RULE 81.

a. Tan vs. Go Chiong Lee 46 Phil 200 (1924) FACTS: Go Bung Kiu died in China on April 15, 1920. On April 26, 1920, Go Chiong Lee was appointed special administrator of the estate, with Tio Liok, Ang Changco, and Manuel Go Tianuy as sureties on his bond in the sum of P30,000. On May 25, 1920, Go Chiong Lee's status with reference to the estate was changed to that of administrator. On the same date, Go Chiong Lee filed a motion in which he prayed that he be allowed to operate two stores belonging to the estate, one in the City of Cebu and the other in the municipality of Toledo, Cebu. The prayer was answered and Lee was granted the authority to open the stores on the condition that he files another bond and that he shall render monthly accounts of the estate. The committee on claims rendered its report on June 2, 1921, admitting as proved, claims amounting to P69,029.91. One month later, the court issued an order directing the payment by the administrator of the claims. Responding to the order of the court, Lee made an accounting and informed the latter that he had made payments in the amount of 16 099.37. He further explained that he had made payments to creditors who came to collect their claims. The debts to the estate had not been collected by him yet as the debtors will pay when their economic conditions will improve. Due to bad economic conditions, the store in Toledo Cebu was hardly making any sales and had to be closed while that in Cebu City had to have its operations economized. The inventory of the estate made by the administrator showed the value of the merchandise on hand at the time of the death of the deceased to be P39,281.57, and the outstanding credits to be P61,534.74, or a combined gross value of P100,816.31. But according to the public accountant R. C. Pangalinan, the estate was worth on May 26, 1920, when Go Chiong Lee became administrator P28,467.51, while it was worth on October 25, 1921, when he ceased to be administrator P8,693.76, or a loss of P19,773.75. The debts of the estate allowed by the commissioner on claims reached to P69,099.91. Sixteen thousand seven hundred pesos and thirty-nine centavos were distributed among the creditors by the administrator, while presumably the remaining debts have not been cancelled. The last report made by the administrator discloses, however, that there may be P21,009.77 on hand which can be used to satisfy the claimants. The present administratrix is running the estate with apparently profitable results. On October 28, 1921, Maxima Tan relieved Go Chiong Lee of his duties as administrator of the estate. As administrator of the estate, Maxima Tan filed complaints against Lee and his sureties for the collection of the amount of 54 700.49 which correspond to the losses incurred by the estate. Tan claimed that the losses were incurred due to the act of Lee in opening the two stores without authority from the court. ISSUE: Is Lee liable for the losses which the estate incurred for the period during which it was under his administration. HELD: NO The trial court based its decision in making Lee liable on the premise that he had no authority from the court. However as shown from the record, Lee was given authority to operate the stores. The losses which the store incurred cannot be imputed to him. The standard of responsibility of the administrator is best measured as in essence the responsibility of a bailee. Like any bailee, he must pursue his discretion honestly and in good faith, or he will become personally liable, to those who are interested in the estate, for waste, conversion, or embezzlement. But where an administrator, entrusted with the carrying on of an estate, acts in good faith and in accordance with the usual rules and methods obtaining in such business, he will not be held liable for losses incurred. (Schouler on Wills, Executors and Administrators, Chapter III; Allen and Hill vs. Shanks [891], 90 Tenn., 359.) We find that the personal responsibility of the former administrator and the sureties on his bond for losses incurred by the estate during his administration, has not been proved.

