Art.

13: Mitigating Circumstances

Incomplete Justifying or Exempting Circumstances People v. CA and Tangan (G.R. No. 103613)
Facts:

On December 1, 1984, Navy Captain Eladio C. Tangan was driving alone on Roxas Boulevard heading south and Generoso Miranda was driving his car in the same direction with his uncle, Manuel Miranda. Generoso was moving ahead of Tangan. Suddenly, firecrackers were thrown in Generoso's way, causing him to swerve to the right and cut Tangan's path. Tangan blew his horn several times. Generoso, slowed down to let Tangan pass. Tangan accelerated and overtook Generoso, but when he got in front, Tangan reduced speed. Generoso tried four or five times to overtake on the right lane but Tangan kept blocking his lane. When Tangan slowed down to make a Uturn, Generoso passed him, pulled over and got out of the car with his uncle. Tangan also stopped his car and got out. Generoso and Tangan then exchanged expletives. Then Tangan went to his car and got his .38 caliber handgun on the front seat.

According to the prosecution witnesses, Mary Ann Borromeo, Rosalia Cruz and Manuel Miranda, the accused pointed his gun at Generoso Miranda and when Manuel Miranda tried to intervene, the accused pointed his gun at Manuel Miranda, and after that the accused pointed again the gun to Generoso Miranda, the accused shot Generoso Miranda at a distance of about a meter. The shot hit the stomach of Generoso Miranda causing the latter to fall. Manuel Miranda grappled for the

possession of the gun and during their grappling, Rosalia Cruz intervened and took hold of the gun and after Rosalia Cruz has taken hold of the gun, a man wearing a red T-shirt took the gun from her. The man in T-shirt was chased by Manuel Miranda who was able to get the gun where the man in red T-shirt placed it.

On the other hand, the defense, particularly the accused and his witness by the name of Nelson Pante claimed that after the gun was taken by the accused from inside his car, the Mirandas started to grapple for possession of the gun and during the grappling, and while the two Mirandas were trying to wrest away the gun from the accused, they fell down at the back of the car of the accused. The accused lost the possession of the gun after falling at the back of his car and as soon as they hit the ground, the gun fell, and it exploded hitting Generoso Miranda.

Tangan ran away while Generoso lay on the ground bloodied. Manuel looked for the gun and ran after Tangan. Tangan found a policeman who allowed him to enter his patrol car. Manuel arrived and told the policeman that Tangan had just shot his nephew. Manuel went back to where Generoso lay and there found two ladies, Mary Ann Borromeo and Rosalina Cruz, helping his nephew board a taxi. Manuel suggested that Generoso be brought to the hospital in his car. He was rushed to the Philippine General Hospital but he expired on the way.

Tangan was charged with the crime of murder with the use of an unlicensed firearm. However, the information was amended to homicide with the use of a licensed firearm, and he was separately charged with illegal possession of unlicensed firearm. Tangan entered a plea of not guilty in the homicide case, but moved to quash the information for illegal possession of unlicensed firearm on various grounds. The motion to quash was denied, whereupon he filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. On November 5, 1987, said petition was dismissed and the joint trial of the two cases was ordered.

After trial, the lower court acquitted Tangan of illegal possession of firearm, but convicted him of homicide. The privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete selfdefense and the ordinary mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party and of passion and obfuscation were appreciated in his favor; Tangan was released from detention after the promulgation of judgment and was allowed bail in the homicide case.

Tangan appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court but increased the award of civil indemnity to P50,000.00. His subsequent motion for reconsideration and a motion to cite the Solicitor General in contempt were denied by the Court of Appeals.

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the prosecution, alleging grave abuse of discretion, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, naming as respondents the Court of Appeals and Tangan, where it prayed that the appellate court's judgment be modified by convicting accused-appellant of homicide without appreciating in his favor any mitigating circumstance.

Issue:

Whether or not Tangan acted in incomplete self-defense?

Decision:

Incomplete self-defense is not considered as a justifying act, but merely a mitigating circumstance; hence, the burden of proving the crime charged in the information is not shifted to the accused. In order that it may be successfully appreciated, however, it is necessary that a majority of the requirements of self-defense be present, particularly the requisite of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Unlawful aggression by itself or in combination with either of the other two requisite suffices to establish incomplete self-defense. Absent the unlawful aggression, there can never be self-defense, complete or incomplete, because if there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of defense will have no basis.

The element of unlawful aggression in self-defense must not come from the person defending himself but from the victim.

A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient. The exchange of insulting words and invectives between Tangan and Generoso Miranda, no matter how objectionable, could not be considered as unlawful aggression, except when coupled with physical assault. There being no lawful aggression on the part of either antagonists, the claim of incomplete self-defense falls.

No Intention to Commit so Grave a Wrong People v. Callet (G.R. No. 135701)

Facts:

Elbert S. Callet was charged and found guilty of the crime of Murder in the death of Alfredo Senador. Callet used a 9-inch hunting knife in stabbing the latter on the left shoulder near the base of the neck causing Senadors death shortly thereafter. Callet appealed his conviction claiming that the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Dumaguete City (Branch 30) gravely erred in failing to consider the mitigating circumstance of the fact that he had no intention to commit so grave a wrong thereforehis liability should be mitigated.

Issue:

Whether or not the criminal liability of Callet be mitigated in that he had no intention to commit so grave a wrong?

Decision: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The lack of intent to commit a wrong so grave is an internal state. It is weighed based on the weapon used, the part of the body injured, the injury inflicted and the manner it is inflicted. The fact that the accused used a 9-inch hunting knife in attacking the victim from behind, without giving him an opportunity to defend himself, clearly shows that he intended to do what he actually did, and he must be held responsible therefore, without the benefit of this mitigating circumstance.

Romera vs. People of the Philippines

FACTS: In the afternoon of October 4, 1998, petitioner Arturo Romera, Roy Mangaya-ay, and five other men were all headed to play volleyball. Caught in the rain, they all while away time at the house of Ciriaca Capil, then one of their companions, Franklin Generol, pulled a prank on Bebing Zulueta to which all of them laughed except Roy Mangaya-ay, the victim. Zulueta got mad at Generol and said a remark to which Romero replied that they all should watch out in Balaguan. Romero and Generol then left. There are two sides of the story in this case. According to the victim, herein petitioner, with a bolo in his hand, was already waiting for him and his companions when they arrived at the house of Antonio Mangaya-ay. Romero stabbed Roy Mangaya-ay in the stomach, fell unconscious, underwent surgery and was confined for more than three weeks. Petitioners side of the story is that, a drunken Roy was the aggressor who went to their house carrying a bolo who later on hacked their walls and Romero, although unsuccessfully. His stabbing of Roy using the latters bolo was an act of self-defense. The trial court found herein petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide. Romero appealed the case the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial courts judgment. Thus, this review for certiorari. ISSUES: Whether or not the mitigating circumstances of provocation and passion or obfuscation present in this case? RULINGS: Thrusting his bolo at petitioner, threatening to kill him, and hacking the bamboo walls of his house are, in our view, sufficient provocation to enrage any man, or stir his rage and obfuscate his thinking, more so when the lives of his wife and children are in danger. Petitioner stabbed the victim as a result of those provocations, and while petitioner was still in a fit of rage. In our view, there was sufficient provocation and the circumstance of passion or obfuscation attended the commission of the offense. But, we must stress that provocation and passion or obfuscation are not two separate mitigating circumstances. Well-settled is the rule that if these two circumstances are based on the same facts, they should be treated together as one mitigating circumstance. From the facts established in this case, it is clear that both circumstances arose from the same set of facts aforementioned. Hence, they should not be treated as two separate mitigating circumstances.

