role in getting Congress to vote for the Thirteenth Amendment,[206] which made emancipation universal and permanent.
Contrabandsan escaped slaves who fled to the Enslaved African Americans did not wait for Lincoln's action before Union Army for freedom and protection, ca. escaping and seeking freedom behind Union lines. From early years of 1862. the war, hundreds of thousands of African Americans escaped to Union lines, especially in occupied areas like Nashville, Norfolk and the Hampton Roads region in 1862, Tennessee from 1862 on, the line of Sherman's march, etc. So many African Americans fled to Union lines that commanders created camps and schools for them, where both adults and children learned to read and write.
The American Missionary Association entered the war effort by sending teachers south to such contraband camps, for instance establishing schools in Norfolk and on nearby plantations. In addition, approximately 180,000 or more African-American men served as soldiers and sailors with Union troops. Most of those were escaped slaves. Probably the most prominent of these African-American soldiers is the 54th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry. Confederates enslaved captured black Union soldiers, and black soldiers especially were shot when trying to surrender at the Fort Pillow Massacre.[207] This led to a breakdown of the prisoner and mail exchange program[208] and the growth of prison camps such as Andersonville prison in Georgia,[209] where almost 13,000 Union prisoners of war died of starvation and disease.[210] After the war, Henry Wirz, the prison's commandant, was tried for war crimes and executed. In spite of the South's shortage of soldiers, most Southern leaders until 1865 opposed enlisting slaves. They used them as laborers to support the war effort. As Howell Cobb said, "If slaves will make good soldiers our whole theory of slavery is wrong." Confederate generals Patrick Cleburne and Robert E. Lee argued in favor of arming blacks late in the war, and Jefferson Davis was eventually persuaded to support plans for arming slaves to avoid military defeat. The Confederacy surrendered at Appomattox before this plan could be implemented.[211] Historian John D. Winters, in The Civil War in Louisiana (1963), referred to the exhilaration of the slaves when the Union Army came through Louisiana: "As the troops moved up to Alexandria, the Negroes crowded the roadsides to watch the passing army. They were 'all frantic with joy, some weeping, some blessing, and some dancing in the exuberance of their emotions.' All of the Negroes were attracted by the pageantry and excitement of the army. Others cheered because they anticipated the freedom to plunder and to do as they pleased now that the Federal troops were there."[212]
The Emancipation Proclamation[213] greatly reduced the Confederacy's hope of getting aid from Britain or France. Lincoln's moderate approach succeeded in getting border states, War Democrats and emancipated slaves fighting on the same side for the Union. The Union-controlled border states (Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, Delaware and West Virginia) were not covered by the Emancipation Proclamation. All abolished slavery on their own, except Kentucky and Delaware.[214]
Union Army soldier on his release from Andersonville prison in May, 1865.
American Civil War The great majority of the 4million slaves were freed by the Emancipation Proclamation, as Union armies moved south. The 13th amendment,[215] ratified December 6, 1865, finally made slavery illegal everywhere in the United States, thus freeing the remaining slaves65,000 in Kentucky (as of 1865),[216] 1,800 in Delaware, and 18 in New Jersey as of 1860.[217] Historian Stephen Oates said that many myths surround Lincoln: "man of the people", "true Christian", "arch villain" and racist. The belief that Lincoln was racist was caused by an incomplete picture of Lincoln, such as focusing on only selective quoting of statements Lincoln made to gain the support of the border states and Northern Democrats, and ignoring the many things he said against slavery, and the military and political context within which such statements were made. Oates said that Lincoln's letter to Horace Greeley has been "persistently misunderstood and misrepresented" for such reasons.[218]
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Crewmembers of USS Wissahickon by the ship's 11-inch Dahlgren gun, circa 1863
Charles Francis Adams proved particularly adept as minister to Britain for the U.S. and Britain was reluctant to boldly challenge the blockade. The Confederacy purchased several warships from commercial ship builders in Britain. The most famous, the CSS Alabama, did considerable damage and led to serious postwar disputes. However, public opinion against slavery created a political liability for European politicians, especially in Britain (who had herself abolished slavery in her own colonies in 1834).[223] War loomed in late 1861 between the U.S. and Britain over the Trent Affair, involving the U.S. Navy's boarding of a British mail steamer to seize two Confederate diplomats. However, London and Washington were able to smooth over the problem after Lincoln released the two. In 1862, the British considered mediationthough even such an offer would have risked war with the U.S. Lord Palmerston reportedly read Uncle Toms Cabin three times when deciding on this.[223] The Union victory in the Battle of Antietam caused them to delay this decision. The Emancipation Proclamation over time would reinforce the political liability of supporting the Confederacy. Despite sympathy for the Confederacy, France's own seizure of Mexico ultimately deterred them from war with the Union. Confederate offers
American Civil War late in the war to end slavery in return for diplomatic recognition were not seriously considered by London or Paris. After 1863, the Polish revolt against Russia further distracted the European powers, and ensured that they would continue to remain neutral.[224]
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21788 miles (unknown operator: u'strong' km) (71%) 8838 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) (29%) 90% 97% Negligible Negligible 30% 10% 3% 4,500,000 300,000 70%
Historians have debated whether the Confederacy could have won the war. Most scholars, such as James McPherson, argue that Confederate victory was at least possible.[226] McPherson argues that the Norths advantage in population and resources made Northern victory likely but not guaranteed. He also argues that if the Confederacy had fought using unconventional tactics, they would have more easily been able to hold out long enough to exhaust the Union.[227]
Andersonville National Cemetery is the final resting place for the Union prisoners who perished while being held at Camp Sumter.
Confederates did not need to invade and hold enemy territory to win, but only needed to fight a defensive war to convince the North that the cost of winning was too high. The North needed to conquer and hold vast stretches of enemy territory and defeat Confederate armies to
win.[227] Some scholars, such as those of the Lost Cause tradition, argue that the Union held an insurmountable long-term advantage over the Confederacy in terms of industrial strength and population. Confederate actions, they argue, only delayed defeat. Civil War historian Shelby Foote expressed this view succinctly: "I think that the North fought that war with one hand behind its back...If there had been more Southern victories, and a lot more, the North simply would have brought that other hand out from behind its back. I don't think the South ever had a chance to win that War."[228] The Confederacy sought to win independence by out-lasting Lincoln; however, after Atlanta fell and Lincoln defeated McClellan in the election of 1864, all hope for a political victory for the South ended. At that point, Lincoln had succeeded in getting the support of the border states, War Democrats, emancipated slaves, Britain, and France. By defeating the Democrats and McClellan, he also defeated the Copperheads and their peace platform.[229] Also important were Lincoln's eloquence in rationalizing the national purpose and his skill in keeping the border states committed to the Union cause. Although Lincoln's approach to emancipation was slow, the Emancipation
American Civil War Proclamation was an effective use of the President's war powers.[230] The Confederate government failed in its attempt to get Europe involved in the war militarily, particularly the United Kingdom and France. Southern leaders needed to get European powers to help break up the blockade the Union had created around the Southern ports and cities. Lincoln's naval blockade was 95% effective at stopping trade goods; as a result, imports and exports to the South declined significantly. The abundance of European cotton and the United Kingdom's hostility to the institution of slavery, along with Lincoln's Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico naval blockades, severely decreased any chance that either the United Kingdom or France would enter the war. The more industrialized economy of the North aided in the production of arms, munitions and supplies, as well as finances and transportation. The table shows the relative advantage of the Union over the Confederate States of America (CSA) at the start of the war. The advantages widened rapidly during the war, as the Northern economy grew, and Confederate territory shrank and its economy weakened. The Union population was 22million and the South 9million in 1861. The Southern population included more than 3.5million slaves and about 5.5million whites, thus leaving the South's white population outnumbered by a ratio of more than four to one.[231] The disparity grew as the Union controlled an increasing amount of southern territory with garrisons, and cut off the trans-Mississippi part of the Confederacy. The Union at the start controlled over 80% of the shipyards, steamships, riverboats, and the Navy. It augmented these by a massive shipbuilding program. This enabled the Union to control the river systems and to blockade the entire southern coastline.[232] Excellent railroad links between Union cities allowed for the quick and cheap movement of troops and supplies. Transportation was much slower and more difficult in the South, which was unable to augment its much smaller rail system, repair damage, or even perform routine Collecting bones after the Battle of Cold Harbor. maintenance.[233] The failure of Davis to maintain positive and April 1865. productive relationships with state governors (especially Governor Joseph E. Brown of Georgia and Governor Zebulon Baird Vance of North Carolina) damaged his ability to draw on regional resources.[234] The Confederacy's "King Cotton" misperception of the world economy led to bad diplomacy, such as the refusal to ship cotton before the blockade started.[235] The Emancipation Proclamation enabled African-Americans, both free blacks and escaped slaves, to join the Union Army. About 190,000 volunteered, further enhancing the numerical advantage the Union armies enjoyed over the Confederates, who did not dare emulate the equivalent manpower source for fear of fundamentally undermining the legitimacy of slavery. Emancipated slaves mostly handled garrison duties, and fought numerous battles in 186465.[236] European immigrants joined the Union Army in large numbers, including 177,000 born in Germany and 144,000 born in Ireland.[237] The railroad industry became the nation's largest employer outside of agriculture. The American Civil War was followed by a boom in railroad construction, which contributed to the Panic of 1873.[238][239]
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Results
Slavery for the Confederacy's 3.5 million blacks effectively ended when Union armies arrived; they were nearly all freed by the Emancipation Proclamation. Slaves in the border states and those located in some former Confederate territory occupied prior to the Emancipation Proclamation were freed by state action or (on December 18, 1865) by the Thirteenth Amendment. The full restoration of the Union was the work of a highly contentious postwar era known as Reconstruction. The war produced about 1,030,000 casualties (3% of the population), including about 620,000 soldier deathstwo-thirds by disease.[240] Binghamton University historian J. David Hacker believes the number of soldier deaths was approximately 750,000, 20% higher than traditionally estimated, and possibly as high as 850,000.[241][242] The war accounted for roughly as many American deaths as all American deaths in other U.S. wars combined.[243]
The causes of the war, the reasons for its outcome, and even the name of the war itself are subjects of lingering contention today. Based on 1860 census figures, 8% of all white males aged 13 to 43 died in the war, including 6% in the North and 18% in the South.[244][245] About 56,000 soldiers died in prisons during the Civil War.[246] An estimated 60,000 men lost limbs in the war.[247] One reason for the high number of battle deaths during the war was the use of Napoleonic tactics, such as charging. With the advent of more accurate rifled barrels, Mini balls and (near the end of the war for the Union army) repeating firearms such as the Spencer repeating rifle, soldiers were mowed down when standing in lines in the open. This led to the adoption of trench warfare, a style of fighting that defined the better part of World War I. The war destroyed much of the wealth that had existed in the South. Income per person in the South dropped to less than 40% than that of the North, a condition which lasted until well into the 20th century. Southern influence in the US federal government, previously considerable, was greatly diminished until the latter half of the 20th century.[248] Reconstruction Reconstruction began during the war (and continued to 1877) in an effort to solve the issues caused by reunion, specifically the legal status of the 11 breakaway states, the Confederate leadership, and the freedmen. Northern leaders during the war agreed that victory would require more than the end of fighting. It had to encompass the two war goals: secession had to be repudiated and all forms of slavery had to be eliminated. Lincoln and the Radical Republicans disagreed sharply on the criteria for these goals. They also disagreed on the degree of federal control that should be imposed on the South, and the process by which Southern states should be reintegrated into the Union. These disputes became central to the political debates after the Confederacy collapsed.
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Monument in honor of the Grand Army of the Republic, organized after the war.
150th anniversary
The year 2011 included the American Civil War's 150th anniversary. Many in the South attempted to incorporate both black history and white perspectives. A Harris Poll given in March 2011 suggested that Americans were still uniquely divided over the results and appropriate memorials to acknowledge the occasion.[252] While traditionally American films of the Civil War feature "brother versus brother" themes[253] film treatments of the war are evolving to include African American characters. Benard Simelton, president of the Alabama NAACP, said celebrating the Civil War is like celebrating the "Holocaust". In reference to slavery, Simelton said that black "rights were taken away" and that blacks "were treated as less than human beings." National Park historian Bob Sutton said that slavery was the "principal cause" of the war. Sutton also claimed that the issue of state rights was incorporated by the Confederacy as a justification for the war in order to get recognition from Britain. Sutton went on to mention that during the 100th anniversary of the Civil War white southerners focused on the genius of southern generals, rather than slavery. In Virginia during the fall of 2010, a conference took place that addressed the slavery issue. During November 2010, black Civil War reenactors from around the country participated in a parade at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.[254]
Hollywood
Hollywood's take on the war has been especially influential in shaping public memory, as seen in such films as "Birth of a Nation," "Gone with the Wind" and "Glory".[255] Filmography Andersonville (1996) An Occurence at Owl Bridge (1962) The Battle of Gettysburg (1913) The Birth of a Nation (1915) The Blue and the Gray (1982 TV series) The Civil War (1990) Civil War Minutes: Confederate (2007) Civil War Minutes: Union (2001) Cold Mountain (2003)
The Colt (2005) Dances with Wolves (1990) Dog Jack (2010)
American Civil War Drums in the Deep South (1951) The General (1926) Gettysburg (1993) Glory (1989) Gods and Generals (2003) Gone with the Wind (1939) The Good The Bad and The Ugly (1967) The Horse Soldiers (1959) The Hunley (1999) The Last Confederate: The Story of Robert Adams (2007) Major Dundee (1965) North and South (TV miniseries) Trilogy (1985, 1986, 1994) The Outlaw Josey Wales (1976) Pharaoh's Army (1995) Raintree County (1957) The Red Badge of Courage (1951) Ride with the Devil (1999) The Shadow Riders (1982) Shenandoah (1965) Sommersby (1993) "Wicked Spring" (2002)
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Notes
[1] Howard Jones, Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom: The Union and Slavery in the Diplomacy of the Civil War (1999) p. 154. [2] Frank J. Williams, "Doing Less and Doing More: The President and the ProclamationLegally, Militarily and Politically," in Harold Holzer, ed. The Emancipation Proclamation (2006) pp. 745. [3] (http:/ / www. binghamton. edu/ inside/ index. php/ inside/ story/ history-professor-civil-war-death-toll-has-been-underestimated) [4] " Killing ground: photographs of the Civil War and the changing American landscape (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=YpAuHGkuIe0C)". John Huddleston (2002). Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN 978-0-8018-6773-6. [5] James C. Bradford, A companion to American military history (2010) vol. 1 p. 101 [6] Foner, Eric (1981). Politics and Ideology in the Age of the Civil War (http:/ / books. google. com/ ?id=rQSYk-LWTxcC). ISBN978-0-19-502926-0. . Retrieved 2012-04-20. [7] Foner, Eric. "The Fiery Trial: Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery" (2011) p 74. [8] McPherson pp 5068 [9] McPherson p 686 [10] Christopher J. Olsen (2002). Political Culture and Secession in Mississippi: Masculinity, Honor, and the Antiparty Tradition, 1830-1860 (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=RrBb2ThDuCkC& pg=PA237). Oxford University Press. p.237. . Retrieved 2012-04-20. footnote 33 [11] Lacy Ford (2011). A Companion to the Civil War and Reconstruction (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=xeQAERwie80C& pg=PT28). Wiley. p.28. . Retrieved 2012-04-20. [12] Quoted in Eric Foner, The Fiery Trial: Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery (2010) p. 100 [13] Glenn M. Linden (2001). Voices from the Gathering Storm: The Coming of the American Civil War (http:/ / books. google. com/ ?id=F20ZsA5ZeeEC& pg=PA184). United States: Rowman & Littlefield. p.236. ISBN978-0-8420-2999-5. . "Prevent, as far as possible, any of our friends from demoralizing themselves, and our cause, by entertaining propositions for compromise of any sort, on slavery extension. There is no possible compromise upon it, but which puts us under again, and leaves all our work to do over again. Whether it be a Mo. Line, or Eli Thayer's Pop. Sov. It is all the same. Let either be done, & immediately filibustering and extending slavery recommences. On that point hold firm, as with a chain of steel. Abraham Lincoln to Elihu B. Washburne, December 13, 1860" [14] Let there be no compromise on the question of extending slavery. If there be, all our labor is lost, and, ere long, must be done again. The dangerous groundthat into which some of our friends have a hankering to runis Pop. Sov. Have none of it. Stand firm. The tug has to come, & better now, than any time hereafter. Abraham Lincoln to Lyman Trumbull, December 10, 1860. [15] Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War (2nd ed. 1995) pp 31112 [16] Cited in Allen C. Guelzo, Lincoln: a very short introduction (Oxford U.P., 2009) p. 61 [17] Eugene D. Genovese, The Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society of the Slave South (Wesleyan U.P,. 1988) p 244
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References
Overviews
Beringer, Richard E., Archer Jones, and Herman Hattaway, Why the South Lost the Civil War (1986) influential analysis of factors; The Elements of Confederate Defeat: Nationalism, War Aims, and Religion (1988), abridged version Bestor, Arthur. 1964. The American Civil War as a Constitutional Crisis. (American Historical Review, LXIX, No. 2: January 1964) in Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction Ed. Irwin Unger. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. New York . 1970. Catton, Bruce, The Civil War, American Heritage, 1960, ISBN 978-0-8281-0305-3, illustrated narrative Davis, William C. The Imperiled Union, 18611865 3v (1983) Donald, David et al. The Civil War and Reconstruction (latest edition 2001); 700 page survey Eicher, David J., The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War, (2001), ISBN 978-0-684-84944-7. Fellman, Michael et al. This Terrible War: The Civil War and its Aftermath (2nd ed. 2007), 544 page survey Guelzo, Allen C. 2004. Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation: the end of slavery in America. Simon & Schuster, New York Foote, Shelby. The Civil War: A Narrative (3 volumes), (1974), ISBN 978-0-394-74913-6. Highly detailed military narrative covering all fronts Holt, Michael F. 2004. The fate of their country: politicians, slavery extension, and the coming of the Civil War Hill and Wang, New York. Katcher, Philip. The History of the American Civil War 18615, (2000), ISBN 978-0-600-60778-6. Detailed analysis of each battle with introduction and background Krannawitter, Thomas L. 2008. Vindicating Lincoln: Defending the Politics of Our Greatest President. Rowman & Littlefield, London. McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (1988), 900 page survey of all aspects of the war; Pulitzer prize McPherson, James M. This Mighty Scourge: Perspectives on the Civil War. Oxford University Press. New York. McPherson, James M. Ordeal By Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction (2nd ed 1992), textbook
American Civil War Nevins, Allan. Ordeal of the Union, an 8-volume set (19471971). the most detailed political, economic and military narrative; by Pulitzer Prize winner 1. Fruits of Manifest Destiny, 18471852; 2. A House Dividing, 18521857; 3. Douglas, Buchanan, and Party Chaos, 18571859; 4. Prologue to Civil War, 18591861; vol. 58 have the series title "War for the Union"; 5. The Improvised War, 18611862; 6. War Becomes Revolution, 18621863; 7. The Organized War, 18631864; 8. The Organized War to Victory, 18641865 Rhodes, James Ford. A History of the Civil War, 18611865 (1918), Pulitzer Prize; a short version of his 5-volume history Miller, William L. 2009. Abraham Lincoln: The Duty of a Statesman Vintage Books. Russell, Robert R. 1966. Constitutional Doctrines with Regard to Slavery in Territories in Journal of Southern History, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Nov. 1966), pp.466486. doi=10.2307/2204926 |jstor=2204926 Stampp, Kenneth M. 1990. America in 1857: a nation on the brink. Oxford University Press, New York. Ward, Geoffrey C. The Civil War (1990), based on PBS series by Ken Burns; visual emphasis Weigley, Russell Frank. A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 18611865 (2004); primarily military
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Biographies
American National Biography 24 vol (1999), essays by scholars on all major figures; online and hardcover editions at many libraries (http://www.anb.org/aboutanb.html) McHenry, Robert ed. Webster's American Military Biographies (1978) Warner, Ezra J., Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders, (1964), ISBN 978-0-8071-0822-2 Warner, Ezra J., Generals in Gray: Lives of the Confederate Commanders, (1959), ISBN 978-0-8071-0823-9 Soldiers Berlin, Ira, et al., eds. Freedom's Soldiers: The Black Military Experience in the Civil War (1998) Glatthaar, Joseph T. General Lee's Army: From Victory to Collapse (2009) Hess, Earl J. The Union Soldier in Battle: Enduring the Ordeal of Combat (1997) McPherson, James. For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War (1998) Power, J. Tracy. Lee's Miserables: Life in the Army of Northern Virginia from the Wilderness to Appomattox (2002) Wiley, Bell Irvin. The Life of Johnny Reb: The Common Soldier of the Confederacy (1962) (ISBN 978-0-8071-0475-0) Wiley, Bell Irvin. Life of Billy Yank: The Common Soldier of the Union (1952) (ISBN 978-0-8071-0476-7)
American Civil War Savage, Kirk, Standing Soldiers, Kneeling Slaves: Race, War, and Monument in Nineteenth-Century America (http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/36470304). Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997. (The definitive book on Civil War monuments.) Tulloch, Hugh. The Debate on the American Civil War Era (1999), historiography Wagner, Margaret E. Gary W. Gallagher, and Paul Finkelman, eds. The Library of Congress Civil War Desk Reference (2002) Woodworth, Steven E. ed. American Civil War: A Handbook of Literature and Research (1996) (ISBN 978-0-313-29019-0), 750 pages of historiography and bibliography online edition (http://www.questia.com/ read/14877569?title=The American Civil War: A Handbook of Literature and Research)
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Primary sources
Commager, Henry Steele (ed.). The Blue and the Gray. The Story of the Civil War as Told by Participants. (1950), excerpts from primary sources Hesseltine, William B. ed.; The Tragic Conflict: The Civil War and Reconstruction (1962), excerpts from primary sources Simpson, Brooks D. et al. eds. The Civil War: The First Year Told by Those Who Lived It (Library of America 2011) 840pp, with 120 documents from 1861 online reviews (http://www.amazon.com/ Civil-War-First-Library-America/dp/1598530887/)
Further reading
Gugliotta, Guy. New Estimate Raises Civil War Death Toll (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/science/ civil-war-toll-up-by-20-percent-in-new-estimate.html?ref=science&pagewanted=all), The New York Times, April 3, 2012, pg. D1 (of the New York edition), and April 2, 2012 on NYTimes.com. Retrieved 2012-04-03 online.
External links
American Civil War (http://www.dmoz.org/Society/History/By_Region/North_America/United_States/ Wars/Civil_War//) at the Open Directory Project Civil War photos (http://www.archives.gov/research/civil-war/photos/index.html) at the National Archives View images (http://www.loc.gov/pictures/search?st=grid&c=100&co=cwp) from the Civil War Photographs Collection (http://www.loc.gov/pictures/collection/cwp/) at the Library of Congress Civil War Trust (http://www.civilwar.org/) Civil War Era Digital Collection at Gettysburg College (http://www.gettysburg.edu/library/gettdigital/ civil_war/civilwar.htm) This collection contains digital images of political cartoons, personal papers, pamphlets, maps, paintings and photographs from the Civil War Era held in Special Collections at Gettysburg College. Civil War 150 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/civil-war) Washington Post interactive website on 150th Anniversary of the American Civil War. Civil War in the American South (http://www.american-south.org/) An Association of Southeastern Research Libraries (ASERL) portal with links to almost 9,000 digitized Civil War-era itemsbooks, pamphlets, broadsides, letters, maps, personal papers, and manuscriptsheld at ASERL member libraries The Civil War (http://www.sonofthesouth.net/) site with 7,000 pages, including the complete run of Harper's Weekly newspapers from the Civil War The short film A HOUSE DIVIDED (1960) (http://www.archive.org/details/gov.archives.arc.54756) is available for free download at the Internet Archive Civil War Living History Reenactments (videos) (http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=U.S.+ Civil+War+reenactments&oq=U.S.+Civil+War+reenactments&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&gs_l=youtube.12...0.
American Civil War 0.0.855.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0..0.0...0.0.U.S.) West Point Atlas of Civil War Battles (http://www.loc.gov/item/map66001088)
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Abraham Lincoln won the 1860 presidential election without being on the ballot in ten of the Southern states. His victory triggered declarations of secession by seven slave states of the Deep South, and their formation of the Confederate States of America, even before Lincoln took office. Nationalists (in the North and elsewhere) refused to recognize the secessions, nor did any foreign government, and the U.S. government in Washington refused to abandon its forts that were in territory claimed by the Confederacy. War began in April 1861 when Confederates attacked Fort Sumter, a major U.S. fortress in South Carolina, the state that had been the first to declare its independence. As a panel of historians emphasized in 2011, "while slavery and its various and multifaceted discontents were the primary cause of disunion, it was disunion itself that sparked the war."[1] States' rights and the tariff issue became entangled in the slavery issue, and were intensified by it.[2] Other important factors were party politics, abolitionism, Southern nationalism, Northern nationalism, expansionism, sectionalism, economics and modernization in the Antebellum period. The United States had become a nation of two distinct regions. The free states in New England, the Northeast, and the Midwest[3] had a rapidly-growing economy based on family farms, industry, mining, commerce and transportation, with a large and rapidly growing urban population. Their growth was fed by a high birth rate and large numbers of European immigrants, especially Irish, British and German. The South was dominated by a settled plantation system based on slavery. There was some rapid growth taking place in the Southwest, (e.g., Texas), based on high birth rates and high migration from the Southeast, but it had a much lower immigration rate from Europe. The South also had fewer large cities, and little manufacturing except in border areas. Slave owners controlled politics and economics, though about 70% of Southern whites owned no slaves and usually were engaged in subsistence agriculture. Overall, the Northern population was growing much more quickly than the Southern population, which made it increasingly difficult for the South to continue to influence the national government. By the time of the 1860 election, the heavily agricultural southern states as a group had fewer Electoral College votes than the rapidly industrializing northern states. Lincoln was able to win the 1860 Presidential election without even being on the ballot in ten Southern states. Southerners felt a loss of federal concern for Southern pro-slavery political demands, and continued domination of the Federal government by "Slaveocracy" was on the wane. This political calculus
The Battle of Fort Sumter was the opening battle in a conflict that had been brewing for decades.
Origins of the American Civil War provided a very real basis for Southerners' worry about the relative political decline of their region due to the North growing much faster in terms of population and industrial output. In the interest of maintaining unity, politicians had mostly moderated opposition to slavery, resulting in numerous compromises such as the Missouri Compromise of 1820. After the Mexican-American War, the issue of slavery in the new territories led to the Compromise of 1850. While the compromise averted an immediate political crisis, it did not permanently resolve the issue of the Slave power (the power of slaveholders to control the national government on the slavery issue). Part of the 1850 compromise was the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, requiring that Northerners assist Southerners in reclaiming fugitive slaves, which many Northerners found to be extremely offensive. Amid the emergence of increasingly virulent and hostile sectional ideologies in national politics, the collapse of the old Second Party System in the 1850s hampered efforts of the politicians to reach yet one more compromise. The compromise that was reached (the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act) outraged too many northerners, and led to the formation of the Republican Party, the first major party with no appeal in the South. The industrializing North and agrarian Midwest became committed to the economic ethos of free-labor industrial capitalism. Arguments that slavery was undesirable for the nation had long existed, and early in U.S. history were made even by some prominent Southerners. After 1840, abolitionists denounced slavery as not only a social evil but a moral wrong. Many Northerners, especially leaders of the new Republican Party, considered slavery a great national evil and believed that a small number of Southern owners of large plantations controlled the national government with the goal of spreading that evil. Southern defenders of slavery, for their part, increasingly came to contend that blacks actually benefited from slavery, an assertion that alienated Northerners even further.
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Background
Early Republic
At the time of the American Revolution, the institution of slavery was firmly established in the American colonies. It was most important in the six southern states from Maryland to Georgia, but the total of a half million slaves were spread out through all of the colonies. In the South 40% of the population was made up of slaves, and as Americans moved into Kentucky and the rest of the southwest fully one-sixth of the settlers were slaves. By the end of the war, the New England states provided most of the American ships that were used in the foreign slave trade while most of their customers were in Georgia and the Carolinas.[4] During this time many Americans found it difficult to reconcile slavery with their interpretation of Christianity and the lofty sentiments that flowed from the Declaration of Independence. A small antislavery movement, led by the Quakers, had some impact in the 1780s and by the late 1780s all of the states except for Georgia had placed some restrictions on their participation in slave trafficking. Still, no serious national political movement against slavery developed, largely due to the overriding concern over achieving national unity.[5] When the Constitutional Convention met, slavery was the one issue "that left the least possibility of compromise, the one that would most pit morality against pragmatism.[6] In the end, while many would take comfort in the fact that the word slavery never occurs in the Constitution, critics note that the three-fifths clause provided slaveholders with extra representatives in Congress, the requirement of the federal government to suppress domestic violence would dedicate national resources to defending against slave revolts, a twenty year delay in banning the import of slaves allowed the South to fortify its labor needs, and the amendment process made the national abolition of slavery very unlikely in the foreseeable future.[7] With the outlawing of the African slave trade on January 1, 1808 many Americans felt that the slavery issue was resolved.[8] Any national discussion that might have continued over slavery was drowned out by the years of trade embargoes, maritime competition with Great Britain and France, and, finally, the War of 1812. The one exception to this quiet regarding slavery was the New Englanders' association of their frustration with the war with their resentment of the three-fifths clause that seemed to allow the South to dominate national politics.[9]
Origins of the American Civil War In the aftermath of the American Revolution, the northern states (north of the Mason-Dixon Line separating Pennsylvania and Maryland) abolished slavery by 1804. In the 1787 Northwest Ordinance, Congress (still under the Articles of Confederation) barred slavery from the Mid-Western territory north of the Ohio River, but when the U.S. Congress organized the southern territories acquired through the Louisiana Purchase, the ban on slavery was omitted.
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Missouri Compromise
In 1819 Congressman James Tallmadge, Jr. of New York initiated an uproar in the South when he proposed two amendments to a bill admitting Missouri to the Union as a free state. The first barred slaves from being moved to Missouri, and the second would free all Missouri slaves born after admission to the Union at age 25.[10] With the admission of Alabama as a slave state in 1819, the U.S. was equally divided with 11 slave states and 11 free states. The admission of the new state of Missouri as a slave state would give the slave states a majority in the Senate; the Tallmadge Amendment would give the free states a majority. The Tallmadge amendments passed the House of Representatives but failed in the Senate when five Northern Senators voted with all the Southern senators.[11] The question was now the admission of Missouri as a slave state, and many leaders shared Thomas Jefferson's fear of a crisis over slaverya fear that Jefferson described as "a fire bell in the night". The crisis was solved by the Compromise of 1820, which admitted Maine to the Union as a free state at the same time that Missouri was admitted as a slave state. The Compromise also banned slavery in the Louisiana Purchase territory north and west of the state of Missouri along the line of 3630. The Missouri Compromise quieted the issue until its limitations on slavery were repealed by the Kansas Nebraska Act of 1854.[12] In the South, the Missouri crisis reawakened old fears that a strong federal government could be a fatal threat to slavery. The Jeffersonian coalition that united southern planters and northern farmers, mechanics and artisans in opposition to the threat presented by the Federalist Party had started to dissolve after the War of 1812.[13] It was not until the Missouri crisis that Americans became aware of the political possibilities of a sectional attack on slavery, and it was not until the mass politics of the Jackson Administration that this type of organization around this issue became practical.[14]
Nullification Crisis
The American System, advocated by Henry Clay in Congress and supported by many nationalist supporters of the War of 1812 such as John C. Calhoun, was a program for rapid economic modernization featuring protective tariffs, internal improvements at Federal expense, and a national bank. The purpose was to develop American industry and international commerce. Since iron, coal, and water power were mainly in the North, this tax plan was doomed to cause rancor in the South where economies were agriculture-based.[15][16] Southerners claimed it demonstrated favoritism toward the North.[17][18] The nation suffered an economic downturn throughout the 1820s, and South Carolina was particularly affected. The highly protective Tariff of 1828 (also called the "Tariff of Abominations"), designed to protect American industry by taxing imported manufactured goods, was enacted into law during the last year of the presidency of John Quincy Adams. Opposed in the South and parts of New England, the expectation of the tariffs opponents was that with the election of Andrew Jackson the tariff would be significantly reduced.[19] By 1828 South Carolina state politics increasingly organized around the tariff issue. When the Jackson administration failed to take any actions to address their concerns, the most radical faction in the state began to advocate that the state declare the tariff null and void within South Carolina. In Washington, an open split on the issue occurred between Jackson and his vice-president John C. Calhoun, the most effective proponent of the constitutional theory of state nullification through his 1828 "South Carolina Exposition and Protest".[20] Congress enacted a new tariff in 1832, but it offered the state little relief, resulting in the most dangerous sectional crisis since the Union was formed. Some militant South Carolinians even hinted at withdrawing from the Union in response. The newly-elected South Carolina legislature then quickly called for the election of delegates to a state
Origins of the American Civil War convention. Once assembled, the convention voted to declare null and void the tariffs of 1828 and 1832 within the state. President Andrew Jackson responded firmly, declaring nullification an act of treason. He then took steps to strengthen federal forts in the state. Violence seemed a real possibility early in 1833 as Jacksonians in Congress introduced a "Force Bill" authorizing the President to use the Federal army and navy in order to enforce acts of Congress. No other state had come forward to support South Carolina, and the state itself was divided on willingness to continue the showdown with the Federal government. The crisis ended when Clay and Calhoun worked to devise a compromise tariff. Both sides later claimed victory. Calhoun and his supporters in South Carolina claimed a victory for nullification, insisting that it had forced the revision of the tariff. Jackson's followers, however, saw the episode as a demonstration that no single state could assert its rights by independent action. Calhoun, in turn, devoted his efforts to building up a sense of Southern solidarity so that when another standoff should come, the whole section might be prepared to act as a bloc in resisting the federal government. As early as 1830, in the midst of the crisis, Calhoun identified the right to own slaves as the chief southern minority right being threatened: I consider the tariff act as the occasion, rather than the real cause of the present unhappy state of things. The truth can no longer be disguised, that the peculiar domestick [sic] institution of the Southern States and the consequent direction which that and her soil have given to her industry, has placed them in regard to taxation and appropriations in opposite relation to the majority of the Union, against the danger of which, if there be no protective power in the reserved rights of the states they must in the end be forced to rebel, or, submit to have their paramount interests sacrificed, their domestic institutions subordinated by Colonization and other schemes, and themselves and children reduced to wretchedness.[21][22] On May 1, 1833, Jackson wrote of this idea, "the tariff was only the pretext, and disunion and southern confederacy the real object. The next pretext will be the negro, or slavery question."[23] The issue appeared again after 1842's Black Tariff. A period of relative free trade after 1846's Walker Tariff reduction followed until 1860, when the protectionist Morrill Tariff was introduced by the Republicans, fueling Southern anti-tariff sentiments once again.
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Origins of the American Civil War Since the original gag was a resolution, not a standing House Rule, it had to be renewed every session and the Adams' faction often gained the floor before the gag could be imposed. However in January 1840, the House of Representatives passed the Twenty-first Rule, which prohibited even the reception of anti-slavery petitions and was a standing House rule. Now the pro-petition forces focused on trying to revoke a standing rule. The Rule raised serious doubts about its constitutionality and had less support than the original Pinckney gag, passing only by 114 to 108. Throughout the gag period, Adams' "superior talent in using and abusing parliamentary rules" and skill in baiting his enemies into making mistakes, enabled him to evade the rule and debate the slavery issues. The gag rule was finally rescinded on December 3, 1844 by a strongly sectional vote of 108 to 80, all the Northern and four Southern Whigs voting for repeal, along with 55 of the 71 Northern Democrats.[29]
39
Although a minority of free Southerners owned slaves (and, in turn, a minority of similar proportion within these slaveholders who owned the vast majority of slaves), Southerners of all classes nevertheless defended the institution of slavery[30] threatened by the rise of free labor abolitionist movements in the Northern states as the cornerstone of their social order. Based on a system of plantation slavery, the social structure of the South was far more stratified and patriarchal than that of the North. In 1850 there were around 350,000 slaveholders in a total free Southern population of about six million. Among slaveholders, the concentration of slave ownership was unevenly distributed. Perhaps around 7 percent of slaveholders owned roughly three-quarters of the slave population. The largest slaveholders, generally owners of large plantations, represented the top stratum of Southern society. They benefited from economies of scale and needed large numbers of slaves on big plantations to produce profitable labor-intensive crops like cotton. This plantation-owning elite, known as "slave magnates", was comparable to the millionaires of the following century. In the 1850s as large plantation owners out-competed smaller farmers, more slaves were owned by fewer planters. Yet, while the proportion of the white population consisting of slaveholders was on the decline on the eve of the Civil Warperhaps falling below around a quarter of free southerners in 1860poor whites and small farmers generally accepted the political leadership of the planter elite. Several factors helped explain why slavery was not under serious threat of internal collapse from any moves for democratic change initiated from the South. First, given the opening of new territories in the West for white settlement, many non-slaveowners also perceived a possibility that they, too, might own slaves at some point in their life.[31]
40 Second, small free farmers in the South often embraced hysterical racism, making them unlikely agents for internal democratic reforms in the South.[32] The principle of white supremacy, accepted by almost all white southerners of all classes, made slavery seem legitimate, natural, and essential for a civilized society. White racism in the South was sustained by official systems of repression such as the "slave codes" and elaborate codes of speech, behavior, and social practices illustrating the subordination of blacks to whites. For example, the "slave patrols" were among the institutions bringing together southern whites of all classes in support of the prevailing economic and racial order. Serving as slave "patrollers" and "overseers" offered white southerners positions of power and honor. These positions gave even poor white southerners the authority to stop, search, whip, maim, and even kill any slave traveling outside his or her plantation. Slave "patrollers" and "overseers" also won prestige in their communities. Policing and punishing blacks who transgressed the regimentation of slave society was a valued community service in the South, where the fear of free blacks threatening law and order figured heavily in the public discourse of the period.
Third, many small farmers with a few slaves and yeomen were linked to elite planters through the market economy.[33] In many areas, small farmers depended on local planter elites for vital goods and services including (but not limited to) access to cotton gins, access to markets, access to feed and livestock, and even for loans (since the banking system was not well developed in the antebellum South). Southern tradesmen often depended on the richest planters for steady work. Such dependency effectively deterred many white non-slaveholders from engaging in any political activity that was not in the interest of the large slaveholders. Furthermore, whites of varying social castes, including poor whites and "plain folk" who worked outside or in the periphery of the market economy (and therefore lacked any real economic interest in the defense of slavery) might nonetheless be linked to elite planters through extensive kinship networks. Since inheritance in the South was often unequitable (and generally favored eldest sons), it was not uncommon for a poor white person to be perhaps the first cousin of the richest plantation owner of his county and to share the same militant support of slavery as his richer relatives. Finally, there was no secret ballot at the time anywhere in the United States this innovation did not become widespread in the U.S. until the 1880s. For a typical white Southerner, this meant that so much as casting a ballot against the wishes of the establishment meant running the risk of social ostracization. Thus, by the 1850s, Southern slaveholders and non-slaveholders alike felt increasingly encircled psychologically and politically in the national political arena because of the rise of free soilism and abolitionism in the Northern states. Increasingly dependent on the North for manufactured goods, for commercial services, and for loans, and increasingly cut off from the flourishing agricultural regions of the Northwest, they faced the prospects of a growing free labor and abolitionist movement in the North. Militant defense of slavery With the outcry over developments in Kansas strong in the North, defenders of slavery increasingly committed to a way of life that abolitionists and their sympathizers considered obsolete or immoral articulated a militant pro-slavery ideology that would lay the groundwork for secession upon the election of a Republican president. Southerners waged a vitriolic response to political change in the North. Slaveholding interests sought to uphold their constitutional rights in the territories and to maintain sufficient political strength to repulse "hostile" and "ruinous" legislation. Behind this shift was the growth of the cotton industry, which left slavery more important than ever to
Violent repression of slaves was a common theme in abolitionist literature in the North. Above, this famous 1863 photo of a man deeply scarred from whipping by an overseer was distributed by abolitionists to illustrate what they saw as the barbarism of Southern society.
Origins of the American Civil War the Southern economy.[34] Literature Reactions to the popularity of Uncle Tom's Cabin (1852) by Harriet Beecher Stowe (whom Abraham Lincoln reputedly called "the little woman that started this great war") and the growth of the abolitionist movement (pronounced after the founding of The Liberator in 1831 by William Lloyd Garrison) inspired an elaborate intellectual defense of slavery. Increasingly vocal (and sometimes violent) abolitionist movements, culminating in John Brown's raid on Harpers Ferry in 1859 were viewed as a serious threat, andin the minds of many Southernersabolitionists were attempting to foment violent slave revolts as seen in Haiti in the 1790s and as attempted by Nat Turner some three decades prior (1831). After J. D. B. DeBow established De Bow's Review in 1846, it grew to become the leading Southern magazine, warning the planter class about the dangers of depending on the North economically. De Bow's Review also emerged as the leading voice for secession. The magazine emphasized the South's economic inequality, relating it to the concentration of manufacturing, shipping, banking and international trade in the North. Searching for Biblical passages endorsing slavery and forming economic, sociological, historical and scientific arguments, slavery went from being a "necessary evil" to a "positive good". Dr. J.H. Van Evrie's book Negroes and Negro slavery: The First an Inferior Race: The Latter Its Normal Condition setting out the arguments the title would suggest was an attempt to apply scientific support to the Southern arguments in favor of race based slavery. Latent sectional divisions suddenly activated derogatory sectional imagery which emerged into sectional ideologies. As industrial capitalism gained momentum in the North, Southern writers emphasized whatever aristocratic traits they valued (but often did not practice) in their own society: courtesy, grace, chivalry, the slow pace of life, orderly life and leisure. This supported their argument that slavery provided a more humane society than industrial labor. In his Cannibals All!, George Fitzhugh argued that the antagonism between labor and capital in a free society would result in "robber barons" and "pauper slavery", while in a slave society such antagonisms were avoided. He advocated enslaving Northern factory workers, for their own benefit. Abraham Lincoln, on the other hand, denounced such Southern insinuations that Northern wage earners were fatally fixed in that condition for life. To Free Soilers, the stereotype of the South was one of a diametrically opposite, static society in which the slave system maintained an entrenched anti-democratic aristocracy. Southern fears of modernization According to the historian James M. McPherson, exceptionalism applied not to the South but to the North after the North phased out slavery and launched an industrial revolution that led to urbanization, which in turn led to increased education, which in its own turn gave ever-increasing strength to various reform movements but especially abolitionism. The fact that seven immigrants out of eight settled in the North (and the fact that most immigrants viewed slavery with disfavor), compounded by the fact that twice as many whites left the South for the North as vice versa, contributed to the South's defensive-aggressive political behavior. The Charleston Mercury read that on the issue of slavery the North and South "are not only two Peoples, but they are rival, hostile Peoples."[35] As De Bow's Review said, "We are resisting revolution.... We are not engaged in a Quixotic fight for the rights of man.... We are conservative."[35] Southern fears of modernity Allan Nevins argued that the Civil War was an "irrepressible" conflict, adopting a phrase first used by U.S. Senator and Abraham Lincoln's Secretary of State William H. Seward. Nevins synthesized contending accounts emphasizing moral, cultural, social, ideological, political, and economic issues. In doing so, he brought the historical discussion back to an emphasis on social and cultural factors. Nevins pointed out that the North and the South were rapidly becoming two different peoples, a point made also by historian Avery Craven. At the root of these cultural differences was the problem of slavery, but fundamental assumptions, tastes, and cultural aims of the regions were
41
Origins of the American Civil War diverging in other ways as well. More specifically, the North was rapidly modernizing in a manner threatening to the South. Historian McPherson explains:[35] When secessionists protested in 1861 that they were acting to preserve traditional rights and values, they were correct. They fought to preserve their constitutional liberties against the perceived Northern threat to overthrow them. The South's concept of republicanism had not changed in three-quarters of a century; the North's had.... The ascension to power of the Republican Party, with its ideology of competitive, egalitarian free-labor capitalism, was a signal to the South that the Northern majority had turned irrevocably towards this frightening, revolutionary future. Harry L. Watson has synthesized research on antebellum southern social, economic, and political history. Self-sufficient yeomen, in Watson's view, "collaborated in their own transformation" by allowing promoters of a market economy to gain political influence. Resultant "doubts and frustrations" provided fertile soil for the argument that southern rights and liberties were menaced by Black Republicanism.[36] J. Mills Thornton III, explained the viewpoint of the average white Alabamian. Thornton contends that Alabama was engulfed in a severe crisis long before 1860. Deeply held principles of freedom, equality, and autonomy, as expressed in republican values appeared threatened, especially during the 1850s, by the relentless expansion of market relations and commercial agriculture. Alabamians were thus, he judged, prepared to believe the worst once Lincoln was elected.[37]
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The politicians of the 1850s were acting in a society in which the traditional restraints that suppressed sectional conflict in the 1820s and 1850s the most important of which being the stability of the two-party system were being eroded as this rapid extension of mass democracy went forward in the North and South. It was an era when the mass political party galvanized voter participation to an unprecedented degree, and a time in which politics formed an essential component of American mass culture. Historians agree that political involvement was a larger concern to the average American in the 1850s than today. Politics was, in one of its functions, a form of mass entertainment, a spectacle with rallies, parades, and colorful personalities. Leading politicians, moreover, often served as a focus for popular interests, aspirations, and values. Historian Allan Nevins, for instance, writes of political rallies in 1856 with turnouts of anywhere from twenty to fifty thousand men and women. Voter turnouts even ran as high as 84% by 1860. An abundance of new parties emerged 185456, including the Republicans, People's party men, Anti-Nebraskans, Fusionists, Know-Nothings, Know-Somethings (anti-slavery nativists), Maine Lawites, Temperance men, Rum Democrats, Silver Gray Whigs, Hindus, Hard Shell Democrats, Soft Shells, Half Shells and Adopted Citizens. By 1858, they were mostly gone, and politics divided four ways. Republicans controlled most Northern states with a strong Democratic minority. The Democrats were split North and South and fielded two tickets in 1860. Southern non-Democrats tried different coalitions; most supported the Constitutional Union party in 1860. Many Southern states held constitutional conventions in 1851 to consider the questions of nullification and secession. With the exception of South Carolina, whose convention election did not even offer the option of "no secession" but rather "no secession without the collaboration of other states", the Southern conventions were dominated by Unionists who voted down articles of secession.
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Economics
Historians today generally agree that economic conflicts were not a major cause of the war. While an economic basis to the sectional crisis was popular among the Progressive school of historians from the 1910s to the 1940s, few professional historians now subscribe to this explanation.[38] According to economic historian Lee A. Craig, "In fact, numerous studies by economic historians over the past several decades reveal that economic conflict was not an inherent condition of North-South relations during the antebellum era and did not cause the Civil War."[39] When numerous groups tried at the last minute in 186061 to find a compromise to avert war, they did not turn to economic policies. The three major attempts at compromise, the Crittenden Compromise, the Corwin Amendment and the Washington Peace Conference, addressed only the slavery-related issues of fugitive slave laws, personal liberty laws, slavery in the territories and interference with slavery within the existing slave states.[40] Economic value of slavery to the South Historian James L. Huston emphasizes the role of slavery as an economic institution. In October 1860 William Lowndes Yancey, a leading advocate of secession, placed the value of Southern-held slaves at $2.8 billion.[41] Huston writes: Understanding the relations between wealth, slavery, and property rights in the South provides a powerful means of understanding southern political behavior leading to disunion. First, the size dimensions of slavery are important to comprehend, for slavery was a colossal institution. Second, the property rights argument was the ultimate defense of slavery, and white southerners and the proslavery radicals knew it. Third, the weak point in the protection of slavery by property rights was the federal government.... Fourth, the intense need to preserve the sanctity of property rights in Africans led southern political leaders to demand the nationalization of slavery the condition under which slaveholders would always be protected in their property holdings.[42] The cotton gin greatly increased the efficiency with which cotton could be harvested, contributing to the consolidation of "King Cotton" as the backbone of the economy of the Deep South, and to the entrenchment of the system of slave labor on which the cotton plantation economy depended. The tendency of monoculture cotton plantings to lead to soil exhaustion created a need for cotton planters to move their operations to new lands, and therefore to the westward expansion of slavery from the Eastern seaboard into new areas (e.g., Alabama, Mississippi, and beyond to East Texas).[43][44] Regional economic differences The South, Midwest, and Northeast had quite different economic structures. They traded with each other and each became more prosperous by staying in the Union, a point many businessmen made in 186061. However Charles A. Beard in the 1920s made a highly influential argument to the effect that these differences caused the war (rather than slavery or constitutional debates). He saw the industrial Northeast forming a coalition with the agrarian Midwest An animation showing the free/slave status of U.S. states and territories, 17891861. against the Plantation South. Critics challenged his image of a unified Northeast and said that the region was in fact highly diverse with many different competing economic interests. In 186061, most business interests in the Northeast opposed war.
Origins of the American Civil War After 1950, only a few mainstream historians accepted the Beard interpretation, though it was accepted by libertarian economists.[45] As Historian Kenneth Stamppwho abandoned Beardianism after 1950, sums up the scholarly consensus:[46] "Most historians...now see no compelling reason why the divergent economies of the North and South should have led to disunion and civil war; rather, they find stronger practical reasons why the sections, whose economies neatly complemented one another, should have found it advantageous to remain united."[47] Free labor vs. pro-slavery arguments Historian Eric Foner argued that a free-labor ideology dominated thinking in the North, which emphasized economic opportunity. By contrast, Southerners described free labor as "greasy mechanics, filthy operators, small-fisted farmers, and moonstruck theorists".[48] They strongly opposed the homestead laws that were proposed to give free farms in the west, fearing the small farmers would oppose plantation slavery. Indeed, opposition to homestead laws was far more common in secessionist rhetoric than opposition to tariffs.[49] Southerners such as Calhoun argued that slavery was "a positive good", and that slaves were more civilized and morally and intellectually improved because of slavery.[50]
44
Origins of the American Civil War dividing of the nation, and it is probably true that it was the splits in the churches which made a final split of the national inevitable."[59] The conflict over how to interpret the Bible was central: The theological crisis occasioned by reasoning like [conservative Presbyterian theologian James H.] Thornwell's was acute. Many Northern Bible-readers and not a few in the South felt that slavery was evil. They somehow knew the Bible supported them in that feeling. Yet when it came to using the Bible as it had been used with such success to evangelize and civilize the United States, the sacred page was snatched out of their hands. Trust in the Bible and reliance upon a Reformed, literal hermeneutic had created a crisis that only bullets, not arguments, could resolve.[60] The result: The question of the Bible and slavery in the era of the Civil War was never a simple question. The issue involved the American expression of a Reformed literal hermeneutic, the failure of hermeneutical alternatives to gain cultural authority, and the exercise of deeply entrenched intuitive racism, as well as the presence of Scripture as an authoritative religious book and slavery as an inherited social-economic relationship. The North forced to fight on unfriendly terrain that it had helped to create lost the exegetical war. The South certainly lost the shooting war. But constructive orthodox theology was the major loser when American believers allowed bullets instead of hermeneutical self-consciousness to determine what the Bible said about slavery. For the history of theology in America, the great tragedy of the Civil War is that the most persuasive theologians were the Rev. Drs. William Tecumseh Sherman and Ulysses S. Grant.[61] There were many causes of the Civil War, but the religious conflict, almost unimaginable in modern America, cut very deep at the time. Noll and others highlight the significance of the religion issue for the famous phrase in Lincoln's second inaugural: "Both read the same Bible and pray to the same God, and each invokes His aid against the other."
45
Abolitionism
Antislavery movements in the North gained momentum in the 1830s and 1840s, a period of rapid transformation of Northern society that inspired a social and political reformism. Many of the reformers of the period, including abolitionists, attempted in one way or another to transform the lifestyle and work habits of labor, helping workers respond to the new demands of an industrializing, capitalistic society. Antislavery, like many other reform movements of the period, was influenced by the legacy of the Second Great Awakening, a period of religious revival in the new country stressing the reform of individuals which was still relatively fresh in the American memory. Thus, while the reform spirit of the period was expressed by a variety of movements with often-conflicting political goals, most reform movements shared a common feature in their emphasis on the Great Awakening principle of transforming the human personality through discipline, order, and restraint. "Abolitionist" had several meanings at the time. The followers of William Lloyd Garrison, including Wendell Phillips and Frederick Douglass, demanded the "immediate abolition of slavery", hence the
Platform of the American Anti-Slavery Society, founded in 1833 by William Lloyd Garrison and Arthur Tappan.
name. A more pragmatic group of abolitionists, like Theodore Weld and Arthur Tappan, wanted immediate action, but that action might well be a program of gradual emancipation, with a long intermediate stage. "Antislavery men",
Origins of the American Civil War like John Quincy Adams, did what they could to limit slavery and end it where possible, but were not part of any abolitionist group. For example, in 1841 Adams represented the Amistad African slaves in the Supreme Court of the United States and argued that they should be set free.[62] In the last years before the war, "antislavery" could mean the Northern majority, like Abraham Lincoln, who opposed expansion of slavery or its influence, as by the Kansas-Nebraska Act, or the Fugitive Slave Act. Many Southerners called all these abolitionists, without distinguishing them from the Garrisonians. James M. McPherson explains the abolitionists' deep beliefs: "All people were equal in God's sight; the souls of black folks were as valuable as those of whites; for one of God's children to enslave another was a violation of the Higher Law, even if it was sanctioned by the Constitution."[63] Stressing the Yankee Protestant ideals of self-improvement, industry, and thrift, most abolitionists most notably William Lloyd Garrison condemned slavery as a lack of control over one's own destiny and the fruits of one's labor. Wendell Phillips, one of the most ardent abolitionists, attacked the Slave Power and presaged disunion as early as 1845: The experience of the fifty years shows us the slaves trebling in A woodcut from the abolitionist Anti-Slavery Almanac (1839) depicts the numbersslaveholders capture of a fugitive slave by a slave patrol. monopolizing the offices and dictating the policy of the Governmentprostituting the strength and influence of the Nation to the support of slavery here and elsewheretrampling on the rights of the free States, and making the courts of the country their tools. To continue this disastrous alliance longer is madness. Why prolong the experiment?[64] Abolitionists also attacked slavery as a threat to the freedom of white Americans. Defining freedom as more than a simple lack of restraint, antebellum reformers held that the truly free man was one who imposed restraints upon himself. Thus, for the anti-slavery reformers of the 1830s and 1840s, the promise of free labor and upward social mobility (opportunities for advancement, rights to own property, and to control one's own labor), was central to the ideal of reforming individuals. Controversy over the so-called Ostend Manifesto (which proposed the U.S. annexation of Cuba as a slave state) and the Fugitive Slave Act kept sectional tensions alive before the issue of slavery in the West could occupy the country's politics in the mid-to-late 1850s. Antislavery sentiment among some groups in the North intensified after the Compromise of 1850, when Southerners began appearing in Northern states to pursue fugitives or often to claim as slaves free African Americans who had resided there for years. Meanwhile, some abolitionists openly sought to prevent enforcement of the law. Violation of the Fugitive Slave Act was often open and organized. In Boston a city from which it was boasted that no fugitive had ever been returned Theodore Parker and other members of the city's elite helped form mobs to prevent enforcement of the law as early as April 1851. A pattern of public resistance emerged in city after city, notably in Syracuse in 1851 (culminating in the Jerry Rescue incident late that year), and Boston again in 1854. But the issue did not lead to a crisis until revived by the same issue underlying the Missouri Compromise of 1820: slavery in the territories.
46
47
I am a believer in that portion of the Declaration of American Independence in which it is set forth, as among self-evident truths, "that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Hence, I am an abolitionist. Hence, I cannot but regard oppression in every formand most of all, that which turns a man into a [66] thingwith indignation and abhorrence.
Opposite opinions on slavery were expressed by Confederate Vice-President Alexander Stephens in his "Cornerstone Speech". Stephens said:
(Thomas Jefferson's) ideas, however, were fundamentally wrong. They rested upon the assumption of the equality of races. This was an error.... Our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea; its foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests, upon the great truth that [67] the negro is not equal to the white man; that slaverysubordination to the superior raceis his natural and normal condition.
In the rural and small-town North, the picture of Northern society (framed by the ethos of "free labor") corresponded to a large degree with reality. Propelled by advancements in transportation and communication especially steam navigation, railroads, and telegraphs the two decades before the Civil War were of rapid expansion in population and economy of the Northwest. Combined with the rise of Northeastern and export markets for their products, the social standing of farmers in the region substantially improved. The small towns and villages that emerged as the Republican Party's heartland showed every sign of vigorous expansion. Their vision for an ideal society was of small-scale capitalism, with white American laborers
Origins of the American Civil War entitled to the chance of upward mobility opportunities for advancement, rights to own property, and to control their own labor. Many free-soilers demanded that the slave labor system and free black settlers (and, in places such as California, Chinese immigrants) should be excluded from the Great Plains to guarantee the predominance there of the free white laborer. Opposition to the 1847 Wilmot Proviso helped to consolidate the "free-soil" forces. The next year, Radical New York Democrats known as Barnburners, members of the Liberty Party, and anti-slavery Whigs held a convention at Buffalo, New York, in August, forming the Free-Soil Party. The party supported former President Martin Van Buren and Charles Francis Adams, Sr., for President and Vice President, respectively. The party opposed the expansion of slavery into territories where it had not yet existed, such as Oregon and the ceded Mexican territory. Relating Northern and Southern positions on slavery to basic differences in labor systems, but insisting on the role of culture and ideology in coloring these differences, Eric Foner's book Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men (1970) went beyond the economic determinism of Charles A. Beard (a leading historian of the 1930s). Foner emphasized the importance of free labor ideology to Northern opponents of slavery, pointing out that the moral concerns of the abolitionists were not necessarily the dominant sentiments in the North. Many Northerners (including Lincoln) opposed slavery also because they feared that black labor might spread to the North and threaten the position of free white laborers. In this sense, Republicans and the abolitionists were able to appeal to powerful emotions in the North through a broader commitment to "free labor" principles. The "Slave Power" idea had a far greater appeal to Northern self-interest than arguments based on the plight of black slaves in the South. If the free labor ideology of the 1830s and 1840s depended on the transformation of Northern society, its entry into politics depended on the rise of mass democracy, in turn propelled by far-reaching social change. Its chance would come by the mid-1850s with the collapse of the traditional two-party system, which had long suppressed sectional conflict.
48
Origins of the American Civil War territory, avoiding the question of slavery in the territories. The Mormons' proposal for a State of Deseret incorporating most of the area of the Mexican Cession but excluding the largest non-Mormon populations in Northern California and central New Mexico was considered unlikely to succeed in Congress, but nevertheless in 1849 President Zachary Taylor sent his agent John Wilson westward with a proposal to combine California and Deseret as a single state, decreasing the number of new free states and the erosion of Southern parity in the Senate. The Compromise of 1850, proposed by Henry Clay in January 1850, guided to passage by Douglas over Northern Whig and Southern Democrat opposition, and enacted September 1850, admitted California as a free state including Southern California and organized Utah Territory and New Mexico Territory with slavery to be decided by popular sovereignty. Texas dropped its claim to the disputed northwestern areas in return for debt relief, and the areas were divided between the two new territories and unorganized territory. El Paso where Texas had successfully established county government was left in Texas. No southern territory dominated by Southerners (like the later short-lived Confederate Territory of Arizona) was created. Also, the slave trade was abolished in Washington, D.C. (but not slavery itself), and the Fugitive Slave Act was strengthened.
49
States' rights
States' rights was an issue in the 19th century for those who felt that the federal government was superseded by the authority of the individual states and was in violation of the role intended for it by the Founding Fathers of the United States. Kenneth M. Stampp notes that each section used states' rights arguments when convenient, and shifted positions when convenient.[68] For example, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was justified by its supporters as a state's right to have its property laws respected by other states, and was resisted by northern legislatures in the form of state personal liberty laws that placed state laws above the federal mandate.
Origins of the American Civil War And then, as a by-product or offshoot of a war of conquest, slavery a subject that leading politicians had, with the exception of the gag rule controversy and Calhouns occasional outbursts, scrupulously kept out of partisan debate erupted as the dominant issue in that arena. So disruptive was the issue that it subjected the federal Union to the greatest strain the young republic had yet known.[71]
50
Origins of the American Civil War slave law than the version mentioned in the Constitution. The Fugitive Slave Law would reignite controversy over slavery.
51
Origins of the American Civil War a new Northern party, and Benjamin Wade, Chase, Charles Sumner, and others spoke out for the union of all opponents of the Nebraska Act. The Tribune's Gamaliel Bailey was involved in calling a caucus of anti-slavery Whig and Democratic Party Congressmen in May. Meeting in a Ripon, Wisconsin, Congregational Church on February 28, 1854, some thirty opponents of the Nebraska Act called for the organization of a new political party and suggested that "Republican" would be the most appropriate name (to link their cause to the defunct Republican Party of Thomas Jefferson). These founders also took a leading role in the creation of the Republican Party in many northern states during the summer of 1854. While conservatives and many moderates were content merely to call for the restoration of the Missouri Compromise or a prohibition of slavery extension, radicals advocated repeal of the Fugitive Slave Laws and rapid abolition in existing states. The term "radical" has also been applied to those who objected to the Compromise of 1850, which extended slavery in the territories. But without the benefit of hindsight, the 1854 elections would seem to indicate the possible triumph of the Know-Nothing movement rather than anti-slavery, with the Catholic/immigrant question replacing slavery as the issue capable of mobilizing mass appeal. Know-Nothings, for instance, captured the mayoralty of Philadelphia with a majority of over 8,000 votes in 1854. Even after opening up immense discord with his Kansas-Nebraska Act, Senator Douglas began speaking of the Know-Nothings, rather than the Republicans, as the principal danger to the Democratic Party. When Republicans spoke of themselves as a party of "free labor", they appealed to a rapidly growing, primarily middle class base of support, not permanent wage earners or the unemployed (the working class). When they extolled the virtues of free labor, they were merely reflecting the experiences of millions of men who had "made it" and millions of others who had a realistic hope of doing so. Like the Tories in England, the Republicans in the United States would emerge as the nationalists, homogenizers, imperialists, and cosmopolitans. Those who had not yet "made it" included Irish immigrants, who made up a large growing proportion of Northern factory workers. Republicans often saw the Catholic working class as lacking the qualities of self-discipline, temperance, and sobriety essential for their vision of ordered liberty. Republicans insisted that there was a high correlation between education, religion, and hard workthe values of the "Protestant work ethic"and Republican votes. "Where free schools are regarded as a nuisance, where religion is least honored and lazy unthrift is the rule", read an editorial of the pro-Republican Chicago Democratic Press after James Buchanan's defeat of John C. Fremont in the 1856 presidential election, "there Buchanan has received his strongest support". Ethno-religious, socio-economic, and cultural fault lines ran throughout American society, but were becoming increasingly sectional, pitting Yankee Protestants with a stake in the emerging industrial capitalism and American nationalism increasingly against those tied to Southern slave holding interests. For example, acclaimed historian Don E. Fehrenbacher, in his Prelude to Greatness, Lincoln in the 1850s, noticed how Illinois was a microcosm of the national political scene, pointing out voting patterns that bore striking correlations to regional patterns of settlement. Those areas settled from the South were staunchly Democratic, while those by New Englanders were staunchly Republican. In addition, a belt of border counties were known for their political moderation, and traditionally held the balance of power. Intertwined with religious, ethnic, regional, and class identities, the issues of free labor and free soil were thus easy to play on. Events during the next two years in "Bleeding Kansas" sustained the popular fervor originally aroused among some elements in the North by the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Free-State settlers from the North were encouraged by press and pulpit and the powerful organs of abolitionist propaganda. Often they received financial help from such organizations as the Massachusetts Emigrant Aid Company. Those from the South often received financial contributions from the communities they left. Southerners sought to uphold their constitutional rights in the territories and to maintain sufficient political strength to repulse "hostile and ruinous legislation". While the Great Plains were largely unfit for the cultivation of cotton, informed Southerners demanded that the West be open to slavery, oftenperhaps most oftenwith minerals in mind. Brazil, for instance, was an example of the
52
Origins of the American Civil War successful use of slave labor in mining. In the middle of the 18th century, diamond mining supplemented gold mining in Minas Gerais and accounted for a massive transfer of masters and slaves from Brazil's northeastern sugar region. Southern leaders knew a good deal about this experience. It was even promoted in the pro-slavery DeBow's Review as far back as 1848.
53
However, the 185556 violence in "Bleeding Kansas" did reach an ideological climax after John Brown regarded by followers as the instrument of God's will to destroy slavery entered the melee. His assassination of five pro-slavery settlers (the so-called "Pottawatomie Massacre", during the night of May 24, 1856) resulted in some irregular, guerrilla-style strife. Aside from John Brown's fervor, the strife in Kansas often involved only armed bands more interested in land claims or loot.
His zeal in the cause of freedom was infinitely superior to mine... Mine was as the taper light; his was as the burning sun. I could live for the slave; John Brown could die for him. Frederick Douglass speaking of John Brown
Of greater importance than the civil strife in Kansas, however, was the reaction against it nationwide and in Congress. In both North and South, the belief was widespread that the aggressive designs of the other section were epitomized by (and responsible for) what was happening in Kansas. Consequently, "Bleeding Kansas" emerged as a symbol of sectional controversy. Indignant over the developments in Kansas, the Republicansthe first entirely sectional major party in U.S. historyentered their first presidential campaign with confidence. Their nominee, John C. Frmont, was a generally safe candidate for the new party. Although his nomination upset some of their Nativist Know-Nothing supporters (his mother was a Catholic), the nomination of the famed explorer of the Far West with no political record was an attempt to woo ex-Democrats. The other two Republican contenders, William H. Seward and Salmon P. Chase, were seen as too radical. Nevertheless, the campaign of 1856 was waged almost exclusively on the slavery issuepitted as a struggle between democracy and aristocracyfocusing on the question of Kansas. The Republicans condemned the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the expansion of slavery, but they advanced a program of internal improvements combining the idealism of anti-slavery with the economic aspirations of the North. The new party rapidly developed a powerful partisan
Origins of the American Civil War culture, and energetic activists drove voters to the polls in unprecedented numbers. People reacted with fervor. Young Republicans organized the "Wide Awake" clubs and chanted "Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men, Frmont!" With Southern fire-eaters and even some moderates uttering threats of secession if Frmont won, the Democratic candidate, Buchanan, benefited from apprehensions about the future of the Union.
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Origins of the American Civil War Republican observers saw the controversy over the Lecompton Constitution as an opportunity to peel off Democratic support in the border states, where Frmont picked up little support. After all, the border states had often gone for Whigs with a Northern base of support in the past without prompting threats of Southern withdrawal from the Union. Among the proponents of this strategy was The New York Times, which called on the Republicans to downplay opposition to popular sovereignty in favor of a compromise policy calling for "no more slave states" in order to quell sectional tensions. The Times maintained that for the Republicans to be competitive in the 1860 elections, they would need to broaden their base of support to include all voters who for one reason or another were upset with the Buchanan Administration. Indeed, pressure was strong for an alliance that would unite the growing opposition to the Democratic Administration. But such an alliance was no novel idea; it would essentially entail transforming the Republicans into the national, conservative, Union party of the country. In effect, this would be a successor to the Whig party. Republican leaders, however, staunchly opposed any attempts to modify the party position on slavery, appalled by what they considered a surrender of their principles when, for example, all the ninety-two Republican members of Congress voted for the Crittenden-Montgomery bill in 1858. Although this compromise measure blocked Kansas' entry into the union as a slave state, the fact that it called for popular sovereignty, rather than outright opposition to the expansion of slavery, was troubling to the party leaders. In the end, the Crittenden-Montgomery bill did not forge a grand anti-administration coalition of Republicans, ex-Whig Southerners in the border states, and Northern Democrats. Instead, the Democratic Party merely split along sectional lines. Anti-Lecompton Democrats complained that a new, pro-slavery test had been imposed upon the party. The Douglasites, however, refused to yield to administration pressure. Like the anti-Nebraska Democrats, who were now members of the Republican Party, the Douglasean insisted that they not the administration commanded the support of most northern Democrats. Extremist sentiment in the South advanced dramatically as the Southern planter class perceived its hold on the executive, legislative, and judicial apparatus of the central government wane. It also grew increasingly difficult for Southern Democrats to manipulate power in many of the Northern states through their allies in the Democratic Party.
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Honor
Historians have emphasized that the sense of honor was a central concern of upper class white Southerners.[83] The idea of being treated like a second class citizen was anathema and could not be tolerated by an honorable southerner. The anti-slavery position held that slavery was a negative or evil phenomenon that damaged the rights of white men and the prospects of republicanism. To the white South this rhetoric made Southerners second-class citizens because it trampled their Constitutional rights to take their property anywhere.[84][85]
Origins of the American Civil War Assault on Sumner (1856) On May 19 Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner gave a long speech in the Senate entitled "The Crime Against Kansas". It which condemned the Slave Power as the evil force behind the nation's troubles. Sumner singled out elderly Senator Andrew P. Butler of South Carolina, accusing him of the most dishonorable conduct imaginable: rape and pimping for prostitution. Sumner said the Southerners had committed a "crime against Kansas": "Not in any common lust for power Northern image of the 1856 attack on Sumner did this uncommon tragedy have its origin. It is the rape of a virgin Territory, compelling it to the hateful embrace of slavery; and it may be clearly traced to a depraved desire for a new Slave State, hideous offspring of such a crime, in the hope of adding to the power of slavery in the National Government."[86] Sumner's markedly sexual innuendo cast the South Carolinian as a pimp who has "chosen a mistress [the harlot slavery]... who, though ugly to others, is always lovely to him, though polluted in the sight of the world is chaste in his sight." According to Hoffer (2010), "It is also important to note the sexual imagery that recurred throughout the oration, which was neither accidental nor without precedent. Abolitionists routinely accused slaveholders of maintaining slavery so that they could engage in forcible sexual relations with their slaves."[87] Three days later, Sumner fell victim to the Southern gentleman's-code, which instructed retaliation for impugning the honor of an elderly kinsman. Bleeding and unconscious after a nearly fatal assault with a heavy cane by Butler's nephew, U.S. Representative Preston Brooks and unable to return to the Senate for three years Sumner became the martyr to the antislavery cause. For anti-slavery partisans the episode proved the barbarism of slave society; by contrast, Brooks was lauded as a hero upholding Southern honor, with dozens of his fellow South Carolinians sending him new canes, including one with the label "Hit him again".
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Emergence of Lincoln
Republican Party structure
Despite their significant loss in the election of 1856, Republican leaders realized that even though they appealed only to Northern voters, they need win only two more states, such as Pennsylvania and Illinois, to win the presidency in 1860. As the Democrats were grappling with their own troubles, leaders in the Republican party fought to keep elected members focused on the issue of slavery in the West, which allowed them to mobilize popular support. Chase wrote Sumner that if the conservatives succeeded, it might be necessary to recreate the Free Soil Party. He was also particularly disturbed by the tendency of many Republicans to eschew moral attacks on slavery for political and economic arguments. The controversy over slavery in the West was still not creating a fixation on the issue of slavery. Although the old restraints on the sectional tensions were being eroded with the rapid William H. Seward, Secretary of State under Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson. extension of mass politics and mass democracy in the North, the perpetuation of conflict over the issue of slavery in the West still required the efforts of radical Democrats in the South and radical Republicans in the North. They had to ensure that the sectional conflict would remain at the center of the political debate. William Seward contemplated this potential in the 1840s, when the Democrats were the nation's majority party, usually controlling Congress, the presidency, and many state offices. The country's institutional structure and party system allowed slaveholders to prevail in more of the nation's territories and to garner a great deal of influence over national policy. With growing popular discontent with the unwillingness of many Democratic leaders to take a stand against slavery, and growing consciousness of the party's increasingly pro-Southern stance, Seward became convinced that the only way for the Whig Party to counteract the Democrats' strong monopoly of the rhetoric of democracy and equality was for the Whigs to embrace anti-slavery as a party platform. Once again, to increasing numbers of Northerners, the Southern labor system was increasingly seen as contrary to the ideals of American democracy. Republicans believed in the existence of "the Slave Power Conspiracy", which had seized control of the federal government and was attempting to pervert the Constitution for its own purposes. The "Slave Power" idea gave the Republicans the anti-aristocratic appeal with which men like Seward had long wished to be associated politically. By fusing older anti-slavery arguments with the idea that slavery posed a threat to Northern free labor and democratic values, it enabled the Republicans to tap into the egalitarian outlook which lay at the heart of Northern society. In this sense, during the 1860 presidential campaign, Republican orators even cast "Honest Abe" as an embodiment of these principles, repeatedly referring to him as "the child of labor" and "son of the frontier", who had proved how "honest industry and toil" were rewarded in the North. Although Lincoln had been a Whig, the "Wide Awakes" (members of the Republican clubs), used replicas of rails that he had split to remind voters of his humble origins. In almost every northern state, organizers attempted to have a Republican Party or an anti-Nebraska fusion movement on ballots in 1854. In areas where the radical Republicans controlled the new organization, the comprehensive radical program became the party policy. Just as they helped organize the Republican Party in the summer of 1854, the radicals played an important role in the national organization of the party in 1856. Republican conventions in New York, Massachusetts, and Illinois adopted radical platforms. These radical platforms in such
Origins of the American Civil War states as Wisconsin, Michigan, Maine, and Vermont usually called for the divorce of the government from slavery, the repeal of the Fugitive Slave Laws, and no more slave states, as did platforms in Pennsylvania, Minnesota, and Massachusetts when radical influence was high. Conservatives at the Republican 1860 nominating convention in Chicago were able to block the nomination of William Seward, who had an earlier reputation as a radical (but by 1860 had been criticized by Horace Greeley as being too moderate). Other candidates had earlier joined or formed parties opposing the Whigs and had thereby made enemies of many delegates. Lincoln was selected on the third ballot. However, conservatives were unable to bring about the resurrection of "Whiggery". The convention's resolutions regarding slavery were roughly the same as they had been in 1856, but the language appeared less radical. In the following months, even Republican conservatives like Thomas Ewing and Edward Baker embraced the platform language that "the normal condition of territories was freedom". All in all, the organizers had done an effective job of shaping the official policy of the Republican Party. Southern slave holding interests now faced the prospects of a Republican President and the entry of new free states that would alter the nation's balance of power between the sections. To many Southerners, the resounding defeat of the Lecompton Constitution foreshadowed the entry of more free states into the Union. Dating back to the Missouri Compromise, the Southern region desperately sought to maintain an equal balance of slave states and free states so as to be competitive in the Senate. Since the last slave state was admitted in 1845, five more free states had entered. The tradition of maintaining a balance between North and South was abandoned in favor of the addition of more free soil states.
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Origins of the American Civil War American historians point out the South was highly developed and on average about as prosperous as the North. Panic of 1857 and sectional realignments A few historians believe that the serious financial panic of 1857 and the economic difficulties leading up to it strengthened the Republican Party and heightened sectional tensions. Before the panic, strong economic growth was being achieved under relatively low tariffs. Hence much of the nation concentrated on growth and prosperity. The iron and textile industries were facing acute, worsening trouble each year after 1850. By 1854, stocks of iron were accumulating in each world market. Iron prices fell, forcing many American iron mills to shut down. Republicans urged western farmers and northern manufacturers to blame the depression on the domination of the low-tariff economic policies of southern-controlled Democratic administrations. However the depression revived suspicion of Northeastern "Vote yourself a farm vote yourself a tariff": a campaign slogan for Abraham Lincoln in 1860. banking interests in both the South and the West. Eastern demand for western farm products shifted the West closer to the North. As the "transportation revolution" (canals and railroads) went forward, an increasingly large share and absolute amount of wheat, corn, and other staples of western producers once difficult to haul across the Appalachians went to markets in the Northeast. The depression emphasized the value of the western markets for eastern goods and homesteaders who would furnish markets and respectable profits. Aside from the land issue, economic difficulties strengthened the Republican case for higher tariffs for industries in response to the depression. This issue was important in Pennsylvania and perhaps New Jersey. Southern response Meanwhile, many Southerners grumbled over "radical" notions of giving land away to farmers that would "abolitionize" the area. While the ideology of Southern sectionalism was well-developed before the Panic of 1857 by figures like J.D.B. DeBow, the panic helped convince even more cotton barons that they had grown too reliant on Eastern financial interests. Thomas Prentice Kettell, former editor of the Democratic Review, was another commentator popular in the South to enjoy a The United States, immediately before the Civil War. All of the lands east of, or great degree of prominence between 1857 bordering, the Mississippi River were organized as states in the Union, but the and 1860. Kettell gathered an array of West was still largely unsettled. statistics in his book on Southern Wealth and Northern Profits, to show that the South produced vast wealth, while the North, with its dependence on raw materials, siphoned off the wealth of the
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Origins of the American Civil War South.[88] Arguing that sectional inequality resulted from the concentration of manufacturing in the North, and from the North's supremacy in communications, transportation, finance, and international trade, his ideas paralleled old physiocratic doctrines that all profits of manufacturing and trade come out of the land.[89] Political sociologists, such as Barrington Moore, have noted that these forms of romantic nostalgia tend to crop up whenever industrialization takes hold.[90] Such Southern hostility to the free farmers gave the North an opportunity for an alliance with Western farmers. After the political realignments of 185758manifested by the emerging strength of the Republican Party and their networks of local support nationwidealmost every issue was entangled with the controversy over the expansion of slavery in the West. While questions of tariffs, banking policy, public land, and subsidies to railroads did not always unite all elements in the North and the Northwest against the interests of slaveholders in the South under the pre-1854 party system, they were translated in terms of sectional conflictwith the expansion of slavery in the West involved. As the depression strengthened the Republican Party, slave holding interests were becoming convinced that the North had aggressive and hostile designs on the Southern way of life. The South was thus increasingly fertile ground for secessionism. The Republicans' Whig-style personality-driven "hurrah" campaign helped stir hysteria in the slave states upon the emergence of Lincoln and intensify divisive tendencies, while Southern "fire eaters" gave credence to notions of the slave power conspiracy among Republican constituencies in the North and West. New Southern demands to re-open the African slave trade further fueled sectional tensions. From the early 1840s until the outbreak of the Civil War, the cost of slaves had been rising steadily. Meanwhile, the price of cotton was experiencing market fluctuations typical of raw commodities. After the Panic of 1857, the price of cotton fell while the price of slaves continued its steep rise. At the 1858 Southern commercial convention, William L. Yancey of Alabama called for the reopening of the African slave trade. Only the delegates from the states of the Upper South, who profited from the domestic trade, opposed the reopening of the slave trade since they saw it as a potential form of competition. The convention in 1858 wound up voting to recommend the repeal of all laws against slave imports, despite some reservations.
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Elections of 1860
Initially, William H. Seward of New York, Salmon P. Chase of Ohio, and Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania, were the leading contenders for the Republican presidential nomination. But Abraham Lincoln, a former one-term House member who gained fame amid the Lincoln-Douglas Debates of 1858, had fewer political opponents within the party and out-maneuvered the other contenders. On May 16, 1860, he received the Republican nomination at their convention in Chicago, Illinois.
The schism in the Democratic Party over the Lecompton Constitution and Douglas' Freeport Doctrine caused Southern "fire-eaters" to oppose front runner Stephen A. Douglas' bid for the Democratic presidential nomination. Douglas defeated the proslavery Lecompton Constitution for Kansas because the majority of Kansans were antislavery, and Douglas' popular sovereignty doctrine would allow the majority to vote slavery up or down as they chose. Douglas' Freeport Doctrine alleged that the antislavery majority of Kansans could thwart the Dred Scott decision that allowed slavery by withholding legislation for a slave code and other laws needed to protect slavery. As a result, Southern extremists demanded a slave code for the territories, and used this issue to divide the northern and southern wings of the Democratic Party. Southerners left the party and in June nominated John C. Breckinridge, while Northern Democrats supported Douglas. As a result, the Southern planter class lost a considerable measure of sway in national politics. Because of the Democrats' division, the Republican nominee faced a divided opposition. Adding to Lincoln's advantage, ex-Whigs from the border states had earlier formed the Constitutional Union Party, nominating John C. Bell for President. Thus, party nominees waged regional campaigns. Douglas and Lincoln competed for Northern votes, while Bell, Douglas and Breckinridge competed for Southern votes. "Vote yourself a farm vote yourself a tariff" could have been a slogan for the Republicans in 1860. In sum, business was to support the farmers' demands for land (popular also in industrial working-class circles) in return for support for a higher tariff. To an extent, the elections of 1860 bolstered the political power of new social forces unleashed by the Industrial Revolution. In February 1861, after the seven states had departed the Union (four more would depart in AprilMay 1861; in late April, Maryland was unable to secede because it was put under martial law), Congress had a strong northern majority and passed the Morrill Tariff Act (signed by Buchanan), which increased duties and provided the government with funds needed for the war.
Origins of the American Civil War Democrats one last chance at unification by going to the convention at Baltimore, Maryland before the split became permanent. The end result was that John C. Breckinridge became the candidate of the Southern Democrats, and Stephen Douglas became the candidate of the Northern Democrats.[91] Yancy's previous 1848 attempt at demanding a slave code for the territories was his Alabama Platform, which was in response to the Northern Wilmot Proviso attempt at banning slavery in territories conquered from Mexico. Both the Alabama Platform and the Wilmot Proviso failed, but Yancey learned to be less overtly radical in order to get more support. Southerners thought they were merely demanding equality, in that they wanted Southern property in slaves to get the same (or more) protection as Northern forms of property.[91]
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Southern secession
With the emergence of the Republicans as the nation's first major sectional party by the mid-1850s, politics became the stage on which sectional tensions were played out. Although much of the West the focal point of sectional tensions was unfit for cotton cultivation, Southern secessionists read the political fallout as a sign that their power in national politics was rapidly weakening. Before, the slave system had been buttressed to an extent by the Democratic Party, which was increasingly seen as representing a more pro-Southern position that unfairly permitted Southerners to prevail in the nation's territories and to dominate national policy before the Civil War. But Democrats suffered a significant reverse in the electoral realignment of the mid-1850s. 1860 was a critical election that marked a stark change in existing patterns of party loyalties among groups of voters; Abraham Lincoln's election was a watershed in the balance of power of competing national and parochial interests and affiliations.[92] Once the election returns were certain, a special South Carolina convention declared "that the Union now subsisting between South Carolina and other states under the name of the 'United States of America' is hereby dissolved", heralding the secession of six more cotton states by February, and the formation of an independent nation, the Confederate States of America. Lipset (1960) examined the secessionist vote in each Southern state in 186061. In each state he divided the counties into high, medium or low proportion of slaves. He found that in the 181 high-slavery counties, the vote was 72% for secession. In the 205 low-slavery counties. the vote was only 37% for secession. (And in the 153 middle counties, the vote for secession was in the middle at 60%).[93] Both the outgoing Buchanan administration and the incoming Lincoln administration refused to recognize the legality of secession or the legitimacy of the Confederacy. After Lincoln called for troops, four border states (that lacked cotton) seceded.[94]
Origins of the American Civil War As for states' rights, while a states' right of revolution mentioned in the Declaration of Independence was based on the inalienable equal rights of man, secessionists believed in a modified version of states' rights that was safe for slavery.[96] These issues were especially important in the lower South, where 47 percent of the population were slaves. The upper South, where 32 percent of the population were slaves, considered the Fort Sumter crisisespecially Lincoln's call for troops to march south to recapture ita cause for secession. The northernmost border slave states, where 13 percent of the population were slaves, did not secede.[98]
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Fort Sumter
When South Carolina seceded In December 1860, Major Robert Anderson, a pro-slavery, former slave-owner from Kentucky, remained loyal to the Union. He was the commanding officer of United States Army forces in Charleston, South Carolinathe last remaining important Union post In the Deep South. Acting without orders, he moved his small garrison from Fort Moultrie, which was indefensible, to the more modern, more defensible, Fort Sumter in the middle of Charleston Harbor. South Carolina leaders cried betrayal, while the North celebrated with enormous excitement at this show of defiance against secessionism. In February 1861 the Confederate States of America was formed and took charge. Jefferson Davis, the Confederate President, ordered the fort be captured. The artillery attack was commanded by Brig. Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard, who had been Anderson's student at West Point. The attack began April 12, 1861, and continued until Anderson, badly outnumbered and outgunned, surrendered the fort on April 14. The battle began the American Civil War, As an overwhelming demand for war swept both the North and South, with only Kentucky attempting to remain neutral.[99] The opening of the Civil War, as well as the modern meaning of the American flag, according to Adam Goodheart (2011), was forged in December 1860, when Anderson, acting without orders, moved the American garrison from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter, in Charleston Harbor, in defiance of the overwhelming power of the new Confederate States of America. Goodheart argues this was the opening move of the Civil War, and the flag was used throughout the North to symbolize American nationalism and rejection of secessionism. Before that day, the flag had served mostly as a military ensign or a convenient marking of American territory, flown from forts, embassies, and ships, and displayed on special occasions like the Fourth of July. But in the weeks after Major Anderson's surprising stand, it became something Robert Anderson's telegram different. Suddenly the Stars and Stripes flew as it does today, and announcing the surrender of Fort Sumter. especially as it did after September 11 from houses, from storefronts, from churches; above the village greens and college quads. For the first time American flags were mass-produced rather than individually stitched and even so, manufacturers could not keep up with demand. As the long winter of 1861 turned into spring, that old flag meant something new. The abstraction of the Union clause was transfigured into a physical thing: strips of cloth that millions of people would fight for, and many thousands die for.[100]
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The irrepressible conflict argument was the first to dominate historical discussion. In the first decades after the fighting, histories of the Civil War generally reflected the views of Northerners who had participated in the conflict. The war appeared to be a stark moral conflict in which the South was to blame, a conflict that arose as a result of the designs of slave power. Henry Wilson's History of The Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America (18721877) is the foremost representative of this moral interpretation, which argued that Northerners had fought to preserve the union against the aggressive designs of "slave power". Later, in his seven-volume History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 to the Civil War, (18931900), James Ford Rhodes identified slavery as the centraland virtually onlycause of the Civil War. The North and South had reached positions on the issue of slavery that were both irreconcilable and unalterable. The conflict had become inevitable. But the idea that the war was avoidable did not gain ground among historians until the 1920s, when the "revisionists" began to offer new accounts of the prologue to the conflict. Revisionist historians, such as James G. Randall and Avery Craven, saw in the social and economic systems of the South no differences so fundamental as to require a war. Randall blamed the ineptitude of a "blundering generation" of leaders. He also saw slavery as essentially a benign institution, crumbling in the presence of 19th century tendencies. Craven, the other leading revisionist, placed more emphasis on the issue of slavery than Randall but argued roughly the same points. In The Coming of the Civil War (1942), Craven argued that slave laborers were not much worse off than Northern workers, that the institution was already on the road to ultimate extinction, and that the war could have been averted by skillful and responsible leaders in the tradition of Congressional statesmen Henry Clay and Daniel Webster. Two of the most important figures in U.S. politics in the first half of the 19th century, Clay and Webster, arguably in contrast to the 1850s generation of leaders, shared a predisposition to compromises marked by a passionate patriotic devotion to the Union. But it is possible that the politicians of the 1850s were not inept. More recent studies have kept elements of the revisionist interpretation alive, emphasizing the role of political agitation (the efforts of Democratic politicians of the South and Republican politicians in the North to keep the sectional conflict at the center of the political debate). David Herbert Donald argued in 1960 that the politicians of the 1850s were not unusually inept but that they were operating in a society in which traditional restraints were being eroded in the face of the rapid extension of democracy. The stability of the two-party system kept the union together, but would collapse in the 1850s, thus reinforcing, rather than suppressing, sectional conflict.
Henry Wilson, author of History of The Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America (18721877).
Origins of the American Civil War Reinforcing this interpretation, political sociologists have pointed out that the stable functioning of a political democracy requires a setting in which parties represent broad coalitions of varying interests, and that peaceful resolution of social conflicts takes place most easily when the major parties share fundamental values. Before the 1850s, the second American two party system (competition between the Democrats and the Whigs) conformed to this pattern, largely because sectional ideologies and issues were kept out of politics to maintain cross-regional networks of political alliances. However, in the 1840s and 1850s, ideology made its way into the heart of the political system despite the best efforts of the conservative Whig Party and the Democratic Party to keep it out.
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Contemporaneous explanations
From Confederate Vice-President Alexander Stephens's "Cornerstone Speech", Savannah, March 21, 1861:
(Jefferson's) ideas, however, were fundamentally wrong. They rested upon the assumption of the equality of races. This was an error.... Our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea; its foundations are laid, its cornerstone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery subordination to the superior race is his natural and normal condition.
In July 1863, as decisive campaigns were fought at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, Republican senator Charles Sumner re-dedicated his speech The Barbarism of Slavery and said that desire to preserve slavery was the sole cause of the war:
[T]here are two apparent rudiments to this war. One is Slavery and the other is State Rights. But the latter is only a cover for the former. If Slavery were out of the way there would be no trouble from State Rights. The war, then, is for Slavery, and nothing else. It is an insane attempt to vindicate by arms the lordship which had been already asserted in debate. With mad-cap audacity it seeks to install this Barbarism as the truest Civilization. Slavery is declared to be the "corner-stone" of the new edifice.
Lincoln's war goals were reactions to the war, as opposed to causes. Abraham Lincoln explained the nationalist goal as the preservation of the Union on August 22, 1862, one month before his preliminary Emancipation Proclamation:
I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored; the nearer the Union will be "the Union as it was." ... My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that.... I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official [101] duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free.
On March 4, 1865, Lincoln said in his Second Inaugural Address that slavery was the cause of the War:
One-eighth of the whole population were colored slaves, not distributed generally over the Union, but localized in the southern part of it. These slaves constituted a peculiar and powerful interest. All knew that this interest was somehow the cause of the war. To strengthen, perpetuate, and extend this interest was the object for which the insurgents would rend the Union even by war, while the Government claimed no right to do more than to restrict the territorial enlargement of it.
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Notes
[1] Elizabeth R. Varon, Bruce Levine, Marc Egnal, and Michael Holt at a plenary session of the organization of American Historians, March 17, 2011, reported by David A. Walsh "Highlights from the 2011 Annual Meeting of the Organization of American Historians in Houston, Texas" HNN online (http:/ / www. hnn. us/ articles/ 137673. html) [2] David Potter, The Impending Crisis, pages 4250 [3] The Mason-Dixon Line and the Ohio River were key boundaries. [4] Fehrenbacher pp.1517. Fehrenbacher wrote, "As a racial caste system, slavery was the most distinctive element in the southern social order. The slave production of staple crops dominated southern agriculture and eminently suited the development of a national market economy." [5] Fehrenbacher pp. 1618 [6] Goldstone p. 13 [7] McDougall p. 318 [8] Forbes p. 4 [9] Mason pp. 34 [10] Freehling p.144 [11] Freehling p. 149. In the House the votes for the Tallmadge amendments in the North were 8610 and 80-14 in favor, while in the South the vote to oppose was 661 and 64-2. [12] Missouri Compromise (http:/ / www. loc. gov/ rr/ program/ bib/ ourdocs/ Missouri. html) [13] Forbes pp. 67 [14] Mason p. 8 [15] Leah S. Glaser, "United States Expansion, 18001860" (http:/ / www. vcdh. virginia. edu/ solguide/ VUS06/ essay06c. html) [16] Richard J. Ellis, Review of The Shaping of American Liberalism: The Debates over Ratification, Nullification, and Slavery. by David F. Ericson, William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 51, No. 4 (1994), pp. 826829 [17] John Tyler, Life Before the Presidency (http:/ / www. millercenter. virginia. edu/ index. php/ Ampres/ essays/ tyler/ biography/ 2) [18] Jane H. Pease, William H. Pease, "The Economics and Politics of Charleston's Nullification Crisis", Journal of Southern History, Vol. 47, No. 3 (1981), pp. 335362 [19] Remini, Andrew Jackson, v2 pp. 136137. Niven pg. 135137. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War pg 143 [20] Craven pg.65. Niven pg. 135137. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War pg 143 [21] Ellis, Richard E. The Union at Risk: Jacksonian Democracy, States' Rights, and the Nullification Crisis (1987), page 193; Freehling, William W. Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Crisis in South Carolina 18161836. (1965), page 257 [22] Ellis p. 193. Ellis further notes that Calhoun and the nullifiers were not the first southerners to link slavery with states rights. At various points in their careers, John Taylor, John Randolph, and Nathaniel Macon had warned that giving too much power to the federal government, especially on such an open-ended issue as internal improvement, could ultimately provide it with the power to emancipate slaves against their owners wishes. [23] Jon Meacham (2009), American Lion: Andrew Jackson in the White House, p. 247; Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, Vol. V, p. 72. [24] Varon (2008) p. 109. Wilentz (2005) p. 451 [25] Miller (1995) pp. 144146 [26] Miller (1995) pp. 209210 [27] Wilentz (2005) pp. 470472 [28] Miller, 112 [29] Miller, pp. 476, 479481 [30] Huston p. 41. Huston writes, "...on at least three matters southerners were united. First, slaves were property. Second, the sanctity of southerners' property rights in slaves was beyond the questioning of anyone inside or outside of the South. Third, slavery was the only means of adjusting social relations properly between Europeans and Africans." [31] Brinkley, Alan (1986). American History: A Survey. New York: McGraw-Hill. pp.328. [32] Moore, Barrington (1966). Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. New York: Beacon Press. pp.117. [33] North, Douglas C. (1961). The Economic Growth of the United States 17901860. Englewood Cliffs. pp.130. [34] Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Eugene D. Genovese, Slavery in White and Black: Class and Race in the Southern Slaveholders' New World Order (2008) [35] James M. McPherson, "Antebellum Southern Exceptionalism: A New Look at an Old Question", Civil War History 29 (Sept. 1983) [36] "Conflict and Collaboration: Yeomen, Slaveholders, and Politics in the Antebellum South", Social History 10 (October 1985): 27398. quote at p. 297. [37] Thornton, Politics and Power in a Slave Society: Alabama, 18001860 (Louisiana State University Press, 1978) [38] McPherson (2007) pp.47. James M. McPherson wrote in referring to the Progressive historians, the Vanderbilt agrarians, and revisionists writing in the 1940s, While one or more of these interpretations remain popular among the Sons of Confederate Veterans and other Southern heritage groups, few historians now subscribe to them. [39] Craig in Woodworth, ed. The American Civil War: A Handbook of Literature and Research (1996), p.505. [40] Donald 2001 pp 13438
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References
Craven, Avery. The Coming of the Civil War (1942) ISBN 0-226-11894-0 Donald, David Herbert, Baker, Jean Harvey, and Holt, Michael F. The Civil War and Reconstruction. (2001) Ellis, Richard E. The Union at Risk: Jacksonian Democracy, States' Rights and the Nullification Crisis. (1987) Fehrenbacher, Don E. The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the United States Government's Relations to Slavery. (2001) ISBN 1-195-14177-6 Forbes, Robert Pierce. The Missouri Compromise and ItAftermath: Slavery and the Meaning of America. (2007) ISBN 978-0-8078-3105-2 Freehling, William W. Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Crisis in South Carolina 18161836. (1965) ISBN 0-19-507681-8 Freehling, William W. The Road to Disunion: Secessionists at Bay 17761854. (1990) ISBN 0-19-505814-3 Freehling, William W. and Craig M. Simpson, eds. Secession Debated: Georgia's Showdown in 1860 (1992), speeches Hesseltine; William B. ed. The Tragic Conflict: The Civil War and Reconstruction (1962), primary documents
Huston, James L. Calculating the Value of the Union: Slavery, Property Rights, and the Economic Origins of the Civil War. (2003) ISBN 0-8078-2804-1 Mason, Matthew. Slavery and Politics in the Early American Republic. (2006) ISBN 13:978-0-8078-3049-9 McDonald, Forrest. States' Rights and the Union: Imperium in Imperio, 17761876. (2000)
Origins of the American Civil War McPherson, James M. This Mighty Scourge: Perspectives on the Civil War. (2007) Miller, William Lee. Arguing About Slavery: John Quincy Adams and the Great Battle in the United States Congress. (1995) ISBN 0-394-56922-9 Niven, John. John C. Calhoun and the Price of Union (1988) ISBN 0-8071-1451-0 Perman, Michael, ed. Major Problems in Civil War & Reconstruction (2nd ed. 1998) primary and secondary sources. Remini, Robert V. Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Freedom, 18221832,v2 (1981) ISBN 0-06-014844-6 Stampp, Kenneth, ed. The Causes of the Civil War (3rd ed 1992), primary and secondary sources. Varon, Elizabeth R. Disunion: The Coming of the American Civil War, 17891859. (2008) ISBN 978-0-8078-3232-5 Wakelyn; Jon L. ed. Southern Pamphlets on Secession, November 1860 April 1861 (1996) Wilentz, Sean. The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln. (2005) ISBN 0-393-05820-4
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Further reading
Historiography
Ayers, Edward L. What Caused the Civil War? Reflections on the South and Southern History (2005). 222 pp. Beale, Howard K., "What Historians Have Said About the Causes of the Civil War", Social Science Research Bulletin 54, 1946. Boritt, Gabor S. ed. Why the Civil War Came (1996) Childers, Christopher. "Interpreting Popular Sovereignty: A Historiographical Essay", Civil War History Volume 57, Number 1, March 2011 pp. 4870 in Project MUSE (http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/civil_war_history/v057/ 57.1.childers.html) Crofts Daniel. Reluctant Confederates: Upper South Unionists in the Secession Crisis (1989), pp 35382 and 457-80 Etcheson, Nicole. "The Origins of the Civil War", History Compass 2005 #3 (North America) Foner, Eric. "The Causes of the American Civil War: Recent Interpretations and New Directions". In Beyond the Civil War Synthesis: Political Essays of the Civil War Era, edited by Robert P. Swierenga, 1975. Kornblith, Gary J., "Rethinking the Coming of the Civil War: A Counterfactual Exercise". Journal of American History 90.1 (2003): 80 pars. detailed historiography; online version (http://www.historycooperative.org/ journals/jah/90.1/kornblith.html) Pressly, Thomas. Americans Interpret Their Civil War (1966), sorts historians into schools of interpretation SenGupta, Gunja. Bleeding Kansas: A Review Essay. Kansas History 24 (Winter 2001/2002): 318341. (http:// www.kshs.org/publicat/history/2001winter_sengupta.pdf) Tulloch, Hugh. The Debate On the American Civil War Era (Issues in Historiography) (2000) Woodworth, Steven E. ed. The American Civil War: A Handbook of Literature and Research (1996), 750 pages of historiography; see part IV on Causation.
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Ramsdell, Charles W. "The Natural Limits of Slavery Expansion", Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 16 (Sept. 1929), 15171, in JSTOR (http://www.jstor.org/pss/30235318); says slavery had almost reached its outer limits of growth by 1860, so war was unnecessary to stop further growth. online version without footnotes (http:// web.archive.org/web/20080605153248/http://edweb.tusd.k12.az.us/uhs/website/Courses/APUSH/1st Sem/Articles Semester 1/Artiles Semester 1/Ramsdell.htm)
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Slavery as cause
Ashworth, John Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in the Antebellum Republic. (1995) "Free labor, wage labor, and the slave power: republicanism and the Republican party in the 1850s", in Melvyn Stokes and Stephen Conway (eds), The Market Revolution in America: Social, Political and Religious Expressions, 18001880, pp.12846. (1996) Donald, David et al. The Civil War and Reconstruction (latest edition 2001); 700-page survey Fellman, Michael et al. This Terrible War: The Civil War and its Aftermath (2003), 400-page survey Foner, Eric Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: the Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War. (1970, 1995) stress on ideology Politics and Ideology in the Age of the Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press. (1981) Freehling, William W. The Road to Disunion: Secessionists at Bay, 17761854 1991., emphasis on slavery Gienapp William E. The Origins of the Republican Party, 18521856 (1987) Manning, Chandra. What This Cruel War Was Over: Soldiers, Slavery, and the Civil War. New York: Vintage Books (2007). McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. (1988), major overview, neoabolitionist emphasis on slavery Morrison, Michael. Slavery and the American West: The Eclipse of Manifest Destiny and the Coming of the Civil War (1997) Ralph E. Morrow. "The Proslavery Argument Revisited", The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 48, No. 1. (June, 1961), pp.7994. in JSTOR (http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0161-391X(196106)48:1<79:TPAR>2.0. CO;2-S) Rhodes, James Ford History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 to the McKinley-Bryan Campaign of 1896 Volume: 1. (1920), highly detailed narrative 185056. vol 2 185660; emphasis on slavery Schlesinger, Arthur Jr. "The Causes of the Civil War" (1949) reprinted in his The Politics of Hope (1963); reintroduced new emphasis on slavery Stampp, Kenneth M. America in 1857: A Nation on the Brink (1990) Stampp, Kenneth M. And the War Came: The North and the Secession Crisis, 18601861 (1950).
External links
Civil War and Reconstruction: Jensen's Guide to WWW Resources (http://tigger.uic.edu/~rjensen/civwar. htm) Report of the Brown University Steering Committee on Slavery and Justice (http://www.brown.edu/Research/ Slavery_Justice/documents/SlaveryAndJustice.pdf) State by state popular vote for president in 1860 election (http://www.multied.com/elections/1860Pop.html) Tulane course article on 1860 election (http://www.tulane.edu/~latner/Background/BackgroundElection. html) Tulane course article on Fort Sumter (http://www.tulane.edu/~sumter/) Onuf, Peter. "Making Two Nations: The Origins of the Civil War" 2003 speech (http://www.albany.edu/ talkinghistory/index.html) The Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History (http://www.gilderlehrman.org) CivilWar.com (http://www.civilwar.com) Many source materials, including states' secession declarations. Causes of the Civil War (http://civilwarcauses.org) Collection of primary documents Declarations of Causes of Seceding States (http://civilwarcauses.org/reasons.htm)
Origins of the American Civil War Alexander H. Stephens' Cornerstone Address (http://civilwartalk.com/cwt_alt/resources/documents/ cornerstone_addy.htm) An entry from Alexander Stephens' diary, dated 1866, reflecting on the origins of the Civil War. (http://www. adena.com/adena/usa/cw/cw223.htm) The Arguments of the Constitutional Unionists in 185051 (http://muse.jhu.edu/demo/civil_war_history/ v046/46.4huston.html) Shmoop US History: Causes of the Civil War (http://www.shmoop.com/intro/history/us/ causes-of-the-civil-war.html) study guide, dates, trivia, multimedia, teachers' guide Booknotes interview with Stephen B. Oates on The Approaching Fury: Voices of the Storm, 18201861, April 27, 1997. (http://www.booknotes.org/Watch/80568-1/Stephen+Oates.aspx)
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Background
Secession
On December 20, 1860, shortly after Abraham Lincoln's victory in the presidential election of 1860, South Carolina adopted an ordinance declaring its secession from the United States of America and by February 1861, six more Southern states had adopted similar ordinances of secession. On February 7, the seven states adopted a provisional constitution for the Confederate States of America and established their temporary capital at Montgomery, Alabama. A February peace conference met in Washington, D.C., but failed to resolve the crisis. The remaining eight slave
Battle of Fort Sumter states rejected pleas to join the Confederacy.[1] The seceding states seized numerous Federal properties within their boundaries, including buildings, arsenals, and fortifications. President James Buchanan protested but took no military action in response. Buchanan was concerned that an overt action could cause the remaining slave states to leave the Union, and while he acknowledged there was no constitutional authority for a state to secede, he could find no constitutional authority for him to act to prevent it.[2]
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objected.[3] Major Robert Anderson of the 1st U.S. Artillery regiment had been appointed to command the Charleston garrison that fall because of rising tensions. A native of Kentucky, he was a protg of Winfield Scott, the general in chief of the Army, and was thought more capable of handling a crisis than the garrison's previous commander, Col. John L. Gardner, who was nearing retirement. Anderson had served an earlier tour of duty at Fort Moultrie and his father had been a defender of the fort (then called Fort Sullivan) during the American Revolutionary War. Throughout the fall, South Carolina authorities considered both secession and the expropriation of Federal property in the harbor to be inevitable. As tensions mounted, the environment around the fort increasingly resembled a siege, to the point that the South Carolina authorities placed picket ships to observe the movements of the troops and threatened violence when forty rifles were transferred to one of the harbor forts from the U.S. arsenal in the city.[4] In contrast to Moultrie, Fort Sumter dominated the entrance to Charleston Harbor and, though unfinished, was designed to be one of the strongest fortresses in the world. In the fall of 1860 work was nearly done, but the fortress was thus far garrisoned by a single soldier, who functioned as a lighthouse keeper, and a small party of civilian construction workers. Under the cover of darkness on December 26, six days after South Carolina declared its secession, Anderson abandoned the indefensible Fort Moultrie, ordering its guns spiked and its gun carriages burned, and surreptitiously relocated his command by small boats to Sumter.[5]
74
75
76
Battle of Fort Sumter considered this reply to be too conditional and wrote a reply, which he handed to Anderson at 3:20 a.m.: "Sir: by authority of Brigadier General Beauregard, commanding the Provisional Forces of the Confederate States, we have the honor to notify you that he will open fire of his batteries on Fort Sumter in one hour from this time." Anderson escorted the officers back to their boat, shook hands with each one, and said "If we never meet in this world again, God grant that we may meet in the next." [21]
77
Bombardment
At 4:30 a.m. on April 12, Lt. Henry S. Farley, acting upon the command of Capt. George S. James, fired a single 10-inch mortar round from Fort Johnson. (James had offered the first shot to Roger Pryor, a noted Virginia secessionist, who declined, saying, "I could not fire the first gun of the war.") The shell exploded over Fort Sumter as a signal to open the general bombardment from 43 guns and mortars at Fort Moultrie, Fort Johnson, the floating battery, and Cummings Point. Under orders from Beauregard, the guns fired in a counterclockwise Bombardment of the Fort by the Confederates. sequence around the harbor, with 2 minutes between each shot; Beauregard wanted to conserve ammunition, which he calculated would last for only 48 hours. Edmund Ruffin, another noted Virginia secessionist, had traveled to Charleston to be present for the beginning of the war, and fired one of the first shots at Sumter after the signal round, a 64-pound shell from the Iron Battery at Cummings Point. The shelling of Fort Sumter from the batteries ringing the harbor awakened Charleston's residents (including diarist Mary Chesnut), who rushed out into the predawn darkness to watch the shells arc over the water and burst inside the fort.[22] Major Anderson held his fire, awaiting daylight. His troops reported for a call at 6 a.m. and then had breakfast. At 7 a.m., Capt. Abner Doubleday fired a shot at the Ironclad Battery at Cummings Point. He missed. Given the available manpower, Anderson could not take advantage of all of his 60 guns. He deliberately avoided using guns that were situated in the fort where casualties were most likely. The fort's best cannons were mounted on the uppermost of its three tiersthe barbette tierwhere his troops were most exposed to incoming fire from overhead. The fort had been designed to withstand a naval assault, and naval warships of the time did not mount guns capable of elevating to shoot over the walls of the fort; however, the land-based cannons manned by the Confederates were capable of landing such indirect fire on Fort Sumter. Fort Sumter's garrison could only safely fire the 21 working guns on the lowest level, which themselves, because they were emplaced in stone, were largely incapable of indirect fire that could seriously threaten Fort Moultrie. Moreover, although the Federals had moved as many of their supplies to Fort Sumter as they could manage, the fort was quite low on ammunition, and was nearly out at the end of the 34-hour bombardment. A more immediate problem was the scarcity of cloth gunpowder cartridges or bags; only 700 were available at the beginning of the battle and workmen sewed frantically to create more, in some cases using socks from Anderson's personal wardrobe. Because of the shortages, Anderson reduced his firing to only six guns: two aimed at Cummings Point, two at Fort Moultrie, and two at the Sullivan's Island batteries.[23] Ships from Fox's relief expedition began to arrive on April 12. Although Fox himself arrived at 3 a.m. on his steamer Baltic, most of the rest of his fleet was delayed until 6 p.m., and one of the two warships, USS Powhatan, never did arrive. Unbeknownst to Fox, it had been ordered to the relief of Fort Pickens in Florida. As landing craft were sent toward the fort with supplies, the artillery fire deterred them and they pulled back. Fox decided to wait until after dark and for the arrival of his warships. The next day, heavy seas made it difficult to load the small boats with men and supplies and Fox was left with the hope that Anderson and his men could hold out until dark on April 13.[24] Although Sumter was a masonry fort, there were wooden buildings inside for barracks and officer quarters. The Confederates targeted these with "hot shot" rounds (cannonballs that had been heated in ovens), starting fires that could prove more dangerous to the men than the explosive artillery. At 7 p.m. on April 12, a rain shower
Battle of Fort Sumter extinguished the flames and at the same time the Union gunners stopped firing for the night. They slept fitfully, concerned about a potential infantry assault against the fort. During the darkness, the Confederates reduced their fire to four shots each hour. The following morning, the full bombardment resumed and the Confederates continued firing hot shot against the wooden buildings. By noon most of the wooden buildings in the fort and the main gate were on fire. The flames moved toward the main ammunition magazine, where 300 barrels of gunpowder were stored. The Union soldiers frantically tried to move the barrels to safety, but two-thirds were left when Anderson judged it was too dangerous and ordered the magazine doors closed. He ordered the remaining barrels thrown into the sea, but the tide kept floating them back together into groups, some of which were ignited by incoming artillery rounds. He also ordered his crews to redouble their efforts at firing, but the Confederates did the same, firing the hot shots almost exclusively. Many of the Confederate soldiers admired the courage and determination of the Yankees. When the fort had to pause its firing, the Confederates often cheered and applauded after the firing resumed and they shouted epithets at some of the nearby Union ships for failing to come to the fort's aid.[25]
78
Surrender
The fort's central flagpole was knocked down at 1 p.m. on April 13, raising doubts among the Confederates about whether the fort was ready to surrender. Col. Louis Wigfall, a former U.S. senator, had been observing the battle and decided that this indicated the fort had had enough punishment. He commandeered a small boat and proceeded from Morris Island, waving a white handkerchief from his sword, dodging incoming rounds from Sullivan's Island. Meeting with Major Fort Sumter Flag Anderson, he said, "You have defended your flag nobly, Sir. You have done all that it is possible to do, and General Beauregard wants to stop this fight. On what terms, Major Anderson, will you evacuate this fort?" Anderson was encouraged that Wigfall had said "evacuate," not "surrender." He was low on ammunition, fires were burning out of control, and his men were hungry and exhausted. Satisfied that they had defended their post with honor, enduring over 3,000 Confederate rounds without losing a man, Anderson agreed to a truce at 2 p.m.[26] Fort Sumter raised Wigfall's white handkerchief on its flagpole as Wigfall departed in his small boat back to Morris Island, where he was hailed as a hero. The handkerchief was spotted in Charleston and a delegation of officers representing BeauregardStephen D. Lee, Porcher Miles, a former mayor of Charleston, and Roger Pryorsailed to Sumter, unaware of Wigfall's visit. Anderson was outraged when these officers disavowed Wigfall's authority, telling him that the former senator had not spoken with Beauregard for two days, and he threatened to resume firing. Meanwhile, General Beauregard himself had finally seen the handkerchief and sent a second set of officers, offering essentially the same terms that Wigfall had presented, so the agreement was reinstated.[27] The Union garrison surrendered the fort to Confederate personnel at 2:30 p.m., April 14. No one from either side was killed during the bombardment. During the 100-gun salute to the U.S. flagAnderson's one condition for withdrawala pile of cartridges blew up from a spark, killing Private Daniel Hough instantly and seriously injuring the rest of the gun crew, one mortally (Private Edward Gallway); these were the first fatalities of the war.[28] The salute was stopped at fifty shots. Gallway and another injured crewman were sent to the hospital in Charleston, where Gallway died a few days later. Union troops were placed aboard a Confederate steamer, the Isabel, where they spent the night and were transported the next morning to Fox's relief ship Baltic, resting outside the harbor bar.[29] Anderson carried the Fort Sumter Flag with him North, where it became a widely known symbol of the battle, and rallying point for supporters of the Union.[30]
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Aftermath
The bombardment of Fort Sumter was the first military action of the American Civil War. Following the surrender, Northerners rallied behind Lincoln's call for all states to send troops to recapture the forts and preserve the Union. With the scale of the rebellion apparently small so far, Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers for 90 days.[31] Some Northern states filled their quotas quickly. There were so many volunteers in Ohio that within 16 days they could have met the full call for 75,000 men by themselves.[32] Other governors from border states were undiplomatic in their responses. For example, Gov. Claiborne Jackson wrote, "Not one man will the state of Missouri furnish to carry on any such unholy crusade", and Gov. Beriah Magoffin wrote, Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern states.[33] The governors of other states still in the Union were equally unsupportive. The call for 75,000 troops triggered the secession of four additional states to join the Confederacy.[34] The ensuing war lasted four years, effectively ending in April 1865, with the surrender of General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia.[35]
Charleston Harbor was completely in Confederate hands for almost the entire four-year duration of the war, leaving a hole in the Union naval blockade. Union forces conducted major operations in 1862 and 1863 to capture Charleston, first overland on James Island (the Battle of Secessionville, June 1862), then by naval assault against Fort Sumter (the First Battle of Charleston Harbor, April 1863), then by seizing the Confederate artillery positions on Morris Island (beginning with the Second Battle of Fort Wagner, July 1863, and followed by a siege until September). After pounding Sumter to rubble with artillery fire, a final amphibious operation attempted to occupy it (the Second Battle of Fort Sumter, September 1863), but was repulsed and no further attempts were made. The Confederates evacuated Fort Sumter and Charleston in February 1865 as Union Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman outflanked the city in the Carolinas Campaign. On April 14, 1865, four years to the day after lowering the Fort Sumter Flag in surrender, Robert Anderson (by then a major general, although ill and in retired status) returned to the ruined fort to raise the flag he had lowered in 1861.[36] Two of the cannons used at Fort Sumter were later presented to Louisiana State University by General William Tecumseh Sherman, who was president of the university before the war began.[37]
Notes
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] McPherson, pp. 23535; Davis, pp. 25, 12729. Detzer, pp. 6769; McPherson, pp. 24648. Burton, pp. 45; Detzer, pp. 2931; Davis, p. 120. Welcher, p. 699; Burton, pp. 6, 8; Detzer, pp. 12, 8283; Davis, p. 120. Detzer, pp. 11020; Davis, pp. 12122. Detzer, p. 78. Detzer, p. 78; Burton, p. 7. "Fort Sumter National Monument" (http:/ / www. cr. nps. gov/ history/ online_books/ hh/ 12/ hh12b. htm). National Park Service. . Retrieved March 10, 2011. [9] Detzer, pp. 13136; Eicher, Longest Night, p. 35; Burton, pp. 1216: The weapons in the arsenal consisted of 18,000 muskets, 3,400 rifles, over 1,000 pistols, and a few artillery pieces, including five 24-pound field howitzers. [10] McPherson, pp. 26466; Burton, pp. 1720; Detzer, pp. 15561; Welcher, p. 699. [11] Welcher, p. 699.
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References
Burton, E. Milby. The Siege of Charleston 18611865. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1970. ISBN 0-87249-345-8. Davis, William C., and the Editors of Time-Life Books. Brother against Brother: The War Begins. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983. ISBN 0-8094-4700-2. Detzer, David. Allegiance: Fort Sumter, Charleston, and the Beginning of the Civil War. New York: Harcourt, 2001. ISBN 0-15-100641-5. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Eicher, John H., and David J. Eicher. Civil War High Commands. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-8047-3641-3. Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide. 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. Oxford History of the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. ISBN 0-19-503863-0. Ripley, Warren. "War's First Death Accidental." In The Civil War at Charleston, edited by Arthur M. Wilcox and Warren Ripley. 16th ed. Charleston, SC: Evening-Post Publishing Co., 1992. OCLC636046368. Ward, Geoffrey C., Ken Burns, and Ric Burns. The Civil War, an Illustrated History. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990. ISBN 978-0-394-56285-8. Welcher, Frank J. The Union Army, 18611865 Organization and Operations. Vol. 1, The Eastern Theater. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989. ISBN 0-253-36453-1. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/sc001.htm)
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Further reading
Chesnut, Mary, Diary of Mary Chesnut (http://docsouth.unc.edu/southlit/chesnut/maryches.html). Fairfax, VA: D. Appleton and Company, 1905. OCLC287696932. Doubleday, Abner. Reminiscences of Forts Sumter and Moultrie in 186061 (http://www.pddoc.com/ skedaddle/articles/sumter_and_moultrie.htm). New York: Harper and Brothers, 1876. OCLC1320168. Hatcher, Richard W. "The Problem in Charleston Harbor: Fort Sumter and the Opening Shots of the Civil War." (http://www.civilwar.org/hallowed-ground-magazine/winter-2010/problem-in-charleston-harbor.html) Hallowed Ground Magazine (Civil War Trust), Winter 2010. Hendrickson, Robert. Sumter: The First Day of the Civil War. New York: Promontory Press, 1996. ISBN 0-88394-095-7. Klein, Maury. Days of Defiance: Sumter, Secession, and the Coming of the Civil War: New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997. ISBN 0-679-44747-4.
External links
Fort Sumter National Monument (http://www.nps.gov/fosu/) National Park Service Historical Handbook (http://www.cr.nps.gov/history/online_books/hh/12/index.htm) Battle of Fort Sumter (http://www.civilwar.org/fortsumter): Maps, histories, photos, and preservation news (CWPT) Crisis at Fort Sumter (http://www.tulane.edu/~sumter/index.html) Details of requests for surrender prior to the battle (http://www.civilwarhome.com/CMHsumter.htm) Discussion of transfer of federal property within state boundaries (http://www.civilwarhome.com/ sumterownership.htm) Newspaper coverage of the Battle of Fort Sumter (http://www.newsinhistory.com/feature/ dramatic-newspaper-coverage-battle-fort-sumter-attack-began-civil-war)
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Background
On April 15, 1861, the day after the U.S. Army surrendered Fort Sumter in the harbor Charleston, South Carolina to Confederate forces, President Abraham Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers to reclaim federal property and to suppress the rebellion begun by the seven Deep South states which had formed the Confederate States of America (Confederacy). Four Upper South States, including Virginia, refused to furnish troops for this purpose and began the process of secession from the Union with the intent of joining the Confederacy.[2] On April 17, 1861, the Virginia Secession Convention began in Richmond, Virginia for the purpose of considering the secession of Virginia. A majority of the delegates immediately passed an ordinance of secession and authorized the governor to call for volunteers to join the military forces of Virginia to defend the state against Federal military action.[3] Virginia Governor John Letcher appointed Robert E. Lee as commander in chief of Virginias army and navy forces on April 22, 1861 at the grade of major general.[3] On April 24, Virginia and the Confederate States agreed that the Virginia
Battle of Fairfax Court House (June 1861) forces would be under the overall direction of the Confederate President pending completion of the process of Virginia joining the Confederate States.[3] These actions effectively took Virginia out of the Union despite the scheduling of a popular vote on the question of secession for May 23, 1861. The popular vote of May 23, 1861 ratified the secession of Virginia. Virginia Governor Letcher issued a proclamation officially transferring Virginia forces to the Confederacy on June 6, 1861.[4] Major General Lee, as commander of the state forces, issued an order in compliance with the proclamation on June 8, 1861.[4] On May 31, 1861, about 210 Virginia (soon to be Confederate) soldiers, occupied Fairfax Court House, about 13.5 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) west of Washington, D.C.[5] These were 120 cavalrymen in two companies, the Prince William cavalry and the Rappahannock cavalry, which then had about 60 men each, and about 90 infantrymen in a company known as the Warrenton Rifles.[6] Fairfax Court House was a village with about 300 inhabitants and the county seat of Fairfax County, Virginia.[7] Confederate Lt. Col. Richard S. Ewell, who had recently resigned as a captain of cavalry in the United States Army was in command of this largely untrained and ill-equipped force.[7] He had only just arrived in town and met a few officers but had not been introduced to the enlisted men.[7] Captain John Q. Marr commanded the Warrenton Rifles.[7] On the night of May 31, 1861, only two pickets were posted on the road east of town because little threat of attack from Federal forces who were no closer than 8 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) away was expected.[7] The small Virginia force had taken this advanced position to help protect against the discovery of the build up of Confederate forces at Manassas Junction, Virginia, a railroad junction about 10 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) farther to the south.[8][9] On the same day, Brigadier General David Hunter gave verbal orders to Lieutenant Charles Henry Tompkins of the 2nd U.S. Cavalry Regiment to gather information about the numbers and location of Confederate forces in the area. Hunter's instructions about entering Fairfax Court House were vague but he seemed to encourage a probe into town to discover more information.[10] At about 10:30 p.m. on the night of May 31, 1861, Tompkins led a Union force of between 50 and 86 regular army cavalrymen, dragoons and a few volunteers from Camp Union at Falls Church, Virginia, on the ordered reconnaissance mission in the direction of Fairfax Court House.[11]
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Battle
At about 3:00 a.m. on the especially dark early morning of June 1, 1861, one of the Confederate pickets, Private A. B. Francis, ran into the town of Fairfax Court House shouting that the enemy was upon them.[12] The other picket, B. F. Florence, had been captured.[10] A few of the Prince William cavalry tried to form a battle line in the street while others ran for their horses.[13] As the Union force arrived on the Falls Church Road, most of the Confederate cavalrymen fled, leaving four of the Prince William cavalrymen in the street to be taken prisoner.[13] Captain Marr moved his men into a clover field west of the Methodist church where they had been camped, just off Little River Turnpike, and formed them into two battle lines.[13] Fleeing Confederate cavalrymen from Prince William came upon them and in the dark, some of Marr's men fired at them, wounding one of their own cavalrymen in the process.[13] The Rappahannock cavalrymen had few weapons and no ammunition so they also fled forthwith when the Union soldiers arrived.[13] According to several accounts, Captain Marr challenged the riders, asking something like "What cavalry is that?" These would have been his last words. Scattered shots were fired as the Union cavalry rode through and Captain Marr fell dead.[14][15] Some other accounts say he was killed while scouting out a better position for his men a little distance away from their line and do not mention a challenge to the Union horsemen. Whether he had moved up to challenge the Union riders or to scout out a better position for his company as some accounts suggest, Marr was not in the immediate presence or line of sight of any of his men on the very dark night when he fell in the dense field..[16] Soon, no one knew where he was or what may have happened to him.[16] His body was found in the clover field later in the morning.[17] The Union force road west through town firing some shots at random.[13] According to many of the accounts of the battle, the Union troopers fired at a man emerging from the hotel in town, who happened to be Lt. Col. Ewell, and
Battle of Fairfax Court House (June 1861) wounded him in the shoulder.[13][18] Regardless of the exact location where Ewell was wounded, he was first Confederate field grade officer wounded in the war.[19] After the initial flurry of activity, the flight of the Prince William cavalrymen and the ride on through town by the Union force, the men of the Warrenton Rifles infantry company realized that Captain Marr was no longer present.[13] As noted, Marr in fact was already lying dead in the clover field nearby, the first Confederate combat casualty of the war.[13] Most historians have concluded that he was struck by one of the random shots fired by the Union horsemen on their first ride through town.[13][20][21] The company was temporarily leaderless after Marr fell because the two lieutenants were on leave and Ewell had not yet arrived on the scene.[13] Former and subsequent Virginia governor and later major general William "Extra Billy" Smith, who had just resigned his seat in the U.S. Congress, then emerged with his rifle from the house where he was staying on his trip back home to Warrenton from Washington, D.C. Smith, at the time a 64-year old civilian, was from Warrenton, had helped recruit the company and knew many of the men. So he took charge of the company despite his lack of military training or experience.[22] Ewell soon arrived but Governor Smith had to assure the men that Ewell was who he said he was, the Confederate officer in command, before they would follow him. Ewell then placed the approximately 40 men of the Warrenton Rifles that he found at the edge of the clover field between the hotel and the courthouse (or the Episcopal Church).[23] where they were able to turn the Union force back to the west with a volley as the cavalrymen approached the Confederate position on their return trip through town.[23][24] The Virginians were not in a good position to defend themselves, however, and after Ewell presently went to find a courier to go for reinforcements, Smith moved the men to a more defensible position behind rail fences about 100 yards closer to the turnpike.[22][25] Civilians, mostly sheltered in buildings, joined in the shooting at the Union horsemen. This may have contributed to Tompkins's inflation of the number of men his force had encountered.[26][27] After having been driven back once by a volley from the Warrenton Rifles and civilian volunteers, the Union force tried to come back through town again. The Warrenton men again forced them to retreat with another three volleys.[22][10] During the exchange of fire, Lieutenant Tompkins had two horses shot from under him. One fell on and injured his foot.[22] The Confederates fired additional volleys at the Federals as they tried to pass through town again on their way back to their base at Camp Union near Falls Church, Virginia.[10] After this third failed attempt to ride through town past the Confederates,[28] the Union cavalrymen were forced to leave town through fields toward Flint Hill in the Oakton area of Fairfax County to the north of the City of Fairfax and return to Camp Union by a longer route.[29] The Confederates initially reported casualties in the affair of one dead (Captain Marr), four (later reduced to two) wounded (including Lt. Col. Ewell) and one missing.[17] A later Confederate account states that only two were wounded, but five were captured, which is in accord with the Union account which states five prisoners were taken and actually names them.[22] The Union force reported one killed, four wounded (including Lt. Tompkins) and one missing. The Union soldier killed was identified as Private Saintclair.[30] The Confederates stated that they took three prisoners and recent accounts agree.[27][31] The Union force also had lost 9 horses killed and 4 wounded.[22][32][33][34]
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Aftermath
Besides the loss of Captain Marr, Confederate commanders, including Brigadier General Milledge Luke Bonham who was in overall command of the area,[35] were unhappy about the lack of arms and ammunition which precipitated the flight of the Confederate cavalry.[36] Union General-in-Chief Winfield Scott was displeased at Tompkins impetuous charge which Scott thought exceeded his orders to scout the Confederate positions and by the fact that Tompkins spoke to newspaper reporters before he even filed his report on the action.[37] Maj. Gen. McDowell praised Tompkins's gallantry but also criticized Tompkins for exceeding orders, without mentioning Brig. Gen. Hunter's role or what Tompkins's exact orders from Hunter were. He also said Tompkins unintentionally frustrated for a time "a more important movement." He also criticized Tompkins for speaking to the press before he
Battle of Fairfax Court House (June 1861) had even filed a report.[38][39] Neither the reports by the participants nor the contemporary accounts in the newspapers about this battle were entirely accurate since both sides inflated the number of men on the other side and the number of casualties their force inflicted on the other side, at least initially.[36] Because the war had just begun and no major battles had been fought, any sort of battle was given undue attention at this stage of the war.[40] Although this battle faded into insignificance after larger Civil War battles with many more casualties were fought, it was notable in several respects, including the occurrence of the first Confederate combat casualty of the war, the first wounding of a field grade officer, an eventual award of a Congressional Medal of Honor for actions at the first combat for which the award was given, the failure to discover the Confederate buildup at Manassas Junction, the delay in Union Army action caused by the inflated report of Confederate strength in the area and the foreshadowing of the thousands of actions of similar type and scale that would occur during the course of the war. Historian Charles Poland, Jr. wrote that the significance of the Battle of Fairfax Court House was not that it was the first land battle of the war or that the first Confederate combat death occurred during the engagement but that it was typical of thousands of other skirmishes that occurred throughout the American Civil War. He also says it was "among the antecedents of the forthcoming first battle at Bull Run."[41][42] In 1893, Charles Henry Tompkins received the Congressional Medal of Honor for his actions at the Battle of Fairfax Court House. His was the first action of a Union Army officer in the American Civil War for which a Congressional Medal of Honor was awarded, although it was not awarded until 32 years later.[38] His citation reads: "Twice charged through the enemy's lines and, taking a carbine from an enlisted man, shot the enemy's captain."[43][44] No other account or source referenced on this page states that Tompkins himself shot Captain Marr.[45] A monument to Captain Marr was erected on June 1, 1904 near the front of the courthouse where it remains today. It reads: "This stone marks the scene of the opening conflict of the war of 18611865, when John Q. Marr, captain of the Warrenton Rifles, who was the first soldier killed in action, fell 800 feet south, 46 degrees West of the spot. June 1, 1861. Erected by the Marr Camp, C.V., June 1, 1904."[10] Several weeks later, on July 17, 1861, Union forces occupied Fairfax Court House as they began their move on Manassas Junction. The Confederates had abandoned the town in the face of the large Union force that was moving toward the first big battlefield of the war.[46] The Union forces moved to Centreville the next day on their way to the preliminary Battle of Blackburn's Ford on July 18, 1861 and the First Battle of Bull Run (Battle of First Manassas) on July 21, 1861. Fairfax Court House and its immediate vicinity would be the scene of several small battles or skirmishes and raids during the war.[47]
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Notes
[1] The Warrenton Rifles would become a company of the Confederate 17th Virginia Volunteer Infantry Regiment later in the month. [2] Hansen, Harry. The Civil War: A History. New York: Bonanza Books, 1961. OCLC500488542. p. 48 [3] Scharf, John Thomas. History of the Confederate States Navy From Its Organization to the Surrender of Its Last Vessel (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=ADMOAAAAIAAJ). New York: Rogers & Sherwood, 1887, p. 39. OCLC317589712. Retrieved February 1, 2011 [4] United States War Dept., Robert Nicholson Scott, et al. The War of the Rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=vo8tAAAAIAAJ) Series I, Volume II. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880. OCLC427057. Retrieved May 14, 2011. p. 911-912. [5] Modern highway driving distance between Fairfax City and Washington, DC is about 18 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km). [6] Poland, Jr., Charles P. The Glories Of War: Small Battle And Early Heroes Of 1861 (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=ELlFs-Lf9jUC). Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2006. ISBN 1-4184-5973-9. p. 249. Retrieved May 10, 2011. pp. 3536 [7] Poland, Jr., 2006, p. 36 [8] Longacre, Edward G. Lincoln's Cavalrymen: A History of the Mounted Forces of the Army of the Potomac. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2000. ISBN 0-8117-1049-1. p. 17 [9] Davis, William C. Battle at Bull Run: A History of the First Major Campaign of the Civil War. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977. ISBN 0-8071-0867-7. p. 33 [10] Poland, 2006, p. 82 [11] Walker, Charles D. Memorial, Virginia Military Institute: Biographical sketches of the Graduates and Eleves of the Virginia Military Institute Who Fell in the War Between the States (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=KcAiAAAAMAAJ). Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott &
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87
References
Crafts, William August. The southern rebellion: being a history of the United States from the Commencement of President Buchanan's administration through the War for the Suppression of the Rebellion (http://books.google. com/books?id=9boVAQAAMAAJ). Vol. 1. Boston, Samuel Walker & Co., 1867]. OCLC6007950. Retrieved May 22, 2011. Davis, William C. Battle at Bull Run: A History of the First Major Campaign of the Civil War. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977. ISBN 0-8071-0867-7. Dyer, Frederick H. A compendium of the War of the Rebellion (http://books.google.com/ books?id=OBkNAQAAMAAJ). pp. 885886. Des Moines, IA: The Dyer Publishing Company, 1908. OCLC181358316. Retrieved May 24, 2011. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Hansen, Harry. The Civil War: A History. New York: Bonanza Books, 1961. OCLC500488542. Longacre, Edward G. Lincoln's Cavalrymen: A History of the Mounted Forces of the Army of the Potomac. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2000. ISBN 0-8117-1049-1. Moore, ed., Frank. The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events (http://books.google.com/ books?id=Xi8OAAAAIAAJ). 11 volumes. Volume 1. New York: G.P. Putnam, D. Van Nostrand, 1861-1863; 1864-68. OCLC2230865. Retrieved May 13, 2011. Pfanz, Donald. Richard S. Ewell: a Soldier's Life. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998. ISBN 0-8078-2389-9. Poland, Jr., Charles P. The Glories Of War: Small Battle And Early Heroes Of 1861 (http://books.google.com/ books?id=ELlFs-Lf9jUC). Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2006. ISBN 1-4184-5973-9. Retrieved May 10, 2011. United States. War Dept, Robert Nicholson Scott, et al. The War of the Rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies (http://books.google.com/books?id=vo8tAAAAIAAJ) Series I, Volume II. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880. OCLC427057. Retrieved May 14, 2011. p. 911-912. "Medal of Honor recipients Civil War (M-Z)" (http://www.history.army.mil/html/moh/civwarmz.html). United States Army Center of Military History. Retrieved 2011-05-15. Walker, Charles D. Memorial, Virginia Military Institute: Biographical sketches of the Graduates and Eleves of the Virginia Military Institute Who Fell in the War Between the States (http://books.google.com/ books?id=KcAiAAAAMAAJ). Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott & Company, 1875. OCLC229174667. Retrieved May 11, 2011.
