Comparative Political Studies

http://cps.sagepub.com Regional Parties and National Politics in Europe: Spain's Estado De Las Autonomas, 1993 to 2000
WILLIAM B. HELLER Comparative Political Studies 2002; 35; 657 DOI: 10.1177/0010414002035006002 The online version of this article can be found at: http://cps.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/35/6/657

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Heller / REGIONAL PARTIES AND NATIONAL 2002 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / AugustPOLITICS

Parties participate in national politics that do not pretend to national presence. The author asks whether such parties affect policy outcomes and concludes that they do, albeit in unexpected ways. Basically, nonnational parties influence policy making under certain conditions by trading policy for authority. They help national parties get the policies they want in return for transfers of policy-making authority to regional governments. This willingness to support national policies with minimal amendment makes regional parties attractive partners for national parties in government. The author examines this argument in light of detailed evidence from Spains minority Socialist and Popular Party governments in the 1990s, along with discussions of the role of regionalism in Belgian politics and of the relationship between the Scottish Nationalist Party and the Labour Party in the United Kingdom.

REGIONAL PARTIES AND NATIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE Spains estado de las autonomas, 1993 to 2000
WILLIAM B. HELLER Binghamton University

olitics is a balancing act. Conflicts of interest between politicians and their constituents force both to compromise on some goals in favor of others, and the interests of individuals and groups can run counter to the interests of society as a whole. Policy outcomes derive from compromise, which is enforced by government structure and process and is the driving force of human ambition (Madison, 1778/1947).

AUTHORS NOTE: I owe a debt of thanks to Joaquim Colominas and the many politicians and scholars in Barcelona, Madrid, and Granada who offered invaluable perspectives, opinions, comments, and suggestions. Abundant thanks as well to Brian Humes, Evelyn Fink, George Tsebelis, Lorelei Moosbrugger, Patrice McMahon, Matthew Shugart, John Hibbing, Alec Stone Sweet, and several anonymous reviewers for reading and commenting on previous drafts. All errors and omissions are my own.
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One of the key aspects of political balance is the trade-off between local and national concerns. Regional divisions over policy are problematic for national parties because they make it more difficult to cleave to a consistent national policy stance. The more a party gives precedence to diverse local concerns, the less coherent will be its program overall (on the value of coherent party labels, see Cox, 1987; Cox & McCubbins, 1993; Shepsle, 1972). Parties with geographically diffuse support cannot adapt to specific local concerns without sacrificing policy clarity nationally. Where there is a need for sensitivity to local concerns, there is an opportunity for explicitly subnational parties to compete for office in regionally defined constituencies. Does bringing regional interests to the fore in national policy making affect policy outcomes? There are essentially two kinds of effects. First, resource allocation: Locally focused politicians would like to dedicate all of a states resources to local interests. Interregional competition for resources suggests that states should fall victim to a national tragedy of the commons as subnational politicians feed at the national budgetary trough. Second, consistency: Any concern about treating all citizens equally conflicts with the kind of locally differentiated policy making that allows local credit claiming. National politicians with preferences about how resources are used should be loath to allow local credit claiming, because the kind of local control required also would enable local politicians to contravene national policy makers wishes (de Figueiredo & Weingast, 2001, call these the fundamental dilemmas of federalism). One means of representing regional interests is through regional parties. Regional parties can make themselves heard through the normal give and take of legislative politics, affecting coalition negotiations much like national parties, or they can challenge national parties in regional constituencies, forcing them to internalize regional concerns or risk losing votes.1 The main difference between national and regional parties is their stance with respect to the demand for regional-level policy-making authority. I argue that regional parties influence policy making under certain conditions by trading policy for authority. That is, they help national parties get the policy they want in return for transferring policy-making authority to regional governments. I examine regional influence in this article principally by looking at the national policy-making role of regional parties in Spain. I concentrate on Spain because first, it has gone from a highly centralized dictatorship (which itself built on a long history of opposition to regionalism) to something akin to a multiparty federal democracy in just over two decades. Second, regional
1. A third avenue for regional influence, legislative upper chambers, empowers regional constituencies rather than parties.

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parties2 have been present in the national parliament (the Cortes) throughout the post-Franco era, but their policy influence has varied significantly. Third, the distinction between national and regional parties is eminently clear in Spain (unlike, e.g., in Belgium, where there appear to be no national parties, or in Germany, where it is difficult to distinguish between Bavarias regional Christian Social Union [CSU] and its national counterpart, the Christian Democratic Union [CDU]). Because one or another of the many aspects of regional parties policy role in the Cortes is likely to be observable in other countries, any analysis that makes sense in Spain ought also to be applicable where regional parties operate in more restricted contexts. With this in mind, I mediate the focus on Spain, with brief comparative discussions of Belgium and Britain. Regional parties play the policy-making game differently than other parties. They help national parties achieve national policy goals at the cost of sacrificing control over regional or local policy. The next section provides a background for this point by looking briefly at the treatment of regional and national policy in the literature. The third section offers an argument detailing the distinction between bargaining over policy among national parties and between national and regional parties. The fourth section examines how Spanish policy making under minority governments fits the argument of the third section with a comparison of parties legislative objectives and achievements for both the Socialist minority government from 1993 to 1996 and the Center-Right minority government of the Partido Popular (PP) from 1996 to spring 2000. The final section concludes.

REGIONAL INTERESTS AND NATIONAL POLICY Unless constituencies span an entire country (as in the Netherlands or Israel), politicians have a strong incentive to build local bases of support and hence ensure their political careers somewhat independent of the institutions
2. This vocabulary is incorrect. Strictly speaking, the Basque Partido Nacionalista Vasco and the Catalan Convergncia i Uni are nationalist because they claim to represent the aspirations of distinct nationalisms within Spain. The Partido Socialista Obrero Espaol and the Partido Popular are state parties (partidos de mbito estatal). The Partido Nacionalista Vasco and the Convergncia i Uni are regional and nationalist but are different from regional parties such as the Coalicin Canaria or regional parties in Aragn and La Rioja that advance regional concerns but not a regional identity. In an attempt to avoid undue confusion, I simply refer to parties based primarily in a single autonomous community as regional and those present in many regions as national.

