University of Utah Western Political Science Association

Beyond Humanism: Gadamer, Althusser, and the Methodology of the Social Sciences Author(s): Susan Hekman Reviewed work(s): Source: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Mar., 1983), pp. 98-115 Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/447847 . Accessed: 21/12/2012 11:09
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BEYOND HUMANISM: THE METHODOLOGY

AND GADAMER, ALTHUSSER, OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

SUSAN HEKMAN

currently Although agree that the positivist(or behaviorist-empiricist) methodology provided a common basis for the social sciences in recentdecades, most would also agree that thisconsensus is a relic of the past. Furthermore, social and politicaltheorists particularwould mostlikely in contemporary share a commonassessmentof thispositivist methodology:thatithas been seriouslydiscreditedin contemporary methodologicaland philosophical discussions in the social sciences. Yet despite this general agreement continue to among theoriststhe majorityof practicingsocial scientists conduct research on the basis of the positivist methodology.This factis mostcommonlyexplained bypointingout thatalthoughsocial and political theorists social scienceis untenable,theyhave mayagree thatpositivist not been able to agree on itsreplacement.The net resultof thissituation, and thereason forthecharacterization the social sciencesas in a stateof of is a without theoretical anchor. crisis, thatthesocialsciencesare castadrift
POSITIVISM VS. HUMANISM

HAS the social ITare BECOME a somethingof a cliche'inmostsocialsciencesthatwe in stateofcrisis. scientists would

of University Texas at Arlington

In the process of discrediting positivist the methodologyin the social have not been remissin proposing sciences,social and politicaltheorists alternativesto positivism.A plethora of anti-positivist methodologies, which,forwant of a betterterm,can be placed under the broad label of "humanism," have been suggested in recent decades. The list includes criticaltheory,ordinarylanguage phenomenology,ethnomethodology, interactionism well as various offshoots these as of analysis,and symbolic positions.Although there are importantdifferences among these positions,theyshare a numberof common themes.On the mostfundamental levelthehumanists model ofscientific argue thatthe positivist knowledge, although perhaps appropriate forthe naturalsciences,is highly inapprothat the reason priate for the social sciences. They argue, furthermore, forthisis thatthe subjectmatter thesocial sciencesis radicallydifferent of fromthatof the natural sciences. The social sciences study"meaningful human action,"a subjectmatterthatcannot be apprehended by employing the techniques of the natural sciences. The humanist attack on positivistsocial sciences that characterizes contemporary discussions in the social sciences, however, is hardly new. Its roots go back at least to the nineteenthcentury'sheated debates over the proper methodology of the social sciences, the Methodenstreit. There are distinct parallels, for instance, between Weber's critique of Mill which figured prominently in the Methodenstreit Peter Winch's recent critique of positivistsocial sciand

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Humanism 99 Beyond ence. These parallels, however, are more disturbingthan reassuring. They suggest that the debate between humanism and positivism,instead of moving toward a satisfactory resolution, particularlyfor the social sciences,is instead provingto be unresolvable. The reason for the persistenceof the debate between positivism and humanismis notreadilyapparent. It would seem,on the faceof it,thatthe humanistsare offering clear alternativeto the positivist a approach that restson an entirely different But closer examinationshows epistemology. thisnotto be the case. Both humanists and positivists, turnsout, share a it fundamentalepistemologicalassumption: the opposition of subject and object. The essence of the positivist approach has been to emphasize the side of thisopposition.They claim thatthe goal of scientific investiobject gationis theaccumulationof "objectiveknowledge"freefromany taintof The humanists,on the other hand, have emphasized the subjectivity. subject side of the dichotomy.In the parlance of contemporaryphilosophy, what the humanists have effectedis the "deconstruction"of the objectof knowledgein the social sciences.That is, theyhave attemptedto showthatthebrute,"objective"factsthatprovidethe raw materialforthe positivist's production of knowledge simply do not exist in the social sciences.They argue, instead,thatthe subjectmatter the social sciences of is inherently action. "subjective"because it deals withmeaningful This epistemological perspective suggests both why the humanist and humanism critiquehas failedand whythe debate betweenpositivism has persisted:Positivism and humanismare, in essence, two sides of the same coin. This complementaryrelationship between positivismand humanism is increasingly coming to the attentionof social and political theorists.One of the pioneers in this line of thought,Michel Foucault, argues that instead of challenging the epistemological foundations of the on positivism humanistshave succeeded onlyin standingpositivism its head. Because theyhave failed to question the opposition of subject and the humanists object thatlies at the heart of the positivist epistemology, have, in effect,chosen one side of this opposition as their exclusive domain. The subjectivismfostered by humanism is, in this sense, the obverse of the objectivismof positivism.1 That the opposition between the objectivismof positivismand the subjectivismof humanism has created serious problems for the social sciencesshould be evidentfromrecenttheoretical discussionsin the social sciences. Schutzian phenomenologists, Wittgensteinianordinary lanand others in the humanist guage philosophers,ethnomethodologists, camp have presented eloquent and convincingarguments against the of These argumentshave, to a large extent,conobjectivism positivism. vinced the social scientific of communityof the futility looking for the "brute facts" defined by the early positivists. The arguments the humanistshave advanced for an alternativemethodologyfor the social sciences,however,have been farless successful.Their principaltactichas
See Dallmayr'sexcellentanalysisof thisthemein his recentTwilight Subjectivity. of Shapiro makes a similarargumentin Language and PoliticalUnderstanding.

