Administrative cases against lawyers; prescriptive period.

The two-year prescri ptive period for initiating a complaint against a lawyer for disbarment or suspe nsion provided under Section 1, Rule VIII of the Rules of Procedure of the IBP C ommission on Bar Discipline should be construed to mean two years from the date of discovery of the professional misconduct. Nesa Isenhardt vs. Atty. Leonardo M. Real, A.C. No. 8254, February 15, 2012. Attorney; disqualification as notary public. A notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signs it is the same person who executed it, p ersonally appearing before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what a re stated therein. This is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party s free act. The duties of a notary public is dictated by public polic y and impressed with public interest. It is not a meaningless ministerial act of acknowledging documents executed by parties who are willing to pay the fees for notarization. It is of no moment that the subject SPA was not utilized by the grantee for the purpose it was intended because the property was allegedly trans ferred from complainant to her brother by virtue of a deed of sale consummated b etween them. What is being penalized is respondent s act of notarizing a document despite the absence of one of the parties. A notarized document is by law entitl ed to full credit upon its face and it is for this reason that notaries public m ust observe the basic requirements in notarizing documents. Otherwise, the conf idence of the public in notarized documents will be undermined. Nesa Isenhardt vs. Atty. Leonardo M. Real, A.C. No. 8254, February 15, 2012. CANON 1 Attorney; government service; applicability of Code of Professional Responsibili ty. The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the government service. Where a lawyer s misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a l awyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of th e bar on such grounds. Martin Lahn III and James P. Concepcion vs. Labor Arbite r Jovencio Li. Mayor, Jr., A.C. No. 7430, February 15, 2012. Attorney; gross ignorance of the law. The respondent labor arbiter, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our government, performs official functions that are akin to those of judges. Accordingly, the present controversy may be approx imated to administrative cases of judges whose decisions, including the manner o f rendering the same, were made subject of administrative cases. While a judge m ay not always be held liable for ignorance of the law for every erroneous order that he renders, it is also axiomatic that when the legal principle involved is sufficiently basic, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of t he law. The unfounded insistence of the respondent on his supposed authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, taken together with the delay in the resolution of the said motion for reconsideratio n, would clearly show that the respondent deliberately intended to cause prejudi ce to the complainants. Martin Lahn III and James P. Concepcion vs. Labor Arbite r Jovencio Li. Mayor, Jr., A.C. No. 7430, February 15, 2012. CANON 1, 6 Attorney; groundless imputation of bribery. As officers of the court, lawyers ar e duty-bound to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers. They are to abstain from offensive or menacing language or behavior be fore the court and must refrain from attributing to a judge motives that are not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case. Atty. Pea cannot be excused for uttering snide and accusatory remarks at the expe nse of the reputation and integrity of members of this Court, and for using thos e unsubstantiated claims as basis for the subject Motion for Inhibition. Not only has respondent Pea failed to show sincere remorse for his malicious insi nuations of bribery and wrongdoing against Justice Carpio, he in fact continuall

y availed of such unethical tactics in moving for the inhibition of eleven Justi ces of the Court. Indeed, his pattern of behavior can no longer be seen as isola ted incidents that the Court can pardon given certain mitigating circumstances. Respondent Pea has blatantly and consistently cast unfounded aspersions against j udicial officers in utter disregard of his duties and responsibilities to the Co urt. Respondent Pea s actions betray a similar disrespectful attitude towards the Court that cannot be countenanced especially for those privileged enough to practice l aw in the country. In re: Supreme Court Resolution dated 28 April 2003 in G.R. N os. 145817 and 145822. A.C. No. 6332, April 17, 2012. Attorney; submission of falsified internal court documents. The falsification, s ubject of the instant administrative case, lies in the fact that respondent Pea s ubmitted to the Court a document he was absolutely certain, at the time of such submission, was a copy of the Agenda of the then ponente. Candor and truthfulness are some of the qualities exacted and expected from memb ers of the legal profession. Thus, lawyers shall commit no falsehood, nor shall they mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. As disciples of tr uth, their lofty vocation is to correctly inform the court of the law and the fa cts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusio ns. Courts are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing a nd pleading before them. In the instant case, the submission of a document purpo rting to be a copy of the Agenda of a member of this Court is an act of dishones ty that puts into doubt the ability of respondent to uphold his duty as a discip le of truth. Respondent led the Court to believe that what he submitted was a faithful reprod uction of the ponente s Agenda, just to support the subject Motion to Inhibit. The original of the purported copy was later found to have been inexistent in the c ourt s records. The Court noted that respondent Pea has not explained, to the Court s satisfaction, how he managed to obtain internal and confidential documents. Respondent Pea is sanctioned for knowingly using confidential and internal court records and documents, which he suspiciously obtained in bolstering his case. Hi s unbridled access to internal court documents has not been properly explained. The cavalier explanation of respondent Pea that this Court s confidential documents would simply find themselves conveniently falling into respondent s lap through r egistered mail and that the envelopes containing them could no longer be traced is unworthy of belief. This gives the Court reason to infer that laws and its ow n internal rules have been violated over and over again by some court personnel, whom respondent Pea now aids and abets by feigning ignorance of how the internal documents could have reached him. It is not unreasonable to even conclude that criminal liabilities have been incurred in relation to the Revised Penal Code an d the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, with Atty. Pea benefitting from the s ame. Respondent s actions clearly merit no other penalty than disbarment. In re: S upreme Court Resolution dated 28 April 2003 in G.R. Nos. 145817 and 145822. A.C. No. 6332, April 17, 2012. CANON 8, 10, 11 Attorney; lack of diligence. When a lawyer takes a client s cause, he covenants th at he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latter s rights. Failure to ex ercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a fam ily makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his client and make s him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the co urts and society. His workload does not justify neglect in handling one s case bec ause it is settled that a lawyer must only accept cases as much as he can effici ently handle. Suzette Del Mundo vs. Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano. A.C. No. 6903, Ap