Battle of Fairfax Court House (June 1861) Wise, George. History of the Seventeenth Virginia Infantry, C. S. A. (http://books.google.com/ books?id=AS77Cym7LL0C). Baltimore: Kelly, Piet and Company, 1870. OCLC1514671. Retrieved May 13, 2011.
88
Background
The U.S. Army surrendered Fort Sumter in the harbor Charleston, South Carolina to Confederate forces on April 14, 1861. The next day, President Abraham Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers to serve for 90 days in order to reclaim federal property and to suppress the rebellion begun by the seven Deep South states which had formed the Confederate States of America (Confederacy). Four Upper South States, including Virginia, refused to furnish troops for this purpose. Instead, political leaders in these states began the process of secession from the Union with the intent of joining the Confederacy.[3] On April 17, 1861, a convention for the purpose of considering the secession of Virginia began in Richmond, Virginia.[4] The convention immediately passed an ordinance of secession and authorized the governor to call for volunteers to join the military forces of Virginia to defend the state against Federal military action.[4] Despite scheduling a popular vote to ultimately determine whether Virginia would secede from the Union, the actions of the Virginia Secession Convention and of the state government, especially Virginia Governor John Letcher, effectively took Virginia out of the Union. Governor Letcher appointed Robert E. Lee, who had just resigned as a colonel in the U.S. Army, as commander in chief of Virginias army and navy forces on April 22, 1861 at the grade of major general.[4] On April 24, 1861, Virginia and the Confederate States agreed that the Virginia forces would be under the overall direction of the Confederate President, Jefferson Davis, pending completion of the process of Virginia joining the Confederate States.[4] The 1st Michigan Volunteer Infantry Regiment, under the command of Colonel Orlando Willcox, was a three-month regiment, the only such regiment from Michigan.[5] The unit was organized at Fort Wayne, Detroit, Michigan, and mustered into United States service on May 1, 1861. The regiment left the State of Michigan for Washington, D.C. on May 13, 1861, reached Washington on May 16, 1861 and occupied Arlington Heights, Virginia and Alexandria, Virginia on May 24, 1861. Orlando Willcox was soon given brigade command. With Willcox in command of the brigade, the regiment was commanded by Major Alonzo F. Bidwell. The 1st Michigan Infantry (90-day) was attached to Orlando Willcox's Brigade, Samuel Heintzelman's Division, Irwin McDowell's Army of Northeastern Virginia. A threeyear regiment with the same regiment number replaced the 90day 1st Michigan Infantry Regiment after the original 1st Michigan Infantry Regiment was mustered out of the Union Army at the end of its term of service. First, however, the 90day men (many of whom reenlisted) would have to fight in the Battle of First Bull Run (Battle of First Manassas).
Battle of Arlington Mills On May 7, 1861 the 11th New York Volunteer Infantry Regiment (1st New York Fire Zouaves) was mustered in to Federal service to serve for the duration of the war, not just for 3 months or a limited period of time. Colonel Elmer E. Ellsworth commanded the regiment. The 11th New York Infantry served in the same brigade as the 1st Michigan Infantry at the First Battle of Bull Run (Battle of First Manassas). The regiment suffered extensive casualties, including many taken prisoner, at the First Battle of Bull Run during the fighting on Henry House Hill and while serving as the rear guard for the retreating Union army. Eventually, on June 2, 1862, after a period of service on guard duty at Newport News, Virginia, near Fort Monroe, the regiment, which had been suffering discipline problems, was mustered out. Many of its remaining members, including men who joined after the First Battle of Bull Run, reenlisted in other regiments. The secession of Virginia was ratified by a popular vote on May 23, 1861. Virginia Governor Letcher issued a proclamation officially transferring Virginia forces to the Confederacy on June 6, 1861. Major General Robert E. Lee, commanding the state forces, issued an order in compliance with the proclamation on June 8, 1861.[6] Despite the presence of Virginia forces in league with the Confederacy in Arlington and Alexandria, Virginia, just across the Potomac River from Washington, D.C., President Lincoln did not wish to make a provocative military move into Virginia until after the popular vote on secession of the state had taken place. In the early morning hours of May 24, 1861, the day after the vote, the 1st Michigan Volunteer Infantry Regiment and the 11th New York Volunteer Infantry Regiment crossed the Long Bridge into Arlington and occupied Arlington Heights. Part of the 1st Michigan Infantry, along with part of the 11th New York Infantry, continued to Alexandria while the other companies of the 11th New York Infantry crossed the Potomac by boat and occupied the town.[7] It was during this operation that Colonel Ellsworth took down a secessionist flag at the Marshall House hotel and was killed by its proprietor James W. Jackson. Jackson, in turn, was immediately killed by Private Francis E. Brownell of Ellsworth's regiment.[8] The 69th New York State Militia, a 90-day regiment, later the 69th Infantry New York State Volunteers (NYSV), under Colonel Michael Corcoran, also participated in the operation, crossing the Potomac River over the Chain Bridge. The Union regiments established camps, performed picket duty and later built part of the defenses of Washington on high ground near the river and up to about five miles (8 km) away from the river. Companies from both the 1st Michigan Infantry under Captain Brown and the 11th New York Infantry under Captain Roth[9] performed picket duty and camped at Arlington Mills, about 5 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) from the Long Bridge at Washington.[10]
89
Battle
On the night of June 1, 1861,[11] Company E of the 1st Michigan Volunteer Infantry Regiment was camped in the Arlington Mill while on picket duty [12] and Company G of the 11th New York Volunteer Infantry Regiment (1st New York Fire Zouaves), having come to relieve them, was in a nearby house. At about 11:00 p.m., a squad of Virginia militia men, which contemporary newspaper accounts stated were only nine in number, approached the Union sentinels and camps and fired a volley. At least one newspaper account at the time stated that in the confusion the Michigan men in the mill and the Zouaves in a nearby house fired on each other as well as at the Virginians.[13] In any event, the Virginians (Confederates) were quickly driven off. The Union forces suffered one killed and one wounded among the New York men while the Confederates suffered one man wounded.[14] The web site of a re-enactor group states with respect to the picket duty performed by the regiment in the early days of the war: "21-year-old Henry S. Cornell of Company G, a member of Engine Co. 13, was killed and another man wounded one night on the picket line."[15] This obviously refers to the affair at Arlington Mills and provides the name of the soldier who was killed in the incident.
90
Aftermath
Following the Battle of Fairfax Court House and the skirmish at Arlington Mills on the same day, the Union Army did not attempt to move farther into northern Virginia until June 17, 1861 when a Union reconnaissance in force led to the Battle of Vienna, Virginia. Historian Charles Poland, Jr. says that the Arlington Mills skirmish and the Battle of Fairfax Court House were "among the antecedents of the forthcoming first battle at Bull Run."[16] The 1st Michigan Volunteer Infantry Regiment fought at the Battle of First Bull Run (Battle of First Manassas) on July 21, 1861.[17][18] The regiment, under Major Bidwell, was mustered out August, 7, 1861. A reorganized 1st Michigan Volunteer Infantry Regiment (3 Years) then was organized at Detroit, Michigan, and mustered into United States service on September 16, 1861.[19] The reorganized regiment served until July, 1865. The 11th New York Volunteer Infantry Regiment (1st New York Fire Zouaves) also fought at the Battle of First Bull Run and suffered many casualties and hundreds taken prisoner as well as some desertions. The regiment was never completely and successfully reorganized and eventually was mustered out of service. Many of its men reenlisted in other New York regiments.
Notes
[1] Arlington Mills, is at Columbia Turnpike as it crosses Four Mile Run. The road had already been built as a through road from the Long Bridge over the Potomac River at Washington, D.C. past the mill to Little River Turnpike. The Arlington Mill - Virginia Historical Markers on Waymarking.com (http:/ / www. waymarking. com/ waymarks/ WM28BB_The_Arlington_Mill) Retrieved June 2, 2011. [2] From that area the Union Army occupied points in Virginia a few miles away from their original areas of occupation on the Potomac River. [3] Hansen, Harry. The Civil War: A History. New York: Bonanza Books, 1961. OCLC500488542. p. 48 [4] Scharf, John Thomas. History of the Confederate States Navy From Its Organization to the Surrender of Its Last Vessel (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=ADMOAAAAIAAJ). New York: Rogers & Sherwood, 1887, p. 39. OCLC317589712. Retrieved February 1, 2011 [5] Threemonth regiments were committed to serve only for a 3month period of time, the length of time for which President Lincoln originally called for volunteers to suppress the rebellion. [6] United States. War Dept, Robert Nicholson Scott, et al. The War of the Rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=vo8tAAAAIAAJ) Series I, Volume II. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880. OCLC427057. Retrieved May 14, 2011. pp. 911912. [7] Dunbar, Willis Frederick and George May. Michigan: a history of the Wolverine State (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=HqGWEAnByeMC). Grand Rapids, MI: Erdmann, 1980. ISBN 978-0-8028-7043-8. Retrieved June 15, 2011. p. 321 [8] Poland, Jr., Charles P. The Glories Of War: Small Battle and Early Heroes Of 1861. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2006. ISBN 1-4184-5973-9. p. 20 [9] The web site of a re-enactor group identifies the first captain of Company G of the 11th New York Volunteer Infantry Regiment as Captain Michael Teagen. (http:/ / www. myrtle-avenue. com/ firezou/ ) [10] Hannings, Bud. Every Day of the Civil War: A Chronological Encyclopedia (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=BC2Qbpa8OjgC). Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2010. ISBN 978-0-7864-4464-9. p. 47. Retrieved May 30, 2011 [11] A brief article in the New York Commercial of June 2, 1861 says the affair took place "shortly before midnight last night." [12] Arlington Mill was a grist mill that had been built in 1836 by George Washington Parke Custis on the Arlington estate where Little River Turnpike crossed Four Mile Run. The Official Records and other sources use the plural "Mills" in reference to the battle. George Washington had built mills on Four Mile Run in this vicinity and some of them still may have been in existence. United States War Dept, Robert Nicholson Scott, et al. The War of the Rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=vo8tAAAAIAAJ). Series I - Volume II. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1880. OCLC460898997. Retrieved June 4, 2011. p. 3 [13] Poland, 2006, p. 83 [14] Hannings, Bud. Every Day of the Civil War: A Chronological Encyclopedia (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=BC2Qbpa8OjgC). Retrieved May 30, 2011. p. 47 [15] (http:/ / www. myrtle-avenue. com/ firezou/ ) [16] Poland, 2006, p. 43
91
References
Arlington Historical Society (http://www.arlingtonhistoricalsociety.org/learn/sites_properties/commercial. html) Retrieved June 5, 2011. The Arlington Mill - Virginia Historical Markers on Waymarking.com (http://www.waymarking.com/ waymarks/WM28BB_The_Arlington_Mill). Retrieved June 2, 2011. The Civil War Archive, Union Regimental Histories, Michigan (http://www.civilwararchive.com/Unreghst/ unmiinf1.htm). Retrieved June 2, 2011. Dunbar, Willis Frederick and George May. Michigan: a history of the Wolverine State (http://books.google. com/books?id=HqGWEAnByeMC). Grand Rapids, MI: Erdmann, 1980. ISBN 978-0-8028-7043-8. Retrieved June 15, 2011. Hannings, Bud. Every Day of the Civil War: A Chronological Encyclopedia (http://books.google.com/ books?id=BC2Qbpa8OjgC). Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2010. ISBN 978-0-7864-4464-9. p. 47. Retrieved May 30, 2011. Hansen, Harry. The Civil War: A History. New York: Bonanza Books, 1961. OCLC500488542. Poland, Jr., Charles P. The Glories Of War: Small Battle and Early Heroes Of 1861. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2006. ISBN 1-4184-5973-9. Scharf, John Thomas. History of the Confederate States Navy From Its Organization to the Surrender of Its Last Vessel (http://books.google.com/books?id=ADMOAAAAIAAJ). New York: Rogers & Sherwood, 1887. OCLC317589712. Retrieved February 1, 2011. United States War Dept, Robert Nicholson Scott, et al. The War of the Rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies (http://books.google.com/books?id=vo8tAAAAIAAJ). Series I Volume II. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1880. OCLC460898997 Retrieved June 4, 2011.
92
Background
In the early morning of May 24, 1861, the day after the secession of Virginia from the Union was ratified by popular vote, Union forces occupied Alexandria, Virginia and Arlington, Virginia, across the Potomac River from Washington, D.C. Union troops occupied the area up to distances of about 5 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) from the river.[1] On June 1, 1861, a small U. S. Regular Army patrol on a scout as far as 8 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) from their post at Camp Union in Falls Church, Virginia rode into Fairfax Court House, Virginia and fought a small and brief battle with part of a company of Virginia militia (soon to be Confederate Army infantry) at the Battle of Fairfax Court House (June 1861).[2] The patrol brought back to the Union Army commanders an exaggerated estimate of Confederate strength at Fairfax Court House. Together with an even smaller affair the same night at a Union outpost in Arlington, the Battle of Arlington Mills,[2] the Fairfax Court House engagement made Union commanders hesitate to extend their bridgehead into Virginia. On June 16, 1861, a Union force of Connecticut infantry under Brig. Gen. Daniel Tyler rode over about 17 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) of the Alexandria, Loudon and Hampshire Railroad line between Alexandria, Virginia and two miles (3km) past Vienna, Virginia. They reported the line clear, although one soldier had been wounded by a shot from ambush.[3] Confederate forces were in the area, however, and it was apparent to Union Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell who was in charge of the department that the railroad would not remain safe without a guard force, especially because he had received information that the Confederates planned to obstruct it.[4][5] On June 17,
Battle of Vienna, Virginia 1861, McDowell sent Brig. Gen. Schenck with the 1st Ohio Infantry under the immediate command of Col. Alexander McDowell McCook[6] to expand the Union position in Fairfax County.[7] Schenck took six companies over the Alexandria, Loudon and Hampshire Railroad line, dropping off detachments to guard railroad bridges between Alexandria, Virginia and Vienna, Virginia. As the train approached Vienna, about 4 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) north of Fairfax Court House and 15 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) from Alexandria, 271 officers and men remained with the train.[6][8][9][10] On the same day, Confederate Col. Gregg took the 6month 1st South Carolina Infantry Regiment, about 575 men, two companies of cavalrymen (about 140 men) and a company of artillery with two artillery pieces (35 men), about 750 men in total, on a scouting mission from Fairfax Court House toward the Potomac River.[4][7][10][11] On their return trip, at about 6:00 p.m., the Confederates heard the train whistle in the distance. Gregg moved his artillery pieces to a curve in the railroad line near Vienna and placed his men around the guns.[7][12] Seeing this disposition, an elderly local Union sympathizer ran down the tracks to warn the approaching train of the hidden Confederate force. The Union officers mostly ignored his warning and the train continued down the track.[7] In response to the warning, an officer was placed on the forward car as a lookout.[13]
93
Battle
The Union soldiers were riding open gondola or platform cars as the train backed down the track toward Vienna.[7] As the train rounded a curve within 0.25 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) of Vienna, one of the men spotted some Confederate cavalrymen on a nearby hill. As the Ohio soldiers prepared to shoot at the horsemen, the Confederates fired their cannons from their hiding place around the curve. The Union force suffered several casualties but were spared from incurring even more by the slightly high initial cannon shots and by quickly jumping from the slowmoving train and either running into nearby woods or moving into protected positions near the cars.[13] Schenck ordered Lieutenant William H. Raynor to go back to the engine and have the engineer take the train out of range in the other direction. Schenck quickly followed Raynor. Raynor had to help loosen the brakes. Because the brakeman had uncoupled most of the cars, the engineer left them. He did not stop for the Union soldiers to catch up but continued all the way back to Alexandria. Schenck now had no means of communication and had to have the wounded men carried back to their camp in blankets by soldiers on foot. The regiment's medical supplies and instruments had been left on the train.[13] Many of the Union infantrymen took shelter behind the cars and tried to return fire against the Confederate force amid a confusion of conflicting orders.[13] McCook reorganized many of them in the woods.[14] The two forces were slightly out of effective musket range and few shots were taken by either side. As darkness fell, the Union force was able to retreat and to elude Confederate cavalry pursuers in the broken terrain. The Confederate pursuit also was apparently called off early due to apprehension that the Union force might be only the advance of a larger body of troops and because the Confederate force was supposed to return to their post that night.[14][15] Confederates took such supplies and equipment as were left behind and burned a passenger car and five platform cars that had been left behind.<ref name="Lossing526"/[16] When the Union commanders at Arlington got word of the attack, they sent wagons to bring back the wounded and the dead but these did not reach the location of the fighting. The next day, a Union sympathizer picked up the bodies of six of the Ohio men and brought them into the Union camp.[16]
94
Aftermath
The Union force suffered casualties of eight soldiers killed and four wounded.[12][13][15] The Confederates reported no casualties. The Union officers were criticized for not sending skirmishers in front of the train which had moved slowly along the track and for disregarding the warning given to them by the local Union sympathizer.[17] The Battle of Vienna followed the Union defeat at the Battle of Big Bethel only a week earlier and historian William C. Davis noted that "the press were much agitated by the minor repulse at Vienna on June 17, and the people were beginning to ask when the Federals would gain some victories."[18] Historian Charles Poland, Jr. says the Battle of Fairfax Court House (June 1861), the Battle of Arlington Mills, the Battle of Vienna, Virginia and several other brief clashes in the area at this time "were among the antecedents of the forthcoming first battle at Bull Run."[19] He also said that the battle has been "cited as the first time the railroad was used in warfare."[16] He no doubt was referring to the use of the railroad for troop movements or involvement in combat or both because some use of railroads for moving ammunition and supplies was made during the Crimean War.[20] Skirmishes took place at Vienna, Virginia on July 9, 1861 and on July 17, 1861 as Union forces began their slow march to Manassas, Virginia and the First Battle of Bull Run (Battle of First Manassas).[21] The railroad, which had eventually become the Washington and Old Dominion Railroad, was abandoned in the 1960s and turned into a trail. The site of the battle is at the crossing of the Washington & Old Dominion Railroad Regional Park and Park Street in Vienna, Virginia.[22]
Notes
[1] Weigley, Russell F. A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 18611865. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000. ISBN 0-253-33738-0. p. 39 [2] Long, E. B. The Civil War Day by Day: An Almanac, 18611865. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971. OCLC68283123. p. 81 [3] Davis, William C. Battle at Bull Run: A History of the First Major Campaign of the Civil War. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977. ISBN 0-8071-0867-7. p. 70 [4] Lossing, Benson John and William Barritt. Pictorial history of the civil war in the United States of America, Volume 1 (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=gmvkkyCLMv8C). Philadelphia, George W. Childs, 1866. OCLC1007582. Retrieved May 1, 2011. p. 525 [5] Tomes, Robert. The War with the South: A History of the Great Rebellion (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=leASAAAAYAAJ). Volume 1. New York: Virtue and Yorston, 18641867. OCLC476284. Retrieved June 11, 2011. p. 323 [6] Crafts, William August. The southern rebellion: being a history of the United States from the Commencement of President Buchanan's administration through the War for the Suppression of the Rebellion (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=9boVAQAAMAAJ). Vol. 1. Boston, Samuel Walker & Co., 1867. OCLC6007950. Retrieved May 22, 2011. p. 235 [7] Poland, Jr., Charles P. The Glories Of War: Small Battle And Early Heroes Of 1861. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2006. ISBN 1-4184-5973-9. p. 44 [8] Poland, 2006, p. 44 says the number was 274. Yet Poland says in a footnote on p. 84 that Schenck left camp with 697 and detached 387 for guard duty, which would have left him with 310 men. Given Eicher's and Davis's number of 271 for the remaining Union force, the 274 number Poland gives on p. 44 should be closer to the correct number of men on the train as it approached Vienna. [9] Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5, p. 78, gives the slightly different figure of 271 men, which actually coincides with General Schenck's report. [10] Davis, 1977, p. 71 [11] United States. War Dept, Robert Nicholson Scott, et al. The War of the Rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=vo8tAAAAIAAJ) Series I, Volume II. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880. OCLC427057. Retrieved May 14, 2011. pp. 128130 [12] Eicher, 2001, p. 78 [13] Poland, 2006, p. 45 [14] Tomes, 18641867, p. 325 [15] Lossing, 1866, p. 526 [16] Poland, 2006, p. 46 [17] Poland, 2006, p. 47 [18] Davis, 1977, p. 72 [19] Poland, 2006, p. 43
95
References
Crafts, William August. The southern rebellion: being a history of the United States from the Commencement of President Buchanan's administration through the War for the Suppression of the Rebellion (http://books.google. com/books?id=9boVAQAAMAAJ). Vol. 1. Boston, Samuel Walker & Co., 1867. OCLC6007950. Retrieved May 22, 2011. Davis, William C. Battle at Bull Run: A History of the First Major Campaign of the Civil War. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977. ISBN 0-8071-0867-7. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Long, E. B. The Civil War Day by Day: An Almanac, 18611865. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971. OCLC68283123. Lossing, Benson John and William Barritt. Pictorial history of the civil war in the United States of America, Volume 1 (http://books.google.com/books?id=gmvkkyCLMv8C). Philadelphia, George W. Childs, 1866. OCLC1007582. Retrieved May 1, 2011. Poland, Jr., Charles P. The Glories Of War: Small Battle And Early Heroes Of 1861]. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2006. ISBN 1-4184-5973-9. Tomes, Robert. The War with the South: A History of the Great Rebellion (http://books.google.com/ books?id=leASAAAAYAAJ). Volume 1. New York: Virtue and Yorston, 18641867. OCLC476284. Retrieved June 11, 2011. United States. War Dept, Robert Nicholson Scott, et al. The War of the Rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies (http://books.google.com/books?id=vo8tAAAAIAAJ) Series I, Volume II. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880. OCLC427057. Retrieved May 14, 2011. Weigley, Russell F. A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 18611865. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000. ISBN 0-253-33738-0.
96
Battle Sequence
On July 2, Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson's division crossed the Potomac River near Williamsport, Maryland and marched on the main road to Martinsburg. Near Hoke's Run, the Union brigades of Cols. John J. Abercrombie and George H. Thomas encountered regiments of Col. Thomas J. Jackson's Confederate brigade, driving them back slowly. Jackson accomplished his orders to delay the Federal advance, withdrawing before Patterson's larger force.
Casualties
Figures vary. The National Park Service quotes Union as 23 and Confederate as 91 (without differentiating types of casualties).[3] Kennedy cites 75 Union deaths and 25 Confederate deaths.[4] In his Official Report, Major-General Robert Patterson states the number of Confederate deaths as "over sixty"[5] but does not describe Union casualties. After the time for propagandizing the casualty figures ended, the following Union regiments precisely reported the sacrifices of their comrades-in-arms: First Wisconsin Infantry: 1 killed, 5 wounded, 1 captured[6] Eleventh Pennsylvania Infantry: 1 killed, 10 wounded, none captured[7] Fifteenth Pennsylvania Infantry: 1 wounded, 35 captured (six of whom died in Confederate prisons within nine months)[8]
Aftermath
On July 3, Patterson occupied Martinsburg, but made no further aggressive moves until July 15, when he marched to Bunker Hill. Instead of moving on Winchester, however, Patterson turned east to Charles Town and then withdrew to Harpers Ferry. Patterson's retrograde movement took pressure off Confederate forces in the Shenandoah Valley and allowed Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston's Army of the Shenandoah to march to support Brig. Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard at Manassas Junction. Following the stunning Union defeat at the First Battle of Bull Run on July 21, the Union commander at Hoke's Run, General Robert Patterson, was assigned popular blame without participating while the Confederate commander at Hoke's Run was assigned glory for his actions during the first major battle of the War; thereafter, the two commanders and two engagements, one a brief skirmish and the other a major battle, cannot be uncoupled in retroanalysis.
97
References
[1] High, Mike. "The C&O Canal Companion" (http:/ / www. press. jhu. edu/ books/ supplemental/ canal/ mile94fallingwaters. html). Johns Hopkins University. . Retrieved 2 March 2012. [2] Johnston, General Joseph E. "Official Report, Manassas Campaign" (http:/ / www. civilwarhome. com/ johnston1stmanassas. htm). . Retrieved 29 February 2012. [3] National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior. "Battle Summary: Hoke's Run, WV" (http:/ / www. nps. gov/ hps/ abpp/ battles/ wv002. htm). . Retrieved 28 February 2012. [4] Kennedy, Francis H. (1998). The Civil War Battlefield Guide, 2nd ed.. New York: Houghton Mifflin Co.. pp.11. ISBN0-395-74012-6. [5] Robert Patterson, Major-General (1865). Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861. Philadelphia: John Campbell. pp.49. [6] "1st Wisconsin Infantry and Their Flag" (http:/ / www. wisconsinbattleflags. com/ units-flags/ 1st-wisconsin. php). . Retrieved 2 March 2012. [7] Civil War in the East. "11th Pennsylvania Infantry Regiment" (http:/ / www. civilwarintheeast. com/ USA/ PA/ PA011. php). . Retrieved 3 March 2012. [8] Bates, Samuel P. (1869). History of Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1861-6; Vol I. Harrisburg, PA: B. Singerly, State Printer. pp.143.
CWSAC Report Update and Resurvey: Individual Battlefield Profiles (http://www.nps.gov/history/hps/abpp/ CWSII/WestVirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Greenbrier River to Kesslers Cross Lanes.pdf)
External links
Battle of Falling Waters (http://www.battleoffallingwaters.com)
Background
On July 16, 1861, the untried Union army under Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell, 35,000 strong, marched out of the Washington, D.C., defenses to give battle to the Confederate Army of the Potomac, which was concentrated around the vital railroad junction at Manassas. Moving slowly, the army reached Fairfax Court House on July 17; the next day, McDowell ordered division commander Brig. Gen. Daniel Tyler to look for a fording point across Bull Run Creek and to "keep up the impression that we are moving on Manassas".[1] The Confederates, about 22,000 men under the command of Brig. Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard, were concentrated near the Bull Run, with detachments spread north of the creek to observe the Federals. When McDowell started his advance from Washington, the Confederate detachments slowly retreated and rejoined the main body. Beauregard expected to be attacked either on the 18th or the 19th near Mitchell's Ford; meanwhile, he continued to ask for reinforcements, especially from Joseph E. Johnston's army in the Shenandoah Valley.[2]
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Battle
On July 18, Tyler advanced to Centreville and found that Centreville was unoccupied by Confederate troops. He then marched southeast to Mitchell's Ford and Blackburn's Ford, arriving at the latter about 11 a.m. Looking south across the stream, Tyler believed that the road to Manassas Junction was clear, but he failed to see the Confederate brigade of Brig. Gen. Situation July 18. ConfederateUnion James Longstreet concealed in the woods behind the ford. He ordered two howitzers under Capt. Romeyn B. Ayres to bombard the Confederates he could see, guns of the Alexandria Artillery and the Washington Artillery, but the fire had no visible effect. He ordered Col. Israel B. Richardson and part of his brigade forward.[3] Richardson's advance met initial resistance from the 1st, 11th, and 17th Virginia Infantry regiments of Longstreet's brigade. Tyler ordered Ayres to move his guns closer to the action, accompanied by cavalry, and he sent the rest of Richardson's brigade toward the ford. Richardson's assault fell apart as the 12th New York Infantry began to retreat under heavy fire, causing a wave of panic to spread through the Union line.[4] Col. Jubal A. Early arrived with his Confederate brigade after marching 2 miles north from Beauregard's headquarters at Wilmer McLean's house. The availability of this additional firepower completed the Confederate victory, and a reinforced Washington Artillery kept the Union troops under fire as they retreated. Colonel Patrick T. Moore of the 1st Virginia Infantry, later a Confederate brigadier general, received a severe head wound in the skirmish and was incapacitated for further field service.[5]
Aftermath
The failed reconnaissance-in-force at Blackburn's Ford led McDowell to decide against a frontal assault along Bull Run. He decided to attempt to cross the stream beyond the Confederate left flank, the maneuver he employed at the First Battle of Bull Run on July 21.[6] Both Longstreet and Early claimed later that the battle "went a long way towards winning the victory of the 21st, for it gave our troops confidence in themselves".[7]
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Notes
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] Davis, pp. 91, 100; Detzel, pp. 14951. Davis, pp. 10811. Davis, pp. 11315. Davis, pp. 11621. Warner, pp. 21920; Wert, p. 508 Davis, p. 15253. Detzel, p. 170.
References
National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va004.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Blackburns Ford to Buckland Mills.pdf) Davis, William C. Battle at Bull Run: A History of the First Major Campaign of the Civil War. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977. ISBN 0-8071-0867-7. Detzer, David. Donnybrook: The Battle of Bull Run, 1861. New York: Harcourt, Inc., 2004. ISBN 0-15-100889-2. Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide, 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Warner, Ezra J. Generals in Gray: Lives of the Confederate Commanders. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1959. ISBN 0-8071-0823-5. Wert, Jeffry D. "Moore, Patrick Theodore" in Historical Times Illustrated History of the Civil War, edited by Patricia L. Faust. New York: Harper & Row, 1986. ISBN 978-0-06-273116-6.
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Background
Further information: Confederate order of battle, Union order of battle Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell was appointed by President Abraham Lincoln to command the Army of Northeastern Virginia. Once in this capacity, McDowell was harassed by impatient politicians and citizens in Washington, who wished to see a quick battlefield victory over the Confederate Army in northern Virginia. McDowell, however, was concerned about the untried nature of his army. He was reassured by President Lincoln, "You are green, it is true, but they are green also; you are all green alike."[1] Against his better judgment, McDowell commenced campaigning. On July 16, 1861, the general departed Washington with the largest field army yet gathered on the Northern Virginia Theater in July 1861 ConfederateUnion North American continent, about 35,000 men (28,452 effectives).[] McDowell's plan was to move westward in three columns, make a diversionary attack on the Confederate line at Bull
First Battle of Bull Run Run with two columns, while the third column moved around the Confederates' right flank to the south, cutting the railroad to Richmond and threatening the rear of the rebel army. He assumed that the Confederates would be forced to abandon Manassas Junction and fall back to the Rappahannock River, the next defensible line in Virginia, which would relieve some of the pressure on the U.S. capital.[2] The Confederate Army of the Potomac (21,883 effectives)[3] under Beauregard was encamped near Manassas Junction, approximately 25 miles (40km) from the United States capital. McDowell planned to attack this numerically inferior enemy army. Union Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson's 18,000 men engaged Johnston's force (the Army of the Shenandoah at 8,884 effectives, augmented by Maj. Gen. Theophilus H. Holmes's brigade of 1,465[3]) in the Shenandoah Valley, preventing them from reinforcing Beauregard. After two days of marching slowly in the sweltering heat, the Union army was allowed to rest in Centreville. McDowell reduced the size of his army to approximately 30,000 by dispatching Brig. Gen. Theodore Runyon with 5,000 troops to protect the army's rear. In the meantime, McDowell searched for a way to outflank Beauregard, who had drawn up his lines along Bull Run. On July 18, the Union commander sent a Situation July 18. division under Brig. Gen. Daniel Tyler to pass on the Confederate right (southeast) flank. Tyler was drawn into a skirmish at Blackburn's Ford over Bull Run and made no headway. Becoming more frustrated, McDowell resolved to attack the Confederate left (northwest) flank instead. He planned to attack with Brig. Gen. Daniel Tyler's division at the Stone Bridge on the Warrenton Turnpike and send the divisions of Brig. Gens. David Hunter and Samuel P. Heintzelman over Sudley Springs Ford. From here, these divisions could march into the Confederate rear. The brigade of Col. Israel B. Richardson (Tyler's Division) would harass the enemy at Blackburn's Ford, preventing them from thwarting the main attack. Patterson would tie down Johnston in the Shenandoah Valley so that reinforcements could not reach the area. Although McDowell had arrived at a theoretically sound plan, it had a number of flaws: it was one that required synchronized execution of troop movements and attacks, skills that had not been developed in the nascent army; it relied on actions by Patterson that he had already failed to take; finally, McDowell had delayed long enough that Johnston's Valley force was able to board trains at Piedmont Station and rush to Manassas Junction to reinforce Beauregard's men.[4] On July 1920, significant reinforcements bolstered the Confederate lines behind Bull Run. Johnston arrived with all of his army, except for the troops of Brig. Gen. Kirby Smith, who were still in transit. Most of the new arrivals were posted in the vicinity of Blackburn's Ford and Beauregard's plan was to attack from there to the north toward Centreville. Johnston, the senior officer, approved the plan. If both of the armies had been able to execute their plans simultaneously, it would have resulted in a mutual counterclockwise movement as they attacked each other's left flank.[5] McDowell was getting contradictory information from his intelligence agents, so he called for the balloon Enterprise, which was being demonstrated by Prof. Thaddeus S. C. Lowe in Washington, to perform aerial reconnaissance.
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Battle
On the morning of July 21, McDowell sent the divisions of Hunter and Heintzelman (about 12,000 men) from Centreville at 2:30 a.m., marching southwest on the Warrenton Turnpike and then turning northwest toward Sudley Springs. Tyler's division (about 8,000) marched directly toward the Stone Bridge. The inexperienced units immediately developed logistical problems. Tyler's division blocked the advance of the main flanking column Situation morning, July 21 on the turnpike. The latter units found the approach roads to Sudley Springs were inadequate, little more than a cart path in some places, and did not begin fording Bull Run until 9:30 a.m. Tyler's men reached the Stone Bridge around 6 a.m.[6] At 5:15 a.m., Richardson's brigade fired a few artillery rounds across Mitchell's Ford on the Confederate right, some of which hit Beauregard's headquarters in the Wilmer McLean house as he was eating breakfast, alerting him to the fact that his offensive battle plan had been preempted. Nevertheless, he ordered demonstration attacks north toward the Union left at Centreville. Bungled orders and poor communications prevented their execution. Although he intended for Brig. Gen. Richard S. Ewell to lead the attack, Ewell, at Union Mills Ford, was simply ordered to "hold ... in readiness to advance at a moment's notice." Brig. Gen. D.R. Jones was supposed to attack in support of Ewell, but found himself moving forward alone. Holmes was also supposed to support, but received no orders at all.[7] All that stood in the path of the 20,000 Union soldiers converging on the Confederate left flank were Col. Nathan "Shanks" Evans and his reduced brigade of 1,100 men.[8] Evans had moved some of his men to intercept the direct threat from Tyler at the bridge, but he began to suspect that the weak attacks from the Union brigade of Brig. Gen. Robert C. Schenck were merely feints. He was informed of the main Union flanking movement through Sudley Springs by Captain Edward Porter Alexander, Beauregard's signal officer, observing from 8 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) southwest on Signal Hill. In the first use of wig-wag semaphore signaling in combat, Alexander sent Federal cavalry at Sudley Spring Ford the message "Look out for your left, your position is turned."[9] Shanks hastily led 900 of his men from their position fronting the Stone Bridge to a new location on the slopes of Matthews Hill, a low rise to the northwest of his previous position.[8] The Confederate delaying action on Matthews Hill included a spoiling attack launched by Major Roberdeau Wheat's 1st Louisiana Special Battalion, "Wheat's Tigers". After Wheat's command was thrown back, and Wheat seriously wounded, Evans received reinforcement from two other brigades under Brig. Gen. Barnard Bee and Col. Francis S. Bartow, bringing the force on the flank to 2,800 men.[8] They successfully slowed Hunter's lead brigade (Brig. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside) in its attempts to ford Bull Run and advance across Young's Branch, at the northern end of Henry House Hill. One of Tyler's brigade commanders, Col. William T. Sherman, crossed at an unguarded ford and struck the right flank of the Confederate defenders. This surprise attack, coupled with pressure from Burnside and Maj. George Sykes, collapsed the Confederate line shortly after 11:30 a.m., sending them in a disorderly retreat to
First Battle of Bull Run Henry House Hill.[10] As they retreated from their Matthews Hill position, the remainder of Evans's, Bee's, and Bartow's commands received some cover from Capt. John D. Imboden and his battery of four 6-pounder guns, who held off the Union advance while the Confederates attempted to regroup on Henry House Hill. They were met by generals Johnston and Beauregard, who had just arrived from Johnston's headquarters at the M. Lewis Farm, "Portici".[11] Fortunately for the Confederates, McDowell did not press his advantage and attempt to seize the strategic ground immediately, choosing to bombard the hill with the batteries of Capts. James B. Ricketts (Battery I, 1st U.S. Artillery) and Charles Griffin (Battery D, 5th U.S.) from Dogan's Ridge.[12] Brig. Gen Thomas J. Jackson's Virginia brigade came up in support of the disorganized Confederates around noon, accompanied by Col. Wade Hampton and his Hampton's Legion, and Col. J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry. Jackson posted his five regiments on the reverse slope of the hill, where they were shielded from direct fire, and was able to assemble 13 guns for the defensive line, which he posted on the crest of the hill; as the guns fired, their recoil moved them down the reverse slope, where they could be safely reloaded.[13] Meanwhile, McDowell ordered the batteries of Ricketts and Griffin to move from Dogan's Ridge to the hill for close infantry support. Their 11 guns engaged in a fierce Attacks on Henry House Hill, noon2 p.m. artillery duel across 300 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) against Jackson's 13. Unlike many engagements in the Civil War, here the Confederate artillery had an advantage. The Union pieces were now within range of the Confederate smoothbores and the predominantly rifled pieces on the Union side were not effective weapons at such close ranges, with many shots fired over the head of their targets.[14]
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One of the casualties of the artillery fire was Judith Carter Henry, an 85-year-old widow and invalid, who was unable to leave her bedroom in the Henry House. As Ricketts began receiving rifle fire, he concluded that it was coming from the Henry House and turned his guns on the building. A shell that crashed through the bedroom wall tore off one of the widow's feet and inflicted multiple injuries, from which she died later that day.[15] "The Enemy are driving us," Bee exclaimed to Jackson. Jackson, a former U.S. Army officer and professor at the Virginia Military Institute, is said to have replied, "Then, Sir, we will give them the bayonet."[16] Bee exhorted his own troops to re-form by shouting, "There is Jackson standing like a stone wall. Let us determine to die here, and we will conquer. Rally behind the Virginians."[17] This exclamation was the source for Jackson's (and his brigade's) nickname, "Stonewall". There is some controversy over Bee's statement and intent, which could not be clarified because he was mortally wounded almost immediately after speaking and none of his subordinate officers wrote reports of the battle. Major Burnett Rhett, chief of staff to General Johnston, claimed that Bee was angry at Jackson's failure to come immediately to the relief of Bee's and Bartow's brigades while they were under heavy pressure. Those who subscribe to this opinion believe that Bee's statement was meant to be pejorative: "Look at Jackson standing there like a stone wall!"[18]
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Artillery commander Griffin decided to move two of his guns to the southern end of his line, hoping to provide enfilade fire against the Confederates. At approximately 3 p.m., these guns were overrun by the 33rd Virginia, whose men were outfitted in blue uniforms, causing Griffin's commander, Maj. William F. Barry, to mistake them for Union troops and to order Griffin not to fire on them. Close range volleys from the 33rd Virginia and Stuart's cavalry attack against the flank of the 11th New York Volunteer Infantry Regiment (Ellsworth's Fire Zouaves), which was supporting the battery, killed many of the Judith Henry grave gunners and scattered the infantry. Capitalizing on this success, Jackson ordered two regiments to charge Ricketts's guns and they were captured as well. As additional Federal infantry engaged, the guns changed hands several times.[19] The capture of the Union guns turned the tide of battle. Although McDowell had brought 15 regiments into the fight on the hill, outnumbering the Confederates two to one, no more than two were ever engaged simultaneously. Jackson continued to press his attacks, telling soldiers of the 4th Virginia Infantry, "Reserve your fire until they come within 50 yards! Then fire and give them the bayonet! And when you charge, yell like furies!" For the first time, Union troops heard the disturbing sound of the Rebel yell. At about 4 p.m., the last Union troops were pushed off Henry House Hill by a charge of two regiments from Col. Philip St. George Cocke's brigade.[20]
To the west, Chinn Ridge had been occupied by Col. Oliver O. Howard's brigade from Heintzelman's division. Also at 4 p.m., two Confederate brigades that had just arrived from the Shenandoah ValleyCol. Jubal A. Early's and Brig. Gen. Kirby Smith's (commanded by Col. Arnold Elzey after Smith was wounded)crushed Howard's brigade. Beauregard ordered his entire line forward. McDowell's force crumbled and began to retreat.[21] The retreat was relatively orderly up to the Bull Run crossings, but it was poorly managed by the Union officers. A Union wagon was overturned by artillery fire on a bridge spanning Cub Run Creek and incited panic in McDowell's force. As the soldiers streamed uncontrollably toward Centreville, discarding their arms and equipment, McDowell ordered Col. Dixon S. Miles's division to act as a rear guard, but it was impossible to rally the army short of Washington. In the disorder that followed, hundreds of Union troops were taken prisoner. Expecting an easy Union victory, the wealthy elite of nearby Washington, including congressmen and their families, had come to picnic and watch the battle. When the Union army was driven back in a running disorder, the roads back to Washington were blocked by panicked civilians attempting to flee in their carriages.[22] Since their combined army had been left highly disorganized as well, Beauregard and Johnston did not fully press their advantage, despite urging from Confederate President Jefferson Davis, who had arrived on the battlefield to see the Union soldiers retreating. An attempt by Johnston to intercept the Union troops from his right flank, using the brigades of Brig. Gens. Milledge L. Bonham and James Longstreet, was a failure. The two commanders squabbled with each other and when Bonham's men received some artillery fire from the Union rear guard, and found that Richardson's brigade blocked the road to Centreville, he called off the pursuit.[23]
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Aftermath
Today will be known as BLACK MONDAY. We are utterly and disgracefully routed, beaten, whipped by secessionists. Union diarist George Templeton Strong
[24]
If the war had turned out to be of short duration, Bull Run would have been a disaster for the Union. But if, as now seemed more plausible, a long and nasty war was inevitable, that battle had a curiously salutary effect for the Union side. It provided a wake-up call for those optimistslike Seward or even Lincolnwho had hoped for or counted on a quick result. David Detzer, Donnybrook
[25]
Bull Run was a turning point in the American Civil War ... in the sense that the battle struck with impelling force upon public opinion at home and abroad, upon Congress, and upon the Commander-in-chief. It framed new patterns of thought and led to far-reaching changes in the conduct of the war. The failure at Bull Run inspired a second Northern rising. Volunteering accelerated, 90-day men reenlisted, states rushed fresh regiments forward in plenitude. ... As they realized victory would not come readily, a new mood fastened upon Northerners. An iron resolve entered the Northern soul ... James A. Rawley, Turning Points of the Civil War
[26]
Bull Run was the largest and bloodiest battle in American history up to that point. Union casualties were 460 killed, 1,124 wounded, and 1,312 missing or captured; Confederate casualties were 387 killed, 1,582 wounded, and 13 missing.[27] Among the latter was Col. Francis S. Bartow, who was the first Confederate brigade commander to be killed in the Civil War. General Bee was mortally wounded and died the following day.[28] Union forces and civilians alike feared that Confederate forces would advance on Washington, D.C., with very little standing in their way. On July 24, Prof. Thaddeus S. C. Lowe ascended in the balloon Enterprise to observe the Confederates moving in and about Manassas Junction and Fairfax. He saw no evidence of massing Rebel forces, but was forced to land in Confederate territory. It was overnight before he was rescued and could report to headquarters. He reported that his observations "restored confidence" to the Union commanders.[29] The Northern public was shocked at the unexpected defeat of their army when an easy victory had been widely anticipated. Both sides quickly came to realize the war would be longer and more brutal than they had imagined. On July 22 President Lincoln signed a bill that provided for the enlistment of another 500,000 men for up to three years of service.[30] The reaction in the Confederacy was more muted. There was little public celebration as the Southerners realized that despite their victory, the greater battles that would inevitably come would mean greater losses for their side as well.[31] Beauregard was considered the hero of the battle and was promoted that day by President Davis to full general in the Confederate Army.[32] Stonewall Jackson, arguably the most important tactical contributor to the victory, received no special recognition, but would later achieve glory for his 1862 Valley Campaign. Irvin McDowell bore the brunt of the blame for the Union defeat and was soon replaced by Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, who was named general-in-chief of all the Union armies. McDowell was also present to bear significant blame for the defeat of Maj. Gen. John Pope's Army of Virginia by Gen. Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia thirteen months later, at the Second Battle of Bull Run. Patterson was also removed from command.[33] The name of the battle has caused controversy since 1861. The Union Army frequently named battles after significant rivers and creeks that played a role in the fighting; the Confederates generally used the names of nearby towns or farms. The U.S. National Park Service uses the Confederate name for its national battlefield park, but the Union name (Bull Run) also has widespread currency in popular literature.[34] Battlefield confusion between the battle flags, especially the similarity of the Confederacy's "Stars and Bars" and the Union's "Stars and Stripes" when fluttering, led to the adoption of the Confederate Battle Flag, which eventually became the most popular symbol of the Confederacy and the South in general.[35]
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In popular media
The First Battle of Bull Run is mentioned in the novel Gods and Generals, but is depicted more fully in its film adaptation. It also appears in the first episode of the second season of the mini-series North and South. Manassas (1999) is the first volume in the James Reasoner Civil War Series of historical novels. The battle is described in Rebel (1993), the first volume of Bernard Cornwell's The Starbuck Chronicles series of historical novels. The battle is also depicted in John Jakes's The Titans, the fifth novel in The Kent Family Chronicles, a series that explores the fictional Confederate cavalry officer Gideon Kent. The battle is the subject of the Johnny Horton song, "Battle of Bull Run". Shaman, second in the Cole family trilogy by Noah Gordon, includes an account of the battle.
Sesquicentennial
Prince William County is staging special events commemorating the 150th anniversary of the Civil War through 2011. Manassas has been named the No. 1 tourist destination in the United States for 2011 by the American Bus Association for its efforts in highlighting the historical impact of the Civil War. The cornerstone of the commemoration event featured a reenactment of the battle on July 2324, 2011. Throughout the year, there will be tours of the Manassas battlefield and other battlefields in the county and a number of related events and activities.[36] The City of Manassas commemorated the 150th anniversary of the battle July 2124, 2011.[37]
The National Jubilee of Peace building at Grant and Lee avenues in Manassas, Virginia, is draped with the U.S. flag for the 150th anniversary commemoration, held on July 21, 2011, of the First Battle of Bull Run.
Notes
[1] Detzer, p. 77; Williams, p. 21; McPherson, p. 336; Davis, p. 110, attributes the remark to general-in-chief Winfield Scott. [2] Davis, pp. 11011. [3] Livermore, p. 77. [4] Eicher, pp. 91100. [5] Eicher, p. 92. [6] Beatie, pp. 28588; Esposito, text for Map 21; Rafuse, "First Battle of Bull Run", p. 312. [7] Eicher, p. 94; Esposito, Map 22. [8] Rafuse, "First Battle of Bull Run", p. 312. [9] Brown, pp. 4345; Alexander, pp. 5051. Alexander recalls that the signal was "You are flanked." [10] Rafuse, "First Battle of Bull Run", pp. 31213; Rafuse, A Single Grand Victory, p. 131; Esposito, Map 22; Eicher, pp. 9495. [11] Eicher, p. 95. [12] Rafuse, "First Battle of Bull Run", p. 313; Eicher, p. 96. [13] Salmon, p. 19. [14] Rafuse, "First Battle of Bull Run", p. 314. [15] Detzer, p. 357; Davis, pp. 204-05. [16] Robertson, p. 264. [17] Freeman, vol. 1, p. 82; Robertson, p. 264. McPherson, p. 342, reports the quotation after "stone wall" as being "Rally around the Virginians!" [18] See, for instance, McPherson, p. 342. There are additional controversies about what Bee said and whether he said anything at all. See Freeman, vol. 1, pp. 73334. [19] Eicher, pp. 9698; Esposito, Map 23; Rafuse, "First Battle of Bull Run", pp. 31415; McPherson, pp. 34244. [20] Rafuse, "First Battle of Bull Run", p. 315; Eicher, p. 98. [21] Rafuse, "First Battle of Bull Run", pp. 31516. [22] McPherson, p. 344; Eicher, p. 98; Esposito, Map 24. [23] Freeman, vol. 1, p. 76; Esposito, Map 24; Davis, p. 149. [24] Eicher, p. 100. [25] Detzer, p. 488.
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References
Alexander, Edward P. Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. Edited by Gary W. Gallagher. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989. ISBN 0-8078-4722-4. Ballard, Ted. First Battle of Bull Run: Staff Ride Guide (http://www.history.army.mil/StaffRide/1st Bull Run/ Contents.htm). Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 2003. ISBN 978-0-16-068078-6. Beatie, Russel H. Army of the Potomac: Birth of Command, November 1860 September 1861. New York: Da Capo Press, 2002. ISBN 0-306-81141-3. Brown, J. Willard. The Signal Corps, U.S.A. in the War of the Rebellion. U.S. Veteran Signal Corps Association, 1896. Reprinted 1974 by Arno Press. ISBN 0-405-06036-X. Davis, William C., and the Editors of Time-Life Books. First Blood: Fort Sumter to Bull Run. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983. ISBN 0-8094-4704-5. Detzer, David. Donnybrook: The Battle of Bull Run, 1861. New York: Harcourt, 2004. ISBN 978-0-15-603143-1. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website (http://www. dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/). Praeger, 1959. Freeman, Douglas S. Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command. 3 vols. New York: Scribner, 1946. ISBN 0-684-85979-3. Haydon, F. Stansbury. Military Ballooning during the Early Civil War. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1941. ISBN 0-8018-6442-9. Livermore, Thomas L. Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America 1861-65. Reprinted with errata, Dayton, OH: Morninside House, 1986. ISBN 0-527-57600-X. First published in 1901 by Houghton Mifflin. McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. Oxford History of the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. ISBN 0-19-503863-0. Rafuse, Ethan S. "First Battle of Bull Run." In Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History, edited by David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000. ISBN 0-393-04758-X. Rafuse, Ethan S. A Single Grand Victory: The First Campaign and Battle of Manassas. The American Crisis Series. Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 2002. ISBN 0-8420-2875-7. Rawley, James A. Turning Points of the Civil War. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966. ISBN 0-8032-8935-9.
First Battle of Bull Run Robertson, James I., Jr. Stonewall Jackson: The Man, The Soldier, The Legend. New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1997. ISBN 0-02-864685-1. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Williams, T. Harry. Lincoln and His Generals. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952. ISBN 0-9654382-6-0. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va005.htm) Professor Thaddeus Lowe's Official Report (Part I) (http://www.civilwarhome.com/loweor.htm)
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Further reading
Davis, William C. Battle at Bull Run: A History of the First Major Campaign of the Civil War. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977. ISBN 0-8071-0867-7. Goldfield, David, et al. The American Journey: A History of the United States. 2nd ed. New York: Prentice Hall, 1999. ISBN 0-13-088243-7. Gottfried, Bradley M. The Maps of First Bull Run: An atlas of the First Bull Run (Manassas) Campaign, including the Battle of Ball's Bluff, JuneOctober 1861. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2009. ISBN 978-1-932714-60-9. Hankinson, Alan. First Bull Run 1861: The South's First Victory. Osprey Campaign Series #10. London: Osprey Publishing, 1991. ISBN 1-85532-133-5. Hennessy, John, Ethan Rafuse, and Harry Smeltzer. "Historians' Forum: The First Battle of Bull Run." Civil War History 57#2 (June 2011): 106120. Longstreet, James. From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America. New York: Da Capo Press, 1992. ISBN 0-306-80464-6. First published in 1896 by J. B. Lippincott and Co. Rable, George. "The Battlefield and Beyond." Civil War History 53#3 (September 2007): 24451.
External links
Manassas National Battlefield Park website (http://www.nps.gov/mana) First Battle of Manassas: An End to Innocence, a National Park Service Teaching with Historic Places (TwHP) lesson plan (http://www.nps.gov/history/NR/twhp/wwwlps/lessons/12manassas/12manassas.htm) Battle of Bull Run (http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/bullrun.html): Battle maps, photos, history articles, and battlefield news (Civil War Trust) Harper's Weekly 1861 Report on the Battle of Bull Run (http://www.sonofthesouth.net/leefoundation/ civil-war/1861/august/battle-bull-run.htm) Civil War Home website on First Bull Run (http://www.civilwarhome.com/1manassa.htm) Animated history of the First Battle of Bull Run (http://www.civilwaranimated.com/BullRunAnimation.html) FirstBullRun.co.uk (http://www.firstbullrun.co.uk) The First Battle of Bull Run (http://www.archive.org/details/first_battle_bull_run_librivox). General P.G.T. Beauregard. Librivox audio recording, Public Domain, 2007. First Manassas Campaign with Official Records and Reports (http://thomaslegion.net/ manassasbullrunbattlesoffirstandsecondmanassasfirstandsecondbullrun.html) Map of the Battles of Bull Run Near Manassas (http://www.wdl.org/en/item/2743/). Solomon Bamberger. Zoomable high-resolution map. Newspaper coverage of the First Battle of Bull Run (http://www.newsinhistory.com/feature/ confederates-rout-union-army-first-battle-bull-runmanassas) Manassas Civil War 150th Anniversary July 21-24, 2011 (http://www.manassascivilwar.org/home.aspx)
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Theater of operations
The Eastern Theater included the campaigns that are generally most famous in the history of the war, if not for their strategic significance, then for their proximity to the large population centers, major newspapers, and the capital cities of the opposing parties. The imaginations of both Northerners and Southerners were captured by the epic struggles between the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, under Robert E. Lee, and the Union Army of the Potomac, under a series of less successful commanders. The bloodiest battle of the war (Gettysburg) and the bloodiest single day of the war (Antietam) were both fought in this theater. The capitals of Washington, D.C., and
Eastern Theater of the American Civil War Richmond were both attacked or besieged. It has been argued that the Western Theater was more strategically important in defeating the Confederacy, but it is inconceivable that the civilian populations of both sides could have considered the war to be at an end without the resolution of Lee's surrender at Appomattox Courthouse in 1865.[1] The theater was bounded by the Appalachian Mountains and the Atlantic Ocean. By far, the majority of battles occurred in the 100 miles between the cities of Washington and Richmond. This terrain favored the Confederate defenders because a series of rivers ran primarily west to east, making them obstacles rather than avenues of approach and lines of communication for the Union. This was quite different than the early years of the Western theater, and since the Union Army had to rely solely on the primitive road system of the era for its primary transportation, it limited winter campaigning for both sides. The Union advantage was control of the sea and major rivers, which would allow an army that stayed close to the ocean to be reinforced and supplied.[2] The campaign classification established by the United States National Park Service (NPS)[3] is more fine-grained than the one used in this article. Some minor NPS campaigns have been omitted and some have been combined into larger categories. Only a few of the 160 battles the NPS classifies for this theater are described. Boxed text in the right margin show the NPS campaigns associated with each section.
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Eastern Theater of the American Civil War Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson with 18,000 men menacing Harpers Ferry, preventing the two Confederate armies from combining against McDowell.[7] On July 21, McDowell's Army of Northeastern Virginia executed a complex turning movement against Beauregard's Confederate Army of the Potomac, beginning the First Battle of Bull Run (also known as First Manassas). Although the Union troops enjoyed an early advantage and drove the Confederate left flank back, the battle advantage turned that afternoon. Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson inspired his Virginia brigade to withstand a strong Union attack, and he received his famous nickname, "Stonewall" Jackson. Timely reinforcements arrived by railroad from Johnston's army; Patterson had been ineffective in keeping them occupied. The inexperienced Union soldiers began to fall back, and it turned into a panicky retreat, with many running almost as far as Washington, D.C. Civilian and political observers, some of whom had treated the battle as festive entertainment, were caught up in the panic. The army returned safely to Washington; Beauregard's army was too tired and inexperienced to launch a pursuit. The Union defeat at First Bull Run shocked the North, and a new sense of grim determination swept the United States as military and civilians alike realized that they would need to invest significant money and manpower to win a protracted, bloody war.[8] George B. McClellan was summoned east in August to command the newly forming Army of the Potomac, which would become the principal army of the Eastern Theater. As a former railroad executive, he possessed outstanding organizational skills well-suited to the tasks of training and administration. He was also strongly ambitious, and by November 1, he had maneuvered around Winfield Scott and was named general-in-chief of all the Union armies, despite the embarrassing defeat of an expedition he sent up the Potomac River at the Battle of Balls Bluff in October.[9]
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Banks reacted by crossing the Potomac in late February and moving south to protect the canal and railroad from Ashby. Jackson's command was operating as the left wing of Gen. Joseph E. Johnston's army, and when Johnston moved from Manassas to Culpeper in March, Jackson's position at Winchester was isolated. On March 12, Banks continued his advance to the southwest ("up the Valley") and occupied Winchester. Valley Campaign: Front Royal to Port Republic. Jackson had withdrawn to Strasburg. Banks's orders, as part of McClellan's overall strategy, were to move farther south and drive Jackson from the Valley. After accomplishing this, he was to withdraw to a position nearer Washington. A strong advance force began the movement south from Winchester on March 17, about the same time that McClellan began his amphibious movement to the Virginia Peninsula.[13] Jackson's orders from Johnston were to avoid general combat because he was seriously outnumbered, but at the same time he was to keep Banks occupied enough to prevent the detachment of troops to reinforce McClellan on the Peninsula. Receiving incorrect intelligence, Banks concluded that Jackson had left the Valley, and he proceeded to move east, back to the vicinity of Washington. Jackson was dismayed at this movement because Banks was doing exactly what Jackson had been directed to prevent. When Ashby reported that only a few infantry regiments and some artillery of Banks's corps remained at Winchester, Jackson decided to attack the Union detachment in an attempt to force the remainder of Banks's corps to return. But Ashby's information was incorrect; actually, an entire Union division was still station in the town. At the First Battle of Kernstown (March 23, 1862), fought a few miles south of Winchester, the Federals stopped Jackson's advance and then counterattacked, turning his left flank and forcing him to retreat. Although a tactical defeat for Jackson, his only defeat during the campaign, it was a strategic victory for the Confederacy, forcing President Lincoln to keep Banks's forces in the Valley and McDowell's 30,000-man corps near Fredericksburg, subtracting about 50,000 soldiers from McClellan's Peninsula invasion force.[14] The Union reorganized after Kernstown: McDowell's command became the Department of the Rappahannock, Banks's corps became the Department of the Shenandoah, while western Virginia (modern West Virginia) became the Mountain Department, commanded by Maj. Gen. John C. Frmont. All three commands, which reported directly to Washington, were ordered to remove Jackson's force as a threat to Washington. The Confederate authorities
Eastern Theater of the American Civil War meanwhile detached Richard S. Ewell's division from Johnston's army and sent it to the Valley. Jackson, now reinforced to 17,000 men, decided to attack the Union forces individually rather than waiting for them to combine and overwhelm him, first concentrating on a column from the Mountain Department commanded by Robert Milroy. While marching on a devious route to mask his intentions, he was attacked by Milroy at the Battle of McDowell on May 8 but was able to repulse the Union army after severe fighting. Banks sent a division to reinforce Irvin McDowell's forces at Fredericksburg, leaving Banks only 8,000 troops, which he relocated to a strong position at Strasburg, Virginia.[15] After Frmont's forces halted their advance into the Valley following McDowell, Jackson next turned to defeating Banks. On May 21, Jackson marched his command east from New Market and proceeded northward. Their speed of forced marching was typical of the campaign and earned his infantrymen the nickname of "Jackson's foot cavalry". He sent his horse cavalry directly north to make Banks think that he was going to attack Strasburg, but his plan was to defeat the small outpost at Front Royal and quickly attack Banks's line of communication at Harpers Ferry. On May 23, at the Battle of Front Royal, Jackson's army surprised and overran the pickets of the 1,000-man Union garrison, capturing nearly 700 of the garrison while suffering fewer than forty casualties himself. Jackson's victory forced Banks from Strasburg into a rapid retreat towards Winchester. Although Jackson attempted to pursue, his troops were exhausted and looted Union supply trains, slowing them down immensely. On May 25, at the First Battle of Winchester, Banks's army was attacked by converging Confederate columns and was soundly defeated, losing over 1,300 casualties and much of his supplies (including 9,000 small arms, a half million rounds of ammunition, and several tons of supplies); they withdrew north across the Potomac River. Jackson attempted pursuit but was unsuccessful, due to looting by Ashby's cavalry and the exhaustion of his infantry; after a few days of rest, he followed Banks's forces as far as Harpers Ferry, where he skirmished with the Union garrison.[16] In Washington, President Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton decided that the defeat of Jackson was an immediate priority (even though Jackson's orders were solely to keep Union forces occupied away from Richmond). They ordered Irvin McDowell to send 20,000 men to Front Royal and Frmont to move to Harrisonburg. If both forces could converge at Strasburg, Jackson's only escape route up the Valley would be cut. The immediate repercussion of this move was to abort McDowell's coordinated attack with McClellan on Richmond. Starting on May 29, while two columns of Union forces pursued him, Jackson started pushing his army in a forced march southward to escape the pincer movements, marching forty miles in thirty-six hours. His army took up defensive positions in Cross Keys and Port Republic, where he was able to defeat Frmont and James Shields (from McDowell's command), respectively, on June 8 and June 9.[17] Following these engagements, Union forces were withdrawn from the Valley. Jackson joined Robert E. Lee on the Peninsula for the Seven Days Battles (where he delivered an uncharacteristically lethargic performance, perhaps because of the strains of the Valley Campaign). He had accomplished his mission, withholding over 50,000 needed troops from McClellan. With the success of his Valley Campaign, Stonewall Jackson became the most celebrated soldier in the Confederacy (until he was eventually eclipsed by Lee) and lifted the morale of the public. In a classic military campaign of surprise and maneuver, he pressed his army to travel 646 miles (1,040km) in 48 days of marching and won five significant victories with a force of about 17,000 against combined foes of 60,000.[18]
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Eastern Theater of the American Civil War had arranged adequate defenses for the capital, and that Johnston would certainly follow him if he moved on Richmond. This plan was discussed for three months in the capital until Lincoln approved McClellan's proposal in early March. By March 9, however, Johnston withdrew his army from Centreville to Culpeper, making McClellan's Urbanna plan impracticable. McClellan then proposed to sail to Fort Monroe and then up the Virginia Peninsula (the narrow strip of land between the James and York rivers) to Richmond. Lincoln reluctantly agreed.[19] Before departing for the Peninsula, McClellan moved the Army of the Potomac to Centreville on a "shakedown" march. He discovered there how weak Johnston's force and position had really been, and he faced mounting criticism. On March 11, Lincoln relieved McClellan of his position as general-in -chief of the Union armies so that he could devote his full attention to the difficult campaign ahead of him. Lincoln himself, with the assistance of Secretary of War Stanton and a War Board of officers, assumed command of the Union armies for the next four months. The Army of the Potomac began to embark for Fort Monroe on March 17. The departure was accompanied by a newfound sense of concern. The first combat of ironclad ships occurred on March 8 and March 9 as the CSS Virginia and the USS Monitor fought the inconclusive Battle of Hampton Roads. The concern for the Army was that their transport ships would be attacked by this new weapon directly in their path. And the U.S. Navy failed to assure McClellan that they could protect operations on either the James or the York, so his idea of amphibiously enveloping Yorktown was abandoned, and he ordered an advance up the Peninsula to begin April 4. On April 5, McClellan was informed that Lincoln had canceled the movement of Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell's corps to Fort Monroe, taking this action because McClellan had failed to leave the number of troops previously agreed upon at Washington, and because Jackson's Valley Campaign was causing concern. McClellan protested vociferously that he was being forced to lead a major campaign without his promised resources, but he moved ahead anyway.[20]
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Up the Peninsula
The Union forces advanced to Yorktown, but halted when McClellan found that the Confederate fortifications extended across the Peninsula instead of being limited to Yorktown as he had expected. After a delay of about a month building up siege resources, constructing trenches and siege batteries, and conducting a couple of minor skirmishes testing the line, the Siege of Yorktown was ready to commence. However, Johnston concluded that the Confederate defenses were too weak to hold off a Union assault and he organized a withdrawal during the night of May 34. During the campaign, the Union Army also seized Hampton Roads and occupied Norfolk. As the Union forces Peninsula Campaign, map of events up to the Battle of Seven Pines. chased withdrawing Confederate forces up the Peninsula (northwest) in the direction of Richmond, the inconclusive single-day Battle of Williamsburg took place at and around Fort Magruder, one mile (1.5km) east of the old colonial capital.[21] By the end of May, the Union forces had successfully advanced to within several miles of Richmond, but progress was slow. McClellan had planned for massive siege operations and brought immense stores of equipment and siege mortars but poor weather and inadequate roads kept his advance to a crawl. And McClellan was by nature a cautious general; he was nervous about attacking a force he believed was twice his in size. In fact, his imagination and his intelligence operations failed him; the proportions were roughly the reverse. During Johnston's slow retreat up the Peninsula, his forces practiced deceptive operations. In particular, the division under John B. Magruder, who was an amateur actor before the war, was able to fool McClellan by ostentatiously marching small numbers of troops past the same position multiple times, appearing to be a larger force.[22] As the Union Army drew towards the outer defenses of Richmond, it became divided by the Chickahominy River, weakening its ability to move troops back and forth along the front. McClellan kept most of his army north of the river, expecting McDowell to march from northern Virginia; only two Union corps (IV and III) were south of the
Eastern Theater of the American Civil War river. Pressured by Confederate President Jefferson Davis and his military advisor Robert E. Lee, Johnston decided to attack the smaller Union force south of the river, hoping that the flooded Chickahominy, swollen from recent heavy rains, would prevent McClellan from moving to the southern bank. The Battle of Seven Pines (also known as the Battle of Fair Oaks), fought on May 31 June 1, 1862, failed to follow Johnston's plan, due to faulty maps, uncoordinated Confederate attacks, and Union reinforcements, which were able to cross the river despite the flooding. The battle was tactically inconclusive, but there were two strategic effects. First, Johnston was wounded during the battle and was replaced by the more aggressive General Robert E. Lee, who would lead this Army of Northern Virginia to many victories in the war. Second, General McClellan chose to abandon his offensive operations to lay siege and await reinforcements he had requested from President Lincoln; as a consequence, he never regained his strategic momentum.[23] Lee used the month-long pause in McClellan's advance to fortify the defenses of Richmond and extended the works south of the James River to a point below Petersburg; the total length of the new defensive line was about 30 miles (50km). To buy time to complete the new defensive line and prepare for an offensive, Lee repeated the tactic of making a small number of troops seem more numerous than they really were. Lee also sent Brig. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry brigade completely around the Union army (June 1315) in order to ascertain if the Union right flank was in the air. In addition, Lee ordered Jackson to bring his force to the Peninsula as reinforcements. Meanwhile, McClellan shifted most of his forces south of the Chickahominy, leaving only Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter's V Corps north of the river.[24]
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Lee then moved onto the offensive, conducting a series of battles that lasted seven days (June 25 July 1) and pushed McClellan back to a safe but nonthreatening position on the James River. McClellan actually struck first on June 25 at the Battle of Oak Grove, during which two Union divisions attempted to seize ground on which McClellan planned to build siege batteries. McClellan planned to attack again the next day but was distracted by the Confederate attack at Mechanicsville or Beaver Dam Creek, on June 26. Lee observed that McClellan had positioned his army straddling the Chickahominy River and could be defeated in detail. He planned for the division of A.P. Hill to demonstrate in Porter's front while Jackson marched behind the Union positions and attacked from the rear. However, Jackson was late in arriving to his assigned position, while Hill started his attack without waiting for
Eastern Theater of the American Civil War Jackson and was repulsed with heavy casualties. Despite being a Union tactical victory, McClellan still ordered Porter to retreat south towards the rest of the Union army, fearing that Porter would be surrounded by vastly superior Confederate forces by morning. Porter set up defensive lines near Gaines's Mill, covering the bridges over the Chickahominy.[25] Lee continued his offensive at the Battle of Gaines's Mill, June 27, launching the largest Confederate attack of the war against Porter's line. (It occurred in almost the same location as the 1864 Battle of Cold Harbor and had similar numbers of casualties.) The attack was poorly coordinated, and the Union lines held for most of the day, but Lee eventually broke through and McClellan withdrew again, heading for a secure base at Harrison's Landing on the James River.[26] The next two days saw minor battles at Garnett's and Golding's Farm and Savage's Station, as McClellan continued his withdraw and Lee attempted to cut off the Union retreat. The Battle of Glendale on June 30 was a bloody battle in which three Confederate divisions converged on the retreating Union forces in the White Oak Swamp, near Frayser's Farm, another name for the battle. Because of a lackluster performance by Stonewall Jackson, Lee's army failed in its last attempt to cut off the Union army before it reached the James.[27] The final battle of the Seven Days, July 1, consisted of uncoordinated Confederate assaults against the Union defensesbuttressed by artillery placements and the naval guns of the Union James River squadronon Malvern Hill. McClellan was absent from the battlefield, instead remaining on the gunboat Galena; the Union corps commanders cooperated in selecting the positions for their troops but none of them exercised overall field command. Lee's army suffered over 5,600 casualties in this effort, compared to only 3,000 Union casualties. Although the Union corps commanders felt that they could hold the field against further Confederate attacks, McClellan ordered the army to retreat back to Harrison's Landing.[28] Malvern Hill signaled the end of both the Seven Days Battles and the Peninsula Campaign. The Army of the Potomac withdrew to the safety of the James River, protected by fire from Union gunboats, and stayed there until August, when they were withdrawn by order of President Lincoln in the run-up to the Second Battle of Bull Run. Although McClellan retained command of the Army of the Potomac, Lincoln showed his displeasure by appointing Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck to McClellan's previous position as general-in-chief of all the Union armies on July 11, 1862.[29] The cost to both sides was high. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia suffered almost 20,000 casualties out of a total of over 90,000 soldiers during the Seven Days, McClellan almost 16,000 out of 105,445. After a successful start on the Peninsula that foretold an early end to the war, Northern morale was crushed by McClellan's retreat. Despite heavy casualties and Lee's clumsy tactical performance, Confederate morale skyrocketed, and Lee was emboldened to continue his aggressive strategy through Northern Virginia and Maryland Campaigns.[30]
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Army of Virginia
President Lincoln reacted to McClellan's failure by appointing John Pope to command the newly formed Army of Virginia. Pope had achieved some success in the Western Theater, and Lincoln sought a more aggressive general than McClellan. The Army of Virginia consisted of over 50,000 men in three corps. Three corps of McClellan's Army of the Potomac later were added for combat operations. Two cavalry brigades were attached directly to two of the infantry corps, which presented a lack of centralized control that had negative effects in the campaign. Pope's mission was to fulfill two objectives: protect Washington and the Shenandoah Valley, and draw Confederate forces away from McClellan by moving in the direction of Northern Virginia Campaign, August 728, 1862. Gordonsville. Pope started on the latter by dispatching cavalry to break the railroad connecting Gordonsville, Charlottesville, and Lynchburg. The cavalry got off to a slow start and found that Stonewall Jackson had occupied Gordonsville with over 14,000 men.[32] Lee perceived that McClellan was no longer a threat to him on the Peninsula, so he felt no compulsion to keep all of his forces in direct defense of Richmond. This allowed him to relocate Jackson to Gordonsville to block Pope and protect the railroad. Lee had larger plans in mind. Since the Union Army was split between McClellan and Pope and they were widely separated, Lee saw an opening to destroy Pope before returning his attention to McClellan. Believing that Ambrose Burnside's troops from North Carolina were being shipped to reinforce Pope, and wanting to take immediate action before those troops were in position, Lee committed Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill to join Jackson with 12,000 men, while distracting McClellan to keep him immobilized.[33] On July 29, Pope moved some of his forces to a position near Cedar Mountain, from whence he could launch raids on Gordonsville. Jackson advanced to Culpeper on August 7, hoping to attack one of Pope's corps before the rest of the army could be concentrated. On August 9, Nathaniel Banks's corps attacked Jackson at Cedar Mountain, gaining an early advantage. A Confederate counterattack led by A.P. Hill drove Banks back across Cedar Creek. By now Jackson had learned that Pope's corps were all together, foiling his plan of defeating each in separate actions. He remained in position until August 12, when he withdrew to Gordonsville.[34] On August 13, Lee sent Maj. Gen. James Longstreet to reinforce Jackson and on the following day sent all of his remaining forces except for two brigades, after he was certain that McClellan was leaving the Peninsula. Lee himself arrived at Gordonsville to take command on August 15. His plan was to defeat Pope before McClellan's army could arrive to reinforce it by cutting bridges in Pope's rear and then attacking his left flank and rear. Pope spoiled Lee's plans by withdrawing to the line of the Rappahannock River; he was aware of Lee's plan because a Union cavalry raid captured a copy of the written order.[35] A series of skirmishes between August 22 and August 25 kept the attention of Pope's army along the river. By August 25, three corps from the Army of the Potomac had arrived from the Peninsula to reinforce Pope. Lee's new plan in the face of all these additional forces outnumbering him was to send Jackson and Stuart with half of the army on a flanking march to cut Pope's line of communication, the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. Pope would be forced to retreat and could be defeated while moving and vulnerable.[36]
Eastern Theater of the American Civil War On the evening of August 26, after passing around Pope's right flank, Jackson's wing of the army struck the railroad at Bristoe Station and before daybreak August 27 marched to capture and destroy the massive Union supply depot at Manassas Junction. This surprise movement forced Pope to leave his defensive line along the Rappahannock and move toward Manassas Junction in the hopes of crushing Jackson's wing before the rest of Lee's army could reunite with it. During the night of August 2728, Jackson marched his divisions north to the First Bull Run (Manassas) battlefield, where he took position behind an unfinished railroad grade. Longstreet's wing of the army marched through the Thoroughfare Gap to join Jackson, uniting the two wings of Lee's army.[37]
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Invasion of Maryland
Lee decided that his army, despite taking heavy losses during the spring and summer, was ready for a great challenge: an invasion of the North. His goal was to penetrate the major Northern states of Maryland and Pennsylvania and cut off the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad line that supplied Washington. He also needed to supply his army and knew the farms of the North had been untouched by war, unlike those in Virginia. And he wished to lower Northern morale, believing that an invading army wreaking havoc inside the North might force Lincoln to negotiate an end to the war, particularly if he would be able to incite an uprising in the slave-holding state of Maryland.[40] The Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac River and reached Frederick, Maryland, on September 6. Lee's specific goals were thought to be an advance towards Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, Maryland Campaign, actions September 3 to cutting the east-west railroad links to the Northeast, followed by September 15, 1862. operations against one of the major eastern cities, such as Philadelphia. News of the invasion caused panic in the North, and Lincoln was forced to take quick action. George B. McClellan had been in military limbo since returning from the Peninsula, but Lincoln restored him to command of all forces around Washington and ordered him to deal with Lee.[41]
Eastern Theater of the American Civil War Lee divided his army. Longstreet was sent to Hagerstown, while Jackson was ordered to seize the Union arsenal at Harpers Ferry, which commanded Lee's supply lines through the Shenandoah Valley; it was also a tempting target, virtually indefensible. McClellan requested permission from Washington to evacuate Harpers Ferry and attach its garrison to his army, but his request was refused. In the Battle of Harpers Ferry, Jackson placed artillery on the heights overlooking the town, forcing the surrender of the garrison of more than 12,000 men on September 15. Jackson led most of his soldiers to join the rest of Lee's army, leaving A.P. Hill's division to complete the occupation of the town.[42] McClellan moved out of Washington with his 87,000-man army in a slow pursuit, reaching Frederick on September 13. There, two Union soldiers discovered a mislaid copy of the detailed campaign plans of Lee's armyGeneral Order Number 191wrapped around three cigars. The order indicated that Lee had divided his army and dispersed portions geographically, thus making each subject to isolation and defeat in detail. McClellan waited 18 hours before deciding to take advantage of this intelligence, a delay that almost squandered his opportunity. That night, the Army of the Potomac moved toward South Mountain where elements of the Army of Northern Virginia waited in defense of the mountain passes. At the Battle of South Mountain on September 14, the Confederate defenders were driven back by the numerically superior Union forces, and McClellan was in a position to destroy Lee's army before it could concentrate.[43] Lee, seeing McClellan's uncharacteristic aggression, and learning through a Confederate sympathizer that his order had been compromised, frantically moved to concentrate his army. He chose not to abandon his invasion and return to Virginia yet, because Jackson had not completed the capture of Harpers Ferry. He also feared the effect on Confederate morale if he gave up his campaign with only the capture of Harpers Ferry to show for it. Instead, he chose to make a stand at Sharpsburg, Maryland.[44]
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Antietam
On September 16, McClellan confronted Lee near Sharpsburg, defending a line to the west of Antietam Creek. At dawn on September 17, the Battle of Antietam began, with Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker's corps mounting a powerful assault on Lee's left flank. Attacks and Overview of the Battle of Antietam. counterattacks swept across the Miller Cornfield and the woods near the Dunker Church. Union assaults against the Sunken Road ("Bloody Lane") eventually pierced the Confederate center, but the Federal advantage was not pressed. In each case, Confederate reinforcements from the right flank prevented a complete Union breakthrough and McClellan refused to release his reserves to complete the breakthrough.[45] In the afternoon, Burnside's corps crossed a stone bridge over Antietam Creek and rolled up the Confederate right. At a crucial moment, A.P. Hill's division arrived from Harpers Ferry and counterattacked, driving back Burnside's men and saving Lee's army from destruction. Although outnumbered two to one, Lee committed his entire force, while McClellan sent in less than three quarters of his army. This enabled Lee to shift brigades and concentrate on each individual Union assault. At over 23,000 casualties, it remains the bloodiest single day in American history. Lee ordered the battered Army of Northern Virginia to withdraw across the Potomac into the Shenandoah Valley. Despite being tactically inconclusive, the battle of Antietam is considered a strategic victory for the Union. Lee's strategic initiative to invade Maryland was defeated. But more importantly, President Lincoln used this opportunity to announce his Emancipation Proclamation, after which the prospect of European powers intervening in the war on behalf of the Confederacy was significantly diminished.[46]
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[[Chancellorsville Campaign]]
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Both armies remained in their positions before Fredericksburg. Hooker planned to send his cavalry, under Maj. Gen. George Stoneman, deep into the Confederate rear to disrupt supply lines. While one corps remained to fix Lee's attention at Fredericksburg, the others were to slip away and make a stealthy flanking march that would put the bulk of Hooker's army behind Lee, catching him in a vise. Lee, who had dispatched a corps of his army under Lt. Gen. James Longstreet to forage in southern Virginia, was outnumbered 57,000 to 97,000.[49] The plan began executing well, and the bulk of the Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan River and was in position on May 1. However, after minor initial contact with the enemy, Hooker began to lose his confidence, and rather than striking the Army of Northern Virginia in its rear as planned, he withdrew to a defensive perimeter around Chancellorsville. On May 2, Robert E. Lee executed one of the boldest maneuvers of the war. Having already split his army to address both wings of Hooker's attack, he split again, sending 20,000 men under Stonewall Jackson on a lengthy flanking march to attack Hooker's unprotected right flank. Achieving almost complete surprise, Jackson's corps routed the Union XI Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard. Following this success Jackson was mortally wounded by friendly fire while scouting in front of his army.[50] While Lee pounded the Chancellorsville defense line with repeated, costly assaults on May 3, the Union VI Corps, under Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick, finally achieved what Ambrose Burnside could not, by successfully assaulting the reduced forces on Marye's Heights in Fredericksburg. The corps began moving westward, once again threatening Lee's rear. Lee was able to deal with both wings of the Army of the Potomac, keeping the stunned Hooker in a defensive posture and dispatching a division to deal with Sedgwick's tentative approach. By May 7, Hooker withdrew all of his forces north of the Rappahannock. It was an expensive victory for Lee, who lost 13,000 men, or 25% of his army; Hooker lost 17,000, but had a lower casualty rate than Lee had incurred.[51]
Eastern Theater of the American Civil War Meade. After reviewing the positions of the army's corps with Hooker, Meade ordered the army to advance into southern Pennsylvania in a wide front, with the intention to protect Washington and Baltimore and to find Lee's army; he also drew up plans to defend a line behind Pipe Creek in northern Maryland in case he could not find suitable ground in Pennsylvania to fight a battle to his advantage.[53] Lee was surprised to find that the Federal army was moving as quickly as it was. As they crossed the Potomac and entered Frederick, Maryland, the Confederates were spread out over a considerable distance in Pennsylvania, with Richard Ewell across the Susquehanna River from Harrisburg and James Longstreet and A. P. Hill behind the mountains in Chambersburg. His cavalry, under Jeb Stuart, was engaged in a wide-ranging raid around the eastern flank of the Union army and was uncharacteristically out of touch with headquarters, leaving Lee blind as to his enemy's position and intentions. Lee realized that, just as in the Maryland Campaign, he had to concentrate his army before it could be defeated in detail. He ordered all units to move to the general vicinity of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.[54]
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[[Gettysburg Campaign]]
Initial movements in the campaign, through July 3; cavalry movements shown with dashed lines.
The Battle of Gettysburg is often considered the war's turning point. Meade defeated Lee in a three-day battle fought by 160,000 soldiers, with 51,000 casualties. It started as a meeting engagement on the morning of July 1, when brigades from Henry Heth's division clashed with Buford's cavalry, and then John F. Reynolds's I Corps. As the
Eastern Theater of the American Civil War Union XI Corps arrived, they and the I Corps were smashed by Ewell's and Hill's corps arriving from the north and forced back through the town, taking up defensive positions on high ground south of town. On July 2, Lee launched a massive pair of assaults against the left and right flanks of Meade's army. Fierce battles raged at Little Round Top, Devil's Den, the Wheatfield, the Peach Orchard, East Cemetery Hill, and Culp's Hill. Meade was able to shift his defenders along interior lines, and they repulsed the Confederate advances. On July 3, Lee launched Pickett's Charge against the Union center, and almost three divisions were slaughtered. By this time, Stuart had returned, and he fought an inconclusive cavalry duel to the east of the main battlefield, attempting to drive into the Union rear area. The two armies stayed in position on July 4 (the same day the Battle of Vicksburg ended in a stunning Union victory), and then Lee ordered a retreat back across the Potomac to Virginia.[55] Meade's pursuit of Lee was tentative and unsuccessful. He received considerable criticism from President Lincoln and others, who believed he could have ended the war in the aftermath of Gettysburg. In October, a portion of Meade's army was detached to the western theater; Lee saw this as an opportunity to defeat the Union army in detail and to threaten Washington so no more Union forces could be sent west. The resulting Bristoe Campaign ended with Lee retreating back to the Rapidan River, having failed in his intentions. Meade was pressured by Lincoln into making one final offensive campaign in the fall of 1863, the Mine Run Campaign. However, Lee was able to cut off Meade's advance and construct breastworks; Meade considered the Confederate defenses too strong for a frontal attack and retreated back to his winter quarters.[56]
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Overland Campaign
In early May, the Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan River and entered the area known as the Wilderness of Spotsylvania. There, in dense woods that nullified the Union army's advantages in artillery, Robert E. Lee surprised Grant and Meade with aggressive assaults. The two-day Battle of the Wilderness was tactically inconclusive, although very damaging to both sides. However, unlike his predecessors, Grant did not retreat after the battle; he sent his army to the southeast and began a campaign of maneuver that kept Lee on the defensive through a series of bloody battles and moved closer to Richmond. Grant knew that his larger army and base of manpower in the North could sustain a war of attrition better than Lee and the Confederacy could. And although Grant suffered high lossesapproximately 55,000 casualtiesduring the campaign, Lee lost even higher percentages of his men, losses that could not be replaced.[59] In the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House, Lee was able to beat Grant to the crossroads town and establish a strong defensive position. In a series of attacks over two weeks, Grant hammered away at the Overland Campaign, from the Wilderness to Confederate lines, mostly centered on a salient known as the "Mule crossing the James River. Shoe". A massive assault by Winfield S. Hancock's II Corps on the "Bloody Angle" portion of this line on May 12 foreshadowed the breakthrough tactics employed against trenches late in World War I. Grant once again disengaged and slipped to the southeast.[60] Intercepting Grant's movement, Lee positioned his forces behind the North Anna River in a salient to force Grant to divide his army to attack it. Lee had the opportunity to defeat Grant but failed to attack in the manner necessary to spring the trap he had set, possibly because of an illness. After rejecting a frontal assault on Lee's positions as too costly and initially approving a plan to move around Lee's left flank, Grant changed his mind and continued moving southeast.[61] On May 31, Union cavalry seized the vital crossroads of Old Cold Harbor while the Confederates arrived from Richmond and from the Totopotomoy Creek lines. Late on June 1, two Union corps reached Cold Harbor and assaulted the Confederate works with some success. By June 2, both armies were on the field, forming on a seven-mile (11km) front. At dawn on June 3, the II and XVIII Corps, followed later by the IX Corps, assaulted the line and were slaughtered at all points in the Battle of Cold Harbor. Grant lost over 12,000 men in a battle that he regretted more than any other and Northern newspapers thereafter frequently referred to him as a "butcher".[62] On the night of June 12, Grant again advanced by his left flank, marching to the James River. He was able to disguise his intentions from Lee, and his army crossed the river on a bridge of pontoons that stretched over 2,100 feet (640 m). What Lee had feared most of allthat Grant would force him into a siege of the capital citywas poised to occur.[63]
130
Petersburg
Grant had decided, however, that there was a more efficient way to get at Richmond and Lee. A few miles to the south, the city of Petersburg contained crucial rail links supplying the capital. If the Union Army could seize it, Richmond would be taken. However, Benjamin Butler had failed to capture it earlier and then indecisive advances by Grant's subordinates also failed to break through the thin lines manned by P.G.T. Beauregard's men, allowing Lee's army to arrive and erect defenses. Both sides settled in for a siege.[64] In an attempt to break the siege, Union troops in Ambrose Burnside's corps mined a tunnel under the Confederate line. On July 30, they detonated the explosives, creating a crater some 135 feet (41 m) in diameter that remains visible to this day. Almost 350 Confederate soldiers were instantly killed in the blast. Despite the ingenuity of the Richmond-Petersburg Theater, fall 1864. Union's plan, the lengthy, bloody Battle of the Crater, as it came to be called, was marred by poor tactical planning and was a decisive Confederate victory.[65] Through the fall and winter, both armies constructed elaborate series of trenches, eventually spanning more than 30 miles (50km), as the Union Army attempted to get around the right (western) flank of the Confederates and destroy their supply lines. Although the Northern public became quite dispirited by the seeming lack of progress at Petersburg, the dramatic success of Sherman at Atlanta helped ensure the reelection of Abraham Lincoln, which guaranteed that the war would be fought to a conclusion.[66]
131
At the Battle of Monocacy (July 9, 1864), Early defeated a smaller force under Lew Wallace near Frederick, Maryland, but this battle delayed his progress enough to allow time for reinforcing the defenses of Washington. Early attacked a fort on the northwest defensive perimeter of Washington (Fort Stevens (July 1112) without success and withdrew back to Virginia. He successfully fought a series of minor battles in the Valley through early August and prevented Wright's corps from returning to Grant at Petersburg. He also burned the city of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, retaliating against Hunter's earlier actions in the Valley.[69] Grant knew that Washington remained vulnerable if Early was still on the loose. He found a new commander aggressive enough to defeat Early: Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan, the cavalry commander of the Army of the Potomac, who was given command of all forces in the area, the Middle Military Division, including the Army of the Shenandoah. Sheridan initially started slowly, primarily because the impending presidential election of 1864 demanded a cautious approach, avoiding any disaster that might lead to the defeat of Abraham Lincoln.[70] Sheridan began moving aggressively in September. He defeated Early in the Third Battle of Winchester on September 19 and the Battle of Fisher's Hill on September 2122. With Early damaged and pinned down, the Valley lay open to the Union. Coupled with Sherman's capture of Atlanta and Adm. David Farragut's victory at Mobile Bay, Lincoln's re-election seemed assured. Sheridan pulled back slowly down the Valley and conducted a scorched earth campaign that presaged Sherman's March to the Sea in November. The goal was to deny the Confederacy the means of feeding its armies in Virginia, and Sheridan's army burned crops, barns, mills, and factories.[71] The campaign was effectively concluded at the Battle of Cedar Creek (October 19, 1864). In a brilliant surprise attack at dawn, Early routed two thirds of the Union army, but his troops were hungry and exhausted and many fell out of their ranks to pillage the Union camp; Sheridan managed to rally his troops and defeat Early decisively. In late fall, Sheridan sent his infantry to assist Grant at Petersburg, with his cavalry arriving the following spring. Most of the men of Early's corps rejoined Lee at Petersburg in December, while Early remained to command a skeleton force until he was relieved of command in March 1865 after his defeat at the Battle of Waynesboro, Virginia.[72]
132
Appomattox (1865)
In January 1865, Robert E. Lee became the general-in-chief of all Confederate armies, but this move came too late to help the Southern cause. As the siege of Petersburg continued, Grant attempted to break or encircle the Confederate forces in multiple attacks moving from east to west; gradually, he cut all of the Confederate supply lines except the Richmond & Danville Railroad entering Richmond and the South Side Railroad supplying Petersburg. By March, the siege had taken an enormous toll on both armies, and Lee decided to pull out of Petersburg. Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon then devised a plan to have the army attack Fort Stedman on the eastern end of the Union Lines, forcing the Union forces to shorten their lines. Although initially a success, his outnumbered corps was forced back by a Union counterattack.[73]
Sheridan returned from the Valley and was tasked with flanking the Confederate army, which forced Lee to send forces under Maj. Gen. George Pickett and Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee to defend the flank. Grant then deployed cavalry and two infantry corps under Sheridan to cut off Pickett's forces. Pickett and Fitzhugh Lee attacked first on March 31 at Dinwiddie Court House, and succeeded in pushing back the Union forces but did not gain a decisive advantage. They withdrew their forces to Five Forks that night. On April 1, Sheridan launched another attack, flanking Pickett's forces and destroying the Confederate left wing, capturing over two thousand Confederates. This victory meant that Sheridan could capture the South Side Railroad the next day.[74] After the victory at Five Forks, Grant ordered an assault along the entire Confederate line on April 2, called the Third Battle of Petersburg, resulting in dramatic breakthroughs. During the fighting, A.P. Hill was killed. During the day and into the night, Lee pulled his forces out from Petersburg and Richmond and headed west to Danville, the destination of the fleeing Confederate government, and then south to meet up with General Joseph E. Johnston in North Carolina. The capital city of Richmond surrendered on the morning of April 3.[75] The campaign became a race between Lee and Sheridan, with Lee attempting to obtain supplies for his retreat and Sheridan attempting to cut him off, with the Union infantry close behind. At Sayler's Creek on April 6, nearly a quarter of the Confederate army (about 8,000 men, the majority of two corps) was cut off and forced to surrender; many of the Confederate supply trains, crossing the creek to the north, were also captured. Although Grant wrote to him suggesting that surrender was his last remaining course of action, Lee still attempted to outmarch the Union forces. In Lee's final attack at Appomattox on the morning April 9, John B. Gordon's depleted corps attempted to break the Union lines and reach the supplies in Lynchburg. They pushed back Sheridan's cavalry briefly but found themselves faced with the full Union V Corps. Surrounded on three sides, Lee was forced to surrender his army to
Eastern Theater of the American Civil War Grant at Appomattox Court House that day, with the formal surrender ceremony taking place two days later.[76] There were further minor battles and surrenders of Confederate armies, but Lee's surrender on April 9, 1865, marked the effective end of the Civil War. Lee, rejecting advice from some of his staff, wanted to ensure that his army did not melt away into the countryside to continue the war as guerrillas, helping to heal the divisions of the country.[77]
133
Notes
[1] Everything Military website (http:/ / www. jcs-group. com/ military/ war1861east. html). Gary W. Gallagher, in Lee and His Army in Confederate History (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001, ISBN 978-0-8078-2631-7), p. 173, wrote that Lee's surrendering army "represented but a fraction of the Confederacy's men under arms, yet virtually everyone, North and South, interpreted Appomattox as the end of the war. ... Wartime evidence points strongly to the conclusion that Lee was correct in believing he operated in the vital geographic area." [2] Echoes of Glory, p. 20. [3] U.S. National Park Service, Civil War Battle Studies by Campaign (http:/ / www. cr. nps. gov/ hps/ abpp/ battles/ bycampgn. htm#West) [4] Foote, vol. 1, pp. 49, 51. [5] Newell, pp. 86, 96, 170, 262. [6] Kennedy, p. 6. [7] Davis, pp. 4, 7275. [8] Davis, pp. 18687, 23439, 255. [9] Davis, p. 251; Kennedy, p. 18. [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] Kennedy, pp. 5963. Kennedy, pp. 401403. Cozzens, pp. 38, 43. Cozzens, pp. 13941. Cozzens, pp. 152, 15758, 216. Cozzens, pp. 22829, 243, 25557. Cozzens, pp. 28182, 307, 315, 37077, 39698. Cozzens, pp. 40811, 477, 497. Cozzens, pp. 504, 51113. Sears (1992), pp. 46, 14, 19. Sears (1992), pp. 1617, 37. Sears (1992), pp. 3839, 4647, 6062, 7081. Sears (1992), pp. 9899, 1089. Sears (1992), pp.11820, 13539, 145. Sears (1992), pp. 155, 159, 16873. Sears (1992), pp. 18389, 197, 21011. Sears (1992), pp. 22341. Kennedy, pp. 97101. Sears (1992), p. 33537. Sears (1992), pp. 338, 351. Sears (1992), pp. 343, 345. Hennessy, p. 23. Hennessy, pp. 6, 8, 2425. Hennessy, pp. 23, 26. Hennessy, pp. 2729. Hennessy, pp. 31, 4850. Hennessy, pp. 82, 9293. Hennessy, pp. 11318, 160. Kennedy, pp. 10810. Hennessy, pp. 44950. Sears (1983), pp. 7074. Sears (1983), pp. 18, 7374, 76, 8183, 94. Sears (1983), pp. 99100, 173. Sears (1983), pp. 12324, 157. Sears (1983), pp. 17879.
[45] Sears (1983), pp. 28081, 302. [46] Sears (1983), pp. 31820. [47] O'Reilly, pp. 23, 4448, 49899.
134
References
Bonekemper, Edward H., III. A Victor, Not a Butcher: Ulysses S. Grant's Overlooked Military Genius. Washington, DC: Regnery, 2004. ISBN 0-89526-062-X. Calkins, Chris. The Appomattox Campaign: March 29 April 9, 1865. Conshohocken, Pennsylvania: Combined Books, 1997. ISBN 0-938289-54-3. Cooling, B. F. Jubal Early's Raid on Washington 1864. Baltimore, MD: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1989. ISBN 0-933852-86-X. Cozzens, Peter. Shenandoah 1862: Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-8078-3200-4. Davis, William C. Battle at Bull Run: A History of the First Major Campaign of the Civil War. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977. ISBN 0-8071-0867-7. The Editors of Time-Life Books. Echoes of Glory: Illustrated Atlas of the Civil War. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1991. ISBN 0-8094-8858-2. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website (http://www. dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/). Foote, Shelby. The Civil War: A Narrative. Vol. 3, Red River to Appomattox. New York: Random House, 1974. ISBN 0-394-74913-8. Fuller, Maj. Gen. J. F. C. The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant. New York: Da Capo Press, 1929. ISBN 0-306-80450-6.
Eastern Theater of the American Civil War Furgurson, Ernest B. Chancellorsville 1863: The Souls of the Brave. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992. ISBN 0-394-58301-9. Hattaway, Herman, and Archer Jones. How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983. ISBN 0-252-00918-5. Hennessy, John J. Return to Bull Run: The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993. ISBN 0-8061-3187-X. Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide. 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Newell, Clayton R. Lee Vs. McClellan: The First Campaign. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 1996. ISBN 0-89526-452-8. O'Reilly, Francis Augustn. The Fredericksburg Campaign: Winter War on the Rappahannock. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2003. ISBN 0-8071-3154-7. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. Gettysburg. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003. ISBN 0-395-86761-4. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6. Sears, Stephen W. Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983. ISBN 0-89919-172-X. Trudeau, Noah Andre. Bloody Roads South: The Wilderness to Cold Harbor, MayJune 1864. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1989. ISBN 0-316-85326-7. Trudeau, Noah Andre. The Last Citadel: Petersburg, Virginia June 1864-April 1865. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1991. ISBN 0-316-85327-5.
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Further reading
Beatie, Russel H. Army of the Potomac: Birth of Command, November 1860 September 1861. New York: Da Capo Press, 2002. ISBN 0-306-81141-3. Beatie, Russel H. Army of the Potomac: McClellan Takes Command, September 1861 February 1862. New York: Da Capo Press, 2004. ISBN 0-306-81252-5. Beatie, Russel H. Army of the Potomac: McClellan's First Campaign, March May 1862. New York: Savas Beatie, 2007. ISBN 978-1-932714-25-8. Browning, Robert Jr. From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1993. ISBN 0-8173-5019-5. Burton, Brian K. Extraordinary Circumstances: The Seven Days Battles. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-253-33963-4. Catton, Bruce. Glory Road. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1952. ISBN 0-385-04167-5. Catton, Bruce. Mr. Lincoln's Army. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1951. ISBN 0-385-04310-4. Catton, Bruce. A Stillness at Appomattox. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1953. ISBN 0-385-04451-8. Foote, Shelby. The Civil War: A Narrative. 3 vols. New York: Random House, 1974. ISBN 0-394-74913-8. Freeman, Douglas S. Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command. 3 vols. New York: Scribner, 1946. ISBN 0-684-85979-3. Freeman, Douglas S. R. E. Lee, A Biography (http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/People/ Robert_E_Lee/FREREL/home.html). 4 vols. New York: Scribner, 1934. Glatthaar, Joseph T. General Lee's Army: From Victory to Collapse. New York: Free Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-684-82787-2.
Eastern Theater of the American Civil War Grant, Ulysses S. Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant (http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/4367). 2 vols. Charles L. Webster & Company, 188586. ISBN 0-914427-67-9. McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. Oxford History of the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. ISBN 0-19-503863-0. Murfin, James V. The Gleam of Bayonets: Battle of Antietam, September 17, 1862. Covington, GA: Mockingbird Press, 1965. ISBN 89176-007-5. Welcher, Frank J. The Union Army, 18611865 Organization and Operations. Vol. 1, The Eastern Theater. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989. ISBN 0-253-36453-1. Wert, Jeffry D. The Sword of Lincoln: The Army of the Potomac. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005. ISBN 0-7432-2506-6. Williams, T. Harry. Lincoln and His Generals. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952. ISBN 0-9654382-6-0.
136
External links
National Park Service Civil War at a Glance (http://www.pueblo.gsa.gov/cic_text/misc/civilwar/civilwar. htm)
137
Background
Northeastern North Carolina is dominated by its sounds; large but shallow bodies of brackish-to-salt water that lie between the mainland and the Outer Banks. Although they are all one body, intimately connected and having a common water level, they are conceptually divided into several distinct regions. The largest of these is Pamlico Sound, immediately behind Hatteras Island; to its north is the second largest, Albemarle Sound, which extends almost to the southern border of Virginia. The linkage between these two, somewhat narrow, is further constricted by Roanoke Island. The portion of the waterway between Roanoke Island and the mainland is known as Croatan Sound. Both the island and the sound are about ten miles (16km) long. The sound at its widest point is a little more than 4 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) across, the island about half that. On the eastern side of the island is Roanoke Sound, much narrower, shallower, and less important. Several North Carolina cities were sited on the sounds, among them New Bern (usually written New Berne in the mid-nineteenth century), Beaufort, Edenton, and Elizabeth City. Others, not lying directly on the sounds, were accessible to the rivers that emptied into them. As much as a third of the state is in their watershed. Through most of the first year of the Civil War, the Confederate forces retained control of the sounds, so that coastwise water-borne commerce of the eastern part of the state was unimpeded. The sounds were linked to Norfolk, Virginia by the Albemarle and Chesapeake Canal and the Dismal Swamp Canal. The blockade of Norfolk could not be complete so long as cargoes could reach the city through its back door. Communications were not affected appreciably when Federal forces captured the forts on the Outer Banks at Hatteras Inlet in August 1861, as the Union Navy could not bring its deep-water vessels into the sounds through the shallow inlets.[1] Roanoke Island was the key to control of the Sounds. If controlled by the Union forces, they would have a base that could be attacked only by an amphibious operation, which the Rebels could not mount. If the Union established naval superiority there, all points on the mainland shores would be equally vulnerable to assault. The Confederate defenders would be forced into an impossible situation: they would either have to give up some positions without a fight, or they would have to spread their assets too thin to be of any use.[2]
Prelude
Further information: Roanoke Island order of battle
Confederate defense
The defense of Roanoke Island started in an accidental manner. When the Federal fleet appeared off Hatteras Inlet on August 27, 1861, the 3rd Georgia Infantry Regiment was hastily sent from Norfolk to help hold the forts there, but the forts fell before they arrived, so they were diverted to Roanoke Island. They remained there for the next three months, making somewhat desultory efforts to expel the Yankees from Hatteras Island.[3] Little was done to secure the position until early October, when Brig. Gen. Hill was assigned to command the coastal defenses of North Carolina in the vicinity of the sounds. Hill set his soldiers to putting up earthworks across the center of the island, but he was called away to service in Virginia before they were completed.[4] Shortly after his departure, his district was split in two; the southern part was assigned to Brig. Gen. Lawrence O'B. Branch, while the northern part was put in control of Henry A. Wise, whose command included Albemarle Sound and Roanoke Island, but not Pamlico Sound and its cities. It is also significant that Branch reported to Brig. Gen. Richard C. Gatlin, who commanded the Department of North Carolina, while Wise was under Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger, who was in charge of the defenses of Norfolk.[5] Wise had been commander of the so-called Wise Legion, but his troops did not accompany him. The Legion was broken up, although he was able to retain two of his old regiments, the 46th and 59th Virginia. He also had three regiments of North Carolina troops, the 2nd, 8th, and 31st North Carolina, plus three companies of the 17th North Carolina. The men from North Carolina were ill-equipped and poorly clothed, often armed with nothing more than
Battle of Roanoke Island their own shotguns. All told, the number came to about 1,400 infantrymen, but the number available for duty was smaller than that because the living conditions put as many as one-fourth of the command on the sick list.[6] Wise begged Richmond to send him some guns, as had Hill before him, but the numbers that were actually sent were inadequate. They were distributed into several nominal forts: facing Croatan Sound were twelve guns in Fort Huger, at Weir's Point, the northwestern corner of the island; four guns in Fort Blanchard, about a mile (1.6km) to the southeast; and nine guns in Fort Bartow, at the romantically-named Pork Point, about a quarter of the way down the island. Across the sound, at Redstone Point opposite Fort Huger, two old canal barges had been pushed up onto the mud, protected by sandbags and cotton bales, armed with seven guns, and named Fort Forrest. These were all the guns that would bear on the sound; the southern half of the island, nearest Pamlico Sound, in the direction from which the attack would come, was unprotected. Five other guns did not face Croatan Sound: a battery of two guns on the eastern side of the island protected against possible assault across Roanoke Sound, and three others occupied an earthwork near the geometric center of the island.[7] Wise made one other contribution to the defense. He found some pile drivers, and was able to impede the sound between Forts Huger and Forrest by a double row of piles, augmented by sunken hulks. The barrier was still being worked on when the attack came.[8] The Confederate Navy also made a contribution to the defense. Seven gunboats, mounting a total of only eight guns, formed the Mosquito Fleet, commanded by Flag Officer William F. Lynch. Wise, for one, believed that their net contribution was negative. Not only were their guns taken from the forts on the island, but so were their crews. He gave vent to his feelings after the battle: "Captain Lynch was energetic, zealous, and active, but he gave too much consequence entirely to his fleet of gunboats, which hindered transportation of piles, lumber, forage, supplies of all kinds, and of troops, by taking away the steam-tugs and converting them into perfectly imbecile gunboats."[9] Despite Wise's disapproval, the Mosquito Fleet was part of the defense, and the Yankees would have to deal with it.
138
Union offense
A short time after Hatteras Island was captured for the Union, Burnside began to promote the idea of a Coast Division, to be composed of fishermen, dockworkers, and other watermen from the northeastern states, and used to attack coastal areas. He reasoned that such men were already familiar with ships, and therefore would be easy to train for amphibious operations. Burnside was a close friend of General-in-Chief George B. McClellan, so he got a respectful hearing. Although Burnside had initially intended to operate in Chesapeake Bay, in the hands of McClellan and the War Department his ideas were soon transformed into a planned assault on the North Carolina interior coast, beginning with Roanoke Island. An unspoken reason for the change of target was the mistaken belief that pro-Union sentiment was being suppressed in North Carolina, and an invasion would allow them to express their true loyalties.[10] When it was fleshed out, the invasion of North Carolina came to be known as the Burnside Expedition. As recruiting progressed, Burnside organized the Coast Division into three brigades, led by three friends from his Military Academy days. Brig. Gen. John G. Foster led the First Brigade, Brig. Gen. Jesse L. Reno the Second, and Brig. Gen. John G. Parke the Third.[11] In early January, nearly 13,000 men were ready for duty.[12] Although the Union Navy would provide most of the gunnery that would be needed to suppress the Rebel batteries, Burnside decided to have some gunboats under Army control. This immediately led to some interference between the two services. The Navy had no vessels sturdy enough to go to sea and at the same time draw little enough water to be able to pass through the shallow inlet, thought to be about 8 feet (unknown operator: u'strong'm). They therefore had to buy suitable merchant ships for conversion, at the very time that Burnside and his agents were also dickering for their ships. Because the sailors were more experienced, they were able to get most of the more suitable ships. The Army was left with a mixed bag of rickety ships that were barely seaworthy.[13] By the time the expedition got under way, the Navy had 20 gunboats, and the Coast Division had nine. The armada was
Battle of Roanoke Island supplemented by several canal boats converted into floating batteries, mounting boat howitzers and protected by sandbags and bales of hay. All told, the expedition carried 108 pieces of ordnance.[14] While Burnside's agents were purchasing the gunboats they were also buying or leasing other vessels to be used as transports. The soldiers and transports for the expedition assembled at Annapolis. Embarkation began on January 5, 1862, and on January 9 they began to get under way, with orders to rendezvous at Fort Monroe, near the entrance to Chesapeake Bay. There they met the naval contingent, and on January 11 they set sail. Until this time, only Burnside and his immediate staff knew their ultimate destination. Once at sea, the captain of each ship opened his sealed orders and learned that his ship should proceed to the vicinity of Cape Hatteras.[15]
139
Battle
From Chesapeake Bay to Pamlico Sound
For many of the Federal soldiers, the voyage to Hatteras Inlet was the worst part of the battle. Earning its reputation, the weather in the vicinity of Cape Hatteras turned foul, causing many of them to become seasick. In an act of bravado, Burnside left his comfortable quarters aboard the transport George Peabody and with his staff went aboard Army gunboat Picket. He chose this vessel because he considered her to be the least seaworthy ship in his command, and by showing his troops that he was willing to share their misery, he earned their devotion. When the storm struck, he began to doubt the wisdom of his move, but Picket survived and got him safely to his destination. Three vessels in the armada were not so lucky: City of New York, laden with ordnance and supplies; Pocahontas, carrying horses; and Army gunboat Zouave were all lost, although all persons aboard were rescued. The only personnel losses were two officers of the 9th New Jersey, who were drowned when their surfboat overturned following a visit to the flagship.[16] The entry into Pamlico Sound through Hatteras Inlet was time consuming. The swash, thought to be eight feet (2.5 m) deep, was found the hard way to be only six feet (1.9 m). Some of the Union Army ships drew too much to get across, and had to be kedged in after being lightened. Others were too deep even to be kedged in; the men or Sketch showing route of Burnside's forces to materials they carried had to be brought ashore on Hatteras Island, and Hatteras Inlet. U.S. Government Printing Office, the ships sent back. Bark John Trucks never made it at all; she could 1866 not get close enough to Hatteras Island even for the men aboard to be taken off. She returned to Annapolis with the majority of the regiment, the 53rd New York, a detachment of the command was active in the battle of Roanoke island [17][18] Not until February 4 was the fleet as ready as it ever would be and assembled in Pamlico Sound.[19] While the Northern fleet was struggling over the bar, the Confederates were strangely inert. No reinforcements were sent to the island, or, for that matter, any of the other possible targets in the region. The number of infantrymen on the island remained at about 1,400, with 800 in reserve at Nag's Head. The major change was negative: on February 1 Wise came down with what he called "pleurisy, with high fever and spitting of blood, threatening pneumonia." He was confined to bed at Nag's Head, and remained hospitalized until February 8, after the battle was over. Although he continued to issue orders, effective command on Roanoke Island fell to Col. H. M. Shaw of the 8th North
140
Map of Roanoke Island, showing forts and fleet dispositions, February 7, 1862, on the left, and on the right, the battlefield where opposing armies met on February 8. Prepared by Lt. Andrews, 9th N.Y. Regiment.
The weakness of the Confederate position was revealed at this time. Only four of the guns at Fort Bartow would bear on the Union gunboats. Forts Huger and Blanchard could not contribute at all. Fort Forrest, on the other side of the sound, was rendered completely useless when gunboat CSS Curlew, holed at the waterline, ran ashore directly in front in her effort to avoid sinking, and in so doing masked the guns of the fort.[22] Losses were light on both sides despite the intensity of the fight. Several of the Union ships were hit, but none suffered severe damage. This was true for the Confederates also, aside from Curlew, but the remaining Mosquito Fleet had to retire simply because they ran out of ammunition.[23] The Army transports, accompanied by its gunboats, had in the meantime arrived at Ashby Harbor, near the midpoint of the island. At 15:00, Burnside ordered the landings to begin, and at 16:00 the troops were reaching shore. A 200-man strong Confederate force commanded by Col. John V. Jordan (31st North Carolina), in position to oppose the landing, was discovered and fired on by the gunboats; the defenders fled without any attempt to return fire.[24] There was no further opposition. Almost all of the 10,000 men present were ashore by midnight. With the infantry went six launches with boat howitzers, commanded by a young midshipman, Benjamin H. Porter. The Union soldiers pushed inland a short distance and then went into camp for the night.[25]
Battle of Roanoke Island time. Reno ordered his 21st Massachusetts, 51st New York, and 9th New Jersey to attack. As they were firing on the Confederates, the 23rd Massachusetts, from the First Brigade, appeared on the other end of the line. The defensive line began to crack; noting this, Foster ordered his remaining forces to attack. Under assault from three sides, the Confederates broke and fled.[27] As no fall-back defenses had been set up, and he was bereft of artillery, Col. Shaw surrendered to Foster. Included in the capitulation were not only the 1,400 infantry that he commanded directly, but also the guns in the forts. Two additional regiments (2nd North Carolina and 46th Virginia) had been sent as reinforcements. They arrived too late to take part in the battle, but not too late to be take part in the surrender. Altogether, some 2,500 men became prisoners of war.[28] Aside from the men who went into captivity, casualties were rather light by American Civil War standards. The Federal forces lost 37 killed, 214 wounded, and 13 missing. The Confederates lost 23 killed, 58 wounded, and 62 missing.[29]
141
Aftermath
Roanoke Island remained in Union control for the rest of the war. Immediately after the battle, the Federal gunboats passed the now-silent Confederate forts into Albemarle Sound, and destroyed what was left of the Mosquito Fleet at the Battle of Elizabeth City. Burnside used the island as staging ground for later assaults on New Bern and Fort Macon, resulting in their capture. Several minor expeditions took other towns on the sounds. The Burnside Expedition ended only in July, when its leader was called to Virginia to take part in the Richmond campaign. After Burnside left, North Carolina ceased to be an active center of the war. With only one or two exceptions, no notable military actions took place until the last days of the conflict, when the Battle of Fort Fisher closed Wilmington, the last open port in the Confederacy. The Army classified the slaves on Roanoke Island as contraband and by late 1862, hundreds more escaped slaves had joined them. While Foster was commander of the Department of North Carolina, in 1863 he appointed Horace James, a Congregational chaplain, as "Superintendent of Negro Affairs for the North Carolina District", encouraging him to support the former slaves in becoming educated, growing their own food, and working. Based in New Bern, James supervised the Trent River contraband camp there, but decided to make Roanoke Island a self-sustaining colony. The Freedmen's Colony of Roanoke Island was an important model that lasted four years; it had a sawmill, established a fisheries, and by 1864 it had 2200 residents. It was overcrowded when residents reached 3900 at its peak, in part because poor soil on the island limited productivity of agriculture. Many of its people worked for the Army for wages, and more than 150 men enlisted in the United States Colored Troops. Missionary teachers recruited by the American Missionary Association taught reading and writing to classes of both children and adults. It was an important step toward citizenship for the freedmen.[30]
Notes
[1] Gen. Wise, the former governor of Virginia, pointed out the importance of Roanoke Island when he requested aid before the battle: ORA I, v. 9, pp. 134, 138. Following the battle, he reiterated the evaluation in a rancorous outburst: ORA I, v. 9, p. 188. [2] The label "key" was frequently applied. ORA I, v. 4, pp. 578-79, 682, 718; v. 9, pp. 115, 126, 134, 138, 187, 188. [3] Campbell, Storm over Carolina, pp. 5264. [4] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, pp. 6263. [5] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads,, pp. 6263. Hill first reported for duty on October 4, and was relieved by Branch on November 16. Branch's district was split on December 21. [6] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, p. 77. Battles and leaders, v. 1, p. 670. [7] Browning, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear, p. 24. [8] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, p. 76. [9] ORA I, v. 9, p. 129. Lynch was not the only target of Wise's invective; this link gives other examples. (http:/ / ehistory. osu. edu/ osu/ books/ battles/ vol2/ pageview. cfm?page=276)
142
Abbreviations used in these notes: ORA (Official records, armies): War of the Rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies. ORN (Official records, navies): Official records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion.
References
Burnside, Ambrose E., "The Burnside Expedition," Battles and leaders of the Civil War, Johnson, Robert Underwood, and Clarence Clough Buell, eds. New York:Century, 18871888; reprint, Castle, n.d. (http:// ehistory.osu.edu/osu/books/battles/index.cfm) Browning, Robert M. Jr., From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War. Univ. of Alabama, 1993. ISBN 0-8173-5019-5 Campbell, R. Thomas, Storm over Carolina: The Confederate Navy's Struggle for Eastern North Carolina. Cumberland House, 2005. ISBN 1-58182-486-6 Miller, James M., The Rebel Shore: The Story of Union Sea Power in the Civil War. Little, Brown and Co., 1957. Trotter, William R., Ironclads and Columbiads: The Coast. Joseph F. Blair, 1989. ISBN 0-89587-088-6 US Navy Department, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion. Series I: 27 volumes. Series II: 3 volumes. Washington: Government Printing Office, 18941922. Series I, volume 6 is most useful. (http://cdl.library.cornell.edu/moa/moa_browse.html) US War Department, A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series I: 53 volumes. Series II: 8 volumes. Series III: 5 volumes. Series IV: 4 volumes. Washington: Government Printing Office, 18861901. Series I, volume 9 is most useful. The War of the Rebellion (http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/ sources/records/list.cfm) National Park Service Battle Summary (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/nc002.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/NorthCarolinaBattlefieldProfiles/Monroes Cross Roads to Wyse Fork.pdf)
143
Background
Elizabeth City lies near the mouth of the Pasquotank River, where it flows into Albemarle Sound from the north. North of the city is the Dismal Swamp Canal. To the east is the southern segment of the Albemarle and Chesapeake Canal, separated from the Pasquotank River by only a narrow neck of land.[1] Much of the food and forage delivered from North Carolina to southeastern Virginia was transported along these two canals. In particular, Norfolk, Virginia depended upon continued access to the canals for its subsistence. So long as the North Carolina Sounds remained in Confederate hands, Norfolk could be well supplied despite the blockading efforts of the Union Navy at the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay.
The Pasquotank River near Elizabeth City, site of battle of 10 February 1862
That changed, however, in early February 1862. In a battle fought on 78 February, the joint operation of a Union Army division under Major General Ambrose E. Burnside and a naval flotilla under Flag Officer Louis M. Goldsborough captured Roanoke Island, a position in Croatan Sound that had previously shielded the sounds from Federal depredations. Earlier, Union ships trying to enforce the blockade on the canals would have had to enter Pamlico Sound through Hatteras Inlet, then pass several Confederate batteries on Roanoke Island before they could get into Albemarle Sound. With the elimination of the batteries, however, all that stood in the way of the Union Navy was the Mosquito Fleet of the Confederate States Navy.[2]
Prelude
Defense: the Mosquito Fleet
The first shots of the Burnside Expedition were fired on 7 February 1862, in the Battle of Roanoke Island. On that first day of the two-day battle, a force of 19 Union gunboats bombarded, rather inconclusively, four Rebel forts facing Croatan Sound and eight ships of the Confederate States Navy. The Federal ships were parts of the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, commanded by Flag Officer Goldsborough. The Confederate vessels were drawn from a unit led by Flag Officer William F. Lynch, termed the "Mosquito Fleet", intended to serve on Albemarle Sound and nearby waters. Two vessels of the Mosquito Fleet were not present: CSS Appomattox had been sent away to Edenton for supplies and did not return in time for the battle, and schooner CSS Black Warrior was left out, presumably because she lacked the mobility that steam power gave the rest of the fleet.[3] The gunnery duel lasted from noon until sunset. The only significant casualty among the fleets was the loss of CSS Curlew, holed at the waterline and beached to avoid sinking; when Roanoke Island was surrendered the next day, she
Battle of Elizabeth City was burned in order to keep her out of Federal hands. One other ship was damaged, but not by enemy action: CSS Forrest damaged her screw by running on a submerged obstacle, and was thereafter unable to move under her own power. The remainder of the Mosquito Fleet suffered only minimal damage. They had to retire at the end of the day, with Forrest in tow, solely because they had nearly run out of ammunition.[4] Flag Officer Lynch took his fleet to Elizabeth City, to resupply and to repair Forrest. Failing to find ammunition to replenish his magazines, he sent Commander Thomas T. Hunter, former captain of CSS Curlew, to Norfolk. He later sent CSS Raleigh up the Dismal Swamp Canal for the same purpose. Hunter returned with enough to resupply only two ships; Lynch divided it among all of his remaining serviceable ships. Raleigh, however, was not able to return in time.[5] No further changes of status affected the Mosquito Fleet. On the eve of battle, Lynch had at his disposal six ships in the water, each with only enough shot and powder to be able to fire ten times.[6] His flagship, Sea Bird, carrying two guns, was a converted sidewheel steamer.[7] Three of his other vessels were former tugs: Appomattox[8] and Ellis,[9] each with two guns, and Beaufort,[10] with only one. Fanny,[11] with two guns, had been a transport vessel used by the United States Army until she was captured by Confederate forces near Cape Hatteras. The last vessel, CSS Black Warrior, a schooner that had been pressed into service only four days before the battle, was armed with two 32-pounder guns.[12] In addition to the eleven guns of his fleet, Lynch counted on the four guns of the Cobb's Point battery for support.[13]
144
145
Battle
Lynch used the time that the Union flotilla was anchored to arrange his own ships for the coming battle. He decided to base his position on the battery of four guns at Cobb's Point, placing schooner CSS Black Warrior opposite the point, and his five remaining steamships in line across the river a short distance upstream. He took this position because he expected the Union to try to reduce the battery before proceeding, as they had done three days previously in the opening phase of the Battle of Roanoke Island. His CSS Ellis after her capture final instructions to his captains included the order not to let the ships fall into enemy hands; if all else failed, they should try to escape, or else destroy their vessels.[18] At dawn on 10 February, Lynch made his first visit to the Cobb's Point battery, to coordinate its defense with his fleet. He found it manned by only seven militiamen and a single civilian. Because the battery was the strong point of his planned defense, he was constrained to order Lieutenant Commanding William Harwar Parker, captain of CSS Beaufort, to come ashore with most of his crew to man the guns. He left only enough on the ship to take her up the canal. With the additional men, only three of the four guns could be manned. When battle was joined, the militiamen promptly deserted; henceforth, only two guns could be used against the enemy.[19] The battery turned out to be irrelevant. Because his ammunition was low and his mission was to destroy the Rebel fleet, Rowan ordered his ships to bypass the battery. Parker and his men got off a few wild shots that did no harm, but they found that their guns would not bear once the Federal fleet was upstream. They therefore could only watch as their ships were destroyed by the attacking Federal fleet.[20] First of the Confederate fleet to be lost was schooner Black Warrior. She was fired on by the entire attacking force as they passed the Cobb's Point battery, so her crew abandoned her and set her afire. Likewise, Fanny was run ashore and burned. A boarding party from Ceres captured CSS Ellis in hand-to-hand combat. Her captain would have blown up Ellis, but a black coal heaver discovered the charges and revealed them to the boarding party. CSS Sea Bird attempted to escape, but was run down and sunk by Commodore Perry. CSS Beaufort and Appomattox made good their escape into the Dismal Swamp Canal. There, in the final irony, Appomattox was found to be 2in (unknown operator: u'strong'cm) too wide to pass through a lock, so she had to be burned. CSS Forrest, on the stocks to repair the damaged screw she had sustained on 8 February, was burned, along with an unnamed and uncompleted gunboat. CSS Raleigh was still at Norfolk, so she was not harmed.[21] She and Beaufort were the only vessels in the Mosquito Fleet to escape either capture or destruction. Casualties were modest. The attacking Federal fleet lost two men killed and seven wounded, while the Rebels lost in all four killed, six wounded, and 34 captured.[22] Quarter Gunner John Davis was awarded the congressional medal of honor for his actions on board the Valley City during the engagement.[23][24]
146
Aftermath
When they learned of the destruction of their fleet and the surrender of the Cobb's Point battery, Confederate troops retreating from Roanoke Island set fires in Elizabeth City, acting under orders from Brigadier General Henry A. Wise to destroy the town. About two blocks had been consumed when sailors from the Union flotilla arrived and were able to save the rest.[25] The Albemarle and Chesapeake Canal was blocked near its entrance at the North River. The retreating Rebels started the obstruction. It was completed by the victorious Federal forces, acting under the orders of Flag Officer Goldsborough.[26] The town of Edenton was taken without loss of blood on 12 February by four of Commander Cowan's gunboats. Two schooners were captured and another destroyed, and eight cannon were seized.[27] More generally, there was no longer a Confederate presence on Albemarle Sound. It remained so for most of the rest of the war; the only significant challenge to Union dominance was the short-lived experiment of CSS Albemarle in the summer of 1864. Although Norfolk was not attacked, it was isolated and increasingly worthless to the Confederate Army. In May, the city was abandoned.
CSS Albemarle
Order of Battle
Confederate: CSS Sea Bird, sidewheel steamer, flagship CSS Fanny, steamer CSS Appomattox, tug boat CSS Ellis, tug boat CSS Beaufort, tug boat CSS Black Warrior, schooner Union: USS Delaware, sidewheel steamer, flagship USS Hetzel, sidewheel steamer USS Isaac N. Semour, sidewheel steamer USS John L. Lockwood, sidewheel steamer USS Ceres, sidewheel steamer USS Shawsheen, sidewheel steamer USS Commodore Perry, sidewheel steamer USS Morse, sidewheel steamer USS Louisiana, screw steamer USS Underwriter, screw steamer USS Valley City, screw steamer USS Whitehead, screw steamer USS Henry Brinker, screw steamer
147
Notes
Abbreviations used in these notes: ORA (Official records, armies): War of the Rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies. ORN (Official records, navies): Official records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion.
[1] The Dismal Swamp Canal begins a little less than 9mi (unknown operator: u'strong'km) from Cobb's Point as the crow flies, but almost twice that measured along the river. From Cobb's Point to the Albemarle and Chesapeake Canal is 12mi (unknown operator: u'strong'km) in a straight line, almost three times that by water. [2] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, pp. 7588. [3] Campbell, Storm over Carolina, pp. 6667. [4] Campbell, Storm over Carolina, pp. 7175. [5] Campbell, Storm over Carolina, pp. 7677. [6] ORN ser. I, v. 6, p. 596. [7] "Sea Bird" (http:/ / www. history. navy. mil/ danfs/ cfa9/ sea_bird. htm). History.navy.mil. . Retrieved 10 February 2012. [8] "Appomattox" (http:/ / www. history. navy. mil/ danfs/ cfa1/ appomattox. htm). History.navy.mil. . Retrieved 10 February 2012. [9] "Ellis" (http:/ / www. history. navy. mil/ danfs/ cfa3/ ellis. htm). History.navy.mil. . Retrieved 10 February 2012. [10] "Beaufort" (http:/ / www. history. navy. mil/ danfs/ cfa1/ beaufort. htm). History.navy.mil. . Retrieved 10 February 2012. [11] "Fanny" (http:/ / www. history. navy. mil/ danfs/ cfa3/ fanny. htm). History.navy.mil. . Retrieved 10 February 2012. [12] "Black Warrior" (http:/ / www. history. navy. mil/ danfs/ cfa2/ black_warrior. htm). History.navy.mil. . Retrieved 10 February 2012. [13] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, p. 88. [14] Browning, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear, p. 28. [15] Because of engine trouble, General Putnam was not able to take part in the battle. [16] See the article for each ship in DANFS. Also ORN ser. II, v. 1, pp. 54, 64, 73, 101, 102, 106, 114, 129, 151, 207, 228, 230, 239, 241. [17] ORN ser. I, v. 5, p. 607. [18] Browning, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear, pp. 2829. [19] ORN ser. I, v. 6, p. 596. [20] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, p. 89. [21] Browning, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear, p. 29. ORN ser. I, v. 6, pp. 607608. [22] Browning, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear, p. 29. Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, pp. 8990. ORN ser. I, v. 6, p. 621. [23] "USS Valley City" (http:/ / ecbattle. home. coastalnet. com/ Medal of Honor. htm). Ecbattle.home.coastalnet.com. . Retrieved 10 February 2012. [24] "US People-Davis, John, Quarter Gunner, USN" (http:/ / www. history. navy. mil/ photos/ pers-us/ uspers-d/ j-davis. htm). History.navy.mil. 27 April 2006. . Retrieved 10 February 2012. [25] ORA ser. I, v. 9, pp. 191193. [26] ORN ser. I, v. 6, p. 635. [27] ORN ser. I, v. 6, p. 637.
References
Browning, Robert M. Jr., From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama, 1993. ISBN 0-8173-5019-5 Campbell, R. Thomas, Storm over Carolina: the Confederate Navy's struggle for eastern North Carolina. Nashville, TN: Cumberland House, 2005. ISBN 1-58182-486-6 Parker, William Harwar, Recollections of a naval officer, 18411865. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1883; reprint ed., Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1985. ISBN 0-87021-533-7 Trotter, William R., Ironclads and columbiads: the coast. Winston-Salem: John F. Blair, 1989. ISBN 0-89587-088-6 US Navy Department, Official records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion. Series I: 27 volumes. Series II: 3 volumes. Washington: Government Printing Office, 18941922. US War Department, A compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series I: 53 volumes. Series II: 8 volumes. Series III: 5 volumes. Series IV: 4 volumes. Washington: Government Printing Office, 18861901.
148
Background
New Bern lies on the right (southwest) bank of the Neuse River, about 37 miles (60km) above its exit into Pamlico Sound. The river is broad in this vicinity, and is deep enough that vessels that can navigate the sound can also ply the river. In the colonial era, the town was quite important as a seaport, but by the time of the Civil War Morehead City and Beaufort had largely supplanted it. Nevertheless, New Bern was still a significant military target, as the railroad (Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad)[1] that connected the coast with the interior passed through the city. A short distance further up, at Goldsboro (spelled Goldsborough in the 19th century), the line crossed the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad, noted for keeping the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia supplied throughout the war. Thus, if New Bern were to fall into Federal hands, an important link in the supply chain of that army would be broken. The land in this part of North Carolina is low and rather flat, and is sometimes marshy. In 1862, the solid land was mostly covered with open pine forest, although in places it was broken into low hills with deciduous forests, separated by ravines.[2] It is crossed by many creeks that sometimes rise to the status of small rivers. One of these, the Trent River, separates New Bern from the land to its south. The slightly smaller Slocum's Creek, enters 16 miles (26km) farther down the Neuse. It was to be the landing site for the attacking Federal forces. The entire action, aside from the takeover of the city, was confined to the land between these two streams. The railroad ran on a system of berms and occasional cuts about a mile (1.6km) inland from the river. It entered the city on a bridge over the Trent River. A county road passed over the same land, also connecting New Bern with Morehead City and Beaufort. In the vicinity of the battle, it lay between railroad and the river, but it crossed the railroad about a mile and a half (2km) north of what would be the battlefield.[3] The road continued to the northwest, crossing the Trent on a drawbridge some 4 miles (6.4km) west of the city.[4] In the manner of the time, the road was unpaved, as the Union soldiers learned to their sorrow.
149
Prelude
Following the secession of North Carolina from the Union, the defenses of the state were neglected by the Confederate government in Richmond. The War Department, directed at first by Secretary Leroy P. Walker and later by Judah P. Benjamin,[5] used the state's best-trained and best-equipped troops to take part in the campaigns in Virginia, which were given a higher priority. They were seen as protecting the Confederate capital of Richmond. When Hatteras Island fell to Union forces in August 1861, only six regiments of infantry were available to defend the entire coast of the state.[6]
The present-day location of Fort Thompson. Only
By that time, the Confederacy had divided the coastal defense into the earthenworks remain. The Neuse River can be seen in the background. separate districts for command purposes; the northern part, from near Cape Lookout to the Virginia border, was assigned to Brig. Gen. Daniel H. Hill, who set up the defensive lines around New Bern. South of the city, across the Trent River, he had built two primary lines. First was a system of breastworks named the "Croatan Works,"[7] near Otter Creek and extending inland as far as the railroad. Six miles (10km) closer to the city was another substantial line anchored on the river by Fort Thompson. The fort held 13 guns, three of which bore on landward approaches.[8] Hill ordered construction of a series of batteries along the river to defend against attack by naval forces.[9] The Confederates blocked the river with two barriers. The first, a mile and a half (2.4km) below Fort Thompson, consisted of a double row of piles cut off below the water, capped with iron, and backed by a row of 30 torpedoes (present-day mines). Each torpedo contained about 200 pounds (100kg) of powder. The second was opposite Fort Thompson and consisted of a row of hulks and chevaux de frise, which would force ships to pass under the guns of the fort.[10] Hill hoped that he would be given sufficient manpower to fill his lines, but he was transferred to service in Virginia before the hoped-for additional troops arrived. Shortly after he was succeeded by Brig. Gen. Lawrence O'B. Branch, the district was divided again. Branch's command extended from Cape Lookout north only to the limits of Pamlico Sound. From there to the Virginia border and beyond was assigned to Brig. Gen. Benjamin Huger, whose primary concern was the defense of Norfolk and environs. This meant in particular that Roanoke Island, between Croatan Sound and Roanoke Sound just north of Pamlico Sound, was not included in Branch's command.[11] Roanoke Island fell to a combined operation of the Union Army's Coast Division, under Brig. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, and a Union gunboat flotilla assembled from the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, under Flag Officer Louis M Goldsborough, on 78 February 1862. That battle was rapidly followed up by the gunboats alone, who wiped out the Confederate Navy's Mosquito Fleet in an assault on Elizabeth City.[12] Shortly afterward, Goldsborough had to leave the sounds for duties at Hampton Roads, and immediate command of the ships he left behind fell to Commander Stephen C. Rowan.[13] As a result of the battles, Union forces could move at will in Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds. Every city and town accessible to those sounds hence became vulnerable to attack. The most important was New Bern, and Burnside soon resolved to take it.