Vindication of a Grave Offense People v. Torpio (G.R. No. 138984)

Facts:

In the evening of October 11, 1997, Anthony went to the house of Dennis and invited the latter for a drinking spree. Afterwards both left the house of Dennis and went to a nearby store and started drinking with a companion named Porboy Perez. The three proceeded to Shoreline. In a cottage, Anthony tried to let Dennis drink gin and as the latter refused, Anthony bathed Dennis with gin and mauled him several times. Dennis crawled beneath the table and Anthony tried to stab him with a 22 fan knife but did not hit him. Dennis got up and ran towards their home.

Upon reaching home, he got a knife. Alarmed by the action of Dennis, his mother shouted. Manuel, his father, tried to scold his son and confiscate from him the knife but failed to do so, resulting to Manuels incurring a wound in his hand. He went back to the cottage. Upon seeing Dennis, Anthony ran towards the creek but Dennis blocked him and stabbed him. When he was hit, Anthony ran but got entangled with fishing net and fell on his back. Dennis then mounted on him and continued stabbing him resulting to the latters death. After stabbing, Dennis left and went to Camp Downes and slept there. The next morning, Dennis voluntarily surrendered himself to Boy Estrera, a well-known police officer.

The trial court rendered a judgment convicting Dennis for the crime of Murder qualified by treachery or evident premeditation and appreciating three mitigating circumstances. His father Manuel was acquitted. Not satisfied with the judgment, Dennis appealed his case.

Issue:

Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of having acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense is appreciated?

Decision:

The Supreme held that the mitigating circumstance of having acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense was properly appreciated. Dennis was humiliated, mauled and almost stabbed by the Anthony. Although the unlawful aggression had ceased when Dennis stabbed Anthony, it was nonetheless a grave offense for which the Dennis may be given the benefit of a mitigating circumstance.

However, the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation cannot be considered apart from the circumstance of vindication of a grave offense. These two circumstances arose from one and the same incident, i.e., the attack on the appellant by Anthony, so that they should be considered as only one mitigating circumstance.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FLORO MALEJANA Expert opinion evidence is to be considered or weighed by the court like any other testimony, in the light of their own general knowledge and experience upon the subject of inquiry. The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of the theory or opinion of the expert, but rather in the aid that he can render to the courts in showing the facts which serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded. Malejana was charged with murder for the death of one Janus Roces. During trial, the three eyewitnesses to the crime testified that on the night of the incident, Malejana fired his armalite rifle at the victim at least five times. The prosecution also presented the property custodian of PNP Pilar, Sorsogon, who testified that he issued to Malejana an M-16 armalite rifle with 260 rounds of live ammunition and when the same was returned to him two days after the incident, only 230 rounds of live ammunition were returned. The rural health physician of Pilar, Sorsogon also testified and concluded that the immediate causes of death of the victim were shock and hemorrhage while the antecedent cause was the multiple gunshot wounds on the latters chest. The defense, for its part, presented as its sole witness ballistics expert Vicente de Vera, chief of the Ballistics Division of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service. He testified against the likelihood ofan armalite being used to kill the victim and posited that the gunshot wounds were more consistent with those inflicted by bullets from a .45 caliber pistol. The trial court found Malejana guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution has established the guilt of Malejana beyond reasonable doubt HELD: The trial courts decision is AFFIRMED. De Veras testimony is not enough to overturn the trial courts decision and acquit Malejana. The proffered opinion of the said expert witness does not conclusively rule out the possibility that an armalite rifle had been used. Expert opinion evidence is to be considered or weighed by the court like any other testimony, in the light of their own general knowledge and experience upon the subject of inquiry. The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of the theory or opinion of the expert, but rather in the aid that he can render to the courts in showing the facts which serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded. In addition, the inclusion or exclusion by the expert of factors or elements that should or should not be considered in the determination of his opinion is to be considered in determining the weight to be attached to his testimony. In this case, the factor that de Vera used as the basis of his initial statement that a .45 caliber gun was used in the shooting, namely the nature and character of the wounds sustained by the victim, did not take into account the distance and relative position of Malejana. It must be remembered that the character of a gunshot wound depends upon the kind of shot, the distance from the body and the gun, and the velocity with which the shot strikes the body. The trial court, therefore, acted well within its discretion in not lending full-faith and credence to the testimony of de Vera which, on its face, is inconclusive as to the point being made, i.e., that an armalite rifle could not have possibly been used in the killing of Roces. Based on the evidence on record, the prosecution was able to establish that Malejana was issued a firearm and shot the victim thrice in the body. The wounds sustained by Roces were the direct and proximate result of his death.

BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROMEAS A VIABLE PLEA WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF SELFDEFENSE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARIVIC GENOSA G.R. No. 135981. September 29, 2000

Facts: On or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel, province of Leyte, accused Marivic Genosa, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused had provided herself for the purpose, inflicting several wounds which caused his death. The lower court found the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and sentenced the accused with the penalty of DEATH. On appeal, the appellant alleged that despite the evidence on record of repeated and severe beatings she had suffered at the hands of her husband, the lower court failed to appreciate her self-defense theory. She claimed that under the surrounding circumstances, her act of killing her husband was equivalent to self-defense. Issue: Whether or not the battered woman syndrome as a viable plea within the concept of self-defense is applicable in this case. Held: No. The court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of an imminent harm, from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probablenot necessarily immediate and actualgrave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

People v. Bates (G.R. No. 139907)

Facts: Around 2:00 in the afternoon of November 28, 1995, Edgar Fuentes, Simon Fuentes and Jose Boholst left Barangay Esperanza, Ormoc City to deliver copra to a certain Fely Rodado at Barangay Green Valley, Ormoc City. After delivering copra around 5:00 in the afternoon, the three men headed back to Barangay Esperanza. While they were along a trail leading to the house of Carlito Bates, the latter suddenly emerged from the thick banana plantation surrounding the trail, aiming his firearm at Jose Boholst who was then walking ahead of his companions. Jose grabbed Carlitos right hand and elbow and tried to wrest possession of the firearm. While the two were grappling for possession, the gun fired, hitting Carlito who immediately fell to the ground. At that instant, Marcelo Bates and his son Marcelo Bates, Jr., brother and nephew of Carlito, respectively, emerged from the banana plantation each brandishing a bolo. They immediately attacked Jose hacking him several times. Jose fell to the ground and rolled but Marcelo and his son kept on hacking him. Marcelo, then, turned to Simon and Edgar and shouted huwes de kutsilyo. Upon hearing the same, Simon and Edgar ran.

