V.

Rule 3 Sections 1 to 3: Parties to a Civil Action

Iron and Steel Authority vs. CA, 249 SCRA 538 (1995) ALFIE petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals Doctrine: When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and functions revert back to the Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying some other disposition When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the consequences of such expiry must be looked for, in the charter of that agency in the Corporation Code. Since, ISA is a non-incorporated agency of the Republic, its powers, duties, functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into the Government Facts: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) created by law for a term of 5 years (later extended by another 10) to aid in developing the steel industry in the Philippines; National Steel Corp., (NSC) is a GOCC which was undergoing expansion; In order to expand, NSC entered into negotiations with pvt. respondent Maria Christina Fertilizer Corp so it could expropriate the land; negotiations failed ISA commences eminent domain proceedings against Maria Christina Corp for the land; files in the RTC of Iligan City; during the trial, the statutory existence of ISA expired; causing MCFC to move for dismissal of the case since ISA no longer had juridical personality; RTC rules in favor of MCFC ISA appealed to the CA; urging that the Republic of the Philippines, the true party in interest, should be allowed to substitute ISA; CA affirms RTC decision; Petition for review filed before the Supreme Court;

Issue: Whether the Republic of the Philippines may substitute ISA as a party in the case for expropriation of MCFCs land; YES; ISA is merely an agent of the Republic. Travel Wide Associated Sales, Inc. vs CA, 199 SCRA 205 (1991) NOEL Decision Systems and Alcuaz -> RTC (complaint against Travel Wide and Trans World. RTC dismissed complaint). Decision Systems and Alcuaz -> CA (CA reversed RTC) Travel Wide and Trans World -> SC (Probably an Appeal by Certio or Petition for Review. na pareho lang din, di ba? hehe! It was not clearly stated on what was the action filed by the petitioners with the SC.) Facts: DECISION SYSTEMS CORPORATION and MANUEL A. ALCUAZ, JR. were the complainants in the original case filed in the RTC where they filed a complaint against petitioner Travel Wide and Trans World. They alleged that the latter failed to comply with their obligation under a Trans World Airlines package deal to travel to the U.S. The package deal was already paid. Trans World moved for dismissal for lack of cause of action. The trial court ordered the private respondents to amend their complaint and particularize their averments. They complied but Trans World and Travel Wide filed separate motions to dismiss stating that the amended complaint still failed to state a cause of action. The motions were denied and the TC held that the allegations were sufficient. In their joint answer, TWA and Travel Wide alleged the special defense that they were not the real parties in interest since they only acted as agents of the principal (Tours Services, Inc.). This allegation was opposed by Decision Systems and Alcuaz positing that they were barred from raising such special defense since it was not raised in the two motions to dismiss the amended complaint. The joint motion was, nevertheless, granted. RTC dismissed complaint of decision systems and Alcuaz finding that Trans and Travel were neither real parties-in-interest. The private respondents went to the then IAC. The latter court reversed the lower court, hence, the current petition. Trans World and Travel Wide invoke rule 16 regarding the grounds for the motion to dismiss. The ground of "not being a real party-in-interest" for a motion to dismiss is not indicated there, thus, they could not have pleaded it in their motion but only in their answer as a special defense. In essence, they were arguing that there is no cause of action because they were not real parties in interest which would fall within the exception. Issue: W/N Petitioners are not real parties-in-interest. (SC: They were real parties-in-interest) Held: SC upheld dismissal of CA but disagrees on ground of dismissal.
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Re: Trial Court erred in finding that TWA and Travel Wide were not parties in interest In disclaiming liability, the petitioners point to the stipulation on Responsibility in the Travel Pass '73 Plan brochure that "Tour Services, Inc. and/or their agents" are acting "as agents for the passengers." They stress further that the Miscellaneous Charge Order issued to Alcuaz indicated that the amount of $218.00 was payable to Tour Services, Inc. and not to either of them. This would mean that, if at all, they were acting as agents of Tour Services, Inc. and not as principal obligors. Without arriving at any factual conclusion, the Court believes it would be useful to make a careful appraisal of the evidence, particularly the terms and conditions of the brochure distributed by the petitioners and the significance of the Miscellaneous Charges Order which was issued by TWA. We note that even the trial court observed the active participation of TWA in the promotion of the travel pass plan as an additional source of revenue for its airline business. It is also worth noting that if the petitioners were indeed acting as agents of the passengers, as the brochure stipulates, they could still be held liable under Article 1909 of the Civil Code, which provides: The agent is responsible not only for fraud, but also for negligence, which shall be judged with more or less rigor by the courts, according to whether the agency was or was not for a compensation. The private respondent * is entitled to prove that the petitioners did not provide adequately for the pre-paid hotel accommodations of Alcuaz, who had to incur additional expenses and was compelled to cut short his business trip because of his depleted dollar allocation. It was not established that the petitioners received any confirmation of the hotel reservations they sent and yet they did not follow up their request nor did they inform Alcuaz that they had not received confirmation. This procedure should have been followed by the petitioners as so provided in the Travel Pass '73 USA. Re: Procedure: Rule 15, Sec.8 of the rules states that in an omnibus motion, all objections available should be included. If not so, they will be deemed waived. An exception to this rule on objections is Rule 9, Sec.2 wherein it is stated that: except the failure to state a cause of action which may be alleged in a latter pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits; but in the last instance, the motion shall be disposed of as provided in section 5, Rule 10 in the light of any evidence which may have been received. Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it shall dismiss the action. It is understandable if in granting the motion for a preliminary hearing on the special defense, the trial judge relied on Rule 16, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, providing as follows: Section 5. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. Any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this rule, except improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. However, the following doctrine laid down in The Heirs of Juliana Clavano v. Genato should have guided him to the contrary, and correct, conclusion: Besides, under this section a preliminary hearing may be had on the affirmative defenses as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. During such preliminary hearing evidence may be admitted. Nevertheless, We believe that the respondent Judge committed an error in conducting a preliminary hearing on the private respondent's affirmative defenses. It is a well-settled rule that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the question submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint itself. Whether those allegations are true or not is beside the point, for their truth is hypothetically admitted by the motion. The issue rather is: admitting them to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the complaint? Stated otherwise, the sufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint in order to sustain a dismissal on this ground. No extraneous matter may be considered nor facts not alleged, which would require evidence and therefore must be raised as defenses and await the trial. In other words, to determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others should be considered. The respondent Judge departed from this rule in conducting a hearing and in receiving evidence in support of the private respondent's affirmative defense, that is, lack of cause of action. The SC sustained the CA in ruling that the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint, albeit nor for the reasons given in the challenged decision. Because the petitioners are real parties-in-interest as defendants in the suit below, the motion to dismiss for lack of a cause of action should not have been granted. Ralla vs. Ralla, 199 SCRA SCRA 495 (1991.) -MELL DOCTRINE:

As a GENERAL RULE, one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff in an action.
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As a validly disinherited heir, and not claiming to be a creditor of his deceased father, Pedro Ralla had no legal personality to question the deed of sale dated between Rosendo Ralla and his son Pablo. Legally speaking, Pedro Ralla was a stranger to the transaction as he did not stand to benefit from its annulment. His disinheritance had rendered him hors de combat.

FACTS: CRUZ, J.: RTC(approved the will; disapproved the disinheritance) CA(approved the disinheritance) SC (dismissed) RTC(sale is void | MR: sale is valid) CA(sale is void) SC(sale is valid)

Pablo and Pedro are siblings. Their father, Rosendo, favored Pablo but not the latter. Pablo administered part of the family properties. Pedro lived with his mother in another town. He was not on good terms with his father. The two brothers partitioned 63 parcels of land left as paraphernal property of their mother. Meanwhile, Rosendo executed a will disinheriting Pedro and leaving everything he owned to Pablo, to whom he said he had earlier sold a part of his property for P10,000. Rosendo himself filed for the probate of the will but died pendente lite. The last will and testament of Rosendo Ralla was allowed but the disinheritance of Pedro was disapproved. This order was elevated to the CA. CA reversed the trial court and reinstated the disinheritance clause after finding that the requisites of a valid disinheritance had been complied with in the will. CA noted that Pedro had threatened to kill his father. The decision was assailed before SC which was dismissed. MR was denied. In this petition, what is involved is the correctness of the decision of the respondent court annulling the deed of sale executed by Rosendo Ralla in favor of Pablo over 149 parcels of land. Pedro had filed on (1972), a complaint to annul the transaction on the ground that it was simulated. The original decision of the trial court declared the sale null and void. On MR, the judge completely reversed himself and held the deed of sale to be valid. This order was in turn set aside by CA, which reinstated the original decision invalidating the deed of sale.

ISSUE: May Pedro question the validity of the sale of their fathers land to Pablo? NO. HELD: CA approved the disinheritance of Pedro Ralla. SC dismissed the petition for review which has long since become final. Since then, Pedro Ralla no longer had the legal standing to question the validity of the sale executed by Rosendo in favor of his other son Pablo. The REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment OR the party entitled to the avails of the suit. "Interest" means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. As a GENERAL RULE, one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a partyplaintiff in an action. As the sole heir, Pablo Ralla had the right to inherit the totality of his father's estate after payment of all its debts. Even if it be assumed that the deed of sale was indeed invalid, the subject-matter nevertheless devolved upon Pablo as the universal successor of his father Rosendo. Our decision is that as a validly disinherited heir, and not claiming to be a creditor of his deceased father, Pedro Ralla had no legal personality to question the deed of sale dated between Rosendo Ralla and his son Pablo. Legally speaking, Pedro Ralla was a stranger to the transaction as he did not stand to benefit from its annulment. His disinheritance had rendered him hors de combat. WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated is set aside and another judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Civil Case

Tampingco vs. IAC, 207 SCRA 652 -MEDZ May 10, 1985 Petitioner Tampingco filed a complaint for payment of disturbance compensation with damages against respondent Horca. o Petitioner Tampinco is the tenant-lessee of the respondents agricultural land under a leasehold contract entered into sometime April 1976 o In a letter dated April 9 1985 respondent informed plaintiff to desist working on the subject land having donated it on Feb 3 1985. Respondent ordered petitioner to vacate the land and is determined to oust him from the premises in violation of the law o Petitioner is willing to accept payment of disturbance or in the alternative, to remain as tenant-lessee of the land. July 5, 1985 case was called for pretrial. TC gave res til July 9, 1985 to file answer Respondent filed motion to dismiss complaint states no cause of action bec the respondent is not the real party in interest having already donated the subject land as a school site and the donation not having benefited the respondent, no compensation is due to petitioner since under Section 36 (1) of the Agrarian Reform Code as amended, disturbance compensation holds true only in cases wherein the lessorowner derives financial benefits from the conversion of the agricultural land into non-agricultural purposes. RTC granted respondents motion to dismiss, denied petitioners MR.
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CA found no merit in the case and dismissed it. WON the private respondent is a real party in interest in whom the suit should be brought. The private respondent bolsters his claim that he is not the real party-in-interest on Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3844 (Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines) which provides that: . . . In the case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligation of the agricultural lessor. The private respondent is of the view that the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, as donee, became the new lessor of the agricultural lessee by operation of law and is therefore the real party-in-interest against whom the claim for disturbance compensation should be directed. We agree with the contentions of the private respondent. The petitioner should have impleaded the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports as the party-defendant for as stated in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals (198 SCRA 300 [1991]), a donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee and once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated. Considering that the tenant in the case at bar is willing to accept payment of disturbance compensation in exchange for his right to cultivate the landholding in question, the real issue is who should pay the compensation. We rule that the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports as the new owner cannot oust the petitioner from the subject riceland and build a public high school thereon until after there is payment of the disturbance compensation in accordance with Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844, as amended. RTC correctly dismissed the complaint for payment because the private respondent is not a real party in interest.

Rule 65 (R65): Petition for Certiorari (PfC) *Grave Abuse of Discretion (GAD) Rule 45 (R45): Petition for Review on Certiorari (PfRC) *Purely questions of LAW; Supreme Court only Motion for Reconsideration (MfR) Motion to Dismiss (MtD) House International Building Tenants Assoc. vs. IAC, 151 SCRA 703 (1987) ANNE NATURE OF THE PETITION: Annulment of Deed of Conditional Sale Trial Court Court of Appeals MR (denied) SC

MR (denied)

DOCTRINE: The real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefitted or injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Consequently, a person who is not a party to a contract and for whose benefit it was not expressly made cannot maintain an action thereon, notwithstanding that the contract, if performed by the parties to it, would incidentally inure to his benefit. FACTS: Petitioner House International Building Tenants Association, INC. (ASSOCIATION, for short) is an association which constitute the great majority of more than a hundred heads of families who are tenants of long and good standing of the 14-storey House International Building. The land and improvements thereon initially belonged to a certain Atty. Felipe Ang who mortagaged the same to the GSIS. For failure to pay, GSIS foreclosed the mortgaged it subsequently sold it to Centertown Marketing Corporation (CENTERTOWN) in a deed of conditional sale, without notice to the tenants of the building and without securing the prior clearance of the then Ministry of Human Settlements. Centertown organized a sister corporation, the Manila Towers Development Corporation for the primary purpose of engaging in the real estate business. Subsequently, Centertown assigned all its rights and obligations to Towers under the Deed of Conditional Sale, with the consent and approval of the GSIS. Petitioner Association then filed a complaint with the RTC of Manila against Centertown, Towers and GSIS for the annulment of the deed of conditional sale and the assignment thereof by Centertown to GSIS. The complaint alleged that the Deed of Conditional Sale is null and void ab initio for being ultra vires since Centertown is not qualified to acquire real estate property or to engage in real estate transactions. The trial court DISMISSED the complaint. Petitioners filed MR. MR was denied. Petitioners appealed to the CA. CA affirmed the TCs judgment. MR was denied.

ISSUE: WHETHER PETITIONER ASSOCIATION HAS THE PERSONALITY TO SUE, ON ITS OWN, AS A CORPORATION REPRESENTING ITS MEMBERS WHO ARE TENANTS OF THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL BUILDING. HELD:
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No, under Sec. 2 Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it provides that Parties in interest Every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. All persons having an interest in the subject matter of the action and in obtaining the relief amended shall be joined as plaintiffs. The real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefitted or injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Consequently, a person who is not a party to a contract and for whose benefit it was not expressly made cannot maintain an action thereon, notwithstanding that the contract, if performed by the parties to it, would incidentally inure to his benefit. In the present case, the real parties in interest are the tenants of the House International Building and not the petitioner Association, which has a personality separate and distinct from that of its members and therefore it has the capacity to sue and be sued although it is composed of the tenants. Petitioner Association has not shown any real, actual, material or substantial interest in the subject matter of the action. The Association has sued in its name, but has not alleged any right belonging to it was violated. The benefits are not meant for the Association but for the unnamed members of the Association who have been allegedly been tenants of the long standing building in question. Pascual vs. Pascual, G.R. No. 157830, Nov 17, 2005 ERWIN Petition for Review on Certiorari from the RTC of Isabela at Roxas based on Rule 45; a question of law Facts Petitioner Dante, a resident of the Unitd States, filed a case for the cancellation of a TCT and Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his sister Marilou, herein respondent over a parcel of land with the Register of Deeds. Marilou filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that Dante, through Sagario failed to avail of lupon mediation mandated by RA 7160 repealed by PD 1508. The law states that when real parties-in-interest live in one barangay, questions regarding real property ownership must first avail of barangay mediation before trial in the court of proper jurisdiction. Sagario and Marilou live in the same barangay. Private respondents believe that Sagario, being the counsel of her brother became his legal representative and the real party-in-interest. Dante interposed stating that he is a resident of the United States and the real party-in-interest, Sagario is merely his attorney-in-fact representing his interest over the proceedings. The RTC sustained Marilous motion; Dante elevated the case to the SC. Issue W/N Atty. Sagario is the real party-in-interest. Held No, he is only the attorney-in-fact of Petitioner Dante. Applying the concept of a real party-in-interest to the attorney-in-fact would be in direct conflict with the definition of such in the Rules of Court. It is clear that Dante is the real party-in-interest being represented by his counsel, Sagario. Holding Sagario otherwise would be detrimental to the intention of the law. Rule 2. Section 3. Revised Rules of Court. Section 2. Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. (2a) Golango vs. Jone B. Fung, G.R. No. 157952, September 8, 2009. KIM Nature: We have before us a petition for review on certiorari Facts: o After almost 6 years, the Prosecution had presented only two witnesses in Criminal Case No. 95-145703. On February 16, 2001, the Prosecution requested that a subpoena ad testificandum be issued to and served on Atty. Oscar Ramos, Prosecution still failed to present Atty. Ramos. o The petitioner then assailed on certiorari in the Court of Appeals; claiming that the RTC judge thereby committed grave abuse of discretion for not issuing the subpoena to require Atty. Ramos to appear and testify. He contended that his prior request for the subpoena for the February 20, 2001 hearing should have been treated as a continuing request for the subpoena considering that the Rules of Court did not require a party to apply for a subpoena again should it not be served in the first time. Court of Appeals rebuffed the petitioner and dismissed the petition for certiorari holding that even then, granting that the subpoena issued for February 20, 2001 hearing was properly served but which hearing was later on postponed, there is still a need to ask for a new subpoena to the same witness for the next scheduled hearing. The court cannot be tasked to guess whether or not petitioner still intends to present the witness at the next hearing. An intention to still present the witness necessarily requires another request for a subpoena. Hence, this appeal.