150 The importance of New Bern was no more obvious to Burnside than it was to the Confederate authorities in Richmond, but they did little to secure it. Although more than a month passed after Roanoke Island fell before Burnside could mount an attack on the city, the local command received no reinforcements. One of General Branch's aides estimated that the lines would need at least 6,130 men to hold them, but he had only about 4,000 at his disposal, a number often reduced by sickness. Furthermore, many of the men were poorly-armed militiamen. The disparity between necessity and reality persuaded Branch to draw his lines in, abandoning some of the strong breastworks erected by his predecessor. The principal defense would be the line based on Fort Thompson.[14]
Defensive line at Battle of New Bern, 14 March 1862 |alt = Map prepared for General Branch, showing his defensive lines. New Bern is off the map at the top; the Federal advance would be from the bottom. The Neuse River flows from top to bottom on the right; the left is limited by Bryce Creek, roughly parallel to the river. The BeaufortNew Bern railroad bisects the image vertically. The defense on the right is a straight line from the river to the railroad, about 3/4 of the distance from the top. From the railroad to Bryce Creek, the line of defense follows another small creek. The right and left halves of the defensive line are offset at the railroad. The land is covered by woods except immediately in front of the lines, where the timber has been felled.
The Fort Thompson line that had been set up by General Hill extended only from the river to the railroad. They ended on the right in a brickyard that would figure prominently in the fighting. Because the land farther to the right was fairly firm and would allow his position to be flanked, General Branch decided to extend the line beyond the railroad and end it in a swamp. This just about doubled the length of the defensive line. He made a major blunder in laying out the line, however. In haste to complete the extension and faced with an exasperating shortage of labor, he decided to use a small creek as a natural part of the line. This creek intersected the railroad at a point some 150 yards (135 meters) up from the brickyard. The line of breastworks therefore had a dogleg in its center.[15]
Battle
Further information: New Bern order of battle
Advance
The soldiers of the Coast Division clambered into their transports at Roanoke Island on 11 March 1862 and got under way early the next morning, accompanied by 14 Navy gunboats and one gunboat of their own. One of the Navy vessels was detached to guard the mouth of the Pamlico River, where it was incorrectly rumored that the Rebels were preparing two ships to cut off transports that might become separated from Navy protection. The main force traversed Pamlico Sound, entered the Neuse River, and anchored near the mouth of Slocum's Creek at dusk. Branch was aware of their presence, and immediately ordered his forces to take up defensive positions. He sent Col. James Sinclair's 35th North Carolina Infantry to the landing at Otter Creek, in front of the Croatan work, with instructions to oppose enemy landings at that site. Colonel Zebulon Vance's 26th North Carolina was ordered into the Croatan work. Other units guarded the river upstream, and reserves were assembled at the intersection of the railroad and the Beaufort road. All units were instructed that if they were forced from their positions, they should fall back on the Fort Thompson line.[16] At dawn on 13 March, the Federal troops began to disembark. A small Rebel unit trying to contest the landing was quickly driven away by fire from the gunboats, as Col. Sinclair interpreted his orders to defend against a landing at Otter Creek narrowly.[17] Burnside spent the morning getting men and equipment ashore. With the infantry came six boat (Navy) howitzers and two Army howitzers. Because of the weather, he decided to land his other artillery closer to the enemy lines, but dense fog soon closed in, and he could not communicate with the fleet. His remaining guns
Battle of New Bern were not landed.[18] A little after noon the Union soldiers began to move toward the Confederate lines, and at about the same time the rains began. The road was soon turned into mud, and the mere act of walking required great exertion. The gunners with the howitzers accompanying the infantry soon were exhausted trying to move their pieces, so a regiment of infantry (51st Pennsylvania) were detailed to help them. Many of those foot soldiers long remembered this as the most arduous part of the battle.[19] As the soldiers made their slow progress, the gunboats kept a short distance ahead, shelling places where Rebels might be waiting. Col. R. P. Campbell, in command of the Confederate right wing, interpreted the naval gunfire as preliminary to another landing that would take the Croatan work in reverse, so he ordered a general pullback to the Fort Thompson line. Thus, when the Federal army came upon the first Confederate breastworks, they found them abandoned.[20] The Coast Division soon resumed its march. Leaving the Croatan work, First (Foster's) Brigade moved on the right, following the county road, while Second (Reno's) Brigade followed the railroad on the left. Third (Parke's) Brigade followed after the First. They continued until they came in contact with enemy pickets, about a mile and a half (2km) away from the Fort Thompson line held by the Rebels. Daylight having been exhausted, Burnside ordered a halt and had the brigades bivouac in the order of their march: First Brigade on the right near the road, Second Brigade on the left near the railroad, and Third Brigade to the rear of the First. The howitzers did not arrive until 0300 the next morning.[21]
151
The fight
The field was covered by a dense fog on the morning of 14 March. Burnside ordered his forces to form and advance on the Rebel works. The Yankees did not have complete information concerning their opponents' disposition at this time; so far as they knew, the Confederate line extended only from the river to the brickyard. In keeping with this belief, Burnside ordered the First Brigade to engage the enemy left, while the Second Brigade would try to turn their right, at the brickyard. The eight howitzers were deployed across the county road. Third Brigade Battle of New Bern as illustrated in Harper's Weekly. 5 April 1862 was held as a reserve.[22] The Army also got some dubious support from the gunboats under Commander Stephen C. Rowan, who shelled the Rebel positions although they were hidden by intervening forests. This gunfire greatly disturbed the North Carolinians, but it was inaccurate enough that Burnside eventually asked Cowan to change direction.[23] Meanwhile, on the other side, General Branch had put his regiments into the line. From his left, at Fort Thompson, to the brickyard on his right, were the 27th, 37th, 7th, and 35th North Carolina Regiments. His reserve was the 33rd Regiment. The right flank of the 35th was anchored in a brickyard kiln that was loopholed for artillery. The entire line beyond the railroad was occupied by a single regiment, the 26th North Carolina, plus a few companies of cavalry. The gap in his line created by the dogleg at the railroad was covered only by his weakest unit, a militia battalion with only two weeks of training, and armed with shotguns and hunting rifles. To give them additional support, he ordered up a two-gun battery of 24-pounders to the kiln, but they were not mounted when they came under attack.[24] The First Brigade of the Union army opposed them from the river to the railroad; right to left, the units were the 25th, 24th, 27th, and 23rd Massachusetts, and the 10th Connecticut. The Beaufort Road ran through the center of this line, and here General Foster placed the howitzers that had been dragged along.[25]
Battle of New Bern On the Federal left, General Reno, still unaware of the extension of the enemy lines beyond the railroad, ordered a part of the 21st Massachusetts to charge the brick kiln, while the 9th New Jersey and the 51st New York would engage the enemy in support. The 51st Pennsylvania was held in reserve. The charge was successful at first, but they then found themselves under fire from the whole line and were forced to pull back.[26] Burnside at this time ordered his reserve, the Third Brigade, into the line to support Reno's Second Brigade. The 4th Rhode Island replaced the 21st Massachusetts, which had used up its ammunition. While trading places, Colonel Isaac P. Rodman of the 4th Rhode Island was told by Lieutenant Colonel William S. Clark of the 21st Massachusetts that he thought that another attack on the brick kiln would be successful. Rodman sent a courier to General Parke informing him that he was taking responsibility, then formed his regiment and ordered them to charge. Armed with better knowledge of the enemy, this charge was successful. The 4th Rhode Island captured nine brass field pieces, and found themselves in rear of the Rebel entrenchments.[27] At this point, the Confederate line broke. The rupture started when the green militiamen fled and exposed the units on both of their flanks. Branch ordered his reserves to plug the gap, but they did not arrive in time. As the line was rolled up on both wings, each regimental commander in succession pulled his unit back to escape being slaughtered. General Branch ordered a retreat, which soon became a rout. The fleeing North Carolinians dashed across the bridge over the Trent River into New Bern, then burned the bridge so precipitately that some of their compatriots were left behind and were captured. They also burned a fire raft in the river, which soon drifted against the railroad bridge and destroyed it.[28] While the battle was in progress, Commander Rowan's ships had moved up the river to assist. They received only minor damage in passing the lower barrier, and then positioned themselves to shell Fort Thompson. When the fort was abandoned, they immediately passed the second barrier and moved on to New Bern. Because Branch's order to retreat included all of the Confederate river batteries, their guns were spiked and they were abandoned to the fleet. At the city, the fleet shelled the retreating Confederate troops, denying them the opportunity to regroup. The retreating units could not reform until they had fled all the way to Kinston. With both bridges destroyed, Burnside's soldiers had to be ferried across the river by the gunboats.[29] Branch had lost 64 killed, 101 wounded, and 413 captured or missing, compared to Burnside's 90 killed, 380 wounded, and a single man captured.[30]
152
Aftermath
New Bern fell and was occupied. It remained in control of the Union Army for the rest of the war. Immediately following the battle, Burnside turned his attention to his next important objective, getting control of the port at Beaufort, which was defended by Fort Macon. The Rebels did not defend Morehead City, which was occupied immediately by the Yankees, or Beaufort, which was taken on 25 March. The siege of Fort Macon began at that time.
Notes
Abbreviations used in these notes: ORA (Official records, armies): War of the Rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies. ORN (Official records, navies): Official records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion.
[1] Official atlas, plate 138. [2] ORA I, v. 9, pp. 224225. [3] Official atlas, plate 40. See also the accompanying sketch from Branch's battle report. [4] ORA I, v. 9, p. 200. [5] Battles and leaders, v. 1, p. 6.
153
References
National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/nc003.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/NorthCarolinaBattlefieldProfiles/Monroes Cross Roads to Wyse Fork.pdf) Barrett, John G. The Civil War in North Carolina. The University of North Carolina Press, 1995. ISBN 0-8078-4520-5 Browning, Robert M. Jr., From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War. Univ. of Alabama, 1993. ISBN 0-8173-5019-5 Campbell, R. Thomas, Storm over Carolina: the Confederate Navy's struggle for eastern North Carolina. Cumberland House, 2005. ISBN 1-58182-486-6 Davis, George B., Leslie J. Perry, and Joseph W. Kirkley, Atlas to accompany the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Government Printing Office, 18911895; reprint, Arno, 1978. Johnson, Robert Underwood, and Clarence Clough Buel, Battles and leaders of the Civil War. Century, 1887, 1888; reprint ed., Castle, n.d. Trotter, William R., Ironclads and columbiads: the coast. Joseph F. Blair, 1989. ISBN 0-89587-088-6 US Navy Department, Official records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion. (http:// cdl.library.cornell.edu/moa/moa_browse.html) Series I: 27 volumes. Series II: 3 volumes. Washington: Government Printing Office, 18941922. Series I, volume 7 is most useful. US War Department, A compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series I: 53 volumes. Series II: 8 volumes. Series III: 5 volumes. Series IV: 4 volumes. Washington: Government Printing Office, 18861901. Series I, volume 9 is most useful. The War of the Rebellion (http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/ sources/records/list.cfm)
154
Background
Fort Macon was one of a system of coastal forts that were built around the borders of the still-young United States following the War of 1812. It was built on the eastern end of Bogue Bank, in the Outer Banks of North Carolina, and was intended to defend the entrance to the ports of Beaufort and Morehead City. Begun in 1826, it was completed and received its first garrison in 1834. As it was intended for defense against attacking enemy naval forces, it was built of masonry. Gunfire from a rolling ship's deck was not accurate enough at that time to be able to break down brick and stone walls. Although the advent of rifled artillery would soon make its walls vulnerable, no alterations were made in the fort. It was a generation out of date when the Civil War came.[1] After the first spate of enthusiasm, the fort was allowed to deteriorate. The woodwork rotted, the ironwork rusted, and gun carriages were allowed to decay. The garrison was steadily reduced in size, until by the time of the beginning of the Civil War the care of the fort was entrusted to a single sergeant.[2] When the fort was taken over by North Carolina troops under Captain Josiah Solomon Pender on April 14 (before the state had seceded from the Union), only four guns were mounted. The local military authorities immediately set about improving the armament. A total of 56 pieces (5 8-inch and 2 10-inch columbiads, 19 24-pounders, 32 32-pounders, and 6 field guns) were mounted, but they had ammunition for only three days of action.[3] At the time of the siege, the garrison of the fort numbered about 430 officers and men, commanded by Colonel Moses J. White. Sickness reduced this number by about a third. Despite the poor diet and other living conditions that they suffered, only one man died. Morale among the men was generally not good, as they were cut off from their families, and White was unpopular, both with his men and with the people of Beaufort. A few men deserted during the siege.[4] When battle came, the fort was outdated, inadequately armed, poorly supplied, and intended for a different form of combat than that it faced. These deficiencies are adequate to explain why the fort succumbed so readily at the first blow.
155
Prelude
Shortly after the Union forces had taken possession of Hatteras Island on the Outer Banks, Brigadier General Ambrose E. Burnside developed a plan to expand Federal control of eastern North Carolina by a joint Army-Navy expedition. His plan was approved by General-in-Chief George B. McClellan and the War Department. He was given authority to recruit and organize a division, to be known as the Coast Division, which would work with the Navy's North Atlantic Blockading Squadron to take control of the North Carolina Sounds and their adjacent cities. The expedition that came to be known by his Coastal North Carolina in the vicinity of Fort name got under way in January 1862, and in early February had made Macon, showing how it dominated the seaward its first conquest, Roanoke Island. Following that, the joint forces went approaches to Morehead City and Beaufort. on to other victories at Elizabeth City and New Bern (often spelled New Berne at the time). Most of the Confederate Army were forced away from the coast as far inland as Kinston by these battles. The major exception was the garrison of Fort Macon.[5] So long as Fort Macon remained in Confederate possession, Burnside (recently promoted to rank of major general) could not use the ports at Beaufort and Morehead City, so immediately following the capture of New Bern on March 14, he ordered Brigadier General John G. Parke, commander of his Third Brigade, to reduce the fort. Parke began by seizing the towns along the inner shore: Carolina City on March 21, Morehead City on March 22, Newport on March 23, and finally Beaufort on March 25. Communications between the garrison and other Confederate forces were thereby severed.[6] Parke also had to repair a railroad bridge at Newport, burned by the retreating Confederates following the loss of New Bern; the railroad was needed for the transport of his siege artillery.[7]
Siege
On March 23, General Parke sent a message from his headquarters at Carolina City to Colonel White, demanding the surrender of the fort. He offered to release the men on parole if the fort was turned over intact. White replied tersely, "I have the honor to decline evacuating Fort Macon." [8] The siege can be regarded as starting with this exchange. The investment of the fort was not yet complete, but that was accomplished on March 29, when a company from Parke's brigade crossed the sound and landed unopposed on Bogue Banks. The Confederate infantry that would have defended against the landing, the 26th North Carolina, had been included in the retreat following the Battle of New Bern.[9] Federal siege artillery followed, and Parke set up four batteries that would bear on the fort: four 8-inch (20.3cm) mortars at a range of 1200 yards (1100 meters); four 10-inch (25.4cm) mortars at a range of 1600 yards (1460 meters); three 30-pounder (13.6kg) rifled Parrotts at a range of 1300 yards (1190 meters); and a 12-pounder (5.4kg) boat howitzer at a range of 1200 yards (1100 meters).[10] The batteries were moved up at night and remained hidden behind sand dunes until they were ready to open fire. The defenders were aware of these activities, but could not waste ammunition by firing at unseen targets. Patrols sent out from the fort to harass the Union soldiers were driven back, usually without loss. On April 17, General Burnside could state in his report to the War Department, "I hope to reduce the fort within ten days."[11] His prediction proved to be remarkably accurate. Preparations were completed by April 23, and on that day General Burnside communicated directly with Colonel White and repeated his demand for surrender, again offering to release the prisoners on parole.[12] Colonel White once more refused, so Burnside on April 24 ordered General Parke to begin the bombardment as soon as possible. Parke waited until nightfall to open the embrasures for his guns behind the dunes. The bombardment began at dawn on April 25. At first, the gunners in the fort manned their pieces and replied vigorously, but they were unable to inflict damage on the Federal guns protected by the dunes.[13]
Siege of Fort Macon The defenders were also distracted by the appearance of four vessels from the Blockading Squadron: the steamers USS Daylight, State of Georgia, and Chippewa, and the bark Gemsbok. Until this time, the Navy had not been involved with the siege, but Commander Samuel Lockwood responded to the sound of gunfire and brought his section of the fleet into action. The weather was not good for a naval bombardment, however; a strong wind created waves that caused the vessels to rock badly enough to disrupt their aim, and after about an hour, the fleet withdrew. The Navy also supplied a pair of floating batteries to the attack, but again the waves interfered, and only one of them got into action. It is not certain whether the fort sustained any hits from the ships. The Confederate return fire was accurate enough to hit two vessels, doing little damage and slightly wounding only one man.[14] The initial fire from the mortars on shore was inaccurate, but a Signal Corps officer in Beaufort, Lieutenant William J. Andrews, acting on his own responsibility, was able to deliver messages to the battery commanders telling them how to adjust their range. After noon, virtually all shots were on target.[15] Nineteen guns were dismounted.[16] The walls of the fort began to crumble under the continued pounding, and in mid-afternoon Colonel White began to fear that the magazine would be breached. At 4:30 p.m., he decided that the fort could no longer hold out, so he ordered that a white flag be raised. Firing on both sides then ceased.[17] Colonel White met with General Parke to discuss terms, and Parke at first demanded unconditional surrender. White asked him for more favorable conditions, and referred to the terms that General Burnside had offered on March 23. Parke did not concede, but agreed not to renew the bombardment until he could consult with Burnside. Burnside reasoned that White could hold out at least one more day, and further action would only cause more casualties and greater damage to the fort. He therefore agreed to adhere to his first terms. The men in the fort were allowed to give their paroles, meaning that they would not take up arms against the United States until properly exchanged. They then were permitted to return to their homes, taking with them their personal property. Shortly after dawn on April 26, the Confederate flag was lowered, the defenders marched out, and Union soldiers of the 5th Rhode Island marched in.[18]
156
Aftermath
The battle had been relatively bloodless, at least by standards that soon would be common in the Civil War. On the Union side, only one man was killed, and two soldiers and one seaman were wounded. On the Confederate side, seven were killed outright, two died of wounds, and sixteen were wounded.[19] Although the Burnside Expedition had gained notable success at little cost in North Carolina, little was done to exploit it. Wilmington, for example, would seem to have been vulnerable, but it was not attacked until the final days of the war. Burnside was recalled shortly after the victory at Fort Macon, to assist General George B. McClellan in the Peninsula Campaign in Virginia. No further major offensive actions took place, and North Carolina became a secondary theater until late in the war. The battle site is now Fort Macon State Park.
Notes
Abbreviations used in these notes: ORA (Official records, armies): War of the Rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies. ORN (Official records, navies): Official records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion.
[1] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, pp. 133134. [2] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, p. 134. Browning, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear, p. 35. [3] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, pp. 10, 135136. Browning, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear, p. 35, says that only 43 guns were mounted. Burnside says in his report that 54 were taken. ORA I, vol. 9, p. 275. [4] ORA I, vol. 9, p. 293. Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, p. 138. [5] Burnside, Battles and leaders, vol. 1, pp. 660669.
157
References
Browning, Robert M. Jr., From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War. Univ. of Alabama, 1993. ISBN 0-8173-5019-5 Campbell, R. Thomas, Storm over Carolina: the Confederate Navy's struggle for eastern North Carolina. Cumberland House, 2005. ISBN 1-58182-486-6 Johnson, Robert Underwood, and Clarence Clough Buel, Battles and leaders of the Civil War. Century, 1887, 1888; reprint ed., Castle, n.d. Burnside, Ambrose E., "The Burnside Expedition," pp. 660669. Hawkins, Rush C., "Early coast operations in North Carolina," pp. 652654. Trotter, William R., Ironclads and columbiads: the coast. Joseph F. Blair, 1989. ISBN 0-89587-088-6 Official records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion. Series I: 27 volumes. Series II: 3 volumes. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1894-1922. Ser. I, vol. 7, pp.277283. A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series I: 53 volumes. Series II: 8 volumes. Series III: 5 volumes. Series IV: 4 volumes. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1886-1901. The War of the Rebellion (http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/records/list.cfm) Ser. I, vol. 9, pp. 270294. National Park Service Battle Summary (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/nc004.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/NorthCarolinaBattlefieldProfiles/Albemarle Sound to Kinston.pdf)
External links
Beaufort Harbor, 1862 (http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/map_item.pl?data=/home/www/data/gmd/gmd390/ g3904/g3904b/cw0308000.jp2&style=cwmap&itemLink=D?gmd:1:./temp/~ammem_3Dge::& title=Beaufort harbor, North Carolina.Re-survey in June and July 1862.Corrected up to April 20th 1864 Chas.G. Krebs, lith.) Fort Macon State Park Home Page (http://www.ncparks.gov/Visit/parks/foma/main.php) Battle of Fort Macon - Civil-War-Journeys.org (http://civil-war-journeys.org/fort_macon_nc.htm)
158
References
CWSAC Battle Summaries, National Park Service (http://www2.cr.nps.gov/abpp/battles/bycampgn.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/NorthCarolinaBattlefieldProfiles/Monroes Cross Roads to Wyse Fork.pdf)
References
National Park Service battle description [1] CWSAC Report Update [2]
References
[1] http:/ / www. nps. gov/ history/ hps/ abpp/ / battles/ nc006. htm [2] http:/ / www. nps. gov/ hps/ abpp/ CWSII/ NorthCarolinaBattlefieldProfiles/ Monroes%20Cross%20Roads%20to%20Wyse%20Fork. pdf
Battle of Dranesville
159
Battle of Dranesville
The Battle of Dranesville was a small battle during the American Civil War that took place between Confederate forces under General J.E.B. Stuart and Union forces under General Edward O.C. Ord on December 20, 1861, in Fairfax County, Virginia, as part of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's operations in northern Virginia. The two forces on similar winter-time patrols encountered and engaged one another in the crossroads village of Dranesville. The battle resulted in a Union victory.
Background
Following the Battle of Ball's Bluff on October 21, major offensive action was halted in the eastern theater, as both armies went into winter quarters. Small detachments were still occasionally sent out to probe the enemy's position and to obtain forage. Such was the case early on the morning of December 20 when General Stuart, with a mixed brigade of infantry comprising the regiments of the 6th South Carolina, 1st Kentucky, 10th Alabama, and 11th Virginia, 150 of his cavalry troopers and Allen S. Cutts's 4 gun Georgia battery, set out north from their position near Centreville to escort the army's wagons trains on a foraging expedition into Loudoun County. Meanwhile, General Ord, leading the 10,000 strong 3rd Brigade of Pennsylvania Reserves set out west from Langley to clear the south bank of the Potomac River of Confederate pickets and partisans in Fairfax and Loudoun. At Colvin Run Mill, Ord left half his force to protect his rear and prevent his force from being cut off from their base at Langley.
Opposing forces
Confederate
Commander: Brig. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart Regiments[1] 11th Virginia Volunteers: Col Samuel Garland, Jr 6th South Carolina Volunteers: Lt Col Secrest 10th Alabama Volunteers: Col J. H. Forney 1st Kentucky Volunteers: Col Thomas A Taylor Sumter Flying Artillery (Georgia): Capt Allen S. Cutt 1st North Carolina Cavalry (100 man detachment): Major James B. Gordon 2nd Virginia Cavalry, Company 'C' (50 man detachment): Capt Andrew L. Pitzer
Battle of Dranesville
160
Union
Commander: Brig. Gen. Edward O.C. Ord Regiments[2] 6th Infantry, Pennsylvania Reserves (a.k.a. 35th Pennsylvania Volunteers): Lt Col William M. Penrose 9th Infantry, Pennsylvania Reserves (a.k.a. 38th Pennsylvania Volunteers): Col Conrad Ferger Jackson 10th Infantry, Pennsylvania Reserves (a.k.a. 39th Pennsylvania Volunteers): Col John S. McCalmont 12th Infantry, Pennsylvania Reserves (a.k.a. 40th Pennsylvania Volunteers): Col John H. Brig. Gen. Edward O.C. Taggart Ord Kane's 1st Pennsylvania Rifle Regiment (a.k.a. 42nd Pennsylvania Volunteers): Lt Col Thomas L. Kane 1st Pennsylvania Reserve Cavalry (a.k.a. 44th Pennsylvania Volunteers): Lt Col Jacob C. Higgins Battery A, 1st Pennsylvania Reserve Artillery (a.k.a. 43rd Pennsylvania Volunteers): Capt Hezakiah Easton[3]
The battle
At about noon, Ord arrived at the intersection of the Georgetown Pike and Leesburg Pike in the village of Dranesville, where he encountered Stuart's advance cavalry pickets, which were quickly driven off by the Union force. Ord then began to lead his command west, down the Leesburg Pike. At around 1 p.m. Stuart, with the main body of his force approached Dranesville from the south, whereupon he encountered the rear of the Union detachment. Ord halted his infantry and wheeled it around to meet the Confederate threat, forming a line on the north side of the Sketch of the Affair at Dranesville, Va. Leesburg Pike. He then deployed his Matz, Otto H., 1895 artillery on an eminence near the intersection. Stuart deployed his infantry on the south side of the pike and his artillery 300 yards south of the federal position. While the Confederate infantry was deploying, the 6th South Carolina mistook the 1st Kentucky for Union troops and opened fire, which was quickly returned by the Kentuckians. Hearing the sound of gunfire, the 9th Pennsylvania charged across the turnpike but were quickly driven back. The artillery then began to duel, but owing to the strength of the Union position, the Confederate guns were quickly knocked out. Ord deployed his infantry in a skirmish line and sent it across the Pike at Stuart and the two sides squared off for nearly 2 hours. At 3 p.m., with his wagons safely away and secure from capture, Stuart ordered a withdrawal. Ord pursued for a half mile, ensuring his line of retreat was safe, before breaking off the attack and returning to Langley. The following day Stuart returned with reinforcements, but found no Federals to engage.
Battle of Dranesville
161
Results
Though the battle was small, of no strategic importance and resulted in only light casualties, it marked the first time in the east that a Union force had bested their Confederate enemy, inflicting 230 casualties while suffering only 71, and were able to drive them from the field.
Notes
[1] Stuart, J.E.B.. "Official Report" (http:/ / www. civilwarhome. com/ stuartdranesvilleor. htm). Shotgun's Home of the American Civil War. . Retrieved 20 February 2012. [2] The 'dual names' of Pennsylvania Reserve Regiments are employed by Samuel P. Bates.Bates, Samuel P. (1869). History of Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1861-1865, Volume I. Harrisburg, PA: B. Singerly, State Printer. pp.539544, 692719, 784875, 9071056. ISBNASINB002FK988S. [3] Boy Scout Troop 1018. "Order of Battle" (http:/ / www. troop1018. org/ History/ history_dranesville. htm). . Retrieved 19 February 2012.
References
Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide.Stackpole Books; Mechanicsburg, Pa. 2001. Evans, Thomas J and James M. Moyer. Mosby's Confederacy:A Guide to the Roads and Sites of Colonel John Singleton Mosby. White Mane Publishing Company, Inc. Shippensburg, Pa. 1991. p.46.
External links
History of the Dranesville, Virginia, area (includes information about the battle) (http://www.troop1018.org/ History/history_dranesville.htm) National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va007.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Deep Bottom II to Drewrys Bluff.pdf)
162
Background
Further information: Confederate order of battle, Union order of battle In the weeks preceding the battle, McClellan had been promoted to general-in-chief of all Union armies and, now, three months after the First Battle of Bull Run was building up the Army of the Potomac in preparation for an eventual advance into Virginia. On October 19, 1861, McClellan ordered Brig. Gen. George A. McCall to march his division to Dranesville, Virginia, twelve miles southeast of Leesburg, in order to discover the purpose of recent Confederate troop movements which indicated that Col. Nathan "Shanks" Evans might have abandoned Leesburg. Evans had, in fact, left the town on October 1617 but had done so on his own authority. When Confederate Brig. Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard expressed his displeasure at this move, Evans returned. By the evening of October 19, he had taken up a defensive position on the Alexandria-to-Winchester Turnpike (modern day State Route 7) east of town. McClellan came to Dranesville to consult with McCall that same evening and ordered McCall to return to his main camp at Langley, Virginia, the following morning. However, McCall requested additional time to complete some mapping of the roads in the area and, as a result, did not actually leave for Langley until the morning of October 21, just as the fighting at Ball's Bluff was heating up. On October 20, while McCall was completing his mapping, McClellan ordered Brig. Gen. Charles Pomeroy Stone to conduct what he called "a slight demonstration" in order to see how the Confederates might react. Stone moved troops to the river at Edwards Ferry, positioned other forces along the river, had his artillery fire into suspected Confederate positions, and briefly crossed about a hundred men of the 1st Minnesota to the Virginia shore just before dusk. Having gotten no reaction from Colonel Evans with all of this activity, Stone recalled his troops to their camps and the "slight demonstration" came to an end. Stone then ordered Col. Charles Devens of the 15th Massachusetts Infantry (stationed on Harrison's Island facing Ball's Bluff) to send a patrol across the river at that point to gather what information it could about enemy deployments. Devens sent Capt. Chase Philbrick and approximately 20 men to carry out Stone's order. Advancing in the dark nearly a mile inland from the bluff, the inexperienced Philbrick mistook a row of trees for the tents of a Confederate camp and, without verifying what he saw, returned and reported the existence of a camp. Stone immediately ordered Devens to cross some 300 men and, as soon as it was light enough to see, attack the camp and, per his orders, "return to your present position." This was the genesis of the Battle of Ball's Bluff. Contrary to the long-held traditional interpretation, it did not come from a plan by either McClellan or Stone to take Leesburg. The initial crossing of troops was a small reconnaissance. That was followed by what was intended to be a raiding party.[1]
163
Battle
On the morning of October 21, Colonel Devens' raiding party discovered the mistake made the previous evening by the patrol; There was no camp to raid. Opting not to recross the river immediately, Devens deployed his men in a tree line and sent a messenger back to report to Stone and get new instructions. On hearing the messenger's report, Stone sent him back to tell Devens that the remainder of the 15th Massachusetts (another 350 men) would cross the river and move to his position. When they arrived, Devens was to turn his raiding party back into a reconnaissance and move toward Leesburg. While the messenger was going back to Col. Devens with this new information, Colonel and U.S. Senator Edward Dickinson Baker showed up at Stone's camp to Balls Bluff Battle Map find out about the morning's events. He had not been involved in any of the activities to that point. Stone told him of the mistake about the camp and about his new orders to reinforce Devens for reconnaissance purposes. He then instructed Baker to go to the crossing point, evaluate the situation, and either withdraw the troops already in Virginia or cross additional troops at his discretion. On the way upriver to execute this order, Baker met Devens' messenger coming back a second time to report that Devens and his men had encountered and briefly engaged the enemy, one company (Co. K) of the 17th Mississippi Infantry. Baker immediately ordered as many troops as he could find to cross the river, but he did so without determining what boats were available to do this. A bottleneck quickly developed so that Union troops could only cross slowly and in small numbers, making the crossing last throughout the day. Meanwhile, Devens's men (now about 650 strong) remained in its advanced position and engaged in two additional skirmishes with a growing force of Confederates, while other Union troops crossed the river but deployed near the bluff and did not advance from there. Devens finally withdrew around 2:00 p.m. and met Baker, who had finally crossed the river half an hour later. Beginning around 3:00 the fighting began in earnest and was almost
continuous until just after dark. Col. Baker was killed at about 4:30 p.m. and remains the only United States Senator ever killed in battle. Following an abortive attempt to break out of their constricted position around the bluff, the Federals began to recross the river in some disarray. Shortly before dark, a fresh Confederate regiment (the 17th Mississippi) arrived and formed the core of the climactic assault that finally broke and routed the Union troops. Many of the Union soldiers were driven down the steep slope at the southern end of Ball's Bluff (behind the current location of the national cemetery) and into the river. Boats attempting to cross back to Harrison Island were soon
Battle of Ball's Bluff swamped and capsized. Many Federals, included some of the wounded, were drowned. Bodies floated downriver to Washington and even as far as Mt. Vernon in the days following the battle. A total of 223 Federals were killed, 226 were wounded, and 553 were captured on the banks of the Potomac later that night. It is interesting to note that the Official Records incorrectly state that only 49 Federals were killed at this battle, an error probably resulting from a mistaken reading of the report of the Union burial detail which crossed over the next day under flag of truce.[2] Fifty-four Union deadof whom only one is identifiedare buried in Ball's Bluff Battlefield and National Cemetery.[3]
164
Aftermath
This Union defeat was relatively minor in comparison to the battles to come in the war, but it had an enormously wide impact in and out of military affairs. Due to the loss of a sitting senator, it led to severe political ramifications in Washington. Stone was treated as the scapegoat for the defeat, but members of Congress suspected that there was a conspiracy to betray the Union. The ensuing outcry, and a desire to learn why Federal forces had lost battles at Bull Run (Manassas), Wilson's Creek, and Ball's Bluff, led to the establishment of the Congressional Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, which would bedevil Union officers for the remainder of the war (particularly those who were Democrats) and contribute to nasty political infighting among the generals in the high command. Lt. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., of the 20th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, survived a nearly fatal wound at Ball's Bluff to become an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States in 1902. Herman Melville's poem "Ball's Bluff - A Reverie" (published in 1866) commemorates the battle. Holmes' great friend and role model, Lt. Henry Livermore Abbott also survived the battle but did not survive the war. In 1865, Abbott was posthumously promoted to Brigadier General. Another outstanding young officer named Edmund Rice also eventually reached the rank of Brigadier General, won the Congressional Medal of Honor and was fortunate enough to survive the war by near a half century. John William Grout was killed in the battle; his death inspired a poem (and later a song) titled "The Vacant Chair". The site of the battle has considerably overgrown today, though ongoing efforts by volunteers have thinned out the overgrowth and made interpretation of the battlefield much easier. It is preserved as the Ball's Bluff Battlefield and National Cemetery, which was declared a National Historic Landmark in 1984.[4] The park is maintained by the Northern Virginia Regional Park Authority.[5]
In culture
Bernard Cornwell's Copperhead, the second installment of The Starbuck Chronicles, begins with the Battle of Ball's Bluff. The fictional Faulconer Legion is placed at the left flank of the Confederate position and led by Captain Starbuck's K Company, begins the rout of the Union forces. Geraldine Brooks' March, winner of the 2006 Pulitzer Prize for Fiction, also opens with the Battle of Ball's Bluff. Mr. March, the father in Louisa May Alcott's Little Women, is the chaplain serving with the Union army.
Notes
[1] Morgan, "A Little Short of Boats," Ironclad Publ.Co., 2004, pp. 73-6. [2] The Medical and Surgical History of the Civil War, Broadfoot Publ. Co., Wilmington, NC, 1992, Vol. 7 Table XXXVIII and various regimental records in National Archives, Washington, DC [3] Holien, p. 141. [4] Edwin C. Bearss (February 8, 1984). National Register of Historic Places Inventory-Nomination: Ball's Bluff Battlefield and National Cemetery (http:/ / pdfhost. focus. nps. gov/ docs/ NHLS/ Text/ 84003880. pdf). National Park Service. and Accompanying 1 aerial photograph, undated. (http:/ / pdfhost. focus. nps. gov/ docs/ NHLS/ Photos/ 84003880. pdf)PDF(110KB) [5] Northern Virginia Regional Park Authority (http:/ / www. nvrpa. org/ parks/ ballsbluff/ index. php) website
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References
Eicher, David J., The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War, Simon & Schuster, 2001, ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Ballard, Ted (2001). "Staff Ride Guide: Battle of Ball's Bluff Guide" (http://www.history.army.mil/StaffRide/ ballsbluff/staff_ride_guide.htm). United States Army Center of Military History. Retrieved April 23, 2008. Farwell, Byron (1990). Ball's Bluff: A Small Battle and Its Long Shadow. McLean, Virginia: EPM Publications. ISBN0-939009-36-6. Garrison, Webb Jr., Strange Battles of the Civil War, Cumberland House Publishing, 2001, ISBN 1-58182-226-X. Holien, Kim Bernard (1995) [1985]. Battle at Ball's Bluff (third printing ed.). Orange, Virginia: Publisher's Press. ISBN0-9534221-0-2 . Morgan, James A., III (2004). A Little Short of Boats: The Fights at Ball's Bluff and Edwards Ferry, October 2122, 1861; a history and tour guide. Discovering Civil War America. 2. Fort Mitchell, Kentucky: Ironclad Publishing. ISBN0-9673770-4-8. Winkler, H. Donald, Civil War Goats and Scapegoats, Cumberland House Publishing, 2008, ISBN 1-58182-631-1. National Park Service battle summary (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va006.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Balls Bluff to Big Bethel.pdf) 150 Years Ago: Battle of Ball's Bluff Oct. 21, 1861 (http://thisweekinthecivilwar.com/?p=686/)
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Background
On August 20, 1861, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan formed the Army of the Potomac, with himself as its first commander.[2] During the summer and fall, McClellan brought a high degree of organization to his new army, and greatly improved its morale by his frequent trips to review and encourage his units. It was a remarkable achievement, in which he came to personify the Army of the Potomac and reaped the adulation of his men.[3] He created defenses for Washington that were almost impregnable, consisting of 48 forts and strong points, with 480 guns manned by 7,200 artillerists.[4]
Peninsula Campaign On November 1, 1861, Gen. Winfield Scott retired and McClellan became general in chief of all the Union armies. The president expressed his concern about the "vast labor" involved in the dual role of army commander and general in chief, but McClellan responded, "I can do it all."[5] On January 12, 1862, McClellan revealed his intentions to transport the Army of the Potomac by ship to Urbanna, Virginia, on the Rappahannock River, outflanking the Confederate forces near Washington, and proceeding 50 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) overland to capture Richmond. On January 27, Lincoln issued an order that required all of his armies to begin offensive operations by February 22, Washington's birthday. On January 31, he issued a supplementary order for the Army of the Potomac to move overland to attack the Confederates at Manassas Junction and Centreville. McClellan immediately replied with a 22-page letter objecting in detail to the president's plan and advocating instead his Urbanna plan, which was the first written instance of the plan's details being presented to the president. Although Lincoln believed his plan was superior, he was relieved that McClellan finally agreed to begin moving, and reluctantly approved. On March 8, doubting McClellan's resolve, Lincoln called a council of war at the White House in which McClellan's subordinates were asked about their confidence in the Urbanna plan. They expressed their confidence to varying degrees. After the meeting, Lincoln issued another order, naming specific officers as corps commanders to report to McClellan (who had been reluctant to do so prior to assessing his division commanders' effectiveness in combat, even though this would have meant his direct supervision of twelve divisions in the field).[6] Before McClellan could implement his plans, the Confederate forces under General Joseph E. Johnston withdrew from their positions before Washington, assuming new positions south of the Rappahannock, which completely nullified the Urbanna strategy. McClellan retooled his plan so that his troops would disembark at Fort Monroe, Virginia, and advance up the Virginia Peninsula to Richmond. However, McClellan came under extreme criticism from the press and the Congress when it was found that Johnston's forces had not only slipped away unnoticed, but had for months fooled the Union Army through the use of Quaker Guns.[7] A further complication for the campaign planning was the emergence of the first ironclad warship, CSS Virginia, which threw Washington into a panic and made naval support operations on the James River seem problematic.[8] In the Battle of Hampton Roads (March 89, 1862), Virginia defeated wooden U.S. Navy ships blockading the harbor of Hampton Roads, Virginia, including the sloop USS Cumberland, and the frigate USS Congress on March 8, calling into question the viability of any of the wooden ships in the world. The following day, the USS Monitor ironclad arrived at the scene and engaged with the Virginia, the famous first duel of the ironclads. The battle, although inconclusive, received worldwide publicity. After the battle, it was clear that ironclad ships were the future of naval warfare. Neither ship severely damaged the other; the only net result was keeping Virginia from attacking any more wooden ships.[9] On March 11, 1862, Lincoln removed McClellan as general-in-chief, leaving him in command of only the Army of the Potomac, ostensibly so that McClellan would be free to devote all his attention to the move on Richmond. Although McClellan was assuaged by supportive comments Lincoln made to him, in time he saw the change of command very differently, describing it as a part of an intrigue "to secure the failure of the approaching campaign."[10]
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Opposing forces
Further information: Confederate order of battle, Union order of battle
Union corps commanders
The Army of the Potomac had approximately 50,000 men at Fort Monroe when McClellan arrived, but this number grew to 121,500 before hostilities began. The army was organized into three corps and other units, as follows:[11] II Corps, Brig. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner commanding: divisions of Brig. Gens. Israel B. Richardson and John Sedgwick III Corps, Brig. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman commanding: divisions of Brig. Gens. Fitz John Porter, Joseph Hooker, and Charles S. Hamilton IV Corps, Brig. Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes commanding: divisions of Brig. Gens. Darius N. Couch, William F. "Baldy" Smith, and Silas Casey 1st Division of the I Corps, Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin commanding Reserve infantry commanded by Brig. Gen. George Sykes Cavalry commanded by Brig. Gen. George Stoneman The garrison of Fort Monroe, 12,000 men under Maj. Gen. John E. Wool; Wool was quickly transferred to another department for duty in Baltimore after the War Department realized that he technically outranked McClellan.
Confederate wing commanders
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On the Confederate side, Johnston's Army of Northern Virginia (newly named as of March 14)[12] was organized into three wings, each composed of several brigades, as follows:[13] Left Wing, Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill commanding: brigades of Brig. Gen. Robert E. Rodes, Winfield S. Featherston, Jubal A. Early, and Gabriel J. Raines Center Wing, Maj. Gen. James Longstreet commanding: brigades of Brig. Gens. A.P. Hill, Richard H. Anderson, George E. Pickett, Cadmus M. Wilcox, Raleigh E. Colston, and Roger A. Pryor Right Wing, Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder commanding: division of Brig. Gen. Lafayette McLaws (brigades of Brig. Gens. Paul J. Semmes, Richard Griffith, Joseph B. Kershaw, and Howell Cobb) and division of Brig. Gen. David R. Jones (brigades of Brig. Gens. Robert A. Toombs and George T. Anderson) Reserve force commanded by Maj. Gen. Gustavus W. Smith Cavalry commanded by Brig. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart However, at the time the Army of the Potomac arrived, only Magruder's 11,000 men faced them on the Peninsula. The bulk of Johnston's force (43,000 men) were at Culpeper, 6,000 under Maj. Gen. Theophilus H. Holmes at Fredericksburg, and 9,000 under Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger at Norfolk. In Richmond, General Robert E. Lee had returned from work on coastal fortifications in the Carolinas and on March 13 became the chief military adviser to Confederate President Jefferson Davis.[14] Forces in the Shenandoah Valley played an indirect role in the campaign. Approximately 50,000 men under Maj. Gens. Nathaniel P. Banks and Irvin McDowell were engaged chasing a much smaller force under Stonewall Jackson in the Valley Campaign. Jackson's expert maneuvering and tactical success in small battles kept the Union men from reinforcing McClellan, much to his dismay. He had planned to have 30,000 under McDowell to join him.[15] Magruder had prepared three defensive lines across the Peninsula. The first, about 12 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) north of Fort Monroe, contained infantry outposts and artillery redoubts, but was insufficiently manned to prevent any Union advance. Its primary purpose was to shield information from the Union about a second line extending from Yorktown to Mulberry Island. This Warwick Line consisted of redoubts, rifle pits, and fortifications behind the Warwick River. By enlarging two dams on the river, the river was turned into a significant military obstacle in its own right. The third defensive line was a series of forts at Williamsburg, which waited unmanned for use by the army if it had to fall back from Yorktown.[16]
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Movement to the Peninsula and the Siege of Yorktown
Further information: Siege of Yorktown (1862) McClellan's army began to sail from Alexandria on March 17. It was an armada that dwarfed all previous American expeditions, transporting 121,500 men, 44 artillery batteries, 1,150 wagons, over 15,000 horses, and tons of equipment and supplies. An English observer remarked that it was the "stride of a giant."[17] With the Virginia still in operation, the U.S. Navy could not assure McClellan that they could protect operations on either the James or the York, so his plan of amphibiously enveloping Yorktown was abandoned, and he ordered an advance up the Peninsula to begin April 4.[18] On April 5, the IV Corps of Brig. Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes made initial contact with Confederate defensive works at Lee's Mill, an area McClellan expected to move through without resistance. Magruder, a fan of theatrics, set up a successful deception campaign. By moving one company in circles through a glen, he gained the appearance of an endless line of reinforcements marching to relieve him. He also spread his artillery very far apart and had it fire sporadically at the Union lines. Federals were convinced that his works were strongly held, reporting that an army of 100,000 was in their path. As the two armies fought an artillery duel, reconnaissance indicated to Keyes the strength and breadth of the Confederate fortifications, and he advised McClellan against assaulting them. McClellan ordered the construction of siege fortifications and brought his heavy siege guns to the front. In the meantime, Gen. Johnston brought reinforcements for Magruder.[19]
McClellan chose not to attack without more reconnaissance and ordered his army to entrench in works parallel to Magruder's and besiege Yorktown. McClellan reacted to Keyes's report, as well as to reports of enemy strength near the town of Yorktown, but he also received word that the I Corps, under Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell, would be withheld for the defense of Washington, instead of joining him on the Peninsula as McClellan had planned. In addition to the pressure of Jackson's Valley Campaign, President Lincoln believed that McClellan had left insufficient force to guard Washington and that the general had been deceptive in his reporting of unit strengths,
Federal Battery # 4 with 13-inch (unknown operator: u'strong'mm) seacoast mortars, Model 1861, during the siege of Yorktown, Virginia, 1862.
Peninsula Campaign counting troops as ready to defend Washington when they were actually deployed elsewhere. McClellan protested that he was being forced to lead a major campaign without his promised resources, but he moved ahead anyway. For the next 10 days, McClellan's men dug while Magruder steadily received reinforcements. By mid April, Magruder commanded 35,000 men, barely enough to defend his line.[20] Although McClellan doubted his numeric superiority over the enemy, he had no doubts about the superiority of his artillery. The siege preparations at Yorktown consisted of 15 batteries with more than 70 heavy guns. When fired in unison, these batteries would deliver over 7,000 pounds of ordnance onto the enemy positions with each volley.[21] On April 16, Union forces probed a point in the Confederate line at Dam No. 1, on the Warwick River near Lee's Mill. Magruder realized the weakness of his position and ordered it strengthened. Three regiments under Brig. Gen. Howell Cobb, with six other regiments nearby, were improving their position on the west bank of the river overlooking the dam. McClellan became concerned that this strengthening might impede his installation of siege batteries.[22] He ordered Brig. Gen. William F. "Baldy" Smith, a division commander in the IV Corps, to "hamper the enemy" in completing their defensive works.[23]
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Battle of Yorktown
At 3 p.m., four companies of the 3rd Vermont Infantry crossed the dam and routed the remaining defenders. Behind the lines, Cobb organized a defense with his brother, Colonel Thomas Cobb of the Georgia Legion, and attacked the Vermonters, who had occupied the Confederate rifle pits. Unable to obtain reinforcements, the Vermont companies withdrew across the dam, suffering casualties as they retreated. At about 5 p.m., Baldy Smith ordered the 6th Vermont to attack Confederate positions downstream from the dam while the 4th Vermont demonstrated at the dam itself. This maneuver failed as the 6th Vermont came under heavy Confederate fire and were forced to withdraw. Some of the wounded men were drowned as they fell into the shallow pond behind the dam.[24] For the remainder of April, the Confederates, now at 57,000 and under the direct command of Johnston, improved their defenses while McClellan undertook the laborious process of transporting and placing massive siege artillery batteries, which he planned to deploy on May 5. Johnston knew that the impending bombardment would be difficult to withstand, so began sending his supply wagons in the direction of Richmond on May 3. Escaped slaves reported that fact to McClellan, who refused to believe them. He was convinced that an army whose strength he estimated as high as 120,000 would stay and fight. On the evening of May 3, the Confederates launched a brief bombardment of their own and then fell silent. Early the next morning, Heintzelman ascended in an observation balloon and found that the Confederate earthworks were empty.[25] McClellan was stunned by the news. He sent cavalry under Brig. Gen. George Stoneman in pursuit and ordered Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin's division to reboard Navy transports, sail up the York River, and cut off Johnston's retreat.[26]
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Williamsburg
Further information: Battle of Williamsburg By May 5, Johnston's army was making slow progress on muddy roads and Stoneman's cavalry was skirmishing with Brig. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry, Johnston's rearguard. To give time for the bulk of his army to get free, Johnston detached part of his force to make a stand at a large earthen fortification, Fort Magruder, straddling the Williamsburg Road (from Yorktown), constructed earlier by Magruder. The Battle of Williamsburg was the first pitched battle of the Peninsula Campaign, in which nearly 41,000 Union and 32,000 Confederates were engaged.[27] Brig. Gen. Joseph Hooker's 2nd Division of the III Corps was the lead infantry in the Union Army advance. They assaulted Fort Magruder and a line of rifle pits and smaller fortifications that extended in an arc southwest from the fort, but were repulsed. Confederate counterattacks, directed by Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, threatened to overwhelm Hooker's division, which had contested the ground alone since the early morning while waiting for the main body of the army to arrive. Hooker had expected Baldy Smith's division of the IV Corps, marching north on the Yorktown Road, to hear the sound of battle and come in on Hooker's right in support. However, Smith had been halted by Sumner more than a mile away from Hooker's position. He had been concerned that the Confederates would leave their fortifications and attack him on the Yorktown Road.[28] Longstreet's men did leave their fortifications, but they attacked Hooker, not Smith or Sumner. The brigade of Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox applied strong pressure to Hooker's line. Hooker's retreating men were aided by the arrival of Brig. Gen. Philip Kearny's 3rd Division of the III Corps at about 2:30 p.m. Kearny ostentatiously rode his horse out in front of his picket lines to reconnoiter and urged his men forward by flashing his saber with his only arm. The Confederates were pushed off the Lee's Mill Road and back into the woods and the abatis of their defensive positions. There, sharp firefights occurred until late in the afternoon.[29] Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock's 1st Brigade of Baldy Smith's division, which had marched a few miles to the Federal right and crossed Cub's Creek at the point where it was dammed to form the Jones's Mill pond, began bombarding Longstreet's left flank around noon. Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill, commanding Longstreet's reserve force, had previously detached a brigade under Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early and posted them on the grounds of the College of William and Mary. Splitting his command, Early led two of his four regiments through the woods without performing adequate reconnaissance and found that they emerged not on the enemy's flank, but directly in front of Hancock's guns, which occupied two abandoned redoubts. He personally led the 24th Virginia Infantry on a futile assault and was wounded by a bullet through the shoulder.[30] Hancock had been ordered repeatedly by Sumner to withdraw his command back to Cub Creek, but he used the Confederate attack as an excuse to hold his ground. As the 24th Virginia charged, D.H. Hill emerged from the woods leading one of Early's other regiments, the 5th North Carolina. He ordered an attack before realizing the difficulty of his situationHancock's 3,400 infantrymen and eight artillery pieces significantly outnumbered the two attacking Confederate regiments, fewer than 1,200 men with no artillery support. He called off the assault after it had begun, but Hancock ordered a counterattack. After the battle, the counterattack received significant publicity as a major, gallant bayonet charge and McClellan's description of Hancock's "superb" performance gave him the nickname, "Hancock the Superb."[31] Confederate casualties at Williamsburg were 1,682, Union 2,283. McClellan miscategorized his first significant battle as a "brilliant victory" over superior forces. However, the defense of Williamsburg was seen by the South as a means of delaying the Federals, which allowed the bulk of the Confederate army to continue its withdrawal toward Richmond.[32]
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Peninsula Campaign underwater obstruction of sunken steamers, pilings, debris, and other vessels connected by chains was placed just below the bluff, making it difficult for vessels to maneuver in the narrow river.[41] On May 15, a detachment of the U.S. Navy's North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, under the command Cmdr. John Rodgers steamed up the James River from Fort Monroe to test the Richmond defenses. At 7:45 a.m., the USS Galena closed to within 600 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) of the fort and anchored, but before Rodgers could open fire, two Confederate rounds pierced the lightly armored vessel. The battle lasted over three hours and during that time, Galena remained almost stationary and took 45 hits. Her crew reported casualties of 14 dead or mortally wounded and 10 injured. Monitor was a frequent target, but her heavier armor withstood the blows. Unfortunately for her crew, her guns could not elevate high enough to fire on the Confederate batteries, 110 feet (unknown operator: u'strong'm) above the river. The USS Naugatuck withdrew when her 100-pounder Parrott rifle exploded. The two wooden gunboats remained safely out of range of the big guns, but the captain of the USS Port Royal was wounded by a sharpshooter. Around 11 a.m., the Union ships withdrew to City Point.[42] The massive fort on Drewry's Bluff had blunted the Union advance just 7 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) short of the Confederate capital.[43] Rodgers reported to McClellan that it was feasible for the Navy to land troops as close as 10 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) from Richmond, but the Union Army never took advantage of this observation.[44]
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On May 18, McClellan reorganized the Army of the Potomac in the field and promoted two major generals to corps command: Fitz John Porter to the new V Corps and William B. Franklin to the VI Corps. The army had 105,000 men in position northeast of the city, outnumbering Johnston's 60,000, but faulty intelligence from the detective Allan Pinkerton on McClellan's staff caused the general to believe that he was outnumbered two to one. Numerous skirmishes between the lines of the armies occurred from May 23 to May 26. Tensions were high in the city, particularly following the earlier sounds of the naval gun battle at Drewry's Bluff.[47]
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Porter's men approached Peake's Crossing in a driving rain. At about noon on May 27, his lead element skirmished briskly with the Confederates until Porter's main body arrived, driving the outnumbered Confederates up the road in the direction of the courthouse. Porter set out in pursuit with most of his force, leaving three regiments to guard the New Bridge and Hanover Court House Roads intersection. This movement exposed the rear of Porter's command to attack by the bulk of Branch's force, which Porter had mistakenly assumed was at Hanover Court House.[50]
Engagement Near Hanover Court-House, Virginia.
Branch also made a poor assumptionthat Porter's force was significantly smaller than it turned out to beand attacked. The initial assault was repulsed, but Martindale's force was eventually almost destroyed by the heavy fire. Porter quickly dispatched the two regiments back to the Kinney Farm. The Confederate line broke under the weight of thousands of new troops and they retreated back through Peake's Crossing to Ashland.[51] The estimates of Union casualties at Hanover Court House vary, from 355 (62 killed, 233 wounded, 70 captured) to 397. The Confederates left 200 dead on the field and 730 were captured by Porter's cavalry. McClellan claimed that Hanover Court House was yet another "glorious victory over superior numbers" and judged that it was "one of the handsomest things of the war."[52] However, the reality of the outcome was that superior (Union) numbers won the day in a disorganized fight, characterized by misjudgments on both sides. The right flank of the Union army remained secure, although technically the Confederates at Peake's Crossing had not intended to threaten it. And McDowell's Corps did not need its roads kept clear because it never arrivedthe defeat of Union forces at the First Battle of Winchester by Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley caused the Lincoln administration to recall McDowell to Fredericksburg.[53] A greater impact than the actual casualties, according to Stephen W. Sears, was the effect on McClellan's preparedness for the next major battle, at Seven Pines and Fair Oaks four days later. During the absence of Porter, McClellan was reluctant to move more of his troops south of the Chickahominy, making his left flank a more attractive target for Johnston. He was also confined to bed, ill with a flare-up of his chronic malaria.[54]
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Peninsula Campaign sent for reinforcements but Keyes was slow in responding. Eventually the mass of Confederates broke through, seized a Union redoubt, and Casey's men retreated to the second line of defensive works at Seven Pines.[59] Hill, now strengthened by reinforcements from Longstreet, hit the secondary Union line near Seven Pines around 4:40 p.m. Hill organized a flanking maneuver to attack Keyes's right flank, which collapsed the Federal line back to the Williamsburg Road. Johnston went forward on the Nine Mile Road with three brigades of Whiting's division and encountered stiff resistance near Fair Oaks Station, the right flank of Keyes's line. Soon heavy Union reinforcements arrived. Brig. Gen. Edwin C. Sumner, II Corps commander, heard the sounds of battle from his position north of the river. On his own initiative, he dispatched a division under Brig. Gen. John Sedgwick over the sole remaining bridge. The treacherous "Grapevine Bridge" was near collapse on the swollen river, but the weight of the crossing troops helped to hold it steady against the rushing water. After the last man had crossed safely, the bridge collapsed and was swept away. Sedgwick's men provided the key to resisting Whiting's attack.[60] At dusk, Johnston was wounded and evacuated to Richmond. G.W. Smith assumed temporary command of the army. Smith, plagued with ill health, was indecisive about the next steps for the battle and made a bad impression on President Davis and General Lee, Davis's military adviser. After the end of fighting the following day, Davis replaced Smith with Lee as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia.[61] On June 1, the Confederates under Smith renewed their assaults against the Federals, who had brought up more reinforcements and fought from strong positions, but made little headway. The fighting ended about 11:30 a.m. when the Confederates withdrew. McClellan arrived on the battlefield from his sick bed at about this time, but the Union Army did not counterattack.[62]
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Brig. Gen. Thomas Francis Meagher at the Battle of Fair Oaks, June 1, 1862.
Both sides claimed victory with roughly equal casualtiesUnion casualties were 5,031 (790 killed, 3,594 wounded, 647 captured or missing), Confederate 6,134 (980 killed, 4,749 wounded, 405 captured or missing).[63] McClellan's advance on Richmond was halted and the Army of Northern Virginia fell back into the Richmond defensive works. The battle was frequently remembered by the Union soldiers as the Battle of Fair Oaks Station because that is where they did their best fighting, whereas the Confederates, for the same reason, called it Seven Pines.[64]
Peninsula Campaign ordered the army to return to the Washington, D.C., area to support Maj. Gen. John Pope's army in the Northern Virginia Campaign and the Second Battle of Bull Run.[69] The Virginia Peninsula was relatively quiet until May 1864, when Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler again invaded as part of the Bermuda Hundred Campaign.[70]
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Notes
[1] Although they are formally considered part of the Peninsula Campaign, the Seven Days are described in the separate Seven Days Battles article. [2] Beatie, Birth of Command, p. 480; Eicher, High Commands, pp. 372, 856. [3] Sears, Young Napoleon, p. 111. [4] Sears, Young Napoleon, p. 116. [5] McPherson, p. 360. [6] Sears, Young Napoleon, pp. 14041, 149, 160; Beatie, McClellan's First Campaign, pp. 2122, 108. [7] Sears, Young Napoleon, pp. 16869; Burton, p. 2; Rafuse, p. 201; Beatie, McClellan's First Campaign, p. 64. [8] Beatie, McClellan's First Campaign, p. 103. [9] Kennedy, p. 88; Eicher, Longest Night, pp. 19599; Salmon, pp. 7276. [10] Beatie, McClellan's First Campaign, pp. 98101; Sears, Young Napoleon, pp. 16465. [11] Eicher, Longest Night, pp. 21415; Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 35963. [12] Eicher, High Commands, pp. 323, 889; Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 46. [13] Eicher, Longest Night, p. 215; Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 36467. [14] Esposito, text to map 39. [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] Eicher, Longest Night, pp. 25767. Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 26, 70. Sears, Young Napoleon, pp. 16769. Beatie, McClellan's First Campaign, pp. 29195; Burton, p. 4; Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 39. Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 4243; Burton, pp. 1415, 20. Burton, p. 15; Salmon, p. 76; Kennedy, p. 88; Rafuse, p. 205. Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 58. Burton, p. 20. Salmon, pp. 7677; Burton, p. 20. Salmon, pp. 7677. Rafuse, p. 211; Esposito, map 41; Burton, p. 24; Salmon, p. 79. Salmon, p. 80. Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 70. Salmon, p. 82. Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 7478; Salmon, p. 82. Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 7880. Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 7983. Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 82 Eicher, Longest Night, p. 270; Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 85; Salmon, p. 83. Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 85; Salmon, p. 85. Webb, p. 82. Salmon, p. 85; Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 86. Salmon, p. 85. Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 8992. Esposito, map 42; Salmon, p. 86; Burton, p. 5. Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 93; Eicher, Longest Night, p. 273, states that it was the 2nd Virginia Artillery. Salmon, p. 87. Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 9394; Salmon, p. 87; Eicher, Longest Night, p. 273. Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 94. Eicher, Longest Night, p. 273; Rafuse, p. 213. Salmon, p. 88; Eicher, Longest Night, pp. 27374; Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 9597. Salmon, p. 90; Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 104106; Esposito, map 41. Rafuse, p. 212; Eicher, Longest Night, pp. 27374. Salmon, p. 90; Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 11314.
[49] Eicher, Longest Night, p. 275; Salmon, p. 90. [50] Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 114; Salmon, pp. 9091. [51] Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 116; Salmon, p. 91.
Peninsula Campaign
[52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] [61] [62] [63] [64] [65] [66] [67] [68] [69] [70] Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 117. Eicher, Longest Night, 276; Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 117; Salmon, p. 91; Kennedy, p. 92. Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 117, 129. Salmon, pp. 2021. Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 11820; Miller, p. 21; Salmon, pp. 9192. Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 120; Miller, pp. 2122; Downs, pp. 67576; Salmon, p. 92. Miller, p. 22; Eicher, Longest Night, p. 276; Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 12123. Eicher, Longest Night, p. 277; Salmon, p. 93. Eicher, Longest Night, pp. 27778; Miller, p. 23; Salmon, p. 94. Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 145; Miller, p. 24; Salmon, p. 94. Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 14245. Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 147. Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 149. Miller, pp. 2560. Eicher, Longest Night, pp. 28081. Eicher, Longest Night, p. 281. Eicher, Longest Night, pp. 29697. Eicher, Longest Night, pp. 32627. Eicher, Longest Night, pp. 68082.
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References
Bailey, Ronald H., and the Editors of Time-Life Books. Forward to Richmond: McClellan's Peninsular Campaign. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983. ISBN 0-8094-4720-7. Beatie, Russel H. Army of the Potomac: Birth of Command, November 1860 September 1861. New York: Da Capo Press, 2002. ISBN 0-306-81141-3. Beatie, Russel H. Army of the Potomac: McClellan's First Campaign, March May 1862. New York: Savas Beatie, 2007. ISBN 978-1-932714-25-8. Burton, Brian K. The Peninsula & Seven Days: A Battlefield Guide. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. ISBN 978-0-8032-6246-1. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Eicher, John H., and David J. Eicher. Civil War High Commands. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-8047-3641-3. Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website (http://www. dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/). Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide (http://www.bibliobase.com/history/readerscomp/ civwar/html/cw_000106_entries.htm). 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. Oxford History of the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. ISBN 0-19-503863-0. Miller, William J. The Battles for Richmond, 1862. National Park Service Civil War Series. Fort Washington, PA: U.S. National Park Service and Eastern National, 1996. ISBN 0-915992-93-0. Rafuse, Ethan S. McClellan's War: The Failure of Moderation in the Struggle for the Union. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005. ISBN 0-253-34532-4. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon. New York: Da Capo Press, 1988. ISBN 0-306-80913-3. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6.
Peninsula Campaign Webb, Alexander S. The Peninsula: McClellan's Campaign of 1862 (http://books.google.com/ books?id=qbE8d82-ZVAC). Secaucus, NJ: Castle Books, 2002. ISBN 0-7858-1575-9. First published 1885. National Park Service battle descriptions (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/bycampgn.htm#East62)
181
Further reading
Gallagher, Gary W., ed. The Richmond Campaign of 1862: The Peninsula & the Seven Days. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000. ISBN 0-8078-2552-2. Martin, David G. The Peninsula Campaign MarchJuly 1862. Conshohocken, PA: Combined Books, 1992. ISBN 978-0-938289-09-8. Welcher, Frank J. The Union Army, 18611865 Organization and Operations. Vol. 1, The Eastern Theater. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989. ISBN 0-253-36453-1. Wheeler, Richard. Sword Over Richmond: An Eyewitness History of McClellan's Peninsula Campaign. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1986. ISBN 0-06-015529-9.
External links
Animated history of the Peninsula Campaign (http://www.civilwaranimated.com/PeninsulaAnimation.html) Stuart's Ride around McClellan (http://www.civilwarhome.com/stuartsride.htm) National Park Service Richmond National Battlefield Park (http://www.nps.gov/rich/index.htm) Map of modern battlefield sites (http://data2.itc.nps.gov/parks/rich/ppMaps/RICHmap1.pdf)
Battle of Hampton Roads of very heavy guns, mounted so that they could fire in all directions was first demonstrated by Monitor but soon became standard in warships of all types. Shipbuilders also incorporated rams into the designs of warship hulls for the rest of the century.[4]
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183
CSS Virginia
When the Civil War broke out, Confederate Secretary of the Navy Stephen R. Mallory was an early enthusiast for the advantages of armor. As he looked upon it, the Confederacy could not match the industrial North in numbers of ships at sea, so they would have to compete by building vessels that would be individually superior to those of the Union. The edge would be provided by armor.[19] Mallory gathered about himself a group of men who were able to put his vision into practice, among them John M. Brooke, John L. Porter, and William P. Williamson.[20] When Mallory's men searched the South for factories that could build engines to drive the heavy ships that he wanted, they found no place to do it immediately. At the best facility, the Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond, building engines from scratch would take at least a year. Upon learning this, Williamson suggested taking the engines from the hulk of Merrimack, recently raised from the bed of the Elizabeth River.[21] His colleagues promptly accepted his suggestion and expanded it, proposing that the design of their projected ironclad be adapted to the hull. Porter produced the revised plans, which were submitted to Mallory for approval. On July 11, 1861, the new design was accepted, and work began almost immediately.[22] The burned-out hull was towed into the graving dock that the Union Navy had failed to destroy. During the subsequent conversion process, the plans were further modified to incorporate an iron ram fitted to the prow. Her offense in addition to the ram consisted of 10 guns: six 9in (unknown operator: u'strong'mm) smooth-bore Dahlgrens, two 6.4in (unknown operator: u'strong'mm) and two 7in (unknown operator: u'strong'mm) Brooke rifles.[23] Trials showed that these rifles firing solid shot would pierce up to eight inches of armor plating. The Tredagar Iron works could produce both solid shot and shell, and since it was believed that Virginia would face only wooden ships, she was given only the shell.[24] Had solid shot been used against the Monitor, the result of the battle might have been different. The armor plating, originally meant to be 1in (unknown operator: u'strong'mm) thick, was replaced by double plates, each 2in (unknown operator: u'strong'mm) thick, backed by 24in (unknown operator: u'strong'cm) of iron and pine. The armor was pierced for 14 gunports: four on each broadside, three forward, and three aft.[25] The revisions, together with the usual problems associated with the transportation system of the South, resulted in delays that pushed out the launch date until February 3, 1862, and she was not commissioned until February 17, bearing the name CSS Virginia.[26]
184
USS Monitor
Intelligence that the Confederates were working to develop an ironclad caused consternation for the Union, but Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles waited for Congress to meet to request permission to consider building armored vessels; Congress gave this permission on August 3, 1861. Welles appointed a commission, which came to be known as the Ironclad Board, of three senior naval officers to choose among the designs that were submitted for consideration. The three men were USS Monitor Captains Joseph Smith[27] and Hiram Paulding, and Commander Charles Henry Davis.[28] The board considered seventeen designs, and chose to support three. First of the three to be completed, even though she was by far the most radical in design, was Swedish engineer and inventor John Ericsson's USSMonitor.[29] Ericsson's Monitor, which was built at Ericsson's yard on the East River in Greenpoint, Brooklyn, incorporated new and striking design features, the most significant of which were her armor and armament. Instead of the large numbers of guns of rather small bore that had characterized warships in the past, Ericsson opted for only two guns of large caliber; he wanted to use 15in (unknown operator: u'strong'mm) guns, but had to settle for 11in (unknown operator: u'strong'mm) Dahlgren guns when the larger size were unavailable.[30] These were mounted in a cylindrical turret, 20ft (unknown operator: u'strong'm) in diameter, 9ft (unknown operator: u'strong'm) high, covered with iron 8in (unknown operator: u'strong'mm) thick. The whole rotated on a central spindle, and was moved by a steam engine that could be controlled by one man. Ericsson was afraid that using the full 30 pounds of black powder to fire the huge cannon would raise the risk of an explosion in the turret. He demanded that a charge of 15 pounds be used to lessen this possibility. As with Virginia, it was found that the full charge would pierce armor plate, a finding that would have affected the outcome of the battle.[31] A serious flaw in the design was the pilot house from which the ship would be conned, a small structure forward of the turret on the main deck. Its presence meant that the guns could not fire directly forward, and it was isolated from other activities on the ship. Despite the late start and the novelty of construction, Monitor was actually completed a few days before her counterpart Virginia, but Virginia was activated first.[32]
Battle
Command
The Confederate chain of command was anomalous. Lieutenant Catesby ap Roger Jones had directed much of the conversion of Merrimack to Virginia, and he was disappointed when he was not named her captain.[33] Jones was retained aboard Virginia, but only as her executive officer. Ordinarily, the ship would have been led by a captain of the Confederate States Navy, to be determined by the rigid seniority system that was in place. Secretary Mallory wanted the aggressive Franklin Buchanan, but at least two other captains had greater seniority and had applied for the post. Mallory evaded the issue by appointing Franklin, head of the Office of Orders and Detail, flag officer in charge of the defenses of Norfolk and the James River. As such, he could control the movements of Virginia. Technically, therefore, the ship went into the battle without a captain.[34] On the Union side, command of the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron was held by Flag Officer Louis M. Goldsborough. He had devised a plan for his frigates to engage Virginia, hoping to trap her in their crossfire.[35] In the event, his plan broke down completely when four of the ships ran aground (one of them intentionally) in the confined waters of the roadstead. On the day of battle, Goldsborough was absent with the ships cooperating with the Burnside Expedition in North Carolina.[36] In his absence, leadership fell to his second in command, Captain John Marston of USSRoanoke. As Roanoke was one of the ships that ran aground, Marston was unable to materially influence the battle, and his participation is often disregarded. Most accounts emphasize the contribution of the
Battle of Hampton Roads captain of Monitor, John L. Worden, to the neglect of others.[37]
185
Battle of Hampton Roads commanded by John Randolph Tucker, had arrived and joined Virginia in the attack on Congress. After an hour of unequal combat, the badly damaged Congress surrendered.[48] While the surviving crewmen of Congress were being ferried off the ship, a Union battery on the north shore opened fire on Virginia. In retaliation, Buchanan ordered Congress fired upon with hot shot, cannon balls heated red-hot. Congress caught fire and burned throughout the rest of the day. Near midnight, the flames reached her magazine and she exploded and sank.[49] Personnel losses included 110 killed or missing and presumed drowned. Another 26 were wounded, of whom ten died within days.[50] Although she had not suffered anything like the damage she had inflicted, Virginia was not completely unscathed. Shots from Cumberland, Congress, and Union troops ashore had riddled her smokestack, reducing her already low speed. Two of her guns were disabled and several armor plates had been loosened. Two of her crew were killed, and more were wounded. One of the wounded was Captain Buchanan, whose left thigh was pierced by a rifle shot.[51] Meanwhile, the James River Squadron had turned its attention to Minnesota, which had left Fort Monroe to join in the battle and had run aground.[42] After Virginia had dealt with the surrender of Congress, she joined the James River Squadron despite her damage. Because of her deep draft and the falling tide, however, Virginia was unable to get close enough to be effective, and darkness prevented the rest of the squadron from aiming their guns to any effect. The attack was therefore suspended. Virginia left with the expectation of returning the next day and completing the task. She retreated into the safety of Confederate-controlled waters off Sewell's Point for the night,[52] but had killed 400 enemy sailors and had lost two. The Union had lost two ships and three were aground.[53] The United States Navy's greatest defeat until World War II caused panic in Washington. As Lincoln's Cabinet met to discuss the disaster, the frightened Secretary of War Edwin Stanton told the others that the Virginia might attack East coast cities, and even shell the White House before the meeting ended. Welles assured his colleagues that they were safe as the ship could not traverse the Potomac river. He added that the Union also had an ironclad, and that it was heading to meet the Virginia.[53]
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Both sides used the respite to prepare for the next day. Virginia put her wounded ashore and underwent temporary repairs. Captain Buchanan was among the wounded, so command on the second day fell to his executive officer,
Battle of Hampton Roads Lieutenant Catesby ap Roger Jones. Jones proved to be no less aggressive than the man he replaced. While Virginia was being prepared for renewal of the battle, and while Congress was still ablaze, Monitor, commanded by Lieutenant John L. Worden, arrived in Hampton Roads. The Union ironclad had been rushed to Hampton Roads in hopes of protecting the Union fleet and preventing Virginia from threatening Union cities. Captain Worden was informed that his primary task was to protect Minnesota, so Monitor took up a position near the grounded Minnesota and waited.[54] All on board felt we had a friend that would stand by us in our hour of trial, wrote Captain Gershom Jacques Van Brunt, the vessels commander, in his official report the day after the engagement.[55] The next morning, at dawn on March 9, 1862, Virginia left her anchorage at Sewell's Point and moved to attack Minnesota, still aground. She was followed by the three ships of the James River Squadron.[56] They found their course blocked, however, by the newly arrived Monitor. At first, Jones believed the strange craftwhich one Confederate sailor mocked as "a cheese on a raft"to be a boiler being towed from the Minnesota, not realizing the nature of his opponent. Soon, however, it was apparent that he had no choice but to fight her.[57][53] The first shot of the engagement, was fired at Monitor by Virginia. The shot flew past Monitor and struck Minnesota, which answered with a broadside; this began what would be a lengthy engagement. Again, all hands were called to quarters, and when she approached within a mile of us I opened upon her with my stern guns and made a signal to the Monitor to attack the enemy, Van Brunt added.[55] After fighting for hours, mostly at close range, neither could overcome the other. The armor of both ships proved adequate. In part, this was because each was handicapped in her offensive capabilities. Buchanan, in Virginia, had not expected to fight another armored vessel, so his guns were supplied only with shell rather than armor-piercing shot.[58] Monitor's guns were used with the standard service charge of only 15lb (unknown operator: u'strong'kg) of powder, which did not give the projectile sufficient momentum to penetrate her opponent's armor. Tests conducted after the battle showed that the Dahlgren guns could be operated safely and efficiently with charges of as much as 30lb (unknown operator: u'strong'kg).[59] The battle finally ceased when a chance shell from Virginia struck the pilot house of Monitor and exploded, driving fragments of paint and iron through the viewing slits into Worden's eyes and temporarily blinding him.[41] As no one else could see to conn the ship, Monitor was forced to draw off. The executive officer, Lieutenant Samuel Dana Greene, took over, and Monitor returned to the fight. In the period of command confusion, however, the crew of Virginia believed that their opponent had withdrawn. Although Minnesota was still aground, the falling tide meant that she was out of reach. Furthermore, Virginia had suffered enough damage to require extensive repair. Convinced that his ship had won the day, Jones ordered her back to Norfolk. At about this time, Monitor returned, only to discover her opponent apparently giving up the fight. Convinced that Virginia was quitting, with orders only to protect Minnesota and not to risk his ship unnecessarily, Greene did not pursue. Thus, each side misinterpreted the moves of the other, and as a result each claimed victory.[60]
187
188
Confederate Secretary of the Navy Stephen Mallory wrote to Confederate President Davis of the action: The conduct of the Officers and men of the squadron reflects unfading honor upon themselves and upon the Navy. The report will be read with deep interest, and its details will not fail to rouse the ardor and nerve the arms of our gallant seamen. It will be remembered that the Virginia was a novelty in naval architecture, wholly unlike any ship that ever floated; that her heaviest guns were equal novelties in ordnance; that her motive power and obedience to her helm were untried, and her officers and crew strangers, comparatively, to the ship and to each other; and yet, under all these disadvantages, the dashing courage and consummate professional ability of Flag Officer Buchanan and his associates achieved the most remarkable victory which naval annals record. In Washington, belief that Monitor had vanquished Virginia was so strong that Worden and his men were awarded the Thanks of Congress:[62] Resolved . . . That the thanks of Congress and the American people are due and are hereby tendered to Lieutenant J. L. Worden, of the United States Navy, and to the officers and men of the ironclad gunboat Monitor, under his command, for the skill and gallantry exhibited by them in the remarkable battle between the Monitor and the rebel ironclad steamer Merrimack. During the two-day engagement, the U.S.S. Minnesota shot off 78 rounds of 10-inch solid shot; 67 rounds of 10-inch solid shot with 15-second fuse; 169 rounds of 9-inch solid shot; 180 9-inch shells with 15-second fuse; 35 8-inch shells with 15-second fuse and 5,567.5 pounds of service powder. Three crew members, Alexander Winslow, Henry Smith and Dennis Harrington were killed during the battle and 16 were wounded.[55]
[61]
189
190
Who won?
The victory claims that were made by each side in the immediate aftermath of the Battle of Hampton Roads, based as both were on misinterpretations of the opponent's behavior, have been dismissed by present-day historians. They agree that the result of the MonitorMerrimack encounter was victory for neither. As the combat between ironclads was the primary significance of the battle, the general verdict is that the overall result was a draw.[69] All would acknowledge that the Southern fleet inflicted far more damage than it received, which would ordinarily imply that they had gained a tactical victory. Compared to other Civil War battles, the loss of men and ships for the Union Navy would be considered a clear defeat. On the other hand, the blockade was not seriously threatened, so the entire battle can be regarded as an assault that ultimately failed.[70] However, initially after the Battle of Hampton Roads, both the Confederates and the Unions used media to claim victory for their own sides. The headline a Boston newspaper the day after the battle read "The Merrimac Driven back by the Steamer!", implying a Union victory, while Confederate media focused on their original success against wooden Union ships. Despite the battle ending in a stalemate, it was seen by both sides as an opportunity to raise war-time morale, especially since the ironclad ships were an exciting naval innovation that intrigued citizens. Evaluation of the strategic results is likewise disputed. The blockade was maintained, even strengthened, and Virginia was bottled up in Hampton Roads. Because a decisive Confederate weapon was negated, some have concluded that the Union could claim a strategic victory.[71] Confederate advocates can counter, however, by arguing that Virginia had a military significance larger than the blockade, which was only a small part of the war in Tidewater Virginia. Her mere presence was sufficient to close the James River to Federal incursions. She also imposed other constraints on the Peninsula Campaign then being mounted by the Union Army under General George B. McClellan, who worried that she could interfere with his positions on the York River. Although his fears were baseless, they continued to affect the movements of his army until Virginia was destroyed.[72]
191
The vulnerability of wooden hulls to armored ships was noted particularly in Britain and France, where the wisdom of the planned conversion of the battle fleet to armor was given a powerful demonstration.[74] Another feature that was emulated was not so successful. Impressed by the ease with which the Virginia had sunk the Cumberland, naval architects began to incorporate rams into their hull designs. The first purpose-built ram in the modern era was the French armored ram Taureau (1863), whose guns were said to have "the sole function of preparing the way for the ram."[75] The inclusion of rams in warship hull design persisted almost to the outbreak of World War I, despite improvements in naval gunnery that quickly made close action between warships almost suicidal, if not impossible.[76]
192
Notes
Abbreviations used in these notes: ORA (Official records, armies): War of the Rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies. ORN (Official records, navies): Official records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion.
[1] Musicant 1995, pp. 134178; Anderson 1962, pp. 7177; Tucker 2006, p. 151. [2] Anderson 1962, pp. 7175. [3] Anderson 1962, pp. 7577. [4] Tucker 2006, p. 175; Luraghi 1996, p. 148. [5] Civil War naval chronology, pp. I-9, I-12. [6] Cumberland and Merrimack, the latter renamed CSS Virginia, would meet again on March 8, 1862. [7] Musicant 1995, pp. 2640. [8] Luraghi 1996, pp. 3435, 42. [9] ORA I, v. 2, pp. 782783. [10] Fort Monroe was one of three major forts in seceded states that were still held by the Union; the others were Fort Zachary Taylor and Fort Pickens, both in Florida. [11] The fort was named Fort Calhoun when construction was started before the outbreak of the war. It was completed only after the war started, and was then renamed for the general who directed the defense of the region. Browning, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear, p. 41. [12] Joseph B. Carr, "Operations of 1861 about Fort Monroe," Battles and leaders, v. 2, pp.144152. [13] Wise 1988, p. 25. [14] Davis 1975, pp. 69, 71. [15] Gibbon 1983, p. 13. [16] Gibbon 1983, pp. 2831. [17] Contemplation of armor was not confined to Europe. The United States had spent a lot of money supporting the development of the Stevens Battery, with nothing to show for it. (Davis, Duel between the first two ironclads, p. 5.) Also, a river boatman at New Orleans, John A. Stevenson, early in the war had converted a tugboat into an armored vessel. As CSS Manassas, she was actually the first armored vessel to go into combat in the war. (Still, Iron afloat, pp. 4651.) [18] Anderson 1962, p. 67. [19] Still 1985, p. 10. [20] After the war, Brooke and Porter engaged in an unseemly fight for recognition as the originator of the Virginia design. In the controversy, the contributions of the engineer Williamson have often been overlooked. Still 1985, pp. 1113; Davis 1975, p. 141. [21] This is a more telling comment on the handicaps faced by the South than it may appear. The reason that Merrimack was in the Gosport yard was to repair her notably balky engines. [22] Still 1985, p. 15. [23] Still 1985, p. 22.
193
[46] Davis, Duel between the first ironclads, pp. 9092. [47] Nelson, Reign of iron: the story of the first battling ironclads, the Monitor and the Merrimack, p. 229-230 [48] Smith, captain of Congress, had been killed by a shot that blew off his head, so the decision to surrender was made by her executive officer, Austin Pendergrast. See Davis, Duel between the first ironclads, p. 100. [49] Davis, Duel between the first ironclads, pp. 98104. [50] Davis, Duel between the first ironclads, p. 109. [51] Davis, Duel between the first ironclads, pp. 103, 105. [52] Still, Iron afloat, p. 32. [53] Malanowski, James (2012-03-08). "The Duel" (http:/ / opinionator. blogs. nytimes. com/ 2012/ 03/ 08/ the-duel/ ). The New York Times. . Retrieved March 13, 2012. [54] ORN I, v. 7, p. 25. [55] The Monitor, The Merrimack...The U.S.S. Minnesota? (http:/ / thisweekinthecivilwar. com/ ?p=1021/ ) [56] Still, Iron afloat, p. 33. [57] Davis, Duel between the first ironclads, p. 121. [58] Musicant, Divided waters, p. 171. [59] Schneller, "A state of war is a most unfavorable period for experiments," retrieved August 24, 2009. (http:/ / www. ijnhonline. org/ volume2_number3_Dec03/ article_schneller_dahlgren_dec03. htm#_edn73) [60] Davis, Duel between the first ironclads, pp. 121134. [61] ORN I, v. 7, p. 43. [62] ORN I, v. 7, p. 39. [63] Davis, Duel between the first ironclads, p. 142. [64] Davis, Duel between the first ironclads, p. 147. [65] T.J. Stiles,The First Tycoon: The Epic Life of Cornelius Vanderbilt (2009), p. 345-348 [66] Anderson, By sea and by river, p. 77. [67] Luraghi, A history of the Confederate Navy, pp. 164167. [68] Davis, Duel between the first ironclads, pp. 160164. [69] Simson, Naval strategies of the Civil War, p. 86. [70] Browning, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear, p. 45. Tucker, Blue and gray navies, p. 175. [71] Musicant, Divided waters, p. 176. [72] Browning, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear, pp. 4552. Simson, Naval strategies of the Civil War, p. 87. [73] G. Smirnov, V. Smirnov (1984). ", " (http:/ / mkmagazin. almanacwhf. ru/ mor_col/ mc_bo/ mc_bo_06. htm) (in Russian). - (Moscow) (1): 3132. . Retrieved 2009-02-10. [74] Luraghi, History of the Confederate Navy, p. 148. [75] Ropp, Theodore, and Stephen S. Roberts. The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval Policy, 18711904. Naval Institute Press, 1987; p. 13. [76] Rose, Lisle Abbott, Power at sea: the age of navalism, 18901918 (vol. 1 of a three-volume set). Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007. ISBN 0-8262-1683-8; p. 45.
194
References
Anderson, Bern. By sea and by river: the naval history of the Civil War. Knopf; reprint, Da Capo, n.d.; 1962. ISBN 0-306-80367-4. Browning, Robert M. Jr.. From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War. University of Alabama; 1993. ISBN 0-8173-5019-5. Davis, William C.. Duel between the first ironclads. Doubleday,; 1975. Durkin, Joseph T.. Stephen R. Mallory: Confederate Navy chief. University of North Carolina; reprint, University of South Carolina, 1987; 1954. ISBN 0-87249-518-3. Gibbons, Tony. The complete encyclopedia of battleships: a technical directory of capital ships from 1860 to the present day. Salamander Books; 1983. ISBN 0-517-37810-8. Luraghi, Raimondo. A history of the Confederate Navy. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press; 1996. ISBN 1-55750-527-6. (translation by Paolo E. Coletta of Marina del Sud: storia della marina confederate nella Guerra Civile Americana, 1861-1865. Rizzoli, 1993.) Musicant, Ivan. Divided waters: the naval history of the Civil War. HarperCollins; 1995. ISBN 0-06-016482-4. Nelson, James L.. Reign of iron: the story of the first battling ironclads, the Monitor and the Merrimack. New York: HarperCollins; 2004. ISBN 0-06-052403-0. Quarstein, John V., C.S.S. Virginia, Mistress of Hampton Roads, self-published for the Virginia Civil War Battles and Leaders Series; 2000. ISBN 1-56190-118-0 Scharf, J. Thomas. History of the Confederate States Navy from its organization to the surrender of its last vessel; its stupendous struggle with the great Navy of the United States, the engagements fought in the rivers and harbors of the South and upon the high seas, blockade-running, first use of iron-clads and torpedoes, and privateer history. New York: Rogers & Sherwood; 1887; reprint, Random House, 1996.. Simson, Jay W.. Naval strategies of the Civil War: Confederate innovations and Federal opportunism. Nashville: Cumberland House; 2001. ISBN 1-58182-195-6. Still, William N. Jr.. Iron afloat: the story of the Confederate armorclads. Vanderbilt University; 1985. ISBN 0-87249-616-3. Tucker, Spencer. Blue & gray navies: the Civil War afloat. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press; 2006. ISBN 1-59114-882-0. United States Department of the Navy, Naval History Department. Civil War naval chronology, 18611865. Government Printing Office; 1971. Wise, Stephen R.. Lifeline of the Confederacy: blockade running during the Civil War. University of South Carolina; 1988. ISBN 0-87249-554. This articleincorporates text from a publication now in the public domain:Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). Encyclopdia Britannica (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press.
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External links
A record of events in Norfolk County, Virginia (http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gdc/lhbcb.08753), online text with an entire chapter on the battle. Civil War Naval History (http://www.multied.com/Navy/cwnavalhistory/) USS Monitor National Historical Site (http://monitor.nos.noaa.gov/) Monitor in the news (http://www.HavenWorks.com/military/uss-monitor) Its 'revolutionary' gun turret has been raised from the ocean floor. On-line exhibition of the Monitor (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/monitor/) "An original 1862 Chicago Tribune Article!" (http://www.footnote.com/spotlight/13465/ the_chicago_tribune_1862_an_account_of/) website devoted to CSS Virginia (http://cssvirginia.org/) Battle of Hampton Road website (http://www.civilwarhome.com/ironclad.htm) First Edition Report on the Battle of the Monitor and Merrimac (http://www.sonofthesouth.net/leefoundation/ civil-war/1862/monitor-merrimac.htm) Newspaper coverage of the Battle of Hampton Roads (http://www.newsinhistory.com/feature/ battle-hampton-roads-historic-first-clash-ironclad-warships) National Park Service Battle Summary (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va008.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Hampton Roads to High Bridge.pdf)
196
Background
In the spring of 1862, Union Major General George B. McClellan launched an amphibious operation against Richmond by landing troops at Fort Monroe and then marching northwest up the Virginia Peninsula. After the fall of Yorktown and the withdrawal of General Joseph E. Johnston's army up the Peninsula, only the Confederate Navy ironclad CSS Virginia prevented Union occupation of the lower James River and Norfolk. When the Confederate garrison at Norfolk was evacuated by Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger on May 10, Flag Officer Josiah Tattnall knew that he could not navigate Virginia through Peninsula Campaign, map of events up to the Battle of Seven the shallow stretches of the James River PinesConfederateUnion toward Richmond, so she was scuttled on May 11 off Craney Island to prevent her capture. This opened the James River at Hampton Roads to Federal gunboats. The only obstacle that protected Richmond from a river approach was Fort Darling on Drewry's Bluff, overlooking a sharp bend on the river 7mi (unknown operator: u'strong'km) down river from the city. The Confederate defenders, including marines, sailors, and soldiers, were supervised by navy Commander Ebenezer Farrand and by army Captain Augustus H. Drewry (the owner of the property that bore his name) of the Southside Heavy Artillery.[1] The eight cannons in the fort, including field artillery pieces and five naval guns, some salvaged from the Virginia, commanded the river for miles in both directions. Guns from CSS Patrick Henry, including an 8in (unknown operator: u'strong'mm) smoothbore, were just upriver and sharpshooters gathered on the river banks. An underwater obstruction of sunken steamers, pilings, debris, and other vessels connected by chains was placed just below the bluff, making it difficult for vessels to maneuver in the narrow river.[2]
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Battle
On May 15, a detachment of the U.S. Navy's North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, under the command of Commander John Rodgers steamed up the James River from Fort Monroe to test the Richmond defenses. The flotilla consisted of the ironclad gunboats USS Monitor (commanded by Lieutenant William N. Jeffers) and Galena (the flagship), the screw gunship Aroostook, the side-wheeler Port Royal, and the twin-screw ironclad Naugatuck.[3] At 07:45, Galena closed to within 600yd (unknown operator: u'strong'm) of the fort and anchored, but before Rodgers could open fire, two Confederate rounds pierced the lightly-armored vessel. The battle lasted over three hours and during that time, Galena remained almost stationary and took 45 hits. Her crew reported casualties of 14 dead or mortally wounded and 10 injured. Monitor was a frequent target, but her heavier armor withstood the blows. Unfortunately for her crew, her guns could not elevate high enough to fire on the Confederate batteries, 110ft (unknown operator: u'strong'm) above the river. Naugatuck withdrew when her 100-pounder Parrott rifle exploded. The two wooden gunboats remained safely out of range of the big guns, but the captain of Port Royal was wounded by a sharpshooter. Around 11:00, the Union ships withdrew to City Point.[4]
Aftermath
The massive fort on Drewry's Bluff had blunted the Union advance just 7mi (unknown operator: u'strong'km) short of the Confederate capital, at a loss of seven Confederates killed and eight wounded.[5] Richmond remained safe. Rodgers reported to Confederate gun at Battery Dantzler, Drewry's Bluff. McClellan that it was feasible for the navy to land troops as close as 10mi (unknown operator: u'strong'km) from Richmond, but the Union Army never took advantage of this observation.[6] The area saw action again during the Siege of Petersburg in 186465. During the battle, Corporal John F. Mackie became the first Marine to earn the Medal of Honor.
198
Notes
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] Sears, p. 93; Eicher, p. 273, states that it was the 2nd Virginia Artillery. Salmon, p. 87. Eicher, pp. 272-73. Sears, pp. 93-94; Salmon, p. 87; Eicher, p. 273. Sears, p. 94. Eicher, p. 273.
References
Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide (http://www.bibliobase.com/history/readerscomp/ civwar/html/cw_000106_entries.htm). 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va012.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Deep Bottom II to Drewrys Bluff.pdf)
External links
Battle of Drury's [sic] Bluff (http://www.generalatomic.com/PerrysSaints/chapter14.html)
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Background
McClellan had chosen to approach the Confederate capital of Richmond, Virginia, with an amphibious operation that landed troops on the tip of the Virginia Peninsula at Fort Monroe. His Army of the Potomac numbered 121,500 men, transported starting on March 17 by 389 vessels.[] McClellan planned to use U.S. Navy forces to envelop Yorktown, but the emergence of the Confederate ironclad CSS Virginia and the Battle of Hampton Roads (March 89, 1862) disrupted this plan. The threat of the Virginia on the James River and the heavy Confederate batteries at the mouth of the York River prevented the Navy from assuring McClellan that they could control either the York or the James, so he settled on a purely land approach toward Yorktown.[1]
Federal battery with 13-inch (unknown operator: u'strong'mm) seacoast mortars, Model 1861, during siege of Yorktown, Virginia 1862.
The Confederate defenders of Yorktown, led by Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder, initially numbered only 1113,000 men;[2] the rest of the Confederate forces, under the overall command of General Joseph E. Johnston, remained spread out across eastern Virginia at Culpeper, Fredericksburg, and Norfolk. Magruder constructed a defensive line from Yorktown on the York River, behind the Warwick River, to Mulberry Point on the James River (even taking advantage of some trenches originally dug by Cornwallis in 1781[3]) to effectively block the full width of the Peninsula, although he could adequately man none of the defensive works at that time. This became known as the Warwick Line. McClellan's plan called for Maj. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman's III Corps to fix the Confederate troops in their trenches near the York River, while the IV Corps under Brig. Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes enveloped the Confederate right and cut off their lines of communication. McClellan and his staff, ignorant of the extent of Magruder's line, assumed the Confederates had concentrated only in the immediate vicinity of Yorktown.[4]
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Battle
Union advance and Lee's Mill
On April 4, 1862, the Union Army pushed through Magruder's initial line of defense but the following day encountered his more effective Warwick Line. The nature of the terrain made it difficult to determine the exact disposition of the Confederate forces. A victim of faulty intelligence, McClellan estimated that the Confederates had 40,000 troops in the defensive line and that Johnston was expected to arrive quickly with an additional 60,000. Magruder, an amateur actor before the war, exacerbated McClellan's confusion by moving infantry and artillery in a noisy, ostentatious manner to make the defenders seem a much larger forces than their actual numbers.[5]
The Union IV Corps first encountered the right flank of Magruder's line on April 5 at Lee's Mill, its earthwork defenses manned by the division of Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws. The 7th Maine Infantry Regiment deployed as skirmishers and stopped about 1000 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) before the fortifications, where they were soon joined by the brigade of Brig. Gen. John Davidson and artillery. An artillery duel raged for several hours while Keyes ordered reconnaissance and additional units arrived, but there was no infantry fighting. On April 6, men from the 6th Maine Infantry and 5th Wisconsin Infantry, under the command of Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, performed reconnaissance around Dam Number One, where Magruder had widened the Warwick to create a water obstacle nearby. They drove off the Confederate pickets and took some prisoners. Hancock considered this area a weak spot in the line, but orders from McClellan prevented any exploitation.[6] Keyes, deceived by Magruder's theatrical troop movements, believed that the Warwick Line fortifications could not be carried by assault and so informed McClellan.[7] To the amazement of the Confederates, and the dismay of President Abraham Lincoln, McClellan chose not to attack without more reconnaissance and ordered his army to entrench in works parallel to Magruder's and besiege Yorktown. McClellan reacted to Keyes's report, as well as to reports of enemy strength near the town of Yorktown, but he also received word that the I Corps, under Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell, would be withheld for the defense of Washington, instead of joining him on the Peninsula as McClellan had planned. For the next 10 days, McClellan's men dug while Magruder steadily received reinforcements. By mid April, Magruder commanded 35,000 men, barely enough to defend his line.[8] Although McClellan doubted his numeric superiority over the enemy, he had no doubts about the superiority of his artillery. The siege preparations at Yorktown consisted of 15 batteries with more than 70 heavy guns, including two 200-pounder Parrotts and 12 100-pound Parrots, with the rest of the rifled pieces divided between 20-pounder and 30-pounder Parrotts and 4.5-inch (unknown operator: u'strong'mm) Rodman siege rifles. These were augmented by 41 mortars, ranging in size from 8 inches (unknown operator: u'strong'mm) to 13-inch (unknown operator: u'strong'mm) seacoast mortars, which weighed over 10 tons and fired shells weighing 220 pounds. When fired in unison, these batteries would deliver over 7,000 pounds of ordnance onto the enemy positions with each volley.[9]
Siege of Yorktown (1862) As the armies dug in, Union Army Balloon Corps aeronaut Professor Thaddeus S. C. Lowe used two balloons, the Constitution and the Intrepid, to perform aerial observation. On April 11, Intrepid carried Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter, a division commander of the III Corps, aloft, but unexpected winds sent the balloon over enemy lines, causing great consternation in the Union command before other winds returned him to safety. Confederate Captain John Bryan suffered a similar wind mishap in a hot air balloon over the Yorktown lines.[10]
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202
Aftermath
From a Union perspective, the action at Dam No. 1 was pointless, but it cost them casualties of 35 dead and 121 wounded; the Confederate casualties were between 60 and 75.[15] Baldy Smith, who was thrown from his unruly horse twice during action, was accused of drunkenness on duty, but a congressional investigation found the allegation to be groundless.[16] For the remainder of April, the Confederates, now at 57,000 and under the direct command of Johnston, improved their defenses while McClellan undertook the laborious process of transporting and placing Peninsula Campaign, map of events up to the Battle of Seven Pines. massive siege artillery batteries, which he planned to deploy on May 5. Johnston knew that the impending bombardment would be difficult to withstand, so began sending his supply wagons in the direction of Richmond on May 3. Escaped slaves reported that fact to McClellan, who refused to believe them. He was convinced that an army whose strength he estimated as high as 120,000 would stay and fight. On the evening of May 3, the Confederates launched a brief bombardment of their own and then fell silent. Early the next morning, Heintzelman ascended in an observation balloon and found that the Confederate earthworks were empty.[17] McClellan was stunned by the news. He sent cavalry under Brig. Gen. George Stoneman in pursuit and ordered Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin's division to reboard Navy transports, sail up the York River, and cut off Johnson's retreat. The stage was set for the subsequent Battle of Williamsburg.[18]
Notes
[1] Eicher, p. 215. [2] Kennedy, p. 88, states 11,000; Eicher, p. 215, and Salmon, p. 76, state 13,000. [3] Sears, p. 48. [4] Eicher, p. 215, [5] Salmon, p. 76; Kennedy, p. 88. [6] Burton, p. 20. This portion of the Warwick River is now the Lee Hall Reservoir, part of Newport News Park. [7] Sears, p. 42; Burton, p. 15. [8] Burton, p. 15; Salmon, p. 76; Kennedy, p. 88. [9] Sears, p. 58. [10] Sears, pp. 54-55. [11] Union reports in the Official Records refer to this engagement as Lee's Mill or Burnt Chimneys. Sears, p. 55, bases his work on these reports. However, more recent histories differentiate the skirmish on April 5 at Lee's Mill from the more significant action nearby on April 16, which they refer to as Dam Number One. See for example, Burton, pp. 14-19, and the Virginia Civil War Traveler map. [12] Burton, p. 20. [13] Salmon, pp. 76-77. [14] Salmon, pp. 76-77; Rickard, np. [15] Salmon, p. 77. [16] Sears, p. 56. [17] Salmon, p. 79.
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References
Burton, Brian K. The Peninsula & Seven Days: A Battlefield Guide. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. ISBN 978-0-8032-6246-1. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide (http://www.bibliobase.com/history/readerscomp/ civwar/html/cw_000106_entries.htm). 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Rickard, J. "Battle of Lee's Mill" (http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/battles_lees_mills.html). Accessed August 2, 2010. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va009.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Winchester II to Yorktown.pdf) Virginia Civil War Traveler map (http://www.civilwartraveler.com/about/maps/PeninsulaMap.pdf)
Battle of Williamsburg
The Battle of Williamsburg, also known as the Battle of Fort Magruder, took place on May 5, 1862, in York County, James City County, and Williamsburg, Virginia, as part of the Peninsula Campaign of the American Civil War. It was the first pitched battle of the Peninsula Campaign, in which nearly 41,000 Federals and 32,000 Confederates were engaged, fighting an inconclusive battle that ended with the Confederates continuing their withdrawal. Following up the Confederate retreat from Yorktown, the Union division of Brig. Gen. Joseph Hooker encountered the Confederate rearguard near Williamsburg. Hooker assaulted Fort Magruder, an earthen fortification alongside the Williamsburg Road, but was repulsed. Confederate counterattacks, directed by Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, threatened to overwhelm the Union left flank, until Brig. Gen. Philip Kearny's division arrived to stabilize the Federal position. Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock's brigade then moved to threaten the Confederate left flank, occupying two abandoned redoubts. The Confederates counterattacked unsuccessfully. Hancock's localized success was not exploited. The Confederate army continued its withdrawal during the night in the direction of Richmond, Virginia.[]
Background
Further information: Confederate Order of Battle, Union Order of Battle When Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston unexpectedly withdrew his forces from the Warwick Line at the Battle of Yorktown the night of May 3, Union Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan was taken by surprise and was unprepared to mount an immediate pursuit. On May 4, he ordered cavalry commander Brig. Gen. George Stoneman to pursue Johnson's rearguard and sent approximately half of his Army of the Potomac along behind Stoneman, under the command of Brig. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner. He also ordered Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin's division to board transport ships on the York River in an attempt to move upstream and land so as to cut off Johnston's retreat. However, it took two days just to board the men and equipment onto the ships, so the maneuver had no effect on the
Battle of Williamsburg battle of May 5; Franklin's division landed and fought in the Battle of Eltham's Landing on May 7.[1] By May 5, Johnston's army was making slow progress on muddy roads and Stoneman's cavalry was skirmishing with Brig. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry, Johnston's rearguard. To give time for the bulk of his army to get free, Johnston detached part of his force to make a stand at a large earthen fortification, Fort Magruder, straddling the Williamsburg Road (from Yorktown), constructed earlier by Brig. Gen. John B. Magruder.[2]
204
Battle
Brig. Gen. Joseph Hooker's 2nd division of the III Corps was the lead infantry in the Union Army advance. They assaulted Fort Magruder and a line of rifle pits and smaller fortifications that extended in an arc south-west from the fort, but were repulsed. Confederate counterattacks, directed by Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, threatened to overwhelm Hooker's division, which had contested the ground alone since the early morning while waiting for the main body of the army to arrive. Hooker had expected Brig. Gen. William F. "Baldy" Smith's 2nd Division of the IV Corps, marching north on the Yorktown Road, to hear the sound of battle and come in on Hooker's right in support. McClellan arriving at the battle, as depicted by Currier and Ives. However, Smith had been halted by Sumner more than a mile away from Hooker's position. He had been concerned that the Confederates would leave their fortifications and attack him on the Yorktown Road.[3] Longstreet's men did leave their fortifications, but they attacked Hooker, not Smith or Sumner. The brigade of Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox applied strong pressure to Hooker's line. Regimental bands playing Yankee Doodle slowed the retreating troops as they passed by, allowing them to rally long enough to be aided by the arrival of Brig. Gen. Philip Kearny's 3rd Division of the III Corps at about 2:30 p.m. Kearny ostentatiously rode his horse out in front of his picket lines to reconnoiter and urged his men forward by flashing his saber with his only arm. The Confederates were pushed off the Lee's Peninsula Campaign, map of events up to the Battle of Seven Pines. ConfederateUnion Mill Road and back into the woods and the abatis of their defensive positions. There, sharp firefights occurred until late in the afternoon.[4] While Hooker continued to confront the Confederate forces in front of Fort Magruder, Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock's 1st Brigade of Baldy Smith's division, which had marched a few miles to the Federal right and crossed Cub's Creek at the point where it was dammed to form the Jones' Mill pond, began bombarding Longstreet's left flank around noon. Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill, commanding Longstreet's reserve force, had previously detached a brigade under Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early and posted them on the grounds of the College of William and Mary. Hearing the sounds of Union artillery, Early and Hill hurried in that direction. Splitting his command, Early led two of his four
Battle of Williamsburg regiments (the 24th and 38th Virginia Infantry) through the woods without performing adequate reconnaissance and found that they emerged not on the enemy's flank, but directly in front of Hancock's guns, which occupied two abandoned redoubts. He personally led the 24th Virginia Infantry on a futile assault and was wounded by a bullet through the shoulder.[5] Hancock had been ordered repeatedly by Sumner to withdraw his command back to Cub Creek, but he used the Confederate attack as an excuse to hold his ground. As the 24th Virginia charged, D.H. Hill emerged from the woods leading one of Early's other regiments, the 5th North Carolina. He ordered an attack before realizing the difficulty of his situationHancock's 3,400 infantrymen and eight artillery pieces significantly outnumbered the two attacking Confederate regiments, fewer than 1,200 men with no artillery support. He called off the assault after it had begun, but Hancock ordered a counterattack. The North Carolinians suffered 302 casualties, the Virginians 508. Union losses were about 100. After the battle, the counterattack received significant publicity as a major, gallant bayonet charge and McClellan's description of Hancock's "superb" performance gave him the nickname, "Hancock the Superb."[6] At about 2:00 p.m., Brig. Gen. John J. Peck's brigade of Brig. Gen. Darius N. Couch's 1st Division of the IV Corps arrived to support and extend the right of Hooker's line, which had, by this stage, been pushed back from the cleared ground in front of Fort Magruder into the abatis and heavy wood about 600 1000 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) from the Confederate fortifications. The morale of Hooker's troops had been affected terribly by the loss of Captain Charles H. Webber's Battery "H" of the 1st U.S. Light Artillery and Captain Walter M. Bramhall's 6th Battery of the New York Light Artillery. Peck's arrival on the field and his brigade's recovery of Bramhall's battery came at a critical moment for Hooker's division, which was on the verge of retreat.
205
Aftermath
The Northern press portrayed the battle as a victory for the Federal army. McClellan mis-categorized it as a "brilliant victory" over superior forces. However, the defense of Williamsburg was seen by the South as a means of delaying the Federals, which allowed the bulk of the Confederate army to continue its withdrawal toward Richmond. Confederate casualties, including the cavalry skirmishing on May 4, were 1,682. Union casualties were 2,283.[]
Notes
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] Sears, pp. 66-70. Sears, p. 70. Salmon, p. 82. Sears, pp. 74-78; Salmon, p. 82. Sears, pp. 78-80. Sears, pp. 79-83.
References
Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va010.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Williamsburg to Winchester I.pdf)
Battle of Williamsburg
206
Further reading
Burton, Brian K. The Peninsula & Seven Days: A Battlefield Guide. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. ISBN 978-0-8032-6246-1. Dubbs, Carol K. Defend This Old Town: Williamsburg During The Civil War. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2002. ISBN 0-8071-3017-6.
External links
Virginia Civil War Traveler map (http://www.civilwartraveler.com/about/maps/PeninsulaMap.pdf) Ricker, Harry H., III. Battle of Williamsburg (http://docs.google.com/Doc?id=dgn898fn_1c7tckrdp) Detailed strategic and tactical description
Background
When Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston unexpectedly withdrew his forces from the Warwick Line at the Battle of Yorktown the night of May 3, Union Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan was taken by surprise and was unprepared to mount an immediate pursuit. On May 4, he ordered cavalry commander Brig. Gen. George Stoneman to pursue Johnston's rearguard and sent approximately half of his Army of the Potomac along behind Stoneman, under the command of Brig. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner. These troops fought in the inconclusive Battle of Williamsburg on May 5, after which the Confederates continued to move northwest in the direction of Richmond.[1]
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McClellan also ordered Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin's division to board transport ships on the York River in an attempt to land and cut off Johnston's retreat. It took two days just to board the men and equipment onto the ships, so Franklin was of no assistance to the Williamsburg action. But McClellan had high hopes for his turning movement, planning to send other divisions (those of Brig. Gens. Fitz John Porter, John Sedgwick, and Israel B. Richardson) by river after Franklin's. Their destination was Eltham's Landing on the south bank of the Pamunkey River across from West Point, a port on the York River, which Peninsula Campaign, map of events up to the Battle of Seven Pines. ConfederateUnion was the terminus of the Richmond and York River Railroad. From the landing, it was about 5 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) south to the small town of Barhamsville, where a key intersection on the road to New Kent Court House was being used by Johnston's army on the afternoon of May 6.[2] Franklin's men came ashore in light pontoon boats and a 400-foot (unknown operator: u'strong'm) long floating wharf was then built from pontoons, canal boats, and lumber, so that artillery and supplies could be unloaded. The work was continued by torchlight through the night and the only enemy resistance was a few random shots fired by Confederate pickets on the bluff above the landing, ending at about 10 p.m.[3]
Battle
Johnston ordered Maj. Gen. G. W. Smith to protect the road to Barhamsville and Smith assigned the division of Brig. Gen. William H. C. Whiting and Hampton's Legion, under Colonel Wade Hampton, to the task. On May 7, Franklin posted Brig. Gen. John Newton's brigade in the woods on either side of the landing road, supported in the rear by portions of two more brigades (Brig. Gens. Henry W. Slocum and Philip Kearny).[4] Newton's skirmish line was pushed back as Brig. Gen. John Bell Hood's Texas Brigade advanced, with Hampton to his right. Hood was concerned about casualties from friendly fire in the thick woods, so he ordered his men to advance with unloaded rifles. Encountering a Union picket line 15 paces away, Hood wrote, "A corporal of the enemy drew down his musket upon me as I stood in front of my line." Fortunately for Hood, Private John Deal of the 4th Texas Infantry had disobeyed his orders and carried a loaded rifle; he managed to shoot the Union corporal before the latter could fire.[5] As a second brigade followed Hood on his left, the Union troops retreated from the woods to the plain before the landing, seeking cover from the fire of Federal gunboats. Whiting employed artillery fire against the gunboats, but his guns had insufficient range, so he disengaged around 2 p.m. Union troops moved back into the woods after the Confederates left, but made no further attempt to advance.[]
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Aftermath
The Battle at Eltham's Landing was little more than a heavy skirmish. There were 194 Union casualties and 48 Confederate.[] Franklin told McClellan, "I congratulate myself that we have maintained our position."[6] Although the action was tactically inconclusive, Franklin missed an opportunity to intercept the Confederate retreat from Williamsburg, allowing it to pass unmolested.[7] Johnston was pleased with the outcome. Considering the success his men enjoyed in executing the order "to feel the enemy gently and fall back," he humorously asked General Hood, "What would your Texans have done, sir, if I had ordered them to charge and drive back the enemy?" Hood replied, "I suppose, General, they would have driven them into the river, and tried to swim out and capture the gunboats."[6]
Notes
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] Salmon, pp. 80-83. Eicher, p. 270; Sears, p. 85; Salmon, p. 83. Sears, p. 85; Salmon, p. 85. Webb, p. 82. Salmon, p. 85; Sears, p. 86. Sears, p. 86.
[7] Salmon, p. 85; Webb, p. 82, argues that Franklin's instructions "were to wait at Eltham until further orders. No mention was made about cutting off the enemy. To make the attempt alone would have been hazardous, and the remaining divisions could not concentrate for several days."
References
Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6. Webb, Alexander S. The Peninsula: McClellan's Campaign of 1862 (http://books.google.com/ books?id=qbE8d82-ZVAC). Secaucus, NJ: Castle Books, 2002. ISBN 0-7858-1575-9. First published 1885. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va011.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Elthams Landing to Five Forks.pdf)
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Background
Further information: Hanover Court House order of battle Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston withdrew his 60,000-man army from the Virginia Peninsula as McClellan's army pursued him and approached the Confederate capital of Richmond. Johnston's defensive line began at the James River at Drewry's Bluff, site of the recent Confederate naval victory, and extended counterclockwise so that his center and left were behind the Chickahominy River, a natural barrier in the spring when it turned the broad plains to the east of Richmond into swamps. Johnston's men burned most of the bridges over the Chickahominy and settled into strong defensive positions north and east of the city. McClellan positioned his 105,000-man army to focus on the northeast sector, for two reasons. First, the Pamunkey River, which ran roughly parallel to the Chickahominy, offered a line of communication that could enable McClellan to get around Johnston's left flank. Second, McClellan anticipated the arrival of the I Corps under Maj. Gen. Irwin McDowell, scheduled to march south from Fredericksburg to reinforce his army, and thus needed to protect their avenue of approach.[1] The Army of the Potomac pushed slowly up the Pamunkey, establishing supply bases at Eltham's Landing, Cumberland Landing, and White House Landing. White House, the plantation of W.H.F. "Rooney" Lee, son of General Robert E. Lee, became McClellan's base of operations. Using the Richmond and York River Railroad, McClellan could bring his heavy siege artillery to the outskirts of Richmond. He moved slowly and deliberately, reacting to faulty intelligence that led him to believe the Confederates outnumbered him significantly. By the end of May, the army had built bridges across the Peninsula Campaign, map of events up to the Battle of Seven Pines. ConfederateUnion Chickahominy and was facing Richmond, straddling the river, with one third of the Army south of the river, two thirds north. (This disposition, which made it difficult for one part of the army to reinforce the other quickly, would prove to be a significant problem in the upcoming Battle of Seven Pines).[2]
Battle of Hanover Court House While skirmishing occurred all along the line between the armies, McClellan heard a rumor from a Virginia civilian that a Confederate force of 17,000 was moving to Hanover Court House, north of Mechanicsville. If this were true, it would threaten the army's right flank and complicate the arrival of McDowell's reinforcements. A Union cavalry reconnaissance adjusted the estimate of the enemy strength to be 6,000, but it was still cause for concern. McClellan ordered his close friend, Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter, commander of the newly formed V Corps, to deal with the threat.[3] Porter departed on his mission at 4 a.m. on May 27 with his 1st Division, under Brig. Gen. George W. Morell, the 3rd Brigade of Brig. Gen. George Sykes's 2nd Division, under Colonel Gouverneur K. Warren, and a composite brigade of cavalry and artillery led by Brig. Gen. William H. Emory, altogether about 12,000 men. The Confederate force, which actually numbered about 4,000 men, was led by Col. Lawrence O'Bryan Branch, and included the 18th, 28th, and 38th North Carolina Infantry regiments, and the 45th Georgia Infantry. They had departed from Gordonsville to guard the Virginia Central Railroad, taking up position at Peake's Crossing, 4 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) southwest of the courthouse, near Slash Church. Another Confederate brigade was stationed 10 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) north at Hanover Junction.[4]
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Battle
Porter's men approached Peake's Crossing in a driving rain. At about noon on May 27, his lead element, the 25th New York Infantry, encountered Col. James H. Lane's 28th North Carolina on a reconnaissance patrol at the farm owned by Dr. Thomas H. Kinney. The New Yorkers, along with the 1st U.S. Sharpshooters, skirmished briskly with the Confederates until Porter's main body arrived, driving the outnumbered Rebels up the road in the direction of the courthouse. Porter set out in pursuit with most of his force, leaving three regiments (the 2nd Maine, the 44th New York, and the damaged 25th New York), under the command of Brig. Gen. John H. Martindale, to guard the New Bridge and Hanover Court House Roads intersection, a mile to the west of Kinney's farm. This movement exposed the rear of Porter's command to attack by the bulk of Branch's force, which Porter had mistakenly assumed was at Hanover Court House.[5] Branch also made a poor assumptionthat Porter's force was significantly smaller than it turned out to beand attacked. Col. Charles C. Lee led his own regiment, the 37th North Carolina, along with the 18th North Carolina and two cannons from Latham's Battery. An initial assault by the 18th was repulsed, but when the 37th joined in, Martindale's force was almost destroyed by the heavy fire. The 44th New York suffered 25% casualties and its battle flag received 44 bullet holes.[6]
When messengers reached Porter with news of the engagement, he quickly dispatched the 9th Massachusetts and 62nd Pennsylvania regiments back to the Kinney Farm. The Confederate line broke under the weight of thousands of new troops and they retreated back through Peake's Crossing to Ashland.
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Aftermath
General McClellan claimed that Hanover Court House was yet another "glorious victory over superior numbers" and judged that it was "one of the handsomest things of the war."[7] However, the reality of the outcome was that superior (Union) numbers won the day in a disorganized fight, characterized by misjudgments on both sides. The right flank of the Union army remained secure, although technically the Confederates at Peake's Crossing had not intended to threaten it. And McDowell's Corps did not need its roads kept clear because it never arrivedthe defeat of Union forces at the First Battle of Winchester by Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley caused the Lincoln administration to recall McDowell to Fredericksburg. The estimates of Union casualties vary, from 355 (62 killed, 233 wounded, 70 captured) to 397. The Confederates left 200 dead on the field and 730 were captured by Porter's cavalry.[8] A greater impact than the actual casualties, according to historian Stephen W. Sears, was the effect on McClellan's preparedness for the next major battle, at Seven Pines and Fair Oaks four days later. During the absence of Porter, McClellan was reluctant to move more of his troops south of the Chickahominy, making his left flank a more attractive target for Johnston.[7]
Notes
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] Salmon, p. 88; Eicher, pp. 273-74; Sears, pp. 95-97. Salmon, p. 90; Sears, pp. 104-06. Salmon, p. 90; Sears, pp. 113-14. Eicher, p. 275; Salmon, p. 90. Sears, p. 114; Salmon, pp. 90-91. Sears, p. 116; Salmon, p. 91. Sears, p. 117. Eicher, 276; Sears, p. 117; Salmon, p. 91; Kennedy, p. 92.
References
Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide (http://www.bibliobase.com/history/readerscomp/ civwar/html/cw_000106_entries.htm). 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va013.htm)
Further reading
Burton, Brian K. The Peninsula & Seven Days: A Battlefield Guide. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. ISBN 978-0-8032-6246-1. Gallagher, Gary W., ed. The Richmond Campaign of 1862: The Peninsula & the Seven Days. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000. ISBN 0-8078-2552-2. Hardy, Micheal. The Battle of Hanover Court House: Turning Point of the Peninsula Campaign, May 27, 1862. McFarland & Co., 2006. ISBN 978-0786424641 Martin, David G. The Peninsula Campaign MarchJuly 1862. Conshohocken, PA: Combined Books, 1992. ISBN 978-0-938289-09-8. Speer, William H. A. Voices from Cemetery Hill: The Civil War Diary, Reports, and Letters of Colonel William Henry Asbury Speer (18611864). Edited by Allen Paul Speer. Johnson City, TN: Overmountain Press, 1997.
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Background
Johnston withdrew his 60,000-man army from the Virginia Peninsula as McClellan's army pursued him and approached the Confederate capital of Richmond. Johnston's defensive line began at the James River at Drewry's Bluff, site of the recent Confederate naval victory, and extended counterclockwise so that his center and left were behind the Chickahominy River, a natural barrier in the spring when it turned the broad plains to the east of Richmond into swamps. Johnston's men burned most of the bridges over the Chickahominy and settled into strong defensive positions north and east of the city. McClellan positioned his 105,000-man army to focus on the northeast sector, for two reasons. First, the Pamunkey River, which ran roughly parallel to the Chickahominy, offered a line of communication that could enable McClellan to get around Johnston's left flank. Second, McClellan anticipated the arrival of the I Corps under Maj. Gen. Irwin McDowell, scheduled to march south from Fredericksburg to reinforce his army, and thus needed to protect their avenue of approach.[2]
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The Army of the Potomac pushed slowly up the Pamunkey, establishing supply bases at Eltham's Landing, Cumberland Landing, and White House Landing. White House, the plantation of W.H.F. "Rooney" Lee, son of General Robert E. Lee, became McClellan's base of operations. Using the Richmond and York River Railroad, McClellan could bring his heavy siege artillery to the outskirts of Richmond. He moved slowly and deliberately, reacting to faulty intelligence that led him to believe the Confederates outnumbered him significantly. By the end of May, the army had built bridges across the Peninsula Campaign, map of events up to the Battle of Seven Pines. ConfederateUnion Chickahominy and was facing Richmond, straddling the river, with one third of the Army south of the river, two thirds north.[3]
Opposing forces
The Union army of 105,000 men was near the outskirts of Richmond to the northeast, straddling the Chickahominy River. There were three Corps north of the river, protecting the Union railroad supply line: the V Corps under Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter; the VI Corps, under Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin; and the II Corps, under Brig. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner. South of the river were the IV Corps, under Brig. Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes, in a position far forward and close to the Confederate lines; and the III Corps, under Brig. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman. At the start of the battle on May 31, McClellan was confined to bed, ill with a flare-up of his chronic malaria.[4]
Johnston had 60,000 men in his Army of Northern Virginia protecting the works of Richmond. His command consisted of the Right Wing, under Maj. Gen. James Longstreet (the divisions of Brig. Gen. Richard H. Anderson, commanding Longstreet's division, Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, and Brig. Gen. Benjamin Huger), the Left Wing, under Maj. Gen. G.W. Smith (the divisions of Brig. Gen. William H. C. Whiting, commanding Smith's division, and Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill), and the Reserve, under Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder (the divisions of Brig. Gens. Lafayette McLaws and David R. Jones).[5]
Johnston's plan
Johnston, who had retreated up the Peninsula to the outskirts of Richmond, knew that he could not survive a massive siege and decided to attack McClellan. His original plan was to attack the Union right flank, north of the Chickahominy River, before McDowell's corps, marching south from Fredericksburg, could arrive. However, on May 27, the same day the Battle of Hanover Court House was fought northeast of Richmond, Johnston learned that McDowell's corps had been diverted to the Shenandoah Valley and would not be reinforcing the Army of the
Battle of Seven Pines Potomac. He decided against attacking across his own natural defense line, the Chickahominy, and planned to capitalize on the Union army's straddle of the river by attacking the two corps south of the river, leaving them isolated from the other three corps north of the river.[6] If executed correctly, Johnston would engage two thirds of his army (22 of its 29 infantry brigades, about 51,000 men) against the 33,000 men in the III and IV Corps. The Confederate attack plan was complex, calling for the divisions of A. P. Hill and Magruder to engage lightly and distract the Union forces north of the river, while Longstreet, commanding the main attack south of the river, was to converge on Keyes from three directions: six brigades under Longstreet's immediate command and four brigades under D. H. Hill were to advance on separate roads at a crossroads known as Seven Pines (because of seven large pine trees clustered at that location); three brigades under Huger were assigned to support Hill's right; Whiting's division was to follow Longstreet's column as a reserve. The plan had an excellent potential for initial success because the division of the IV Corps farthest forward, manning the earthworks a mile west of Seven Pines, was that of Brig. Gen. Silas Casey, 6,000 men who were the least experienced in Keyes's corps. If Keyes could be defeated, the III Corps, to the east, could the be pinned against the Chickahominy and overwhelmed.[7] The complex plan was mismanaged from the start. Johnston chose to issue his orders to Longstreet orally in a long and rambling meeting on May 30. The other generals received written orders that were vague and contradictory. He also failed to notify all of the division commanders that Longstreet was in tactical command south of the river. (This missing detail was a serious oversight because both Huger and Smith technically outranked Longstreet.) On Longstreet's part, he either misunderstood his orders or chose to modify them without informing Johnston. Rather than taking his assigned avenue of advance on the Nine Mile Road, his column joined Hill's on the Williamsburg Road, which not only delayed the advance, but limited the attack to a narrow front with only a fraction of its total force. Exacerbating the problems on both sides was a severe thunderstorm on the night of May 30, which flooded the river, destroyed most of the Union bridges, and turned the roads into morasses of mud.[8]
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215
Battle
The attack got off to a bad start on May 31 when Longstreet marched down the Charles City Road and turned onto the Williamsburg Road instead of the Nine Mile Road. Huger's orders had not specified a time that the attack was scheduled to start and he was not awakened until he heard a division marching nearby. Johnston and his second-in-command, Smith, unaware of Longstreet's location or Huger's delay, waited at their headquarters for word of the start of the battle. Five hours after the scheduled start, at 1 p.m., D.H. Hill became impatient and sent his brigades forward against Casey's division.[9] Casey's line, manned by inexperienced troops, buckled with some men retreating, but fought fiercely for possession of their earthworks, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. The Confederates only engaged four brigades of the thirteen on their right flank that day, so they did not hit with the power that they could have concentrated on this weak point in the Union line. Casey sent for reinforcements but Keyes was slow Battle of Seven Pines. in responding. Eventually the mass of Confederates broke through, seized a Union redoubt, and Casey's men retreated to the second line of defensive works at Seven Pines. During this period, both of the high commanders were unaware of the severity of the battle. As late as 2:30 p.m., Heintzelman reported to McClellan, still sick in bed, that he had received no word from Keyes. Johnston was only 2 miles from the front, but an acoustic shadow prevented him from hearing the sounds of cannons and musketry and he and his staff did not know the battle had begun until 4 p.m.[10] The Army of the Potomac was accompanied by the Union Army Balloon Corps commanded by Prof. Thaddeus S. C. Lowe, who had established two balloon camps on the north side of the river, one at Gaines's Farm and one at Mechanicsville. Lowe reported on May 29 the buildup of Confederate forces to the left of New Bridge or in front of the Fair Oaks train station.[11] With constant rain on May 30 and heavy winds the morning of May 31, the aerostats Washington and Intrepid did not launch until noon. Lowe observed Confederate troops moving in battle formation and this information was relayed verbally to McClellan's headquarters by 2 p.m.[11] Lowe continued to send reports from the Intrepid via telegraph the remainder of May 31. On June 1, Lowe reported that the Confederate barracks to the left of Richmond as being free from smoke.[12] McClellan did not follow up on this information with a counterattack by his corps north of the Chickahominy River.[13]
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Around 4:40 p.m., Hill, now strengthened by reinforcements from Longstreet, hit the secondary Union line near Seven Pines, which was manned by the remnants of Casey's division, the IV Corps division of Brig. Gen. Darius N. Couch, and Brig. Gen. Philip Kearny's division from Heintzelman's III Corps. Hill organized a flanking maneuver, sending four regiments under Colonel Micah Jenkins from Longstreet's command to attack Keyes's right flank. The attack collapsed the Federal line back to the Williamsburg Road, a mile and a half beyond Seven Pines. The fighting in that part of the line died out by 7:30 p.m.[14] Just before Hill's attack began, Johnston received a note from Longstreet requesting that he join the battle, the first news he had heard of the fighting. Johnston went forward on the Nine Mile Road with three brigades of Whiting's division and encountered stiff resistance near Fair Oaks Station, the right flank of Keyes's line. Soon heavy Union reinforcements arrived. Brig. Gen. Edwin C. Sumner, II Corps commander, heard the sounds of battle from his position north of the Prof. Lowe ascending in the Intrepid to observe river. On his own initiative, he dispatched a division under Brig. Gen. the Battle of Seven Pines. John Sedgwick over the sole remaining bridge. The treacherous "Grapevine Bridge" was near collapse from the swollen river, but the weight of the crossing troops helped to hold it steady against the rushing water. When told that the river could not be crossed, Sumner replied "Impossible!? Sir, I tell you I can cross! I am ordered!" After the last man had crossed safely, the bridge collapsed and was swept away. Sedgwick's men provided the key to resisting Whiting's attack. The fighting was costly as Whiting lost three of four brigade commanders. Brig. Gen. Wade Hampton went down wounded, Robert H. Hatton was killed, and J. Johnston Pettigrew was wounded and captured. On the Union side, Brig. Gen. Oliver O. Howard had his right arm shattered by a Mini ball. The arm was amputated, and he would not return to action for several months.[15] The most historically significant incident of the day occurred around dusk, when Johnston was struck in the right shoulder by a bullet, immediately followed by a shell fragment hitting him in the chest. He fell unconscious from his horse with a broken right shoulder blade and two broken ribs and was evacuated to Richmond. G.W. Smith assumed temporary command of the army. Smith, plagued with ill health, was indecisive about the next steps for the battle and made a bad impression on Confederate President Jefferson Davis and General Robert E. Lee, Davis's military adviser. After the end of fighting the following day, Davis replaced Smith with Lee as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia.[16]
General Thomas Francis Meagher at the Battle of Fair Oaks, June 1, 1862.
On June 1, the Confederates renewed their assaults against the Federals, who had brought up more reinforcements and fought from strong positions, but made little headway. Brig. Gen. Israel B. Richardson's division of the II Corps had arrived, along with two brigades from Brig. Gen. Joseph Hooker's division of the III Corps (the third under Brig. Gen Cuvier Grover was left behind to guard the bridges at White Oak Swamp). They engaged Huger's and Longstreet's divisions, whose lines finally broke under the attacks. The fighting ended about 11:30 a.m. when the Confederates withdrew. McClellan arrived on the battlefield from his sick bed at about this time, but the Union Army did not counterattack.[17]
Battle of Seven Pines Total Confederate strength on the field was about 40,000 men in 4 divisions (out of 7 divisions and 52,000 total men under Johnson's command). Two brigades (Blanchard's and Hood's) were held in reserve and did not get into the fighting at all. Union strength was almost 52,000 men for the three army corps engaged (out of five corps and 92,000 total). All infantry brigades present on the field participated in the battle.
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Aftermath
Both sides claimed victory with roughly equal casualties, but neither side's accomplishment was impressive. George B. McClellan's advance on Richmond was halted and the Army of Northern Virginia fell back into the Richmond defensive works. Union casualties were 5,031 (790 killed, 3,594 wounded, 647 captured or missing) and Confederate 6,134 (980 killed, 4,749 wounded, 405 captured or missing).[] The battle was frequently remembered by the Union soldiers as the Battle of Fair Oaks Station because that is where they did their best fighting, whereas the Confederates, for the same reason, called it Seven Pines. Historian Stephen W. Sears remarked that its current common name, Seven Pines, is the most appropriate because it was at the crossroads of Seven Pines that the heaviest fighting and highest casualties occurred.[18] Despite claiming victory, McClellan was shaken by the experience. He wrote to his wife, "I am tired of the sickening sight of the battlefield, with its mangled corpses & poor suffering wounded! Victory has no charms for me when purchased at such cost."[19] He redeployed all of his army except for the V Corps south of the river, and although he continued to plan for a siege and the capture of Richmond, he lost the strategic initiative. An offensive begun by the new Confederate commander, Gen. Robert E. Lee, would be planned while the Union troops passively sat in the outskirts of Richmond. The Seven Days Battles of June 25 through July 1, 1862, drove the Union Army back to the James River and saved the Confederate capital.[20] The change in leadership of the Confederate Army in the field as a result of Seven Pines had a profound effect on the war. On June 24, 1862, McClellan's massive Army of the Potomac was within 6 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) of the Confederate capital of Richmond; Union soldiers wrote that they could hear church bells ringing in the city. Within 90 days, however, Robert E. Lee had driven McClellan from the Peninsula, Pope had been soundly beaten at the Second Battle of Bull Run, and the battle lines were 20 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) from the Union capital in Washington. It would take almost two more years before the Union Army again got that close to Richmond, and almost three years before it finally captured it.