b. Lizarraga Hermanos vs Abada 40 Phil 124 FACTS Caponong died, owing plaintiffs sum of money.His widow Abada was administratrix. Commissioners to appraise estate and pass on claims against estate were appointed. Abada leased Hacienda Coronacion to Zayco. Abada married Alvarez. Lease was transferred to Alvarez by Zayco. Nearly 7 yrs after death of Caponong, plaintiffs filed suit in CFI against Abada personally and asadministratrix, alleging that Caponong owed plaintiffs P12783.74, they claimed that Abada, personally and as administratrix, had been receiving money and effects used by her for Hacienda Coronacion It is further alleged that account of defendant showed balance in favor of plaintiffs of P62437.15 and that defendant recognized only about P14000 w/c however hadnt been paid. Defendant admits that she owed P8555.78 as administratrix, and the balance was due by her personally. The guardian of the minor children of Caponong asked permission to intervene. He denied the claim and alleged that the estate of Caponong didnt owe plaintiffs anything. Afterwards, the parties presented a motion stating that they made an amicable settlement. Court then dismissed the action. The settlement was that defendants recognized that Caponongs estate was indebted to plaintiffs in sum of P68,611.01, to be paid w/ 10% interest in 7equal annual installments. The defendants agreed to give plaintiffs first mortgage on all property of Caponong and all property belonging exclusively to Abada. The defendants agreed to mortgage also the carabaos on the hacienda. Thereafter, a mortgage of the hacienda was executed but the curacaos were not mortgaged. The compromise was approved by the court. In this present action, the plaintiffs allege that defendants had let 2 installments go by w/o paying anything and that defendants refused to sign the agreement mortgaging the curacaos. It is also claimed that defendants were about to transfer their property not mortgaged. Plaintiffs prayed for attachment on property of defendants which the court granted. Plaintiffs filed a motion and asked court to appoint a receiver. Court granted this motion and the receiver took charge of property and defendants were ousted from the house. Abada and the guardian filed answer that claim of plaintiffs against the intestate proceedings of Caponong had been allowed in sum of P12, 783.74 by commissioners. They further stated that the property belonged to children of deceased and the only interest of Abada was her usufructuary interest in 1/6 of the property. All the property was in custodia legis and could not be attached. The compromise agreement and the mortgage executed were obtained through fraud and false representation. The Judge dissolved the attachment and discharged the receiver. Judgment was also given for plaintiffs to recover from administratrix P8555.78 w/ interest. Personal judgment was also given plaintiffs against Abada and Alvarez for P79970.21. Abada appealed personally and as administratrix. ISSUES 1. WON the compromise agreement and the mortgage were valid2. WON the curacaos could be attached3. WON appointment of receiver was proper. HELD 1. NO. The claim of plaintiffs against estate of Caponong had been fixed. Court says that its approval was meant to include only the amount actually due by estate; the balance was intended to be approved as against Abada personally. The record in Case 969 is presented. Plaintiffs allege that their original claim against estate was only P12783.74 and that the balance was due from Abada as administratrix and personally w/o stating how much was owed by her personally and how much was owed by her asadministratrix. Commissioners shall pass upon claims against estate. The law fixed the limit of the estates liability. The court couldnt charge it w/debts that were never owed by it. The administratrix could only charge the estate w/reasonable expenses of administration. Estate owed plaintiffs less than P13000 when commissioners passed on their claim. Part of this was paid, leaving balance of P8555.78. Plaintiffs made advances to administratrix until their claim was more than P68000.It is urged that a major part of this P68000 is administration expenses but no reason is given why such expense of administration should be so great.-Administration expense would be the necessary expenses of handling property, protecting it against destruction / deterioration. But if plaintiffs let the administratrix have money & effects till their claim grow to P68000, they cant be permitted to charge this amount as expense of administration. By expense of administration we

understand to be the reasonable & necessary expense of caring forth prop and managing it till debts are paid, and of dividing it so as to partition it and deliver to the heirs. The court could not approve a settlement saddling upon the estate debts it never owed. If it did, its approval is a nullity. Neither executors, unless specially authorized by will, nor administrators, have power to bind estate of deceased by borrowing money. Statute grants no power to administrator to borrow money upon mortgage of real estate of decedent. Such an act is foreign to the policy and purpose of administration w/c aims to close up, not to continue the estate. Mortgage was void.CFIs should exert themselves to close up estates w/in 12 most from time they are presented; they may refuse to allow any compensation to executors / administrators who dont actively labor to that end.2. NO- If they were in the name & possession of administratrix, they were in custodia legis, and couldnt be attached.3. NO- Court should have taken other means to protect creditor & wind up the estate c. Wilson vs Rear 55 Phil 44 October 16, 1930 FACTS Wilson was appointed special administrator in the settlement of the estate of Charles Rear. The estate had the following assets: real property valued at P15,300, and personal property valued at P5,250. The only debts against the deceased were one in favor of Sewal Fleming which then amounted to P800, and one in favor of J. S. Alano for P500, and if you include interest and accumulated taxes, the debt of the estate was P1,655.54. Wilson, on his own volition and without any authority or process of court, continued the operation of the plantation. He employed Fleming as manager at a salary of P200 per month, and a large number of men, so that at the time of the filing of the amended final account, the total expense for labor was P2,863.62, and the amount of the manager's salary was P4,533.33. In the end, as shown by his own report, the estate, which was appraised at P20,800, with actual debts of the deceased of only P1,655.54,was all wiped out and lost, and left with a deficit of P1,809.69. ISSUE WON the administrator was remiss in his duty as such. Does he have authority to continue the business of the deceased? HELD Yes. In this situation, it was the legal duty of the administrator to at once apply to the court for an order to sell the personal property to pay the debts of the deceased and the expenses of administration. The total of all claims against the deceased, including interest and taxes was P1,655.54, and that the whole amount of the court costs and expenses of administration was P1,767.04, the total of which is P3,422.58. At the time of his appointment, the value of the personal property of the deceased which came into his possession was P5,800, and the whole amount of claims against Rear, if the personal property of the estate had been promptly sold, would have been paid, and the estate would have balance left of P2,377.42. Wilson was appointed and qualified as administrator, and the law imposed upon him legal duties and obligations, among which was to handle the estate in a business-like manner, marshal its assets, and close the estate without any unreasonable or unnecessary delay. He was not appointed to act for or on behalf of the creditors, or to represent the interests of the heirs only. He should have administered the affairs of the estate for the use and benefit alike of all interested persons, as any prudent businessman would handle his own personal business. An administrator, without a specific showing or an order of the court, does not have any legal right to continue the operation of the business in which the deceased was engaged, or to eat up and absorb the assets of the estate in the payment of operating expenses. The law does not impose upon an administrator a high degree of care in the administration of an estate, but it does impose upon him ordinary and usual care, for want of which he is personally liable. Ruling Case Law, vol. 11, and section 142 says:"Winding up Business. An executor or administrator ordinarily has no power to continue the business in which the decedent was engaged at the time of his death xxx the normal duty of the personal representative in reference to such business is limited to winding it up xxx-The same principle is also laid down in Cyc., vol.18, p. 241, where it is said:

