Response to:

Transforming bailiff action Consultation paper Local Authorities Council Tax Liability Order applications Bailiff Malpractice

April 2, 2012

Contents

Transforming bailiff action

1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 Clarifying the law Forced entry Costs of Enforcement related Services Staged approach Regulatory Regime Remedies and Complaints handling

1 1 1 2 3

Local Authorities Council Tax Liability Order applications

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 Councils and the courts profiteering Example Vulnerable Residents Unlawfully Profiting

7 7 8 8 9

Bailiff Malpractice

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Transforming bailiff action

1.1.

Clarifying the law Forced entry

It may be in order for a complete rethink about the way some debts are handled, especially in the case of council tax collections. Far too many innocent people are having bailiffs levying their goods, with the subsequent risk that they may force entry to their homes. Council tax orders obtained through the Magistrates courts are unreliable. They therefore should not be relied upon by enforcement agents, as evidence that stated amounts of outstanding debt are accurate or that debt even exists. It is reckless then, that bailiffs are allowed to use these liability orders to enforce alleged debt. These court orders are unreliable because applications are not monitored by councils applying for them and magistrates courts are rubber stamping applications without any meaningful review of the complaints. This is causing many orders to be passed for enforcement, where those residents pose no threat of defaulting. The problem is apparently escalated largely due to the lack of human involvement in the process. The need for council staff to be engaged in monitoring the procedure is obvious, but the reason this appears not to happen is probably down to the assumption that an automated operation can and should be relied upon to function autonomously. As evidence confirms in the number of these blunders, such an assumption is very misguided. Because of the cavalier approach to issuing court orders, in certain cases, bailiffs may be pursuing debtors for outstanding amounts equal only to the escalating enforcement fees. This scenario can arise for example, if a debtor has settled outstanding debt with the council by the time a bailiff has been instructed to the case. By this stage, the intransigent council staff or the same from an outsourced agency would refuse to take any interest in the circumstances of the enquiring taxpayer and insist the matter be taken up with their enforcement agent. It has to be remembered that these council tax liability orders can too easily be obtained from the court, however, reversing them is not so straight forward. Reform of the applications process is necessary, which should include more stringent monitoring to reduce the ease with which councils can obtain orders. Allowing this chaos, expense and waste of everyones time will undoubtedly continue if nothing is done to address these issues.

1.2.

Costs of enforcement related services Staged approach

It is proposed in the consultation paper that the staged approach would remove possible financial incentives for the bailiffs taking unnecessary enforcement action. In theory this seems feasible, and with the proposed fees, when compared with those currently allowed, increasing by 600 per cent for pre-levy stage enforcement theres no argument that the bailiff would be recompensed for the work undertaken. What there is clear evidence of though, is the input from those influencing the revised fee proposal who have a vested interest in boosting their profits. It could be viewed that implementing such an inflated scale of fees might be the only way to prevent fraudulent charging. If this is deemed to be the only measure to control the criminal
Consultation paper Response 1

element residing in the private enforcement industry, then it suggests that those working for these bailiff firms are not the type of people, a responsible government would want doing this job. The current commission based fee arrangement, presumably functions to engage enforcement agents in the high volume of cases requiring bailiff action, with the financial reward being the carrot intended to incentivise the undertaking of the job. Rewarding enforcement agents with such extreme financial incentives as proposed, may have a detrimental effect on the volume of collections made on behalf of local authorities. If by introducing these higher fees, the incentive is lost to clear current volumes, this must impact on what is essentially the primary concern of councils, which is to carry out a conveyor belt style operation of these collections. 1.3. Regulatory Regime

The Government does not consider it appropriate that a statutory independent regulator is created. I dont believe that a regulator, described as independent, or otherwise would operate autonomously, and definitely not in the interest of the public. I have seen no evidence of any so called independent bodies acting in anyones interest than either government departments or large corporations. Even though the government has no immediate plans to introduce a regulator, it is likely to be unpopular and inappropriate if it were to consider proposals, put forward by the British Parking Association, to act as the industrys independent regulator. The proposals make this appear suspiciously like a profit making opportunity for BPA. The reference to the DVLAs Accredited Trade Association status for instance, makes one wonder if they intend to exploit members of the public, by selling their personal details to whichever members qualify and are willing to pay for the privilege. The message conveying the extent of independence is not overly convincing when the proposals state that: overall responsibility to the Privy Council would ensure a degree of independence from central and local Government. There are concerns also that a regulation formed by statute would have engineered into it, a complaint process, severely limiting the scope for investigation, thereby rendering it ineffective for the person complaining. A system that processes and determines complaints as "unfounded" would carry on the tradition to what we have become accustomed. Like most other regulatory organisations it would probably function as indemnity cover taken out to insure against malpractice, with the added bonus that the insurance premium is paid by the taxpayer. Within their regulation proposals, the BPAs appeals and complaints procedure follows a recognisable pattern, being that a number of stages must be actioned before a complaint can be ridden out of the system. It would begin with the initial complaint being turned down, after which an aggrieved person would then be permitted to appeal to an independent Adjudicator, whose decision would be final and binding on both parties. The complaints body, in the words of the BPA would have to be seen to be independent, hence, appointing Ombudsmen or Adjudicators. After the final decision expectedly negative from the aggrieved persons perspective the complaint would then be successfully ridden out of the system, unless of course, their decision was challenged through judicial review. Something, again
Consultation paper Response 2

in the words of the BPA, would be extremely rare, indicated by existing Adjudication models; presumably as such action would be prohibitively expensive for the aggrieved person. If its complaint procedure were to be formed by statute, it is likely such a scheme set by law, would have legislation written so the odds are stacked against the complainant. This has found to be the case with organisations having Statutory Complaint Procedures such as the LGO, ICO and IPCC. As an example, the LGO state in their reports, that where a body has acted with maladministration, the Ombudsman may only uphold a complaint if certain criteria has been met. In other words they can not provide a satisfactory service for the complainant as their hands are tied because of legislation and what the law says. An investigating officer has no discretionary powers to use common sense or his own judgment. In far too many cases a complaint will be thrown out because the law wont allow it to be investigated. A complaint body like this, which dictates to a person what they can, and cannot be aggrieve by, is quite obviously a sham and effectively useless.

1.4.

Remedies and Complaints handling

It is an indication that those forwarding the proposals are not acknowledging the seriousness of the situation by suggesting the problems are so trivial that the industry should be self regulating and grievances be dealt with in-house. It also indicates that they are probably aware that an independent body, if it was truly allowed to act independently, would expose the truth in a very short time, bringing the entire enforcement industry into disrepute. To put forward a suggestion that "in the first instance redress should at least be attempted with the enforcement agent involved" cannot be in anyone's interest but the enforcement agent. In many instances, a complainant would be highlighting a bailiff's attempt to defraud them. A bailiff knowing that if he wished, he could prevent a complaint going any further either by duping an uninformed debtor, or, on detecting a savvier customer admitting that he'd made an error is effectively given the green light for him to chance his arm. It is worth noting that this is all academic, as complaints concerning bailiff fraud getting the attention of the Police are not taken seriously, fobbed off and never investigated. The point made in the proposals regarding there already being effective avenues of complaint, is pushing it to say the least. There may be avenues of complaint but there is little evidence that these are effective. I doubt the average person being pursued by the local authority would be aware that the Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992 exist, let alone know that within them can be found regulations governing how bailiffs should operate. Similarly it is doubtful they would be aware of the distress for Rent Rules 1988 which also, theoretically, provide a means of redress. Council Tax Regulations provide for complaints to be made to the Magistrates' court in relation to appeals in connection with distress. The aggrieved person makes a complaint to the court, and requests that a summons is directed to the authority to appear before the court to answer to the matter. Apart from it being unlikely that aggrieved persons will be aware this action is open to them, it is unlikely councils nor bailiff firms would make them aware. Time limits mean that unless a complaint is made within 6 months from the time the matter of complaint arose, the aggrieved person would be time barred from bringing the proceedings before the court under section 127 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980. There is however, another obstacle in that unless the complainant qualifies for a concession, there is a fee of 200 for making the application.
Consultation paper Response 3

The distress for Rent Rules provides another means of redress. Those aggrieved by bailiffs can submit a complaint (form 4) to the County court which issued the bailiffs certificate. This is a direct complaint against an individual bailiff, so the enforcement firm is out of the firing line. Unfortunately, decisions found in favour of complainants would likely result in the bailiff having to forfeit the security which he is required to lodge in court and/or loosing his certificate. This is something a Judge would want to avoid as it would leave the bailiff without employment and undermine the court which allowed the issue of the certificate. So, if the avenues of complaint mentioned in the proposals, refer to the above, then there has been some misunderstanding as these are clearly not effective as far as the aggrieved person is concerned. It should in theory be possible for a debtor to resolve any dispute with the creditor. This however, in the case of local authorities is a hopeless battle. In practice, council staff dealing with enquiries are often obstructive and routinely refuse to deal with members of the public about matters relating to their contracted bailiffs. Instead they refer them to the individual bailiff who has been instructed the case. Councils assume that i) ii) iii) the recovery is at a stage where responsibility is no longer theirs, their system is perfect, so appointing bailiffs has been the correct course of action, and bailiffs should, as far as possible, be self financing.

It is unlikely a council, given the job of investigating itself, would find in favour of a formal complaint against its appointed bailiff contractor. So this too, is another procedure which fails the aggrieved, as the authoritys objective will be to always cover-up malpractice and side with their contractor. The option open to an aggrieved resident to involve the Local Government Ombudsman gives little incentive for the authority to conduct its investigations impartially. Very few complaints are investigated and almost none are upheld. Apparently because either it is the organisations function or its hands are tied because the law doesnt allow it to investigate matters considered outside its remit, thus imposing severe limitations on its role. So it would seem the authorities are confident, very few formal complaints which are progressed to the Local Government Ombudsman, will have any consequences for them. Debt Recovery Strategies within councils will likely mean that authorisation is only given to certain officers within debt recovery sections who are able to intervene in dispute situations arising from their bailiff contractors. This being a probable contributing factor fuelling the obstruction which members of the public are met with by council staff. That, and aggrieved residents wishing to raise concerns, are having telephone enquiries diverted, and dealt with by contracted-out corporate call centres. This is a service many councils are outsourcing, causing the prevention of malpractice to be highlighted. Consequently, it is allowed it to continue, without being brought to the attention of the relevant managers, who should, if they had authorisation to do so, investigate the complaint. Police Sections 2 to 4 of the Fraud Act 2006 provide legislation needed to protect the public from much of the malpractice you are likely to encounter with bailiffs. Unfortunately though it seems not to be policy of the Police to recognise these sections of the Act in instances where bailiffs have defrauded or attempted to defraud alleged debtors. Either this or their hands are tied.
Consultation paper Response 4

Contrary to the commonly held view of the Police that fraud committed by bailiffs can be dismissed as CIVIL, a response to Lord Lucas of Crudwell & Dingwall from the Home Office Minister of State Baroness Scotland of Asthal in the House of Lords suggests otherwise.

From Parliament publications, 20 April 2007: Crime: Fraud Lord Lucas asked Her Majestys Government: Whether a bailiff who repeatedly charges for work that has not been done commits a fraud within the meaning of Sections 1 to 5 of the Fraud Act 2006; and, if so, which sections of the Act apply; and whether it would be right for the police to claim that such an action is a civil and not a criminal matter. [HL2743] 20 Apr 2007 : Column WA94 The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Scotland of Asthal): A bailiff or any other person who dishonestly charges for work that has not been done will be committing an offence under the Fraud Act 2006. Section 1 of the 2006 Act contains the new general offence of fraud. One means by which this offence can be committed is set out in Section 2, on fraud by false representation. This section applies where a person dishonestly makes a false representation and intends, by making the representation, to make a gain for himself or another, or cause a loss to another, or expose another to a risk of loss. It is also possible that, where a bailiff repeatedly charges for work that has not been done, this conduct will amount to fraudulent trading either under Section 9 of the 2006 Act or under the provisions on fraudulent trading in company legislation.

However, despite the above response and the view of the Police that bailiff fraud is a civil matter, the Home Office seem uninterested in issuing guidance to police forces on the application of the provisions of the Fraud Act 2006 to bailiff operations or local authority officials, employing private bailiff companies. It considers decisions on whether and how to investigate a crime rest solely with the police and that such operational issues are the ultimate responsibility of the chief officer of the force concerned.

Information Commissioner Similarly the Data Protection Act 1998 is in place to protect the public against breaches of confidentiality. The Information Commissioners Office should step in where bailiffs have breached this with alleged debtors, but it seems they let it go and are not interested in formally dealing with them.

Consultation paper Response

Statutory Complaint Procedures As detailed in the previous section, statutory complaint procedures such as the LGO, IPCC etc, are legislated so the system is heavily weighted in favour of the organisation at fault. This at best leaves the aggrieved person frustrated at the injustice of a system that doesnt bother investigating concerns that the complainant thought serious enough to take the time to bring to the attention of the organisation. At worst, because of the inherent inflexibility in the system, maladministration, crime and malpractice all go unchallenged and are allowed to continue because the investigator, free to ride the next complaint out of the system, has done his part in identifying that the law wont allow him to investigate.

Consultation paper Response

Local Authorities Council Tax Liability Order applications

2.1.

Councils and the courts profiteering

Excessive costs are being incurred by far too many residents because of unnecessarily high volumes of Council tax liability order applications. If more attention was focussed on reducing the numbers needlessly passed over for recovery action, the figures which represent problem payers would be much truer. As it now stands the situation is massively exaggerated because of council's over enthusiasm to maximise income generated with court applications. It seems departments are mistaking their role, which is to process the recovery of outstanding debt, and not exploit court action for a source of revenue. To councils, these are merely numbers, with each account progressed to court generating income of up to 10 percent on top of taxpayers bills. Unfortunately it is householders caught-out, who are paying the price with inflated council tax and often bailiff fees, as a result of this target culture. Decisions prompting court action are not taken by council staff but are in fact initiated by a soulless computer system, whose input data having met the required criteria is subsequently triggered to generate 'en masse', the requisite computer printouts, admissible as evidence that the householder has defaulted. However, this doesnt excuse recovery staff from involving themselves in monitoring and updating cases to reflect additional payments or new information. In many cases this would prevent unnecessarily progressing cases for recovery. It isnt good enough for staff to withdraw their input, purely because of technological advancement and to blindly process applications through the court. The disproportionate number of resident's accounts being progressed to court and subsequently incurring these costs, may well be as a result of manipulation rather than negligence of councils and court staff reviewing these cases. Councils have a minimum amount of outstanding debt, below which, recovery departments should not progress for court action. Data obtained from Freedom of Information requests suggests hundreds of thousands of cases, below these minimums, make up complaint lists which councils deliver to the court. Evidently these lists are not in any meaningful way being reviewed by court staff, with applications just being rubber stamped (sometimes thousands with respect a single application) giving the councils the go-ahead to post out summonses, sometimes for as much as 200 a time. Where there's evidence of authorities making liability order applications for only a penny, and being granted by the court, this more than indicates maladministration exists both at councils and magistrates' courts. The case between "Regina v. Brentford Justices, Ex parte Catlin" made a point that "a decision by magistrates whether to issue a summons pursuant to information laid, involves the exercise of a judicial function, and is not merely administrative." Lord Chief Justice, Lord Widgery stated that: "....before a summons or warrant is issued the information must be laid before a magistrate and he must go through the judicial exercise of deciding whether a summons or warrant ought to be issued or not. If a magistrate authorises the issue of a summons without having
Consultation paper Response 7

applied his mind to the information then he is guilty of dereliction of duty and if in any particular justices' clerk's office a practice goes on of summonses being issued without information being laid before the magistrate at all, then a very serious instance of maladministration arises which should have the attention of the Authorities without delay...." There clearly then, exists in these liability order applications, at least a dereliction of duty, when so many are granted for insignificant amounts. Many of which would likely have originated from administration errors or oversight rather than non-payment. Whatever the cause, these small debts certainly don't warrant being grossly inflated by council's court costs and bailiff fees.

2.2.

Example

The following details the level of income for both Magistrates' courts and councils which can be generated as a consequence of these liability order applications. This, being just one council tax liability order hearing, held on the afternoon of 2nd June 2011 at Grimsby Magistrates court in respect of applications made by North East Lincolnshire council. 3,361 Summonses were sent out with in connection with NNDR and council tax debts. These included Joint and Several Residents, the Council posts letters to each individual, so the costs related to 2,602 householders incurring 70 for being summoned costs are only added once to each account. However, this still meant the MoJ was entitled to 7,806 of its share of the profits where court time amounted to only half an hour for the two defendants from the 3,361 summoned who were heard in the courtroom. This meant North East Lincolnshire Council was entitled to collect the remaining 174,334 of the 182,140 costs granted by the Magistrates' court. 2,297 liability orders were granted, a figure lower than the 2,602 accounts liable for summons costs because of accounts being settled or payment plans being set-up in advance of the hearing. Though agreements between the authority and taxpayer will have been made in relation to a number of accounts, these will have incurred full costs, including those for obtaining a liability order because of the growing trend for local authorities to load costs for obtaining the order onto the costs imposed earlier for the summons. This is squeezing more revenue out of residents, and it is not permitted in the Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992. 2.3. Vulnerable Residents

Councils neglect checking the status of alleged debtors, as well as pursuing trivial amounts, when appointing cases to bailiffs i.e. they may be classed as vulnerable and in those cases, the bailiffs should not be instructed. The council, in these circumstances, will pass on responsibility and rely on the bailiff to determine cases where debtors are vulnerable. It is obviously not in the bailiffs interest to determine a status as vulnerable. As far as the enforcement agent is concerned he will have been given instructions to collect whatever is on the liability order. So, if the councils recovery section functions as it should, and the Courts judicial procedure is not in question, then the bailiff would be satisfied that the validity of the order would not be in doubt. However, high volumes and the automated nature of these applications, tend to unnecessarily implicate innocent and the vulnerable. Unfortunately reversing an order, is not as straight forward as obtaining it in the first place.
Consultation paper Response 8

2.4.

Unlawfully Profiting

Disregard for any judicial procedure in these liability order applications however, is not the whole story. There is another side to councils, aggressively pursuing revenue through them. Having gone through no proper judicial process, the rubber stamping of the bulk applications brings into question the whole legality of the process. The council tax regulations state that only costs reasonably incurred by the authority up until obtaining the order can be included in the costs they impose on the taxpayer. The regulations do not provide for councils to profit from them. Liability order hearings are typically scheduled to take place at Magistrates courts, several times a year. Council officers conduct the event in a hired room, making a mockery of a court hearing, which should be a judicial process. The bulk nature of the applications, brings into question the profit local authorities are making with respect an hour or so's visit to the Magistrates court which means costs incurred by householders far exceed those which the authority incurs, obtaining the orders. Profits are compounded due to the automated nature of reminder, final notices and summonses which are printed and sent out en masse. Operational costs are further minimised as this part of the recovery process is geared around set dates in the system, which, if no payment activity is detected, triggers dispatchment of the relevant notices. Examples of local authorities incriminating themselves over unlawful costs can be found even on their own websites. Perhaps most blatant have been Cabinet reports for Westminster City Council where publicly available records show that from 2003 to 2010, court costs which it charges for alleged non payment of Council Tax and NNDR increased by 158% and 354% respectively. In one of the reports, the council admitted the administrative processes for Council Tax and NNDR Liability Order applications were identical and as such would be difficult to prove a difference in administration costs. It therefore decided that an application to the Court to increase costs may require a breakdown of administrative costs and decided theyd play safe by keeping costs the same for both Council Tax and NNDR. It had also decided against increasing the NNDR charges to a higher level than that set for Council Tax in the hope that it would function as a deterrent against non payment of the lager sums involved for NNDR. It was on the basis the cost of issuing a summons should only take into account the administration involved and not a deterrent element, as there is nothing in the legislation to support an increase in costs on this basis. However, in the subsequent review to increase these costs, Westminster council identified that some local authorities had a higher level of court costs for NNDR than Council Tax. This had apparently been accepted by their local courts and was more in keeping with the larger sums involved for NNDR, therefore more of a deterrent. Alarmingly, it proposed to increase NNDR costs to a higher level than that set for Council Tax because it perceived that the Court would be likely to accept the increase without additional supporting evidence due to neighbouring boroughs setting this precedent. It also anticipated that the proposed increase in court cost would act as an incentive to the boroughs Council Tax and NNDR payers to ensure that their instalment payments were kept up to date. Bizarrely, the council no longer considered that the cost of issuing a summons should only take into account the administration involved. It was now exploiting the deterrent element, something it was previously reluctant to do.
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It seems theyd intuitively known what they could get away with. Sensing that the Magistrates' court would approve these unreasonable and unjustified price hikes without requesting additional supporting evidence. Costs imposed on taxpayers were no longer considered the administration costs incurred by the authority, but an amount they could get away with or an amount the Legal Forum of London allowed other councils. Despite costs having to be reasonably incurred by the council for those they impose on the taxpayer, cabinet reports reveal those other than administration costs involved in the recovery process are being paid for by taxpayers caught out with these penalties. They revealed in three consecutive court cost reviews that the proposed increases would generate annually additional revenue of approximately 320,000, 300,000 and 130,000 respectively. References in the reports were made to generating additional revenue or income on around 14 separate occasions. Other references made it obvious they were preoccupied with either what neighbouring boroughs were charging, or what incentives, increasing court costs would have on taxpayers to ensure their instalment payments were kept up to date. The council had made it clear that its main objective was to offset these inflated cost imposed on its residents against the overall cost of the administration of Council Tax and Business Rates, therefore maintaining a low Council Tax. These increases obviously dont represent a corresponding increase in recovery costs. It is clear that Westminster council view these penalties as a financial mechanism which they can conveniently tweak whenever the need arises to increase revenue. It seems calling upon them has become second nature. With no opposition, the authority must believe it can carry on profiteering indefinitely. Confirming this, another statement in one of their reports highlighted that failing to increase court costs or increasing to a level below that set by neighbouring boroughs would result in the Council not maximising its potential income. Haringey council, in a scrutiny panel review of income collection stated that the review panel recommended that the Benefits and Local Taxation Service ensure the maximum possible is charged for Court Costs and that the charge be reviewed at regular intervals subject to any guidance/legislation governing Court Costs. It is impossible for the council or the court to know the level of costs with respect each liability order application. The number applied for will vary, and therefore so should the costs. The higher the number rubber stamped at the bulk hearing will correspondingly reduce the costs attributable for each individual. Therefore it should not be possible for the summons to state on it a fixed amount of costs. Furthermore, the summons is merely a means for giving a defendant notice of the proceedings. It should not then be possible for the council to state an amount with regards costs on the summons document. Clearly there should be no reference to any agreed fixed cost on the summons document. This should be determined at the court hearing where the council should have to itemise the time and effort expended on each element of the case. Magistrates should then use their discretion to award an appropriate amount of costs. This would essentially take into account the number of defendants incurring the costs. It would therefore be unlikely the sum requested would be awarded, as it would
Consultation paper Response 10

be identified as inappropriate profit and costs which would be incurred in any event would be disallowed leaving only those specific to the claim being made. Newham council, in reviewing the level of charges for summons and liability court costs, introduced measures it thought would act as an incentive to keep council taxpayers instalment payments up to date. Its approach was slightly more subtle than just hiking up the fees. It identified that changing the composition of the summons and liability court costs by front loading the charge would deter customers from defaulting at this stage as a higher charge would affect the taxpayer at the summons stage. This example is another clear illustration that councils have no obligation to provide a breakdown of administrative costs to the Magistrates court. Other evidence, where a Magistrates court negligently awarded costs to North East Lincolnshire council has been uncovered by a Freedom of Information request. The request was sparked off because a 23% overall increase in the penalty had been implimented to generate a forecasted additional 752,000 over a four year period. All costs were also front loaded to the summons. The councils correspondence was not so much a request, backed up with a breakdown of additional administrative costs, but a letter informing the Magistrates court that it had taken the decision to do this. Dear Mr ...... Court Costs for Council Tax and National Non Domestic Rates I am writing to advise you that North East Lincolnshire Council has taken the decision to increase the court costs which it charges to tax payers for the non payment of Council Tax and National Non Domestic Rates. The costs to be charged for a summons for Council Tax and National Non Domestic Rates will be 70.00. There will be no additional costs for the liability order. The increase will take effect from 1st April 2011. These are just a couple of examples where councils flout the Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations by manipulating the composition of the summons and liability order court costs to squeeze more revenue from them. In many cases, councils are front loading the entire costs on to the summons so that the costs incurred for obtaining the liability order are payable at the summons stage. Therefore, in these circumstances, councils are unlawfully collecting penalties from debtors who settle their accounts prior to any court action. It states in the Council Tax Regulations that these fees must be incurred independently first, when the summons is issued, and secondly, when the liability order is granted. And as previously mentioned, these costs should be reasonably incurred by the authority.

Consultation paper Response

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Bailiff malpractice

Bailiff malpractice will be at unacceptable levels as long as councils and government bodies deny the fact that a conflict of interest exists where private enforcement firms are contracted to collect debt on behalf of the government. These private bailiff firms are in business to make money and are using local authorities as a vehicle to this end. Evidently theyre getting away with malpractice by relying on the expertise of councils, Police and other government bodies to conceal evidence and silencing complainants. The public might take some persuading that a serious attempt is being made by the MoJ to stamp out this malpractice in the bailiff industry, especially when such a cozy arrangement exists between the offending bailiff firms and the MoJ. For instance, Julie Green-Jones the chief executive of Rossendales has been involved in helping the Ministry of Justice shape new legislation under the Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act. When proposals include a 600% hike in the fee structure, its obvious why she would want to work closely with the MoJ and influence legislation. But what is unlikely to go down well with the public is why the head of an enforcement firm, well publicised on TV and in the press for its unlawful practices, would be a suitable candidate for holding discussions with the MoJ. Then you have former employees at the ministry jumping ship and taking managerial positions at these questionable firms. Christine Sharples joined Rossendales from the MoJ, as compliance manager, while former MoJ Policy Advisor, Chris Bell joined the Shergroup enforcement company providing advice directly to the Chief Executive, Claire Sandbrook. An ITV documentary exposing the true horrors of Rossendales revealing shocking footage of bailiffs was aired, after a two week postponement, on October 31, 2011. In light of the evidence revealed in this expos it seemed the government displayed utter contempt for the public when Rossendales were subsequently awarded the Child Maintenance and Enforcement Commission contract in November to enforce liability orders on behalf of the Child Support Agency. Concerns raised in this TV programme must have been known before it was awarded the contract, as would those revealed in the national press. This is a kick in the teeth, especially for anyone who has been scammed by Rossendales, to see millions of pounds being put in the hands of Ms Green-Jones. Common among private bailiffs are the fees they charge related to phantom visits. Often the first of a series of attempts to defraud the alleged debtor, where no evidence exists of any visits being made. It was confirmed in the House of Lords on the 20 April 2007 that for dishonestly charging for work which is not carried out, it is an offence under the 2006 Fraud Act. However, it is commonly stated by the Police that such fraud is not a criminal offence, but a civil matter. This malpractice then, is clearly abetted by Police. In charging debtors for visits that have not been made, they would be unaware of any charges accumulating. Consequently there would also be a breach of the National Standards for Enforcement Agents. Its code of practice states that: Enforcement agents will on each and every occasion when a visit is made to a debtors property which incurs a fee for the debtor, leave a notice detailing the fees charged to date, including the one for that visit, and the fees which will be incurred if further action becomes necessary... As visit fees can be charged for a maximum of two calls only to a debtors home, there is no financial gain for them to make/charge for any further visits.

Consultation paper Response

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Assuming the firm is going for its full compliment, once the debtor unknowingly incurs fees for the phantom visits, the next action will require the bailiffs status to take a transformation from one who merely calls (or doesnt as the case may be) to one who arrives in what may technically be described as a van a van bailiff. A van bailiff would typically add more than 100 to the fees for turning up in a vehicle. Ideally though, without itemising charges, so the debtor remains in the dark. Of course, this charge is to cover expenses for hiring a vehicle to remove goods which have previously been levied, subject to say, a breached payment arrangement. If no previous visits had been made, it is likely neither a levy nor payment arrangement would exist. However, this may not stop the bailiff levying on items outside so the debtor is unaware of mounting charges. A vehicle, for example, may or may not belong the debtor. If a bailiffs interests were only to add another charge for levying, whether goods were owned by the debtor is not important to him if there is no intention of taking them. If levied items were thought not to belong the debtor, it would be beneficial for the bailiff to keep details from the debtor. This would involve failing to leave a Notice of Seizure of Goods and Inventory. It states though, in the Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992, that details of the levy must be handed to, or left at the premises where the distress is levied. There are certain bailiff firms which, have systematically been charging debtors a fee for advertising the sale of levied goods, where in the majority of cases, there has been no such advertising. Seemingly this has been allowed to go on unchallenged. The fee, listed under header H in schedule 5 of the Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations is to cover out of pocket expenses in relation to advertising. The fee carries a minimum 24.50 charge, or, the actual costs up to a maximum of 5% of the amount in respect of which the liability order was made. For this to be lawful, another condition must be met. Levied goods must have also physically been removed. To get this overcharging into perspective, it states on private bailiff firm Rossendales website that goods are actually removed by bailiffs in only 1% of cases nationally. Councils are often complicit with bailiff firms in allowing that in all cases, they charge this fee. It is likely that in such circumstances, the bailiff firm will have duped the council into believing this charge is for releasing levied goods or some other such fabrication.

Consultation paper Response

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