GROUP 3

Collado, Erika C. Cortes, Maple Joy L. Cruz, Elizabeth Joie G. Cruz, Erika O. De Leon, Ma.Bernardita P. Garcia, Gemma O. Honorio, Maiden D. Manansala, Tessa Lonica A. Mendoza, Ma. Josefina E. Ng Sy, Ma. Katrina Ocampo, Jaden B. Reyes, Maria Bernadez T. Semana, Agelyn R. Singson, Noelle Joanna M. Tanada, Riza Rose G. Teves, Hanna Mae C. Tiongson,Eileen V.

RULE ON HABEAS DATA

RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

A.M. NO. 08-1-16-SC January 22, 2008 Effectivity: February 2, 2008

WRIT OF HABEAS DATA A remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in the LIFE, LIBERTY OR SECURITY is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a PUBLIC OFFICIAL or EMPLOYEE, or of PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL or ENTITY engaged in gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (Section. 1) The writ in general is designed to safeguard individual freedom from the abuse in the information age by means of an individual complaint presented in a constitutional court. Specifically, it protects the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of a person. (The Philippine Supreme Courts bulletin) Please see Appendix B for Justice Punos speech on habeas data

HABEAS DATA VIS--VIS Habeas data essentially allows families of victims of enforced disappearance to petition the courts to compel government and security officials to allow access to documents about the missing person. While amparo denies state officials the defense of denial with which they normally evade petitions for habeas corpus that families of missing persons file, and compels them instead to exert efforts to find these missing persons or face sanctions. (Festin, 2011)

The writ of habeas corpus cannot be invoked in labor disputes where there is no unlawful violation of the right to life, liberty, or security.
Meralco vs Lim, GR No. 184769, October 5, 2010

Facts: A letter was sent to the Meralco admin department in bulacan denouncing Lim, an administrative clerk. She was ordered to be transferred to Alabang due to concerns over her safety. She complained under the premise that the transfer was a denial of her due process. She wrote a letter stating that: It appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be [sic] highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all. She added, instead of the management supposedly extending favor to me, the net result and effect of management action would be a punitive one. She asked for deferment thereafter. Since the company didnt respond, she filed for a writ of habeas data in the Bulacan RTC due to meralcos omission of provding her with details about the report of the letter. To her, this constituted a violation of her liberty and security. She asked for disclosure of the data and measures for keeping the confidentiality of the data. Meralco filed a reply saying that the jurisdiction was with the NLRC and that the petition wasnt in order. Trial court ruled in her favor. In the SC, Meralco petitioned that Habeas Data applies to entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved partys person, family or home

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Issue: Is Habeas Data the right remedy for Lim? Held: No, petition dismissed Ratio: Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party Its a forum for enforcing ones right to the truth. Like amparo, habeas data was a response to killings and enforced disappearances. As decided in Castillo v Cruz, habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment is a property right in the due process clause. Lim was concerned with her employment, one that can be solved in the NLRC. There was no violation of respondents right to privacy. Respondent even said that the letters were mere jokes and even conceded the fact that the issue was labor related due to references to real intent of management.

Habeas data cannot be invoked when respondents in the petition or issuance of the writ are not gathering,collecting, or stroring data or information.
Castillo vs Cruz, GR No. 182165, November 25 2009 Facts: Amanda Cruz who, along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos , refused to vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan which intended to utilize it for local projects.The Province thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the Spouses Cruz before the then Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bulacan, Bulacan. The MTC rendered judgment against the Spouses Cruz, which judgment, following its affirmance by the RTC, became final and executory. The finality of the decision in the ejectment case notwithstanding, the spouses Cruz refused to vacate the property. They thereupon filed cases against the Province and the judges who presided over the case. The Spouses Cruz sought in the case for injunction the issuance of a permanent writ of injunction to prevent the execution of the final and executory judgment against them. The RTC, finding merit in the Spouses Cruzes allegation that subsequent events changed the situation of the parties to justify a suspension of the execution of the final and executory judgment, issued a permanent writ of injunction. Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however. Insisting that the RTCOrder of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of light threats. Respondents later filed a "Respectful Motion-Petition for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data," Issue: Whether or not RTC erred in granting the petittion for writ of amparo and habeas data Held: Yes, the cour erred in granting the motion. Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) From the above-quoted provisions, the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and security. And the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions. To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the acts complained of and its effect on respondents right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners entry into the property. Oddly, respondents also seek the issuance of a writ of habeas data when it is not even alleged that petitioners are gathering, collecting or storing data or information regarding their person, family, home and correspondence.