The issue is whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on the petition for certiorari of the petitioner. Held: Before the court continues with the petition for review, it pointed out the gross procedural misstep committed by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals. o The petitioner did not join the People of the Philippines as a party in his action for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. He thereby ignored that the People of the Philippines were indispensable parties due to his objective being to set aside the trial courts order dated May 23, 2001 that concerned the public aspect of Criminal Case No. 95-145703. The omission was fatal and already enough cause for the summary rejection of his petition for certiorari. o The petitioner did not also obtain the consent of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to his petition for certiorari. At the very least, he should have furnished a copy of the petition for certiorari to the OSG prior to the filing thereof,[8] but even that he did not do.

The trial courts assailed order terminating the Prosecutions presentation of evidence was merely interlocutory. This fact surely adds justification to the Court of Appeals rejection of the petition for certiorari, because it is the settled rule that certiorari does not lie to review an interlocutory order, but only a final judgment or order that terminates the proceedings. Certiorari will be refused where there has been no final judgment or order and the proceeding for which the writ is sought is still pending and undetermined in the lower court. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc (now known as Banco De Oro-EPCI, Inc.) vs. Heirs of Antonio C. Tiu, et al., G.R. No. 178529, September 4, 2009. -SUZETTE Petitioner: EQUITABLE PCI BANK Respondents: HEIRS OF ANTONIO TIU Nature of the case: Petition for review on certiorari before the SC Facts: Antonio Tiu executed a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) in favor of PCIB to secure a the loan of Gabriel Ching amounting to 7M. The REM was with the marital consent of Antonios wife, Matilde. Antonio then executed an amendment to the REM (AREM) which increased the amount to 26M, it also bears the signature of his wife above the With my Marital Consent After Antonio died, the obligation remained unsettled. PCI Bank filed a petition for sale for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the AREM before the RTC of Tacloban. Auction sale was then scheduled A day before the auction, the heirs of Antonio Tiu filed a Complaint/Petition before the RTC Tacloban for the annulment of the AREM and injunction with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and TRO. The Heirs of Antonio said that the AREM was without force and effect since at the time of the execution of the instrument, Matilde was suffering from advance alzheimers disease and thus incapable of giving her consent to it. RTC issued a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction Equitable then filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action, since the plaintiffs were not the real parties-in-interests. RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and the MR filed by Equitable. They filed petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the CA but was also denied. Equitable then filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC

Issue: WON the complaint filed without impleading the principal should be dismissed for lack of cause of action.

Held: Petition GRANTED. The decision of the CA was REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. And the complaint before the RTC was DISMISSED. Rationale:

The court said that since the subject property is presumed conjugal, Matilde is obliged principally under the AREM, hence according to Art 1397 of the Civil Code and Sec 2 Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, she is the real party in interest and the action must be prosecuted in her name as she stands to be benefited or injured in the action. The court also said that it should be the legal guardian of Matilde who should file the action on her behalf assuming she is incapacitated. And since there is no allegation in the complaint that respondents were designated legal guardian to file action on her behalf, the name Matilde, who is deemed the real party in interest, should be included in the title of the case, as provided for in Sec3 of the Rules of Court. Article 1397 of the Civil Code The action for annulment of contracts may be instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily. However, persons who are capable cannot alleged the incapacity of those with whom they contracted; nor can those who exerted intimidation, violence or undue influence, or employed fraud, or caused mistake base their action upon these flaws of the contract. Sec2 Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
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A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Sec3 Rule 3 Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.

Bayan Muna vs. Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, Feb. 11, 2011 -TIN Nature: Petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition under Rule 65 Facts: 1. Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of DFA. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary.

2. On December 28, 2000, the RP signed the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) ICC vested with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. The Philippines has not yet ratified the said Statute

3. On May 13, 2003 the RP forged the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

aims to protect what it refers to and defines as persons of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in international tribunals.

4. Petitioner BAYAN MUNA imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be
struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.

5. Respondents question petitioners standing to maintain a suit

Issue: WON petitioner has legal standing to sue? Held: YES. Petitioners have legal standing to sue. They are suing as citizens of the Philippines and the subject matter of the case is of transcendental importance. Petitioners have complied with the requisites in order to sue as a citizen and to challenge a law or any act of the government. These are as follows: a.) interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal

b.)
c.)

must show that the law or any government act is invalid and that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining

some direct injury as a result of its enforcement the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that

he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. It is a partys personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the act being challenged, and calls for more than just a generalized grievance. Locus standi, however, is merely a matter of procedure. In a catena of cases, the SC has adopted a liberal stance on locus standi. In cases of transcendental importance, the Court may relax the standing requirements and allow a suit to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review.

VI.

Rule 3, Sections 4 to 6: Parties to a Civil Action

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Wong vs. IAC, 200 SCRA 792 -ALFIE

petition for certiorari to review the decisions of the Intermediate Appellate Court Doctrine: There is no laches or even finality of decision so to speak in Romarico Hensons case because the decision in the civil case between Wong and Katrina Henson is null and void for having been rendered without jurisdiction for failure to observe the notice requirements observed by law. Romarico is an indispensible party because the properties levied against were registered under his name and the conjugal partnership under (pre family code) civil code, is not liable for the personal expenses of the wife when not in connection with the family or the childrens education. Facts: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 18 Sept. 1972; Katrina Henson issued a check in favor of Anita Chan; the check was dishonored for lack of funds and Anita Wong and her husband filed a case against Sps. Henson for collection of a sum of money in CFI Pampanga; Atty. Yumul filed a counterclaim on behalf of Katrina but it was not shown on record that Romarico Henson was represented by Katrinas lawyer; CFI decided in favor of the Wongs and issued a writ of execution against Hensons properties; A writ of execution was levied against four lots owned by Romarico Henson in Angeles City; the property was sold by the sheriff to the highest bidder, Juanico Santos Romarico Henson files with the same court a motion enjoining the sheriff from approving the final bill of sale of the land sold. CFI held that Romarico was not given his day in court as he was not represented by counsel nor was he notified of the hearings and was never declared in default; and that the conjugal property (pre-Family Code) is not liable for the personal indebtedness of Katrina. Wong appealed to the IAC; who affirmed the CFI, ruling that estoppel may not be applied against Romarico because he did not know anything about the case; Wong appeals to the Supreme Court on certiorari.

Issue: Whether Romarico is guilty of laches and may not now belatedly assert his rights over the properties because he and Katrina were represented by Atty. Yumul. Held: NO. Romarico and Katrina were already separated when Katrina entered into a business deal with the Wongs. Mariano vs. CA, G.R. No. 151283, June 7, 1989 NOEL Esther Sanchez -> CFI of CALOOCAN (against Mariano. RTC for Mariano) Mariano -> CFI of CALOOCAN (writ of execution. Granted. Levied upon real and personal properties belonging to the CPG of Sanchez and her husband) Sanchez -> CA (Certio. Dismissed) Daniel -> CFI of QC (complaint for annulment execution pending appeal of CFI of CALOOCAN. QC CFI ordered sheriff to temporarily desist from proceeding with the auction sale) Mariano -> Special Civil Action to CA (CA dismissed) Mariano -> SC (appeal on certiorari or petition for review) Facts: Esther Sanchez filed against petitioner Mariano in the CFI of Caloocan. The case was for the recovery of the value of ladies ready made dresses that were allegedly purchased and delivered to Mariano. Sanchez moved for an issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. The court granted. A bond was posted by Veritas Insurance in the amount of 11k and resulted in the seizure of Marianos property worth 15k. Marianos motion for discharge of the attachment was denied. She went to the CA on certio. Upon orders of the CA, the trial court received evidence on whether or not the attachment was regularly issued. After doing so, the TC concluded that the attachment was improperly issued and was dissolved. Mariano subsequently filed an answer with counterclaim with damages due to the wrongful attachment. The TC rendered a judgment in favour of Mariano. Veritas insurance was also ordered to pay full insuranc coverage to defendant since it was the one who posted the attachment bond. Sanchez then sought for an appeal. While the approval of the appeal was pending, Mariano filed a motion for the immediate execution of the judgement. TC granted. Sheriff garnished the sum of 11k from Veritas and levied up real and personal property belonging to the conjugal partnership of Sanchez and her husband, Private respondent Daniel Sanchez. Sanchez went to the CA for certio praying for the annulment of the execution pending appeal. This was dismissed. After dismissal, Daniel filed a complaint for annulment of the execution in the CFI of QC in his capacity as administrator of the conjugal partnership. He alleged that the conjugal partnership should not be held liable for obligations exclusively contracted by the wife. The QC court issued an ordered setting the matted of injuction for hearing and commanding the sheriff, in the mean time to desist from peroceeding with the auction sale.
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Mariano when to the CA with a special civil action of certio. Initially, it was given due course (CA 7th division) but was subsequently dismissed (by CA 8th division). The 8th ruled that the QC court had not interfered with the execution process of the Caloocan Court because Daniels action raised an the issue of the validity of the sheriffs levy on the conjugal partnership different from those adjudicated int he Caloocan court and sanchez was not a party to the case filed in Caloocan. Aggrieved, Mariano went to the SC with the current petition. ISSUE: W/N a claim that property levied on in execution of a judgment is not property of the judgment debtor, Daniel Sanchez's wife, but of the conjugal partnership of the Sanchez Spouses is properly cognizable by a Court other than that which rendered judgment adversely to the wife. (SC: NO) HELD: The rule, one of great importance in the administration of justice, is that a Court of First Instance has no power to restrain by means of injunction the execution of a judgment or decree of another judge of concurrent or coordinate jurisdictions. Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, authorizes a "third person," i.e., "any other person than the judgment debtor or his agent," to vindicate "his claim to the property by any proper action." The section reads as follows: SEC. 17. Proceedings where property claimed by third person.-If property levied on be claimed by any other person than the judgment debtor or his agent, and such person make an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serve the same upon the officer making the levy, and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment creditor or his agent, on demand of the officer, indemnify the officer against such claim by a bond in a sum not greater than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of execution. The officer is not liable for damages, for the taking or keeping of the property, to any third-party claimant, unless a claim is made by the latter and unless an action for damages is brought by him against the officer within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond. But nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property by any proper action The "proper action" referred to in the section "is and should be an entirely separate and distinct action from that in which execution has issued, if instituted by a stranger to the latter suit:" and in "such separate action, the court may issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the sheriff enjoining him from proceeding with the execution sale." "Upon the other hand, if the claim of impropriety on the part of the sheriff in the execution proceedings is made by a party to the action, not a stranger thereto, any relief therefrom may be applied for with, and obtained from, only the executing court; and this is true even if a new party has been impleaded in the suit." In the case at bar, the husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a "stranger" to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife. In any case, whether by intervention in the court issuing the writ, or by separate action, it is unavailing for either Esther Sanchez or her husband, Daniel, to seek preclusion of the enforcement of the writ of possession against their conjugal assets. For it being established, as aforestated, that Esther had engaged in business with her husband's consent, and the income derived therefrom had been expended, in part at least, for the support of her family, the liability of the conjugal assets to respond for the wife's obligations in the premises cannot be disputed. Spouses Buado vs. CA, G.R. No. 145222, April 24, 2009 MELL DOCTRINE: Only a stranger to the case may file a third-party claim. In determining whether the husband is a stranger to the suit, the character of the property must be taken into account. The husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a "stranger" to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife for an obligation that has redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. On the other hand, a spouse is deemed a stranger to the action wherein the writ of execution was issued and is therefore justified in bringing an independent action to vindicate her right of ownership over his exclusive or paraphernal property. FACTS: TINGA, J.: RTC(Buado)CA(Af) SC(Af) RTC(annulment of sale:dismissed | MR denied) CA(remand branch 21) SC(65:Af )

Spouses Roberto and Venus Buado filed (1984) a complaint for damages against Erlinda Nicol with RTC-Bacoor. Said action originated from Erlinda Nicol's civil liability arising from the criminal offense of slander filed by petitioners. The trial court ordered (1987) Erlinda to pay damages. Said decision was affirmed, successively, by the CA and SC. It became final and executory (1992). The trial court issued a writ of execution, commanding that goods and chattels of the defendant Erlinda Nicol to cause the sum of P40K, representing the moral damages etc.. But if personal property cannot be found to satisfy this execution, then that of the lands and buildings of defendant.
9

Erlinda Nicol's personal properties were insufficient to satisfy the judgment, Thus, Deputy Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real property on execution. The auction sale proceeded with petitioners as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued in favor of petitioners. Almost a year later, Romulo Nicol, the husband of Erlinda, filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners and the deputy sheriff. Respondent alleged that petitioners, connived and directly levied upon and execute his real property without exhausting the personal properties of Erlinda. Respondent claimed that his property was valued at P500K was only sold at P51,685, whereas the judgment obligation of Erlinda Nicol was only P40K. Petitioners claimed that respondent should have filed the case where the judgment originated and which issued the order of execution, writ of execution, notice of levy and notice of sheriff's sale. RTC dismissed respondent's complaint and ruled that branch 19 has jurisdiction over the case. MR was denied. CA reversed the trial court and held that branch 21 has jurisdiction to act on the complaint filed by appellant. It REMANDED to RTC-Branch 21 for further proceedings. MR was denied. Petitioners insist that respondent is not the "third party" contemplated in Section 16, Rule 39 ROC, hence a separate action need not be filed. Petitioners assert that the obligation of the wife redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership and cited authorities to the effect that the husband is liable for the tort committed by his wife.

ISSUE: May the husband of the judgment debtor file an independent action to protect the conjugal property subject to execution? YES. (see qualification) HELD: The question of jurisdiction could be resolved through a proper interpretation of Section 16, Rule 39 of the ROC <check the codal>. Only a stranger to the case may file a third-party claim. <SEE DOCTRINE> Article 122 of the FC explicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse. By no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. Begosa vs. Chairman, PVA, 32 SCRA 466 (1970) -MEDZ Doctrines: When doctrine of state immunity from suit not applicable An obligation or liability of the state created by statute is enforceable against the officer or agent charged with the duty to execute the law When doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies not applicable While as a rule administrative remedies must first be resorted to before court action may be taken, that rule only applies when there is an express legal provision requi8ring such administrative step as a condition precedent to taking action in court Facts: Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Manila. Plaintiff Begosa sought the aid of the judiciary to obtain benefits to which he believed he was entitled under the Veterans Bill of Rights. There were insistent objections from the chairman and the members of the Philippine Veterans Assoc. o Begosa was an inlisted man in good standing of the Phil. Commonwealth Army and was later permanently incapacitated due to injuries he sustained. o Defendants insisted that he was not entitled because he was honorably discharged, although such event did not take place until almost five years after the end of the war. The lower court, presided by judge Soriano, decided in favor of plaintiff Defendants appealed relying once more on the principal grounds raised below that plaintiff should have exhausted his administrative remedies before coming to court and that he was in fact suing the State without its consent having been obtained.