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and parties of national government (Duchaceck, 1970; Riker, 1975). To the extent that local priorities differ from national ones, this means that regional governments often might prefer policies different from what the national government wants. To achieve regionally differentiated policies, policy must be made subnationally, or national policy makers must be sensitive to local concerns. Politicians are unlikely to focus on regional distinctions if they cannot benefit from doing so. The possibility of benefiting, whether through policy influence, symbolic representation (Meguid, 2000), or credit claiming (van Houten, 2000), depends among other things on the party system and voter receptiveness to regionally defined appeals (see van Houten, 2000, on the logic of regional assertiveness). When national and local interests collide, however, constitutions generally advantage national over regional legislation. Courts might protect subnational government authority (Bednar, Eskridge, & Ferejohn, 1998), but where there is no constitutional court so empowered or where the constitution either is ambiguous or favors the national government,3 dependence on the courts would be a recipe for central government dominance. Regional interests are best served if they are represented in policy making. To Ordeshook (Hamilton, 1778/1947; Ordeshook, 1996; see also Ordeshook & Shvetsova, 1997), regional interests are represented when national parties internalize regional concerns. This works in the United States through federalized parties, wherein nominees for state office or even . . . the national legislature . . . are controlled largely by state organizations, which together control the nomination for the presidency (Ordeshook, 1996, p. 206). Regional parties can play an analogous role in multiparty legislatures through the give and take of coalition politics. Regional parties participate normally (i.e., in the same way as national parties) in coalition politics, but because they focus primarily on their own regions rather than the entire country, they do not seek the same set of rewards as national parties. To the extent that regional party objectives are orthogonal (i.e., on a different and a priori unconnected dimension) to those of national parties, national-regional party cooperation opens the door to policy-making
3. Spains constitution is ambiguous. It enumerates the authorities permitted to autonomous communities (Article 148) and allows the state to cede other authorities as well (Article 150.2), but it also allows the state to make laws even in areas set aside for autonomous communities if it is in the general interest to do so (Article 150.3; see also Article 155). One interview subject in Barcelona summed up the comments of many when he commented that the court is like the tower of Pisait inclines toward the central government (see, e.g., Ma Valles & Foix, 1988).

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bargains that would be unavailable to national parties alone. The argument depends on the coincidence of two circumstances. First, no party may control a majority of national legislative seats. Second, there must exist clearly defined regions, usually but not necessarily with regional governments in place, for regional parties to represent. The region underpins the regional partys preferences and creates the basis for interparty gains from trade.

MULTIPARTY POLICY MAKING When no single party controls a majority of seats, minority parties have a conditional veto over policy. Agreement requires bargain and compromise, and the policy produced likely will be different from what any of the bargaining parties would have produced alone. Alliances between regional and national parties allow for profitable side payments and issue linkages (Schwebach, 1995; Sebenius, 1983), in which one partys side payment is anothers key policy gain. One implication of this argument is that national policy, as embodied, for example, in the national budget, should be closer to the national party ideal point than it would be in other coalition situations in which regional parties are excluded from legislative majorities. Bargaining between national parties is a fight over how to allocate a pool of resources across programs. Bargaining among regional parties should be similar, albeit over how to divide the budget among regions rather than programs. Regional parties bargaining with national parties, by contrast, have an alternative. Although not precluded from getting what they can of the national pool of resources for their regions, they also have the option of bargaining over regional authority, that is, not simply how resources are allocated but also who gets to decide their allocation.
TRADING POLICY FOR AUTHORITY

The political allocation of resources involves two questions. First, how much is to be allocated to what ends? Second, who decides not only general priorities but also how best to meet them? Regional parties want resource allocation to be sensitive to regional needs, arguably a task best suited to regional governments. National parties in government want the national government to control resources. To see how regional parties differ from national ones, consider policy bargaining among three legislative partiestwo national parties (Nat1 and Nat2) and a regional party (Reg)none of which controls a legislative major-

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Autono my

Rega

ZR IReg(R)

Rega,lr R

Z1

Nat 1 a Nat 2 a

Nat2a,lr INat2(R) Z2

Nat1a,lr

INat1(R) 0
Nat2 lr ,Reg lr Nat1lr
Left-Right

Figure 1. Regional (Reg) and national (Nat1 and Nat2) party preferences on two dimensions.

ity. Figure 1 illustrates an example of three such parties and their ideal points with respect to the traditional Left-Right policy dimension (on the horizontal axis) and a second, vertical dimension (autonomy) comprising preferences over regional governmentspolicy-making authority. Parties closer to the origin prefer a stronger central government. Each partys ideal point on each axis is denoted by the party name with subscripts a and lr, respectively. Party ideal points for both policies together are labeled with the party name and the subscript a,lr. The example is constructed so that the smaller parties share the same ideal policy on the budget dimension and the national parties share the same ideal on the autonomy dimension; the regional party thus is no closer than the small national party to the large national party on either dimension. The ellipses around parties two-dimensional ideal points are representative indifference contours (so called because parties value equally all points on the ellipses around their ideal points and are therefore indifferent between them) that show the extent to which parties are willing to trade across the two dimensions. The solid indifference contours depict parties preferences relative to the policy that obtains in the absence of change (the reversionary pol-