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WHO MAY FILE Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by: 1. Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party namely: the spouse, children and parents; or 2. Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in no.1. Unlike in amparo, human rights organizations or institutions are no longer allowed to file the petition. WHERE TO FILE 1. Regional Trial Court where the petitioner or respondent resides, or which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored at the option of the petitioner. 2. Supreme Court pr the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan when the action concerns public data files of government offices. (Section 3) WHERE RETURNABLE When issued by : 1. The RTC or any judge thereof returnable before such court or judge. 2. CA or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices before such court or any justice thereof,or to any RTC of the place where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored. 3. SC or any of its justices before such Court or any justice thereof, or before the CA of the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, or to any RTC of the place where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered,collected or stored.

The writ of habeas data shall be enforceable anywhere within the Philippines. No docket fees and other lawful fees shall be required from an indigent petitioner. (Section 5) A petition for a writ of habeas data must be verified.

CONTENTS OF THE PETITION 1. Personal circumstances of the petitioner and respondent; 2. The manner the right of privacy is violated or threatened; 3. Action and recourse taken by the petitioner to secure the date or information; 4. Location of the files, registers or database. the government office, person in charge, in possession and control of the data, if known; Habeas Data Page 4

5. reliefs prayed for; and 6. Other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable. ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The Clerck of Court shall issue the writ under under the seal of the court and cause it to be served within three (3) days from the issuance; or In case of urgent necessity, the justice or judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or person to serve it. the writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later than ten (10) working days from the date of its issuance.

RETURN Respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits within five (5) working days from service of the writ, which period may be reasonably extended by the Court for justifiable reasons. general denial of the allegations in the petition is not allowed.

CONTENTS OF RETURN 1. The lawful defenses such as national security, state secrets, privileged communication, confidentiality of the source of the information of media and others. 2. In case of respondent in charge, possession or control of the data or information subject to the petition: a) a disclosure of the data or information about the petitioner, the nature of such data or information, and the purpose for its collection. b) the steps of actions taken by the respondent to ensure the security and confidentiality of the data or information c) the currency and accuracy of the data or information held.

3. other allegations relevant to the resolution of the proceeding EFFECT OF FAILURE TO FILE A RETURN the court shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte, granting the petitioner such relief as the petition may warrant unless the court in its discretion requires the petitioner to submit evidence. making a false return,or refusing to make a return; or any person who otherwise disobeys or resists a lawful process or order of the court shall be punished by contempt.

DEFENSES AVAILABLE TO RESPONDENT Habeas Data Page 5

a) national security b) state secrets c) privileged communication d) confidentiality of the source of the information of media Hearing in chambers maybe conducted here the respondent invokes the above mentioned defenses. HEARING Summary in nature but the judge may call a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties. Being in the nature of summary proceedings, prohibited pleading and motion shall apply therein.

JUDGEMENT Court to render judgment within 10 days from the time the petition is submitted for decision.

GRANT OF WRIT vs. GRANT OF THE PRIVELEGE OF THE WRIT the grant of writ refers to the decision of the court to give due course to the petition, require respondents to file their return and set the petition for hearing. the grant of the privilege of the writ means that the petition is found meritorious, the prayers therein are granted and the petitioner is granted the relief sought.

RETURN OF SERVICE The officer who executed the judgment shall, within 3 days from its enforcement, make a verified return to the court.

CONTENTS OF THE RETURN OF SERVICE a) full statement of the proceedings under the writ; and b) complete inventory of the database or information or documents or articles inspected, updated, rectified, or deleted, with the copies served on the petitioner and respondent. c) statement by the officer how the judgment was enforced and complied with by the respondent; d) all the objections of the parties regarding the manner and regularity of the service of writ. APPEAL Within 5 days to appeal to the SC under Rule 45 and may raise questions of fact or law or both.