Issue: W/N the State may be sued and W/N Begosa shouldve exhausted all his administrative remedies Held: Yes and No. Judgment in favor of Begosa, affirming judge Sorianos decision
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Ratio: After rejecting as untenable the defenses that there was no exhaustion of administrative remedies, that the action is in the nature of money claim which should first be presented before the Auditor General, and that said action is in reality a suit against the Government without the latters consent, the decision concludes in favor of Begosa. Appellants elevated the matter to us. The careful and painstaking way in which the controlling statutory provision were considered and applied by then Judge Soriano must have impelled them to place their faith in the alleged failure to respect the doctrines of non-suability and exhaustion of administrative remedies to obtain a reversal. As to the doctrine of non-suability We have recently had occasion to reaffirm the force and primacy of the doctrine of non-suability. It does not admit of doubt, then, that if the suit were in fact against the State, the lower court shouldve dismissed the complaint. Nor it is to be doubted that while ostensibly an action may be against a public official, the defendant may in reality be the government. As a result, it is equally well-settled that where a litigation may have adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in the disbursement of funds or loss of property, the public official proceeded against not being liable in his personal capacity, then the doctrin of non-suability may appropriately be invoked. It has no application, however, where the suit against such a functionary had to be instituted because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed by statute appropriating public funds for the benefit of plaintiff or petitioner. Such is the present case. Lim v Nelson individuals seizing private property in their personal capacity as public officers and for the benefit of the government may be sued for the recovery of the property itself and made to justify its seizure, although they cannot be sued for damages for loss of the property and failure to return it, as this latter type of action involves financial responsibility of the government with respect to which its agents cannot be sued without its consent. Ruiz v Cabahug the suit is not one against the Government, or a claim against it, but one against the officials to compel them to act in accordance with the rights to be established by the architects, or to prevent them from making payment and trecognition until the contending architects have established their respective rights and interests in the funds for the work done.. As to the exhaustion of administrative remedies Gonzales v Hechanova (Gonzales doctrine) the principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, or where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of the President bear the implied or assumed approval of the alter, unlessactually disapproved by him, or where there are circumstance indicating the urgency of the judicial intervention Where there is a stipulation of facts, as in this case, the question before the lower court being solely on of law and on the face of the decision, the actuation of appellants being patently illegal, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies certainly does not come into play. Mobil Phil. Vs. Customs, Arrastre ( 18 SCRA 1120) (1966) ANNE Recovery of the valued of an undelivered case CFI MTD SC NATURE OF THE ACTION: Appeal from an order of dismissal rendered by the CFI Manila DOCTRINE: A defendant in a civil suit must be (1) a natural person; (2) a juridical person; (3) an entity authorized by law to be sued. FACTS: Four cases of rotary drill were shipped from abroad consigned to herein petitioner Mobil Philippines. The shipment arrived and was discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs handling then handling the arrastre operations threin. The Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only of the shipment. Thereafter, Mobil Philippines filed suit in CFI against the Customs Arrastre Service to recover the value of the undelivered case. The defendants filed an MTD on the ground that not being persons under the law, defendants cannot be sued. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that neither the Customs Arrastre Service nor the Bureau of Customs is suable. Plaintiff Mobil appealed to the SC

ISSUE: WHETHER THE DEFENDANT CUSTOM ARRASTRE SERVICE CAN BE SUED. HELD:
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No, the Rules of Court Sec. 3 provides that only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. Neither the Bureau of Customs nor its function unit, the Customs Arrastre Service is a person. They are merely parts of the machinery of Government. It follows that defendants herein cannot be sued under the first two categories of natural or juridical persons. The fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity. The Bureau of Customs, to repeat, is part of the Department of Finance with no personality of its own apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties. The this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident engaging in the same does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit. Pursuant to express legislative mandate and as a necessary incident of its prime governmental function, the Bureau of Customs is immune from suit, there being no statute to the contrary. American Express Co. vs. Santiago, 49 SCRA 75 (1973) -ERWIN Petition for Review on Certiorari under rule 45 from the CFI of Manila; a question of law Facts Santiago procured a credit card from American Express granting him a credit line for his personal use. He traveled the world charging his purchases to the said card. He procured a substantial amount of credit card charges. American Express demanded payment, which Santiago refused. AmEx filed a collection case against Santiago. Respondent alleges that AmEx only served as a bridge introducing him to the storeowners and their merchandise. As such, they should be the ones suing him instead of AmEx. Issue W/N AmEx is the real party-in-interest. Held Yes, it has been established by the lower court that even if it was the stores that Santiago directly transacted with; AmEx was the one who paid for the items that he had purchased. Clearly, AmEx is the creditor of Santiago and it is the correct party to the suit. Rule 2. Section 3. Revised Rules of Court. Section 2. Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. (2a)

VII. RULE 3, SECTIONS 7 TO 12 (Parties to a Civil Action)

LOZANO vs. BALLESTEROS, 195 SCRA 681 (1991) KIM Nature: An appeal elevated by the CA on pure questions of law seeking the reversal of the decision of the CFI Facts: o o Deceased mother of the plaintiffs (agusto and Antonio) sold the land in question to Marciana de Dios Plaintiffs, together with de Dios, filed a verified petition with the CFI of Pangasinan seeking the approval of the consolidationsubdivision plan and for the annotation of several documents at the back of the OCT of the land aforementioned

o o o o

The CFI approved the said petition, a TCT was thus issued in the name of de Dios. Plaintiffs caused the annotation of their adverse claim at the back of the title of the said lot De Dios sold the lot to defendant Ballesteros and that the TCT was later transferred in his name Plaintiffs filed an action for reconveyance against De Dios alleging that the estate of Augusto Lonzano is the absolute owner of the said lots The court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs Judgment was not satisfied as De Dios was insolvent Thus, plaintiffs filed several complaints before the CFI of Pangasinan for reconveyance and recovery of possession
12

o o o

o
o o

But later on Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the Ballesteros and held that Ballesteros is the absolute owner Plaintiffs interposed an appeal to the CA Appellants insist that the consequence of this cautionary notice is that whatever would be the result of their claim against De Dios is binding on the subsequent purchasers or successors-in-interest

Issue: W/N appellants adverse claim has been carried along in the subsequent titles of the defendants Held: No o The applicable law in the case at bar is Sec. 110 of the Land Registration Act. Hence, for the purpose of registration and as required by the Act, the following are the formal requisites of an adverse claim The adverse claimant must state the following in writing o Alleged right or interest How and under whom such alleged right or interest is acquired Description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed CoT number

Statement must be signed and sworn to before a notary public or other officer authorized to administer oath The claimant should state his residence or the place to which all notices may be served upon him

The lower court noted that the adverse claim filed an annotated at the back of the title did not meet the requirements provided for in Sec. 110 of Act 496, that is setting forth fully how or under whom the heirs of Lozano acquired the said property. The effect of non-compliance renders the adverse claim non-registrable and ineffective. Despite the ballesteros alleged knowledge of the appellants claim against De Dios, the allegation of bad faith is devoid of merit by reason of the ineffectiveness of the adverse claim. Appellants also contend that the appellee is bound by the decision in the former reconveyance case against De Dios. The lower court however stressed that the said decision relied upon by the appellants is a nullity as an indispensable party, herein defendants, were not impleaded. Failure to implead herein defendants constitute a legal obstacle to the exercise of judicial power in the said case and that it renders the judgment an absolute nullity Accordingly, Sec. 7, Rule 3 of the RoC is appropriate o Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants (indispensability of parties)

An indispensable party is one without whom the action cannot be finally determined, whose interests in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so bound up with that of the other parties that his legal presence as a party to the proceedings is an absolute necessity

Judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED with modification

MR. & MRS. TADEO P. DAEL, petitioners, vs. THE HON. BERNARDO TEVES, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, Branch VIII and DIONISIO EDOROT, VIDAL EDOROT, PONCIANO EDOROT, PETRA EDOROT, DIOSDADA EDOROT, JUANA EDOROT, and the late HERMINIGILDO EDOROT, represented by his heirs. VICTOR EDOROT, PEDRITO EDOROT and JACOBO EDOROT, respondents. G.R. No. L-34124 April 30, 1985 -SUZETTE

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Nature of the case: Petition for review on certiorari of the Order from the CFI of Misamis Oriental dismissing petitioners complaint and the denial of the latters MR Doctrine: Where the Court orders the plaintiff to amend its complaint within a certain period of time in order to implead as party defendants one who is not a party to the case but who is an indispensable party, plaintiff's refusal to comply with such order is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint. Facts: 19 Oct 1970 Petitioners filed with the CFI of Misamis Oriental a complaint for ownership, recovery of possession & damages against the respondents o Alleged that Petitioners are the true and absolute owners in simple fee of a parcel of land and that defendants, by means of force, threats and intimidation occupied the said property

Respondents filed their Answer with Counterclaim claiming that they inherited the property from their deceased parents 2 June 1971 Judge Malvar was transferred to another judicial district and Judge Teves was appointed 29 June 1971 An Order was issued

In consideration of the fact that two of the defendants had died before the filing of the case, the plaintiffs are hereby given until 15 July 1971 to file an amended complaint to include the heirs or representatives of said deceased defendants

27 July 1971 Counsel for Respondent filed an ex-parte manifestation praying that the case be dismissed pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 17 of the RoC for failure of Petitioners to comply with the aforequoted order of the court to file an amended complaint o TC then issued an order dismissing the complaint for failure to comply

Issue: Held: Ratio:

Petitioners MR was likewise dismissed Hence this petition

WON the respondent Judge acted with Grave Abuse of Discretion in ordering the petitioners to file an amended complaint

No

Since respondents claim to be the owners and possessors of the property in question through inheritance, necessarily then, that the deceased defendants have an undivided interest, right and participation adverse to that of the petitioners o o Herminigildo died on 29 Sept 1969 Petra died on 5 April 1970 Since both of them died prior to the filing of the complaint and their interest in the property in question having been inured by intestacy to their heirs, the latter thereby became the real parties in interest who should be impleaded as defendants without whom no final determination of the case can be had Decidedly, they are then indispensable parties

Sec. 2 and 7, Rule 3 of the RoC is applicable The heirs of deceased defendants in the case at bar being indispensable parties, respondent Judge acted properly in ordering the amendment of the complaint Thus, it has been held that where the Court orders the plaintiff to amend its complaint within a certain period of time in order to implead as party defendants one who is not a party to the case but is an indispensable party, plaintiffs refusal to comply with such order is a ground for dismissal

14

Petitioners cannot claim that their failure to amend the complaint was due to Respondents counsel failure to inform the Court of such information o Petitioners rely on Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the RoC Said Rule provides that it is the duty of the counsel of the deceased to inform the court of such an event and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representative

Petitioners reliance on said Rule is misplaced o Sec. 16, Rule 3 applies to a situation where a party dies after the filing of the complaint and during the pendency of the case In the case at bar, the two defendants died before the filing of the complaint

Lastly, Petitioners contend that Respondents ex-parte manifestation did not comply with the required notice of motions pursuant to Sec. 4-6 of Rule 15 of the RoC

Suffice it to state that said manifestation, informing the Court that the Petitioners failed to amend the complaint, is not a litigated motion and may be acted upon without proof of service on the adverse party

In fact, under Sec. 3, Rule 17, the Court can motu propio, dismiss the case for failure to comply with its order

The lower courts order is AFFIRMED SENO VS. MANGUBAT, 156 SCRA 113 (1987) TIN Nature: an appeal certified to the SC by the CA from the order of the CFI of Rizal dismissing the action for reformation of instrument and annulment of subsequent sale Facts: 1. Plaintiff Seno executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over a property in favor of defendant Marcos Mangubat and certain Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat

2.

It was alleged however by Seno that the true intention was a loan with mortgage over the property, not to sell it. Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat sold their rights over the property to Marcos Mangubat Marcos Mangubat was able to obtain a title over the property and thereafter sold it to Spouses Luzame

Seno filed a complaint for reformation of a Deed of Sale executed in favor of defendant Marcos Mangubat and the annulment of a subsequent sale to defendant spouses Francisco Luzame

3. On motion of Spouses Luzame, the trial court ordered the inclusion as defendants of Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat on
the ground that they are indispensable parties

4. The newly impleaded defendants moved for the dismissal of the case against them on the ground of prescription- Motion was GRANTED
5. 6. 7. Defendants filed MR asking the court to dismiss the case against all of them- GRANTED by the trial court Plaintiffs filed MR- DENIED Plaintiffs appealed with the CA

8. CA certified the instant case to the SC holding that the assignment of errors made by plaintiffs raised purely legal questions
Issue: WON defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat are indispensable parties? Held: NO Defendants are not indispensable parties. They are only proper parties, their joinder as parties defendants was correctly ordered being in accordance with Sec. 8 of Rule 3.
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Said defendants no longer have any interest in the subject property. However, being parties to the instrument sought to be reformed, their presence is necessary in order to settle all the possible issues of tile controversy. Whether the disputed sale be declared an absolute sale or an equitable mortgage, the rights of all the defendants will have been amply protected. Under Section 7, indispensable parties must always be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the court cannot proceed without them. Necessary parties must be joined, under Section 8, in order to adjudicate the whole controversy and avoid multiplicity of suits. Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence. Necessary parties are those whose presence is necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose interests are so far separable that a final decree can be made in their absence without affecting them Lotte Phils vs. dela Cruz, G.R. No. 1663302, July 28, 2005 ALFIE petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals Doctrine: An indispensible party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action. The joinder of indispensible parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensible parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction. If such parties are absent, the judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. 7J is an indispensible party and should have been impleaded before the Court of Appeals. Facts: 1. 2. Lotte is a domestic corporation and the many respondents in this case are those who were hired and assigned to the confectionery facility operated by Lotte; 7J Maintenance Services contracted Lotte to provide manpower for maintenance, utility and janitorial services to Lotte; after some time, Lotte dispensed with 7Js services due to the expiration of the service contracts; Lotte also told Dela Cruz et al. (employed through 7J) to wait to be called back but they were never called back; Delac Cruz et al. files a labor complaint against Lotte and 7J for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter; the Arbiter rules that 7J is guilty of illegal dismissal and is liable for 13th month pay and SIL; Dela Cruz et al. appealed to NLRC praying that Lotte be declared as the direct employer because 7J is a mere labor-only contractor; NLRC affirms Labor Arbiter and rules against Dela Cruz; Through Certioriari, Dela Cruz files with the Court of Appeals against NLRC and Lotte; CA reversed and set aside the rulings of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC; declaring Lotte as the real employer of Dela Cruz; Lotte appeals to the Supreme Court via certiorari;

3.
4. 5. 6.

Issue: Lotte asserts that 7J is an indispensible party and should have been impleaded in the petition in the Court of Appeals; following this, the petiton before the CA should be dismissable for failure to comply with procedure. Held: YES. 7J is an indispensible party to the proceedings. Nicencio Tan Quiombing, petitioner, Vs. Court of Appeals, and Sps. Francisco and Manuelita A. Saligo, respondents. G.R. No. 93010. August 30, 1990. -NOEL Appeal assailing the decision of the CA which affirmed the ruling of the TC. TC ruled in favour of the Saligos. Quiombing -> TC (not specified kung CFI or RTC pero TC for Saligos) Quiombing -> CA (appealed. affirmed RTC) Quiombing -> SC (Appeal) Facts: Nicencio Tan Quiombing and Dante Bisco jointly and severally bound themselves to construct the house of the Spouses Saligo for the price of 137,940.00. Spouses agreed to pay the two. A subsequent agreement was made between Quiombing and Manuelita (Saligo) wherein the latter acknowledged the completion of the house and undertook to pay the balance of the contract price. Manuelita signed a promisorry note regarding the balance which was payable to Quiombing. (date signed: 11/19/1984. Payable date: 12/31/1984) After almost two years from the date of signing (10/09/86), Quiombing filed a complaint for recovery of the balance plus charges and interests. He alleged that the Saligo spouses were not able to pay the balance despite repeated demands. Instead of filing an answer, the spouses moved to dismiss the complaint contending that Biscocho was an indispensable party and should be impleaded as well. Motion was initially denied but was reconsidered. Quiombings complaint was dismissed w/o prejudice to filing an amended complaint impleading Biscocho.
16

Quiombing did not amend the complaint but chose to appeal the order of dismissal. He argued that as solidary creditor, he could enforce the claim and the amount was payable only to him under the second agreement since Biscocho was not mentioned therein. The CA sustained the TC. It justified that the two were solidary obligees only and should be also considered solidary obligors based on the 1st agreement. The CA further stated that the TC could not have decided the dispute since Biscochos rights would necessarily be affected being part of the 1st agreement and that the 2nd agreement was merely a part of the 1st. Issue: W/N Biscocho should be impleaded. (SC:NO) Held: The SC said that since Quiombing and Biscocho were solidary creditors of the Spouses, either of them can enforce the whole obligation. To implead Biscocho would be a useless formality. If Quiombing eventually collects the balance, Biscocho may later claim his share from Quiombing. But that would be Biscoshos to make and the Spouses has to right to interfere. On the other hand, Rule 3, Sec. 7 of the ROC provides the compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. According to Judge Jose Feria: where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either one of the parties is indispensable and the other is not even necessary (now proper) because complete relief may be obtained by the either. In this wise, though Biscocho signed the initial agreement, he need not be included as co-plaintiff since Quiombing, as solidary creditor, can by himself alone enforce the payment of the construction costs. The participation of Biscocho is not at all necessary, much less, indispensable. Domingo vs. Scheer, 421 SCRA 468 MELL DOCTRINE: The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality. Strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void. The responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties rests on the petitioner/plaintiff. However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiffs failure to comply. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. FACTS: CALLEJO, SR., J.: BID(to deport)CA(Rv)SC(45: Affirmed CA)

Respondent Herbert Markus Emil Scheer is a native of Germany. His application for permanent resident status was granted (1986). He married widowed Edith delos Reyes with whom he had two daughters. They resided in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, where the respondent established and managed the Bavaria Restaurant. A German Vice Consul informed (1995) the Philippine Ambassador to Bonn, Germany that the respondent had police records and financial liabilities in Germany. A warrant of arrest had been issued against him by German authorities; Their Embassy requested the DFA to inform the competent Philippine authorities. The Board of Commissioners (BOC) thereafter issued a Summary Deportation Order (1997). BID Commissioner Leandro T. Verceles allowed the respondent to remain in the Philippines, giving the latter time to secure a clearance and a new passport from the German Embassy. Nonetheless, the respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC which did not resolve the respondents motion. Meanwhile, the District Court of Straubing dismissed the criminal case against the respondent for physical injuries. The German Embassy in Manila issued a temporary passport to the respondent. The respondent reiterated his request for the cancellation of the Summary Deportation Order. As Immigration Commissioner Andrea T. Domingo assumed office she wrote the German Embassy and inquired if the respondent was wanted by the German police who replied in the negative. BID agents apprehended the respondent (June 6, 2002) in his residence on orders of the petitioner. The petitioner refused to release the respondent. Respondent filed with the BID a motion for bail. Also filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for TRO and writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin the petitioner from proceeding with the respondents deportation.
17

The BOC ruled that its 1995 Order had become final and executory after the lapse of one year, that it was not competent to reverse the Order. CA issued (2002) a status quo order restraining the petitioner from deporting the respondent. BOC then issued an Omnibus Resolution denying the respondents Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner alleged that the BOC was an indispensable party to the petition, and failure to implead the BOC warranted the denial of the petition. CA rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent granting his petition for certiorari and prohibition and permanently enjoining the petitioner from deporting the respondent. The CA ruled that a number of cases in relevant jurisprudence wherein only the Immigration Commissioner was impleaded to decide whether an alien may stay or be deported. Ordinarily, the nonjoinder of an indispensable party or the real party interest is not by itself a ground for the dismissal of the petition. The court before which the petition is filed must first require the joinder of such party. It is the noncompliance with said order that would be a ground for the dismissal of the petition.

