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ALERTS

FOR May 2013 Automated Elec ons

BANTAYAN! MODERN DAY WHOLESALE CHEATING

THE PRECINCT Each clustered precinct is at the center stage on Elec on Day. All ac vi es therein must be monitored and if possible covered live by CCTV and made available to the public via internet live streaming. Alterna vely, if cost considera on makes it imprac cal to implement, organize youth and other groups in each barangay to monitor. During Elec on Day, they can upload pictures taken at the precincts to watch dogs' websites for viewing by the public on real me basis. BALLOTS When the BALLOTS of kilometric size arrive in the Provincial Treasurer's Oce, MONITOR them in the premises 24 hours a day un l the actual distribu on on Elec on Day. Watch out for PRESHADED BALLOTS. Require the BEI to exhibit every ballot to the public or the watchers before giving it to the voter. Any preshaded ballot is prima facie evidence of fraud on the part of the BEI. With the longsize BALLOT (the longest in the world!), secrecy of vo ng is compromised. VOTERS' LIST VOTERS' lists in 2010 came in three kinds: CVL, CCVL and PVL. In many cases, there were discrepancies in the said lists from the list posted outside the polling center. The CCVL should be considered as the ocial. Check out the copy posted on the wall or door of the precinct for presence or absence (alive, dead, absent, and uniden ed) of any person in your respec ve barangay. Check out the biometrics list of registered voters. If there are discrepancies, make a manifesta on with the elec on ocer and have him/her signed your manifesta on and show proof that

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there are discrepancies. Watch out for ying voters. Make a ci zens' arrest if discovered and veried. 4. PCOS, THE HARDWARE The PCOS machine and the BEI with the technicians are the MAIN observa on posts on Elec on Day at the precinct. Every ac vity revolves around them. WATCHERS MUST POSITION THEMSELVES CLOSE TO THE TWO MAIN OBSERVATION POSTS: THE PCOS & THE BEI WITH TECHNICIANS CHECK THAT THE PROTECTIVE COUNTER OF THE PCOS WHICH IS CONTROLLED BY THE CF CARD, STARTS AT ZERO WATCH OUT FOR DELAYING TACTICS inside the Polling Precinct to warrant extension of vo ng me including surrep ous shu ng down of PCOS IN CASE OF SUDDEN SHUTDOWN, voters must check the electrical connec on and ensure this incident is recorded and reported to monitors TRY TO DISTINGUISH THE OFFICIAL PRECINCTASSIGNED PCOS FROM THE FAKE PCOS AND/OR CONTINGENT PCOS. Because cer ca on and tes ng are anything but arbitrary, there is no way to know if the PCOS machine at the precinct is the authorized Precinctassigned PCOS machine. PCOS buying or PCOS control is a new form of modernday chea ng that everybody must be wary of 5. TECHNICIANS & BEI No BEIs should ever be allowed to ins tute the delaying tac c of allowing only 10 voters to vote at any given me. Vo ng must proceed freely and con nuously. No BEIs should ever be allowed to break the vo ng process for any length of me and for any reason. Watcher should be alerted about undue delay in the vo ng and transmission process. Warn them that no extension of vo ng will ever be allowed and that steps are taken to determine beforehand if deliberate delays are made especially with the opera on of the PCOS like bogging down and shu ng the PCOS down. Technicians on the other hand must not nker with the PCOS machines and other paraphernalia UNLESS technical trouble arises. Record every ac vity by the technician especially in entering passwords, inser ng CF cards or any external device.

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CF CARDS SWITCHING OF CF CARDS PRIOR TO OR IN THE COURSE OF VOTING: Record the serial number of the CF card. The use of CF card should not have been allowed in automated elec ons. But Comelec and Smartma c insisted. CF Card is not WORM (write onceread many). New data can be supplanted on the device and thus tampered with especially with the absence of industry prescribed safeguards like digital signature. If the CF card is a empted to be switched by the BEIs or Smartma c personnel prior to or in the course of vo ng for any reason, precinct watchers must have all BEIs or Smartma c personnel sign form sta ng the reasons thereof and taking note of any iden ca on marks or numbers both of the original and replacement CF cards. State boldly and clearly the corresponding penalty for the appropriate criminal oense. TRANSPORT OF CF CARDS TO MBOC: There should be plas c transparent boxes of a size sucient to guarantee visibility during transport. This is to prevent switching of CF cards while in transit. If not done, one will never know if the same CF card had been successfully transported. CF card buying is a new form of modernday wholesale chea ng in automated elec ons that everybody must be wary of.

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TRASMISSION & SERVERS Tes ng of the transmission is a necessary ac on that should have been addressed since the last 2010 elec ons. The February 2 mock elec ons using a few PCOS machines in only 12 areas showed dismal problems in transmission. Conic ng DOCUMENTED data IN May 2010 on transmission transmission successfully sent at the na onal level but record as failed transmission at the precinct level is an opening for FRAUD. Iden fy each clustered precinct site for presence or absence of signal with representa ves of COMELEC, SMARTMATIC, and RESPECTIVE PARTIES. Compare this data with actual situa on on Elec on Day to determine presence or absence of jamming of signals as an indica on of fraud. The SERVERS at the na onal level, for poli cal par es, ci zens' arm/KBP must be vigilantly watched for discrepancies of data transmission. Jamming transmission is a new form of modernday chea ng that everybody must be wary of

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PUBLIC WEBSITE In 2010, the Comelec website was found to contain incomplete and erroneous data entries as conrmed by a report by Dr. Pablo Manalastas, IT Fellow of CenPEG and Ateneo IT Department faculty, submi ed to the Comelec and Congress. It was eventually pulled out of the internet when RA 9369 prescribes it should be in full public view on elec on day and up to three (3 years) a er the elec on. The May 2013 elec on results should be posted on the Comelec website. THE COMELEC So far, the Comelec as the prime elec on manager has been inconsistent, untransparent and tolerant of non compliance and viola ons of the law by the technology provider, Smartma c on the quality of PCOS technology to be used in local condi ons. It has allowed the prepara ons of the system to proceed without an independent source code review by poli cal par es/interested par es; no updated SLI cer ca on and owner authoriza on; no correc ons of programming errors and no digital signature, among others. The Comelec is the primary agency to be watched. It is compromising the quality of prepara ons for automated elec ons in the country, to the point of circumven ng the laws just to proceed with a legacy and alterna ve to fraudulent manual elec ons.

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10. SMARTMATIC & ITS CONTRACTED PARTIES The company providing the vo ng technology to the Philippines, Smartma c no longer has the trust of and the license to operate the PCOS technology in the Philippines from the so ware owner, Dominion Vo ng System. What it does and con nues to do with the vo ng technology has dragged the Philippines into a vicious corporate war that compromises the integrity and transparency of the elec ons and the sovereignty of the country. The conduct of the RMA or random manual audit should be similarly watched. RMA should be done immediately, not weeks or months a er the closing of the polls as was done in 2010. A competent party with exper se in elec on audit should be authorized to do it.

Prepared by: CenPEG Elec on Team with AES Watch Filipino IT 4 Elec ons (FIT4E) and Biliran Kawsa February 18, 2013