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100 Western PoliticalQuarterly been to argue thatthe social scientist's first and primary taskis to describe social actionin theactor'sterms.Mostof thehumanistschools meaningful also argue thatthe social scientific can investigator and mustmove beyond this descriptivelevel, but these arguments have not been taken very seriously theirpositivist by opponents. Ignoringthe humanists'claim that are not limitedto the descriptivelevel, the positivists have argued they that the humanistposition restricts the social sciences to the "mere deof scription" social action. It followsthatthe social sciences are relegated to therealm of"subjectivity" because theyare excluded fromthe realm of charac"objective knowledge" that, for both humanist and positivist, terizesthe scientific realm. The positivist side of the debate, however,has also failed to presenta viable positionon the methodologyof the social sciences.Critiquesof the of objectivism the naive positivist position have resulted in increasingly sophisticated reformulationsof the positivistposition. The strongest themesof these reformulations that the social sciences,if they are, first, are to claim the status of a science, must define their data in objective termsand, second, thatthe social sciences must be able to move beyond the "mere description"of social action if theyare to avoid the relativism implicitin the humanistposition. Both of these themes have struckrehave been sponsive chords among social scientists.But the positivists unable to describe to theiropponents' satisfaction constitution the the of have been unable to offer objectivedata of thesocial sciencesand, further, an epistemologically for satisfactory justification thepurportedobjectivity of social scientific analysis. This assessmentof the stateof the debate points to two conclusions. of First,it suggeststhat in order to transcendthe sterility the on-going debate between positivismand humanism the validityof the positivist mustbe specifically definition epistemology challenged and the positivist of "scientific knowledge"called intoquestion. Second, itsuggeststhat,as a first step,itis necessaryto completethecritiqueof positivism begun bythe humanistsby"deconstructing" otherside of the subject-object the opposition:the knowingsubject.It is necessary, otherwords,to challenge the in epistemologicalprimacyof the knowingsubjectpresupposed bythe epistemologyof both positivismand humanism. The aim of the following theorists whose workis moving analysisis to examine twocontemporary in thesedirections. theorists Althoughtheyare nottheonlycontemporary to move beyond the humanistcritique of positivism, and although they stem from very different intellectualtraditions,Hans-Georg Gadamer and, to a lesser extent,Louis Althusserneverthelessexemplifywhat is entailed by this movement.2Both have succeeded in transcendingthe debate by moving to a new epistemological plane. humanist-positivist
2

It should be noted in thiscontext,however,thata school of thoughtfallingunder the label of "realism"has also challenged the validity the positivist of and extended epistemology theircritique to the social sciences. See Bhaskar (1971), Benton (1977), and Thomas has betweenthe realists (1980). In addition,at leastone theorist noted a strongsimilarity and Althusser'sposition (Scott, 1979: 327-40).

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Humanism 101 Beyond of They have done so, first, callingintoquestion the epistemology the by positivistmethodology that lays exclusive claim to the production of method. Sec"objectiveknowledge" throughadherence to the scientific ond, theyhave rejectedwhathas come to be the hallmarkof thehumanist role of the knowing human position: an emphasis on the constituting subject. The significance of the movement represented by the work of Gadamer and Althussercan best be explained by describing it in the epistemologicaltermsemployed above. It was statedthatboth positivists and humanists accept the opposition of subject and object, that both of accept thatthe object side of thisdichotomyis definitive the scientific realm, and that each focuses on an opposite side of this dichotomy. the Specifically positivists argue thatthe object side of the dichotomycan be apprehended a prioriand definethisapprehension as the acquisition of "brutefacts."The humanists, althoughtheydenytheexistenceof brute facts thesocial sciences,argue thatthe subjectside of thedichotomy in can be apprehended a prioriand definethisapprehension as the interpretationof meaningfulaction. Gadamer and Althusserdeny both these postulates by arguing that both subject and object are creationsof the conceptual scheme of the interpreter. They assert that neithercan be apa priori because neither subject nor object is a realitythat prehended exists prior to the conceptual scheme. Several importantconsequences followfromthis view. First,because Gadamer and Althusserreject the of oppositionof subjectand object theyalso rejectthe definition scientific method founded on it, a definitionaccepted by both positivistsand humanists.It followsthatbothavoid the humanists'problemofjustifying the scientific statusof the social sciences. But, secondly,and mostimportantly, movingthe social sciencesonto a new epistemologicalplane in by whichneithersubject nor object have a prioristatus,theyoffera way of the debate betweenpositivism and humanismthathas transcending futile created the currentcrisisin the social sciences. The purpose of the followingexamination of the work of Gadamer and Althusser to reveal,in more concreteterms, is how thistranscendence is accomplishedin each's theory. Because Gadamer attackstheproblemof the futility the positivist-humanist of debate mostdirectly, workoffers his a clearer understandingof the methodologicalimplications thismoveof ment than does that of Althusser. But, despite the superiority of Gadamer's approach in this regard, Althusser's position is worthyof serious attention a because, like Gadamer, he offers means of transcendand humanism. ing the impasse created by the opposition of positivism The philosophicaldifferences betweenthe two theorists also worthy is of note. The factthatGadamer and Althussershare certainepistemological assumptionsdespite theirverydifferent philosophicalroots suggeststhe of significance this movementfor the social sciences.
GADAMER

A. The critique theEnlightenment conception knowledge of of Gadamer's hermeneutics embodies two elements that are of for the methodologicalsignificance the social sciences: first, rejectionof

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PoliticalQuarterly 102 Western methoddeveloped in the the peculiar statusof theconceptionof scientific and humanists, and, and accepted by both positivists Enlightenment thatavoids refersecond, the developmentof a theoryof interpretation Both of thesepositionsare ence to the "subject"or "subjectiveintentions." hermeneutics developed in the extensivecritiqueof nineteenth-century whichoccupies Gadamer's attentionin Truth Method. and Before examining thiscritique,however,an initialproblem mustbe considered: the fact thatGadamer statesin quite unequivocal termsthathisaim isnotto offer a methodology for the social sciences. In the introductionto Truthand Methodhe statesthat his goal is, rather,to understand what the human sciences are and what connectsthem to the totality experience of the of world (1975:xiii). Thus he is not concerned withmethodperse but what lies behind method,a positionwhichrestson his definition hermeneuof ticsitself:"The hermeneuticalexperience is prior to all methodological alienationbecause it is the matrixout of whicharise the questions thatit thendirectsto science" (1976A: 26). Strictly speaking,then,an examinationof Gadamer's positionconsistsof an explorationof the methodological implications of his work rather than an explicit examination of "Gadamerian methodology." The key both to Gadamer's allegiance to nineteenth-century hermeneuticsand to his departure fromthis traditioncan be found in his definition objective,scientific of knowlcritique of the Enlightenment's edge. In summary,Gadamer's argument is that although Dilthey and Schleiermacher began this critique in the right direction, they left it unfinished.Gadamer sees his workas both a continuationof theirwork and, at a crucialjuncture,a significant departure fromit. The core of the definitionof knowledge is the identification "true," of Enlightenment's "exact," and "objective" knowledge with the product of the scientific the method,thatis,the methodof thenaturalsciences,and, furthermore, identification all deviationsfromthismodel as inexact and subjective. of The error of nineteenth-century on hermeneutics, Gadamer's account, was itsfailureto offer sufficiently a radical critiqueof thisposition.Even though Diltheyand Schleiermacherattemptedto formulatea methodology forthe human sciences in opposition to thatof the natural sciences, thisattemptwas a failurebecause implicit theirapproach is the accepin tance of thevalidity the Enlightenment's of definition objectiveknowlof Thus theycould not,as theyclaimed,offer distinctive a method for edge. the social sciences.What theirthoughtamounts to, on the contrary, an is intothe Enlightenment explicationof how the human sciencesfit conception of knowledge, either by mimickingthe objectivity the natural of sciences or by conceding the "subjectivity" the human sciences (1975: of 6-9). Given the magnitudeof the failureof nineteenth-century hermeneutics, it would seem that Gadamer would do well to abandon the hermeneuticaltradition altogetherin his search fora proper understanding of the human sciences. Gadamer's specificcriticisms these thinkers, of however,explain whyhe employstheirthoughtas a starting pointforhis own critiqueof the Enlightenment. What Gadamer sees to be thevalue of