Petitioner maintains that the respondents petition should have been dismissed because he failed to implead the real party-in-interest as mandated by Rule 3, Section 7 ROC, The inclusion of the BOC as respondent in the case was necessary in order that its actions could be directly attacked and for the court to acquire jurisdiction over it. The respondent counters that the petitioner is already estopped from raising this issue.

ISSUE: Is the BOC an indispensable party? YES. HELD: The respondent was arrested and detained on the basis of the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC. The motions had to be resolved by the BOC as the order sought to be resolved and reconsidered was issued by it and not by the petitioner alone. The powers and duties of the BOC may not be exercised by the individual members of the Commission. Section 7, Rule 3 of the ROC, as amended, requires indispensable parties to be joined as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality. Strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void. The responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties rests on the petitioner/plaintiff. However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiffs failure to comply. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. In this case, the CA did not require the respondent to implead the BOC as respondent, but merely relied on the rulings of the Court Vivo v. Arca, and Vivo v. Cloribel. The CAs reliance on the said rulings is misplaced as the BOC was not a necessary nor even an indispensable party in the aforecited cases. The petition should not be dismissed because the second action would only be a repetition of the first. *** CA had jurisdiction over the petition of the respondent. The petition did not involve the act or power of the President of the Philippines to deport or exclude an alien from the country. This being so, the petition necessarily did not call for a substitution of the Presidents discretion on the matter of the deportation of the respondent with that of the judgment of the CA. BOC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing its Summary Deportation Order and Omnibus Resolution, and that the petitioner committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in causing the arrest and detention of the private respondent. Aliens may be expelled or deported from the Philippines only on grounds and in the manner provided for by the Constitution, the Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, and administrative issuances pursuant thereto. The BOC ordered the private respondents deportation without even conducting summary deportation proceedings. The BOC merely relied on the Letter of the German Vice Consul and of the German Embassys Note Verbale. The BOC speculated that the respondent committed insurance fraud and illegal activities in the Philippines and would not, thus, be issued a new passport. This, in turn, caused the BOC to conclude that the respondent was an undesirable alien. The respondent was not afforded any hearing at all. The arrest and detention of the respondent and his deportation under the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC for insurance fraud and illegal activities in Palawan violated his constitutional and statutory rights to due process. The Respondents Arrest and Detention was Premature, Unwarranted and Arbitrary The arrest of the respondent in his house, at near midnight, and his subsequent detention was premature, unwarranted and arbitrary. The petitioner was required to first resolve the respondents Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order, which was filed more than six years before. The BOC issued its Summary Deportation Order without affording the respondent the right to be heard on his motion and adduce evidence. Apparently, the BOC did not bother to review its own records in resolving the respondents Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. There is no law nor rule which provides that a Summary Deportation Order issued by the BOC in the exercise of its authority becomes final after one year from its issuance, or that the aggrieved party is barred from filing a motion for a reconsideration of any order or decision of the BOC. The Rules of Court may be applied in a suppletory manner to deportation proceedings and under Rule 37, a motion for reconsideration of a decision or final order may be filed by the aggrieved party. The petitioner even admits that there is no longer a legal or factual basis to disqualify the respondent from remaining in the country as a permanent resident. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
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Chua vs. Torres, G.R. No. 151900, Aug. 30, 2005. -MEDZ Christine Chua, herein petitioner, filed a complaint for damages before the RTC against respondents, impleading her brother Jonathan Chua as a necessary co-plaintiff complaint alleged that Jonathan Chua issued in favor of the Caltex Service Center his personal RCBC Check in payment for purchases of diesel oil check was dishonored by the drawee bank when presented for payment on the ground that the account was closed respondent Beltran who was employee of Caltex, instituted against petitioner a criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 with the MTC MTC then issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner while Jonathan Chua was named as a plaintiff to the suit, it was explicitly qualified in the second paragraph of the complaint that he was being 'impleaded here-in as a necessary party-plaintiff There was no allegation in the complaint of any damage or injury sustained by Jonathan, and the prayer therein expressly named petitioner as the only party to whom respondents were sought to recompense Neither did Jonathan Chua sign any verification or certification against forum-shopping, although petitioner did sign an attestation, wherein she identified herself as 'the principal plaintiff Jonathan Chua did not sign as well any verification to the complaint, ostensibly in violation of Section 7, Rule 4 of the Rules of Civil Procedure Petitioner alleged in her complaint that Jonathan was a necessary party RTC ordered the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that Jonathan Chua had not executed a certification against forum-shopping

RTC ruled that Jonathan Chua was obliged to execute or sign such certification

since Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules' of Civil Procedure requires that a plaintiff or principal party who files a complaint or initiatory pleading execute such certification

After the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration[12] lodged by petitioner, the matter was elevated directly to this Court by way of petition for review under Rule 45

ISSUES: 1) whether or not Jonathan Chua was misjoined as a party plaintiff in this case 2) whether the absence of the signature of the person misjoined as a party-plaintiff in either the verification page or certification against forum-shopping is ground for the dismissal of the action HELD: 1) Yes The subject complaint does not allege any rights of Jonathan Chua violated by respondents, present any rights of his to be enforced, or seek in his behalf any rights to the avails of suit. In short, Jonathan claims nothing, and for nothing, in the subject complaint

it is only in the name of a real party in interest that a civil suit may be prosecuted.[19]
Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. "Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest Petitioner failed to demonstrate how Jonathan can be considered as a necessary party, other than by noting that he was 'the one who really issued the check in controversy Such fact, if proven, may establish the malice of respondents in filing the criminal case against petitioner for violation of B.P. 22, but does not create the need to require Jonathan's participation as a necessary party

Section 8, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure defines a necessary party as 'one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action.[24] Necessary parties are those whose presence is necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose interests are so far separable that a final decree can be made in their absence without affecting them Jonathan Chua does not stand to be affected should the RTC rule either favorably or unfavorably of the complaint. This is due to the nature of the cause of action of the complaint, which alleges an injury personal to petitioner, and the relief prayed for, which is to be adjudicated solely to petitioner. There is no allegation in the complaint alleging any violation or omission of any right of Jonathan, either arising from contract or from law.
19

Jonathan should be deemed a necessary party just so he was called to testify by his sister, in order to prove the essential allegation that she did not issue the check in question, and perhaps such testimony would be vital to petitioner's cause of action such circumstance would merely place him in the same class as those witnesses whose testimony would be necessary to prove the allegations of the complaint but the fact remains that Jonathan would stand unaffected by the final ruling on the complaint No.

2)

Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997

Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately misjoinder of parties is not fatal to the complaint. The rule prohibits dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties

dropping of misjoined parties from the complaint may be done motu proprio by the court, at any stage, without need for a motion to such effect from the adverse party Section 11, Rule 3 indicates that the misjoinder of parties, while erroneous, may be corrected with ease through amendment, without further hindrance to the prosecution of the suit Since the misjoined party plaintiff receives no recognition from the court as either an indispensable or necessary party-plaintiff, it then follows that whatever action or inaction the misjoined party may take on the verification or certification against forumshopping is inconsequential. it should not have mattered to the RTC that Jonathan Chua had failed to sign the certification against forum-shopping, since he was misjoined as a plaintiff in the first place

Republic vs. Campos G.R. No. 84895 May 4, 1989 ANNE Nature of the action: Petition for review the decision and resolution of the CA. FACTS: Petitioner RP filed with respondent court Sandiganbayan a complaint for reconveyance reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against Alfredo Romualdez, Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda Marcos, Jose Campos, JR and 45 other defendants. Petitioner seek to recover from them ill-gotten wealth consisting of funds and other property. Subsequently, Jose Campos, JR filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss praying that he be removed as party defendant from the complaint on the grounds that he had voluntary surrender or turned over to the Government of the RP and that he was entitled to the immunity granted by the PCGG being a member of the immediate family of Jose Campos. RP filed with the SB a Motion seeking to drop defendant Jose D. Campos, JR from the complaint on the ground that the PCGG granted immunity to Mr. Jose Y. Campos and his family. SB issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to drop Campos, JR from the complaint.

ISSUE: WHETHER PETITIONER RP CAN VALIDLY DROP JOSE D. CAMPOS, JR. AS PARTY DEFENDANT BY VIRTUE OF THE PCGGS GRANT OF IMMUNITY IN FAVOR OF HIS FATHER JOSE Y. CAMPOS AND THE LATTERS FAMILY. HELD: Yes, the Solicitor General asserts that the name of Jose D. Campos, Jr. was included as defendant in the complaint through mistake or oversight and that pursuant to section 1 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court it has a right to drop him as defendant without prior consent of any party. A cursory reading of Executive Order No. 14 shows that the PCGG is authorized to file both criminal and civil cases against persons suspected of having acquired ill-gotten wealth. Section 3 thereof provides: "SECTION 3. Civil suits for restitution, reparation of damages, or indemnification for consequential damages, forfeiture proceedings provided for under Republic Act No. 1379, or any other civil actions under the Civil Code or other existing laws, in connection with Executive Order No. 1 dated February 28, 1986 and Executive Order No. 2 dated March 12, 1986, may be filed separately from and proceed independently of any criminal proceedings and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence." It is crystal clear from the law that the PCGG may file an independent civil action separate from the criminal action. Hence, section 5 thereof which empowers the PCGG to grant criminal immunity must be interpreted to relate only to a criminal action and not to a civil action. In case of a civil action, the power to grant immunity or the making of the decision not to file a civil case or to drop one already in progress must be related to section 3 of the law which specifically provides for the procedures and the applicable laws in the prosecution of civil suits. Even from the viewpoint of procedure, the PCGG was right when it filed a motion to drop Jose Campos, Jr. as defendant in the civil case. Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states: "SECTION 11, RULE 3. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. - Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. . . .

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No one is free to join anybody in a complaint in court only to drop him unceremoniously later at the pleasure of the plaintiff. The rule presupposes that the original inclusion had been made in the honest conviction that it was proper and the subsequent dropping is requested because it turned out that such inclusion was a mistake. There is nothing whimsical or capricious in dropping the petitioner-intervenor from the complaint. Quite the contrary, it is based on sound and salutary reasons. As discussed earlier, the PCGG's motion to drop Campos, Jr. as defendant in Civil Case No. 0010 has legal basis under Executive Order No. 14. The fact that Campos, Jr. and all the other defendants were charged solidarily in the complaint does not make him an indispensable party. "Solidarity does not make a solidary obligor an indispensable party in a suit filed by the creditor. Article 1216 of the Civil Code says that the creditor 'may proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously." There is no showing that the dropping of Jose Campos, Jr. as defendant would be unjust to the other defendants in the civil case because, the other defendants can still pursue the case and put up their defenses. Malagarte vs. CA, G.R. No. 166519, March 31, 2009 ERWIN Petition for Review on Certiorari under rule 45 from the Court of Appeals after it was dismissed by the CFI of Maasin, Southern Leyte; a question of law RTC denied CA denied MR denied SC affirmed petitioners Facts Petitioners filed a case of recovery of title to property with damages against respondents over a parcel of coconut land. Private respondents Dominador and Aurora assert that both them and petitioners inherited the property in question from a common ancestor. It was later revealed that there were other co-owners of the said lot. After resting the case, through their memorandum, private respondents contend that failure to include the other owners should be a valid ground for termination. CFI dismissed based on the absence of the other indispensable parties. Issue W/N the failure to implead the co-owners is a valid ground for dismissal Held No, it is not a valid ground for dismissal. The law presumes that in the absence of the co-owners in the complaint shows that those who participated shall have done so in their name and in representation of their common interest. The only exception to this rule would be if the action would only benefit the plaintiff, as such the participation of the co-owners in the complaint is indispensable. This does not violate the Due Process clause as it has been clearly established in the trial that the co-owners, in pursuit of their collective right have granted petitioners authority to file suit in assertion of their rights over the parcel of land. The correct remedy would have been an order of the court to include the names of the other co-owners as indispensable parties on its own or by motion of the parties; it is not a valid grounds for automatic dismissal. Rule 9. Section 3. Revised Rules of Court.

Section 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded. Whenever in any pleading in which a claim is asserted a necessary party is not joined, the pleader shall set forth his name, if known, and shall state why he is omitted. Should the court find the reason for the omission unmeritorious, it may order the inclusion of the omitted necessary party if jurisdiction over his person may be obtained. The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall be deemed a waiver of the claim against such party. The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such necessary party. (8a, 9a) Marmo vs. Anacay, G.R. No. 182585, Nov. 27, 2009 KIM Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari Facts: o Moises O. Anacay filed a case for Annulment of Sale, Recovery of Title with Damages against the petitioners[6] and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite. The complaint states, among others, that: the respondent is the bona-fide co-owner, together with his wife, Gloria P. Anacay (now deceased), of a 50-square meter parcel of land. They authorized petitioner Josephine to sell the subject property; petitioner Josephine sold the subject property to petitioner Danilo payable in monthly installments; petitioner Danilo defaulted in his installment payments from December 2002 onwards; the respondent subsequently discovered that TCT No. 815595 had been cancelled and TCT No. T-972424 was issued in petitioner Josephines name by virtue of a falsified Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 20, 2001;and later transferred in Danilos name. Thus Anacay filed a complaint before the RTC.
21

Following the pre-trial conference, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the case for the respondents failure to include his children as indispensable parties.[10] The respondent filed an Opposition, arguing that his children are not indispensable parties because the issue in the case can be resolved without their participation in the proceedings.

o o

RTC denied the motion to dismis After the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners elevated their case to the CA through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The CA dismissed the petition. Hence this appeal. The petitioners submit that the respondents children, who succeeded their deceased mother as co-owners of the property, are indispensable parties because a full determination of the case cannot be made without their presence

o o

Issue: whether or not the children are indispensable parties. Held: No. o Section 7, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as parties-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action and who, for this reason, must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants. Jurisprudence further holds that a party is indispensable, not only if he has an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but also if his interest is such that a final decree cannot be made without affecting this interest or without placing the controversy in a situation where the final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. He is a person whose absence disallows the court from making an effective, complete, or equitable determination of the controversy between or among the contending parties. o Where the suit is brought by a co-owner, without repudiating the co-ownership, then the suit is presumed to be filed for the benefit of the other co-owners and may proceed without impleading the other co-owners. However, where the co-owner repudiates the co-ownership by claiming sole ownership of the property or where the suit is brought against a co-owner, his co-owners are indispensable parties and must be impleaded as party-defendants, as the suit affects the rights and interests of these other co-owners. In the present case, the respondent, as the plaintiff in the court below, never disputed the existence of a co-ownership nor claimed to be the sole or exclusive owner of the litigated lot. In fact, he recognized that he is a bona-fide co-owner of the questioned property, along with his deceased wife. Moreover and more importantly, the respondents claim in his complaint is personal to him and his wife, i.e., that his and his wifes signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioner Josephine were falsified. The issue therefore is falsification, an issue which does not require the participation of the respondents co-owners at the trial; it can be determined without their presence because they are not parties to the document; their signatures do not appear therein. Their rights and interests as co-owners are adequately protected by their co-owner and father, respondent Moises O. Anacay, since the complaint was made precisely to recover ownership and possession of the properties owned in common, and, as such, will redound to the benefit of all the co-owners. In sum, respondents children, as co-owners of the subject property, are not indispensable parties to the resolution of the case

Banda vs. Enrile, G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010 - SUZETTE Atty. Sylvia Banda et al., petitioners vs EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE INFORMATION AGENCY and THE NATIONAL TREASURER, G.R. No 166620, April 20, 2010 Nature of the case: Petition for Certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 378 dated October 25, 2004, issued by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (President Arroyo) Facts: (This case assails the consitutionality of EO 378 issued by GMA, so most of the discussion in the full text pertains to consti law) Petitioners characterize their action as a class suit filed on their own behalf and on behalf of all their co-employees at the National Printing Office (NPO) NPO was formed during the term of former President Corazon C. Aquino by virtue of Executive Order No. 285 which provided, among others, the creation of the NPO from the merger of the Government Printing Office and the relevant printing units of the Philippine Information Agency (PIA) On October 25, 2004, President Arroyo issued the herein assailed Executive Order No. 378, amending Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the NPO, petitioners now challenge its constitutionality, contending that:
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(1) it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by former President Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers; and (2) Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners security of tenure, because it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO Issue: (In relation to CivPro) WON the petition qualifies as a class suit Ruling: No. Ratio: Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as follows: Sec. 12. Class suit. When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual interest. From the foregoing definition, the requisites of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.