ril 16, 2012. Attorney; obligation to hold in trust money of his client. A lawyer is obliged t o hold in trust money of his client that may come to his possession. As trustee of such funds, he is bound to keep them separate and apart from his own. Money e ntrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the filing and processin g of a case if not utilized, must be returned immediately upon demand. Failure t o return gives rise to a presumption that he has misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed on him. And the conversion of funds entrusted to him const itutes gross violation of professional ethics and betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Suzette Del Mundo vs. Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano. A.C. N o. 6903, April 16, 2012. CANON 16, 18 Attorney; representation of conflicting interests. The proscription against repre sentation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing par ties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. The prohib ition also applies even if the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to th e disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. To be held a ccountable under this rule, it is enough that the opposing parties in one case, o ne of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer s respective retainers with each of them would affect the performan ce of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients. Anion vs. Sabistsana. A.C. N o. 5098, April 11, 2012. CANON 15 Attorney; False and untruthful statements in pleadings. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for it. Lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity a nd fair dealing. They must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal pr ofession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Magat s act clearly falls short of the standards set by the Code of Professi onal Responsibility, particularly Rule 10.01, which provides: Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artif ice. The Court ruled that there was a deliberate intent on the part of Atty. Magat to mislead the court when he filed the motion to dismiss the criminal charges on t he basis of double jeopardy. Atty. Magat should not make any false and untruthfu l statements in his pleadings. If it were true that there was a similar case for slight physical injuries that was really filed in court, all he had to do was t o secure a certification from that court that, indeed, a case was filed. Rodrigo Molina vs. Atty. Ceferino Magat A.C. No. 1900. June 13, 2012. CANON 10 Attorney; Neglect etc.Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorneyclient relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client s cause. Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is that lawyer s duty to serve the clien t with competence and diligence. Respondent has failed to fulfill this duty. Whe n the RTC ruled against complainant and her husband, they filed a Notice of Appe al. Consequently, what should apply is the rule on ordinary appealed cases or Ru le 44 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Rule 44 requires that the appellant s brief be filed after the records of the case have been elevated to the CA. Respondent , as a litigator, was expected to know this procedure. Canon 5 of the Code reads :

CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in co ntinuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in d isseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence. The supposed lack of time given to respondent to acquaint himself with the facts of the case does not excuse his negligence. Rule 18.02 of the Code provides tha t a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation. While it is true that respondent was not complainant s lawyer from the trial to the app ellate court stage, this fact did not excuse him from his duty to diligently stu dy a case he had agreed to handle. If he felt he did not have enough time to stu dy the pertinent matters involved, as he was approached by complainant s husband o nly two days before the expiration of the period for filing the Appellant s Brief, respondent should have filed a motion for extension of time to file the proper pleading instead of whatever pleading he could come up with, just to beat the de adline set by the Court of Appeals. Also, as counsel, he had the duty to inform his clients of the status of their c ase. His failure to do so amounted to a violation of Rule 18.04 of the Code, whi ch reads: 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client s request for information. If it were true that all attempts to contact his client proved futile, the least respondent could have done was to inform the CA by filing a Notice of Withdrawa l of Appearance as counsel. He could have thus explained why he was no longer th e counsel of complainant and her husband in the case and informed the court that he could no longer contact them. His failure to take this measure proves his ne gligence. The failure of respondent to file the proper pleading and a comment on Duigan s Mo tion to Dismiss is negligence on his part. Under 18.03 of the Code, a lawyer is liable for negligence in handling the client s case, viz: Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and h is negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them, otherwise their negl igence in fulfilling their duty would render them liable for disciplinary action . Respondent has failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer. When a lawyer viol ates his duties to his client, he engages in unethical and unprofessional conduc t for which he should be held accountable. Emilia R. Hernandez vs. Atty. Venanci o B. Padilla, A.C. No. 9387, June 20, 2012. CANON 5, 17, 18 Attorney; bigamy; gross immorality. A disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the ba r and not the procedural technicalities in filing the case.Respondent s regard for marriage contracts as ordinary agreements indicates either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage or his gross ignorance of the law on what course of action to take to annul a marriage under the old Civil Code provisions. Respond ent entered into marriage twice while his first marriage was still subsisting. H e exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a me mber of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding r espect and dignity.His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immor al conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revi sed Rules of Court. Manuel G. Villatuya vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos A.C. No. 6 622, July 10, 2012. CANON 1, 2, 7, 9, 15 Attorney; conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbar

ment. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment . Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in th e private duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, c ontrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.Section 27, Rule 138 provid es that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as atto rney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross mis conduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his convic tion of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath whic h he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedi ence of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appe aring as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The pract ice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thr ough paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. In a disbarment case, the Court will no longer review a final judgment of conv iction. The crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. The la wyer s final conviction of the crime of direct bribery clearly falls under one of the grounds for disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138. Disbarment follows as a consequence of the lawyer s conviction of the crime. Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. vs. Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa. A.C. No. 7360, July 24, 2012. CANON 6 Attorney; sharing of fees. A lawyer is proscribed by Rule 9.02 of the Code of Pr ofessional Responsibility to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal servic es rendered with a person not licensed to practice law. In Tan Tek Beng v. David , it was rule that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to share the f ees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that t he lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Manuel G. Villatuya vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012. CANON 2, 9, 15 Attorney; failure to account for money. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: Canon 16-A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his clien t that may come into his possession. Rule 16.01-A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or rec eived for or from the client. Rule 16.02-A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart f rom his own and those of others kept by him. Rule 16.03-A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the purpose, should be immediately returned. A lawyer s failure to return upon demand the fund s held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him b y his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of pr ofessional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and dese rves punishment. Emilia O. Dhaliwal vs. Atty. Abelardo B. Dumaguing. A.C. No. 93 90, August 1, 2012. Attorney; grave misconduct and dishonesty. The purpose of disbarment is to prote ct the courts and the public from the misconduct of the officers of the court an d to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise t his important function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. The Court cited the case of In Re: S otto and ruled that One of the qualifications required of a candidate for admissi on to the bar is the possession of good moral character, and, when one who has a

lready been admitted to the bar clearly shows, by a series of acts, that he does not follow such moral principles as should govern the conduct of an upright per son, and that, in his dealings with his clients and with the courts, he disregar ds the rule of professional ethics required to be observed by every attorney, it is the duty of the court, as guardian of the interests of society, as well as o f the preservation of the ideal standard of professional conduct, to make use of its powers to deprive him of his professional attributes which he so unworthily abused. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall n ot engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The Code exacts f rom lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal processes but also mandates t he utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with clients and the mone ys entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciary relationship. Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, respondent may either be disbarred or suspended for committing deceitful and dishonest acts. This rule p rovides that in any of the following circumstances, to wit: (1) deceit; (2) malp ractice; (3) gross misconduct; (4) grossly immoral conduct;(5) conviction of a c rime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer s oath; (7) wilful dis obedience of any lawful order of a superior court; or (8) corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so; the C ourt is vested with the authority and discretion to impose either the extreme pe nalty of disbarment or mere suspension. Grace M. Anacta vs. Atty. Eduardo D. Res urrecction. A.C. No. 9074, August 14, 2012. Attorney; immorality. The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profe ssion, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms emb odied in the Code. Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wan ting of the above standards whether in their professional or in their private ca pacity. The settled rule is that betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relat ions outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deli berate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by t he Constitution and affirmed by our laws. Respondent violated the Lawyer s Oath14 and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in unl awful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Engr.Gilbert Tumbokon vs. Atty. M ariano R. Pefianco. A.C. No. 6116, August 1, 2012 Attorney; representing conflicting interest. Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer cannot represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclos ure of the facts. An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciar y nature of their relationship, sound public policy dictates that he be prohibit ed from representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. A n attorney may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as coun sel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former cli ent. This rule is so absolute that good faith and honest intention on the erring lawyer s part does not make it inoperative. The reason for this is that a lawyer acquires knowledge of his former client s doings, whether documented or not, that he would ordinarily not have acquired were it not for the trust and confidence t hat his client placed on him in the light of their relationship. It would simply be impossible for the lawyer to identify and erase such entrusted knowledge wit

h faultless precision or lock the same into an iron box when suing the former cl ient on behalf of a new one. Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc., represente d by Gabriel H. Abad vs. Atty. Richard V. Funk. A.C. No. 9094, August 15, 2012 Attorney; sharing of fees with non- lawyers. Respondent s defense that forgery ha d attended the execution of the August 11, 1995 letter was belied by his July 16 , 1997 letter admitting to have undertaken the payment of complainant s commission but passing on the responsibility to Sps. Yap. Clearly, respondent has violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipul ating to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice l aw, except in certain cases which do not obtain in the case at bar. Engr. Gilber t Tumbokon vs. Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco. A.C. No. 6116, August 1, 2012.