"C. Engaging in Business 1. GENERAL RULE. The general rule is that neither an executor nor an administrator is justified in placing or leaving assets in trade, for this is a hazardous use to permit of trust moneys; and trading lies outside the scope of administrative functions. So great a breach of trust is it for the representative to engage in business with the funds of the estate that the law charges him with all the losses thereby incurred without on the other hand allowing him to receive the benefit of any profits that he may make, the rule being that the persons beneficially interested in the estate may either hold the representative liable for the amount so used with interest, or at their election take all the profits which the representative has made by such unauthorized use of the funds of the estate.

d. Ocampo vs Ocampo G.R. No. 187879 July 5, 2010 FACTS: Petitioners Dalisay E. Ocampo (Dalisay), Vince E. Ocampo (Vince), Melinda Carla E. Ocampo (Melinda), and Leonardo E. Ocampo, Jr. (Leonardo, Jr.) are the surviving wife and the children of Leonardo Ocampo (Leonardo), who died on January 23, 2004. Leonardo and his siblings, respondents Renato M. Ocampo (Renato) and Erlinda M. Ocampo (Erlinda) are the legitimate children and only heirs of the spouses Vicente and Maxima Ocampo, who died intestate on December 19, 1972 and February 19, 1996, respectively. Vicente and Maxima left several properties, mostly situated in Bian, Laguna. Vicente and Maxima left no will and no debts. Upon the death of Leonardo Ocampo, his heirs filed a petition for the intestate proceedings for the estate of Leonardo and that of his deceased parents. The siblings of Leonardo opposed the petition claiming that only one estate can be tackled in a single intestate proceeding. Thus they resolved to face the intestate proceedings for the parents of Leonardo first. Both parties filed petitions before the courts for their appointment as special administrators of the estate. The court then appointed Dalisay and the respondents as joint administrators of the estate and required them to posts bonds in the amount of P200 000 each. The respondents however questioned the appointment of Dalisay as co-special joint administrator and filed a motion praying that they be exempted from posting a bond. The RTC gave its order and revoked the appointment of Dalisay as co-special administrator and appointed Vince and Erlinda as joint special administrators. However the court did not abandon the requirement of posting a bond for the appointed special administrators. Petitioners filed a Motion to Submit Inventory and Accounting dated November 20, 2006,15 praying that the RTC issue an order directing respondents to submit a true inventory of the estate of the decedent spouses and to render an accounting thereof from the time they took over the collection of the income of the estate. Thereafter, the respondents filed a motion with a prayer for them to enter into the office of the administrator without posting a bond. They also claimed that the RTC should first hold in abeyance the resolution of the motion for the submission of an accounting and inventory until the issue on the exemption from posting a bond is first resolved. In a subsequent order, the RTC revoked the appointment of the respondents as joint special administrators on the ground of their failure to follow a court order which is the posting of a bond. In the same order, the court also appointed Melinda as the administrator of the estate of the spouses. Aggrieved, the respondents filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 claiming that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in removing the respondents as special administrators without receiving a single evidence regarding their disqualifications and that the appointment of Melinda is not in accordance with the Rules. They also claimed that the pendency of their motion for their exemption from posting a bond prevents them from complying with the duties of an administrator. On December 16, 2008, the CA rendered its assailed Decision granting the petition based on the finding that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in revoking respondents appointment as joint special administrators without first ruling on their motion for exemption from bond, and for appointing Melinda as regular administratrix without conducting a formal hearing to determine her competency to assume as such. According to the CA, the posting of the bond is a prerequisite before respondents could enter their duties and responsibilities as joint special administrators, particularly their submission of an inventory of the properties of the estate and an income statement thereon. This decision was appealed by the petitioners.

