How Fool Is a Holy Fool?

Agneta Schreurs

he editors asked me to write a short response to your commentaries. They asked me to do that as a set; therefore, I respond to your texts as a whole. First, I thank you for your comments. I appreciate very much that you took the time to read and reflect on my article. I am really very happy with your positive evaluation of my article, particularly because my choice for this subject has much to do with my own biography. I have been raised by nonreligious parents and grandparents. My mother being a classical scholar and my father a scientist, I knew more about antiquity and chemistry than about the Bible, which in fact did not figure at all in my education. However, when I was forty years old, I took on theology at the University of Utrecht as an extra study in my free time, mainly because I felt embarrassed whenever my students or clients brought the subject up and I did not know the first thing about it. Right from the beginning I became absolutely excited about this study, not only about the broad range of fascinating subjects, but also because quite a number churches had merged the academic part of their seminaries with the theological faculty of the University of Utrecht into an academically very high-standard curriculum. Students and teachers were a mix of Dutch Reformed, Roman Catholic, Old Catholic, Baptist, and several other denominations, in my time even a Jewish rabbi and a Winti (an indigenous religion in the former Dutch West Indies). Outsider as I was, this offered me a unique
2007 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

opportunity to become acquainted in a personal and natural way with their various faiths. Nevertheless, it took me three years before I realized what all those fascinating things had to do with my life and with my work! This realization was the reason why, after getting my masters degree in theology, I decided to choose a combination of philosophy of religion and psychology of religion for my doctoral dissertation and to change my group practice into work that explicitly dealt with the interconnections between spirituality and psychotherapy. I also want to thank you for sharing your thoughts on the larger contexts of my subject. From my biographical sketch, you can see that I agree with both of you in that it is high time that psychiatry and psychotherapy pay more attention toand become more knowledgeable about their religious patients religion and spirituality. Not because I think the talking cures may have much in common with faith healing (in fact, I agree with Gibson [2000] that they have much more in common with the gentle craft of taking confession), but because it is unprofessional not to do so. When a person consults a priest or minister with regard to a religious problem, it often appears that there are also psychological problems involved. That is why theological curricula include pastoral psychology and clinical training courses. This is also true the other way round: psychological problems treated in psychotherapy and counseling may involve a patients religious mindset. How-

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ever, most psychotherapists are generally neither religious themselves nor trained in assessing and understanding the great variety of ways in which people may be religious and how these may be intertwined with the problems for which they have sought therapeutic help. In particular, they are mostly not trained in discovering how their patients religiousness may be a cause of therapeutic failure or, alternatively, a source of support and as such a help toward therapeutic progress. In addition to such lack in information and training, and in contrast with most clergy, clients in therapy may easily have very different religious backgrounds. As a result of this professional situation, many psychotherapists feel uncomfortable in this area and unprofessionally tend to ignore, avoid, or reinterpret in psychological terms their patients spiritual expressions. The point I tried to make is this: to successfully discover and assess how a patients religiousness may be a cause of psychological problems or conversely, be a source of support and as such a help toward therapeutic progress, you need at least some basic insight into the individual and usually implicit theology of such a patient (I have called that a personal theology to distinguish it from the systematic and explicit theology developed by professional theologians). This need is present because a theology functions as the overall frame of meaning and purpose within which religious and/or nonreligious problems arise, are verbalized, and can be solved. I agree that a therapist is ethically prohibited from discouraging a patients religious belief, even if this is clearly the source of that persons psychological difficulty. As a result, a therapist is required to make the choice either to work within the patients religious frame of reference or to refer the patient to a religious professional. For making a choice that is in the best interest of his patient, however, a therapist must have some basic insight into the theology this patient has been brought up in or has acquired himself. I agree also that it is clinically inappropriate to engage clients in philosophical and theological debates on theism, atheism, deism, agnosticism, and so on. A therapeutic session is not the appropriate place to engage in any debates, full stop.