Notes
[1] Miller, p. 25. [2] Salmon, p. 88; Eicher, pp. 27374; Sears, pp. 9597. [3] Salmon, p. 90; Sears, pp. 10406. [4] Eicher, pp. 27677. [5] Eicher, p. 276. [6] Salmon, pp. 2021. [7] Sears, pp. 11820; Miller, p. 21; Salmon, pp. 9192. [8] Sears, p. 120; Miller, pp. 2122; Downs, pp. 67576; Salmon, p. 92. [9] Miller, p. 22; Eicher, p. 276; Sears, pp. 12123. [10] Eicher, p. 277; Salmon, p. 93. [11] Lowe, p. 133. [12] Lowe, pp. 135-137. [13] Sears, pp. 149-150. [14] Miller, p. 23; Eicher, pp. 27778; Salmon, p. 94. [15] Eicher, p. 278; Sears, pp. 136-38, 143; Miller, p. 23; Salmon, p. 94. [16] Sears, pp. 145; Miller, p. 24; Salmon, p. 94. [17] Sears, pp. 14245. [18] Sears, p. 149. [19] Eicher, p. 279. [20] Miller, pp. 2560.
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References
Downs, Alan C. "Fair Oaks/Seven Pines." In Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History, edited by David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000. ISBN 0-393-04758-X. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website (http://www. dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/). Lowe, Thaddeus S. C. My Balloons in Peace and War: Memoirs of Thaddeus S.C. Lowe, Chief of the Aeronautic Corps of the Army of the United States during the Civil War. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2004. ISBN 978-0-7734-6522-0. Miller, William J. The Battles for Richmond, 1862. National Park Service Civil War Series. Fort Washington, PA: U.S. National Park Service and Eastern National, 1996. ISBN 0-915992-93-0. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va014.htm) Virginia War Museum battle description (http://www.peninsulacampaign.org/7pines.shtml) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Sappony Church to Spotsylvania Court House.pdf)
Further reading
Burton, Brian K. The Peninsula & Seven Days: A Battlefield Guide. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. ISBN 978-0-8032-6246-1.
External links
Battle of Seven Pines in Encyclopedia Virginia (http://encyclopediavirginia.org/Seven_Pines_Battle_of) Animated history of the Peninsula Campaign (http://www.historyanimated.com/Peninsulah.html) Prof. Thaddeus Lowe, the Civil War Years (http://www.thaddeuslowe.name/CWyears.htm) The bridge that saved an Army: Grapevine Bridge and the Battle of Fair Oaks (http://www. thisweekinthecivilwar.com/?p=1254/)
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Seven Days Battles As McClellan's army reached the outskirts of Richmond, a minor battle occurred at Hanover Court House (May 27), but it was followed by a surprise attack by Johnston at the Battle of Seven Pines or Fair Oaks on May 31 and June 1. The battle was inconclusive, with heavy casualties, but it had lasting effects on the campaign. Johnston was wounded and replaced on June 1 by the more aggressive Robert E. Lee. Lee spent almost a month extending his defensive lines and organizing his Army of Northern Virginia; McClellan accommodated this by sitting passively to his front, waiting for dry weather and roads, until the start of the Seven Days. Lee, who had developed a reputation for caution early in the war, knew he had no numerical superiority over McClellan, but he planned an offensive campaign that was the first indication of the aggressive nature he would display for the remainder of the war.[2]
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Opposing forces
Further information: Seven Days Confederate order of battle, Seven Days Union order of battle The armies that fought in the Seven Days Battles comprised almost 200,000 men, which offered the potential for the largest battles of the war. However, the inexperience or caution of the generals involved usually prevented the appropriate concentration of forces and mass necessary for decisive tactical victories.
Union
Union corps commanders Confederate commanders
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McClellan's Army of the Potomac, with approximately 104,000 men,[] was organized largely as it had been at Seven Pines.[3]
Seven Days Battles II Corps, Brig. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner commanding: divisions of Brig. Gens. Israel B. Richardson and John Sedgwick. III Corps, Brig. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman commanding: divisions of Brig. Gens. Joseph Hooker and Philip Kearny. IV Corps, Brig. Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes commanding: divisions of Brig. Gens. Darius N. Couch and John J. Peck. V Corps, Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter commanding: divisions of Brig. Gens. George W. Morell, George Sykes, and George A. McCall. VI Corps, Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin commanding: divisions of Brig. Gens. Henry W. Slocum and William F. "Baldy" Smith. Reserve forces included the cavalry reserve under Brig. Gen. Philip St. George Cooke (Jeb Stuart's father-in-law) and the supply base at White House Landing under Brig. Gen. Silas Casey.
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Confederate
Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was larger than the one he inherited from Johnston, and, at about 92,000 men,[] the largest Confederate army assembled during the war.[4] Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, having just arrived from his victories in the Valley Campaign, commanded a force consisting of his own division (now commanded by Brig. Gen. Charles S. Winder) and those of Maj. Gen. Richard S. Ewell, Brig. Gen. William H. C. Whiting, and Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill. Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill's "Light Division" (which was so named because it traveled light and was able to maneuver and strike quickly) consisted of the brigades of Brig. Gens. Charles W. Field, Maxcy Gregg, Joseph R. Anderson, Lawrence O'Bryan Branch, James J. Archer, and William Dorsey Pender. Maj. Gen. James Longstreet's division consisted of the brigades of Brig. Gens. James L. Kemper, Richard H. Anderson, George E. Pickett, Cadmus M. Wilcox, Roger A. Pryor, and Winfield Scott Featherston. Longstreet also had operational command over Hill's Light Division. Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder commanded the divisions of Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws, Brig. Gen. David R. Jones, and Magruder's own division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Howell Cobb. Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger's division consisted of the brigades of Brig. Gens. William Mahone, Ambrose R. Wright, Lewis A. Armistead, and Robert Ransom, Jr. Maj. Gen. Theophilus H. Holmes' division consisted of the brigades of Brig. Gens. Junius Daniel, John G. Walker, Henry A. Wise, and the cavalry brigade of Brig. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart.
Seven Days Battles (Lee hoped that Porter would evacuate his trenches under pressure, obviating the need for a direct frontal assault.) Following this, Longstreet and D.H. Hill would pass through Mechanicsville and join the battle. Huger and Magruder would provide diversions on their fronts to distract McClellan as to Lee's real intentions. Lee hoped that Porter would be overwhelmed from two sides by the mass of 65,000 men, and the two leading Confederate divisions would move on Cold Harbor and cut McClellan's communications with White House Landing.[6] McClellan also planned an offensive. He had received intelligence that Lee was prepared to move and that the arrival of Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's force from the Shenandoah Valley was imminent. (McClellan was aware of Jackson's presence at Ashland Station, but did nothing to reinforce Porter's vulnerable corps north of the river.)[7] He decided to resume the offensive before Lee could. Anticipating Jackson's reinforcements marching from the north, he increased cavalry patrols on likely avenues of approach. He wanted to advance his siege artillery about a mile and a half closer to the city by taking the high ground on Nine Mile Road around Old Tavern. In preparation for that, he planned an attack on Oak Grove, south of Old Tavern and the Richmond and York River Railroad, which would position his men to attack Old Tavern from two directions.[8]
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Seven Days Battles Heintzelman ordered reinforcements sent forward and also notified army commander McClellan, who was attempting to manage the battle by telegraph from 3 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) away. McClellan ordered his men to withdraw back to their entrenchments, mystifying his subordinates on the scene. Arriving at the front at 1 p.m., seeing that the situation was not as bad as he had feared, McClellan ordered his men forward to retake the ground for which they had already fought once that day. The fighting lasted until nightfall.[11] The minor battle was McClellan's only tactical offensive action against Richmond. His attack gained only 600 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) at a cost of over 1,000 casualties on both sides and was not strong enough to derail the offensive planned by Robert E. Lee, which already had been set in motion.[12]
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Jackson and his command arrived late in the afternoon and he ordered his troops to bivouac for the evening while a major battle was raging within earshot. His proximity to Porter's flank caused McClellan to order Porter to withdraw after dark behind Boatswain's Swamp, 5 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) to the east. McClellan was concerned that the Confederate buildup on his right flank threatened his supply line, the Richmond and York River Railroad north of the Chickahominy, and he decided to shift his base of supply to the James River. He also believed that the diversions by Huger and Magruder south of the river meant that he was seriously outnumbered. (He reported to Washington that he faced 200,000 Confederates, but there were actually 85,000.)[16] This was a strategic decision of grave importance because it meant that, without the railroad to supply his army, he would be forced to abandon his siege of Richmond. A.P. Hill, now with Longstreet and D.H. Hill behind him, continued his attack, despite orders from Lee to hold his ground. His assault was beaten back with heavy casualties.[17] Overall, the battle was a Union tactical victory, in which the Confederates suffered heavy casualties and achieved none of their specific objectives due to the seriously flawed execution of Lee's plan. Instead of over 60,000 men crushing the enemy's flank, only five brigades, about 15,000 men, had seen action. Their losses were 1,484 versus Porter's 361. Despite the short-term Union success, however, it was the start of a strategic debacle. McClellan began to withdraw his army to the southeast and never regained the initiative.[18]
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Gaines's Mill
Further information: Battle of Gaines's Mill By the morning of June 27, the Union forces were concentrated into a semicircle with Porter collapsing his line into an east-west salient north of the river and the four corps south of the river remaining in their original positions. McClellan ordered Porter to hold Gaines's Mill at all costs so that the army could change its base of supply to the James River. Several of McClellan's subordinates urged him to attack Magruder's division south of the river, but he feared the vast numbers of Confederates he believed to be before him and refused to capitalize on the overwhelming superiority he actually held on that front.[19] Lee continued his offensive on June 27, launching the largest Confederate attack of the war, about 57,000 men in six divisions.[20] A.P. Hill resumed his attack across Beaver Dam Creek early in the morning, but found the line lightly defended. By early afternoon, he ran into strong opposition by Porter, deployed along Boatswain's Creek and the swampy terrain was a major obstacle against the attack. As Longstreet arrived to the south of A.P. Hill, he saw the difficulty of attacking over such terrain and delayed until Stonewall Jackson could attack on Hill's left.[21] For the second time in the Seven Days, however, Jackson was late. D.H. Hill attacked the Federal right and was held off by the division of Brig. Gen. George Sykes; he backed off to await Jackson's arrival. Longstreet was ordered to conduct a diversionary attack to stabilize the lines until Jackson could arrive and attack from the north. In Longstreet's attack, Brig. Gen. George E. Pickett's brigade attempted a frontal assault and was beaten back under severe fire with heavy losses. Jackson finally reached D.H. Hill's position at 3 p.m. and began his assault at 4:30 p.m.[22] Porter's line was saved by Brig. Gen. Henry W. Slocum's division moving into position to bolster his defense. Shortly after dark, the Confederates mounted another attack, poorly coordinated, but this time collapsing the Federal line. Brig. Gen. John Bell Hood's Texas Brigade opened a gap in the line, as did Pickett's Brigade on its second attempt of the day. By 4 a.m. on June 28, Porter withdrew across the Chickahominy, burning the bridges behind him.[23] For the second day, Magruder was able to continue fooling McClellan south of the river by employing minor diversionary attacks. He was able to occupy 60,000 Federal troops while the heavier action occurred north of the river.[24] Gaines's Mill was the only clear-cut Confederate tactical victory of the Peninsula Campaign.[25] Union casualties from the 34,214 engaged were 6,837 (894 killed, 3,107 wounded, and 2,836 captured or missing). Of the 57,018 Confederates engaged, losses totaled 7,993 (1,483 killed, 6,402 wounded, 108 missing or captured).[26] Since the Confederate assault was conducted against only a small portion of the Union Army (the V Corps, one fifth of the army), the army emerged from the battle in relatively good shape overall. However, although McClellan had already planned to shift his supply base to the James River, his defeat unnerved him and he precipitously decided to abandon his advance on Richmond.[27]
Union withdrawal
The night of June 27, McClellan ordered his entire army to withdraw to a secure base at Harrison's Landing on the James. His actions have puzzled military historians ever since. He was actually in a strong position, having withstood strong Confederate attacks, while having deployed only one of his five corps in battle. Porter had performed well against heavy odds. Furthermore, McClellan was aware that the War Department had created a new Army of Virginia and ordered it to be sent to the Peninsula to reinforce him. But Lee had unnerved him, and he surrendered the initiative. He sent a telegram to the Secretary of War that included the statement: "If I save this Army now I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or any other persons in Washingtonyou have done your best to sacrifice this Army." (The military telegraph department chose to omit this sentence from the copy given to the Secretary.)[28]
Seven Days Battles McClellan ordered Keyes's IV Corps to move west of Glendale and protect the army's withdrawal, and Porter was to move to the high ground at Malvern Hill to develop defensive positions. The supply trains were ordered to move south toward the river. McClellan departed for Harrison's Landing without specifying any exact routes of withdrawal and without designating a second-in-command. For the remainder of the Seven Days, he had no direct command of the battles. Gaines's Mill and the Union retreat across the Chickahominy was a psychological victory for the Confederacy, signaling that Richmond was out of danger.[29] Lee's cavalry reported that Union troops had abandoned their defense of the Richmond and York River Railroad and the White House supply depot on the York River. That information, plus the sighting of large dust clouds south of the Chickahominy River, finally convinced Lee that McClellan was heading for the James. Until this time, Lee anticipated that McClellan would be withdrawing to the east to protect his supply line to the York River and positioned his forces to react to that, unable to act decisively while he awaited evidence of McClellan's intentions.[30]
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Savage's Station
Further information: Battle of Savage's Station On June 29, the bulk of McClellan's army concentrated around Savage's Station on the Richmond and York River Railroad, a Federal supply depot since just before Seven Pines, preparing for a difficult crossing through and around White Oak Swamp. It did so without centralized direction because McClellan had personally moved south of Malvern Hill after Gaines's Mill without leaving directions for corps movements during the retreat nor naming a second in command. Clouds of black smoke filled the air as the Union troops were ordered to burn anything they could not carry. Union morale plummeted, particularly so for those wounded, who realized that they were not being evacuated from Savage's Station with the rest of the Army.[34] Lee devised a complex plan to pursue and destroy McClellan's army. Longstreet's and A.P. Hill's divisions looped back toward Richmond and then southeast to the crossroads at Glendale, Holmes's division headed farther south, to the vicinity of Malvern Hill, and Magruder's division was ordered to move due east to attack the Federal rear guard. Stonewall Jackson, commanding three divisions, was to rebuild a bridge over the Chickahominy and head due south to Savage's Station, where he would link up with Magruder and deliver a strong blow that might cause the Union Army to turn around and fight during its retreat.[35] McClellan's rear guard at Savage's Station consisted five divisions from Sumner's II Corps, Heintzelman's III Corps, and Franklin's VI Corps. McClellan considered his senior corps commander, Sumner, to be incompetent, so he appointed no one to command the rear guard.[36]
Seven Days Battles Initial contact between the armies occurred at 9 a.m. on June 29, a four-regiment fight about 2 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) west of Savage's Station, lasting for about two hours before disengaging.[37] Meanwhile, Jackson was not advancing as Lee had planned. He was taking time to rebuild bridges over the Chickahominy and he received a garbled order from Lee's chief of staff that made him believe he should stay north of the river and guard the crossings. These failures of the Confederate plan were being matched on the Union side, however. Heintzelman decided on his own that his corps was not needed to defend Savage's Station, so he decided to follow the rest of the army without informing his fellow generals.[38] Magruder was faced with the problem of attacking Sumner's 26,600 men with his own 14,000. He hesitated until 5 p.m., when he sent only two and a half brigades forward. Union artillery opened fire and pickets were sent forward to meet the assault.[39] The two brigade front of Kershaw and Semmes began to push the narrow defensive line of one of Sedgwick's brigades. Sumner managed this part of the battle erratically, selecting regiments for combat from multiple brigades almost at random. By the time all of these units reached the front, the two sides were at rough paritytwo brigades each. Although Magruder had been conservative about his attack, Sumner was even more so. Of the 26 regiments he had in his corps, only 10 were engaged at Savage's Station.[40] The fighting turned into a bloody stalemate as darkness fell and strong thunderstorms began to move in. The "Land Merrimack"the first instance of an armored railroad battery to be used in combatbombarded the Union front, with some of its shells reaching as far to the rear as the field hospital. The final action of the evening was as the Vermont Brigade, attempting to hold the flank south of the Williamsburg Road, charged into the woods and were met with murderous fire, suffering more casualties of any brigade on the field that day.[41] There were about 1,500 casualties on both sides, plus 2,500 previously wounded Union soldiers who were left to be captured when their field hospital was evacuated. Stonewall Jackson eventually crossed the river by about 2:30 a.m. on June 30, but it was too late to crush the Union Army, as Lee had hoped. General Lee reprimanded Magruder, but the fault for the lost opportunity must be shared equally with the poor staff work at Lee's own headquarters and a less than aggressive performance by Jackson.[42]
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The Confederate plan was once again marred by poor execution. Huger's men were slowed by felled trees obstructing the Charles City Road, spending hours chopping a new road through the thick woods. Huger failed to take any alternative route, and, fearing a counterattack, failed to participate in the battle. Magruder marched around aimlessly, unable to decide whether he should be aiding Longstreet or Holmes; by 4 p.m., Lee ordered Magruder to join Holmes on the River Road and attack Malvern Hill. Stonewall Jackson moved slowly and spent the entire day north of the creek, making only feeble efforts to cross and attack Franklin's VI Corps in the Battle of White Oak Swamp, attempting to rebuild a destroyed bridge, although adequate fords were
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nearby, and engaging in a pointless artillery duel. Jackson's inaction allowed some units to be detached from Franklin's corps in late afternoon to reinforce the Union troops at Glendale. Holmes's relatively inexperienced troops made no progress against Porter at Turkey Bridge on Malvern Hill, even with the reinforcements from Magruder, and were repulsed by effective artillery fire and by Federal gunboats on the James.[45] At 2 p.m., as they waited for sounds of Huger's expected attack, Lee, Longstreet, and visiting Confederate President Jefferson Davis were conferring on horseback when they came under heavy artillery fire, wounding two men and killing three horses. A.P. Hill, the commander in that sector, ordered the president and senior generals to the rear. Longstreet attempted to silence the six batteries of Federal guns firing in his direction, but long-range artillery fire proved to be inadequate. He ordered Col. Micah Jenkins to charge the batteries, which brought on a general fight around 4 p.m.[46]
Seven Days Battles, July 1, 1862.
Although belated and not initiated as planned, the assaults by the divisions of A.P. Hill and Longstreet, under Longstreet's overall command, turned out to be the only ones to follow Lee's order to attack the main Union concentration. Longstreet's 20,000 men were not reinforced by other Confederate divisions of Huger and Jackson, despite their concentration within a three-mile (5km) radius. They assaulted the disjointed Union line of 40,000 men, arranged in a two-mile (3km) arc north and south of the Glendale intersection, but the brunt of the fighting was centered on the position held by the Pennsylvania Reserves division of the V Corps, 6,000 men under Brig. Gen. George A. McCall, just west of the Nelson Farm. (The farm was owned by R.H. Nelson, but its former owner was named Frayser and many of the locals referred to it as Frayser's, or Frazier's, Farm.)[47] Three Confederate brigades made the assault, but Longstreet ordered them forward in a piecemeal fashion,[48] over several hours. Brig. Gen. James L. Kemper's Virginians charged through the thick woods first and emerged in front of five batteries of McCall's artillery. In their first combat experience, the brigade conducted a disorderly but enthusiastic assault, which carried them through the guns and broke through McCall's main line with Jenkins's support, followed up a few hours later by Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox's Alabamans. The Confederate brigades met stiff resistance in sometimes hand-to-hand combat.[49] On McCall's flanks, the divisions of Brig. Gen. Joseph Hooker (to the south) and Brig. Gens. Philip Kearny and Henry W. Slocum (to the north), held against repeated Confederate attacks. Brig. Gen. John Sedgwick's division, which had units both in reserve and around White Oak Swamp, came up to fill a gap after a brutal counterattack. Heavy fighting continued until about 8:30 p.m. Longstreet committed virtually every brigade in the divisions under his command, while on the Union side they had been fed in individually to plug holes in the line as they occurred.[50] The battle was tactically inconclusive, although Lee failed to achieve his objective of preventing the Federal escape and crippling McClellan's army, if not destroying it. Union casualties were 3,797, Confederate about the same at
Seven Days Battles 3,673, but more than 40% higher in killed and wounded. Although Jackson's wing of the army and Franklin's corps comprised tens of thousands of men, the action at White Oak Swamp included no infantry activity and was limited to primarily an artillery duel with few casualties.[51]
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Malvern Hill
Further information: Battle of Malvern Hill The final battle of the Seven Days was the first in which the Union Army occupied favorable ground. Malvern Hill offered good observation and artillery positions, having been prepared the previous day by Porter's V Corps. McClellan himself was not present on the battlefield, having preceded his army to Harrison's Landing on the James, and Porter was the most senior of the corps commanders. The slopes were cleared of timber, providing great visibility, and the open fields to the north could be swept by deadly fire from the 250 guns[52] placed by Col. Henry J. Hunt, McClellan's chief of artillery. Beyond this space, the terrain was swampy and thickly wooded. Almost the entire Army of the Potomac occupied the hill and the line extended in a vast semicircle from Harrison's Landing on the extreme right to Brig. Gen. George W. Morell's division of Porter's corps on the extreme left, which occupied the geographically advantageous ground on the northwestern slopes of the hill.[53] Rather than flanking the position, Lee attacked it directly, hoping that his artillery would clear the way for a successful infantry assault. His plan was to attack the hill from the north on the Quaker Road, using the divisions of Stonewall Jackson, Richard S. Ewell, D.H. Hill, and Brig. Gen. William H.C. Whiting. Magruder was ordered to follow Jackson and deploy to his right when he reached the battlefield. Huger's division was to follow as well, but Lee reserved the right to position him based on developments. The divisions of Longstreet and A.P. Hill, which had been the most heavily engaged in Glendale the previous day, were held in reserve.[54] Once again, Lee's complex plan was poorly executed. The approaching soldiers were delayed by severely muddy roads and poor maps. Jackson arrived at the swampy creek called Western Run and stopped abruptly. Magruder's guides mistakenly sent him on the Long Bridge Road to the southwest, away from the battlefield. Eventually the battle line was assembled with Huger's division (brigades of Brig. Gens. Ambrose R. Wright and Lewis A. Armistead) on the Confederate right and D.H. Hill's division (brigades of Brig. Gen. John Bell Hood and Col. Evander M. Law) on the Quaker Road to the left. They awaited the Confederate bombardment before attacking.[55] Unfortunately for Lee, Henry Hunt struck first, launching one of the greatest artillery barrages in the war from 1 p.m. to 2:30 p.m. The Union gunners had superior equipment and expertise and disabled most of the Confederate batteries. Despite the setback, Lee sent his infantry forward at 3:30 p.m. and Armistead's brigade made some progress through lines of Union sharpshooters. By 4 p.m., Magruder arrived and he was ordered forward to support Armistead. His attack was piecemeal and poorly organized. Meanwhile, D. H. Hill launched his division forward along the Quaker Road, past Willis Church. Across the entire line of battle, the Confederate troops reached only within 200 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) of the Union Center and were repulsed by nightfall with heavy losses.[56]
It wasn't war; it was murder. Major General D.H. Hill
Lee's army suffered 5,355 casualties (versus 3,214 Union) in this wasted effort, but continued to follow the Union army all the way to Harrison's Landing. On Evelington Heights, part of the property of Edmund Ruffin, the Confederates had an opportunity to dominate the Union camps, making their position on the bank of the James potentially untenable; although the Confederate position would be subjected to Union naval gunfire, the heights were an exceptionally strong defensive position that would have been very difficult for the Union to capture with infantry. Cavalry commander Jeb Stuart reached the heights and began bombardment with a single cannon. This alerted the Federals to the potential danger and they captured the heights before any Confederate infantry could reach the scene.[57]
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Aftermath
Our success has not been as great or complete as we should have desired. ... Under ordinary circumstances the Federal Army should have been destroyed. General Robert E. Lee
[58]
My conscience is clear at least to this extentviz.: that I have honestly done the best I could; I shall leave it to others to decide whether that was the best that could have been done& if they find any who can do better am perfectly willing to step aside & give way. Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, letter to his wife
[58]
The Seven Days Battles ended the Peninsula Campaign. The Army of the Potomac encamped around Berkeley Plantation, birthplace of William Henry Harrison. The Union defensive position was a strong one that Lee did not consider attacking, withdrawing instead to the defenses of Richmond. With its back to the James River, the army was protected by Union gunboats, but suffered heavily from heat, humidity, and disease. In August, they were withdrawn by order of President Lincoln to reinforce the Army of Virginia in the Northern Virginia Campaign and the Second Battle of Bull Run.[59] Both sides suffered heavy casualties. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia suffered about 20,000 casualties (3,494 killed, 15,758 wounded, and 952 captured or missing) out of a total of over 90,000 soldiers during the Seven Days. McClellan reported casualties of about 16,000 (1,734 killed, 8,062 wounded, and 6,053 captured or missing) out of a total of 105,445. Despite their victory, many Confederates were stunned by the losses.[60] The effects of the Seven Days Battles were widespread. After a successful start on the Peninsula that foretold an early end to the war, Northern morale was crushed by McClellan's retreat. Despite heavy casualties and clumsy tactical performances by Lee and his generals, Confederate morale skyrocketed, and Lee was emboldened to continue his aggressive strategy through Second Bull Run and the Maryland Campaign. McClellan's previous position as general-in-chief of all the Union armies, vacant since March, was filled on July 23, 1862, by Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, although McClellan did retain command of the Army of the Potomac. Lee reacted to the performances of his subordinates by a reorganization of his army and by forcing the reassignment of Holmes and Magruder out of Virginia.[61]
Notes
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. xi; Miller, pp. 818; Burton, Peninsula & Seven Days, p. 5; Eicher, pp. 26874. Rafuse, p. 220; Miller, pp. 2025; Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, p. 26; Eicher, pp. 27580. Eicher, p. 282; Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 195, 35963. Eicher, pp. 28182; Sears, Gates of Richmond, 195, 36467. Esposito, text to map 45 (called Stuart's raid "of dubious value"); Time-Life, p. 2530; Rafuse, p. 221; Harsh, pp. 8081; Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, pp. 1823; Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 19597; Eicher, pp. 28283. [6] Eicher, p. 283; Time-Life, p. 31; Rafuse, p. 221. [7] Salmon, pp. 9697. [8] Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 183; Esposito, map 44; Time-Life, p. 31; Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, pp. 4143; Salmon, p. 97. [9] Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, p. 43; Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 184. [10] Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 18587; Time-Life, p. 31; Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, p. 45; Salmon, p. 98. [11] Eicher, p. 283; Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, pp. 4748; Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 18788. [12] Salmon, p. 98; Eicher, p. 283. [13] Burton, Peninsula & Seven Days, p. 63; Eicher, p. 283; Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 194. [14] Esposito, map 45; Harsh, p. 92; Eicher, p. 284; Salmon, pp. 99100. [15] Esposito, map 45. [16] Sears, Young Napoleon, p. 205. [17] Burton, Peninsula & Seven Days, pp. 66, 88; Time-Life, pp. 3436; Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, pp. 62, 8081; Rafuse, pp. 22125; Salmon, pp. 100101; Eicher, pp. 28384. [18] Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 208209; Eicher, pp. 28485; Salmon, p. 101. [19] Kennedy, pp. 9394; Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 183208; Salmon, pp. 99101.
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References
Burton, Brian K. Extraordinary Circumstances: The Seven Days Battles. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-253-33963-4. Burton, Brian K. The Peninsula & Seven Days: A Battlefield Guide. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. ISBN 978-0-8032-6246-1. Editors of Time-Life Books. Lee Takes Command: From Seven Days to Second Bull Run. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1984. ISBN 0-8094-4804-1. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website (http://www. dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/). Harsh, Joseph L. Confederate Tide Rising: Robert E. Lee and the Making of Southern Strategy, 18611862. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1998. ISBN 0-87338-580-2. Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide (http://www.bibliobase.com/history/readerscomp/ civwar/html/cw_000106_entries.htm). 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Miller, William J. The Battles for Richmond, 1862. National Park Service Civil War Series. Fort Washington, PA: U.S. National Park Service and Eastern National, 1996. ISBN 0-915992-93-0. Rafuse, Ethan S. McClellan's War: The Failure of Moderation in the Struggle for the Union. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005. ISBN 0-253-34532-4. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon. New York: Da Capo Press, 1988. ISBN 0-306-80913-3. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6. National Park Service battle descriptions (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/bycampgn.htm#East62)
Further reading
Gallagher, Gary W., ed. The Richmond Campaign of 1862: The Peninsula & the Seven Days. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000. ISBN 0-8078-2552-2. Martin, David G. The Peninsula Campaign MarchJuly 1862. Conshohocken, PA: Combined Books, 1992. ISBN 978-0-938289-09-8. Robertson, James I., Jr. Stonewall Jackson: The Man, The Soldier, The Legend. New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1997. ISBN 0-02-864685-1. Webb, Alexander S. The Peninsula: McClellan's Campaign of 1862 (http://books.google.com/ books?id=qbE8d82-ZVAC). Secaucus, NJ: Castle Books, 2002. ISBN 0-7858-1575-9. First published 1885. Wert, Jeffry D. General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Soldier: A Biography. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993. ISBN 0-671-70921-6. Welcher, Frank J. The Union Army, 18611865 Organization and Operations. Vol. 1, The Eastern Theater. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989. ISBN 0-253-36453-1. Wheeler, Richard. Sword Over Richmond: An Eyewitness History of McClellan's Peninsula Campaign. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1986. ISBN 0-06-015529-9.
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External links
Animated history of the Peninsula Campaign (http://www.historyanimated.com/PeninsulaAnimation.html) [[fr:Bataille de Sept Jours]
Background
Following the stalemate at the Battle of Seven Pines on May 31 and June 1, 1862, McClellan's Army of the Potomac sat passively in their positions around the eastern outskirts of Richmond. The new commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee, used the following three and a half weeks to reorganize his army, extend his defensive lines, and plan offensive operations against McClellan's larger army. McClellan received intelligence that Lee was prepared to move and that the arrival of Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's force from the Shenandoah Valley was imminent.[1] McClellan decided to resume the offensive before Lee could. Anticipating Jackson's reinforcements marching from the north, he increased cavalry patrols on likely avenues of approach. He wanted to advance his siege artillery about a mile and a half closer to the city by taking the high ground on Nine Mile Road around Old Tavern. In preparation for that, he planned an attack on Oak Grove, south of Old Tavern and the Richmond and York River Railroad, which would position his men to attack Old Tavern from two directions. Known locally for a stand of tall oak trees, Oak Grove was the site of Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill's assault at Seven Pines on May 31 and had seen numerous clashes between pickets since that time.[2] The attack was planned to advance to the west, along the axis of the Williamsburg Road, in the direction of Richmond. Between the two armies was a small, dense forest, 1200 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) wide, bisected by the headwaters of White Oak Swamp. Two divisions of the III Corps were selected for the assault, commanded by Brig. Gens. Joseph Hooker and Philip Kearny. Facing them was the division of Confederate Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger.[3]
Battle
At 8:30 a.m., June 25, three Union brigades stepped off in orderly line of battle. From right to left, they were commanded by Brig. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles (the Excelsior Brigade), Brig. Gen. Cuvier Grover, both of Hooker's division, and Brig. Gen. John C. Robinson from Kearny's division. Although Robinson and Grover made good progress on the left and in the center, Sickles's New Yorkers encountered difficulties moving through their abatis, then through the upper portions of the swamp, and finally met stiff Confederate resistance, all of which threw the Federal line out of alignment. Huger took advantage of the confusion by launching a counterattack with the brigade of Brig. Gen. Ambrose R. Wright against Grover's brigade.[4]
Battle of Oak Grove Adding to the confusion, one of Wright's Georgia regiments wore red Zouave uniforms. Many of Grover's men believed that only the Union Army had Zouave units, so were reluctant to fire on their own men. When they finally realized that Union troops would not be approaching from the direction of Richmond, they opened fire. At a crucial moment in the battle, the 25th North Carolina of Brig. Gen. Robert Ransom's brigade, in their first combat engagement, delivered a perfectly synchronized volley of rifle fire against Sickles's brigade, breaking up its delayed attack and sending the 71st New York into a panicked retreat, which Sickles described as "disgraceful confusion."[5] Informed of Sickles's reverse, corps commander Heintzelman ordered reinforcements sent forward and also notified army commander McClellan, who was attempting to manage the battle by telegraph from 3 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) away. McClellan, unaware of most details of the engagement, became alarmed and at 10:30 a.m. ordered his men to withdraw back to their entrenchments, an order that mystified his subordinates on the scene. He telegraphed that he would be arriving at the front in person, which caused a 2.5 hour lull in the action. At 1 p.m., seeing that the situation was not as bad as he had feared, McClellan ordered his men forward to retake the ground for which they had already fought once that day. The fighting lasted until nightfall.[6]
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Aftermath
The minor battle was McClellan's only tactical offensive action against Richmond. His attack gained only 600 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) at a cost of over 1,000 casualties on both sides and was not strong enough to derail the offensive planned by Robert E. Lee, which already had been set in motion. The next day, Lee seized the initiative by attacking at Beaver Dam Creek north of the Chickahominy River, near Mechanicsville, the first major battle of the Seven Days, and the beginning of a strategic retreat by the Union Army.[7]
Notes
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] Salmon, pp. 9697. Sears, p. 183; Salmon, p. 97. Sears, p. 184. Sears, pp. 18586; Salmon, p. 98. Sears, pp. 18687; Salmon, p. 98. Sears, pp. 18788. Salmon, p. 98.
References
Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide. 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va015.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Oak Grove to Opequon.pdf)
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Further reading
Burton, Brian K. Extraordinary Circumstances: The Seven Days Battles. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-253-33963-4. Burton, Brian K. The Peninsula & Seven Days: A Battlefield Guide. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. ISBN 978-0-8032-6246-1.
Battle of Beaver Dam Creek Gens. Benjamin Huger and John B. Magruder) to face the Union main body. This concentrated about 65,000 troops against 30,000, leaving only 25,000 to protect Richmond against the other 60,000 men of the Union army. It was a risky plan that required careful execution, but Lee knew that he could not win in a battle of attrition or siege against the Union army. The Confederate cavalry under Brig. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart had reconnoitered Porter's right flank (as part of a daring, although militarily pointless, circumnavigation of the entire Union army from June 12 to June 15) and found it vulnerable. McClellan was aware of Jackson's arrival and presence at Ashland Station, but did nothing to reinforce Porter's vulnerable corps north of the river.[3] Lee's plan called for Jackson to begin the attack on Porter's north flank early on June 26. Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill's Light Division was to advance from Meadow Bridge when he heard Jackson's guns, clear the Union pickets from Mechanicsville, and then move to Beaver Dam Creek. The divisions of Maj. Gens. D.H. Hill and James Longstreet were to pass through Mechanicsville, D.H. Hill to support Jackson and Longstreet to support A.P. Hill. Lee expected Jackson's flanking movement to force Porter to abandon his line behind the creek, and so A. P. Hill and Longstreet would not have to attack Union entrenchments. South of the Chickahominy, Magruder and Huger were to demonstrate, deceiving the four Union corps on their front.[4]
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Battle
Lee's intricate plan went awry immediately. Jackson's men, fatigued from their recent campaign and lengthy march, ran at least four hours behind schedule. By 3 p.m., A.P. Hill grew impatient and began his attack without orders: a frontal assault with 11,000 men. Brig. Gen. George A. McCall's Union division was forced back. Porter reinforced McCall with the brigades of Brig. Gens. John H. Martindale and Charles Griffin, and extended and strengthened his right flank. He fell back and concentrated along Beaver Dam Creek and Ellerson's Mill. There, 14,000 well entrenched infantry, supported by 32 guns in six batteries, repulsed repeated Confederate attacks with substantial casualties.[5] Jackson and his command arrived late in the afternoon. However, unable to find A.P. Hill or D.H. Hill, Jackson did nothing. Although a major battle was raging within earshot, he ordered his troops to bivouac for the evening. A.P. Hill, now with Longstreet and D.H. Hill behind him, continued his attack, despite orders from Lee to hold his ground. His assault was beaten back with more casualties.[6] Jackson did not attack, but his presence near Porter's flank caused McClellan to order Porter to withdraw after dark behind Boatswain's Swamp, five miles (8 km) to the east. McClellan was concerned that the Confederate buildup on his right flank threatened his supply line, the Richmond and York River Railroad north of the Chickahominy, and he decided to shift his base of supply to the James River. (He also believed that the demonstrations by Huger and Magruder showed that he was seriously outnumbered.) This was a strategic decision of grave import because it meant that, without the railroad to supply his army, he had to abandon his siege of Richmond.[7]
Aftermath
Overall, the battle was a Union tactical victory, in which the Confederates suffered heavy casualties and achieved none of their specific objectives due to the seriously flawed execution of Lee's plan. Instead of over 60,000 men crushing the enemy's flank, only five brigades, about 15,000 men, had seen action. Their losses were 1,484 versus Porter's 361. Lee's staff recalled that he was "deeply, bitterly disappointed"[8] by Jackson's performance, but communication breakdowns, poorly written orders from Lee, and bad judgment by most of Lee's other subordinates were also to blame.[9] Despite the Union tactical success, however, it was the start of a strategic debacle and the unraveling of the Peninsula Campaign. McClellan began to withdraw his army to the southeast and never regained the initiative. The next day the Seven Days Battles continued as Lee attacked Porter at the Battle of Gaines' Mill.[10]
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Notes
[1] The Battle of Oak Grove is considered the start of the Seven Days, but it was a very minor battle in comparison to those that followed. [2] Salmon, p. 96; Eicher, pp. 281-82. [3] Sears, pp. 195-97; Eicher, pp. 282-83. [4] Eicher, p. 283; Sears, p. 194. [5] Eicher, p. 284; Salmon, pp. 99-100. [6] Salmon, p. 101. [7] Salmon, pp. 100-01; Eicher, pp. 283-84. [8] Sears, p. 208. [9] Sears, pp. 208-09; Eicher, pp. 284-85. [10] Sears, p. 209; Salmon, p. 101.
References
Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website (http://www. dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/). Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide (http://www.bibliobase.com/history/readerscomp/ civwar/html/cw_000106_entries.htm). 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va016.htm)
Further reading
Burton, Brian K. Extraordinary Circumstances: The Seven Days Battles. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-253-33963-4. Burton, Brian K. The Peninsula & Seven Days: A Battlefield Guide. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. ISBN 978-0-8032-6246-1.
External links
The Battle of Beaver Dam Creek (http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/beaver-dam-creek.html): Battle maps, history articles, photos, and preservation news (CWPT) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Balls Bluff to Big Bethel.pdf)
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Background
Further information: Seven Days Battles McClellan's Army of the Potomac had pushed to within a few miles of the Confederate capital of Richmond and had stalled following the Battle of Seven Pines in late May 1862. Lee wanted to take the initiative, believing that remaining on the strategic defensive would play into Union hands and allow the Confederacy to be worn down. He planned to shift his 90,000-man Confederate army to the north of Richmond, and attack McClellan's right flank. The Confederate cavalry under the command of Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart had ridden around McClellan's army, confirming that the flank was opennot anchored on Totopotomoy Creekand vulnerable. Lee planned to use Maj. Gen. Stonewall Jackson's force, transported by rail from the Shenandoah Valley, to attack on McClellan's right and rear, while the remainder of his army under Maj. Gens. A.P. Hill, James Longstreet, and D.H. Hill attacked from the direction of Mechanicsville.[1] The Seven Days Battles began with a Union attack in the minor Battle of Oak Grove on June 25, but the first major battle started the next day when Lee launched a large-scale assault against McClellan at the Battle of Beaver Dam Creek (or Mechanicsville). Lee attacked Porter's V Corps north of the Chickahominy, while the bulk of the Union Army was relatively unoccupied south of the river. Although this battle was a tactical victory for the Union, McClellan realized that he could not keep Porter's corps in place with Jackson threatening his flank. He ordered Porter to begin a withdrawal and at the same time decided to change the army's base of supply from White House on the Pamunkey River to Harrison's Landing on the James River. (This decision was fatal to McClellan's campaign because by abandoning the railroad that led from the Pamunkey, he would no longer be able to supply his planned siege of Richmond with the necessary heavy artillery.)[2] Several of McClellan's subordinates urged him to attack the Confederate division of Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder south of the Chickahominy, but he feared the vast numbers of Confederates he believed to be before him and failed to capitalize on the overwhelming superiority he actually held on that front. Magruder assisted in this misapprehension by ordering frequent, noisy movements of small units back and forth and by using groups of slaves with drums to simulate large marching columns. Furthermore, the Union Army Balloon Corps, which had performed
Battle of Gaines's Mill the only aerial observation during the Peninsula Campaign, was now joined by a Confederate competitor. Capt. Langdon Cheves of South Carolina had constructed a multicolored balloon of dress silk obtained from Charleston and Savannah, which sailed aloft tethered to a boxcar on the York River Railroad, manned by Maj. Edward Porter Alexander. The appearance of this balloon reinforced McClellan's fear that the Confederates were planning for an offensive against his left flank. For the second day, the Confederates were able to continue fooling McClellan south of the river by employing minor diversionary attacks to command the attention of 60,000 Federal troops while the heavier action occurred north of the river.[3] The order to Porter's corps came just before dawn and they did not have adequate time to prepare a strong rear guard for the withdrawal, resulting in numerous men from Brig. Gen. George A. McCall's division being captured by the advancing Confederates. Porter selected a new defensive line on a plateau behind Boatswain's Swamp, just to the southeast of a mill owned by Dr. William F. Gaines. It was a strong position, with two divisions laid out in a semicircleBrig. Gen. George W. Morell on the left and Brig. Gen. George Sykes on the rightand two divisions in reserveBrig. Gen. George A. McCall and Brig. Gen. Henry W. Slocum, the latter on loan to Porter from Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin's VI Corps. Slocum's division had not crossed the river by the start of the battle, held up by McClellan's concern about an impending attack on Franklin's front.[4]
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The ruins of Gaines's Mill, burned by a Union cavalry raid in 1864, led by Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan.
Lee's offensive plan for June 27 was similar to that of the preceding day. He would use A.P. Hill's and Longstreet's divisions to pressure Porter's corps as it withdrew, while Stonewall Jackson, augmented by D.H. Hill (Jackson's brother-in-law), hit Porter's right and rear. The combined effort of all of Lee's force was destined to be the largest Confederate attack of the war, about 57,000 men in six divisions. Lee traveled to Walnut Grove Church to meet with Jackson and describe the plan, which called for Jackson to march toward Old Cold Harbor, and then south beyond Porter's flank. Unfortunately, Lee made Seven Days Battles, June 2627, 1862. ConfederateUnion incorrect assumptions about Porter's disposition. He assumed that the V Corps would defend the line of Powhite Creek, somewhat to the west of Porter's actual location.[5]
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Battle
The first actions of the battle occurred between noon and 1 p.m. on June 27 after D.H. Hill's division reached Old Cold Harbor, where it was scheduled to link up with Stonewall Jackson's command. Hill pushed through the crossroads with two brigades, which encountered unexpected infantry fire. Seeking to suppress the fire, he brought forward the Jeff Davis Battery from Alabama, but it was soon outgunned by two six-gun batteries manned by U.S. regulars from Brig. Gen. George Sykes's division. Hill was surprised at the level of resistance and also that he seemed to be meeting the front of the Union force, not the expected flank, so he determined to wait for Jackson's arrival before moving further. The noise from this engagement failed to reach General Lee at his headquarters, the house owned by William Hogan, named "Selwyn".[6]
A.P. Hill's division had moved across Beaver Dam Creek early in the morning, finding the former Union line lightly defended. As they proceeded eastward and approached Gaines's Mill at about the time that D.H. Hill's men were engaged, Porter formally asked McClellan to send Slocum's division across the Chickahominy over Alexander's Bridge to support him. Hill's lead brigade, under Brig. Gen. Ewell's attack Maxcy Gregg, was held up by skirmishers from Col. Hiram Berdan's 1st U.S. Sharpshooters and the 9th Massachusetts Infantry. By early afternoon, he ran into strong opposition by Porter, deployed along Boatswain's Creek and the swampy terrain was a major obstacle against the
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advance. Attacks by the brigades of Brig. Gens. Gregg, Dorsey Pender, Joseph R. Anderson, and Lawrence O'Bryan Branch made little headway. A particularly bloody engagement occurred as the 1st South Carolina Rifles attacked a Massachusetts battery, but were repulsed by Zouaves of the 5th New York, which inflicted 57% casualties (76 killed, 221 wounded, and 58 missing) on the South Carolinians, the greatest Confederate regimental losses of the day.[7] Instead of pursuing a fleeing enemy, as his orders had directed, A.P. Hill had General Confederate attack attacked an entrenched Union position, losing about 2,000 of his 13,200 men in the failed attempt. Combined with his attacks at Mechanicsville the previous day, the Light Division had lost over a quarter of its men. General McClellan was encouraged by the telegrams Porter sent back to his headquarters a few miles to the rear. He replied, "If the enemy are retiring and you are a chasseur, pitch in." He also told Franklin to cross the river over the Duane bridge and attack the enemy's flank if he saw a chance, but he was dismayed to hear that the VI Corps commander had destroyed the bridge for fear of a possible enemy attack. At the same time, Brig. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner of the II Corps reported enemy activity in his front. McClellan's optimism was dashed and he ordered that his headquarters equipment be packed up in preparation for the retreat. On the Confederate side, General Lee had been an active participant in the failed assault, rallying his troops too close to the front for their comfort. As Longstreet arrived to the southwest of A.P. Hill, he saw the difficulty of attacking over such terrain and delayed until Stonewall Jackson could attack on Hill's left.[8] For the second time in the Seven Days, however, Jackson was late. A guide from the 4th Virginia Cavalry, Pvt. John Henry Timberlake, had misunderstood Jackson's intent and led him down the wrong road. After they counter-marched, losing about an hour, Jackson's troops found the road to Old Cold Harbor obstructed by trees felled by the retreating Union army and were harassed by sharpshooters, delaying their arrival. The first of Jackson's command to reach the battlefield was the division of Maj. Gen. Richard S. Ewell, who was met by Lee's aide, Walter Taylor, and instructed to move into action immediately. Lee was concerned that Porter would counterattack the weakened troops of A.P. Hill, so he ordered Longstreet to conduct a diversionary attack to stabilize the lines until Jackson's full command could arrive and attack from the north. In Longstreet's attack, Brig. Gen. George E. Pickett's brigade attempted a frontal assault and was beaten back under severe fire with heavy losses. Pickett himself was wounded in the shoulder. Confederate President Jefferson Davis was among the party witnessing Pickett's failed attempt.[9] Ewell began his attack immediately, around 3:30 p.m., without waiting for his entire division to come on line. General Lee's instructions were to advance along the same axis used by the brigades of Gregg and Branch, to maintain the momentum of the attack. He sent in his lead brigade, Louisianans under Col. Isaac Seymour, commanding in Maj. Gen. Richard Taylor's absence for medical reasons. Seymour was relatively inexperienced and his troops became confused in the woods and bogs of Boatswain's Swamp. Their confusion increased when Col. Seymour was killed by a Union rifle volley. Maj. Roberdeau Wheat, the colorful leader of the Louisiana Tigers Battalion, moved to the front to lead the brigade, but he was also killed with a bullet through his head. The Louisiana
Battle of Gaines's Mill Brigade withdrew from the battle. Ewell's attack continued with two regiments from the brigade of Brig. Gen. Isaac R. Trimble, but they could not advance beyond the swamp, falling with about 20% casualties. Porter was starting to receive reinforcements from Slocum's division and he brought forward troops to feed into gaps in his line. However, despite telegrams from Porter for more assistance, General McClellan gave no thought to the advantages of a counterattack. He asked his corps commanders south of the river whether they had any troops they could spare. When no one volunteered, he directed Sumner of the II Corps to send two brigadesabout one tenth of the armyacross the river, but because of the distances involved they would not reach the scene for another three hours.[10] When Stonewall Jackson finally reached Old Cold Harbor, weary from the marching and counter-marching, he began to arrange his troops and those of D.H. Hill to trap the Federals he expected to be driven east by Longstreet and A.P. Hill. He soon received instructions from General Lee that informed him of the current situation and he began to prepare his command to assault the main Federal line. Faulty staff work prevented his men from moving forward for over an hour. While Jackson rode back and forth distractedly, his chaplain, Maj. Robert L. Dabney, took the initiative to find the divisions of Brig. Gens. William H. C. Whiting and Charles S. Winder and corrected the garbled instructions they had received. Generals Lee and Jackson met on the Telegraph Road to coordinate a final assault across the entire Federal line.[11] Lee's assault at 7 p.m. was conducted by 16 brigades, about 32,100 men. Porter had about 34,000 men to defend the line, but many of these were worn out from the previous attacks and command cohesion was hampered by feeding isolated reinforcements into the line to fill gaps. Nevertheless, they had the advantages of good defensible terrain and superiority in artillery. The Confederates were not able to advance "Battle of Gaines Mill, Valley of the simultaneously in a neat battle line over the 2.25-mile front, but rushed Chickahominy, Virginia, June 27, 1862." Records forward and were repulsed intermittently in smaller unit actions. On of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, 1860 1985. the Confederate left, the assault by D.H. Hill's division met heavy resistance from the regulars of Sykes's division around the McGehee house. In the center, the Georgians of Brig. Gen. Alexander R. Lawton's brigade were in their first battle. They pushed forward with the assistance of the Stonewall Brigade of Winder's division, along with Elzey's and Trimble's of Ewell's division. The Confederate right was opposed by the most difficult terrain, a quarter-mile open wheatfield that sloped down to Boatswain's Swamp and then faced two lines of Union defenders on higher ground. James Longstreet wrote in his report, "I was, in fact, in the position from which the enemy wished us to attack him."[12] As the sun was starting to go down, William Whiting's division achieved the breakthrough on Longstreet's front. Brig. Gen. John Bell Hood's Texas Brigade move forward swiftly and aggressively and broke a hole in the line. Pickett's brigade also succeeded in its second assault of the day. Confederate breakthroughs on their center and right could not be countered and the Union line crumbled. Sykes's regulars conducted an orderly withdrawal from the McGehee house to Grapevine Bridge. The Union brigades of Brig. Gens. Thomas F. Meagher and William H. French arrived from the II Corps, too late to help other than as a rear guard for Porter's retreat. A battalion of the 5th U.S. Cavalry under Captain Charles J. Whiting made a desperate charge against the Texas Brigade, but was forced to surrender after heavy losses. By 4 a.m. on June 28, Porter withdrew across the Chickahominy, burning the bridges behind him.[13]
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Aftermath
Gaines's Mill was an intense battle, the largest of the Seven Days and the only clear-cut Confederate tactical victory of the Peninsula Campaign.[] Union casualties from the 34,214 engaged were 6,837 (894 killed, 3,107 wounded, and 2,836 captured or missing). Of the 57,018 Confederates engaged, losses totaled 7,993 (1,483 killed, 6,402 wounded, 108 missing or captured).[] Since the Confederate assault was conducted against only a small portion of the Union Army (the V Corps, one fifth of the army), the army emerged from the battle in relatively good shape overall. Lee's victory, his first of the war, could have been more complete if it were not for the mishaps of Stonewall Jackson. Historian Stephen W. Sears speculates that it were not for Jackson's misdirected march and his poor staff work, the major assault that Lee unleashed at 7 p.m. could have occurred three or four hours earlier. This would have put Porter in grave jeopardy, without any last-minute reinforcements and the cover of darkness. He quotes Edward Porter Alexander, prominent Confederate artillery officer and postwar historian: "Had Jackson attacked when he first arrived, or during A.P. Hill's attack, we would have had an easy victorycomparatively, & would have captured most of Porter's command."[14] Although McClellan had already planned to shift his supply base to the James River, his defeat unnerved him and he precipitously decided to abandon his advance on Richmond and begin the retreat of his entire army to the James. Gaines's Mill and the Union retreat across the Chickahominy was a psychological victory for the Confederacy, signaling that Richmond was out of danger.[15]
Notes
[1] Salmon, pp. 64, 9697. [2] Kennedy, pp. 9394; Burton, pp. 7981; Sears, pp. 183208; Salmon, pp. 99101. [3] Eicher, p. 287; Sears, pp. 21516. Sears notes that stories about the silk coming from donated ladies' dresses is apocryphal. [4] Salmon, pp. 102103; Sears, pp. 21415. [5] Time-Life, p. 45; Sears, pp. 21719. [6] Sears, pp. 21921; Burton, p. 103. Salmon, p. 102, states that the artillery engagement occurred at 2 p.m. Welcher, p. 819, states 11 a.m. [7] Burton, pp. 9199; Sears, pp. 22326; Kennedy, p. 96; Eicher, p. 285; Salmon, pp. 103104. [8] Burton, pp. 94, 99101; Sears, pp. 227. [9] Burton, pp. 102104; Sears, pp. 22728, 23233; Welcher, p. 820. [10] Sears, pp, 22834; Eicher, p. 285; Burton, pp. 102104, 113, 129; Kennedy, p. 96; Salmon, pp. 104106. [11] Sears, pp, 23435; Burton, pp. 11011; Salmon, p. 106. [12] Sears, pp, 23640; Burton, pp. 11727. [13] Burton, pp. 12736; Kennedy, pp. 9697; Sears, pp. 24042; Salmon, p. 106; Welcher, p. 820. [14] Sears, pp. 24950. [15] Sears, pp. 25051.
References
Burton, Brian K. Extraordinary Circumstances: The Seven Days Battles. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-253-33963-4. Editors of Time-Life Books. Lee Takes Command: From Seven Days to Second Bull Run. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1984. ISBN 0-8094-4804-1. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide. 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6.
Battle of Gaines's Mill Welcher, Frank J. The Union Army, 18611865 Organization and Operations. Vol. 1, The Eastern Theater. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989. ISBN 0-253-36453-1. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va017.htm)
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Further reading
Burton, Brian K. The Peninsula & Seven Days: A Battlefield Guide. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. ISBN 978-0-8032-6246-1. Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website (http://www. dean.usma.edu/history/Atlases/american_civil_war/Civil_war.html). Harsh, Joseph L. Confederate Tide Rising: Robert E. Lee and the Making of Southern Strategy, 18611862. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1998. ISBN 0-87338-580-2. Miller, William J. The Battles for Richmond, 1862. National Park Service Civil War Series. Fort Washington, PA: U.S. National Park Service and Eastern National, 1996. ISBN 0-915992-93-0. Rafuse, Ethan S. McClellan's War: The Failure of Moderation in the Struggle for the Union. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005. ISBN 0-253-34532-4. Robertson, James I., Jr. Stonewall Jackson: The Man, The Soldier, The Legend. New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1997. ISBN 0-02-864685-1. Spruill, Matt III, and Matt Spruill IV. Echoes of Thunder: A Guide to the Seven Days Battles. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2006. ISBN 1-57233-547-5.
External links
Battle of Gaines's Mill in Encyclopedia Virginia (http://encyclopediavirginia.org/Gaines_s_Mill_Battle_of) The Battle of Gaines' Mill (http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/gaines-mill.html): Battle maps, history articles, photos, and preservation news (Civil War Trust) Animated history of the Peninsula Campaign (http://www.historyanimated.com/PeninsulaAnimation.html)
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Background
The Seven Days Battles began with a Union attack in the minor Battle of Oak Grove on June 25, 1862, but Union Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan and his Army of the Potomac quickly lost the initiative as Confederate General Robert E. Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia began a series of attacks at Beaver Dam Creek on June 26 and Gaines's Mill on June 27. The Army of the Potomac began its retreat toward the James River.[1] Lee's cavalry reported that Union troops had abandoned their defense of the Richmond and York River Railroad and the White House supply depot on the York River. That information, plus the sighting of large dust clouds south of the Chickahominy River, convinced Lee that McClellan was heading for the James.[2]
Battle
While Lee's main attack at Gaines' Mill was progressing on June 27, the Confederates south of the Chickahominy performed a reconnaissance in force to determine the location of McClellan's retreating army. Brig. Gen. John B. Magruder, who up to this time had engaged the Union forces on the Peninsula primarily with theatrical diversions, ordered Brig. Gen. Robert A. Toombs's brigade forward to "feel the enemy." Toombs, a Georgia politician with a disdain for professional officers, instead launched a sharp attack at dusk against Brig. Gen. William F. "Baldy" Smith's VI Corps division near Old Tavern at the farm of James M. Garnett. The attack was easily repulsed by the brigade of Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, inflicting 271 casualties among the Georgians.[3] On June 28, Toombs again was ordered to conduct a reconnaissance, but turned it into an attack over the same ground, meeting the enemy at the farm of Simon Gouldin (also known as Golding). Toombs took it upon himself to order his fellow brigade commander, Brig. Gen. George T. Anderson, to join the assault. Two of Anderson's regiments, the 7th and 8th Georgia, preceded Toombs's brigade into the assault and were subjected to a vigorous Federal counterattack by the 49th Pennsylvania and 43rd New York, losing 156 men.[4]
Aftermath
Union casualties were 189, Confederate 438.[] These were the only attacks south of the Chickahominy River in conjunction with Gaines's Mill, but they helped to convince McClellan that he was being subjected to attacks from all directions, increasing his anxiety and his determination to get his army to safety at the James.[5] Lee's pursuit of the main bulk of McClellan's army continued on June 29 at the Battle of Savage's Station.
Notes
[1] Salmon, p. 64. [2] Salmon, p. 107. [3] Sears, pp. 247, 258; Salmon, p. 108. [4] Sears, pp. 25859; Salmon, p. 108. [5] Salmon, p. 108.
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References
Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide. 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6.
External links
National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va018.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Gaines Mill to Guard Hill.pdf)
Background
The Seven Days Battles began with a Union attack in the minor Battle of Oak Grove on June 25, 1862, but Union Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan and his Army of the Potomac quickly lost the initiative as Confederate General Robert E. Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia began a series of attacks at Beaver Dam Creek on June 26, Gaines' Mill on June 27, and the minor actions at Garnett's and Golding's Farm on June 27 and June 28. The Army of the Potomac continued its retreat toward the James River.[1] The bulk of McClellan's army concentrated around Savage's Station on the Richmond and York River Railroad, preparing for a difficult crossing through and around White Oak Swamp. It did so without centralized direction because McClellan had personally moved south of Malvern Hill after Gaines' Mill without leaving directions for corps movements during the retreat nor naming a second in command. Clouds of black smoke filled the air as the Union troops were ordered to burn anything they could not carry. Union morale plummeted, particularly so for those wounded, who realized that they were not being evacuated from Savage's Station with the rest of the Army.[2] Lee devised a complex plan to pursue and destroy McClellan's army. While the divisions of Maj. Gens. James Longstreet and A.P. Hill looped back toward Richmond and then southeast to the crossroads at Glendale, and Maj. Gen. Theophilus H. Holmes's division headed farther south, to the vicinity of Malvern Hill, Brig. Gen. John B. Magruder's division was ordered to move due east along the Williamsburg Road and the York River Railroad to attack the Federal rear guard. Stonewall Jackson, commanding his own division, as well as the divisions of Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill and Brig. Gen. William H. C. Whiting, was to rebuild a bridge over the Chickahominy and head due south to Savage's Station, where he would link up with Magruder and deliver a strong blow that might cause the Union Army to turn around and fight during its retreat.[3]
Battle of Savage's Station McClellan's rear guard at Savage's Station consisted of the II Corps, commanded by Brig. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner (two divisions), the III Corps, under Brig. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman (two divisions), and the VI Corps, under Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin (one division). McClellan considered his senior corps commander, Sumner, to be incompetent, so he appointed no one to command the rear guard.[4]
248
Battle
Initial contact between the armies occurred at 9 a.m. on June 29. On the farm and orchards owned by a Mr. Allen, about 2 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) west of Savage's Station, two Georgia regiments from the brigade of Brig. Gen. George T. Anderson fought against two Pennsylvania regiments from Sumner's corps for about two hours before disengaging, suffering 28 casualties to the Pennsylvanians' 119. The highest ranking casualty was Confederate Brig. Gen. Richard Griffith, who was mortally wounded by a Union shell fragment.[5] Magruder, who was alleged to be under the influence of morphine to combat a bout of indigestion, was confused and became concerned that he might be attacked by a superior force. He requested reinforcements from Lee, who ordered two brigades from the division of Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger to assist, under the condition that they would have to be returned if they were not engaged by 2 p.m.[6] Meanwhile, Jackson was not advancing as Lee had planned. He was taking time to rebuild bridges over the Chickahominy and he received a garbled order from Lee's chief of staff that made him believe he should stay north of the river and guard the crossings. These failures of the Confederate plan were being matched on the Union side, however. Heintzelman decided on his own that his corps was not needed to defend Savage's Station, Sumner's and Franklin's being sufficient, so he decided to follow the rest of the army without informing his fellow generals.[7] Magruder was forced to give up the two brigades from Huger's division at 2 p.m. and was faced with the problem of attacking Sumner's 26,600 men with his own 14,000. He hesitated until 5 p.m., when he sent only two and a half brigades forward. Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw commanded the left flank, Brig. Gen. Paul J. Semmes the center, and Col. William Barksdale (Griffith's Brigade) the right. Franklin and Brig. Gen. John Sedgwick were on a reconnaissance to the west of Savage's Station when they saw Kershaw's brigade approaching. Their immediate assumption was that these were men from Heintzelman's corps, but they soon realized their mistake. This was the first indication of Heintzelman's unannounced departure and Sumner, for one, was particularly outraged, refusing to speak to Heintzelman the following day. Union artillery opened fire and pickets were sent forward to meet the assault.[8] Magruder's attack was accompanied by the first armored railroad battery to be used in combat. Earlier in June, General Lee had hoped to counter the approach of McClellan's siege artillery by rail by using his own weapon: a 32-pounder Brooke naval rifle, shielded by a sloping casemate of railroad iron, nicknamed the "Land Merrimack." It was pushed by a locomotive at about the speed of the marching infantry.[9] However, even with this impressive weapon, which outgunned anything the Federal artillerists possessed, the results of Magruder's decision to send only part of his smaller force against a much larger enemy were predictable.[10] The first Union unit to engage was one of Sedgwick's brigades, Philadelphians led by Brig. Gen. William W. Burns, but his defensive line proved inadequate to cover the two brigade front of Kershaw and Semmes. Sumner managed this part of the battle erratically, selecting regiments for combat almost at random. He sent in two of Burns's regiments, and then the 1st Minnesota Infantry from another brigade in Sedgwick's division, and finally one regiment each from two different brigades in Brig. Gen. Israel B. Richardson's division. By the time all of these units reached the front, the two sides were at rough paritytwo brigades each. Although Magruder had been conservative about his attack, Sumner was even more so. Of the 26 regiments he had in his corps, only 10 were engaged at Savage's Station.[11] The fighting turned into a bloody stalemate as darkness fell and strong thunderstorms began to move in. The Land Merrimack bombarded the Union front, with some of its shells reaching as far to the rear as the field hospital. The final actions of the evening were by the Vermont Brigade, commanded by Colonel William T. H. Brooks, of Brig.
Battle of Savage's Station Gen. William F. "Baldy" Smith's division. Attempting to hold the flank south of the Williamsburg Road, the Vermonters charged into the woods and were met with murderous fire, suffering more casualties of any brigade on the field that day. The brigade as a whole took 439 casualties; the 5th Vermont regiment, commanded by Lt. Col. Lewis A. Grant, lost nearly half of its men, 209 of 428.[12]
249
Aftermath
The battle was a stalemate at the cost of about 1,500 casualties on both sides, plus 2,500 previously wounded Union soldiers who were left to be captured when their field hospital was evacuated. Stonewall Jackson eventually crossed the river by about 2:30 a.m. on June 30, but it was too late to crush the Union Army, as Lee had hoped. Most of the Army of the Potomac crossed White Oak Swamp Creek unmolested by noon on June 30. General Lee reprimanded Magruder in a dispatch: "I regret much that you have made so little progress today in the pursuit of the enemy. In order to reap the fruits of our victory that pursuit should be most vigorous. ... We must lose no more time or he will escape us entirely." However, the fault for the lost opportunity must be shared equally with the poor staff work at Lee's own headquarters and a less than aggressive performance by Jackson. The Seven Days continued with the much larger Battle of Glendale and the Battle of White Oak Swamp on June 30.[13]
Notes
[1] Salmon, p. 64. [2] Eicher, p. 290; Salmon, p. 111. [3] Sears, p. 261; Salmon, p. 110; Eicher, p. 290. [4] Eicher, p. 290; Sears, p. 261; Salmon, p. 111. [5] Sears, pp. 265-66. [6] Salmon, p. 111. [7] Eicher, p. 291; Sears, p. 267; Salmon, pp. 111-12. [8] Salmon, p. 112; Sears, p. 270. [9] Sears, pp. 269-70. [10] Eicher, p. 291. [11] Sears, p. 271; Salmon, p. 112. [12] Sears, pp. 271-72; Eicher, p. 291. [13] Sears, p. 274; Salmon, p. 112; Eicher, p. 291.
References
Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide (http://www.bibliobase.com/history/readerscomp/ civwar/html/cw_000106_entries.htm). 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va019.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Sappony Church to Spotsylvania Court House.pdf)
250
Further reading
Burton, Brian K. Extraordinary Circumstances: The Seven Days Battles. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-253-33963-4. Burton, Brian K. The Peninsula & Seven Days: A Battlefield Guide. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. ISBN 978-0-8032-6246-1.
External links
Battle of Savage's Station in Encyclopedia Virginia (http://encyclopediavirginia.org/ Savage_s_Station_Battle_of)
Background
The Seven Days Battles began with a Union attack in the minor Battle of Oak Grove on June 25, 1862, but McClellan quickly lost the initiative as Lee began a series of attacks at Beaver Dam Creek on June 26, Gaines's Mill on June 27, the minor actions at Garnett's and Golding's Farm on June 27 and June 28, and the attack on the Union rear guard at Savage's Station on June 29. McClellan's Army of the Potomac continued its retreat toward the safety of Harrison's Landing on the James River.[1] Most elements of McClellan's army had been able to cross White Oak Swamp Creek by noon on June 30. About one third of the army had reached the James River, but the remainder was still marching between White Oak Swamp and Glendale.[2] Lee ordered his Army of Northern Virginia to converge on the retreating Union forces, bottlenecked on the inadequate road network. Stonewall Jackson was ordered to press the Union rear guard at the White Oak Swamp crossing while the largest part of Lee's army, some 45,000 men, would attack the Army of the Potomac in mid-retreat at Glendale, about 2 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) southwest, splitting it in two.[3] Stonewall Jackson had acquired fame for his brilliant campaign in the Shenandoah Valley, but had performed poorly so far under Lee's command in the Seven Days.[4] Perhaps too fatigued from his campaign and travel from the Valley, he arrived late at Mechanicsville (Beaver Dam Creek) and inexplicably ordered his men to bivouac for the night within clear earshot of the battle. He was late and disoriented at Gaines's Mill. He was late again at Savage's Station.[5] The upcoming action in support of Lee's assault at Glendale would offer him another opportunity. Jackson and Lee met privately on the morning of June 30 at Savage's Station and Lee's exact orders were not recorded, but they apparently were for Jackson to march to White Oak Swamp and engage the Union forces there to prevent them from reinforcing the remainder of the rear guard at Glendale.[6]
Battle of White Oak Swamp The last Union unit to travel south through White Oak Swamp, and thus Jackson's target, was the VI Corps under Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin, consisting of the divisions of Brig. Gens. William F. "Baldy" Smith and Israel B. Richardson.[6]
251
Battle
Jackson's men marched south on the White Oak Road with their artillery chief, Colonel Stapleton Crutchfield, at the head of the column. They marched slowly because they were accompanied by thousands of wounded Union prisoners and many of the stores that they obtained at Savage's Station. They found that the single bridge over the swamp had been burned two hours earlier. Jackson arrived at noon and approved Crutchfield's gun emplacement that was designed to fire diagonally from a ridge across the swamp against the Union batteries and infantry positions that they saw about 300 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) away. At 2 p.m. on June 30, seven Confederate batteries of 31 guns opened fire, catching the Union troops by surprise and disabling several of their cannons.[7] After ordering his engineers to begin rebuilding the bridge, Jackson directed Col. Thomas T. Munford's 2nd Virginia Cavalry to cross the swamp and capture some of the Union guns abandoned during the bombardment. As the men Seven Days Battles, June 30, 1862. and horses waded through water that was belly deep and fouled with debris, Jackson and Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill crossed the river to perform a personal reconnaissance. A Union artillery shell exploded only a few feet away from the generals mounted on horseback, although neither was injured. Jackson saw that Union artillery and infantry was reinforcing the position, and that Federal sharpshooters would play havoc with his engineers on the bridge. He realized that this was not a place that he could make an opposed crossing.[8] Munford reported that he found a ford a quarter of a mile downstream that would be suitable for the infantry to cross. Brig. Gen. Wade Hampton found a closer point at which a simple bridge could be built for infantry. Jackson ordered him to build the bridge, but took no specific action to cross the swamp, having decided that it was infeasible to attack if he could not cross his artillery. While the artillery duel across the swamp escalated to over 40 guns, and while the battle at Glendale raged less than 3 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) away, Jackson sat beneath a large oak tree and fell asleep for over an hour.[9]
252
Aftermath
Jackson's inaction allowed some units to be detached from Franklin's corps in late afternoon to reinforce the Union troops at Glendale. Jackson did not inform Lee of his situation and Lee did not send anyone to find Jackson until it was too late to make a difference. Although Jackson's wing of the Army and Franklin's corps comprised tens of thousands of men, the action at White Oak Swamp included no infantry activity and was limited to primarily an artillery duel. The Confederates lost 3 artillerymen killed and 12 wounded, but there is no exact record of the number of Union casualties; historian Brian K. Burton estimates as many as 100 Union casualties, with the highest losses in the 5th New Hampshire, which had 5 men killed and 9 wounded.[] After dinner with his staff that night, Jackson fell asleep again, with a biscuit clenched between his teeth. Upon awakening he announced, "Now, gentlemen, let us at once to bed, and rise with the dawn, and see if tomorrow we can do something." Two weeks later he offered an explanation for his unusually lethargic conduct at the battle: "If General Lee had wanted me, he could have sent for me."[10] Lee never criticized Jackson's performance in the battle.[11] Edward Porter Alexander, the prominent Confederate artillery commander and postwar historian, lamented about the great lost opportunity at Glendale and White Oak Swamp: "When one thinks of the great chances in General Lee's grasp that one summer afternoon, it is enough to make one cry ... to think that our Stonewall Jackson lost them."[12]
Notes
[1] Salmon, p. 64. [2] Eicher, pp. 290-91; Kennedy, p. 98; Salmon, p. 113. [3] Eicher, p. 291; Salmon, pp. 113-15. [4] See, for instance, Freeman, R.E. Lee, vol. 2, p. 247: "... by every test, Jackson had failed throughout the Seven Days." [5] Salmon, pp. 64-65. [6] Salmon, p. 117. [7] Robertson, p. 493; Salmon, p. 117. [8] Robertson, p. 494; Salmon, p. 117. [9] Robertson, pp. 494-95; Salmon, pp. 117-19. [10] Robertson, pp. 495-96. [11] Sears, p. 278. [12] Robertson, p. 496.
References
Burton, Brian K. Extraordinary Circumstances: The Seven Days Battles. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-253-33963-4. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Freeman, Douglas S. R. E. Lee, A Biography (http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/People/ Robert_E_Lee/FREREL/home.html). 4 vols. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 193435. OCLC166632575. Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide. 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Robertson, James I., Jr. Stonewall Jackson: The Man, The Soldier, The Legend. New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1997. ISBN 0-02-864685-1. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va020a.htm)
Battle of White Oak Swamp CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/White oak Road to Wilderness.pdf)
253
External links
Animated history of the Peninsula Campaign (http://www.historyanimated.com/Peninsulah.html)
Battle of Glendale
The Battle of Glendale, also known as the Battle of Frayser's Farm, Frazier's Farm, Nelson's Farm, Charles City Crossroads, New Market Road, or Riddell's Shop, took place on June 30, 1862, in Henrico County, Virginia, on the sixth day of the Seven Days Battles (Peninsula Campaign) of the American Civil War.[1] The Confederate divisions of Maj. Gens. Benjamin Huger, James Longstreet, and A.P. Hill converged on the retreating Union Army in the vicinity of Glendale or Frayser's Farm. Longstreet's and Hill's attacks penetrated the Union defense near Willis Church. Union counterattacks sealed the break and saved their line of retreat along the Willis Church Road. Huger's advance was stopped on the Charles City Road. The divisions led by Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson were delayed by Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin's corps at White Oak Swamp. Confederate Maj. Gen. Theophilus H. Holmes made a feeble attempt to attack the Union left flank at Turkey Bridge but was driven back. This had been Lee's best chance to cut off the Union army from the James River. That night, the Union army established a strong position on Malvern Hill.[2]
Background
The Seven Days Battles began with a Union attack in the minor Battle of Oak Grove on June 25, 1862, but McClellan quickly lost the initiative as Lee began a series of attacks at Beaver Dam Creek (Mechanicsville) on June 26, Gaines's Mill on June 27, the minor actions at Garnett's and Golding's Farm on June 27 and June 28, and the attack on the Union rear guard at Savage's Station on June 29. McClellan's Army of the Potomac continued its retreat toward the safety of Harrison's Landing on the James River.[3] After Gaines's Mill, McClellan left his army with no clear instructions on routes of withdrawal and without naming a second-in-command. The bulk of the V Corps (less McCall), under Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter, moved to occupy Malvern Hill, while the remaining four corps of the Army of the Potomac were essentially operating independently in their fighting withdrawal. Most elements of the army had been able to cross White Oak Swamp Creek by noon on June 30. About one third of the army had reached the James River, but the remainder was still marching between White Oak Swamp and Glendale. (Glendale was the name of a tiny community at the intersection of the Charles City Road and the Quaker Road, or Willis Church Road, which led over Malvern Hill to the James River.)[4] After inspecting the line of march that morning, McClellan rode south and boarded the ironclad USS Galena on the James.[5] Lee ordered his Army of Northern Virginia to converge on the retreating Union forces, bottlenecked on the inadequate road network. The Army of the Potomac, lacking overall command coherence, presented a discontinuous, ragged defensive line. Stonewall Jackson was ordered to press the Union rear guard at the White Oak Swamp crossing while the largest part of Lee's army, some 45,000 men, would attack the Army of the Potomac in mid-retreat at Glendale, about 2 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) southwest, splitting it in two. Huger's division would strike first after a three-mile (5 km) march on the Charles City Road, supported by Longstreet and A.P. Hill, whose divisions were about 7 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) to the west, in a mass attack. Holmes was ordered to cannonade retreating Federals near Malvern Hill.[6]
Battle of Glendale
254
Battle
As with most of the Seven Days Battles, Lee's plan was poorly executed. Huger was slowed by felled trees obstructing the Charles City Road, a result of the efforts of pioneers from Brig. Gen. Henry W. Slocum's division. Huger had his men spend hours chopping a new road through the thick woods in what became known as the "Battle of the Axes". He failed to take any alternative route, and, fearing a counterattack, failed to participate in the battle. By 4 p.m., Lee ordered Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder to join Holmes on the River Road and attack Malvern Hill, the left flank of the Union line, then ordered him to assist Longstreet, so his division spent the day countermarching. Stonewall Jackson moved slowly and spent the entire day north of the creek, making only feeble efforts to cross and attack Franklin's VI Corps in the Battle of White Oak Swamp, attempting to force back the enemy so that a destroyed bridge could be rebuilt, although adequate fords were nearby, by a fruitless artillery duel. (Despite his stunning victories in the recent Valley Campaign, or perhaps due to the fatigue of Seven Days Battles, June 30, 1862. that campaign, Jackson's contributions to the Seven Days were marred by slow execution and poor judgment throughout) His presence did draw two of Brig. Gen. John Sedgwick's three brigades, which had been defending the Charles City crossroads, north as reinforcements. McCall's division had stopped at Charles City Crossroads on its march to rejoin Porter. The gap in the line left by Sedgwick was noticed and plugged by his three brigades. Holmes's inexperienced troops (from his Department of North Carolina, attached to the Army of Northern Virginia) made no progress against Porter at Turkey Bridge and Malvern Hill and were repulsed by artillery fire and by the Federal gunboats Galena and Aroostook on the James.[7] At 2 p.m., as they waited for sounds of Huger's expected attack, Lee, Longstreet, and visiting Confederate President Jefferson Davis were conferring on horseback when they came under heavy artillery fire, wounding two men and killing three horses. A.P. Hill, the commander in that sector, ordered the president and senior generals to the rear. Longstreet attempted to silence the six batteries of Federal guns firing in his direction, but long-range artillery fire proved to be inadequate. He ordered Col. Micah Jenkins to charge the batteries, which brought on a general fight around 4 p.m.[8] Although belated and not initiated as planned, the assaults by the divisions of A.P. Hill and Longstreet, under Longstreet's overall command, turned out to be the only ones to follow Lee's order to attack the main Union concentration. Longstreet's 20,000 men were not reinforced by other Confederate divisions of Huger and Jackson, despite their concentration within a three-mile 3 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) radius. They assaulted the disjointed Union line of 40,000 men, arranged in a 2 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) arc north and south of the Glendale intersection, but the brunt of the fighting was centered on the position held by the Pennsylvania Reserves division of the V Corps, 6,000 men under Brig. Gen. George A. McCall, just west of the
Battle of Glendale Nelson Farm owned by Nelson, north of Willis Church. (The farm was owned by R.H. Nelson, but its former owner was named Frayser and many of the locals referred to it as Frayser's, or Frazier's, Farm.)[9] McCall's division included the brigades of Brig. Gen. George G. Meade on the right and Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour on the left, with the brigade of Brig. Gen. John F. Reynolds (led by Col. Seneca G. Simmons since Reynolds's capture at Boatswain's Swamp after Gaines's Mill) in reserve.[10] Three Confederate brigades were sent forward in the assault, from north to south: Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox, Col. Micah Jenkins (Anderson's Brigade), and Brig. Gen. James L. Kemper. Longstreet ordered them forward in a piecemeal fashion, over several hours. Kemper's Virginians charged through the thick woods first and emerged in front of five batteries of McCall's artillery. In their first combat experience, the brigade conducted a disorderly but enthusiastic assault, which carried them through the guns and broke through McCall's main line with Jenkins's support, followed up a few hours later by Wilcox's brigade of Alabamians. The Confederate brigades met stiff resistance from Meade and Seymour in bitter hand-to-hand combat where men stabbed each other with bayonets and used rifles as clubs. Officers even took to using their (normally ornamental) swords as weapons. Meade was wounded in the fighting, two of his artillery batteries captured (Lt. Alanson Randol's and Capt. James Cooper's), but one was retaken. McCall was captured when he mistakenly rode into the Confederate picket line, looking for positions to place his rallied men.[11] On McCall's northern flank, the division of Brig. Gen. Philip Kearny held against repeated Confederate attacks with reinforcements of Caldwell's brigade and two brigades from Slocum's division. On the southern flank, Brig. Gen. Joseph Hooker's division repelled and once pursued minor attacks. Sedgwick's division, whose brigades had returned from near White Oak Swamp, came up to fill a gap after a brutal counterattack. Heavy fighting continued until about 8:30 p.m. Longstreet committed virtually every brigade in the divisions under his command, while on the Union side they had been fed in individually to plug holes in the line as they occurred.[12]
255
Aftermath
The battle was tactically inconclusive, although Lee failed to achieve his objective of preventing the Federal escape and crippling McClellan's army, if not destroying it. Longstreet's performance had been poor, sending in brigade after brigade in a piecemeal fashion, rather than striking with concentrated force in the manner for which he would be known later in the war. He also was not supported by Huger and Jackson, as Lee had planned. Instead of attacking, both generals merely kept their divisions on the north side of White Oak Swamp and launching no action other than an occasional artillery exchange. Union casualties were 3,797 (297 killed, 1,696 wounded, and 1,804 missing or captured). Confederate casualties were comparable in total3,673 (638 killed, 2,814 wounded, and 221 missing)but more than 40% higher in killed and wounded. Longstreet lost more than a quarter of his division.[13] Union generals Meade and Edwin V. Sumner and Confederate generals Joseph R. Anderson, Dorsey Pender, and Winfield S. Featherston were wounded.[] On the evening of June 30, McClellan, who had witnessed none of the fighting, wired the War Department: "My Army has behaved superbly and have done all that men could do. If none of us escape we shall at least have done honor to the country. I shall do my best to save the Army." He later requested 50,000 reinforcements (which the War Department had no chance of providing). "With them, I will retrieve our fortunes."[14] McClellan has received significant criticism from historians about his detachment from the battle, sailing on the Galena out of touch while his men fought. Ethan Rafuse wrote that after McClellan supervised the deployment of three corps near the Glendale crossroads, what he did next "almost defies belief. ... Even though his men were at the time engaged in a fierce battle near Glendale ... he spent the afternoon on board the Galena, dining with [Captain] Rodgers and traveling briefly up river to watch the gunboat shelling of a Confederate division that had been spotted marching east along the River road toward Malvern Hill." Brian K. Burton wrote that, "more than on any other day, McClellan's judgment on the thirtieth is suspect. He had arranged for signal communications between Malvern Hill and the river but that is a poor substitute. To leave units from five different corps at a vital point with no overall commander is to court disaster."
Battle of Glendale Stephen W. Sears wrote when McClellan deserted his army on the Glendale and Malvern Hill battlefields during the Seven Days, he was guilty of dereliction of duty."[15] After the battle, Lee wrote, "Could the other commands have cooperated in this action, the result would have proved most disastrous to the enemy."[16] Confederate Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill was even more direct: "Had all our troops been at Frayser's Farm, there would have been no Malvern Hill."[17] Confederate Brig. Gen. Edward Porter Alexander wrote after the war that, "Never, before or after, did the fates put such a prize within our reach. It is my individual belief that on two occasions in the four years, we were within reach of military successes so great that we might have hoped to end the war with our independence. ... The first was at Bull Run [in] July 1861 ... This [second] chance of June 30, 1862 impresses me as the best of all."[18] Lee would have only one more opportunity to intercept McClellan's army before it reached the safety of the river and the end of the Seven Days, at the Battle of Malvern Hill on July 1.[19]
256
Notes
[1] The NPS battle summary (http:/ / www. cr. nps. gov/ hps/ abpp/ battles/ va020b. htm) lists the alternative names for the battle, although most other sources do not mention Riddell's Shop. Riddell's blacksmith shop was located at the Glendale crossroads (Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 278) and was an alternative name for the Glendale Cross Roads (Welcher, p. 825). Another engagement took place in this area on June 13, 1864, during the Overland Campaign, and the name Riddell's Shop is usually used for that. [2] NPS (http:/ / www. cr. nps. gov/ hps/ abpp/ battles/ va020b. htm). [3] Salmon, p. 64. [4] Burton, p. 165. [5] Eicher, pp. 29091; Kennedy, p. 98; Salmon, p. 113. [6] Eicher, p. 291; Salmon, pp. 11315; Burton, pp. 26869; Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 291. [7] Burton, pp. 25758, 27375; Kennedy, p. 100; Salmon, p. 115; Eicher, pp. 29192. [8] Burton, p. 275; Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 290; Kennedy, p. 100. [9] Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 294. [10] Kennedy, p. 100; Salmon, p. 116. [11] Burton, pp. 289, 29596; Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 29499; Kennedy, p. 100; Salmon, p. 116. [12] Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 300306; Burton, pp. 28286; Kennedy, p. 100; Salmon, p. 116. [13] Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 307. [14] Wert, pp. 11617. [15] Rafuse, p. 227; Burton, p. 243; Sears, Controversies and Commanders, p. 17. [16] Lee's battle report, Official Records, Series I, Vol XI/2 [S# 13]. [17] Alexander, p. 98. [18] Alexander, pp. 109110. [19] Salmon, p. 66.
References
Alexander, Edward P. Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. Edited by Gary W. Gallagher. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989. ISBN 0-8078-4722-4. Burton, Brian K. Extraordinary Circumstances: The Seven Days Battles. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-253-33963-4. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website (http://www. dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/). Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide. 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6.
Battle of Glendale Rafuse, Ethan S. McClellan's War: The Failure of Moderation in the Struggle for the Union. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005. ISBN 0-253-34532-4. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. Controversies & Commanders: Dispatches from the Army of the Potomac. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1999. ISBN 0-395-86760-6. Sears, Stephen W. George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon. New York: Da Capo Press, 1988. ISBN 0-306-80913-3. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6. U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion (http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/records/list.cfm): a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 18801901. Hooker's report, number 36 (http://www.civilwar.com/?option=com_officialrecord&series=Series I& volume=Volume XI&part=Part II&page=107) McCall's report, number 154 (http://www.civilwar.com/?option=com_officialrecord&series=Series I& volume=Volume XI&part=Part II&page=383) Seymour's report, number 155 (http://www.civilwar.com/?option=com_officialrecord&series=Series I& volume=Volume XI&part=Part II&page=397) Holmes's report, number 352 (http://www.civilwar.com/?option=com_officialrecord&series=Series I& volume=Volume XI&part=Part II&page=905) Welcher, Frank J. The Union Army, 18611865 Organization and Operations. Vol. 1, The Eastern Theater. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989. ISBN 0-253-36453-1. Wert, Jeffry D. The Sword of Lincoln: The Army of the Potomac. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005. ISBN 0-7432-2506-6. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va020b.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/White oak Road to Wilderness.pdf)
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External links
Battle of Glendale in Encyclopedia Virginia (http://encyclopediavirginia.org/Glendale_Battle_of) Animated history of the Peninsula Campaign (http://www.historyanimated.com/Peninsulah.html) Battle of Glendale (http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/glendale.html): Maps, histories, photos, and preservation news (Civil War Trust)
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Background
The final battle of the Seven Days was the first in which the Union Army occupied favorable ground. For the preceding six days, McClellan's Army of the Potomac had been retreating to the safety of the James River, pursued by Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. Up to this point, the major battles of the Seven Days had been mostly inconclusive, but McClellan was unnerved by Lee's aggressive assaults and remained convinced that he was seriously outnumbered, although in fact the two armies were roughly equal.[1] Malvern Hill offered good observation and artillery positions, having been prepared the previous day by the V Corps, under Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter. McClellan himself was not present on the battlefield, having preceded his army to Harrison's Landing on the James, and Porter was the most senior of the corps commanders. The slopes were cleared of timber, providing great visibility, and the open fields to the north could be swept by deadly fire from the 250 guns placed by Col. Henry J. Hunt, McClellan's chief of artillery. Three gunboats on the James River, the USS Galena, USS Jacob Bell, and USS Aroostook, added even more firepower. Beyond this space, the terrain was swampy and thickly wooded.[2] The entire Army of the Potomac occupied the hill, with the exception of Brig. Gen. Silas Casey's Division, now commanded by Brig. Gen. John J. Peck, of the IV Corps, which had proceeded to Harrison's Landing and, while not engaged, formed the extreme right of the Federal line. The Federal line extended in a vast semicircle from Harrison's Landing on the extreme right to Brig. Gen. George W. Morell's division of Porter's Corps on the extreme left, which occupied the geographically advantageous ground on the northwestern slopes of the hill. Adjoining the right of Morell's command was Brig. Gen. Darius N. Couch's division, which had been detached from the IV Corps, now at Harrison's Landing, and occupied the effective center of the Federal position. Although Porter commanded the portion of the field on which Couch's troops were positioned, he elected to allow Couch to act in command independently, not bringing his detached division under the command of one of the other corps commanders. Extending the Federal line on Couch's right were the divisions of Brig. Gens. Philip Kearny and Joseph Hooker of Brig. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman's III Corps. To the right was Brig. Gen. Edwin Vose Sumner's II Corps, consisting of the divisions of Brig. Gens. Israel B. Richardson and John Sedgwick, which were anchored to Peck's Division of the IV Corps at Harrison's Landing. For the most part however, the Union infantry were passive spectators in the battle.[3]
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Rather than flanking the position, Lee attacked it directly, hoping that his artillery would clear the way for a successful infantry assault (just as he would plan the following year in Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg). He also believed that his soldiers were in better fighting shape than their Union counterparts, despite the six preceding days of hard fighting and marching. (A number of the Union Corps had in fact not yet participated in direct combat.) Lee's plan was to attack the hill from the north on the Quaker Road, using the divisions of Maj. Gens. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, Richard S. Ewell, D.H. Hill, and Brig. Gen. William H.C. Whiting. Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder was ordered to follow Jackson and deploy to his right when he reached the battlefield. Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger's division was to follow as well, but Lee reserved the right to position him based on developments. The divisions of Maj. Gens. James Longstreet and A.P. Hill, which had been the most heavily engaged in the Battle of Glendale the previous day, were held in reserve. Seeing how strong the Union position was, D.H. Hill opposed the idea of a direct attack, but Lee was confident that one final push would work.[4]
Battle
As with most of the battles in the Seven Days, Lee's complex plan was poorly executed. The approaching soldiers were delayed by severely muddy roads and poor maps. Jackson arrived at the swampy creek called Western Run and stopped abruptly. Magruder's guides mistakenly sent him on the Long Bridge Road to the southwest, away from the battlefield. Eventually the battle line was assembled with Huger's division (brigades of Brig. Gens. Ambrose R. Wright and Lewis A. Armistead) on the Confederate right and D.H. Hill's division (brigades of Brig. Gen. John Bell Hood and Col. Evander M. Law) on the Quaker Road to the left. They awaited the Confederate bombardment before attacking.[5] Unfortunately for Lee, Henry Hunt struck first, launching one of the greatest artillery barrages in the war from 1 p.m. to 2:30 p.m. The Union gunners had superior equipment and expertise and disabled most of the Confederate batteries, which were concentrated on a hill 1200 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) north of the Crew House and at Poindexter's farm to the northeast. The advancing columns of Confederate infantry were blasted to pieces by the massed artillery. Even more terrifying were the huge 50-pound shells lobbed from the three gunboats. Despite the setback, Lee sent his infantry forward at 3:30 p.m. and Armistead's brigade made some progress through lines of Union sharpshooters. By 4 p.m., Magruder arrived and he was ordered forward to support Armistead. His attack was piecemeal and poorly organized.[6] Meanwhile, D. H. Hill launched his division forward along the Quaker Road, past Willis Church. Across the entire line of battle, the Confederate troops reached only within 200 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) of the Union
Battle of Malvern Hill Center and were repulsed by nightfall with heavy losses. As the sun was going down, Brig. General Isaac Trimble of Ewell's division began to move his troops forward. Jackson stopped him and asked "What are you going to do?" Trimble replied "I'm going to charge those batteries, sir!" "I guess you'd better not try it." Jackson said. "General [D.H.] Hill has just tried with his entire division and been repulsed. I guess you'd better not try it."[7]
260
Aftermath
D.H. Hill wrote afterward in a postwar article, "It wasn't war; it was murder."[8] Lee's army suffered 5,650 casualties (versus 2,214 Union) in this wasted effort, but continued to follow the Union army all the way to Harrison's Landing. On Evelington Heights, part of the property of Edmund Ruffin, the Confederates had an opportunity to dominate the Union camps, making their position on the bank of the James potentially untenable; although the Confederate position would be subjected to Union naval gunfire, the heights were an exceptionally strong defensive position that would have been very difficult for the Union to capture with infantry. Cavalry commander Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart reached the heights and began bombardment with a single cannon from Capt. John Pelham's artillery. This alerted the Federals to the potential danger and they captured the heights before any Confederate infantry could reach the scene.[9] Malvern Hill ended the Peninsula Campaign. When McClellan's army Cannons at the Malvern Hill site, which is part of ceased to threaten Richmond, Lee sent Jackson to operate against Maj. the Richmond National Battlefield Park Gen. John Pope's army along the Rapidan River, thus initiating the Northern Virginia Campaign. After reporting to the Union authorities in Washington that a further advance on Richmond was hopeless, McClellan's army was slowly transferred to northern Virginia to reinforce Pope.[10]
Notes
[1] Kennedy, pp. 101. [2] Burton, pp. 30710. [3] Burton, pp. 306308. [4] Sears, pp. 31314. [5] Burton, pp. 31416. [6] Sears, pp. 31523. [7] Burton, pp. 33740, 356. [8] Burton, p. 340. [9] Burton, pp. 357, 38183. [10] Sears, pp. 350, 354.
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References
Burton, Brian K. Extraordinary Circumstances: The Seven Days Battles. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-253-33963-4. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website (http://www. dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/). Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide, 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va021.htm)
External links
Battle of Malvern Hill in Encyclopedia Virginia (http://encyclopediavirginia.org/Malvern_Hill_Battle_of) Animated history of the Peninsula Campaign (http://www.historyanimated.com/Peninsulah.html) Malvern Hill Battlefield Page: Battle maps, photos, history articles, and battlefield news (http://www.civilwar. org/battlefields/malvern-hill.html) (Civil War Trust) Poem (http://www.online-literature.com/melville/569/) by Herman Melville CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Lewis Farm to Manassas II.pdf)
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After the collapse of McClellan's Peninsula Campaign in the Seven Days Battles of June 1862, President Abraham Lincoln appointed John Pope to command the newly formed Army of Virginia. Pope had achieved some success in the Western Theater, and Lincoln sought a more aggressive general than McClellan. Pope did not endear himself to his subordinate commandersall three selected as corps commanders technically outranked himor to his junior officers, by his boastful orders that implied Eastern soldiers were inferior to their Western counterparts. Some of his enlisted men were encouraged by Pope's aggressive tone.[3] The Union Army of Virginia was constituted on June 26, 1862, from existing departments operating around Virginia, most of which had recently been outmaneuvered in Jackson's Valley Campaign: Maj. Gen. John C. Frmont's Mountain Department, Maj. Gen Irvin McDowell's Department of the Rappahannock, Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks's Department of the Shenandoah, Brig. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis's brigade from the Military District of Washington, and Brig. Gen Jacob D. Cox's division from western Virginia. The new army was divided into three corps of 51,000 men, under Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel, replacing Frmont, who refused to serve under Pope (his junior in rank) and resigned his command. (I Corps); Banks (II Corps); and McDowell (III Corps). Sturgis's Washington troops constituted the Army reserve. Cavalry brigades under Col. John Beardsley and Brig. Gens. John P. Hatch and George D. Bayard were attached directly to the three infantry corps, a lack of centralized control that had negative effects in the campaign. Parts of three corps (III, V, and VI) of McClellan's Army of the Potomac and Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside's IX Corps (commanded by Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno), eventually joined Pope for combat operations, raising his strength to 77,000.[4] On the Confederate side, General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was organized into two "wings" or "commands" (the designation of these units as "corps" would not be authorized under Confederate law until November 1862) of about 55,000 men. The "right wing" was commanded by Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, the left by Maj. Gen. Stonewall Jackson. The Cavalry Division under Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart was attached to Jackson's wing. The Confederate organization was considerably simpler than the one Lee inherited for the Seven Days Battles; in that campaign there had been eleven separate divisions, which led to breakdowns in communications and the inability of the army to execute Lee's battle plans properly. William H.C. Whiting, Theophilus Holmes, Benjamin Huger, and John B. Magruder were all reassigned elsewhere. The command structure was reorganized as follows: Jackson's wing comprised his old Valley Army; the Stonewall Division (now commanded by Brig. Gen. Charles S. Winder) and Maj. Gen. Richard Ewell's division, plus the newly added command of Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill. Longstreet had seven divisions. His former command was divided into two parts led by Brig. Gens. Cadmus Wilcox and James Kemper. Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson got Huger's division, and Brig. Gen. John B. Hood Whiting's. Brig. Gens. David R. Jones and Lafayette McLaws continued in command of their divisions, both of which had been part of Magruder's Army of the Peninsula. Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill's command was also placed under Longstreet. Also joining was Brig. Gen. Nathan G. "Shanks" Evans's independent South Carolina brigade. McLaws and Hill were left in Richmond, and so Longstreet would take only five divisions north.[5]
263
264
Cedar Mountain
Further information: Battle of Cedar Mountain On August 9, Nathaniel Banks's corps Northern Virginia Campaign, August 7 August 28, 1862. ConfederateUnion attacked Jackson at Cedar Mountain, gaining an early advantage. Confederate Brig. Gen. Charles S. Winder was killed and his division mauled. A Confederate counterattack led by Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill drove Banks back across Cedar Creek. Jackson's advance was stopped, however, by the Union division of Brig. Gen. James B. Ricketts. By now Jackson had learned that Pope's corps were all together, foiling his plan of defeating each in separate actions. He remained in position until August 12, then withdrew to Gordonsville.[12]
265
Thoroughfare Gap
Further information: Battle of Thoroughfare Gap After skirmishing near Chapman's Mill in Thoroughfare Gap, Ricketts's Union division was flanked on August 28 by a Confederate column passing through Hopewell Gap several miles to the north and by troops securing the high ground at Thoroughfare Gap. Ricketts retired, and Longstreet's wing of the army marched through the gap to join Jackson. This seemingly inconsequential action virtually ensured Pope's defeat during the battles of August 2930 because it allowed the two wings of Lee's army to unite on the Manassas battlefield. Ricketts withdrew via Gainesville to Manassas Junction.[18]
266
Chantilly
Further information: Battle of Chantilly Making a wide flanking march, Jackson hoped to cut off the Union retreat from Bull Run. On September 1, beyond Chantilly Plantation on the Little River Turnpike near Ox Hill, Jackson sent his divisions against two Union divisions under Maj. Gens. Philip Kearny and Isaac Stevens. Confederate attacks were stopped by fierce fighting during a severe thunderstorm. Union generals Stevens and Kearny were both killed. Recognizing that his army was still in danger at Fairfax Courthouse, Pope ordered the retreat to continue to Washington.[21]
Aftermath
The Northern Virginia Campaign had been expensive for both sides, although Lee's smaller army spent its resources more carefully. Union casualties were 16,054 (1,724 killed, 8,372 wounded, 5,958 missing/captured) out of about 75,000 engaged, roughly comparable to the losses two months earlier in the Seven Days Battles; Confederate losses were 9,197 (1,481 killed, 7,627 wounded, 89 missing/captured) of 48,500.[]
The [Army of Northern Virginia] acquired that magnificent morale which made them equal to twice their numbers, & which they never lost even to the surrender at Appomattox. And [Lee's] confidence in them, & theirs in him, were so equal that no man can yet say which was greatest. Edward Porter Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy
[22]
The campaign was a triumph for Lee and his two principal subordinates. Military historian John J. Hennessy described it as Lee's greatest campaign, the "happiest marriage of strategy and tactics he would ever attain." He balanced audacious actions with proper caution and chose his subordinates' roles to best effect. Jackson's flank march54 miles in 36 hours into the rear of the Union Armywas "the boldest maneuver of its kind during the war, and Jackson executed it flawlessly." Longstreet's attack on August 30, "timely, powerful, and swift, would
Northern Virginia Campaign come as close to destroying a Union army as any ever would."[23] Pope, out-maneuvered by Lee, was virtually besieged in Washington. If it were not for his close political and personal ties to President Lincoln, his military career might have been completely ruined. Instead, he was transferred to Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and command of the Army's Department of the Northwest, where he fought the Dakota War of 1862.[24] Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan assumed command of all Union forces around Washington, and his Army of the Potomac absorbed the forces of the Army of Virginia, which was disbanded on September 12, 1862. With Pope no longer a threat and McClellan reorganizing his command, Lee turned his army north on September 4 to cross the Potomac River and invade Maryland, initiating the Maryland Campaign and the battles of Harpers Ferry, South Mountain, and Antietam.[25] The Bull Run battlefields are preserved by the National Park Service in Manassas National Battlefield Park.
267
Notes
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] Hennessy, p. 458. Hennessy, p. 12. Eicher, p. 318; Martin, pp. 24, 32-33; Hennessy, p. 12. Martin, p. 280; Eicher, p. 318; Hennessy, p. 6. Hennessy, pp. 561-67; Glatthaar, pp. 157-58; Freeman, vol. 1, pp. 610-14; Harsh, p. 106; Langellier, pp. 90-93.
[6] Esposito, Map 54. [7] Esposito, Map 55; Martin, pp. 45-46. [8] Hennessy, pp. 14-21; Martin, pp. 36-37. [9] Harsh, pp. 119-23. [10] Hennessy, p. 10; Sears, p. 353; Esposito, Map 56; Welcher, pp. 835-36. [11] Esposito, Map 56. [12] NPS Cedar Mountain summary (http:/ / www. nps. gov/ history/ hps/ abpp/ battles/ va022. htm). [13] Hennessy, pp. 35-51; Eicher, p. 322; Esposito, Map 57. [14] Martin, pp. 92, 101-02; Eicher, p. 322; Esposito, Map 57. [15] NPS Rappahannock Station summary (http:/ / www. nps. gov/ history/ hps/ abpp/ battles/ va023. htm). [16] Salmon, pp. 127-28; Eicher, pp. 322-23; Esposito, Map 58. [17] NPS Manassas Station Operations summary (http:/ / www. nps. gov/ history/ hps/ abpp/ battles/ va024. htm). [18] NPS Thoroughfare Gap summary (http:/ / www. nps. gov/ history/ hps/ abpp/ battles/ va025. htm). [19] The National Park Service (http:/ / www. cr. nps. gov/ hps/ abpp/ battles/ va026. htm) has established these dates for the battle. The references by Greene, Hennessy, Salmon, and Kennedy, whose works are closely aligned with the NPS, adopt these dates as well. However, all of the other references to this article specify that the action on August 28 was a prelude to, but separate from, the Second Battle of Bull Run. Some of these authors name the action on August 28 the Battle of Groveton or Brawner's Farm. [20] NPS Second Manassas summary (http:/ / www. nps. gov/ history/ hps/ abpp/ battles/ va026. htm). [21] NPS Chantilly summary (http:/ / www. nps. gov/ history/ hps/ abpp/ battles/ va027. htm). [22] Alexander, p. 139. [23] Hennessy, pp. 457-61. [24] Martin, p. 33. [25] Eicher, pp. 336-37.
References
Alexander, Edward P. Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. Edited by Gary W. Gallagher. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989. ISBN 0-8078-4722-4. Editors of Time-Life Books. Lee Takes Command: From Seven Days to Second Bull Run. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1984. ISBN 0-8094-4804-1. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website (http://www.
Northern Virginia Campaign dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/). Freeman, Douglas S. Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command. 3 vols. New York: Scribner, 1946. ISBN 0-684-85979-3. Glatthaar, Joseph T. General Lee's Army: From Victory to Collapse. New York: Free Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-684-82787-2. Greene, A. Wilson. The Second Battle of Manassas. National Park Service Civil War Series. Fort Washington, PA: U.S. National Park Service and Eastern National, 2006. ISBN 0-915992-85-X. Harsh, Joseph L. Confederate Tide Rising: Robert E. Lee and the Making of Southern Strategy, 18611862. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1998. ISBN 0-87338-580-2. Hennessy, John J. Return to Bull Run: The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993. ISBN 0-8061-3187-X. Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide (http://www.bibliobase.com/history/readerscomp/ civwar/html/cw_000106_entries.htm). 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Langellier, John. Second Manassas 1862: Robert E. Lee's Greatest Victory. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002. ISBN 1-84176-230-X. Martin, David G. The Second Bull Run Campaign: JulyAugust 1862. New York: Da Capo Press, 1997. ISBN 0-306-81332-7.
268
Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sauers, Richard A. "Second Battle of Bull Run." In Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History, edited by David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000. ISBN 0-393-04758-X. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6. Welcher, Frank J. The Union Army, 18611865 Organization and Operations. Vol. 1, The Eastern Theater. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989. ISBN 0-253-36453-1. Whitehorne, Joseph W. A. The Battle of Second Manassas: Self-Guided Tour (http://www.history.army.mil/ books/Staff-Rides/2Manassas/2mns-fm.htm). Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 1990. OCLC20723735. Woodworth, Steven E., and Kenneth J. Winkle. Oxford Atlas of the Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. ISBN 0-19-522131-1. National Park Service battle descriptions (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/bycampgn.htm#East62)
Further reading
Stackpole, Edward J. From Cedar Mountain to Antietam. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1993. ISBN 0-8117-2438-7.
External links
Animated History of the Second Manassas Campaign (http://www.historyanimated.com/ManassasTwo.html)
269
Background
Further information: Confederate order of battle, Union order of battle On June 26, Maj. Gen. John Pope was placed in command of the newly constituted Union Army of Virginia. Pope deployed his army in an arc across Northern Virginia. Its right flank, under Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel, was positioned at Sperryville on the Blue Ridge Mountains, its center, under Maj. Gen Nathaniel P. Banks, was located at Little Washington and its left flank under Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell was at Falmouth on the Rappahannock River. Part of Banks's corps, Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford's brigade and Brig. Gen John P. Hatch's cavalry, were stationed 20 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) beyond the Union line, at Culpeper Court House.[1] General Robert E. Lee responded to Pope's dispositions by dispatching Major General Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson with 14,000 men to Gordonsville on July 13. Jackson was later reinforced with another 10,000 men by Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill's division on July 27.[2] On August 6, Pope marched his forces south into Culpeper County with the objective of capturing the rail junction at Gordonsville, in an attempt to draw Confederate attention away from Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's withdrawal from the Virginia Peninsula.[3] In response to this threat, Jackson chose to go on the offensive, attacking Pope's vanguard under Banks, before the entire Army of Virginia could be brought to bear on his position at Gordonsville.[4] After defeating Banks, he then hoped to move on Culpeper Court House, 26 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) north of Gordonsville and the focal point of the Union arc about Northern Virginia, to keep Pope's army from uniting. This would allow Jackson to fight and hopefully defeat each of the Union Corps separately, as he had done during the Valley Campaign. Accordingly, Jackson set out on August 7 for Culpeper.[5] The cavalry under Brig. Gen. Beverly Robertson was sent ahead to dispatch the Federal cavalry guarding the fords of the Rapidan River and occupying Madison Court House, threatening the Confederates left flank as they marched northward. This task was easily accomplished by Robertson on August 8.[6] Jackson's march on Culpeper Court House was hindered by the severe heat wave over Virginia at the beginning of August, as well as by his characteristic secrecy about his plan, which caused confusion among his divisional commanders as to the exact route of advance. As such, the head of his column had only progressed 8 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) by the evening of August 8. The Federal Cavalry, though easily dispatched by Robertson, quickly returned to Pope and alerted him of the Confederate advance. In response, Pope ordered Sigel to Culpeper Court House to reinforce Banks, and Banks was ordered to maintain a defensive line on a ridge above Cedar Run, 7 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) south of Culpeper Court House.[7]
270
Battle
Confederate position
On the morning of August 9, Jackson's army crossed to the Rapidan River into Culpeper County, led by Maj. Gen. Richard S. Ewell's division, followed by Brig. Gen. Charles S. Winder's division, with Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill's division in the rear. Just before noon, Brig. Gen. Jubal Early's brigade, the vanguard of Ewell's division, came upon Federal cavalry and artillery occupying the ridge above Cedar Run, just to the north-west of Cedar Mountain. Early brought up his guns and an artillery duel began between the opposing forces as Early's infantry formed a line on the eastern side of the Culpeper-Orange Turnpike (present day U.S. Route 15) on the high ground on the opposite bank of Cedar Run.[8] As the rest of Ewell's division arrived they formed on Early's right, anchored against the northern slope of the mountain and Sketch of Battle of Cedar Run deployed there six guns on its ridge. Winder's division formed to Early's left, on the west side of the Turnpike, with Brig. Gen. William Taliaferro's brigade closest to Early, and Col. Thomas S. Garnett's on the far Confederate left in a wheat field at the edge of a woods. Winder's artillery filled a gap on the road between the two division, the Stonewall Brigade, led by Col. Charles R. Ronald, was brought up in support behind the guns. A.P Hill's division, still marching up the Turnpike, was ordered to stand in reserve on the Confederate left.[9]
Union position
The Federals formed a line on a ridge above Cedar Run, with Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford's brigade on forming the Union right in a field across from Garnett and Brig. Gen. Christopher C. Auger's division on the Union left to the east of the Turnpike. Brig. Gen. John W. Geary's brigade was anchored on the Turnpike opposing Taliaferro, while Brig. Gen Henry Prince's brigade formed the far left opposite Ewell. Brig. Gen. George S. Greene's understrength brigade (only two regiments) was kept in reserve in the rear.[10]
271
Union attack
A little before 5:00 p.m. as the artillery fight began to wane, Confederate Brig. Gen. Charles S. Winder fell mortally wounded. He had been ill that day and was taken onto the field in an ambulance wagon. While attempting to direct his troops, he was struck by a shell fragment. Winder's left arm and side were torn to pieces, and he died a few hours later. As a result, command of the division devolved on William Taliaferro, who was completely ignorant of Jackson's battle plan. Dispositions on his part of the field were still incomplete; Garnett's brigade Cedar Mountain battlefield, facing south from the approximate southwestern was isolated from the main Confederate corner of the wheat field line, with its flank dangerously exposed to the woods. The Stonewall Brigade was to have come up to support them, but remained a half mile distant behind the artillery.[11] Before leadership could properly be restored to the division the Union attack began. Geary and Prince were sent against the Confederate right. The Federal advance was swift and threatened to break the Confederate line, prompting Early to come galloping to the front from Cedar Mountain where he was directing troop dispositions. Early's stabilizing presence and the raking fire of the Confederate guns halted the Union advance on the Confederate right.[10] On the left Crawford attacked Winder's division, sending one brigade directly at the Confederate line and another brigade through the woods on a flanking movement. The Federals came from the woods directly into the flank of the 1st Virginia Infantry, who under the pressure from attack on two fronts broke for the rear. The Federals pushed on, not waiting to reform their lines, rolling through the outflanked 42nd Virginia until they found themselves in Taliaferro's and the artillery's rear. The Stonewall Brigade came up and was swept aside by Crawford's troops before it had a chance to react. Jackson ordered the batteries withdrawn before they were captured, but Taliaferro and Early's left were hit hard by the Union advance and threatened to break.[12]
Confederate counterattack
At this dire point, Gen. Jackson rode to that part of the field to rally the men and came upon his old brigade finally being brought up to reinforce the line. Intending to inspire the troops there, he attempted to brandish his sword; however, due to the infrequency with which he drew it, it had rusted in its scabbard and he was unable to dislodge it. Undaunted, he unbuckled the sword from his belt and waved it, scabbard and all, over his head. He then grabbed a battle flag from a retreating standard bearer and yelled at his men to rally around him.[13] The Stonewall Brigade, heartened by their commander, launched into the Union troops and drove them back. By this point, Banks's men were becoming tired and disorganized, with their ammunition nearly gone. Without any support, his men had been unable to follow up on their initial success. In their zeal, the Stonewall Brigade pursued the Federals as they fell back, but soon found themselves beyond the Confederate line and without support. The Federals reformed and attacked, driving the 4th and 27th Virginia back. But the actions of the Stonewall Brigade gave the Confederate line time to reform and A.P Hill's troops to come up and fill the gaps from Winder's broken regiments.[14] Jackson ordered Hill and Ewell to advance. He encountered Brig. Gen. Lawrence O'Bryan Branch (a career politician) making a lengthy speech to his troops, and urged him to press forward. The Union right immediately collapsed. Ewell, having difficulty silencing his guns, was delayed, but the Union left began to waver at the sight of Crawford's retreat and were finally broken by a charge down Cedar Mountain by Brig. Gen. Isaac R. Trimble's brigade.[15]
272
Confederate pursuit
Despite bringing up Greene's reserve brigade in support, by 7 p.m. the Union line was in full retreat. In a last-ditch effort to help cover his infantry's retreat, Banks sent two squadrons of cavalry at the Confederate line. They were met with a devastating volley from the Confederate infantry posted behind a fence on the road, allowing only 71 of 174 to escape.[14] The Confederate infantry and Brig. Gen William E. Jones's 7th Virginia Cavalry hotly pursued the retreating Federals, nearly capturing Banks and Pope, who were at their headquarters a mile behind the Federal line.[16] After a mile-and-a-half of pursuit, Jackson grew weary as darkness set in, as he was unsure of the location of the rest of Pope's army. Finally, several Union infantrymen captured by the 7th Virginia informed the Confederates that Pope was bringing Sigel forward to reinforce Banks. Accordingly, Jackson called off the pursuit and by around 10 p.m the fighting had ceased. By this point, Brig. Gen. James Ricketts's division of McDowell's corps was arriving, which effectively covered Banks's retreat.[17]
Aftermath
Losses were high in the battle: Union casualties of 2,353 (314 killed, 1,445 wounded, 594 missing), Confederate 1,338 (231 killed, 1,107 wounded).[] Crawford's brigade had lost over 50% of its total strength, including most of its officers. Prince's and Geary's brigades suffered 3040% casualty rates. Both generals were wounded, and Prince was also captured.[18] Confederate Brig. Gen. Charles S. Winder was mortally wounded by a shell. For two days, Jackson maintained his position south of Cedar Run on the western slope of the mountain, waiting for a Federal attack that did not come. Finally, receiving news that all of Pope's army had arrived at Culpeper Court House, on August 12, Jackson fell back on Gordonsville to a more defensive position behind the Rapidan River.[19] Weather and poor communication with his divisional commanders had robbed Jackson of the initiative in the fight. Still expecting to face the same cautious opponent from the Valley, he was taken by surprise and very nearly driven from the field. Excellent commanding by the Confederates at the crucial moment of the battle and the fortuitous arrival of Hill staved off defeat, eventually allowing their numerical superiority to drive the Federals from the field. For his part, Banks, having been soundly defeated by Jackson in the Valley, was anxious to make up for previous losses. Rather than fighting a defensive battle from a strong position because he was outnumbered 2 to 1, giving time for the rest of Pope's army to arrive, he decided to take the initiative and attack Jackson before he could fully form his lines. The bold move very nearly paid off, but in the end he was again defeated by his old foe.[20] With Jackson on the loose, wreaking havoc against Union forces, General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck became apprehensive and called off Pope's advance on Gordonsville, thereby giving Lee the initiative in the Northern Virginia Campaign. The battle effectively shifted fighting in Virginia from the Virginia Peninsula into northern Virginia.[16]
Notes
[1] Salmon, pp. 125-126. [2] McPherson, p. 525. [3] Henderson, p. 402. [4] Salmon, p. 127. [5] Henderson, p. 403. [6] McDonald, p. 80. [7] Henderson, pp. 405-407. [8] Henderson, p. 407. [9] Salmon, p. 132. [10] Salmon, p. 134. [11] Henderson, pp. 408-409. [12] Henderson, pp. 409-410; Wood, pp. 64-65. [13] NPS Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park website (http:/ / www. nps. gov/ archive/ frsp/ cedar. htm). [14] Henderson, p. 411.
273
References
National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va022.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Cedar Creek to Chancellorsville.pdf) Hearn, Chester. The Civil War: Virginia. London: Salamander Books, 2005. ISBN 1-84065-558-5. Henderson, G. F. R. Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War (http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/12233). New York: Smithmark, 1995. ISBN 0-8317-3288-1. First published in 1903 by Longman, Greens, and Co. McDonald, William N. A History of the Laurel Brigade (http://books.google.com/ books?id=mhZCAAAAIAAJ). Edited by Bushrod C. Washington. Baltimore: K. S. McDonald, 1907. OCLC3523435. McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. Oxford History of the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. ISBN 0-19-503863-0. Robertson, James I., Jr. Stonewall Jackson: The Man, The Soldier, The Legend. New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1997. ISBN 0-02-864685-1. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Welcher, Frank J. The Union Army, 18611865 Organization and Operations. Vol. 1, The Eastern Theater. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989. ISBN 0-253-36453-1. Wood, W. J. Civil War Generalship: The Art of Command. New York: Da Capo Press, 2000. ISBN 0-306-80973-7. First published 1977 by Greenwood Press.
Further reading
Banks, Raymond H. King of Louisiana, 1862-1865, and Other Government Work: A Biography of Major General Nathaniel Prentice Banks (https://sites.google.com/site/nathanielpbanksbiography/''The). Las Vegas, NV: R. H. Banks, 2005. OCLC63270945. Krick, Robert K. Stonewall Jackson at Cedar Mountain. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990. ISBN 0-8078-5355-0.
External links
Battle of Cedar Mountain in Encyclopedia Virginia (http://encyclopediavirginia.org/ Cedar_Mountain_Battle_of) The Battle of Cedar Mountain (http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/cedar-mountain.html): Battle maps, photos, and preservation news (Civil War Trust)
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Union pickets at Rappahannock Station, Virginia photographed here in August 1862 will be driven away by Confederates under James Longstreet and J.E.B. Stuart
Over the next several days, August 22 to August 25, the two armies fought a series of minor actions along the Rappahannock River, including Waterloo Bridge, Lee Springs, Freeman's Ford, and Sulphur Springs, resulting in a few hundred casualties combined. Together, these skirmishes primed Pope's army along the river, while Jackson's wing marched via Thoroughfare Gap to capture Bristoe Station and destroy Federal supplies at Manassas Junction, far in the rear of Pope's army.
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Background
In mid-August 1862, Confederate General Robert E. Lee attempted to cut the supply and communications lines of the Union Army of Virginia, commanded by Major General John Pope, but the Confederate offensive was stalled following the First Battle of Rappahannock Station. To break the stalemate, Lee sent the Left Wing of the army under Major General Thomas J. Jackson around the right of the Union army, through Thoroughfare Gap, and cut the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, breaking the Union supply line. The other Confederate wing commanded by Major General James Longstreet would hold Pope's attention along the Rappahannock and then follow Jackson after thirty six hours. Jackson started his march at 3 a.m. on August 25.[1] Jackson's movement was observed by the Union army about 9 a.m. but Pope thought Jackson was marching to the Shenandoah Valley. Consequently, he turned his attention to Longstreet's wing, which was demonstrating along the Rappahannock River during the day. Pope's orders throughout the day were contradictory and the Union army was unable to mount an attack across the river as Pope intended. WHen Union cavalry spotted Jackson coming through Thoroughfare Gap, Pope pulled his forces back from the river and attempted to locate Jackson's force.[2]
Manassas Station Operations (Stonewall Jackson) caused Taylor's brigade to rout and Taylor himself was mortally wounded. Scammon's two regiments arrived and served as a rear-guard to cover the Union retreat. Union losses totaled nearly 450 (including over 200 prisoners), while the Confederates lost only twenty-five men.[5] To the west, Ewell deployed his division along Kettle Run to serve as protection for Jackson's rear against Pope's forces. Joseph Hooker's division of the Union III Corps first encountered Ewell's skirmishers about 2:30 p.m. Ewell was able to hold his position for over an hour but Hooker then brought up his own artillery and tried to outflank the Confederate line. Shortly after 4 p.m., Ewell received orders from Jackson to retreat to Manassas Junction and successfully disengaged; Hooker was unable to pursue due to the bridge across Broad Run to the north which was burned. Ewell lost less than 150 men in the fight, while Hooker lost 400 men.[6]
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Aftermath
Now aware that Pope was nearby, Jackson decided to move north to the scene of the First Battle of Bull Run, where he could link up with Longstreet or retreat further north towards Aldie as circumstances dictated. After allowing the soldiers to take as much supplies as they could carry, Jackson had the rest of the supplies burned at midnight and started his troops north.[7] Pope saw the fires at Manassas Junction but believed that it meant Jackson was desperate; he ordered his corps to march on Manassas from the south, east, and north. Pope knew that Longstreet was moving north towards Thoroughfare Gap but did not detach any force to delay him, believing that the Union army could defeat Jackson before Longstreet could arrive.[8] The defeat of Taylor's force convinced George B. McClellan, commanding the Union forces in Washington, not to send any further reinforcements to Pope unless they had artillery and cavalry.[9]
Notes
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] Hennessy, pp. 9296. Hennessy, pp. 103110. Hennessy, pp. 110115; Naisawald, p. 64. Hennessy, pp. 116122. Hennessy, pp. 123127; Naisawald, pp. 6669. Cheeks, pp. 5255; Hennessy, pp. 129135. Hennessy, pp. 135138. Hennessy, pp. 138141. Hennessy, pp. 127129.
References
Cheeks, Robert C. "Ewell's Flawless Performance at Kettle Run", in America's Civil War, Volume 13, Number 5 (Number 2000). Hennessy, John J. Return to Bull Run: The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993. ISBN 0-671-79368-3. Naisawald, L. VanLoan. "Stonewall's Manassas Return", in America's Civil War, Volume 15, Number 5 (November 2002). National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va024.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Manassas Gap to Middleburg.pdf)
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Background
On August 26, Maj. Gen. Stonewall Jackson led his corps of the Army of Northern Virginia through Thoroughfare Gap on his way to raiding the Union supply depot at the Manassas Junction. In response to the raid, the following day Union Maj. Gen. Irwin McDowell set out from Warrenton to Manassas Junction to engage Jackson. In order to protect his army's left flank, he dispatched Brig. Gen. James B. Ricketts's brigade and the 1st New Jersey Cavalry under Sir Percy Wyndham towards the Gap. Ricketts stopped at Gainesville, 6 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) to the east, while Wyndham occupied the gap. Maj. Gen. James Longstreet's corps, meanwhile, followed in the path of Jackson's march and was approaching the gap from the west late on the evening of August 27.[1]
Battle
At 9:30 a.m. on August 28, Wyndam's troopers encountered Longstreet's vanguard while attempting to fell trees across the road on the east side of the gap. Wyndham immediately dispatched a courier to Ricketts at Gainesville. Ricketts's advance was slow, however, and he had only reached Haymarket, 3 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) to the east, by 2 p.m. By that point, Wyndham had been driven from the Gap and Longstreet took possession of it. The Federal position was still strong though, as a series of low-lying ridges east of the gap provided an excellent ground for defending the road to Gainesville, and the Confederates had not occupied the hills to the north and south of the gap.[2] In order to meet this Union threat, Longstreet developed a plan, whereby he would command the gap from the high ground on either side and then outflank the Union position on the eastern ridge. The 9th Georgia from Col. George T. Anderson's brigade was sent to Chapman's Mill on the east side of the gap to repulse a Federal attack by the 11th Pennsylvania, who ironically, to reach the gap, had to remove the trees felled by Wyndham earlier that morning. The impediment allowed Anderson to send half of his brigade up to the slope to the north of the gap to occupy the high ground while still having sufficient men to repulse the 11th Pennsylvania. To the south of the gap, the 2nd and 20th Georgia regiments from Henry Benning's brigade raced up the slopes on the west against the 13th Massachusetts, climbing up the east side. The Georgians won out and drove the 13th Massachusetts back down the steep slopes.[3] With the gap firmly in Confederate control, Col. Evander M. Law's brigade was ordered up and over the ridge to the north of the gap to attack the Federal right. At the same time, Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox was sent with three brigades 6 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) to the north, through Hopewell Gap, to outflank the Federal position and attack its rear. When Law's brigade came down the eastern slope of the mountain and attacked the Federal right, Ricketts sent the 84th New York against them, temporarily checking Law's advance. The 2nd and 20th Georgia, however, pressed down the slopes to the south and soon attacked the Federal left. With his position rapidly becoming untenable, Ricketts decided to fall back on Gainesville, leaving the gap to the Confederates before Wilcox could cut off his line of retreat.[4]
278
Aftermath
In terms of casualties, the battle was small, with only 100 combined, but had major strategic consequences. Ricketts failed to fully comprehend the importance of keeping the two wings of the Confederate army apart. Rather than entrenching his force in a strong defensive position at the gap, the easiest and quickest crossing of the Bull Run Range, he left only cavalry there while he sat a half-days march away at Gainesville, protecting the railroad, a job much more suited for his cavalry. As such, he lost the advantage and the only hope his small force had in seriously hindering Longstreet's advance. His failure to do so allowed the two wings of the Confederate army to unite at Manassas and virtually ensured Pope's defeat during the Second Battle of Bull Run on August 29.[5]
Notes
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] Hennessy, pp. 148, 15354. Hennessy, pp. 15455. Hennessy, pp. 15558. Hennessy, pp. 15860. Hennessy, pp. 16061.