Upholding the prosecution evidence, the trial court rendered its Judgment, finding Marcelo Bates guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.

Issue:

Whether or not Marcelo could validly invoke the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation?

Decision:

Passion and obfuscation may not be properly appreciated in favor of appellant. To be considered as a mitigating circumstance, passion or obfuscation must arise from

lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of lawlessness or revenge or from anger and resentment. In the present case, clearly, Marcelo was infuriated upon seeing is brother, Carlito, shot by Jose. However, a distinction must be made between the first time that Marcelo hacked Jose and the second time that the former hacked the latter. When Marcelo hacked Jose right after seeing the latter shoot at Carlito, and if appellant refrained from doing anything else after that, he could have validly invoked the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. But when, upon seeing his brother Carlito dead, Marcelo went back to Jose, who by then was already prostrate on the ground and hardly moving, hacking Jose again was a clear case of someone acting out of anger in the spirit of revenge.

People v. Lab-eo (G.R. No. 133438)

Facts: Segundina Cayno was engaged in the business of selling rummage goods. Early in the morning of October 21, 1996 her son, Jerry Cayno went to the dap-ayan or barangay hall, in front of the Tadian Public Market to display the goods for sale. After displaying the goods, Segundina arrived and took over. Before noontime, while Nancy and Julie were plucking the white hair strands of Segundina, appellant Wilson Lab-eo arrived and approached his aunt, Segundina. Upon seeing him, Nancy went to a distance of about two meters while Julie was still near Segundina. Appellant sat down in front of his aunt and uttered something to her in a very soft voice. Nancy did not hear what he said because of her distance from them while Julie could not make out the conversation because of the sound coming from a running motor engine. What they only heard was Segundinas answer which was uttered in a loud angry voice koma-an ka tay baka mahigh bloodac (you get out because I might suffer high blood). They saw appellant leave. When appellant returned about 3 to 5 minutes after, Segundina was sitting on a low rattan stool. In front of her were Nancy and Julie, they did not notice appellants return, especially Segundina who had her back to appellant. When Julie saw appellant approach Segundina from the back, Julie thought that he would just box his aunt because she did not see the knife, which was wrapped in his blue jacket. Then appellant suddenly made a thrusting motion and he stabbed Segundina on the left portion of her back. He then ran away leaving the knife at the victims back with the jacket he had covered it with, hanging by the knifes handle. Appellant surrendered to the police authorities. The appellant was indicted for murder. The appellant does not deny stabbing Cayno. However, he maintains that neither treachery nor evident The Trial Court found the

premeditation attended the commission of the crime.

appellant guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Issue:

Whether or not the actuation of the accused can be properly appreciated as passion or obfuscation in his favour?

Decision:

For a person to be motivated by passion and obfuscation, there must first exist an unlawful act that would naturally produce an impulse sufficient to overcome reason and self-control. There is passional obfuscation when the crime is committed due to an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. In asking the appellant to leave, the victim did not do anything unlawful. There is an absolute lack of proof that the appellant was utterly humiliated by the victims utterance. Nor was it shown that the victim made that remark in an insulting and repugnant manner. The victims utterance was not the stimulus required by jurisprudence to be so overwhelming as to overcome reason and self-restraint.

People of the Philippines vs. Gonzales, Jr.

FACTS: On October 31, 1998 at about 2:30 p.m., the families of Noel Andres and herein accusedappellant were both on their way to the exit of the Loyola Memorial Park. At the intersection point, the cars they were driving almost collided. Later on, when Andres found an opportunity, he cut Gonzalez off, disembarked from his car and went over to Gonzales. Altercation then ensued. Meanwhile, Dino Gonzalez, son of Inocencio, entered the scene in defense of his father. Fearing that his son was in danger, Gonzalez took out the gun which was already in his car compartment. Upon seeing his father, Gonzalezs daughter, Trisha, hugged her father and in the process held his hand holding the gun. The appellant tried to free his hand and with Trishas substantial body weight pushing against him the appellant lost his balance and the gun accidentally fired. Feliber Andres, Noels wife, was shot to death while their son, Kenneth and nephew Kevin were wounded. The trial court found the accused guilty of the complex crime of murder and two counts of frustrated murder and accordingly sentenced him to death. Accused were also ordered to pay for civil liabilities to the heirs of Mrs. Andres, and the parents of Kevin Valdez. Hence, an automatic review or this case. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error when it found treachery was present in the commission of the crime. 2. Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to appreciate voluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation, incomplete defense of a relative and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong be considered as mitigating circumstances. RULINGS: 1. It has been consistently held by this court that chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes committed at the spur of the moment or that were preceded by heated altercations are generally not attended by treachery for lack of opportunity of the accused to deliberately employ a treacherous mode of attack. Thus, the sudden attack made by the accused due to his infuriation by reason of the victims provocation was held to be without treachery. Sudden attacks made by the accused preceded by curses and insults by the victim or acts taunting the accused to retaliate or the rebellious or aggressive behavior of the victim were held to be without treachery as the victim was sufficiently forewarned of reprisal. For the rules on treachery to apply the sudden attack must have been preconceived by the accused, unexpected by the victim and without provocation on the part of the latter. We affirm the recommendation of the Solicitor-General that the shooting was not attended by treachery and accordingly the crime committed for the death of Feliber Andres is homicide and not murder. 2. The mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation, incomplete

defense of a relative and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, pleaded by the defense, were not convincingly proved and none can be considered in the imposition of penalties. The testimony of prosecution witness contradicts the appellants pretense of voluntary surrender. The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is also not obtaining. Provocation must be sufficient to excite a person to commit the wrong committed and that the provocation must be commensurate to the crime committed. The sufficiency of provocation varies according to the circumstances of the case. The aggressive behavior of Noel Andres towards the appellant and his son may be demeaning or humiliating but it is not sufficient provocation to shoot at the complainants vehicle. The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative is also unmeritorious since the act of Andres in cursing and shouting at the appellant and his son do not amount to an unlawful aggression against them, Dino Gonzalez. Finally, the plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong is likewise devoid of merit. This mitigating circumstance is obtaining when there is a notable disparity between the means employed by the accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime committed. The intention of the accused at the time of the commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of attack employed and the injury sustained by the victim. The appellants use of a gun, although not deliberately sought nor employed in the shooting, should have reasonably placed the appellant on guard of the possible consequences of his act. The use of a gun is sufficient to produce the resulting crimes committed.