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Humanism 103 Beyond this traditionis most evident in his examination of Dilthey. Dilthey's was contribution to advance the principlethatall understanding historiis callyconditioned.This principleformsthecore of Gadamer's approach to as hermeneutics well. But Dilthey'stheoryalso containstwofundamental errors. First,Dilthey presupposes that, in the process of historicalinhistorical observersoccupy an Archemedean pointvis-a-vis terpretation, thetext.He assumes,in otherwords,thatinterpreters overcometheir can own historicity offer "objective"analysisof a text.His second error an and is his assumption that historicalunderstandinginvolves"gettinginside the mind" of the author of the text,thatis, apprehending the subjective intentions its author (1975: 204ff). of In the processof correcting thesetwoerrorsin Dilthey'smethodology Gadamer develops the two themes that, it is being argued, are of methodological significancefor the social sciences. The firsttheme is developed in the context of an examination of the nature of historical understanding.The essence of Gadamer's argumentis the assertionthat Diltheydid not understand his own principlethatall understandingis historical.He failed to see that all understanding,withoutexception, necessarilyinvolves preconceptionsthat are a product of the historical setting.Gadamer definesthese preconceptionsas "prejudice." His argumentwithregard to prejudice is radical in itssimplicity: understandAll involvesprejudice and thusneither observernor observed, ingnecessarily textor interpreter be said to be freefromprejudice. Prejudice is not, can as theEnlightenment thinkers thatmustbe eliminated argued, something on the way to truth.Nor is it, as Dilthey thought,somethingthat the historical observercan sidestepin the processof interpretation. Rather,it is a positivepossibility the most primordialkind of knowing (1975: of 236). The basic principleof Gadamer's hermeneutics, then,is his provocativestatement thatthe attemptto remove all prejudice is itselfa prejudice (1975: 244). Both the Enlightenment and nineteenth-century hermeneutics failed to grasp the phenomenon of understanding because theyfailed to understand the necessityof prejudice. This correctionof Diltheyestablishestwo importantpoints: first, it establishesthatin the processof interpretation, as well as text interpreter are bound by prejudice, and, second, it reveals thatthe Enlightenment's definitionof truthas the eliminationof prejudice is erroneous. These pointsformthe basis of Gadamer's theoryof the phenomenon of underof standing.Understanding,he asserts,is the interplay the movementof the traditionand the movement of the interpreter.It is a dialectical process he compares to the dialecticof question and answer. And, most both elementsof the dialectic,the interpreter well as the as importantly, conditioned. text,are historically
At the beginning of all historicalhermeneutics,then, the abstractantithesisbetween traditionand historicalresearch, between historyand knowledge, must be discarded. The effectof a living traditionand the effectof historicalstudy must constitutea unity,the analysis of which would reveal only a textureof reciprocal relationships.(1975: 251.)

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104 Western PoliticalQuarterly It is important note at thispoint,however,thatGadamer phrases his to discussion of the necessityof prejudice in understanding in positive rather than negative terms. His point is not the negative one that we should resign ourselves to the necessityof prejudice. Rather, he insists that prejudice represents the productive possibility understanding. of textinvolvesbeing aware of the effect the of Understandinga historical text on the interpreter's own understanding of it. Understanding, in short,is reflexive;it involvesan openness to traditionthat permitsthe traditionto speak.3 What occurs in understandingGadamer labels the and the interpre"fusingof horizons."Both the textunder investigation ter of the text, he claims, have "horizons" of understanding that are conditioned.The processof interpretation does not,however, historically entailthattheinvestigator entersthe horizonof thetext.Rather,it simply involvesthe fusingof the two horizons into a distinctunit: The projecting thehistorical of is a then, only phaseintheprocess horizon, of understanding, does notbecomesolidified theself-alienation and into of a pastconsciousness, is overtaken our ownpresent but of horizon by In of there takesplacea real understanding. theprocess understanding of which means that thehistorical horizon projected, as is fusing horizons, itissimultaneously We the act removed. described conscious ofthis fusion as thetaskof theeffective-historical consciousness. (1975: 273-74.) This notion of what occurs in the phenomenon of understanding reveals the errorof the Enlightenment's of exclusive identification truth withthe scientific method'seliminationof prejudice. But to demonstrate that error and to suggest a model for the kind of truthsought in the human sciences Gadamer mustproduce an "experience of truth"thatis distinct fromthescientific methodyetindisputablein itself. This problem provides the contextforhis discussionof the aestheticexperience in the first sectionof Truth he and Method.Rhetorically asks: "Is there to be no knowledgein art?Does not the experience of art containa claim to truth whichis certainly different fromthatof science,but equallycertainly not is inferior it?(1975: 87.) Gadarner'sspecific to aim in thissectionis to rescue the aestheticexperience fromthe subjectivismto which Kant and subsequent Enlightenment thoughtrelinquishedit and, thus,to retrievethe notion of truthin art (1975: 88). More broadly, however,his goal is to reveal the fundamentalinadequacy of the scientific model of knowledge. Instrumental thislargergoal is his discovery an aspect of theexperito of ence of truth artthatcontradicts in thismodel. In theaesthetic experience the spectatoris an intimateand inseparable part of the process of knowmodel, however,the knoweris definedas aloof from ing. In the scientific that which is known (1975: 114-17). What Gadamer's analysis of the aestheticexperience suggests,then,is thatif the aestheticexperience is a valid experience of truthand if these elementsare valid componentsof
3

Gadamer expresses thisprinciplein the contextof his discussionof effective operative) (or historical consciousness (Wirkungsgeschichtliche Bewusstsein)."Effective history" he defines as the demonstrationof the effectivity historywithinunderstandingitself of (1975: 267).