INSTITUTION OF SEPARATE ACTIONS Habeas Data Page 6

Filing of a petition for the writ of habeas data shall not preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative actions. Consolidation: 1. When a criminal action is file subsequent to the filing of petition for the writ, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action 2. When the criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a petition for a writ of habeas data, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action.

After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to govern the disposition of the reliefs in the petition. When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. the relief under the writ shall be available to an aggrieved party by motion in the criminal case. the procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition f the releifs available under the writ of habeas data.

DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IN HABEAS DATA PROCEEDINGS Although originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the command responsibility doctrine has also found application in civil cases for human rights abuses. This development in the use of command responsibility in civil proceedings shows that the application of this doctrinehas been liberally extended even to cases not criminal in nature. Thus, the doctrine may likewise find application in proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of habeas data.

Rodriguez vs Arroyo, et al., GR No. 191805 November 15,2011

Facts: Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).He claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. On September 6, 2009 at 5 pm, four men forcibly took him and forced him into a car. Inside the vehicle were several men in civilian clothes, one of whom was holding a . 45 caliber pistol.The men, whom he later found out to be soldiers of the 17th Infantry Batallion forced Rodriguez to confess to being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA). During the course of his detention he suffered torture. On 13 September 2009, the soldiers forced Rodriguez to sign documents declaring that he had surrendered in an encounter in Cumao, and that the soldiers did not shoot him because he became a military asset in May. When he refused to sign the document, he received another beating. Thus, he was compelled to sign, but did so using a different signature to show that he was merely coerced. The soldiers then wrote something on the paper, making it appear that he was the one who had written it, and forced him to sign the document. The soldiers took photographs of him while he was signing. Upon his release, he reached his house in Sta. Ana, Manila at 3:00 a.m. on 18 September 2010. Soldiers went inside the house, and took photographs and a video footage thereof. The soldiers explained that the photos and videos would serve as

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evidence of the fact that Rodriguez and his family were able to arrive home safely. Despite Rodriguezs efforts to confront the soldiers about their acts, they still continued and only left thirty minutes later. On 7 December 2009, Rodriguez filed for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties among the petition prayed were: (1) Ordering respondents to produce documents submitted to them regarding any report on Rodriguez, including operation reports and provost marshall reports of the 5th Infantry Division, the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), prior to, on and subsequent to 6 September 2009; and (2) Ordering records pertinent or in any way connected to Rodriguez, which are in the custody of respondents, to be expunged, disabused, and forever barred from being used. On 15 December 2009, the Supreme Court granted the respective writs after finding that the petition sufficiently alleged that Rodriguez had been abducted, tortured and later released by members of the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army. Respondents were ordered to file a verified return on the writs and to comment on the petition. Respondents averred that petitioner had not presented any adequate and competent evidence, much less substantial evidence, to establish his claim that public respondents had violated, were violating or threatening to violate his rights to life, liberty and security, as well as his right to privacy. Hence, he was not entitled to the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data or to the corresponding interim reliefs (i.e. inspection order, production order and temporary protection order) provided under the rule on the writ of amparo and the rule on the writ of habeas data. Issue/s: 1. Whether the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted after the writs of amparo and habeas data have already been issued in his favour. 2. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data cases. Held: It must be emphasized that the writs of amparo and habeas data were promulgated to ensure the protection of the peoples rights to life, liberty and security. The rules on these writs were issued in light of the alarming prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a persons right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. As an independent and summary remedy to protect the right to privacy especially the right to informational privacy the proceedings for the issuance of the writ of habeas data does not entail any finding of criminal, civil or administrative culpability. If the allegations in the petition are proven through substantial evidence, then the Court may (a) grant access to the database or information; (b) enjoin the act complained of; or (c) in case the database or information contains erroneous data or information, order its deletion, destruction or rectification. 1.) No. Rodriguez was successful in proving through substantial evidence that respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Brig. Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, and Lt. Col. Mina were responsible and accountable for the violation of Rodriguezs rights to life, liberty and security on the basis of (a) his abduction, detention and torture from 6 September to 17 September 2009, and (b) the lack of any fair and effective official investigation as to his allegations. Thus, the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data must be granted in his favor. As a result, there is no longer any need to issue a temporary protection order, as the privilege of these writs already has the effect of enjoining respondents in G.R. No. 191805 from violating his rights to life, liberty and security. 2.) No. Rodriguez fails to prove through substantial evidence that former President Arroyo is responsible or accountable for his abduction. Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that on the basis of the Melo Commission and