People v. Enguito (326 SCRA 508)

Facts:

On or about September 22, 1991, Felipe Requerme was driving a motorela, together with his wife Rosita and another passenger, Engr. Wilfredo Achumbre, who is the deceased in this case. The deceased was picked up by them on their way home and requested them to bring him to his house. While on their way, a white vehicle, which was later on identified as a Ceres Kia automobile bearing Plate No. 722, intentionally hit and pushed the motorela that they were riding and violently kept pushing it causing it to turn around facing the direction from where it came from and fell on its right side. Rosita testified that while she was struggling out of the motorela she noticed that the white vehicle went up the elevated catwalk or pathway pursuing Achumbre who was hit when he was already at the railing (barandilla). Then she observed that the white vehicle drove away without even caring to see what happened to them. The spouses/victims were brought to the police station while the Achumbre was brought to the hospital who was declared dead on arrival. It was later on found out upon investigation that said incident was predicated on the earlier fight which transpired between Achumbre and the driver of the motor vehicle, Thadeos Enguito, the accused in this case. As a result of the death of Achumbre, his wife filed a criminal complaint against the accused. The Regional Trial Court found him guilty with the crime of Homicide with Less Serious Physical Injuries, taking into consideration the aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle which was alleged in the information. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter modified the crime to Murder due to the aggravating circumstance. The accused went to the Supreme Court imputing error on the decision of the Court of Appeals with respect to the declaration of the crime of Murder against him on the ground that he did not intentionally choose the motor vehicle he was driving as a means of committing the offense, and that at most, the vehicle was the only available means to stop the deceased from escaping. He argued that it was his intention to apprehend and surrender the deceased to the police for his previous act of mauling him but in the process, he killed the deceased.

Issue:

Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle should be considered in this case?

Decision:

The indictment against accused-appellant is murder attended by the use of motor vehicle. The use of a motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder if the same was perpetrated by means thereof. Appellant's claim that he merely used the motor vehicle, Kia Ceres van, to stop the victim from escaping is belied by his actuations. By his own admission, he testified that there was a police mobile patrol near the crossing. Accusedappellant could have easily sought the assistance of the police instead of taking the law into his own hands. Moreover, accused-appellant already noticed the deceased trying to jump out of the motorela but he still continued his pursuit. He did not stop the vehicle after hitting the deceased[16] who was hit when he (Achumbre) was at the railing of the Marcos bridge. Accused-appellant further used the vehicle in his attempt to escape. He was already more than one (1) kilometer away from the place of the incident that he stopped his vehicle upon seeing the police mobile patrol which was following him.

Appellant contends that he should have been convicted of the crime of homicide with two (2) mitigating circumstances of acting in passion and voluntary surrender; and had the charge been homicide he could have pleaded guilty. We find that these mitigating circumstances cannot be appreciated in his favor. Accused-appellant was allegedly "still very angry" while he was following, bumping and pushing the motorela which was in front of him. He was previously mauled by the deceased and he was allegedly rendered unconscious by the blows inflicted on him. When he regained consciousness, he claims that he wanted to look for a policeman to report that he was mauled. Clearly, accused-appellant's state of mind after he was mauled and before he

crushed Achumbre to death was such that he was still able to act reasonably. In fact, he admitted having seen a police mobile patrol nearby but instead, he chose to resort to the dastardly act which resulted in the death of Achumbre and in the injuries of the spouses Requerme. For passion to be considered as a mitigating circumstance, facts must be proved to show causes sufficient to produce loss of self-control and to overcome reason. The turmoil and unreason which naturally result from a quarrel or fight should not be confused with the sentiment or excitement in the mind of a person injured or offended to such a degree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-control.

The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated. Evidence shows that accused-appellant was further pursued by the police. Appellant himself testified that he stopped his vehicle just after the police mobile stopped but admitted having "stopped farther than the police mobile". SPO3 Catiil further testified that appellant did not surrender but only stopped his vehicle when its right tire was already flat. His testimony was corroborated by PO3 Makiling who was patrolling the portion of Marcos Bridge. He testified that he saw the vehicle being driven by accusedappellant already destroyed and the right portion of the vehicle a little bit lower as it was running flat. Clearly, accused-appellant could have eluded arrest but his situation became futile when his vehicle suffered a flat tire.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the existence or non-existence of a mitigating circumstance in the case at bar will not affect the penalty to be imposed pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime committed by accused-appellant is the complex crime of murder with less serious physical injuries. Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for a complex crime shall be the maximum period of the penalty for the most serious crime. The crime was committed in 1992 where the penalty for the crime of murder, which is the most serious crime, was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The death penalty being the maximum period of the penalty for murder should be imposed for the complex crime of murder with less serious physical injuries considering that under Article 63, an indivisible penalty cannot be affected by the presence of any mitigating or

aggravating circumstance. And, consonant with the ruling in People vs. Muoz that Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution did not change the period of the penalty for murder except only insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua, the Court of Appeals was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE vs GUEVARRA

Facts (as found by the prosecution): April 8, 1980, evening; San Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija: Armed men entered the house of spouses Luisito and Priscilla Cruz and robbed them of P3,000 & jewelry. Subsequently, they also took the spouses car and forcibly boarded Priscilla along with them. They headed towards Manila, and along the way Priscilla recognized the one of the kidnappers, who then was driving the car. They told her that they were holding her for ransom of P50,000, but later on left her at Paxton Hotel in Valenzuela, the kidnappers having convinced themselves that the kidnapping did not materialize. On same date, Luisito Cruz reported the incident, which led the police authorities to the detention and investigation of accused Vergel Bustamante at the WPD in Manila. He was later identified by Priscilla as the driver of the car when they kidnapped her. Procedure:

Information Amended Information, per trial courts order. The amended info charged Jaime Guevarra, Poncing Abergas, Dan Tolentino, Baldo De Jesus, Roming Longhair, Boy Tae, Boy Pogi, Vergel Bustamante alias Dan Saksak, and Chotse Doe alias Bernabe Sulaybar, with kidnapping

Separate trial for Abergas and Bustamante only, as Tolentino could not be served with subpoenas and other accused were reported to have died already

Conviction: Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention; sentence: Death Penalty Automatic review by Supreme Court. But with the adoption of the 1987 Consti., which does not allow imposition of death penalty, the sentence was reduced to reclusion perpetua. Thus Bustamante elected to continue the case on appeal.