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Humanism 105 Beyond that experience, then the fact that theycontradictthe scientific model entails that it does not, as its proponents claim, encompass all possible valid "kinds experiencesof truth.Rather,it suggeststhatother,perfectly of truth"are possible, both in aestheticsand in the human sciences. B. "Subjectless" and interpretation theroleoflanguage of Gadamer's thought that has methodological The second theme for significance the social sciencesconcernshis rejectionof the claim that involves"gettinginside the author's mind." This theme is interpretation mostcompletelydeveloped in his extensiveanalysisof language in Truth andMethod. The starting pointof thisanalysisis hisassertionthatlanguage is a universal phenomenon:
The phenomenon of understanding, then, shows the universalityof withinit - not human linguisticality a medium thatcarrieseverything as onlythe "culture"thathas been handed down to us throughlanguage, but (in absolutelyeverything because everything the worldand out of it) is

in in which included therealm "understanding" understandability of and we move.(1976A: 25.)

Gadamer's discussionof language solidifies numberof keypointsmade a earlier in his discussion of aestheticsand historicalconsciousness. In his discussionof historical consciousnesshe argued, first, thatunderstanding can neverbe freefromprejudice and, second, thatitinvolvesthe unity of observer and observed (the fusing of horizons). In the discussion of aesthetics latterpointwas phrased in termsof theparticipatory of the role the spectatorin the aestheticexperience. Both of these points are now establishedas universally applicable in the discussionof language. First, It entailsparticipation. is impossibleto remain language, quite obviously, aloof fromthe language throughwhich understandingoccurs. Second, the linguisticality understandingidentifies locus of the "prejudice" of the so crucial to Gadamer's account. It becomes clear thatwe cannot escape this prejudice because we cannot escape our language and the preunderstandingsembodied in it. But Gadamer's analysis of language does more than merelyclarify establishedpoints.Rather,itestablishesa distinctive previously theoryof thatascends to a new epistemologicalplane. The keyeleinterpretation mentin thattheory his pointthatlanguage is "I-less." For Gadamer this is entails that language is necessarilycommon. In his words, "Whoever speaks a language thatno one else understandsdoes not speak"(1976A: Gadamer compares participationin lan65). Following Wittsenstein, in definestheactivity of guage to participation a game, and, furthermore, language as a formof life.But forGadamer itis not the case thatwe, that thatlanguage playsus: is,subjects, playgames withlanguage, but,rather, itis nota matter our making of words of whenwe use Strictly speaking, it we tool speak.Thoughwe"use"words, isnotinthesensethat puta given to use as we please.Wordsthemselves the prescribe onlywaywecan put them use.One refers that proper to to as which does "usage" something notdependon us,butrather on it,since are notallowed violate we we to it.
(1976B: 93.)

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PoliticalQuarterly 106 Western Two importantconsequences followfromthis position. First,in the is the processof interpretation interpreter alwaysinside language. When a textis interpretedthe interpreter does not step outside language to an Archemedean point of objectivity, but, rather, moves in the horizon for definedbythelanguage employed.Second, and more importantly the thatthe phenomenon of presentargument,Gadamer's theoryestablishes understandingthat occurs in language does not entail recourse to the consciousnessof the individual subject. In other words,when we understand a text what occurs is not the grasping of the author's subjective but, rather,the interplayof the (linguistic)traditionsof inintentions, terpreterand interpreted.Gadamer states this point veryexplicitly: in Whenwe understand textwe do notputourselves theplace of the a activities the of and it is nota matter penetrating spirtual of the other, author.... The meaning hermeneutical of is the inquiry todisclose miracleofunderstanding or utterances notthemysterious and communitexts in cationof souls. Understanding a participation the commonaim. is (1979: 147.) This statementis the essence of what has been referredto above as Gadamer's rejectionof the subject in his theoryof interpretation. What of Gadamer is asserting thatthesubjectiveintentions theauthorof a text is are not the "real" objects of the interpreter'sanalysis. Rather, for Gadamer, the meaning of the textis independent of the author's intentions.It formsa horizonof meaningconstituted the historical of by setting the text.Gadamer's positionon subjectiveintentionality moveover,a is, controversial one. The methodologicalsignificance Gadamer's stance of on thisissue can be illustrated referring the controversy position to his by has aroused among literary Eric Hirsch,in an ongoing debate with critics. Gadamer, has attackedhis positionon subjective(or whathe calls "authoHirsch'sobjectionto Gadamer's positionthatthe rial") intention.Briefly, author'sintention does not fixthe meaningof a textis thatitobviatesthe possibilityof the objective interpretationof texts. Against Gadamer Hirschclaimsthatthe meaningof a textis fixedand "objective"because it is determinedbythe author'sintention. From the perspectiveafforded by theforegoing Hirsch'spositionas discussion,however,itis easyto identify fallingpreyto the same errorsas thatof Dilthey.Hirsch,likeDilthey,fails to see thatthe determination what he calls the "meaning" of a textis a of dialectical process which must take into account the historicity the of interpreteras well as that of the text. Hirsch assumes, instead, that means "getting insidetheauthor'smind"froma positionof interpretation historicalobjectivity.Gadamer's analysis of historical understanding, in however,showed this position to be fundamentally error. The importanceof Hirsch's criticism, however,lies not in its novelty but ratherin thefactthatitrevealsthesignificance Gadamer's rejection of of subjectiveintentionality the context of contemporarydiscussions. in Hirsch's conviction that "objectivity textual interpretation in requires (1967: 237) leads him to a explicitreferenceto the speaker's subjectivity" of position that is characteristic those who unquestioninglyaccept the