Not about such issues, not about anything else. I also agree that a therapist is supposed to work with the clients worldview to achieve the goals of therapy. My point is, though, that to be able to do so you need at least some basic insight into your clients worldview and its implied anthropological and metaphysical presuppositions (be these of the religious variety or not), and, as Utsch insists, also into your own worldview and your own tacit anthropological and metaphysical presuppositions. Otherwise, you are in danger of misdiagnosing the patients problems, misinterpreting their expressions, and projecting your own tacit presuppositions onto them. You also need such basic insight to help them discover the positive and healthy therapeutic potential of their own type of spirituality. Moreover, with such insight, therapists are in a much better position to help their patients help themselves in this respect. This is so because, with such insight, therapists do not need to steer such patients away from their religious beliefs, nor to honor the therapeutic ethic of neutrality in such a strict way that they always have to respectfully desist from asking any critical questions about their patients perceived spirituality. And yes, the differences between human relations and spiritual relationships should not be glossed over, and neither should any other aspects of spirituality I have omitted. Discussing these, too, however, would make this article at least twice as long and thus not fit into the journals format. In my book (Schreurs 2002) on this subject, I could be more elaborate, but even there I had to limit myself in this respect. Another point you raise is that of terminology. There is indeed a huge confusion about the concepts related to spirituality and religion. Spirituality originates from the Christian tradition in which the concepts of the human spirit (spiritus = pneuma, a human faculty that is different from anima = psyche) and the Holy Spirit (Spiritus Sanctus) are quite central in the context of pneumatology rather than psychology. But as you rightly observe, in modern language use the term has come to denote a different concept, much too vague and much too broad to be useful for academic studies where you need more precise terms. In practice-oriented conceptualizing, we have to

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think very carefully about the level of abstraction we choose. If that is too high, it is probably not very relevant. For example, if we take all religions together and select from them the few things they have in common in our concept religion, it is questionable whether the few features they share are also the most central ones in any particular religion or the most relevant ones for designing a useful methodology. The same is true if we put the properties all spiritualities have in common into our concept of spirituality. On the other hand, if we choose our abstraction level too low, our conceptual instrument applies only to a much too small sample of our clients. That is why in most studies in this field the authors start with specifying what they in their publication mean with spirituality and related terms. That is also why in my article and book I state explicitly that I address primarily nonreligious psychotherapists and counselors dealing with Christian clients and that I try to explain some therapeutically relevant structures of such clients personal implementation of spirituality. As much as I can, I do my explaining in terms and descriptions that are more familiar for this intended readership than most traditional Christian terminology would be, and less likely to make them suspicious of any hidden evangelizing agenda in my text. Unfortunately, I seem not to have quite succeeded in this respect, because you seem to interpret my subject as ones direct experience of the sacred or numinous. That is a reduction I cannot subscribe to, nor intended to make. In Christianity spiritual life is supposed to be primarily a commitment that you engage in as a response to being somehow touched or convinced by the life and message of Christ. Certainly, what triggers off such response may be an experience, for example, being moved by a text, or, as you describe, by paintings or choral music. In some cases, it may even involve a visionary, auditive, and mystical experience such as James (1902/1994) describes and some authors consider as potential evidence of the existence of a transcendent being. However, such triggers are not restricted to what since James has become called religious experiences, they may, for example, also be intellectually convincing argumentsor

a mix of both as seems to have been the case with Augustine. My impression is that in early, patristic, and medieval Christianity logical arguments did indeed have a greater trigger potential than emotional experiences, although both types are reported all through history. In fact, during the first centuries, Christianity was even described as being a philosophy. Irrespective of the trigger, however, if the response to such a trigger is not followed by a commitment to strive sincerely for a life of Christ-like faith in God, altruistic love, and compassionate justice, then I do not think it qualifies for the concept of Christian spirituality. After the initial commitment, an ensuing life that is being lived in, inspired by, and developed through this striving and the tensions it evokes, may include special transcendent experiences, visions, etceteraor it may not. But in Christian spirituality they are a grace, a gift, and added value. Not something to be earned through good works or be brought about by manipulating your consciousness. To answer your question about how this framework would be relevant to a growing recognition in our present culture of spiritualities that reject the idea of a personal godhead; the answer is rather simple: I do not think it is relevant. But if you really want to know, find out precisely what it is that such spiritualities are rejecting (a broken or distorted relationship may still be a relational aspect; it may even be an important part of selfidentity), ask what is central to their spiritual life, whether that has any relational aspects, and if so, figure out how their underlying relational grammar compares with the one I sketched. Easier said than done, of course. My approach is not designed for working with a clientele such as the other 30% of the UK population you mention. They probably need another approach. The relational approach may be relevant, however, for other (mono- or poly-)theistic spiritualities, either within or outside traditional religions. You ask, What distinguishes a personal relationship with a deity, however wholesome it may be, from a delusion? In Christian spirituality, it is a central tenet that there is a personal God with whom human beings can have a relationship and who can communicate with us, albeit often in