Bustamantes claim on appeal: trial court erred in ordering amendment of the info. To include Vergel Bustamante alias Dan Saksak as one and the same person

HELD: 1) Questioned order of the trial court to amend the info. and include the correct name of Dan Saksak as Vergel Bustamante is not without basis. Records of the criminal case forwarded by the MTC of NE to the RTC of NE led the judge of the latter to believe that Bustamante & Dan Saksak was one & the same person (di sinabi sa case kung bakit kasali yung MTC dito. Apparently, it conducted a preliminary examination): a) A subpoena issued by the MTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija in Crim Case Nos. 186-80 & 192-

80 was directed to one Vergel Bustamante alias Dan Saksak. b) In a return of service of one subpoena, the warden of the City Jail of Manila informed the

Clerk of Court of the MTC of Gapan, NE that Vergel Bustmante @ Dan Saksak said to be one of the accused is not included in the list of present Inmates of said Jail c) The order issued by the MTC of Gapan, NE finding a prima facie case against the accused

therein also stated that one of the accused is Vergel Bustamante alias Dan Saksak d) The letter of transmittal of the records of the cases to the RTC of NE stated that one of the

accused therein, Vergel Bustamante @ Dan Saksak is detained at the Mla. City Jail 2) In any event, THE ISSUE CANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL . THE ISSUE IS ONE AFFECTING JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED BEFORE THE RTC IN A MOTION TO QUAH THE INFORMATION. SINCE THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT FAILED TO DO SO, HE IS DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED HIS OBJECTION TO THE INFORMATION.

Andrada v. People (GR No. 135222)

Facts:

In an Information dated January 7, 1987, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City charged petitioner with Frustrated Murder committed as follows: That on or about the 24th day of September 1986, in the City of Baguio, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and hack one Arsenio Ugerio on the head twice with a bolo thereby inflicting the latter: hacking wound, head, resulting in (1) skull and scalp avulsion vertex; (2) depressed comminuted skull fracture, right parieto occipital with significant brain laceration; operation done; craciectomy; vertex debridement; craniectomy; right parieto occipital; dural repair; debridement, thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder as a consequence thereof, but nevertheless, the felony was not committed by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, by the timely medical attendance extended to Arsenio Ugerio which prevented his death. When arraigned on February 9, 1987, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel de parte, pleaded Not Guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued.

Petitioner interposed self-defense and invoked the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

The RTC rendered its Decision finding the accused Peter Andrada guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs Decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused Peter Andrada is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender?

Decision:

Evidence for the prosecution shows that petitioner, after attacking the victim, ran away. He was apprehended by responding police officers in the waiting shed at the corner of Cambas Road and Magsaysay Avenue. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the surrender must be spontaneous, made in such a manner that it shows the interest of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or wishes to save them the trouble and expenses that would be necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Here, the surrender was not spontaneous.

People v. Quimzon (G.R. No. 133541)

Facts: In an Information dated July 28, 1992, appellant, Ricky Quimzon and three oher persons, namely Salvacion Lascarom, Canoto Cabero and Edgardo Detona were charged with the crime of murder allegedly committed as follows: That on or about the 7th day of March 1992, in the Municipality of Burauen, Province of Leyte, Philipines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another with treachery and abuse of superior strength, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniuosly attack, assault, strike, stab and wound one Marlo Casiong with short bolos locally known as pisao which accused provided themselves for the purpose, thereby hitting and inflicting upon the said Marlo Casiong with fatal wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his death shortly thereafter. Appellant surrendered to the police authorities on August 18, 1994 while his other coaccused remain at-large. When arraigned on September 28, 1994, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued. The RTC rendered its Decision finding the accused Ricky Quimzon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs Decision. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the appellant Ricky Quimzon is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender? Decision: It appears in the Commitment Order, dated August 14, 1994, issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of the MTC of Burauen, Leyte, that appellant voluntarily surrendered to SPO1 Josefino Agustin of PNP Burauen, Leyte on August 18, 1994. An examination of the records reveals that it can not be considered as a mitigating circumstance. For the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surreder to be appreciated, the accused must satisfactorily comply with three requisites: (1) he has not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latters agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary. There must be a showing of spontaneity and an intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because the accused acknowledges his guilt or wishes to spare them the trouble and expense concominant to his capture. The surrender of appellant was far from being spontaneous and unconditional. The warrant of arrest is date June 17, 1992 and all the accused, including appellant, remained atlarge, which prompted the Executive Judge of the RTC of Palo, Leyte to achieve the case. It took appellant two years before he finally surrendered to the police. In between said period, appellant, through counsel, filed a Motion to Fix Bail Bond without surrendering his person to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Records do not reveal that the motion had been acted upon by the trial court. This act of appellant may be considered as a condition set by him before he

surrenders to proper authorities, thus preventing his subsequent act of surrendering from being considered as a mitigating circumstance. G.R. No. 135551. October 27, 2000 People vs. Taraya FACTS: Accused-appelants Ampie Taraya, Jonar Estrada and Arly Cantuba, all are relatives, were charged for the crime of murder qualified by treachery for the death of Salvador Reyes. Salvador Reyes was killed on the night of September 24, 1995. Prosecution witnesses Mariano Adillo, David Angeles and Gregorio Reyes testified against the accused appellants. Their statements were countered by Armando Bilara, Domingo Decena, SPO2 Emmanuel Martinez and the accused appellants themselves. Prosecution witness Mariano testified that he saw the three accused approach Salvador the night Salvador was killed. Prosecution witness David Angles swore to have seen the actual killing and positively identified the three accused. Gregorio Reyes, the victims father, said that his son had an altercation with Arly. The defense countered their claims. Barangay Tanod Armando Bilara stated that David Angeles brother had a fistfight with Jonar, implying that there might be a different reason as to David Angeles insistence on Jonars involvement in the killing. Domingo Decena also testified that on the night of the killing he saw Salvador hit Ampie with a pipe which Ampie luckily avoided. Domingo added that Ampie, to defend himself hacked Salvador and ran away. Domingo stated that he also ran back home out of fear and only found out of Salvadors death the next morning. SPO2 Emmanuel Martinez testified that Ampie did surrender himself at the police station on Octiber 9, 1997. Ampie admitted on killing Salvador but contended that he did so out of self-defense and said that his cousins had nothing to do with it. Jonar and Arly both had alibis. Trial Court ruled against accused appellants for murder and appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Accused appellants appealed, arguing that Ampie should not be charged with murder since he have done so only out of self-defense plus Salvador was also armed with a pipe that night, which disqualifies treachery in the case. They further asserted that Arly and Jonar were not co-conspirators in the killing of Salvador Reyes. They were implicated by David Angeles, Jr claims which were not supported by clear evidence. Furthermore, they insisted that Ampie be allowed to avail of a mitigated sentence since he surrendered himself at the police station at his own will. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Jonar and Arly were co-conspirators in the killing of Salvador. 2. Whether or not Ampies contention of self-defense be given consideration. 3. Whether or not Ampies voluntary surrender made him eligible for a a mitigated sentence. HELD:

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. It does not require that such agreement occurred for an appreciable period prior to the commission of the crime; it is sufficient that at the time of the execution thereof, all accused had the same purpose and were united therein. The Court ruled that David Angeles testimony was not persuasive as to the participation of Arly and jonar in the crime. There had been no certainty as to their action to show a deliberate and concerted cooperation on their part as to likewise render them liable for the killing of Salvador. Prosecution evidence failed to convince the court as to its sufficiency with moral certainty that there indeed had been conspiracy among accused-appellants. Thus, The Court acquitted Jonar and Arly. The Court also ruled that, there being no positive and direct evidence to show that the attack was sudden and unexpected, treachery as a circumstance to qualify the killing to murder cannot be appreciated against AMPIE. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Treachery as a qualifying circumstance requires that the offender deliberately employs means of execution which deprives the person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate. Ampie thereforecould only be charged with homicide. As to the issue of Ampies voluntary surrender, the court emphasized that for one to avail of mitigating circumstance for voluntary surrender, the following requisites must be present: (1) the offender had not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter's agent; (3) the surrender was voluntary; and (4) there is no pending warrant of arrest or information filed. When Ampie surrendered, a pending warrant of arrest had already been issued. His arrest by that time was already imminent.

Confession of Guilt People v. Montinola (G.R. Nos. 131856-57) Facts: On 18 November 1996, William Montinola, armed with an unlicensed Cal .380 Pistol Llama deliberately, willfully and criminally with violence against or intimidation of persons, with intent of gain, take and carry away cash amount of P67,500.00 belonging to Jose Eduardo Reteracion. Montinola shot the victim on the neck, killing Reteracion. Two criminal cases were filed against Montinola and he was later on sentenced to reclusion perpetua for robbery with homicide and death for illegal possession of firearm. Issue: Whether the use of an unlicensed firearm on the killing perpetrated by reason or on occasion of the robbery may be treated as a separate offense or as an aggravating circumstance in the crime of robbery with homicide? Decision: Sec. 1 of P.D.1866 provides that if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed. Said Presidential Decree was however, amended by R.A. 8294, while Montinolas case was still pending. R.A. 8294 provides that if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. The Court held In recent cases, we ruled that there could be no separate conviction for illegal possession of firearm if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm; instead, such use shall be considered merely as an aggravating circumstance in the homicide or murder committed. Hence, insofar as the new law will be advantageous to WILLIAM as it will spare him from a separate conviction for illegal possession of firearm, it shall be given retroactive effect. Pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, use of an unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstance in the homicide or murder committed. At any rate, even assuming that the aggravating circumstances present in the commission of homicide or murder may be counted in the determination of the penalty for robbery with homicide, we cannot appreciate in this case the special aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294. Such law was not yet enacted when the crime was committed by WILLIAM; it cannot, therefore, be given retroactive effect for being unfavorable to him. The Court further held Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, robbery with homicide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, which are both indivisible penalties. Article 63 of the same Code provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the greater penalty shall be applied when the commission of the deed is attended by one aggravating circumstance. If we would apply retroactively the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, the imposable penalty would be death. Conformably with our ruling in People v. Valdez, insofar as the new law would aggravate the crime of robbery with homicide and increase the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death, it would not be given retroactive application, lest it would acquire the character of an ex post facto law. Hence, we shall not appreciate that special aggravating circumstance. There being no modifying circumstances, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon accused-appellant WILLIAM.

People v. Dawaton (G.R. No. 146247) Facts: Edgar Dawaton was found guilty by the trial court of murder qualified by treachery and was sentenced to death. On 20 September 1998, Leonidas Lavares and several companions, including Dawaton were drinking in the house of the accuseds uncle. Already drunk, Leonidas Lavares decided to sleep while the accused and his companions continued drinking. Dawaton awakened Lavares by stabbing him at the base of the neck. Dawaton continued stabbing Lavares until the victim died. Dawaton then ran away to the house of his other relative, where he was later on arrested by the police. Issue: Whether or not the penalty of death imposed by the trial court upon the accused was correct? Decision: No. The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in not considering the alternative circumstance of intoxication in favor of the accused. Under Art. 15 of The Revised Penal Code, intoxication of the offender shall be considered as a mitigating circumstance when the offender commits a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony. Otherwise, when habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.The allegation that the accused was drunk when he committed the crime was corroborated by the prosecution witnesses. The accused and his drinking companions had consumed four (4) bottles of gin at the house of Esmeraldo Cortez, each one drinking at least a bottle. It was also attested that while the four (4) shared another bottle of gin at the house of Amado Dawaton, it was the accused who drank most of its contents. The Court further stated that Under Art. 63, par. 3, of The Revised Penal Code, in all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two (2) indivisible penalties, such as in this case, when the commission of the act is attended by a mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Since no aggravating circumstance attended the killing but there existed the mitigating circumstance of intoxication, the accused should be sentenced only to the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Similar and Analogous Circumstances Canta v. People (G.R. No. 140937) Facts: Narciso Gabriel owns a cow that was passed on from one person to another and each person was responsible for the care and custody of the said cow. At the time the cow got lost, it was under the care and custody of Gardenio Agapay. Agapay took the cow in the mountain of Pilipogan, 40 meters away from his hut, at around 5:00 in the afternoon. When he came back to get the cow at past 9 in the evening, the cow was gone. However, Aagapay saw footprints that led to the house of Filomeno Vallejos. Vallejos told Agapay that Exuperancio Canta took the cow. Agapay and Maria were instructed by Narciso to get the cow and on their way to Florenitno Cantas house, they saw Exuperancio. The latter told them that if it was really Narciso who was the owner of the cow, he should get it himself. Exuperancia accompanied the two to his fathers house and both recognized the cow but Florentino was not home. Exuperancio told Maria and Agapay that he would call them the next day to talk about the matter with his father. Exuperancio never called. The matter was reported to the police and Narciso and Exuperancio were called for investigation. Exuperancio admitted taking the cow but claims that he was the real owner of the cow and that it was lost on December 3, 1985. However, Narciso presented a certificate of ownership issued on March 9, 1986, signed by the municipal treasurer, in which the cow was described as two years old and female. Then, the petitioner also presented a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle dated February 27, 1985 and a statement executed by Franklin Telen, who was the janitor at the treasurer's office of the municipality, that he executed the certificate of ownership in favor of Exuperancio. The trial court rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty of the offense charged. Exuperancio filed a Motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's decision. Issue: Whether or not the lower courts were correct in sentencing Exuperancio to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, five (5) months, and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, and to pay the costs? Decision: No. The Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly found petitioner guilty of violation of 2(c) of P. D. No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974. However, it erred in imposing the penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 12 years, 5 months and 11 days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. The trial court apparently considered P. D. No. 533 as a special law and applied 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which provides that "if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." However, as held in People v. Macatanda,P. D. No. 533 is not a special law. The penalty for its violation is in terms of the classification and duration of penalties prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, thus indicating that the intent of the lawmaker was to amend the Revised Penal Code with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle. In fact, 10 of the law provides:

The provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code, as amended, pertinent provisions of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, all laws, decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations which are inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. There being one mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime, the penalty to be imposed in this case should be fixed in its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, in relation to Art. 64 of the Revised Penal Code, petitioner should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which is within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i. e.,prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium, and the maximum of which is prision mayor in its maximum period.