References
Hennessy, John J. Return to Bull Run: The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993. ISBN 0-671-79368-3. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va025.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Thoroughfare Gap to Upperville.pdf)
External links
The Battle of Thoroughfare Gap (http://www.civilwar.org/thoroughfaregap): Maps, facts, photos, and preservation news (Civil War Trust)
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Gen.Robert E. Lee
280
After the collapse of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's Peninsula Campaign in the Seven Days Battles of June 1862, President Abraham Lincoln appointed John Pope to command the newly formed Army of Virginia. Pope had achieved some success in the Western Theater, and Lincoln sought a more aggressive general than McClellan.[3] The Union Army of Virginia was divided into three corps of 51,000 men, under Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel (I Corps); Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks (II Corps); and Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell, who had led the losing Union army at First Bull Run (III Corps). Parts of three corps (III, V, and VI) of McClellan's Army of the Potomac and Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside's IX Corps (commanded by Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno), eventually joined Pope for combat operations, raising his strength to 77,000.[4] On the Confederate side, Gen. Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was organized into two "wings" or "commands" totaling about 55,000 men. The "right wing" was commanded by Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, the left by Maj. Gen. Stonewall Jackson. The Cavalry Division under Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart was attached to Jackson's wing.[5]
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Pope's mission was to fulfill two basic objectives: protect Washington and the Shenandoah Valley; and draw Confederate forces away from McClellan by moving in the direction of Gordonsville.[6] Based on his experience fighting McClellan in the Seven Days, Robert E. Lee perceived that McClellan was no further threat to him on the Virginia Peninsula, so he felt no compulsion to keep all of his forces in direct defense of Richmond. This allowed him to relocate Jackson to Gordonsville to block Pope and protect the Virginia Central [7] Railroad. Lee had larger plans in mind. Since the Union Army was split between McClellan and Pope and they were Northern Virginia Campaign, August 728, 1862. ConfederateUnion widely separated, Lee saw an opportunity to destroy Pope before returning his attention to McClellan. He committed Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill to join Jackson with 12,000 men. On August 3, General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck directed McClellan to begin his final withdrawal from the Peninsula and to return to Northern Virginia to support Pope. McClellan protested and did not begin his redeployment until August 14.[8] On August 9, Nathaniel Banks's corps attacked Jackson at Cedar Mountain, gaining an early advantage, but a Confederate counterattack led by A.P. Hill drove Banks back across Cedar Creek. Jackson's advance was stopped, however, by the Union division of Brig. Gen. James B. Ricketts. By now Jackson had learned that Pope's corps were all together, foiling his plan of defeating each in separate actions. He remained in position until August 12, then withdrew to Gordonsville.[9] On August 13, Lee sent Longstreet to reinforce Jackson. From August 22 to August 25, the two armies fought a series of minor actions along the Rappahannock River. Heavy rains had swollen the river and Lee was unable to force a crossing. By this time, reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac were arriving from the Peninsula. Lee's new plan in the face of all these additional forces outnumbering him was to send Jackson and Stuart with half of the army on a flanking march to cut Pope's line of communication, the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. Pope would be forced to retreat and could be defeated while moving and vulnerable. Jackson departed on August 25 and reached Salem (present-day Marshall) that night.[10] On the evening of August 26, after passing around Pope's right flank via Thoroughfare Gap, Jackson's wing of the army struck the Orange & Alexandria Railroad at Bristoe Station and before daybreak August 27 marched to capture and destroy the massive Union supply depot at Manassas Junction. This surprise movement forced Pope into an abrupt retreat from his defensive line along the Rappahannock. During the night of August 2728, Jackson marched his divisions north to the First Bull Run (Manassas) battlefield, where he took position behind an unfinished railroad grade below Stony Ridge.[11] The defensive position was a good one. The heavy woods allowed the Confederates to conceal themselves, while maintaining good observation points of the Warrenton Turnpike, the likely avenue of Union movement, only a few hundred yards to the south. There were good approach roads for Longstreet to join Jackson, or for Jackson to retreat to the Bull Run Mountains if he could not be reinforced in time. Finally, the unfinished railroad grade offered cuts and fills that could be used as ready-made entrenchments.[12]
Second Battle of Bull Run In the Battle of Thoroughfare Gap on August 28, Longstreet's wing broke through light Union resistance and marched through the gap to join Jackson. This seemingly inconsequential action virtually ensured Pope's defeat during the coming battles because it allowed the two wings of Lee's army to unite on the Manassas battlefield.[13]
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Battle
August 28: Brawner's Farm (Groveton)
The Second Battle of Bull Run began on August 28 as a Federal column, under Jackson's observation just outside of Gainesville, near the farm of the John Brawner family, moved along the Warrenton Turnpike. It consisted of units from Brig. Gen. Rufus King's division: the brigades of Brig. Gens. John P. Hatch, John Gibbon, Abner Doubleday, and Marsena R. Patrick, marching eastward to concentrate with the rest of Pope's army at Centreville. King was not with his division because he had suffered a serious epileptic attack earlier that day.[14] Jackson, who had been relieved to hear Action at Brawner's Farm, August 28. earlier that Longstreet's men were on their way to join him, displayed himself prominently to the Union troops, but his presence was disregarded. Concerned that Pope might be withdrawing his army behind Bull Run to link up with McClellan's arriving forces, Jackson determined to attack. Returning to his position behind the tree line, he told his subordinates, "Bring out your men, gentlemen." At about 6:30 p.m., Confederate artillery began shelling the portion of the column to their front, John Gibbon's Black Hat Brigade (later to be named the Iron Brigade). This soon-to-become-famous outfit were rookies who had never seen any combat action thus far (they had spent the whole Peninsula Campaign stationed in the Fredericksburg area) Gibbon, a former artilleryman, responded with fire from Battery B, 4th U.S. Artillery. The artillery exchange halted King's column. Hatch's brigade had proceeded past the area and Patrick's men, in the rear of the column, sought cover, leaving Gibbon and Doubleday to respond to Jackson's attack. Gibbon assumed that, since Jackson was supposedly at Centreville (according to Pope), and having just seen the 14th Brooklyn Zouaves of Hatch's Brigade reconnoiter the position, that these were merely horse artillery cannons from Jeb Stuart's cavalry.[15] Gibbon sent aides out to the other brigades with requests for reinforcements, and sent his staff officer Frank A. Haskell to bring the veteran 2nd Wisconsin Infantry up the hill to disperse the harassing cannons. Gibbon met the 2nd in the woods saying, "If we can get you up there quietly, we can capture those guns."[16]
Our men on the left loaded and fired with the energy of madmen, and the 6th worked with equal desperation. This stopped the rush of the enemy and they halted and fired upon us their deadly musketry. During a few awful moments, I could see by the lurid light of the powder flashes, the whole of both lines. The two ... were within ... fifty yards of each other pouring musketry into each other as fast as men could load and shoot. Maj. Rufus R. Dawes, 6th Wisconsin
[17]
The 2nd Wisconsin, under the command of Col. Edgar O'Connor, advanced obliquely back through the woods the Federal column was passing through. When the 430 men emerged from the woods on John Brawner's farm they were
Second Battle of Bull Run quietly formed and advanced up the hill. Upon reaching the plateau, they deployed skirmishers who drove back Confederate skirmishers. They soon received a heavy volley into their right flank by 800 men of the fabled Stonewall Brigade, commanded by Col. William S. Baylor. Absorbing the volley from 150 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm), the 2nd Wisconsin did not waver, but replied with a devastating volley at the Virginians in Brawner's orchard. The Confederates returned fire when the lines were only 80 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) apart. As units were added by both sides, the battle lines remained close together. Odd for a Civil War battle, the two sides simply stood and exchanged volleys in the old-fashioned Napoleonic style with soldiers lined up shoulder-to-shoulder firing at each other. Jackson described the action as "fierce and sanguinary." Gibbon added his 19th Indiana. Jackson, personally directing the actions of his regiments instead of passing orders to the division commander, Maj. Gen. Richard S. Ewell, sent in three Georgia regiments belonging to Brig. Gen. Alexander R. Lawton's brigade. Gibbon countered this advance with the 7th Wisconsin. Jackson ordered Brig. Gen. Isaac R. Trimble's brigade to support Lawton, which met the last of Gibbon's regiments, the 6th Wisconsin.[18] After Trimble's brigade entered the action, Gibbon needed to fill a gap in his line between the 6th Wisconsin and the rest of the Iron Brigade regiments. Doubleday sent in the 56th Pennsylvania and the 76th New York, who advanced through the woods and checked the new Confederate advance. These men arrived at the scene after dark and both Trimble and Lawton launched uncoordinated assaults against them. Horse artillery under Captain John Pelham was ordered forward by Jackson and fired at the 19th Indiana from less than 100 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm). The engagement ended around 9 p.m., with Gibbon's men slowly retreating backwards still firing, making their line at the edge of the woods. Doubleday's regiments retired to the turnpike in an orderly fashion. The fight was essentially a stalemate, but at a heavy cost, with over 1,150 Union and 1,250 Confederate casualties. The 2nd Wisconsin lost 276 of 430 engaged. The Stonewall brigade lost 340 out of 800. Two Georgia regimentsTrimble's 21st and Lawton's 26theach lost more than 70%. In all, one of every three men engaged in the fight was shot. Confederate Brig. Gen. William B. Taliaferro wrote, "In this fight there was no maneuvering and very little tactics. It was a question of endurance and both endured." Taliaferro was wounded, as was Ewell, whose left leg was shattered by a Mini ball and had to be amputated, removing him from action for the next 10 months.[19]
In a few moments our entire line was engaged in a fierce and sanguinary struggle with the enemy. As one line was repulsed another took its place and pressed forward as if determined by force of numbers and fury of assault to drive us from our positions. Maj. Gen. Stonewall Jackson
[20]
283
Jackson had not been able to achieve a decisive victory with his superior force (about 6,200 men against Gibbon's 2,100),[21] due to darkness, his piecemeal deployment of forces, the wounding of two of his key generals, and the tenacity of the enemy. But he had achieved his strategic intent, attracting the attention of John Pope. Pope wrongly assumed that the fight at the Brawner Farm occurred as Jackson was retreating from Centreville. Pope believed he had "bagged" Jackson and sought to capture him before he could be reinforced by Longstreet. Pope's dispatch sent that evening to Maj. Gen. Philip Kearny stated, in part, "General McDowell has intercepted the retreat of the enemy and is now in his front ... Unless he can escape by by-paths leading to the north to-night, he must be captured." Gibbon conferred with King, Patrick, and Doubleday as to the next move, because McDowell was "lost in the woods." Per Gibbon's recommendation, the only remaining Federal force still between Lee and Jackson moved out at 1 a.m. heading east on the pike towards Centreville.[22] Pope issued orders to his subordinates to surround Jackson and attack him in the morning, but he made several erroneous assumptions. He assumed that McDowell and Sigel were blocking Jackson's retreat routes toward the Bull Run Mountains, but the bulk of both units were southeast of Jackson along the Manassas-Sudley Road. Pope's assumption that Jackson was attempting to retreat was completely wrong; Jackson was in a good defensive position, anxiously awaiting the arrival of Longstreet to begin attacking Pope. Despite receiving intelligence of Longstreet's movements, Pope inexplicably discounted his effect on the battle to come.[23]
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285
By 1 p.m., Sigel's sector was reinforced by the division of Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker (III Corps) and the brigade of Brig. Gen. Isaac Stevens (IX Corps). Pope also arrived on the battlefield, expecting to see the culmination of his victory. By this time, Longstreet's initial units were in position to Jackson's right. Brig. Gen. John Bell Hood's division straddled the turnpike, loosely connected with Jackson's right flank. To Hood's right were the divisions of Brig. Gens. James L. Kemper and David R. "Neighbor" Jones. Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox's division arrived last and was placed into reserve.[28] Stuart's cavalry encountered Porter, Hatch, and McDowell moving up the Manassas-Gainesville Road and a brief firefight halted the Union column. Then a courier arrived with a message for Porter and McDowell, a controversial August 29, 12 noon: Longstreet arrives, Porter stalls. document from Pope that has become known as the "Joint Order". Historian John J. Hennessy described the order as a "masterpiece of contradiction and obfuscation that would become the focal point of decades of wrangling." It described the attacks on Jackson's left, which were already underway, but was unclear about what Porter and McDowell were supposed to do. Rather than moving "to" Gainesville and striking Jackson's supposedly unprotected right flank, it described a move "toward" Gainesville and "as soon as communication is established [with the other divisions] the whole command shall halt. It may be necessary to fall back behind Bull Run to Centreville tonight." Nowhere in the order did Pope explicitly direct Porter and McDowell to attack and he concluded the order with "If any considerable advantages are to be gained from departing from this order it will not be strictly carried out," rendering the document virtually useless as a military order.[29] Meanwhile, Stuart's cavalry under Col. Thomas Rosser deceived the Union generals by dragging tree branches behind a regiment of horses to simulate great clouds of dust from large columns of marching soldiers. At this time, McDowell received a report from his cavalry commander, Brig. Gen. John Buford, who reported that 17 regiments of infantry, one battery, and 500 cavalry were moving through Gainesville at 8:15 a.m. This was Longstreet's wing arriving from Thoroughfare Gap, and it warned the two Union generals that trouble lay to their front. The Union advance was again halted. For some reason, McDowell neglected to forward Buford's report to Pope until about 7 p.m., so the army commander was operating under two severe misconceptions: that Longstreet was not near the battlefield and that Porter and McDowell were marching to attack Jackson's right flank.[30] As Longstreet's men were placed into their final positions, General Lee ordered an offensive against the Union left. (Longstreet later remembered that Lee "was inclined to engage as soon as practicable, but did not order.") Longstreet, however, saw that the divisions of Reynolds and Schenck extended south of the Warrenton Turnpike, overlapping half of his line, and he argued against making the attack at that time. Lee eventually relented when Jeb Stuart reported that the force on the Gainesville-Manassas Road (Porter and McDowell) was formidable.[31]
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Pope, assuming that the attack on Jackson's right would proceed as he thought he had ordered, authorized four separate attacks against Jackson's front with the intent of diverging the Confederates' attention until Porter delivered the fatal blow. Brig. Gen. Cuvier Grover's brigade attacked at 3 p.m., expecting to be supported by Kearny's division. Grover was fortunate to accidentally strike through a gap in a line that opened between Thomas and Gregg. His spirited bayonet charge was successful temporarily, but Kearny once again did not move forward as ordered and Pope did not intend to support a major attack. Brig. Gen. Dorsey Pender's brigade beat back the attack.[32]
Reynolds was ordered to conduct a spoiling attack south of the turnpike and encountered Longstreet's men, causing him to call off his demonstration. Pope dismissed Reynolds's concern as a case of mistaken identity, insisting that Reynolds had run into Porter's V Corps, preparing to attack Jackson's flank. Jesse Reno ordered a IX Corps brigade under Col. James Nagle to attack the center of Jackson's line again. This time Brig. Gen. Isaac R. Trimble's brigade was driven back from the railroad embankment, but Confederate counterattacks restored the line and pursued Nagle's troops back into the open fields until Union artillery halted their advance.[33] At 4:30 p.m., Pope finally sent an explicit order to Porter to attack, but his aide (his nephew) lost his way and did not deliver the message until 6:30 p.m. In any event, Porter was in no better position to attack then than he was earlier in the day. But in anticipation of the attack that would not come, Pope ordered Kearny to attack Jackson's far left flank, intending to put strong pressure on both ends of the line. At 5 p.m., for the first time in the battle, Kearny's fierce offensive reputation was realized and he surged forward with ten regiments, striking A.P. Hill's depleted division. August 29, 57 p.m., Kearny's attack, Hood vs. Hatch. The brunt of the attack fell on Gregg's brigade, which had taken nine assaults that day and was nearly out of ammunition in addition to having lost most of its officers. They fell back onto the
Second Battle of Bull Run edge of a hillside, Gregg lopping some wildflowers with his old Revolutionary War scimitar and remarking "Let us die here my men, let us die here."[34] [35]A.P. Hill sent a message to Jackson calling for help. Jubal Early's brigade (which began the day on the extreme right of the Confederate line) and Lawrence O'Brien Branch's brigade (held in reserve so far) counterattacked and drove back Kearny's division. On the Confederate right, Longstreet observed a movement of McDowell's force away from his front; the I Corps was moving divisions to Henry House Hill to support Reynolds. This report caused Lee to revive his plan for an offensive in that sector. Longstreet once again argued against it, this time due to inadequate time before dusk. He suggested instead that a reconnaissance in force could feel the position of the enemy and set up the Confederates for a morning attack. Lee agreed and Hood's division was sent forward. At the same time, Pope, who maintained his delusion that the Confederates were retreating, sent the division of John P. Hatch west on the turnpike to pursue. Hood and Hatch collided briefly at the Groveton crossroads, but the short, violent confrontation ended at darkness and both sides withdrew. Longstreet and his subordinates again argued to Lee that they should not be attacking a force they considered to be placed in a strong defensive position, and for the third time, Lee canceled the planned assault.[36] When Pope learned from McDowell about Buford's report, he finally acknowledged that Longstreet was on the field, but he optimistically assumed that Longstreet was there only to reinforce Jackson while the entire Confederate army withdrew; Hood's division had in fact just done that. Pope issued explicit orders for Porter's corps to rejoin the main body of the army and planned for another offensive on August 30. Historian A. Wilson Greene argues that this was Pope's worst decision of the battle. Since he no longer had numerical superiority over the Confederates and did not possess any geographical advantage, the most prudent course would have been to withdraw his army over Bull Run and unite with McClellan's Army of the Potomac, which had 25,000 men nearby.[37] One of the historical controversies of the battle involves George B. McClellan's cooperation with John Pope. In late August, two full corps of the Army of the Potomac (William B. Franklin's VI Corps and Edwin V. Sumner's II Corps) had arrived in Alexandria, but McClellan would not allow them to advance to Manassas because of what he considered inadequate artillery, cavalry, and transportation support. He was accused by his political opponents of deliberately undermining Pope's position, and he did not help his case in history when he wrote to his wife on August 10, "Pope will be badly thrashed within two days & ... they will be very glad to turn over the redemption of their affairs to me. I won't undertake it unless I have full & entire control." He told Abraham Lincoln on August 29 that it might be wise "to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe."[38]
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Second Battle of Bull Run of the battle, Confederates in Col. Bradley T. Johnson's and Col. Leroy A. Stafford's brigades fired so much that they ran out of ammunition and resorted to throwing large rocks at the 24th New York, causing occasional damage, and prompting some of the surprised New Yorkers to throw them back. To support Jackson's exhausted defense, which was stretched to the breaking point, Longstreet's artillery added to the barrage against Union reinforcements attempting to move in, cutting them to pieces.[42] Having suffered significant casualties, Porter did not engage Sykes's reserve division and halted his assault, essentially leaving his lead brigades to extricate themselves without support. The withdrawal was also a costly operation. Some of the jubilant Confederates in Starke's brigade attempted a pursuit, but were beaten back by the Union reserves posted along the Groveton-Sudley Road. Overall, Jackson's command was too depleted to counterattack, allowing Porter to stabilize the situation north of the turnpike. Concerned about Porter's situation, however, Irvin McDowell ordered Reynolds's division to leave Chinn Ridge and come to Porter's support. This may have been the worst tactical decision of the day because it left only 2,200 Union troops south of the turnpike, where they would soon face ten times their number of Confederates.[43] Lee and Longstreet agreed that the time was right for the long awaited assault and that the objective would be Henry House Hill, which had been the key terrain in the First Battle of Bull Run, and which, if captured, would dominate the potential Union line of retreat. Longstreet's command of 25,000 men in five divisions stretched nearly a mile and a half from the Brawner Farm in the north to the Manassas Gap Railroad in the south. To reach the hill, they would have to traverse 1.5 to 2 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) of ground containing ridges, streams, and some August 30, 4 p.m.: Start of Longstreet's attack. heavily wooded areas. Longstreet knew that he would not be able to project a well coordinated battle line across this terrain, so he had to rely on the drive and initiative of his division commanders. The lead division, on the left, closest to the turnpike, was John Bell Hood's Texans, supported by Brig. Gen. Nathan G. "Shanks" Evans's South Carolinians. On Hood's right were Kemper's and Jones's divisions. Anderson's division was held as a ready reserve. Just before the attack, Lee signaled to Jackson: "General Longstreet is advancing; look out for and protect his left flank."[44]
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The Union defenders south of the turnpike consisted of only two brigades, commanded by Cols. Nathaniel C. McLean (Schenck's division, Sigel's I Corps) and Gouverneur K. Warren (Sykes's division, Porter's V Corps). McLean held Chinn Ridge, Warren was near Groveton, about 800 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) further west. Hood's men began the assault at 4 p.m., immediately overwhelming Warren's two regiments, the 5th New York (Durye's Zouaves) and 10th New York (the National Zouaves). Within the first 10 minutes of contact, the 500 men of the 5th New York lost almost 300 shot, 120 of them mortally wounded. This was the largest loss of life of any infantry regiment in a single August 30, 4:30 p.m.: Union defense of Chinn Ridge. battle during the entire war. The Zouave regiments had been wearing bright red and blue uniforms, and one of Hood's officers wrote that the bodies laying on the hill reminded him of the Texas countryside when the wildflowers were in bloom.[45] As Pope and McDowell realized the danger of their situation, they ordered units to occupy Henry House Hill, but until that could occur, McLean's brigade was the only obstacle to the Confederate onslaught. His 1,200 Ohioans in four regiments lined up, facing west on Chinn Ridge, with one artillery battery in support, and were able to repulse two assaults, first by Hood and then by Shanks Evans's brigade (Kemper's division). The third assault, by Col. Montgomery D. Corse's brigade (also Kemper's division), was successful. McLean's men mistakenly believed the men approaching the southern tip of the ridge were friendly and withheld their fire. When they realized their mistake, a fierce firefight ensued for over 10 minutes at virtually point-blank range. Added fire from a Louisiana artillery battery caused the Union line to collapse. The Ohio brigade suffered 33% casualties, but they gave Pope an additional 30 minutes to bring up reinforcements.[46] The first two Union brigades to arrive were from Rickett's division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Zealous B. Tower and Col. John W. Stiles. Tower's brigade was overwhelmed by attacks from three sides. His artillery battery was captured and he was seriously wounded. Stiles's brigade, following Tower, fell victim to two newly arrived brigades from Kemper's division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Micah Jenkins and Col. Eppa Hunton. During this intense fighting, the commander of the 12th Massachusetts, Col. Fletcher Webster (son of the statesman Daniel Webster), was mortally wounded. Two more Union brigades poured into the battle from Sigel's I Corps, commanded by Cols. John Koltes and Wodzimierz Krzyanowski, but had no more success than their predecessors. Both brigades were driven off in disorder and Koltes was killed. The lead elements of Jones's division, the brigades of Cols. George T. Anderson and Henry L. Benning, swept all Union resistance off Chinn Ridge by 6 p.m. However, the successful Confederate assault came at a high cost, both in men (Hood's and Kemper's divisions suffered heavy losses and were at least temporarily incapable of further offensive action) and in time. Henry House Hill was still several hundred yards away and there was only an hour of daylight remaining.[47]
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During the first two hours of the Confederate assault, Pope had been able to place four brigades in defense of Henry House Hill: two from Reynolds's division, one from Sykes's, and Brig. Gen. Robert H. Milroy's independent brigade. Lee realized that additional combat power would be required to complete his assault, so he ordered Richard Anderson's division from its reserve position. While these troops were moving up, D.R. Jones launched an attack on the hill with the brigades of Benning and G.T. Anderson. With 3,000 men, this was the largest concentrated attack of the afternoon, but it was poorly coordinated and the four Union brigades held their ground. Additional pressure was applied with the arrival of August 30, 5 p.m.: Final Confederate attacks, beginning of the Union retreat. two brigades from Anderson's division: Brig. Gens. William Mahone and Ambrose R. Wright. The regulars from Sykes's division had no natural defensive advantage on the end of the line and they were driven back toward the Henry House. Inexplicably, Anderson declined to exploit his opening, perhaps because of the growing darkness. The hill remained in Union hands.[49] Stonewall Jackson, under relatively ambiguous orders from Lee to support Longstreet, launched an attack north of the turnpike at 6 p.m., probably as soon as his exhausted forces could be mustered. Historian John J. Hennessy called Jackson's delays "one of the battle's great puzzles" and "one of the most significant Confederate failures" of the battle, greatly reducing the value of his advance.[50] The attack coincided with Pope's ordered withdrawal of units north of the turnpike to assist in the Henry House Hill defense and the Confederates were able to overrun a number of artillery and infantry units in their fierce assault. By 7 p.m., however, Pope had established a strong defensive line that aligned with the units on Henry House Hill. At 8 p.m., he ordered a general withdrawal on the turnpike to Centreville. Unlike the calamitous retreat at the First Battle of Bull Run, the Union movement was quiet and orderly. The Confederates, weary from battle and low on ammunition, did not pursue in the darkness. Although Lee had won a great victory, he had not achieved his objective of destroying Pope's army.[51]
Aftermath
Union casualties were about 10,000 killed and wounded out of 62,000 engaged; the Confederates lost about 1,300 killed and 7,000 wounded out of 50,000.[52] As the Union Army concentrated on Centreville, Lee planned his next move. He sent Jackson on another flanking march in an attempt to interpose his army between Pope and Washington. Pope countered the move and the two forces clashed a final time at the Battle of Chantilly (also known as Ox Hill) on September 1. Lee immediately began his next campaign on September 3, when the vanguard of the Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac River, marching toward a fateful encounter with the Army of the
Second Battle of Bull Run Potomac in the Maryland Campaign and the Battle of Antietam.[53]
A splendid army almost demoralized, millions of public property given up or destroyed, thousands of lives of our best men sacrificed for no purpose. I dare not trust myself to speak of this commander [Pope] as I feel and believe. Suffice to say ... that more insolence, superciliousness, ignorance, and pretentiousness were never combined in one man. It can in truth be said of him that he had not a friend in his command from the smallest drummer boy to the highest general officer. Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams (II Corps division commander)
[54]
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Pope was relieved of command on September 12, 1862, and his army was merged into the Army of the Potomac as it marched into Maryland under McClellan. He spent the remainder of the war in the Department of the Northwest in Minnesota, dealing with the Dakota War of 1862. Pope sought scapegoats to spread the blame for his defeat. On November 25, 1862, Fitz John Porter was arrested and court-martialed for his actions on August 29. Porter was found guilty on January 10, 1863, of disobedience and misconduct, and he was dismissed from the Army on January 21. He spent most of the remainder of his life fighting against the verdict. In 1878, a special commission under General John M. Schofield exonerated Porter by finding that his reluctance to attack Longstreet probably saved Pope's Army of Virginia from an even greater defeat. Eight years later, President Chester A. Arthur reversed Porter's sentence.[55] James Longstreet was criticized for his performance during the battle and the postbellum advocates of the Lost Cause claimed that his slowness, reluctance to attack, and disobedience to Gen. Lee on August 29 were a harbinger of his controversial performance to come on July 2, 1863, at the Battle of Gettysburg. Lee's biographer, Douglas Southall Freeman, wrote: "The seeds of much of the disaster at Gettysburg were sown in that instant when Lee yielded to Longstreet and Longstreet discovered that he would."[56]
Notes
[1] National Park Service (http:/ / www. cr. nps. gov/ hps/ abpp/ battles/ va026. htm). There were Confederate offensives in the war that employed more men57,000 at Gaines' Mill, for instancebut they involved multiple, piecemeal attacks over longer periods. [2] National Park Service (http:/ / www. cr. nps. gov/ hps/ abpp/ battles/ va026. htm) [3] Eicher, p. 318; Martin, pp. 24, 32-33; Hennessy, p. 12. [4] Martin, p. 280; Eicher, p. 318; Hennessy, p. 6. [5] Hennessy, pp. 561-67; Langellier, pp. 90-93. [6] Esposito, Map 54. [7] Whitehorne, Overview, np. [8] Hennessy, p. 10; Esposito, Map 56. [9] NPS Cedar Mountain summary (http:/ / www. nps. gov/ history/ hps/ abpp/ battles/ va022. htm). [10] Salmon, pp. 127-28; Eicher, pp. 322-23; Esposito, Map 58. [11] NPS Manassas Station Operations summary (http:/ / www. nps. gov/ history/ hps/ abpp/ battles/ va024. htm). [12] Hennessy, pp. 145, 200-01; Greene, p. 17. [13] NPS Thoroughfare Gap summary (http:/ / www. nps. gov/ history/ hps/ abpp/ battles/ va025. htm). [14] Greene, p. 19. [15] Dawes, p. 60. [16] Herdegen, p. 91; Greene, pp. 19-21; Eicher, p. 326; Salmon, p. 147. [17] Dawes, p. 62. [18] Herdegen, pp. 91-92; Hennessy, pp. 173-80; Greene, p. 21; Salmon, p. 147. [19] Hennessy, pp. 180-88; Eicher, p. 326; Greene, pp. 22-23; Salmon, p. 147. [20] Ropes, p. 134. [21] Time-Life, p. 139. [22] Nolan, pp. 92-93; Hennessy, p. 194. [23] Greene, pp. 23-24; Hennessy, p. 194. [24] Greene, pp. 24-25; Hennessy, pp. 201-02. [25] Hennessy, p. 204; Greene, pp. 26-27. [26] Salmon, p. 148; Whitehorne, Stop 5; Hennessy, pp. 205-14; Eicher, p. 328; Greene, p. 27. [27] Martin, pp. 171-72; Hennessy, pp. 221-22; Greene, p. 27. [28] Greene, pp. 27-28; Hennessy, pp. 226-28. [29] Esposito, map 62; Greene, pp. 28-29; Hennessy, pp. 232-36.
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References
Dawes, Rufus R. A Full Blown Yankee of the Iron Brigade: Service with the Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999. ISBN 0-8032-6618-9. First published 1890 by E. R. Alderman and Sons. Editors of Time-Life Books. Lee Takes Command: From Seven Days to Second Bull Run. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1984. ISBN 0-8094-4804-1. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website (http://www. dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/). Gallagher, Gary W. Lee and His Generals in War and Memory. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1998. ISBN 0-8071-2958-5. Greene, A. Wilson. The Second Battle of Manassas. National Park Service Civil War Series. Fort Washington, PA: U.S. National Park Service and Eastern National, 2006. ISBN 0-915992-85-X. Harsh, Joseph L. Confederate Tide Rising: Robert E. Lee and the Making of Southern Strategy, 18611862. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1998. ISBN 0-87338-580-2. Hennessy, John J. Return to Bull Run: The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993. ISBN 0-8061-3187-X. Herdegen, Lance J. The Men Stood Like Iron: How the Iron Brigade Won Its Name. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997. ISBN 0-253-33221-4. Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide (http://www.bibliobase.com/history/readerscomp/ civwar/html/cw_000106_entries.htm). 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Langellier, John. Second Manassas 1862: Robert E. Lee's Greatest Victory. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002. ISBN 1-84176-230-X.
Second Battle of Bull Run Longstreet, James. From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America. New York: Da Capo Press, 1992. ISBN 0-306-80464-6. First published in 1896 by J. B. Lippincott and Co. Martin, David G. The Second Bull Run Campaign: JulyAugust 1862. New York: Da Capo Press, 1997. ISBN 0-306-81332-7. Nolan, Alan T. The Iron Brigade, A Military History. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961. ISBN 0-253-34102-7. Ropes, John Codman. The Army in the Civil War. Vol. 4, The Army under Pope (http://books.google.com/ books?id=_ysOAAAAIAAJ&dq=Army+Under+Pope). New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1881. OCLC458186269. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Warner, Ezra J. Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964. ISBN 0-8071-0822-7. Wert, Jeffry D. General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Soldier: A Biography. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993. ISBN 0-671-70921-6. Whitehorne, Joseph W. A. The Battle of Second Manassas: Self-Guided Tour (http://www.history.army.mil/ books/Staff-Rides/2Manassas/2mns-fm.htm). Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 1990. OCLC20723735. Woodworth, Steven E., and Kenneth J. Winkle. Oxford Atlas of the Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. ISBN 0-19-522131-1. National Park Service battle description (http://www.nps.gov/history/hps/abpp/battles/va026.htm)
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Further reading
Ballard, Ted, and Billy Arthur. Second Bull Run Staff Ride: Briefing Book (http://www.history.army.mil/ StaffRide/Second_Bull_Run/Second_Bull Run_Staff_Ride_Briefing_Book.pdf). Carlisle, PA: United States Army Center of Military History, 1999?. OCLC42908426. Beaudot, William J. K., and Lance J. Herdegen. An Irishman in the Iron Brigade: The Civil War Memoirs of James P. Sullivan, Sergt., Company K, 6th Wisconsin Volunteers. New York: Fordham University Press, 1993. ISBN 978-0-8232-1501-0. Whitehorne, Joseph W. A. The Battle of Second Manassas: Self-Guided Tour (http://www.history.army.mil/ books/Staff-Rides/2Manassas/2mns-fm.htm). Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 1990. OCLC20723735.
External links
Manassas National Battlefield Park website (http://www.nps.gov/mana) Second Manassas Battlefield Page (http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/second-manassas.html): Battle maps, photos, history articles, and battlefield news (CWPT) Second Bull Run Order of Battle (http://www.brettschulte.net/OOBs/SecondBullRun/SecondBullRun.html) The Battle of Gainesville on the 2nd Wisconsin's Website (http://www.secondwi.com/wisconsinregiments/ battles2.htm) Animated History of the Second Manassas Campaign (http://www.civilwaranimated.com/ ManassasTwoAnimation.html) Peninsula Campaign and Second Battle of Manassas animation (http://www.theartofbattle.com/ peninsula-campaign-and-second-battle-of-manassas-1862.htm) by Neal West Eye witness accounts by Sergeant Luther Mesnard of Company D of OH 55th (http://freepages.military. rootsweb.ancestry.com/~redmurdock/LutherMesnard.html)
Battle of Chantilly
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Battle of Chantilly
The Battle of Chantilly (or Ox Hill, the Confederate name) took place on September 1, 1862, in Fairfax County, Virginia, as the concluding battle of the Northern Virginia Campaign of the American Civil War. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's corps of the Army of Northern Virginia attempted to cut off the line of retreat of the Union Army of Virginia but was attacked by two Union divisions. During the ensuing battle, both Union division commanders were killed but the Union attack halted Jackson's advance.
Background
Further information: Confederate order of battle, Union order of battle Defeated in the Second Battle of Bull Run on August 30, Union Maj. Gen. John Pope ordered his Army of Virginia to retreat to Centreville. The movement began after dark, with Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell's III Corps providing cover. The army crossed Bull Run and the last troops across, Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel's I Corps, destroyed Stone Bridge behind them. Gen. Robert E. Lee decided not to press the advantage gained that day, largely because he knew his Army of Northern Virginia was exhausted from two weeks of nearly constant marching and nearly three days of battle, so the Union retreat went unmolested. Lee's decision also allowed the Army of Virginia's II Corps, under Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks, to consolidate with the bulk of Pope's army, marching in from Bristoe Station, where they had been guarding the army's trains. More importantly, Lee's decision bought time for the Union to push to the front the Army of the Potomac's II, V, and VI Corps, which had been brought from the Peninsula andmuch to Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's dismayplaced under Pope's command.[1] By the morning of August 31, Pope began to lose his grasp on command of his army. The defeat at Second Bull Run seemed to have shattered his nerve and Pope was unsure what to do next; he knew Washington wanted an attack but he feared Lee might strike first and destroy his reforming force before it was ready to fight again. Calling a conference of his corps commanderssomething he had been loath to do previously in the Virginia Campaignin his Centreville headquarters, Pope agreed with their decision to retreat further into the Washington defenses. But a message from General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck directed him to attack and he ordered an advance on Lee's forces on the Manassas field.[2] Lee, however, had already set in motion his own plan that would rob Pope of the initiative to attack. Lee directed Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson to march his troops around Pope's right flank to get behind the Union position at Centreville. Leading the way and scouting for any Union blocking force was Confederate cavalry under the command of Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart. Maj. Gen. James Longstreet's command would remain in place for the day to deceive Pope into believing that Lee's entire force remained in his front, while Jackson's command made their flanking march, north and then east, to take strategically important Germantown, Virginia, where Pope's only two routes to Washingtonthe Warrenton Pike (modern U.S. Route 29) and the Little River Turnpike (modern U.S. Route 50)converged. Jackson's men, hungry and worn, moved slowly and bivouacked for the night at Pleasant Valley, three miles northeast of Centreville. As Pope settled down for the night on August 31, he was unaware that Lee was on the verge of turning his flank.[3] During the night two events occurred that would force Pope to change his mind. A staff officer arrived from the Germantown position to report that a heavy force of cavalry had shelled the intersection before retreating. Fortunately for Lee and Stuart, Pope dismissed the cavalry as little more than a patrol. But when, hours later, two Union cavalrymen reported seeing a large mass of infantry marching east down the Little River Turnpike, Pope realized that his army was in danger. He countermanded actions preparing for an attack and directed the army to retreat from Centreville to Washington; he also sent out a series of infantry probes up the roads that Lee might use to reach his troops as they pulled back.[4]
Battle of Chantilly
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Battle
On the morning of September 1, Pope ordered Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner of the II Corps, Army of the Potomac, to send a brigade north to reconnoiter; the army's cavalry was too exhausted for the mission. But at the same time, he continued his movement in the direction of Washington, sending McDowell's corps to Germantown (on the western border of modern day Fairfax, Virginia), where it could protect an important intersection the army needed for the retreat. He also sent two brigades from Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno's IX Corps, under the command of Brig. Gen. Isaac Stevens, to block Jackson. Maj. Gen. Philip Kearny's division from the III Corps followed later that afternoon.[5]
Jackson resumed his march to the south, but his troops were tired and hungry and made poor progress as the rain continued. They marched only three miles and occupied Ox Hill, southeast of Chantilly Plantation, and halted, while Jackson himself took a nap. All during the morning, Confederate cavalry skirmished with Union infantry and cavalry. At about 3 p.m., Steven's division arrived at Ox Hill. Despite being outnumbered, Stevens chose to attack across a grassy field against Brig. Gen. Alexander Lawton's division in the Confederate center. The Union attack was initially successful, routing the brigade of Colonel Henry Strong and driving in the flank of Captain William Brown, with Brown killed during the fighting. The Union division was driven back following a counterattack by Brig. Gen. Jubal Early's brigade. Stevens was killed during this attack about 5 p.m. by a shot through his temple.[6] A severe thunderstorm erupted about this time, resulting in limited visibility and an increased dependence on the bayonet, as the rain soaked the ammunition of the infantry and made it useless. Kearny arrived about this time with his division and deployed Brig. Gen. David B. Birney's brigade on Stevens's left, ordering it to attack across the field. Birney managed to maneuver close to the Confederate line but his attack stalled in hand-to-hand combat with Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill's division. Kearny mistakenly rode into the Confederate lines during the battle and was killed. As Kearny's other two brigades arrived on the field, Birney used the reinforcements as a rear guard as he withdrew the remainder of the Union force to the southern side of the farm fields, ending the battle.[7]
Aftermath
That night, Longstreet arrived to relieve Jackson's troops and to renew the battle in the morning. The lines were so close that some soldiers accidentally stumbled into the camps of the opposing army. The Union army withdrew to Germantown and Fairfax Court House that night, followed over the next few days by retreating to the defenses of Washington. The Confederate cavalry would attempt a pursuit but failed to cause significant damage to the Union army.[8] The fighting was tactically inconclusive. Although Jackson's turning movement was foiled and he was unable to block the Union retreat or destroy Pope's army, National Park Service historians count Chantilly as a strategic Confederate victory because it neutralized any threat from Pope's army and cleared the way for Lee to begin his Maryland Campaign.[9] The Confederates claimed a tactical victory as well because they held the field after the battle. Two Union generals were killed, while one Confederate brigade commander was killed. Pope, recognizing the attack as an indication of continued danger to his army, continued his retreat to the fortifications around Washington, D.C. Lee began the Maryland Campaign, which culminated in the Battle of Antietam, after Pope retreated out of Virginia. The Army of the Potomac, under Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, absorbed the forces of Pope's Army of Virginia, which was disbanded as a separate army.[10]
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Battlefield today
The site of the battle, once rural farmland, is now surrounded by suburban development in Fairfax County. The modern thoroughfares of Route 50 (Lee-Jackson Memorial Highway) and State Route 7100 (Fairfax County Parkway), as well as State Route 608 (West Ox Road) intersect near the location of the battle. A 4.8 acre (19,000 m) memorial park, the Ox Hill Battlefield Park, is located off of West Ox Road and lies adjacent to the Fairfax Towne Center shopping area, and includes the site of the battle. The park is under the jurisdiction of the Fairfax County Park Authority; in January 2005, the Authority approved a General Management Plan and Conceptual Development Plan[11] that sets forth a detailed history and future management framework for the site.[12]
A small yard located within the nearby Fairfax Towne Center has been preserved to mark the area where Robert E. Lee and his troops marched across to get to the Ox Hill Battlefield.[13]
Notes
[1] Hennessy, pp. 43638. [2] Hennessy, pp. 44041. [3] Hennessy, pp. 44143. [4] Hennessy, pp. 44648. [5] Taylor, pp. 33, 4749. [6] Taylor, pp. 3940, 5153, 6369. [7] Taylor, pp. 70, 7787, 90. [8] Taylor, pp. 9091, 93. [9] CWSAC Report Update (http:/ / www. nps. gov/ history/ hps/ abpp/ CWSII/ VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/ Chantilly to Cold Harbor. pdf) [10] Taylor, pp. 109111; Hennessy, pp. 45355. [11] Fairfax County Park Authority plan (http:/ / www. fairfaxcounty. gov/ parks/ gmp/ oxhillgmp. pdf) [12] Taylor, pp. 12528. [13] Taylor, p. 128.
References
Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website (http://www. dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/). Hennessy, John J. Return to Bull Run: The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993. ISBN 0-671-79368-3. Ropes, John Codman. The Army in the Civil War. Vol. 4, The Army under Pope. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1881. OCLC458186269. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Taylor, Paul. He Hath Loosed the Fateful Lightning: The Battle of Ox Hill (Chantilly), September 1, 1862. Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishers, 2003. ISBN 1-57249-329-1. National Park Service battle description (http://www.nps.gov/history/hps/abpp/battles/va027.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/history/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Chantilly to Cold Harbor.pdf)
Battle of Chantilly
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Further reading
Mauro, Charles V. The Battle of Chantilly (Ox Hill): A Monumental Storm. Fairfax, VA: Fairfax County History Commission, 2002. ISBN 0-914927-35-3. Welker, David. Tempest at Ox Hill: The Battle of Chantilly. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2002. ISBN 978-0-306-81118-0.
External links
The Battle of Chantilly (http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/chantilly.html): Animated maps, histories, photos, and preservation news (Civil War Trust) The Battle of Chantilly (Ox Hill), a docudrama about the battle (http://www.blmproductions.com/ BLM_Productions/The_Battle_of_Chantilly.html)
Maryland Campaign
The Maryland Campaignor Antietam Campaignoccurred September 420, 1862, during the American Civil War. Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee's first invasion of the North was repulsed by the Army of the Potomac under Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, who moved to intercept Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia and eventually attacked it near Sharpsburg, Maryland. The resulting Battle of Antietam was the bloodiest single-day battle in American history and is widely considered one of the major turning points of the war.
George B. McClellan and Robert E. Lee, commanding generals of the Maryland Campaign
Following his victory in the Northern Virginia Campaign, Lee moved north with 55,000 men through the Shenandoah Valley starting on September 4, 1862. His objective was to resupply his army outside of the war-torn Virginia theater and to damage Northern morale in anticipation of the November elections. He undertook the risky maneuver of splitting his army so that he could continue north into Maryland while simultaneously capturing the Federal garrison and arsenal at Harpers Ferry. McClellan accidentally found a copy of Lee's orders to his subordinate commanders and planned to isolate and defeat the separated portions of Lee's army. While Confederate Maj. Gen. Stonewall Jackson surrounded, bombarded, and captured Harpers Ferry (September 1215), McClellan's army of 84,000 men attempted to move quickly through the South Mountain passes that separated him from Lee. The Battle of South Mountain on September 14 delayed McClellan's advance and allowed Lee sufficient time to concentrate most of his army at Sharpsburg. The Battle of Antietam (or Sharpsburg) on September 17 was the bloodiest day in American military history with over 22,000 casualties. Lee, outnumbered two to one, moved his defensive forces to parry each offensive blow, but McClellan never deployed all of the reserves of his army to capitalize on localized successes and destroy the Confederates. On September 18, Lee ordered a withdrawal across the Potomac and on September 1920, fights by Lee's rear guard at Shepherdstown ended the campaign.
Maryland Campaign Although Antietam was a tactical draw, Lee's Maryland Campaign failed to achieve its objectives. President Abraham Lincoln used this Union victory as the justification for announcing his Emancipation Proclamation, which effectively ended any threat of European support for the Confederacy.
299
Background
The year 1862 started out well for Union forces in the Eastern Theater. George B. McClellan's Army of the Potomac had invaded the Virginia Peninsula during the Peninsula Campaign and by June stood only a few miles outside the Confederate capital at Richmond. But, when Robert E. Lee assumed command of the Army of Northern Virginia on June 1, 1862, fortunes reversed. Lee fought McClellan aggressively in the Seven Days Battles; McClellan lost his nerve, and his army retreated down the Peninsula. Lee then conducted the Northern Virginia Campaign in which he outmaneuvered and defeated Maj. Gen. John Pope and his Army of Virginia, most significantly at the Second Battle of Bull Run (Second Manassas). Lee's Maryland Campaign can be considered the concluding part of a logically connected, three-campaign, summer offensive against Federal forces in the Eastern Theater.[1] The Confederates had suffered significant manpower losses in the wake of the summer campaigns. Nevertheless, Lee decided his army was ready for a great challenge: an invasion of the North. His goal was to reach the major Northern states of Maryland and Pennsylvania, and cut off the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad line that supplied Washington, D.C. His movements would threaten Washington and Baltimore, so as to "annoy and harass the enemy."[2] Several motives led to Lee's decision to launch an invasion. First, he needed to supply his army and knew the farms of the North had been untouched by war, unlike those in Virginia. Moving the war northward would relieve pressure on Virginia. Second was the issue of Northern morale. Lee knew the Confederacy did not have to win the war by defeating the North militarily; it merely needed to make the Northern populace and government unwilling to continue the fight. With the Congressional elections of 1862 approaching in November, Lee believed that an invading army playing havoc inside the North could tip the balance of Congress to the Democratic Party, which might force Abraham Lincoln to negotiate an end to the war. He told Confederate President Jefferson Davis in a letter of September 3 that the enemy was "much weakened and demoralized."[3] There were secondary reasons as well. The Confederate invasion might be able to incite an uprising in Maryland, especially given that it was a slave-holding state and many of its citizens held a sympathetic stance toward the South. Some Confederate politicians, including Jefferson Davis, believed the prospect of foreign recognition for the Confederacy would be made stronger by a military victory on Northern soil, but there is no evidence that Lee thought the South should base its military plans on this possibility. Nevertheless, the news of the victory at Second Bull Run and the start of Lee's invasion caused considerable diplomatic activity between the Confederate States and France and England.[4] After the defeat of Pope at Second Bull Run, President Lincoln reluctantly returned to the man who had mended a broken army beforeGeorge B. McClellan after the Union defeat at the First Battle of Bull Run (First Manassas). He knew that McClellan was a strong organizer and a skilled trainer of troops, able to recombine the units of Pope's army with the Army of the Potomac faster than anyone. On September 2, 1862, Lincoln named McClellan to command "the fortifications of Washington, and all the troops for the defense of the capital."[5] The appointment was controversial in the Cabinet, a majority of whom signed a petition declaring to the president "our deliberate opinion that, at this time, it is not safe to entrust to Major General McClellan the command of any Army of the United States."[6] The president admitted that it was like "curing the bite with the hair of the dog." But Lincoln told his secretary, John Hay, "We must use what tools we have. There is no man in the Army who can man these fortifications and lick these troops of ours into shape half as well as he. If he can't fight himself, he excels in making others ready to fight."[7]
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Opposing forces
Confederate
Confederate corps commanders
Further information: Antietam Confederate order of battle General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was organized into two large infantry corps, about 55,000 effectives at the beginning of September.[8] The First Corps, under Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, consisted of the divisions of Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws, Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson, Brig. Gen. David R. Jones, Brig. Gen. John G. Walker, Brig. Gen. John Bell Hood, and an independent brigade under Brig. Gen. Nathan G. "Shanks" Evans. The Second Corps, under Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, consisted of the divisions of Brig. Gen. Alexander R. Lawton, Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill (the Light Division), Brig. Gen. John R. Jones, and Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill. The remaining units were the Cavalry Corps, under Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart, and the reserve artillery, commanded by Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton. The Second Corps was organized with artillery attached to each division, in contrast to the First Corps, which reserved its artillery at the corps level.
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Union
Union corps commanders
Further information: Antietam Union order of battle Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's Army of the Potomac, bolstered by units absorbed from John Pope's Army of Virginia, included six infantry corps, about 84,000 men.[9] The I Corps, under Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, consisted of the divisions of Brig. Gens. Rufus King, James B. Ricketts, and George G. Meade. The II Corps, under Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, consisted of the divisions of Maj. Gens. Israel B. Richardson and John Sedgwick, and Brig. Gen. William H. French. The V Corps, under Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter, consisted of the divisions of Maj. Gen. George W. Morell, Brig. Gen. George Sykes, and Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys. The VI Corps, under Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin, consisted of the divisions of Maj. Gens. Henry W. Slocum and William F. "Baldy" Smith, and a division from the IV Corps under Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch. The IX Corps, under Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, consisted of the divisions of Brig. Gens. Orlando B. Willcox, Samuel D. Sturgis, and Isaac P. Rodman, and the Kanawha Division, under Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox.
Maryland Campaign The XII Corps, under Maj. Gen. Joseph K. Mansfield, consisted of the divisions of Brig. Gens. Alpheus S. Williams and George S. Greene, and the cavalry division of Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton. During the march north into Maryland, McClellan changed his army's command structure, appointing commanders for three "wings": the left, commanded by William B. Franklin, consisted of his own VI Corps plus the division of Darius Couch; the center, under Edwin Sumner, consisted of his II Corps and the XII Corps; the right, under Ambrose Burnside, consisted of his IX Corps (temporarily commanded by Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno) and the I Corps. This wing organization was revoked just before the start of the Battle of Antietam.[10]
302
Initial movements
On September 3, just two days after the Battle of Chantilly, Lee wrote to President Davis that he had decided to cross into Maryland unless the president objected. On the same day, Lee began shifting his army north and west from Chantilly towards Leesburg, Virginia. On September 4, advance elements of the Army of Northern Virginia crossed into Maryland from Loudoun County. The main body of the army advanced into Frederick, Maryland, on September 7. The 55,000-man army had been reinforced by troops who had been defending Richmondthe divisions of Maj. Gens. D.H. Hill and Lafayette McLaws and two brigades under Brig. Gen. John G. Walkerbut they merely made up for the 9,000 men lost at Bull Run and Chantilly.[11] Lee's invasion coincided with another Maryland Campaign, actions September 315, 1862 ConfederateUnion strategic offensive by the Confederacy. Generals Braxton Bragg and Edmund Kirby Smith had simultaneously launched invasions of Kentucky.[12] Jefferson Davis sent to all three generals a draft public proclamation, with blank spaces available for them to insert the name of whatever state their invading forces might reach. Davis wrote to explain to the public (and, indirectly, the European Powers) why the South seemed to be changing its strategy. Until this point, the Confederacy had claimed it was the victim of aggression and was merely defending itself against "foreign invasion." Davis explained that the Confederacy was still waging a war of self-defense. He wrote there was "no design of conquest," and that the invasions were only an aggressive effort to force the Lincoln government to let the South go in peace. "We are driven to protect our own country by transferring the seat of war to that of an enemy who pursues us with a relentless and apparently aimless hostility."[13] Davis's draft proclamation did not reach his generals until after they had issued proclamations of their own. They stressed that they had come as liberators, not conquerors, to these border states, but they did not address the larger issue of the Confederate strategy shift as Davis had desired. Lee's proclamation announced to the people of Maryland that his army had come "with the deepest sympathy [for] the wrongs that have been inflicted upon the citizens of the
Maryland Campaign commonwealth allied to the States of the South by the strongest social, political, and commercial ties ... to aid you in throwing off this foreign yoke, to enable you again to enjoy the inalienable rights of freemen."[14]
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Reactions to invasion
Lee's invasion was fraught with difficulties from the beginning. The Confederate Army's numerical strength suffered in the wake of straggling and desertion. Although he started from Chantilly with 55,000 men, within 10 days this number had diminished to 45,000.[19] Some troops refused to cross the Potomac River because an invasion of Union territory violated their beliefs that they were fighting only to defend their states from Northern aggression. Countless others became ill with diarrhea after eating unripe "green corn" from the Maryland fields or fell out because their shoeless feet were bloodied on hard-surfaced Northern roads.[17] Lee ordered his commanders to deal harshly with stragglers, whom he considered cowards "who desert their comrades in peril" and were therefore "unworthy members of an army that has immortalized itself" in its recent campaigns.[20] Upon entering Maryland, the Confederates found little support; rather, they were met with reactions that ranged from a cool lack of enthusiasm, to, in most cases, open hostility. Robert E. Lee was disappointed at the state's resistance, a condition that he had not anticipated. Although Maryland was a slaveholding state, Confederate sympathies were considerably less pronounced among the civilian population, which generally supported the Union cause, than among the pro-secession Maryland legislature. Furthermore, many of the fiercely pro-Southern Marylanders had already traveled south at the beginning of the war to join the Confederate Army in Virginia. Only a "few score" of men joined Lee's columns in Maryland.[21] Maryland and Pennsylvania, alarmed and outraged by the invasion, rose at once to arms. Pennsylvania Governor Andrew Curtin called for 50,000 militia to turn out, and he nominated Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds, a native Pennsylvanian, to command them. (This caused considerable frustration to McClellan and Reynolds's corps commander, Joseph Hooker, but general-in-chief Henry W. Halleck ordered Reynolds to serve under Curtin and told Hooker to find a new division commander.) As far north as Wilkes-Barre, church and courthouse bells rang out, calling men to drill.[22] In Maryland, panic was much more widespread than in Pennsylvania, which was not yet immediately threatened. Baltimore, which Lee incorrectly regarded as a hotbed of secession merely waiting for the appearance of Confederate armies to revolt, took up the war call against him immediately.[23] When it was learned in Baltimore that Southern armies had crossed the Potomac, the reaction was one of instantaneous hysteria followed quickly by stoic resolution. Crowds milled in the street outside newspaper offices waiting for the latest bulletins, and the sale of liquor was halted to restrain the excitable. The public stocked up on
Maryland Campaign food and other essentials, fearing a siege. Philadelphia was also sent into a flurry of frenzied preparations, despite being over 150 miles (240km) from Hagerstown and in no immediate danger.[24]
304
McClellan's pursuit
I did not believe before coming here that there was so much Union feeling in the state. ... The whole population [of Frederick] seemed to turn out to welcome us. When Genl McClellan came thro[ugh] the ladies nearly eat him up, they kissed his clothing, threw their arms around his horse's neck and committed all sorts of extravagances. Brig. Gen. John Gibbon
[25]
McClellan moved out of Washington starting on September 7 with his 87,000-man army in a lethargic pursuit.[26] He was a naturally cautious general and assumed he would be facing over 120,000 Confederates. He also was maintaining running arguments with the government in Washington, demanding that the forces defending the capital city report to him.[27] The army started with relatively low morale, a consequence of its defeats on the Peninsula and at Second Bull Run, but upon crossing into Maryland, their spirits were boosted by the "friendly, almost tumultuous welcome" that they received from the citizens of the state.[28] The Army of the Potomac reached Frederick, Maryland, on September 13. There, Union soldiers discovered a mislaid copy of the detailed campaign plans of Lee's armySpecial Order 191wrapped around three cigars. The order indicated that Lee had divided his army and dispersed portions geographically, thus making each subject to isolation and defeat in detail. Upon realizing the intelligence value of this discovery, McClellan threw up his arms and exclaimed, "Now I know what to do!" He waved the order at his old Army friend, Brig. Gen. John Gibbon, and said, "Here is a paper with which if I cannot whip Bobbie Lee, I will be willing to go home." He telegraphed President Lincoln: "I have the whole rebel force in front of me, but I am confident, and no time shall be lost. I think Lee has made a gross mistake, and that he will be severely punished for it. I have all the plans of the rebels, and will catch them in their own trap if my men are equal to the emergency. ... Will send you trophies." McClellan waited 18 hours before deciding to take advantage of this intelligence. His delay squandered the opportunity to destroy Lee's army.[29] On the night of September 13, the Army of the Potomac moved toward South Mountain, with Burnside's right wing of the army directed to Turner's Gap, and Franklin's left wing to Crampton's Gap. South Mountain is the name given to the continuation of the Blue Ridge Mountains after they enter Maryland. It is a natural obstacle that separates the Shenandoah Valley and Cumberland Valley from the eastern part of Maryland. Crossing the passes of South Mountain was the only way to reach Lee's army.[30] Lee, seeing McClellan's uncharacteristic aggressive actions, and possibly learning through a Confederate sympathizer that his order had been compromised,[31] quickly moved to concentrate his army. He chose not to abandon his invasion and return to Virginia yet, because Jackson had not completed the capture of Harpers Ferry. Instead, he chose to make a stand at Sharpsburg, Maryland. In the meantime, elements of the Army of Northern Virginia waited in defense of the passes of South Mountain.[32] Although he was being pursued at a leisurely pace by Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan and the Union Army of the Potomac, outnumbering him more than two to one, Lee chose the risky strategy of dividing his army to seize the prize of Harpers Ferry. While the corps of Maj. Gen. James Longstreet drove north in the direction of Hagerstown, Lee sent columns of troops to converge and attack Harpers Ferry from three directions. The largest column, 11,500 men under Jackson, was to recross the Potomac and circle around to the west of Harpers Ferry and attack it from Bolivar Heights, while the other two columns, under Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws (8,000 men) and Brig. Gen. John G. Walker (3,400), were to capture Maryland Heights and Loudoun Heights, commanding the town from the east and south.[33]
Maryland Campaign
305
South Mountain
Further information: Battle of South Mountain, Battle of Crampton's Gap Pitched battles were fought on September 14 for possession of the South Mountain passes: Crampton's, Turner's, and Fox's Gaps. Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill defended Turner's and Fox's Gaps against Burnside. To the south, Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws defended Crampton's Gap against Franklin. Franklin was able to break through at Crampton's Gap, but the Confederates were able to hold Turner's and Fox's, if only precariously. Lee realized the futility of his position against the numerically superior Union forces, and he ordered his troops to Sharpsburg. McClellan was then theoretically in a position to destroy Lee's army before it could concentrate. McClellan's limited activity on September 15 after his victory at South Mountain, however, condemned the garrison at Harpers Ferry to capture and gave Lee time to unite his scattered divisions at Sharpsburg.[36]
Maryland Campaign
306
Antietam (Sharpsburg)
Further information: Battle of Antietam On September 16, McClellan confronted Lee near Sharpsburg, defending a line to the west of Antietam Creek. At dawn on September 17, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker's I Corps mounted a powerful assault on Lee's left flank that began the bloody battle. Attacks and counterattacks swept across the Miller Cornfield and the woods near the Dunker Church as Maj. Gen. Joseph K. Mansfield's XII Corps joined to reinforce Hooker. Union assaults against the Sunken Road ("Bloody Lane") by Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner's II Corps eventually pierced the Confederate center, but the Federal advantage was not pressed. In the afternoon, Burnside's IX Corps crossed a stone bridge over Antietam Creek and rolled up the Confederate right. At a crucial moment, A.P. Hill's division arrived from Harpers Ferry and counterattacked, driving back Burnside's men and saving Lee's army from destruction. Although outnumbered two to one, Lee committed his entire force, while McClellan sent in only four of his six available Battle of Antietam (Sharpsburg), September 17, corps. This enabled Lee to shift brigades across the battlefield and 1862 counter each individual Union assault. During the night, both armies consolidated their lines. In spite of crippling casualtiesUnion 12,401, or 25%; Confederate 10,316, or 31%Lee continued to skirmish with McClellan throughout September 18, while transporting his wounded men south of the Potomac. McClellan did not renew the offensive. After dark, Lee ordered the battered Army of Northern Virginia to withdraw across the Potomac into the Shenandoah Valley.[37]
Shepherdstown
Further information: Battle of Shepherdstown On September 19, a detachment of Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter's V Corps pushed across the river at Boteler's Ford, attacked the Confederate rear guard commanded by Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton, and captured four guns. Early on September 20, Porter pushed elements of two divisions across the Potomac to establish a bridgehead. A.P. Hill's division counterattacked while many of the Federals were crossing and nearly annihilated the 118th Pennsylvania (the "Corn Exchange" Regiment), inflicting 269 casualties. This rearguard action discouraged further Federal pursuit.[38]
Maryland Campaign
307
Lee successfully withdrew across the Potomac, ending the Maryland Campaign and summer campaigning altogether. President Lincoln was disappointed in McClellan's performance. He believed that the general's cautious and poorly coordinated actions in the field had forced the battle to a draw rather than a crippling Confederate defeat. He was even more astonished that from September 17 to October 26, despite repeated entreaties from the War Department and the president, McClellan declined to pursue Lee across the Potomac, citing shortages of equipment and the fear of overextending his forces. General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck wrote in his official report, "The Confederate dead at Antietam long inactivity of so large an army in the face of a defeated foe, and during the most favorable season for rapid movements and a vigorous campaign, was a matter of great disappointment and regret."[39] Lincoln relieved McClellan of his command of the Army of the Potomac on November 7, effectively ending the general's military career. Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside rose to command the Army of the Potomac. The Eastern Theater was relatively quiet until December, when Lee faced Burnside at the Battle of Fredericksburg.[40] Although a tactical draw, the Battle of Antietam was a strategic victory for the Union. It forced the end of Lee's strategic invasion of the North and gave Abraham Lincoln the victory he was awaiting before announcing the Emancipation Proclamation on September 22, which took effect on January 1, 1863. Although Lincoln had intended to do so earlier, he was advised by his Cabinet to make this announcement after a Union victory to avoid the perception that it was issued out of desperation. The Confederate reversal at Antietam also dissuaded the governments of France and Great Britain from recognizing the Confederacy. And, with the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation, it became less likely that future battlefield victories would induce foreign recognition. Lincoln had effectively highlighted slavery as a tenet of the Confederate States of America, and the abhorrence of slavery in France and Great Britain would not allow for intervention on behalf of the South.[41]
Notes
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] Eicher, pp. 268-334; McPherson, pp. 30-34, 44-47, 80-86. Sears, Landscape, pp. 65-66; Esposito, text for map 65; Eicher, p. 336-37. McPherson, pp. 89-92; Glatthaar, p. 164; Eicher, p. 337. McPherson, pp. 91-94; Eicher, p. 337. Rafuse, p. 268; McPherson, pp. 86-87. Sears, McClellan, p. 260. Bailey, Bloodiest Day, p. 15. Eicher, p. 337; O.R. Series 1, Vol. XIX part 2 (S# 28), p. 621; Luvaas and Nelson, pp. 294-300; Esposito, map 67; Sears, Landscape, pp. 366-72. Although most histories, including the Official Records, refer to these organizations as Corps, that designation was not formally made until November 6, 1862, after the Maryland Campaign. Longstreet's unit was referred to as the Right Wing, Jackson's the Left Wing, for most of 1862. (Gen. Lee referred in official correspondence to these as "commands". See, for instance, Luvaas and Nelson, p. 4.) Harsh, Sounding the Shallows, pp. 32-90, states that D.H. Hill was temporarily in command of a "Center Wing" with his own division (commanded initially by Brig. Gen. Roswell S. Ripley, and the divisions of Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws and Brig. Gen. John G. Walker. The other references list him strictly as a division commander. [9] Eicher, p. 338. [10] Sears, Landscape, p. 102. [11] Sears, Landscape, p. 69. [12] McPherson, p. 75; Sears, Landscape, p. 63. The word invasion has been used historically for these operations, and in the case of Kentucky it is valid. The Confederacy was attempting to regain territory it believed was its own. In the case of Maryland, however, Lee had no plans to seize and hold Union territory, and therefore his actions would more properly be described as a strategic raid or an incursion. [13] Sears, Landscape, pp. 68-69. [14] McPherson, p. 91; Sears, Landscape, pp. 68-69. [15] Eicher, p. 339 [16] Bailey, p. 38.
Maryland Campaign
[17] Sears, Landscape, p. 83. [18] Rafuse, pp. 285-86. [19] McPherson, p. 100. [20] Glatthaar, p. 167; Esposito, map 65; McPherson, p. 100. [21] McPherson, p. 98; Glatthaar, p. 166; Eicher, p. 339. [22] McPherson, p. 101. [23] Sears, Landscape, pp. 99-100. [24] Sears, Landscape, pp. 100-101. [25] McPherson, p. 105. [26] Eicher, p. 339. [27] Esposito, map 65; Eicher, p. 340. [28] McPherson, pp. 104-05. [29] Sears, Landscape, p. 113; Glatthaar, p. 168; Eicher, p. 340; Rafuse, pp. 291-93; McPherson, pp. 108-09. [30] Sears, Landscape, pp. 82-83; Eicher, p. 340. [31] Sears, Landscape, pp. 350-52. General Lee made no reference to the lost order in his 1862 reports, and it was not until 1863, after McClellan had published his own report, that Lee acknowledged the circumstances of McClellan's intelligence find. However, in interviews after the war, he mentioned the Confederate sympathizer who had supposedly witnessed McClellan reading the order. Discovery of these interviews prompted Douglas Southall Freeman to include this information in his 1946 Lee's Lieutenants (a revised view from his 1934 work, the four volume biography of Lee), which has led to citations in subsequent sources. Sears argues that "there is substantial evidence that in this instance Lee's memory failed him" and that the "conclusion seems inescapable that Lee learned from the Maryland civilian only that the Federal army had suddenly become active" and nothing more. [32] Esposito, map 56; Rafuse, p. 295; Eicher, p. 341. [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] Bailey, p. 39. McPherson, p. 109; Esposito, map 66; Eicher, pp. 344-49. Eicher, pp. 345-47; Glatthaar, p. 168; Esposito, map 56; McPherson, p. 110. Eicher, pp. 341-44; McPherson, pp. 111-12; Esposito, map 66. McPherson, pp. 116-31; Esposito, maps 67-69; Eicher, pp. 348-63. Eicher, p. 363. Bailey, p. 67. McPherson, pp. 150-53; Esposito, map 70; Eicher, pp. 382-83. McPherson, pp. 138-39, 146-49; Eicher, pp. 365-66.
308
References
Bailey, Ronald H., and the Editors of Time-Life Books. The Bloodiest Day: The Battle of Antietam. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1984. ISBN 0-8094-4740-1. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website (http://www. dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/). Glatthaar, Joseph T. General Lee's Army: From Victory to Collapse. New York: Free Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-684-82787-2. Harsh, Joseph L. Sounding the Shallows: A Confederate Companion for the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2000. ISBN 0-87338-641-8. Luvaas, Jay, and Harold W. Nelson, eds. Guide to the Battle of Antietam. U.S. Army War College Guides to Civil War Battles. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987. ISBN 0-7006-0784-6. McPherson, James M. Crossroads of Freedom: Antietam, The Battle That Changed the Course of the Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. ISBN 0-19-513521-0. Rafuse, Ethan S. McClellan's War: The Failure of Moderation in the Struggle for the Union. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005. ISBN 0-253-34532-4. Sears, Stephen W. George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon. New York: Da Capo Press, 1988. ISBN 0-306-80913-3.
Maryland Campaign Sears, Stephen W. Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983. ISBN 0-89919-172-X. Wolff, Robert S. "The Antietam Campaign." In Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History, edited by David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000. ISBN 0-393-04758-X. National Park Service battle descriptions (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/bycampgn.htm#East62)
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Further reading
Cannan, John. The Antietam Campaign: AugustSeptember 1862. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 1994. ISBN 0-938289-91-8. Carman, Ezra Ayers. The Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Vol. 1, South Mountain. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2010. ISBN 978-1-932714-81-4. Carman, Ezra Ayers. The Maryland Campaign of September 1862: Ezra A. Carman's Definitive Account of the Union and Confederate Armies at Antietam. Edited by Joseph Pierro. New York: Routledge, 2008. ISBN 0-415-95628-5. Gallagher, Gary W., ed. Antietam: Essays on the 1862 Maryland Campaign. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1989. ISBN 0-87338-400-8. Harsh, Joseph L. Confederate Tide Rising: Robert E. Lee and the Making of Southern Strategy, 18611862. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1998. ISBN 0-87338-580-2. Harsh, Joseph L. Taken at the Flood: Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1999. ISBN 0-87338-631-0. Jamieson, Perry D. Death in September: The Antietam Campaign. Abilene, TX: McWhiney Foundation Press, 1999. ISBN 1-893114-07-4. Murfin, James V. The Gleam of Bayonets: The Battle of Antietam and the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965. ISBN 0-8071-0990-8.
External links
Antietam on the Web (http://aotw.org) Maryland Military Historical Society (http://www.marylandmilitaryhistory.org) Animated history of the Maryland Campaign (http://www.historyanimated.com/AntietamAnimation.html)
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Background
After the failure of Army of Northern Virginia to deliver a decisive blow to the Army of Virginia at the Battle of Ox Hill following the Second Battle of Bull Run, Robert E. Lee decided it unwise to pursue the Federals any further towards their fortifications near Washington D.C.. Instead, he planned to move into Loudoun County to obtain forage and provisions and to reorganize the army before his planned invasion of Maryland. At the time, Loudoun County was occupied by Federal troops operating from the Union garrison at Harpers Ferry. As such, J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry was sent in advance to screen the army's movements and to clear Loudoun of enemy resistance. To this end, on September 1, the 2nd Virginia Cavalry, under the command of Col. Thomas T. Munford, was assigned to secure the town of Leesburg and the river crossings in its vicinity.
Battle
The following day, as Munford approached the eastern end of Leesburg, he split his command, sending a squadron under the command of Captain Jesse Irvine, Jr. directly through town, while he, with the rest of his regiment turned north off the Leesburg Pike (present day Route 7) towards the Edward's Ferry river crossing. Irvine and his command rushed into town to find Samuel C. Means and his Unionist Loudoun Rangers guarding the courthouse. The Rangers, having been severely manhandled by E.V. White and his partisan Rebels a few days prior at Waterford, put up little resistance before retreating north up King Street (Route 15), though not before suffering four wounded. The Rangers fell back on Cole's Maryland Cavalry, who were positioned to the north of town at the Big Spring (near present day Tutt Lane), with Irvine's command in hot pursuit. Cole's dismounted command began to engage Irving, but moments later Munford's command attacked from their rear flank, having been able to circumvent the Union position by riding around its left flank along the river and approaching its rear via Smart's Mill Lane, which Cole had foolishly left unguarded. Cole attempted to mount his command to engage Munford, but many of his troops were killed or wounded before they could reach their horses. Those that did, briefly engaged Munford before retreating towards the Catoctin Mountain and the road to Waterford, which cut through a gap in the ridge. Munford gave chase for two miles, driving the Federals through the gap into Loudoun Valley before retiring, having successfully cleared Leesburg and the river crossings in its vicinity.
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Results
Of Munford's 163 troops on the field, he suffered 2 killed and 5 wounded, while of the Loudoun Rangers 30 or so men, 1 was killed, 6 were wounded and 4 captured. Cole's Cavalry, estimated at 150 strong, reported 6 killed, 27 wounded, and 11 captured, though a significant amount of those casualties were officers.
Battlefield
The main portion of the battle started approximately where the present day U.S. Rt. 15 Bypass converges with Business Rt. 15 near the Harrison Farm (this being Cole's initial position). The battle then moved southwest across present day Morven Park and Ida Lee Park to Old Waterford Road. None of the battlefield is protected as such, but Morvin Park remains undeveloped, as does much of Ida Lee Park, so if one follows the Civil War Trails signs to the historical marker off of Tutts Lane, a good feel for the setting of the battle can be had. Cole's initial position has been mostly obliterated by construction and widening of the Rt 15 highway system, as well as the partial condemnation of the Harrison Farm by the public school system to build Smart's Mill Middle School and Frances Hazel Reid Elementary School. Likewise, the approach Munford took up Smart's Mill Lane has become a housing development, though a piece of the old road survives within the modern subdivision.
References
Turner, Fitzhugh (ed.), Loudoun County and the Civil War, Loudoun County Civil War Centennial Commission; Leesburg, Virginia, 1961. Phillips, John T. II. (ed.), The Bulletin of the Historical Society of Loudoun County, Virginia, 1957-1976. Goose Creek Productions: Leesburg, Virginia, 1997. Driver, Robert J., Jr. and Harold E. Howard, 2nd Virginia Cavalry. H.E. Howard, Inc., Lynchburg, Virginia, 1995.
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Background
Harpers Ferry (originally Harper's Ferry) is a small town at the confluence of the Potomac River and the Shenandoah River, the site of a historic Federal arsenal (founded by President George Washington in 1799)[1] and a bridge for the critical Baltimore and Ohio Railroad across the Potomac. It was earlier the site of the abolitionist John Brown's attack on the Federal arsenal there in 1859. The town was virtually indefensible, dominated on all sides by higher ground. To the west, the ground rose gradually for about a mile and a half to Bolivar Heights, a plateau 668 feet (unknown operator: u'strong'm) high, that stretches from the Potomac to the Shenandoah. To the south, across the Shenandoah, Loudoun Heights overlooks from 1180 feet (unknown operator: u'strong'm). And to the northeast, across the Potomac, the southernmost extremity of Elk Ridge forms the 1,476-foot-high crest of Maryland Heights. A Federal soldier wrote that if these three heights could not be held, Harpers Ferry would be "no more defensible than a well bottom."[2] As Gen. Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia advanced into Maryland, Lee expected that the Union garrisons that potentially blocked his supply line in the Shenandoah Valley, at Winchester, Martinsburg, and Harpers Ferry, would be cut off and abandoned without firing a shot (and, in fact, both Winchester and Martinsburg were evacuated).[3] But the Harpers Ferry garrison had not retreated. Lee planned to capture the garrison and the arsenal, not only to seize its supplies of rifles and ammunition, but to secure his line of supply back to Virginia. Although he was being pursued at a leisurely pace by Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan and the Union Army of the Potomac, outnumbering him more than two to one, Lee chose the risky strategy of dividing his army to seize the prize of Harpers Ferry. While the corps of Maj. Gen. James Longstreet drove north in the direction of Hagerstown, Lee sent columns of troops to converge and attack Harpers Ferry from three directions. The largest column, 11,500
Battle of Harpers Ferry men under Jackson, was to recross the Potomac and circle around to the west of Harpers Ferry and attack it from Bolivar Heights, while the other two columns, under Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws (8,000 men) and Brig. Gen. John G. Walker (3,400), were to capture Maryland Heights and Loudoun Heights, commanding the town from the east and south.[4] McClellan had wanted to add the Harpers Ferry garrison to his field army, but general-in-chief Henry W. Halleck had refused, saying that the movement would be too difficult and that the garrison had to defend itself "until the latest moment," or until McClellan could relieve it. Halleck had probably expected its commander, Col. Dixon S. Miles, to show some military knowledge and courage. Miles was a 38-year veteran of the U.S. Army and the Mexican-American War, but who had been disgraced after the First Battle of Bull Run when a court of inquiry held that he had been drunk during the battle. Miles swore off liquor and was sent to the supposedly quiet post at Harpers Ferry.[5] His garrison comprised 14,000 men, many inexperienced, including 2,500 who had been forced out of Martinsburg by the approach of Jackson's men on September 11.[4] On the night of September 11, McLaws arrived at Brownsville, 6 miles northeast of Harpers Ferry. He left 3,000 men near Brownsville Gap to protect his rear and moved 3,000 others toward the Potomac River to seal off any eastern escape route from Harpers Ferry. He dispatched the veteran brigades of Brig. Gens. Joseph B. Kershaw and William Barksdale to seize Maryland Heights on September 12.[2] The other Confederate columns were making slow progress and were behind schedule. Jackson's men were delayed at Martinsburg. Walker's men were ordered to destroy the aqueduct carrying the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal across the Monocacy River where it empties into the Potomac, but his engineers had difficulty demolishing the stone structure and the attempt was eventually abandoned.[6] Walker reentered Virginia, in Loudoun County on the 9th, across from Point of Rocks. Walker was escorted by Col. E.V. White, Loudoun native, and his 35th Battalion of Virginia Cavalry. White was unhappy with the assignment and preferred to be with the rest of the army. Unfortunately White had gotten into an altercation with Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart in Frederick and was subsequently ordered back to Virginia by Lee. Whether or not his disposition was to blame, White led Walker on a meandering route around the Short Hill Mountain to reach the base of Loudoun Heights four days later on September 13.[7] So the attack on Harpers Ferry that had been planned for September 11 was delayed, increasing the risk that McClellan might engage and destroy a portion of Lee's army while it was divided.
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Battle
September 12
Miles insisted on keeping most of the troops near the town instead of taking up commanding positions on the surrounding heights. He apparently was interpreting literally his orders to hold the town. The defenses of the most important position, Maryland Heights, were designed to fight off raiders, but not to hold the heights themselves. There was a powerful artillery battery halfway up the heights: two 9-inch (unknown operator: u'strong'mm) naval Dahlgren rifles, one 50-pounder Parrott rifle, and four 12-pounder smoothbores. On the crest, Miles assigned Col. Thomas H. Ford of the 32nd Ohio Infantry to command parts of four regiments, 1,600 men. Some of these men, including those of the 126th New York, had been in the Army only 21 days and lacked basic Maryland Campaign, actions September 315, 1862 ConfederateUnion combat skills. They erected primitive breastworks and sent skirmishers a quarter-mile in the direction of the Confederates.[8] On September 12 they encountered the approaching men from Kershaw's South Carolina brigade, who had been moving slowly through the very difficult terrain on Elk Ridge. Rifle volleys from behind abatis caused the Confederates to stop for the night.
September 13
Kershaw began his attack at about 6:30 a.m., September 13. He planned to push his own brigade directly against the Union breastworks while Barksdale's Mississippians flanked the Federal right. Kershaw's men charged
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into the abatis twice and were driven back with heavy losses. The inexperienced New York troops were holding their own. Their commander, Col. Ford, felt ill that morning and stayed back two miles (3km) behind the lines, leaving the fighting to Col. Eliakim Sherrill, the second-ranking officer. Sherrill was wounded by a bullet through the cheek and tongue while rallying his men and had to be carried from the field, making the green troops grow panicky. As Barksdale's Mississippians approached on the flank, the New Yorkers broke and fled rearward. Although Maj. Sylvester Hewitt ordered the remaining units to reform farther along the ridge, orders came at 3:30 p.m. from Col. Ford to retreat. (In doing so, he apparently neglected to send for the 900 men of the 115th New York, waiting in reserve midway up the slope.) His men destroyed their artillery pieces and crossed a pontoon bridge back to Harpers Ferry. Ford later insisted he had the authority from Miles to order the withdrawal, but a court of inquiry concluded that he had "abandoned his position without sufficient cause," and recommended his dismissal from the Army.[9]
During the fighting on Maryland Heights, the other Confederate columns arrivedWalker to the base of Loudoun Heights at 10 a.m. and Jackson's three divisions (Brig. Gen. John R. Jones to the north, Brig. Gen. Alexander R. Lawton in the center, and Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill to the south) to the west of Bolivar Heights at 11 a.m.and were astonished to see that these positions were not defended. Inside the town, the Union officers realized they were surrounded and pleaded with Miles to attempt to recapture Maryland Heights, but he refused, insisting that Military positions of September 1415, 1862. his forces on Bolivar Heights would defend the Restored Civil War period map. town from the west. He exclaimed, "I am ordered to hold this place and God damn my soul to hell if I don't."[9] In fact, Jackson's and Miles's forces to the west of town were roughly equal, but Miles was ignoring the threat from the artillery massing to his northeast and south. Late that night, Miles sent Capt. Charles Russell of the 1st Maryland Cavalry with nine troopers to slip through the enemy lines and take a message to McClellan, or any other general he could find, informing them that the besieged town could hold out only for 48 hours. Otherwise, he would be forced to surrender. Russell's men slipped across South Mountain and reached McClellan's headquarters at Frederick. The general was surprised and dismayed to
Battle of Harpers Ferry receive the news. He wrote a message to Miles that a relief force was on the way and told him, "Hold out to the last extremity. If it is possible, re-occupy the Maryland Heights with your whole force." McClellan ordered Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin and his VI Corps to march from Crampton's Gap to relieve Miles. Although three couriers were sent with this information on different routes, none of them reached Harpers Ferry in time.[10][11]
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September 14
While battles raged at the passes on South Mountain, Jackson had methodically positioned his artillery around Harpers Ferry. This included four Parrott rifles to the summit of Maryland Heights, a task that required 200 men wrestling the ropes of each gun. Although Jackson wanted all of his guns to open fire simultaneously, Walker on Loudoun Heights grew impatient and began an ineffectual bombardment with five guns shortly after 1 p.m. Jackson ordered A.P. Hill to move down the west bank of the Shenandoah in preparation for a flank attack on the Federal left the next morning.[12] That night, the Union officers realized they had less than 24 hours left, but they made no attempt to recapture Maryland Heights. Unbeknownst to Miles, only a single Confederate regiment now occupied the crest, after McLaws had withdrawn the remainder to meet the Union assault at Crampton's Gap.[12] Col. Benjamin F. "Grimes" Davis proposed to Miles that his troopers of the 12th Illinois Cavalry, the Loudoun Rangers, and some smaller units from Maryland and Rhode Island, attempt to break out. Cavalry forces were essentially useless in the defense of the town. Miles dismissed the idea as "wild and impractical," but Davis was adamant and Miles relented when he saw that the fiery Mississippian intended to break out, with or without permission. Davis and Col. Amos Voss led their 1,400 cavalrymen out of Harpers Ferry on a pontoon bridge across the Potomac, turning left onto a narrow road that wound to the west around the base of Maryland Heights in the north toward Sharpsburg. Despite a number of close calls with returning Confederates from South Mountain, the cavalry column encountered a wagon train approaching from Hagerstown with James Longstreet's reserve supply of ammunition. They were able to trick the wagoneers into following them in another direction and they repulsed the Confederate cavalry escort in the rear of the column. Capturing more than 40 enemy ordnance wagons, Davis had lost not a single man in combat, the first great cavalry exploit of the war for the Army of the Potomac.[13]
September 15
By the morning of September 15, Jackson had positioned nearly 50 guns on Maryland Heights and at the base of Loudoun Heights, prepared to enfilade the rear of the Federal line on Bolivar Heights. Jackson began a fierce artillery barrage from all sides and ordered an infantry assault for 8 a.m. Miles realized that the situation was hopeless. He had no expectation that relief would arrive from McClellan in time and his artillery ammunition was in short supply. At a council of war with his brigade commanders, he agreed to raise the white flag of surrender. But he would not be personally present at any ceremony. He was confronted by a captain of the 126th New York Infantry, who said, "For 's sake, Colonel, don't surrender us. Don't you hear the signal guns? Our forces are near us. Let us cut our way out and join them." But Miles replied, "Impossible. They will blow us out of this place in half an hour." As the captain turned away in disdain, a shell exploded, shattering Miles's left leg. So disgusted were the men of the garrison with Miles's behavior, which some claimed involved being drunk again, it was difficult to find a man who would take him to the hospital. He was mortally wounded and died the next day. Some historians have speculated that Miles was struck deliberately by fire from his own men.[14]
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Aftermath
Jackson had won a great victory at minor expense. The Confederate Army sustained 286 casualties (39 killed, 247 wounded), mostly from the fighting on Maryland Heights, while the Union Army sustained 217 (44 killed, 173 wounded).[15] The Union garrison also surrendered 12,419 men, 13,000 small arms, 200 wagons, and 73 artillery pieces.[16] It was the largest surrender of Federal forces during the Civil War.[17] Confederate soldiers feasted on Union food supplies and helped themselves to fresh blue Federal uniforms, which would cause some confusion in the coming days. About the only unhappy men in Jackson's force were the cavalrymen, who had hoped to replenish their exhausted mounts.[18] Jackson sent off a courier to Lee with the news. "Through God's blessing, Harper's Ferry and its garrison are to be surrendered." As he rode into town to supervise his men, Union soldiers lined the roadside, eager for a look at the famous Stonewall. One of them observed Jackson's dirty, seedy uniform and remarked, "Boys, he isn't much for looks, but if we'd had him we wouldn't have been caught in this trap."[19] By early afternoon, Jackson received an urgent message from General Lee: Get your troops to Sharpsburg as quickly as possible. Jackson left A.P. Hill at Harpers Ferry to manage the parole of Federal prisoners and began marching to join the Battle of Antietam.[17]
Notes
[1] Wolff, p. 928. [2] Bailey, p. 39. [3] Sears, p. 83. [4] Bailey, pp. 38-39. [5] Sears, p. 89. [6] Sears, p. 95. [7] Divine, np. [8] Sears, pp. 122-23. [9] Bailey, p. 43. [10] Sears, p. 133. [11] Wolff, p. 930. [12] Bailey, p. 56. [13] Sears, pp. 151-52; Bailey, pp. 57-58. [14] Eicher, p. 347. [15] NPS (http:/ / www. nps. gov/ history/ hps/ abpp/ battles/ wv010. htm). [16] Bailey, p. 59. [17] Robertson, p. 606. [18] Sears, pp. 153-54. [19] Sears, p. 154.
References
Bailey, Ronald H., and the Editors of Time-Life Books. The Bloodiest Day: The Battle of Antietam. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1984. ISBN 0-8094-4740-1. Bodart, Gaston (1908). Militr-historisches kreigs-lexikon, (1618-1905) (http://books.google.com/ books?id=Eo4DAAAAYAAJ). Stern. Divine, John. 35th Battalion, Virginia Cavalry. Lynchburg, VA: H. E. Howard, 1985. ISBN 0-930919-19-X. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website (http://www. dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/). Robertson, James I., Jr. Stonewall Jackson: The Man, The Soldier, The Legend. New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1997. ISBN 0-02-864685-1.
Battle of Harpers Ferry Sears, Stephen W. Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983. ISBN 0-89919-172-X. Wolff, Robert S. "Harper's Ferry, (West) Virginia." In Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History, edited by David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000. ISBN 0-393-04758-X. National Parks Service battle description (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/wv010.htm) CWSAC Report Update and Resurvey: Individual Battlefield Profiles (http://www.nps.gov/history/hps/abpp/ CWSII/WestVirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Greenbrier River to Kesslers Cross Lanes.pdf)
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External links
Animated history of the Battle of Antietam (http://www.historyanimated.com/Antietamh.html)
Background
South Mountain is the name given to the continuation of the Blue Ridge Mountains after they enter Maryland. It is a natural obstacle that separates the Hagerstown Valley and Cumberland Valley from the eastern part of Maryland. After Lee invaded Maryland, a copy of an order, known as order 191, detailing troop movements that he wrote fell into the hands of McClellan. From this, McClellan learned that Lee had split his forces and the Union general hoped to attack and defeat some of these isolated forces before they could concentrate against him. To reach Lee, McClellan had to move across South Mountain. Lee learned of McClellan's intelligence coup and quickly sent forces to reinforce the passes to block his advance. McClellan temporarily organized his army into three wings for the attacks on the passes. Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside, the Right Wing, commanded the I Corps (Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker) and IX Corps (Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno). The Right Wing was sent to Turner's Gap and Fox's Gap in the north. The Left Wing, commanded by Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin, consisting of his own VI Corps and Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch's division of the IV Corps, was sent to Crampton's Gap in the south. The Center Wing (II Corps and XII Corps), under Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, was in reserve.
Battles
Crampton's Gap
Further information: Battle of Crampton's Gap At the southernmost point of the battle, near Burkittsville, Confederate cavalry and a small portion of Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws's division defended Brownsville Pass and Crampton's Gap. McLaws was unaware of the approach of 12,000 Federals and had only 500 men under Col. William A. Parham thinly deployed behind a three quarter-mile-long stone wall at the eastern base of Crampton's Gap. Franklin spent three hours deploying his forces.
Battle of South Mountain A Confederate later wrote of a "lion making exceedingly careful preparations to spring on a plucky little mouse." Franklin deployed the division of Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum on the right and Maj. Gen. William F. "Baldy" Smith on the left. They seized the gap and captured 400 prisoners, mostly men who were arriving as late reinforcements from Brig. Gen. Howell Cobb's brigade.[1]
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Turner's Gap
Confederate Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill, deploying 5,000 men over more than 2 miles, defended both Turner's Gap and Fox's Gap. Burnside sent Hooker's I Corps to the right and Turner's Gap. The Union Iron Brigade attacked Colonel Alfred H. Colquitt's brigade along the National Road, driving it back up the mountain, but it refused to yield the pass. Hooker positioned three divisions opposite two peaks located one mile north of the gap. The Alabama Brigade of Brig. Gen. Robert E. Rodes was forced to withdraw because of his isolated position, despite the arrival of reinforcements from Brig. Gen. David R. Jones's division and Brig. Gen. Nathan G. Evans's brigade. Darkness and the difficult terrain prevented the complete collapse of Lee's line. At nightfall, the Federals held the high ground while[2] the Confederates still held the gap.[1][3]
Fox's Gap
Just to the south, other elements of Hill's division (most notably Drayton's Brigade [4]) defended Fox's Gap against Reno's IX Corps. A 9 a.m. attack by Union Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox's Kanawha Division secured much of the land south of the gap. In the movement, Lt. Col. Rutherford B. Hayes of the 23rd Ohio led a flank attack and was seriously wounded. Cox pushed through the North Carolinians positioned behind a stone wall at the gap's crest, but he failed to capitalize on his gains as his men were exhausted, allowing Confederate reinforcements to deploy in the gap around the Daniel Wise farm. Reno sent forward the rest of his corps, but due to the timely arrival of Southern reinforcements under Confederate Brig. Gen. John Bell Hood, they failed to dislodge the defenders. Union Maj. Gen. Jesse Reno and Confederate Brig. Gen. Samuel Garland, Jr., were killed at Fox's Gap. Union soldiers dumped 60 Confederate bodies down Farmer Wise's dry well, paying him $60 in compensation.[5][6][7]
Aftermath
By dusk, with Crampton's Gap lost and his position at Fox's and Turner's Gaps precarious, Lee ordered his outnumbered forces to withdraw from South Mountain. McClellan was now in position to destroy Lee's army before it could concentrate. Union casualties of 28,000 engaged were 2,325 (443 killed, 1,807 wounded, and 75 missing); Confederates lost 2,685 (325 killed, 1560 wounded, and 800 missing) of 18,000.[5] The Battle of South Mountain was an important morale booster for the defeat-stricken Army of the Potomac. The New York World wrote that the battle "turn[ed] back the tide of rebel successes" and "the strength of the rebels is hopelessly broken."[8] Lee contemplated the end of his Maryland campaign. However, McClellan's limited activity on September 15 after his victory at South Mountain condemned the garrison at Harpers Ferry to capture[9] and gave Lee time to unite his scattered divisions at Sharpsburg for the Battle of Antietam on September 17.[10] The battlefields are preserved within the South Mountain State Park, Gathland State Park, and the Appalachian National Scenic Trail. Crampton's Gap Historic District and Turner's and Fox's Gaps Historic District are listed on the National Register of Historic Places.[11]
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Notes
[1] [2] [3] [4] Kennedy, p. 117. Antietam on the Web (http:/ / antietam. aotw. org/ exhibit. php?exhibit_id=40) General D. H. Hill's report of his operations at this time is included in the Official Records, Series I, Vol. 19, pp. 1019-1022. lost Confederate Legion: Phillips Legion infantry at Fox's Gap, The | Military Images | Find Articles at BNET (http:/ / findarticles. com/ p/ articles/ mi_qa3905/ is_200101/ ai_n8947088/ ) [5] Eicher, p. 344. [6] They were reburied at Washington Confederate Cemetery in 1877. See Friends of South Mountain (http:/ / www. friendsofsouthmountain. org/ southmountain. html) [7] Battles and Leaders of the Civil War Volume 2 .p.573 and 583 (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=4il3AAAAMAAJ& pg=PA697& dq=Battles+ and+ Leaders+ of+ the+ Civil+ War+ Volume+ 2& hl=en& ei=QikSTdzgAoSQnwfRt53aDg& sa=X& oi=book_result& ct=result& resnum=2& ved=0CDEQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage& q& f=false) [8] McPherson, p. 112. [9] Sears, McClellan, p. 292; McPherson, p. 112. [10] Sears, Landscape, p. 149. [11] "National Register Information System" (http:/ / nrhp. focus. nps. gov/ natreg/ docs/ All_Data. html). National Register of Historic Places. National Park Service. 2008-04-15. .
References
Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide (http://www.bibliobase.com/history/readerscomp/ civwar/html/cw_000106_entries.htm). 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. McPherson, James M. Crossroads of Freedom: Antietam, The Battle That Changed the Course of the Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. ISBN 0-19-513521-0. McPherson, James M. Crossroads of Freedom: Antietam, The Battle That Changed the Course of the Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. ISBN 0-19-513521-0. Sears, Stephen W. Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983. ISBN 0-89919-172-X. U.S. War Department. The War of the Rebellion (http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/records/list.cfm): a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 18801901. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/md002.htm)
Further reading
Carman, Ezra Ayers. The Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Vol. 1, South Mountain. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2010. ISBN 978-1-932714-81-4.
External links
Battle of South Mountain (http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/south-mountain.html): Maps, photos, histories, and preservation news (CWPT)
Battle of Antietam
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Battle of Antietam
The Battle of Antietam ( /ntitm/) also known as the Battle of Sharpsburg, particularly in the South, fought on September 17, 1862, near Sharpsburg, Maryland, and Antietam Creek, as part of the Maryland Campaign, was the first major battle in the American Civil War to take place on Union soil. It was the bloodiest single-day battle in American history, with about 23,000 casualties on both sides.[1] After pursuing Confederate General Robert E. Lee into Maryland, Union Army Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan launched attacks against Lee's army, in defensive positions behind Antietam Creek. At dawn on September 17, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker's corps mounted a powerful assault on Lee's left flank. Attacks and counterattacks swept across Miller's cornfield and fighting swirled around the Dunker Church. Union assaults against the Sunken Road eventually pierced the Confederate center, but the Federal advantage was not followed up. In the afternoon, Union Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside's corps entered the action, capturing a stone bridge over Antietam Creek and advancing against the Confederate right. At a crucial moment, Confederate Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill's division arrived from Harpers Ferry and launched a surprise counterattack, driving back Burnside and ending the battle. Although outnumbered two-to-one, Lee committed his entire force, while McClellan sent in less than three-quarters of his army, enabling Lee to fight the Federals to a standstill. During the night, both armies consolidated their lines. In spite of crippling casualties, Lee continued to skirmish with McClellan throughout September 18, while removing his battered army south of the Potomac River.[2] Despite having superiority of numbers, McClellan's attacks failed to achieve force concentration, allowing Lee to counter by shifting forces and moving interior lines to meet each challenge. Despite ample reserve forces that could have been deployed to exploit localized successes, McClellan failed to destroy Lee's army. Nevertheless, Lee's invasion of Maryland was ended, and he was able to withdraw his army back to Virginia without interference from the cautious McClellan. Although the battle was tactically inconclusive, it had significance as enough of a victory to give President Abraham Lincoln the confidence to announce his Emancipation Proclamation, which discouraged the British and French governments from potential plans for recognition of the Confederacy.
Battle of Antietam
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Opposing forces
Confederate
Confederate corps commanders
Further information: Antietam Confederate order of battle General Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was organized into two large infantry corps.[8] The First Corps, under Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, consisted of the divisions of: Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws (brigades of Brig. Gens. Joseph B. Kershaw, Howell Cobb, Paul J. Semmes, and William Barksdale). Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson (brigades of Cols. Alfred Cumming, W.A. Parham, and Carnot Posey, and Brig. Gens. Lewis A. Armistead, Roger A. Pryor, and Ambrose R. Wright). Brig. Gen. David R. Jones (brigades of Brig. Gens. Robert A. Toombs, Thomas F. Drayton, Richard B. Garnett, James L. Kemper, and Cols. Joseph T. Walker and George T. Anderson). Brig. Gen. John G. Walker (brigades of Colonel Van H. Manning and Brig. Gen. Robert Ransom, Jr.). Brig. Gen. John Bell Hood (brigades of Cols. William T. Wofford and Evander M. Law). Independent brigade under Brig. Gen. Nathan G. "Shanks" Evans. The Second Corps, under Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, consisted of the divisions of: Brig. Gen. Alexander R. Lawton (brigades of Col. Marcellus Douglass, Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early, Col. James A. Walker, and Brig. Gen. Harry T. Hays). Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill (the Light Division brigades of Brig. Gens. Lawrence O'Bryan Branch, Maxcy Gregg, James J. Archer, and William Dorsey Pender, and Cols. John M. Brockenbrough and Edward L. Thomas). Brig. Gen. John R. Jones (brigades of Cols. A.J. Grigsby, E. T. H. Warren, Bradley T. Johnson, and Brig. Gen. William E. Starke). Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill (brigades of Brig. Gens. Roswell S. Ripley, Robert E. Rodes, Samuel Garland, Jr., George B. Anderson, and Col. Alfred H. Colquitt). The remaining units were the Cavalry Corps, under Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart, and the reserve artillery, commanded by Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton. The Second Corps was organized with artillery attached to each division, in
Battle of Antietam contrast to the First Corps, which reserved its artillery at the corps level.
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Union
Further information: Antietam Union order of battle
Union corps commanders
Battle of Antietam
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Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's Army of the Potomac, bolstered by units absorbed from John Pope's Army of Virginia, included six infantry corps.[9] The I Corps, under Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, consisted of the divisions of: Brig. Gen. Abner Doubleday (brigades of Col. Walter Phelps, Brig. Gens. Marsena R. Patrick and John Gibbon, and Lt. Col. J. William Hofmann). Brig. Gen. James B. Ricketts (brigades of Brig. Gen. Abram Durye, Col. William H. Christian, and Brig. Gen. George L. Hartsuff). Brig. Gen. George G. Meade (brigades of Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour, Col. Albert Magilton and Lt. Col. Robert Anderson). The II Corps, under Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, consisted of the divisions of:
Lincoln with McClellan and staff at the Grove Farm after the battle. Notable figures (from left) are 5. Alexander S. Webb, Chief of Staff, V Corps; 6. McClellan;. 8. Dr. Jonathan Letterman; 10. Lincoln; 11. Henry J. Hunt; 12. Fitz John Porter; 15. Andrew A. Humphreys; 16. Capt. George Armstrong Custer.
Maj. Gen. Israel B. Richardson (brigades of Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell, Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Meagher, and Col. John R. Brooke). Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick (brigades of Brig. Gens. Willis A. Gorman, Oliver O. Howard, and Napoleon J.T. Dana). Brig. Gen. William H. French (brigades of Brig. Gen. Nathan Kimball, Col. Dwight Morris, and Brig. Gen. Max Weber). The V Corps, under Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter, consisted of the divisions of: Maj. Gen. George W. Morell (brigades of Col. James Barnes, Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin, and Col. T.B.W. Stockton). Brig. Gen. George Sykes (brigades of Lt. Col. Robert C. Buchanan, Major Charles S. Lovell, and Col. Gouverneur K. Warren). Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys (brigades of Brig. Gen. Erastus B. Tyler and Col. Peter H. Allabach). The VI Corps, under Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin, consisted of the divisions of: Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum (brigades of Col. Alfred T.A. Torbert, Col. Joseph J. Bartlett, and Brig. Gen. John Newton). Maj. Gen. William F. "Baldy" Smith (brigades of Brig. Gens. Winfield S. Hancock and William T. H. Brooks and Col. William H. Irwin). A division from the IV Corps under Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch (brigades of Brig. Gens. Charles Devens, Jr., Albion P. Howe, and John Cochran). The IX Corps, under Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside (Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox exercised operational command during the battle), consisted of the divisions of: Brig. Gen. Orlando B. Willcox (brigades of Cols. Benjamin C. Christ and Thomas Welsh). Brig. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis (brigades of Brig. Gens. James Nagle and Edward Ferrero). Brig. Gen. Isaac P. Rodman (brigades of Cols. Harrison S. Fairchild and Edward Harland). Kanawha Division, under Col. Eliakim P. Scammon (brigades of Cols. Hugh Ewing and George Crook).
The XII Corps, under Maj. Gen. Joseph K. Mansfield, consisted of the divisions of: Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams (brigades of Brig. Gens. Samuel W. Crawford and George H. Gordon). Brig. Gen. George S. Greene (brigades of Lt. Col. Hector Tyndale, Col. Henry J. Stainrook, and Col. William B. Goodrich).
Battle of Antietam The cavalry division of Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton consisted of the brigades of Maj. Charles J. Whiting and Cols. John F. Farnsworth, Richard H. Rush, Andrew T. McReynolds, and Benjamin F. Davis.
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Battle
Near the town of Sharpsburg, Lee deployed his available forces behind Antietam Creek along a low ridge, starting on September 15. While it was an effective defensive position, it was not an impregnable one. The terrain provided excellent cover for infantrymen, with rail and stone fences, outcroppings of limestone, and little hollows and swales. The creek to their front was only a minor barrier, ranging from 60 to 100 feet (1830 m) in width, and was fordable in places and crossed by three stone bridges each a mile (1.5km) apart. It was also a precarious position because the Confederate rear was blocked by the Potomac River and only a single crossing point, Boteler's Ford at Shepherdstown, was nearby should retreat be necessary. (The ford at Williamsport, Maryland, was 10 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) northwest from Sharpsburg and had been used by Jackson in his march to Harpers Ferry. The disposition of Union forces during the battle made it impractical to consider retreating in that direction.) And on September 15, the force under Lee's immediate command consisted of no more than 18,000 men, only a third the size of the Federal army.[10]
The first two Union divisions arrived on the afternoon of September 15 and the bulk of the remainder of the army late that evening. Although an immediate Union attack on the morning of September 16 would have had an overwhelming advantage in numbers, McClellan's trademark caution and his belief that Lee had as many as 100,000 men at Sharpsburg caused him to delay his attack for a day.[11] This gave the Confederates more time to prepare defensive positions and allowed Longstreet's corps to arrive from Hagerstown and Jackson's corps, minus A.P. Hill's division, to arrive from Harpers Ferry. Jackson defended the left (northern) flank, anchored on the Potomac, Longstreet the right (southern) flank, anchored on the Antietam, a line that was about 4 miles (6km) long. (As the battle progressed and Lee shifted units, these corps boundaries overlapped considerably.)[12] On the evening of September 16, McClellan ordered Hooker's I Corps to cross Antietam Creek and probe the enemy positions. Meade's division cautiously attacked the Confederates under Hood near the East Woods. After darkness, artillery fire continued as McClellan continued to position his troops. McClellan's plan was to overwhelm the enemy's left flank. He arrived at this decision because of the configuration of bridges over the Antietam. The lower bridge (which would soon be named Burnside Bridge) was dominated by Confederate positions on the bluffs overlooking it. The middle bridge, on the road from Boonsboro, was subject to artillery fire from the heights near Sharpsburg. But the upper bridge was 2 miles (3km) east of the Confederate guns and could be crossed safely.
Battle of Antietam McClellan planned to commit more than half his army to the assault, starting with two corps, supported by a third, and if necessary a fourth. He intended to launch a simultaneous diversionary attack against the Confederate right with a fifth corps, and he was prepared to strike the center with his reserves if either attack succeeded.[13] The skirmish in the East Woods served to signal McClellan's intentions to Lee, who prepared his defenses accordingly. He shifted men to his left flank and sent urgent messages to his two commanders who had not yet arrived on the battlefield: Lafayette McLaws with two divisions and A.P. Hill with one division.[14] McClellan's plans were ill-coordinated and were executed poorly. He issued to each of his subordinate commanders only the orders for his own corps, not general orders describing the entire battle plan. The terrain of the battlefield made it difficult for those commanders to monitor events outside of their sectors, and McClellan's headquarters were more than a mile in the rear (at the Philip Pry house, east of the creek), making it difficult for him to control the separate corps. Therefore, the battle progressed the next day as essentially three separate, mostly uncoordinated battles: morning in the northern end of the battlefield, midday in the center, and afternoon in the south. This lack of coordination and concentration of McClellan's forces almost completely nullified the two-to-one advantage the Union enjoyed and allowed Lee to shift his defensive forces to meet each offensive.[15]
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Morning
The battle opened at dawn (about 5:30 a.m.) on September 17 with an attack down the Hagerstown Turnpike by the Union I Corps under Joseph Hooker. Hooker's objective was the plateau on which sat the Dunker Church, a modest whitewashed building belonging to a local sect of German Baptists. Hooker had approximately 8,600 men, little more than the 7,700 defenders under Stonewall Jackson, and this slight disparity was more than offset by the Confederates' strong defensive positions.[16] Abner Doubleday's division moved on Hooker's right, James Ricketts's moved on the left into the East Woods, and George Meade's Pennsylvania Reserves division deployed in the center and slightly to the rear. Jackson's defense consisted of the divisions under Alexander Lawton and John R. Jones in line from the West Woods, across the Turnpike, and along the southern end of the Miller Cornfield. Four brigades were held in reserve inside the West Woods.[17]
As the first Union men emerged from the North Woods and into the Cornfield, an artillery duel erupted. Confederate fire was from the horse artillery batteries under Jeb Stuart to the west and four batteries under Col. Stephen D. Lee on the high ground across the pike from the Dunker Church to the south. Union return fire was from nine batteries on the ridge behind the North Woods and twenty 20-pounder Parrott rifles, 2 miles (3km) east of Antietam Creek. The conflagration caused heavy casualties on both sides and was described by Col. Lee as "artillery Hell."[18]
Battle of Antietam Seeing the glint of Confederate bayonets concealed in the Cornfield, Hooker halted his infantry and brought up four batteries of artillery, which fired shell and canister over the heads of the Federal infantry, covering the field. All at once, the cornfield exploded into chaos as a savage battle raged through the area. Men beat each other over the heads with rifle butts and stabbed each other with bayonets. Officers rode around on their horses sweating and cursing and yelling orders no one could hear in the noise. Rifles became hot and fouled from too much firing. The air was filled with a hail of bullets and shells.[19] Meade's 1st Brigade of Pennsylvanians, under Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour, began advancing through the East Woods and exchanged fire with Colonel James Walker's brigade of Alabama, Georgia, and North Carolina troops. As Walker's men forced Seymour's back, aided by Lee's artillery fire, Ricketts's division entered the Cornfield, also to be torn up by artillery. Brig. Gen. Abram Durye's brigade marched directly into volleys from Colonel Marcellus Douglass's Georgia brigade. Enduring heavy fire from a range of 250 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) and gaining no advantage because of a lack of reinforcements, Durye ordered a withdrawal.[17]
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The reinforcements that Durye had expectedbrigades under Brig. Gen. George L. Hartsuff and Col. William A. Christianhad difficulties reaching the scene. Hartsuff was wounded by a shell, and Christian dismounted and fled to the rear in terror. When the men were rallied and advanced into the Cornfield, they met the same artillery and infantry fire as their predecessors. As the superior Union numbers began to tell, the Louisiana "Tiger" Brigade under Harry Hays entered the fray and forced the Union men back to the East Woods. The casualties received by the 12th Massachusetts Infantry, 67%, were the highest of any unit that day.[20] The Tigers were beaten back eventually when the Federals brought up a battery of 3-inch ordnance rifles and rolled them directly into the Cornfield, point-blank fire that slaughtered the Tigers, who lost 323 of their 500 men.[21]
...the most deadly fire of the war. Rifles are shot to pieces in the hands of the soldiers, canteens and haversacks are riddled with bullets, the dead and wounded go down in scores. Captain Benjamin F. Cook of the 12th Massachusetts Infantry, on the attack by the Louisiana Tigers at the Cornfield
[22]
Dead Confederate soldiers from Starke's Louisiana Brigade, on the Hagerstown Turnpike, north of the Dunker Church. Photograph by Alexander Gardner
While the Cornfield remained a bloody stalemate, Federal advances a few hundred yards to the west were more successful. Brig. Gen. John Gibbon's 4th Brigade of Doubleday's division (recently named the Iron Brigade) began advancing down and astride the turnpike, into the cornfield, and in the West Woods, pushing aside Jackson's men.[23] They were halted by a charge of 1,150 men from Starke's brigade, leveling heavy fire from 30 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) away. The Confederate brigade withdrew after being exposed to fierce return fire from the Iron Brigade, and Starke was mortally wounded.[24] The Union advance on the Dunker Church resumed and cut a large gap in Jackson's defensive line, which teetered near collapse. Although the cost was steep, Hooker's corps was making steady progress. Confederate reinforcements arrived just after 7 a.m. The divisions under McLaws and Richard H. Anderson arrived following a night march from Harpers Ferry. Around 7:15, General Lee moved George T. Anderson's Georgia brigade from the right flank of the army to aid Jackson. At 7 a.m., Hood's division of 2,300 men advanced through the West Woods and pushed the Union troops back through the Cornfield again. The Texans attacked with particular ferocity because as they were called from their reserve position they were forced to interrupt the first hot breakfast they had had in days. They were aided by three brigades of D.H. Hill's division arriving from the Mumma Farm, southeast of the Cornfield, and by Jubal Early's brigade, pushing through the West Woods from the Nicodemus Farm, where they had been supporting Jeb Stuart's horse artillery. Some officers of the Iron Brigade rallied men around the artillery pieces of Battery B, 4th U.S. Artillery, and Gibbon himself saw to it that his previous unit did not lose a single caisson.[25] Hood's men bore the brunt of the fighting, however, and paid a heavy price60%
Battle of Antietam casualtiesbut they were able to prevent the defensive line from crumbling and held off the I Corps. When asked by a fellow officer where his division was, Hood replied, "Dead on the field."[26] Hooker's men had also paid heavily but without achieving their objectives. After two hours and 2,500 casualties, they were back where they started. The Cornfield, an area about 250 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) deep and 400 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) wide, was a scene of indescribable destruction. It was estimated that the Cornfield changed hands no fewer than 15 times in the course of the morning.[27] Major Rufus R. Dawes, who assumed command of Iron Brigade's 6th Wisconsin Regiment during the battle, later compared the fighting around the Hagerstown Turnpike with the stone wall at Fredericksburg, Spotsylvania's "Bloody Angle", and the slaughter pen of Cold Harbor, insisting that "the Antietam Turnpike surpassed them all in manifest evidence of slaughter."[28] Hooker called for support from the 7,200 men of Mansfield's XII Corps.
... every stalk of corn in the northern and greater part of the field was cut as closely as could have been done with a knife, and the [Confederates] slain lay in rows precisely as they had stood in their ranks a few moments before. Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker
[19]
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Half of Mansfield's men were raw recruits, and Mansfield was also inexperienced, having taken command only two days before. Although he was a veteran of 40 years' service, he had never led large numbers of soldiers in combat. Concerned that his men would bolt under fire, he marched them in a formation that was known as "column of companies, closed in mass," a bunched-up formation in which a regiment was arrayed ten ranks deep instead of the normal two. As his men entered the East Woods, they presented an excellent artillery target, "almost as good a target as a barn." Mansfield himself was shot in the stomach and died the next day. Alpheus Williams assumed temporary command of the XII Corps.[29] The new recruits of Mansfield's 1st Division made no progress against Hood's line, which was reinforced by D.H. Hill's Assaults by the XII Corps, 7:30 to 9:00 a.m. divisions under Colquitt and McRae. The 2nd Division of the XII Corps, under George Sears Greene, however, broke through McRae's men, who fled under the mistaken belief that they were about to be trapped by a flanking attack. This breach of the line forced Hood and his men, outnumbered, to regroup in the West Woods, where they had started the day.[20] Greene was able to reach the Dunker Church, Hooker's original objective, and drove off Stephen Lee's batteries. Federal forces held most of the ground to the east of the turnpike. Hooker attempted to gather the scattered remnants of his I Corps to continue the assault, but a Confederate sharpshooter spotted the general's conspicuous white horse and shot Hooker through the foot. Command of his I Corps fell to General Meade, since Hooker's senior subordinate, James B. Ricketts, had also been wounded. But with
Battle of Antietam Hooker removed from the field, there was no general left with the authority to rally the men of the I and XII Corps. Greene's men came under heavy fire from the West Woods and withdrew from the Dunker Church. In an effort to turn the Confederate left flank and relieve the pressure on Mansfield's men, Sumner's II Corps was ordered at 7:20 a.m. to send two divisions into battle. Sedgwick's division of 5,400 men was the first to ford the Antietam, and they entered the East Woods with the intention of turning left and forcing the Confederates south into the assault of Ambrose Burnside's IX Corps. But the plan went awry. They became separated from William H. French's division, and at 9 a.m. Sumner, who was accompanying the division, launched the attack with an unusual battle formationthe three brigades in three long lines, men side-by-side, with only 50 to 70 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) separating the lines. They were assaulted first by Confederate artillery and then from three sides by the divisions of Early, Walker, and McLaws, and in less than half an hour Sedgwick's men were forced to retreat in great disorder to their starting point with over 2,200 casualties, including Sedgwick himself, who was taken out of action for several months by a wound.[30] Sumner has been condemned by most historians for his "reckless" attack, his lack of coordination with the I and XII Corps headquarters, losing control of French's division when he accompanied Sedgwick's, failing to perform adequate reconnaissance prior to launching his attack, and selecting the unusual battle formation that was so effectively flanked by the Confederate counterattack. Historian M.V. Armstrong's recent scholarship, however, has determined that Sumner did perform appropriate reconnaissance and his decision to attack where he did was
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The Dunker Church after September 17, 1862. Here, both Union and Confederate dead lie together on the field.
justified by the information available to him.[31] The final actions in the morning phase of the battle were around 10 a.m., when two regiments of the XII Corps advanced, only to be confronted by the division of John G. Walker, newly arrived from the Confederate right. They fought in the area between the Cornfield in the West Woods, but soon Walker's men were forced back by two brigades of Greene's division, and the Federal troops seized some ground in the West Woods. The morning phase ended with casualties on both sides of almost 13,000, including two Union corps commanders.[32]
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Midday
By midday, the action had shifted to the center of the Confederate line. Sumner had accompanied the morning attack of Sedgwick's division, but another of his divisions, under French, lost contact with Sumner and Sedgwick and inexplicably headed south. Eager for an opportunity to see combat, French found skirmishers in his path and ordered his men forward. By this time, Sumner's aide (and son) located French, described the terrible fighting in the West Woods and relayed an order for him to divert Confederate attention by attacking their center.[33] French confronted D.H. Hill's division. Hill commanded about 2,500 men, less than half the number under French, and three of his five brigades had been torn up during the morning combat. This sector of Longstreet's line was theoretically the weakest. But Hill's men were in a strong defensive position, atop a gradual ridge, in a sunken road worn down by years of wagon traffic, which formed a natural trench.[34]
French launched a series of brigade-sized assaults against Hill's improvised breastworks at around 9:30 a.m. The first brigade to attack, mostly inexperienced troops commanded by Brig. Gen. Max Weber, was quickly cut down by heavy rifle fire; neither side deployed artillery at this point. The second attack, more raw recruits under Col. Dwight Morris, was also subjected to heavy fire but managed to beat back a counterattack by the Alabama Brigade of Robert Rodes. The third, under Brig. Gen. Nathan Kimball, included three veteran regiments, but they also fell to fire from the sunken road. French's division suffered 1,750 casualties (of his 5,700 men) in under an hour.[35] Reinforcements were arriving on both sides, and by 10:30 a.m. Robert E. Lee sent his final reserve divisionsome 3,400 men under Maj. Gen. Richard H. Andersonto bolster Hill's line and extend it to the right, preparing an attack that would envelop French's left flank. But at the same time, the 4,000 men of Maj. Gen. Israel B. Richardson's division arrived on French's left. This was the last of Sumner's three divisions, which had been held up in the rear by McClellan as he organized his reserve forces.[36] Richardson's fresh troops struck the first blow. Leading off the fourth attack of the day against the sunken road was the Irish Brigade of Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Meagher. As they advanced with emerald green flags snapping in the breeze, a regimental chaplain, Father William Corby, rode back and forth across the front of the formation shouting words of conditional absolution prescribed by the Roman Catholic Church for those who were about to die. (Corby performed a similar service at Gettysburg in 1863.) The mostly Irish immigrants lost 540 men to heavy volleys before they were ordered to withdraw.[37] Gen. Richardson personally dispatched the brigade of Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell into battle around noon (after being told that Caldwell was in the rear, behind a haystack), and finally the tide turned. Anderson's Confederate division had been little help to the defenders after Gen. Anderson was wounded early in the fighting. Other key
Battle of Antietam leaders were lost as well, including George B. Anderson (no relation; Anderson's successor, Col. Charles C. Tew of the 2nd North Carolina, was killed minutes after assuming command)[38] and Col. John B. Gordon of the 6th Alabama. (Gordon received four serious wounds in the fight. He lay unconscious, face down in his cap, and later told colleagues that he should have smothered in his own blood, except for the act of an unidentified Yankee, who had earlier shot a hole in his cap, which allowed the blood to drain.)[39] Rodes was wounded in the thigh but was still on the field. These losses contributed directly to the confusion of the following events.
We were shooting them like sheep in a pen. If a bullet missed the mark at first it was liable to strike the further bank, angle back, and take them secondarily. Sergeant of the 61st New York
[40]
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As Caldwell's brigade advanced around the right flank of the Confederates, Col. Francis C. Barlow and 350 men of the 61st and 64th New York saw a weak point in the line and seized a knoll commanding the sunken road. This allowed them to get enfilade fire into the Confederate line, turning it into a deadly trap. In attempting to wheel around to meet this threat, a command from Rodes was misunderstood by Lt. Col. James N. Lightfoot, who had succeeded the unconscious John Gordon. Lightfoot ordered his men to about-face and march away, an order that all five regiments of the brigade thought applied to them as well. Confederate troops streamed toward Sharpsburg, their line lost. Richardson's men were in hot pursuit when massed artillery hastily assembled by Gen. Longstreet drove them back. A counterattack with 200 men led by D.H. Hill got around the Federal left flank near the sunken road, and although they were driven back by a fierce charge of the 5th New Hampshire, this stemmed the collapse of the center. Reluctantly, Richardson ordered his division to fall back to north of the ridge facing the sunken road. His division lost about 1,000 men. Col. Barlow was severely wounded, and Richardson mortally wounded.[41] Winfield S. Hancock assumed division command. Although Hancock would have an excellent future reputation as an aggressive division and corps commander, the unexpected change of command sapped the momentum of the Federal advance.[42] The carnage from 9:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. on the sunken road gave it the name Bloody Lane, leaving about 5,600 casualties (Union 3,000, Confederate 2,600) along the 800-yard (unknown operator: u'strong'm) road. And yet a great opportunity presented itself. If this broken sector of the Confederate line were exploited, Lee's army would have been divided in half and possibly defeated. There were ample forces available to do so. There was a reserve of 3,500 cavalry and the 10,300 infantrymen of Gen. Porter's V Corps, waiting near the middle bridge, a mile away. The VI Corps had just arrived with 12,000 men. The Bloody Lane in 2005. Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin of the VI Corps was ready to exploit this breakthrough, but Sumner, the senior corps commander, ordered him not to advance. Franklin appealed to McClellan, who left his headquarters in the rear to hear both arguments but backed Sumner's decision, ordering Franklin and Hancock to hold their positions.[43] Later in the day, the commander of the other reserve unit near the center, the V Corps, Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter, heard recommendations from Maj. Gen. George Sykes, commanding his 2nd Division, that another attack be made in the center, an idea that intrigued McClellan. However, Porter is said to have told McClellan, "Remember, General, I command the last reserve of the last Army of the Republic." McClellan demurred and another opportunity was lost.[44]
Battle of Antietam
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Confederate dead lie in the "Bloody Lane" after the Battle of Antietam, 1862.
Afternoon
The action moved to the southern end of the battlefield. McClellan's plan called for Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside and the IX Corps to conduct a diversionary attack in support of Hooker's I Corps, hoping to draw Confederate attention away from the intended main attack in the north. However, Burnside was instructed to wait for explicit orders before launching his attack, and those orders did not reach him until 10 a.m.[45] Burnside was strangely passive during preparations for the battle. He was disgruntled that McClellan had abandoned the previous arrangement of "wing" commanders reporting to him. Previously, Burnside had commanded a wing that included both the I and IX Corps and now he was responsible only for the IX Corps. Implicitly refusing to give up his higher authority, Burnside treated first Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno (killed at South Mountain) and then Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox of the Kanawha Division as the corps commander, funneling orders to the corps through him.
Burnside had four divisions (12,500 troops) and 50 guns east of Antietam Creek. Facing him was a force that had been greatly depleted by Lee's movement of units to bolster the Confederate left flank. At dawn, the divisions of Brig. Gens. David R. Jones and John G. Walker stood in defense, but by 10 a.m. all of Walker's men and Col.
Battle of Antietam George T. Anderson's Georgia brigade had been removed. Jones had only about 3,000 men and 12 guns available to meet Burnside. Four thin brigades guarded the ridges near Sharpsburg, primarily a low plateau known as Cemetery Hill. The remaining 400 menthe 2nd and 20th Georgia regiments, under the command of Brig. Gen. Robert Toombs, with two artillery batteriesdefended Rohrbach's Bridge, a three-span, 125-foot (38 m) stone structure that was the southernmost crossing of the Antietam.[46] It would become known to history as Burnside's Bridge because of the notoriety of the coming battle. The bridge was a difficult objective. The road leading to it ran parallel to the creek and was exposed to enemy fire. The bridge was dominated by a 100-foot (30 m) high wooded bluff on the west bank, strewn with boulders from an old quarry, making infantry and sharpshooter fire from good covered positions a dangerous impediment to crossing.
Go and look at [Burnside's Bridge], and tell me if you don't think Burnside and his corps might have executed a hop, skip, and jump and landed on the other side. One thing is certain, they might have waded it that day without getting their waist belts wet in any place. Confederate staff officer Henry Kyd Douglas
[47]
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Antietam Creek in this sector was seldom more than 50 feet (15 m) wide, and several stretches were only waist deep and out of Confederate range. Burnside has been widely criticized for ignoring this fact, starting with derision from Confederate staff officer Henry Kyd Douglas.[47] However, the commanding terrain across the sometimes shallow creek made crossing the water a comparatively easy part of a difficult problem. Burnside concentrated his plan instead on storming the bridge while simultaneously crossing a ford McClellan's engineers had identified a half mile (1km) downstream, but when Burnside's men reached it, they found the banks too high to negotiate. While Col. George Crook's Ohio brigade prepared to attack the bridge with the support of Brig. Gen. Samuel Sturgis's division, the rest of the Kanawha Division and Brig. Gen. Isaac Rodman's division struggled through thick brush trying to locate Snavely's Ford, 2 miles (3km) downstream, intending to flank the Confederates.[48] Crook's assault on the bridge was led by skirmishers from the 11th Connecticut, who were ordered to clear the bridge for the Ohioans to cross and assault the bluff. After receiving punishing fire for 15 minutes, the Connecticut men withdrew with 139 casualties, one third of their strength, including their commander, Col. Henry W. Kingsbury, who was fatally wounded.[49] Crook's main assault went awry when his unfamiliarity with the terrain caused his men to reach the creek a quarter mile (400 m) upstream from the bridge, where they exchanged volleys with Confederate skirmishers for the next few hours.[50] While Rodman's division was out of touch, slogging toward Snavely's Ford, Burnside and Cox directed a second assault at the bridge by one of Sturgis's brigades, led by the 2nd Maryland and 6th New Hampshire. They also fell prey to the Confederate sharpshooters and artillery, and their attack fell apart.[51] By this time it was noon, and McClellan was losing patience. He sent a succession of couriers to motivate Burnside to move forward. He ordered one aide, "Tell him if it costs 10,000 men he must go now." He increased the pressure by sending his inspector general, Col. Delos B. Sackett, to confront Burnside, who reacted indignantly: "McClellan appears to think I am not trying my best to carry this bridge; you are the third or fourth one who has been to me this morning with similar orders."[52] The third attempt to take the bridge was at 12:30 p.m. by Sturgis's other brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. Edward Ferrero. It was led by the 51st New York and the 51st Pennsylvania, who, with adequate artillery support and a promise that a recently canceled whiskey ration would be restored if they were successful, charged downhill and took up positions on the east bank. Maneuvering a captured light howitzer into position, they fired double canister down the bridge and got within 25 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) of the enemy. By 1 p.m., Confederate ammunition was running low, and word reached Toombs that Rodman's men were crossing Snavely's Ford on their flank. He ordered a withdrawal. His Georgians had cost the Federals more than 500 casualties, giving up fewer than 160 themselves. And they had stalled Burnside's assault on the southern flank for more than three hours.[53]
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Burnside's Bridge.
Charge of the 51st New York and 51st Pennsylvania across Burnside's Bridge, by Edwin Forbes.
Confederate guns on the hill above poured fire into the Union ranks at Burnside's bridge. Photo taken just after the Battle of Antietam, 1862.
Burnside's assault stalled again on its own. His officers had neglected to transport ammunition across the bridge, which was itself becoming a bottleneck for soldiers, artillery, and wagons. This represented another two-hour delay. Gen. Lee used this time to bolster his right flank. He ordered up every available artillery unit, although he made no attempt to strengthen D.R. Jones's badly outnumbered force with infantry units from the left. Instead, he counted on the arrival of A.P. Hill's Light Division, currently embarked on an exhausting 17 mile (27km) march from Harpers Ferry. By 2 p.m., Hill's men had reached Boteler's Ford, and Hill was able to confer with the relieved Lee at 2:30, who ordered him to bring up his men to the right of Jones.[54] The Federals were completely unaware that 3,000 new men would be facing them. Burnside's plan was to move around the weakened Confederate right flank, converge on Sharpsburg, and cut Lee's army off from Boteler's Ford, their only escape route across the Potomac. At 3 p.m., Burnside left Sturgis's division in reserve on the west bank and moved west with over 8,000 troops (most of them fresh) and 22 guns for close support.[55] An initial assault led by the 79th New York "Cameron Highlanders" succeeded against Jones's outnumbered division, which was pushed back past Cemetery Hill and to within 200 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) of Sharpsburg. Farther to the left, Rodman's division advanced toward Harpers Ferry Road. Its lead brigade, under Col. Harrison Fairchild, containing several colorful Zouaves of the 9th New York, came under heavy shellfire from a dozen enemy guns mounted on a ridge to their front, but they kept pushing forward. There was panic in the streets of Sharpsburg, clogged with retreating Confederates. Of the five brigades in Jones's division, only Toombs's brigade was still intact, but he had only 700 men.[56] A. P. Hill's division arrived at 3:30 p.m. Hill divided his column, with two brigades moving southeast to guard his flank and the other three, about 2,000 men, moving to the right of Toombs's brigade and preparing for a counterattack. At 3:40 p.m., Brig. Gen. Maxcy Gregg's brigade of South Carolinians attacked the 16th Connecticut on Rodman's left flank in the cornfield of farmer John Otto. The Connecticut men had been in service for only three weeks, and their line disintegrated with 185 casualties. The 4th Rhode Island came up on the right, but they had poor visibility amid the high stalks of corn, and they were disoriented because many of the Confederates were wearing Union uniforms captured at Harpers Ferry. They also broke and ran, leaving the 8th Connecticut far out in advance and isolated. They were enveloped and driven down the hills toward Antietam Creek. A counterattack by regiments from the Kanawha Division fell short.[57] The IX Corps had suffered casualties of about 20% but still possessed twice the number of Confederates confronting them. Unnerved by the collapse of his flank, Burnside ordered his men all the way back to the west bank of the Antietam, where he urgently requested more men and guns. McClellan was able to provide just one battery. He said, "I can do nothing more. I have no infantry." In fact, however, McClellan had two fresh corps in reserve, Porter's V and Franklin's VI, but he was too cautious, concerned about an imminent massive counterstrike by Lee. Burnside's men spent the rest of the day guarding the bridge they had suffered so much to capture.[58]
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Aftermath
The battle was over by 5:30 p.m. Losses for the day were heavy on both sides. The Union had 12,401 casualties with 2,108 dead. Confederate casualties were 10,318 with 1,546 dead. This represented 25% of the Federal force and 31% of the Confederate.[] More Americans died on September 17, 1862, than on any other day in the nation's military history.[60] Several generals died as a result of the battle, including Maj. Gens. Joseph K. Mansfield and Israel B. Richardson and Brig. Gen. Isaac P. Rodman on the Union side (all mortally wounded), and Brig. Gens. Lawrence O. Branch and William E. Starke on the Confederate side (killed).[61]
On the morning of September 18, Lee's army prepared to defend against a Federal assault that never came. After an improvised truce for both sides to recover and exchange their wounded, Lee's forces began withdrawing across the Potomac that evening to return to Virginia.[62] President Lincoln was disappointed in McClellan's performance. He believed that McClellan's cautious and poorly coordinated actions in the field had forced the battle to a draw rather than a crippling Confederate defeat. Historian Stephen Sears agrees.[63] In making his battle against great odds to save the Republic, General McClellan had committed barely 50,000 infantry and artillerymen to the contest. A third of his army did not fire a shot. Even at that, his men repeatedly drove the Army of Northern Virginia to the brink of disaster, feats of valor entirely lost on a commander thinking of little beyond staving off his own defeat. Stephen W. Sears, Landscape Turned Red The president was even more astonished that from September 17 to October 26, despite repeated entreaties from the War Department and the president himself, McClellan declined to pursue Lee across the Potomac, citing shortages of equipment and the fear of overextending his forces. General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck wrote in his official report, "The long inactivity of so large an army in the face of a defeated foe, and during the most favorable season for rapid movements and a vigorous campaign, was a matter of great disappointment and regret."[64] Lincoln relieved McClellan of his command of the Army of the Potomac on November 7, effectively ending the general's military career.
Confederate dead gathered for burial after the [59] battle. Photograph by Alexander Gardner
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Some students of history question the designation of "strategic victory" for the Union. After all, McClellan performed poorly in the campaign and the battle itself, and Lee displayed great generalship in holding his own in battle against an army that greatly outnumbered him. Casualties were comparable on both sides, although Lee lost a higher percentage of his army. Lee withdrew from the battlefield first, the technical definition of the tactical loser in a Civil War battle. However, in a strategic sense, despite being a tactical draw, Antietam is considered a turning point of the war and a victory for the Union because it ended Lee's strategic campaign (his first invasion of the North) and it allowed President President Lincoln and General George B. McClellan in the general's Lincoln to issue the Emancipation Proclamation on tent near the Antietam battlefield, October 3, 1862. Photograph by September 22, which took effect on January 1, 1863. Alexander Gardner Although Lincoln had intended to do so earlier, he was advised by his Cabinet to make this announcement after a Union victory to avoid the perception that it was issued out of desperation. The Union victory and Lincoln's proclamation played a considerable role in dissuading the governments of France and Britain from recognizing the Confederacy; some suspected they were planning to do so in the aftermath of another Union defeat. When the issue of emancipation was linked to the progress of the war, neither government had the political will to oppose the United States. Historian James M. McPherson summed up the importance of Antietam in his Crossroads of Freedom:[65] No other campaign and battle in the war had such momentous, multiple consequences as Antietam. In July 1863 the dual Union triumphs at Gettysburg and Vicksburg struck another blow that blunted a renewed Confederate offensive in the East and cut off the western third of the Confederacy from the rest. In September 1864 Sherman's capture of Atlanta reversed another decline in Northern morale and set the stage for the final drive to Union victory. These also were pivotal moments. But they would never have happened if the triple Confederate offensives in Mississippi, Kentucky, and most of all Maryland had not been defeated in the fall of 1862. James M. McPherson, Crossroads of Freedom The battle is commemorated at Antietam National Battlefield.
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Gallery
Confederate soldiers on the Antietam battlefield as they fell inside the fence on the Hagerstown road, September 1862 {picture #550} by Alexander Gardner (photographer)Alexander Gardner
Confederate horses lay dead and artillery caissons destroyed on Antietam battlefieldSite identified by Frassanito, pp. 168-70.
Dead on Antietam battlefieldSite identified by Robert Kalasky, "Military Images" Volume XX, Number 6 May-June 1999, pp. 24-29.
Confederate dead at Bloody Lane, looking east from the north bank. Alexander Gardner photograph
Confederate dead at Bloody Lane, looking northeast from the south bank. Alexander Gardner photographThe Union soldiers looking on were likely members of the 130th Pennsylvania, who were assigned burial detail
"Confederate soldier who after being wounded had evidently dragged himself to a little ravine on the hillside where he died". Photograph by Alexander Gardner (photographer)Alexander Gardner
"A Lonely Grave" Federal grave at Antietam by Alexander GardnerSite identified by Frassanito, pp. 171-74.
Antietam Battlefield photograph by Alexander GardnerOriginal description claimed "Battlefield of Antietam on the Day of the Battle" 17 September 1862; however, see Frassanito, pp. 70-73.
Artillery hell by Captain James Hope (Dunker Church at the far left)
"A Fateful Turn" Late morning looking east toward the Roulette Farm by Captain James Hope
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The Lutheran Church just east of Sharpsburg marks the extent of the Union offensive during the Battle of Antietam, 1862.
Notes
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] McPherson, p. 3. NPS (http:/ / www. cr. nps. gov/ hps/ abpp/ battles/ md003. htm). McPherson, p. 100; Eicher, p. 337; Sears, p. 69 "perhaps 50,000". Sears, pp. 65-66; McPherson, pp. 88-95. Sears, p. 112; McPherson, p. 108. McPherson, p. 109. McPherson, pp. 110-12.
[8] Eicher, p. 337; O.R. Series 1, Vol. XIX part 2 (S# 28), p. 621; Luvaas and Nelson, pp. 294-300; Esposito, map 67; Sears, pp. 366-72. Although most histories, including the Official Records, refer to these organizations as Corps, that designation was not formally made until November 6, 1862, after the Maryland Campaign. Longstreet's unit was referred to as the Right Wing, Jackson's the Left Wing, for most of 1862. (Gen. Lee referred in official correspondence to these as "commands". See, for instance, Luvaas and Nelson, p. 4. Lee used this term because a Confederate law forbade the creation of army corps. It had been intended as a states' rights measure to ensure that governors would retain some control over the troops from their state, and Lee lobbied strongly for repeal of this law.) Harsh, Sounding the Shallows, pp. 32-90, states that D.H. Hill was temporarily in command of a "Center Wing" with his own division commanded initially by Brig. Gen. Roswell S. Ripley, and the divisions of Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws and Brig. Gen. John G. Walker. The other references list him strictly as a division commander. [9] Sears, pp. 35966; Welcher, pp. 78688; Eicher, p. 338. [10] Bailey, p. 60. [11] Sears, p. 174. [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] Sears, pp. 164, 175-76. Bailey, p. 63. Harsh, Taken at the Flood, pp. 366-67; Sears, p. 174. Sears, pp. 169-74. Sears, p. 181. Wolff, p. 60. Sears, pp. 19091. Bailey, p. 70. Wolff, p. 61. Bailey, pp. 71, 73. Bailey, p. 71. Dawes, pp. 88-91. Bailey, p. 75. Dawes, pp. 91-93. Bailey, p. 79. Bailey, p. 81. Dawes, p. 95. Bailey, pp. 79-80. Armstrong, pp. 3-27; Sears, pp. 221-30; Eicher, pp. 353-55; Wolff, pp. 61-62. Armstrong, pp. 39-55. Kennedy, p. 120. Bailey, p. 93.
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[34] Bailey, p. 94. [35] Wolff, p. 63. [36] Bailey, p. 99. [37] Bailey, p. 100. [38] Bailey, pp. 101, 103. [39] Sears, p. 242. [40] Bailey, p. 102. [41] Sears, p. 254. [42] Bailey, p. 108. [43] Bailey, pp. 108-9. [44] Bailey, p. 141. [45] Jamieson, p. 94. McClellan issued the order at 9:10, after the repulse of Hooker's and Mansfield's assaults, having waited for the VI Corps to reach the battlefield and take up a reserve position. [46] Wolff, p. 64. [47] Douglas, p. 172. [48] Eicher, 359-60; Sears, p. 260; Wolff, p. 64. [49] Tucker, p. 87. [50] Sears, p. 263. [51] Bailey, p. 120. [52] Sears, pp. 264-65. [53] Sears, pp. 266-67; Bailey, pp. 125-26. [54] Sears, p. 276. [55] Bailey, p. 131. [56] Bailey, pp. 133-36. [57] Bailey, pp. 136-37. [58] Sears, pp. 291-92. [59] Site identified by Frassanito, pp. 105-108. [60] Antietam is sometimes cited as the bloodiest day in all of American history, but the deaths from the Galveston Hurricane of 1900 are significantly higher. The bloodiest battle in American history was Gettysburg, but its more than 46,000 casualties occurred over three days. Antietam ranks fifth in terms of total casualties in the Civil War, falling behind Chickamauga, Chancellorsville, and Spotsylvania Court House. [61] Sears, pp. 206, 254, 287, 290, 194. [62] Sears, pp. 297, 306-07. [63] Sears, p. 296. [64] Bailey, p. 67. [65] McPherson, p. 155. [66] Site identified by Frassanito, pp. 168-70. [67] Site identified by Robert Kalasky, "Military Images" Volume XX, Number 6 May-June 1999, pp. 24-29. [68] The Union soldiers looking on were likely members of the 130th Pennsylvania, who were assigned burial detail [69] Site identified by Frassanito, pp. 144-47. [70] Site identified by Frassanito, pp. 171-74. [71] Original description claimed "Battlefield of Antietam on the Day of the Battle" 17 September 1862; however, see Frassanito, pp. 70-73.
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References
Armstrong, Marion V. Disaster in the West Woods: General Edwin V. Sumner and the II Corps at Antietam. Sharpsburg, MD: Western Maryland Interpretive Association, 2002. Bailey, Ronald H., and the Editors of Time-Life Books. The Bloodiest Day: The Battle of Antietam. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1984. ISBN 0-8094-4740-1. Cannan, John. The Antietam Campaign: AugustSeptember 1862. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 1994. ISBN 0-938289-91-8. Dawes, Rufus R. A Full Blown Yankee of the Iron Brigade: Service with the Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999. ISBN 0-8032-6618-9. First published 1890 by E. R. Alderman and Sons. Douglas, Henry Kyd. I Rode with Stonewall: The War Experiences of the Youngest Member of Jackson's Staff. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1940. ISBN 0-8078-0337-5.