Mathay v. The Consolidated Bank and Trust Company:

An action does not become a class suit merely because it is designated as such in the pleadings. Whether the suit is or is not a class suit depends upon the attending facts, and the complaint, or other pleading initiating the class action should allege the existence of the necessary facts, to wit, the existence of a subject matter of common interest, and the existence of a class and the number of persons in the alleged class, in order that the court might be enabled to determine whether the members of the class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, to contrast the number appearing on the record with the number in the class and to determine whether claimants on record adequately represent the class and the subject matter of general or common interest Here, the petition failed to state the number of NPO employees who would be affected by the assailed Executive Order and who were allegedly represented by petitioners. It was the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, who pointed out that there were about 549 employees in the NPO. The 67 petitioners undeniably comprised a small fraction of the NPO employees whom they claimed to represent. The court noted that only 20 petitioners effectively instituted the present case. MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc., we observed that an element of a class suit or representative suit is the adequacy of representation. In determining the question of fair and adequate representation of members of a class, the court must consider (a) whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the interest of the other members of the class; (b) the proportion of those made a party, as it so bears, to the total membership of the class; and (c) any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class.

Previously, we held in Ibaes v. Roman Catholic Church that where the interests of the plaintiffs and the other members of the class they seek to represent are diametrically opposed, the class suit will not prosper. In the case, a Manifestation of Desistance, to which the previously mentioned Affidavit of Desistance was attached, was filed by the President of the National Printing Office Workers Association (NAPOWA). The said manifestation expressed NAPOWAs opposition to the filing of the instant petition in any court. Even if we take into account the contention of petitioners counsel that the NAPOWA President had no legal standing to file such manifestation, the said pleading is a clear indication that there is a divergence of opinions and views among the members of the class sought to be represented, and not all are in favor of filing the present suit.

23

There is here an apparent conflict between petitioners interests and those of the persons whom they claim to represent. Since it cannot be said that petitioners sufficiently represent the interests of the entire class, the instant case cannot be properly treated as a class suit. Side Note: EO 378 was declared constitutional

Petition was dismissed. Office of the City Mayor of Paraaque City, et al. vs. Mario D. Ebio and His Children/Heirs namely, Arturo V. Ebio, Eduardo, et al., G.R. No. 178411, June 23, 2010 TIN Nature: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 Facts: 1. The Sangguninang Brgy of Vitalez passed a Resolution seeking assistance from the City Government of Paraaque for the construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek, Respondent Ebio opposed the construction of said road.

The Ebios trace their ownership over the said land from their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez who gave the lot to his son Pedro who has a daughter named Zenaida who married respondent Ebio

2. The City Administrator sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to vacate the area within the next thirty (30) days, or be physically
evicted from the said property

3. Respondents applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners (City Officials & Brgy Officials) before the RTC- DENIED for
lack of merit

4. Respondents moved for reconsideration- DENIED 5. Respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals- CA ruled in favor of respondents 6. Petitioners filed an MR- DENIED 7. Hence this petition
Issue: Whether the State is an indispensable party to respondents action for prohibitory injunction?

Petitioners argue that since the creek, being a tributary of the river, is classified as part of the public domain, any land that may have formed along its banks through time should also be considered as part of the public domain. And respondents should have included the State as it is an indispensable party to the action

Held: NO The action for prohibition seeks to enjoin the city government of Paraaque from proceeding with its implementation of the road construction project. The State is neither a necessary nor an indispensable party to an action where no positive act shall be required from it or where no obligation shall be imposed upon it, such as in the case at bar. Neither would it be an indispensable party if none of its properties shall be divested nor any of its rights infringed. An indispensable party is one whose interest in the controversy is such that a final decree would necessarily affect his/her right, so that the court cannot proceed without their presence. In contrast, a necessary party is one whose presence in the proceedings is necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy but whose interest is separable such that a final decree can be made in their absence without affecting them. Carandang vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 160347 November 29, 2006 ALFIE MELL (repeating case) DOCTRINE: Other than the indispensable and necessary parties, there is a third set of parties: the PRO-FORMA parties, which are those who are required to be joined as co-parties in suits by or against another party as may be provided by the applicable substantive law or procedural rule. PRO-FORMA PARTIES can either be indispensable, necessary or neither indispensable nor necessary. The third case occurs if, for example, a husband files an action to recover a property which he claims to be part of his exclusive property. The wife may have no legal interest in such property, but the rules nevertheless require that she be joined as a party. In cases of pro-forma parties who are neither indispensable nor necessary, the GENERAL RULE under Section 11, Rule 3 must be followed: such non-joinder is not a ground for dismissal. Hence, in a case concerning an action to recover a sum of money, we held that the failure to join the spouse in that case was not a jurisdictional defect. The non-joinder of a spouse does not warrant dismissal as it is merely a formal requirement which may be cured by amendment. Conversely, dismissal is warranted only if the pro-forma party not joined in the complaint is an indispensable party.
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In suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties. The suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners. FACTS: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: RTC(in favor of De Guzman) CA(Af | MR denied) SC(45: Af)

Quirino de Guzman and the Spouses Carandang are stockholders as well as corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting System (MBS), with equities at (54%) and (46%) respectively. The capital stock of MBS was increased (1983) and was subscribed by the spouses Carandang. MBS again increased (1989) its capital stock, and the spouses Carandang yet again subscribed to the increase. De Guzman claims that, part of the payment for these subscriptions were paid by him. Thus, he sent a demand letter to the spouses Carandang for the payment of said total amount. The spouses refused to pay the amount, contending that a pre-incorporation agreement was executed between [Arcadio Carandang] and De Guzman, whereby the latter promised to pay for the stock subscriptions of the former without cost, in consideration for Arcadio's technical expertise, therefore, there is no indebtedness on their part. De Guzman filed (1992) his complaint, seeking to recover the P336K together with damages. RTC ruled in favor of De Guzman. CA affirmed the same. MR was denied. The spouses Carandang claims that the Decision of the RTC, having been rendered after the death of Quirino de Guzman, is void for failing to comply with Section 16, Rule 3, ROC. <check the codal> Three of the four checks used to pay their stock subscriptions were issued in the name of Milagros de Guzman, the latter should be considered an indispensable party

ISSUE: Should RTC dismissed the case for failure to state a cause of action, considering that Milagros De Guzman, allegedly an indispensable party, was not included as a party-plaintiff? NO. HELD: RTC Decision is valid despite the failure to comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of the ROC, because of the express waiver of the heirs to the jurisdiction over their persons, and because there had been, before the promulgation of the RTC Decision, no further proceedings requiring the appearance of de Guzman's counsel. RE NON-INCLUSION IN THE COMPLAINT OF AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY. Petitioners erroneously interchange the terms "real party in interest" and "indispensable party." A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. On the other hand, an INDISPENSABLE PARTY is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, in contrast to a NECESSARY PARTY, which is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. What dismissal on this ground entails is an EXAMINATION of whether the parties presently pleaded are interested in the outcome of the litigation, and NOT whether all persons interested in such outcome are actually pleaded. The latter query is relevant in discussions concerning indispensable and necessary parties, but not in discussions concerning real parties in interest. Both indispensable and necessary parties are considered as real parties in interest, since both classes of parties stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains govern the property relations of Quirino and Milagros de Guzman. All property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. Credits loaned during the time of the marriage are presumed to be conjugal property. As such, Quirino de Guzman, being a co-owner of specific partnership property, is certainly a real party in interest. Dismissal on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, by reason that the suit was allegedly not brought by a real party in interest, is therefore unwarranted. When an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should likewise be dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actuations of the court void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. On the other hand, the non-joinder of necessary parties do not result in the dismissal of the case. Non-compliance with the order for the inclusion of a necessary party would not warrant the dismissal of the complaint. This is an EXCEPTION to Section 3, Rule 17 which allows the dismissal of the complaint for failure to comply with an order of the court. Section 11, Rule 3 provides that the non-joinder of parties is not a ground for the dismissal of the action. Other than the indispensable and necessary parties, there is a third set of parties: the PRO-FORMA parties, which are those who are required to be joined as co-parties in suits by or against another party as may be provided by the applicable substantive law or procedural rule. An example is provided by Section 4, Rule 3 of the ROC: Sec. 4. Spouses as parties. - Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law. PRO-FORMA PARTIES can either be indispensable, necessary or neither indispensable nor necessary. The third case occurs if, for example, a husband files an action to recover a property which he claims to be part of his exclusive property. The wife may have no legal interest in such property, but the rules nevertheless require that she be joined as a party. In cases of pro-forma parties who are neither indispensable nor necessary, the GENERAL RULE under Section 11, Rule 3 must be followed: such non-joinder is not a ground for dismissal. Hence, in a case concerning an action to recover a sum of money, we held that the failure to join the spouse in that case was not a jurisdictional defect. The non-joinder of a spouse does not warrant dismissal as it is merely a formal requirement which may be cured by amendment.
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Conversely, dismissal is warranted only if the pro-forma party not joined in the complaint is an indispensable party. Milagros de Guzman, being presumed to be a co-owner of the credits allegedly extended to the spouses Carandang, seems to be either an indispensable or a necessary party. If she is an indispensable party, dismissal would be proper. If she is merely a necessary party, dismissal is not warranted. Art. 108, FC provides that the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Article 1811 of the Civil Code provides that "[a] partner is a co-owner with the other partners of specific partnership property." Taken with the presumption of the conjugal nature of the funds used to finance the four checks used to pay for petitioners' stock subscriptions, and with the presumption that the credits themselves are part of conjugal funds, Article 1811 makes Quirino and Milagros de Guzman co-owners of the alleged credit. Being co-owners of the alleged credit, Quirino and Milagros de Guzman may separately bring an action for the its recovery. In a co-ownership, coowners may bring actions for the recovery of co-owned property without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of his co-owners. In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties. The suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners. SC hold that Milagros de Guzman is not an indispensable party in the action for the recovery of the allegedly loaned money to the spouses Carandang. As such, she need not have been impleaded in said suit, and dismissal of the suit is not warranted by her not being a party thereto. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the CA is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION Limos vs. Sps. Odones, G.R. No. 186979, August 11, 2010 -NOEL Rule 45 certio which assails the decision and resolution of the CA. The decision affirmed the resolution and order of the lower court wherein it denied petitioners motion to set preliminary hearing the special and affirmative defenses and MR. Odones -> RTC (against Limos et al. RTC issued reso which was adverse to the request of Limos et al) Limos et al -> CA (affirmed RTC reso) Limos et al -> SC (45 certio) Facts: Spouses Odones filed a complaint for the annulment of Deed, Title and damages against Limos and the Delos Reyeses with the RTC of Camiling Tarlac. The complaint alleged that the Spouses Odones were owner of a parcel of land by virtue of an Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and sale executed by the heirs of Donata Lardizabal It took a while for the said spouses to decide to register the parcel of land as theirs. When they did, they found out that the OCT of the parcel was already cancelled and a TCT was already issued in the name of Limos, et.al. Limos, et al were able to secure the TCT by virtue of an alleged DoAS executed by the Spouses Donata Lardizabal and Francisco Razalan. The said parcel was already subdivided between them with subsequent TCTs issued over the division. The Odones Spouses sought to have the TCTs cancelled on the ground that the Signatures of the Razalan Spouses were forged. They stated that the deeds were signed in 1972 but the spouses have been dead since 71 (alleged wife died 1926, alleged husband died 1971). Limos et al pleaded affirmative defenses on the grounds of: 1) 2) 3) Failure to state cause of action since the extrajudicial Succession of the estate of Donata was not published and contained formal defects, hence, the Odones spouses were not real parties in interest; Non-joinder of the other heirs of Donata Lardizabal as indispensable parites; The claim of the spouses Odones is already barred by laches.

In reply, the Odones spouses denied the affirmative defences and insisted on the vality of the Extrajudicial Succession of the Estate. They maintained that they are the true owners of the subject parcel and the DoAS the favors Limos et al was void. They even appended a sworn statement made by Amadeo Razalan declaring that he did not succeed the parcel of land, he did not sell the land to Limos and delos Reyes and asserted truthfulness of the rights of other Razalans as heirs (and sellers to the Odones Spouses) Limos et al served a request for admission of several matters to the Spouses Odones. Some of these matters alleged that some of the heir/sellers did not appear or sign the Extrajudicial Succession and Sale of the estate in favour of the Odones spouses, hence, void. The spouses Odones were not able to reply upon the request, hence, they impliedly admitted them. The spouses commented that the matters were not material and emphasized that the issue is w/n the sale to Limos et al was valid. In a Resolution, the RTC denied the request to admit due to redundancy and some of them were effectively denied by the Extrajudicial Succession of the Estate and Sale and the Sworn statement of Amadeo. Limos et al filed MR of the resolution but was denied.
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Limos et al went to the CA with a 65 certio alleging grave abuse on the part of the RTC. The CA dismissed the petition, hence, the current rule 45 petition to the SC. Limos et al posits that pursuant to Rule 26, Secs. 1-2, a party who fails to respond to a Request for Admission shall be deemed to have impliedly admitted all the matters contained therein. Issues: W/N the non-joinder of the other heirs would be tantamount to dismissal of the complaint (SC: NO) W/N the request for admission was correctly denied by the lower courts (SC: YES) HELD: Re: Non Joinder Iit is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. It is only when the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that the latter may dismiss the complaint.31 In this case, no such order was issued by the trial court. Re: Request for admission Under Rule 26, Secs. 1-2, a party who fails to respond to the request for admission would be deemed to have impliedly admitted to the matters contained. It must be emphasized, however, that the application of the rules on modes of discovery rests upon the sound discretion of the court. As such, it is the duty of the courts to examine thoroughly the circumstances of each case and to determine the applicability of the modes of discovery, bearing always in mind the aim to attain an expeditious administration of justice. As correctly observed by the trial court, the matters set forth in petitioners Request for Admission were the same affirmative defenses pleaded in their Answer which respondents already traversed in their Reply. The said defenses were likewise sufficiently controverted in the complaint and its annexes. In effect, petitioners sought to compel respondents to deny once again the very matters they had already denied, a redundancy, which if abetted, will serve no purpose but to delay the proceedings and thus defeat the purpose of the rule on admission as a mode of discovery which is "to expedite trial and relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry." A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting partys pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact described in the request, whose purpose is to establish said partys cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is pointless, useless, and a mere redundancy. Verily then, if the trial court finds that the matters in a Request for Admission were already admitted or denied in previous pleadings by the requested party, the latter cannot be compelled to admit or deny them anew. In turn, the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response to the request and thereafter, assume or even demand the application of the implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26. Petition DENIED. CA decision AFFIRMED.