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Humanism 107 Beyond of model of objective knowledge: searching for legitimacy the scientific the "objective facts"that will make the social sciences truly"scientific." Hirsch, along with many contemporarysocial scientists, argues that if social scientists can identify the "objective data" in their discipline that parallels that of the natural sciences, then the social sciences, too, can obtain objective knowledge. Hirsch puts it this way: The identity genre,pre-understanding, hypothesis of and that suggests themuch-advertised in between and the cleavage thinking the sciences humanities does notexist.The hypothetico-deductive is process fundamental bothof them, itis in all thinking aspiresto knowledge. in as that (196: 246). There is a certain irony in this position. What it comes to is that the subjectiveintentionsof authors become the objective data of the social sciences. And, although this position is distinctfromthe positivist view thatthedata of thesocial sciencesare objectivein thestrict sense,itclearly of depends on the assumptionof the validity the positivist conceptionof scientific method. Hirsch's quarrel with Gadamer points to the followingconclusion: unless the validity the positivist of methoditself is conceptionof scientific the social scienceswillinevitably into the errorof mimickfall challenged ing the methodsof the naturalsciences.Gadamer's rejectionof subjective thatthe positivist intentionality suggests,further, conceptionof scientific knowledgecan only be challenged by calling into question both sides of the subject-object on dichotomy whichthatconceptionrests.It cannot be debunked by proclaiming,as Hirsch does, the objectivity subjectivity. of Nor can it be debunked by givingup on objectivity altogetherand embracing subjectivity. It can be concluded, then, that, taken together,the two themes of Gadamer's theory- the rejection of the Enlightenment conception of knowledge and the rejectionof subjectiveintentionality offera radicallydifferent perspectiveon the nature and taskof the human sciences, theirrelationshipto the natural sciences. In the and, most particularly, course of his analysis of the linguisticality understandingGadamer of shows that all understanding involves, first,the participationof the knowerin the act of knowing,and, second, the inescapable influenceof the knower's "prejudice." This prejudice is defined as the prethatis a preconditionof all human ununderstandingor forestructure, From thisit follows,however,that,on Gadamer's view, in derstanding. the naturalsciences the goal of knowledgeis preciselyto exclude both of these fundamentalelementsof human understanding.The natural sciences define knowledgein termsof the exclusion of the influenceof the observer'sperspectiveas well as any historical, particularistic aspects of the experience under analysis. It must be concluded, then, that the natural sciences are an aberrant and highlyunique mode of knowing ratherthan the model for all true knowledge. As Gadamer puts it, "the but conceptof objectivity representedbythe sciencesexemplifies a special

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PoliticalQuarterly 108 Western is case" (1979: 129). But even more significant Gadamer's conclusionas to where thisleaves the social sciences. On this point he is veryclear: then IfVerstehen basicmoment human of isthe in-der-Welt-sein,thehuman are nearerto humanself-understanding the naturalscithan sciences ences.The objectivitythelatter nolonger unequivocal obligatan and of is (1979: 106). oryideal of knowledge. Gadamer's extensiveexamination of the relationshipbetween truth thattruthis not strictly and method,then,leads to twoconclusions: first, the provinceof scientific method,nor is thatmethod the universalmodel of certain knowledge, and, second, that the understanding which is soughtin thehuman sciencesprovidesthefoundationor preconditionfor the naturalsciences(1975: xvii,446-47). This positionhas theeffect in of, a sense, turningthe tableson the naturalsciencesby definingthe human sciences as epistemologically of prior. It also has the effect removingthe "inferiority complex" that is the result of the acceptance of the Enlightenment'smodel of scientificknowledge. The acceptance of this to model leaves the social scienceswithonlytwoalternatives: first, attempt to identify the "objective data" of the social sciences (either as the behavioristsdo, in a "value-free" assessment of human behavior, or, as or, Diltheydoes, in the apprehension of subjectiveintentions) second, to identifythe human sciences as inherently "subjective" and, hence, exof cluded fromthe realm of truth.By callingintoquestion the legitimacy of method and by the Enlightenment's identification truthwithscientific Gadamer offers the human to the rejecting appeal to subjectiveintentions sciences a self-identification distinctfromeither of these conceptions.
ALTHUSSER

Althusser's social theory, withitstiesto both Frenchstructuralism and Marxism,would seem to be the polar opposite of Gadamer's hermeneutics.But thereare twoimportant respectsin whichthe theoriesconverge: as both explicitly eschew subjectiveintentionality a valid basis for first, analysis and, second, both offeran epistemology that repudiates the methodand objectiveknowledge. Enlightenment conceptionof scientific The convergenceof thetwoapproaches on theseissues,however,is all the more striking because of the differences betweenthem.Despite precisely these differences and despite the factthatGadamer's approach is on the whole superior to that of Althusser because he offersa more radical critique of the Enlightenmentconception of knowledge, it is worth exploring how the two theories converge on these issues. And, more it positively, can be argued that in certain respects Althusser'stheory servesas a kind of complementto Gadamer's approach. While Gadamer Althussergoes merelyproclaimshis rejectionof subjectiveintentionality, on to offer specific a deconstruction theconceptof "man," the knowing of subject.Also, whileGadamer concernshimself solelywitha critiqueof the method, Althusser'stheorysupplies a more Enlightenment'sscientific fully developed non-positivist(or, in Althusser's terminology,non-