Battle of Antietam Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website (http://www. dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/). Frassanito, William A. Antietam: The Photographic Legacy of America's Bloodiest Day. Gettysburg, PA: Thomas Publications, 1978. ISBN 1-57747-005-2. Harsh, Joseph L. Sounding the Shallows: A Confederate Companion for the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2000. ISBN 0-87338-641-8. Harsh, Joseph L. Taken at the Flood: Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1999. ISBN 0-87338-631-0. Jamieson, Perry D. Death in September: The Antietam Campaign. Abilene, TX: McWhiney Foundation Press, 1999. ISBN 1-893114-07-4. Kalasky, Robert. "Union dead...Confederate Dead'." Military Images Magazine. Volume XX, Number 6, MayJune 1999. Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide (http://www.bibliobase.com/history/readerscomp/ civwar/html/cw_000106_entries.htm). 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Luvaas, Jay, and Harold W. Nelson, eds. Guide to the Battle of Antietam. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987. ISBN 0-7006-0784-6. McPherson, James M. Crossroads of Freedom: Antietam, The Battle That Changed the Course of the Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. ISBN 0-19-513521-0. Priest, John Michael. Antietam: The Soldiers' Battle. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. ISBN 0-19-508466-7. Sears, Stephen W. Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983. ISBN 0-89919-172-X. Tucker, Phillip Thomas. Burnside's Bridge: The Climactic Struggle of the 2nd and 20th Georgia at Antietam Creek. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2000. ISBN 0-8117-0199-9. Welcher, Frank J. The Union Army, 18611865 Organization and Operations. Vol. 1, The Eastern Theater. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989. ISBN 0-253-36453-1. Wolff, Robert S. "The Antietam Campaign." In Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History, edited by David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000. ISBN 0-393-04758-X. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/md003.htm)
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Further reading
Armstrong Marion V., Jr. Unfurl Those Colors! McClellan, Sumner, and the Second Army Corps in the Antietam Campaign. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-8173-1600-6. Ballard, Ted. Battle of Antietam: Staff Ride Guide (http://www.history.army.mil/StaffRide/Antietam/ Contents.htm). Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 2006. OCLC68192262. Breeden, James O. "Field Medicine at Antietam." Caduceus: A Humanities Journal for Medicine and the Health Sciences 10#1 (1994): 822. Carman, Ezra Ayers. The Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Vol. 1, South Mountain. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2010. ISBN 978-1-932714-81-4. Carman, Ezra Ayers. The Maryland Campaign of September 1862: Ezra A. Carman's Definitive Account of the Union and Confederate Armies at Antietam. Edited by Joseph Pierro. New York: Routledge, 2008. ISBN 0-415-95628-5.
Battle of Antietam Catton, Bruce. "Crisis at the Antietam." (http://www.americanheritage.com/content/crisis-antietam) American Heritage 9#5 (August 1958): 5496. Frassanito, William A. Antietam: The Photographic Legacy of America's Bloodiest Day. New York: Scribner, 1978. ISBN 978-0-684-15659-0. Gallagher, Gary W., ed. Antietam: Essays on the 1862 Maryland Campaign. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1989. ISBN 0-87338-400-8. Gottfried, Bradley M. The Maps of Antietam: An Atlas of the Antietam (Sharpsburg) Campaign, including the Battle of South Mountain, September 220, 1862. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2011. ISBN 978-1-61121-086-6. Jermann, Donald R. Antietam: The Lost Order. Gretna, LA: Pelican Publishing Co., 2006. ISBN 1-58980-366-3. Jordan, Brian M. Unholy Sabbath: The Battle of South Mountain in History and Memory, September 14, 1862. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie LLC, 2012. ISBN 978-1-61121-088-0. Harsh, Joseph L. Confederate Tide Rising: Robert E. Lee and the Making of Southern Strategy, 18611862. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1998. ISBN 0-87338-580-2. Murfin, James V. The Gleam of Bayonets: The Battle of Antietam and the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965. ISBN 0-8071-0990-8. Priest, John M. Before Antietam: The Battle for South Mountain. Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing Co., 1992. ISBN 978-0-942597-37-0. Rowland, Thomas J. George B. McClellan and Civil War History: In the Shadow of Grant and Sherman. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1998. ISBN 0-87338-603-5.
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External links
Animated history of the Battle of Antietam (http://www.civilwaranimated.com/AntietamAnimation.html) The Battle of Antietam (http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/antietam.html): Maps, histories, photos, and preservation news (Civil War Trust) Lincoln and Lee at Antietam (http://www.antietamconflict.com/) Antietam National Battlefield Park (http://www.nps.gov/anti/) Antietam on the Web (http://antietam.aotw.org) Official Reports from Antietam: George McClellan (http://civilwartalk.com/Resource_Center/ General_Resources/Military_Letters_and_Reports/ report-of-george-b-mcclellan-on-the-battle-of-antietamseptember-29-1862-a168.html), Robert E. Lee (http:// civilwartalk.com/Resource_Center/General_Resources/Military_Letters_and_Reports/ report-of-general-robert-e-lee-on-the-battle-of-antietamseptember-18-1862-a167.html) USS Antietam (http://www.cg54.navy.mil/) Collection of pictures by Alexander Gardner (http://www.old-picture.com/antietam-index-001.htm) Online transcription of 1869 record of original Confederate Burials in Washington County, Maryland, including Antietam Battlefield {Washington County Maryland Free Library-for reference only} (http://www.whilbr.org/ confederateSoldiers/index.aspx) History of Antietam National Cemetery, including a descriptive list of all the loyal soldiers buried therein (http:// www.whilbr.org/antietamNationalCemetery/index.aspx), published 1869 Hagerstown Herald of Freedom and Torch Light Sept 1862, first edition after the Battle of Antietam (http:// www.whilbr.org/HeraldofFreedom/index.aspx) Brotherswar.com The Battle of Antietam (http://www.brotherswar.com/Antietam-Sharpsburg.htm) Battle of Antietam: Two Great American Armies Engage in Combat (http://www.historynet.com/ wars_conflicts/american_civil_war/3785852.html) article by Ted Alexander
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Battle of Shepherdstown
The Battle of Shepherdstown, also known as the Battle of Boteler's Ford, took place September 1920, 1862, in Jefferson County, Virginia (now West Virginia), at the end of the Maryland Campaign of the American Civil War.
Background
After the Battle of Antietam, Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia prepared to defend against a Federal assault that never came. After an improvised truce for both sides to recover and exchange their wounded, Lee's forces began withdrawing across the Potomac River on the evening of September 18 to return to Virginia. Lee left behind a rear guard of two infantry brigades and 45 guns under his chief of artillery, Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton, to hold Boteler's Ford.[1]
Battle
Shortly before dusk on September 19, Union Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin sent 2,000 infantry and sharpshooters from Maj. Gen. Fitz-John Porter's V Corps across the Potomac River at Boteler's Ford. They attacked the Pendleton's rearguard, capturing four artillery pieces before being recalled. Pendleton reported to Gen. Robert E. Lee that Federals were now on the Virginia side of the river, and that he had lost part of his artillery. Early on September 20, Porter pushed elements of two divisions across the Potomac to establish a bridgehead. Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill's "Light Division" marched 5 miles back towards Shepherdstown and counterattacked under fire from Union artillery across the river on the Maryland hills. Porter, receiving reports that his infantry on the Virginia side was badly outnumbered, ordered a withdrawal. However, the colonel of the inexperienced 118th Pennsylvania (the "Corn Exchange" Regiment) refused to retire until orders were received through the proper chain of command, and his regiment became isolated. As the Confederates approached, the Union regiment panicked, with men scrambling down the steep cliffs and crossing the ford and a nearby dam. Several men drowned in their attempt to reach safety, and the regiment reported 269 casualties out of 737 men.[2]
Aftermath
Total Union casualties for the two days were 363, Confederate 261.[1] The rearguard action at Shepherdstown discouraged any further significant Federal pursuit of Lee's retiring army, ending the Maryland Campaign.
Notes
[1] Kennedy, p. 121. [2] Sears, p. 307.
References
Kennedy, Frances H., ed., The Civil War Battlefield Guide, 2nd ed., Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998, ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Sears, Stephen W., Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, Houghton Mifflin, 1983, ISBN 0-89919-172-X. National Park Service battle description (http://www.nps.gov/history/hps/abpp/battles/wv016.htm) CWSAC Report Update and Resurvey: Individual Battlefield Profiles (http://www.nps.gov/history/hps/abpp/ CWSII/WestVirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Rich Mountain to Summit Point.pdf)
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External links
Battle of Shepherdstown in Encyclopedia Virginia (http://encyclopediavirginia.org/Shepherdstown_Battle_of)
Battle of Unison
The Battle of Unison or Battle of Union refers to a series of American Civil War cavalry skirmishes in Loudoun County, Virginia, between October 31 November 2, 1862, between the Confederate forces of J.E.B. Stuart and various units of the Union Army of the Potomac. Although driven from the field in individual engagements, Stuart accomplished his mission to delay the enemy and screen the movements of the retreating Army of Northern Virginia.
Background
Following the Battle of Antietam, Robert E. Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia limped back into Virginia through the Shenandoah Valley. At the same time, J.E.B. Stuart and his cavalry set out from Williamsport to ride around the Federal army for the second time in the war. On October 10, 1862, Stuart completed his ride and reentered Virginia via White's Ford in Loudoun County, bringing along nearly 1,200 captured horses. Stuart quickly passed through the county and crossed over Snickers Gap into the Shenandoah Valley to rejoin Lee's army. On October 27, George B. McClellan and his Army of the Potomac belatedly reentered Virginia in pursuit of Lee, crossing the Potomac River around Berlin (present day Brunswick, Maryland) and Harpers Ferry. The Union army proceeded down the Loudoun Valley, foraging off local farms. On October 30, Stuart, with Brigadier General Fitzhugh Lee's brigade and Major John Pelham's artillery, reentered Loudoun County to reconnoiter the enemy's position and screen the movement of the Army of Northern Virginia as it repositioned itself south of the Rappahannock River. After crossing the Blue Ridge into Loudoun County, they bivouacked in Bloomfield for the night.
The skirmishes
On October 28, Stuart' men rode down the Snicker's Gap Turnpike towards Mountville, where Federals were reportedly camped. Upon entering the village, the Confederates found a force of about 100 or so Federals. Stuart was able to surprise and rout them, killing or capturing almost the entire force. Those who escaped galloped down the turnpike towards Aldie with the Confederates in hot pursuit. The chase stopped at Aldie, where Stuart's cavalrymen encountered a large contingent of Federals defending the village. Union artillery placed on the heights west of town drove Stuart's force back up the turnpike. Stuart refused to give up the fight, however, and soon brought up Pelham's artillery. It outdueled its Union counterpart, eventually driving it and the rest of the Federals from Aldie. During the artillery duel, Stuart received an erroneous report that Federals were approaching the Confederates' rear from Mountville, and thus he neglected to give chase. Instead, he turned his force to meet this phantom threat in his rear. Upon realizing the error, Stuart and his forces retired to Bloomfield, leaving pickets east and west of his position along the turnpike. The following morning, Stuart's eastern pickets at Philomont were attacked by approaching Federals. In response, he moved his force east to Unison at the intersection of the turnpike and the major north-south road through the area, thus placing himself between the Federals and D.H. Hill's forces encamped at Upperville. The Federals, however, did not press the attack for the rest of the day. The next morning at 8 a.m., they attacked Stuart's position with infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Stuart skillfully dismounted his command and had them take cover behind numerous stone walls in Unison, while placing Pelham's artillery on the heights west of town. In these positions, he was able to hold out against a far superior Federal force for most of the day. Finally, as night fell, the Federals made a concerted push, and Stuart was forced to make a hasty
Battle of Unison retreat to Upperville, leaving his seriously wounded behind. Once safely at Upperville, Stuart planned a renewed attack on the Federals for the next day, but scouts soon reported that the entire Federal Army was bearing down on him. Stuart decided to cross the Blue Ridge at Ashby's Gap the following morning to meet up with Stonewall Jackson and screen his movements in the Shenandoah Valley.
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Results
The Federals were able to force Stuart to leave his wounded behind when was driven from Loudoun County, but it took the weight of nearly the entire army to do so and the Federals still were unable to prevent Stuart from killing and capturing more men and seizing more horses. Furthermore, Stuart was able to drive a portion of the Federal army before him. Ultimately, Stuart succeeded in slowing down and harassing the already slow and beleaguered Federals, contributing to the War Department's decision to remove General McClellan from his command. Stuart's actions helped give the Confederate army more time to reposition and regather itself for a renewed Union campaign in Virginia. Riding with Stuart during the fighting around Unison was a young scout and staff officer who was seeing the Loudoun Valley for the first time. This scout, John S. Mosby, would become widely celebrated in that region for his daring exploits as a partisan ranger.
External links
Description of the battle from the Unison Preservation Society [1] General McClellan's Removal [2]
References
[1] http:/ / www. unisonva. org/ battlefield-summary. html [2] https:/ / docs. google. com/ document/ d/ 138VhvFepWZW9sGCguHv2n2ZMMg28qGNDuz0RXs6It0M/ edit?hl=en_US
Battle of Fredericksburg
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Battle of Fredericksburg
The Battle of Fredericksburg was fought December 1115, 1862, in and around Fredericksburg, Virginia, between General Robert E. Lee's Confederate Army of Northern Virginia and the Union Army of the Potomac, commanded by Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside. The Union army's futile frontal attacks on December 13 against entrenched Confederate defenders on the heights behind the city is remembered as one of the most one-sided battles of the American Civil War, with Union casualties more than twice as heavy as those suffered by the Confederates. Burnside's plan was to cross the Rappahannock River at Fredericksburg in mid-November and race to the Confederate capital of Richmond before Lee's army could stop him. Bureaucratic delays prevented Burnside from receiving the necessary pontoon bridges in time and Lee moved his army to block the crossings. When the Union army was finally able to build its bridges and cross under fire, urban combat resulted in the city on December 1112. Union troops prepared to assault Confederate defensive positions south of the city and on a strongly fortified ridge just west of the city known as Marye's Heights. On December 13, the "grand division" of Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin was able to pierce the first defensive line of Confederate Lt. Gen. Stonewall Jackson to the south, but was finally repulsed. Burnside ordered the grand divisions of Maj. Gens. Edwin V. Sumner and Joseph Hooker to make multiple frontal assaults against Lt. Gen. James Longstreet's position on Marye's Heights, all of which were repulsed with heavy losses. On December 15, Burnside withdrew his army, ending another failed Union campaign in the Eastern Theater.
Battle of Fredericksburg Alexandria Railroad would be an inadequate supply line. (Burnside was also influenced by plans McClellan began developing just prior to being relieved. Aware that Lee had blocked the O&A, McClellan considered a route through Fredericksburg and ordered a small group of cavalrymen commanded by Capt. Ulric Dahlgren to investigate the condition of the RF&P.) While Burnside began assembling a supply base at Falmouth, near Fredericksburg, the Lincoln administration entertained a lengthy debate about the wisdom of his plan, which differed from the president's preference of a movement south on the O&A and a direct confrontation with Lee's army instead of the movement focused on the city of Richmond. Lincoln reluctantly approved the plan on November 14 but cautioned his general to move with great speed, certainly doubting that Lee would cooperate as Burnside anticipated.[3]
347
Opposing forces
Key Union commanders Key Confederate Commanders
Gen.Robert E. Lee
Battle of Fredericksburg
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Battle of Fredericksburg
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Further information: Confederate order of battle and Union order of battle Burnside organized his Army of the Potomac into three so-called grand divisions, organizations that included infantry corps, cavalry, and artillery, comprising 120,000 men, of whom 114,000 would be engaged in the coming battle:[4] The Right Grand Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Edwin V. "Bull" Sumner, consisted of the II Corps of Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch (divisions of Brig. Gens. Winfield S. Hancock, Oliver O. Howard, and William H. French) and the IX Corps of Brig. Gen. Orlando B. Willcox (divisions of Brig. Gens. William W. Burns, Samuel D. Sturgis, and George W. Getty). A cavalry division under Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton was attached. The Center Grand Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, consisted of the III Corps of Brig. Gen. George Stoneman (divisions of Brig. Gens. David B. Birney, Daniel E. Sickles, and Amiel W. Whipple) and the V Corps of Brig. Gen. Daniel Butterfield (divisions of Brig. Gens. Charles Griffin, George Sykes, and Andrew A. Humphreys). A cavalry brigade under Brig. Gen. William W. Averell was attached. The Left Grand Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin, consisted of the I Corps of Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds (divisions of Brig. Gens. Abner Doubleday and John Gibbon and Maj. Gen. George G. Meade) and the VI Corps of Maj. Gen. William F. "Baldy" Smith (divisions of Brig. Gens. William T. H. Brooks, Albion P. Howe, and John Newton). A cavalry brigade commanded by Brig. Gen. George D. Bayard was attached. The Reserve, commanded by Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel of the XI Corps, was in the area of Fairfax Court House. The XII Corps, under Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum, was called from Harpers Ferry to Dumfries, Virginia, to join the reserve force on December 9, but none of these troops participated in the battle.[5] Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia had nearly 85,000 men, with 72,500 engaged. His organization of the army in corps was approved by an act of the Confederate Congress on November 6, 1862.[6] The First Corps of Lt. Gen. James Longstreet included the divisions of Maj. Gens. Lafayette McLaws, Richard H. Anderson, George E. Pickett, and John Bell Hood, and Brig. Gen. Robert Ransom, Jr. The Second Corps of Lt. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson included the divisions of Maj. Gens. D.H. Hill and A.P. Hill, and Brig. Gens. Jubal A. Early and William B. Taliaferro. Reserve Artillery under Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton. The Cavalry Division under Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart.
Battle of Fredericksburg The two armies at Fredericksburg represented the largest number of armed men that ever confronted each other for combat during the Civil War.[7]
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Movement to battle
The Union Army began marching on November 15, and the first elements arrived in Falmouth on November 17. Burnside's plan quickly went awryhe had ordered pontoon bridges to be sent to the front and assembled for his quick crossing of the Rappahannock, but because of administrative bungling, the bridges had not preceded the army. As Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner arrived, he strongly urged an immediate crossing of the river to scatter the token Confederate force of 500 men in the town and occupying the commanding heights to the west. Burnside became anxious, concerned that the increasing autumn rains would make the fording points unusable and that Sumner might be cut off and destroyed, ordering Sumner to wait in Falmouth.[8]
Lee at first anticipated that Burnside would beat him across the Rappahannock and that to protect Richmond, he would assume the next defensible position to the south, the North Anna River. But when he saw how slowly Burnside was moving (and Confederate President Jefferson Davis expressed reservations about planning for a battle so close to Richmond), he directed all of his army toward Fredericksburg. By November 23, all of Longstreet's corps had arrived and Lee placed them on the ridge known as Marye's Heights to the west of town, with Anderson's division on the far left, McLaws's directly behind the town, and Pickett's and Hood's to the right. He sent for Jackson on November 26, but his Second Corps commander had anticipated the need and began forced-marching his troops from Winchester on November 22, covering as many as 20 miles a day. Jackson arrived at Lee's headquarters on November 29 and his divisions were deployed to prevent Burnside crossing downstream from Fredericksburg: D.H. Hill's division moved to Port Royal, 18 miles down river; Early's 12 miles down river at Skinker's Neck; A.P. Hill's at Thomas Yerby's house, "Belvoir", about 6 miles southeast of town; and Taliaferro's along the RF&P Railroad, 4 miles south at Guinea Station.[9] The boats and equipment for a single pontoon bridge arrived at Falmouth on November 25, much too late to enable the Army of the Potomac to cross the river without opposition. Burnside still had an opportunity, however, because by then he was facing only half of Lee's army, not yet dug in, and if he acted quickly, he might have been able to attack Longstreet and defeat him before Jackson arrived. Once again he squandered his opportunity. The full complement of bridges arrived at the end of the month, but by this time Jackson was present and Longstreet was preparing strong defenses.[10] Burnside originally planned to cross his army east of Fredericksburg at Skinker's Neck, but an advance movement by Federal gunboats to there was fired upon and drew Early's and D.H. Hill's divisions into that area, a movement
Battle of Fredericksburg spotted by Union balloon observers. Now assuming that Lee had anticipated his plan, Burnside guessed that the Confederates had weakened their left and center to concentrate against him on their right. So he decided to cross directly at Fredericksburg. On December 9, he wrote to Halleck, "I think now the enemy will be more surprised by a crossing immediately in our front than any other part of the river. ... I'm convinced that a large force of the enemy is now concentrated at Port Royal, its left resting on Fredericksburg, which we hope to turn." In addition to his numerical advantage in troop strength, Burnside also had the advantage of knowing his army could not be attacked effectively. On the other side of the Rappahannock, 220 artillery pieces had been located on the ridge known as Stafford Heights to prevent Lee's army from mounting any major counterattacks.[11]
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Battle
Crossing the Rappahannock, December 1112
Skinkers Neck on the Rappanhannock below Fredericksburg, VA, 1862 sketch by Alfred Waud
Model of a portion of the pontoon bridge built for the film Gods and Generals, displayed at the Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park
Union engineers began to assemble six pontoon bridges before dawn on December 11, two just north of the town center, a third on the southern end of town, and three farther south, near the confluence of the Rappahannock and Deep Run. The engineers constructing the bridge directly across from city came under punishing fire from Confederate sharpshooters, primarily from the Mississippi brigade of Brig. Gen. William Barksdale, in command of the town defenses. Union artillery attempted to dislodge the sharpshooters, but their positions in the cellars of houses rendered the fire from 150 guns mostly ineffective. Eventually Burnside's artillery commander, Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt, convinced him to send infantry landing parties over in the pontoon boats to secure a small bridgehead and rout the sharpshooters. Col. Norman J. Hall volunteered his brigade for this assignment. Burnside suddenly turned reluctant, lamenting to Hall in front of his men that "the effort meant death to most of those who should undertake
Battle of Fredericksburg the voyage." When his men responded to Hall's request with three cheers, Burnside relented. At 3 p.m., the Union artillery began a preparatory bombardment and 135 infantrymen from the 7th Michigan and the 19th Massachusetts crowded into the small boats. They crossed successfully and spread out in a skirmish line to clear the sharpshooters. Although some of the Confederates surrendered, fighting proceeded street by street through the town as the engineers completed the bridges. Sumner's Right Grand Division began crossing at 4:30 p.m., but the bulk of his men did not cross until December 12. Hooker's Center Grand Division crossed on December 13, using both the northern and southern bridges.[12] The clearing of the city buildings by Sumner's infantry and by artillery fire from across the river began the first major urban combat of the war. Union gunners sent more than 5,000 shells against the town and the ridges to the west. By nightfall, four brigades of Union troops occupied the town, which they looted with a fury that had not been seen in the war up to that point. This behavior enraged Lee, who compared their depredations with those of the ancient Vandals. The destruction also angered the Confederate troops, many of whom were native Virginians. Many on the Union side were also shocked by the destruction inflicted on Fredericksburg. Civilian casualties were unusually sparse in the midst of such widespread violence; George Rable estimates no more than four civilian deaths.[13] River crossings south of the city by Franklin's Left Grand Division were much less eventful. Both bridges were completed by 11 a.m. on December 11 while five batteries of Union artillery suppressed most sniper fire against the engineers. Franklin was ordered at 4 p.m. to cross his entire command, but only a single brigade was sent out before dark. Crossings resumed at dawn and were completed by 1 p.m. on December 12. Early on December 13, Jackson recalled his divisions under Jubal Early and D.H. Hill from down river positions to join his main defensive lines south of the city.[14] Burnside's verbal instructions on December 12 outlined a main attack by Franklin, supported by Hooker, on the southern flank, while Sumner made a secondary attack on the northern. His actual orders on December 13 were vague and confusing to his subordinates. At 5 p.m. on December 12, he made a cursory inspection of the southern flank, where Franklin and his subordinates pressed him to give definite orders for a morning attack by the grand division, so they would have adequate time to position their forces overnight. However, Burnside demurred and the order did not reach Franklin until 7:15 or 7:45 a.m. When it arrived, it was not as Franklin expected. Rather than ordering an attack by the entire grand division of almost 60,000 men, Franklin was to keep his men in position, but was to send "a division at least" to seize the high ground (Prospect Hill) around Hamilton's Crossing, Sumner was to send one division through the city and up Telegraph Road, and both flanks were to be prepared to commit their entire commands. Burnside was apparently expecting these weak attacks to intimidate Lee, causing him to withdraw. Franklin, who had originally advocated a vigorous assault, chose to interpret Burnside's order very conservatively. Brig. Gen. James A. Hardie, who delivered the order, did not ensure that Burnside's intentions were understood by Franklin, and map inaccuracies about the road network made those intentions unclear. Furthermore, Burnside's choice of the verb "to seize" was less forceful in 19th century military terminology than an order "to carry" the heights.[15]
352
Battle of Fredericksburg
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Battle of Fredericksburg cover from Union artillery and were not expecting to be attacked at that moment, so were killed or captured unarmed. Gregg at first mistook the Union soldiers for fleeing Confederate troops and ordered his men not to fire on them. While he rode prominently in front of his lines, the partially deaf Gregg could not hear the approaching Federals or their bullets flying around him. He was shot through the spinal cord, dying two days later.[17] Confederate reservesthe divisions of Brig. Gens. Jubal A. Early and William B. Taliaferromoved into the fray from behind Gregg's original position. Inspired by their attack, regiments from Lane's and Archer's brigades rallied and formed a new defensive line in the gap. Now Meade's men were receiving fire from three sides and could not withstand the pressure. Feger Jackson attempted to flank a Confederate battery, but after his horse was shot and he began to lead on foot, he was shot in the head by a volley and his brigade fell back, leaderless (Col. Joseph W. Fisher soon replaced Jackson in command).[18] To Meade's right, Gibbon's division prepared to move forward at 1 p.m. Brig. Gen. Nelson Taylor proposed to Gibbon that they supplement Meade's assault with a bayonet charge against Lane's position. However, Gibbon stated that this would violate his orders, so Taylor's brigade did not move forward until 1:30 p.m. The attack did not have the benefit of a gap to exploit, nor did the Union soldiers have any wooded cover for their advance, so progress was slow under heavy fire from Lane's brigade and Confederate artillery. Immediately following Taylor was the brigade of Col. Peter Lyle, and the advance of the two brigades ground to a halt before they reached the railroad. Committing his reserve at 1:45 p.m., Gibbon sent forward his brigade under Col. Adrian R. Root, which moved through the survivors of the first two brigades, but they were soon brought to a halt as well. Eventually some of the Federals reached the crest of the ridge and had some success during hand-to-hand fightingmen on both sides had depleted their ammunition and resorted to bayonets and rifle butts, and even empty rifles with bayonets thrown like javelinsbut they were forced to withdraw back across the railroad embankment along with Meade's men to their left. Gibbon's attack, despite heavy casualties, had failed to support Meade's temporary breakthrough.[19]
My God, General Reynolds, did they think my division could whip Lee's whole army? Maj. Gen. George G. Meade to Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds, afternoon of December 13
[20]
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After the battle Meade complained that some of Gibbon's officers had not charged quickly enough. But his primary frustration was with Brig. Gen. David B. Birney, whose division of the III Corps had been designated to support the attack as well. Birney claimed that his men had been subjected to damaging artillery fire as they formed up, that he had not understood the importance of Meade's attack, and that Reynolds had not ordered his division forward. When Meade galloped to the rear to confront Birney with a string of fierce profanities that, in the words of one staff lieutenant, "almost makes the stones creep," he was finally able to order the brigadier forward under his own responsibility, but harbored resentment for weeks. By this time, however, it was too late to accomplish any further offensive action.[21] Early's division began a counterattack, led initially by Col. Edmund N. Atkinson's Georgia brigade, which inspired the men from the brigades of Col. Robert Hoke, Brig. Gen. James J. Archer, and Col. John M. Brockenbrough to charge forward out of the railroad ditches, driving Meade's men from the woods in a disorderly retreat, followed closely by Gibbon's. Early's orders to his brigades were to pursue as far as the railroad, but in the chaos many kept up the pressure over the open fields as far as the old Richmond Road. Union artillery crews proceeded to unleash a blast of close-range canister shot, firing as fast as they could load their guns. The Confederates were also struck by the leading brigade of Birney's belated advance, commanded by Brig. Gen. J. H. Hobart Ward. Birney followed up with the brigades of Brig. Gens. Hiram G. Berry and John C. Robinson, which broke the Rebel advance that had threatened to drive the Union into the river. Any further Confederate advance was deterred by the arrival of the III Corps division of Brig. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles on the right. General Burnside, who by this time was focused on his attacks on Marye's Heights, was dismayed that his left flank attack had not achieved the success he assumed earlier in the day. He ordered Franklin to "advance his right and front," but despite repeated entreaties, Franklin refused, claiming that all of his forces had been engaged. This was not true, however, as the entire VI Corps and Brig. Gen. Abner Doubleday's division of the I Corps had been mostly idle, suffering only a few casualties from artillery fire
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The Confederates withdrew back to the safety of the hills south of town. Stonewall Jackson considered mounting a resumed counterattack, but the Federal artillery and impending darkness changed his mind. A fortuitous Union breakthrough had been wasted because Franklin did not reinforce Meade's success with some of the 20,000 men standing in reserve. Neither Franklin nor Reynolds took any personal involvement in the battle, and were unavailable to their subordinates at the critical point. Franklin's losses were about 5,000 casualties in comparison to Stonewall Jackson's 3,400, demonstrating the ferocity of the fighting. Skirmishing and artillery duels continued until dark, but no additional major attacks took place, while the center of the battle moved north to Marye's Heights.[24]
On the northern end of the battlefield, Brig. Gen. William H. French's division of the II Corps prepared to move forward, subjected to Confederate artillery fire that was descending on the fog-covered city of Fredericksburg. General Burnside's orders to Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, commander of the Right Grand Division, was to send "a division or more" to seize the high ground to the west of the city, assuming that his assault on the southern end of the Confederate line would be the decisive action of the battle. The avenue of approach was difficultmostly open fields, but interrupted by scattered houses, fences, and gardens that would restrict the movement of battle lines. A
Sumner's assault, 1:00 p.m., December 13, 1862. The sequence of Union division attacks was French (II Corps), Hancock (II), Howard (II), and Sturgis (IX).
canal stood about 200 yards west of the town, crossed by three narrow bridges, which would require the Union troops to funnel themselves into columns before proceeding. About 600 yards to the west of Fredericksburg was the
Battle of Fredericksburg low ridge known as Marye's Heights, rising 4050 feet above the plain. (Although popularly known as Marye's Heights, the ridge was composed of several hills separated by ravines, from north to south: Taylor's Hill, Stansbury Hill, Marye's Hill, and Willis Hill.) Near the crest of the portion of the ridge comprising Marye's Hill and Willis Hill, a narrow lane in a slight cutthe Telegraph Road, known after the battle as the Sunken Roadwas protected by a 4-foot stone wall, enhanced in places with log breastworks and abatis, making it a perfect infantry defensive position. Confederate Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws initially had about 2,000 men on the front line of Marye's Heights and there were an additional 7,000 men in reserve on the crest and behind the ridge. Massed artillery provided almost uninterrupted coverage of the plain below. General Longstreet had been assured by his artillery commander, Lt. Col. Edward Porter Alexander, "General, we cover that ground now so well that we will comb it as with a fine-tooth comb. A chicken could not live on that field when we open on it."[25] The fog lifted from the town around 10 a.m. and Sumner gave his order to advance an hour later. French's brigade under Brig. Gen. Nathan Kimball began to move around noon. They advanced slowly through heavy artillery fire, crossed the canal in columns over the narrow bridges, and formed in line, with fixed bayonets, behind the protection of a shallow bluff. In perfect line of battle, they advanced up the muddy slope until they were cut down at about 125 yards from the stone wall by repeated rifle volleys. Some soldiers were able to get as close as 40 yards, but having suffered severe casualties from both the artillery and infantry fire, the survivors clung to the ground. Kimball was severely wounded during the assault, and his brigade suffered 25% casualties. French's brigades under Col. John W. Andrews and Col. Oliver H. Palmer followed, with casualty rates of almost 50%.[26] Sumner's original order called for the division of Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock to support French and Hancock sent forward his brigade under Col. Samuel K. Zook behind Palmer's. They met a similar fate. Next was his Irish Brigade under Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Meagher. By coincidence, they attacked the area defended by fellow Irishmen of Col. Robert McMillan's 24th Georgia Infantry. One Confederate who spotted the green regimental flags approaching cried out, "Oh God, what a pity! Here comes Meagher's fellows." But McMillan exhorted his troops: "Give it to them now, boys! Now's the time! Give it to The sunken road at Marye's Heights in 2010. them!" Hancock's final brigade was led by Brig. Gen. John C. Approximately 3,000 Confederate infantrymen Caldwell. Leading his two regiments on the left, Col. Nelson A. Miles were lined up in multiple ranks behind the stone suggested to Caldwell that the practice of marching in formation, wall for about 600 yards, and another 3,000 were atop the slope behind it, along with their artillery. firing, and stopping to reload, made the Union soldiers easy targets, and that a concerted bayonet charge might be effective in carrying the works. Caldwell denied permission. Miles was struck by a bullet in the throat as he led his men to within 40 yards of the wall, where they were pinned down as their predecessors had been. Caldwell himself was soon struck by two bullets and put out of action.[27] The commander of the II Corps, Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch, was dismayed at the carnage wrought upon his two divisions in the hour of fighting and, like Col. Miles, realized that the tactics were not working. He first considered a massive bayonet charge to overwhelm the defenders, but as he surveyed the front, he quickly realized that French's and Hancock's divisions were in no shape to move forward again. He next planned for his final division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, to swing to the right and attempt to envelop the Confederate left, but upon receiving urgent requests for help from French and Hancock, he sent Howard's men over and around the fallen troops instead. The brigade of Col. Joshua Owen went in first, reinforced by Col. Norman J. Hall's brigade, and then two regiments of Brig. Gen. Alfred Sully's brigade. The other corps in Sumner's grand division was the IX Corps, and he sent in one of its divisions under Brig. Gen. Samuel Sturgis. After two hours of desperate fighting, four Union divisions had failed in the mission Burnside had originally assigned to one. Casualties were heavy: II Corps losses for the afternoon were 4,114, Sturgis's division 1,011.[28]
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Battle of Fredericksburg While the Union Army paused, Longstreet reinforced his line so that there were four ranks of infantrymen behind the stone wall. Brig. Gen. Thomas R. R. Cobb of Georgia, who had commanded the key sector of the line, was mortally wounded by a sniper's bullet and was replaced by Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw. General Lee expressed concerns to Longstreet about the massing troops breaking his line, but Longstreet assured his commander, "General, if you put every man on the other side of the Potomac on that field to approach me over the same line, and give me plenty of ammunition, I will kill them all before they reach my line."[29] By midafternoon, Burnside had failed on both flanks to make progress against the Confederates. Rather than reconsidering his approach in the face of heavy casualties, he stubbornly decided to continue on the same path. He sent orders to Franklin to renew the assault on the left (which, as described earlier, the Left Grand Division commander ignored) and ordered his Center Grand Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, to cross the Rappahannock into Fredericksburg and continue the attack on Marye's Heights. Hooker performed a personal reconnaissance (something that neither Hooker's assault, 3:30 p.m., December 13, 1862. The sequence of Union division attacks Burnside nor Sumner had done, both was Griffin (V Corps), Humphreys (V), and Getty (IX). remaining east of the river during the failed assaults) and returned to Burnside's headquarters to advise against the attack.[30] Brig. Gen. Daniel Butterfield, commanding Hooker's V Corps, while waiting for Hooker to return from his conference with Burnside, sent his division under Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin to relieve Sturgis's men. By this time, Maj. Gen. George Pickett's Confederate division and one of Maj. Gen. John Bell Hood's brigades had marched north to reinforce Marye's Heights. Griffin smashed his three brigades against the Confederate position, one by one. Also concerned about Sturgis, Couch sent the six guns of Capt. John G. Hazard's Battery B, 1st Rhode Island Light Artillery, to within 150 yards of the Confederate line. They were hit hard by Confederate sharpshooter and artillery fire and provided no effective relief to Sturgis.[31] A soldier in Hancock's division reported movement in the Confederate line that led some to believe that the enemy might be retreating. Despite the unlikeliness of this supposition, the V Corps division of Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys was ordered to attack and capitalize on the situation. Humphreys led his first brigade on horseback, with his men moving over and around fallen troops with fixed bayonets and unloaded rifles; some of the fallen men clutched at the passing pant legs, urging their comrades not to go forward, causing the brigade to become disorganized in their advance. The charge reached to within 50 yards before being cut down by concentrated rifle fire. Brig. Gen. George Sykes was ordered to move forward with his V Corps regular army division to support Humphreys's retreat, but his men were caught
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Genl. Humphreys charging at the head of his division after sunset of the 13th Dec, 1862 sketch by Alfred Waud
Battle of Fredericksburg By 4 p.m., Hooker had returned from his meeting with Burnside, having failed to convince the commanding general to abandon the attacks. While Humphreys was still attacking, Hooker reluctantly ordered the IX Corps division of Brig. Gen. George W. Getty to attack as well, but this time to the leftmost portion of Marye's Heights, Willis Hill. Col. Rush Hawkins's brigade, followed by Col. Edward Harland's brigade, moved along an unfinished railroad line just north of Hazel Run, approaching close to the Confederate line without detection in the gathering twilight, but they were eventually detected, fired on, and repulsed.[33] Seven Union divisions had been sent in, generally one brigade at a time, for a total of fourteen individual charges,[34] all of which failed, costing them from 6,000 to 8,000 casualties.[35] Confederate losses at Marye's Heights totaled around 1,200.[36] The falling of darkness and the pleas of Burnside's subordinates were enough to put an end to the attacks. Longstreet later wrote, "The charges had been desperate and bloody, but utterly hopeless."[37] Thousands of Union soldiers spent the cold December night on the fields leading to the heights, unable to move or assist the wounded because of Confederate fire. That night, Burnside attempted to blame his subordinates for the disastrous attacks, but they argued that it was entirely his fault and no one else's.[38]
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Aftermath
Western view from Fredericksburg down Telegraph Road with Marye's Heights visible in the distant center
Marye's House upon Marye's Heights was the center of the Confederate position during the battle. Confederate troop encampments are visible to the right
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Sumner's headquarters, Chatham Manor, on Stafford Heights. Burnside observed the battle primarily from this location.
The Union army suffered 12,653 casualties (1,284 killed, 9,600 wounded, 1,769 captured/missing).[41] Two Union generals were mortally wounded: Brig. Gens. George D. Bayard and Conrad F. Jackson. The Confederate army lost 5,377 (608 killed, 4,116 wounded, 653 captured/missing),[42] most of them in the early fighting on Jackson's front. Confederate Brig. Gens. Maxcy Gregg and T. R. R. Cobb were both mortally wounded. The casualties sustained by each army showed clearly how disastrous the Union army's tactics were. Although the fighting on the southern flank produced roughly equal casualties (about 4,000 Confederate, 5,000 Union), the northern flank was completely lopsided, with about eight Union casualties for each Confederate. Burnside's men had suffered considerably more in the attack originally meant as a diversion than in his main effort.[43] The South erupted in jubilation over their great victory. The Richmond Examiner described it as a "stunning defeat to the invader, a splendid victory to the defender of the sacred soil." General Lee, normally reserved, was described by the Charleston Mercury as "jubilant, almost off-balance, and seemingly desirous of embracing everyone who calls on him." The newspaper also exclaimed that, "General Lee knows his business and the army has yet known no such word as fail."[44] Reactions were opposite in the North, and both the Army and President Lincoln came under strong attacks from politicians and the press. The Cincinnati Commercial wrote, "It can hardly be in human nature for men to show more valor or generals to manifest less judgment, than were perceptible on our side that day." Senator Zachariah Chandler, a Radical Republican, wrote that, "The President is a weak man, too weak for the occasion, and those fool or traitor generals are wasting time and yet more precious blood in indecisive battles and delays." Pennsylvania Governor Andrew Curtin visited the White House after a trip to the battlefield. He told the president, "It was not a battle, it was a butchery." Curtin reported that the president was "heart-broken at the recital, and soon reached a state of nervous excitement bordering on insanity." Lincoln himself wrote, "If there is a worse place than hell, I am in it."[45] Burnside was relieved of command a month later, following an unsuccessful attempt to purge some of his subordinates from the Army and the humiliating failure of his "Mud March" in January.[46]
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Preservation efforts
In March 2006, the Civil War Preservation Trust (CWPT) announced the beginning of a $12 million national campaign to preserve the historic Slaughter Pen Farm, a key part of the Fredericksburg battlefield. The 205-acre (unknown operator: u'strong'km2) farm, known locally as the Pierson Tract, was the scene of bloody struggle on December 13, 1862. Over this ground Federal troops under Maj. Gen. George Meade and Brig. Gen. John Gibbon launched their assault against Lt. Gen. Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson's Confederates holding CWPT President Jim Lighthizer at Slaughter Pen the southern portion of the Army of Northern Virginia's line at Farm Fredericksburg. Despite suffering enormous casualties the Federal troops under Meade were able to temporarily penetrate the Confederate line and for a time represented the North's best chance of winning the Battle of Fredericksburg. The fighting on this southern portion of the battlefield, later named the Slaughter Pen, produced 5,000 casualties and five Medal of Honor recipients. The Slaughter Pen Farm was considered to be the largest remaining unprotected part of the Fredericksburg battlefield. It is also the only place on the battlefield where a visitor can still follow the Union assault of December 13 from beginning to end. Nearly all the other land associated with Union attacks at Fredericksburgeither on the southern end of the battlefield or in front of Marye's Heightshas been degraded by development. The $12 million acquisition of the Slaughter Pen Farm at the Fredericksburg battlefield has been called the most ambitious nonprofit battlefield acquisition in American history.[47] In October 2006 the Department of the Interior awarded a $2 million grant based on the significance of the Slaughter Pen Farm. The money was provided through a U.S. Congressional appropriation from the Land and Water Conservation Fund. The fund supports non-federal efforts to acquire and preserve meaningful American Civil War battlefield lands. The program is administered by the American Battlefield Protection Program, an arm of the National Park Service. In addition, the Central Virginia Battlefields Trust (CVBT) committed $1 million toward the Slaughter Pen Farm fundraising campaign.[47]
In popular media
The Battle of Fredericksburg was depicted in the 2003 film Gods and Generals, based on the novel of the same name. Both the novel and film focused primarily on the disastrous charges on Marye's Heights, with the movie highlighting the charges of Hancock's division, the Irish Brigade, Caldwell's and Zook's brigades, and the 20th Maine Infantry Regiment. American author Louisa May Alcott fictionalized her experience nursing soldiers injured in the Battle of Fredericksburg in her book Hospital Sketches (1863).
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Notes
[1] O'Reilly, pp. 46. [2] Esposito, text to map 71; Marvel, pp. 15961; O'Reilly, pp. 12. [3] Eicher, p. 396; O'Reilly, pp. 1423; Welcher, p. 700; Marvel, pp. 16465. [4] Eicher, pp. 39697; O'Reilly, p. 21; Welcher, pp. 700701. [5] Kennedy, p. 144; Welcher, p. 701. [6] Eicher, p. 397; O'Reilly, p. 10. [7] Goolrick, p. 39; O'Reilly, p. 7. [8] Rable, pp. 8182; O'Reilly, pp. 2532; Eicher, p. 397; Welcher, p. 700; Kennedy, p. 145; Salmon, p. 145. [9] Goolrick, p. 39; O'Reilly, pp. 3343; Eicher, p. 397; Welcher, pp. 701702. [10] Eicher, p. 398; Center for Military History, p. 1; Marvel. p. 168. [11] O'Reilly, pp. 5152; Eicher, p. 398; Goolrick, pp. 3940; Esposito, map 72; Marvel, pp. 16970. [12] O'Reilly, pp. 6785; Goolrick, pp. 5052; Esposito, map 72; Welcher, pp. 703704. [13] Rable, pp. 16667, 17789; O'Reilly, pp. 57126; Eicher, pp. 39899; Goolrick, pp. 5358. [14] Welcher, pp. 703704; Center for Military History, p. 3. [15] Eicher, pp. 399400; Goolrick, pp. 6061; Marvel, pp. 18087; Center for Military History, pp. 23; Kennedy, p. 145; O'Reilly, p. 137. To "seize" was typically ordered for positions not occupied by a significant enemy force. [16] Rable, pp. 192203; O'Reilly, pp. 13565; Goolrick, pp. 6365; Eicher, p. 400; Salmon, p. 163. [17] Goolrick, pp. 6567; Rable, pp. 19394, 20514; O'Reilly, pp. 16677; Salmon, pp. 16364. [18] Welcher, pp. 706707; Rable, pp. 20417; Goolrick, p. 67. [19] Rable, pp. 21114; O'Reilly, pp. 18797; Goolrick, pp. 6770; Welcher, pp. 706707. [20] Rable, p. 216. [21] Rable, pp. 21417; Welcher, p. 707. [22] Rable, pp. 24452; Goolrick, p. 71; O'Reilly, pp. 198245. [23] Gallagher, p. vii, discusses the exact wording of Lee's famous quotation. John Esten Cooke, a member of Jeb Stuart's staff, wrote that Lee told Longstreet, "It is well this is so terrible! we should grow too fond of it!" The quotation as it is generally remembered today was reported by Edward Porter Alexander in his Military Memoirs of a Confederate (p. 302) and popularized by Douglas Southall Freeman in his 193435 biography, R.E. Lee (vol. 2, p. 462). Gallagher remarks that Longstreet made no mention of this quotation in any of his postwar writings. Eicher, p. 403, attributes this remark to Lee in the context of the Marye's Heights front. [24] O'Reilly, pp. 187245, 499; Goolrick, p. 71; Welcher, p. 708; Rable, pp. 21117. [25] Welcher, pp. 708709; Goolrick, pp. 7273; Rable, pp. 21920; O'Reilly, pp. 24950. [26] Rable, pp. 21828; O'Reilly, pp. 24673; Goolrick, pp. 7377; Welcher, pp. 70910. [27] Welcher, p. 710; O'Reilly, pp. 273323; Rable, pp. 22836; Goolrick, pp. 7779. [28] Goolrick, pp. 8084; Welcher, p. 710; O'Reilly, pp. 32454; Rable, pp. 23743. [29] Goolrick, p. 84; O'Reilly, pp. 32454. Smith, pp. 9798, describes conflicting stories about the nature of Cobb's wound. The sniper version is sourced to Kershaw. Rable, p. 228, and Eicher, p. 401, claim it was a shrapnel wound. [30] O'Reilly, p. 363; Eicher, p. 403; Goolrick, p. 85; Rable, p. 254; Marvel, pp. 19293. [31] Rable, pp. 25659; Goolrick, p. 85; Welcher, p. 711; O'Reilly, pp. 36388. [32] Goolrick, pp. 8586; Rable, pp. 26064; Welcher, p. 712. [33] O'Reilly, pp. 390429; Rable, pp. 26466; Welcher, p. 712; Goolrick, p. 87. [34] Esposito, text for map 73. The divisions were French (II Corps), Hancock (II), Howard (II), Sturgis (IX), Griffin (V), Humphreys (V), and Getty (IX). [35] Historians differ in reporting Union casualties in the Marye's Heights sector. Esposito, in notes for map 73, cites "over 6,000." Goolrick, p. 87, cites 7,000. Gallagher, p. 23, "nearly 8,000." All other references list total battle casualties. [36] Goolrick, pp. 83, 87. [37] Goolrick, p. 87. [38] Marvel, pp. 203207. [39] Rable, pp. 26972; Eicher, p. 403; Marvel, pp. 196200; Goolrick, pp. 8991. [40] O'Reilly, p. 439; Rable, p. 273. [41] Eicher, p. 405. [42] Eicher, p. 405. Foote, p. 44, claims that this number was later acknowledged to be 4,201, based on over 1,000 men who had been considered wounded or missing returning from Christmas holidays with their families immediately after the battle. Goolrick, p. 779, agrees with this figure. [43] O'Reilly, p. 499. [44] Goolrick, p. 92. [45] Goolrick, pp. 9293. [46] O'Reilly, pp. 46791.
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[47] Civil War Preservation Trust Announces Campaign to Save Slaughter Pen Farm (http:/ / www. civilwar. org/ news/ PressDetail. php?releaseID=120)
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References
Alexander, Edward P. Military Memoirs of a Confederate: A Critical Narrative. New York: Da Capo Press, 1993. ISBN 0-306-80509-X. First published 1907 by Charles Scribner's Sons. Center of Military History. Fredericksburg Staff Ride: Briefing Book (http://www.history.army.mil/StaffRide/ Fredericksburg/Fredericksburg_Staff_Ride_Briefing_Book.pdf). Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 2002. OCLC50210530. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website (http://www. dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/). Foote, Shelby. The Civil War: A Narrative. Vol. 2, Fredericksburg to Meridian. New York: Random House, 1958. ISBN 0-394-49517-9. Freeman, Douglas S. R. E. Lee, A Biography (http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/People/ Robert_E_Lee/FREREL/home.html). 4 vols. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 193435. OCLC166632575. Gallagher, Gary W., ed. The Fredericksburg Campaign: Decision on the Rappahannock. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995. ISBN 0-8078-2193-4. Goolrick, William K., and the Editors of Time-Life Books. Rebels Resurgent: Fredericksburg to Chancellorsville. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1985. ISBN 0-8094-4748-7. Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide. 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Marvel, William. Burnside. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991. ISBN 0-8078-1983-2. O'Reilly, Francis Augustn. The Fredericksburg Campaign: Winter War on the Rappahannock. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2003. ISBN 0-8071-3154-7. Rable, George C. Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg! Chapel Hill: University Of North Carolina Press, 2002. ISBN 0-8078-2673-1. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Smith, Derek. The Gallant Dead: Union & Confederate Generals Killed in the Civil War. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2005. ISBN 0-8117-0132-8. Tucker, Spencer C. "First Battle of Fredericksburg." In Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History, edited by David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000. ISBN 0-393-04758-X. U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion (http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/records/list.cfm): a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series 1, Vol. XXI, Part 1. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 18801901. Welcher, Frank J. The Union Army, 18611865 Organization and Operations. Vol. 1, The Eastern Theater. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989. ISBN 0-253-36453-1. National Park Service battle description (http://www.nps.gov/history/hps/abpp/battles/va028.htm)
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Further reading
Catton, Bruce. Mr. Lincoln's Army. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1951. ISBN 0-385-04310-4. Evans, Clement A., ed. Confederate Military History: A Library of Confederate States History (http://www. archive.org/search.php?query=publisher:"Confederate Pub.Co."). 12 vols. Atlanta: Confederate Publishing Company, 1899. OCLC833588. Glatthaar, Joseph T. General Lee's Army: From Victory to Collapse. New York: Free Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-684-82787-2. Hattaway, Herman, and Archer Jones. How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983. ISBN 0-252-00918-5. Longstreet, James. From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America. New York: Da Capo Press, 1992. ISBN 0-306-80464-6. First published in 1896 by J. B. Lippincott and Co. Wert, Jeffry D. The Sword of Lincoln: The Army of the Potomac. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005. ISBN 0-7432-2506-6.
External links
Battle of Fredericksburg in Encyclopedia Virginia (http://encyclopediavirginia.org/Fredericksburg_Battle_of) The Brothers War: The Battle of Fredericksburg (http://www.brotherswar.com/Fredericksburg.htm) Fredericksburg order of battle (http://www.brettschulte.net/OOBs/Fredericksburg/Fredericksburg.html) Battle of Fredericksburg (http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/fredericksburg.html): Maps, histories, photos, and preservation news (Civil War Trust) Chatham Plantation: Witness to the Civil War, a National Park Service Teaching with Historic Places (TwHP) lesson plan (http://www.nps.gov/history/NR/twhp/wwwlps/lessons/45chatham/45chatham.htm) Animated history of the Battle of Fredericksburg (http://www.civilwaranimated.com/ FredericksburgAnimation.html)
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Mud March (American Civil War) Once Burnside left, Lincoln told Halleck that none of his generals were willing to cooperate with his plans, and he (Halleck) ought to go down to Fredericksburg himself and assess the situation. Halleck for his part had no advice to offer Burnside except to destroy the Confederate army while taking as minimal damage as possible. Lincoln also told the latter to reconsider resigning from the army. So Burnside revived his plan but reversed the original sequence. Instead of crossing the Rappahannock south of Fredericksburg, he initially planned to move upstream and cross at U.S. Ford, due north of the Chancellorsville crossroads.[1] The offensive began with a westward move on January 20, 1863, in unseasonably mild weather. Burnside, with a head start, altered his plan to aim at Banks' Ford, a closer, quicker crossing. At dawn of January 21, engineers would push five bridges across; after that, two grand divisions would be over the river in four hours. Meanwhile, another grand division would distract the Rebels by repeating the December crossing at Fredericksburg.[2] During the night of the 20th, the rain began, and by the morning of the 21st, the earth was soaked and the river banks had the appearance of a quagmire. Already, fifteen pontoons were on the river, nearly spanning it, and five more were amply sufficient. Burnside began at once to bring up his artillery, which had the effect of making a perfect mortar bed. For a considerable area around the ford all day the men worked in the rain but to little purpose. Quite a number of cannon were advanced near the ford, but the 22nd only added to the storm, and the artillery, caissons and even wagons were swamped in the mud. The storm had delayed Burnside's movements, giving Lee ample time to line the other shore with his army, though there was no attempt to interfere with his crossing except from the sharpshooters, who peppered away on all occasions. No doubt Lee was hoping Burnside would effect a crossing; with a swollen river in his rear, it would have been a sorry predicament for the Union Army indeed, but Burnside finally became resigned to his fate and gave the order for the army to retire to its quarters, and thus ended the famous mud march.[3] The Mud March was Burnside's final attempt to command the Army of the Potomac.[1] Lincoln replaced him with Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker on January 26, 1863.[4]
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Notes
[1] [2] [3] [4] Boatner, p. 573. Furgurson p. 16 Stine Boatner, p. 409.
References
Boatner, Mark Mayo, III. The Civil War Dictionary. New York: McKay, 1988. ISBN 0-8129-1726-X. First published 1959 by McKay. Furgurson, Ernest B. Chancellorsville 1863: The Souls of the Brave Vintage Books, 1992. ISBN 0-679-72831-7. Stine, James H. =History of the Army of the Potomac Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: J. B. Rodgers Printing Co., 1892. ISBN: ASIN: B004IN3KF2.
Further reading
Catton, Bruce. Glory Road. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1952. ISBN 0-385-04167-5.
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Background
On June 3, Robert E. Lee decided to begin his second invasion of Northern soil and accordingly ordered his army to evacuate the lines around Fredericksburg and move into the Shenandoah Valley. To cover the withdrawal, Lee left A.P. Hill's III corps, with orders to remain along the lines until the Army was safely away. Rumors of Lee's movements reached Union general Joseph Hooker almost immediately. To determine the validity of the various reports he was receiving he ordered the VI corps under John Sedgwick to conduct a reconnaissance in force on June 5.
The battle
On the morning of the 5th the VI corps led by the 26th New Jersey and 5th Vermount began crossing the Rappahannock River near Deep Run. The initial attempt at crossing was soon repulsed by Confederates entrenched in rifle pits on the southern bank. After artillery fire failed to dislodge the Confederates, Sedgewick ordered to regiments to cross in pontoon boats. The union troops were able to successfully land the boats on the southern bank and overrun the rifle pits, capturing 35 prisoners. They then advanced up the bank to edge of a woods where they encountered a strong detachment of Confederates supported by artillery. A hot fire fight ensued that was described as "severe" at times before the Union advance was halted and driven back across the river, suffering 57 casualties. When the Federals failed to attack again, Hill withdrew the following day to rejoin the army.
Aftermath
By successfully defeating the Union reconnaissance party, A.P. Hill convinced Sedgwick that Lee still held Fredericksburg in force. Accordingly Hooker remained along the Rappahanock giving Lee a valuable head start on his invasion. However, Hooker remained unsure of Lee's true position and intentions and accordingly ordered a reconnaissance by his Cavalry, which resulted in the Battle of Brandy Station on June 9.
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persons
Abraham Lincoln
Abraham Lincoln
Abraham Lincoln at age 54, 1863 16th President of the United States In office March 4, 1861 April 15, 1865 Vice President Hannibal Hamlin Andrew Johnson James Buchanan Andrew Johnson
Preceded by Succeeded by
Member of the U.S. House of Representatives from Illinois's 7th district In office March 4, 1847 March 3, 1849 Preceded by Succeeded by John Henry Thomas Harris Personal details Born February 12, 1809 Hodgenville, Kentucky, U.S. April 15, 1865 (aged56) Petersen House, Washington, D.C., U.S. Republican (18541865) National Union (18641865) Whig (Before 1854)
Died
Political party
Abraham Lincoln
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Spouse(s) Children Mary Todd Robert Edward William Tad Lawyer See article
Abraham Lincoln i/ebrhmlkn/ (February 12, 1809 April 15, 1865) was the 16th President of the United States, serving from March 1861 until his assassination in April 1865. He successfully led his country through its greatest constitutional, military and moral crisis the American Civil War preserving the Union while ending slavery, and promoting economic and financial modernization. Reared in a poor family on the western frontier, Lincoln was mostly self-educated. He became a country lawyer, a Whig Party leader, Illinois state legislator in the 1830s, and a one-term member of the United States House of Representatives in the 1840s. After a series of debates in 1858 that gave national visibility to his opposition to the expansion of slavery, Lincoln lost a Senate race to his arch-rival Stephen A. Douglas. Lincoln, a moderate from a swing state, secured the Republican Party nomination. With almost no support in the South he swept the North and was elected president in 1860. His election was the signal for seven southern slave states to declare their secession from the Union and form the Confederate States of America. The departure of the Southerners gave Lincoln's party firm control of Congress, but no formula for compromise or reconciliation was found. And the war came. When the North enthusiastically rallied behind the national flag after the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861, President Lincoln concentrated on the military and political dimensions of the war effort. His goal was now to reunify the nation. He vigorously exercised unprecedented war powers, including the arrest and detention without trial of thousands of suspected secessionists. He prevented British recognition of the Confederacy by skillfully handling the Trent affair late in 1861. His efforts toward the abolition of slavery include issuing his Emancipation Proclamation in 1863, encouraging the border states to outlaw slavery, and helping push through Congress the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which finally ended all slavery in December 1865. Lincoln closely supervised the war effort, especially the selection of top generals, including commanding general Ulysses S. Grant. He brought leaders of various factions of his party into his cabinet and pressured them to cooperate. Under his leadership, the Union set up a naval blockade that shut down the South's normal trade, took control of the border slave states at the start of the war, gained control of communications with gunboats on the southern river systems, and tried repeatedly to capture the Confederate capital at Richmond, Virginia. Each time a general failed, Lincoln substituted another until finally Grant succeeded in 1865. An exceptionally astute politician deeply involved with power issues in each state, he reached out to War Democrats and managed his own re-election in the 1864 presidential election. As the leader of the moderate faction of the Republican party, Lincoln found his policies and personality were "blasted from all sides": Radical Republicans demanded harsher treatment of the South, War Democrats desired more compromise, Copperheads despised him, and irreconcilable secessionists plotted his death.[1] Politically, Lincoln fought back with patronage, by pitting his opponents against each other, and by appealing to the American people with his powers of oratory.[2] His Gettysburg
Abraham Lincoln Address of 1863 became the most quoted speech in American history.[3] It was an iconic statement of America's dedication to the principles of nationalism, republicanism, equal rights, liberty, and democracy. At the close of the war, Lincoln held a moderate view of Reconstruction, seeking to reunite the nation speedily through a policy of generous reconciliation in the face of lingering and bitter divisiveness. But six days after the surrender of Confederate commanding general Robert E. Lee, Lincoln was assassinated by Confederate sympathizer John Wilkes Booth. His death was the first assassination of a U.S. president and sent the nation into mourning. Lincoln has been consistently ranked by scholars and the public as one of the three greatest U.S. presidents.[4][5]
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Abraham Lincoln new homestead in Coles County, Illinois. It was then that, as an ambitious 22-year-old, Lincoln decided to seek a better life and struck out on his own. Canoeing down the Sangamon River, Lincoln ended up in the village of New Salem in Sangamon County.[22] In the spring of 1831, hired by New Salem businessman Denton Offutt and accompanied by friends, he took goods by flatboat from New Salem to New Orleans via the Sangamon, Illinois, and Mississippi rivers. After arriving in New Orleansand witnessing slavery firsthandhe walked back home.[23]
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Lincoln's first romantic interest was Ann Rutledge, whom he met when he first moved to New Salem; by 1835, they were in a relationship but not formally engaged. She died on August 25, most likely of typhoid fever.[24] In the early 1830s, he met Mary Owens from Kentucky when she was visiting her sister. Late in 1836, Lincoln agreed to a match with Mary if she returned to New Salem. Mary did return in November 1836, and Lincoln courted her for a time; however, they both had second thoughts about their relationship. On August 16, 1837, Lincoln wrote Mary a letter suggesting he would not blame her if she ended the relationship. She never replied and the courtship was over.[25] In 1840, Lincoln became engaged to Mary Todd, who was from a wealthy slave-holding family in Lexington, Kentucky.[26] They met in Springfield, Illinois, in December 1839[27] and were engaged the following December.[28] A wedding set for January 1, 1841, was canceled when the two broke off their engagement at Lincoln's initiative.[27][29] They later met again at a party and married on November 4, 1842, in the Springfield mansion of Mary's married sister.[30] While preparing for the nuptials and feeling anxiety again, Lincoln, when asked where he was going, replied, "To hell, I suppose."[31] In 1844, the couple bought a house in Springfield near Lincoln's law office. Mary Todd Lincoln kept house, often with the help of a relative or hired servant girl.[32] Robert Todd Lincoln was born in 1843 and Edward Baker Lincoln (Eddie) in 1846. Lincoln "was remarkably fond of children",[33] and the Lincolns were not considered to be strict with their children.[34] Edward died on February 1, 1850, in Springfield, likely of tuberculosis. "Willie" Lincoln was
Abraham Lincoln born on December 21, 1850, and died on February 20, 1862. The Lincolns' fourth son, Thomas "Tad" Lincoln, was born on April 4, 1853, and died of heart failure at the age of 18 on July 16, 1871.[35] Robert was the only child to live to adulthood and have children. His last descendant, grandson Robert Todd Lincoln Beckwith, died in 1985.[36] The deaths of their sons had profound effects on both parents. Later in life, Mary struggled with the stresses of losing her husband and sons, and Robert Lincoln committed her temporarily to a mental health asylum in 1875.[37] Abraham Lincoln suffered from "melancholy", a condition which now is referred to as clinical depression.[38] Lincoln's father-in-law was based in Lexington, Kentucky; he and others of the Todd family were either slave owners or slave traders. Lincoln was close to the Todds, and he and his family occasionally visited the Todd estate in Lexington.[39] He was an affectionate, though often absent, husband and father of four children.
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Abraham Lincoln
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Congressman Lincoln
From the early 1830s, Lincoln was a steadfast Whig and professed to friends in 1861 to be, "an old line Whig, a disciple of Henry Clay".[54] The party, including Lincoln, favored economic modernization in banking, protective tariffs to fund internal improvements including railroads, and espoused urbanization as well.[55] In 1846, Lincoln was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives, where he served one two-year term. He was the only Whig in the Illinois delegation, but he showed his party loyalty by participating in almost all votes and making speeches that echoed the party line.[56] Lincoln, in collaboration with abolitionist Congressman Joshua R. Giddings, wrote a bill to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia with compensation for the owners, enforcement to capture fugitive slaves, and a popular vote on the matter. He abandoned the bill when it failed to garner sufficient Whig supporters.[57] On foreign and military policy, Lincoln spoke out against the MexicanAmerican War, which he attributed to President Polk's desire for "military glorythat attractive rainbow, that rises in showers of blood".[58] Lincoln also supported the Wilmot Proviso, which, if it had been adopted, would have banned slavery in any U.S. territory won from Mexico.[59] Lincoln emphasized his opposition to Polk by drafting and introducing his Spot Resolutions. The war had begun with a Mexican slaughter of American soldiers in territory disputed by Mexico and the US; Polk insisted that Mexican soldiers had "invaded our territory and shed the blood of our fellow-citizens on our own soil".[60][61] Lincoln demanded that Polk show Congress the exact spot on which blood had been shed and prove that the spot was on American soil.[61] Congress never enacted the resolution or even debated it, the national papers ignored it, and it resulted in a loss of political support for Lincoln in his district. One Illinois newspaper derisively nicknamed him "spotty Lincoln".[62][63][64] Lincoln later regretted some of his statements, especially his attack on the presidential war-making powers.[65] Realizing Clay was unlikely to win the presidency, Lincoln, who had pledged in 1846 to serve only one term in the House, supported General Zachary Taylor for the Whig nomination in the 1848 presidential election.[66] Taylor won and Lincoln hoped to be appointed Commissioner of the General Land Office, but that lucrative patronage job went to an Illinois rival, Justin Butterfield, considered by the administration to be a highly skilled lawyer, but in Lincoln's view, an "old fossil".[67] The administration offered him the consolation prize of secretary or governor of the Oregon Territory. This distant territory was a Democratic stronghold, and acceptance of the post would have effectively ended his legal and political career in Illinois, so he declined and resumed his law practice.[68]
Prairie lawyer
Lincoln returned to practicing law in Springfield, handling "every kind of business that could come before a prairie lawyer".[69] Twice a year for 16 years, 10 weeks at a time, he appeared in county seats in the midstate region when the county courts were in session.[70] Lincoln handled many transportation cases in the midst of the nation's western expansion, particularly the conflicts arising from the operation of river barges under the many new railroad bridges. As a riverboat man, Lincoln initially favored those interests, but ultimately represented whoever hired him.[71] His reputation grew, and he appeared before the Supreme Court of the United States, arguing a case involving a canal boat that sank after hitting a bridge.[72] In 1849, he received a patent for a flotation device for the movement of boats in shallow water. The idea was never commercialized, but Lincoln is the only president to hold a patent.[73][74]
Lincoln in his late 30s photo taken by one of Lincoln's law students around 1846
Abraham Lincoln In 1851, he represented Alton & Sangamon Railroad in a dispute with one of its shareholders, James A. Barret, who had refused to pay the balance on his pledge to buy shares in the railroad on the grounds that the company had changed its original train route.[75][76] Lincoln successfully argued that the railroad company was not bound by its original charter in existence at the time of Barret's pledge; the charter was amended in the public interest to provide a newer, superior, and less expensive route, and the corporation retained the right to demand Barret's payment. The decision by the Illinois Supreme Court has been cited by numerous other courts in the nation.[75] Lincoln appeared before the Illinois Supreme Court in 175 cases, in 51 as sole counsel, of which 31 were decided in his favor.[77] From 1853 to 1860, another of Lincoln's largest clients was the Illinois Central Railroad.[78] Lincoln's most notable criminal trial occurred in 1858 when he defended William "Duff" Armstrong, who was on trial for the murder of James Preston Metzker.[79] The case is famous for Lincoln's use of a fact established by judicial notice in order to challenge the credibility of an eyewitness. After an opposing witness testified seeing the crime in the moonlight, Lincoln produced a Farmers' Almanac showing the moon was at a low angle, drastically reducing visibility. Based on this evidence, Armstrong was acquitted.[79] Lincoln rarely raised objections in the courtroom; but in an 1859 case, where he defended a cousin Peachy Harrison, who was accused of stabbing another to death, Lincoln angrily protested the judge's decision to exclude evidence favorable to his client. Instead of holding Lincoln in contempt of court as was expected, the judge, a Democrat, reversed his ruling, allowing the evidence and acquitting Harrison.[79][80]
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On October 16, 1854, in his "Peoria Speech", Lincoln declared his opposition to slavery, which he repeated en route to the presidency.[85] Speaking in his Kentucky accent, with a very powerful voice,[86] he said the Kansas Act had a "declared indifference, but as I must think, a covert real zeal for the spread of slavery. I cannot but hate it. I hate it because of the monstrous injustice of slavery itself. I hate it because it deprives our republican example of its just influence in the world..."[87] In late 1854, Lincoln ran as a Whig for the U.S. Senate seat from Illinois. At that time, senators were elected by the state legislature.[88] After leading in the first six rounds of voting in the Illinois assembly, his support began to dwindle, and Lincoln instructed his backers to vote for Lyman Trumbull, who defeated opponent Joel Aldrich Matteson.[89] The Whigs had been irreparably split by the Portrait of Dred Scott. Lincoln KansasNebraska Act. Lincoln wrote, "I think I am a Whig, but others say there denounced the Supreme Court are no Whigs, and that I am an abolitionist, even though I do no more than decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford as oppose the extension of slavery." Drawing on remnants of the old Whig party, a conspiracy to extend slavery. and on disenchanted Free Soil, Liberty, and Democratic party members, he was instrumental in forging the shape of the new Republican Party.[90] At the 1856 Republican National Convention, Lincoln placed second in the contest to become the party's candidate for vice president.[91] In 185758, Douglas broke with President James Buchanan, leading to a fight for control of the Democratic Party. Some eastern Republicans even favored the reelection of Douglas for the Senate in 1858, since he had led the opposition to the Lecompton Constitution, which would have admitted Kansas as a slave state.[92] In March 1857, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford; Chief Justice Roger B. Taney opined that blacks were not citizens, and derived no rights from the Constitution. Lincoln denounced the decision, alleging it was the product of a conspiracy of Democrats to support the Slave Power[93] Lincoln argued, "The authors of the Declaration of Independence never intended 'to say all were equal in color, size, intellect, moral developments, or social capacity', but they 'did consider all men created equalequal in certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness'."[94] After the state Republican party convention nominated him for the U.S. Senate in 1858, Lincoln delivered his House Divided Speech, drawing on Mark 3:25: "A house divided against itself cannot stand. I believe this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolvedI do not expect the house to fallbut I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing, or all the other."[95] The speech created an evocative image of the danger of disunion caused by the slavery debate, and rallied Republicans across the North.[96] The stage was then set for the campaign for statewide election of the Illinois legislature which would, in turn, select Lincoln or Douglas as its U.S. senator.[97]
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Though the Republican legislative candidates won more popular votes, the Democrats won more seats, and the legislature re-elected Douglas to the Senate. Despite the bitterness of the defeat for Lincoln, his articulation of the issues gave him a national political reputation.[101] In May 1859, Lincoln purchased the Illinois Staats-Anzeiger, a German-language newspaper which was consistently supportive; most of the state's 130,000 German Americans voted Democratic but there was Republican support that a German-language paper could mobilize.[102] On February 27, 1860, New York party leaders invited Lincoln to give a speech at Cooper Union to a group of powerful Republicans. Lincoln argued that the Founding Fathers had little use for popular sovereignty and had repeatedly sought to restrict slavery. Lincoln insisted the moral foundation of the Republicans required opposition to slavery, and rejected any "groping for some middle ground between the right and the wrong".[103] Despite his inelegant appearancemany in the audience thought him awkward and even ugly[104]Lincoln demonstrated an intellectual leadership that brought him into the front ranks of the party and into contention for the Republican presidential nomination. Journalist Noah Brooks reported, "No man ever before made such an impression on his first appeal to a New York audience."[105][106] Historian Donald described the speech as a "superb political move for an unannounced candidate, to appear in one rival's (William H. Seward) own state at an event sponsored by the second rival's (Salmon P. Chase) loyalists, while not mentioning either by name during its delivery."[107] In response to an inquiry about his presidential intentions, Lincoln said, "The taste is in my mouth a little."[108]
"The Rail Candidate"Lincoln's 1860 candidacy is depicted as held up by the slavery issuea slave on the left and party organization on the right.
Abraham Lincoln Lincoln's success depended on his reputation as a moderate on the slavery issue, and his strong support for Whiggish programs of internal improvements and the protective tariff.[112] On the third ballot Pennsylvania put him over the top. Pennsylvania iron interests were reassured by his support for protective tariffs.[113] Lincoln's managers had been adroitly focused on this delegation as well as the others, while following Lincoln's strong dictate to "Make no contracts that bind me".[114] Most Republicans agreed with Lincoln that the North was the aggrieved party, as the Slave Power tightened its grasp on the national government with the Dred Scott decision and the presidency of James Buchanan. Throughout the 1850s, Lincoln doubted the prospects of civil war, and his supporters rejected claims that his election would incite secession.[115] Meanwhile, Douglas was selected as the candidate of the Northern Democrats, with Herschel Vespasian Johnson as the vice-presidential candidate. Delegates from 11 slave states walked out of the Democratic convention, disagreeing with Douglas's position on popular sovereignty, and ultimately selected John C. Breckinridge as their candidate.[116] As Douglas and the other candidates went through with their campaigns, Lincoln was the only one of them who gave no speeches. Instead, he monitored the campaign closely and relied on the enthusiasm of the Republican Party. The party did the leg work that produced majorities across the North, and produced an abundance of campaign posters, leaflets, and newspaper editorials. There were thousands of Republican speakers who focused first on the party platform, and second on Lincoln's life story, emphasizing his childhood poverty. The goal was to demonstrate the superior power of "free labor", whereby a common farm boy could work his way to the top by his own efforts.[117] The Republican Party's production of campaign literature dwarfed the combined opposition; a Chicago Tribune writer produced a pamphlet that detailed Lincoln's life, and sold 100,000 to 200,000 copies.[118]
376
Presidency
1860 election and secession
In 1860, northern and western electoral votes (shown in red) put Lincoln into the White House.
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1861 inaugural at Capitol. The rotunda still under construction
On November 6, 1860, Lincoln was elected the 16th president of the United States, beating Democrat Stephen A. Douglas, John C. Breckinridge of the Southern Democrats, and John Bell of the new Constitutional Union Party. He was the first president from the Republican Party. Winning entirely on the strength of his support in the North and West, no ballots were cast for him in 10 of the 15 Southern slave states, and he won only two of 996 counties in all the Southern states.[119] Lincoln received 1,866,452 votes, Douglas 1,376,957 votes, Breckinridge 849,781 votes, and Bell 588,789 votes. Turnout was 82.2percent, with Lincoln winning the free Northern states, as well as California and Oregon. Douglas won Missouri, and split New Jersey with Lincoln.[120] Bell won Virginia, Tennessee, and Kentucky, and Breckinridge won the rest of the South.[121] Although Lincoln won only a plurality of the popular vote, his victory in the electoral college was decisive: Lincoln had 180 and his opponents added together had only 123. There were fusion tickets in which all of Lincoln's opponents combined to support the same slate of Electors in New York, New Jersey, and Rhode Island, but even if the anti-Lincoln vote had been combined in every state, Lincoln still would have won a majority in the Electoral College.[122] As Lincoln's election became evident, secessionists made clear their intent to leave the Union before he took office the next March.[123] On December 20, 1860, South Carolina took the lead by adopting an ordinance of secession; by February 1, 1861, Florida, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas followed.[124][125] Six of these states then adopted a constitution and declared themselves to be a sovereign nation, the Confederate States of America.[124] The upper South and border states (Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, and Arkansas) listened to, but initially rejected, the secessionist appeal.[126] President Buchanan and President-elect Lincoln refused to recognize the Confederacy, declaring secession illegal.[127] The Confederacy selected Jefferson Davis as its provisional President on February 9, 1861.[128] There were attempts at compromise. The Crittenden Compromise would have extended the Missouri Compromise line of 1820, dividing the territories into slave and free, contrary to the Republican Party's free-soil platform.[129] Lincoln rejected the idea, saying, "I will suffer death before I consent ... to any concession or compromise which looks like buying the privilege to take possession of this government to which we have a constitutional right."[130] Lincoln, however, did support the Corwin Amendment to the Constitution, which had passed in Congress and protected slavery in those states where it already existed.[131] A few weeks before the war, he went so far as to pen a letter to every governor asking for their support in ratifying the Corwin Amendment as a means to avoid secession.[132] En route to his inauguration by train, Lincoln addressed crowds and legislatures across the North.[133] The president-elect then evaded possible assassins in Baltimore, who were uncovered by Lincoln's head of security, Allan Pinkerton. On February 23, 1861, he arrived in disguise in Washington, D.C., which was placed under substantial military guard.[134] Lincoln directed his inaugural address to the South, proclaiming once again that he had no intention, or inclination, to abolish slavery in the Southern states: Apprehension seems to exist among the people of the Southern States that by the accession of a Republican Administration their property and their peace and personal security are to be endangered. There has never been any reasonable cause for such apprehension. Indeed, the most ample evidence to the contrary has all the while existed and been open to their inspection. It is found in nearly all the published speeches of him who now addresses you. I do but quote from one of those speeches when I declare that "I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so." First inaugural address, 4 March 1861[135] The President ended his address with an appeal to the people of the South: "We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies ... The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battlefield, and patriot grave, to every living heart and hearthstone, all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as
Abraham Lincoln surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature."[136] The failure of the Peace Conference of 1861 signaled that legislative compromise was implausible. By March 1861, no leaders of the insurrection had proposed rejoining the Union on any terms. Meanwhile, Lincoln and nearly every Republican leader agreed that the dismantling of the Union could not be tolerated.[137]
378
War begins
The commander of Fort Sumter, South Carolina, Major Robert Anderson sent a request for provisions to Washington, and the execution of Lincoln's order to meet that request was seen by the secessionists as an act of war. On April 12, 1861, Confederate forces fired on Union troops at Fort Sumter, forcing them to surrender, and began the war. Historian Allan Nevins argued that the newly inaugurated Lincoln made three miscalculations: underestimating the gravity of the crisis, exaggerating the strength of Unionist sentiment in the South, and not realizing the Southern Unionists were insisting there be no invasion.[138] William Tecumseh Sherman talked to Lincoln during inauguration week and was "sadly disappointed" at his failure to realize that "the country was sleeping on a Major Anderson, Ft. Sumter volcano" and that the South was preparing for war.[139] Donald concludes that, commander "His repeated efforts to avoid collision in the months between inauguration and the firing on Ft. Sumter showed he adhered to his vow not to be the first to shed fraternal blood. But he also vowed not to surrender the forts. The only resolution of these contradictory positions was for the confederates to fire the first shot; they did just that."[140] On April 15, Lincoln called on all the states to send detachments totaling 75,000 troops to recapture forts, protect Washington, and "preserve the Union", which, in his view, still existed intact despite the actions of the seceding states. This call forced the states to choose sides. Virginia declared its secession and was rewarded with the Confederate capital, despite the exposed position of Richmond so close to Union lines. North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas also voted for secession over the next two months. Secession sentiment was strong in Missouri and Maryland, but did not prevail; Kentucky tried to be neutral.[141] Troops headed south towards Washington to protect the capital in response to Lincoln's call. On April 19, secessionist mobs in Baltimore that controlled the rail links attacked Union troops traveling to the capital. George William Brown, the Mayor of Baltimore, and other suspect Maryland politicians were arrested and imprisoned, without a warrant, as Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus.[142] John Merryman, a leader in the secessionist group in Maryland, petitioned Chief Justice Roger B. Taney to issue a writ of habeas corpus, saying holding Merryman without a hearing was unlawful. Taney issued the writ, thereby ordering Merryman's release, but Lincoln ignored it. Then and throughout the war, Lincoln came under heavy, often vituperative attack from antiwar Democrats, called Copperheads.[143]
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The war effort was the source of continued disparagement of Lincoln, and dominated his time and attention. From the start, it was clear that bipartisan support would be essential to success in the war effort, and any manner of compromise alienated factions on both sides of the aisle, such as the appointment of Republicans and Democrats to command positions in the Union Army. Copperheads criticized Lincoln for refusing to compromise on the slavery issue. Conversely, the Radical Republicans criticized him for moving too slowly in abolishing slavery.[145] On August "Running the 'Machine'": An 1864 political cartoon takes a swing at Lincoln's 6, 1861, Lincoln signed the Confiscation administrationfeaturing William Fessenden, Edwin Stanton, William Seward, Act that authorized judiciary proceedings to Gideon Welles, Lincoln and others. confiscate and free slaves who were used to support the Confederate war effort. In practice the law had little effect, but it did signal political support for abolishing slavery in the Confederacy[146] In late August 1861, General John C. Frmont, the 1856 Republican presidential nominee, issued, without consulting Washington, a proclamation of martial law in Missouri. He declared that any citizen found bearing arms could be court-martialed and shot, and that slaves of persons aiding the rebellion would be freed. Frmont was already under a cloud with charges of negligence in his command of the Department of the West compounded with allegations of fraud and corruption. Lincoln overruled Frmont's proclamation. Lincoln believed that Fremont's emancipation was political; neither militarily necessary nor legal.[147] Union enlistments from Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri increased by over 40,000 troops.[148] The Trent Affair of late 1861 threatened war with Great Britain. The U.S. Navy illegally intercepted a British merchant ship the Trent on the high seas and seized two Confederate envoys; Britain protested vehemently while the U.S. cheered. Lincoln resolved the issue by releasing the two men and war was successfully averted with Britain.[149] Lincoln's foreign policy approach had been initially hands off, due to his inexperience; he left most diplomacy appointments and other foreign policy matters to his Secretary of State, William Seward. Seward's initial reaction to the Trent affair, however, was too bellicose, so Lincoln also turned to Senator Charles Sumner, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and an expert in British diplomacy.[150] To learn technical military terms, Lincoln borrowed and studied Henry Halleck's book, Elements of Military Art and Science from the Library of Congress.[151] Lincoln painstakingly monitored the telegraphic reports coming in to the War Department in Washington, D.C. He kept close tabs on all phases of the military effort, consulted with governors, and selected generals based on their past success (as well as their state and party). In January 1862, after many complaints of inefficiency and profiteering in the War Department, Lincoln replaced Simon Cameron with Edwin Stanton as War Secretary. Stanton was one of many conservative Democrats (he supported Breckenridge in the 1860 election) who became anti-slavery Republicans under Lincoln's leadership.[152] In terms of war strategy, Lincoln articulated two priorities: to ensure that Washington was well-defended, and to conduct an aggressive war effort that would satisfy the demand in the North for prompt, decisive victory; major Northern newspaper editors expected victory within 90 days.[153] Twice a week, Lincoln would meet with his cabinet in the afternoon, and occasionally Mary Lincoln would force him to take a carriage ride because she was concerned he was working too hard.[154] Lincoln learned from his chief of staff General Henry Halleck, a student of the European strategist Jomini, of the critical need to control strategic points, such as the Mississippi River;[155] he also knew well the importance of
Abraham Lincoln Vicksburg and understood the necessity of defeating the enemy's army, rather than simply capturing territory.[156]
380
General McClellan
After the Union defeat at the First Battle of Bull Run and the retirement of the aged Winfield Scott in late 1861, Lincoln appointed Major General George B. McClellan general-in-chief of all the Union armies.[157] McClellan, a young West Point graduate, railroad executive, and Pennsylvania Democrat, took several months to plan and attempt his Peninsula Campaign, longer than Lincoln wanted. The campaign's objective was to capture Richmond by moving the Army of the Potomac by boat to the peninsula and then overland to the Confederate capital. McClellan's repeated delays frustrated Lincoln and Congress, as did his position that no troops were needed to defend Washington. Lincoln insisted on holding some of McClellan's troops in defense of the capital; McClellan, who consistently overestimated the strength of Confederate troops, blamed this decision for the ultimate failure of the Peninsula Campaign.[158] Lincoln removed McClellan as general-in-chief and appointed Henry Wager Halleck in March 1862, after McClellan's "Harrison's Landing Letter", in which he offered unsolicited political advice to Lincoln urging caution in the war effort.[159] McClellan's letter incensed Radical Republicans, who successfully pressured Lincoln to appoint John Pope, a Republican, as head of the new Army of Virginia. Pope complied with Lincoln's strategic desire to move toward Richmond from the north, thus protecting the capital from attack. However, lacking requested reinforcements from McClellan, now commanding the Army of the Potomac, Pope was soundly defeated at the Second Lincoln and McClellan after the Battle of Antietam Battle of Bull Run in the summer of 1862, forcing the Army of the [160] Potomac to defend Washington for a second time. The war also expanded with naval operations in 1862 when the CSS Virginia, formerly the USS Merrimack, damaged or destroyed three Union vessels in Norfolk, Virginia, before being engaged and damaged by the USS Monitor. Lincoln closely reviewed the dispatches and interrogated naval officers during their clash in the Battle of Hampton Roads.[161] Despite his dissatisfaction with McClellan's failure to reinforce Pope, Lincoln was desperate, and restored him to command of all forces around Washington, to the dismay of all in his cabinet but Seward.[162] Two days after McClellan's return to command, General Robert E. Lee's forces crossed the Potomac River into Maryland, leading to the Battle of Antietam in September 1862.[163] The ensuing Union victory was among the bloodiest in American history, but it enabled Lincoln to announce that he would issue an Emancipation Proclamation in January. Having composed the Proclamation some time earlier, Lincoln had waited for a military victory to publish it to avoid it being perceived as the product of desperation.[164] McClellan then resisted the President's demand that he pursue Lee's retreating and exposed army, while his counterpart General Don Carlos Buell likewise refused orders to move the Army of the Ohio against rebel forces in eastern Tennessee. As a result, Lincoln replaced Buell with William Rosecrans; and, after the 1862 midterm elections, he replaced McClellan with Republican Ambrose Burnside. Both of these replacements were political moderates and prospectively more supportive of the Commander-in-Chief.[165] Burnside, against the advice of the president, prematurely launched an offensive across the Rappahannock River and was stunningly defeated by Lee at Fredericksburg in December. Not only had Burnside been defeated on the battlefield, but his soldiers were disgruntled and undisciplined. Desertions during 1863 were in the thousands and they increased after Fredericksburg.[166] Lincoln brought in Joseph Hooker, despite his record of loose talk about the need for a military dictatorship.[167] The mid-term elections in 1862 brought the Republicans severe losses due to sharp disfavor with the administration over its failure to deliver a speedy end to the war, as well as rising inflation, new high taxes, rumors of corruption,
Abraham Lincoln the suspension of habeas corpus, the military draft law, and fears that freed slaves would undermine the labor market. The Emancipation Proclamation announced in September gained votes for the Republicans in the rural areas of New England and the upper Midwest, but it lost votes in the cities and the lower Midwest. While Republicans were discouraged, Democrats were energized and did especially well in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and New York. The Republicans did maintain their majorities in Congress and in the major states, except New York. The Cincinnati Gazette contended that the voters were "depressed by the interminable nature of this war, as so far conducted, and by the rapid exhaustion of the national resources without progress".[168] In the spring of 1863, Lincoln was optimistic about upcoming campaigns to the point of thinking the end of the war could be near if a string of victories could be put together; these plans included Hooker's attack on Lee north of Richmond, Rosecrans' on Chattanooga, Grant's on Vicksburg, and a naval assault on Charleston.[169] Hooker was routed by Lee at the Battle of Chancellorsville in May,[170] but continued to command his troops for some weeks. He ignored Lincoln's order to divide his troops, and possibly force Lee to do the same in Harper's Ferry, and tendered his resignation, which Lincoln accepted. He was replaced by George Meade, who followed Lee into Pennsylvania for the Gettysburg Campaign, which was a victory for the Union, though Lee's army avoided capture. At the same time, after initial setbacks, Grant laid siege to Vicksburg and the Union navy attained some success in Charleston harbor.[171] After the Battle of Gettysburg, Lincoln clearly understood that his military decisions would be more effectively carried out by conveying his orders through his War Secretary or his general-in-chief on to his generals, who resented his civilian interference with their own plans. Even so, he often continued to give detailed directions to his generals as Commander in Chief.[172]
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Emancipation Proclamation
Lincoln understood that the Federal government's power to end slavery was limited by the Constitution, which before 1865, committed the issue to individual states. He argued before and during his election that the eventual extinction of slavery would result from preventing its expansion into new U.S. territory. At the beginning of the war, he also sought to persuade the states to accept compensated emancipation in return for their prohibition of slavery (an offer that took effect only in Lincoln presents the first draft of the Emancipation Proclamation to his cabinet. Washington, D.C., in April 1862). Lincoln Painted by Francis Bicknell Carpenter in 1864 believed that curtailing slavery in these ways would economically expunge it, as envisioned by the Founding Fathers, under the constitution.[173] President Lincoln rejected two geographically limited emancipation attempts by Major General John C. Frmont in August 1861 and by Major General David Hunter in May 1862, on the grounds that it was not within their power, and it would upset the border states loyal to the Union.[174] On June 19, 1862, endorsed by Lincoln, Congress passed an act banning slavery on all federal territory. In July 1862, the Second Confiscation Act was passed, which set up court procedures that could free the slaves of anyone convicted of aiding the rebellion. Although Lincoln believed it was not within Congress's power to free the slaves within the states, he approved the bill in deference to the legislature. He felt such action could only be taken by the commander-in-chief using war powers granted to the president by the Constitution, and Lincoln was planning to take that action. In that month, Lincoln discussed a draft of the Emancipation Proclamation with his cabinet. In it, he stated that "as a fit and necessary military measure, on January 1, 1863, all persons held as slaves in the Confederate
Abraham Lincoln states will thenceforward, and forever, be free."[175] Privately, Lincoln concluded at this point that the war could not be won without freeing the slaves. However Confederate and anti-war propagandists had success spreading the theme that emancipation was a stumbling block to peace and reunification. Republican editor Horace Greeley of the highly influential New York Tribune fell for the ploy.[176] and Lincoln refuted it directly in a shrewd letter of August 22, 1862. The President said the primary goal of his actions as president (he used the first person pronoun and explicitly refers to his "official duty") was preserving the Union:[177] My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that. What I do about slavery, and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. . . . [] I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free.[178] The Emancipation Proclamation, issued on September 22, 1862, and put into effect on January 1, 1863, declared free the slaves in 10 states not then under Union control, with exemptions specified for areas already under Union control in two states.[179] Once the abolition of slavery in the rebel states became a military objective, as Union armies advanced south, more slaves were liberated until over three million of them in Confederate territory were freed. Lincoln's comment on the signing of the Proclamation was: "I never, in my life, felt more certain that I was doing right, than I do in signing this paper."[180] For some time, Lincoln continued earlier plans to set up colonies for the newly freed slaves. He commented favorably on colonization in the Emancipation Proclamation, but all attempts at such a massive undertaking failed.[181] A few days after Emancipation was announced, 13 Republican governors met at the War Governors' Conference; they supported the president's Proclamation, but suggested the removal of General George B. McClellan as commander of the Union Army.[182] Using former slaves in the military was official government policy after the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation. At first, Lincoln was reluctant to fully implement this program, but by the spring of 1863, he was ready to initiate "a massive recruitment of Negro troops". In a letter to Andrew Johnson, the military governor of Tennessee, encouraging him to lead the way in raising black troops, Lincoln wrote, "The bare sight of 50,000 armed and drilled black soldiers on the banks of the Mississippi would end the rebellion at once".[183] By the end of 1863, at Lincoln's direction, General Lorenzo Thomas had recruited 20 regiments of blacks from the Mississippi Valley.[184] Frederick Douglass once observed of Lincoln: "In his company, I was never reminded of my humble origin, or of my unpopular color".[185]
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Gettysburg Address
With the great Union victory at the Battle of Gettysburg in July 1863, and the defeat of the Copperheads in the Ohio election in the fall, Lincoln maintained a strong base of party support and was in a strong position to redefine the war effort, despite the New York City draft riots. The stage was set for his address at the Gettysburg battlefield cemetery.[186] Defying Lincoln's prediction that "the world will little note, nor long remember what we say here," the Address became the most quoted speech in American history.[3] The Gettysburg Address was delivered at the dedication of the Soldiers' National Cemetery in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, on the afternoon of Thursday, November 19, 1863. In 272 words, and three minutes, Lincoln asserted the nation was born not in 1789, but in 1776, "conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal." He defined the war as an effort dedicated to these principles of liberty and equality for all. The emancipation of slaves was now part of the national war effort. He declared that the deaths of so many brave soldiers would not be in vain, that slavery would end as a result of the losses, and the future of democracy would be assured, that "government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth." Lincoln concluded
Abraham Lincoln that the Civil War had a profound objective: a new birth of freedom in the nation.[187][188]
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General Grant
Meade's failure to capture Lee's army as it retreated from Gettysburg, and the continued passivity of the Army of the Potomac, persuaded Lincoln that a change in command was needed. General Ulysses S. Grant's victories at the Battle of Shiloh and in the Vicksburg campaign impressed Lincoln and made Grant a strong candidate to head the Union Army. Responding to criticism of Grant after Shiloh, Lincoln had said, "I can't spare this man. He fights."[189] With Grant in command, Lincoln felt the Union Army could relentlessly pursue a series of coordinated offensives in multiple theaters, and have a top commander who agreed on the use of black troops.[190]
President Lincoln (center right) with, from left, Generals Sherman, Grant and Admiral Porter 1868 painting of events aboard the River Queen in March, 1865
Nevertheless, Lincoln was concerned that Grant might be considering a candidacy for President in 1864, as McClellan was. Lincoln arranged for an intermediary to make inquiry into Grant's political intentions, and being assured that he had none, submitted to the Senate Grant's promotion to commander of the Union Army. He obtained Congress's consent to reinstate for Grant the rank of Lieutenant General, which no officer had held since George Washington.[191] Grant waged his bloody Overland Campaign in 1864. This is often characterized as a war of attrition, given high Union losses at battles such as the Battle of the Wilderness and Cold Harbor. Even though they had the advantage of fighting on the defensive, the Confederate forces had "almost as high a percentage of casualties as the Union forces".[192] The high casualty figures of the Union alarmed the North; Grant had lost a third of his army, and Lincoln asked what Grant's plans were, to which the general replied, "I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer."[193] The Confederacy lacked reinforcements, so Lee's army shrank with every battle, forcing it back to trenches outside Petersburg, Virginia, where Grant began a siege. Lincoln then made an extended visit to Grant's headquarters at City Point, Virginia. This allowed the president to confer in person with Grant and William Tecumseh Sherman about the hostilities, as Sherman coincidentally managed a hasty visit to Grant from his position in North Carolina.[194] Lincoln and the Republican party mobilized support for the draft throughout the North, and replaced his losses.[195] Lincoln authorized Grant to target the Confederate infrastructuresuch as plantations, railroads, and bridgeshoping to destroy the South's morale and weaken its economic ability to continue fighting. Grant's move to Petersburg resulted in the obstruction of three railroads between Richmond and the South. This strategy allowed Generals Sherman and Philip Sheridan to destroy plantations and towns in Virginia's Shenandoah Valley. The damage caused by Sherman's March to the Sea through Georgia in 1864 was limited to a 60-mile (unknown operator: u'strong'km) swath, but neither Lincoln nor his commanders saw destruction as the main goal, but rather defeat of the Confederate armies. As Neely (2004) concludes, there was no effort to engage in "total war" against civilians, as in World War II.[196] Confederate general Jubal Anderson Early began a series of assaults in the North that threatened the Capital. During his raid on Washington, D.C. in 1864, Lincoln was watching the combat from an exposed position; Captain Oliver
Abraham Lincoln Wendell Holmes shouted at him, "Get down, you damn fool, before you get shot!"[197] After repeated calls on Grant to defend Washington, Sheridan was appointed and the threat from Early was dispatched.[198] As Grant continued to wear down Lee's forces, efforts to discuss peace began. Confederate Vice President Stephens led a group to meet with Lincoln, Seward, and others at Hampton Roads. Lincoln refused to allow any negotiation with the Confederacy as a coequal; his sole objective was an agreement to end the fighting and the meetings produced no results.[199] On April 1, 1865, Grant successfully outflanked Lee's forces in the Battle of Five Forks and nearly encircled Petersburg, and the Confederate government evacuated Richmond. Days later, when that city fell, Lincoln visited the vanquished Confederate capital; as he walked through the city, white Southerners were stone-faced, but freedmen greeted him as a hero. On April 9, Lee surrendered to Grant at Appomattox and the war was effectively over.[200]
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1864 re-election
Lincoln was a master politician, bringing togetherand holding togetherall the main factions of the Republican Party, and bringing in War Democrats such as Edwin M. Stanton and Andrew Johnson as well. Lincoln spent many hours a week talking to politicians from across the land and using his patronage powersgreatly expanded over peacetimeto hold the factions of his party together, build support for his own policies, and fend off efforts by Radicals to drop him from the 1864 ticket.[201][202] At its 1864 convention, the Republican Party selected Andrew Johnson, a War Democrat from the Southern state of Tennessee, as his running mate. To broaden his coalition to include War Democrats as well as Republicans, Lincoln ran under the label of the new Union Party.[203] When Grant's spring campaigns turned into bloody stalemates and Union casualties mounted, the lack of military success wore heavily on the President's re-election prospects, and many Republicans across the country feared that Lincoln would be defeated. Sharing this fear, Lincoln wrote and signed a pledge that, if he should lose the election, he would still defeat the Confederacy before turning over the White House:[204] This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this Administration will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to so co-operate with the President elect, as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration; as he will have secured his election on such ground that he cannot possibly save it afterward.[205] Lincoln did not show the pledge to his cabinet, but asked them to sign the sealed envelope.
An electoral landslide (in red) for Lincoln in the 1864 election, southern states (brown) and territories (light brown) not in play
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Lincoln's second inaugural address in 1865 at the almost completed Capitol building
While the Democratic platform followed the Peace wing of the party and called the war a "failure", their candidate, General George B. McClellan, supported the war and repudiated the platform. Lincoln provided Grant with more troops and mobilized his party to renew its support of Grant in the war effort. Sherman's capture of Atlanta in September and David Farragut's capture of Mobile ended defeatist jitters;[206] the Democratic Party was deeply split, with some leaders and most soldiers openly for Lincoln. By contrast, the National Union Party was united and energized as Lincoln made emancipation the central issue, and state Republican parties stressed the perfidy of the Copperheads.[207] Lincoln was re-elected in a landslide, carrying all but three states, and receiving 78 percent of the Union soldiers' vote.[208] On March 4, 1865, Lincoln delivered his second inaugural address. In it, he deemed the high casualties on both sides to be God's will. Historian Mark Noll concludes it ranks "among the small handful of semi-sacred texts by which Americans conceive their place in the world".[209] Lincoln said: Fondly do we hopefervently do we praythat this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God wills that it continue, until all the wealth piled by the bond-man's 250 years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash, shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said 3,000 years ago, so still it must be said, "the judgments of the Lord, are true and righteous altogether". With malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphanto do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace, among ourselves, and with all nations.[210]
Reconstruction
Reconstruction began during the war, as Lincoln and his associates anticipated questions of how to reintegrate the conquered southern states, and how to determine the fates of Confederate leaders and freed slaves. Shortly after Lee's surrender, a general had asked Lincoln how the defeated Confederates should be treated, and Lincoln replied, "Let 'em up easy."[211] In keeping with that sentiment, Lincoln led the moderates regarding Reconstruction policy, and was opposed by the Radical Republicans, under Rep. Thaddeus Stevens, Sen. Charles Sumner and Sen. Benjamin Wade, political allies of the president on other issues. Determined to find a course that would reunite the nation and not alienate the South, Lincoln urged that speedy elections under generous terms be held throughout the war. His Amnesty Proclamation of December 8, 1863, offered pardons to those who had not held a Confederate civil office, had not mistreated Union prisoners, and would sign an oath of allegiance.[212]
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As Southern states were subdued, critical decisions had to be made as to their leadership while their administrations were re-formed. Of special importance were Tennessee and Arkansas, where Lincoln appointed Generals Andrew Johnson and Frederick Steele as military governors, respectively. In Louisiana, Lincoln ordered General Nathaniel P. Banks to promote a plan that would restore statehood when 10 percent of the voters agreed to it. Lincoln's Democratic opponents seized on these appointments to accuse him of using the military to ensure his and the Republicans' political aspirations. On the other hand, the Radicals denounced his policy as too lenient, and passed their own plan, the Wade-Davis Bill, in 1864. When Lincoln vetoed the bill, the Radicals retaliated by refusing to seat representatives elected from Louisiana, Arkansas, and [213] Tennessee.
A political cartoon of Andrew Johnson and Abraham Lincoln, 1865, entitled "The Rail Splitter At Work Repairing the Union." The caption reads (Johnson): Take it quietly Uncle Abe and I will draw it closer than ever. (Lincoln): A few more stitches Andy and the good old Union will be mended.
Lincoln's appointments were designed to keep both the moderate and Radical factions in harness. To fill Chief Justice Taney's seat on the Supreme Court, he named the choice of the Radicals, Salmon P. Chase, who Lincoln believed would uphold the emancipation and paper money policies.[214] After implementing the Emancipation Proclamation, which did not apply to every state, Lincoln increased pressure on Congress to outlaw slavery throughout the entire nation with a constitutional amendment. Lincoln declared that such an amendment would "clinch the whole matter".[215] By December 1863 a proposed constitutional amendment that would outlaw slavery absolutely was brought to Congress for passage. This first attempt at an amendment failed to pass, falling short of the required two-thirds majority on June 15, 1864, in the House of Representatives. Passage of the proposed amendment became part of the Republican/Unionist platform in the election of 1864. After a long debate in the House, a second attempt passed Congress on January 13, 1865, and was sent to the state legislatures for ratification.[216] Upon ratification, it became the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution on December 6, 1865.[217] As the war drew to a close, Lincoln's presidential Reconstruction for the South was in flux; having believed the federal government had limited responsibility to the millions of freedmen. He signed into law Senator Charles Sumner's Freedman's Bureau bill that set up a temporary federal agency designed to meet the immediate material needs of former slaves. The law assigned land for a lease of three years with the ability to purchase title for the freedmen. Lincoln stated that his Louisiana plan did not apply to all states under Reconstruction. Shortly before his assassination, Lincoln announced he had a new plan for southern Reconstruction. Discussions with his cabinet revealed Lincoln planned short-term military control over southern states, until readmission under the control of southern Unionists.[218]
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Other enactments
Lincoln adhered to the Whig theory of the presidency, which gave Congress primary responsibility for writing the laws while the Executive enforced them. Lincoln only vetoed four bills passed by Congress; the only important one was the Wade-Davis Bill with its harsh program of Reconstruction.[226] He signed the Homestead Act in 1862, making millions of acres of government-held land in the West available for purchase at very low cost. The Morrill Land-Grant Colleges Act, also signed in 1862, provided government grants for agricultural colleges in each state. The Pacific Railway Acts of 1862 and 1864 granted federal support for the construction of the United States' First Transcontinental Railroad, which was completed in 1869.[227] The passage of the Homestead Act and the Pacific Railway Acts was made possible by the absence of Southern congressmen and senators who had opposed the measures in the 1850s.[228]
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Abraham Lincoln
Vice President Hannibal Hamlin Andrew Johnson State War William H. Seward Simon Cameron Edwin M. Stanton Treasury Salmon P. Chase
William P. Fessenden 18641865 Hugh McCulloch Justice Edward Bates James Speed Post Montgomery Blair 1865 18611864 18641865 18611864
William Dennison, Jr. 18641865 Navy Interior Gideon Welles Caleb B. Smith John P. Usher 18611865 18611862 18631865
Other important legislation involved two measures to raise revenues for the Federal government: tariffs (a policy with long precedent), and a new Federal income tax. In 1861, Lincoln signed the second and third Morrill Tariff, the first having become law under James Buchanan. In 1861, Lincoln signed the Revenue Act of 1861, creating the first U.S. income tax.[230] This created a flat tax of 3 percent on incomes above $800, which was later changed by the Revenue Act of 1862 to a progressive rate structure.[231] Lincoln also presided over the expansion of the federal government's economic influence in several other areas. The creation of the system of national banks by the National Banking Act provided a strong financial network in the country. It also established a national currency. In 1862, Congress created, with Lincoln's approval, the Department of Agriculture.[232] In 1862, Lincoln sent a senior general, John Pope, to put down the "Sioux Uprising" in Minnesota. Presented with 303 execution warrants for convicted Santee Dakota who were accused of killing innocent farmers, Lincoln conducted his own personal review of each of these warrants, eventually approving 39 for execution (one was later reprieved).[233] President Lincoln had planned to reform federal Indian policy.[234] In the wake of Grant's casualties in his campaign against Lee, Lincoln had considered yet another executive call for a military draft, but it was never issued. In response to rumors of one, however, the editors of the New York World and the Journal of Commerce published a false draft proclamation which created an opportunity for the editors and others employed at the publications to corner the gold market. Lincoln's reaction was to send the strongest of messages to the media about such behavior; he ordered the military to seize the two papers. The seizure lasted for two days.[235] Lincoln is largely responsible for the institution of the Thanksgiving holiday in the United States.[236] Before Lincoln's presidency, Thanksgiving, while a regional holiday in New England since the 17th century, had been proclaimed by the federal government only sporadically and on irregular dates. The last such proclamation had been during James Madison's presidency 50 years before. In 1863, Lincoln declared the final Thursday in November of that year to be a day of Thanksgiving.[236] In June 1864, Lincoln approved the Yosemite Grant enacted by Congress,
Abraham Lincoln which provided unprecedented federal protection for the area now known as Yosemite National Park.[237]
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Assassination
John Wilkes Booth was a well-known actor and a Confederate spy from Maryland; though he never joined the Confederate army, he had contacts with the Confederate secret service.[240] In 1864, Booth formulated a plan (very similar to one of Thomas N. Conrad previously authorized by the Confederacy)[241] to kidnap Lincoln in exchange for the release of Confederate prisoners.
Abraham Lincoln
390 After attending an April 11, 1865, speech in which Lincoln promoted voting rights for blacks, an incensed Booth changed his plans and became determined to assassinate the president.[242] Learning that the President, First Lady, and head Union general Ulysses S. Grant would be attending Ford's Theatre, Booth formulated a plan with co-conspirators to assassinate Vice President Andrew Johnson, Secretary of State William H. Seward and General Grant. Without his main bodyguard, Ward Hill Lamon, Lincoln left to attend the play Our American Cousin on April 14. Grant along with his wife chose at the last minute to travel to Philadelphia instead of attending the play.[243]
Lincoln's bodyguard, John Parker, left Ford's Theater during intermission to join Lincoln's coachman for drinks in the Star Saloon next door. The now unguarded President sat in his state box in the balcony. Seizing the opportunity, Booth crept up from behind and at about 10:13pm, aimed at the back of Lincoln's head and fired at point-blank range, mortally wounding the President. Major Henry Rathbone momentarily grappled with Booth, but Booth stabbed him and escaped.[244][245] After being on the run for 10 days, Booth was tracked down and found on a farm in Virginia, some 30 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) south of Washington, D.C. After a brief fight with Union troops, Booth was killed by Sergeant Boston Corbett on April 26.[246] An Army surgeon, Doctor Charles Leale, was sitting nearby at the theater and immediately assisted the President. He found the President unresponsive, barely breathing and with no detectable pulse. Having determined that the President had been shot in the head, and not stabbed in the shoulder as originally thought, he made an attempt to clear the blood clot, after which the President began to breath more naturally.[247] The dying man was taken across the street to Petersen House. After being in a coma for nine hours, Lincoln died at 7:22am on April 15. Presbyterian minister Phineas Densmore Gurley, then present, was asked to offer a prayer, after which Secretary of War Stanton saluted and said, "Now he belongs to the ages."[248] Lincoln's flag-enfolded body was then escorted in the rain to the White House by bareheaded Union officers, while the city's church bells rang. Vice President Johnson was sworn in as President at 10:00am the day after the assassination. Lincoln lay in state in the East Room, and then in the Capitol Rotunda from April 19 through April 21. For three weeks, his funeral train brought the body to cities across the North for large-scale memorials attended by hundreds of thousands, as well as many people who gathered in informal trackside tributes with bands, bonfires and hymn singing.[249][250]
Shown in the presidential booth of Ford's Theatre, from left to right, are Henry Rathbone, Clara Harris, Mary Todd Lincoln, Abraham Lincoln, and his assassin John Wilkes Booth.
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Historical reputation
In surveys of scholars ranking Presidents since the 1940s, Lincoln is consistently ranked in the top three, often #1.[4][5] A 2004 study found that scholars in the fields of history and politics ranked Lincoln number one, while legal scholars placed him second after Washington.[260] Of all the presidential ranking polls conducted since 1948, Lincoln has been rated at the very top in the majority of polls: Schlesinger 1948, Schlesinger 1962, 1982 Murray Blessing Survey, Chicago Tribune 1982 poll, Schlesinger 1996, CSPAN 1996, Ridings-McIver 1996, Time 2008, and CSPAN 2009. Generally, the top three presidents are rated as 1) Lincoln; 2) George Washington; and 3) Franklin D. Roosevelt, although Lincoln and Washington, and Washington and Roosevelt, occasionally are reversed.[261] President Lincoln's assassination made him a national martyr and endowed him with a recognition of mythic proportion. Lincoln was viewed by abolitionists as a champion for human liberty. Republicans linked Lincoln's name to their party. Many, though not all, in the South considered Lincoln as a man of outstanding ability.[262] Schwartz argues that Lincoln's reputation grew slowly in the late 19th century until the Progressive Era (19001920s) when he emerged as one of the most venerated heroes in American history, with even white Southerners in agreement. The high point came in 1922 with the dedication of the Lincoln Memorial on the Mall in Washington.[263] In the New Deal era liberals honored Lincoln not so much as the self-made man or the great war president, but as the advocate of the common man who doubtless would have supported the welfare state. In the Cold War years, Lincoln's image shifted to emphasize the symbol of freedom who brought hope to those oppressed by communist regimes.[264]
The Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library and Museum focuses on Lincoln scholarship and popular interpretation
Abraham Lincoln By the 1970s Lincoln had became a hero to political conservatives[265] for his intense nationalism, support for business, his insistence on stopping the spread of un-freedom (slavery), his acting in terms of Lockean and Burkean principles on behalf of both liberty and tradition, and his devotion to the principles of the Founding Fathers.[266][267][268] As a Whig activist, Lincoln was a spokesman for business interests, favoring high tariffs, banks, internal improvements, and railroads in opposition to the agrarian Democrats.[269] William C. Harris found that Lincoln's "reverence for the Founding Fathers, the Constitution, the laws under it, and the preservation of the Republic and its institutions undergirded and strengthened his conservatism.".[270] James G. Randall emphasizes his tolerance and his especially his moderation "in his preference for orderly progress, his distrust of dangerous agitation, and his reluctance toward ill digested schemes of reform." Randall concludes that, "he was conservative in his complete avoidance of that type of so-called 'radicalism' which involved abuse of the South, hatred for the slaveholder, thirst for vengeance, partisan plotting, and ungenerous demands that Southern institutions be transformed overnight by outsiders."[271] By the late 1960s, liberals, such as historian Lerone Bennett, were having second thoughts, especially regarding Lincoln's views on racial issues.[272][273] Bennett won wide attention when he called Lincoln a white supremacist in 1968.[274] He noted that Lincoln used ethnic slurs, told jokes that ridiculed blacks, insisted he opposed social equality, and proposed sending freed slaves to another country. Defenders, such as authors Dirck and Cashin, retorted that he was not as bad as most politicians;[275] and that he was a "moral visionary" who deftly advanced the abolitionist cause, as fast as politically possible.[276] The emphasis shifted away from Lincoln-the-emancipator to an argument that blacks had freed themselves from slavery, or at least were responsible for pressuring the government on emancipation.[277][278] Historian Barry Schwartz wrote in 2009 that Lincoln's image suffered "erosion, fading prestige, benign ridicule," in the late 20th century.[279] On the other hand, Donald opined in his 1996 biography that Lincoln was distinctly endowed with the personality trait of negative capability, defined by the poet John Keats and attributed to extraordinary leaders who were "content in the midst of uncertainties and doubts, and not compelled toward fact or reason."[280]
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Memorials
Further information: Cultural depictions of Abraham Lincoln Lincoln has been memorialized in many town, city, and county names,[281] including the capital of Nebraska. The first public monument to Abraham Lincoln was a statue erected in front of the District of Columbia City Hall in 1868, three years after his assassination.[282] Lincoln's name and image appear in numerous other places, such as the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C. and Lincoln's sculpture on Mount Rushmore.[283] Abraham Lincoln Birthplace National Historical Park in Hodgenville, Kentucky,[284] Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C. Lincoln Boyhood National Memorial in Lincoln City, Indiana,[285] [286] Lincoln's New Salem, Illinois, and Lincoln Home National Historic Site in Springfield, Illinois[287] commemorate the president.[288] Ford's Theatre and Petersen House (where he died) are maintained as museums, as is the Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library and Museum, located in Springfield.[289][290] The Lincoln Tomb in Oak Ridge Cemetery in Springfield, Illinois, contains his remains and those of his wife Mary and three of his four sons, Edward, William, and Thomas.[291] Within a year of this death, his image began to be disseminated throughout the world on stamps,[292] and he is the only U.S. President to appear on a U.S. airmail stamp.[293] Currency honoring the president includes the United States' five-dollar bill and the Lincoln cent, which represents the first regularly circulating U.S. coin to feature an actual person's image.[294]
Abraham Lincoln The first statue of Lincoln outside the United States was erected in Edinburgh, Scotland in 1893. The work of George Edwin Bissell, it stands on a memorial to Scots immigrants who enlisted with the Union during the Civil War, the only memorial to the war erected outside the United States. A large statue of Lincoln standing was unveiled near Westminster Abbey in London, on July 28, 1920, in an elaborate ceremony. The principal addresses were delivered in the abbey church.[295] Abraham Lincoln's birthday, February 12, was never a national holiday, but it was at one time observed by as many as 30 states.[281] In 1971, Presidents Day became a national holiday, combining Lincoln's and Washington's birthdays and replacing most states' celebration of his birthday.[296] The Abraham Lincoln Association was formed in 1908 to commemorate the centennial of Lincoln's birth.[297] In 2000, Congress established the Abraham Lincoln Bicentennial Commission to commemorate his 200th birthday in February 2009.[298] Lincoln sites remain popular tourist attractions, but crowds have thinned. In the late 1960s, 650,000 people a year visited the home in Springfield, slipping to 393,000 in 20002003. Likewise visits to New Salem fell by half, probably because of the enormous draw of the new museum in Springfield. Visits to the Lincoln Memorial in Washington peaked at 4.3million in 1987 and have since declined. However crowds at Ford's Theatre in Washington have grown sharply.[299]
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References
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Additional references
Burkhimer, Michael (2003). One Hundred Essential Lincoln Books. Cumberland House. ISBN978-1-58182-369-1. Burlingame, Michael (2008). Abraham Lincoln: A Life (2 volumes). Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN978-0-8018-8993-6., the most detailed biography Cox, LaWanda (1981). Lincoln and Black Freedom: A Study in Presidential Leadership. University of South Carolina Press. ISBN978-0-87249-400-8. Foner, Eric (2008). Our Lincoln: New Perspectives on Lincoln and His World. W.W. Norton. ISBN978-0-393-06756-9. Holzer, Harold (2008). Lincoln President-Elect: Abraham Lincoln and the Great Secession Winter 1860-1861 (http://books.google.com/books?id=34cVaFHdgMMC). Simon and Schuster. McPherson, James M. (2008). Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief. Penguin Press. ISBN978-1-59420-191-2. Miller, Richard Lawrence (2011). Lincoln and His World: The Rise to National Prominence, 1843-1853 (http:// books.google.com/books?id=c1odBTiRSJcC). McFarland., vol 3. of detailed biography Neely, Mark E (1984). The Abraham Lincoln Encyclopedia. Da Capo Press. ISBN978-0-306-80209-6. Neely, Mark E (1994). The Last Best Hope of Earth: Abraham Lincoln and the Promise of America. Harvard University Press. ISBN978-0-674-51125-5. Randall, James G. (19451955). Lincoln the President (4 volumes). Dodd, Mead. OCLC4183070. Smith, Adam I.P. "The 'Cult' of Abraham Lincoln and the Strange Survival of Liberal England in the Era of the World Wars," Twentieth Century British History, (Dec 2010) 21#4 pp 486509
External links
The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (http://quod.lib.umich.edu/l/lincoln/) Works by or about Abraham Lincoln (http://worldcat.org/identities/lccn-n79-6779) in libraries (WorldCat catalog) Mr. Lincoln's Virtual Library (http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/alhtml/alhome.html) Poetry written by Abraham Lincoln (http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/prespoetry/al.html) The Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library and Museum (http://www.alplm.org/home.html) Springfield, Illinois The Papers of Abraham Lincoln (http://www.papersofabrahamlincoln.org/) documentary editing project US PATNo. 6,469 (http://www.google.com/patents?vid=6469)Manner of Buoying VesselsA. Lincoln1849 National Endowment for the Humanities Spotlight Abraham Lincoln (http://edsitement.neh.gov/ teaching-abraham-lincoln#node-19470) The Abraham Lincoln Bicentennial Commission (http://www.abrahamlincoln200.org/) Lincoln/Net: Abraham Lincoln Historical Digitization Project, Northern Illinois University Libraries (http:// lincoln.lib.niu.edu/) Abraham Lincoln: A Resource Guide from the Library of Congress (http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ presidents/lincoln/) Abraham Lincoln (http://web.archive.org/web/20110725003410/http://americanpresidents.org/presidents/ president.asp?PresidentNumber=16) at C-SPAN's American Presidents: Life Portraits C-SPAN's Lincoln 200 Years (http://legacy.c-span.org/Series/Lincoln-200-Years.aspx)
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Joshua Chamberlain
Joshua Chamberlain
Bvt. Maj. Gen. Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain 32nd Governor of Maine In office January 2, 1867 January 4, 1871 Preceded by Succeeded by Samuel Cony Sidney Perham Personal details Born Lawrence Joshua Chamberlain September 8, 1828 Brewer, Maine February 24, 1914 (aged85) Portland, Maine Republican Fanny Chamberlain Grace Dupee (Chamberlain) Allen (b. 1856), Infant Son (unnamed) (d. 1857), Harold Wyllys Chamberlain (b. 1858), Emily Stelle Chamberlain (d. 1860), Gertrude Loraine Chamberlain (d. 1865) Brunswick, Maine (His house is preserved as a historical landmark to this day.) Bowdoin College Educator, Military Congregationalist Military service Nickname(s) Allegiance Lion of the Round Top United States of America Union
Died
Service/branch United States Army Union Army Years of service Rank 186266
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Commands
20th Maine Infantry 3rd Brigade, 1st Division, V Corps 1st Brigade, 1st Division, V Corps 1st Division, V Corps American Civil War Battle of Fredericksburg Second Battle of Petersburg Appomattox Campaign
Battles/wars
Awards
Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain (September 8, 1828 February 24, 1914),[1] born as Lawrence Joshua Chamberlain,[2][3] was an American college professor from the State of Maine, who volunteered during the American Civil War to join the Union Army. Although having no earlier education in military strategies, he became a highly respected and decorated Union officer, reaching the rank of brigadier general (and brevet major general). For his gallantry at Gettysburg, he was awarded the Medal of Honor. He was given the honor of commanding the Union troops at the surrender ceremony for the infantry of Robert E. Lee's Army at Appomattox, Virginia. After the war, he entered politics as a Republican and served four one-year terms of office as the 32nd Governor of Maine. He served on the faculty, and as president, of his alma mater, Bowdoin College.
Early life
Chamberlain was born Lawrence Joshua Chamberlain in Brewer, Maine, the son of Sarah Dupree (ne Brastow) and Joshua Chamberlain. He was the oldest of five children. He entered Bowdoin College in Brunswick, Maine, in 1848, after teaching himself to read Ancient Greek in order to pass the entrance exam. While at Bowdoin he met many people who would influence his life, including Harriet Beecher Stowe, the wife of a Bowdoin professor. Chamberlain would often go to listen to her read passages from what would later become her celebrated novel, Uncle Tom's Cabin. He also joined the Peucinian Society, a group of students with Federalist leanings. A member of the Phi Beta Kappa academic honor society and a brother of the Alpha Delta Phi fraternity, Chamberlain graduated in 1852. He married Fanny Adams, adopted daughter of a local clergyman, in 1855, and they had five children, one of whom was born too prematurely to survive and two of whom died in infancy. Adams's father did not at first approve of the marriage, but later approved and shared a mutual respect with his son-in-law. Chamberlain studied for three additional years at Bangor Theological Seminary in Bangor, Maine, returned to Bowdoin, and began a career in education as a professor of rhetoric. He eventually went on to teach every subject in the curriculum with the exception of science and mathematics. In 1861 he was appointed Professor of Modern Languages.[4] He was fluent in nine languages other than English: Greek, Latin, Spanish, German, French, Italian, Arabic, Hebrew, and Syriac. Chamberlain's great-grandfathers were soldiers in the American Revolutionary War. One, Franklin Chamberlain, was a sergeant in the battle of Yorktown. His grandfather, also named Joshua Chamberlain, was a colonel in the local militia during the War of 1812 and was court-martialed (but exonerated) for his part in the humiliating Battle of Hampden, which led to the sacking of Bangor and Brewer by British forces. His father also had served during the abortive Aroostook War of 1839. Chamberlain himself was not trained in military science, but felt a strong desire to serve his country.
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Civil War
Chamberlain believed the Union needed to be supported by all those willing against the Confederacy. On several occasions Chamberlain spoke freely of his beliefs during his class urging students to follow their hearts in regards to the war while issuing his own proclamation that the cause was just. Of his desire to serve in the War he wrote to Maine's Governor Israel Washburn, Jr., "I fear, this war, so costly of blood and treasure, will not cease until men of the North are willing to leave good positions, and sacrifice the dearest personal interests, to rescue our country from desolation, and defend the national existence against treachery."[5] Many faculty at Bowdoin did not feel his enthusiasm for various reasons and Chamberlain was subsequently granted a leave of absence (supposedly to study languages for two years in Europe). He then promptly enlisted unbeknownst to those at Bowdoin and his family. Offered the colonelcy of the 20th Maine Regiment, he declined, according to his biographer, John J. Pullen, preferring to "start a little lower and learn the business first." He was appointed lieutenant colonel of the regiment on August 8, 1862, under the command of Col. Adelbert Ames. The 20th was part of the V Corps in the Union Army of the Potomac. One of Chamberlain's younger brothers, Thomas Chamberlain, was also an officer of the 20th Maine, and another, John Chamberlain, visited the regiment at Gettysburg as a member of the U.S. Christian Commission until appointed as a chaplain in another Maine Volunteer regiment.
Battle of Fredericksburg
Chamberlain's regiment marched to the Battle of Antietam, but did not participate in the fighting. The 20th Maine fought at the subsequent Battle of Fredericksburg, suffering relatively small numbers of casualties in the assaults on Marye's Heights, but were forced to spend a miserable night on the freezing battlefield among the many wounded from other regiments. Chamberlain chronicled this night well in his diary and went to great length discussing his having to use bodies of the fallen for shelter and a pillow while listening to the bullets zip into the corpses.
Battle of Chancellorsville
The 20th missed the Battle of Chancellorsville in May of 1863 due to an outbreak of smallpox in their ranks (which was caused by an errant smallpox vaccine), which kept them on guard duty in the rear.[6] Chamberlain was promoted to colonel of the regiment in June 1863, upon the promotion of Ames.
Battle of Gettysburg
Chamberlain achieved fame at the Battle of Gettysburg, where his valiant defense of a hill named Little Round Top became the focus of many publications and stories, including the novel The Killer Angels and the film Gettysburg.
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On the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg, Union forces were recovering from initial defeats and hastily regrouping into defensive positions on a line of hills south of the town. Sensing the momentary vulnerability of the Union forces, the Confederates began an attack against the Union left flank. Sent to defend the southern slope of Little Round Top by Col. Strong Vincent, Chamberlain found himself and the 20th Maine at the far left end of the entire Union line. He quickly understood the strategic significance of the small hill, and the need for the 20th Maine to hold the Union left at all costs. The men from Maine waited until troops from the 15th Alabama Infantry regiment, under Chamberlain's position on Little Round Top Col. William C. Oates, charged up the hill, attempting to flank the Union position. Time and time again the Confederates struck, until the 20th Maine was almost doubled back upon itself. With many casualties and ammunition running low, Col. Chamberlain recognized the dire circumstances and ordered his left wing (which was now looking southeast, compared to the rest of the regiment, which was facing west) to initiate a bayonet charge. From his report of the day: "At that crisis, I ordered the bayonet. The word was enough." While battlefield conditions make it unlikely that many men heard Chamberlain's order, most historians believe he initiated the charge. The 20th Maine charged down the hill, with the left wing wheeling continually to make the charging line swing like a hinge, thus creating a simultaneous frontal assault and flanking maneuver, capturing 101 of the Confederate soldiers and successfully saving the flank. This version of the battle was popularized by the book, "Killer Angels" and the movie, "Gettysburg" and there is a historical debate on the validity of this account.[7]. Chamberlain sustained two slight wounds in the battle, one when a shot hit his sword scabbard and bruised his thigh, and another when his right foot was hit by a spent bullet or piece of shrapnel. For his tenacity at defending Little Round Top he was known by the sobriquet Lion of the Round Top. Prior to the Battle, Chamberlain was quite ill, developing malaria and dysentery. Later, due to this illness, he was taken off active duty until he recovered.
Siege of Petersburg
In April 1864, Chamberlain returned to the Army of the Potomac and was promoted to brigade commander shortly before the Siege of Petersburg. There, in a major action on June 18, at Rives' Salient, Chamberlain was shot through the right hip and groin. Despite the injury, Chamberlain withdrew his sword and stuck it into the ground in order to keep himself upright to dissuade the growing resolve for retreat. He stood upright for several minutes until he collapsed and lay unconscious from loss of blood. The wound was considered mortal by the division's surgeon, who predicted he would perish; Chamberlain's incorrectly recorded death in battle was reported in the Maine newspapers, and Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant gave Chamberlain a battlefield promotion to the rank of brigadier general after receiving an urgent recommendation on June 19 from corps commander Maj. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren: "He has been recommended for promotion for gallant and efficient conduct on previous occasion and yesterday led his brigade against the enemy under most destructive fire. He expresses the wish that he may receive the recognition of his services by promotion before he dies for the gratification of his family and friends."[8] Not expected to live, Chamberlain displayed surprising will and courage, and with the support of his brother Tom, was back in command by November. Although many, including his wife Fanny, urged Chamberlain to resign, he was determined to serve through the end of the war. In early 1865, Chamberlain was given command of the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division of V Corps, and he continued to act with courage and resolve. On March 29, 1865, his brigade participated in a major skirmish on the Quaker Road during Grant's final advance that would finish the war. Despite losses, another wound (in the left arm and chest), and nearly being captured, Chamberlain was successful and brevetted to the rank of major general by President Abraham Lincoln.
Joshua Chamberlain In all, Chamberlain served in 20 battles and numerous skirmishes, was cited for bravery four times, had six horses shot from under him, and was wounded six times.
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Appomattox
On the morning of April 9, 1865, Chamberlain learned of the desire by Lee to surrender the Army of Northern Virginia when a Confederate staff officer approached him under a flag of truce. "Sir," he reported to Chamberlain, "I am from General Gordon. General Lee desires a cessation of hostilities until he can hear from General Grant as to the proposed surrender."[9] The next day, Chamberlain was summoned to Union headquarters where Maj. Gen. Charles Griffin informed him that he had been selected to preside over the parade of the Confederate infantry as part of their formal surrender at Appomattox Court House on April 12.[10] Thus Chamberlain was responsible for one of the most poignant scenes of the Civil War. As the Confederate soldiers marched down the road to surrender their arms and colors, Chamberlain, on his own initiative, ordered his men to come to attention and "carry arms" as a show of respect. Chamberlain described what happened next: Gordon, at the head of the marching column, outdoes us in courtesy. He was riding with downcast eyes and more than pensive look; but at this clatter of arms he raises his eyes and instantly catching the significance, wheels his horse with that superb grace of which he is master, drops the point of his sword to his stirrup, gives a command, at which the great Confederate ensign following him is dipped and his decimated brigades, as they reach our right, respond to the 'carry.' All the while on our part not a sound of trumpet or drum, not a cheer, nor a word nor motion of man, but awful stillness as if it were the passing of the dead.[11] Chamberlain's salute to the Confederate soldiers was unpopular with many in the North, but he defended his action in his memoirs, The Passing of the Armies. Many years later, Gordon, in his own memoirs, called Chamberlain "one of the knightliest soldiers of the Federal Army." Gordon never mentioned the anecdote until after he read Chamberlain's account, more than 40 years later.[12]
Post-war career
Chamberlain left the army soon after the war ended, going back to his home state of Maine. Due to his immense popularity he served as Governor of Maine for four one-year terms after he won election as a Republican. His victory in 1866 set the record for the most votes and the highest percentage for any Maine governor by that time. He would break his own record in 1868. During his time in office he was attacked by those angered by his support for capital punishment and by his refusal to create a special police force to enforce the prohibition of alcohol.
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1866 Maine Governor Election Party Candidate Votes Percentage 62.4% 37.6%
1867 Maine Governor Election Party Candidate Votes Percentage 55.5% 44.5%
1868 Maine Governor Election Party Candidate Votes Percentage 72.1% 27.9%
1869 Maine Governor Election Party Candidate Votes Percentage 55.4% 39.8% 4.8%
Republican Joshua Chamberlain 54,314 Democratic Franklin Smith Prohibition N.G. Hitchborn 39,033 4,736
After leaving political office, he returned to Bowdoin College. In 1871, he was appointed president of Bowdoin and remained in that position until 1883, when he was forced to resign due to ill health from his war wounds. He also served as an ex-officio trustee of nearby Bates College from 1867 to 1871. In January 1880, there was a dispute about who was the newly elected governor of Maine, and the Maine State House was occupied by a band of armed men. The outgoing governor, Alonzo Garcelon, summoned Chamberlain, the commander of the Maine Militia, to take charge. Chamberlain sent home the armed men, and arranged for the Augusta police to keep control. He stayed in the State House most of the twelve-day period until the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's decision on the election results was known. During this time, there were threats of assassination and kidnapping, and on one occasion he went outside to face down a crowd of 25-30 men intending to kill him, and both sides offered bribes to appoint him a United States senator. Having gratified neither side in the dispute, he did not become a senator, and his career in state politics ended. Chamberlain served as Surveyor of the Port of Portland, Maine, a federal appointment, and engaged in business activities, including real estate dealings in Florida and a college of art in New York, as well as hotels and railroads. He also wrote several books about Maine, education, and his Civil War memoir, The Passing of the Armies. From the time of his serious wound in 1864 until his death, he was forced to wear an early form of a catheter with a bag and underwent six operations to try to correct the original wound and stop the fevers and infections that plagued him, without success. In 1893, 30 years after the battle that made the 20th Maine famous, Chamberlain was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions at Gettysburg. The citation commends him for his "Daring heroism and great tenacity in holding his position on the Little Round Top against repeated assaults, and carrying the advance position on the Great Round Top."
Joshua Chamberlain Beginning with his first election as governor of Maine, continuing to the end of his life, even as he suffered continual pain and discomfort from his wounds of 1864, Chamberlain was active in the Grand Army of the Republic and made many return visits to Gettysburg, giving speeches at soldiers' reunions. In 1898 at the age of 70, still in pain from his wounds, he volunteered for duty as an officer in the Spanish-American War. Rejected for duty, he called it one of the major disappointments of his life. As in many other Civil War actions, controversy arose when one of his subordinate officers stated that Chamberlain never actually ordered a charge at Gettysburg. The claim never seriously affected Chamberlain's fame or notoriety, however. In May 1913, he made his last known visit to Gettysburg while involved in planning the 50th anniversary reunion. Due to deteriorating health, he was unable to attend the reunion two months later. Chamberlain became a founding member of the Maine Institution for the Blind, in Portland, now called The Iris Network. Chamberlain's wife herself was visually impaired, and he served on the first Board of Directors for the Agency. Chamberlain died of his lingering wartime wounds in 1914 at Portland, Maine, age 85, and is buried in Pine Grove Cemetery in Brunswick, Chamberlain photographed later in life in Portland, Maine, wearing uniform and his medals Maine.[1] Beside him as he died was Dr. Abner Shaw of Portland, one of the two surgeons who had operated on him in Petersburg 50 years previously. He was the last Civil War veteran to die as a result of wounds from the war.[13] A full study of his medical history strongly suggests that it was complications from the wound suffered at Petersburg that resulted in his death.[14] His home, located across Maine Street from the Bowdoin College campus, is now the Joshua L. Chamberlain Museum and is owned by the Pejepscot Historical Society, which also maintains an extensive research collection on Chamberlain. Memorabilia on display include the mini ball that almost ended his life at Petersburg and Don Troiani's original painting of the charge at Little Round Top. Tours of the home are conducted by knowledgeable volunteer docents from late May until mid-October. US Route 1A is carried across the Penobscot River between Bangor and Brewer, Maine by the Joshua Chamberlain Bridge, a four lane steel plate girder bridge opened in 1959.