ISSUE: Is the payment of the bond a pre-requesite before the appointed administrators can enter their office? HELD: NO. Granting the certiorari petition, the CA found that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in revoking respondents appointment as joint special administrators, and for failing to first resolve the pending Motion for Exemption to File Administrators Bond, ratiocinating that the posting of the administrators bond is a pre-requisite to respondents entering into the duties and responsibilities of their designated office. This Court disagrees. RTC revoked respondents appointment as special administrators for failing to post their administrators bond and to submit an inventory and accounting as required of them, tantamount to failing to comply with its lawful orders. Inarguably, this was, again, a denial of respondents plea to assume their office sans a bond. The RTC rightly did so. Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 81, the bond secures the performance of the duties and obligations of an administrator namely: (1) to administer the estate and pay the debts; (2) to perform all judicial orders; (3) to account within one (1) year and at any other time when required by the probate court; and (4) to make an inventory within three (3) months. More specifically, per Section 4 of the same Rule, the bond is conditioned on the faithful execution of the administration of the decedents estate requiring the special administrator to (1) make and return a true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which come to his possession or knowledge; (2) truly account for such as received by him when required by the court; and (3) deliver the same to the person appointed as executor or regular administrator, or to such other person as may be authorized to receive them. Verily, the administration bond is for the benefit of the creditors and the heirs, as it compels the administrator, whether regular or special, to perform the trust reposed in, and discharge the obligations incumbent upon, him. Its object and purpose is to safeguard the properties of the decedent, and, therefore, the bond should not be considered as part of the necessary expenses chargeable against the estate, not being included among the acts constituting the care, management, and settlement of the estate. Moreover, the ability to post the bond is in the nature of a qualification for the office of administration.

RULE 82
a. Gustilo vs Sian 53 phil 155 (1929) FACTS: It appears that on July 7, 1923, Agripino S. Gustilo was appointed administrator of the estate of his deceased father, Angel Gustilo; and on July 30, 1925, the administrator filed his accounts for the years 1923 to 1925, inclusive. On October 15, 1926, the widow of the intestate, in conjunction with other heirs, presented a motion asking for the removal of the administrator, charging him with being negligent, to appear in his accounts exorbitant and illegal expenses, ruinous to the state under administration. On July 16, 1927, the administrator presented a motion asking that he be granted a salary of P3,000 annually. On the same day the administrator presented separate accounts for the years 19251926 and 1926-1927. In the first of these accounts there appeared a deficit of P462.25; while in the second there appeared a deficit of P3,222.91. To these accounts opposition was made by Leocadia Majito, one of the creditors, the opposition being especially directed to the annual salary of P3,000 which the administrator credited to himself and the sum of P1,000 paid by him to his attorney. This opposition on the part of Leocadia Majito was reiterate nine days later in a writing in which exception was taken to the distribution of surplus in the amount of P11,304.50. Still later, on August 5, 1927, Leocadia Majito, in a more detailed writing of opposition, pointed out that certain alleged debts had been charged twice to the estate and that no adequate vouchers were exhibited to justify the charges. After hearing the parties, Judge Santa Maria disapproved the two accounts and ordered the administrator to file an amended account. While Judge Santa Maria was on leave, the administrator filed the same accounts without amending them before judge Salas. Judge Salas approved the accounts. After

the return of Judge Santa Maria, the creditors of the estate of the deceased moved to reconsider the decision of judge Santa Maria but alleging fraud and mistake but the same was denied. The petitioners filed this appeal praying for the removal of Gustilo as administrator. ISSUE: Shall Gustilo be removed as administrator of the estate. HELD: YES A careful examination of the facts revealed in this record concerning the activities of Agripino S. Gustilo, as administrator of Angel Gustilo, convinces this court that he is not a fit person to be administrator of this estate and that he has not in fact administered it so far with due regard to the rights of other persons in interest. It is the opinion of the court, therefore, that he should be removed and required to render his accounts as administrator. b. Quasha vs LCM Construction G.R. No. 74873, August 26, 2008 FACTS: Raymond Triviere passed away on 14 December 1987. On 13 January 1988, proceedings for the settlement of his intestate estate were instituted by his widow, Amy Consuelo Triviere, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63 of the National Capital Region (NCR), docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. M-1678. Atty. Enrique P. Syquia (Syquia) and Atty. William H. Quasha (Quasha) of the Quasha Law Office, representing the widow and children of the late Raymond Triviere, respectively, were appointed administrators of the estate of the deceased in April 1988. As administrators, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha incurred expenses for the payment of real estate taxes, security services, and the preservation and administration of the estate, as well as litigation expenses. In February 1995, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed before the RTC a Motion for Payment of their litigation expenses. Citing their failure to submit an accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate under administration, the RTC denied in May 1995 the Motion for Payment of Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha. In 1996, Atty. Quasha also passed away. Atty. Redentor Zapata (Zapata), also of the Quasha Law Office, took over as the counsel of the Triviere children, and continued to help Atty. Syquia in the settlement of the estate. Later on, they filed for the payment of certain amounts to themselves and to the heirs representing their pay for their services as administrators of the estate and their attorneys fees. They claimed that they have been performing their tasks diligently and that all the debts to the estate have been paid except for the claim of LCN construction. LCN construction opposed the motion for the payment of the certain amounts saying that the estate was already insolvent and that no payments can be made until all debts have been settled. The trial court denied the motion on the basis of the failure of the administrators to file an accounting. The administrators moved to reconsider the order. In all their pleadings with the court, they referred to themselves as administrators of the estate. The RTC granted the second motion for payment although it reduced the amount. This decision was attacked by LCN on the ground that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in its decision because it was clearly stated in the rules that there can be no payment of any other kind from the estate until the debts and claims against it have all been paid. It is further argued that the claim of Quasha Law Office is not in accordance with the rules since it was provided under the rules that Section 7. What expenses and fees allowed executor or administrator. Not to charge for services as attorney. Compensation provided by will controls unless renounced. Quasha however contends that the same is not applicable to it since it is not an administrator of the estate. ISSUE: is the law office an administrator of the estate?