People v. Evina (405 SCRA 152) Facts: Gerardo Gavina was serve sentence of Reclusion Pertpetua for raping certain Ms. Maritess Catcharo. Based on the given facts, Gerardo took advantage of the time when the victims mother was not around. He would likely forced Maritess to have carnal knowledged against her will and even poked a knife at her while doing the deed in the victims dwelling and threthened the victim to kill her family should she tell her parents what happened. On November 13, 1991 when the appellant arrived at the Catcharro residence he proceeded inside the bedroom of Maritess, the latter ran out of the bedroom and told her mother not to leave her because her Papa Gerry might raped her again. Surprised by what he heard, the following day Maritess was brought to Tacloban City Medical Center for a check-up and found to have lacerations to the victims genitalia. Contrary to the facts above, appellant claimed that the night of the incident he was working as porter until 10 PM, thus it cannot be said that he committed the crime accused of him. Based on the information submitted, aggravating circumstances of use of weapon and dwelling were not alleged. Issue: Whether or not aggravating circumstances proved during trial but was not alleged in the information may be considered? Decision: The supreme court held in the negative. Although the special aggravating circumstance of the use of a weapon and the aggravating circumstance of dwelling were proven, these aggravating circumstances cannot be considered in fixing the penalty because they were not alleged in the information as mandated by Rule 110, Sections 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although the crimes charged were committed before the effectivity of the said rule, nevertheless, the same should be applied retroactively being favorable to the appellant.

PEOPLE vs ANTONIO Facts: In the early morning of June 16, 1996 Wilson Antonio alias Instik, the accused and Sergio Bobby Mella were having a drinking session where the victim boxed the accused. Upon arriving home together 2shots were fired although it was not certain who fired the shots Wilson believed it was Bobby. Wilson then shouted out that he will kill Bobby. At 7:15 am of June 16, 1996 went to the house of the victim despite her sisters plea Wilfe. Upon arriving Wilson shot the victim while he was in bed sleeping together with his7 year old son. The victim died thereafter. Wilson eluded arrest for more than one year. The accused raised insanity as a defense. Wilson, has from 1994 to 1996, underwent treatment for his unusual behavior. He was prescribed medications but did not take them religiously. Furthermore he habitually drank alcohol, which interfered with his medication. On Sept 14, 1998 Dr. Rowena Cosca examined the accused and diagnosed him with schizo-affective disorder. A person suffering from psychosis does not know what he is doing and is deprived of his faculty to distinguish right from wrong; he is deprived of reason and does not understand the consequences of his actuations because of his behavioral symptoms. Issue: Whether or not the accused was insane at the time of the commission of the crime entitling him to exempting circumstances of insanity. Held: No he is not. Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. When insanity is alleged to free a person from criminal liability, it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence which must refer to the time immediately preceding the act or at the very moment of its execution. A review of the evidence fails to show that the accused was legally insane at the time he shot Bobby. Dr. Coscas testimony as well as that of Wilsons mother failed to show that he was insane at the moment of the killing since they were not there. Wilsons testimony during his cross examination admitting his awareness of the circumstances of crime militates heavily against the defense. His condition however qualifies as a mitigating circumstance of illness which diminishes the exercise of his will without depriving him of the consciousness of his acts.

People v. Palaganas (501 SCRA 533)

Facts: On January 16, 1998 brothers Servillano and Michael Ferrer went to Tidbits Videoke bar singing and drinking beer. On the same evening Jaime Palaganas and Ferdinand Palaganas and Virgilio Bautista arrived. The two groups occupied separate tables. After the Ferrers singing Jaime Palaganas started singing and was joined by Tony Ferrer who sang loudly and in mocking manner. This insulted Jaime and soon a fight ensued between Ferrers and Palaganas. Ferdinand ran towards his house and sought help from his brother Fuijeric, the latter went outside however he was stoned by the Ferrer brothers. As they were continuously stoned the appellant Ferdinand suddenly pulled the trigger with the gun in his hands. The trial court rendered a decision finding the petitioner guilty of the crime of Homicide and Frustrated homicide but not guilty of violation of COMELEC RES. 2958. Issue: Whether or not violation of COMELEC RES. 2958 may be considered as Special aggravating circumstances which will negate consideration of mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender? Decision: With the passage of Republic Act. No. 8294 on 6 June 1997, the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is now considered as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not a generic aggravating circumstance.68 Republic Act No. 8294 applies to the instant case since it took effect before the commission of the crimes in 21 April 1998. Therefore, the use of an unlicensed firearm by the petitioner in the instant case should be designated and appreciated as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not merely a generic aggravating circumstance.

People v. Mendoza (327 SCRA 695)

Facts: Efren Mendoza was charged with the crime of murder for killing Anchito Nano. In this case Efren alleged that Anchito Nano arrived at their house and upon arrival it started to destroy the house and that the her wife was shouting for help. Efren immediately look for something to protect his family but found a bolo. He approached Anchito but the latter tried to hacked him but he was able to hacked him first on the right side of his neck resulting to the death of the victim. Thereafter Mendoza went to Municipal Hall of Vinzon and voluntarily surrendered to the police. He claimed that it was self defense. The autopsy revealed that location of the wounds found on the body of the victim came from the back of the victims body. The court ruled rejecting appellants self defense. This court finds that the accused was not in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, an attempt to defend himself by means which appeared unreasonable by using a long bolo is unjustifiable. Hence this appeal. Issue: Whether or not voluntary surrender was offset by the aggravating circumstances of treachery? Decision: The Supreme Court held in the negative. A qualifying circumstance changes the nature of the crime. A generic aggravating circumstance, on the other hand, does not affect the designation of the crime; it merely provides for the imposition of the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. Thus, while a generic aggravating circumstance may be offset by a mitigating circumstance, a qualifying circumstance may not. 32 Treachery in the present case is a qualifying, not a generic aggravating circumstance. Its presence served to characterize the killing as murder; it cannot at the same time be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance to warrant the imposition of the maximum penalty. Thus, it cannot offset voluntary surrender.