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icy, R, often but not necessarily equivalent to the status quo); the broken ellipses around Nat1a,lr and Nat2a,lr, labeled Z1 and Z2, respectively, indicate the range of policies that both national parties prefer to anything they could achieve by working together. (The broken ellipse around Rega,lr, ZR, is for illustrative purposes only.) The flatter the ellipse, the more the party in question values the short-axis dimension (see Laver & Hunt, 1992, pp. 76-82). In the extreme, the indifference contour of a party that cares about only one of the dimensions would be a straight line, indicating an absolute unwillingness to concede anything on the preferred dimension, no matter what is offered in return. The regional party depicted in the figure is willing to cede a great deal on the socioeconomic policy dimension in return for greater autonomy, that is, transfers of authority to the regional government. The national parties are willing to cede autonomy in return for support of socioeconomic policy closer, in weighted-policy terms, to their ideals. The curves connecting Rega,lr, Nat2a,lr, and Nat1a,lr are contract curves; no policy on a contract curve can be changed without damaging the interests of at least one of the parties anchoring it.
MODELING THE REAL WORLD: REGIONAL PARTIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Why should a national party prefer to deal with a regional one? Under some circumstances, depending on the reversion, it would not. For many possible reversionary policies, however, there is more room for negotiation between a national party and a regional party than between national parties. This can be seen in Figure 1. As shown by the overlap of indifference contours Z1 and Z2 with IReg(R), both national parties can be better off dealing with the regional party than with each other. If Nat2 is the governing party, for example, it can get outcomes closer to its ideal point by proposing policy in the area defined by the overlap of IReg(R) and Z1. Such proposals beat not only the reversion but also anything that both Nat1 and Nat2 prefer to R. The situation is similar for Nat1, although the area of possible agreement is smaller. The regional party might want to deal with Nat2, which prefers the regional party ideal point Rega,lr to R, but Nat1 can guard against such bargains by allying with Nat2 if policy moves too high on the autonomy axis. For a broad range of possible reversionary policies, there is always some proposal that both Nat1 (or Nat2) and Reg prefer to any deal between Nat1 and Nat2. The distribution of party ideal points in Spain suggests that the example in Figure 1 can easily be adapted to the Spanish case. Figure 2 shows spatial locations, derived from Manifesto Research Group data (Budge,

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Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, & Tannenbaum, 2001), for key Spanish parties at the 1989, 1993, and 1996 elections.4 The horizontal axis represents the classic Left-Right dimension of politics, and the vertical axis represents generic support for more regional-level control over policy making. The size of the marker at each partys ideal point represents its relative share of legislative seats. As can be seen in the figure, the PP and the Partido Socialista Obrero Espaol (PSOE) are well apart on the Left-Right dimension but nearly on top of each other on the vertical dimension, whereas the Convergncia i Uni (CiU) and the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) are well above both on the vertical axis (cf. Acha Ugarte & Prez-Nievas, 1998, Table 6.5; Molas & Bartomeus, 1998). Assuming that actors multidimensional ideal points indicate something about their willingness to trade off dimensions (cf. Laver & Hunt, 1992, pp. 76-82), then party indifference contours such as those depicted in Figure 1 would predispose both the PP and the PSOE to deal with the regional parties rather than with Izquierda Unida (IU) or each other. Figure 2 suggests that the CiU would likely be willing to cooperate with either the PP or the PSOE, supporting their preferred policies in return for transfers of policy authority to the Catalan regional government.5 The PNV might be willing as well, although its position to the right of the PP means that it has little bargaining leverage: It cannot easily threaten to withdraw support from a PP program that reflects PNV preferences on the Left-Right dimension. As will be seen in the fourth section, this expectation was borne out during the minority PP government of 1996 to 2000. Before focusing more closely on policy-for-authority trade-offs in Spain, it is fair to ask if the model applies anywhere else. Can this mode of analysis shed light on politics in Belgium, for example, where regional parties abound but there are no national parties? What about the case of regional parties in
4. Manifesto Research Group data are attractive because they provide election-specific measures. Moreover, other measures prove insufficient for present purposes; for example, the Spanish case is missing from Laver and Hunts (1992) data set, and Huber and Inglehart (1995) have no measure for support for decentralization. It is important to keep in mind, however, that manifestos for any given election likely are driven by context and strategy, and so single-election manifesto data should be treated with caution (M. McDonald, personal communication, May 31, 2001). 5. In Spain, as in Germany, it takes a constructive vote of no confidence to bring a government down. This makes forced government resignations less likely and so might weaken junior coalition partners bargaining positions. However, a government must be able to command a majority to pass laws, particularly budgets. A Senate veto of the budget brought down Australias government in 1975, even though the Senates confidence is not required for government survival (Epstein, 1977), and Felipe Gonzlez dissolved the PSOEs minority government when the CiU suggested that it could no longer commit to support government bills.

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i)

1989 election

EE
Support for decentralization

PNV PA PSOE IU Left-right position EA PAR CDS PP CiU

ii)

1993 election ERC

Support for decentralization

EA PNV CiU PSOE IU Left-right position PAR PP

iii)

1996 election

CiU
Support for decentralization

PNV

PSOE IU PP Left-right position

Figure 2. Two-dimensional preferences for major regional and national parties in Spain. Source: Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, & Tannenbaum (2001). Note: CDS = Centro Democrtico y Social; CiU = Convergncia i Uni; EA = Eusko Alkartasuna; EE = Euskadiko Ezkerra; ERC = Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya; IU = Izquierda Unida; PA = Partido Andalucista; PAR = Partido Aragons; PNV = Partido Nacionalista Vasco; PSOE = Partido Socialista Obrero Espaol; PP = Partido Popular. Available party-location data do not include information on the Coalicin Canaria.

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which coalition or minority government is not the norm: Does it help understand the interaction of the Scottish National Party (SNP) and the Labour Party, and Labours embrace of the cause of devolution, in Britain? I look first at Belgium. Belgium Belgium is almost synonymous with regionalization. Whereas Spanish constitutional politics have focused on the balance between the center and regions, Belgium has opted for the regions over the center. Since the Socialists finally split along linguistic lines in 1978, there have been no national Belgian parties. Flemish and Walloon parties compete head to head in elections only in Brussels (Buelens & Van Dyck, 1998, p. 65; Fitzmaurice, 1996, p. 170), and even then, they likely appeal to different sectors of the electorate. Interregional rivalry leads to difficulties in characterizing Belgian parties (Fitzmaurice, 1996). On one hand, the regional question had become an important concern for all parties by the mid-1960s, so the linguistic parties essentially were in the mainstream. On the other hand, economics and the Brussels question have damped some parties autonomist fervor: The Volksunie (VU) saw links with Wallonia as a financial liability for Flanders, but at the same time, federalism provided safeguards for the Flemish population in Brussels; Walloon parties, by contrast, prefer federalism to maintain economic transfers from Flanders. The 1977 Tindemans IV government included the Front Dmocratique des Francophones (FDF) and the VU not because it needed them to pass legislation but to add credibility to the institutional reform project, which was embraced by all the formerly national parties. The Martens VIII government (1988-1991) included the VU for the same reason. In neither case were the linguistic parties necessary even for the two-thirds majority needed for constitutional reforms. The key to Belgian politics in terms of the national-regional coalition model is that what appears to be an additional bargaining dimension is in fact not. The parties had partitioned the country in practice by the late 1970s, with no party running candidates in both Flanders and Wallonia, well before the constitutional reforms did so de jure. All parties agreed on regional autonomy. To the extent that regional autonomy means that programmatic policy is made at the regional level, the national parliament is left to focus on allocating resources among regions rather than programs. National policy making thus boils down to a divide-the-dollar game between Flanders and Wallonia (with parties from both regions concerned about protecting their allies in Brussels).

