Summary of Updates in Political Law Prof REX M.

ALOBBA

Legislative Powers; Creation of Pet; Judicial Review 1. MACALIN TAL VS. PET (G.R. No. 191618; November 23, 2010; MR denied on June 7, 2011) Constitutionality; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; Creation. Petitioner here claimed that the creation of the Presidenti al Electoral Tribun al (PET) is uncons titution al as it viol ates Section 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualific ations of the President or Vice-President, and may promulg ate its rules for the purpose. He contends that the provision, as worded, does not authorize the constitution of the PET. The Court said that, while the above provision does not specify the establishment of the PET, neither does it preclude, much less prohibit, the same. The Court further said that its constitutional mandate to act as sole judge of election contests involving the President or Vice-President, and its rule- making authority in connection therewith (granted by the provision of Section 4 that the Court may promulg ate its rules for the purpose ), are not restric ted but include all necess ary powers implicit in the exercise of such mandate and authority. These powers are plen ary and the authority of the Court to decide presidential and vicepresiden tial election contests through the PET are derived from the une quivocal grant of jurisdiction under Section 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Accordingly, the creation of the PET implements Section 4 and faithfully complies with the constitutional directive. The discussions of the Constitution al Comm ission clearly support the foregoing conclusion. Constitutionality; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; Exercise of Quasi-Judicial Function. The Court here rejected petitioners claim that the Presidenti al Electoral Tribunal (PET) exercises quasi-judicial func tions contr ary to Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which states that The Members of the Supre me Court and of other courts established by law shall not be design ated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administr ative functions. The tradition al grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides that the power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Consistent with the pres idential system of government, the function of dealing with the settle ment of dispu tes, controversies or conflicts invol ving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforce able is apportioned to courts of justice. With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power was expanded to include the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies invol ving rights which are legally dem andable and enforce able, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or ins trumentality of the Government. Judicial power was thus expanded, but it remained absolute. The Court held that set up embodied in the 1987 Constitution characteri zes the resolu tion of electoral contests as essenti ally an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as the PET, resolves a presiden tial or vice-presidenti al election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. The present Constitution has alloc ated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latters exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding president ial and vice-presidenti al election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a deri vative of the plen ary judicial power alloc ated to courts of law, expressly pro vided in the Constitution. Power of Judicial Review; Executive Power 2. LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO versus THE PHIL IPPINE TRUTH COMMISS ION OF 2010 (G.R. No. 192935; December 7, 2010) REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., versus EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD (G.R. No. 193036; December 7, 2010) Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limi tations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sus tained, or will sus tain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

Among all these limi tations, only the legal standing of the petitioners has been put at issue. Legal St anding of the Pet itioner s The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners-legisl ators to file their peti tion for failure to demonstr ate their personal stake in the outcome of the case. It argues that the petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger of sust aining any person al injury attribut able to the creation of the PTC. Not claiming to be the subject of the comm issions investig ations, petitioners will not sustain injury in its creation or as a result of its proceed ings. The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the petitioners-legisl ators to assail Executive Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurp ation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. This cert ainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the usurp ation of their power and rights as members of the legisl ature before the Court. As held in Philippine Constitution Associ ation v. Enriquez, To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to partici pate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a deriv ative but nonetheless subst antial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts. Indeed, legisl ators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerog ative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviol ate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerog atives as legislators. With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no standing to question the creation of the PTC and the budget for its oper ations. It emphasi zes that the funds to be used for the creation and oper ation of the commission are to be taken from those funds already appropri ated by Congress. Thus, the allocation and disbursement of funds for the commission will not entail congression al action but will simply be an exercise of the Presidents power over contingent funds. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sus taining, any personal and direct injury attribu table to the implement ation of Execu tive Order No. 1. Nowhere in his peti tion is an assertion of a clear right that may justify his clamor for the Court to exercise judicial power and to wield the axe over presidenti al issu ances in defense of the Constitution. The case of David v. Arroyo explained the deep-se ated rules on locus standi. Thus: Locus standi is defined as "a right of appe arance in a court of justice on a given question." In priv ate suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interes t" rule as cont ained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that "every action must be pros ecuted or defend ed in the name of the real party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefi ted or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought. The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a represent ative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequ ately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other wo rds, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindic ation of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or "taxpayer. Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxp ayer" standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instru ment of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: "In matter of mere public right, howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public griev ance be remedied." With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restr ain the unl awful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied."

However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he dis agreed with, and thus hinders the activities of government al agencies engaged in public service, the United State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent "direct injury" test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a pri vate individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legisl ative action, he must show that he has sust ained a dir ect injury as a result of that action, and it is not suffici ent that he has a general int erest common to all memb ers of the pub lic. This Court adopted the "dir ect injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and subst antial int erest in the case such that he has sustain ed, or will sust ain dir ect injury as a result." The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix. [Emphases included. Citations omitted] Notwithst anding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontr aditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legisl ators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental import ance, of overreaching signific ance to society, or of paramount public interest." Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Associ ation, Inc. v. Torres, the Court held that in cases of paramount import ance where serious constitution al questions are involved, the standing re quire ments may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordin ary citizens and taxp ayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect and gener al interest shared in common with the public. The OSG claims that the determin ants of transcendent al impor tance laid down in CREBA v. ERC and Meralco are non-existent in this case. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of transcenden tal import ance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendent al and paramount import ance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the guid ance of all. Undoub tedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of the Presidents first effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court takes cogniz ance of the petition not due to overwhelming politic al undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overre aching significance to society. Power of the President to Create the Truth Comm iss ion In his memor andum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office and not merely an adjunct body of the Office of the President. Thus, in order that the President may create a public office he must be empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authoriz ation ves ted in him by law. According to petitioner, such power cannot be presumed since there is no provision in the Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to create a truth commission. He adds that Section 31 of the Administr ative Code of 1987, granting the President the continuing authority to reorg anize his office, cannot serve as basis for the creation of a truth commission considering the afores aid provision merely uses verbs such as "reorg anize," "transfer," "consolid ate," "merge," and "abolish." Insofar as it vests in the President the plen ary power to reorg anize the Office of the President to the extent of creating a public office, Section 31 is inconsistent with the principle of separ ation of powers enshrined in the Constitution and must be deemed repe aled upon the effectivity thereof. Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legisl ators argue that the creation of a public office lies within the province of Congress and not with the executive branch of government. They maint ain that the deleg ated authority of the President to reorg anize under Section 31 of the Revised Administr ative Code: 1) does not permit the President to create a public office, much less a truth commission; 2) is limited to the reorg anization of the administr ative structure of the Office of the President; 3) is limited to the restructuring of the internal org ans of the Office of the President Proper, tr ansfer of functions and transfer of agencies; and 4) only to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. Such continuing authority of the President to reorg anize his office is limited, and by issuing Executive Order No. 1, the President overstepped the limits of this deleg ated authority. xxx

The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorg anize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administr ative Code? Section 31 contempl ates "reorg anization" as limited by the follo wing functional and structur al lines: (1) restructuring the intern al organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolid ating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolid ation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redund ancy of functions. These point to situ ations where a body or an office is already existent but a modific ation or alter ation thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative. To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Section 31 is a mispl aced supposition, even in the plainest meaning attribut able to the term "restructure" an "alteration of an existing structure." Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive Secretary, But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorg anize any department or agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power that which consti tutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administr ative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorg anize the administrative structure of the Office of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Dep artments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canoni zado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorg anization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolid ation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redund ancy of functions." It takes place when there is an alter ation of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Dep artment of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the Presidents continuing authority to reorg anize. [Emph asis Supp lied] In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of control. Control is essenti ally the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the perform ance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. 47 Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid deleg ation from Congress, or his inheren t duty to faithfully execute the laws. The ques tion is this, is there a valid deleg ation of power from Congress, empowering the President to create a public office? According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursu ant to the above provision finds statutory basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772. The said law granted the President the continuing authority to reorg anize the national government, including the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities, transfer appropri ations, and to standardize salaries and materi als. This decree, in relation to Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has been invoked in several cases such as Larin v. Executive Secretary. The Court, however, declines to recogni ze P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to create a public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronis tic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a deleg ation to then President Marcos of the authority to reorgani ze the administr ative structure of the national government including the power to create offices and transfer appropri ations pursu ant to one of the purposes of the decree, embodied in its last "Whereas" clause: WHEREAS, the transition tow ards the parliamen tary form of government will necessi tate flexibility in the org anization of the national government. Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manage ability and resiliency during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio upon the convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. In fact, even the Solicitor Gener al agrees with this view. x x x

While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads: Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive dep artments, bure aus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supp lied). As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the alloc ation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The Presidents power to conduct investig ations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case, fund amental laws on public accoun tability and transparency is inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investig ations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority. As explained in the landmark case of Marcos v. Manglapus: x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidenti al system of government and restored the sep aration of legislative, executi ve and judicial powers by their actual distri bution among three distinct branches of government with provision for checks and balances. It would not be accur ate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pert ain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations. On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of sp ecific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is tradition ally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumer ated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. It has been adv anced that whatever power inherent in the government judicial has to be executive. x x x. that is neither legisl ative nor

Indeed, the Executive is given much leew ay in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recogni zed powers of the President granted pursu ant to this constitution ally- mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health v. Camposano, the authority of the President to issue Ad ministr ative Order No. 298, creating an investig ative committee to look into the administr ative charges filed against the employees of the Department of Health for the anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ruled: The Chief Executives pow er to create the Ad hoc Inv estigating Committ ee cannot be doubted. Having been constitution ally granted full control of the Executive Dep artment, to which respondents belong, the President has the oblig ation to ensure that all execu tive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investig ating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry. [Emphasis supp lied] It should be stressed that the purpose of allo wing ad hoc investig ating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the perfor mance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to be revisited, this was also the objective of the investig ative bodies created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo Com mission and the Zenarosa Commission. There being no changes in the government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare such executi ve power as non-existent just because the direct ion of the political winds have changed. On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropri ate funds for the oper ation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropri ation but only an allotment or alloc ations of existing funds alre ady appropri ated. Accordingly, there is no usurp ation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropri ate funds. Further, there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the oper ation of the commission because, in the words of the Solicitor Gener al,

"whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission." Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regul ations, there is no impropriety in the funding. Pow er of the Truth Com mission to Investi gate The Presidents power to conduct investig ations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is well recogni zed. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17 thereof. As the Chief Executive, the president represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has the authority to directly assume the functions of the executive department. Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to prim arily inves tigate reports of graft and corruption and to recommend the appropri ate action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. It has been said that "Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to hear and determine ques tions of fact to which the legisl ative policy is to apply and to decide in accord ance with the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and administering the same law." In simpler terms, judicial discretion is involved in the exercise of these quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be clearly authorized by the legisl ature in the case of administr ative agencies. The distinction between the power to investig ate and the power to adjudicate was deline ated by the Court in Cario v. Commission on Hum an Rights. Thus: "Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, in quire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The diction ary definition of "inves tigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x to subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investig ation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intim ated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by applic ation of the law to the facts established by the inquiry. The legal me aning of "investig ate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observ ation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investig ation," "investig ation" being in turn described as "(a)n administr ative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." "Adjudicate," commonly or popul arly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, deter mine, resolve, rule on, settle. The diction ary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x." In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determin ation of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." [Italics included. Citations Omitted] Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The func tion of receiving evidence and ascert aining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accomp anied by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the con troversy may be decided or resolved authori tatively, finally and definitively, subject to appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. Even respondents themselves admit that the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial power. Contr ary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not suppl ant the Ombudsm an or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investig ative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. As poin ted out by the Solicitor General, the recommend ation to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of the commission to conduct a fact-finding investig ation." The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the charges against them, is cert ainly not a function given to the commission. The phr ase, "when in the course of its investigation," under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a contr ary interpret ation from that of the petitioners. The function of determining prob able cause for the filing of the appropri ate com plaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.

At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investig ate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other simil arly authorized government agencies. Thus, in the case of Ombudsm an v. Galicia, it was written: This power of investig ation granted to the Ombudsm an by the 1987 Constitu tion and The Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is shared with other simil arly authori zed government agencies such as the PCGG and judges of municip al trial courts and munici pal circuit trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary investig ation on charges against public employees and officials is likewise concurrently shared with the Dep artment of Justice. Despite the passage of the Local Government Code in 1991, the Ombudsma n retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the President and the local Sangguni ans to investigate compl aints against local elective officials. [Emph asis supp lied]. Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contr avene the power of the Ombudsman cases under Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770, which states: to investig ate criminal

(1) Investig ate and prosecute on its own or on com plaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has pri mary jurisdiction over cases cogniz able by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its prim ary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of government, the inves tigation of such cases. [Emph ases supp lied] The act of investig ation by the Ombuds man as enunci ated above contempl ates the conduct of a preli minary investig ation or the deter mination of the existence of prob able cause. This is categoric ally out of the PTCs sphere of functions. Its power to inves tigate is limited to obt aining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the perform ance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. In this reg ard, the PTC commits no act of usurp ation of the Ombudsmans primordial duties. The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its author ity under Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised Administrative Code is by no means exclus ive and, thus, can be shared with a body like wise tasked to investig ate the commission of crimes. Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Comm ission and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at best, be recommend atory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsm an and the DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the recommend ation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their mandated duties but will inste ad be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for violations of graft laws. 3. MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ V. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, ET AL. (G.R. No. 193459; Febru ary 15, 2011) Petitioner urged the Court to look into the narration of facts constituting the offenses vis--vis her submissions disclaiming the alleg ations in the compl aints. The SC denied this as that would require the Court to make a determin ation of what constitutes an impe achable offense. Such a determination is a purely politic al question, which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature. Jurisdiction and Authority of the Civil Service Comm iss ion 4. EUGENIO S. CAPABLANCA vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (G.R. No. 179370; Novem ber 19, 2009) The Civil Service Com mission (CSC) Caraga has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investig ation of a possible administr ative case of dishonesty against PO1 Cap ablanca for alleged CSP examin ation irregularity. The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, is mandated to establish a career service, to strengthen the merit and rewards system, and to adopt me asures to promote mor ale, efficiency and integrity in the civil service. The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrument alities, and agencies of the government, including government-owned or controlled corpor ations with original charters. Specifically, Section 91 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6975 (1990) or the Dep artment of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990 pro vides that the Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regul ations shall apply to all personnel of the Department, to which herein petitioner belongs. Section 12 of Executive Order (EO) No. 292 or the Administr ative Code of 1987, enumer ates the powers and functions of the CSC. In addi tion, Section 28, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regul ations specifically confers upon the CSC the authority to take cogni zance over any irregul arities or

anomalies connected with the examinations. To carry out this mand ate, the CSC issued Resolution No. 991936, or the Uniform Rules on Administr ative Cases in the Civil Service, empowering its Regional Offices to take cogniz ance of cases involving CSC examin ation anomalies. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it initi ated the conduct of a preli minary investigation on the alleged civil service examin ation irregul arity committed by the petitioner.

It has alre ady been settled in Cruz v. Civil Service Commission that the appell ate power of the CSC will only apply when the subject of the administr ative cases filed against erring employees is in connection with the duties and functions of their office, and not in cases where the acts of complainant arose from che ating in the civil service examinations.

5.

WINSTON F. GARCIA VS. MARIO I. MOLINA, ET AL./WINSTON F. GARCIA VS. MARIO I. MOLINA, ET AL. (G.R. No. 157383/G.R. No. 174137, August 18, 2010) The civil service enco mpasses all branches and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corpor ations with original charters, like the Government Service Insur ance System (GSIS), or those created by special law. Thus, GSIS employees are part of the civil service system and are subject to the law and to the circul ars, rules and regulations issued by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on disci pline, attend ance and general terms and conditions of employment. The CSC has jurisdiction to hear and decide disciplinary cases against erring employees.

Powers of COA 6. RAMON R. YAP VS. COMMISSI ON ON AUDIT (G.R. No. 158562; April 23, 2010) The 1987 Constitution has made the COA the guardi an of public funds, ves ting it with broad powers over all accounts pert aining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property including the exclusive authori ty to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods for such review, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regul ations. Section 11, Chapter 4, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 echoes this consti tution al mandate given to COA. In light of these express provisions of law granting respondent COA its power and authority, we have previously ruled that its exercise of its gener al aud it power is among the constitutional mechanisms that give life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of government. Furthermore, we have also declared that COA is endowed with enough l atitude to determine, prevent and disallow irregular, unnecess ary, excessive, extravag ant or unconscion able expenditures of govern ment f unds. Based on the foregoing discussion and due to the lack or absence of any law or jurisprudence saying otherwise, we rule that, in resolving cases brought before it on appeal, respondent COA is not required to limit its review only to the grounds relied upon by a govern ment agencys auditor with respect to disallowing certain disbursements of public funds. In conson ance with its gener al audit power, respondent COA is not merely legally permitted, but is also duty-bound to make its own assessment of the merits of the disallo wed disbursement and not simp ly restrict itself to reviewing the validity of the ground relied upon by the auditor of the government agency concerned. To hold otherwise would render COAs vital constitutional power unduly limited and thereby useless and ineffective. State Immun ity 7. AIR TRANSPO RTATION OFFICE vs. SPOUSES DAVID ELISEA RAMOS (G.R. No. 159402; Febru ary 23, 2011) In our view, the CA there by correctly appreci ated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the Government not performing a purely government al or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management and mainten ance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerog ative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the States immunity from suit. We uphold the CAs afore quoted holding. We further observe the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the taking without just compens ation and without the proper expropri ation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs property. 16 Thus, in De los Santos v.

Intermedi ate Appell ate Court, 17 the trial courts dismiss al based on the doctr ine of non-su ability of the State of two cases (one of which was for damages) filed by owners of property where a road 9 meter s wide and 128.70 meters long occupying a total area of 1,165 square meters and an artificial creek 23.20 meters wide and 128.69 meters long occupying an area of 2,906 square meters had been constructed by the provincial engineer of Rizal and a private contr actor without the owners knowledge and consent was reversed and the cases rem anded for trial on the merits. The Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was not an instrument for perpetr ating any injustice on a citizen. In exercising the right of eminent dom ain, the Court explained, the State exercised its jus imperii, as dis tinguished from its propriet ary rights, or jus gestionis; yet, even in that area, where priv ate property had been taken in expropri ation without just compens ation being paid, the defense of immunity from suit could not be set up by the State against an action for payment by the owners. Lastly, the issue of whether or not the ATO could be sued without the States consent has been rendered moot by the passage of Republic Act No. 9497, other wise known as the Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008. R.A. No. 9497 abolished the ATO. x x x Under its Transitory Provisions, R.A. No. 9497 established in place of the ATO the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), which thereby assumed all of the ATOs powers, duties and rights, assets, real and person al properties, funds, and revenues, viz: x x x With the CAAP having legally succeeded the ATO pursu ant to R.A. No. 9497, the oblig ations that the ATO had incurred by virtue of the deed of sale with the Ramos spouses might now be enforced against the CAAP. 8. PROFESSIONAL VIDEO, INC., vs. TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (G.R. No. 155504; June 26, 2009)

The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution and has been an est ablished princ iple that anted ates the Constitution. It is a universally recogni zed princi ple of intern ational law that exempts a state and its org ans from the jurisdiction of another state. The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practic al ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. It also rests on reasons of public policy that public service would be hindered, and the public end angered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and, consequently, controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the proper administr ation of the government. The proscri bed suit that the state immunity princi ple covers takes on various forms, namely: a suit against the Republic by name; a suit against an unincorpor ated government agency; a suit against a government agency covered by a charter with respect to the agencys performance of government al functions; and a suit that on its face is against a government officer, but where the ulti mate liability will fall on the government. In the present case, the writ of attachment was issued against a government agency covered by its own charter. The TESDA performs government al functions, and the issu ance of certific ations is a task within its function of developing and establishing a system of skills standardiz ation, testing, and certific ation in the country. From the perspective of this func tion, the core reason for the existence of state imm unity applies i.e., the public policy reason that the perform ance of government al function cannot be hindered or del ayed by suits, nor can these suits control the use and disposition of the means for the performance of government al functions. Even assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary contr act with PROVI and thereby gave its implied consent to be sued, TESDAs funds are still public in nature and, thus, cannot be the valid subject of a writ of garnishment or attachment.

9.

GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), et al., versus ARNULFO D. AQUINO (G.R. No. 180388; January 18, 2011) The doctrine of government al immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. It would be the apex of injustice and highly inequitable to defeat respondents right to be duly compens ated for actual work performed and services rendered, where both the government and the public have for years received and accepted benefits from the project and reaped the fruits of respondents honest toil and labor. The rule, in any case, is not absolu te for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance.

Inte rn ationa l Law 10. BAYAN MUNA versus ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive Secret ary, and BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Secret ary of Foreign Affairs (G.R. No. 159618; February 1, 2011) International Agreements; limitations on sovereignty. The RP, by entering into the Agreement, does thereby abdic ate its sovereignty, abdic ation being done by its waiving or abandoning its right to seek recourse through the Rome Statute of the ICC for erring Americans committing intern ation al crimes in the country. As it were, the Agreement is but a form of affirmance and confirm ation of the Philippines national criminal jurisdiction. Nation al crimin al jurisdiction being prim ary, it is always the responsibility and within the prerog ative of the RP either to prosecute criminal offenses equ ally covered by the Rome Statute or to accede to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Thus, the Philippines may decide to try persons of the US, as the term is understood in the Agreement, under our nation al crimin al justice system; or it ma y opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or over US persons committing high crimes in the country and defer to the second ary criminal jurisdiction of the ICC over them. In the same breath, the US must extend the same privilege to the Philippines with respect to persons of the RP committing high crimes within US territori al jurisdiction. By their nature, treaties and international agree ments actually have a limiting effect on the otherwise encomp assing and absolute nature of sovereignty. By their volunt ary act, nations may decide to surrender or waive some aspects of their state power or agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise exclusive and absolute jurisdiction. The usual underlying consider ation in this partial surrender may be the gre ater benefits derived from a pact or a reciproc al undert aking of one contr acting party to grant the same privileges or immunities to the other. International Agreements; treaties and executive agreements. Under intern ational law, there is no difference between treaties and executi ve agreements in terms of their binding effects on the contracting states concerned, as long as the negoti ating func tionar ies have remained within their powers. However, a treaty has gre ater dignity than an executive agreement, because its consti tutional efficacy is beyo nd doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and the people; a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agree ment, takes precedence over any prior statutory enactment. Petitioner, in this case, argues that the Non-Surrender Agreement between the Philippines and the US is of dubious validity, part aking as it does of the nature of a treaty; hence, it must be duly concurred in by the Senate. Petitioner relies on the case, Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, in which the Court stated: intern ational agreements involving politic al issues or changes of national policy and those involving intern ation al arrangements of a per manent character usu ally take the form of treaties; while those embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well est ablished nation al policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature take the form of executi ve agreements. According to petitioner, the subject of the Agreement does not fall under any of the subject-categories that are enumer ated in the Eastern Sea Trading case that may be covered by an executive agree ment, such as comm ercial/consular relations, most-f avored nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navig ation arrangements and settlement of claims. The Supreme Court held, however, that the categoriz ation of subject matters that may be covered by intern ational agreements mentioned in Eastern Sea Trading is not cast in stone. There are no hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering, on a given subject, into a treaty or an executive agreement as an instrument of international relations. The prim ary consider ation in the choice of the form of agreement is the parties intent and desire to craft an intern ational agreement in the form they so wish to further their respective interests. The matter of form takes a back seat when it comes to effectiveness and binding effect of the enforcement of a treaty or an execu tive agreement, as the parties in either intern ation al agreement each labor under the pacta sunt servanda principle.

Republic Act No. 9522

March 10, 2009

AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446, TO DEFINE THE ARCHIPELAGIC BASELINE OF THE PHILIPP INES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Be it ena cted by the Senate and Hou se of Representatives of the Philippines in Congre ss assembled:: Section 1. Section 1 of Repub lic Act No. 3046, entitled "An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines", as amended by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5446, is hereby ame nded to read as follows:

Section 1. The baselines of the Philippines archipelago are hereby defined and described specifically as follows: Basepoint Number Station Name Location World Geodetic System of 1984 (WGS 84) Coordinates Latitude (N) 1 PAB-01 2 PAB-02 3 PAB-04 4 PAB-05A 5 PAB-05B 6 PAB-05 7 PAB-06 8 PAB-06B 9 PAB-06C 10 PAB-07 11 PAB-08 12 PAB-10A 13 PAB-11 14 PAB-12 15 PAB-13 16 PAB-13A 17 PAB-14 18 PAB-14A 19 PAB-14D 20 PAB-15 21 PAB-16A 22 PAB-16B 23 PAB-16C 24 PAB-16D 25 PAB-17 26 PAB-18A 27 PAB-19C 28 PAB-19D 29 PAB-20A 30 PAB-21B 31 PAB-22 32 PAB-22C 33 PAB-23 34 PAB-23B 35 PAB-23C Amianan Is. Balintang Is. Bigan Pt. Ditolong Pt. Ditolong Pt. Ditolong Pt. Spires Is. Digollorin Pt. Digollorin Rk. Divimisa Pt. Dinoban Pt. Tinaga Is. Horodaba Rk. Matulin Rk. Atalaya Pt. Bacan Is. Finch Rk. Cube Rk. NW Manjud Pt. SE Manjud Pt. S Sorz Cay Panablihon Alugon N Bunga Pt. E Bunga Pt. SE Tobabao Is. Suluan Is. N Tua son Pt. Arangasa Is. San co Pt. Bago so Is Languyan Languyan Languyan N Baculin Pt. 21657.73 " 195738.19 " 181835.30 " 17716.30 " 17614.79 " 17551.31 " 17236.91 " 165918.03 " 164956.11 " 164738.86 " 161844.33 " 142954.43 " 146.29.91 " 146.10.40 " 12416.37 " 123618.41 " 1232.33.62 " 1231.57.45 " 122836.42 " 122737.51 " 122141.64 " 121727.17 " 121321.95 " 121148.16 " 121120.67 " 1267.00 " 104516.70 " 94959.58 " 85316.62 " 81311.53 " 74245.02 " 72949.47 " 72916.93 " 72830.97 " 72729.42 " Longitude (E) 121 5727.71 " 122 946.32 " 122 2019.07 " 122 3128.34 " 122 3143.84 " 122 3142.66 " 122 313.28 " 122 2756.61 " 122 2650.78 " 122 264.40 " 122 1406.69 " 122 5751.15 " 124 1659.21 " 124 1726.28 " 125 353.71 " 125 850.19 " 125 1259.70 " 125 1332.37 " 125 1712.32 " 125 185.23 " 125 237.41 " 125 270.12 " 125 3019.47 " 125 3130.88 " 125 3148.29 " 125 3411.94 " 125 588.78 " 126 106.39 " 126 2048.81 " 126 2853.25 " 126 3429.08 " 126 3559.24 " 126 3559.50 " 126 3557.30 " 126 3551.31 " Distance to next basepoint 70.08 99.17 71.83 1.05 0.39 3.29 9.74 3.51 2.40 30.94 116.26 80.29 0.54 96.04 6.79 5.52 0.80 4.90 1.30 7.09 5.68 5.21 1.94 0.54 5.71 83.94 56.28 57.44 40.69 30.80 12.95 0.54 0.76 1.2 10.12