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Command history
Lieutenant Colonel (second in command), 20th Maine (August 8, 1862) Colonel, commanding 20th Maine (May 20, 1863) Commanding 3rd Brigade, 1st Division, V Corps (August 26 November 19, 1863) Commanding 1st Brigade (June 618, 1864) Brigadier General of Volunteers (June 18, 1864) Commanding 1st Brigade (November 19, 1864 January 5, 1865) Commanding 1st Brigade (February 27 April 11, 1865) Brevet Major General of Volunteers (March 29, 1865) Commanding 1st Division (April 20 June 28, 1865) Commanding 1st Brigade, 3rd Division, Wright's Provisional Corps, Middle Department (June 28 July, 1865)
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In popular media
Chamberlain is a key character in Michael Shaara's Pulitzer Prize-winning historical novel about Gettysburg, The Killer Angels, and the movie based on that novel, Gettysburg (in which Chamberlain was played by actor Jeff Daniels, who repeated that role in the Gods and Generals prequel). Tom Eishen's historical novel Courage on Little Round Top is a detailed look at Chamberlain as well as Robert Wicker, the young Confederate officer who fired his pistol at Chamberlain's head during the 20th Maine's historic charge down Little Round Top. Ken Burns's 1990 nine-part PBS film The Civil War featured Chamberlain prominently. Steve Earle's song Dixieland from his album The Mountain refers to Chamberlain and the Battle of Gettysburg: I am Kilrain of the 20th Maine and I fight for Chamberlain 'Cause he stood right with us when the Johnnies came like a banshee on the wind When the smoke cleared out of Gettysburg, many a mother wept For many a good boy died there, sure, and the air smelled just like death I am Kilrain of the 20th Maine and I'd march to hell and back again For Colonel Joshua Chamberlainwe're all goin' down to Dixieland Although his name is never said, Chamberlain's actions during the Battle of Gettysburg are popularized in the song Hold at All Costs featured on the CD The Glorious Burden by the band Iced Earth, in which singer Tim Owens takes the role of Chamberlain at the battle on Little Round Top. Shipyard Brewing Company named a pale ale after Chamberlain, and decorated the label with his profile. In the book The Traveler's Gift by Andy Andrews, Chamberlain is the main character in one of the chapters, giving a brief lesson on his history. In the second of the Percy Jackson & The Olympians series (The Sea of Monsters), Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain is mentioned by the centaur Chiron as single-handedly changing the course of the American Civil War. The book "The Lost Regiment" and the subsequent series by author William R. Forstchen chronicle the adventures of the "35th Maine", a Union regiment from Maine having been transported to an alien planet. The regiment was based on the 20th Maine, with the main character and commander of the regiment, Andrew Lawrence Keane, also being a college professor. Chamberlain and the story of Little Round Top is mentioned in a recent episode of "Homeland" on Showtime in a scene at Gettysburg.
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Notes
[1] Eicher, pp. 168-69. [2] Chamberlain, Joshua L. The Grand Old Man of Maine: Selected Letters of Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, 1865-1914 (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=M0yvGdpYvAcC& pg=PA31& dq="Lawrence+ Joshua+ Chamberlain"& hl=en& ei=WHSsTc-zKOG70QHuov34CA& sa=X& oi=book_result& ct=result& resnum=1& sqi=2& ved=0CCwQ6AEwAA#v=onepage& q& f=false) (2004). Jeremiah Goulka, ed. UNC Press Books. p. 31. ISBN 0-8078-2864-5. Google Books. Retrieved on April 18, 2011. [3] Trulock, p. 26. [4] Chase, p. 63. [5] As cited in: Thomas A. Desjardin, Joshua L. Chamberlain, Greystone Communication, 1999, p. 22. [6] Desjardin, pp. 4-5. [7] Desjardin, Thomas (2009). Stand Firm Ye Boys From Maine. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. ISBN978-0-19-538231-0. [8] Pullen, pp. 12-13. [9] Longacre, p. 243. [10] Desjardins, p. 118, states that General Grant personally selected Chamberlain from all of the officers in the army. Marvel, pp. 259-60, attributes the Grant story to Chamberlain's memory in the "dim, distant light of old age." Longacre, pp. 244-47, does not connect General Grant directly to the choice of Chamberlain, and further states that "By the turn of the 20th century, after Chamberlain had commemorated the surrender parade in numerous speeches and publications, some of the Union participants would quarrel with his presentation of events. They would charge him with making it appear that his brigade alone took part in the ceremony, ignoring other elements of the Fifth Corps also present for Gordon's surrender as well as to receive the surrender of General Longstreet's corps that same afternoon. These critics would also charge Chamberlain with implying that he had received arms and flags throughout morning and afternoon instead of during only a portion of the day as evidence suggested. Other veterans would claim that General Bartlett, not Chamberlain, had been Grant's choice to preside at the parade and that Chamberlain took over only because his superior was summoned elsewhere at the last minute. Critics of a later day would even deny that Chamberlain and Gordon had exchanged salutes of honor." [11] Chamberlain, p. 196. [12] Marvel, p. 261. [13] Patrick, Bethanne Kelly. Maj. Gen. Joshua L. Chamberlain (http:/ / www. military. com/ Content/ MoreContent1/ ?file=cvw_g_chamberlain) [14] Schmidt, Jim. "The Medical Department: A Thorn in the Lion of the Union", Civil War News, October 2000.
References
"Civil War (A-L); Chamberlain, Joshua entry" (http://www.history.army.mil/html/moh/civwaral.html). Medal of Honor recipients. United States Army Center of Military History. August 6, 2009. Retrieved July 13, 2010. Chamberlain, Joshua L. (1992). The Passing of the Armies: An Account of the Final Campaign of the Army of the Potomac, Based upon Personal Reminiscences of the Fifth Army Corps. Bantam. ISBN978-0-553-29992-2. Chase, Henry (1893). Representative Men of Maine. Portland, Maine: The Lakeside Press. Desjardin, Thomas A. (1995). Stand Firm Ye Boys from Maine: The 20th Maine and the Gettysburg Campaign. Thomas Publications. ISBN1-57747-034-6. Eicher, John H.; David J. Eicher (2001). Civil War High Commands. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. ISBN0-8047-3641-3. Eishen, Thomas (2004). Courage on Little Round Top. Skyward Publishing. ISBN1-881554-38-4. Levinsky, Allan M. (2006). "Chamberlain's Stand Against Political Upheaval: His second Little Round Top". Discover Maine: Maine's History Magazine 3: 1821. Longacre, Edward G. (1999). Joshua Chamberlain: The Soldier and the Man. Combined Publishing. ISBN978-0-306-81312-2. Marvel, William (2000). A Place Called Appomattox. University of North Carolina Press. ISBN978-0-8078-2568-6. Nesbitt, Mark (1996). Through Blood & Fire: Selected Civil War Papers of Major General Joshua Chamberlain. Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books. ISBN0-8117-1750-X. Pullen, John J. (1999). Joshua Chamberlain: A Hero's Life and Legacy. Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books. ISBN978-0-8117-0886-9.
Joshua Chamberlain Trulock, Alice Rains (2001). In the Hands of Providence: Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain and the American Civil War. University of North Carolina Press. Wallace, Willard M. (1991). Soul of the Lion: A Biography of General Joshua L. Chamberlain. Gettysburg, Pennsylvania: Stan Clark Military Books. ISBN1-879664-00-3.
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Further reading
Lemke, William (1997). A Pride of Lions: Joshua Chamberlain & Other Maine Civil War Heroes. Covered Bridge Press.
External links
Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain Digital Archive at Bowdoin College (http://learn.bowdoin.edu/ joshua-lawrence-chamberlain/) Chamberlain-Adams Family Papers. (http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:RAD.SCHL:sch00114) Schlesinger Library (http://www.radcliffe.edu/schles), Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University. Short Chamberlain bio and photos of his boyhood home in Brewer, his home in Brunswick, his gravesite, and the family plot in Brewer (http://www.joshualawrencechamberlain.net) Index to Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain's Pages (http://dragoon1st.tripod.com/cw/jlc.html) Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain Biography (http://www.civilwarhome.com/jlchamberlainbio.htm) Joshua Chamberlain: Maine's Favorite Son (http://www.wickedgoodmaine.com/facts/history/chamberlain. shtml) Tribute to Major General Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain (http://www.joshua.lurker00.com/) Joshua L. Chamberlain, a Biographical Essay (http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/gettysburg/articles/ chamberlain1.aspx) Medal of Honor recipients on Film (http://www.voicenet.com/~lpadilla/chamberlain.html) Joshua L. Chamberlain Museum in Brunswick, Maine (http://community.curtislibrary.com/pejepscot.htm) Managed by the Pejepscot Historical Society The Iris Network (formerly the Maine Institution for the Blind) (http://www.theiris.org)
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Stonewall Jackson
Thomas Jonathan "Stonewall" Jackson
General Jackson's "Chancellorsville" Portrait, taken at a Spotsylvania County farm on April 26, 1863, seven days before he was wounded at the Battle of Chancellorsville. Nickname Born Died Place of burial Allegiance Yearsof service Rank Commands held Battles/wars Stonewall, Old Jack, Old Blue Light, Tom Fool January 21, 1824 Clarksburg, Virginia (now West Virginia) May 10, 1863 (aged39) Guinea Station, Virginia Stonewall Jackson Memorial Cemetery Lexington, Virginia United States Army Confederate States Army 18461851 (USA) 18611863 (CSA) Brevet Major (USA) Lieutenant General (CSA) Stonewall Brigade Second Corps, Army of Northern Virginia Mexican-American War American Civil War
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Great Train Raid of 1861 Battle of Falling Waters First Battle of Bull Run (First Manassas) Romney Expedition Valley Campaign First Battle of Kernstown Battle of Front Royal Battle of Winchester (1862) Battle of Port Republic Seven Days Battles
Battle of Gaines' Mill Battle of Savage's Station Battle of White Oak Swamp Battle of Malvern Hill Northern Virginia Campaign
Battle of Cedar Mountain First Battle of Rappahannock Station Manassas Station Second Battle of Bull Run (Second Manassas) Battle of Chantilly Maryland Campaign Battle of Harpers Ferry Battle of Antietam Battle of Fredericksburg Battle of Chancellorsville
Thomas Jonathan "Stonewall" Jackson[1] (January 21, 1824[2] May 10, 1863) was a Confederate general during the American Civil War, and one of the best-known Confederate commanders after General Robert E. Lee.[3] His military career includes the Valley Campaign of 1862 and his service as a corps commander in the Army of Northern Virginia under Robert E. Lee. Confederate pickets accidentally shot him at the Battle of Chancellorsville on May 2, 1863; the general survived with the loss of an arm to amputation. However, he died of complications from pneumonia eight days later. His death was a severe setback for the Confederacy, affecting not only its military prospects, but also the morale of its army and of the general public. Jackson in death became an icon of Southern heroism and commitment, joining Lee in the pantheon of the "Lost Cause".[4] Military historians consider Jackson to be one of the most gifted tactical commanders in U.S. history. His Valley Campaign and his envelopment of the Union Army right wing at Chancellorsville are studied worldwide even today as examples of innovative and bold leadership. He excelled as well in other battles: the First Battle of Bull Run (First Manassas) (where he received his famous nickname "Stonewall"), Second Bull Run (Second Manassas), Antietam, and Fredericksburg. Jackson was not universally successful as a commander, however, as displayed by his weak and confused efforts during the Seven Days Battles around Richmond in 1862.
Early life
Paternal ancestry
Thomas Jonathan Jackson was the great-grandson of John Jackson (1715 or 1719 1801) and Elizabeth Cummins (also known as Elizabeth Comings and Elizabeth Needles) (1723 1828). John Jackson was a Protestant in Coleraine, County Londonderry, Ireland. While living in London, he was convicted of the capital crime of larceny for stealing 170; the judge at the Old Bailey sentenced him to a seven-year indenture in America. Elizabeth, a strong, blonde woman over 6 feet (unknown operator: u'strong'm) tall, born in London, was also convicted of larceny in an unrelated case for stealing 19 pieces of silver, jewelry, and fine lace, and received a similar sentence.
Stonewall Jackson They both were transported on the prison ship Litchfield, which departed London in May 1749 with 150 convicts. John and Elizabeth met on board and were in love by the time the ship arrived at Annapolis, Maryland. Although they were sent to different locations in Maryland for their indentures, the couple married in July 1755.[5] The family migrated west across the Blue Ridge Mountains to settle near Moorefield, Virginia, (now West Virginia) in 1758. In 1770, they moved farther west to the Tygart Valley. They began to acquire large parcels of virgin farmland near the present-day town of Buckhannon, including 3,000 acres (12km) in Elizabeth's name. John and his two teenage sons were early recruits for the American Revolutionary War, fighting in the Battle of Kings Mountain on October 7, 1780; John finished the war as captain and served as a lieutenant of the Virginia Militia after 1787. While the men were in the Army, Elizabeth converted their home to a haven, "Jackson's Fort," for refugees from Indian attacks.[6] John and Elizabeth had eight children. Their second son was Edward Jackson (March 1, 1759 December 25, 1828), and Edward's third son was Jonathan Jackson, Thomas's father.[7]
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Early childhood
Thomas Jackson was the third child of Julia Beckwith (ne Neale) Jackson (17981831) and Jonathan Jackson (17901826), an attorney. Both of Jackson's parents were natives of Virginia. The family already had two young children and were living in Clarksburg, in what is now West Virginia, when Thomas was born. He was named for his maternal grandfather. Thomas's sister Elizabeth (age six) died of typhoid fever on March 6, 1826, with two-year-old Thomas at her bedside. His father also died of a typhoid fever on March 26. Jackson's mother gave birth to Thomas's sister Laura Ann the day after Jackson's father died.[8] Julia Jackson thus was widowed at 28 and was left with much debt and three young children (including the newborn). She sold the family's possessions to pay the debts. She declined family charity and moved into a small rented one-room house. Julia took in sewing and taught school to support herself and her three young children for about four years. In 1830, Julia Neale Jackson remarried. Her new husband, Blake Woodson,[9] an attorney, did not like his stepchildren. There were continuing financial problems. The following year, after giving birth to Thomas's half-brother, Julia died of complications, leaving her three older children orphaned.[10] Julia was buried in an unmarked grave in a homemade coffin in Westlake Cemetery along the James River and Kanawha Turnpike in Fayette County within the corporate limits of present-day Ansted, West Virginia.
Jackson's Mill
Stonewall Jackson was sent to live with her mother's family, Thomas to live with his Aunt Polly (his father's sister) and her husband, Isaac Brake, on a farm 4 miles from Clarksburg. Thomas was treated by Brake as an outsider and, having suffered verbal abuse for over a year, ran away from the family. When his cousin in Clarksburg besought him to return to Aunt Polly's, he replied, "Maybe I ought to, ma'am, but I am not going to." He walked 18 miles through mountain wilderness to Jackson's Mill, where he was welcomed by his uncles and he remained there for the following seven years.[11] Cummins Jackson was strict with Thomas, who looked up to Cummins as a schoolteacher. Jackson helped around the farm, tending sheep with the assistance of a sheepdog, driving teams of oxen and helping harvest wheat and corn. Formal education was not easily obtained, but he attended school when and where he could. Much of Jackson's education was self-taught. He once made a deal with one of his uncle's slaves to provide him with pine knots in exchange for reading lessons; Thomas would stay up at night reading borrowed books by the light of those burning pine knots. Virginia law forbade teaching a slave, free black or mulatto to read or write, as enacted following Nat Turner's Slave Rebellion in Southampton County in 1831. Nevertheless, Jackson secretly taught the slave to write, as he had promised. Once literate, the young slave fled to Canada via the underground railroad.[12] In his later years at Jackson's Mill, Thomas was a school teacher.
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Stained glass of Jackson's life in the Washington National Cathedral in part depicting his service in the Mexican-American War
In the spring of 1851,[15] Jackson accepted a newly created teaching position at the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), in Lexington, Virginia. He became Professor of Natural and Experimental Philosophy and Instructor of Artillery. Jackson's teachings are still used at VMI today because they are timeless military essentials: discipline, mobility, assessing the enemy's strength and intentions while attempting to conceal your own, and the efficiency of artillery combined with an infantry assault. However, despite the high quality of his work, he was not popular as a teacher, and the students called him "Tom Fool." He memorized his lectures and then recited them to the class; any students who came to ask for help were only given the same explanation as before. And if students came to ask again, Jackson viewed this as insubordination and likewise punished them. The students mocked his apparently stern, religious nature and his eccentric traits. In 1856, a group of alumni attempted to have Jackson removed from his position.[16]
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Little as he was known to the white inhabitants of Lexington, Jackson was revered by many of the African-Americans in town, both slaves and free blacks. He was instrumental in the organization in 1855 of Sunday School classes for blacks at the Presbyterian Church. His second wife, Mary Anna Jackson, taught with Jackson, as "he preferred that my labors should be given to the colored children, believing that it was more important and useful to put the strong hand of the Gospel under the ignorant African race, to lift them up."[17] The pastor, Dr. William Spottswood White, described the relationship between Jackson and his Sunday afternoon students: "In their religious instruction he succeeded wonderfully. His discipline was systematic and firm, but very kind. ... His servants reverenced and loved him, as they would have done a brother or father. ... He was emphatically the black man's friend." He addressed his students by name and they in turn referred to him affectionately as "Marse Major."[18] Jackson's family owned six slaves in the late 1850s. Three (Hetty, Cyrus, and George, a mother and two teenage sons) were received as a wedding present. Another, Albert, requested that Jackson purchase him and allow him to work for his freedom; he was employed as a waiter in one of the Lexington hotels and Jackson rented him to VMI. Amy also requested that Jackson purchase her from a public auction and she served the family as a cook and housekeeper. The sixth, Emma, was a four-year-old orphan with a learning disability, accepted by Jackson from an aged widow and presented to his second wife, Mary Anna, as a welcome-home gift.[19] After the American Civil War began he appears to have hired out or sold his slaves. Mary Anna Jackson, in her 1895 memoir, said, "our servants ... without the firm guidance and restraint of their master, the excitement of the times proved so demoralizing to them that he deemed it best for me to provide them with good homes among the permanent residents."[20] James Robertson wrote about Jackson's view on slavery:[21] Jackson neither apologized for nor spoke in favor of the practice of slavery. He probably opposed the institution. Yet in his mind the Creator had sanctioned slavery, and man had no moral right to challenge its existence. The good Christian slaveholder was one who treated his servants fairly and humanely at all times. While an instructor at VMI in 1853, Thomas Jackson married Elinor "Ellie" Junkin, whose father, George Junkin, was president of Washington College (later named Washington and Lee University) in Lexington. An addition was built onto the president's residence for the Jacksons, and when Robert E. Lee became president of Washington College he lived in the same home, now known as the Lee-Jackson House.[22] Ellie gave birth to a stillborn son on October 22, 1854, experiencing a hemorrhage an hour later that proved fatal.[23] After a tour of Europe, Jackson married again, in 1857. Mary Anna Morrison was from North Carolina, where her father was the first president of Davidson College. They had a daughter named Mary Graham on April 30, 1858, but the baby died less than a month later. Another daughter was born in 1862, shortly before her father's death. The Jacksons named her Julia Laura, after his mother and sister. Jackson purchased the only house he ever owned while in Lexington. Built in 1801, the brick town house at 8 East Washington Street was purchased by Jackson in 1859. He lived in it for two years before being called to serve in the Confederacy. Jackson never returned to his home. In November 1859, at the request of the governor of Virginia, Major William Gilham led a contingent of the VMI Cadet Corps to Charles Town to provide an additional military presence at the hanging of militant abolitionist John Brown on December 2, following his raid on the federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry on October 16. Major Jackson was placed in command of the artillery, consisting of two howitzers manned by 21 cadets.
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Civil War
In 1861, as the American Civil War broke out, Jackson became a drill master for some of the many new recruits in the Confederate Army. On April 27, 1861, Virginia Governor John Letcher ordered Colonel Jackson to take command at Harpers Ferry, where he would assemble and command the famous "Stonewall Brigade", consisting of the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 27th, and 33rd Virginia Infantry regiments. All of these units were from the Shenandoah Valley region of Virginia, where Jackson located his headquarters throughout the first two years of the war. Jackson became known for his relentless drilling of his troops; he believed discipline was vital to success on the battlefield. Following raids on the B&O Railroad on May 24, he was promoted to brigadier general on June 17.[24]
The Colonel Lewis T. Moore house, which served as the Winchester Headquarters of Lt. Gen. T. J. "Stonewall" Jackson (photo 2007).
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Valley Campaign
In the spring of 1862, Union Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's Army of the Potomac approached Richmond from the southeast in the Peninsula Campaign, Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell's large corps were poised to hit Richmond from the north, and Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks's army threatened the Shenandoah Valley. Jackson was ordered by Richmond to operate in the Valley to defeat Banks' threat and prevent McDowell's troops from reinforcing McClellan. Jackson possessed the attributes to succeed against his poorly coordinated and sometimes timid opponents: a combination of great audacity, excellent knowledge and shrewd use of the terrain, and the ability to inspire his troops to great feats of marching and fighting. The campaign started with a tactical defeat at Kernstown on March 23, 1862, when faulty intelligence led him to believe he was attacking a small detachment. But it became a strategic victory for the Confederacy, because his aggressiveness suggested that he possessed a Lt. Gen. Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson much larger force, convincing President Abraham Lincoln to keep photographed at Winchester, Virginia 1862. Banks' troops in the Valley and McDowell's 30,000-man corps near Fredericksburg, subtracting about 50,000 soldiers from McClellan's invasion force. As it transpired, it was Jackson's only defeat in the Valley. By adding Maj. Gen. Richard S. Ewell's large division and Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson's small division, Jackson increased his army to 17,000 men. He was still significantly outnumbered, but attacked portions of his divided enemy individually at McDowell, defeating both Brig. Gens. Robert H. Milroy and Robert C. Schenck. He defeated Banks at Front Royal and Winchester, ejecting him from the Valley. Lincoln decided that the defeat of Jackson was an immediate priority (though Jackson's orders were solely to keep Union forces occupied away from Richmond). He ordered Irvin McDowell to send 20,000 men to Front Royal and Maj. Gen. John C. Frmont to move to Harrisonburg. If both forces could converge at Strasburg, Jackson's only escape route up the Valley would be cut.
After a series of maneuvers, Jackson defeated Frmont's command at Cross Keys and Brig. Gen. James Shields at Port Republic on June 89. Union forces were withdrawn from the Valley. It was a classic military campaign of surprise and maneuver. Jackson pressed his army to travel 646 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) in 48 days of marching and won five significant victories with a force of about 17,000 against a combined force of 60,000. Stonewall Jackson's reputation for moving his troops so rapidly earned them the oxymoronic nickname "foot cavalry". He became the most celebrated soldier in the Confederacy (until he was eventually eclipsed by Lee) and lifted the morale of the Southern public.
Historical marker marking the end of Gen. Stonewall Jacksons pursuit of the Federals after the Battle of McDowell, May 12, 1862
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Peninsula
McClellan's Peninsula Campaign toward Richmond stalled at the Battle of Seven Pines on May 31 and June 1. After the Valley Campaign ended in mid-June, Jackson and his troops were called to join Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia in defense of the capital. By utilizing a railroad tunnel under the Blue Ridge Mountains and then transporting troops to Hanover County on the Virginia Central Railroad, Jackson and his forces made a surprise appearance in front of McClellan at Mechanicsville. Reports had last placed Jackson's forces in the Shenandoah Valley; their presence near Richmond added greatly to the Union commander's overestimation of the strength and numbers of the forces before him. This proved a crucial factor in McClellan's decision to re-establish his base at a point many miles downstream from Richmond on the James River at Harrison's Landing, essentially a retreat that ended the Peninsula Campaign and prolonged the war almost three more years. Jackson's troops served well under Lee in the series of battles known as the Seven Days Battles, but Jackson's own performance in those battles is generally considered to be poor.[29] He arrived late at Mechanicsville and inexplicably ordered his men to bivouac for the night within clear earshot of the battle. He was late and disoriented at Gaines' Mill. He was late again at Savage's Station and at White Oak Swamp he failed to employ fording places to cross White Oak Swamp Creek, attempting for hours to rebuild a bridge, which limited his involvement to an ineffectual artillery duel and a missed opportunity. At Malvern Hill Jackson participated in the futile, piecemeal frontal assaults against entrenched Union infantry and massed artillery, and suffered heavy casualties (but this was a problem for all of Lee's army in that ill-considered battle). The reasons for Jackson's sluggish and poorly-coordinated actions during the Seven Days are disputed, although a severe lack of sleep after the grueling march and railroad trip from the Shenandoah Valley was probably a significant factor. Both Jackson and his troops were completely exhausted. It has also been said by Longstreet that, "General Jackson never showed his genius when under the immediate command of General Lee."
Stonewall Jackson When Lee decided to invade the North in the Maryland Campaign, Jackson took Harpers Ferry, then hastened to join the rest of the army at Sharpsburg, Maryland, where they fought McClellan in the Battle of Antietam. Antietam was primarily a defensive battle against superior odds, although McClellan failed to exploit his advantage. Jackson's men bore the brunt of the initial attacks on the northern end of the battlefield and, at the end of the day, successfully resisted a breakthrough on the southern end when Jackson's subordinate, Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill, arrived at the last minute from Harpers Ferry. The Confederate forces held their position, but the battle was extremely bloody for both sides, and Lee withdrew the Army of Northern Virginia back across the Potomac River, ending the invasion. Jackson was promoted to lieutenant general. On October 10 his command was redesignated the Second Corps. Before the armies camped for winter, Jackson's Second Corps held off a strong Union assault against the right flank of the Confederate line at the Battle of Fredericksburg, in what became a decisive Confederate victory. Just before the battle, Jackson was delighted to receive a letter about the birth of his daughter, Julia Laura Jackson, on November 23.[31] Also before the battle, Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart, Lee's dashing and well-dressed cavalry commander, presented to Jackson a fine general's frock that he had ordered from one of the best tailors in Richmond. Jackson's previous coat was threadbare and colorless from exposure to the elements, its buttons removed by admiring ladies. Jackson asked his staff to thank Stuart, saying that although the coat was too handsome for him, he would cherish it as a souvenir. His staff insisted that he wear it to dinner, which caused scores of soldiers to rush to see him in uncharacteristic garb. So embarrassed was Jackson with the attention that he did not wear the new uniform for months.[32]
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Chancellorsville
At the Battle of Chancellorsville, the Army of Northern Virginia was faced with a serious threat by the Army of the Potomac and its new commanding general, Major General Joseph Hooker. General Lee decided to employ a risky tactic to take the initiative and offensive away from Hooker's new southern thrusthe decided to divide his forces. Jackson and his entire corps were sent on an aggressive flanking maneuver to the right of the Union lines. This flanking movement would be one of the most successful and dramatic of the war. While riding with his infantry in a wide berth well south and west of the Federal line of battle, Jackson employed Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry to provide for better reconnaissance in regards to the exact location of the Union right and rear. The results were far better than even Jackson could have hoped. Lee found the entire right side of the Federal lines in the middle of open field, guarded merely by two guns that faced westward, as well as the supplies and rear encampments. The men were eating and playing games in carefree fashion, completely unaware that an entire Confederate corps was less than a mile away. What happened next is given in Lee's own words: So impressed was I with my discovery, that I rode rapidly back to the point on the Plank road where I had left my cavalry, and back down the road Jackson was moving, until I met "Stonewall" himself. "General," said I, "if you will ride with me, halting your column here, out of sight, I will show you the enemy's right, and you will perceive the great advantage of attacking down the Old turnpike instead of the Plank road, the enemy's lines being taken in reverse. Bring only one courier, as you will be in view from the top of the hill." Jackson assented, and I rapidly conducted him to the point of observation. There had been no change in the picture. I only knew Jackson slightly. I watched him closely as he gazed upon Howard's troops. It was then about 2 P.M. His eyes burned with a brilliant glow, lighting up a sad face. His expression was one of intense interest, his face was colored slightly with the paint of approaching battle, and radiant at the success of his flank movement. To the remarks made to him while the unconscious line of blue was pointed out, he did not reply once during the five minutes he was on the hill, and yet his lips were moving. From what I have read and heard of Jackson since that day, I know now what he was doing then. Oh! "beware of rashness," General Hooker. Stonewall Jackson is praying in full view and in rear of your right flank! While talking to the Great God of Battles, how could he hear what a poor cavalryman was saying. "Tell General Rodes," said he, suddenly whirling his horse towards the courier, "to move across the Old plank road; halt when he gets to the
Stonewall Jackson Old turnpike, and I will join him there." One more look upon the Federal lines, and then he rode rapidly down the hill, his arms flapping to the motion of his horse, over whose head it seemed, good rider as he was, he would certainly go. I expected to be told I had made a valuable personal reconnaissancesaving the lives of many soldiers, and that Jackson was indebted to me to that amount at least. Perhaps I might have been a little chagrined at Jackson's silence, and hence commented inwardly and adversely upon his horsemanship. Alas! I had looked upon him for the last time. Fitzhugh Lee, address to the Association of the Army of Northern Virginia, 1879 Jackson immediately returned to his corps and arranged his divisions into a line of battle to charge directly into the oblivious Federal right. The Confederates marched silently until they were merely several hundred feet from the Union position, then released a bloodthirsty cry and full charge. Many of the Federals were captured without a shot fired, the rest were driven into a full rout. Jackson pursued relentlessly back toward the center of the Federal line until dusk. Darkness ended the assault. As Jackson and his staff were returning to camp on May 2, they were mistaken for a Union cavalry force by the 18th North Carolina Infantry regiment who shouted, "Halt, who goes there?", but fired before evaluating the reply. Frantic shouts by Jackson's staff identifying the party were replied to by Major John D. Barry with the retort, "It's a damned Yankee trick! Fire!" [33] A second volley was fired in response; in all, Jackson was hit by three bullets, two in the left arm and one in the right hand. Several other men in his staff were killed, in addition to many horses. Darkness and confusion The plantation office building where Stonewall prevented Jackson from getting immediate care. He was dropped from Jackson died in Guinea Station, Virginia. his stretcher while being evacuated because of incoming artillery rounds. Because of his injuries, Jackson's left arm had to be amputated by Dr. Hunter McGuire.[34] Jackson was moved to Thomas C. Chandler's 740 acres (unknown operator: u'strong'km2) plantation named Fairfield. He was offered Chandler's home for recovery, but Jackson refused and suggested using Chandler's plantation office building instead. He was thought to be out of harm's way; but unknown to the doctors, he already had classic symptoms of pneumonia, complaining of a sore chest. This soreness was mistakenly thought to be the result of his rough handling in the battlefield evacuation.
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Death
Lee wrote to Jackson after learning of his injuries, stating "Could I have directed events, I would have chosen for the good of the country to be disabled in your stead."[35] Jackson died of complications from pneumonia on May 10, 1863. On his death bed, though he became weaker, he remained spiritually strong, saying towards the end "It is the Lord's Day; my wish is fulfilled. I have always desired to die on Sunday." Dr. McGuire wrote an account of his final hours and his last words: A few moments before he died he cried out in his delirium, "Order A.P. Hill to prepare for action! Pass the infantry to Jackson equestrian monument in downtown Charlottesville, Virginia the front rapidly! Tell Major Hawks"then stopped, leaving the sentence unfinished. Presently a smile of ineffable sweetness spread itself over his pale face, and he said quietly, and with an expression, as if of relief, "Let us cross over the river, and rest under the shade of the trees."[36]
Stonewall Jackson His body was moved to the Governor's Mansion in Richmond for the public to mourn, and he was then moved to be buried in the Stonewall Jackson Memorial Cemetery, Lexington, Virginia. However, the arm that was amputated on May 2 was buried separately by Jackson's chaplain, at the J. Horace Lacy house, "Ellwood", in the Wilderness of Orange County, near the field hospital.[37] Upon hearing of Jackson's death, Robert E. Lee mourned the loss of both a friend and a trusted commander. As Jackson lay dying, Lee sent a message through Chaplain Lacy, saying "Give General Jackson my affectionate regards, and say to him: he has lost his left arm but I my right."[38] The night Lee learned of Jackson's death, he told his cook, "William, I have lost my right arm" and "I'm bleeding at the heart."[39] Harpers Weekly reported Jackson's death on May 23, 1863, as follows: DEATH OF STONEWALL JACKSON. General "Stonewall" Jackson was badly wounded in the arm at the battles of Chancellorsville, and had his arm amputated. The operation did not succeed, and pneumonia setting in, he died on the 10th inst., near Richmond, Virginia.[40]
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Legacy
Jackson's sometimes unusual command style and personality traits, combined with his frequent success in battle, contribute to his legacy as one of the most remarkable characters of the Civil War.[41] Although martial, stern in attitude, he was profoundly religious and a deacon in the Presbyterian Church. One of his many nicknames was "Old Blue Lights,"[42] a term applied to a military man whose evangelical zeal burned with the intensity of the blue light used for night-time display.[43] He disliked fighting on Sunday, although that did not stop him from doing so after much personal debate. He loved his wife very much and sent her tender letters. In direct contrast to Lee, Jackson was not a striking figure, often wearing old, worn-out clothes rather than a fancy uniform.
Physical ailments
Jackson held a lifelong belief that one of his arms was longer than the "Stonewall" Jackson statue, Manassas National other, and thus usually held the "longer" arm up to equalize his Battlefield Park circulation. He was described as a "champion sleeper", even falling asleep with food in his mouth occasionally. A paper delivered to the Society of Clinical Psychologists hypothesized that Jackson had Asperger syndrome,[44] although other possible explanations exist.[45] Indeed Jackson suffered a number of ailments, for which he sought relief via contemporary practices of his day including hydrotherapy, popular in America at that time, visiting establishments at Oswego, New York (1850) and Round Hill, Massachusetts (1860) although with little evidence of success.[46][47] Jackson also suffered a significant hearing loss in both of his ears as a result of his prior service in the U.S. Army as an artillery officer. A recurring story concerns Jackson's love of lemons, which he allegedly gnawed whole to alleviate symptoms of dyspepsia. General Richard Taylor, son of President Zachary Taylor, wrote a passage in his war memoirs about Jackson eating lemons: "Where Jackson got his lemons 'no fellow could find out,' but he was rarely without one."[48] However, recent research by his biographer, James I. Robertson, Jr., has found that none of his contemporaries, including members of his staff, friends, or his wife, recorded any unusual obsessions with lemons and Jackson thought of a lemon as a "rare treat ... enjoyed greatly whenever it could be obtained from the enemy's camp". Jackson was fond of all fruits, particularly peaches, "but he enjoyed with relish lemons, oranges, watermelons, apples, grapes,
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Command style
In command, Jackson was extremely secretive about his plans and extremely meticulous about military discipline. This secretive nature did not stand him in good stead with his subordinates, who were often not aware of his overall operational intentions until the last minute, and who complained of being left out of key decisions.[50] Robert E. Lee could trust Jackson with deliberately non-detailed orders that conveyed Lee's overall objectives, what modern doctrine calls the "end state". This was because Jackson had a talent for understanding Lee's sometimes unstated goals and Lee trusted Jackson with the ability to take whatever actions were necessary to implement his end state requirements. Few of Lee's subsequent corps commanders had this ability. At Gettysburg, this resulted in lost opportunities. Thus, after the Federals retreated to the heights south of town, Lee sent one of his new corps commanders, Richard S. Ewell, discretionary orders A portrait of Stonewall Jackson (1864, J. W. King) in the National Portrait Gallery that the heights (Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill) be taken "if practicable". Without Jackson's intuitive grasp of Lee's orders or the instinct to take advantage of sudden tactical opportunities, Ewell chose not to attempt the assault, and this failure is considered by historians to be the greatest missed opportunity of the battle.[51]
Horsemanship
Jackson had a poor reputation as a horseman. One of his soldiers, Georgia volunteer William Andrews, wrote that Jackson was "a very ordinary looking man of medium size, his uniform badly soiled as though it had seen hard service. He wore a cap pulled down nearly to his nose and was riding a rawboned horse that did not look much like a charger, unless it would be on hay or clover. He certainly made a poor figure on a horseback, with his stirrup leather six inches too short, putting his knees nearly level with his horse's back, and his heels turned out with his toes sticking behind his horse's foreshoulder. A sorry description of our most famous general, but a correct one."[52] His horse was named "Little Sorrel" (also known as "Old Sorrel"), a small chestnut gelding.[53] He rode Little Sorrel throughout the war, and was riding him when he was shot at Chancellorsville. Little Sorrel died at age 36 and is buried near a statue of Jackson on the parade grounds of VMI. (His mounted hide is on display in the VMI Museum.)[54]
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Remembering Jackson
After the war, Jackson's wife and young daughter Julia moved from Lexington to North Carolina. Mary Anna Jackson wrote[56] two books about her husband's life, including some of his letters. She never remarried, and was known as the "Widow of the Confederacy", living until 1915. His daughter Julia married, and bore children, but she died of typhoid fever at the age of 26 years. A former Confederate soldier who admired Jackson, Captain Thomas R. Ranson of Staunton, Virginia, also remembered the tragic life of Jackson's mother. Years after the War, he went to the tiny mountain hamlet of Ansted in Fayette County, West Virginia, and had a marble marker placed over the unmarked grave of Julia Neale Jackson in Westlake Cemetery, to make sure that the site was not lost forever.
General Lee's last visit to Stonewall Jackson's grave, painting by Louis Eckhardt, 1872.
Commemorations
West Virginia's Stonewall Jackson State Park is named in his honor. Nearby, at Stonewall Jackson's historical childhood home, his uncle's grist mill is the centerpiece of a historical site at the Jackson's Mill Center for Lifelong Learning and State 4-H Camp. The facility, located near Weston, serves as a special campus for West Virginia University and the WVU Extension Service. He is memorialized on historic Monument Avenue in Richmond, Virginia; on the grounds of the state capitol in his native West Virginia; and in many other places. At VMI, a bronze statue of Jackson stands outside the main entrance to the cadet barracks; first-year cadets exiting the barracks through that archway are required to honor Jackson's memory by saluting the statue.[57] The lineage of Jackson's Confederate Army unit, the Stonewall Brigade, continues to the present day in form of the 116th Infantry Brigade of the U.S. Army, currently part of the Virginia National Guard. The unit's shoulder sleeve insignia worn until 2008 depicted Stonewall Jackson mounted on horseback. The United States Navy submarine U.S.S. Stonewall Jackson (SSBN 634), commissioned in 1964, was named for him. The words "StrengthMobility" are emblazoned on the ship's banner, words taken from letters written by General Jackson. It was the third U.S. Navy ship named for him. The submarine was decommissioned in 1995. During World War II, the Navy named a Liberty ship the SS T.J.
The Stonewall Brigade, Dedicated to the Memory of Stonewall Jackson, the Immortal Southern Hero, and his Brave Veterans, Sheet music, 1863
Jackson in his honor. The U.S. M36 tank destroyer was nicknamed Jackson after him by British forces in World War II. The Commonwealth of Virginia honors Jackson's birthday on Lee-Jackson Day, a state holiday observed as such since 1904. It is currently observed on the Friday preceding the third Monday in January.
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Jackson also appears prominently in the enormous bas-relief carving on the face of Stone Mountain riding with Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee. The carving depicts the three on horseback, appearing to ride in a group from right to left across the mountainside. The lower parts of the horses' bodies merge into the mountainside at the foot of the carving. The three riders are shown bare-headed and holding their hats to their chests. It is the largest such carving in the world. "Stonewall" Jackson appeared on the CSA $500 bill (7th Issue, February 17, 1864).
Davis, Lee, and Jackson on Stone Mountain.
The towns of Stonewall in Virginia, North Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas and Kentucky are named in his honor as is Stonewall County in Texas. During a training exercise in western Virginia by U.S. Marines in 1921, the Marine commander, General Smedley Butler was told by a local farmer that Stonewall Jackson's arm was buried nearby under a granite marker, to which Butler replied, "Bosh! I will take a squad of Marines and dig up that spot to prove you wrong!"[58] Butler found the arm in a box under the marker. He later replaced the wooden box with a metal one, and reburied the arm. He left a plaque on the granite monument marking the burial place of Jackson's arm; the plaque is no longer on the marker but can be viewed at the Chancellorsville Battlefield visitor's center .[58][59]
In popular media
Jackson is featured prominently in the novel and film Gods and Generals. In the film, he is portrayed by Stephen Lang. The Theater at Lime Kiln, a local outdoor theater company in Lexington, Virginia, has performed a country-style musical about the life and times of Stonewall Jackson entitled Stonewall Country since 1984.[60] In the 2012 film Abraham Lincoln vs. Zombies, Jackson is portrayed by Don McGraw as one of the heroes of the story, giving his life to save Lincoln and the rest of the surviving team.
Quotations
Always mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy, if possible; and when you strike and overcome him, never let up in the pursuit so long as your men have strength to follow; for an army routed, if hotly pursued, becomes panic-stricken, and can then be destroyed by half their number. The other rule is, never fight against heavy odds, if by any possible maneuvering you can hurl your own force on only a part, and that the weakest part, of your enemy and crush it. Such tactics will win every time, and a small army may thus destroy a large one in detail, and repeated victory will make it invincible.[61] Jackson to General Imboden To move swiftly, strike vigorously, and secure all the fruits of victory, is the secret of successful war.[62] Jackson, 1863 The only true rule for cavalry is to follow the enemy as long as he retreats.[63] Jackson to Colonel Munford on June 13, 1862 War means fighting. The business of the soldier is to fight. Armies are not called out to dig trenches, to live in camps, but to find the enemy and strike him; to invade his country, and do him all possible damage in the shortest possible time. This will involve great destruction of life and property while it lasts; but such a war will of necessity be of brief continuance, and so would be an economy of life and property in the end.[62] Let us cross over the river, and rest under the shade of the trees.
Stonewall Jackson Jackson, last words The time for war has not yet come, but it will come, and that soon; and when it does come, my advice is to draw the sword and throw away the scabbard. My religious belief teaches me to feel as safe in battle as in bed. God has fixed the time for my death. I do not concern myself about that, but to be always ready, no matter when it may overtake me. ... That is the way all men should live, and then all would be equally brave.[64]
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Notes
[1] Farwell, p. xi, states that the overwhelmingly common usage of the middle name Jonathan was never documented and that Jackson did not acknowledge it, instead using the signature form "T. J. Jackson." Robertson, p. 19, states that a county document on February 28, 1841, was the first recorded instance of Jackson using a middle initial, although "whether it stood for his father Jonathan's name is not known." All of the other references to this article cite his full name as Thomas Jonathan Jackson. [2] Eicher, High Commands, p. 316; Robertson, p. 7. The physician, Dr. James McCally, recalls delivering baby Thomas just before midnight on January 20, but the family has insisted since then that he was born in the first minutes of January 21. The later date is the one generally acknowledged in biographies. [3] Jackson biography at Civil War Home (http:/ / www. civilwarhome. com/ jackbio. htm). [4] Wallace Hettle, Inventing Stonewall Jackson: A Civil War Hero in History and Memory (Louisiana State University Press, 2011) [5] Robertson, pp. 1-2. [6] Robertson, pp. 2-3. [7] VMI Jackson genealogy site (http:/ / www. vmi. edu/ archives2. aspx?id=5005); Robertson, p. 4. [8] Robertson, p. 7. [9] Robertson, p. 8. [10] Robertson, p. 10. [11] Robertson, pp. 9-16. Robertson refers to multiple bachelor uncles in residence at the mill, but does not name them. [12] Robertson, p. 17. [13] Robertson, p. 40. [14] Robertson, p. 69. [15] Robertson, pp. 108-10. He left the Army on March 21, 1851, but stayed on the rolls, officially on furlough, for nine months. His resignation took effect formally on February 2, 1852, and he joined the VMI faculty in August 1851. [16] Virginia Military Institute Archives: Stonewall Jackson FAQ (http:/ / www. vmi. edu/ archives/ Jackson/ tjjfaq. html) [17] Jackson, Mary Anna, Memoirs of Stonewall Jackson, by His Widow (Louisville, Ky, 1895), 78. [18] Robertson, p. 169. [19] Robertson, pp. 191-92. [20] Jackson, 152. [21] Robertson, p. 191. [22] Isbell, Sherman. "Archibald Alexander Travelogue" (http:/ / web. archive. org/ web/ 20050914211643/ http:/ / members. aol. com/ RSISBELL/ va. html). Archived from the original (http:/ / members. aol. com/ RSISBELL/ va. html) on September 14, 2005. . Retrieved 2008-12-17. "After 1844, the presidents resided in the neighboring brick house, known as the Lee-Jackson House. While Presbyterian minister George Junkin was president, the appendage on the right side of the Lee-Jackson house was from 1853 the residence of Junkin's daughter and her husband, Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson. After Jackson's wife died the next year, Jackson remained in the house for another three years. Robert E. Lee, president of the college from 1865 to 1870, resided in the brick house until 1869..." [23] Robertson, p. 157. [24] Eicher, High Commands, p. 316. [25] Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, vol. 1, p. 82; Robertson, p. 264. McPherson, p. 342, reports the quotation after "stone wall" as being "Rally around the Virginians!" [26] See, for instance, Goldfield, David, et al., The American Journey: A History of the United States, Prentice Hall, 1999, ISBN 0-13-088243-7. There are additional controversies about what Bee said and whether he said anything at all. See Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, vol. 1, pp. 73334. [27] McPherson, p. 342. [28] Robertson, pp. 263, 268. [29] See, for instance, Freeman, R.E. Lee, vol. 2, p. 247: "... by every test, Jackson had failed throughout the Seven Days. This is in part to being unfamiliar with the area and to following orders which stated he was to wait until he had communicated with the others before starting a battle." Confederate politician Robert Toombs wrote that "Stonewall Jackson and his troops did little or nothing in these battles of the Chickahominy" (Robertson, p. 504). [30] Wert, p. 206. [31] Robertson, p. 645.
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[32] Robertson, p. 630. [33] Foote, Shelby, The Civil War: A Narrative, Vol. 2 [34] Apperson, p. 430. [35] Robertson, p. 739 [36] McGuire, pp. 162-63. [37] Sorensen, James. " Stonewall Jackson's Arm (http:/ / americanheritage. com/ content/ stonewall-jacksons-arm)" American Heritage, April/May 2005. [38] Robertson, p. 746. [39] Hall, Kenneth. Stonewall Jackson and religious faith in military command (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=sKWZWyVuVdsC& lpg=PP1& dq=Stonewall Jackson and religious faith in military command& pg=PA184#v=onepage& q& f=false). McFarland, 2005. [40] Harpers Weekly, May 23, 1863 (http:/ / www. sonofthesouth. net/ leefoundation/ civil-war/ 1863/ may/ lee-order-59. htm) [41] "Stonewall Jackson: Popular Questions" (http:/ / www. vmi. edu/ archives. aspx?id=3761& ekmensel=fb5d653b_207_281_3761_1). Virginia Military Institute. . Retrieved 2009-05-06. [42] "Stonewall Jackson's Way" (http:/ / www. encyclopediavirginia. org/ media_player?mets_filename=evm00001984mets. xml). . Retrieved December 24, 2011. [43] Gareth Atkins, review of Evangelicals in the Royal Navy, 1775-1815: Blue Lights and Psalm-Singers by Richard Blake (review no. 799) accessed Dec. 24, 2011 at www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/799 [44] Fitzgerald, Michael, Society of Clinical Psychologists paper (http:/ / www. scpnet. com/ paper2_2. htm). [45] Schildkrout, Enid (1997). Medical Diagnosis in Psychotherapy Patients: Identifying Medical Conditions Manifesting as Psychiatric Disorders. Canada: John Wiley. ISBN0-471-16872-6. [46] Cartmell, Donald (2001). "The Legend of Stonewall" (http:/ / books. google. com. au/ books?id=7mCIW1bR438C& dq="The+ civil+ war+ book+ of+ lists"& printsec=frontcover#v=onepage& q=& f=false). The Civil War Book of Lists. Franklin Lakes, New Jersey: The Career Press Inc. pp.187192. ISBN1-56414-504-2. . [47] Samaritan Medical Center (September 2008). "Stonewall Jackson and the Henderson Hydropath" (http:/ / library. samaritanhealth. com/ library/ Newsletter/ SMCNewsletter42. pdf). in Samaritan Medical Center Newsletter. No.42. . Retrieved 13 December 2009. [48] Taylor, p. 50 [49] Robertson, p. xi. [50] Robertson, p. xiv. [51] Pfanz, p. 344; Eicher, Longest Night, p. 517; Sears, p. 228; Trudeau, p. 253. Both Sears and Trudeau record "if possible". [52] Robertson, p. 499. [53] Robertson, p. 230. [54] "Little Sorrel Buried at VMI July 20, 1997" (http:/ / users. erols. com/ va-udc/ sorrell. html); Robertson, p. 922, n. 16. [55] See, for instance, Sears, Gettysburg, pp. 233-34. Alternative theories about Gettysburg are prominent ideas in the literature about the Lost Cause. [56] Jackson, Mary Anna (1895). Memoirs of Stonewall Jackson by His Widow (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=D_BSA0GZn8QC& printsec=frontcover& dq=anna+ jackson+ memoirs). Louisville, KY: The Prentice Press. . [57] VMI article about Jackson (http:/ / www. vmi. edu/ Dynamic. aspx?id=13243) [58] Farwell, 1993, p. 513 [59] Horwitz, 1999, p. 232 [60] BroadwayWorld.com article (http:/ / broadwayworld. com/ article/ STONEWALL_COUNTRY_Returns_To_Theater_at_Lime_Kiln_For_25th_Anniversary_7912_20090703) [61] Underwood and Buel, Vol.2, p. 297. [62] Henderson, Vol. 2, chapter XXV, p. 481. [63] Henderson, Vol. 1, chapter XI, S. 392. [64] "Stonewall Jackson at the Battle of Bull's Run" (http:/ / query. nytimes. com/ mem/ archive-free/ pdf?res=FB0D1FFC3A5812718DDDAA0894DD405B8584F0D3), New York Times, May 3, 1885, citing the recollections of John D. Imboden.
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References
Alexander, Bevin. Lost Victories: The Military Genius of Stonewall Jackson. New York: Holt, 1992, ISBN 978-0-8050-1830-1. Apperson, John Samuel. Repairing the "March of Mars": The Civil War diaries of John Samuel Apperson, hospital steward in the Stonewall Brigade, 1861-1865. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-86554-779-3. Bryson, Bill. A Walk in the Woods. New York: Broadway Books, 1998. ISBN 0-7679-0251-3. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Eicher, John H., and David J. Eicher. Civil War High Commands. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-8047-3641-3. Farwell, Byron. Stonewall: A Biography of General Thomas J. Jackson. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1993. ISBN 978-0-393-31086-3. Freeman, Douglas S. Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command. 3 vols. New York: Scribner, 1946. ISBN 0-684-85979-3. Freeman, Douglas S. R. E. Lee, A Biography (http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/People/ Robert_E_Lee/FREREL/home.html). 4 vols. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 193435. OCLC166632575. Henderson, G. F. R. Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War (http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/12233). New York: Smithmark, 1995. ISBN 0-8317-3288-1. First published in 1898 by Longman, Greens, and Co. (The 1900 version has an introduction by Field Marshal Viscount Wolseley.) Hettle, Wallace. Inventing Stonewall Jackson: A Civil War Hero in History and Memory (Louisiana State University Press, 2011) Johnson, Robert Underwood, and Clarence C. Buel, eds. Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (http://ehistory. osu.edu/osu/books/battles/index.cfm). 4 vols. New York: Century Co., 1884-1888. OCLC2048818. McGuire, Dr. Hunter. "Death of Stonewall Jackson" (http://americancivilwar.com/south/ stonewall_jackson_death.html). Southern Historical Society Papers 14 (1886). McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. Oxford History of the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. ISBN 0-19-503863-0. Pfanz, Harry W. Gettysburg The First Day. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. ISBN 0-8078-2624-3. Robertson, James I., Jr. Stonewall Jackson: The Man, The Soldier, The Legend. New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1997. ISBN 0-02-864685-1. Sears, Stephen W. Gettysburg. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003. ISBN 0-395-86761-4. Sharlet, Jeff. "Through a Glass, Darkly: How the Christian Right is Reimagining U.S. History." Harpers, December 2006. Taylor, Richard. Destruction and Reconstruction: Personal Experiences of the Late War (http://docsouth.unc. edu/fpn/taylor/menu.html). Nashville, TN: J.S. Sanders & Co., 2001. ISBN 1-879941-21-X. First published 1879 by D. Appleton. Trudeau, Noah Andre. Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage. New York: HarperCollins, 2002. ISBN 0-06-019363-8. Wert, Jeffry D. General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Soldier: A Biography. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993. ISBN 0-671-70921-6. Jackson genealogy site (http://www.vmi.edu/archives2.aspx?id=5005) at Virginia Military Institute
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Further reading
Chambers, Lenoir. Stonewall Jackson. New York: Morrow, 1959. OCLC186539122. Cooke, John Esten, Moses Drury Hoge, and John William Jones. http://books.google.com/ books?id=DKHFaHBX2isC Stonewall Jackson: A Military Biography]. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1876. OCLC299589. Cozzens, Peter. Shenandoah 1862: Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-8078-3200-4. Dabney, R. L. Life of Lieut.-Gen. Thomas J. Jackson (Stonewall Jackson) (http://books.google.com/ books?id=-G0FAAAAQAAJ). London: James Nisbet and Co., 1866. OCLC457442354. Douglas, Henry Kyd. I Rode with Stonewall: The War Experiences of the Youngest Member of Jackson's Staff. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1940. ISBN 0-8078-0337-5. Robertson, James I., Jr. Stonewall Jackson's Book of Maxims. Nashville, TN: Cumberland House, 2002. ISBN 1-58182-296-0. Shackel, Paul A. Archaeology and Created Memory: Public History in a National Park. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2000. ISBN 978-0-306-46177-4. White, Henry A. Stonewall Jackson (http://books.google.com/books?id=ErA-AAAAYAAJ). Philadelphia: G.W. Jacobs and Co., 1909. OCLC3911913. Wilkins, J. Steven. All Things for Good: The Steadfast Fidelity of Stonewall Jackson. Nashville, TN: Cumberland House Publishing, 2004. ISBN 1-58182-225-1.
External links
Virginia Military Institute Archives Stonewall Jackson Resources (http://www.vmi.edu/archives. aspx?id=3747) Jackson genealogy site (http://thomaslegion.net/generalstonewalljacksongenealogy.html) Stonewall Jackson Pictures (http://www.sonofthesouth.net/leefoundation/Stonewall_Jackson_Pictures.htm) "Death of 'Stonewall' Jackson (http://atlnewspapers.galileo.usg.edu/atlnewspapers/view?docId=news/ asc1863/asc1863-0305.xml&query=stonewall jackson dead&brand=atlnewspapers-brand), Southern Confederacy, May 12, 1863. Atlanta Historic Newspapers Archive (http://dlg.galileo.usg.edu/atlnewspapers/ ). Digital Library of Georgia. Find-a-Grave entry for Jackson (http://www.findagrave.com/cgi-bin/fg.cgi?page=gr&GRid=536) Find-a-Grave entry for Jackson's arm (http://www.findagrave.com/cgi-bin/fg.cgi?page=gr&GRid=2739) Fitzhugh Lee's 1879 address on Chancellorsville (http://www.civilwarhome.com/fleechancellorsville.htm) The Stonewall Jackson House (http://www.stonewalljackson.org/) Animated history of the campaigns of Stonewall Jackson (http://www.civilwaranimated.com/index.php/ stonewall-jackson) Details on John Jackson's larceny trial in the Court Records of the Old Bailey (http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/ browse.jsp?id=t17490113-2-defend40&div=t17490113-2#highlight)
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Jefferson Davis
Jefferson Davis
Jefferson Davis, c. 1862 President of the Confederate States of America In office February 18, 1861 May 11, 1865 Provisional: February 11, 1861February 22, 1862 Vice President Preceded by Succeeded by Alexander Stephens Office instituted Office abolished
23rd United States Secretary of War In office March 7, 1853 March 3, 1857 President Preceded by Succeeded by Franklin Pierce Charles Magill Conrad John B. Floyd United States Senator from Mississippi In office August 10, 1847 September 23, 1851 Preceded by Succeeded by Jesse Speight John J. McRae
In office [1] March 4, 1857 January 21, 1861 Preceded by Succeeded by Stephen Adams Adelbert Ames (1870)
Member of the U.S. House of Representatives from Mississippi's At-large district In office December 8, 1845 June 1, 1846 Preceded by Tilghman M. Tucker
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Succeeded by Henry T. Ellett Personal details Born Jefferson Finis Davis June 3, 1808 Christian County, Kentucky December 6, 1889 (aged81) New Orleans, Louisiana Confederate American Democratic Sarah Knox Taylor Varina Howell Jefferson College Transylvania University U.S.M.A. Soldier, Politician Episcopal
Died
Alma mater
Military service Allegiance Confederate States of America United States of America United States Army Mississippi Rifles
Service/branch
Jefferson Finis Davis (June 3, 1808 December 6, 1889) was an American statesman and leader of the Confederacy during the American Civil War, serving as President of the Confederate States of America for its entire history. Davis was born in Kentucky to Samuel and Jane (Cook) Davis. After attending Transylvania University, Davis graduated from West Point and fought in the MexicanAmerican War as a colonel of a volunteer regiment. He served as the United States Secretary of War under Democratic President Franklin Pierce. Both before and after his time in the Pierce administration, he served as a Democratic U.S. Senator representing the State of Mississippi. As a senator, he argued against secession, but did agree that each state was sovereign and had an unquestionable right to secede from the Union.[2] On February 9, 1861, after Davis resigned from the United States Senate, he was selected to be the provisional President of the Confederate States of America; he was elected without opposition to a six-year term that November. During his presidency, Davis took charge of the Confederate war plans but was unable to find a strategy to stop the larger, more powerful and better organized Union. His diplomatic efforts failed to gain recognition from any foreign country, and he paid little attention to the collapsing Confederate economy, printing more and more paper money to cover the war's expenses. Historians have criticized Davis for being a much less effective war leader than his Union counterpart Abraham Lincoln, which they attribute to Davis being overbearing, controlling, and overly meddlesome, as well as being out of touch with public opinion, and lacking support from a political party (since the Confederacy had no political parties).[3] His preoccupation with detail, reluctance to delegate responsibility, lack of popular appeal, feuds with powerful state governors, inability to get along with people who disagreed with him, neglect of
Jefferson Davis civil matters in favor of military onesall these shortcomings worked against him.[4] After Davis was captured on May 10, 1865, he was charged with treason. Although he was not tried, he was stripped of his eligibility to run for public office; Congress posthumously lifted this restriction in 1978, 89 years after his death.[5] While not disgraced, he was displaced in Southern affection after the war by the leading Confederate general Robert E. Lee. However, many Southerners empathized with his defiance, refusal to accept defeat, and resistance to Reconstruction. Over time, admiration for his pride and ideals made him a Civil War hero to many Southerners, and his legacy became part of the foundation of the postwar New South.[6] In spite of his former status as the president of the Confederacy, Davis began to encourage reconciliation by the late 1880s, telling Southerners to be loyal to the Union.[7][8][9]
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Marriage
Davis served under Zachary Taylor starting in 1832. That same year, Taylor's family, including his daughter Sarah Knox Taylor, joined him at Fort Crawford. Davis and Sarah fell in love. Taylor did not want Sarah to be an army wife, having had first-hand experience with the difficulties of that life for families. Later, Taylor developed a dislike for Davis, but the couple continued to see each other and intended to marry. After Davis left Fort Crawford in 1833, he did not see Sarah for more than two years. He decided to leave the army and become a cotton planter with his brother Joseph; this may have been partly due to Zachary Taylor's concerns. Sarah and Jefferson were married on June 17, 1835, at the house of her aunt near Louisville, Kentucky. The newlyweds settled at Hurricane Plantation, owned by Jefferson's older brother Joseph Davis, at Davis Bend in Warren County, Mississippi. While visiting Davis' oldest sister near Saint Francisville, Louisiana, both newlyweds contracted malaria. At age 19, Sarah died three months after the wedding on September 15, 1835.[12][15]
Early career
Joseph Davis gave his brother 900 acres of land adjoining his property, where Davis eventually developed Brierfield Plantation. Davis began with one slave, James Pemberton. By early 1836, Davis had purchased 16 slaves. He held a total of 40 slaves by 1840 and 74 by 1845. Pemberton served as Davis' overseer, an unusual position for a slave in Mississippi.[16] For eight years following Sarah's death, Davis was reclusive; he worshipped her memory. He studied government and history, and had private political discussions with his brother Joseph. In 1840 he attended a Democratic meeting in Vicksburg and, to his surprise, was chosen as a delegate to the party's state convention in Jackson. In 1842 Davis attended the Democratic convention, and in 1843 became a candidate for the state House of Representatives, losing his first election. In 1844, Davis was sent to the party convention for a third time, and his interest in politics deepened. He was selected as one of six presidential electors for the 1844 presidential election and campaigned effectively throughout Mississippi for the Democratic candidate, James K. Polk[17][18]
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437 Jefferson and Varina Howell Davis had six children; three died before reaching adulthood. Margaret and Winnie survived Jefferson. Samuel Emory, born July 30, 1852, was named after his grandfather; he died June 30, 1854, of an undiagnosed disease.[19] Margaret Howell, born February 25, 1855.[20] She married Joel Addison Hayes, Jr. (18481919), and moved to Colorado Springs. They had five children; Margaret was the only child of Jefferson and Varina to marry and raise a family. She died on July 18, 1909 at the age of 54.[21] Jefferson Davis, Jr., born January 16, 1857. He died of yellow fever at age 21 on October 16, 1878, during an epidemic in the Mississippi River Valley that caused 20,000 deaths.[22]
Joseph Evan, born on April 18, 1859; died at five years old as the result of an accidental fall on April 30, 1864.[23]
William Howell, born on December 6, 1861, and named for Varina's father; died of diphtheria on October 16, 1872.[24] Varina Anne "Winnie" Davis, born on June 27, 1864, several months after Joseph's death. She died on September 18, 1898, at age 34. She was unmarried as her parents had refused to let her marry into a northern, abolitionist family.[25] Davis was plagued with poor health for most of his life. In addition to bouts with malaria, battle wounds from fighting in the Mexican-American War, and a chronic eye infection that made it impossible for him to endure bright light, he also suffered from trigeminal neuralgia, a nerve disorder that causes severe pain in the face. It has been called one of the most painful ailments known to mankind.[26][27]
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Return to politics
Senator
Because of his war service, Governor Brown of Mississippi appointed Davis to fill out the senate term of the late Jesse Speight. He took his seat on December 5, 1847, and was elected to serve the remainder of his term in January 1848.[32] The Smithsonian Institution appointed him a regent at the end of December 1847.[33] In 1848 Senator Davis introduced the first of several proposed amendments to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo; this one would annex most of northeastern Mexico and failed with a vote of 44 to 11.[34] Regarding Cuba, Davis declared that it "must be ours" to "increase the number of slaveholding constituencies."[35] He also was concerned about the security implications of a Spanish holding lying a few miles off the coast of Florida.[36] A group of Cuban revolutionaries led by Narciso Lpez intended to forcibly liberate Cuba from Spanish rule. In 1849, Lpez visited Davis and asked him to lead his filibuster expedition to Cuba. He offered an immediate payment of $100,000,[37] plus the same amount when Cuba was liberated. Davis turned down the offer, stating that it was inconsistent with his duty as a senator. When asked to recommend someone else, Davis suggested Robert E. Lee, then an army major in Baltimore; Lpez approached Lee, who also declined on the grounds of his duty.[38][39]
Jefferson Davis around age 39, c.1847
The senate made Davis chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs. When his term expired he was elected to the same seat (by the Mississippi legislature, as the constitution mandated at the time). He had not served a year when he resigned (in September 1851) to run for the governorship of Mississippi on the issue of the Compromise of 1850, which Davis opposed. He was defeated by fellow Senator Henry Stuart Foote by 999 votes.[40] Left without political office, Davis continued his political activity. He took part in a convention on states' rights, held at Jackson, Mississippi, in January 1852. In the weeks leading up to the presidential election of 1852, he campaigned in numerous Southern states for Democratic candidates Franklin Pierce and William R. King.[41]
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Secretary of War
Franklin Pierce won the presidential election, and in 1853 he made Davis his Secretary of War.[42] In this capacity, Davis gave Congress four annual reports (in December of each year), as well as an elaborate one (submitted on February 22, 1855) on various routes for the proposed Transcontinental Railroad. He promoted the Gadsden Purchase of today's southern Arizona from Mexico. He also increased the size of the regular army from 11,000 to 15,000 and introduced general usage of the improved guns which he had used successfully during the MexicanAmerican War.[43] The Pierce administration ended in 1857 with the loss of the Democratic nomination to James Buchanan. Davis' term was to end with Pierce's, so he ran successfully for the Senate, and re-entered it on March 4, 1857.[44]
Return to Senate
His renewed service in the senate was interrupted by an illness that Jefferson Davis around age 45, 1853 threatened him with the loss of his left eye. Still nominally serving in the senate, Davis spent the summer of 1858 in Portland, Maine. On the Fourth of July, he delivered an anti-secessionist speech on board a ship near Boston. He again urged the preservation of the Union on October 11 in Faneuil Hall, Boston, and returned to the senate soon after.[45] As Davis explained in his memoir The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, he believed that each state was sovereign and had an unquestionable right to secede from the Union. He counseled delay among his fellow Southerners, because he did not think that the North would permit the peaceable exercise of the right to secession. Having served as secretary of war under President Franklin Pierce, he also knew that the South lacked the military and naval resources necessary to defend itself if war were to break out. Following the election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860, however, events accelerated. South Carolina adopted an ordinance of secession on December 20, 1860, and Mississippi did so on January 9, 1861. Davis had expected this but waited until he received official notification; then on January 21, the day Davis called "the saddest day of my life",[46] he delivered a farewell address to the United States Senate, resigned and returned to Mississippi.[47]
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Jefferson Davis is sworn in as President of the Confederate States of America on February 18, 1861, on the steps of the Alabama State Capitol.
Several forts in Confederate territory remained in Union hands. Davis sent a commission to Washington with an offer to pay for any federal property on Southern soil, as well as the Southern portion of the national debt. Lincoln refused. Informal discussions did take place with Secretary of State William Seward through Supreme Court Justice John A. Campbell, an Alabamian who had not yet resigned; Seward hinted that Fort Sumter would be evacuated, but nothing definite was said.[54] On March 1, Davis appointed General P. G. T. Beauregard to command all Confederate troops in the vicinity of Charleston, South Carolina, where state officials prepared to take possession of Fort Sumter; Beauregard was to prepare his forces but avoid an attack on the fort. When Lincoln moved to resupply the fort with food, Davis and his cabinet directed Beauregard to demand its surrender or else take possession by force. Major Anderson did not surrender. Beauregard bombarded the fort, and the Civil War began.[55] When Virginia joined the Confederacy, Davis moved his government to Richmond in May 1861. He and his family took up his residence there at the White House of the Confederacy later that month.[56] Having served since February as the provisional president, Davis was elected to a full six-year term on November 6, 1861 and was inaugurated on February 22, 1862.[57] In June 1862, in his most successful move, Davis assigned General Robert E. Lee to replace the wounded Joseph E. Johnston in command of the Army of Northern Virginia, the main Confederate Army in the Eastern Theater. That December he made a tour of Confederate armies in the west of the country. Davis had a very small circle of military advisers, and largely made the main strategic decisions on his own (or approved those suggested by Lee). Davis evaluated the Confederacy's national resources and weaknesses and decided that, in order to win its independence, the Confederacy would have to fight mostly on the strategic defensive. Davis maintained mostly a defensive outlook throughout the war, paying special attention to the defense of his national capital at Richmond. He attempted strategic offensives when he felt that military success would (a) shake Northern self-confidence and (b) strengthen the peace movements there. The campaigns met defeat at Antietam (1862) and Gettysburg (1863).[58]
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The original Confederate Cabinet. L-R: Judah P. Benjamin, Stephen Mallory, Christopher Memminger, Alexander Stephens, LeRoy Pope Walker, Jefferson Davis, John H. Reagan and Robert Toombs.
confirmed.[59] Since the Confederacy was founded, among other things, on states rights, one important factor in Davis choice of cabinet members was representation from the various states. He depended partly upon recommendations from congressmen and other prominent people, and this helped maintain good relations between the executive and legislative branches. This also led to complaints as more states joined the Confederacy, however, because there were more states than cabinet positions.[60] Once the war began, there were frequent changes to the cabinet. Robert Hunter of Virginia replaced Toombs as Secretary of State on July 25, 1861. On September 17, Walker resigned as Secretary of War; Benjamin left the Attorney General position replace Walker, and Thomas Bragg of North Carolina (brother of General Braxton Bragg) took Benjamins place as Attorney General.[61] Following the November 1861 election, Davis announced the permanent cabinet in March of 1862. Benjamin moved again, to Secretary of State; George W. Randolph of Virginia had been made the Secretary of War. Mallory continued as Secretary of the Navy and Reagan as Postmaster General; both men kept their positions throughout the war. Memminger remained Secretary of the Treasury, while Thomas Hill Watts of Alabama was made Attorney General.[62] In 1862, Randolph resigned from the War Department, and James Seddon of Virginia was appointed to replace him. In late 1863, Watts resigned as Attorney General to take office as the Governor of Alabama, and George Davis of North Carolina took his place. In 1864, Memminger withdrew from the Treasury post due to congressional opposition, and was replaced by George Trenholm of South Carolina. In 1865, congressional opposition likewise caused Seddon to withdraw, and he was replaced by John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky.[63]
Strategic failures
Most historians sharply criticize Davis for his flawed military strategy, his selection of friends for military commands, and his neglect of homefront crises.[64][65] Until late in the war, he resisted efforts to appoint a general-in-chief, essentially handling those duties himself. On January 31, 1865, Lee assumed this role, but it was far too late. Davis insisted on a strategy of trying to defend all Southern territory with ostensibly equal effort. This diluted the limited resources of the South and made it vulnerable to coordinated strategic thrusts by the Union into the vital Western Theater (e.g., the capture of New Orleans in early 1862). He made other controversial strategic choices, such as allowing Lee to invade the North in 1862 and 1863 while the Western armies were under very heavy pressure. Not only did Lee lose at Gettysburg, but Vicksburg simultaneously fell, and the Union took control of the
Jefferson Davis Mississippi River, splitting the Confederacy. At Vicksburg, the failure to coordinate multiple forces on both sides of the Mississippi River rested primarily on the inability of Davis to create a harmonious departmental arrangement or to force such commanders as generals Edmund Kirby Smith, Earl Van Dorn, and Theophilus H. Holmes to work together.[66] Davis has been faulted for poor coordination and management of his generals. This includes his reluctance to resolve a dispute between Leonidas Polk, a personal friend, and Braxton Bragg, who was defeated in important battles and distrusted by his subordinates.[67] He did relieve the cautious but capable Joseph E. Johnston and replaced him with the reckless John Bell Hood, resulting in the loss of Atlanta and the eventual loss of an army.[68] Davis gave speeches to soldiers and politicians but largely ignored the common people and thereby failed to harness Confederate nationalism by directing the energies of the people into winning the war. More and more, the plain folk resented the favoritism shown the rich and powerful.[69] Davis did not use his presidential pulpit to rally the people with stirring rhetoriche called instead for people to be fatalistic and to die for their new country.[70] Apart from two month-long trips across the country where he met a few hundred people, Davis stayed in Richmond where few people saw him; newspapers had limited circulation and most Confederates had little favorable information about him.[71] In April 1863, food shortages led to rioting in Richmond, as poor people robbed and looted numerous stores for food until Davis cracked down and restored order.[72] Davis feuded bitterly with his vice president. Perhaps even more serious, he clashed with powerful state governors who used states' rights arguments to withhold their militia units from national service and otherwise blocked mobilization plans.[73]
442
Jefferson Davis hidden at Senator David Levy Yulee's plantation in Florida, then placed in the care of a railroad agent in Waldo. On June 15, 1865, Union soldiers seized Davis' personal baggage, together with some of the Confederate government's records, from the agent. A historical marker now stands at this site.[79][80][81]
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Imprisonment
On May 19, 1865, Davis was imprisoned in a casemate at Fortress Monroe, on the coast of Virginia. He was placed in irons for three days. Davis was indicted for treason a year later. While in prison, Davis arranged to sell his Mississippi plantation to one of his former slaves, Ben Montgomery. While he was in prison, Pope Pius IX sent Davis a portrait inscribed with the Latin words, "Venite ad me omnes qui laboratis, et ego reficiam vos, dicit Dominus", which comes from Matthew 11:28 and translates as, "Come to me all ye who labor and are heavy burdened and I will give you Contemporary sketch of Davis imprisoned in Ft. Monroe rest, sayeth the Lord." A hand-woven crown of thorns associated with the portrait is often said to have been made by the Pope[82] but may have been woven by his wife Varina Davis.[83] Varina Davis with their young daughter Winnie were allowed to join Davis, and the family were eventually given an apartment in the officers' quarters.
Later years
After two years of imprisonment, Davis was released on bail of $100,000, which was posted by prominent citizens of both Northern and Southern states, including Horace Greeley, Cornelius Vanderbilt and Gerrit Smith. (He was a former member of the Secret Six who had supported John Brown). Davis visited Canada, Cuba and Europe in search of work. In December 1868 the court rejected a motion to nullify the indictment, but the prosecution dropped the case in February 1869. That same year, Davis was hired as president of the Carolina Life Insurance Company in Memphis, Tennessee. He turned down the opportunity to become the first president of the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas (now Texas A&M University).[84] For a time, he began to regain his income, but the insurance company went bankrupt in the Panic of 1873 and Davis had difficulty finding new work. During Reconstruction, Davis remained silent; however, he privately expressed opinions that federal military rule and Republican authority over former Confederate states was unjustified. He considered "Yankee and Negroe" rule in the south oppressive. Davis held contemporary beliefs that Blacks were inferior to the White race. The historian William J. Cooper has stated that Davis believed in southern social order that included "a democratic white polity based firmly on dominance of a controlled and excluded black caste."[85] In 1876, Davis promoted a society for the stimulation of U.S. trade with South America. He visited England the next year. In 1877, Sarah Anne Ellis Dorsey, a wealthy widow who had heard of his difficulties, invited him to stay at her plantation of Beauvoir near Biloxi, Mississippi. She provided him with a cabin for his own use and helped him with his writing - through organization, dictation, editing, and encouragement.[86] Knowing she was severely ill, in 1878 Dorsey made over her will, leaving Beauvoir and her financial assets to Jefferson Davis and, in the case of his death, to his only surviving child, Winnie Davis.[87] Dorsey died in 1879, by when, both the Davises and Winnie were living at Beauvoir. Over the next two years, Davis completed The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government (1881).[88]
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Davis' reputation in the South was restored by the book, and by his warm reception on his tour of the region in 1886 and 1887. In numerous stops, he attended "Lost Cause" ceremonies, where large crowds showered him with affection and local leaders presented emotional speeches honoring his sacrifices to the would-be nation. The Meriden Daily Journal stated that Davis, at a reception held in New Orleans in May, 1887, urged southerners to be loyal to the nation. He said, "United you are now, and if the Union is ever to be broken, let the other side break it." Davis stated that men in the Confederacy had successfully fought for their own rights with inferior numbers during the Civil War and that the northern historians ignored this view.[8] Davis firmly believed that Confederate secession was constitutional. The former Confederate president was optimistic concerning American prosperity and the next generation.[89] Davis completed A Short History of the Confederate States of America in October 1889. On November 6 he left Beauvoir to visit his plantation at Brierfield. On the steamboat trip upriver, he Jefferson Davis at his home c.1885 became ill; on the 13th he left Brierfield to return to New Orleans. Varina Davis, who had taken another boat to Brierfield, met him on the river, and he finally received some medical care. They arrived in New Orleans on the 16th, and he was taken to the home of Charles Erasmus Fenner, an Associate Justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court. Though Davis remained in bed, he was stable for the next two weeks, but took a turn for the worse in early December. Just when he appeared to be improving, he lost consciousness on the evening of the 5th. He died at age 81 at 12:45 AM on Friday, December 6, 1889, in the presence of several friends and with his hand in Varina's.[90][91] His funeral was one of the largest in the South. Davis was first entombed at the Army of Northern Virginia tomb at Metairie Cemetery in New Orleans. In 1893, Mrs. Davis decided to have his remains reinterred at Hollywood Cemetery in Richmond.[92] After the remains were exhumed in New Orleans, they lay for a day at Memorial Hall of the newly organized Louisiana Historical Association, with many mourners passing by the casket, including Governor Murphy J. Foster, Sr. The body was placed on a Louisville and Nashville Railroad car and transported to Richmond.[93] A continuous cortge, day and night, accompanied his body from New Orleans to Richmond.[94]
Legacy
Numerous memorials were created to Jefferson Davis. Examples include the 351-foot (unknown operator: u'strong'm) concrete obelisk located at the Jefferson Davis State Historic Site in Fairview, Kentucky, marking his birthplace. Construction of the monument began in 1917 and was finished in 1924.[95] The Jefferson Davis Presidential Library was established at Beauvoir Plantation in 1998 in Biloxi, Mississippi after its use for some years as a Confederate Veterans Home. Dedicated in 1998, the house and library was damaged by Hurricane Katrina in 2005; the house reopened in 2008.[96]
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Based at Rice University in Houston, Texas, The Papers of Jefferson Davis is an editing project to publish documents related to Jefferson Davis. Since the early 1960s, it has published 12 volumes, the first in 1971 and the most recent in 2008; three more volumes are planned. The project has roughly 100,000 documents in its archives.[97] The birthday of Jefferson Davis is commemorated in several states. His birthday, June 3, is celebrated in Florida,[98] Kentucky,[99] Louisiana[100] and Tennessee;[101] in Alabama, it is celebrated on the first Monday in June.[102] In Mississippi, the last Monday of May (Memorial Day) is celebrated as "National Memorial Day and Jefferson Davis' Birthday".[103] In Texas, "Confederate Heroes Day" is celebrated on January 19, the birthday of Robert E. Lee;[101] Jefferson Davis birthday had been officially celebrated on June 3 but was combined with Lee's birthday in 1973.[104] In 1913, the United Daughters of the Confederacy conceived the Postwar portrait of Jefferson Davis by Daniel Jefferson Davis Memorial Highway, a transcontinental highway to Huntington be built through the South.[105] Portions of the highway's route in Virginia, Alabama and other states still bear the name of Jefferson Davis.[105] On September 20, 2011, the County Board of Arlington County, Virginia voted to change the name of "Old Jefferson Davis Highway" (the original route of the road in the County) after the chairman of the Board, Chris Zimmerman, noted that Jefferson Davis had little connection to the county.[106]
Notes
[1] Foote, Shelby (1958). The Civil War: A Narrative, Fort Sumter to Perryville. New York: Random House. p. 3. [2] [3] [4] [5] Strode 1955, p. 230. Cooper 2008, pp. 15. Wiley, Bell I. (January 1967). "Jefferson Davis: An Appraisal". Civil War Times Illustrated 6 (1): 417. "Restoration of Citizenship Rights to Jefferson F. Davis Statement on Signing S. J. Res. 16 into Law" (http:/ / www. presidency. ucsb. edu/ ws/ ?pid=29993). The American Presidency Project. . Retrieved July 17, 2011. [6] Strawbridge, Wilm K. (December 2007). "A Monument Better Than Marble: Jefferson Davis and the New South". Journal of Mississippi History 69 (4): 325347. [7] Collins 2005, p. 156. [8] "Jefferson Davis' Loyalty". The Meriden Daily Journal: p.1. May 14, 1887. [9] "Jeff Davis Coming Around" (http:/ / query. nytimes. com/ gst/ abstract. html?res=9D01E0DE1730E633A25757C1A9639C94669FD7CF& scp=2& sq=Jeff+ Davis+ Coming+ Around& st=p). New York Times. May 14, 1887. . Retrieved June 10, 2011. [10] Strode 1955, pp. 45. [11] Strode 1955, pp. 1127. [12] Hamilton, Holman (1978). "Jefferson Davis Before His Presidency". The Three Kentucky Presidents. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. ISBN0-8131-0246-4. [13] U.S. Military Academy, Register of Officers and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy from March 16, 1802 to January 1, 1850. Compiled by Capt. George W. Cullum. West Point, N.Y.: 1850, p. 148. [14] Strode 1955, p. 76. [15] Cooper 2000, pp. 6472. [16] Cooper 2000, pp. 75-79. Davis 1991, p. 89. [17] Strode 1955, pp. 136137. [18] Cooper 2000, pp. 8488, 98-100. [19] Strode 1955, pp. 242, 268. [20] Strode 1955, p. 273.
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[21] "Margaret Howell Davis Hayes Chapter No. 2652" (http:/ / www. coloradoudc. org/ ). Colorado United Daughters of the Confederacy. . Retrieved July 20, 2011. [22] Strode 1964, p. 436. [23] Cooper 2000, p. 480. [24] Cooper 2000, p. 595. [25] Strode 1964, pp. 527528. [26] Potter, Robert (1994). Jefferson Davis: Confederate President. Steck-Vaughn Company. p.74. [27] Allen 1999, pp. 197198. [28] Strode 1955, p. 157. [29] Strode 1955, pp. 161162. [30] Strode 1955, pp. 164167. [31] Strode 1955, p. 188. [32] Dodd 1907, pp. 12, 93. [33] Strode 1955, p. 195. [34] Rives, George Lockhart (1913). The United States and Mexico, 1821-1848 (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=vfhAAAAAIAAJ). New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. pp.634636. . [35] McPherson, James M. (1989). Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. New York: Bantam Books. p.104. [36] Strode 1955, p. 210. [37] $100,000 in 1849 would be worth more than $2,000,000 in 2010.Williamson, Samuel H. (2011). Seven Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount, 1774 to present. MeasuringWorth (http:/ / www. measuringworth. com). [38] Thomson, Janice E. (1996). Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns. Princeton University Press. p.121. [39] Strode 1955, pp. 211212. [40] Rowland, Dunbar (1912). The Official and Statistical Register of the State of Mississippi (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=-MoGAQAAIAAJ& pg=PA111& vq=foote& dq=henry+ s+ foote+ 1851& source=gbs_search_s& cad=0). Mississippi Department of Archives and History. Nashville, Tennessee: Press of Brandon Printing Company. p.111. . Retrieved March 26, 2009. [41] Dodd 1907, pp. 130131. [42] Kleber, John E., ed. (1992). "Davis, Jefferson". The Kentucky Encyclopedia. Associate editors: Thomas D. Clark, Lowell H. Harrison, and James C. Klotter. Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. ISBN0-8131-1772-0. [43] Dodd 1907, pp. 80, 133135. [44] Dodd 1907, pp. 152153. [45] Dodd 1907, pp. 12, 171172. [46] Cooper 2000, p. 3. [47] "Jefferson Davis' Farewell" (http:/ / senate. gov/ artandhistory/ history/ minute/ Jefferson_Davis_Farewell. htm). United States Senate. . Retrieved June 9, 2011. [48] Cooper 2000, p. 322. [49] Joan E. Cashin, First Lady of the Confederacy: Varina Davis's Civil War, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006, p. [50] Strode 1955, pp. 402403. [51] "Inaugural Address of President Davis" (http:/ / www. archive. org/ stream/ inauguraladdress00conf#page/ n1/ mode/ 2up). Montgomery, Alabama: Shorter and Reid, Printers. February 18, 1861. . Retrieved July 17, 2011. [52] Dodd 1907, pp. 197198. [53] "Jefferson Davis" (http:/ / www. civilwarhome. com/ jdavisbio. htm). Document. www.civilwarhome.com. . [54] Cooper 2000, pp. 361-2. [55] Cooper 2000, pp. 337340. [56] Strode 1959, pp. 9094. [57] Dodd 1907, p. 263. [58] Dawson, Joseph G. III (April 2009). "Jefferson Davis and the Confederacy's "Offensive-Defensive" Strategy in the U.S. Civil War". Journal of Military History 73 (2): 591607. [59] Patrick 1944, p. 51. [60] Patrick 1944, pp. 4950, 56. [61] Patrick 1944, p. 53. [62] Patrick 1944, pp. 5556. [63] Patrick 1944, p. 57. [64] Beringer, Richard E., Hattaway, Herman, Jones, Archer, and Still, William N., Jr. (1986). Why the South Lost the Civil War. Athens: University of Georgia Press. [65] Woodworth, Steven E. (1990). Jefferson Davis and His Generals: The Failure of Confederate Command in the West. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. [66] Woodworth, Steven E. (1990). "Dismembering the Confederacy: Jefferson Davis and the Trans-Mississippi West". Military History of the Southwest 20 (1): 122. [67] Woodworth, Jefferson Davis and His Generals, pp. 9293.
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[68] Hattaway and Beringer 2002. [69] Escott 1978. [70] Cooper 2000, pp. 475, 496. [71] Andrews, J. Cutler (1966). "The Confederate Press and Public Morale". Journal of Southern History 32. [72] Cooper 2000, pp. 447, 480, 496. [73] Cooper 2000, p. 511. [74] Keegan, John (2009). The American Civil War: A Military History. Vintage Books. pp.375376. ISBN978-0-307-27314-7. [75] Dodd 1907, pp. 353357. [76] Winters, John D. (1963). The Civil War in Louisiana. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. p.419. ISBN0-8071-0834-0. [77] "Jefferson Davis Was Captured" (http:/ / www. americaslibrary. gov/ jb/ civil/ jb_civil_jeffdav_1. html). USA.gov. 2007. . Retrieved February 4, 2010. [78] "Capture of Jefferson Davis" (http:/ / www. georgiaencyclopedia. org/ nge/ Article. jsp?id=h-640). The New Georgia Encyclopedia. . Retrieved June 8, 2011. [79] Boone, Floyd E. (1988). Florida Historical Markers & Sites: A Guide to More Than 700 Historic Sites. Houston, Texas: Gulf Publishing Company. p.15. ISBN0-87201-558-0. [80] "Historical Markers in Alachua County, Florida DICKISON AND HIS MEN / JEFFERSON DAVIS' BAGGAGE" (http:/ / Growth-Management. Alachua. FL. US/ historic/ historic_commission/ historical_markers/ jeffdavistext. htm). Alachua County Historical Commission. . Retrieved August 4, 2011. [81] "Historic Markers Across Florida Dickison and his men / Jefferson Davis' baggage" (http:/ / www. lat34north. com/ HistoricMarkersFL/ MarkerDetail. cfm?KeyID=001-1& MarkerTitle=Dickison and his men / Jefferson Davis' baggage). Latitude 34 North. . Retrieved August 4, 2011. [82] Strode 1964, p. 302. [83] Kevin Levin. "Update on Jefferson Davis's Crown of Thorns" (http:/ / cwmemory. com/ 2009/ 09/ 27/ update-on-jefferson-daviss-crown-of-thorns/ ). Civil War Memory. . Retrieved August 21, 2011. [84] Strode 1964, pp. 402404. [85] Cooper 2000, pp. 574, 575, 602, 603. [86] Bertram Wyatt-Brown, The House of Percy: Honor, Melancholy and Imagination in a Southern Family, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 165-166 [87] Bertram Wyatt-Brown, The House of Percy: Honor, Melancholy and Imagination in a Southern Family, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 166 [88] Strode 1964, pp. 439441, 448449. [89] Cooper 2000, p. 658. [90] Cooper 2000, pp. 652654. [91] Charles E. Fenner. "Eulogy of Robert E. Lee" (http:/ / leearchive. wlu. edu/ reference/ misc/ fenner/ index. html). . [92] "Jefferson Finis Davis" (http:/ / www. findagrave. com/ cgi-bin/ fg. cgi?page=gr& GSln=davis& GSfn=Jefferson& GSmn=finis& GSbyrel=in& GSdyrel=in& GSob=n& GRid=260& ). Find a Grave. 2001. . Retrieved June 8, 2011. [93] Urquhart, Kenneth Trist (March 21, 1959). "Seventy Years of the Louisiana Historical Association" (http:/ / www. lahistory. org/ uploads/ UrquhartLHAHistoryFinal. pdf) (PDF). Alexandria, Louisiana: Louisiana Historical Association. . Retrieved July 21, 2010. [94] Collins 2005. [95] "Jefferson Davis State Historic Site" (http:/ / parks. ky. gov/ findparks/ histparks/ jd/ ). Kentucky State Parks. . Retrieved July 17, 2011. [96] "Beauvoir The Jefferson Davis Home and Presidential Library" (http:/ / www. beauvoir. org/ ). Mississippi Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans. . Retrieved July 17, 2011. [97] "The Papers of Jefferson Davis" (http:/ / jeffersondavis. rice. edu/ ). Rice University. . Retrieved July 17, 2011. [98] "The 2010 Florida Statutes (including Special Session A)" (http:/ / www. leg. state. fl. us/ statutes/ index. cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute& Search_String=& URL=0600-0699/ 0683/ Sections/ 0683. 01. html). The Florida Legislature. . Retrieved July 25, 2011. [99] "State Public Holidays" (http:/ / www. washingtondc. worldweb. com/ TravelEssentials/ PublicHolidays/ ). World Web Technologies, Inc.. . Retrieved July 25, 2011. [100] "Days of public rest, legal holidays, and half-holidays" (http:/ / www. legis. state. la. us/ lss/ lss. asp?doc=74097). The Louisiana State Legislature. . Retrieved July 25, 2011. [101] "Memorial Day History" (http:/ / www1. va. gov/ opa/ speceven/ memday/ history. asp). United States Department of Veterans Affairs. . Retrieved July 25, 2011. [102] "Official State of Alabama Calend" (http:/ / www. info. alabama. gov/ calendar. aspx). Alabama State Government. . Retrieved July 25, 2011. [103] "Mississippi Code of 1972 SEC. 3-3-7. Legal holiday." (http:/ / www. mscode. com/ free/ statutes/ 03/ 003/ 0007. htm). LawNetCom, Inc.. . Retrieved July 25, 2011. [104] "State holidays" (http:/ / www. tsl. state. tx. us/ ref/ abouttx/ holidays. html). Texas State Library. . Retrieved July 25, 2011. [105] Weingroff, Richard F. (April 7, 2011). "Jefferson Davis Memorial Highway" (http:/ / www. fhwa. dot. gov/ infrastructure/ jdavis. cfm). Highway History (http:/ / www. fhwa. dot. gov/ infrastructure/ history. cfm). Federal Highway Administration, United States Department of
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Transportation. . Retrieved September 29, 2011. [106] McCaffrey, Scott (September 28, 2011). "Road Renaming Proves Another Chance to Re-Fight the Civil War" (http:/ / www. sungazette. net/ arlington/ politics/ road-renaming-proves-another-chance-to-re-fight-the-civil/ article_22798c8c-e9c5-11e0-a526-001cc4c002e0. html). Arlington Sun Gazette. Springfield, Virginia: Sun Gazette Newspapers. . Retrieved September 29, 2011.
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References Bibliography
Secondary sources
Allen, Felicity (1999). Jefferson Davis: Unconquerable Heart (http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o& d=106229784). Columbia: The University of Missouri Press. Ballard, Michael B. (1986). Long Shadow: Jefferson Davis and the Final Days of the Confederacy (http://www. questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=14023352). Jackson: University Press of Mississippi. Collins, Donald E. (2005). The Death and Resurrection of Jefferson Davis. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Cooper, William J. (2000). Jefferson Davis, American. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Cooper, William J. (2008). Jefferson Davis and the Civil War Era. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. Current, Richard, et al. (1993). Encyclopedia of the Confederacy. New York: Simon & Schuster. Davis, William C. (1991). Jefferson Davis: The Man and His Hour. New York: HarperCollins. Dodd, William E. (1907). Jefferson Davis (http://books.google.com/books?id=xtJ2AAAAMAAJ& printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false). Philadelphia: George W. Jacobs and Company. Eaton, Clement (1977). Jefferson Davis. New York: The Free Press. Escott, Paul (1978). After Secession: Jefferson Davis and the Failure of Confederate Nationalism. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. Hattaway, Herman and Beringer, Richard E. (2002). Jefferson Davis, Confederate President. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Neely Jr., Mark E. (1993). Confederate Bastille: Jefferson Davis and Civil Liberties (http://www.questia.com/ PM.qst?a=o&d=29306356). Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. Patrick, Rembert W. (1944). Jefferson Davis and His Cabinet. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. Rable, George C. (1994). The Confederate Republic: A Revolution against Politics (http://www.questia.com/ PM.qst?a=o&d=10417084). Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Stoker, Donald, "There Was No Offensive-Defensive Confederate Strategy," Journal of Military History, 73 (April 2009), 57190. Strode, Hudson (1955). Jefferson Davis, Volume I: American Patriot. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company. Strode, Hudson (1959). Jefferson Davis, Volume II: Confederate President. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company. Strode, Hudson (1964). Jefferson Davis, Volume III: Tragic Hero. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company. Swanson, James L. (2010). Bloody Crimes: The Chase for Jefferson Davis and the Death Pageant for Lincoln's Corpse. New York: HarperCollins. Thomas, Emory M. (1979). The Confederate Nation, 18611865. New York: Harper & Row.
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Primary sources
Davis, Jefferson (2003). Cooper, Jr., William J. ed. Jefferson Davis: The Essential Writings. Davis, Jefferson (1881). The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government. Rowland, Dunbar, ed. (1923). Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist: His Letters, Papers, and Speeches. Jackson: Mississippi Department of Archives and History. Monroe, Jr., Haskell M.; McIntosh, James T.; Crist, Lynda L., eds. (19712008). The Papers of Jefferson Davis. Louisiana State University Press.
External links
Jefferson Davis in Encyclopedia Virginia (http://encyclopediavirginia.org/Davis_Jefferson_1808-1889) Jefferson Davis's final resting place (http://www.virginia.org/Listings/HistoricSites/HollywoodCemetery/) Booknotes interview with William Cooper on Jefferson Davis, American, April 8, 2001. (http://www.booknotes. org/Watch/162328-1/William+Cooper.aspx) Works by Jefferson Davis (http://www.gutenberg.org/author/Davis+Jefferson) at Project Gutenberg Jefferson Davis (http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=D000113) at the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress
Adelbert Ames
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Adelbert Ames
Adelbert Ames
General, Governor and Senator from Mississippi 30th Governor of Mississippi In office January 4, 1874 March 20, 1876 Preceded by Succeeded by Ridgley C. Powers John M. Stone 27th Governor of Mississippi In office June 15, 1868 March 10, 1870 Preceded by Succeeded by Benjamin G. Humphreys James L. Alcorn United States Senator from Mississippi In office February 24, 1870 January 4, 1874 Preceded by Jefferson Davis Secession (Vacant until 1870) Henry R. Pease Personal details Born October 31, 1835 Rockland, Maine April 12, 1933 (aged97) Ormond Beach, Florida Hildreth Family Cemetery Lowell, Massachusetts 423939N 711836W Republican Blanche Butler Butler, Edith, Sarah, Blanche, Adelbert, Jr., Jessie United States Military Academy Military
Succeeded by
Died
Resting place
Adelbert Ames
451
Religion Episcopalian Military service Allegiance United States of America Union United States Army Union Army
Service/branch
Years of service 18611870, 18981899 Rank Commands Battles/wars Brevet Major General 20th Maine Volunteer Infantry American Civil War Spanish-American War Medal of Honor
Awards
Adelbert Ames (October 31, 1835 April 12, 1933) was an American sailor, soldier, and politician. He served with distinction as a Union Army general during the American Civil War. As a Radical Republican and a Carpetbagger, he was military governor, Senator and civilian governor in Reconstruction-era Mississippi. In 1898 he served as a United States Army general during the Spanish-American War. Ames was the last general officer of the American Civil War from either side of the conflict to die, dying at age 97 in 1933.[1]
performance there.[7] Returning to duty the following spring, Ames was part of the defenses of Washington, D.C..[8] He then fought in the Peninsula Campaign, and saw action at the Battle of Yorktown from April 5 to May 4, the Battle of Gaines' Mill on June 27, and the Battle of Malvern Hill that July. Ames was commended for his conduct at Malvern Hill by Col. Henry J. Hunt, chief of the artillery of the Army of the Potomac, and he received a brevet promotion to lieutenant
Adelbert Ames colonel on July 1.[5] Although Ames was becoming an excellent artillery officer, he realized that significant promotions would be available only in the infantry. He returned to Maine and politicked to receive a commission as a regimental commander of infantry and was assigned to command the 20th Maine Volunteer Infantry Regiment on August 20, 1862.[5] The 20th Maine fought in the Maryland Campaign, but saw little action at the Battle of Antietam on September 17, while in a reserve capacity. During the Union defeat at the Battle of Fredericksburg that winter, Ames led his regiment in one of the last charges on December 13 against Marye's Heights. During the Chancellorsville Campaign in May 1863, Ames volunteered as an aide-de-camp to Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, commander of the V Corps. Probably as a result of this staff duty and his proximity to the influential Meade, Ames was promoted to brigadier general in the Union Army on May 20, 1863, two weeks following the Battle of Chancellorsville.[5] Ames assumed brigade command in the XI Corps of the Army of the Potomac, relinquishing his command of the 20th Maine to Lt. Col. Joshua L. Chamberlain, who would soon lead the regiment to fame in the Battle of Gettysburg that July.[9] While his own experience at Gettysburg did not achieve the renown of Chamberlain's, Ames performed well under difficult circumstances. During the massive assault by Confederate Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell on July 1, 1863, Ames's division commander, Brig. Gen. Francis C. Barlow, moved his division well in front of other elements of the XI Corps to a slight rise that is now known as Barlow's Knoll. This salient position was quickly overrun, and Barlow was wounded and captured. Ames took command of the division and led it in retreat through the Ames (seated, center) and his staff during the streets of Gettysburg to a position on Cemetery Hill. On July 2, the American Civil War second day of battle, Ames's battered division bore the brunt of the assault on East Cemetery Hill by Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early, but was able to hold the critical position with help from surrounding units. At one point Ames himself took part in the hand-to-hand fighting. After the battle, the men of the 20th Maine presented Ames with their battle flag as a token of their esteem. After the battle, Ames reverted to brigade command with a brevet promotion to colonel in the regular army. His division, under the command of Brig. Gen. George H. Gordon, was transferred to the Department of the South, where it served in actions in South Carolina and Florida. In 1864, Ames's division, now part of the X Corps of the Army of the James, served under Maj. Gen. Benjamin Franklin Butler in the Bermuda Hundred Campaign and the Siege of Petersburg. In the future, he would become Butler's son-in-law. That winter, the division was reassigned to the XXIV Corps and sent to North Carolina. During the two years following his service in the Army of the Potomac, Ames shifted between brigade and division command (and even led his corps on two occasions), though he generally can be identified as a division commander. He led the successful assault in the Battle of Fort Fisher (commanding the 2nd Division, XXIV Corps), accompanying his men into the formidable coastal fortress as most of his staff were shot down by Confederate snipers.[6] He received a
Ames as a major general in the Union Army
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Adelbert Ames brevet promotion to major general in the Union Army (and brigadier general in the regular army) on March 13, 1865, for his role in the battle.[10]
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Later life
After leaving office, Ames settled briefly in Northfield, Minnesota, where he joined his father and brother in their flour-milling business. During his residence there, in September 1876, Jesse James and his gang of former Confederate guerrillas raided the town's bank, largely because of Ames's (and controversial Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler's) investment in it, but failed in their attempt to rob it. Ames next headed to New York City, then later settled in Tewksbury, Massachusetts[13] as an executive in a flour mill, along with other business interests in the nearby city of Lowell.[11] In 1898, he was appointed brigadier general of volunteers in the Spanish-American War and fought in Cuba.[11] Several years afterward, he retired from business pursuits in Lowell. Ames corresponded extensively with the historian James Wilford Garner during this period; Garner's dissertation viewed Reconstruction as "unwise," but absolved Ames of personal corruption.[14] Ames's widow compiled a collection of her correspondence with Ames, Chronicles from the Nineteenth Century, published posthumously in 1957. Ames died in 1933 at the age of 97 in his winter home, located in Ormond Beach, Florida, next to the estate of his friend John D. Rockefeller. At the time of his death, Ames was the last surviving general who had served in the Civil War. Ames is buried in the Hildreth family cemeterythe family of his mother-in-law, Sarah Hildreth Butlerbehind the main cemetery (also known as Hildreth Cemetery) on Hildreth Street in Lowell.[15] Buried with him are his wife Blanche Butler Ames, their six children, and the spouses of his son Butler and his daughter Edith.
Ames's Medal of Honor plaque The monument marking the resting place of Adelbert Ames and his family in the Hildreth family cemetery in Lowell
Notable Descendants
His daughter Blanche Ames Ames (she married into another Ames family) was a noted suffragist, inventor, artist, and writer. The mansion she designed and had built is now part of Borderland State Park in Massachusetts. His son Adelbert Ames, Jr. was a noted scientist. His son Butler Ames was a businessman and politician, who represented Massachusetts in Congress for ten years. Adelbert Ames was also the great-grandfather of George Plimpton. John F. Kennedy, through George Plimpton, is indirectly responsible for a full-length biography of General Ames. In Profiles in Courage, Kennedy relied on Jim Crow-era historical texts to produce a brief but devastating portrait of Ames's administration of Mississippi in his profile of Mississippi Senator Lucius Q.C. Lamar. Ames's daughter Blanche Ames Ames, a formidable figure in Massachusetts, bombarded the then-senator with letters complaining about the depiction, and continued her barrage after Kennedy entered the White House. President Kennedy then turned to his friend Plimpton to tell Blanche, Plimpton's grandmother, that she was "interfering with state business." Her response was to write her own book about her father, Adelbert Ames, in 1964. In the years since Profiles in Courage was published, historical opinion has shifted, and Ames's role as a politician in Mississippi is viewed far more favorably.
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In memoriam
A Medal of Honor plaque for Ames's gravesite was dedicated at a ceremony honoring Benjamin Butler's 191st birthday, held at the Hildreth family cemeterythe only time of the year it is open to the publicon November 1, 2009.[16] The United Spanish War Veterans established Camp 19, General Adelbert Ames Post, in Lowell, Massachusetts.
In popular media
Ames was portrayed by Matt Letscher in the movie adaptation of Jeffrey Shaara's Gods and Generals. He is a character in the alternate history novel Gettysburg, written by Newt Gingrich and William Forstchen. He is also the main focus of the historical work Redemption by Nicholas Lehmann.
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Notes
[1] Warner, p. 6, "This last survivor of the full-rank general officers on either side of the conflict ..."; Eicher, p. 103, "... the last surviving substantive Civil War general officer." [2] Quigley, p. 1. [3] Budiansky, pp. 64, 99. [4] Warner, p. 5. [5] Eicher, p. 102. [6] Budiansky, p. 65. [7] Eicher, p. 102; Warner, p. 5. [8] Warner, p. 6. [9] "Adelbert Ames" (http:/ / www. findagrave. com/ cgi-bin/ fg. cgi?page=gr& GRid=13057). Claim to Fame: Medal of Honor recipients. Find a Grave. . Retrieved 2009-01-12. [10] Eicher, p. 103. [11] "AMES, Adelbert" (http:/ / bioguide. congress. gov/ scripts/ biodisplay. pl?index=A000172). Biographical Directory of the United States Congress. United States Congress. . Retrieved 2009-04-11. [12] Ellem (1992) [13] Lowell Sun: Our Gettysburg Hero (http:/ / extras. lowellsun. com/ gettysburg/ ) [14] Lemann, np. [15] "Hildreth Family Cemetery" (http:/ / www. findagrave. com/ cgi-bin/ fg. cgi?page=gr& GRid=2181963). Find a Grave. . Retrieved February 11, 2009. [16] "Lowell, MA event Nov 1st" (http:/ / www. findagrave. com/ cgi-bin/ fg. cgi?page=gr& GRid=1234912). Find a Grave. . Retrieved October 7, 2010. [17] 40B for Ames Hill Castle? - Tewksbury Town Crier: Tewksbury Town Crier (http:/ / homenewshere. com/ tewksbury_town_crier/ article_7572db27-d10e-594a-8d48-2df756a30f7c. html) [18] Ames Hill Castle wins 9-month reprieve - Lowell Sun Online (http:/ / www. lowellsun. com/ local/ ci_20212668/ ames-hill-castle-wins-9-month-reprieve) [19] "Medal of Honor citations" (http:/ / www. history. army. mil/ html/ moh/ civwaral. html). American Medal of Honor recipients for the American Civil War (A-L). United States Army Center of Military History. June 8, 2009. Archived (http:/ / web. archive. org/ web/ 20090619234504/ http:/ / www. history. army. mil/ html/ moh/ civwaral. html) from the original on 19 June 2009. . Retrieved June 8, 2009.
References
This article incorporatespublic domain material from websites or documents of the United States Army Center of Military History. Ames, Blanche. Adelbert Ames, 18351933. New York: Argosy-Antiquarian, 1964. OCLC221717458. Budiansky, Stephen. The Bloody Shirt: Terror After Appomattox. New York: Viking, 2008. ISBN 978-0-670-01840-6. Current, Richard Nelson. Those Terrible Carpetbaggers: A Reinterpretation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. ISBN 978-0-19-504872-8. Eicher, John H., and David J. Eicher. Civil War High Commands. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-8047-3641-3. Ellem, Warren A. "The Overthrow of Reconstruction in Mississippi." Journal of Mississippi History 1992 54(2): 175-201. Garner, James Wilford. Reconstruction in Mississippi (http://books.google.com/books?id=o3AOAAAAIAAJ). Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968. First published in 1901. Harris, William C. The Day of the Carpetbagger: Republican Reconstruction in Mississippi. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969. ISBN 978-0-8071-0366-1. Harris, William C. Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967. OCLC647759. Lemann, Nicholas. Redemption: The Last Battle of the Civil War. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2006. ISBN 978-0-374-53069-3. Lord, Stuart B. "Adelbert Ames, Soldier and Politician: a Reevaluation." Maine Historical Society Quarterly 13(2) (1973): 81-97.
Adelbert Ames Quigley, Robert D. Civil War Spoken Here: A Dictionary of Mispronounced People, Places and Things of the 1860's. Collingswood, NJ: C. W. Historicals, 1993. ISBN 0-9637745-0-6. Stiles, T. J. Jesse James: Last Rebel of the Civil War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002. ISBN 978-0-375-40583-9. Tagg, Larry (1998). The Generals of Gettysburg (http://www.rocemabra.com/~roger/tagg/generals/). Campbell, CA: Savas Publishing. ISBN1-882810-30-9. Retrieved October 5, 2010. Warner, Ezra J. Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964. ISBN 0-8071-0822-7. "Adelbert Ames" (http://www.findagrave.com/cgi-bin/fg.cgi?page=gr&GRid=13057). Claim to Fame: Medal of Honor recipients. Find a Grave. Retrieved March 17, 2010.
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Further reading
Benson, Harry King. "The Public Career of Adelbert Ames, 1861-1876." PhD U. Of Virginia. Dissertation Abstracts International; 1976 36(7): 4705-A, 342 pp. Wainwright, Charles S. A Diary of Battle: The Personal Journals of Colonel Charles S. Wainwright. Edited by Allan Nevins. New York: Da Capo Press, 1998. First published 1962 by Harcourt.
External links
Adelbert Ames (http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=A000172) at the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress Retrieved on February 15, 2008 "Maine state archives: 20th Maine Battle Flag" (http://www.maine.gov/sos/arc/exhibits/20flag.htm). Archived (http://web.archive.org/web/20100922050046/http://www.maine.gov/sos/arc/exhibits/20flag. htm) from the original on 22 September 2010. Retrieved September 27, 2010. "A photocopy of a published speech by Adelbert Ames is available at The University of Mississippi, Archives and Special Collections in the Small Manuscript Collection (MUM00400)." (http://purl.oclc.org/umarchives/ MUM00400/). Retrieved March 17, 2010. "Adelbert Ames's account of his role during the James-Younger gang's raid on the First National Bank of Northfield, Minnesota, in 1876." (http://www.tjstiles.net/bio.htm). Retrieved March 17, 2010. "Biography of Blanche Ames Ames" (http://www.harvardsquarelibrary.org/unitarians/ames.html). Retrieved March 17, 2010. "Home of Heroes" (http://www.homeofheroes.com/moh/citations_1862_cwa/ames_adelbert.html). Retrieved March 17, 2010. "History Central" (http://www.historycentral.com/bio/UGENS/USAAmes.html). Retrieved March 17, 2010. "Ames, Adelbert". Appletons' Cyclopdia of American Biography. 1900. "Ames, Adelbert". Encyclopedia Americana. 1920.
Ambrose Burnside
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Ambrose Burnside
Ambrose Burnside
Ambrose Burnside, circa 1880 United States Senator from Rhode Island In office March 4, 1875 September 13, 1881 Preceded by Succeeded by William Sprague IV Nelson W. Aldrich
30th Governor of Rhode Island In office May 29, 1866 May 25, 1869 Preceded by Succeeded by James Y. Smith Seth Padelford Personal details Born May 23, 1824 Liberty, Indiana September 13, 1881 (aged57) Bristol, Rhode Island Swan Point Cemetery Providence, Rhode Island Republican United States Military Academy Soldier, inventor, industrialist
Died
Resting place
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Allegiance United States of America Union Union Army
Service/branch
Years of service 18471865 Rank Commands Major General Army of the Potomac Army of the Ohio Mexican-American War American Civil War First Battle of Bull Run Burnside's North Carolina Expedition Battle of Roanoke Island Battle of New Bern Maryland Campaign Battle of South Mountain Battle of Antietam Battle of Fredericksburg Knoxville Campaign Overland Campaign Battle of the Wilderness Battle of Spotsylvania Court House Battle of North Anna Battle of Cold Harbor Siege of Petersburg Battle of the Crater
Battles/wars
Ambrose Everett Burnside (May 23, 1824 September 13, 1881) was an American soldier, railroad executive, inventor, industrialist, and politician from Rhode Island, serving as governor and a U.S. Senator. As a Union Army general in the American Civil War, he conducted successful campaigns in North Carolina and East Tennessee but was defeated in the disastrous Battle of Fredericksburg and Battle of the Crater, earning his reputation as one of the most incompetent generals of the war. His distinctive style of facial hair is now known as sideburns, derived from his last name.
Ambrose Burnside there, he married Mary Richmond Bishop of Providence, Rhode Island, on April 27. The marriage, which lasted until Burnside's death, was childless.[5] In 1853, Burnside resigned his commission in the United States Army, although maintaining a position in the state militia, and devoted his time and energy to the manufacture of the famous rifle that bears his name, the Burnside carbine. The Secretary of War under President James Buchanan, John B. Floyd, contracted with the Burnside Arms Company to equip a large portion of the Army with his carbine and induced him to establish extensive factories for its manufacture. The Bristol Rifle Works were no sooner complete than another gunmaker allegedly bribed Floyd to break his $100,000 contract with Burnside. Burnside ran as a Democrat for one of the Congressional seats in Rhode Island in 1858 and was defeated in a landslide. The burdens of the campaign and the destruction by fire of his factory contributed to his financial ruin, and he was forced to assign his firearm patents to others. He went west in search of employment and became treasurer of the Illinois Central Railroad, where he worked for, and became friendly with, one of his future commanding officers, George B. McClellan.[6]
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Civil War
First Bull Run
At the outbreak of the Civil War, Burnside was a brigadier general in the Rhode Island Militia. He raised a regiment, the 1st Rhode Island Volunteer Infantry, and was appointed its colonel on May 2, 1861. Within a month, he ascended to brigade command in the Department of Northeast Virginia. He commanded the brigade without distinction at the First Battle of Bull Run in July, committing his troops piecemeal, and took over division command temporarily for wounded Brig. Gen. David Hunter. After his 90-day regiment was mustered out of service on August 2, he was promoted to brigadier general of volunteers on August 6, and was assigned to train provisional brigades in the nascent Army of the Potomac.[4]
North Carolina
Burnside commanded the Coast Division, or North Carolina Expeditionary Forcethree brigades assembled in Annapolis, Maryland, which formed the nucleus for his future IX Corpsand the Department of North Carolina, from September 1861 until July 1862. He conducted a successful amphibious campaign that closed over 80% of the North Carolina sea coast to Confederate shipping for the remainder of the war.[7] For his successes at the battles of Roanoke Island and New Bern, the first significant Union victories in the Eastern Theater, he was promoted to major general of volunteers on March 18. In July, his forces were transported north to Newport News, Virginia, and became the IX Corps of the Army of the Potomac.[4]
Burnside (seated, center) and officers of the 1st Rhode Island at Camp Sprague, Rhode Island, 1861.
Ambrose Burnside Following Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's failure in the Peninsula Campaign, Burnside was offered command of the Army of the Potomac.[8] Refusing this opportunitybecause of his loyalty to McClellan and because he understood his own lack of military experiencehe detached part of his corps in support of Maj. Gen. John Pope's Army of Virginia in the Northern Virginia Campaign. Telegrams extremely critical of Pope's abilities as a commander from Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter that he received at this time and forwarded on to his superiors in concurrence would later play a significant role in Porter's court-martial, in which Burnside would appear as a star witness.[9] Burnside again declined command following Pope's debacle at Second Bull Run.[10]
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Antietam
Burnside was given command of the "Right Wing" of the Army of the Potomac (the I Corps and IX Corps) at the start of the Maryland Campaign for the Battle of South Mountain, but McClellan separated the two corps at the Battle of Antietam, placing them on opposite ends of the Union battle line, returning Burnside to command of just the IX Corps. Implicitly refusing to give up his higher authority, Burnside treated first Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno (killed at South Mountain) and then Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox as the corps commander, funneling orders to the corps through them. This cumbersome arrangement contributed to his slowness in attacking and crossing what is now called "Burnside's Bridge" on the southern flank of the Union line.[11]
Burnside did not perform adequate reconnaissance of the area, and instead of taking advantage of several easy fording sites out of range of the enemy, his troops were forced into repeated assaults across the narrow bridge which was dominated by Confederate sharpshooters on high ground. By noon, McClellan was losing patience. He sent a succession of couriers to motivate Burnside to move forward. He ordered one aide, "Tell him if it costs 10,000 men he must go now." He increased the pressure by sending his inspector general to confront Burnside, who reacted indignantly: "McClellan appears to think I am not trying my best to carry this bridge; you are the third or fourth one who has been to me this morning with similar orders."[12] The delay allowed Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill's Confederate division to come up from Harpers Ferry and repulse the Union breakthrough. McClellan refused Burnside's requests for reinforcements, and the battle ended in a tactical stalemate.[13]
Fredericksburg
McClellan was removed after failing to pursue General Robert E. Lee's retreat from Antietam, and Burnside was assigned to command the Army of the Potomac on November 7, 1862. He reluctantly obeyed this order, the third such in his brief career. President Abraham Lincoln pressured Burnside to take aggressive action and on November 14 approved his plan to capture the Confederate capital at Richmond, Virginia. This plan led to a humiliating and costly Union defeat at the Battle of Fredericksburg on December 13. His advance upon Fredericksburg was rapid, but planning in marshaling pontoon bridges for crossing the Rappahannock River and his own reluctance to deploy portions of his army across fording points later delayed the attack. This allowed Gen. Lee to concentrate along Marye's Heights just west of
Ambrose Burnside town and easily repulse the Union attacks. Assaults south of town, which were supposed to be the main avenue of attack, were also mismanaged, and initial Union breakthroughs went unsupported. Upset by the failure of his plan and by the enormous casualties of his repeated, futile frontal assaults, Burnside declared that he would lead an assault by his old corps. His corps commanders talked him out of it, but relations between the commander and his subordinates were strained. Accepting full blame, he offered to retire from the U.S. Army, but this was refused. In January 1863, Burnside launched a second offensive against Lee, but it bogged down in winter rains before it accomplished anything and has been derisively called the Mud March. In its wake, he asked that several officers, who were openly insubordinate, be relieved of duty and court-martialed; he also offered to resign. Lincoln chose the latter option on January 26 and replaced him with Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, one of the officers who had conspired against Burnside.[14]
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East Tennessee
Lincoln was unwilling to lose Burnside from the Army and assigned him to command the Department of the Ohio and his old IX Corps. In Ohio, Burnside issued his controversial General Order Number 38, making it a crime to express any kind of opposition to the war. Burnside used it to arrest former Ohio congressman and candidate for governor of Ohio Clement Vallandigham, a prominent leader in the copperhead peace movement, and try him in a military court (despite the fact that he was a civilian).[15] Burnside also dealt with Confederate raiders such as John Hunt Morgan. In the Knoxville Campaign, Burnside advanced to Knoxville, Tennessee, first bypassing the Confederate-held Cumberland Gap. After occupying Knoxville unopposed, he sent troops back to the Cumberland Gap. Brig. Gen. John W. Frazer, the Confederate commander, refused to surrender in the face of two Union brigades and Burnside arrived with a third, forcing the surrender of Frazer and 2,300 Confederates.[16] After Union Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans was defeated at the Battle of Chickamauga, Burnside was pursued by Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, against whose troops he had battled at Marye's Heights. Burnside skillfully outmaneuvered Longstreet at the Battle of Campbell's Station and was able to reach his entrenchments and safety in Knoxville, where he was briefly besieged until the Confederate defeat at the Battle of Fort Sanders outside the city. Tying down Longstreet's corps at Knoxville contributed to Gen. Braxton Bragg's defeat by Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant at Chattanooga. Troops under Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman marched to Burnside's aid, but the siege had already been lifted; Longstreet withdrew, eventually returning to Virginia.[14]
Overland Campaign
Burnside was ordered to take the IX Corps back to the Eastern Theater, where, in Annapolis, Maryland, he built it up to a strength of over 21,000 effectives.[17] The IX Corps fought in the Overland Campaign of May 1864 as an independent command, reporting initially to Grant; his corps was not assigned to the Army of the Potomac because Burnside outranked its commander, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, who had been a division commander under Burnside at Fredericksburg. This cumbersome arrangement was rectified on May 24 just before the Battle of North Anna, when Burnside agreed to waive his precedence of rank and was placed under Meade's direct command.[18] Burnside fought at the battles of Wilderness and Spotsylvania Court House, where he did not perform in a distinguished manner,[19] attacking piecemeal and appearing reluctant to commit his troops to the frontal assaults that characterized these battles. After North Anna and Cold Harbor, he took his place in the siege lines at Petersburg.[20]
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The Crater
As the two armies faced the stalemate of trench warfare at Petersburg in July 1864, Burnside agreed to a plan suggested by a regiment of Pennsylvania coal miners in his corps: dig a mine under a fort in the Confederate entrenchments and ignite explosives there to achieve a surprise breakthrough. The fort was destroyed on July 30 in what is known as the Battle of the Crater. Because of interference from Meade, Burnside was ordered, only hours before the infantry attack, not to use his division of black troops, which had been specially trained for this mission. He was forced to use untrained white troops instead. He could Petersburg Crater with Union soldier in 1865 not decide which division to choose as a replacement, so he had his three subordinate commanders draw lots. The division chosen by chance was that commanded by Brig. Gen. James H. Ledlie, who failed to brief the men on what was expected of them and was reported during the battle to be drunk well behind the lines, providing no leadership. Ledlie's men entered the huge crater instead of going around it, becoming trapped, and were subjected to murderous fire from Confederates around the rim, resulting in high casualties. Burnside was relieved of command on August 14 and sent on leave by Grant; Meade never recalled him to duty. A court of inquiry later placed the blame for the Crater fiasco on Burnside and his subordinates. In December, Burnside met with President Lincoln and General Grant about his future. He was contemplating resignation, but Lincoln and Grant requested that he remain in the Army. At the end of the interview, Burnside wrote, "I was not informed of any duty upon which I am to be placed." He finally resigned his commission on April 15, 1865.[21]
Postbellum career
After his resignation, Burnside was employed in numerous railroad and industrial directorships, including the presidencies of the Cincinnati and Martinsville Railroad, the Indianapolis and Vincennes Railroad, the Cairo and Vincennes Railroad, and the Rhode Island Locomotive Works. He was elected to three one-year terms as Governor of Rhode Island (May 1866 to May 1869). He was commander-in-chief of the Grand Army of the Republic veterans' association from 1871 to 1872.[22] At its inception in 1871, the National Rifle Association chose him as its first president.[23][24]
During a visit to Europe in 1870, Burnside attempted to mediate between the French and the Germans in the Franco-Prussian War. In 1874 he was elected as U.S. Senator from Rhode Island, was re-elected in 1880, and served until his death in 1881. During that time, Burnside, who had been a Democrat before the war, ran as a Republican, playing a prominent role in military affairs as well as serving as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in 1881.[25] Burnside died suddenly of "neuralgia of the heart" (Angina pectoris) at Bristol, Rhode Island, and is buried in Swan Point Cemetery, Providence, Rhode Island.[25] An equestrian statue in his honor was erected in the late 19th century in Burnside Park in Providence.
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He had been the most unfortunate commander of the Army, a general who had been cursed by succeeding its most popular leader and a man who believed he was unfit for the post. His tenure had been marked by bitter animosity among his subordinates and a fearful, if not needless, sacrifice of life. A firm patriot, he lacked the power of personality and will to direct recalcitrant generals. He had been willing to fight the enemy, but the terrible slope before Marye's Heights stands as his legacy. Jeffry D. Wert, The Sword of Lincoln Bruce Catton summarized Burnside:
[28]
... Burnside had repeatedly demonstrated that it had been a military tragedy to give him a rank higher than colonel. One reason might have been that, with all his deficiencies, Burnside never had any angles of his own to play; he was a simple, honest, loyal soldier, doing his best even if that best was not very good, never scheming or conniving or backbiting. Also, he was modest; in an army many of whose generals were insufferable prima donnas, Burnside never mistook himself for Napoleon. Physically he was impressive: tall, just a little stout, wearing what was probably the most artistic and awe-inspiring set of whiskers in all that bewhiskered Army. He customarily wore a high, bell-crowned felt hat with the brim turned down and a double-breasted, knee-length frock coat, belted at the waista costume which, unfortunately, is apt to strike the modern eye as being very much like that of a beefy city cop of the 1880s. Bruce Catton, Mr. Lincoln's Army
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Sideburns
Burnside was noted for his unusual facial hair, joining strips of hair in front of his ears to his mustache but with chin clean-shaven; the word burnsides was coined to describe this style. The syllables were later reversed to give sideburns.[26]
In memoriam
Burnside residence hall at the University of Rhode Island in Kingston and Burnside Park in downtown Providence are named after General Burnside. In south-central Kentucky, a small town south of Somerset is named "Burnside" at the former site of Camp Burnside, near the former Cumberland River town of Port Isabelle.
In popular media
Burnside was portrayed by Alex Hyde-White in Ronald F. Maxwell's 2003 film Gods and Generals, which includes the Battle of Fredericksburg.[29]
Notes
[1] Mierka, np. The original spelling of his middle name was Everts, for Dr. Sylvanus Everts, the physician who delivered him. Ambrose Everts was also the name of Edghill's and Pamela's first child, who died a few months before the future general was born. The name was misspelled during his enrollment at West Point, and he did not correct the record. [2] familysearch.org (http:/ / www. familysearch. org/ eng/ default. asp) [3] Mierka, np., describes the relationship with the tailor as indentured servitude. [4] Eicher, pp. 155-56; Sauers, pp. 327-28; Warner, pp. 57-58; Wilson, np. [5] Eicher, pp. 155-56; Mierka, np.; Warner, pp. 57-58. [6] Eicher, pp. 155-56; Mierka, np.; Sauers, pp. 327-28; Warner, pp. 57-58. [7] Mierka, np. [8] Marvel, pp. 99-100. [9] Marvel, pp. 209-10. [10] Sauers, pp. 327-28; Wilson, np. [11] Bailey, pp. 120-21. [12] Sears, pp. 264-65. [13] Bailey, pp. 126-39. [14] Wilson, np.; Warner, p. 58; Sauers, p. 328. [15] McPherson, pp. 596-97. McPherson remarked that Burnside's "political judgment proved no more subtle than his military judgment at Fredericksburg." [16] Korn, p. 104. [17] Grimsley, p. 245, n. 43. [18] Esposito, text for map 120. [19] Grimsley, p. 230, describes Burnside's conduct as "inept." Rhea, p. 317: "[Burnside's] failings were so flagrant that the Army talked about them openly. He stumbled badly in the Wilderness and worse still at Spotsylvania." [20] Wilson, np. [21] Wert, pp. 385-86; Mierka, np.; Eicher, pp. 155-56. [22] Eicher, pp. 155-56. [23] NRA History (http:/ / www. nrahq. org/ history. asp) [24] NRA "About Us" webpage, accessed September 9, 2008 (http:/ / www. nra. org/ Aboutus. aspx) [25] Wilson, np.; Eicher, p. 156. [26] Goolrick, p. 29. [27] Wert, p. 217. [28] Catton, pp. 256-57. [29] Gods and Generals - Internet Movie Database (http:/ / www. imdb. com/ title/ tt0279111/ fullcredits#cast).
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References
Bailey, Ronald H., and the Editors of Time-Life Books. The Bloodiest Day: The Battle of Antietam. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1984. ISBN 0-8094-4740-1. Catton, Bruce. Mr. Lincoln's Army. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1951. ISBN 0-385-04310-4. Eicher, John H., and David J. Eicher. Civil War High Commands. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-8047-3641-3. Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website (http://www. dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/). Goolrick, William K., and the Editors of Time-Life Books. Rebels Resurgent: Fredericksburg to Chancellorsville. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1985. ISBN 0-8094-4748-7. Grimsley, Mark. And Keep Moving On: The Virginia Campaign, MayJune 1864. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002. ISBN 0-8032-2162-2. Korn, Jerry, and the Editors of Time-Life Books. The Fight for Chattanooga: Chickamauga to Missionary Ridge. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1985. ISBN 0-8094-4816-5. McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. Oxford History of the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. ISBN 0-19-503863-0. Marvel, William. Burnside. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991. ISBN 0-8078-1983-2. Mierka, Gregg A. "Rhode Island's Own." (http://webspace.webring.com/people/ig/gsgreene/burnside.html) MOLLUS biography. Accessed July 19, 2010. Rhea, Gordon C. The Battles for Spotsylvania Court House and the Road to Yellow Tavern May 712, 1864. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997. ISBN 0-8071-2136-3. Sauers, Richard A. "Ambrose Everett Burnside." In Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History, edited by David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000. ISBN 0-393-04758-X. Sears, Stephen W. Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983. ISBN 0-89919-172-X. Warner, Ezra J. Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964. ISBN 0-8071-0822-7. Wert, Jeffry D. The Sword of Lincoln: The Army of the Potomac. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005. ISBN 0-7432-2506-6. Wilson, James Grant, John Fiske and Stanley L. Klos, eds. "Ambrose Burnside." In Appleton's Cyclopedia of American Biography (http://www.virtualology.com/uscivilwarhall/AMBROSEBURNSIDE.COM/). New Work: D. Appleton & Co., 18871889 and 1999.
External links
Ambrose E. Burnside in Encyclopedia Virginia (http://encyclopediavirginia.org/ Burnside_Ambrose_E_1824-1881) Burnside's grave (http://quahog.org/attractions/index.php?id=81) Civil War Home biography (http://www.civilwarhome.com/burnbio.htm)
Ellis Spear
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Ellis Spear
Ellis Spear
Bvt. Brig. Gen. Ellis Spear Born Died Place of burial Allegiance Service/branch October 15, 1834 Warren, Maine April 3, 1917 (aged82) Washington, D.C. Arlington National Cemetery United States of America Union United States Army Union Army
Otherwork
Patent attorney
Ellis Spear (October 15, 1834 April 3, 1917) was an officer in the 20th Maine Volunteer Infantry Regiment who rose to the rank of general during the American Civil War.
Biography
Spear was born in Warren, Maine, in 1834 and was educated at Bowdoin College, graduating in 1858. Eventually Spear studied law, but when the Civil War erupted he became a recruiter and formed Company G of the 20th Maine. Spear was commissioned as a captain, but was quickly promoted to the rank of major, then lieutenant colonel, and later brevetted colonel and brigadier general at the end of the war. At Appomattox Court House in 1865, Spear witnessed the meeting of Grant and Lee during the surrender the Army of Northern Virginia.[1] After the war, Spear became a patent attorney and eventually became the United States Commissioner of Patents and wrote about the war. One author claims that Spear believed that many members of the 20th Maine, particularly Colonel Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, exaggerated their roles at the Battle of Gettysburg actions at Little Round Top. His writings provide corroboration to Lieutenant Holman S. Melcher's claims about initiating the charge.[2]
Ellis Spear Spear died in Washington, D.C., and was buried with honors at Arlington National Cemetery. His papers were later published by his grandson. Spear was played by Donal Logue in the 1993 film Gettysburg.