People v. Villamor (G.R. Nos. 140407-08)

Facts: On November 25, 1995, brothers Jerry Velez and Jelord Velez were on their way home on board a motorcycle. A motorcycle was speeding behind them and as they were about to cross the bridge, they heard gun shots firing behind them. As they turned around, Jerry identified PO3 Renato Villamor and Jessie Maghilom riding the motorcycle behind them. Shots were fired at them and Jerry sustained wounds on the abdomen and elbow while Jelord died on the spot. The trial proceeded against PO3 Villamor while Maghilom was still at large. During trial, the Trial Court found the PO3 Renato Villamor guilty of having commited Murder aggravated by the circumstance of taking advantage of his public position. Issue: Whether or not the Trial Court properly applied the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position? Decision: The Supreme Court ruled that the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position under paragraph 1 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code was improperly applied. A public officer must use the influence that is vested in his office as a means to realize the purpose of the crime to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. The question Did the accused abuse his office to commit the crime must be asked in order to appreciate this circumstance as an aggravating circumstance. No proof was shown that Villamor took advantage of his position of being a policeman when he shot Jelord Velez. Neither was his influence, prestige or ascendancy used in killing Velez. Even without occupying a public position, the accused could have committed the crime.

People v. Magayac (G.R. No. 126043)

Facts: On February 11, 1994, Jimmy Lumague, Tino Magayac and Manuel Magayac, were preparing for fishing along with other persons. Tino Magayac, pushed Jimmy for no reason. When Jimmy asked why, Tino proceeded to hit Jimmy at the back. Hours later, Tino hit Jimmy at the stomach and Manuel proceeded to hit Tino as well. The fight, however, was intervened. The next day, Jimmy and Manuel exchanged blows. They were, again, separated from each other. On February 12, Manuel, while carrying a long rifle, approached Jimmy. As the Jimmy was trying to leave, he was shot by Manuel right on his stomach. Jimmy fell on the ground and was shot at the back several times. Afterwhich, Manuel surrendered to the PC Mobile Force. An information for Murder with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of public position as a member of the CAFGU. The Trial Court found him guilty of Murder aggravated by cruelty and taking advantage of public position, appreciated by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Issue: Whether or not the circumstance of taking advantage of public position should be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance considering the facts of the case? Decision: The Supreme Court held that in the commission of the offense, there was no aggravating circumstance, specifically abuse of public position. Considering the facts of the case, Manuel was a member of the CAFGU and the weapon used to shoot Jimmy was a government issued M-14 rifle. These, however, do not necessarily prove that Manuel took advantage of his public position as a member of the CAFGU when the crime of murder was committed.

Fortuna v. People (G.R. No. 135784)

Facts: On July 21, 1992, siblings Diosdada Montecillo and Mario Montecillo were standing at the corner of Mabini and Harrison Streets. A mobile patrol car stopped in front of them and a policeman alighted. The policeman frisked Mario and took Marios belt. He motioned Mario to enter the car. Mario obeyed and was followed by Diosdada. While inside the car, the policemen told Mario that he would be brought to the Bicutan police station where he would be interrogated, mauled and heckled for carrying a deadly weapon. They told the Montecillos that the bailbond for carrying a deadly weapon was P12,000. The Montecillos were asked how much they had and then Diosdada was asked to alight from the car. The driver followed her, took P1,500 from her wallet and instructed her to tell the others that she only had P3,500. Inside the car, they were told

to put all her money on the box. The Montecillos were told to get off at Harrison Plaza. From there, they went home. The 3 policemen, Fortuna, Garcia, and Pablo, were charged with robbery and were found guilty of having conspired in committing the crime with intimidation of persons. Issue: Whether or not abuse of public position should be taken as an aggravating circumstance by the mere fact that the accused were police officers? Decision: The Supreme Courted held that the lower courts failed to appreciate the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position. Being police officers, it placed them in a position terrify the Montecillos to surrender their money as bail. It was on the account of their authority that convinced the Montecillos that they had committed a crime and that they would be taken to the police station. Had they not been police officers, they would have not convinced the Montecillos into giving them their money.

People v. Tac-an (G.R. No. 76338-39)

Facts: Renato Tac-anand Francis Escanowere close friends being classmates in high school and members of the local Bronx gang. Francis withdrew from the gang on the advice of his mother who saw that Renato carried a handgun on his visits to their home. Things started turning sour between the two, and came to a head on Dec 14, 1984. After an earlier altercation on that day, Renato went home and got his gun. He entered the Mathematics class under Mr. Damaso Pasilbas in Rm15 and shouted for Francis. After locating the victim he fired at him but missed. He was later able to hit him in the head as he was running to the door with his classmates to escape. After this, Renato paced outside in the hallway. A teacher unknowing that Renato was the culprit, asked him for help unwittingly informing him that Francis was still alive. Renato immediately reentered the room and saying "So, he is still alive. Where is his chest?" Standing over Francis sprawled face down on the classroom floor, Renato aimed at the chest of Francis and fired once more. The bullet entered Francis' back below the right shoulder, and exited on his front chest just above the right nipple. Tac-an was charged with illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866. An amended information for murder was subsequently filed aggravated by the use of illegal possession of firearms. Issues: Whether or not illegal possession of a firearm is a special aggravating circumstance in crimes of homicide and murder? Decision: No.Under an information charging homicide or murder, the use of an unlicensed firearm is not an aggravating circumstance nor can it be used to increase the penalty for the second offense of homicide or murder to death or reclusion perpetua. The character of the instrument used in taking or destroying human existence is not one of those included in the enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. On the other hand, under an information for unlawful possession of a firearm or ammunition, P.D. 1866 authorizes the increase of the imposable penalty for unlawful possession if the unlicensed firearm was used to destroy human existence. Though it is not one of the enumerated aggravating circumstances in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, it may still be considered to increase the penalty imposed because of the explicit provision of the said special law.

People v. De Mesa (G.R. No. 137036)

Facts:

Barangay Chairman Patricio Motas of Sta. Cruz Putol, San Pablo City was pronounced dead on arrival on October 15, 1996 at San Pablo City District Hospital. The autopsy report showed that the cause of death was shock and hemorrhage due to gunshot wounds at the back of the victim.

Hernando De Mesa was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder by the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, pay the costs and to indemnify the heirs of the victim. Treachery, nighttime, in contempt of or with assault to public authorities, were appreciated by the trial court as aggravating circumstances attending the case thereby qualifying the crime committed to murder.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in determining the nature of the crime committed and the corresponding penalty to be imposed?

Decision:

Yes. The prosecution failed to positively prove the presence of anyqualifying aggravating circumstance whereby the crime committed is only homicide for which the imposable penalty provided by the Revised Penal Code is Reclusion Temporal.

Being the case, Indeterminate Sentence Law may now be applied and absent any aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the penalty that may be imposed is

prision mayor in its medium period as minimum to reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum.