Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC FACTS: Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte

where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months. ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte. HELD: Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons: 1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte; 2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue. 3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium. 4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary

intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones. WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

Facts: Petitioner Agapito Aquino was disqualified from being proclaimed as the winner of the Makati City Congressional elections because his opponents were questioning his residency requirements. Comelec contend that in order that he could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City, Aquino must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice. To prove his residence at Makati, petitioner presented an alleged lease agreement of a condominium in the area. Issue: WON leasing a condominium unit is enough to prove residence, for election purposes. Ruling: Residence, as used in election laws, always mean domicile. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of respondents intention to reside in Makati City it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones original domicile especially since, by its terms, it is only for a period of two (2) years, and respondent Aquino himself testified that his intention was really for only one (l) year because he has other residences in Manila or Quezon City. While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati (and the fact, of his stated domicile in Tarlac) indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his physical residence 27 is not to acquires new residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City. 28 The absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions stated above, the lack of identification sentimental, actual or otherwise with the area, and the suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement was effected all belie petitioners claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution, in the Second District of Makati.

FRIVALDO

vs.

COMELEC

FACTS: Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on 22 January 1988, and assumed office in due time. On 27 October 1988, the league of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Comelec a petition for the annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on 20 January 1983. Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictators agents abroad. He also argued that the challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within 10 days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omhibus Election Code. ISSUE: Whether Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on 18 January 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon? HELD: The Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over the question as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Congress and elective provincial and city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldos citizenship has already been made by the COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. The Solicitors stance is assumed to have bben taken by him after consultation with COMELEC and with its approval. It therefore represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that the Supreme Court may review. In the certificate of candidacy filed on 19 November 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary nor do they claim to have been coerced to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. Still, if he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. He failed to take such categorical acts. Rhe anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country cannot be permitted. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. Frivaldo is disqualified from serving as governor of Sorsogon.

MORENO vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 168550. August 10, 2006 FACTS: Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention. The Comelec en banc granted her petition and disqualified Moreno. Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was already granted probation. Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also argued that under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed. However, the Comelec en banc assails Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code which provides that those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence, are disqualified from running for any elective local position. Since Moreno was released from probation on December 20, 2000, disqualification shall commence on this date and end two (2) years thence. The grant of probation to Moreno merely suspended the execution of his sentence but did not affect his disqualification from running for an elective local office. On his petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under the Local Government Code applies only to those who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do not serve the adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should allegedly be read as an exception to the Local Government Code because it is a special law which applies only to probationers. Further, even assuming that he is disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied pardon of his previous misconduct. ISSUE: Does Morenos probation grant him the right to run in public office? HELD: Yes. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that "[t]he final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was granted." Thus, when Moreno was finally discharged upon the court's finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction were restored to him, including the right to run for public office. It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which also covers probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not specifically disqualify probationers from running for a local elective office. Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the Local Government Code. While the Local Government Code is a later law which sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of local elective officials, the Probation Law is a special legislation which applies only to probationers. It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute.

Dela Torre vs COMELEC [258 SCRA 485] Facts: Section 40 (a) of Republic Act 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) provides that a prior conviction of a crime becomes a ground for disqualification from running for any elective local position i.e. when the conviction is for an offense involving moral turpitude. Citing above as ground, the COMELEC in a resolution, declared petitioner disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna. COMELEC held that petitioner was found guilty by the MTC for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, an offense whose nature involves moral turpitude. Petitioner claimed that Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to his case inasmuch as the probation granted him by the MTC which suspended the execution of the judgment of conviction and all other legal consequences flowing therefrom, rendered inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well. However, he admits all the elements of the crime of fencing. Issue: WON the petitioner applicant is disqualified for the coming elections due to a crime involving moral turpitude. Held: Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. From the definition of fencing in Sec. 2 of PD 1612, an element of the crime of fencing may be gleaned that the accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. Moral turpitude is deducible from this. Actual knowledge by the fence of the fact that property received as stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of ones rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. And although the participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in point in time and in degree, both the fence and the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded ones peaceful dominion for gain thus deliberately reneging the process private duties they owe their fellowmen in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals.

CAASI V CA (1990) FACTS: Miguel won as Mayor of Bolinao. Caasi, a rival candidate, objected to Miguels qualifications on the ground that the latter was a green card holder, hence a permanent resident of America and not of Bolinao. (COMELEC dismissed the contest, holding that the possession of a green card does not establish Miguels abandonment of his Philippine residence) When Miguel returned to the Philippines in November 1987,he stayed in Bolinao for only three (3) months before the elections on January 18, 1988. ISSUE: WON Miguel is a resident of Bolinao, and not US.

HELD: Miguel lost his Philippine residence. The law requires that the candidate who is a green cardholder must have waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country. Miguels act of filing a certifcate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines did not itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the US. There must be some other act independent of and prior to the filing of his candidacy. No evidence that Miguel waived his status as green card holder before he ran for mayor. Local Govt Code requires residence of one (1) year in the municipality (to get acquainted with the places condition). Omnibus Election Code has a policy of banning Philippine citizens with dual loyalties and allegiance.

Marquez vs. COMELEC Facts: It is averred that at the time respondent Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles, USA. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged flight from that country. Before the May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation of respondents certificate of candidacy on the ground of the candidates disqualification under section 40 of the Local Government Code [Section 40. Disqualification. The following persons are disqualified from running for any local elective position... (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad.] was filed by petitioner, but COMELEC dismissed the petition. Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon. Petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings against private respondent before the COMELEC but the latter dismissed the petition. Issue: Whether private respondent, who at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy is said to be facing a criminal chargebefore a foreign court and evading a warrant of arrest comes within the term fugitive from justice. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 provides: Article 73. Disqualifications The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position:
xxxx(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment.

It is clear from this provision that fugitives from justice refer only to persons who has been convicted by final judgment. However, COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not private respondent is a fugitive from justice when it outrightly denied the petition for quo warranto. The Court opted to remand the case to COMELEC to resolve and proceed with the case. The Oversight Committee evidently entertained serious apprehensions on the possible constitutional infirmity of Section 40(e) of RA 7160 if the disqualification therein meant were to be so taken as to embrace those who merely were facing criminal charges. A similar concern was expressed by Senator R. A. V. Saguisag who, during the bicameral conference committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives, made this reservation: de ipa-refine lang natin 'yung language especially 'yung, the scope of fugitive. Medyo bothered ako doon, a. The Oversight Committee finally came out with Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. It provided:
Art. 73. Disqualifications. The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position: (e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment. It includes those who after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. The COMELEC is directed to proceed and settle the case in conformity of the given clarification with the term fugitive from justice.

RODRIGUEZ vs. COMELEC

259 SCRA 296, 1996 Facts: The petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez was a candidate for Governor in the Province of Quezon in the May 8, 1995 elections. His rival candidate for the said position was Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr., herein private respondent. Private respondent filed a petition for disqualification before the COMELEC based principally on the allegation that Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice. Private respondent revealed that a charge for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property is pending against the petitioner before the Los Angeles Municipal Court. Rodriguez is therefore a fugitive from justice which is a ground for his disqualification/ ineligibility under Section 40 (e) of the Local Government Code according to Marquez. Rodriguez, however, submitted a certification from the Commission of Immigration showing that Rodriguez left the US on June 25, 1985- roughly five (5) months prior to the institution of the criminal complaint filed against him before the Los Angeles Court. Issue: Whether or not Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice. Held: No. The Supreme Court reiterated that a fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates ones flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment or of a promulgated judgement of conviction.