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quiteunexpectedwaysandwithquiteunexpected people.Therefore,yes,withinthisspiritualitythere isarealpossibilityofauthenticmutuality.That doesnotmeanthatweshoulduncriticallyaccept allreportedvisions,auditions,prophecies,andso on,assuch.Fromtheearliesttimes,Christianity, aswellasmostothertheisticreligionsIknowof (worldreligionsaswellastribalreligions),have developedcriteriafordistinguishingtheauthentic fromthefakeorpathological.Inancienttimes, thiswasanevenmorevitalissuethanitistoday, because visionaries could exert immense moral andpoliticalpower.OldTestamentprophets,for example,sometimesopenlyopposedtheirkings, andRussianholyfoolsoncewalkednakedand burdenedwithheavychainsthroughthestreets, publicly reprimanding the Czar for his cruelty. Nobody else dared to criticize the Czar. Their voluntary foolish behavior of nakedness and painsimultaneouslysymbolizedGodssolidarity withtheCzarsvictimsandmadeitclearthatthey themselveswereimmunetowhatevercrueltythe Czar would subject them to: they had nothing tolose. Theseexamplesareexceptionalofcourse,but basicallythecriteriaarestillthesameasinearlier times: the character of the person involved, the result of the process of purification with the helpofanexperiencedspiritualdirector,andthe fruitsoftheexperiencesunderconsideration, that is, whether in the long run the religious community involved has profited (in a spiritual sense)fromit.Itisneversupposedtobeapurely individual matter. DSM-IV TR formulates also criteriaforadelusion:
afalsebeliefbasedonincorrectinferenceaboutexternalrealitythatisfirmlysustaineddespitewhatalmost everyone else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertibleandobviousprooforevidencetothe contrary.Thebeliefisnotoneordinarilyacceptedby other members of the persons culture or subculture (e.g., it is not an article of religious faith). When a falsebeliefinvolvesavaluejudgment,itisregardedas adelusiononlywhenthejudgmentissoextremeasto defycredibility...

Itseemstomethatboththetraditionalreligious andtheDSMcriteriaresembleeachotherrather closely.Smallwonder,becausebotharedesigned

forpracticaluseandthereforebothcontextdependent,andmoreoverchangeableiftheywould appeartobeunsatisfactory.Andjustaswiththe traditionalreligiouscriteria,therearealsoproblems with this DSM definition and its implicit criteria.Theyarethesubjectofanongoingcritical discussion(e.g.,Glas2006;JacksonandFulford 1997;Jones1999).Recently,thefocusofthisdiscussionhasmovedfromtheissueofthecontent offalsebeliefs,whichisbristlingwithpitfalls, towardthequestionofthefunctionandthequalityofapatientsbeliefs,irrespectiveoftheirbeing falseornot(e.g.,DrinnanandLavender2006; Musalek2003). Idonotthinkthatreligiousdogmashouldbe rejected because of the mindless violence and sufferingthatisalmostalwaystheinevitableconsequenceofreligiousdogma.WithSophoklesI wouldsay,Seethatthineownjudgmentisjust, before thou blame thy neighbour (1924, 5501).WhatshouldberejectediswhatIwouldcall ideological abuse of dogma. Should democracy be rejected because it is misused in the interest of oil companies, arms industries, and political ambition?ShouldMarxscriticismofthecapitalistsystemberejectedbecauseofitshavingbeen hijacked by dictators? Is there any reason why spirituality,inthesenseyouuseit,wouldnot becomesusceptibletospiritualabusenowthat thistypeofspiritualityhasbecomesofashionable andissellingsowellinfact,isthatnotalready happeninghereandthere,insomespiritualtherapies,forexample(CarretteandKing2005;Utsch 2005)?Itseemstomethattherightquestionsare: WhatproblemsweretheChurchFatherstrying tosolvewhentheydesignedthesedogmas?;In whatwaysdidtheytrytodothat?;Arewestill confrontedwiththeseproblems?;andifso,Are theirsolutionsstilladequateforus,andshouldwe thereforetrytoexplaintheminmodernconcepts? And if their solutions are not adequate for our generation,shouldwedesignnewwaysoftacklingtheseproblems?Onlyafterhavingreflected onthesequestionswecanask,Shouldwereject thesedogmasaltogether?andifnot,Howcan wepreventordiscouragetheirideologicalabuse? Icannotelaborateonthishere,butperhapsreadingAllisons(1994)bookcouldbehelpful.Inan