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the Alston Report, respondents in G.R. No. 191805 already had knowledge of and information on, and should have known that a climate of enforced disappearances had been perpetrated on members of the NPA. Without even attaching, or at the very least, quoting these reports, Rodriguez contends that the Melo Report points to rogue military men as the perpetrators. While the Alston Report states that there is a policy allowing enforced disappearances and pins the blame on the President. Aside from Rodriguezs general averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establish the President's responsibility or accountability for his abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that she should have known about the violation of his right to life, liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent it.

APPENDIX A

RELATED CASES ON HABEAS DATA

DANIEL TAPUZ vs. HON. JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO (sps. Sanson) G.R. No. 182484 June 17, 2008
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and issuance of the Writ of Amparo and the Writ of Habeas Data filed by the petitioners and posit as well that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint for forcible entry. That Tupaz et. al., came in the morning of April 16, 2006, in to the property of the spouses armed with bolos and suspected firearms, with force and intimidation, took possession of the disputed property and built a nipa and bamboo structure. The Spouses Sanson then, filed a complaint before the MCTC of Baruanga-Malay, Aklan for forcible entry with damages against the Tupaz and allege that they own the 1 hectare of land as evidenced by the TCT in their name. The MCTC ruled in favor of the Sansons, finding that the latter had previous possession of the disputed land since1993 up to the time the land was taken. On appeal, the RTC granted the decision of the MCTC and issued a writ of demolition against herein petitioner. Petitioner therefore, filed for a motion for reconsideration but was subsequently denied. The case was elevated to the CA through Rule 42, to have the Injunction and Writ of Demolition reviewed. While in the CA, the sheriff served the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition to Tupaz. Thus, came before the SC praying for three (3) remedies: Certiorari under Rule 65, the issuance of the writ of Habeas Data and the issuance of the writ of Amparo. ISSUE: Whether or not the Writ of Amparo and Writ of Habeas Data may be issued?

HELD: The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or

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threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules. That the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefore are vague or doubtful. Petition is DENIED.

MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA vs. P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the PNPProvincial Director of Ilocos Norte, and P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his capacity as Chief, Intelligence Division, PNP Provincial Office, Ilocos Norte GR No. 193636 July 24, 2012 FACTS: The present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa (Gamboa) was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. Meanwhile, respondent Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was the Officer-in-Charge, and respondent Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.) William O. Fang was the Chief of the Provincial Investigation and Detective Management Branch, both of the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial Office. On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275). The body, which was later on referred to as the Zearosa Commission, was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them permanently in the future. Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNPIlocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG. Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNPIlocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zearosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Reports enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs. On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the portion of the Report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG. Gamboa averred that her association with a PAG also appeared on print media. Thus, she was publicly tagged as someone who maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified information that the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded to the Zearosa Commission. As a result, she claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the enumeration of personalities maintaining a PAG as published in the Report also made her, as well as her supporters and other people identified with her, susceptible to harassment and police surveillance operations. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte. In her Petition, she prayed for the following reliefs: (a) destruction of the unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos Norte database; (b) withdrawal of all information forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c) rectification of the damage done to her honor; (d) ordering respondents to refrain from forwarding unverified reports against her; and (e) restraining respondents from making baseless reports. Despite the foregoing findings, RTC nevertheless dismissed the Petition on the ground that Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not Writ of habeas data may be granted. HELD:

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No. The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a persons right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads: Habeas data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. The notion of informational privacy is still developing in Philippine law and jurisprudence. Considering that even the Latin American habeas data, on which our own Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is rooted, finds its origins from the European tradition of data protection, this Court can be guided by cases on the protection of personal data decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Of particular note is Leander v. Sweden, in which the ECHR balanced the right of citizens to be free from interference in their private affairs with the right of the state to protect its national security. Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a specific component of the right to privacy, may yield to an overriding legitimate state interest. In similar fashion, the determination of whether the privilege of the writ of habeas data, being an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this case entails a delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion upon the private life of Gamboa and the relevant state interest involved. The collection and forwarding of information by the PNP vis--vis the interest of the state to dismantle private armies. The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority. It also provides for the establishment of one police force that is national in scope and civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national police commission. Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently. To enable the Zearosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it with the powers of an investigative body, including the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation and use compulsory processes to produce documents, books, and records. A.O. 275 likewise authorized the Zearosa Commission to deputize the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, the PNP, and any other law enforcement agency to assist the commission in the performance of its functions. Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is empowered by law to (a) enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the protection of lives and properties; (b) maintain peace and order and take all necessary steps to ensure public safety; and (c) investigate and prevent crimes. Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers and functions accorded to the Zearosa Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities. One of those individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa. This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court,

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however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zearosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zearosa Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the formers mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the latter. Following the pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander, the fact that the PNP released information to the Zearosa Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and investigation. Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system, which was used to update information on individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored the situation on the field. Thus, safeguards were put in place to make sure that the information collected maintained its integrity and accuracy. Pending the enactment of legislation on data protection, this Court declines to make any further determination as to the propriety of sharing information during specific stages of intelligence gathering. To do otherwise would supplant the discretion of investigative bodies in the accomplishment of their functions, resulting in an undue encroachment on their competence. However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection established in existing law and jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless deems it necessary to caution these investigating entities that information-sharing must observe strict confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must be released exclusively to the authorities empowered to receive the relevant information. After all, inherent to the right to privacy is the freedom from "unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities." In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized its confidential nature. That it was leaked to third parties and the media was regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were responsible for this unintended disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to her reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and improper. Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome. It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. In re: Melissa Roxas GR No. 189155 September 7, 2010 Petitioner Roxas is an American citizen of Filipino descent. While in the United States, petitioner enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member. On April of 2009, she volunteered to join members of BAYAN-Tarlac in Habeas Data Page 12

conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical mission. After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her companions, Juanito Carabeo (Carabeo) and John Edward Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to rest in the house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo (Mr. Paolo) in Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac. At around 1:30 in the afternoon, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged inside and ordered petitioner and her companions to lie on the ground face down. The armed men were all in civilian clothes and, with the exception of their leader, were also wearing bonnets to conceal their faces. What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with torture. From there, she could hear the sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes taking off and landing and some construction bustle. She inferred that she was taken to the military camp of Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija. The thrust of the interrogations was to convince petitioner to abandon her communist beliefs in favor of returning to "the fold." The torture, on the other hand, consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and suffocating the petitioner. Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to learn the names of three of her interrogators who introduced themselves to her as "Dex," "James" and "RC."29 "RC" even told petitioner that those who tortured her came from the "Special Operations Group," and that she was abducted because her name is included in the "Order of Battle." On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncles house in Quezon City. But petitioner continued to receive calls from RC via the cellular phone given to her. Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppression of any existing government files or records linking her to the communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data by enjoining the public respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioners "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture." military and police hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it was government agents who were behind her abduction and torture. Petitioner likewise included in her suit "Rose," "Dex" and "RC". Issue: Whether or not the petitioner should be granted the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Held: The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals. The writ operates to protect a persons right to control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to do. The main problem is that there is actually no evidence on record that shows that any of the public respondents had violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public respondents that would have violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner, i.e., keeping Habeas Data Page 13

records of investigations and other reports about the petitioners ties with the CPPNPA, was not adequately provenconsidering that the origin of such records were virtually unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the appellate court from the video and photograph released by Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press conference. No evidence on record even shows that any of the public respondents had access to such video or photograph.

APPENDIX B
The Common Right to Privacy* by Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno Supreme Court I. INTRODUCTION The writ of habeas data finds its justification on the right to privacy. Allow me therefore to deal very briefly about the right to privacy. The right to privacy is a right inherent in human beings. From the dawn of time when man lived in what Thomas Hobbes called, the State of Nature where the individual was lawmaker, law enforcer and law interpreter of the laws of naturethe right to be let alone existed not as a claim but as part of the naturalorder. John Locke argued that thisnatural condition of mankind is what would exist if there were no government, no laws, and no common power to restrain human nature. The state of nature is a war of all against all, in which human beings constantlyseek to destroy each other in an incessant pursuit for self-advancement and power. Hence, when human beings formed societies and entered intosocial contractsthe first provision that the individual consented to is thathe or she shall live with others, and hence, shall not live alone. The right to be let alone was voluntarily curtailed in exchange for living in a common society governed by common laws that protect life, liberty and property. But the right to privacy, the right to be let alone was not completely surrendered. Even during thereign ofabsolutist regimes, the right was recognized. The oft quoted ruling is:1 The King was powerful; he was clothed with majesty; his will was the law, but, with few exceptions, the humblest citizen or subject might shut the door of his humble cottage in the face of the monarch and defend his intrusion into that privacy which was regarded as sacred as any of the kingly prerogatives2 Hence, civilization evolved but alwaysthere was the effort to find the delicate balance between the public sphere, on the one hand, where the individual is in communal activity, and the private sphere on the other, where the individual may pursue his path to individuation. II. US HISTORY

1 2

U.S. v. Arceo, 3 Phil. 381 (1904). Id. at 384.

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At this juncture, let us take a sideglance at the United States where the right to privacy has had more time to evolve. Though the right to privacy is not a right found in the text of the United StatesConstitution, it has been recognized as an inherent limitation in the governments ability to regulate the conduct of its citizens. As held by the US Supreme Court in the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, [the] right to privacy [is] older than the Bill of Rights -- older than our political parties.3 The Court then held that the right to privacy was a fundamental right under the Constitution and it came from penumbras of the Bill of Rights through the First, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments.4 According to current US jurisprudence, the constitutional right to privacy has three strands: (1) locational (or situational) privacy, (2) informational privacy, and (3) decisional privacy. Locational or situational privacyis the easiest and least controversial of the three. Locational privacy refers to the privacy that is felt in a physical space, such as that which may be violated by trespass and unwarranted search and seizure. Informational privacyis usually defined as the right of individuals to control information about themselves.5This includes the control over the processing, acquisition, disclosure and use of personal information. 6Informational privacy draws primarily upon the tort law of privacy. Decisional privacyis usually defined as the right of individuals to make certain kinds of fundamental choices with respect to their personal and reproductive autonomy. Among the three strands of privacy, decisional privacy, or the constitutional protection [for] personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education, has been the most controversial. Within this strand, the Court has found constitutional rights of minors to obtain contraception without parental consent,7of adults to possess obscene materials,8 of women to obtain abortions,9and of all individuals to engage in acts historically characterized as deviate sexual intercourse.10 Let me now advert briefly to --III. THE PHILIPPINE LAWS ON PRIVACY A. Privacy in the Constitution

3 4

Id. at 489. Id. at 484-485. 5 See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, MARC ROTENBERG & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW (2d ed. 2005); RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW (2d ed. 2001). 6 See William L. Prosser, Privacy,48 Cal. L. Rev. 382, 389 (1960); Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions,50 STAN. L. REV., 1193-1202-02 (1998) 7 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 8 Stanley v. Ga., 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969). 9 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 10 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see alsoLaurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" that Dare Not Speak Its Name,117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1896-97 (2004)

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The right is entrenched in Article III of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines contains the Bill of Rights. Section 2 provides that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable xxx. It is also embedded in Section 3(1) which states that the privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.11 B. Privacy in the Laws Aside from the Constitution, our laws protect privacy. The Civil Code of the Philippines states that [e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy, and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons.12 Also, Article 32(11) of the Civil Codestates that any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs x x x the privacy of communication and correspondence x x x shall be liable to the latter for damages. The Anti-Wiretapping Act13guarantees a reasonable expectation of privacy in ones conversations over electronic means. Bank records are protected by the Bank Secrecy Act14and the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act.15The Act provides that deposits with banks or banking institutions are confidential and may not be examined, inquired, or looked into absent exceptional circumstances. C. Privacy in Judicial Decisions Similarly decisions of our Supreme Court recognize the right to privacy. In Morfe v. Mutuc 16the Supreme Court had the occasion to rule on the existence of the right to privacy, despite dismissing the action for declaratory judgment challenging the validity of the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019). Morferecognized the constitutional right to privacy as laid down in Griswold v. Connecticut.17 Let me now go to --IV. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS In other countries, privacy protection has become an impetus for modern laws that protect data and information. The United Kingdom has promulgated their Data Protection Act of 1998and Australia has promulgated their Privacy Act of 1988.

11

1987 PHIL. CONST. art. III, 3(1)

12

CIVIL CODE, art. 26.

13

Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication and for Other Purposes, Republic Act No. 4200, promulgated June 19, 1965.
14

Bank Secrecy Act, Republic Act No.7653.

15

Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, Republic Act No. 1405. Morfe v. Mutuc, 130 Phil. 415 (1968). See Griswold, supra note 4. Page 16

16

17

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Today, all member countries of the European Union are required to legislate to ensure that citizens have a right to privacy, through the regional governing bodys. The Philippines has an outdated law on data transfer, i.e., Presidential Decree No. 1718 entitled Providing For Incentives In The Pursuit of Economic Development Programs By Restricting The Use of Documents and Information Vital To The National Interest in Certain Proceedings and Processes.Broadly, P.D. 1718 prohibits the export of all documents and information from the Philippines to other countries that may adversely affect the interests of Philippine corporations, individuals, or government agencies. P.D. 1718 contains exceptions for exportation of information that are a matter of form, in connection with business transactions or negotiations that require them, in compliance with international agreements, or made pursuant to authority granted by the designated representative of the President. This law, however, cannot be implemented because of lack of rules and regulations in its enforcement. Finally, allow me now to discuss --V. THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA AND INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY The writ of habeas data has a very short history.18The direct predecessor of the writ of habeas data is the Council of Europes 108thConvention on Data Protection of 1981.A comparative law scholar has described habeas data as a procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age.19 The European Data Protection Convention of 1981 was convened to develop safeguards to secure the privacy of the individual by way of regulating the processing of personal information or data. Habeas data was initially developed in the early 1980 Europe, where countries like Germany founded its use upon the constitutional recognition of the right to individual self-determination. In Latin American countries, the action of habeas datawas used to investigate human rights violations committed during past military dictatorships in the Western Hemisphere. Family members of disappeared persons resorted to actions for habeas datato obtain information concerning government conduct, to learn the fate of disappeared persons, and to exact accountability. Thus, these actions constitute important means to guarantee the right to informational privacy and to enhance the right to truth. The basic attribute of informational privacy is the right of individuals to control the flow of information involving them. To deprive individuals of their power to control or determine withwhom to share information of their personal data would negatetheir right to their own personhood. The essence of the right to informational privacy goes to the very heart of a person's individuality, an exclusive and personal sphere upon which the state has no right to intrude absent any compelling interest. As the erosion of personal privacy by computer technology and advanced information systems accelerates, the individual's ability to control their use diminishes. There is therefore a pressingneed to provide for judicial remedies that would allow the summary hearing of the unlawful use of data or information and to remedy possible violations of the right to privacy. What do we see in the future?
18

See Andres Guadamuz, Habeas Data and the European Data Protection Directive, in THE JOURNAL OF INFORMATION, LAW AND TECHNOLOGY (JILT) (2001).
19

ENRIQUE FALCON, HABEAS DATA: CONCEPTO Y PROCEDIMIENTO 23 (1996) (translation provided).

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VI. FUTURE TRENDS A. Computerization and Technology A hundred years ago, it was the rightover locational or situational privacy which was debated. The rightto a physical space became the hotbed of constitutional and tort law controversies. The turn of this century has given us a new field of battle in the right to privacythe intangible world called the Internet and the regional areas created by networks. Computer technology has advanced rapidly with the global Internet system.20The computer systems tend to intrude upon privacy, as they can handle personal information by disseminating evidence of present and past actions or associations, even without the individuals consent. There is also the probability of introducing inaccurate information over which the individual has no control.21 Technology has developed rapidly thatones presence may be monitored and catalogued just by a press ofthe palm, or the finger within the blink of an eye. These technologies, called biometric technologies, create a profile of persons in the workplace orin the public database depicting the habits of a person. The use of biometric technologiesis on the rise in the Philippines. Since March of 1996, private companies and government agencies have adopted fingerscan technologies inapplications ranging from time management and payroll systems tosecurity access control. Many companies use the technology primarily to reduce fraudulent time card punching. Other uses of biometric technology in the Philippines include the dispensation of health care and social services; privacy systems for database and records protection; travel securitysystems with passport, ticket, and baggage verification; business, residence, and vehicle security with access and operator authentication; processing and circulation control in the corrections or prison environment; and portable systems for on-scene recognition of individuals for use in law enforcement. National ID proposals also typically include fingerprints as part of the information available on the ID card. As with all technologies, this may be prone to abuse and misuse. B. Public Records Without doubt,computerization of government public records has made information easier to access. Manystates consider driver's licensing files to be public records. Driving records generally contain the individual's full name, birth date, and address. Somecountries even use an individual's Social Security number as the license number. In addition, voter registration, property records, and many court records are readily available. Beth Givens, director of the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, has warned that, [w]hen bits and pieces of information are gatheredfrom several sources, the brevity of some of those pieces can be misleading.22
20

Coquia, supranote 44, at 215. See also Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1633 (1999).
21

Id.

22

Beth Givens, Public Records in a Computerized Network Environment: Privacy Implications, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse First Amendment Coalition Conference, at http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/speech1.htm (Sept. 23, 1995) (last visited Feb. 1, Habeas Data Page 18

When compiling the bits and pieces of information from various publicrecords, the accumulated data may be sorted in many different ways to essentially create new records, which may be used for any range of reasonsbeyond the original public policy reason for collecting them.23 C. Commercial Information Systems Banks, telemarketers, credit card companies, and many other private companies also store information over their clients.Again, these information may be subject to misuse. Computers have enhanced the ability of individuals and companies to collect, store, organize, and disseminate information rapidly and with great ease. The government and the private sector use computers to collect personal information. Computers have created new ways to combine information, thus enabling the companies to create profiles of almost every individual. These profiles are easily transferable from one person or company to another and have become valuable commodities. In the United States, identity thefthas become a real problem.24 Identity theft is among the fastest growing financial crimes in America with more than 500,000 victims each year.25 Identity theft occurs when an individual appropriates another's name, address, Social Security number, or other identifying information to commit fraud.26 It is very easy for criminals to obtain personal information. In public places, identity thieves may watch you at the automatic teller machine (ATM) as you punch in the personal identification number or they may listen to telephone conversations for a credit card number.27 Some identity thieves may even go through the trash to obtain records that revealyour name, address, and telephone number.28 The increased use of computers has enabled the Internet to become a valuable source for identity thieves. The Internet is a tool that has made it easier and cheaper to access dataon just about anyone. Identity theft is a violation of the right to informational privacy and may cause one to become burdened by the wrongful use of his personal information. Credit bureaus, the computerization of public records, and information brokershave also made it easier to obtain personal information. Credit bureaus provide credit reports, often including one's name, birth date, Social Security number, address, credit accounts and other public record information to credit grantors in an effort to help in determining whether to approve a loan.29 2008).
23 24

id., Lynn M. LoPucki, Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft Problem, 80 TEX. L. REV. 89, 89 (2001). 25 Julia C. Schiller, Informational Privacy v. Commercial Speech Doctrine, 11 CommLaw Conspectus 349, 354 (2003) citingIdentity Theft and Pretext Calling, OCC Advisory Letter, AL 2001-4, (Apr. 30, 2001). 26 id 27 id at 355 28 id at 354 29 id

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These and more, provide real dangers nowadays to ones informational privacy and ones right to life, liberty and security. CONCLUSION To end, it may be wise to remember the words of Justice Brandeis, who had the foresight to argue for the judicial recognition of the right to privacy. In his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. U.S. (which would later become the majority opinion in Katz v. U.S.), Justice Brandeis wrote: The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.30 Justice Brandeis also offered a reminder about governmental abuse of power that has special salience today: Experience should teach us to bemost on our guard to protect liberty when the government'spurposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.31 The writ of habeas datawas promulgated to protect the right to informational privacy. The writ of habeasdata is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.32 The promulgation of the writ of habeas datais but a small step to protect informational privacy of the Filipino individual. More needs to be done. Thank you and good day to all.

30 31

Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) id., at 479 32 1, Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data, A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, promulgated January 22, 2008, effective February 2, 2008

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