VIII. RULE 3, SECTIONS 13 TO 19: Parties to a Civil Action

Chiang Kai Shek School vs. CA, G.R. No. 58028. April 18, 1989. MELL DOCTRINE: The school itself may be sued in its own name, there is no need to apply Rule 3, Section 15, under which the persons joined in an association without any juridical personality may be sued with such association FACTS: CRUZ, J.: CFI(dismissed) CA(Rv) SC(45:Affirmed~CA)

Fausta F. Oh had been teaching in the school since 1932 for a continuous period of almost 33 years. Out of the blue, and for no apparent or given reason, she was dismissed. She demanded separation pay, social security benefits, salary differentials, maternity benefits and moral and exemplary damages. The original defendant was the Chiang Kai Shek School but when it filed an MTD on the ground that it could not be sued, the complaint was amended. Certain officials of the school were also impleaded to make them solidarily liable with the school. CFI-Sorsogon dismissed the complaint. On appeal, CA set aside the decision of CFI, which held the school suable and liable while absolving the other defendants. MR having been denied, the school came to SC in this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Will a complaint filed against persons associated under a common name will justify a judgment against the association itself and not its individual members?
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HELD: It is true that Rule 3, Section 1, of the ROC clearly provides that "only natural or juridical persons may be parties in a civil action." It is also not denied that the school has not been incorporated. However, this omission should not prejudice the private respondent in the assertion of her claims against the school. Having been recognized by the government, Petitioner was under obligation to incorporate under the Corporation Law within 90 days from such recognition. It appears that it had not done so at the time the complaint was filed notwithstanding that it had been in existence even earlier than 1932. The petitioner cannot now invoke its own non-compliance with the law to immunize it from the private respondent's complaint. For 32 years, petitioner represented itself as possessed of juridical personality to do so, the petitioner is now estopped from denying such personality to defeat respondents claim against it. As the school itself may be sued in its own name, there is no need to apply Rule 3, Section 15, under which the persons joined in an association without any juridical personality may be sued with such association. Besides, it has been shown that the individual members of the board of trustees are not liable, having been appointed only after the private respondent's dismissal. ***Even assuming that the petitioner was a charitable institution as it claims, the private respondent was nonetheless still entitled to the protection of the Termination Pay Law, which was then in force. ***The Court holds, after considering the particular circumstance of Oh's employment, that she had become a permanent employee of the school and entitled to security of tenure at the time of her dismissal. SC finds that the private respondent was arbitrarily treated by the petitioner, which has shown no cause for her removal nor had it given her the notice required by the Termination Pay Law. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed decision is AFFIRMED except for the award of separation pay, which is reduced to P2,880.00. All the other awards are approved. ATTY. LAVINA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 171 SCRA 691 (1989) MEDZ FACTS: April 6, 1983 Maria Carmen Gabriel y Paterno, single, 72 years old, executed a donation mortis causa in favor of her widowed sister-in-law, Josefina C. Gabriel, 75 years of age, over a parcel of land with improvements in Sampaloc, Manila, covered by a TCT in Carmen's name. The donation was thumbmarked by Carmen before Notary Public Jose T. Constantino. It was accepted by the donee in the same instrument. August 11, 1983 Carmen, who was already gravely ill with breast cancer, executed a Last Will And Testament in which she bequeathed the same Sampaloc property to her cousin and companion, Remedios C. Muyot, and willed a small lot in Antipolo, Rizal to Josefina. She named a friend, Concepcion M. De Garcia, as executrix of her will. August 15, 1983 Carmen executed a General Power of Attorney appointing Remedios M. Muyot, as her attorney-in-fact. November 3, 1983 Josefina registered an adverse claim on the title of the Sampaloc property based on the donation made by Carmen in her favor. November 4, 1983 Remedios Muyot, as Carmen's attorney- in-fact, hired Atty. Celso D. Lavia, as Carmen's counsel, on a 30% contingent fee basis. November 19, 1983 Carmen thumbmarked an "AFFIDAVIT OF DENIAL" repudiating the donation of the Sampaloc property to Josefina because it was allegedly procured through fraud and trickery. She alleged that in April 1983, she still could sign her name, and that she had no intention of donating the property to Josefina who had not done her any favor and in fact abandoned her during her illness. November 19, 1983 she thumbmarked a "REVOCATION OF DONATION" before Notary Public James Beltran. November 21, 1983 Remedios Muyot, as Carmen's attorney-in-fact, sold the Sampaloc property to Virgilio D. Cebrero for an alleged consideration of P2,664,655. November 29, 1983 Carmen passed away. December 1, 1983 the "REVOCATION OF DONATION" was registered on the back of Carmen's TCT. December 5, 1983 Josefina filed a complaint in the RTC of Manila against Carmen's estate and the Register of Deeds of Manila to annul the Deed of Revocation of Donation. She alleged that the deed of revocation, made only ten (10) days before Carmen's death, was false and fictitious. - She asked the court to appoint an administrator ad litem for the estate of Carmen P. Gabriel. - Upon filing the complaint, she caused to be recorded a Notice of Lis Pendens on the title of the property. Without appointing a special administrator for Carmen's estate, the court caused summons to be served on the estate. The summons was received by Remedios Muyot. January 24, 1984 the Cebreros registered the sale of the Sampaloc property to them and obtained TCT in their names. February 6, 1984 Josefina's complaint was amended to implead Muyot and the Cebrero spouses as additional defendants. In addition to the original causes of action, the amended complaint sought the nullification of Muyot's General Power of Attorney and the sale of the Sampaloc property to the Cebrero spouses.
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Atty. Lavia filed an Answer for the Estate and Muyot. Josefina filed a motion to disqualify him on the ground that his authority as counsel for Carmen was extinguished upon her death. She also assailed the service of summons to the decedent's Estate through Muyot and reiterated her motion for the appointment of a special administrator for the Estate. Atty. Lavia opposed the motions.

September 23, 1986 Judge Vicencio denied Josefina's motion to disqualify Atty. Lavia. He also denied the motion to appoint a special administrator for the Estate "since the deceased left a Will naming an administratrix (executrix) and the latter has accepted the trust." He sustained his court's jurisdiction over the Estate based on the service of summons upon Muyot. January 23, 1987 Cebrero filed a motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens on the Sampaloc property. February 6, 1987 Before Judge Vicencio could act on it, Josefina filed a petition for certiorari on in the Court of Appeals assailing Judge Vicencio's order and praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to stop him from further proceeding in Civil Case. The Court of Appeals issued a restraining order on February 10, 1987, ordering the lower court to "desist from proceeding with Civil Case No. 8321629 until further orders." March 16, 1987 in spite of the restraining order, Judge Vicencio issued an order cancelling the notice of lis pendens because he believed the Appellate Court's restraining order of February 10, 1987 expired on March 3, 1987, i.e., after 20 days. March 4, 1987 the Court of Appeals set aside Judge Vicencio's order and required him, as well as his branch clerk of court and Attorney Lavia to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt of court. The Court of Appeals held that the 20-day limitation on the life of a restraining order did not apply to it but only to lower court "judges". The Court of Appeals further observed that the application of BP Blg. 224 to "judges" only "springs from practical considerations evident from the Rule itself." May 26, 1987 Lavia, Muyot, and Cebrero filed in this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing that resolution. They prayed that the Court of Appeals be enjoined from further proceeding. Without giving due course to the petition, We ordered the respondents to comment. During the pendency of the case, and eleven (11) months after the Court of Appeals issued the assailed order on May 4, 1987, this Court rendered a divided opinion in another case, "Delbros Hotel Corporation vs. The Intermediate Appellate Court, et al." defining the scope of BP Blg. 224. This Court held: The applicability of the above-quoted provision (Sec. 5, B.P. Blg. 224) to the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now the Court of Appeals, can hardly be doubted. The Interim Rules and Guidelines were promulgated to implement the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 (B.P. Blg. 129) which include the Intermediate Appellate Court among the courts organized thereunder. xxx Thus, paragraphs 14 and 15 of the Interim Rules expressly provide for Procedure in the Intermediate Appellate Court. Indeed, if paragraph 8 of the Interim Rules were not intended to apply to temporary restraining orders issued by the respondent Court, there would have been absolutely no reason for the inclusion of said paragraph in the Interim Rules. The limited life-span of temporary restraining orders issued by the regional trial courts and municipal trial courts is already provided for in B.P. Blg. 224. It was precisely to include the Intermediate Appellate Court within the same limitation as to the effectivity of its temporary restraining orders that B.P. Blg. 224 was incorporated in the Interim Rules, with the significant change of the word 'judge' to 'court,' so as to make it clear and unequivocal that the temporary restraining orders contemplated therein are those issued not only by trial judges but also by justices of the appellate court. This decision sustains Judge Vicencio's, not the Court of Appeals', interpretation of BP Blg. 224. However, this circumstance does not excuse his defiance of the Appellate Court's restraining order, for the heart of the issue in this case, is not whether the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted BP Blg. 224, but whether petitioners' disobedience of the Appellate Court's restraining order was contemptuous. We hold that it was. If the petitioners wanted the Court of Appeals to hear Josefina's application for a preliminary writ of injunction within twenty (20) days after it issued the temporary restraining order, they should have filed a motion to that effect, or, they should have asked the Court to limit the duration of its restraining order. - Instead, without notice to the other party or to the Court of Appeals, they persuaded the trial judge to grant their pending motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens. - The secrecy that shrouded that maneuver is a badge of their bad faith and constitutes contempt for the Appellate Court that issued the restraining order. G.R. No. 79917. During the pendency of G.R. No. 78295 in this Court, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision on September 15, 1987 in CA-G.R. SP No. 11260, granting Josefina's petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
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WHEREFORE, based on all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered: (1) annulling the assailed order dated 12 January 1987 as well as its related earlier order of September 23, 1986; (2) declaring that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the estate of Maria Carmen P. Gabriel; (3) ordering respondent Atty. Celso Lavia to refrain from representing the estate of the deceased Maria Carmen P. Gabriel in Civil Case No. 8321629; and (4) declaring that all pleadings, motions and papers filed by Atty. Lavia are sham and ordered expunged from the records of said case. Resolution of the contempt incident against respondent judge, Atty. Lavia and the branch clerk of court of respondent judge is hereby held in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's resolution of respondent's petition for review. (pp. 53-54, Rollo, G.R. No. 79917.) Within the 30-day extension granted by this Court, Attorney Lavia, Remedios Muyot, and the Cebrero spouses appealed by certiorari to this Court where their petition was docketed as G.R. No. 79917. The case was later consolidated with G.R. No. 78295. The Court of Appeals held that Attorney Lavia may not appear "as counsel for the estate of Carmen P. Gabriel because his authority as her counsel was extinguished upon Carmen's death" (Art. 1919, Civil Code). It also held that "respondent Remedios Muyot was not capacitated to receive summons for the estate because the general power of attorney constituting her as agent of the deceased became inoperative upon the death of the principal." The service of summons upon her was void. However, the Court held that a special administrator need not be appointed for the estate in Civil Case No. 83-21629 as the last will and testament of Maria Carmen P. Gabriel had been allowed probate on 3 February 1987 in Sp. Proc. No. 8423954 and letters testamentary had been issued to the duly designated executrix, Concepcion M. De Garcia, to represent the Estate. ISSUE/S: The petitioners allege in their petition for review of the decision that the Court of Appeals erred: 1. in holding that the trial court had not acquired jurisdiction over the estate of Carmen P. Gabriel; and 2. in holding that Attorney Celso Lavia's authority as counsel for Carmen P. Gabriel was extinguished upon her death. HELD: No reversible error in the appealed decision and orders of the Court of Appeals, the petitions for review are dismissed with costs against the petitioners. RATIO:

The petitioners' argument that service of the summons on Remedios Muyot was valid and sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the Court over the Estate of Carmen P. Gabriel, because Muyot was Carmen's attorney-in-fact, is not correct. The estate of a dead person may only be summoned through the executor or administrator of his estate for it is the executor or administrator who may sue or be sued (Sec. 3, Rule 3, Rules of Court) and who may bring or defend actions for the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the deceased (Sec. 2, Rule 87, Rules of Court). The general power of attorney appointing Remedios as Carmen's agent or attorney-in- fact was extinguished upon Carmen's demise. Thereafter, Remedios was bereft of authority to represent Carmen. The petitioner's contention that the agency was "constituted in the common interest of the principal and the agent" and that hence it was not extinguished by the death of the principal (Art. 1930, Civil Code) is refuted by the instrument itself which explicitly provided that the powers conferred on the agent were to be exercised for the "sole benefit" of the principal, Carmen P. Gabriel (Annex D, p. 61, Rollo, G.R. No. 79917). Carmen's death likewise divested Attorney Lavia of authority to represent her as counsel. A dead client has no personality and cannot be represented by an attorney (Barrameda vs. Barbara, 90 Phil. 718, 723; Caisip vs. Hon. Cabangon, 109 Phil. 150). LAWAS vs. CA, 146 SCRA 173 (1986) -ANNE NATURE OF THE ACTION: An appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition for certiorari under, Rule 65 of said Rules against respondent Judge Bernardo L. Salas of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.

FACTS:

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Private respondent Pelaez filed a Complaint against petitioner's father, Pedro Sepulveda, for ownership and partition of certain parcels of land. Defendant Pedro Sepulveda filed his Answer resisting the claim and raising the special defenses of laches, prescription and failure to ventilate in a previous special proceeding. During the presentation of evidence for the plaintiff, the defendant died. Counsels for the deceased defendant filed a notice of death wherein were enumerated the thirteen children and surviving spouse of the deceased. Petitioner filed a petition for letters of administration and she was appointed judicial administratrix of the estate of her late father. At the hearing of the case former counsels for the deceased defendant, manifested in open court that with the death of their client, their contract with him was also terminated and none of the thirteen children nor the surviving spouse had renewed the contract, but instead they had engaged the services of other lawyers in the intestate proceedings. Notwithstanding the manifestation of the former counsels of the deceased defendant, the respondent trial judge set the case for hearing on January 13, 1976 and sent the notice of hearing to said counsels. The respondent trial judge issued three orders. o First - substituted the heirs of the deceased defendant as defendants; o Second - authorized Atty. Teodoro Almase, counsel for the plaintiff, to present his evidence in the absence of Attys. Antigua and Branzuela and o Third - treated the case submitted for decision, after the plaintiff had presented his evidence and rested his case, and directed that said counsels and the fourteen heirs of the deceased defendant be furnished copies thereof. The respondent trial judge rendered a decision against the heirs of the deceased defendant. The ten of the children of the deceased defendant, who apparently did not know that a decision had already been rendered, filed an Answer in-substitution of the deceased defendant through their counsel Atty. Jesus Yray. This was denied admission by the respondent trial judge for being already moot and academic because of the earlier decision. The widow and two other children of the deceased defendant, through their counsel Atty. Delfin Quijano, filed a motion for substitution and for reconsideration. The respondent trial judge issued an order setting aside his decision and setting the case in the calendar for cross-examination of the plaintiff, Pacifico Pelaez, with a proviso that said order was applicable only to the three heirs who had filed the motion. The respondent trial judge lifted the order setting aside his decision, despite the verbal petition for postponement of the hearing made by one of the three heirs on the ground of the absence of their counsel. Petitioner, filed a motion to intervene and/or substitute the deceased defendant. The respondent trial judge denied the motion for the reason that the decision had already become final. Petitioner then filed a special civil action of certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul the proceedings in the respondent trial court. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari. Hence, the present appeal.

HELD:

Section 16 of Rule 3 provides as follows: Duty of attorney upon death, incapacity, or incompetency of party. Whenever a party to a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death, incapacity or incompetency, and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representative.

The former counsels for the deceased defendant, complied with this rule by filing a notice of death on May 21, 1975. They also correctly manifested in open court at the hearing of the case on November 27, 1975, that with the death of their client their contract with him was also terminated and none of the heirs of the deceased had renewed the contract, and the heirs had instead engaged the services of other lawyers in the intestate proceedings.

Both the respondent trial judge and the Court of Appeals erred in considering the former counsels of the deceased defendant as counsels for the heirs of the deceased. The statement in the decision of the Court of Appeals that "the appearance of the lawyers of their deceased father in court on January 13, 1976 (Annex K) carries the presumption that they were authorized by the heirs of the deceased defendant" is erroneous. As this Court held in People vs. Florendo (77 Phil. 16), "the attorneys for the offended party ceased to be the attorneys for the deceased upon the death of the latter, the principal. " Moreover, such a presumption was not warranted in view of the manifestation of said lawyers in open court on November 27, 1975 that they were not representing the heirs of the deceased defendant.
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Moreover, as above stated, petitioner had as early as May 5, 1975 filed a petition for letters of administration, and the same was granted in July, 1975.

Section 17 of Rule 3 provides as follows:

Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shag order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the de ceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

In the case at bar, in view of the pendency of Special Proceeding No. 37-SF Intestate Estate of Pedro Sepulveda, and the pending application of petitioner to be appointed judicial administratrix of the estate, the respondent trial judge should have awaited the appointment of petitioner and granted her motion to substitute the deceased defendant.

While the lower courts correctly held that the death of Pedro Sepulveda did not obliterate his verified Answer to the Complaint filed by private respondent and that the Answer filed by the ten heirs and the Answer filed by the Administratrix were both unnecessary, the said heirs or the administratrix could, with leave of court, file an Amended Answer.

The Court rules that the proceedings conducted by the respondent trial judge after the death of the deceased defendant are null and void.

VDA. DE SALAZAR VS. CA, G.R. NO. 121510 ERWIN Facts Private Respondents filed an ejectment case against Benjamin Salazar, deceased and husband of herein petitioner. The case was heard at the Court of Agrarian Relations and the RTC. The RTC decided in favor of the private respondents, the duration of the case spanned from 1970 to 1993. Petitioner/s elevated the case through an ordinary appeal to the CA asserting that private respondents, Nepomuceno failed to establish their right to cultivate and convert their landholdings. The CA denied their petition.