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accessible style, he explains how the theological debates in patristic times about whether Christ was either a human being who was adopted by God, or a divine being who only appeared to be a man and therefore had not really suffered and died, were efforts to solve a very real pastoralpsychological problem, a problem that is still with us and still causes psychological problems. In my view, most other traditional doctrines also need either to be explained and reconnected to pastoralpsychological problems or to be reformulated in modern concepts. That is what Brmmer (1993, 2005) and other philosophers of religion are trying to do. In the course of your argument, you extend the issue of delusions into the epistemological question about the evidential justification of any religious conviction, or rather, of the existence of any God. I like that challenge and will now in my turn put on my philosophers coat, which distinctly smells of post-Wittgensteinian and post-Ricoeurian sweat because that is what I have taught for many years. It is a different discourse from what I try to do in my article, so I restrict myself to a few remarks here. Maybe we can continue at some other time and place? First, I think the quest for experience, be it pure or impure, as evidence for the existence of God (or evidence of anything at all, other than the existence of such experiences) is rather outdated. Philosophically, the search for objective truth via detached introspection cannot be held in the light of the critique on essentialism and on the mindbody distinction. Psychologically, detached introspection and concepts such as Winnicotts (1990) True Self may be useful for helping people clarify their inner turmoils, but then we are talking about instrumental, not veridical value. However, even if I would for the sake of this argument grant you that the existence of God or some other transcendent reality could in principle be proved by detached and noncontextual introspection, even then I think experience is a far too broad and vague concept to be useful for any such goal. I am not an expert in this area, but I understand that studies of the bodys genetic predispositions, neurochemical functions, and emotional programs indicate that unusual and/or unexpected experiences trigger off simultane-

ously emotional and cognitive responses. There is, however, no one emotionalcognitive center in the brain; humans possess a wide variety of emotional systems with various adaptive cognitive functions. According to evolutionary researchers, most of these are directed toward biological and social/cultural survival. As Fuller (2006) puts it, . . . the brains most pressing concern is that of discerning agency and intention in what are otherwise causally opaque situations. The brain is wired to seek the source of causal agency, purpose, or intentionality of events that vitally impinge on our lives (p. 368). Fuller points to the fact that some of such emotional programs, particularly those of wonder and curiosity, rather than leading to identifying agency in the immediate environment, lead to moral and metaphysical reflection. Researchers have shown that there exists a family of emotions, each of which can motivate higher level conceptions of existence, exploration, creativity, and lively engagement in the environment. Fullers analysis of wonder suggests that wonder plays an important role in shaping a religious sensibility toward life. Moreover, the religious sensibility shaped by wonder squares well with the pragmatic criteria we might reasonably use to assess the value of spiritual postures toward life: immediate luminousness, important elements of philosophical reasonableness, and moral helpfulness. It seems to me that all this implies that philosophically we can never go behind these intricate connections between unusual experience and its emotionalcognitive responses. However, it is not irrational at all to argue that a transcendent Something or Someone may trigger off such experiences and their higher order cognitions. It seems to me that we can rationally argue that if the Biblical God exists, and if He would want to reveal His existence to us other than by means of revealing Himself in Christ and the Bible, and if He exists as pure Divine Love, then it would be much more practical and efficient for Him to do such revealing by using as a channel our evolutionary brain structures through experiences that trigger off emotions of deep love and awe and their related cognitions, rather than to do so by using detached pure experience as His channelwhatever that may be. In that case, it would be quite sensible

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to develop a psychology of love additional to Fullers psychology of wonder. Its veridical potential could then be tested by trying to love as much and as deeply a we canand seeing to what experiences that leads us and how convincing these are for the existence of the Biblical God. I do not know whether such reasoning would convince me (still talking as a philosopher), but if we want to look for experiential evidence outside the Biblical tradition, then this looks more promising to me than reasoning from experiences that trigger off a pure emotionalcognitive program. Second, you combine the quest for experiential evidence for the existence of God with your desire to do away with religion (in the sense you use that term). I am not sure what you mean: do you suggest that we should throw away all religion if we fail to find infallible evidence for the existence of God or gods or something transcendent of any kind? If so, then let us for the sake of this argument make that position still stronger and suppose that you and I and a few other philosophers have found proof that such transcendent Someones or Somethings do not exist. Proof that is irrefutable according to our strict philosophical criteria, albeit unconvincing to the large majority of religious Someonists or spiritual Somethingists who are quite happy with their own implicit criteria. My question to you is: Do you really mean that in such a case we should throw away all religion? We would then be in the same position as Tawfiq al-Hakim presents in his philosophical play River of Madness. In this play, the whole population has drunk water from a poisoned river, and as a result everybody has become mad. They are all quite happy and do not realize that they are mad. Their madness makes them think that they are alright but that everybody who has not drunk from the water is mad. Only the king and his grand vizier have not drunk. They are the only ones who are not mad, who know that they are not mad and who know the truth: all the others are mad. They discuss their options: what is truth, what is wisdom, what is madness? The last line is:
The King (with insistence): Let there be brought to me a cup of the rivers water.

