Balance of Power: Political
perceived by both as covering the world as a whole.
The smallest power advantage obtained by the one
had to be compensated by the other.
In the post Cold War world regional balances
became more important. In South East Asia, for
example, the members of ASEAN had transformed
their economic cooperation in a security alliance
directed to what they saw as the hegemonic ambitions
of Vietnam, demonstrated by Vietnam’s intervention
and occupation of Cambodia. Recently Vietnam
joined ASEAN because of an unspoken common
interest in balancing China’s possible bid for he-
gemony in the region. American foreign policy has
been constantly concerned with regional balances of
power, in Europe, but also in East Asia and the Middle
East.
6. Conclusion: A Permanent Feature of
International Politics?
Since the Congress of Vienna all attempts to create an
international order were based on an extension of
balance of power policy. The exception was the League
of Nations. But its impotence can be explained by the
neglect of balance of power considerations and over-
estimation of the effectiveness of the all against one
requirement of punishing an aggressor, especially if
that were a Great Power.
After 1991, the United States was the only global
Great Power left. It is not likely that it will remain so
indefinitely. Potential challengers, such as China or
the European Union, are already there, even though
still much too weak. Will balance of power policy
become relevant again in the future? As long as a
monopoly of violence at the international level does
not come into being, balance of power policy may
well remain relevant.
See also: First World War, The; International Law
and Treaties; International Organization; Interna-
tional Relations, History of; Military History; Peace-
making in History; Second World War, The; Warfare
in History
Bibliography
Carr E H 1946 The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939. Macmillan,
London
Elias N 1982 The Ci
ilising Process, Vol. II: State Formation and
Ci
ilization. Basil Blackwell, Oxford
Gulick E V 1955 Europe’s Classical Balance of Power: A Case
History of One of the Great Concepts of European Statecraft.
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY
Kant I 1957 Perpetual Peace. Bobbs Merril, New York
Kautilya 1992 The Arthasastra. Rangarajan L N (ed.) Penguin
Books, New Delhi, India
Kissinger H A 1957 A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh
and the Problems of Peace. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, MA
Meinecke F 1929 Die Idee der Staatsraison in der neueren
Geschichte. Oldenbourg, Munich, Germany
Nicholson H 1947 The Congress of Vienna. Phoenix Publishing,
Bern, Switzerland
van Benthem van den Bergh G 1992 The Nuclear Re
olution and
the End of the Cold War: Forced Restraint. Macmillan,
Houndmills, Basingstoke, UK
Vincent R J, Wright M (eds.) Special issue on the balance of
power. Re
iew of International Studies 15(2)
Watson A 1992 The E
olution of International Society: A
Comparati
e Historical Analysis. Routledge, London
Wedgwood C V 1963 The Thirty Years War. Routledge,
London
G. van Benthem van den Bergh
Balance of Power: Political
As Kenneth Waltz has noted, ‘If there is any dis-
tinctively political theory of international politics,
balance-of-power theory is it. And yet one cannot find
a statement of the theory that is generally accepted’
(Waltz 1979, p. 117; for surveys of the meaning of
balance of power see Claude 1962, Haas 1953, Wight
1968, 1973). But cutting through the welter of possible
meanings and making a few simple and undemanding
assumptions leads to a conception that explains a
number of outcomes which, while familiar, cannot
otherwise be readily explained: no state has come to
dominate the international system; few wars are total;
losers rarely are divided up at the end of the war and
indeed are reintegrated into the international system;
small states, who do not have the resources to protect
themselves, usually survive. There is then a form of
stability in international politics. Although the fates of
individual units rise and fall, states and much of the
pattern of their interaction remain. The system is
never transformed from an anarchical into a hier-
archical one. (Note that this says nothing about
whether wars are more likely when power is evenly
distributed among the units or whether one state,
although not dominant, is clearly stonger than the
others (Kugler and Lemke 1996). Although those
engaged in this debate often frame it in terms of
balance of power, in fact the question is quite a
separate one.)
The outcomes will follow if four assumptions hold.
First, there must be several independent units. Second,
the units must want to survive. They can seek to
expand and indeed many usually will, but at minimum
they must want to maintain their independence. Third,
any unit must be willing to ally with any other on the
basis of calculations of interest, which means that
ideology and hatreds must not be strong enough to
prevent actors from working together when it is
necessary for them to do so. Fourth, war must be a
viable tool of statecraft. Under these conditions, the
1039
Balance of Power: Political
system will be preserved even as states press every
advantage, pay no attention to the common good,
adopt ruthless tactics, and expect others to behave the
same way. Put differently, states do not strive for
balance; the restraints are not internal in the sense of
each state believing that it should be restrained.