After the termination of the initial appeal, they filed another petition for annulment of judgment grounded upon the death of Benjamin in 1991 during the pendency of the RTC trial stating that the heirs and assignees were not impleaded, which deprived them of their right to due process. It is alleged that they should have first been impleaded upon the death of Benjamin as a form of effecting substitution of heirs, without such they were deprived of the said right. The CA denied the second petition and they filed an MR, which was also turned down.

CAR/RTC denied CA ordinary appeal; denied CA petition for relief of judgment; denied CA MR; denied SC denied

Issue W/N the failure to substitute petitioners, after the death of the original party removes jurisdiction over their person. Held Generally, YES but this case is an exception. As a general rule, it is indispensable that parties should be impleaded for the court to acquire jurisdiction over their persons without which, voids and annuls the proceedings. The failure to substitute in cases where the original party died invalidates the subsequent proceedings, as the continuation of such would violate the due process rights of the heirs and assignees. But as was manifest in this case, an exception exists to the general rule
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From the proceedings, it was established that: 1. in spite of the death of Benjamin, representation through his legal counsel continued. This showed that the family continually supported and were aware of the developments in the trial;

2. petitioner even testified in court confirming the death of her husband, submitting herself and the heirs to the jurisdiction of the court; 3. that jurisdiction by estoppel exists, established by the simple appearance of the party in court. 4. The issue was raised only after the courts failed to sustain their allegations, that they asserted the jurisdictional question. This was made through the second action with the CA. The action for recovery of real property is a real action, not extinguished by death. This placed the parties in a peculiar situation but through the petitioners apparent actions, submitted her and the decedents heirs to the jurisdiction of the lower court. By the action of petitioner, she is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the courts. Section 16. Rule 3. Revised Rules of Court Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice. If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. (16a, 17a)

BONIFACIO, et al. vs. Hon. DIZON, et al. (1989) KIM Nature: INSTANT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI INVOLVING PURE QUESTION OF LAW FACTS: o OLIMPIO BONIFACIO (decedent) filed before the Court of Agrarian Relations a case for ejectment against private respondent Pastora SAN MIGUEL Judge Serapio granted OLIMPIO to eject SAN MIGUEL

SAN MIGUEL appealed, and the CA affirmed the lower courts decision

o o

SAN MIGUEL then sought relief before the SC During her petition on Aug 7, 1983, Olimpio Bonifacio passed away o o No notice of death was given to the Court No order for substitution of his heir was made

o o

The SC denied SAN MIGUELs petition for lack of merit, and affirmed the CA decision A writ of execution was issued on Feb 1986, and on Mar 1986, the Deputy Sheriff reported that SAN MIGUEL refused to vacate the portion she occupied (her house)
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o o

SAN MIGUEL moved to quash the writ of execution The BONIFACIOs countered with a writ of demolition and an order declaring SAN MIGUEL in contempt of court for re-entering the subject land however Judge Dizon ordered that the implementation of the writ of execution based on the CAR decision was null and void. The motion for Demolition was also denied, as well as the petition for contempt. DIZON now contends that the case is not an ordinary ejectment case, but an ejectment of an agricultural lessee. Thus the action is personal to OLIMPIO, as thus, it died with him. The non-substitution of OLIMPIOs heirs rendered the proceedings after OLIMPIOs death NULL AND VOID

ISSUE: Whether or not the favorable judgment obtained by the decedent is inherited by the compulsory heirs? HELD: YES Judge Dizon is correct in saying that the case is not an ordinary ejectment case, it is an agrarian case. HOWEVER, even if public policy is involved, the GENERAL RULE that an ejectment case survives the death of a party Under the provision, ejectment of an agricultural lessee is not only the right of the landowner-lessor BUT ALSO WHEN HIS IMMEDIATE FAMILY desires so. THEREFORE, how can it be personal when the law allows an immediate family member to eject an agricultural lessee Clearly then, the right of cultivation as a ground for ejectment was not a right exclusive and personal to the landowner-lessor. Now as to THE DUTY OF THE ATTORNEY to inform the court of his clients death; In case of a partys death, the court, if the action survives shall then order upon proper notice the legal representatives of the deceased to appear and to be substituted within a period of 30 days or the time granted by court. The Heirs of the Late Florentina Nuguid vda de Haberer vs. CA, 104 SCRA 534 (1981) -SUZETTE

PETITION FOR REVIEW BY WAY OF APPEAL FROM RESOLUTIONS OF THE CA, DISMISSING THE APPEAL OF THE LATE FLORENTINA VDA DE HABERER FACTS: FLORENTINA VDA DE HABERER filed complaints for recovery of possession of the parcel of land situated in Mandaluyong, she was the duly registered owner. She filed the case before the CFI Rizal o She alleged that the private respondents entered and built houses May 26, 1971 The CFI dismissed all complaints On the motion of FLORENTINA the cases were reopened and retried due to newly discovered evidence o September 15, 1972 The CFI still issued an order reviving its previous decision (dismissing all complaints) The 1972 decision was appealed to the CA o The cases were erroneously dismissed in the lower court, for being allegedly filed out of time. Jan 1975, the SC rendered its judgment setting aside the CAs dismissal on appeal and ordered the reinstatement of the case for the proper disposition on the merits. o Because the appeal was perfected in time The cases were remanded to the CA o FLORENTINA was required to file a printed brief within 45 days from her receipt of notice o 3 days before the period was to expire, June 18, 1975, FLORENTINAs counsel requested for an extension of time to file The request was granted, they were given a 90 day extension June 1975, the private respondent opposed the extension by filing a Motion to Set Aside Order Granting Extension of Time to File Brief THEN, FLORENTINA DIES on MAY 26, 1975 o Her counsel gave the CA notice of her death on June 28, 1975. Her counsel also asked to suspend the running of the period to file appellants brief pending the appointment of an executor of her Estate in the CFI QC There was already a petition for the probate of her will (meaning, the will was submitted in court, and the court has to determine if it is a valid will.) Respondents then contend that the lawyers of the deceased NO LONGER HAD ANY LEGAL STANDING and could no longer act in her behalf because the client-attorney relationship has been severed (because FLORENTINA is dead) The motion FLORENTINAs counsel gave on June 28, 1975 remained UNACTED and the original extension granted was about to expire. o Sept 18 1975, her counsel filed a motion asking for an extension of 60 days and/or resolution suspending the running of the period. o CA had remained silent o Nov 14, 1975, not certain whether the heirs would retain the counsel, they filed another extension of time to file appellants brief and/or a resolution suspending the running of the period. Nov 24, 1975 the CA DENIED the request for extension and dismissed the appeal
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o The appellant had 195 days to file the brief Dec 8, 1975, FLORENTINAs counsel filed a MR explaining why they made requests for extension/suspension o Due to the uncertainty that their services may no longer be retained by the heirs or legal representatives of their deceased client BUT felt that they had the right to preserve the right of such heirs pursuant to R 3, S 17 of the Rules of Court, pending the settlement of FLORENTINAs estate o The printed brief for the appellant, wasnt printed for professional ethical considerations pending the courts resolution o They also submitted 2 separate orders issued by The Court of Agrarian Relations CFI Guimba, Nueva Ecija THESE orders granted the deceaseds counsels prayer to hold in abeyance further proceedings therein pending the appointment of an administrator CA denied the reconsideration stating that, litigants have no right to assume that such extensions will be granted as a matter of course o BUT the COURT (SC) says that the CA erred in applying the principle and summarily denying reconsideration o NOTE: The attorney would thereafter have no further power or authority to appear or take any further action in the case, save to inform the court of the client's death and take the necessary steps to safeguard the deceased's rights in the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the client-attorney relationship was terminated by the death of FLORENTINA (deceased-client)? HELD: NO.

1.

The deceaseds counsel properly informed the court of the death of FLORENTINA a. The sought suspension of the proceedings and period for filing appellants brief PENDING THE APPOINTMENT of the executor of the deceaseds estate before CFI QC 2. S 17, Rule 3 sets the rule on substitution of parties in case of death of the parties a. After the notice of a partys death and the claim is not extinguished, to order upon proper notice the legal representative of the deceased to appear within 30 days or the time granted. 3. Since there was no administrator of the estate, the suspension of the running of the period within which to file appellants brief was welltaken. a. THE CA should have set a period for the substitution of the deceased party with her legal representative or heirs i. IF the CA ruled this way, then the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased 1. BUT THEY DIDNT, the CA gravely erred in not following the rule 4. When a party dies in an action that survives, and no order is issued by the court for the appearance of the legal representative or the heirs of the deceased a. SINCE NO SUBSTITUTION TOOK PLACE, the trial by the court are NULL and VOID i. Because the court did not properly acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or heirs. 5. The Original 45-day period should have been automatically suspended until the proper substitution of the deceased appellant by her executor or administrator or her heirs. 6. What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities a. A liberal, rather than a strict and inflexible adherence to the Rules, is justified not only because appellant (in this case, her estate and/or heirs) should be given every opportunity to be heard but also because no substantial injury or prejudice can well be caused to the adverse parties principally, since they are in actual possession of the disputed land. b. The better and certainly the more prudent course of action in every judicial proceeding is to hear both sides and decide on the merits rather than dispose of a case on technicalities, especially where no substantial prejudice is caused to the adverse party. 7. The dismissal of an appeal based on the appellant's failure to file brief is based on a power granted to respondent Court of Appeals and not on a specific and mandatory duty imposed upon it by the Rules. a. Since it is not MANDATORY i. failure of an appellant to file his brief within the time prescribed does not have the effect of dismissing the appeal automatically ii. the Court of Appeals has the discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss appellant's appeal, which discretion must be a sound one to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case b. prima facie meritorious case which should be properly determined on the merits and "the element of rigidity should not be affixed to procedural concepts and made to cover the matter" 8. On March 19, 1976, counsels submitted with their Manifestation the written authority dated January 20, 1976 individually signed by instituted heirs and/or legal representatives of the testate estate of the deceased Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer granting said counsels full authority to file and prosecute the case and any other incidental cases for and in their behalf, a. Such manifestation and authority may be deemed the formal substitution of the deceased by her heirs, as in fact they appear as petitioners in the title of the case at bar. 9. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted and respondent court's resolutions of November 24, 1975 and January 15, 1976 are set aside. a. The cases are remanded to the CA for further proceedings and proper determination of the appeal on merits 10. SIDE NOTE: counsel for respondents Felipe C. Navarro be disbarred for "gross misconduct and/or malpractice"
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Gochan vs. Young, G.R. No. 131889, March 12, 2001 -TIN Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 Facts: 1. Gochan Realty, for brevity was registered with the SEC 2. 3. 4. Felix Gochan Sr.'s daughter, Alice, mother of [herein respondents], inherited 50 shares of stock in Gochan Realty from the former Alice died leaving the 50 shares to her husband, John Young, Sr RTC of Cebu adjudicated 6/14 of these shares to her children, herein [respondents] Richard Young, David Young, Jane Young Llaban, John Young Jr., Mary Young Hsu and Alexander Thomas Young Five days later, at which time all the children had reached the age of majority, their father John Sr., requested Gochan Realty to partition the shares of his late wife by cancelling the stock certificates in his name and issuing in lieu thereof, new stock certificates in the names of [herein respondents]. Respondent Gochan Realty refused, citing as reason, the right of first refusal granted to the remaining stockholders by the Articles of Incorporation John, Sr. died, leaving the shares to the respondents respondents Cecilia Gochan Uy and Miguel Uy filed a complaint with the SEC for issuance of shares of stock to the rightful owners, nullification of shares of stock, reconveyance of property impressed with trust, accounting, removal of officers and directors and damages against respondents. A Notice of Lis Pendens was annotated as real properties of the corporation. 9. petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint; respondents opposed

5.

6.

7. 8.

10. petitioners filed a Motion for cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens. Respondents opposed the said motion. 11. SEC granted the motion to dismiss and ordered the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated upon the titles of the corporate lands 12. Respondents moved for a reconsideration but the same was denied 13. Respondents appealed to the SEC en banc- ruled for the petitioners 14. Respondents then filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals- ruled in favor of petitioners 15. Hence this petition Issue: 1. WON the spouses UY has personality to file the suit before the SEC?

Yes. Since the sale of the shares of stocks to Gochan Realty is void ab initio, in effect the Spouses Uy remained the owners of the stocks. They remain as stockholder of the corporation in view of the nullity of the Contract of Sale. Although Cecilia was no longer registered as a stockholder in the corporate records as of the filing of the case before the SEC, the admitted allegations in the Complaint made her still a bona fide stockholder of Felix Gochan & Sons Realty Corporation (FGSRC), as between said parties

2. WON the action filed by respondents is not a derivative suit?

NO. the Complaint alleges all the components of a derivative suit. The allegations of injury to the Spouses Uy can coexist with those pertaining to the corporation. The personal injury suffered by the spouses cannot disqualify them from filing a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation. It merely gives rise to an additional cause of action for damages against the erring directors. This cause of action is also included in the Complaint filed before the SEC.

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The Spouses Uy have the capacity to file a derivative suit in behalf of and for the benefit of the corporation. The reason is that, as earlier discussed, the allegations of the Complaint make them out as stockholders at the time the questioned transaction occurred, as well as at the time the action was filed and during the pendency of the action.

3. WON the Intestate Estate of John D. Young Sr. is not an indispensable party and not properly represented?

No. His estate is an indispensable party. The Complaint filed with the SEC refers to the registration, in the name of the other heirs of Alice Gochan Young, of 6/14th of the shares still registered under the name of John D. Young Sr. Since all the shares that belonged to Alice are still in his name, no final determination can be had without his estate being impleaded in the suit. His estate is thus an indispensable party with respect to the cause of action dealing with the registration of the shares in the names of the heirs of Alice.

The Intestate Estate of John D. Young Sr. is properly represented. The Rules of Court, while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated. For the protection of the interests of the decedent, this Court has in previous instances16 recognized the heirs as proper representatives of the decedent, even when there is already an administrator appointed by the court. When no administrator has been appointed, as in this case, there is all the more reason to recognize the heirs as the proper representatives of the deceased. Since the Rules do not specifically prohibit them from representing the deceased, and since no administrator had as yet been appointed at the time of the institution of the Complaint with the SEC, we see nothing wrong with the fact that it was the heirs of John D. Young Sr. who represented his estate in the case filed before the SEC. Atty. Rogelio E. Sarsaba vs. Fe vda De Te, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact Faustino Castaeda, G.R. No. 175910, July 30, 2009. ALFIE petition for review on certiorari of an order of the RTC of Digos, Davao Del Sur Doctrine: 1. In all cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, appeal may be made to the CA by mere notice of appeal; when the questions involve fact or mixed questions of fact and law; 2. In all cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction where the appellant raises only questions of law, the appeal must be taken to the SC under Rule 45; In this case, the contested RTC order is interlocutory, meaning it determines an incidental matter and does not touch on the merits of the case. It is not a proper subject of an appeal before the SC. Facts: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Sereno, a petitioner in an NLRC case, represented by Atty. Sarsaba was declared to have been illegally dismissed and ordered his employer, Gasing to pay the monetary claims; in order to do this, Sereno accompanied the Sheriff of the NLRC and levied a Fuso Truck that was in the possession of Gasing; Fe Vda. De Te soon filed with the RTC for recovery of the same truck claiming that she was the wife of the registered owner the now deceased Pedro Te. Vda de Te soon died herself. Hower, Atty. Carpentero, de Tes lawyer contended that de Tes death did not render functus officio her right to sue becase her attorney-infact Cataneda had long testified on her behalf. RTC ruled in favor of de Te; Sarsaba filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the RTC; Sarsaba filed directly to the Supreme Court via the present petition involving pure questions of law;

Issue: Whether petitioner Sarsaba correctly availed of the mode of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. NO. He did not. Dagadag vs. Tongnawa, G.R. 161166-67, Feb. 03, 2005 -NOEL Rule 45 certio assailing the decision and resolutioin of the CA. CA granted the review filed with it. It favoured Tongnawa and Gammod (there were reinstated with backwages) and reversed the CSC resolutions which upheld Mayor Dagadags order of suspension and separation over the two. Tongnawa and Gammod -> CSC (appealed order of Dagadag which suspended them from working. CSC upheld order of suspension) Tongnawa and Gammod -> CA (petition to review decision of CSC. CA reversed CSC resolutions) Dagadag -> SC (rule 45 certio) Facts:
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Dagadag was the former Mayor of Tanudan, Kalinga. Tongnawa and Gammod are the municipal engineer and municipal planning and development coordinator, respectively, of the said town. During his mayorship, Dagadag issued memos to Tongnawa and Gammod asking them to explain why they should not be sanctioned for acts unbecoming of public servants. They complied by submitting their explanation on the matter. Dagadag then issued an order creating a Municipal Grievance Committee to investigate the charges against the two. The chairman was Vice-Mayor Dangpason. The committee found respondents liable for insubordination, non-performance of duties and being AWOL. In turn, Mayor Dagadag issued an order suspending Tongnawa and Gammod. Tongnawa and Gammod appealed to the CSC contending that they were deprived of due process. While this appeal was pending, Dagadag issued an order dropping the two from the roll of employees by reason of unauthorized absences. The CSC then affirmed the orders of Dagadag. Dahil nakupal ng CSC, they went to the CA to with a 45 certio. The appellate court reversed the CSC. Tongnawa and Gammod presented the sworn statement of Vice-Mayor Dangpason. The statement had renounced the contents of the minutes of the supposed investigation. Dangpason who wish(ed) to set the record straightin fairness to all concerned categorically declared that the two were not given an opportunity to defend themselves since there was no actual investigation conducted and even expressed his willingness to testify and confirm his declarations just to ascertain the truth. These declarations of were not denied by the Mayor. In the absence therefore of any showing of ill intent or bad faith on the part of Dangpason and Tumbali, their Affidavits are to be afforded great weight and credence. Dagadag filed an M.R. but was denied, hence, the current recourse. In their comment, Tongnawa and Gammod aver that Dagadag has no legal personality to filed the instant petition since he has already ceased to be the municipal mayor of the town. ISSUE: W/N Dagadag still has legal personality to pursue the case. (SC: WULAH NAH) HELD: The SC held that a Mayor can legally pursue a case since he/she has the power of appointment. Similarly, where a municipal mayor orders the suspension or dismissal of a municipal employee on grounds he believes to be proper, but his order is reversed or nullified by the CSC or the Court of Appeals (as in this case), he has the right to contest such adverse ruling. His right to appeal flows from the fact that his power to appoint carries with it the power to remove. The second reason why the municipal mayor of Tanudan has legal personality to challenge the Decision of the CA is because the salaries of the respondents, being municipal officials, are drawn from the municipal funds. Obviously, the mayor has real and substantial interest in the outcome of the administrative cases against respondents. However, Dagadag, at the time he filed with this Court the instant petition assailing the Appellate Court Decision, was no longer the mayor of Tanudan. Section 17, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is relevant, thus: "Sec. 17. Death or separation of a party who is a public officer. When a public officer is a party in an action in his official capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and maintained by or against his successor if, xxx, it is satisfactorily shown to the court by any party that there is a substantial need for continuing or maintaining it and that the successor adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue the action of his predecessor. xxx" Interpreting the above rule, where the petitioner (a public officer) ceases to be mayor, the appeal and/or action he initiated may be continued and maintained by his successor if there is substantial need to do so. If the successor failed to pursue the appeal and/or action, the same should be dismissed. Records show that upon Dagadags cessation from public office, his successor did not file any manifestation to the effect that he is continuing and maintaining this appeal. Thus, Dagadag has lost his legal personality to interpose the instant petition. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. Carandang vs. Heirs of Quirino de Guzman, G.R. No. 160347, November 29, 2006 MELL DOCTRINE: Other than the indispensable and necessary parties, there is a third set of parties: the PRO-FORMA parties, which are those who are required to be joined as co-parties in suits by or against another party as may be provided by the applicable substantive law or procedural rule.
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PRO-FORMA PARTIES can either be indispensable, necessary or neither indispensable nor necessary. The third case occurs if, for example, a husband files an action to recover a property which he claims to be part of his exclusive property. The wife may have no legal interest in such property, but the rules nevertheless require that she be joined as a party. In cases of pro-forma parties who are neither indispensable nor necessary, the GENERAL RULE under Section 11, Rule 3 must be followed: such non-joinder is not a ground for dismissal. Hence, in a case concerning an action to recover a sum of money, we held that the failure to join the spouse in that case was not a jurisdictional defect. The non-joinder of a spouse does not warrant dismissal as it is merely a formal requirement which may be cured by amendment. Conversely, dismissal is warranted only if the pro-forma party not joined in the complaint is an indispensable party. In suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties. The suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners. FACTS: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: RTC(in favor of De Guzman) CA(Af | MR denied) SC(45: Af)

Quirino de Guzman and the Spouses Carandang are stockholders as well as corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting System (MBS), with equities at (54%) and (46%) respectively. The capital stock of MBS was increased (1983) and was subscribed by the spouses Carandang. MBS again increased (1989) its capital stock, and the spouses Carandang yet again subscribed to the increase. De Guzman claims that, part of the payment for these subscriptions were paid by him. Thus, he sent a demand letter to the spouses Carandang for the payment of said total amount. The spouses refused to pay the amount, contending that a pre-incorporation agreement was executed between [Arcadio Carandang] and De Guzman, whereby the latter promised to pay for the stock subscriptions of the former without cost, in consideration for Arcadio's technical expertise, therefore, there is no indebtedness on their part. De Guzman filed (1992) his complaint, seeking to recover the P336K together with damages. RTC ruled in favor of De Guzman. CA affirmed the same. MR was denied. The spouses Carandang claims that the Decision of the RTC, having been rendered after the death of Quirino de Guzman, is void for failing to comply with Section 16, Rule 3, ROC. <check the codal> Three of the four checks used to pay their stock subscriptions were issued in the name of Milagros de Guzman, the latter should be considered an indispensable party

ISSUE: Should RTC dismissed the case for failure to state a cause of action, considering that Milagros De Guzman, allegedly an indispensable party, was not included as a party-plaintiff? NO. HELD: RTC Decision is valid despite the failure to comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of the ROC, because of the express waiver of the heirs to the jurisdiction over their persons, and because there had been, before the promulgation of the RTC Decision, no further proceedings requiring the appearance of de Guzman's counsel. RE NON-INCLUSION IN THE COMPLAINT OF AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY. Petitioners erroneously interchange the terms "real party in interest" and "indispensable party." A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. On the other hand, an INDISPENSABLE PARTY is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, in contrast to a NECESSARY PARTY, which is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. What dismissal on this ground entails is an EXAMINATION of whether the parties presently pleaded are interested in the outcome of the litigation, and NOT whether all persons interested in such outcome are actually pleaded. The latter query is relevant in discussions concerning indispensable and necessary parties, but not in discussions concerning real parties in interest. Both indispensable and necessary parties are considered as real parties in interest, since both classes of parties stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains govern the property relations of Quirino and Milagros de Guzman. All property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. Credits loaned during the time of the marriage are presumed to be conjugal property. As such, Quirino de Guzman, being a co-owner of specific partnership property, is certainly a real party in interest. Dismissal on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, by reason that the suit was allegedly not brought by a real party in interest, is therefore unwarranted. When an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should likewise be dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actuations of the court void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. On the other hand, the non-joinder of necessary parties do not result in the dismissal of the case. Non-compliance with the order for the inclusion of a necessary party would not warrant the dismissal of the complaint. This is an EXCEPTION to Section 3, Rule 17 which allows the dismissal of the complaint for failure to comply with an order of the court. Section 11, Rule 3 provides that the non-joinder of parties is not a ground for the dismissal of the action. Other than the indispensable and necessary parties, there is a third set of parties: the PRO-FORMA parties, which are those who are required to be joined as co-parties in suits by or against another party as may be provided by the applicable substantive law or procedural rule. An example is provided by Section 4, Rule 3 of the ROC:
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Sec. 4. Spouses as parties. - Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law. PRO-FORMA PARTIES can either be indispensable, necessary or neither indispensable nor necessary. The third case occurs if, for example, a husband files an action to recover a property which he claims to be part of his exclusive property. The wife may have no legal interest in such property, but the rules nevertheless require that she be joined as a party. In cases of pro-forma parties who are neither indispensable nor necessary, the GENERAL RULE under Section 11, Rule 3 must be followed: such non-joinder is not a ground for dismissal. Hence, in a case concerning an action to recover a sum of money, we held that the failure to join the spouse in that case was not a jurisdictional defect. The non-joinder of a spouse does not warrant dismissal as it is merely a formal requirement which may be cured by amendment. Conversely, dismissal is warranted only if the pro-forma party not joined in the complaint is an indispensable party. Milagros de Guzman, being presumed to be a co-owner of the credits allegedly extended to the spouses Carandang, seems to be either an indispensable or a necessary party. If she is an indispensable party, dismissal would be proper. If she is merely a necessary party, dismissal is not warranted. Art. 108, FC provides that the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Article 1811 of the Civil Code provides that "[a] partner is a co-owner with the other partners of specific partnership property." Taken with the presumption of the conjugal nature of the funds used to finance the four checks used to pay for petitioners' stock subscriptions, and with the presumption that the credits themselves are part of conjugal funds, Article 1811 makes Quirino and Milagros de Guzman co-owners of the alleged credit. Being co-owners of the alleged credit, Quirino and Milagros de Guzman may separately bring an action for the its recovery. In a co-ownership, coowners may bring actions for the recovery of co-owned property without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of his co-owners. In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties. The suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners. SC hold that Milagros de Guzman is not an indispensable party in the action for the recovery of the allegedly loaned money to the spouses Carandang. As such, she need not have been impleaded in said suit, and dismissal of the suit is not warranted by her not being a party thereto. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the CA is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION

IX.

RULE 3, SECTIONS 18 TO 22: Parties to a Civil Action

ROMUALDEZ VS. TIGLAO, G.R. NO. 51151, July 24, 1981 MEDZ Nature of Action: Appeal the decision of CA. Facts: Paz G. Romualdez and others sued Antonio Tiglao for the payment of unpaid rentals for the lease of a hacienda and its sugar quota. Included in the suit were Felisa Tiglao and others who had guaranteed the payment of the rents jointly and severally with Antonio Tiglao. The TC rendered a decision in favour of the plaintiffs. The judgment was not satisfied notwithstanding a writ of execution to enforce it. Paz G. Romualdez, et al. filed Civil Case14424 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against Antonio Tiglao and his sureties in order to revive the judgment above quoted. It should be stated that when the suit to revive judgment was filed, Felisa F. Tiglao had died and her estate was being settled. The administratrix of Tiglaos estate questioned the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit to revive judgment. CA ruled for the revival of judgment. Issue: WON he Estate of Tiglao can be liable? Held: Yes. This argument is simply answered thus: the original judgment has become stale because of its non-execution after the lapse of five years. (Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.) Accordingly, it cannot be presented against the Estate of Felisa Tiglao unless it is first revived by action. This is precisely why the appellees have instituted the second suit whose object is not to make the Estate of Felisa Tiglao pay the sums of money adjudged in the first judgment but merely to keep alive said judgment so that the sums therein awarded can be presented as claims against the estate. THE BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS vs. HEIRS OF MAXIMO M. KALAW, 20 SCRA 1967 ANNE NATURE OF THE ACTION: Appeal from judgment of the CFI Manila

FACTS: The National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO,) avowedly for the protection, preservation and development of the coconut industry in the Philippines. NACOCO's charter was amended [by Republic Act 5] and was engaged in buying, selling, barter, exporting, copra and other dessicated coconut, and to act as agent, broker or commission merchant of the producers, dealers or merchants" thereof. The charter amendment was enacted to stabilize copra prices, to serve coconut producers by securing advantageous prices for them, to cut down to a minimum, if not altogether eliminate, the margin of middlemen, mostly aliens. General manager and board chairman of NACOCO was Maximo M. Kalaw; defendants Juan Bocar and Casimiro Garcia were members of the Board; defendant Leonor Moll became director only on December 22, 1947. NACOCO, after the passage of Republic Act 5, embarked on copra trading activities.
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HELD:

NACOCO entered into different contracts with different companies for the delivery of copra. When it became clear that the contracts would be unprofitable, Kalaw submitted them to the board for approval. Kalaw made a full disclosure of the situation, apprised the board of the impending heavy losses. No action was taken on the contracts. Then, Pres. Roxas made a statement that the NACOCO head did his best to avert the losses, emphasized that government concerns faced the same risks that confronted private companies, that NACOCO was recouping its losses, and that Kalaw was to remain in his post. Tthe board met again with Kalaw, Bocar, Garcia and Moll in attendance. They unanimously approved the contracts. NACOCO but partially performed the contracts, The buyers threatened damage suits. But one buyer, Louis Dreyfus & Go. (Overseas) Ltd. in fact sue before the CFI of Manila, For the undelivered copra. o NACOCO put up the defenses that: the contracts were void because Louis Dreyfus & Co. (Overseas) Ltd. did not have license to do business here; and failure to deliver was due to force majeure, the typhoons. To project the utter unreasonableness of this compromise, we reproduce in haec verba this finding below: In this suit, NACOCO seeks to recover the sum of P1,343,274.52 from general manager and board chairman Maximo M. Kalaw, and directors Juan Bocar, Casimiro Garcia and Leonor Moll. It charges Kalaw with negligence under Article 2176, new Civil Code; and defendant board members, including Kalaw, with bad faith and/or breach of trust for having approved the contracts. The fifth amended complaint, on which this case was tried, was filed on July 2, 1959. Defendants resisted the action upon defenses hereinafter in this opinion to be discussed. The lower court dismissed the complaint Plaintiff appealed direct to this Court.

1. Plaintiff Board of Liquidators has lost its legal personality to continue with this suit. By Executive Order 372, the government, the sole stockholder, abolished NACOCO, and placed its assets in the hands of the Board of Liquidators. The Board of Liquidators thus became the trustee on behalf of the government. It was an express trust. The legal interest became vested in the trustee the Board of Liquidators. The beneficial interest remained with the sole stockholder the government. At no time had the government withdrawn the property, or the authority to continue the present suit, from the Board of Liquidators. If for this reason alone, we cannot stay the hand of the Board of Liquidators from prosecuting this case to its final conclusion.

We, accordingly, rule that the Board of Liquidators has personality to proceed as: party-plaintiff in this case.

2. Defendants' second poser is that the action is unenforceable against the heirs of Kalaw.

Clearly then, the present case is not a mere action for the recovery of money nor a claim for money arising from contract. The suit involves alleged tortious acts. And the action is embraced in suits filed "to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal", which survive.

And, the conclusion remains: Action against the Kalaw heirs and, for the matter, against the Estate of Casimiro Garcia survives. The preliminaries out of the way, we now go to the core of the controversy.

3. Plaintiff levelled a major attack on the lower court's holding that Kalaw justifiedly entered into the controverted contracts without the prior approval of the corporation's directorate.

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These previous contract it should be stressed, were signed by Kalaw without prior authority from the board. Said contracts were known all along to the board members. Nothing was said by them. The aforesaid contracts stand to prove one thing: Obviously, NACOCO board met the difficulties attendant to forward sales by leaving the adoption of means to end, to the sound discretion of NACOCO's general manager Maximo M. Kalaw.

In the case at bar, the practice of the corporation has been to allow its general manager to negotiate and execute contracts in its copra
trading activities for and in NACOCO's behalf without prior board approval. If the by-laws were to be literally followed, the board should give its stamp of prior approval on all corporate contracts. But that board itself, by its acts and through acquiescence, practically laid aside the by-law requirement of prior approval.

Under the given circumstances, the Kalaw contracts are valid corporate acts.

4. To what then may we trace the damage suffered by NACOCO. Indeed, were it not for the typhoons, 42 NACOCO could have, with ease, met its contractual obligations. Stock accessibility was no problem. NACOCO had 90 buying agencies spread throughout the islands. It could purchase 2,000 tons of copra a day. The various contracts involved delivery of but 16,500 tons over a five-month period. Despite the typhoons, NACOCO was still able to deliver a little short of 50% of the tonnage required under the contracts. As the trial court correctly observed, this is a case of damnum absque injuria. Conjunction of damage and wrong is here absent. There cannot be an actionable wrong if either one or the other is wanting. 43

Aguas vs. Llemos, 5 SCRA 595 ERWIN Facts The deceased, Hermogenes made the petitioners, Maria, Felix and Francisco believe that an action was filed for a petition of writ of possession against them in the CFI of Catbalogan, Samar. They traveled all the way from Manila, where they reside with their counsel but to their surprise upon arriving no such action was filed with the court. Petitioners filed a case to recover damages for the inconvenience caused against them but before he could file an answer, Hermogenes died. The heirs moved for the dismissal of the case, which was granted by the lower court. Petitioner filed to substitute the respondent with the legal heirs of the deceased, which respondent-heirs vehemently opposed. It was dismissed by the lower court on the ground that it must be the estate through its administrator that should be impleaded in the case and not the legal heirs and recommended that a claim be made through the intestate proceedings. MR filed by petitioners was denied. Issue W/N the tortuous act committed by the decedent is extinguished through death. Held No, the action still persists, as it is not one of the enumerations extinguished by death and are as follows: (1) claims for funeral expenses and those for the last sickness of the decedent; (2) judgments for money; and (3) "all claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract express or implied". While those that survives are: (1) actions to recover real and personal property from the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property. Therefore, it can be concluded that the act committed by the deceased transcended his death. But the court dismissed the case as the parties have agreed to an amicable settlement. Section 20. Rule 3. Revised Rules of Court. Section 20. Action and contractual money claims. When the action is for recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed
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but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. (21a)

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