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Britain The SNP does not fit into the model of bargaining between national and regional parties, because of the United Kingdoms history of single-party majority governments. Even when the government did require SNP support, as between the two 1974 general elections, the SNPs bargaining position was weak. (In hindsight, threats to bring down the government must have had little substantive effect, because Prime Minister Wilson called new elections barely 7 months after the February 1974 election that led to a minority Labour government.) The SNP, like the CSU with the CDU in Germany, is so close to Labour on the Left-Right dimension (Newell, 1998) that a non-Labour government would make it worse off in Left-Right terms and probably no better off with respect to the goal of greater autonomy for Scotland. Does the policy-for-authority model yield any insight into the role and impact of the SNP? The SNPs policy proximity to Labour might be a disadvantage in bargaining, but Labour has nonetheless moved a lot closer than the Conservative Party to the SNP on the autonomy dimension. The SNPs leverage here is indirect. Historically, without its Scottish members of parliament (MPs), Labour usually cannot muster a parliamentary majority (Tony Blairs overwhelming Labour majorities, which have not required Scottish Labour MPs, are unusual). As Newell (1998) argues, Labour has had to take up the cause of devolution to maintain its electoral competitiveness in Scotland.6 In essence, by competing for Labour voters in Scotland, the SNP has forced Labour to commit to a measure of autonomy for Scotland as the price of winning a majority of seats in Westminster.
DISCUSSION

Regional parties are founded on the claim that their regions should be treated differently than the country at large. Where there is a significant constituency for this claim, national parties that compete against regional parties might be well advised to demonstrate sensitivity to regional demands. The Labour Party in Britain did this by incorporating devolution into its electoral program; Spains Socialists (the PSOE) have adopted a federal structure that allows candidate independence in regional elections. In general, Spains
6. Meguid (2000) argues that SNP voters focus on nonpolicy issues because rational, policyoriented voters should back Labour (the SNP is not likely to wield policy influence). More voters might support the SNP if Labour were less sensitive to Scottish demands for self rule, however.

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major national parties are fairly centralist, and regional interests are voiced in parliament by regional parties. When national parties need regional party support to govern, as during the period from 1993 to 2000, they listen to those voices. The claim that a represented region merits differential treatment in essence introduces a new dimension into the policy-bargaining mix, one that makes fruitful bargains possible. The policy-for-authority model boils down to this: Negotiations that encompass more than a single policy dimension allow greater gains from trade where parties rank the dimensions differently than where their priorities are similar. For trade-offs across dimensions to be profitable, the parties have to be able to link the two dimensions. The next section consists of an examination of this argument applied to Spain. I examine and compare some of the main goals and achievements of the three largest regional partiesthe CiU, the PNV, and the Coalicin Canaria (CC)in Spain from 1993 to 2000. For reasons of data availability, the analysis focuses mostly on the PP minority government in power from April 1996 to spring 2000.

POLICY TRADING IN SPAIN FROM 1993 Democracy and the estado de las autonomas (i.e., the quasi-federal division of Spain into self-governing regions) are closely linked, both chronologically and normatively (see, e.g., Subirats et al., 1997, p. 384), so it is impossible to say how democratic policy might have developed in the absence of the autonomous communities. I argue that the creation of autonomous communities has had an important, albeit indirect, effect on central government policy making and outcomes. First, regional parties were crucial to the survival of national minority governments between 1993 and 2000. As such, they were able to win concessions from the central government on matters of interest to them while enabling minority governments in Madrid to cleave to their programs much more closely than might be expected. Second, despite having relatively clear ideological identities within their own regions, in the national arena, not only have they claimed convincingly to be willing to work with parties of the Right or the Left, but they have acted on that claim. Regional party successes have been achieved for the most part through the give and take of coalition politics. Throughout the 1980s and into the early 1990s, Spains autonomous communities were in many ways only symbolic. Catalans, Valencians, Basques, and Galicians could speak and teach their respective languages, but their governments lacked the authority to decide on the allocation of resources in society. The bulk of their budgets came from the

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central government, which set tax rates, disbursed tax revenues among the regions, and told the regional governments how to use the resources it gave them.7 Regional interests did better after 1993, as is to be expected: They were crucial to the survival of governments of both the Right and the Left and reaped rewards for their support. They enjoyed little apparent privilege in the allocation of state resources, however (see, e.g., Sol Vilanova, 1997). It is not that regional parties blindly supported the government and got nothing in return. Rather, they negotiated not principally over resources but over the allocation of state authority. After a long period of dominance by the PSOE, which held a majority of Cortes seats from 1982 to 1993, Spains national parties appear to have settled into a fairly common pattern. The PP, which embraces moderate liberals and the Catholic Right, as well as at least some of the heirs of Francos legacy, holds down the political Right. The PSOE is firmly ensconced slightly left of center, and the United Left (IU, formerly the Spanish Communist Party) anchors the more hard-line Left. For the two elections prior to March 12, 2000, when the PP took an unprecedented 183 of the 350 seats in the Congress of Deputies, voters saw to it that no single party controlled a majority of seats in the Cortes.8 Finally, there is evidence that Catalan voters, at least, situate themselves and their parties in a space defined by a Left-Right dimension and a community membership dimension that corresponds nicely to how people feel about regional political authority (Molas & Bartomeus, 1998).
ANTECEDENTS: THE PSOES 50% SOLUTION, 1989 TO 1993

From 1982 to 1993, the PSOE held a majority of seats in the Congreso de los Diputados. This allowed it to govern freely, because it could muster the necessary votes even to pass organic laws.9 In 1989, however, after it lost a recount challenge to the IU, the PSOEs seat share in the Congreso was reduced to exactly half. For ordinary legislation, a simple majority was more than sufficient. Indeed, the PSOEs 175 seats gave the Socialists a reasonable working majority because the refusal of the four Herri Batasuna (a Basque separatist
7. The Basque and Navarre governments control their own resources more than other autonomous communities but have only recently won the power to structure the incidence of taxes. 8. In 1993, the PSOE took 159 seats (45.4%) to the PPs 141 (40.3%). In 1996, the PP took 156 seats (44.6%) to the PSOEs 141 (see Tables 1 and 3). 9. Organic laws implement constitutional provisions (Article 81) and are midway between the Constitution and ordinary laws (Donaghy & Newton, 1986, p. 53). They require the support of a majority of deputies, not simply a majority of those voting, to pass.

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party) deputies to take their seats reduced the maximum number of voting members to 346. The real test for the PSOE came in 1993. In the lead-up to the 1993 elections, polls predicted an even split between the PSOE and the PP, with the Catalan CiU holding enough seats to determine the majority. After a close-fought campaign in which the PSOE appealed with some success to voters reservations about the PPs commitment to Spains new geographic and political pluralism,10 the PSOE took only 159 seats (to the PPs 141 seats) in the Congress. The CiU, with 17 seats, held the key to the majority.
PSOE MINORITY GOVERNMENT, 1993 TO 1996

After the elections of June 6, 1993, the PSOE began to explore coalition prospects. It had come out of the election 17 seats short of a majority and reasonably could expect to have trouble seeing legislation through the Cortes if it did not extend a hand to other parties. The range of possible partners was broad, if not deep: As Table 1 shows, election results dictated that any PSOE-led majority also would have had to include the PP, CiU, or IU to reach 176 seats. From the outset, the PSOE talked up the idea of forming a single-party minority government with explicit parliamentary support from the CiU and the PNV. Although an alliance with the CiU alone was mathematically feasible, it would have been politically undesirable on several counts. First, there is security in having something of a cushion: Unexpected absences, oddball coalitions of convenience, or occasional attacks of legislator integrity can too easily upset a bare majority (Dodd, 1976). Second, by the same reasoning that led Tindemans to bring the VU and the FDF into government in Belgium to make his project more credible, dealing only with the CiU could have created electoral vulnerabilities for the PSOE and made its policies suspect by opening it up to accusations of favoritism. Had the PSOE wanted to brake nationalists attempts to transfer more power to the autonomous-community governments, it could have sought support from the IU. In return, however, it would have had to slow progress with respect to the European Union (EU) and the European Monetary Union as well as support policy closer to the IUs ideal on a number of fronts, from labor markets and pensions to privatization and budgets. The nationalist parties, for their part, demanded explicit commitments to nationalist goals, without which they claimed no deals were possible.
10. The PSOE campaign called on voters to reject the PP by casting a useful vote (voto til) for the Socialists rather than a wasted vote for a smaller party with no hope of forming a government.

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Heller / REGIONAL PARTIES AND NATIONAL POLITICS Table 1 1993 Election Results, Congreso de los Diputados Party PSOE PP IU CiU PNV CC HB ERC PAR EA UV Seats 159 141 18 17 5 4 2 1 1 1 1

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Percentage of Seatsa 45.43 40.29 5.14 4.86 1.43 1.14 0.57 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29

Source: Elaborated by the author using data from the Congreso de los Diputados (2001b) Web site. Note: PSOE = Partido Socialista Obrero Espaol; PP = Partido Popular; IU = Izquierda Unida; CiU = Convergncia i Uni; PNV = Partido Nacionalista Vasco; CC = Coalicin Canaria; HB = Herri Batasuna; ERC = Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya; PAR = Partido Aragons; EA = Eusko Alkartasuna; UV = Uni Valenciana. a. Percentages sum to over 100 because of rounding error.

The nationalists clearly preferred not to tie themselves into a formal coalition (Hayley, 1993). They would support the PSOE in the Cortes when necessary and convenientindeed, the PSOE won investiture with 181 votes in the first round (its own 159 votes plus 17 from the CiU and 5 from the PNV)but no more than that. As PNV leader Xabier Arzallus put it, I dont believe that blind faith, without a clear plan of action and solutions for our long-term problems, makes a solid base for a successful collaboration (Balmer, 1993). What was the basis of regional partiessupport for the PSOE? They all certainly shared some common concernschief among them unemployment, which was very highbut not a common ideological basis for addressing them. PSOE preferences are straightforward: The Socialists had 11 years to make and unmake policy as they wished, so they likely were happy with the status quo balance of regional and national government authorities. The preferences of the regional parties are more complex: Table 2 shows some of the principal policy goals of the PNV, CiU, and CC with respect both to national (budgetary) policy and to transfers of authority from the central government in Madrid to the autonomous regions. It should be noted that support for small business, although clearly a national policy issue, can be cast as an issue of regional interest: Small business is strong in Catalonia. Unlike the Basques, the Catalansability to set policy independent of the central government was severely limited by their lack of both resources and authority.

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Table 2 Policy and Authority-Transfer Goals and Achievements, 1993 to 1996 Convergncia i Uni National policy Tax breaks for small business Interest rate cuts Flexible labor market Increased privatization Reduced central government spending New health finance system Right to retain tax revenue a Give CCAA authority over highways and ports CCAA authority to administer EU funds where their autonomy statutes give them jurisdiction Control over police Small business tax breaks CCAA can retain 15% of tax revenue Authority over EU funds Control over police New health finance system Partido Nacionalista Vasco Reduce unemployment Coalicin Canaria Recognition of uniqueness of distant, insular province

Authority transfer

Control over nationally provided employment (job creation and training) funds Transfer of authorities included in Guernica Statute Lowered provincial taxes Increased local control over health services EU investment funds

Achievements

Note: EU = European Union. a. CCAA is the Spanish acronym for autonomous communities.

Beginning in 1993, they set out to extract as much of both from the central government as they could, initially focusing more on resources. They wanted the same rights as the Basques, not only to collect but also to retain 100% of tax revenue (minus a quota to pay for central government services). In 1993, however, they agreed to accept a much lower retention rate of 15%. They sought other authority transfers as well, but revenue retention was their key concern. The PNV demanded both less and more from the Socialist government. It demanded less because the Basques already had the right to retain and control revenues. This meant not only that the Basques had their own resources but also that to the extent that they controlled resource allocation in the Basque country, central government measures would not be directly relevant to them. And the PNV demanded more because the few new authorities it did seek

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struck to the heart of the Socialists ideology and support base. On one hand, the PNV sought control over resources for job creation and training. In proportion to the governments accession to this demand, the PNVs national concern with policy to deal with unemployment would be obviated. On the other hand, it demanded that the central government honor its obligations with regard to the Basque autonomy statute (the Guernica Statute) and complete the transfer of authorities therein. The CC, for its part, simply worked to convince the Socialists that the Canary Islandseconomic conditions and distance from Spain warranted special consideration. Ultimately, the PSOEs options came down to a choice between dealing with either the IU or the CiU (and the other regional parties). They opted to deal with the regional parties, ceding greater autonomy to the regions but toeing the line on Maastricht and reiterating or even increasing their commitment to privatization and budgetary rigor. The Catalans fared fairly well under the PSOE minority government (see Table 2). They got their small business tax breaks (the Socialists claimed to share the CiUs goal in this instance; see Santos, 1993), a new health finance system, authority over EU funds pertaining to areas already under their jurisdiction according to the autonomy statute, and most important, both a regional police force and the right to retain 15% of tax revenues rather than submit all receipts to Madrid and wait for the central government to hand them back with strings attached. The PNV did less well. By late 1993, the Basques were already complaining about the lack of progress in transferring to the regional government the authorities granted to it in the Guernica Statute. This should not have been altogether unexpected, because PNV support was neither necessary nor sufficient for the Socialists to enact legislation. By the time the PP took the reins of government in spring 1996, the PNV was looking bitterly forward to exercising more influence, given that the PPs position was weaker than the Socialists had been. The CC realized some important policy gains during the minority Socialist government. It sought no special policies but rather asked policy makers to recognize that it needed more resources to achieve any policy on the table. They appear to have made a successful case. CC gains were not directly traceable to actions in the Congreso, however, but were negotiated bilaterally between the central and Canary Islands governments. The CCs achievements in parliament were less impressive: As the CC itself put it, the CCs proposals [in the Congreso] . . . met with an insurmountable wall of incomprehension. The major groups (PSOE and PP) acted as always: despite having representatives from the Canaries in their ranks, they gave priority to national interests (Coalicin Canaria, 1997a).

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Despite having fared reasonably well under a PSOE minority government, the CiU forced the PSOE government prematurely to dissolve the Cortes. They could not oust the PSOE on a question of confidence, because of Spains constructive no-confidence rule (Article 113), but the threat to withdraw support for government legislation did the trick. The Catalans were unhappy with both the pace and the content of authority transfers. The right to retain 15% of tax receipts up front, for example, was not the permanent cession it wanted but rather a simple law passed with the 1994 budget and set to expire in 1996 (Altable, 1993, p. 30). Further, not only did the government fail to meet the nationalists even halfway with respect to such regional issues as coastal jurisdiction and traffic control, but it also ignored the CiUs express wishes on national policy when it introduced a more permissive abortion law (Horcajo, 1995). In this case, the CiU gained little on the autonomy dimension and nothing on national policy, making continued support both unpalatable and unrewarding. Dissatisfaction with progress on postelection agreements and the conviction that better results were unlikely in the future led the CiU in 1995 to advise the Socialists that it was time to call a new election.
PP MINORITY GOVERNMENT, 1996 TO 2000

The PP held the most seats in the Cortes after the March 1996 elections but was in a slightly worse position than the Socialists in 1993. Wereas the PSOE could have turned to the IU had it found the CiUs demands too repugnant, Aznar and the PP already occupied the right wing of the ideological spectrum and hence had few feasible options. With only 156 seats, the PP had to court the CiU and either the CC or the PNV to get over the majority threshold (see Table 3). The regional parties entered negotiations with the PP with clear goals and ready to drive hard bargains. The CC, working to build electoral support in its home territory, was eager to go on record as a constructive participant in the policy process. The Basques and the Catalans simply allowed Aznar to woo them. All signed on at the end of the day to support a PP minority government, despite PP militantstaunting of the CiU and Pujol prior to the elections and despite their reservations about the populares commitment to the estado de autonomas. The PP formalized its agreements with the regional parties in signed documents. The CiU, the PNV, and the CC agreed to support the PP and its program in return for government commitment to goals delineated in a series of investiture pacts. On other issues, the regional parties continued to fight for policy changes they thought desirablethe pacts did not commit

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Heller / REGIONAL PARTIES AND NATIONAL POLITICS Table 3 1996 Election Results, Congreso de Diputados Party PSOE PP IU CiU PNV CC HB ERC EA UV BNG Seats 141 156 21 16 5 4 2 1 1 1 2

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Percentage of Seats 40.29 44.57 6.00 4.57 1.43 1.14 0.57 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.57

Source: Elaborated by the author using data from the Congreso de los Diputados (2001a) Web site. Note: PSOE = Partido Socialista Obrero Espaol; PP = Partido Popular; IU = Izquierda Unida; CiU = Convergncia i Uni; PNV = Partido Nacionalista Vasco; CC = Coalicin Canaria; HB = Herri Batasuna; ERC = Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya; EA = Eusko Alkartasuna; UV = Uni Valenciana; BNG = Bloque Nacionalista Galego.

them to eschew politicsbut when push came to shove, they tended to support the PP. The 1996 pacts included three types of policy statements. First, there were broad statements of lofty goals, such as reducing unemployment and eliminating excess government employees. Second, there were specific national policy goals, such as eliminating obligatory military service. Finally, there were issues of interest primarily (if not solely) to the autonomous communities. The policy-for-authority model leads to the prediction that the so-called governability pacts will be based mostly on this last type of issue, with the governing national party ceding ground to the autonomous communities on issues of interest to them in return for their support on more national issues. To address this prediction, Table 4 shows the policy agreements elaborated in the pacts (column 2) along with the party (or parties) whose pact with the PP addresses each agreement (column 1).11 The PPs original position with respect to each issue, as elaborated in the partys program for the 1996 elections, is shown in column 3. Column 4 indicates whether legislation partially or entirely addressing each issue has been passed.
11. Few would disagree with the vaguely defined goals of the first type of policy statement (though the means might be controversial). I therefore do not include them in the table.

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Table 4 Policy and Authority-Transfer Goals and Achievements, 1996 to June 1998 Party Governability and Investiture Pact PP Electoral Program Result

National policy goals CiU Ensure that Spain is in first wave of EMU Same CC CiU a Same New model of CCAA finance CC CiU Eliminate obligatory military service Reduce obligatory military service Autonomous community goals CiU CCAA representation in Spanish delegations to EU CCAA representation in EU Committee of the Regions CC CiU Transfer authority over ports Identify ports to be transferred to CCAA CiU Transfer regulatory authority over coastal lands Cooperation with CCAA with respect to coastal lands CiU Transfer authority over land use Coordinate with CCAA on land use policy CC Increased government investment in Canary Islands Same CC Reform Canary Islands autonomy statute Same CiU Complete authority transfers specified in autonomy statutes Same PNV PNV Renew and revise Concierto Econmico CiU Eliminate civil governors PNV CiU Respect CiU-PSOE accords on Catalan police force CiU Transfer traffic authority

Done Done Done

Done Done Partial Partial Done Done Partial

Done Done Done

CiU PNV CiU PNV CiU CiU PNV PNV

Transfer employment office Transfer apprenticeship and internship programs Generalitat participation in job-training policy Reduce highway tolls Return properties seized from political parties under Franco Consolidate Basque telecom under aegis of Euskaltel

Partial (for CiU) Done Done Done

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Sources: Convergncia i Uni (1996, 1998), Partido Nacionalista Vasco (1996), Coalicin Canaria (1996, 1998), Ministerio de Administraciones Pblicas (2000). Note: PP = Partido Popular; CiU = Convergncia i Uni; CC = Coalicin Canaria; EMU = European Monetary Union; EU = European Union; PNV = Partido Nacionalista Vasco; PSOE = Partido Socialista Obrero Espaol. a. CCAA is the Spanish acronym for autonomous communities.

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Did the PP alter its policies to garner the regional parties support? With respect to national policy, of which precious little is addressed in the pacts, it is apparent that the populares did not have to alter their position by much. Only with respect to the professionalization of the militarythe CiU wanted to eliminate obligatory service altogether, whereas the PP preferred to retain it at a reduced leveldoes the PPs preelection position differ noticeably from the policy it agreed to pursue. It is with regard to policies of direct interest to the autonomous communities that clear differences can be found. First, there are a number of issues (the last 10 entries in Table 4) on which the PPs election manifesto was silent. Either the PP preferred the status quo to available alternatives, or it did not care enough about these issues to elaborate positions on them. In the absence of evidence of PP indifference and in light of the partys enduring commitment to the ideal of a unified Spain, it probably is safer to assume that the PP preferred not to take action. Second, there are issues for which the positions formalized in the governability pacts echo the PPs preelection declarations. As can be seen in Table 4, two of the three agreements in this category are specific to the Canary Islanders, in keeping with PP prime ministerial candidate Aznars promise to the islanders that a PP government would pay attention to their needs (Ruiz de Aza, 1996). The PPs efforts on behalf of the islands should be seen as a recognition that the archipelagos geographical and economic conditions and constraints demanded special attention. Unlike the Basques and the Catalans, who insist that distinct regions have distinct needs and therefore deserve special treatment, the CCs electoral program called for strict application of the principle of solidarity among regions to ameliorate regional variations in levels of infrastructure and services (Coalicin Canaria, 1997b). The third item, the commitment to complete authority transfers, was for the PP part of an effort to end what it saw as damaging debates and negotiations regarding autonomy and its extent. As one PP deputy explained, the populares sought to comply with the autonomy statutes and avoid ongoing bargaining wars with the regional parties (anonymous PP deputy, personal communication, June 15, 1998). The agreements on policy directed to the autonomous communities provide evidence of PP concessions. The PPs electoral program was conservative on each of these four issues. The pacts, in contrast, promised the autonomous communities direct participation in EU politics and committed the PP government to significant increases in autonomous-community regulatory authority. It is impossible to infer categorically that the PP had been forced to concede important ground to the regional partiesits electoral program was ambiguous on how far it was willing to gobut apparent PP foot dragging

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and CiU dissatisfaction with legislation transferring authority over land use and coastal lands suggest that the populares would have been happier with a lower threshold. In short, for these four issues, the PP agreed to deals clearly more favorable to the autonomas than its original position. One of the interesting details of the PPs pacts with regional parties is the differences among the parties. Both the CC and the CiU subscribed to a number of national goals, but whereas the CC barely looked beyond the question of how to get more and better resources for the Canary Islands, the CiU demanded a long list of explicit transfers of regulatory and legislative authority to the Catalan Generalitat. The PNV, by contrast, sought little beyond renewal of the cupo vasco (the amount the Basques cede to the central government in a form of revenue sharing), the completion of transfers enumerated in the Basque autonomy statute, and most important, the early renegotiation of the Ley del Concierto Econmico to allow the Basques to set tax rates and incidence. For the PNV, this last was worth a legislature of support for the PP minority government (Aizpeolea, 1997). Although the CC increasingly has been acting more like a nationalist party (Aizpeolea, 1999), the evidence from the pacts supports the opinion of many Spanish scholars and politicians (including some with ties to the CC) that it is a different kind of party than the CiU or the PNV: It appears to care more about resources for the islands than authority transfers. In this, the CC echoed the CiU in 1993, which focused first on resources and only later on control over them.
DISCUSSION

By the end of the PPs 2nd year in government, two things at least were clear. First, majority requirements for legislative passage can maneuver even strongly centralist parties, as the PP was perceived to be even after the 1996 election, into accepting and supporting regional demands. Second, small parties can bring down a government that fails to fulfill its side of a bargain, even without recourse to a vote of censure, as the CiU demonstrated when it forced the PSOE minority government to call early elections for spring 1996. From 1993 to the March 2000 election, the CiU was well situated to gain from trades with the government. Mathematically, it was not the only possible source of support for the PSOE and PP minority governments: The IU or, respectively, the PP and the PSOE could have rounded out a majority for both minority governments. The fact that both the PSOE and the PP turned to the regional parties is consistent with the claim that they could better achieve their national goals by trading them against regional partiesregional goals. When the CiU threatened to withdraw its support, the government paid attention. The PNV, however, rendered redundant by both its ideological

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affinity with the PP (see Figure 2) and its counterparts willingness to see the PP along, found that it had no such leverage. Fed up with lack of movement on Inem and social security, both of which it claims are fundamental to the Guernica Statute, the PNV announced that it considered its bargain with the government broken (Guenaga, 1997). The governments response was muted, and both the CiU and the CC made it clear that they did not join the PNVs protest. Surreally, though the PNV loudly declared the abrogation of the formal pact, it carefully did not promise to oppose the 1998 budget or any other government initiative. When Aznar called new elections in early 2000, the old Ley del Concierto Econmico, the issue that was ostensibly most important to the PNV, remained in place. One issue that stands out for its absence is the reform of the Senate. Created to provide territorial representation (Article 69.1), the Senate is conspicuous for its policy irrelevance. Senate reform has been under discussion for some time, but to little effect. There is little agreement over what a reformed Senate should look like: The Catalans would like to see the Senate take on much more legislative authority, but they want to retain or extend the asymmetry of the estado de las autonomas, wherein some regions autonomy is both broader and deeper than others(Uni Democrtica de Catalunya, 2000, pp. 54-63). Other regions oppose this view, as do both the PP and the PSOE.

CONCLUSION This article began by asking whether regional party participation in national policy making affects outcomes. The answer, substantiated in a close examination of Spain from 1993 to 2000, is that it does. Regional parties can affect policy when they control veto gates in the policy process. Prior to 1993, majority Socialist governments controlled all veto gates. Today, the PP does. With minority governments, however, the need to build legislative majorities gave regional parties the power to block government initiatives and hence to affect policy. The situation appears different in the United Kingdom, where the SNP never has held on to a key policy-making role. In the face of majority governments, the SNP should be inconsequential, an expectation belied by the Labour Partys (re)establishment of a Scottish parliament (abolished in 1707) after taking over the government in 1997. In light of the policy-for-authority model, however, Labours adaptation of the SNP project makes good sense. Historically, Scottish support at the polls has been necessary for the Labour Party to hold a majority in Westminster. In Scotland, Labours competition is not the Tories but rather the Liberals and, equally important, the

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SNP. Against the Liberals, Labour can run in Scotland as anywhere else; against the SNP, it cannot. Labour opted to compete by appealing to SNP voters on the decentralization dimension, in the same way that the SNP appeals to Labour voters on socioeconomic issues. In essence, Labour ceded the SNPs point on decentralization to improve its chances of winning a national majority and so be able to make policy. The trade-off is the same as the PP and the PSOE made with the CiU and the PNV, but the timing is different: at elections in the United Kingdom, as opposed to in coalition negotiations in Spain. The Spanish constitution (Articles 148 to 151) requires each autonomous community to negotiate its authority with the central government. To realize their potential, the autonomas need the central government legislatively to transfer authorities to them. To this end, regional parties focus not on legislative objectives per se but on the allocation of authority to legislate. This focus on authority sets regional parties in Spain apart from other small parties in the world of coalition bargaining. In Belgium, the question of authority is largely settled. Control over the central state is not so much about control over the allocation of resources among policies as among regions. The notion of one region or linguistic group taking the reins of government would be anathema to the other, but the constitutionally stipulated balance in government between the Flemish and the Walloons guarantees against such an occurrence by giving representatives of each group a veto over outcomes. National policy making involves neither the allocation of authority nor the implementation of policy priorities. Rather, it is a bargaining game between autonomous actors over resources, which they then can allocate independently as they see fit. There is only one dimension of bargaining, and the requirement that the cabinet include equal numbers of Walloons and Flemish is in effect a recognition that gains from trade are unavailable, and the best both sides can do is agree on where to split the difference. The machinery that enables Spains regional parties to affect policy is fundamentally no different from that which allows the Italian Refounded Communists to force government action on some issue of importance to them or that which for so long made the small Free Democrat Party a key player in Germany. If regional parties exercise influence in the same way as other small parties in other multiparty systems, can it in fact be claimed that they matter? Have they done anything other than to provide symbols and rhetoric to further the careers of regional politicians, who provide regional-nationalist packaging for policies that any reasonably responsive party in even the most unitary of states would provide anyway (albeit sans the regionalist rhetoric)? Regional parties demand increased authority within their own regions. In return, they support budget policies relatively close to the governing partys

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ideal. This is likely to be a delicate balancing act, and it is not surprising that negotiations should continue even after an initial support agreement is reached. What is unique about the Spanish case is the result: The explicitly negotiated agreements between minority governments and regional parties have allowed governments to achieve national policy outcomes (i.e., budgets) closer to their ideals than they likely could have achieved either in the absence of pacts or by shunting the regional parties aside in favor of working with other national parties. The government gets to pass legislation it wants, and the regions get the authority that they want. Such a trade would be inconceivable in the absence of constitutionally grounded regional governments such as are found in Spains estado de las autonomas.

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William B. Heller has recently accepted a position at Binghamton University as an assistant professor of political science. His previous affiliation was with the University of NebraskaLincoln. He has published articles in the American Journal of Political Science and the Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, among others.

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