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Humanism 109 Beyond can empiricist) knowledge.This complementarity conceptionof scientific be explicatedby focusingon twoaspects of Althusser'sextensivecorpus: his discussionof the ideological concept of "man" and his understanding of the construction scientific of concepts. A. The ideological of concept "man" Like Gadamer, Althusser's restson a critiqueand reinterpretatheory tionof the nineteenth-century approach to epistemologicalissues. In the case of Althusserthecore of hisapproach is a distinctive of interpretation Marx's social theory.Alhusser's interpretation Marx revolvesaround of the thesis that,after 1845, Marx effectedan epistemologicalbreak (or rupture)withthe humanistphilosophyof hisyouthand enteredintowhat Althussercalls a new "continentof thought"by introducinga radically new epistemology.Althusserdefines his task as that of explicatingthis epistemological perspectivewhich is implicitin Marx's later work. His principalargumentis thatMarx's epistemologicalbreak withthe classical economistswas constituted his definition the economyas a theoretiof by cal concept rather than a "real" object of theoreticalinquiry. For the classical economists,the economy was defined as a "real" object in the sense thatitwas seen as theresultof human relationsultimately reducible to individualhuman actions.Thus, forthesetheorists, boththe objectand the subject,that is, both the economy and the "men" who constituteit, were attributedreality. It is thisidentification Marx's breakthrough theseparationof real of as and theoreticalobjects that formsthe core of Althusser'sepistemology. Central to this argument is the thesis that the objects of the real and theoretical worldsare produced in analogous ways.Marx's taskin Capital, as Althussersees it, is to "construct"the concept of the economy as a in purelytheoretical concept and to show, entirely the theoreticalrealm, how it is produced (1970: 182). The goal of Althusser'sdiscussionis the parallel one of revealingthe errorof the classicaleconomist'sassumption that "man" can be an object of theoreticalknowledge. For Althusser, "man" is not, as the classical economists assumed, the "real" object of theoretical the of inquiry.He is,rather, "bearer"of thestructure capitalist In Marx's analysis,Althusserinsists, men neverappear as men. economy. His theoryprecludes the possibility thatindividualmen can be seen as the articulationof the social structure.Men, rather,enter the analysisonly insofaras theyfill certaindeterminateplaces in the social structure (1970: 252-53). Gadamer's critiqueof Dilthey'sunderstandingof subjectiveintentions formsthe basis of his epistemologicalunderstandingof the role of the subject. In a parallel fashion Althusser's critique of the classical economists'and, derivatively, humanistMarxists'concept of "man" the formsthe basis of his epistemologicalunderstandingof what he calls the of account,is "category thesubject."The humanists'error,on Althusser's to interpretthe social totality a totalityof intersubjective as relations between "men," who are "real" objects of theoreticalinquiry. Marx's maturetheory, contrast, in identifies real protagonists history the the in as

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110 Western PoliticalQuarterly social relationsof production. Biological men are only the supports or of bearers of the guises assigned to themby the structure relationsin the social formation.Historyis, thus, "a process withouta subject" (1971: 124). Historicalevents cannot, as the humanistsargue, be explained by referenceto individualwills,but, rather,somethingbecomes a historical event by insertioninto formsthat are themselveshistorical(1969: 126). What Althusseris asserting,in other words, is that "subjects" have no status.They are theoretiindependentreality apart fromtheirtheoretical cal objectsconstructed the scientific in realm of thought,not,as both the humanistsand classical economiststhought,"real" entities. The conceptof"man," then,forAlthusseras forFoucault, epitomizes the errorsof the humanists'approach to social theory.Althusser's deconstruction thisconcept,furthermore, a keyelementin his theoretical is of approach.4 By arguing that both subjects and objects are products of theoreticaldiscourse he has effectively undermined the humanists'positionand thedichotomy betweensubjectand objecton whichitrests.Their appeal to the realityof subjects and subjective wills is shown to be as of unfounded as the positivists' appeal to the reality brute facts.Furthermore,theconvergencebetweenAlthusser'spositionon thisissue and that of Gadamer should be clear. Both argue, althoughin different ways,that the "subject" and, more specifically, the subjectivewill or intentionof social actorsis not the "real" object of theoretical inquiry.Gadamer does thisbyrejecting notionthatinterpretation the involvesprobingsubjective intentions;Althusser rejects it by arguing that subjects are theoretical rather than "real" entities.But these positionscome to much the same thing: the rejectionof the essence of the humanistposition- the conhuman subject. stituting B. The construction theoretical of concepts The second aspect of Althusser'spositionthatconvergeswiththatof Gadamer can be found in his discussionof the construction theoretical of concepts. On the face of it, however, Althusser'sposition on this issue appears to be radically,opposed to Gadamer's approach. In contrastto Gadamer's broad examination of the nature of human understanding, Althusser'sexaminationis cast in termsof a narrowconcern: the formulation of scientific concepts. Also, in his approach Althusserdefines no differencesbetween the natural and social sciences while significant Gadamer's theoryrests on the definitionof a profound difference be4 But

Althusser'sdeconstruction the subject also raises a serious problem. If Althusser of rejectsthe "bourgeois myth"of the subject as the origin,then the question arises as to how he deals withbiologicalhuman beings in his theory.Here Althusseris less clear. He declares that human beings are agents in history that work in and through historical forms(1976: 95). In other words theyare active in history ratherthan creatorsof it. Althusser insists thatMarx's theoretical anti-humanism does notentail"despising"man, but, rather,establishesthe necessityof abstractingfrom concrete individuals (1976: has 200). It seemsfairto conclude,however,thatalthoughAlthusser takenan important step in revealingthe dependence of humanismon the concept of the subject,he has not as yet worked out a coherent theoreticalapproach that serves as an antidote to the humanists'error in this regard.