HELD: NO. When Atty. Quasha passed away in 1996, Atty. Syquia was left as the sole administrator of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere. The person of Atty. Quasha was distinct from that of petitioner Quasha Law Office; and the appointment of Atty. Quasha as administrator of the estate did not extend to his law office. Neither could petitioner Quasha Law Office be deemed to have substituted Atty. Quasha as administrator upon the latter's death for the same would be in violation of the rules on the appointment and substitution of estate administrators, particularly, Section 2, Rule 82 of the Revised Rules of Court.24 Hence, when Atty. Quasha died, petitioner Quasha Law Office merely helped in the settlement of the estate as counsel for the petitioner children of the late Raymond Triviere. Corollary thereto, Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court provides in clear and unequivocal terms the modes for replacing an administrator of an estate upon the death of an administrator, to wit: Section 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or removal. x x x. When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the court grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person. The records of the case are wanting in evidence that Quasha Law Office or any of its lawyers substituted Atty. Quasha as co-administrator of the estate. None of the documents attached pertain to the issuance of letters of administration to petitioner Quasha Law Office or any of its lawyers at any time after the demise of Atty. Quasha in 1996. This Court is thus inclined to give credence to petitioner's contention that while it rendered legal services for the settlement of the estate of Raymond Triviere since the time of Atty. Quasha's death in 1996, it did not serve as co-administrator thereof, granting that it was never even issued letters of administration.

RULE 83.
Santero vs. CFI GR L-61700 FACTS: Pablo Santero, the only legitimate son of Pascual and Simona Santero, had three children with Felixberta Pacursa namely, Princesita, Federico and Willie (herein petitioners). He also had four children with Anselma Diaz namely, Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina, and Miguel (herein private respondents). These children are all natural children since neither of their mothers was married to their father. In 1973, Pablo Santero died. Anselma Diaz who is the second spouse filed a Motion For Allowance in for the benefit of four of her children. Movant Anselma Diaz only followed the precedent of the Court which granted a similar motion last year to be spent for the school expenses of her wards. This was granted by the court in its assailed order. The petitioners opposed said decision on the ground that private respondents were no longer studying, that they have attained the age of majority, that all of them except for Miguel are gainfully employed, and the administrator did not have sufficient funds to cover the said expenses. In the Reply filed by the guardian-movant, she admitted some of her children are of age and not enrolled for the first semester due to lack of funds but will be enrolled as soon as they are given the requested allowances. She cited Article 290 of the Civil Code providing that: Support is everything that is indispensable for substance, dwelling, clothing and medical attendance, according to the social position of the family. Support also includes the education of the person entitled to be supported until he completes his education or training for some trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.'

ISSUE: Whether the grant of allowance was valid despite the fact the fact that the grantees were no longer minors. HELD: YES The controlling provision of law is not Rule 83, Sec. 3 of the New Rules of Court but Arts. 290 and 188 of the Civil Code reading as follows: Art. 290. Support is everything that is indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing and medical attendance, according to the social position of the family. Support also includes the education of the person entitled to be supported until he completes his education or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the children during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them. The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188. While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence, the private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo Santero. Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule. Be it noted however that with respect to "spouse," the same must be the "legitimate spouse" (not common-law spouses who are the mothers of the children here).

RULE 84.
a. De Hilado vs Nava G.R. No. L-46249 FACTS: (text of the whole case) On February 8, 1935, the administatrix Estefania Fenix of the intestate of the deceased Rafael Jocson, executed in favor of appellant Jesus R. Nava a contract of lease period of five crop years, over certain properties of the estate, at a stipulated rental of P1,000 a year. The contract was entered into without the intervention of the court acting in the intestate proceedings. On July 23, 1936, appellee herein, Conception Jocson de Hillado, filed a motion in said proceedings, praying that the administratix be required to explain certain details in the matter of said lease; and in reply to the answer filed by said administratrix to lease the lands compromised in the contract to the highest bidder at public auction. Jesus R. Nava, the lessee, filed a motion asking that the order be set aside, it having been issued without jurisdiction. The motion was denied, and he appealed. The controlling issue here raised is whether or not the lower court has the power to annul, in the intestate proceedings, a contract of lease executed by the administratrix without its intervention. Appellant maintains that it has no such power, and that the contract can only be annulled in a separate, independent proceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The contract here in question being a mere act of administration, could validy be entered into by the administratrix within her powers of administration, even without the court's previous authority.

And the court had no power to annul or invalidate the contract in the intestate proceedings wherein it had no jurisdiction over the person of the lessee. A separate ordinary action is necessary to that effect. b. San Diego vs Nombre FACTS: Nombre was initially the appointed asministrator of the estate. He entered into a lease contract with Escanlar for a period of 3 years. This was done without authorization of the court. Nombre was removed as an administrator and was replaced. The court then sought the annulment of the contract for lack of authorization. ISSUE: Whether or not a judicial administrator can validly lease property of the estate without prior judicial authority and approval. HELD: Rule 84, section 3, of the Rules of Court authorizes a judicial administrator, among other things to administer the estate of the deceased not disposed of by will. Under this provision, the executor or administrator has the power of administering the estate of the deceased for purpose of liquidation and distribution. He may, therefore, exercise all acts of administration without authority of the court. For instance, he may lease the property without securing previously any permission from the court. And where the lease has been formally entered into, the court cannot, in the same proceeding, annul the same, to the prejudice of the lessee, over whose person it had no jurisdiction. The proper remedy would be a separate action by the administrator or the heirs to annul the lease.

RULE 85.
a. Garcia vs Escudero G.R. No. L-16753 FACTS: Gregorio Garcia Verdejo, owner of certain properties situated in the municipality of Dolores, Province of Tayabas, died in Manila in the year 1895, leaving an open will wherein the named as his heirs his three sisters the plaintiffs herein, and appointed as his administrators, Sisenando Marasigan and the defendant Placido Escudero. The plaintiffs, as the testamentary heirs of the testator brought an action to compel the respondent to deliver to them the properties of the testator which were not disposed of by will. They also prayed that the respondent render an accounting from the period starting February 24, 1896. The court rendered its decision and gave the order, among other things, that the respondent render his accounts within 60 days. The respondent complied with the order and filed his account with the court for the latters approval. The trial court disapproved the accounts thus the respondent appealed with his assignment of errors as issues in this case. ISSUES: 1. The trial court erred in sentencing the defendant to pay the sum of P230, the value of the personal properties listed in Exhibit 2 of the plaintiffs; and in not holding that said properties perished by a fortuitous event or force majeure in a fire that broke out in the barrio wherein was situated the house of the defendant in which they were kept. 2. The trial court erred in sentencing the defendant to pay the sum of P1,445, the value of the cattle claimed in the complaint, consisting of 1 black horse, 1 black mare, and 5 female carabaos, and in not holding that said animals died of rinderpest and that the defendant, therefore, was not responsible for their loss. 3. The trial court erred in holding that the defendant was found to render an account of the fruits of the coconut lands and liable for their value, notwithstanding the fact that those lands were seized and held

by the revolutionists in Dolores during the period from February 24, 1896, to January 1, 1902, and notwithstanding the fact that said properties had been taken from his administration and control. 4. The trial court erred in holding that the defendant was bound to render an account of the products of said coconut lands covering the period from January 1, 1902, to August 15, 1906, and in disapproving the account rendered, covering this period. 5. The trial court erred in disapproving the account rendered by him insofar as the items under "Sundries" account are concerned, and in not finding that the defendant had really incurred the expenses and disbursement therein specified. HELD: Turning to the assignments of error, the first refers to certain personal properties, which, as appears from the evidence, were destroyed by fire. The trial court held the defendant responsible for such properties, it being of the opinion that he was negligent in having left them in the barrio of Santo Nio where they were. Taking into account the fact that that fire occurred in a calamitous time, for, as appears from the evidence, it was caused by the North American forces who were fighting the Philippine revolutionists, we find that the disaster could not have been prevented by the defendant. It might be said that he could have foreseen it, but it does not appear just how and where those properties could have been kept absolutely safe by the defendant, it not having been proven that the town of San Pablo, the place of residence of the defendant, was any safer than that of Santo Nio. It was not shown that such properties were destroyed through the negligence of the defendant. The second error assigned is concerned with the finding of the court below, holding the defendant liable for the value of the cattle that perished during the rinderpest of 1898, on account of the fact that no written evidence of their death had been introduced in accordance with the laws then in force on large cattle. In the first place the fact of the death of those animals is proven by the testimony of the defendant based on his personal knowledge, and this testimony is not a secondary, but original, evidence of such fact. It would be a secondary evidence if such testimony were a mere recital of the contents of the credentials or annotated certificates issued in accordance with article 7 of the Large Cattle Regulation approved by Royal Order dated August 19, 1862, in force in the Philippines in 1898. Besides, it does not appear that whenever an animal died, the officer having authority on the matter (teniente de ganados) was notified in all cases of the fact and the regulations complied with. In the second place, no timely objection was made to said testimony of the defendant. We find that the trial court committed the second error assigned. Coming to the third error, it refers to the order of the court requiring the defendant to render an account of the products of the coconut lands from February 24, 1896, to January 1, 1902. The evidence shows that those coconut lands were seized by the Philippine revolutionists in the year 1899 and that in 1902 they were a forest. The Philippine Revolution lasted, practically, during the whole period from 1896 to 1902, and the defendant, residing as he was, in a town far away from the coconut lands, could not, as he testified, go to the lands to gather their fruits, and thus he got none, according to his testimony. We hold that the defendant should be relieved from the obligation to render the account mentioned in this assignment of error. With regard to the accounts referred to in the fourth assignment of error, which pertain to the period from January 1, 1902 to August 15, 1906, the defendant says in his statement of accounts that in 1902 and 1903 the fruit of the coconut trees hardly covered the small expenses; that in 1904 and 1905, they began to yield something but very little. It not having been proven that in those periods the coconut lands produced anything to be accounted for, we find the report made by the defendant sufficient on this matter, and it is unnecessary to require him to make a detailed statement of said products. As to the fifth assignment of error, which has reference to those items of the defendant's accounts, appearing under "Sundries" account, we find that those items are proved by the testimony of the defendant, the plaintiffs' evidence being insufficient to overthrow or weaken it. We believe that the items under "Sundries" account in defendant's statement should have been approved.

b. Nicolas vs Nicolas GR. No. L-42516 This is an appeal taken by Domingo Nicolas, ex-administrator of the intestate of the deceased Santiago Nicolas, from the order of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, the dispositive part of which reads as follows: The court, therefore, approves the two accounts dated August 14, 1933 and March 14, 1934, presented by the ex-administrator Domingo Nicolas, with the amendments above-stated and with a balance of P726.01 in favor of the administration, which sum said Domingo Nicolas must turn over to the administrator Protasio Santos, through the clerk of this court, within the period of twenty (20) days from this date. In case of noncompliance with this order on the part of Domingo Nicolas, let the bond given by said ex-administrator be attached in order to collect said sum of P726.01. He appealed the order of the court and insisted that the inclusion of other documents should be allowed as the inclusion of said pleadings, orders, decrees and judgments in the record on appeal alleges as a ground thereof that they constitute the best evidence of the services rendered by him and his attorney. The court however rejected this contention stating the inclusion of these documents is unnecessary. The rule only requires the inclusion of the order appealed from. He also contended that he has not been given the opportunity to be heard on his accounts as the court has not let him testify under oath. However, it has been shown that a hearing has been called by the court for the appellant to testify on his account. Issue: Is the appellant entitled to payment of 4 pesos for every pleading which he performed? HELD: As to the items 3, 5, 6 and 9 under the heading "III Payments", consisting in "Money advanced to Attorney Bartolome Domingo, P400", "Partial payment of the debt of the deceased in favor of Miguel Julian, P105.10", "Partial payment to Commissioner Gregorio Gabriel, P100", and "Expenses during the anniversary, of the deceased, P36.50", we are of the opinion that the court a quo correctly rejected them on the ground that they had not been authorized by said court and because they had already been discussed in Judge Buenaventura Ocampo's order of November 14, 1933, from which no appeal was taken. Item 9 thereof, consisting in expenses incurred by the appellant on the occasion of the anniversary of the death of the deceased, amounting to P36.50, cannot be considered a part of the funeral expenses nor treated as the erection of a mausoleum which forms part of the sepulture of the deceased, because it bears no relation to the funeral. With respect to the other expenses and fees which the ex-administrator-appellant seeks to collect and which the lower court, rejected, the law only authorizes the administrator to collect for his services as such the sum of P4 for every day actually and necessarily spent by him in the administration and care of the estate of a deceased person, not for every act or task he might perform, even if it were to take only a few minutes to do so, as indicated by the nature of the great majority of the task performed by him, for each and every one of which he seeks to collect P4. Therefore this court is of the opinion that the 18 days granted by the lower court to the exadministrator-appellant as actually and necessarily spent by him in the performance of his duties, at P4 a day, are reasonable.

c. Salonga vs Pascual GR. 127165 FACTS: Olivia Pascual (executor) engage the services of petitioner in connection with the settlement of the estate of Dona Adela. Their agreement as to the professional fees due to petitioner is contained in a letter dated 25 of August 1987, signed by Atty. Esteban Salonga in behalf of petitioner and Olivia Pascual. It is stipulated therein, among others, that the final professional fee shall be3% of the total gross estate as well as the fruits thereof based on the court approved the inventory of the estate. Fruits shall be reckoned from the time of *Olivia Pascuals+ appointment as executrix of the estate. The 3% final fee shall be payable upon approval by the court of the agreement for the distribution of the properties to the court designated heirs of the estate. After Dona Adelas will had been admitted to probate, petitioner had initially filed a Notice of Attorneys Lien wherein it identified itself as the attorney for the executrix named in the said will, Dra. Olivia S. Pascual, and sought to file its claim and/or lien for attorneys fee equivalent to Three Percent (3%) of the total gross estate, pursuant to the 1987 Retainer Agreement. Copies of this Notice to Attorneys Lien were furnished Atty. Fortunato Viray, Jr. and Crisanto Cornejo, who appear on record to have served as counsels for the various oppositors to the probate of the 1987 will of Dona Adela. This Notice of Attorneys Lien was noted by the probate Court in its order of 4 November 1993, as a lien that must be satisfied chargeable to the share of Olivia S. Pascual.