36 PAB-24 37 PAB-24A 38 PAB-25B 39 PAB-25 40 PAB-26 41 PAB-27 42 PAB-28 43 PAB-29 44 PAB-30 45 PAB-31 46 PAB-32 47 PAB-33A 48 PAB-34A 49 PAB-35 50 PAB-35A 51 PAB-38A 52 PAB-39 53 PAB-40 54 PAB-40A 55 PAB-41A 56 PAB-42A 57 PAB-43 58 PAB-44 59 PAB-45 60 PAB-46 61 PAB-47 62 PAB-48 63 PAB-48A 64 PAB-49 65 PAB-50 66 PAB-51 67 PAB-52 68 PAB-53 69 PAB-54 70 PAB-54A 71 PAB-54B 72 PAB-55 73 PAB-60 74 PAB.61

Pusan Pt. S Pusan Pt. Cape San Agustin Cape San Agustin SE Sarangani Is. Pangil Bato Pt. Tapundo Pt. W Calia Pt. Manamil Is. Marampog Pt. Pola Pt. Kantuan Is Tonggu il Is. Tongqu il Is Tongqu il Is. Kirapusan Is Manuk Manka Is. Fran ces Ree f Fran ces Ree f Bajapa Ree f Paguan Is. Alice Ree f Alice Ree f Omap oy Rk. Bukut Lapis Pt. Pea rl Bank Bagnan Is. Taganak Is Great Bakkungaa n Is. Libiman Is. Sibaung Is. Muligi Is. South Mangsee Is. Balabac Is. Balabac Great Ree f Balabac Great Ree f Balabac Great Ree f Ada Ree f Secam Is.

71719.80 " 71614.43 " 61714.73 " 6168.35 " 52334.20 " 52321.80 " 62155.66 " 52158.48 " 5222.91 " 52320.18 " 698.44 " 62647.22 " 6233.77 " 618.51 " 6017.88 " 512.8.70 " 44739.24 " 42453.84 " 4253.83 " 436"9.01 " 44252.07 " 44555.25 " 4475.36 " 45510.45 " 5223.73 " 54635.15 " 6558.41 " 6414.08 " 6114.65 " 61339.90 " 61743.99 " 65214.53 " 73026.05 " 74830.69 " 75127.17 " 75219.86 " 75436.35 " 820.26 " 81118.36 "

126 3618.26 " 126 3557.20 " 126 1214.40 " 126 1135.06 " 125 2842.11 " 125 2819.59 " 126 2511.21 " 125 2152.03 " 125 2059.73 " 125 1944.29 " 124 1542.81 " 122 13.34.50 " 121 5636.20 " 121 5441.45 " 121 6311.17 " 120 4138.14 " 119 5158.08 " 119 1450.71 119 1415.15 " 119 322.75 " 119 144.04 " 119 315.19 " 119 512.94 " 119 221.30 119 4418.14 " 119 3951.77 " 118 2657.30 " 118 1833.33 " 118 654.15 " 118 352.09 " 118 05.44 " 118 2340.49 " 117 1833.75 " 116 5939.18 " 116 5417.19 " 116 5328.73 " 116 5316.64 " 116 5410.04 " 116 5951.87 "

