Ars Disputandi

Volume 7 (2007)
issN: 15665399
Alan G. Phillips, Jr.
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An Incomplete Diagnosis
John Dewey and the Origin of Evil
Abstract
In this discussion note, I examine scattered comments about evil from John Deweys
works. After a brief consideration of what critics like Reinhold Niebuhr have said
about the weaknesses of Deweys theodicy, I will oer my own critique. In short, I
argue that Dewey subverts his own theory of inquiry when he comes to the
problem of the origin and genesis of evil.
[1]
In his book How We Think, John Dewey outlines the general steps in-
volved in the act of problem-solving. At one point, his discussion of this process
focuses on an analogy with medicine where doctors take the time to diagnose
the illnesses of patients before proceeding with treatment regimens. For Dewey,
the diagnostic phase of problem solving is an important part of any complete act
of thought. He points out, In the case of a physician this proceeding is known
as diagnosis, but a similar inspection is required in every novel and complicated
situation to prevent rushing to a conclusion.
1
[2]
Despite Deweys emphasis on this important stage in his theory of
inquiry, there seem to be a whole species of situations that he exempts from his
general approach to problem solving. At times, he conjures these problematic
situations away, baptizing them as pseudo-problems divorced from the world
of thought and action. Unfortunately, many of these so-called pseudo-problems
impinge on human life and existence in signicant ways that make them hard to
dismiss or ignore.
[3]
One example I have in mind here concerns the many past attempts to
diagnose the origin and cause of evil in problematic situations. As noted by many
authors bothbefore andafter Deweys era, this liberal Americanphilosopher often
evaded general attempts to diagnose and discern evil beyond his personal faith
in problem solving and the constraints of a benecent, democratic community.
However, proceeding beyond these authors, I shall argue that John Dewey skirted
his own ideal of diagnosis when confronted with competing explanations and
etiologies of the source and origin of evil in human society. The problem here
is not with Deweys attempt to use what is best in science to tackle complicated
situations and diculties in life. Instead, the diculty enters when a rigorous
approach to problem-solving is violated because the problems confronted seem
to transcend the current tools of diagnosis. It is my contention that at select points
1. John Dewey, How We Think (New York: D. C. Heath, 1910), 74.
c August 23, 2007, Ars Disputandi. If you would like to cite this article, please do so as follows:
Alan G. Phillips, Jr., An Incomplete Diagnosis, Ars Disputandi [http://www.ArsDisputandi.org] 7 (2007), paragraph
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Alan G. Phillips, Jr.: An Incomplete Diagnosis
Dewey violated the very ideal of inquiry that he advocates in noted works like
How We Think and Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. This is especially true when one
examines how he handled human evil in his work.
[4]
When considering the issue of howevil is to be explained or understood,
Dewey presents his readers with two prevailing options in the Ethics. He points
out the following:
There are two alternatives in the judgment of good and evil. (1) They may be
regarded as having moral signicance, that is, as having a voluntary basis and
origin. (2) Or they may be considered as substantial properties of things, as a
sort of essence diusedthroughout them, or as a kindof force resident inthem,
in virtue of which persons and things are noxious or helpful, malevolent or
kindly.
2
[5]
Earlier, before outlining these two alternatives, Dewey explains that savage
tribes attribute everything from sickness to death as the result of malevolent
magic and do not make distinctions between natural evils and those that origi-
nate in ones own intention and character.
3
He then points out that in the case
of these archaic societies evil must be removed by physical methods. In his brief
examination of this speculative dichotomy in the history of religious and moral
reasoning, Dewey sets up a questionable contrast between a savage and civilized
approach to human morality, reecting the linear, evolutionist assumptions of
his day.
4
This contrast in Deweys philosophy promotes what Reinhold Niebuhr
calls, a cultural lag theory of human evil.
5
By contrasting savage society
with civilized, Dewey models the sort of either/or thinking that he challenged
throughout his life and career in books like Democracy and Education.
6
He ends
up promoting dualistic thinking about evils origin, etiology and consequences in
human societies in the development of this opposition.
[6]
In The Quest for Certainty, Dewey once again touches upon problems
associated with the origin and genesis of evil. He commences with his attempt at
accounting for the problem of evil in human thought by saying:
The assumption of the antecedent inherent identity of actual and ideal has
generated problems which have not been solved. It is the source of the
problem of evil; of evil not merely in the moral sense, but in that of the
existence of defect and aberration, of uncertainty and error, of all deviation
from the perfect. If the universe is in itself ideal, why is there so much in
our experience of which it is so thoroughly unideal? Attempts to answer this
kind of question have always been compelled to introduce lapse from perfect
2. John Dewey, Ethics, in Jo Ann Boydston, ed., John Dewey: The Middle Works, 18991924,
vol. 5 (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University, [1908] 1978), 409.
3. Dewey, Ethics, 41.
4. For a good discussion of problems related to the primitive/civilized dichotomy, see the
collection of essays by Ashley Montagu, ed. The Concept of the Primitive (New York: Free Press,
1968).
5. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1 (New York: Charles Scribners
Sons, 1964), 113.
6. John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: Free Press, [1916] 1966), 346347.
Ars Disputandi 7 (2007), http://www.ArsDisputandi.org
Alan G. Phillips, Jr.: An Incomplete Diagnosis
Being . . . There are many versions of this doctrine. The simplest, though
not the one which has most commended itself to many philosophers, is the
idea of the fall of man, a fall which, in the words of Cardinal Newman, has
implicated all creation in an original catastrophe.
7
[7]
Just as he begins to address traditional views of Being as opposed to its
antithesis in the history of philosophical inquiry, Dewey refrains fromthe attempt,
explaining, I amnot concerned to discuss themand their respective strengths and
weaknesses.
8
Here, he leaves the reader with an honest admission, but he also
violates a general principle of his theory of inquiry: sustained and open inquiry
that culminates in a sound diagnosis. Commenting on the analogy with the
physician, Dewey notes, A large part of his technique, as a skilled practitioner,
is to prevent the acceptance of the rst suggestions that arise; even, indeed, to
postpone the occurrence of any very denite suggestion till the trouble the
nature of the problem has been thoroughly explored.
9
On the surface, One
might empathize with Deweys pragmatic retreat from a scholastic treatise, as
he carefully selects what he will address in The Quest For Certainty. After all,
most philosophy books have to stay on the main point and avoid a plethora of
digressions. But is this dismissal of long-standing, classical problems justied
when it appears throughout his corpus? Does such a dismissal violate his own
approach to inquiry and problem solving?
[8]
Select commentators have noted that Dewey avoided a coherent di-
agnosis of the nature and scope of evil at worst, or accorded it a supercial
treatment at best. In the process of examining Deweys optimism about the po-
tential benets of social scientic inquiry, Reinhold Niebuhr observed, The real
cause of social inertia, our predatory self-interest, is mentioned [by Dewey]
only in passing without inuencing his reasoning, and with no indication that
he understands how much social conservatism is due to the economic interests
of the owning classes.
10
Here, from a Marxist vantage point, Niebuhr draws
attention to Deweys cursory treatment of the source for self-interests that fuel
complex social problems like war, poverty and greed. In The Promise of Pragma-
tism, John Patrick Diggins contrasts the ideas of both Dewey and Niebuhr on the
potential for goodness that might come out of cooperative social inquiry. Diggins
concludes, Niebuhrs critique remains valid. For Dewey not only refused to give
much attention to power and its origins, he also had no idea where to look for it
other than as some kind of aberration.
11
Commenting on this recurrent critique
of Deweys pragmatism, Raymond Boisvert mentions those who accused Dewey
of relying on too much optimism about education and intellectual inquiry at the
expense of exploring the depths of those selsh interests that motivate human
7. John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York: G. P. Putnam Sons, [1929] 1960), 240.
8. Dewey, Quest for Certainty, 240.
9. Dewey, How We Think, 74.
10. Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics (New
York: Charles Scribners Sons, [1932] 1960), xiv.
11. John Patrick Diggins, The Promise of Pragmatism: Modernism and the Crisis of Knowledge
and Authority (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 289.
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Alan G. Phillips, Jr.: An Incomplete Diagnosis
behavior.
12
[9]
Having considered some of the noted skepticism toward the potential
of Deweys theory of inquiry, one might tackle this issue in another way. Several
questions might facilitate a restatement of sorts. Was Deweys problem an over
reliance on his method of intelligence alone? Or does he violate his own method
when dealing with human evil? Does he attempt to address various human
ills before an adequate diagnosis is completed? Is he out-of-sequence when it
comes to tackling complex social problems according to his outline of inquiry
in works like How We Think? Is there a way in which his theory of inquiry can
be developed or augmented in order to clear a path for what some philosophers
would call perennial human concerns? The etiological phase of diagnosis is vital
to medicine and many other important elds of humanistic concern. Why does
Dewey seem to bypass this phase or oversimplify it when addressing complex
moral, psychological and social questions?
[10]
Specic cases of suspected evil must be examined independently in
order to complete a diagnosis of the factors that contributed to them. No doubt,
the constellation of factors contributing to the Holocaust will be dierent from
the interactions that produced Columbine or the Gulag. Even from a Christian
theological standpoint, the etiology of evil is not always simple, as it must be
examined on a case-by-case approach. The book of James warns believers that
humans have the natural capacity to tempt themselves, apart from any sort of
ongoing, supernatural intervention.
13
On the other hand, the Bible is replete with
passages that lay the origin of evil at the feet of extra-human, demonic forces.
14
Then, there are the various natural disasters like drought that God permits as part
of His sovereign will. Unless one is a modern-day Manichean, there are more
than only two sources of evil in religious thought.
[11]
So, why does Dewey fail to examine this in his writings? On this front,
he lapses into the sort of diametric oppositions that he spent a lifetime refuting.
He fails to tease out the nuances and complications at work in serious religious
points of view. Worse than this, he seems to violate his own commitments as
an experimentalist, committing the fallacy of Do as I say, not as I do. In this
sense, an exceptional philosopher demonstrated the limits of his superb abilities
to inquire.
12. Raymond D. Boisvert, John Dewey: Rethinking Our Time (Albany, New York: State
University of New York, 1998), 167168, n. 4.
13. See James 1: 1315.
14. See John 10: 10; Ephesians 6: 1011; Revelation 12: 710.
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