Rather, restraint and stability arise as ambition checks
ambition and self-interest counteracts self-interest.
The basic argument about how this happens is well
known, if contested. For any state to survive, none of
the others can be permitted to amass so much power
that it can dominate. Although states do not invariably
join the weaker side, if they are to safeguard their own
independence and security they must balance against
any actor that becomes excessively menacing. In a way
analogous to the operation of Adam Smith’s invisible
hand, the maintenance of the system is an unintended
consequence of states seeking to advance themselves,
not the product of their desire to protect the in-
ternational community or a preference for balance.
Balance is then maintained by negative feedback:
movement toward dominance calls up forces that put
dominance out of reach.
The theory obviously passes one important test in
that no state has been able to dominate the inter-
national system. But this is not definitive. Few have
tried: Napoleon, Hitler, perhaps the Kaiser and Louis
XIV. Although others may not have made the effort
because they anticipated that they would be blocked,
the small number of challenges must undermine our
confidence that the system could have been maintained
had there been more of them. Furthermore, although
the overall balance of power system has never failed,
local ones have. Not only have some countries come to
dominate their regions (this can perhaps be accom-
modated within the theory), but isolated systems have
fallen under the sway of one actor. While we consider
it natural for China to be unified, in fact for centuries
it consisted of independent states. Rome’s neighbors
did not unite to check its power, and the British
conquest of India was also made possible by the failure
of a local balance. But these cases were still geo-
graphically limited and did not produce a world
empire and bring international politics to an end.
The other restraints and puzzles mentioned earlier—
the fact that few wars become total and that losers and
small states are not divided up—also follow from the
dictates of self-interest within the constraints imposed
by the anarchical system. Since any state can ally with
any other, states do not have permanent friends and
enemies. Because today’s adversary may be tomor-
row’s ally, crippling it would be foolish. Furthermore,
while the state would gain territory and wealth from
dividing up the loser, others might gain even more,
thus putting the state at a disadvantage in subsequent
conflicts.
The knowledge that allies and enemies are not
permanent and the expectation that losers will be
treated relatively generously reinforce one another.
1040
Because the members of the winning coalition know
that it is not likely to remain together after the war,
each has to fear accretions to the power of its allies.
Because winners know that they are not likely to be
able to dismember the loser, why should they prolong
the war? Each state’s knowledge that its allies have
reason to contemplate a separate peace provides it
with further incentives to move quickly. The result,
then, is a relatively moderate outcome not despite but
because of the fear and greed of the individual states.
This is one reason why international wars are much
more likely to end in negotiated settlements than civil
wars (Licklider 1993).
There is something wrong with this picture, how-
ever. Wars against hegemons can become total, losers
sometimes are divided up, and the postwar relations
among states are often very different from those
prevailing previously (Jervis 1985). The reason is that
a long and bitter war against the hegemon undermines
the assumptions necessary for the operation of the
balance. States are likely to come to believe that wars
are so destructive that they cannot be a normal
instrument of statecraft and to see the hegemon as
inherently evil and aggressive, which means that it is
not a fit alliance partner and the winning coalition
must stay together. As a result, wartime allies are not
regarded as being as much of a potential threat as
balance of power reasoning would lead us to expect.
Postwar politics may then be unusually moderate and
a concert system may evolve in which the states
positively value the system, develop longer-run con-
ceptions of their self-interests, and forego competitive
gains in the expectation that others will reciprocate.
Ironically, then, a war against a would-be hegemon
that epitomizes the operation of the balance of power
is likely to produce a system in which the actors
consciously moderate their behavior and restrain
themselves.
1. An Alternati
e View
The model of the balance of power presented here is
clearly a version of systems theory in that it sees a
radical separation between intentions and outcomes.
An alternative view of the balance of power that sees
more congruence is summarized by Edward Gulick
when he says that ‘balance-of-power theory demanded
restraint, abnegation, and the denial of immediate self-
interest’ (Gulick 1955, p. 33). Morton Kaplan’s
conception of the balance of power similarly posits
internalized moderation as two of his six rules call for
self-restraint: ‘stop fighting rather than eliminate an
essential national actor,’ and ‘permit defeated or
constrained essential national actors to re-enter the
system as acceptable role partners’ (Kaplan 1957, p.
23). For Kaplan, these rules not only describe how
states behave, they consciously guide statesmen’s
actions. In contrast to the version of balancing

discussed earlier, Kaplan points out that in his
computer model, ‘if actors do not take system stability
requirements into account, a ‘‘balance of power’’
system will be stable only if some extra systemic factor
… prevents a roll-up of the system’ (Kaplan 1979, p.