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References
Arlington National Cemetery biography [3]
Notes
[1] Spear, Ellis, The Civil War Recollections of General Ellis Spear. [2] Styple, William B. (Ed.), With a Flash of his Sword: The Writings of. Maj. Holman S. Melcher, 20th Maine Infantry, Belle Grove Publishing, 1994. [3] http:/ / www. arlingtoncemetery. net/ espear. htm
Ulysses S. Grant
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Ulysses S. Grant
Ulysses Grant
18th President of the United States In office March 4, 1869 March 4, 1877 Vice President Schuyler Colfax Henry Wilson Andrew Johnson Rutherford B. Hayes
Preceded by Succeeded by
Commanding General of the Army In office March 9, 1864 March 4, 1869 President Abraham Lincoln Andrew Johnson Henry Halleck William Sherman Personal details Born April 27, 1822 Point Pleasant, Ohio, US July 23, 1885 (aged63) Wilton, New York, US Republican Julia Dent Jesse Ulysses Nellie Frederick U.S.M.A. Soldier
Preceded by Succeeded by
Died
Ulysses S. Grant
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Religion Signature Military service Allegiance United States Union Union Army United States Army Methodism
Service/branch
Years of service 18391854 18611869 Rank Commands General of the Army 21st Illinois Infantry Regiment Army of the Tennessee Military Division of the Mississippi United States Army Mexican-American War Battle of Resaca de la Palma Battle of Palo Alto Battle of Monterrey Siege of Veracruz Battle of Molino del Rey Battle of Chapultepec
Battles/wars
American Civil War Battle of Fort Donelson Battle of Shiloh Siege of Vicksburg Chattanooga Campaign Overland Campaign Siege of Petersburg Appomattox Campaign
Ulysses S. Grant (born Hiram Ulysses Grant; April 27, 1822 July 23, 1885) was the 18th President of the United States (18691877) following his dominant role in the second half of the Civil War. Under Grant, the Union Army defeated the Confederate military and effectively ended the war with the surrender of Robert E. Lee's army at Appomattox. As president he led the Radical Republicans in their effort to eliminate all vestiges of Confederate nationalism and slavery; he effectively destroyed the Ku Klux Klan in 1871.[1] His reputation was marred by his repeated defense of corrupt appointees, and by the deep economic depression (called the "Panic of 1873") that dominated his second term. Although his Republican Party split in 1872 with reformers denouncing him, Grant was easily reelected. By 1874 the opposition was gaining strength and as he left the White House in March 1877, conservative white Southerners, as federal troops were withdrawn, regained control of every state in the South and Reconstruction ended on a note of failure as the civil rights of blacks were not secure. A career soldier, he graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point and served in the MexicanAmerican War. When the Civil War began in 1861, Grant trained Union volunteer regiments in Illinois. In 1862, as a general he fought a series of battles and was promoted to major general after forcing the surrender of a large Confederate army and gaining control of Kentucky and most of Tennessee. He then led Union forces to victory after initial setbacks in the Battle of Shiloh, earning a reputation as an aggressive commander. In July 1863, after a long, complex campaign, Grant defeated five uncoordinated Confederate armies (capturing one of them) and seized Vicksburg. This famous victory gave the Union full control of the Mississippi River, split off the western Confederacy, and opened the way for more Union triumphs. After another win at the Battle of Chattanooga in late
Ulysses S. Grant 1863, President Abraham Lincoln made him lieutenant general and commander of all of the Union Armies. As commanding general of the army, Grant confronted Robert E. Lee in a series of very bloody battles in 1864 known as the Overland Campaign that ended bottling up Lee at Petersburg, outside the Confederate capital of Richmond. During the siege, Grant coordinated a series of devastating campaigns launched by William Tecumseh Sherman, Philip Sheridan, and George Thomas. Finally breaking through Lee's trenches, the Union Army captured Richmond in April 1865. Lee surrendered his depleted forces to Grant at Appomattox as the Confederacy collapsed. Although Lee's allies denounced Grant in the 1870s as a ruthless butcher who won by brute force, most historians have hailed his military genius.[2] As president, he enforced Reconstruction by enforcing civil rights laws and fighting Ku Klux Klan violence. Grant won passage of the Fifteenth Amendment; giving constitutional protection for African American voting rights. He used the army to build the Republican Party in the South, based on black voters, Northern newcomers ("Carpetbaggers") and native white supporters ("Scalawags.") As a result, African Americans were represented in the U.S. Congress for the first time in American history in 1870. Grant's reputation as president by 1875 was at an all time high for his previous veto of the Inflation Bill, the passage of the Resumption of Specie Act, and Secretary Bristow's successful raids that shut down the Whiskey Ring.[3] Grant's foreign policy, led by Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, implemented International Arbitration, settled the Alabama Claims with Britain and avoided war with Spain over the Virginius Affair. His attempted annexation of the Dominican Republic failed. Grant's response to the Panic of 1873 and the severe depression that followed was ineffective. More than any other president, Grant had to respond to Congressional investigations into financial corruption charges of all federal departments.[4] In 1876, Grant's reputation was damaged by his White House deposition defending his personal secretary Orville Babcock, indicted in the Whiskey Ring graft trials, and his Secretary of War William W. Belknap's resignation, impeachment by the House, and trial in the Senate over receiving profit money from the Fort Sill tradership. After leaving office, Grant embarked on a two-year world tour that included many enthusiastic royal receptions. In 1880, he made an unsuccessful bid for a third presidential term. His memoirs were a critical and popular success. Historians until recently have given Grant's presidency the worst rankings; his reputation, however, has significantly improved because of greater appreciation for his enforcement of African American voting and citizenship rights during Reconstruction.
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Ulysses S. Grant West Point, he adopted this name with a middle initial only. His nickname became "Sam" among army colleagues at the academy, since the initials "U.S." stood for "Uncle Sam". The "S", according to Grant, did not "stand for anything", though Hamer had used it to abbreviate his mother's maiden name.[11][12][13] The influence of Grant's family brought about the appointment to West Point, while Grant himself later recalled "a military life had no charms for me".[14] Grant, then standing at 5 feet 2inches and weighing 117lbs., graduated from West Point in 1843, ranking 21st in a class of 39. Part of Grant's demerits were due to his refusal, at times, of compulsory church attendance, then a West Point policy that Grant viewed as anti-republican.[7] Grant freely admitted that he was lax in his studies; however, he achieved above average grades in mathematics and geology.[15] He established no close or lasting friendships while at West Point, though to his own later advantage, he closely observed the many notable officers he would serve with and command in the future.[16] At West Point, Grant studied under artist Robert Walter Weir and produced nine surviving artworks.[15] Trained under Prussian horse master, Herschberger, Grant established a reputation as a fearless and expert horseman, setting an equestrian high jump record that lasted almost 25 years.[15] Grant later recalled that his departure from West Point was of the happiest of his times, and that his intent had been to resign his commission after serving the minimum term of obligated duty.[17] Although naturally suited for cavalry, he was assigned to duty as a regimental quartermaster, managing supplies and equipment in the 4th U.S. Infantry, and achieved the rank of brevet second lieutenant.[12][18]
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On August 22, 1848 after a four-year engagement, Grant married Julia Boggs Dent (18261902), the daughter of a prominent Missouri plantation and slave owner, and sister of a West Point roommate, Frederick.[23] He and Julia had four children: Frederick Dent Grant; Ulysses S. "Buck" Grant, Jr.; Ellen Wrenshall "Nellie" Grant; and Jesse [24] Root Grant. The couple corresponded during his service in Mexico; in one letter Julia shared with him a very pleasurable dream she had of him in a beard, which he was then sporting upon his return after the war.[25]
Grant from West Point to Appomattox, an 1885 engraving by Thure de Thulstrup. Clockwise from lower left: Graduation from West Point (1843); In the tower at Chapultepec (1847); Drilling his Volunteers (1861); The Battle of Fort Donelson (1862); The Battle of Shiloh (1862); The Siege of Vicksburg (1863); The Battle of Chattanooga (1863); Appointment as Lieutenant General by Abraham Lincoln (1864); The Surrender of General Robert E. Lee at Appomattox Court House (1865)
Ulysses S. Grant Lieutenant Grant was assigned to several different posts over the ensuing six years. His first post war assignments took him and Julia to Detroit and Sackets Harbor, New York, which was perhaps their happiest location. At this time Julia asked Grant to provide her regularly with whatever funds he considered appropriate to manage their household, which he consented to. She continued to manage the household accounts for them until her death.[26] In the spring of 1852, he traveled in to Washington, DC in a failed attempt to prevail upon the Congress to rescind an order that he, in his capacity as quartermaster, reimburse the military $1000 in losses incurred on his watch, for which he bore no personal guilt.[27] He was sent west to Fort Vancouver in the Oregon Territory in 1852, initially landing in San Francisco during the height of the California Gold Rush. Julia could not accompany him primarily because she was eight months pregnant with their second child; also, a lieutenant's salary would not support a family on the frontier. The journey proved to be a ordeal due to transportation disruptions and an outbreak of cholera within the entourage while traveling overland through Panama. Grant exhibited notable organizational and humanitarian skills, arranging makeshift transportation and hospital facilities in Cruces to take care of the sick. There were 150 4th Infantry fatalities including Grant's long time fellow soldier friend John H. Gore.[28] After Grant arrived in San Francisco he was stationed in the Pacific Northwest. At Fort Vancouver, he served as quartermaster of the 4th Infantry Regiment. Grant came in contact with western American Indian tribes. In 1853, Grant stated that the Native Americans were "harmless" and that they would be "peaceful" had they not been "put upon by the whites".[29] He stated that the Klickitat tribe was formerly "powerful", yet had been inundated by white civilization's "whiskey and Small pox."[30] While on assignment out west and in an effort to supplement a military salary inadequate to support his family, Grant, assuming his work as quartermaster so equipped him, attempted but failed at several business ventures. His father had predicted early in this son's life that he would never succeed in business, hence Jesse's efforts to steer him to the military. The business failures in the west only confirmed this belief, creating frustration for both father and son, now into his thirties. In at least one case Grant had even naively allowed himself to be swindled by a partner. These failures, along with the separation from his family, made for quite an unhappy soldier, husband and son. Widespread rumors began to circulate that Grant was drinking in excess.[31] In the summer of 1853, he was promoted to captain, one of only 50 still on active duty, and assigned to command Company F, 4th Infantry, at Fort Humboldt, on the northwest California coast. Without explanation, he shortly thereafter resigned from the army with little notice on July 31, 1854. The commanding officer at Fort Humbolt, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. Buchanan, a strict disciplinarian, had reports that Grant was intoxicated off duty while seated at the pay officer's table.[32] Buchanan had previously warned Grant several times to stop the alleged binge drinking.[32] In lieu of a courtmartial, Buchanan gave Grant an ultimatum to sign a drafted resignation letter.[32] Grant resigned; the War Department stated on his record, "Nothing stands against his good name."[32] Rumors, however, persisted in the regular army of Grant's intemperance. According to biographer McFeely, historians overwhelmingly agree that his intemperance at the time was a fact, though there are no eyewitness reports extant.[32][33][34][35] Grant's father, again believing his son's only potential for success to be in the military, tried to get the Secretary of War to rescind the resignation, to no avail.[36]
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General Ulysses S. Grant at City Point in 1864 with his wife and son Jesse
"Hardscrabble" home Grant built in Missouri for his family. Photo: 1891
Although unopposed to slavery at the time, Grant kept his political opinions private and never endorsed any candidate running for public office before the Civil War.[40] His father-in-law was a prominent Democrat in St. Louis, a factor that helped derail Grant's bid to become county engineer in 1859, while his own father was an outspoken Republican in Galena. In the 1856 election, he cast his first presidential vote for the Democratic candidate James Buchanan, saying he was really voting against Fremont, the Republican presidential candidate.[40] In 1860, he favored the Democratic presidential candidate Stephen A. Douglas over Abraham Lincoln, and Lincoln over the alternate Democratic candidate, John C. Breckinridge. Lacking the residency requirements in Illinois at the time, he could not vote. It was during the Civil War that his political sympathies coincided with the Republicans' aggressive prosecution of the war. In 1864, his patron Congressman Elihu B. Washburne used Grant's private letters as campaign literature for Lincoln's reelection.[41]
Ulysses S. Grant volunteer units, but Grant wanted, and expected, a field command in the regular Army. He made multiple efforts with contacts (including General McClellan) to acquire such a position with no success. Meanwhile, he remained efficient and energetic at the training camps and made a positive impression on the volunteer Union recruits. With the aid of his advocate in Washington, DC, Elihu B. Washburne, Grant was promoted to Colonel by Governor Richard Yates on June 14, 1861, and put in charge of the unruly Twenty-first Illinois volunteer regiment. By the end of August 1861, Grant was given charge of the District of Cairo by Maj. Gen John C. Fremont, an outside Lincoln appointment, who viewed Grant as "a man of dogged persistence, and iron will." Grant's own demeanor had changed immediately at the outset of the war; having renewed energies, he began to walk with a confident step.[42][43][44][45] Indeed, he later recalled with apparent satisfaction that after that first recruitment meeting in Galena, 'I never went into our leather store again, to put up a package or do other business..."[46] During this time Grant quickly perceived that the war would be fought for the most part by volunteers, and not professional soldiers.[47]
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Shiloh
The Union advances achieved by Maj. Gen. Grant and Adm. Foote at Forts Henry and Donelson caused significant concern in the Confederate government. The Union army, known as the Army of the Tennessee, under Grant had increased to 48,894 men and was encamped on the western side of the Tennessee River. Grant met with his senior General, William T. Sherman, who advised he was prepared to attack the Confederate stronghold of equal numbers at Corinth, Mississippi.[54] The Confederates had the same thing in mind, and moved first at dawn on April 6, 1862, with a full-force attack on the Union Army at the Battle of Shiloh; the objective was to annihilate the western Union offensive in one massive assault. Over 44,699 confederate troops, led by Albert Sidney Johnston and P.G.T. Beauregard, vigorously attacked five divisions of Grants army bivouacked nine miles south at Pittsburgh Landing. Aware of the impending Confederate attack, Union troops sounded the alarm and readied for battle, however, no defensive entrenchment works had been made. The Confederates struck hard and repulsed the Union Army towards the Tennessee River. At the end of the day, the Union Army was largely vulnerable, and subject to elimination by Beauregard, had he been able to continue the fight, but for the exhaustion of his troops.[55] Not only did they avoid panic, but Grant and Sherman actually rallied their troops for a vicious counterattack the next morning. With reinforcement troops from Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell and Maj. Gen. Lew Wallace's missing division, Grant succeeded in driving the Confederates back to the road from Corinth; though he stopped short of capturing Beauregard's army, he was able to stabilize the Army of the Tennessee.[56][57] The battle was the costliest of the Civil War at the time, with aggregate Union and Confederate casualties of 23,746, and minimal strategic advantage gained by either side. Nevertheless, Grant received high praise from many corners. He later remarked that the carnage at Shiloh had made it clear to him that the Confederacy would only be defeated by complete annihilation of its army. Lincoln was also alarmed at the level of casualties, and queried Halleck as to Grant's potential responsibility for them; Grant was criticized for his decision to keep the Union Army bivouacked rather than entrenched. Gen. Halleck transferred command of the Army of the Tennessee to Gen. George H. Thomas and effectively demoted Grant to the hollow position of second-in-command of all the armies of the west. As a result, Grant was again on the verge of resigning until Gen. Sherman paid a visit to his camp. Sherman's experiences in the military had been very similar to Grant's; he had studied at West Point, served in the Mexican War, and later had resigned from the Army only to fail in his civilian career. Sherman succeeded in convincing Grant to remain in Halleck's army. Due to Halleck's sluggardly assault on Corinthcovering 19 miles in 30 daysthe entire Confederate force there escaped; the 120,000-man Union Army was then broken up. Charles A. Dana, an investigative agent for Secretary of War Stanton at the time, interviewed Grant; Dana related to Lincoln and Stanton that Grant appeared "self-possessed and eager to make war." Thus, Grant was reinstated to his command of the Army of the Tennessee.[58]
Vicksburg
Further information: Western Theater of the American Civil War President Lincoln was determined to take the strategic Confederate stronghold at Vicksburg, located on the Mississippi River. Major General John A. McClernand was authorized to raise an army in his home state of Illinois for the purpose of taking Vicksburg; Grant was very frustrated at the lack of direction he was receiving to move forward from his station in Memphis, and more aggravated to learn of this apparent effort to brush him aside. According to biographer McFeely, this discontent may have been responsible for Grant's ill-considered issuance of General Orders No. 11 on December 17,
The Battle of Jackson, fought on 14 May 1863, in Jackson, Mississippi, was part of the Vicksburg Campaign.
Ulysses S. Grant 1862. This order expelled Jews, as a class, from Grant's military district, in reaction to illicit activities of overly aggressive cotton traders in the Union camps, which Grant believed was interfering with military operations.[59] President Lincoln demanded the order be revoked, and Grant rescinded it 21 days after issuance. Without admitting fault, Grant believed he had only complied with the instructions sent from Washington. According to another Grant biographer, Jean E. Smith, it was "one of the most blatant examples of state-sponsored anti-Semitism in American history."[60] Grant had believed that gold, along with cotton, was being smuggled through enemy lines and that Jews could pass freely into enemy camps.[61] Grant later expressed regret for this order in 1868; his attitude concerning Jews was otherwise undeclared.[61] In December 1862, with the approval of Halleck, Grant moved to take Vicksburg by an overland route, aided by Charles Hamilton and James McPherson, in combination with a water expedition on the Mississippi led by Maj. Gen. Sherman. Grant had thus pre-empted his rival McClernand's move. Confederate cavalry raiders Bedford Forest and Earl Van Dorn stalled Grant's advance by breaking communications, while the Confederate army led by John C. Pemberton concentrated and repulsed Sherman's direct approach at Chickasaw Bayou. McClernand afterwards made an attempt to salvage Sherman's effort to no avail, so at the end of the first day neither Grant nor McClernand had succeeded.[62] During the second attempt to capture Vicksburg, Grant made a series of unsuccessful and highly criticized movements along bayou and canal water routes. Finally, in April 1863, Grant marched Union troops down the west side of the Mississippi River and crossed east over at Bruinsburg using Adm. David Porter's naval ships. Grant previously had implemented two diversion battles that confused Pemberton and allowed the Union Army to cross the Mississippi River. After a series of battles and having taken a railroad junction near Jackson, Grant went on to defeat Confederate General John C. Pemberton at the Battle of Champion Hill. Grant then made two assaults on the Vickburg fortress, and suffered gruesome losses. This battle and one other at Cold Harbor were prominent in his memory as the distinctly regrettable ones of the war. After the failed assault, Grant decided to settle for a siege lasting seven weeks. According to biographer McFeely, as the siege began, Grant lapsed into a two day drinking episode.[63] Pemberton, who was in charge of the fortress, surrendered to Grant on July 4, 1863.[64][65][66] During the Vicksburg campaign, Grant assumed responsibility for refugee-contraband slaves who were dislodged by the war and vulnerable to Confederate marauders; President Lincoln had also authorized their recruitment into the Union Army. Grant put the refugees under the protection of Chaplain John Eaton who authorized them to work on abandoned Confederate plantations harvesting cotton and cutting wood to fuel Union steamers. The effort was the precursor to the Freedman's Bureau during later Reconstruction.[57] The Vicksburg Campaign was Grants greatest achievement up to this time, opening the south to Chattanooga and giving the Union army access to the vital grain supply in Georgia. The fall of Vicksburg in 1863, combined with the Union naval capture of New Orleans in 1862, gave the Union Army and Navy control over the entire Mississippi and logistically fractured the Confederacy.[67] Grant demonstrated that an indirect assault coupled with diversionary tactics was highly effective strategy in defeating an entrenched Confederate Army. Although the success at Vicksburg was a great morale boost for the Union war effort, Grant received much criticism for his decisions and his reported drunkenness. President Lincoln again sent Charles Dana to keep a watchful eye on Grant's alleged intemperance; Dana eventually became Grant's devoted ally, and made light of the drinking.[68] The personal rivalry between McClernand and Grant continued over Vicksburg, but ended when Grant removed McClernand from command after he issued, and arranged the publication of, a military order in contravention of Grant.[64]
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Chattanooga
President Lincoln put Grant in command of the newly formed Division of the Mississippi in October 1863; Grant was then effectively in charge of the entire western war front for the Union, except for Louisiana. After the Battle of Chickamauga, Confederate General Braxton Bragg forced Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans's Army of the Cumberland to retreat into Chattanooga, a central railway hub, surrounded the city and kept the Union army from escaping. Only Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas and the XIV corps kept the Army of the Cumberland from complete defeat at the Battle of Chickamauga. When Union troops swarm Missionary Ridge and defeat informed of the ominous situation at Chattanooga, Grant relieved Maj. Bragg's army. Gen. Rosecrans from duty and placed Maj. Gen. Thomas in charge of the besieged Army of the Cumberland. To stop the siege and go on the attack, Grant, injured from a recent horse fall in New Orleans, personally rode out to Chattanooga and took charge of the Union Army's desperate situation. Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker and two divisions of the Army of the Potomac were sent by President Lincoln to reinforce the Army of the Cumberland, however, the Confederates kept the two Armies from meeting. Grant's first action was to open up a supply line to the Army of the Cumberland trapped in Chattanooga. Through an ingenious plan by Maj. Gen. William F. Smith, a "Cracker Line" was formed with Hooker's Army of the Potomac located at Lookout Mountain and supplied the Army of the Cumberland with food and military weapons.[69][70][71] On November 23, 1863 the situation at Chattanooga was urgent. Grant had organized three armies to attack Bragg on Missionary Ridge and Confederate troops on Lookout Mountain. On November 24, Maj. Gen. Sherman and four divisions of the Army of the Tennessee assaulted Bragg's right flank. Thomas and Army of the Cumberland, under order from Grant, overtook Confederate picket trenches at the base of Missionary Ridge. Maj. Gen. Hooker and the Army of the Potomac took Lookout Mountain and captured 1,064 prisoners.[72] On November 25, Sherman continued his attack on Bragg's right flank on the northern section of Missionary Ridge.[73] In response to Sherman's assault Bragg withdrew Confederate troops on the main ridge to reinforce the Confederate right flank.[74] Seeing that Bragg was reinforcing his right flank, Grant ordered Thomas to make a general assault on Missionary Ridge.[75] After a brief delay, the Army of the Cumberland, led by Sheridan and Wood, stormed over and captured the first Confederate rifle entrenchments.[76] Without further orders, the Army of the Cumberland continued up hill and captured the Confederate's secondary entrenchments on top of Missionary Ridge; forcing the defeated Confederates into disorganized retreat.[77] Though Bragg's army had not been captured, the decisive battle opened Georgia and the heartland of the Confederacy to Union invasion by Maj. Gen. Sherman.[69][78] Grant's fame increased throughout the country, and he was promoted to Lieutenant General, a position that had previously been given to George Washington and given to Winfield Scott as a brevet promotion. Grant was given charge of the entire Union Army.[79] Grant gave the Department of the Mississippi to Maj. Gen. Sherman, and went east to Washington, DC to make and implement a strategy with President Lincoln to decisively win the Civil War in 1864, when Lincoln was facing re-election. After settling Julia into a house in Georgetown, he then established his headquarters fifty miles away, near Gen. Meade's Army of the Potomac in Culpeper, Virginia.[80]
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Overland Campaign
The Union strategy, of a comprehensive effort to bring about a speedy victory for the Union, designed by President Lincoln and Grant, consisted of combined military Union offensives, attacking the Confederacy's armies, railroads, and economic infrastructure, to keep the Confederate armies from mobilizing reinforcements within southern interior lines. Maj. Gen. Sherman would attack Atlanta and Georgia, while the Army of the Potomac, led by Maj. Gen. George Meade with Grant in camp, would attack Robert E. Lee's Army of "On to Richmond" - Ulysses S. Grant and George Virginia. Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler was to attack and advance Meade riding horseback at the Battle of the [81] towards Richmond from the south, going up the James River. Wilderness. Depending on Lee's actions, Grant would join forces with Butler's armies and be fed supplies from the James River. Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel was to capture the railroad line at Lynchburg, move east, and attack from the Blue Ridge Mountains. Lee's objectives were to prolong the war and discourage the Northern will to fight, keep Grant from crossing south of the James River, and protect Richmond from Union attack.[82][83][84] Grant was riding a tide of popularity, and there were discussions in some corners that a Union victory early in the year could open the possibility of his candidacy for the presidency. Grant was aware of it, but had ruled out any self interest in discussions with Lincoln, and assigned no weight to it; in any case, the possibility would soon vanish with delays on the battlefield.[85] The efforts of both Sigel and Butler failed and Grant was left alone to fight Lee in a series of bloody battles of attrition known as the Overland Campaign. After taking the month of April 1864 to assemble and ready the Union Army of the Potomac, Grant crossed the Rapidan River on May 4 and attacked Lee in the Wilderness, a hard-fought battle with many casualties, lasting three days. Rather than retreat as his Union predecessors had done, Grant flanked Lee's Army of Virginia to the southeast and attempted to wedge the Union Army between Lee and Richmond at Spotsylvania.[86] Lee's army got to Spotsylvania first and a costly and lengthy battle began that lasted 13 days. During the battle, Grant attempted to break through Lee's line of defense at the Mule Shoe, which resulted in one of the most violent assaults during the Civil War, known as The Battle of the Bloody Angle. Unable to break Lee's line of defense after repeated attempts, Grant flanked Lee to the southeast east again at North Anna, a battle that lasted three days.[87] This time the Confederate Army had a superior defensive advantage on Grant; however, due to sickness, Lee was unable to lead the battle. Grant then maneuvered the Union Army to Cold Harbor, a vital railroad hub that was linked to Richmond, but Lee was able to make strong trenches to defend against a Union assault. During the third day of the 13-day Cold Harbor battle, Grant led a costly fatal assault on Lee's trenches, and as news spread in the North, heavy criticism fell on Grant, who was called "the Butcher", having lost 52,788 casualties in 30 days since crossing the Rapidan.[88] Lee suffered 32,907 Confederate casualties, on troops he could not replace, and was forced to take defensive entrenchment positions to stave off attack on Richmond.[88] When the two armies had fought to a stalemate, the two generals ruthlessly took three days to reach an truce, so that the dead and dying could be removed from the battlefield.[89] The costly June 3 assault at Cold Harbor was the second of two battles in the war which Grant later distinctly regretted.[90] Unknown to Robert E. Lee, Grant pulled out of Cold Harbor and stealthily moved his Army south of the James River, freed Maj. Gen. Butler from the Bermuda Hundred, and attacked Petersburg, Richmond's central railroad hub.[82][83][84]
Ulysses S. Grant
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Petersburg
After Grant and the Army of the Potomac had successfully crossed the James River undetected by Lee and rescued Maj. Gen. Butler from the Bermuda Hundred, Grant advanced the Union army southward to capture Petersburg. Confederate General P.G.T. Beauregard, in charge of Petersburg, was able to defend the city and Lee's veteran reinforcements arrived. Grant forced Lee into a long nine month siege of Petersburg and the Union war effort stalled.[91] Northern resentment grew as the Copperhead movement led by Clement Vallandigham The Dictator siege mortar used by the Union demanded that the war be settled through peace talks. But an indirect Army at Petersburg. 1864 benefit of the Petersburg siege was found in preventing Lee from reinforcing armies to oppose Sherman and Sheridan.[92] During the siege, Sherman was able to take Atlanta, a victory that advanced President Lincoln's reelection. Maj. Gen. Sheridan was given command of the Union Army of the Shenandoah and directed to "follow the enemy to their death".[93] Sheridan defeated Confederate General Jubal Early in the Shenandoah Valley, saving Washington, DC from capture. Lee had sent Early up the Shenandoah Valley to attack Washington, DC and draw troops away from Grant's Army of the Potomac. Sheridan's cavalry, after Early was defeated, pursuant to Grant's orders, destroyed vital Confederate supply farms in the Shenandoah Valley. When Sheridan reported suffering attacks by irregular Confederate cavalry under John S. Mosby, Grant recommended rounding up their families for imprisonment as hostages at Ft. McHenry.[93] Grant attempted to blow up part of Lee's Petersburg trenches from an underground tunnel; however, the explosion created a crater from which Confederates could easily pick off Union troops below. The 3500 Union casualties were over 3 for every 1 of the Confederates; Grant admitted the tactic had been a "stupendous failure".[94][95] On August 9, 1864 Lieut. Gen. Grant, who had just arrived at his headquarters in City Point, narrowly escaped certain death when Confederate spies blew up an ammunition barge moored below the city's bluffs. The enormous explosion, similar to the Petersburg mine, killed 47 men; 146 injured.[96] As the war slowly progressed, Grant continued to extend Robert E. Lee's entrenchment defenses southwest of Petersburg, in an effort to capture vital railroad links. By August 21, 1864 the Union Army had reached and captured the Weldon Railroad. As Grant continued to push the Union advance westward towards the South Side Railroad, Lee's entrenchment lines became overstretched and undermanned. With the Federal army having rebuilt the City Point Railroad, Grant was able to use mortars to attack Lee's entrenchments; the most famous and largest mortar used during the Civil War, over 17,000 pounds, was called the Dictator.[97] Lee also implemented the use of mortars on the Confederate line.[97] Once Sherman reached the East Coast and Gen. Thomas finally dispatched Gen. Hood in Tennessee, Union victory appeared certain, and Lincoln resolved to attempt a negotiated end to the war with the Confederates. He enlisted Francis Preston Blair to carry a message to Jefferson Davis; Davis appointed three Commissioners, who were sent to Grant to arrange a peace conference. Meanwhile, Lincoln sent Secretary of State Seward and his emissary Major Thomas T. Eckert to Hampton Roads to facilitate a meeting. Eckert met with the Confederate Commissioners and insisted that they acknowledge that "one common country" was to be the subject of the conference. This brought matters to a halt; Grant contacted the President directly and Lincoln agreed to personally meet with the Commissioners at Ft. Monroe. Though Grant was pivotal in arranging the peace conference, it ultimately yielded no results; but Grant had demonstrated a remarkable willingness and ability to assume a diplomatic role beyond his normal military posture.[98] Grant's diplomacy failed him, however, when he jokingly suggested to his wife that, perhaps if she met with Mrs. Louise (James) Longstreet, they could restore peace. When Julia took the offer seriously and pleaded for the opportunity, and Grant earnestly objected, she turned silent, indignant and quite disappointed.[99]
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Appomattox
In March 1865, while Lincoln met at City Point with Grant, Sherman and Admiral David Dixon Porter, Union forces finally took Petersburg and then captured Richmond in April, after an unsuccessful Confederate assault on Fort Stedman. Lee's Confederate troops began deserting in large numbers to the Army of the Potomac; disease and lack of supplies also weakened Lee's forces.[100] Lee attempted to link up with the remnants of Confederate General Joe Johnson's defeated army; however, Union cavalry forces led by Maj. Gen. Phil Sheridan were able to stop the two armies from converging. Lee and the Army of Virginia reluctantly surrendered to Grant at Appomattox Court House on April 9, 1865. Grant gave generous terms; Confederate troops surrendered their weapons and were allowed to return to their homes, with their mounts, on the condition that they would not take up arms against the United States. Within a few weeks the Civil War was over.[101]
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Ulysses S. Grant nature of this proposal, and refused to agree to the recommendation. As a compromise Grant sent Lieut. Gen. Sherman in his place; this posting to Mexico also conveniently diminished Sherman's availability for the War Secretary's job.[115] After the war, thousands of Irish veterans joined the Fenian Brotherhood and formed the Irish Republican Army with the intention of invading and holding Canada hostage in exchange for Irish independence. In June 1866, Johnson sent Grant to Buffalo, NY, to assess the situation. He ordered the Canadian border closed to prevent Fenian soldiers from crossing over at Fort Erie and that more weapons be confiscated. In June 1866, the US Army arrested 700 Fenian troops at Buffalo and the Fenians gave up on their attempt to invade Canada.[116]
483
Congressional Reconstruction
In the elections of 1866 an intramural fight arose in Maryland, when the Governor appointed partisan Radical police commissioners who would be responsible for managing voter registration. A request was made for federal troops to intervene by the opposing Conservatives, a move which Grant initially considered inappropriate. In a political move to provide some manner of response, Grant met as a civilian with the opposing party heads and, with his potential use of the armed forces an implicit threat, was able to facilitate a settlement.[117] Making unprecedented use of the power of the military, Congress divided the southern states into five military districts to ensure that African Americans newly granted constitutional and congressional rights were protected. Transitional state governments in each district were to be led by military governors general. Grant, who was to select the general to govern each district, preferred the will of Congress through the enforcement of congressional Reconstruction, but at the outset was opposed to the use of the military; nevertheless, he adapted, and for example, authorized Phil Sheridan to remove public officials in Louisiana who were against congressional Reconstruction. Sheridan's aggressive methods to register freedmen met with Johnson's disapproval, and the President sought his removal. Grant perceptively stayed the middle course, and recommended a rebuke but not a dismissal.[118] Throughout the Reconstruction period, more than 1,500 African Americans were elected to political office, while Grant and the military protected their rights initially by overturning the black codes in 1867.[119] Congressional Reconstruction finally ended with the Compromise of 1877 and the complete withdrawal of military troops from the southern states.
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Forney forged ahead with an editorial reviewing Grant's record with the recommendation for his nomination; he made a point of getting Grant's personal review before publication. By reviewing the article, though limited to the accuracy of his record, Grant implicitly opened the door for the nomination despite the precarious financial prospects in his future.[125] He was chosen as the Republican presidential candidate at the 1868 Republican National Convention in Chicago; he faced no significant opposition. In his letter of acceptance to the party, Grant concluded with "Let us have peace," which became his campaign slogan.[126] As was common practice at the time, Grant remained home in Galena during the campaign, and left most of the active campaigning and speaking on his behalf to his campaign manager William E. Chandler and others.[127] Grant's General Orders No. 11 and antisemitism became an issue during the 1868 presidential campaign. In a letter, published after the election, Grant sought to unequivocally distance himself from General Orders No. 11: "Grant's self-serving explanation", notes Jonathan Sarna, "did not actually bear close scrutiny," but Jews nonetheless generously accepted his attempt at self-extrication: "I have no prejudice against sect or race, but want each individual to be judged by his own merit. Orders No. 11 does not sustain this statement, I admit, but then I do not sustain that order. It never would have been issued if it had not been telegraphed the moment it was penned, and without reflection."[128] Though Jewish opinion was mixed, Grant's determination to court Jewish voters ultimately resulted in his capturing the majority of that vote, though Grant did lose some Jewish votes as a result of the order.[129] In the general election of that year, Grant won against former New York Governor Horatio Seymour with a lead of 300,000 votes out of 5,716,082 votes cast. Grant commanded an Electoral College landslide, receiving 214 votes to Seymour's 80. When he assumed the presidency, Grant had never before held elected office and, at the age of 46, was the youngest person yet elected president. After the election, in an attempt to reconcile with Jewish leaders and people, Grant offered the position of Secretary of the Treasury to Joseph Seligman, a prominent Jewish businessman. Seligman, who had helped finance the Union war effort by obtaining European capital, declined the offer.[130] Grant appointed more Jews to public office than any president before him.[131] Grant was the first US President to be elected after the nation had outlawed slavery and given citizenship to former African American slaves by US constitutional amendments. Implementation of these new rights was slow to come; in the 1868 election, the black vote counted in only sixteen of the thirty-seven states.[127]
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Presidency 18691877
The second president from Ohio, Grant was elected the 18th President of the United States in 1868, and was re-elected to the office in 1872; he served as President from March 4, 1869, to March 4, 1877. The commencement of the Grant administration was somewhat unorthodox. First, Grant's relationship with his predecessor Johnson had deteriorated badly, culminating with Johnson's appointment of Grant antagonist William Rosecrans as minister to Mexico.[132] Despite his own efforts to the contrary, Grant even rode to his inauguration without the outgoing President Johnson, breaking a long held tradition; indeed, Johnson did not even attend the inauguration. Grant also took a unique and overly self-confident approach to his cabinet choices. In keeping with his style of acting unilaterally as a military commander, his nominations were made with minimal Congressional consultation, and were even kept secret until submission to the Senate for confirmation.[133][134] Finally, Grant's primary appointment, the President Ulysses S. Grant Secretary of State, which went to Hamilton Fish, a New York Brady 1869 conservative statesman, actually grew out of a strong relationship initially forged between the two men's wives.[135] Grant's first choice, Elihu B. Washburne, given the State Department only as personal favor, served 12 days in office, resigned due to "sickness", and then was appointed Minister to France.[136] Grant's other Cabinet appointments, Jacob D. Cox (Interior), John A.J. Creswell (Postmaster General), and Ebenezer Rockwood Hoar (Attorney General), were popularly received by the nation.[137] Booming post-war industrial markets and the expansion of the American West fueled wild speculation and corruption throughout the United States, only to come to an abrupt crash with the Panic of 1873. National wounds brought on by the massive socio-economic upheaval of the Civil War continued to mend.[138] Although there were initial scandals in his first term, Grant remained popular in the country and was re-elected a second term in 1872. Notable accomplishments as President include policies for the protection of African Americans in the Reconstruction states as well as Native Americans in the West, the Treaty of Washington in 1871, and the Specie Payment Resumption Act in 1875. The Department of Justice was created during the Grant administration in an effort to centralize under the Attorney General the hiring of lawyers to represent federal agencies.[139] Grant's personal reputation as President suffered from the continued scandals caused by many corrupt appointees and personal associates and for the ruined economy caused by the Panic of 1873. A faction of the Republican party, the Liberal Republicans, bolted in 1872, publicly denounced the political patronage system known as Grantism and demanded amnesty for Confederate soldiers. In his re-election campaign, Grant benefited from the loyal support of Harper's Weekly political cartoonist Thomas Nast.[140] As more scandals were exposed during Grant's second term in office, his personal reputation was severely damaged, while any chance for a consecutive third term nomination vanished. Grant had multiple opportunities to strengthen the Supreme Court with nominations; historians consider his appointments not to have benefitted the Court. When Chief Justice Chase died, Grant botched his replacement badly with several failed nominations before the ultimate choice, Morrison Remick Waite was confirmed by the Senate.[141]
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Domestic policies
Later Reconstruction When Grant took Presidential office in 1869, Reconstruction of the former Confederate States had not been completed. President Grant successfully worked with Congress to readmit the last four Confederate states Virginia, Mississippi, Texas, and Georgia into the Union, while ensuring their constitutions protected every citizens voting rights through the use of the military.[142] President Grant won passage of the Fifteenth Amendment having guaranteed the voting rights to over a million freed African Americans. President Grant effectively enforced the Civil Rights of Southern freedmen through the use of Justice Department in coordination with the U.S. Military and the Department of War. Grant's two Attorney Generals Amos T. Akerman and George H. Williams, in addition to Solicitor General Benjamin Bristow, effectively prosecuted and shut down the Ku Klux Klan by 1872 through the use of the Force Acts passed by President Grant and Congress. President Grant supported amnesty for former Confederates and signed the Amnesty Act of 1872 to further this.[143] He favored a limited number of troops to be stationed in the Southsufficient numbers to protect Southern Freedmen, suppress the violent tactics of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), and prop up Republican governors, but not so many as to create resentment in the general population. President Grant signed the Naturalization Act of 1870 that allowed persons of African descent to become citizens of the United States. By 1873, Grant was confronted by a Northern public angry with the economic depression that began in 1873 and tired of continuing to use the army to control politics in the former Confederate states. In 187375, he watched as the Democrats (called Redeemers) took the control of all but three Southern states. The Republican coalition in the South was collapsing. When urgent telegrams from Republicans begged for Army help to put down the violence by paramilitary groups at election time, he told his Attorney General that, "the whole public is tired of these annual autumnal outbreaks in the South," insisting that state militias should handle the problems, not the Army.[144] Grant was reluctant to use federal troops, lest they engender the notion he was acting as a military dictator; he was also concerned that increased military pressure in the South might cause white supremacists in the North to bolt from the Republican Party.[145] Grant did effectively use the military to keep peace during the Election of 1874 in Louisiana, the nation's most contested Reconstruction state. Grant signed the Civil Rights Act of 1875, that gave rights for African Americans to attend public events, to eat in public places, and to stay overnight in public hotels. The Republican Party and the nation, however, during the Election of 1876 became more concerned with monetary legislation rather than Reconstruction. Conservative Democratic Party legislators took over all of the Southern state governments as all remaining U.S. troops were pulled out of the South by President Rutherford B. Hayes under the Compromise of 1877. Civil and human rights A distinguishing characteristic in the Grant Presidency was his concern with the plight of African Americans and native Indian tribes, in addition to civil rights for all Americans. Grant's 1868 campaign slogan, "Let us have peace," defined his motivation and assured his success. As president for two terms, Grant made many advances in civil and human rights. In 1869 and 1871, he signed bills promoting black voting rights and prosecuting Klan leaders. He won passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, which gave freedmen the vote, and the Ku Klux Klan Act, which empowered the president "to arrest and break up disguised night marauders.[146]
Grant's staff. General Ely S. Parker (far left), a Seneca, was the first Native American to be appointed as Commissioner of Indian Affairs, serving until 1871.
Ulysses S. Grant Grant continued to fight for black civil rights when he pressed for the former slaves to be "possessed of the civil rights which citizenship should carry with it." However, by 1874, a new wave of paramilitary organizations arose in the Deep South. The Red Shirts and White League, who conducted insurgency in Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Louisiana, operated openly and were better organized than the Ku Klux Klan had been. They aimed to turn Republicans out of office, suppress the black vote, and disrupt elections. In response to the renewed violent outbreaks against African Americans, Grant was the first President to sign a congressional civil rights act: the Civil Rights Act of 1875.[147] This legislation mandated equal treatment in public accommodations and jury selection. Grant's attempts to provide justice to Native Americans marked a radical reversal of what had long been the government's policy: "Wars of extermination... are demoralizing and wicked," he nobly told Congress. Grant's innovative "Peace" policy advocated Native American citizenship and education. It recommended use of reservations for protection of tribes.[148] Grant, however, allowed millions of buffalo to be hunted without restriction, eventually resulting in the depletion of Native American food supply and of tribal independence.[149] Statistical data indicate that during Grant's two terms as President the number of Indian battles per year decreased by 58, going from 101 Indian battles in 1869 to 43 in 1877.[150] Panic of 1873 and inflation bill The Panic of 1873 was a world-wide depression that started when the stock market in Vienna crashed in June 1873. Unsettled markets soon spread to Berlin, and throughout Europe. Three months later, the Panic spread to the United States when three major banks stopped making payments, the New York Warehouse & Security Company on September 8, Kenyon, Cox, & Co. on September 13, and the largest bank, Jay Cooke & Company, on September 18. On September 20, the New York Stock Exchange shut down for ten days. All of these events created a depression that lasted five years in the United States, ruined thousands of businesses, depressed daily wages by 25% from 1873 to 1876, and brought the unemployment rate up to 14%. Some 89 out of 364 American railroads went bankrupt.[151][152] The causes of the panic in the United States included over-expansion in the railroad industry after the Civil War, losses in the Chicago and Boston fires of 1871 and 1872, respectively, and insatiable speculation by Wall Street financiers. All of this growth was done on borrowed money by many banks in the United States, having over-speculated in the railroad industry. Grant, who knew little about finance, relied on bankers for advice on how to curb the panic. Secretary of Treasury William A. Richardson responded by liquidating a series of Political cartoon by Thomas Nast: Grant outstanding bonds. The banks, in turn, issued short-term clearing house congratulated for vetoing the "inflation bill" on certificates to be used as cash. People became desperate for paper April 22, 1874. currency. Although the issuance of clearing house certificates curbed the Panic on Wall Street, it did nothing to stop the ensuing five-year depression. Grant did nothing to prevent the panic and responded slowly after the banks crashed in September. The limited action of Secretary Richardson did little to increase confidence in the general economy.[153][154][155] After the Panic of 1873, Congress debated an inflationary policy to stimulate the economy and passed the Legal Tender Act (known as the "Inflation Bill") on April 14, 1874 to increase the nation's tight money supply. Many farmers and working men favored the bill; but Eastern bankers favored a veto because of their reliance on bonds and foreign investors. On April 22, 1874, Grant unexpectedly vetoed the bill on the grounds that it would destroy the credit of the nation.[156][157]
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Foreign policies
Further information: Hamilton Fish Dominican Republic and Washington treaties The Caribbean island of Hispaniola, now Haiti, and the Dominican Republic (sometimes known as Santo Domingo), were the sources of bitter political discussion and controversy during Grant's first term in office. Grant wanted to annex the Dominican Republic by treaty to allow Freedmen, oppressed in the United States, to work, and to force Brazil to abandon slavery. Senator Charles Sumner was opposed to annexation because it would reduce the number of autonomous nations run by Africans in the western hemisphere. Also disputed was the unscrupulous annexation process under the supervision of Grant's private secretary, Orville E. Babcock. Unexplainably, Grant did not Grant with family at their cottage in Long Branch, New Jersey, 1870. consult with his Cabinet over the issue, bipassing State Department [158] procedure. Secretary Fish decided to resign over the affair, however, Grant was able to convince Fish to remain on his Cabinet.[158] Grant personally lobbied Senators to pass the treaty, including Sen. Charles Sumner, at that time considered controversial for a President.[158] The annexation treaty was defeated by the Senate in 1871 and led to unending political enmity between Sumner and Grant.[159] Nineteenth Century ideals of Anglo superiority and antagonism towards tropical hemisphere miscegenation, held by Sen. Carl Schurz, was a significant factor in the treaty's defeat.[160] Historians have heralded the Treaty of Washington for settling the Alabama Claims dispute between Britain and the United States by International Arbitration. In 1871, Grants Secretary of State Hamilton Fish orchestrated the negotiation. The main purpose of the arbitration treaty was to remedy the damages done to American merchants by three Confederate war ships built by or purchased from the British. A major point of contention in the negotiation was whether "indirect" damages would be included in the settlement.[161] A commission met in Washington and designed a treaty whereby an international tribunal would settle the damage amounts; the British admitted regret, rather than fault. Grant and the Senate approved the Treaty of Washington. The international tribunal awarded the United States $15,500,000.[162] Virginius incident On October 31, 1873, a merchant ship, Virginius, carrying war materials and men to aid the Cuban insurrection, was taken captive by a Spanish warship. Virginius was flying the United States flag and had an American registry; the US did not at first realize it was secretly owned by Cuban insurgents. 53 of the passengers and crew, eight being United States citizens, were trying to illegally get into Cuba to help overthrow the government; they were executed, and many Americans such as William M. Evarts, Henry Ward Beecher, and even Vice President Henry Wilson made impassioned speeches calling for war with Spain.[163]
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Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, having gained President Grant's support, handled the crisis coolly to reach a diplomatic solution rather than war.[164] Grant kept the Virginius incident at the top of his weekly cabinet meetings agenda and kept his policy of non recognition of Cuban belligerancy.[165] Sec. Fish found out there was question over whether Virginius had the right to bear the United States flag. Spain's President expressed profound regret for the tragedy and was willing to make reparations through arbitration.[163] Fish met with the Spanish Ambassador in Washington and negotiated in reparations. Spain surrendered the Virginius and paid a cash indemnity of $80,000 to the families of the executed Americans.[163] President Grant's Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, has ranked high among historians, having settled the Alabama Claims and coolly handling the Virginius Affair.
King Kalkaua of Hawaii meets President Grant at the White House, 1874.
Scandals
Further information: Grantism President Grant faced financial corruption charges or scandals in all federal departments during his two terms in office.[166] Some historians have emphasized Grant's responsibility for the corruption, while others have considered this exaggeration, and stress Grant's establishment of Civil Service reform and abolishment of the moiety system.[166] The President was by habit fiercely loyal and protective to those he befriended and complacently trusted; effectively reformers who desired integrity in the federal government became hostile to the Administration and caused a party split in 1872. This and his inability to establish personal accountability among his cabinet members and other subordinates facilitated many scandals. Although personally honest with his own money matters, Grant's had difficulty in spotting corrupt individuals.[167] In November 1876, President Grant pardoned President Grant with his wife, Julia, and son, Jesse, in 1872. both William O. Avery and William McKee, who were convicted in connection with the Whiskey Ring tax evasion frauds in St. Louis; having served six months of their two year sentences.[168] There were 11 scandals directly associated with Grant's two terms. The main scandals included Black Friday in 1869 and the Whiskey Ring in 1875. The primary instigator and contributor to these and other scandals was Grant's personal secretary, Orville E. Babcock, who indirectly controlled many cabinet departments and was able to delay investigations by reformers. Babcock had direct access to Grant at the White House and had tremendous influence over who could see the President.[169] Grant's political opponents used the phrase Grantism, coined by Sen. Charles Sumner during the Presidential election of 1872, to describe the many corruption charges during the Grant Administration.[170] The Crdit Mobilier scandal was exposed during the Grant Administration in 1872; the involvement of Vice-President Schuyler Colfax was an embarrassment to the Administration, but the wrong doing in that instance is not generally imputed to Grant's Presidency.[171] Robert C. Schenck, U.S. Ambassador to Britain, was involved with the Emma Silver Mine scandal, however, this embarrassment was not directly associated with President Grant or the State Department. Grant appointed reformer Benjamin Bristow to the Secretary of Treasury in 1874, who uncovered and shut down the notorious Whiskey Ring. In order to help Bristow's investigation and clean house, Grant appointed reformer Edwards
Ulysses S. Grant Pierrepont as U.S. Attorney General.[172] Initially Grant fully endorsed Bristow's investigation having stated, "Let no guilty man escape if it can be avoided," however, after Sec. Bristow discovered that the President's personal secretary Babcock was involved in the ring, Grant became defensive and eventually defended Babcock in an unprecedented 1876 deposition, which biographer McFeely contends was perjurious; the deposition was read in St. Louis during the Whiskey Ring graft trials.[173][174] Biographer Smith, however, maintains that evidence against Babcock was circumstantial.[174] The result of Grant's deposition, as well as testimony from Sherman, brought Babcock an acquittal.[175] No President, before or since Grant, has ever given a deposition for a criminal defendant in a federal trial.[173] This and the other scandals ruined any chances for Grant getting a third term nomination.
Concurrent Scandals and Corruption Black Friday Description Date
490
Speculators corner the gold market and ruin the economy for several years.
1869 1872
New York custom house Three investigations, two congressional and one Treasury, looked into alleged corruption ring set up at the New ring York Custom House under two of Grant's appointments, collectors Moses H. Grinnell and Thomas Murphy. Star Route Postal Ring Salary Grab Sanborn Contract Delano Affair Pratt & Boyd Whiskey Ring Trading Post Ring Cattelism Corrupt system of postal contractors, clerks, and brokers to obtain lucrative Star Route postal contracts. Congressmen receive a retroactive $5,000 bonus for previous term served. John Sanborn collected taxes at exorbitant fees and split the profits among associates. Secretary of Interior, Columbus Delano, allegedly took bribes to secure fraudulent land grants. Attorney General George H. Williams allegedly received a bribe not to prosecute the Pratt & Boyd company. Corrupt government officials and whiskey makers steal millions of dollars in national tax evasion scam. Secretary of War William Belknap allegedly takes extortion money from trading contractor at Fort Sill. Secretary of Navy George Robeson allegedly receives bribes from Cattell & Company for lucrative Naval contracts. Private Secretary Orville Babcock indicted over framing a private citizen for uncovering corrupt Washington contractors.
1876
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Post-presidency
World tour
After the end of his second term in the White House, Grant spent over two years traveling the world with his wife.[177] In Britain and Ireland[178] the crowds were enormous. The Grants dined with Queen Victoria at Windsor Castle,and with Prince Bismarck in Germany, met Pope Leo XIII at the Vatican then ventured east to Russia, Egypt, the Holy Land, Siam (Thailand), Burma, and China.[179] In Japan, they were cordially received by Emperor Meiji and Empress Shken at the Imperial Palace. Today in Shiba Park in Tokyo, a tree still stands that Grant planted during his stay. In 1879, the Meiji government of Japan announced the annexation of the Ryukyu Islands. China objected, and Grant was asked to arbitrate the matter. He worked with Japanese and Chinese officials to arrange a compromise, by which Japan would get most of the Ryukyus, and China would get the southernmost island groups, and Taiwan, thus settling the dispute over Taiwan at the same time. In the end, after Grant's departure, and much negotiation, China refused to sign the agreement.[180]
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Memoirs
Grant learned in 1884 that he was suffering from throat cancer.[186] He had forfeited his military pension when he assumed the Presidency, but Congress subsequently restored Grant to the rank of General of the Army with full retirement pay.[187][188] At the suggestion of Robert Johnson, Grant wrote several articles on his Civil War campaigns for The Century Magazine at $500 each. The articles were well received by critics, and Johnson suggested Grant write a book of memoirs, as Sherman and others had successfully done.[189] Grant took up the project and asked an old friend and fellow Grant funeral train passing through West Point, New York writer, Adam Badeau, to review and critique his work (though Grant is reputed to have been the better writer). Century offered Grant a book contract, including a 10% royalty. When Grant shared this information with his friend Mark Twain, Twain suggested that Grant counter with a request for double the royalty; at the same time, he made his own offer to Grant for his memoirs, talking of a 75% royalty. Grant ultimately decided on Twain's company, Charles L. Webster and Co., as his publisher. His son Fred assisted primarily with references and proofing. Grant finished his memoir just a few days before his death.[190] Twain created a unique marketing system designed to reach millions of veterans with a patriotic appeal just as the nation began mourning the war hero's death. Ten thousand agents canvassed the North, following a script Twain had devised; many were themselves veterans who dressed in their old uniforms. They sold 350,000 two-volume sets at prices from $3.50 to $12 (depending on the binding). Each copy contained what looked like a handwritten note from Grant himself. In the end, Grant's widow Julia received about $450,000, suggesting a royalty of about 30%.[191][192][193] The Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant has been highly regarded by the general public, military historians and literary critics.[194] Grant was a shrewd, intelligent, and effective writer. He portrayed himself in the persona of the honorable Western hero, whose strength lies in his honesty and straightforwardness. He candidly depicts his battles against both the external Confederates and internal Army foes.[195]
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Death
Grant died of throat cancer at the age of 63 in Mount McGregor. His last words were, "I hope that nobody will be distressed on my account."[196] After lying in state, Grant's body was placed on a funeral train and traveled via West Point to New York City. His body lies in New York City's Riverside Park, beside that of his wife, in Grant's Tomb, the largest mausoleum in North America. Grant is honored by the Ulysses S. Grant Memorial at the base of Capitol Hill in Washington. In early 2010, Grant was proposed by the Ohio Historical Society as a finalist in a statewide vote for inclusion in Statuary Hall at the United States Capitol.
Historical reputation
Ulysses S. Grant, during the latter 19th Century, was popularly viewed as "a symbol of the American national identity and memory."[197] Millions of people viewed his New York City funeral procession in 1885 and attended Grant's Tomb 1897 Grant's Tomb Manhattan dedication.[197] However, at the turn of the 20th Century ex-Confederates and the Dunning School, began to minimize Grant's accomplishments as commanding general and President. Northerners in addition having desired national reconciliation distorted Grant's reputation, having viewed the Northern and Confederate cause on equal moral terms.[198] Grant himself desired peace, however, he believed the Union victory was morally superior and meant the Southerners had to abide by the Northern victor's terms. From the 1920s through the 1980s Grant was viewed as a brutal warrior general and an inept President. However, revisionist historians have since begun to look at Grant from a new approach having appreciated his genius as general, his protection of African Americans during Reconstruction as commanding general and President, and his peace policy towards American Indians. Grant's legacy as a military leader and President will always be entwined with the American Civil War and Reconstruction.[198][199]
Presidential library
In May 2012, on the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Ulysses S. Grant Foundation, Mississippi State University was selected as the permanent location for Ulysses S. Grant's Presidential Library. President Grant's artifacts are to remain permanently at the Mitchell Memorial Library on the MSU campus. These include Grant's letters and photographs while he was President from 1869 to 1877. The MSU library cataloged and cross-referenced 15,000 linear feet of material. Grant's letters have been divided into 31 volumes while a 32 volume is due to be released.[200]
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Film
Grant is the third most popular American president to be portrayed in movies, films, or cinema, his character appearing in 35 movies.[202] He is often portrayed as a scowling drunkard, which is historically inaccurate. Portrayals include:[203] The Birth of a Nation, 1915 silent epic movie, played by Donald Crisp Only the Brave, 1930, played by Guy Oliver They Died with their Boots On, 1941, played by Joseph Crehen (uncredited) The Horse Soldiers, 1959 John Wayne movie, played by Stan Jones How the West Was Won, 1962, played by Harry Morgan Wild Wild West, 1999, played by Kevin Kline Jonah Hex, 2010, played by Aidan Quinn
Television
The Wild Wild West, aired on CBS, 19651969, portrayed by James Gregory (series pilot) and Roy Engel The Blue and the Gray (miniseries), aired on CBS, 1982, portrayed by Rip Torn North and South (TV Miniseries), aired on ABC, 1986, portrayed by Anthony Zerbe Gore Vidal's Lincoln, 1988, portrayed by James Gammon The Civil War (TV series), aired on PBS, 1990, voiced by Jason Robards Lincoln, aired on PBS, 1992, portrayed by Rod Steiger The Day Lincoln Was Shot, aired on TNT, 1998, portrayed by John Ashton.[204] Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee, aired on HBO, 2007, portrayed by Senator Fred Thompson. Sherman's March, aired on the History Channel, 2007, portrayed by Harry Bulkeley To Appomattox, an HBO miniseries currently in pre-production, with Rob Lowe[205] to portray Grant
References
[1] Martinez, James Michael (2007). Carpetbaggers, Cavalry, and the Ku Klux Klan: Exposing the Invisible Empire During Reconstruction. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN978-0742550780. [2] Bonekemper (2004), pp. 271282. [3] Smith, p. 585 [4] McFeely-Woodward, p. 134 [5] Smith (2001), pp. 2122. [6] Farina (2007), pp. 13, 14; Simpson (2000), pp. 2, 3. [7] The Humanist (MarchApril, 2009) [8] Longacre (2006), pp. 6, 7. [9] McFeely, p .8. [10] McFeely, p. 10. [11] McFeely, p. 12. [12] Smith (2001), pp. 24, 83. [13] Simon (1967), p. 298. [14] McFeely, p. 16. [15] Smith (2001), pp. 2628. [16] McFeely, p. 20. [17] McFeely, pp. 16, 19. [18] Longacre (2006), p. 24. [19] Longacre (2006), pp. 3536 [20] Longacre (2006), pp. 3742.
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[21] Longacre (2006), p. 40. [22] Ulysses S Grant Quotes on the Military Academy and the Mexican War (http:/ / www. fadedgiant. net/ html/ grant_ulysses_s_quotes_west_po. htm); McFeely, pp. 31, 37. [23] McFeely, pp. 20, 26. [24] Smith (2001), Grant, p. 73. [25] McFeely, p. 34. [26] McFeely, p. 44. [27] McFeely, p. 46. [28] McFeely, p. 47. [29] Simon (1967), Papers of Ulysses S. Grant Vol. 1, p. 296 [30] Simon (1967), Papers of Ulysses S. Grant Vol. 1, p. 310. [31] McFeely, p. 49. [32] Longacre (2006), General Ulysses S. Grant: The Soldier and the Man, pp. 5558 [33] McFeely, p. 55. [34] According to Smith (2001), pp. 8788, and Lewis (1950), pp. 328332, two of Grant's lieutenants corroborated this story and Buchanan confirmed it to another officer in a conversation during the Civil War. Years later, Grant is said to have told John Eaton, "the vice of intemperance had not a little to do with my decision to resign." [35] Edmonds (1915), Ulysses S. Grant, pp. 7475 . [36] McFeely, p. 57. [37] McFeely, pp. 5960. [38] McFeely, p. 64. [39] McFeely, pp. 6566. [40] McFeely, p. 69. [41] The Abraham Lincoln Papers (http:/ / memory. loc. gov/ cgi-bin/ ampage?collId=mal& fileName=mal1/ 365/ 3652100/ malpage. db& recNum=0) at the Library of Congress. Retrieved April 28, 2007. [42] Jones (2002), Historical Dictionary of the Civil War A-L, pp. 589591. [43] Catton (1963), Terrible Swift Sword, pp. 28, 29. [44] McFeely, pp. 7376, 80. [45] Smith (2001), Grant, pp. 107108. [46] McFeely, p. 73. [47] McFeely, p. 80. [48] Kendall D. Gott, Where the South Lost the War: An Analysis of the Fort Henry-Fort Donelson Campaign, February 1862 (2011) [49] McFeely, pp. 9294. [50] H. J. Maihafer, "The Partnership," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, (May 1967) 93#5 pp 49-57 [51] William Whyte, "Full Speed Ahead: Yankee Ironclads Unleashed into the Volunteer State," Tennessee Historical Quarterly, (Spring 2010), 69#1 pp 18-39 [52] Isbell (02-12-2012), Fort Donelson Victory Brings Forth "Unconditional Surrender" Grant [53] Smith (2001), Grant, pp. 125134. [54] McFeely, p. 111. [55] McFeely, p. 114. [56] McFeely, p. 115. [57] Jones (2002), Historical Dictionary of the Civil War A-L, pp. 589591; Catton (1963), Terrible Swift Sword , pp. 229238; Smith (2001), Grant, pp. 167205. [58] McFeely, pp. 117121. [59] McFeely, pp. 123124. [60] Smith (2001), Grant, pp. 225227; Korn (1951), American Jewry and the Civil War [61] Longacre (2006), pp. 159161. [62] McFeely, pp. 125126. [63] McFeely, pp. 132135. [64] Jones (2002), Historical Dictionary of the Civil War A-L, pp. 589591; Catton (1963), Terrible Swift Sword , pp. 375381. [65] McFeely, pp. 122138. [66] Smith (2001), Grant, pp. 206257; Hart (1954), Strategy, pp. 147, 148. [67] Gallagher (2011), "Did the fall of Vicksburg really matter?" Civil War Times, 50.4, pp. 23+., Retrieved on 11-02-2011 [68] McFeely, pp. 128, 135. [69] Jones (2002), Historical Dictionary of the Civil War A-L, pp. 589591; Catton (1969), Grant Takes Command, pp. 4262. [70] McFeely, pp. 139151. [71] Smith (2001), Grant, pp. 262271; Grant, Memoirs and Selected Letters (1990), p. 418. [72] Grant, Memoirs and Selected Letters (1990), pp. 440441. [73] Grant, Memoirs and Selected Letters (1990), pp. 436439.
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[127] McFeely, p. 284. [128] Jonathan Sarna (12 March 2012). "The Jewish Vote" (http:/ / www. tabletmag. com/ jewish-news-and-politics/ 93625/ the-jewish-vote/ ). Tablet. . Retrieved 13 March 2012. [129] American Jewish history, Volume 6, Part 1, Jeffrey S. Gurock, American Jewish Historical Society, Taylor & Francis, 1998, p. 15. [130] Robert Michael, A Concise History Of American Antisemitism, p. 92. Rowman & Littlefield, 2005. [131] "Welcome To The Jewish Ledger" (http:/ / www. jewishledger. com/ articles/ 2009/ 02/ 11/ news/ on_the_cover/ news02. txt). . Retrieved February 5, 2011. [132] Smith (2001), p. 463 [133] McFeely, p. 286. [134] Smith (2001), pp. 465-466. [135] McFeely, p. 296. [136] Smith (2001), pp. 470-471. [137] Smith (2001), pp. 469-470 [138] Woodward, C. Vann (April 1957). "The Lowest Ebb" (http:/ / www. americanheritage. com/ articles/ magazine/ ah/ 1957/ 3/ 1957_3_52. shtml). American Heritage. . Retrieved December 9, 2010. [139] McFeely, p. 368. [140] Albert Bigelow Paine, Thomas Nast: His Period and His Pictures, 1904. [141] McFeely, p.392. [142] Simon (1967), Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, Volume 19, pp. xiii [143] "Amnesty & Civil Rights" (http:/ / query. nytimes. com/ mem/ archive-free/ pdf?_r=1& res=9404E7DF1E3EEE34BC4B51DFB3668389669FDE) (PDF). The New-York Times: pp.12. May 23, 1872. . [144] John Y. Simon, ed. The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant: 1875 (2003) p. xii [145] McFeely, pp. 420422. [146] Smith (2001), Grant, pp. 542547. [147] "The Civil Rights Bill" (http:/ / query. nytimes. com/ mem/ archive-free/ pdf?res=9803EEDC1E39EF34BC4A53DFB566838E669FDE) (PDF). The New-York Times: pp.12. March 2, 1875. . [148] McFeely, p. 308. [149] Brown (1970), pp. 264271; Smith (2001), pp. 536538; Brister (2000) [150] Michno (2003), 362. [151] McFeely, p. 391. [152] Smith (2001), Grant, pp. 375377. [153] Smith (2001), pp. 375377. [154] Kinley PhD, David (1910). The Independent treasury of the United States and its relations to the banks of its country (http:/ / books. google. com/ ?id=4MAZAAAAYAAJ& pg=PA225& dq=Panic+ of+ 1873#v=onepage& q=Panic of 1873). 5637. pp.225235. . Retrieved February 2, 2010. [155] Rhodes LL.D, D.Litt, James Ford (1920). History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 to the McKinley-Brian campaign of 1896 (http:/ / books. google. com/ ?id=N_cpAAAAYAAJ& pg=PA126& dq=Grant+ Vetoed+ Inflation+ Bill& cd=1#v=onepage& q=). pp.118119. . Retrieved February 2, 2010. [156] Rhodes, James Ford (1912). History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 to the Final Restoration of Home Rule at the South in 1877 (http:/ / books. google. com/ ?id=0cMTAAAAYAAJ& pg=RA1-PA182& dq=Benjamin+ Bristow#v=onepage& q=Benjamin Bristow). pp.126127. . Retrieved February 2, 2010. [157] Smith (2001), Grant, pp. 576577. [158] Cox, p. 167 [159] McFeely, pp. 349352. [160] Mejas-Lpez (2009), The Inverted Conquest, p. 132 [161] McFeely, p. 354. [162] Corning, Amos Elwood (1918). Hamilton Fish (http:/ / books. google. com/ ?id=QcNEAAAAIAAJ& printsec=frontcover& dq=Hamilton+ Fish& q=). pp.5984. . Retrieved February 2, 2010. [163] Corning, Amos Elwood (1918). Hamilton Fish (http:/ / books. google. com/ ?id=QcNEAAAAIAAJ& printsec=frontcover& dq=Hamilton+ Fish& q=). pp.9092. . Retrieved February 2, 2010. [164] Bradford, p. 93 [165] Bradford, pp. 57, 59 [166] McFeely-Woodward (1974), pp. 133134. [167] C. Vann Woodward, The Lowest Ebb [168] Simon (2005), Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, Vol. 28, pg. 13 [169] Woodward (1957) [170] Sumner, Charles (May 31, 1872). "Republicanism vs. Grantism" (http:/ / www. archive. org/ stream/ republicanismvsg00sumn#page/ n1/ mode/ 2up). . [171] McFeely, p.381.
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[172] Smith (2001), pg. 584-585 [173] O'Neil (13 Feb. 2011), The Saint Louis Dispatch [174] Smith (2001), pp. 590-591. [175] McFeely, p.405. [176] "Yellowstone, the First National Park" (http:/ / memory. loc. gov/ ammem/ gmdhtml/ yehtml/ yeabout. html). . [177] "Grant's Letters Abroad Journaling His World Tour" (http:/ / www. shapell. org/ manuscript. aspx?175608). Shapell Manuscript Foundation. . [178] Christmas Shopping. "The great zoo's who... Lifestyle" (http:/ / www. independent. ie/ lifestyle/ the-great-zoos-who-2669960. html). Independent.ie. . Retrieved 2011-12-10. [179] McFeely, 459460. [180] "Assimilation Practices in Okinawa" (http:/ / www. uchinanchu. org/ uchinanchu/ history_assimilation. html). Okinawa Peace Network of Los Angeles. . Retrieved March 21, 2011. [181] Hesseltine (2001), pp. 432439. [182] McFeely, pp.478480. [183] McFeely, pp.488490. [184] "American Experience U.S. Grant: Warrior" (http:/ / www. pbs. org/ wgbh/ americanexperience/ films/ grant). PBS. . Retrieved September 23, 2011. [185] Grant, Julia Dent; Simon, John Y. (1988). The personal memoirs of Julia Dent Grant (Mrs. Ulysses S. Grant) (http:/ / books. google. com/ ?id=tQaZhxwbLB8C& pg=PA168& dq=Ulysses+ S. + Grant+ and+ Ferndinand+ Ward& cd=3#v=onepage& q=). p.168. ISBN978-0-8093-1443-0. . Retrieved February 23, 2010. [186] Today, it is believed that he suffered from a T1N1 carcinoma of the tonsillar fossa. A Renehan and J C Lowry (July 1995). "The oral tumours of two American presidents: what if they were alive today?". J R Soc Med. 88 (7): 377383. PMC1295266. PMID7562805. [187] Smith (2001), Grant, pp. 622, 625. [188] Garland, Ulysses S. Grant: his life and character, p. 512. [189] McFeely, p.494. [190] McFeely, p.505. [191] McFeely, p.501. [192] Craig E. Miller, "'Give the Book to Clemens'," American History, April 1999, Vol. 34, Issue 1 [193] see also Booknotes interview with Mark Perry on Grant and Twain: The Story of a Friendship That Changed America, July 18, 2004. (http:/ / www. booknotes. org/ Watch/ 182749-1/ Mark+ Perry. aspx) [194] Edmund Wilson, Patriotic Gore: Studies in the Literature of the American Civil War, (1962) pp. 131173. [195] Henry M. W. Russell, "The memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant: The rhetoric of judgment," Virginia Quarterly Review, (Spring 1990) 66#2 pp. 189209. [196] Crompton (2009), p. 104 [197] Waugh (2009), p. 2 [198] Waugh (2009), p. 3 [199] Wilentz (2010), The Return of Ulysses (http:/ / www. tnr. com/ book/ review/ the-return-ulyses-s-grant?page=0,0), accessdate = 05-10-2012 [200] Smith (May 18, 2012), Ulysses S. Grant: How 'bout them Dawgs!, The Dispatch [201] see IMDb page for Grant (http:/ / www. imdb. com/ character/ ch0029461/ ) [202] 30Jun08. "Top Five Cinematically Portrayed Presidents" (http:/ / chasness. wordpress. com/ 2008/ 06/ 30/ top-five-cinematically-portrayed-presidents/ ). Chasness.wordpress.com. . Retrieved February 5, 2011. [203] "answers.com: What actors played Ulysses S Grant in the movies?" (http:/ / wiki. answers. com/ Q/ What_actors_played_Ulysses_S_Grant_in_the_movies). Wiki.answers.com. July 26, 1997. . Retrieved February 5, 2011. [204] "The Day Lincoln Was Shot (TV 1998) IMDb" (http:/ / www. imdb. com/ title/ tt0140613/ ). IMDb.com, Inc.. . Retrieved March 29, 2011. [205] "To Appomattox" (http:/ / www. toappomattox. com/ To_Appomattox. html). To Appomattox. . Retrieved February 19, 2011.
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Biographical and political American Annual Cyclopedia... 1868 (http://books.google.com/books?id=maIoAAAAYAAJ&dq=ulysses+ intitle:cyclopedia&lr=&as_drrb_is=b&as_minm_is=0&as_miny_is=1869&as_maxm_is=0& as_maxy_is=1873&as_brr=0&source=gbs_navlinks_s). Volume 8. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1873. Bunting III, Josiah. Ulysses S. Grant. New York: Times Books, 2004. ISBN 0-8050-6949-6. Dunning. William. Reconstruction Political and Economic 18651877 (1905), vol 22 (http://www.archive.org/ details/americannation22hartrich). Cox, Jacob Dolson (July, 1895). "How Judge Hoar Ceased to be Attorney General." (http://cdl.library.cornell. edu/cgi-bin/moa/pageviewer?frames=1&cite=&coll=moa&view=50&root=/moa/atla/atla0076/& tif=00171.TIF&pagenum=162). Atlantic Monthly Making of America (Cornell University Library) 76 (454): 162173. Retrieved 05-20-2012. Garland, Hamlin. Ulysses S. Grant: His Life and Character (http://books.google.com/ books?id=AEIOAAAAIAAJ&dq=ulysses+intitle:Ulysses+intitle:S+intitle:Grant+intitle:His+intitle:Life+ intitle:and+intitle:Character&lr=&as_drrb_is=q&as_minm_is=0&as_miny_is=&as_maxm_is=0& as_maxy_is=&num=50&as_brr=3). New York, Doubleday & McClure co., 1898. Hardy, William E. "South of the Border: Ulysses S. Grant and the French Intervention," Civil War History Vol. 54#1 (2008) pp 63+. online edition (http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5026686310) Hesseltine, William B. Ulysses S. Grant, Politician (http://www.questia.com/library/book/ ulysses-s-grant-politician-by-william-b-hesseltine.jsp). New York, F. Ungar Pub. Co. [1957, 1935]. ISBN 1-931313-85-7. Longacre, Edward G. (2006). General Ulysses S. Grant The Soldier And The Man. Cambridge, Massachusetts: First De Capo Press. ISBN0-306-81269-X. Mantell, Martin E. Johnson, Grant, and the Politics of Reconstruction (http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o& d=89815306). New York, Columbia University Press, 1973. McFeely, William S. (1981). Grant: A Biography. Norton. ISBN0-393-01372-3.; Pulitzer Prize McFeely, William S (1974). C. Vann Woodward. ed. Responses of the Presidents to Charges of Misconduct. New York, New York: Delacorte Press. ISBN0-440-05923-2. Nevins, Allan, Hamilton Fish: The Inner History of the Grant Administration (http://www.questia.com/PM. qst?a=o&d=94934148). New York, Dodd, Mead, 1936, 2 vol. Rhodes, James Ford. History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 to the McKinley-Bryan Campaign of 1896 (http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=24644891). Volume: 6 and 7, 1920. Sarna, Jonathan (2012). When General Grant Expelled the Jews (http://nextbookpress.com/books/248/ when-grant-expelled-the-jews/). New York, NY: Nextbook Press. ISBN978-0-8052-4279-9. Scaturro, Frank J. President Grant Reconsidered. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1998. Simpson, Brooks D., Let Us Have Peace: Ulysses S. Grant and the Politics of War and Reconstruction, 18611868. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991. Simpson, Brooks D. The Reconstruction Presidents. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998. Simpson, Brooks D. (2000). Ulysses S. Grant: Triumph Over Adversity, 18221865 (http://books.google.com/ ?id=LiXipzGjMxsC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Ulysses+S.+Grant,+18611864:+His+Rise+from+ Obscurity+to+Military+Greatness#v=onepage&q&f=false). Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin. ISBN0-395-65994-9. Simon, John Y. "Ulysses S. Grant". in Henry Graff, ed. The Presidents: A Reference History (2nd ed. 1997), pp.245260. Smith, Jean Edward (2001). Grant. New York, New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN0-684-84927-5.
Ulysses S. Grant Waugh, Joan (2009). U.S. Grant: American Hero, American Myth. The University of North Carolina Press. ISBN978-0-8078-3317-9. Historiography Skidmore, Max J. "The Presidency of Ulysses S. Grant: A Reconsideration". White House Studies. (Feb 2005) 5#2 pp 255270 Rafuse, Ethan S. "Still a Mystery? General Grant and the Historians, 1981-2006," Journal of Military History, (July 2007) 71#3 pp 849874, Wilentz, Sean (March 14, 2010). "Who's Buried in the History Books?" (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/ 14/opinion/14wilentz.html). The New York Times. Retrieved 11-04-2011. Wilson, Edmund. Patriotic Gore: Studies in the Literature of the American Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962). pp.131173 on Grant's Memoirs Military Badeau, Adam. Military History of Ulysses S. Grant, from April 1861, to April 1865 (http://books.google.com/ books?id=JeUDAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=inauthor:Badeau+inauthor:Adam&num=30& as_brr=0). New York: D. Appleton, 1881. Ballard, Michael B. Vicksburg, The Campaign that Opened the Mississippi. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004. ISBN 0-8078-2893-9. Bearss, Edwin C.. The Vicksburg Campaign. Dayton, Ohio: Morningside, 1991. ISBN 0-89029-308-2. Bonekemper III, Edward H. (2004). A Victor, Not a Butcher: Ulysses S. Grant's Overlooked Military Genius. Washington, DC: Regnery. ISBN0-89526-062-X. Bonekemper III, Edward H. (April, 2011). "The butcher's bill: Ulysses S. Grant is often referred to as a 'butcher,' but does Robert E. Lee actually deserve that title?". Civl War Times 52 (1): 3643. Carter, Samuel III. The Final Fortress: The Campaign for Vicksburg, 18621863. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980. Catton, Bruce. Grant Moves South. Boston: Little, Brown, 1960. ISBN 0-316-13207-1; Grant Takes Command. (1968). ISBN 0-316-13210-1; U. S. Grant and the American Military Tradition. 1954. Cavanaugh, Michael A., and William Marvel. The Petersburg Campaign: The Battle of the Crater: "The Horrid Pit," June 25 August 6, 1864. Lynchburg, Va.: H.E. Howard, 1989. Davis, William C. Death in the Trenches: Grant at Petersburg. Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 1986. popular Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Eicher, John H., and Eicher, David J. Civil War High Commands. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-8047-3641-3. Fuller, Maj. Gen. J. F. C.. Grant and Lee, a Study in Personality and Generalship. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957. ISBN 0-253-13400-5. Farina, William (2007). Ulysses S. Grant, 18611864: His Rise from Obscurity to Military Greatness (http:// books.google.com/?id=LiXipzGjMxsC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Ulysses+S.+Grant:+1861-1864& cd=1#v=onepage&q). Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Co. ISBN978-0-7864-2977-6. Isbell, Tim (2012-02-13). "Fort Donelson Victory Brings Forth 'Unconditional Surrender' Grant" (http://www. sunherald.com/2012/02/13/3750488/fort-donelson-victory-brings-forth.html). Sun Herald (Biloxi-Gulfport and South Mississippi). Retrieved 02-13-2012. Gott, Kendall D. Where the South Lost the War: An Analysis of the Fort Henry-Fort Donelson Campaign, February 1862. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2003. ISBN 0-8117-0049-6. Korda, Michael. Ulysses S. Grant: The Unlikely Hero. New York: Atlas Books/HarperCollins, 2004. Lewis, Lloyd. Captain Sam Grant. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1950. ISBN 0-316-52348-8. McWhiney, Grady. Battle in the Wilderness: Grant Meets Lee. Fort Worth: Ryan Place Publishers, 1995.
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Ulysses S. Grant McDonough, James Lee. Shiloh: In Hell Before Night. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1977. McDonough, James Lee. Chattanooga: A Death Grip on the Confederacy. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1984. McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. ISBN 0-19-503863-0. Maney, R. Wayne. Marching to Cold Harbor. Victory and Failure, 1864. Shippensburg, Pa., US: White Mane Pub. Co., 1994. Matter, William D. If It Takes All Summer: The Battle of Spotsylvania. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988. Miers, Earl Schenck. The Web of Victory: Grant at Vicksburg. New York: Knopf, 1955. Mosier, John. Grant. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006. ISBN 1-4039-7136-6. Rafuse, Ethan Sepp. "Still a Mystery? General Grant and the Historians, 19812006," Journal of Military History, Volume 71, Number 3, July 2007, pp.849874 in Project MUSE (http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ journal_of_military_history/v071/71.3rafuse.html) Rhea, Gordon C. The Battle of the Wilderness May 56, 1864. Louisiana State University Press, 1994. ISBN 0-8071-1873-7. Rhea, Gordon C. The Battles for Spotsylvania Court House and the Road to Yellow Tavern May 712, 1864. Louisiana State University Press, 1997. ISBN 0-8071-2136-3. Rhea, Gordon C. To the North Anna River: Grant and Lee, May 1325, 1864. Louisiana State University Press, 2000. ISBN 0-8071-2535-0. Rhea, Gordon C., Cold Harbor: Grant and Lee, May 26 June 3, 1864. Louisiana State University Press, 2002. ISBN 0-8071-2803-1. Schenker, Carl R., Jr. "Ulysses in His Tent: Halleck, Grant, Sherman, and 'The Turning Point of the War'". Civil War History (June 2010), vol. 56, no. 2, p.175. Simpson, Brooks D. "Continuous Hammering and Mere Attrition: Lost Cause Critics and the Military Reputation of Ulysses S. Grant". The Myth of the Lost Cause and Civil War History. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000. Simpson, Brooks D. "After Shiloh: Grant, Sherman, and Survival". The Shiloh Campaign. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2009. Steere, Edward. The Wilderness Campaign. Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Co., 1960. Walsh, George. "Whip the Rebellion": Ulysses S. Grant's Rise to Command (2005) 480pp ISBN 0-7653-0527-5; popular narrative Williams, Kenneth P. Lincoln Finds a General: A Military Study of the Civil War. New York, Macmillan, 1959 (volume 5). Williams, T. Harry, McClellan, Sherman and Grant. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1962. Woodworth, Steven E. Nothing but Victory: The Army of the Tennessee, 1861 1865. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005. ISBN 0-375-41218-2. Primary sources Simon, John Y. (1967-2012, 32 vol.). The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant (http://www.siupress.com/ (S(ncswkbmyrobsrw45bwtf1yqq))/catalog/ProductSearch.aspx?ExtendedSearch=false&SearchOnLoad=true& rhl=U S Grant Papers&sj=1009&rhdcid=1009). Southern Illinois University Press. Grant, Ulysses S. Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant (http://www.bartleby.com/1011/). C.L. Webster & Co., 1885. Wilson, Edmund. Patriotic Gore: Studies in the Literature of the American Civil War New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. pp.131173 for commentary Grant, Ulysses S. Memoirs and Selected Letters (Mary Drake McFeely & William S. McFeely, eds.) The Library of America (http://www.loa.org/), 1990. ISBN 978-0-940450-58-5
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Ulysses S. Grant Johnson, R. U., and Buel, C. C., eds. Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. 4 vols. New York, 188788. Porter, Horace. Campaigning with Grant. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1897. Sherman, William Tecumseh, Memoirs of General William T. Sherman. 2 vols. New York: D. Appleton, 1875. First Inaugural Address (http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/presiden/inaug/grant1.htm) Second Inaugural Address (http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/presiden/inaug/grant2.htm)
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External links
Ulysses S. Grant Association (http://library.msstate.edu/USGrant/) Miller Center of Public Affairs essays on Grant and cabinet members (http://www.millercenter.virginia.edu/ index.php/academic/americanpresident/grant) Ulysses S. Grant: A Resource Guide from the Library of Congress (http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ presidents/grant/index.html) Many rare General Grant photographs (http://www.empirenet.com/~ulysses/) Collection of US Grant Letters (http://www.familytales.org/results.php?tla=usg) Ulysses S. Grant's Memoirs (http://www.gutenberg.org/catalog/world/readfile?fk_files=1991454) Original Documents and Letters from Ulysses S. Grant (http://www.shapell.org/manuscript.aspx?169060) Shapell Manuscript Foundation Historic White Haven (Grant-Dent home) (http://www.nps.gov/ulsg/) Ulysses S. Grant Genealogy, Mississippi State University Library (http://library.msstate.edu/usgrant/ genealogy.asp) Animations of the Campaigns of Ulysses S. Grant (Forts Henry and Donelson, Shiloh, Vicksburg, Chattanooga, Overland, and Petersburg/Appomattox) (http://www.civilwaranimated.com/index.php/ulysses-s-grant) Ulysses S. Grant (http://americanpresidents.org/presidents/president.asp?PresidentNumber=18) at C-SPAN's American Presidents: Life Portraits Booknotes interview with Brooks D. Simpson on Ulysses S. Grant: Triumph Over Adversity, 1822-1865, July 16, 2000. (http://www.booknotes.org/Watch/157728-1/Brooks+Simpson.aspx) Booknotes interview with Mark Perry on Grant and Twain: The Story of a Friendship That Changed America, July 18, 2004. (http://www.booknotes.org/Watch/182749-1/Mark+Perry.aspx)
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foreigen power
France in the American Civil War
The French Empire remained officially neutral throughout the American Civil War and never recognized the Confederate States of America. However, several major industries in France and Emperor Napoleon III had economic interests or territorial ambitions which favored dealings with the Confederacy. At the same time, other French political leaders, such as Foreign Minister Edouard Thouvenel, favored the United States. Between 1861 and 1865, the Union blockade caused a significant decreasing of the French cotton importation, leading to the "famine du coton" (cotton hunger): textile industries of Alsace, Nord-Pas-de-Calais and Normandy suffered from this shortage of raw material (which doubled in price in 1862) and were forced to dismiss many workers.
As a result, many French industrialists and politicians were rather favorable to a quick Southern victory. Emperor Napolon III was also interested in Central America (trade and plans of a transoceanic canal) and wanted to create a new empire in Mexico, where his troops landed in December 1861. A Confederate victory would have likely made this plan easier. Further information: French intervention in Mexico William L. Dayton, who was appointed minister to France by President Lincoln, met the French Foreign Minister, Edouard Thouvenel, who was perceived to be pro-Union and was influential in dampening Napoleons initial inclination towards diplomatic recognition of Confederate independence. However, Thouvenel resigned from office in 1862. The Southern delegate in Paris, John Slidell, made offers to Napolon III : in exchange for a recognition of the Confederate States and naval help sent in New Orleans to break the blockade, the Confederacy would sell raw cotton to France[1]. Count Walewski and Eugne Rouher agreed with him, but British disapproval and, especially, the first Union military victories led French diplomacy to refuse this plan. In 1864, Napolon III sent his own dentist and confidant, the Philadelphian Thomas W. Evans, as an unofficial diplomat to Lincoln and U. S. Secretary of State William H. Seward. Evans convinced the Emperor that Southern defeat was impending. In keeping with its official neutrality, the French government blocked the sale of the ironclad CSS Stonewall prior to delivery to the Confederacy in February 1864 and resold this ship to the Royal Danish Navy as the Strkodder. The ship left Bordeaux on its shakedown cruise with a Danish crew in June 1864. However, the Danish refused to accept the ship due to price disagreements with the shipbuilder L'Arman[2] . L'Arman subsequently secretly resold the ship by January 1865 to the Confederacy while still at sea. France regained normal diplomatic relations with the United States in 1866, when Napolon III decided to withdraw his troops from Mexico.
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References
Footnotes
[1] Pierre Renouvin, Histoire des relations internationales, t.5, Paris, Hachette, 1994, II, pp. 601-606. [2] ^ Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume VII, Number 6. Richmond, Virginia: 1879. Pages 263280.
Bibliography
Case, Lynn M., and Warren E. Spencer. The United States and France: Civil War Diplomacy (1970) Blumenthal, Henry. A Reappraisal of Franco-American Relations, 1830-1871 (1959) Blumenthal, Henry. France and the United States: Their Diplomatic Relations (1970) Jordan, Donaldson, and Edwin J. Pratt. Europe and the American Civil War (2nd ed. 1969). chap. 13 Owsley, Frank L. King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign Relations of the Confederate States of America (1931), chap. 9 Pinkney, David H. "France and the Civil War," in Harold Hyman, ed. Heard Round the World (1969) Milza, Pierre (2004). Napolon III. Perrin. p.533. ISBN2-7028-9399-6. Sainlaude, Stve. The French Government and the Civil War, 1861-1865. The diplomatic action (2011) Sainlaude, Stve. France and the Confederacy, 1861-1865 (2011)
Confederate policies
The Confederacy, and its president Jefferson Davis, believed from the beginning that British dependence on cotton for its large textile industry would lead to diplomatic recognition and mediation or military intervention. Historian Charles Hubbard writes: Davis left foreign policy to others in government and, rather than developing an aggressive diplomatic effort, tended to expect events to accomplish diplomatic objectives. The new president was committed to the notion that cotton would secure recognition and legitimacy from the powers of Europe. The men Davis selected as secretary of state and emissaries to Europe were chosen for political and personal reasons not for their diplomatic potential. This was due, in part, to the belief that cotton could accomplish the Confederate
Britain in the American Civil War objectives with little help from Confederate diplomats.[4]
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U.S. policies
The Unions main goal in foreign affairs was maintain friendly relations and large scale trade with the world, and prevent any official recognition of the Confederacy by Britain or anyone else. Other concerns included preventing the Confederacy from buying foreign-made warships, plus the Free States gaining European support for policies against slavery, and attracting immigrant laborers, farmers and soldiers. There had been continuous improvement in Anglo-American relations throughout the 1850s. The issues of Oregon, Texas, and the Canadian border had all been resolved and trade was brisk. Secretary of State William H. Seward, the primary architect of American foreign policy during the war, intended to maintain the policy principles that had served the country well since the American Revolution non-intervention by the United States in the affairs of other countries and resistance to foreign intervention in the affairs of the United States and other countries in this hemisphere.[5]
British policies
Even before the war, British Prime Minister Viscount Palmerston urged a policy of neutrality. His international concerns were centered in Europe where he had to watch both Napoleon IIIs ambitions in Europe and Bismarcks rise in Germany. During the Civil War, British reactions to American events were shaped by past British policies and their own national interests, both strategically and economically. In the Western Hemisphere, as relations with the United States improved, Britain had become cautious about confronting the United States over issues in Central America. As a naval power, Britain had a long record of insisting that neutral nations abide by its blockades, a perspective that led from the earliest days of the war to de facto support for the Union blockade and frustration in the South. [6] Diplomatic observers were suspicious of British motives. The Russian Minister in Washington Eduard de Stoeckl noted, The Cabinet of London is watching attentively the internal dissensions of the Union and awaits the result with an impatience which it has difficulty in British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston disguising. De Stoeckl advised his government that Britain would recognize the Confederate States at its earliest opportunity. Cassius Clay, the United States Minister in Russia, stated, I saw at a glance where the feeling of England was. They hoped for our ruin! They are jealous of our power. They care neither for the South nor the North. They hate both.[7] Lincoln appointed Charles Francis Adams as minister to Britain. An important part of his mission was to make clear to the British that the war was strictly an internal insurrection affording the Confederacy no rights under international law. Any movement by Britain toward officially recognizing the Confederacy would be considered an unfriendly act toward the United States. Sewards instructions to Adams included the suggestion that it be made clear to Britain that
Britain in the American Civil War a nation with widely scattered possessions, as well as a homeland that included Scotland and Ireland, should be very wary of set[ting] a dangerous precedent.[8] Lord Lyons was appointed as the British minister to the United States in April 1859. An Oxford graduate, he had two decades of diplomatic experience before being given the American post. Lyons, like many British leaders, had reservations about Seward, reservations he shared freely in his correspondence which was widely circulated within the British government.[9][10] As early as January 7, 1861, well before the Lincoln administration had even assumed office, Lyons wrote to British Foreign Secretary Lord Russell about Seward: I cannot help fearing that he will be a dangerous foreign minister. His view of the relations between the United States and Britain had always been that they are a good material to make political capital of. ... I do not think Mr. Seward would contemplate actually going to war with us, but he would be well disposed to play the old game of seeking popularity here by displaying violence toward us.[11] Despite his distrust of Seward, throughout 1861 Lyons maintained a calm and measured diplomacy that contributed to a peaceful resolution to the Trent crisis.[12]
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Slavery
The Confederate States of America came into existence when seven of the 15 slave states protested the election of Republican president Lincoln, because his party had made clear its commitment to the containment of slavery geographically and the weakening of its political power. Republicans typically denounced the Slave Power. However slavery was the cornerstone of the South's plantation economy; yet it was repugnant to the moral sensibilities of most people in Britain, which had abolished slavery in its Empire in the 1830s. But up to the fall of 1862, the immediate end of slavery was not an issue in the war and in fact, some Union states (Kentucky, West Virginia, Maryland, Missouri, and Delaware) still allowed slavery. Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, by making ending slavery an objective of the war, had caused European intervention on the side of the South to be politically unappetizing. Pro-Southern leaders in Britain therefore spoke of mediation looking forward to peace, though they understood that meant the independence of the Confederacy and continuation of slavery.[13]
Britain in the American Civil War War was unlikely in any event, for the U.S. was providing Britain with over 40% of its wheat ("corn") imports during the war years, and suspension would have caused massive famine because Britain imported about 25-30% of its grain, and poor crops during 1861 and 1862 in France made Britain even more dependent on shiploads from New York. Britain's shortage of cotton was partially made up by imports from India and Egypt by 1863.[16] The Trent Affair led to the Lyons-Seward Treaty of 1862, an agreement to clamp down hard on the Atlantic slave trade, using the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy.
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Britain in the American Civil War final, conclusive Confederate triumph could be anticipated. The swift recession of the high Confederate tide was as visible in Britain as in America, and in the end Palmerston and Russell dropped any notion of bringing a mediation-recognition program before the cabinet.
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Confederate diplomacy
Once the war with the United States began, the best hope for the survival of the Confederacy was military intervention by Britain and France. The U.S. realized this as well and made it clear that recognition of the Confederacy meant war with the United States and the cutoff of food shipments into Britain. The Confederates who had believed in "King Cotton" that is, Britain had to support the Confederacy to obtain cotton for its industries were proven wrong. Britain, in fact, had ample stores of cotton in 1861 and depended much more on grain from the U.S.[20] During its existence, the Confederate government sent repeated delegations to Europe; historians do not give them high marks for diplomatic skills. James M. Mason was sent to London as Confederate minister to Queen Victoria, and John Slidell was sent to Paris as minister to Napoleon III. Both were able to obtain private meetings with high British and French officials, but they failed to secure official recognition for the Confederacy. Britain and the United States were at sword's point during the Trent Affair in late 1861. Mason and Slidell had been illegally seized from a British ship by an American warship. Queen Victoria's husband, Prince Albert, helped calm the situation, and Lincoln released Mason and Slidell, so the episode was no help to the Confederacy.[21] Throughout the early years of the war, British foreign secretary Lord Russell and Napoleon III, and, to a lesser extent, British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston, explored the risks and advantages of recognition of the Confederacy, or at least of offering a mediation. Recognition meant certain war with the United States, loss of American grain, loss of exports to the United States, loss of investments in American securities, potential loss of Canada and other North American colonies, higher taxes and a threat to the British merchant marine with little to gain in return. Many party leaders and the general public wanted no war with such high costs and meager benefits. Recognition was considered following the Second Battle of Manassas when the British government was preparing to mediate in the conflict, but the Union victory at the Battle of Antietam and Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, combined with internal opposition, caused the government to back away.[22] In 1863, the Confederacy expelled all foreign consuls (all of them British or French diplomats) for advising their subjects to refuse to serve in combat against the U.S.[23] Throughout the war all the European powers adopted a policy of neutrality, meeting informally with Confederate diplomats but withholding diplomatic recognition. None ever sent an ambassador or official delegation to Richmond. However, they applied international law principles that recognized the Union and Confederate sides as belligerents. Canada allowed both Confederate and Union agents to work openly within its borders.[24]
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Bibliography
Adams, Ephraim Douglass. Great Britain and the American Civil War (2 vol. 1925) online edition of 1958 reprint
[27]
Baxter, James P. 3rd. "Papers Relating to Belligerent and Neutral Rights, 1861-1865". American Historical Review Vol 34 No 1 (Oct 1928) in JSTOR [28] Baxter, James P. 3rd. "The British Government and Neutral Rights, 1861-1865." American Historical Review Vol 34 No 1 (Oct 1928) in JSTOR [29] Berwanger, Eugene H. The British Foreign Service and the American Civil War. (1994), the diplomats and consuls Blackett, R. J. M. Divided Hearts: Britain and the American Civil War (2001) 273pp Bourne Kenneth. Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815-1908. (1967) Bourne, Kenneth. British Preparations for War with the North, 1861-1862. The English Historical Review Vol 76 No 301 (Oct 1961) pp 600632 in JSTOR [30] Brauer, Kinley J. "The Slavery Problem in the Diplomacy of the American Civil War," Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Aug., 1977), pp.439469 in JSTOR [31] Brauer, Kinley J. "British Mediation and the American Civil War: A Reconsideration," Journal of Southern History, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Feb., 1972), pp.4964 in JSTOR [32] Campbell, Duncan Andrew, English Public Opinion and the American Civil War (2003) Cook Adrian. The Alabama Claims: American Politics and Anglo-American Relations, 1861-1872. (1975) Crook, David Paul. The North, the South, and the Powers, 1861-1865 (1974.) Crook, D. P. Diplomacy During the American Civil War. (1975). Duberman Martin B. Charles Francis Adams, 1807-1886 (1961) Ferris, Norman B. Desperate Diplomacy: William H. Seward's Foreign Policy, 1861. (1976) 265pp, scholarly study of 1861. Ferris, Norman B. The Trent Affair: A Diplomatic Crisis (1977) standard history Foreman, Amanda. A World on Fire: Britains Crucial Role in the American Civil War (Random House, 2011), 958 pp.
Britain in the American Civil War Geoffrey Wheatcroft, "How the British Nearly Supported the Confederacy," New York Times Sunday Book Review June 30, 2011 online [33] Gentry, Judith Fenner. "A Confederate Success in Europe: The Erlanger Loan," Journal of Southern History, Vol. 36, No. 2 (May, 1970), pp.157188 in JSTOR [34] Ginzberg, Eli. "The Economics of British Neutrality during the American Civil War," Agricultural History, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Oct., 1936), pp.147156 in JSTOR [35] Graebner, Norman A., Northern Diplomacy and European Neutrality in Why the North Won the Civil War edited by David Herbert Donald. (1960) ISBN 0-684-82506-6 (1996 Revision) Hubbard, Charles M. The Burden of Confederate Diplomacy (1998) 271pp Hyman, Harold Melvin. Heard Round the World; the Impact Abroad of the Civil War. (1969). Jenkins, Brian. Britain & the War for the Union. (2 vol 1974), by Canadian scholar Jones, Howard. Union in Peril: The Crisis over British Intervention in the Civil War (1992) Jones, Howard. Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom: the Union and Slavery in the Diplomacy of the Civil War, (1999) Jones, Wilbur Devereux. "The British Conservatives and the American Civil War," American Historical Review, Vol. 58, No. 3 (Apr., 1953), pp. 527-543 in JSTOR [36] Lester, Richard I. Confederate Finance and Purchasing in Great Britain. (1975).
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Lorimer, Douglas A. "The Role of Anti-Slavery Sentiment in English Reactions to the American Civil War," Historical Journal, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Jun., 1976), pp.405420 in JSTOR [37] Macdonald, Helen Grace. Canadian Public Opinion and the American Civil War (1926) Mahin, Dean B. One war at a time: The international dimensions of the American Civil War (Brassey's, 1999) Merli, Frank J. The Alabama, British Neutrality, and the American Civil War. (2004). 225 pp. Merli, Frank J. Great Britain and the Confederate Navy, 1861-1865 (1971) 360pp Morton, W. L. The Critical Years: The Union of British North America, 1857-1873 (1964), on Canada Nevins, Allan. "Britain, France and the War Issues." In Allan Nevins, The War for the Union: War Becomes Revolution, 1862-1863, (1960) pp.242274, excellent summary Owsley, Frank Lawrence. King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign Relations of the Confederate States of America (1931) Milne, A. Taylor. "The Lyons-Seward Treaty of 1862," American Historical Review, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Apr., 1933), pp.511525 in JSTOR [38] Taylor, John M. William Henry Seward: Lincoln's Right Hand (1991), 340pp; popular biography that praises Seward Van Deusen, Glyndon G. William Henry Seward (1967), standard biography. Warren, Gordon H. Fountain of Discontent: The Trent Affair and Freedom of the Seas (1981), 317pp, based on extensive archival work Winks Robin W. Canada and the United States: The Civil War Years. (1971).
References
[1] [2] [3] [4] http:/ / www. americancivilwar. org. uk/ news_css-alabama-crew-of-the-british-isles_32. htm Martin B. Duberman, Charles Francis Adams, 1807-1886 (1961) The Oxford Illustrated History of the British Army (1994) p. 135 Hubbard pg. 7. Hubbard further writes that Davis policy was a rigid and inflexible policy based on economic coercion and force. The stubborn reliance of the Confederates on a King Cotton strategy resulted in a natural resistance to coercion from the Europeans. Daviss policy was to hold back cotton until the Europeans came to get it. The opinions of Secretary of War Judah Benjamin and Secretary of the Treasury Christopher Memminger that cotton should be immediately exported in order to build up foreign credits was overridden by Davis. Hubbard pg. 21-25
[5] Jones (1992) pg. 2-3. Hubbard pg. 17. Mahin pg. 12 [6] Berwanger pg. 874. Hubbard pg. 18. Baxter, The British Government and Neutral Rights, pg. 9. Baxter wrote, ...the British government, while defending the rights of British merchants and shipowners, kept one eye on the precedents and the other on the future interests of the
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Background
When the American Civil War broke out on April 12, 1861 the newly formed Confederate States of America had no ships to speak of in its navy. In the months leading up to the war the the Confederate government was well aware of the naval supremacy of the north and sought the help of Great Britain, who had great interests throughout the plantations of the South.[3] The British became the primary ship builders and sources of supply for the Confederate government for the duration of the civil war. Several courses of action soon developed. The Confederacy was in dire need of many basic supplies, and without the resources of the industrial north it had to look to other venues for its supplies. Coming to their aid, an experienced and former U.S. naval captain, Raphael Semmes[4], devised a plan for which to thwart the naval supremacy of the North. He proposed a militia of privateers which would both strike at the North's merchant ships and which would provide supplies to the south by running the blockades. Confederate President Jefferson Davis approved of the plan. On April 15 President Lincoln issued his first proclamation, calling out 75,000 troops in response to the Confederate bombardment of Fort Sumter On April 17 Davis issued a proclamation, offering Letters of marque to anyone who would offer their ship in the service of the Confederacy.[5][6] To this end British investors were the most prolific in offering such aid. The North refused to recognize the sovereignty of the Confederacy along with its right to issue Letters of marque and in little time Lincoln responded on April 19 and issued a second proclamation, threatening the Confederacy with a blockade along its coastlines. i.e.Scott's Anaconda plan extended along the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico coastlines and up into the lower Mississippi River.[7] [8] Lincoln's proclamation also contained a threat that any actions against the Union by crews of ships acting under a Confederate letter of marque would be treated as pirates and subject to prosecution for such crimes, which usually called for the death penalty. In response Davis countered with threats of retaliation while the British also proclaimed its refusal to concur with Lincoln's proclamation in nearby Nassau and its territorial waters.[9][10][11] Soon after Lincoln announced the blockade, the profitable business of running supplies through the blockade to the Confederacy began. At first the actual blockade was slow to materialize as the task of patrolling thousands of miles
Blockade runners of the American Civil War of coastline was enormous - the blockade considered by some to be little more than a 'paper blockade'. Wilmington wasn't blockaded until July 14, 1861, three months after Lincoln's proclamation. [12] But soon Federal forces began to more effectively enforce the coastal blockade and established squadrons at the various Southern ports while also setting up roving patrols just outside British territorial waters in the Caribbean, most notably in the Bahamas. As the risk of capture or destruction increased amateur blockade runners began to cease operations with most of the trade now being handled by courageous sea captains who were soon using specially made steamers that allowed them to evade or out run Union ships on blockade patrol.[13][14]
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Union Blockade
Realizing the war would not be won quickly with a couple of decisive battles the Union military strategy was designed by General Winfield Scott who developed a naval strategy would play a crucial role. It was Scott who devised the famous Anaconda plan that employed a naval blockade around the coastline of the Confederacy with the idea of adversely effecting its economy and supply lines. Because of the thousands of miles of coastline with its many rivers, bays and inlets, the blockade proved largely ineffectual during the first couple of years of the war.[15] [16] This allowed blockade runners to import military supplies to the 1861 characterized map of Scott's blockade plan. Confederacy with relative ease. Deliveries of armaments and military supplies to the South and cotton to England, were coordinated by military agents like Major Walker, who played a key role for the Confederacy. Walker also served as fiscal agent.[17] Lincoln's proclamation raised issues with England and other powers relating to international law. [18] In the midst of a naval blockade the Confederacy received an almost steady supply of arms and other goods from Europe along with mail. At the same time it was exporting cotton and other commodities to France and England whose textile industries were greatly dependent on these southern exports. Out going runners would also carry mail. [19][20] During the course of the civil war most of the attempts to run the blockade succeeded, but as the months passed the captains and crews on blockade patrol became more seasoned and grew wiser to the various tactics employed by blockade runners. During the last two years of the war the only vessels capable of getting though the blockade were the blockade runners that were specifically designed for speed. [21][22] During the first year of the war the southern ports in the Gulf of Mexico experienced a great deal of blockade running activity. In the first ten months New Orleans, the largest cotton port in the world, gave port to more than 300 blockade runners. When New Orleans fell to Union forces on April 25, 1862 the center for blockade running activity shifted to Mobile, Alabama. With New Orleans and the Mississippi river secured the blockade efforts along the Gulf coast were greatly increased, forcing blockade runners to use the port at Galveston. When Mobile came under siege in the Summer of 1864, all activity there moved to Galveston. Blockade runners there were now using Havana as a stopover point for transferring cargoes to and from neutral ships.[23]
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The same urgent demand for military ordnance and supplies was dispatched to Richmond from every military center throughout the south. Because of the incursions of the Union Army the Confederate navy was also in very short supply of coal, the only sources being located in North Carolina and Alabama.[29] At this time the Confederate government depended almost entirely on privately owned blockade runners. However the Confederacy had enough foresight to realize that it needed its own vessels bringing in supplies. Acting for the Confederate Navy Department James Bulloch began procuring vessels in Europe, most notably the Fingal which made its famous run into Savannah carrying 10 thousand Enfield rifles, 1 million cartridges, 2 million percussion caps, 400 barrels of powder along with swords, revolvers and other military supplies.[30]
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Central figures
Coordinating the business affairs of the Confederacy with shipbuilders, purchasing agents, suppliers and shippers in Liverpool, Nassau, Wilmington and other ports involved the concerted efforts of a number of notable men and shipping companies. Foremost in this effort was Major Josiah C. Gorgas and Fraser, Trenholm and Company who worked closely with Gorgas and Confederate Naval Secretary and other agents of the Confederacy.[31] Josiah C. Gorgas Because the south lacked the industrial resources of the North it was forced to seek military supplies from other, often overseas, sources. Blockade runners became the chief means of supplying the blockaded Confederacy. Ships of the Confederate Navy used for running the blockaded were employed by Confederate Chief of Ordnance, Major Josiah C. Gorgas, a West Point graduate of 1841 who prior to the war had worked in the United States Ordnance Bureau and who served in nearly every arsenal in the nation. While working in the south he became sympathetic to the secessionist movement and eventually sided with the Confederacy, becoming the head of the Confederate Ordnance Bureau. Gorgas liaised with Charles Prioleau who headed Trenholm's Liverpool office, arranging for the shipping of arms and other supplies to the Confederacy. Most of the arms sent to the Confederacy departed from Liverpool. During the summer of 1861 Gorgas stockpiled Major Josiah C. Gorgas supplies and prepared his first load of cargo while Trenholm company procured a suitable ship for the voyage. A 1,200 ton iron-hulled steamer, the Bermuda, was chosen to make the voyage.[32] Caleb Huse To coordinate the business and the buying of weapons and supplies in England Gorgas relied on agents Captain Caleb Huse and Major Edward C. Anderson. Under Gorgas' direction Huse served as an arms procurement agent and purchasing specialist, well known for his successful acquisition of weapons contracts with various European nations including the United Kingdom and Austria, among others. Anderson was also sent to aid Huse and check on his activity.[33] Huse arranged the sale and procurement of rifles and other ordnance from the London Armoury Company which became the chief supplier of arms to the Confederacy throughout the war. By February 1863 the Armoury had shipped over 70,000 rifles to the Confederacy.[32][34] Huse was also owner of several seagoing steamers used in blockade running and made several trips to Europe and back aboard these vessels.[35] While in Europe Huse represented the Confederate War Dept and Ordnance Bureau throughout the entire war and also arranged for credit and the shipping of supplies when funds were short.[36] These men also acted as liaisons with Charles Prioleau of Trenholm company in Liverpool, England. Through him they would procure the ships and arrange for the shipment of these goods to the Confederacy. Bulloch would work in close correspondence with Confederate Secretary of the Navy Stephen Mallory in the procurement of several British made blockade running vessels.[32][37] James Dunwoody Bulloch, the half-brother of the a notable CSA officer, Irvine Bulloch, was the Confederacy's chief foreign agent in Great Britain. Inside two months after the attack on Fort Sumter, Bulloch arrived at Liverpool where he established his base of operations. As his first order of business he made contact with Confederate Commissioners the Hon. William Yancy and the Hon. Dudly Mann in London. After being welcomed they discussed the diplomatic situation as they had not been officially received by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as the Confederate government had not permanently established themselves as an independent foreign power. [38] Bulloch then established a relationship with the shipping firm of Fraser & Trenholm where he arranged a conference with Fraser-Trenholm officials who were the designated financial agents of the new Confederate government. [39] They arranged the buying and selling of cotton and were ultimately responsible for shipping approximately seven-eights of all the cotton exported from the Confederate States during the war.[40] Bulloch also arranged for the building and purchase of the Florida, the Alabama and the Shenandoah. He also commissioned a shipbuilder in France to construct the Stonewall, an armored ram.[41]
Blockade runners of the American Civil War John Newland Maffitt On 11 April 1862, George W. Randolph, the new Confederate Secretary of War appointed John Maffitt, a notorious privateer with a long success record, to be the acting agent in Nassau for the Confederacy. Nassau was one of several off shore stopover points for shipments coming into or leaving the Confederate States. Maffitt's duties were broad. "You are authorized to take entire control of all vessels loaded with arms and munitions for the Confederate States." Maffitt's duties included selecting ports of entry and discharging and replacing officers and crews as needed. His only condition was that he first confer with Louis Heylinger, Confederate agent in Nassau.[42]
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Blockade runners
The ships employed in blockade-running were almost all privately owned, many of them British or French built. The Confederate government only had about eleven ships of its own that were employed in the blockade-running effort. Among the most famous blockade runners was the CSS Robert E. Lee an English built iron-hulled, steamer which was eventually captured by Union forces in 1863 [43] and the privately owned Syren which made a record 33 successful runs through the Union blockade.[44] [45] The blockade runners had a specific function in the handling of cargoes headed for the Confederacy. CS Ella & Annie Purchases of supplies made in England were first shipped to Nassau in the bottoms of British vessels where the cargoes would be transferred to blockade runners, ships of lighter draft and greater speed. From Nassau they would make their way to Wilmington, Charleston and Savannah. Lewis Heylinger of New Orleans was the agent and representative in Nassau for the Confederacy throughout the war. His job was to coordinate the transferring of cargoes arriving from England to the blockade runners and then arrange for shipping to the Confederacy. [46][47] The first outbound blockade runner to elude the blockade made its way to Nassau, landing there on December 5, 1861. Blockade runners would typically export cotton to Nassau where it would be stored, then transferred to a neutral ship and sent to England, usually Liverpool.[32] By the end of the war, 397 ships sailed from the Confederacy to Nassau, and 588 went from Nassau to the Confederacy.[48] Often times vessels departing from various ports in Bermuda ran to Wilmington and Charleston from where most of the supplies were then shipped by rail to Augusta, the main depot for the Western armies, or to Richmond, the main eastern depot. Imports shipped to Galveston were also sent by rail to Houston. By 1863 Union attacks along the Confederate coast made running the Wilmington on the Cape Fear River blockade more difficult, forcing blockade runners to use other ports besides those at Wilmington, Charleston and Savannah. After the capture of New Orleans in 1862 the ports in Mobile and Galveston were the next choice, used in conjunction with the port in Havana as a transfer point. [49] [23]
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Unlike Charleston and Savannah, Wilmington was the central depot for blockade runners throughout the most of the civil war. The union made several attempts to stop the ships coming and going but it proved to be a great and futile effort as the blockade runners were built for speed. This was made plainly evident on December 23, 1864 when the largest Union fleet ever to assemble in the Atlantic attacked Fort Fisher a massive fortification protecting the Cape Fear River entrance and Wilmington. While the fleet of 125 Men-of-war and transports were blockading the harbor an incoming blockade runner tactfully passed through the fleet and took refuge up river. The last blockade runner to make its way into Wilmington's port was the SS Wild Rover, on January 5. The fort was attacked a second time on January 13, 1865 and after a two day siege was captured on January 15 by the Union Army and Navy. [50] Several blockade runners previously docked up river managed to escape in the midst of battle. Prior to the capture of the fort Rear Admiral Porter in command of the eastern flotilla wrote to the war department, "Blockade running seems almost as brisk as ever, the new class of blockade runners are very fast and sometimes come in an play around our vessels, they are built entirely for speed.[51] Eventually, Union attacks were also being made along the Bermuda coast, where Union men-of-war ships often seized neutral vessels and their cargoes. This outraged Lewis Heyliger who was appointed by the Treasury of the Confederacy as head of the "depository" of Confederate funds in Nassau. Among his chief duties was to arrange and coordinate shipments of cotton and tobacco to England and to organize and conduct the purchase of incoming cargoes.[52] [53]
Charleston Harbor
Soon after Lincoln's proclamation blockade-runners were being produced, lighter vessels specifically designed to evade and outrun Union ships on blockade patrol. Many of the vessels were built in English ship yards and were designed to be used as fast transports for dispatch purposes, carrying important (often business) correspondence and light cargoes. Inbound vessels carried general mail and other correspondence and typically imported firearms, military ordnance, and paper, a simple commodity that was scarce throughout the agrarian south and badly needed by the Confederate government and general population. On the return trips to Nassau or Bermuda, stopover ports for cargoes coming from or destined for England, they would also carry mail and most often exported cotton and tobacco, commodities that brought a great price in Europe.[54] The Confederate Navy had a small number of its own seagoing ships used in blockade running efforts, but most of the ships employed were privately owned vessels. Many of these ships were built and designed in England by various shipping companies and other interested parties for the express purpose of getting through the blockade quickly. The ships that emerged from this enterprise were all side-wheel steamers, long and narrow vessels with a shallow draft allowing them to cut through the water more efficiently. Many were painted a dark gray color so they
Blockade runners of the American Civil War would blend in better with the backdrop of the night sea. A few ships were painted white to help obscure their profile against the daytime horizon. While crossing great expanses of ocean the steamers would burn normal coal that produced a dark smoke but when the were about to approach land they would often switch to burning a smokeless anthracite coal which greatly reduced their profile along the horizon. Sometimes these ships would use cotton soaked in turpentine as fuel as it gave off little smoke and produced intense heat that resulted in a marked increase in ship's speed.[55][56] The first Confederate blockade runner left Charleston and arrived at Nassau on December 5, 1861 with 144 bales of cotton. The trip between Charleston and Nassau took a first-class steamer approximately 48 hours to complete, taking another three days to unload and load again and to recoal. [51]
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Among some the notable blockade runners were privately owned vessels like the Syren, a 169-foot (52 m) steel-hulled sidewheel steamer that made a record 33 successful runs through the Union blockade.[44][45] and the CSS Advance that completed more than 20 successful runs before being captured.[58] SS Syren : The Syren was a privately owned iron-hulled sidewheel steamer, built at Greenwich, Kent, England in 1863 and designed for outrunning and evading the vessels on Union blockade patrol. Owned by the Charleston Importing and Exporting Company, the Syren made her first run on 5 November 1863, running supplies from Nassau to Wilmington. The Syren completed a record 33 runs through the blockade, the most of any blockade runner.[44][59] The steamers Syren, along with Celt, Deer and Lady Davis, were captured in Charleston harbor at the Ashley River where she had successfully run in through the blockade the night before, on February 18, 1865. [60] See also: Wilmington, North Carolina in the American Civil War. CSS Robert E. Lee : A schooner-rigged, iron-hulled, paddle-steamer of the Confederate Navy, used as a blockade runner, commanded by Lieutenant Richard H. Gayle. Captured 9 November 1863 off the coast of North Carolina by USS James Adger and USS Iron Age.[61][62] SS Tristram Shandy : An iron-hulled sidewheel steamer completed in 1864 at Greenock, Scotland, used as a blockade runner, captured 15 May 1864 by the USS Kansas.[63] CSS Advance : A side-wheel steamer, built at Greenock, Scotland, in 1862, purchased by the CSA (North Carolina [64] under the name Lord Clyde in 1863, renamed Advance for running Union blockade. Vessel made 20 blockade runs before its capture on 10 September 1864 by USS Santiago de Cuba off Wilmington, North Carolina. Renamed USS Frolic in 1865.[65] CSS General Sumter : A 437-ton screw steamer cruiser, was built at Philadelphia as the merchant steamship Habana Purchased by the Confederate Government at New Orleans in April 1861, she was converted to a cruiser and placed under the command of Raphael Semmes. While coaling and getting supplies at Martinique she was blockaded by Federal sloop of war Iroquois, but ran the blockaded and made her way out to sea. Sumter captured
Blockade runners of the American Civil War another six ships from late November into January 1862, while cruising in European waters.[66] In January 1862 the Sumter was sent to Gibraltar but was unexpectedly captured by Federal men-of-war ships and was later sold, thus ending her career as a blockade-runner.[67] CSS Florida Commissioned 17 August 1862 at Green Cay, Bahamas. Commanded by Capt. John Newland Maffitt. Sailed to Cardenas and Havana, Cuba before making the famous run into Mobile Bay, Alabama on 4 September 1862.[68][69] The Lynx, a 220' steel hull sidewheel steamer, made 9 successful blockade runs, owned by Fraser Trenholm & Co., destroyed trying to leave Wilmington, 25 September 1864.[17] CSS Flamingo, three stacked, sloop rigged steamer, used by Confederate Navy as a blockade runner. One of the largest types of blockade running vessels operating out of ports in England that carried high priority cargoes.[37] CSS Kate 165' wooden sidewheel steamer of 477 tons, made 20 successful blockade runs. Built in New York and purchased by John Fraser & Co, it eventually ran aground at Cape Fear, 18 November 1862.[70][71] The Laurel, a 207' iron hull single screw steamer, commanded by Lt. John F. Ramsey, CSN, made 1 successful blockade run as CSS vessel, owned by the CSA, renamed Confederate States and survived the war.[72] CS Eagle a Spofford & Tileston steamship.[73]
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Less notable
Notes
[1] Tans, 1995 p.24 [2] Homser, 1913 pp.163-165 [3] Bulloch, 1884 p.2 [4] Some historians spell it as 'Semines'Evans, 1899 p.100 [5] Cooper, 2001 p.366 [6] Scharf, 1894 pp.53-54 [7] Sandburg, 1954 p.234 [8] Merli, 1970 p.236 [9] Merli, 1970 p.48 [10] Jones. 1992 p.22 [11] Semmes, 1869 p.83 [12] Frajola, 2012 p.2 [13] Merli, 1970 p.236 [14] Shingleton, 1994 p.39 [15] Tans, 1995 p.1 [16] Though the Union Navy was slow to meet the needs of the blockade it is generally accepted that if it was not for its presence at various battles, along with the blockade it had imposed on the Confederacy, that the Union would have lost the war.Bennett, 1897 p.196 When the Union troops were not coordinated with the Union navy they often found themselves in retreat. i.e.George McClellan was forced to retreat from Richmond and seek protection along the James River under the guns of the naval vessels there; Without the naval presence on the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers General Pope's flanks were pushed back by Stonewall Jackson as Confederate troop movement went unabated at the Battle of Cedar Mountain. [17] Frajola, 2012 p.12 [18] Jones. 1992 p.47 [19] Scharf, 1894 p.v-vi [20] Tans, 1995 p.26 [21] Merli, 1970 p.246 [22] Bulloch, 1884 p.57 [23] Tans, 1995 p.13 [24] Soley, 1885 p.182 [25] Konstam, Bryan, 2004 p.11 [26] Wise, 1991 pp.46-47 [27] Spencer p.6 [28] Wise, 1991 p.47
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[51] Stark, 1891 pp.97-98 [52] Wise, 1991 p.133 [53] Peters, 1939 p.16 [54] Herbert, 1894 p.53 [55] Tans, 1995 p.19 [56] Herbert, 1894 p.46 [57] Officers of CSS Sumter, first Confederate ship put to sea. Lieuts. John M. Kell, Robert T. Chapman, John M. Stribling, William E. Evans, paymaster Henry Myers, Suergon Francis L. Galt, Midshipman William A. Hicks, Richard F. Armstrong, Albert G. Hudgins, John F. Holden and Joseph D. Wilson; Lieut. of Marines B.K. Howell; Engineers Miles J. Freeman, William P. Brooks, Matthew O'Brian and Simeon W. Cummings; Boatswain Benjamin P.McCaskey; Gunner J.O.Cuddly; Sailmaker W.P.Beaufort, Carpenter William Robinson and Captain's clerk Breedlove Smith.Evans, 1899 p.100 [58] Wyllie, 2007 p.22 [59] Frajola, 2012 p.6 [60] "Civil War Naval History" (http:/ / www. historycentral. com/ navy/ cwnavalhistory/ February1865. html). History Central . . Retrieved 17 May 2012. [61] Wyllie, 2007 p.196 [62] Wilkinson, 1877 p.65 [63] U.S.Navy, DANFS, Tristram Shandy, page article [64] Coulter, 1950 p.292 [65] U.S.Navy, DANFS, Advance, page article [66] U.S.Navy, DANFS, CSS General Sumter page article [67] Homser, 1913 p.109 [68] Walske, 2011 p.4 [69] Ellis, Article [70] Walske, 2011 p.17 [71] Frajola, 2012 p.4 [72] Frajola, 2012 p.8 [73] Walske, 2011 p.2 [74] Walske, 2011 p.3 [75] Walske, 2011 p.9 [76] Walske, 2011 p.21 [77] Walske, 2011 p.22 [78] Walske, 2011 p.25 [79] Walske, 2011 p.30 [80] Walske, 2011 p.31
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References Bibliography
Bennett, Frank M. (1897). The steam navy of the United States:. Warren & Company Publishers, Philadelphia. pp.502. ISBN10:1176467921. Url1 (http://books.google.com/ books/about/The_steam_navy_of_the_United_States.html?id=VYgDAAAAYAAJ) Url2 (http://www.archive. org/stream/cu31924030755361/cu31924030755361_djvu.txt) Dept U.S.Navy. SHIPS of the CONFEDERATE STATES. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY -- NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER. Confederate Congress, 1861-1865 (1905). Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States of America, 1861-1865. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington. pp.917. Url (http://books.google.com/ books?id=j1QrAQAAMAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s) Cooper, William J. (2001). Jefferson Davis, American. Random House Digital, Inc. pp.848. ISBN0-394-56916-4. Url (http://books.google.com/books?id=j05vwNRXi-0C&vq=blockade&dq=jefferson+ davis&source=gbs_navlinks_s) Coulter, Ellis Merton (1994, 7th printing) [1950]. The Confederate States of America, 1861-1865. Louisiana State University Press. pp.644. ISBN0-8071-0007-2. Url (http://books.google.com/ books?id=Z2_ZM0dWVrsC&vq=blockade&dq=Ellis+Merton+Coulter&source=gbs_navlinks_s) Donald, David Herbert (1996). Lincoln. Simon and Schuster, New York. pp.714. ISBN13: 978-0684825359. Url (http://books.google.com/ books?id=fuTY3mxs9awC&vq="blockade+runner"&source=gbs_navlinks_s) Ellis, John E.. "CONFEDERATE STATES NAVY, MUSEUM, LIBRARY & RESEARCH INSTITUTE" (http:/ /www.csnavy.org/index.htm). Confederate States Navy Research Library, Mobile, Alabama. Retrieved 10 April 2012. Evans, Clement Anselm (1899). Confederate military history: a library of Confederate States history, Volume 12. Confederate publishing company. pp.403. Url (http://books.google.com/books?id=3MFYAAAAMAAJ& source=gbs_navlinks_s) Frajola, Richard (2011). "Tales from the Blockade" (http://www.rfrajola.com/blockade/Blockades.pdf). Richard Frajola. pp.16. Retrieved 5 May 2012. Heidler, David Stephen & Jeanne T.; Coles, David J. (2002). Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History. W. W. Norton & Company, New York. pp.2733. ISBN0-393-04758-x. Url (http://books.google.com/books?id=SdrYv7S60fgC&dq=blockade+runner+syren& source=gbs_navlinks_s) Hosmer, James Kendall (1913). The American civil war, Volume 2. Harper & Brothers Publishers, New York, London. pp.351. Url1 (http://books.google.com/ books?id=odpMJbrtjgsC&source=gbs_navlinks_s) Jones, Howard (1992). Union in Peril: The Crisis Over British Intervention in the Civil War. University of North Carolina Press Press. pp.300. Url (http://books.google.com/books?id=D0g24cxFMj4C& dq=Union+Blockade&source=gbs_navlinks_s) Katcher, Philip R. N. (2003). The Army of Northern Virginia: Lee's Army in the American Civil War, 1861-1865. Fitzroy Dearborn, New York. pp.352. ISBN1-57958-331-8. Url (http://books.google.com/ books?id=AW8SV0g7eKYC&dq="London+Armoury+Company"&source=gbs_navlinks_s)
Blockade runners of the American Civil War Konstam, Angus; Bryan, Tony (2004). Confederate Blockade Runner 1861-65. Osprey Publishing, Wisconsin. pp.48. Url (http://books.google.com/books?id=pO8VeEgAk0QC& source=gbs_navlinks_s) MacDonald, John (2009). The Historical Atlas of the Civil War. Chartwell Books, New York. pp.400. ISBN13:978-07858-2703-0. Url (http://books.google.com/books/ about/The_Historical_Atlas_of_the_Civil_War.html?id=3fo1bwAACAAJ) McNeil, Jim (2003). Masters of the Shoals: Tales of the Cape Fear Pilots Who Ran the Union Blockade. Da Capo Press. pp.188. ISBN0-306-81280-0. Url (http://books.google.com/books?id=SdrYv7S60fgC&dq=blockade+ runner+syren&source=gbs_navlinks_s) Merli, Frank J. (1970). Great Britain and the Confederate Navy, 1861-1865. Indiana University Press, Indiana. pp.342. ISBN0-253-21735-0. Url (http://books.google.com/ books?id=_13gYH6v4jUC&vq=captured&source=gbs_navlinks_s) Peters, Thelma Peterson (1939). The Bahamas and Blockade-running During the American Civil War. Duke University, North Carolina. pp.145. ISBN1-57958-331-8. Url (http://books.google.com/books/about/ The_Bahamas_and_blockade_running_during.html?id=ADZHXwAACAAJ) Url2 (http://digitalcollections.fiu. edu/tequesta/files/1945/45_1_02.pdf) Sandburg, Carl (1954). Abraham Lincoln. Galahad Books, New York. pp.762. ISBN0-88365-832-1. Url (http://www.amazon.com/ Abraham-Lincoln-Prairie-Years-War/dp/0156027526) Shingleton, Royce (1994). High Seas Confederate: The Life and Times of John Newland Maffitt. University of South Carolina Press. pp.160. ISBN0-87249-986-3. Url (http://books.google.com/ books?id=prYkRhyTPJ8C&source=gbs_navlinks_s) Soley, James Russell (1885). The Blockade And The Cruisers. Digital Scanning Inc. pp.276. ISBN1-58218-556-5. Url (http://books.google.com/ books?id=eEWQKoSf3f4C&vq=siren&source=gbs_navlinks_s) Spencer, Warren F. (1997). The Confederate Navy in Europe. University of Alabama Press Press. pp.288. ISBN0-87249-986-3. Url (http://books.google.com/ books?id=x1jXQ2vMoI8C&vq=Georgiana&source=gbs_navlinks_s) Stark, James H. (1891). Stark's history and guide to the Bahama Islands. Duke University, North Carolina. pp.243. Url (http://books.google.com/books/about/ The_Bahamas_and_blockade_running_during.html?id=ADZHXwAACAAJ) Tans, Jochem H. (1995). The Hapless Anaconda: Union Blockade 1861-1865. The Concord Review, Inc.. pp.30. Url (http://www.tcr.org/tcr/essays/CB_Blockade.pdf) U.S.Congress, 1893-1894 (1895). Congressional edition, Volume 3267, Issue 1. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington. pp.989. Url (http:// books.google.com/books?id=j1QrAQAAMAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s) Wagner, Gary W.; McPherson, James M. (2006). The Library of Congress Civil War Desk Reference. Simon and Schuster Inc., New York, 2006.. pp.976. ISBN978-1-4391-6. Url1 (http://books.google.com/ books?id=yBVCAAAAIAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s) Url2 (http://www.amazon.com/ s?search-alias=stripbooks&field-isbn=158544152X) Walske, Steve (2011). Civil War Blockade Mail: 1861 - 1865. Steve Walske Exhibition at WESTPEX 2011. pp.32. Url (http://www.rfrajola.com/swwestpex/swblock.pdf) Wise, Stephen R. (1991). Lifeline of the Confederacy: Blockade Running During the Civil War. Univ of South Carolina Press. pp.403. Url (http://books.google.com/books/about/
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Blockade runners of the American Civil War Lifeline_of_the_Confederacy.html?id=_kq7diciSsQC) Wyllie, Arthur (2007). The Union Navy. Lulu.com. pp.668. ISBN978-1-4303-2117-0. Url1 (http://books. google.com/books?id=EnSAlDbRcyIC&source=gbs_navlinks_s) (2007). Confederate Officers. Lulu.com. pp.580. ISBN978-0-615-17222-4. Url1 (http://books.google.com/ books?id=867sVhrVSzUC&source=gbs_navlinks_s) (2007). The Confederate States Navy. Lulu.com. pp.466. ISBN978-0-615-17222-4. Url1 (http://books.google. com/books?id=Nk9qsEI4XpAC&source=gbs_navlinks_s) Url2 (http://www.amazon.com/ Confederate-States-Navy-Arthur-Wyllie/dp/1430302577)
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Primary Sources
Bulloch, James Dunwody (1884). The secret service of the Confederate States in Europe, or, How the Confederate cruisers were equipped. G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York. pp.460. Url (http://books.google.com/ books?id=mg8pAAAAYAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s) Daniels, Josephus, Secretary of the Navy; Marsh, C.C., Captain, U.S.Navy, retired (1921). Official records of the Union and Confederate navies in the War of the Rebellion. Government Printing Office, United States. Naval War Records Office, United States. Office of Naval Records and Library. pp.276. ISBN1-58218-556-5. Url (http://books.google.com/ books?id=vTRAAAAAYAAJ&dq="lady+sterling"&source=gbs_navlinks_s) Gorgas, Josiah (1995). Sarah Woolfolk Wiggins. ed. The Journals of Josiah Gorgas, 1857-1878. University of Alabama Press. pp.305. ISBN0-8071-0007-2. Url (http://books.google.com/ books?id=Z2_ZM0dWVrsC&vq=blockade&dq=Ellis+Merton+Coulter&source=gbs_navlinks_s) Herbert, H.A.; Woods, Robert H. (1896). Official records of the Union and Confederate navies in the war of the rebellion (2). Government Printing Office, Washington; Hon.H.A. Herbert, Secretary of the Navy; Lieut. Richard Bush, USN, Superintendent Naval War records. pp.252. Url (http://books.google.com/ books?id=xTXw8uLuAbkC&vq="blockade+runner"&source=gbs_navlinks_s) Scharf, John Thomas (1894). History of the Confederate States navy from its organization to the surrender of its last vessel:. Joseph McDonough, Albany, N.Y.. pp.824. ISBN1-58544-152-X. Url1 (http://books.google.com/ books?id=rTMOAAAAIAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s) Url2 (http://www.archive.org/stream/ cu31924032779625#page/n7/mode/2up) Semmes, Raphael (1864). The Cruise of the Alabama and the Sumter. Digital Scanning, Inc., Mass. pp.348. ISBN1-58218-355-4. ISBN 1-58218-353-8 Url (http://books.google. com/books?id=uBbhsAs2sWwC&dq=subject:"History"+"civil+war"+-spanish+-russian+-bosnia&lr=& as_brr=1&source=gbs_navlinks_s) . (1869). Memoirs of service afloat: during the war between the states. Kelly, Piet & Co., Baltimore. pp.833. ISBN1-58218-556-5. Url (http://books.google.com/books/about/ Memoirs_of_service_afloat.html?id=geASAAAAYAAJ) Wilkinson, John (1877). The Narrative of a Blockade-Runner. Sheldon & Company, New York. pp.252. Url1 (http://www.manybooks.net/titles/wilkinsonj2197721977-8. html) Url2 (http://confederatereprint.com/product_info.php?products_id=200)
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Further reading
Hearn, Chester G. (1992). Gray raiders of the sea: how eight Confederate warships destroyed the Union's high seas commerce. International Marine Pub.,. pp.351. ISBN0-393-04758-x. Url (http://books.google.com/ books/about/Gray_raiders_of_the_sea.html?id=Pe52AAAAMAAJ) Woodworth, Steven E. (1996). The American Civil War: A Handbook of Literature and Research. Greenwood Publishing Group. pp.754. ISBN1-57958-331-8. Url (http://books.google.com/books?id=rb3ANWoZt1YC& source=gbs_navlinks_s)
External links
US NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER, Ships of the Confederate States (http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/ sh-us-cs/csa-sh/csa-name.htm) Smithsonian Institution: Blockade mail (http://arago.si.edu/index.asp?con=2&cmd=1&id=168328&img=1& pg=1)
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License
Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported //creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/