Issue: whether a lawyer who renders legal service to the executor or administrator of an estate can claim attorneys fee against the estate instead of the executor or administrator Ruling: When a lawyer has rendered legal services to the executor or administrator to assist him in the execution of his trust, his attorneys fee may be allowed as expenses of administration. The estate is, however, not directly liable for his fees, the liability for payment resting primarily on the executor or administrator. If the administrator had paid the fees, he would be entitled as the reimbursement from the estate. The procedure to be followed by counsel in order to collect his fees is to request the administrator to make payment, and should the latter fail to pay, either to (a) file an action against him in his personal capacity, and not as administrator, or (b) file a petition in the testate or intestate proceedings asking the court, after notice to all the heirs and interested parties, to direct the payment of his fees as expenses of administration. Whichever course is adopted, the heirs and other persons interested in the estate will have the right to inquire into the value of the services of the lawyer and on the necessity of his employment. While the direct recovery of the attorneys fees from the estate may be authorized if the executor refuses to pay such fees, and claim through the filing of the proper petition with the probate court, such claim remains convertible. The petition must be made with notice to all the heirs and interested parties. It may be so that petitioner, in filing this Notice of Attorneys Lien, initially intended to hold Olivia Pascual, and not Dona Adelas estate, liable for the attorneys fees. It did identify itself as the lawyer of Olivia Pascual, and the Probate Court did note that the lien be satisfied chargeable to the share of the executor. Yet it must also be noted that such lien, as it is, is only contingent on the final settlement of the estate of Dona Adela, at such time, since the Retainer Agreement on which the lien is hinged provides that the final fee be payable upon approval by the court of agreement for the distribution of the properties to the court designated heirs of the estate. This is also made clear by the order noting the lien, which qualified that said lien was chargeable only to the share of Olivia Pascual, hence implying that at the very least, it may be claimed only after her share to Dona Adelas is already determinate. In rendering its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on this qualification made by the Probate Court that the lien for attorneys fees was chargeable only to the share of Olivia Pascual. Yet

the Notice of Attorneys Lien only seeks to serve notice of the prudency of the claim for attorneys fees, and not the payment of such fees itself. On its own, the Notice of Attorneys Lien cannot serve as the petitioner of attorneys fees. On the other hand, Escueta and its kindred cases do explicitly recognize the recourse for the lawyer to directly make the claim for attorneys fees against the estate, no the executor or administrator. The filing of the notice of attorneys lien and the qualificatory character of the rulings thereon, do not preclude the resort to the mode of recovery against the estate as authorized by jurisprudence. Clearly then, we disagree with the opinion of the court of appeals that attorneys fees can be claimed only against the share of Olivia Pascual. The instant case is rooted in an incomplete attempt to resort to the second mode of recovery of attorneys fees as authorized in Escueta, originating as it did from the denial of petitioners motion for writ of execution, and not the notice of attorneys liens. The motion did expressly seek the payment of attorneys fees to petitioner. Escueta and Occena, among the cases, did clearly lay down the manner under which such may be paid out even prior to the final settlement of the fee as an administration expense directly chargeable to the estate itself. The critical question in the present petition is that whether this motion for writ of execution satisfies the requisites set in Escueta for a claim for attorneys fees directly chargeable against the estate. It does not. The fact that the prayer for attorneys fees was through a motion and not a petition should not impede such claim, considering that the motion was nonetheless filed with the probate court. However, the record bares that the requisite notice to all heirs and interested parties has not been satisfied. Dona Adelas will designated 19 other individuals apart from Olivia Pascual, and four different institutions as recipients of devises or legacies consisting of real properties, jewelries and cash amounts. Yet Olivia Pascual was served with a copy of the motion for writ of execution, the motion which effectively sought the immediate payment of petitioners attorneys fees. As early as 29, april 1994, Olivia Pascual, in opposing the motion for writ of esecution, already pointed out that petitioner had failed to give sufficient notice to all interested parties to the estate, particularly the several devises and legatees so named in the will. Such notice is material to the other heirs to the estate. The payment of attorneys fees, especially in the amount of 3% of the total gross estate as sought for by petitioner, substantially diminishes the estate of the estate and may consequently cause the diminution of their devises and legacies. Since this persons were so named in the very will itself, there is no reason why petitioner could not have given due notice to this persons in its claim for attorneys fees. The requisite notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees is anchored on the constitutional principle that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.