136). In other words, stability and restraint are not
likely unless the actors seek stability.
Here the system is preserved because states want to
preserve it and there is little conflict between a state’s
short-run and long-run interest. The two are harmon-
ized because the norms have been internalized through
socialization as the actors watch and interact with
their peers. Indeed, Paul Schroeder’s important study
of the transformation of European international poli-
tics caused by the Napoleonic wars stresses that stable
peace and the concert were produced not only by the
defeat of the aggressor, but also by the painful learning
that led the victors to understand that others’ interests
had to be respected, that smaller states could play a
valuable role, and that the eighteenth century practice
of compensation and indemnities led to endless cycles
of warfare (Schroeder 1994; also see Schroeder 1992
and Jervis 1992). But this view cannot readily explain
how the system can be maintained in the face of actors
who have interests in exploiting others’ moderation.
Nevertheless, it is certainly possible that states feel
internal restraints and that, if they do not, the system
will be torn apart by high levels of warfare. If the
proponents of the version of balance of power set forth
here draw on the analogy of Smith’s invisible hand,
critics can respond that unalloyed capitalism, like an
engine out of control, will produce so much un-
constrained energy that it will soon destroy itself. Just
as economic liberalism must be embedded in broader
societal norms if capitalism is to be compatible with a
well-functioning society (Polanyi 1944), perhaps the
pursuit of narrow self-interest can yield stability and a
modicum of productive peace only if it is bounded by
normative conceptions that limit predatory behavior.
2. Anticipation of the Operation of Balance of
Power
States may be restrained by the expectation that if they
are not, they will be faced with intense opposition.
These cases fall in between the two models discussed
above. Indeed, if the view of the balance as automatic
is correct it would be surprising if decision-makers
heedlessly sought to expand; awareness of the likely
feedback would lead them to be restrained even though
this impulse does not flow from internalized norms
and the desire to preserve the international order.
Much has been written about self-defeating expansion,
but we should not neglect the fact that leaders may be
inhibited by the anticipation of these processes. These
cases are literally countless—that is, they cannot be
counted because they do not leave traces in the
historical record. But perceptive leaders realize that
Balance of Power: Political
the balance of power makes it dangerous for their
countries to be too powerful. Edmund Burke made the
point eloquently at the end of the eighteenth century:
Among precautions against ambition, it may not be amiss to
take one precaution against our own. I must fairly say, I
dread our own power and our own ambition; I dread our
being too much dreaded. It is ridiculous to say we are not
men, and that, as men, we shall never wish to aggrandize
ourselves in some way or other. Can we say that even at this
hour we are not invidiously aggrandized? We are already in
possession of almost all the commerce of the world. Our
empire in India is an awful thing. If we should come to be in
a condition not only to have all this ascendant in commerce,
but to be absolutely able, without the least control, to hold
the commerce of all other nations totally dependent upon our
good pleasure, we may say that we shall not abuse this
astonishing and hitherto unheard-of power. But every other
nation will think we shall abuse it. It is impossible but that,
sooner or later, this stage of things must produce a com-
bination against us which may end in our ruin (quoted in
Morgenthau 1978, pp. 169–70).
Finally, if we think of balance of power in the
broadest sense of power checking power, these dy-
namics are built into the basic forms of domestic
politics. The American Constitution was built on the
concept of checks and balances because the founders
believed that potentially dangerous power could best
be tamed by countervailing power, to use the term that
Galbraith later applied to many aspects of American
political and economic life (Galbraith 1952). Other
aspects of domestic politics illustrate negative feed-
back as the unintended consequences of the pursuit of
narrower self-interest in a way even more analogous to
the automatic balance. Most obviously, it is hard for
any political party to gain a monopoly of power
because the competition can mount matching or
competing claims. If the political pendulum swings in
one direction, those losing influence usually will
increase their unity and activity.
See also: Alliances: Political; Diplomacy; First World
War, The; International Relations, History of; In-
ternational Relations: Theories; National Security
Studies and War Potential of Nations; Nations and
Nation-states in History; Peacemaking in History;
Realism\Neorealism; War: Causes and Patterns; War,
Sociology of; Warfare in History
Bibliography
Claude I 1962 Power and International Relations. Random
House, New York
Galbraith J K 1952 American Capitalism: The Concept of
Counter
ailing Power. Houghton Mifflin, Boston
Gulick E V 1955 Europe’s Classical Balance of Power. Cornell
University Press, Ithaca, NY
Haas E B 1953 The balance of power: prescription, concept or
propaganda. World Politics 5: 442–77
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Balance of Power: Political
Jervis R 1985 From balance to concert. World Politics 38: 58–79
Jervis R 1992 A political science perspective on the balance of
power and the concert. American Historical Re
iew 97: 716–24
Kaplan M A 1957 System and Process in International Politics.
Wiley, New York
Kaplan M A 1979 Towards Professionalism in International
Theory. Free Press, New York
Kugler J, Lemke D (eds.) 1996 Parity and War. University of
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI
Licklider R (ed.) 1993 Stopping the Killing: How Ci
il Wars
End. New York University Press, New York
Morgenthau H J 1978 Politics Among Nations, 5th edn. Rev.
Knopf, New York
Polanyi K 1944 The Great Transformation. Farrar & Rinehart,
New York
Schroeder P W 1992 Did the Vienna settlement rest on a balance
of power. American Historical Re
iew 97: 683–706
Schroeder P W 1994 The Transformation of European Politics,
1787–1848. Oxford University Press, New York
Waltz K N 1979 Theory of International Politics. Addison-
Wesley, Boston, MA
Waltz K N 1991 America as a model for the world? A foreign
policy perspective. PS: Political Science and Politics 24: 669
Waltz K N 1993 The emerging structure of international
politics. International Security 18: 44–79
Wight M 1968 The balance of power. In: Butterfield H (ed.)
Diplomatic In
estigations. Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, MA
Wight M 1973 The balance of power and international order. In:
James A (ed.) The Bases of International Order. Oxford
University Press, London
R. Jervis
Copyright # 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd.
All rights reserved.
Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy procedures are intended to provide an
efficient and fair mechanism for the reorganization or
liquidation of the assets of insolvent debtors. Debtors
include both individuals and business entities. A
second important objective of some bankruptcy pro-
cedures is the financial rehabilitation of overindebted
individuals. Rehabilitation sometimes includes dis-
charge of indebtedness.
1. Fair and Efficient Administration of Insol
ent
Estates
1.1 The Need for Bankruptcy
Reliance on the usual legal procedures to collect debts
from non-paying debtors can lead to inefficient and
unfair results when applied to an insolvent debtor.
When there are not enough assets to pay all creditors,
non-bankruptcy law commonly favors the creditor
who seizes and sells assets before other creditors do.
The resulting race to seize the debtor’s assets can lead
1042
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences
to inefficient dispositions of debtor’s assets. For
example, if a business is making a profit even while
insolvent, it may be more efficient to allow it to
continue to operate and pay debts from future profits,
yet competition between creditors can lead to sale of
assets that makes continued operation of the business
impossible (Jackson 1985). Competition between cred-
itors also leads to unnecessarily duplicative collection
activities. Many people also believe it is unfair to give
priority in the distribution of the limited assets of an
insolvent estate to the creditors who are the first to
initiate formal collection actions.
Bankruptcy procedures address each of these diffi-
culties. Once a bankruptcy proceeding is initiated,
unsecured creditors are automatically enjoined from
using non-bankruptcy collection procedures. In some
countries, secured creditors are similarly enjoined.
These injunctions eliminate duplicative collection ef-
forts and permit an orderly disposition of the debtor’s
assets. In bankruptcy, the debtor’s assets constitute a
bankruptcy estate, to be managed in the interests of
the estate’s beneficiaries, the creditors. When the
bankruptcy estate makes distributions, creditors with
similar contractual priorities are usually paid pro rata
according to the amount they are owed. Contractual
promises to subordinate or to privilege particular
creditors in the distribution of debtor’s assets (in-
cluding security agreements) are normally respected,
and a few creditors (e.g., tax creditors) receive priority
payments by statutory mandate. However, priorities
are not usually given to creditors who have initiated
collection activities before the bankruptcy filing.
1.2 Liquidation
s. Reorganization in Business
Bankruptcy
The assets of an insolvent business estate may be sold,
either as a unit or in separate parts, to the highest
bidder(s), which is called a liquidation. Alternatively,
the assets may be retained by an entity and operated as
a continuing business, which is called a reorganization.
In a liquidation, creditors are paid the proceeds of the
sale(s). In a reorganization, creditors are given secur-
ities (debt instruments and\or shares) in the new
reorganized entity, which represent rights in the future
income of the continuing business. Bankruptcy cred-
itors often have conflicting interests in the decision
whether to liquidate or reorganize an insolvent busi-
ness estate.
Creditors with contractual priority over other cred-
itors (including, most importantly, secured creditors)
usually prefer rapid liquidation if the anticipated
proceeds will pay them in full. Reorganization both
delays repayment and introduces an element of risk,
because the continuing business might lose money,
thus depriving these senior creditors of full payment.
This preference for liquidation exists even when
reorganization seems the better option from the
ISBN: 0-08-043076-7