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Humanism 111 Beyond in tweenthetwo.Despite thesecontrasts, however,itcan be argued that, a broad sense, the twoapproaches dictatea similarapproach to the definiand mostimportantly, tionof knowledgein the social sciences.First, both Gadamer and Althussermove the debate over the social sciencesbeyond the narrow confinesof the positivist-humanist dichotomyby rejecting As both alternatives. a resultof thispositionboth claim, second, thatthe goal of thesocial sciencescannotbe definedas theacquisitionof "objective as Asking knowledge"of socialreality ithas been definedbythe positivists. forthe "objectivity" knowledgein the social sciences,in both accounts, of is askingthewrongquestion. But neitherGadamer nor Althusserturn,as do the humanists,to the subjectivity the social sciences to rectify of this error. Both turn,instead, to an analysisof the internaldynamicof the productionof knowledge. In the case of Gadamer thismeant examining the relationshipbetween truthand method. In the case of Althusserit means examining the construction scientific of concepts. Althusser's of the productionof scientific concepts,like thatof theory his deconstruction theconceptof "man" is rooted in his understanding of of Marx's theoreticalapproach. His theorycan be reduced to two theses whichhe derivesfromMarx's analysisin Capital: first, radical separathe tion of the realms of thoughtand reality,and, second, the analogy betweenthe productionof scientific conceptsand the productionof objects in the materialworld.The first thesisstemsfromthe positionthatscience has no object outside itsown activity but,rather,produces itsown norms and the criterionof its own existence. Althusseropposes this theoryto what he labels the "empiricist"conception of knowledge, a position roughlyequivalent to what was referredto above under the heading of On definition empiricist the sees knowledgeas the positivism. Althusser's extraction the essence fromthe real, concreteobject. This extraction, of whichretainsthereality theobject sought,is accomplishedthroughthe of use of the scientist's "abstract" concepts. In opposition to thisconception of knowledge Althusserproposes a radical separation of the realms of thoughtand realitythat entails a rejectionof the empiricistnotion that knowledgeis a partof thereal world. Marx's analysisin Capital,Althusser claims,is informedby thisposition.For Marx the production process of real, material objects takes place entirelyin the real world, while the in productionof thoughtobjectstakesplace entirely therealmof thought (1970: 41). The goal of Marx's analysis,then, is not to understand the betweenthe real and the thought, but,rather,to analyze the relationship process of productionof thoughtobjects (1970: 54). As Althusserunderstandsit,then,whatis accomplishedin the acquisition of scientificknowledge is not, as in the empiricistaccount, the appropriationof the real world by the worldof thought.This is the case because "the sphere of thereal is separate in all itsaspectsfromthesphere of thought" (1970: 87).5 The goal of Althusser'stheory,rather, is to
5Althusser's has separationbetweenthoughtand reality been the subjectof much criticism. See Scott(1974), Callinicos (1976), Benton (1977) and Glucksmann(1974). In addition to arguing thatAlthusser'sseparation of these two realms is illegitimate, these authors

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PoliticalQuarterly 112 Western presentan analysisof how the scientist produces and manipulates conthe cepts within realm of thought.His pointof departure is the assertion an that,in the separate worldsof the real and the theoretical, analogous formof production occurs. Like production in the material world, the productionof scientific conceptsbegins withraw materials.But theseraw materialsare not, as the empiricistsclaim, "objective" or "given" facts about the real world. They are, rather,the body of conceptsoperativein the scientific at community a particulartime.This body of concepts will differfrom one historicalperiod to another and with the necessarily developmentallevelof a particularscience.But theyare at anygivenpoint a productof the normsand values of scientific discourse and the particular problematicmotivating that discourse.6 This understanding of the process of the production of scientific concepts provides Althusserwithanswers to a numberof questions central to the definitionof knowledge in the social sciences. One of these questions is the definitionof what constitutesa scientific concept. Scientific account,have no connectionwiththe real concepts,on Althusser's world.They are formulatedwithonlyone end in view: the productionof knowledge. Another question concerns the means of guaranteeing the of Alscientificity the knowledge produced by the scientific community. thusser's answer to this is very straightforward: guarantee of scithe is entificity given by the operating norms and rules whollyinternal to scientific discourse (1970: 67). Two importantresults follow from this position. First, Althusser clearly rejects the empiricistnotion that the of scientificity resultsis guaranteed throughreferenceto the"facts."Since there are no "facts"in the sense of real world data in Althusser'stheory, therecan be no "checking"of the factsto guarantee the accuracyof the results.In short,thewhole question of the"objectivity" scientific of factsis dissolved.The second resultis equally significant. Since Althusserclaims that the criterionof scientificity given by the norms of scientific is discourse and thatthese normschange withthe developmentof the particular science,itfollows thatthosethings thatare recognizedas "knowledges" are historically conditioned. Since the normsof the scientific community are historically of but produced, thereis no general criterion scientificity, criteria sciences(1970: 62-7).7 onlytheparticular developed byparticular
also point out thathe is confused on thispoint. Despite arguing forthe radical separationof the real and the thought,he also wantsto maintainthe primacyof the real over the thought(1970: 87). 6The "abstract"concepts that provide scientists with their raw materialsAlthusserlabels GeneralitiesI. They are operated on and, in his words,"transformed" Generalities by II: the axiomatic methods of the science. The result of this transformation is Generalities III: the "knowledge" that is the goal of scientific analysis. Althusser is carefulto insist, however,thatGeneralitiesIII do not reveal the essence of Generalities I. Rather, Generalities III, which he also refersto as the "concrete in thought,"are transformations the abstractconcepts of GeneralitiesI (1969: 184-85). of 7 This has that aspectof Althusser's theory been attackedon twocontradictory grounds: first, he needs a univesalcriterion scientificity failsto supplyone (Glucksmann,1974), of and of and, second, thathe overemphasizestheabsolutenessof thecriterion scientificity and, hence, fails to give proper emphasis to the historicalconditions under which it is produced (Callinicos, 1976: 102; Geras, 1972: 80).

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Humanism 113 Beyond betweenthe two It can be concluded, then,thatdespite thedifferences like Gadamer, rejectsthe Enlightenment theories,Althusser, conception of scientific methodologynot by claiming,as the humanistsdo, thatit is inapplicable to the social sciences, but, rather,by attackingits central or of epistemologicaltenets. He rejects the possibility even desirability "objective knowledge" provided by this model not by claiming that the social sciences are inherently subjectivebut by denying any connection betweenthe real and theoretical worlds.He also establishesthe unavoidable historicity knowledge by definingthe production of scientific of discourse in historicalterms.In sum, he grounds his conception of knowlwithinthe confinesof scientific discourse and grounds that edge entirely in discourse firmly history.
CONCLUSION

In the foregoingI have attemptedto establishthatboth Gadamer and discussionsof the Althusser make valuable contributions contemporary to of the social sciencesbecause both theoriesmove beyond the philosophy debate. Both accomplishthis steriledogmatismof the positivist/humanist movement,first, challenging the fundamental premises of the Enby methodand, second, byrejectingthe lightenment conceptionof scientific constitutive of theindividualsubjectthathas been the hallmarkof the role humanistcritique.The resultof thismovementin bothcases is to place the social sciences on a new epistemological plane. In conclusion the methodologicalimplicationsof this movementcan be specifiedby identhree aspects of theirapproaches thatpoint the social sciences in tifying new directions.Although in two of these cases Gadamer's apdistinctly it proach is clearlysuperiorto thatof Althusser, is nevertheless significant that,in a broad sense, theirapproaches move the social sciencesin similar methodologicaldirections. the First, workof Gadamer and Althusserpointsto an approach to the social sciencesthatdefinesanalysisin termsof modes of discourse rather than in termsof specifying relationshipbetween the real world and the theworldof theory. Gadamer and Althusser approach thisissue in different ways,however. By focusingon the problem of the nature of human understanding,Gadamer, on the one hand, encourages us to thinkof not interpretation as the appropriationof the "real" subjectiveintentions of authors,but, rather,in termsof the dialecticalinterplay traditions. of Althusser's on theotherhand, is castin terms histhesisof the of approach, radical separationof the worldsof thoughtand reality. The advantage of Althusser's approach is that,like Gadamer, his analysisis cast in termsof and fact.But it should guaranteeingthe correspondencebetween theory also be noted that Althusser'sposition,as his many criticshave argued, also raisesa serious problem.Even thoughhe uses thethesisof theradical attack separation of the two worldsof thoughtand realityto specifically the empiricist(positivist)relationship between these two realms, it is neverthelessthe case that simplyby positing the existence of the two worlds he perpetuates the positivistillusion that, somehow, there is a

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114 Western PoliticalQuarterly "real" world out there that is distinct from the world of thought. Gadamer's perspective, in contrast, avoids this problem entirely.By analyzing the universal phenomenon of human understanding, Gadamer's approach definitely rejectsthe notionof a real worldopposed to the world of discourse. Second, the workof Gadamer and Althusserpoints to the definitive rejectionof the inferiorstatusdictated to the social sciences by both the and humanistapproaches. Althusseraccomplishesthisbyvirtupositivist betweenthe naturaland social sciences,but, allyignoringany distinction at the same time,rejectingthe epistemologicalpositionthatrelegatesthe social sciences to second-class status. His analysis of the production of scientificknowledge holds for all scientificanalysis, thus placing the branches of science on an equal footing.Gadamer, however,definesthe social sciences as epistemologically prior to the natural sciences because theydeal withthe universalphenomenon of understandingwhichis the precondition for all human knowledge. Again, it can be argued that Gadamer's approach to thisparticularissue is superior to thatof Althusser. Althusserfailsto account forwhatis the mostsignificant of discovery Gadamer's hermeneutics:his identification the "prejudice" that unof dergirds knowledge in both the natural and human sciences. Although both theorists the social scienceson a new footing the vis-ai-vis natural put sciences,Gadamer's position,bydelvingmore deeply intothe problemof human understanding,offersa more complete analysis of the relationship between the sciences. Third, the work of Gadamer and Althusserdictatesa position that in of of definestheactivity analysisor interpretation termsof theinterplay withina mode of discourse. The terminologicaldifferences concepts between the two approaches make it difficult express this point in to terms,however.Althusser'spositionis cast in termsof the prodgeneral use theirconceptual apparatus to operate uction of discourse: scientists in on theobjectof investigation order to produce theobjectof knowledge. Gadamer castshis argumentin termsof the processof interpretation: the horizon of the interpreter fused with the horizon of the text into a is distinct entity. Althoughthe twoapproaches are, as was indicated above, far fromidentical,it can nevertheless argued thatwhat is common to be both is the positionthatthe productionof knowledgeis to be understood in termsof an interplay meaningsand concepts internalto discourse. of In these three areas, then, both Gadamer and Althusser point the social sciencesin directions thatwould move thembeyondboth positivism and humanism. By encouraging social scientists be suspicious of the to as well as the "objects"presupposed in positivist social science, "subjects" both Gadamer and Althusserhave made a significant contribution.By to encouraging us, furthermore, think in terms of the production of discourse ratherthan in termsof "objective" knowledge theyoffernew directionsfor inquiryin the social sciences. It is in this sense that their of approaches are worthy close attention.Although the specificsof the

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Beyond Humanism

115

methodology dictated by both theorists have yet to be worked out, it seems clear that the social sciences would profit by moving onto the epistemological plane suggested by their analyses. REFERENCES trans. Grahame Lock. Atlantic Althusser,Louis (1976). Essaysin Self-Criticism, Highlands: Humanities Press. London: Allen Lane, Penguin Press. (1969).For Marx,trans.Ben Brewster. Althusser, Louis, and E. Balibar (1970). ReadingCapital,trans.Ben Brewster.New York: Pantheon Books. Foundations the ThreeSociologies.Boston: Benton, Ted (1977). Philosophical of Routledge and Kegan Paul. AtlanticHighlands: Humanities Bhaskar, Ray (1979) ThePossibility Naturalism. of Press. Marxism.London: Pluto Press. Callinicos, Alex (1976). Althusser's Fred (1981). Twilight Subjectivity. Amherst:The University Masof Dallmayr, of sachusettsPress. trans.and ed. David E. Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1976a). Philosophical Hermeneutics, of Linge. Berkeley: University California Press. Studies,trans. P. Christopher (1976b). Hegel'sDialectic:Five Hermeneutic Smith. New Haven: Yale University Press. Social (1979). "The Problem of HistoricalConsciousness." In Interpretive Science, ed. Paul Rabinow and William Sullivan. Berkeley: Universityof California Press, pp. 103-60. and Method.New York: The Seabury Press. (1975). Truth New Geras, Norman (1972). "Althusser'sMarxism:An Accountand Assessment." 57-86. LeftReview71 (January-February): in A Social Glucksmann,Miriam(1974). Structuralist Analysis Contemporary Thought: and London: Comparison theTheories Claude Levi-Strauss Louis Althusser. of of Routledge and Kegan Paul. in New Press. Hirsch,Eric D. (1967). Validity Interpretation. Haven: Yale University P. (1979). "RealistSociologyand the Critiqueof Empiricism." PhilosoScott, John phyofSocial Science9 (September): 327-40. (1974). "Sociological Theorizing and the AlthusserianIdeal." Sociological and Theory 89-113. 5: Analysis Michael (1981). Languageand PoliticalUnderstanding. New Haven: Yale Shapiro, Press. University Thomas, David (1980). Naturalism and Social Science. New York: Cambridge Press. University

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