1.14 63.28 1.28 67.65 0.43 3.44 3.31 0.87 1.79 78.42 122.88 29.44 2.38 1.72 85.94 55.24 43.44 0.61 15.48 6.88 8.40 2.28 18.60 23.37 44.20 75.17 8.54 13.46 3.97 5.53 41.60 75.06 26.00 6.08 1.18 2.27 5.42 10.85 30.88

12

75 PAB-62 76 PAB-63 77 PAB-63A 78 PAB-64 79 PAB.64B 80 PAB-65C 81 PAB-67 82 PAB-68 83 PAB-71 84 PAB-72 85 PAB-72B 86 PAB-73 87 PAB-74 88 PAB-74A 89 PAB-75 90 PAB-75C 91 PAB-75D 92 PAB-76 93 PAB-77 94 PAB-78 95 PAB-79 96 PAB-79B 97 PAB-80 98 PAB-82 99 PAB-83 100 PAB-84 101 PAB-85

Latua Pt. SW Tatub Pt. W Sicud Pt. Tarumpitao Pt. Dry Is. Sinangcolan Pt. Pinnacle Rk. Cabra Is Hermana Mayor Is. Tambobo Pt. Rena Pt. Rena Pt. Rocky Ledge Piedra Pt. Piedra Pt. Piedra Pt. Piedra Pt. Dile Pt. Pinget Is. Baboc Is. Cape Bojea dor Bobon Calagangan Pt. Itbayat Is. Amianan Is Amianan Is. Amianan Is.

88756.37 " 84417.40 " 85332.20 " 92.57.47 " 95922.54 " 111319.82 " 121935.22 " 135324.45 " 154843.61 " 155761.67 " 16957.90 " 161012.42 " 161634.46 " 163712.70 " 161829.49 " 161928.20 " 16204.38 " 173424.94 " 174117.56 " 17554.13 " 182932.42 " 183052.88 " 191014.78 " 204315.74 " 21717.47 " 21718.41 " 21712.04 "

1171551.23 " 1172039.37 " 1172815.78 " 1173738.88 " 1183653.61 " 1191517.74 " 1195056.00 12015.86 " 1194656.09 " 1194455.32 " 11945.15.76 " 1194511.95 " 1194619.50 " 1194628.62 " 1194644.94 " 119477.69 " 1194720.48 " 1202033.36 " 120212.20 " 1202440.56 " 1203342.41 " 1203455.35 " 1211252.64 " 1214657.80 " 1215643.85 " 1215648.79 " 121573.65 "

7.91 11.89 13.20 81.12 82.76 74.65 93.88 115.69 9.30 12.06 0.25 6.43 0.65 1.30 1.04 0.63 80.60 6.86 14.15 35.40 1.77 58.23 98.07 25.63 0.08 0.25 0.44

Section 2. The baseline in the following area s over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): a) The Kalayaa n Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596; and b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. Section 3. This Act affirms that the Repub lic of the Philippines has dominion, sovereignty and jurisdiction over all portions of the national territory as defined in the Constitution and by provisions of applicable laws including, withou t limitation, Repub lic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Gover nment Code of 1991, as amended. Section 4. This Act, together with the geographic coordinates and the chart and maps indicating the aforesaid baselines, shall be deposited and registered with the Secretary General of the United Nations. Section 5. The National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) shall forthwith produ ce and pub lish charts and maps of the appropriate scale clea rly representing the delinea tion of basepoints and baselines as set forth in this Act.

Section 6. The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be provided in a supp lemental budyet or included in the General Appropriations Act of the year of its ena ctment into law. Section 7. If any portion or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid the other portions or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect. Section 8. The provisions of Repub lic Act No. 3046, as amended by Repub lic Act No. 5446, and all other laws, decree s, executive order s, rules and iss uances inconsistent with this Act are hereby amended or modified accordingly. Section 9. This Act shall take effect fiftee n (15) days following its pub lication in the Official Gazette or in any two (2) newspaper of general circulation. Approved (Sgd.) PROSPE RO C. NOGRALES Spea ker of the Hou se of Representatives (Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE President of the Senate

This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2699 and Hou se Bill No. 3216 was finally pa ssed by the Senate and the Hou se of Representative on February 17, 2009. (Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP Secretary General Hou se of Represenatives Approved: MAR 10, 2009 (Sgd.) GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO President of the Philippines (Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES Secretary of Senate