References
Allison, F. C. 1994. The cruelty of heresy. London: SPCK. Brmmer, V. 1993. The model of love: A study in philosophical theology. Cambridge/New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul. . 2005. Atonement, Christology and the Trinity: Making sense of Christian doctrine. Burlington, CT: Ashgate. Carrette, J., and R. King. 2005. Selling spirituality: The silent takeover of religion. Abingdon/Oxon: Routledge. Drinnan, A., and T. Lavender. 2006. Deconstructing delusions: A qualitative study examining the relationship between religious beliefs and religious delusions. Mental Health, Religion and Culture 9, no. 4:31731. Fuller, R. 2006. Wonder and the religious sensibility: A study in religion and emotion. The Journal of Religion 86, no. 3:364384. Gibson, T. L. 2000. Wholeness and transcendence in the practice of pastoral psychotherapy from a JudeoChristian perspective. In The psychology of mature spirituality, ed. P. Young-Eisendrath and M.E. Miller, 17586. London: Routledge. Glas, G. 2006. De overtuigingsdader. Tussen overtuiging en psychopathologie [Between belief and psychopathology]. Ontmoetingen 12:3348. Jackson, M., and K. W. M. Fulford. 1997. Spiritual experience and psychopathology. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 4, no. 1:14165. James, W. 1902/1994. Varieties of religious experience. New York: Random House. Jones, E. 1999. The phenomenology of abnormal belief: A philosophical and psychiatric inquiry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 6, no. 1:116. Musalek, M. 2003. Meaning and causes of delusions. In Nature and narrative: An introduction to the new philosophy of psychiatry, ed. B. Fulford, K. Morris, J. Sadler, and G. Stanghellini, 15569. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Saward, J. 1980. Perfect fools: Folly for Christs sake in Catholic and Orthodox spirituality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schreurs, A. 2002. Psychotherapy and spirituality: Integrating the spiritual dimension into therapeutic practice. London: Kingsley. Sophokles. Elektra, trans. R. C. Jebb, 1924. Tawfiq al-Hakim. 1963. River of madness. In Islamic literature, 20311. New York: Washington Square Press. Utsch, M. 2005. Religise Fragen in der Psychotherapie: Psychologische Zugnge zu Religiositt und Spiritualitt. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. Winnicott, D. W. 1990. The maturational processes and the facilitating environment. London: Karnac Books and The Institute of Psycho-Analysis.

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psychiatryandphilosophyofmindtoilluminate one another. He can be contacted via e-mail at mark.rego@yale.edu. Patricia A. RossisaResearchAssociateatthe Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science at theUniversityofMinnesota.Sheisalsocurrently visitingassistantprofessorofphilosophyatCarleton College. Her philosophical background is inphilosophyofscience,andshehasaparticular interest in philosophy of psychology and psychiatry.Sheiswritingabookontheconceptof mentaldisorder.Shecanbecontactedviae-mail atrossx035@umn.edu. Agneta Schueurs has studied social psychology,theology,andphilosophyattheuniversities of Amsterdam and Utrecht (The Netherlands) and worked as a lecturer and researcher at the University of Utrecht and the Vrije Universiteit of Amsterdam, and as a group therapist at the

InstituteofSpiritualDirectionandPastoralPsychotherapy in Utrecht. She is a member of the Christian Society of Psychiatrists, Psychologists andPsychotherapists,theDutchAssociationfor GroupPsychotherapy,theInternationalAssociationforthePsychologyofReligion,andtheSociety fortheStudyofTheology.Shecanbecontacted viae-mailatagneta.schreurs@planet.nl. Demian WhitingisLecturerinHealthCareEthics at the University of Liverpool. His research interests include philosophy of emotion, philosophicalpsychopathology,andappliedethics.He haswrittenanumberofarticlesonthesetopics, includingonepaperentitledStandingUpforan Affective Account of Emotion (Philosophical Explorations,2006),inwhichhedefendstheclaim thatemotionsarenothingmorethansuigeneris feelingstates.Hecanbecontactedviae-mailat ddw@liv.ac.uk.

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