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* FM 3-20.

98 [FM 17-98]
Field Manual Headquarters
No 3-20.98 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 2 December 2002

RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON

Contents
Page
PREFACE ............................................................................................. v

Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 1-1


Section I Types of Reconnaissance Platoons ....................... 1-2
Section II Operational Environment ......................................... 1-3
Section III Tactical Organization ............................................... 1-5
Section IV Responsibilities ........................................................ 1-16
Section V Missions, Capabilities and Limitations,
and Vehicle Capabilities .................................... 1-18
Section VI Battle Command ....................................................... 1-21
Section VII Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield ............. 1-26
Section VIII Situational Awareness ............................................. 1-32
Section IX Navigation ................................................................. 1-37

Chapter 2 LEADERSHIP COMPETENCIES ......................................................... 2-1


Section I Troop-Leading Procedures ...................................... 2-1
Section II Deployment ............................................................... 2-17
Section III Tactical Movement ................................................... 2-18
Section IV Actions on Contact ................................................... 2-32
Section V Employment of Fires ................................................ 2-43
Section VI Communications ...................................................... 2-44
Section VII Reporting ................................................................... 2-51

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to US Government agencies and their


contractors. This publication contains technical or operational information that is for official
Government use. This determination was made on 12 July 2002. Other requests for this document
will be referred to Commander, US Army Armor Center, ATTN: ATZK-TDD-C, Fort Knox, KY
40121-5000.
DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or
reconstruction of the document.
_________________

* This publication supersedes FM 17-98, 10 April 1999.

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FM 3-20.98 ___________________________________________________________________

Page
Chapter 3 RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS ................................................... 3-1
Section I Purpose and Fundamentals .................................... 3-1
Section II Reconnaissance Planning, Methods,
and Tactical Employment .................................. 3-3
Section III Multidimensional Aspects of Reconnaissance
and Surveillance ................................................. 3-29
Section IV Route Reconnaissance ............................................ 3-43
Section V Area Reconnaissance .............................................. 3-51
Section VI Zone Reconnaissance .............................................. 3-57
Section VII Obstacle/Restriction Reconnaissance ................... 3-64

Chapter 4 SECURITY OPERATIONS ................................................................... 4-1


Section I Purpose and Fundamentals .................................... 4-1
Section II Planning Considerations ......................................... 4-3
Section III Screening Missions .................................................. 4-4
Section IV Convoy and Area Security Operations ................... 4-22

Chapter 5 DISMOUNTED OPERATIONS ............................................................. 5-1


Section I Troop-Leading Procedures ...................................... 5-1
Section II Patrolling Tasks ........................................................ 5-14
Section III Actions on Contact ................................................... 5-24
Section IV Types of Patrols ........................................................ 5-32
Section V Patrol Bases .............................................................. 5-54
Section VI Observation Posts .................................................... 5-58

Chapter 6 OTHER TACTICAL OPERATIONS ..................................................... 6-1


Section I Assembly Areas ........................................................ 6-1
Section II Road Marches ........................................................... 6-4
Section III Battle Handover During Passage of Lines ............. 6-9
Section IV Relief in Place ........................................................... 6-16

Chapter 7 URBAN OPERATIONS ........................................................................ 7-1


Section I Phases of Urban Operations ................................... 7-1
Section II Understanding the Urban Environment ................. 7-2
Section III Planning .................................................................... 7-7
Section IV Execution .................................................................. 7-20

Chapter 8 COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ................ 8-1


Section I Employ Fire Support ................................................ 8-1
Section II Unmanned Aerial Vehicles ....................................... 8-26
Section III Combat Engineers .................................................... 8-32
Section IV Air Defense ................................................................ 8-34
Section V Aviation Support ....................................................... 8-38
Section VI Multicapable Sensor Teams .................................... 8-62
Section VII Combat Service Support .......................................... 8-66

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_______________________________________________________ Reconnaissance Platoon

Page
Chapter 9 ESSENTIAL FIELD DATA ................................................................... 9-1
Section I Route Reconnaissance Symbols ............................ 9-1
Section II Route Classification ................................................. 9-7
Section III Curve Calculations ................................................... 9-12
Section IV Slope Estimation ...................................................... 9-15
Section V Constrictions ............................................................ 9-19
Section VI Stream Reconnaissance .......................................... 9-23
Section VII Ford Reconnaissance .............................................. 9-26
Section VIII Ferry Reconnaissance ............................................. 9-28
Section IX Bridge Classification and Reconnaissance ........... 9-30
Section X Bypasses ................................................................... 9-53
Section XI Measurement Conversions ..................................... 9-54

Appendix A COMBAT ORDERS .............................................................................. A-1


Section I Warning Orders ........................................................ A-1
Section II Operation Orders ...................................................... A-2
Section III Fragmentary Orders ................................................. A-6
Section IV Patrol Orders ............................................................. A-7

Appendix B REPORT FORMATS ............................................................................ B-1


Section I Contact and Blue Reports (Operations) .................. B-2
Section II Green Reports (Intelligence) ................................... B-7
Section III Yellow Reports (Logistics) ...................................... B-10
Section IV Red Reports (Personnel) ......................................... B-16
Section V NBC Reports ............................................................. B-17
Section VI Digital Reporting and C2 Messages ....................... B-21

Appendix C NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL OPERATIONS ............. C-1


Section I Principles of NBC Defense ...................................... C-1
Section II Contamination Avoidance ....................................... C-5
Section III NBC Equipment ........................................................ C-11
Section IV Reconnoitering an NBC Environment .................... C-26
Section V Shielding the Force (Reducing Platoon
Vulnerability) ...................................................... C-40
Section VI Decontamination and First Aid ............................... C-52

Appendix D STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS .............. D-1


Section I General Considerations ........................................... D-2
Section II Stability Operations .................................................. D-9
Section III Support Operations .................................................. D-15
Section IV Role of the Reconnaissance Platoon in Stability
Operations and Support Operations ................ D-20
Section V Light/Medium Operations in Stability and
Support Environments ...................................... D-36

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FM 3-20.98 ___________________________________________________________________

Page
Appendix E ANTENNAS .......................................................................................... E-1
Section I Siting Considerations .............................................. E-1
Section II Field-Expedient Repair ............................................. E-2
Section III Field-Expedient Antennas ....................................... E-5

Appendix F DEMOLITIONS AND OBSTACLES ..................................................... F-1


Section I Demolitions ............................................................... F-1
Section II Mines ......................................................................... F-26
Section III Obstacle Characteristics and Report Formats ...... F-36
Section IV Obstacle Turnover .................................................... F-39
Section V Obstacle Breaching Capabilities ............................. F-39
Section VI Field-Expedient Mines and Demolitions ................ F-43

Appendix G ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ...................................................... G-1


Section I Environmental Risk Management Process ............ G-1
Section II Environmental Risk Assessment Worksheet ........ G-3

Appendix H RISK MANAGEMENT .......................................................................... H-1


Section I Risk Management Procedures ............................................. H-1
Section II Implementation Responsibilities ......................................... H-6

Appendix I FRATRICIDE PREVENTION ................................................................. I-1


Section I The Role of Training in Fratricide Prevention ....... I-1
Section II Effects of Fratricide .................................................. I-2
Section III Causes of Fratricide ................................................. I-2
Section IV Fratricide Risk Assessment ..................................... I-4
Section V Fratricide Prevention Measures .............................. I-6
Section VI Stopping a Friendly Fire Incident ............................ I-7

Appendix J DEBRIEFING FORMAT ........................................................................ J-1

GLOSSARY .................................................................................. Glossary-1

BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................... Bibliography-1

INDEX ................................................................................................... Index-1

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Preface
On the ever-changing landscape of the modern battlefield, the reconnaissance
platoon remains one of the tactical commander’s most valued assets. This is
especially true in the traditional role of the cavalry: as the commander’s “eyes
and ears” on the forward edge of the battle. Today’s reconnaissance platoon
complements its strengths in mobility, speed, and stealth with the latest
technology to provide an accurate, timely picture of developments in the area
of operations.

This field manual describes how the reconnaissance platoon conducts its
primary missions, reconnaissance and security. The manual focuses on the
principles of platoon operations and on the tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTP) the platoon uses to acquire information and provide
security and protection for other units on the battlefield. It also covers a
variety of supporting tasks and operations the platoon must perform or
coordinate, either as part of its reconnaissance and security missions or as
assigned by the commander.

FM 3-20.98 (FM 17-98) is for leaders of reconnaissance platoons employing


M3-series cavalry fighting vehicles (CFV), high-mobility multipurpose
wheeled vehicles (HMMWV), or Stryker reconnaissance vehicles (RV). This
covers platoons of the armor battalion, the mechanized infantry battalion, the
heavy division, the heavy cavalry regiment, the light cavalry regiment, and
the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron.
The principles and TTP are also adaptable for scout platoons of the light
division reconnaissance squadron.

The US Army Armor Center is the proponent for this publication. Users and
readers are invited to submit comments and recommended changes. Prepare
comments using DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and
Blank Forms) or in a memorandum using a similar format. Send
recommendations to Commander, US Army Armor Center, ATTN: ATZK-
TDD-C, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5000, or e-mail the DA Form 2028 to Chief,
Cavalry Branch, from the Doctrine Division web site at
http://147.238.100.101/center/dtdd/doctrine/armordoc.htm. (After accessing
the web site, select “Organization” from the menu on the left side of the
screen to reach the Cavalry Branch site.)

The procedures described in this manual are intended as a guide only and
are not to be considered inflexible. Each situation in war and military
operations other than war must be resolved by intelligent interpretation and
application of the doctrine described here.

v
Chapter 1

Introduction
This manual is a doctrinal
CONTENTS
guide for reconnaissance
platoons. This field manual, Role of the Reconnaisssance Platoon ....... 1-1
Types of Reconnaisssance Platoons ......... 1-2
with ARTEP 17-97F-10 MTP Operational Environment ............................ 1-3
and ST 3-20.983, focuses on Scope of Operations ............................. 1-4
principles of reconnaissance Operational Concept ............................. 1-5
platoon operations and the Tactical Organization ................................... 1-6
tactics, techniques, and Reconnaissance Platoon
Organizations .................................... 1-6
procedures (TTP) the platoon Dismounted Organization .................... 1-15
uses to operate in a theater of Task Organization ................................. 1-17
operations and to acquire Responsibilities ........................................... 1-17
information for its higher Platoon Leader ...................................... 1-17
commander. The term “recon- Platoon Sergeant .................................. 1-18
Section and Squad Leaders ................. 1-18
naissance platoon” refers to HUMINT Collectors ............................... 1-19
all forms of the scout platoon, Missions, Capabilities and Limitations,
whether it is part of an armor and Vehicle Characteristics .......... 1-19
or infantry battalion, a Missions ................................................ 1-19
cavalry squadron, a brigade Capabilities and Limitations ................ 1-20
Vehicle Characteristics ........................ 1-21
reconnaissance troop (BRT), Battle Command .......................................... 1-23
or a cavalry squadron (recon- Command and Control
naissance, surveillance, and in the Platoon .................................... 1-24
target acquisition [RSTA]). Command Relationships ...................... 1-24
References to the “recce FBCB2 in the Battle Command
Structure ............................................ 1-25
platoon” in this manual apply Intelligence Preparation of the
specifically to reconnaissance Battlefield ....................................... 1-29
platoons that are organic to What IPB Accomplishes ....................... 1-29
the cavalry squadron (RSTA) . The IPB Process ................................... 1-30
Refer to Section II of this Friendly COA Development
and War-gaming ................................ 1-31
chapter for a discussion of the Reconnaissance and
various types of reconnais- Surveillance Plan ............................... 1-33
sance platoons. Platoon IPB Execution .......................... 1-34
Situational Awareness ................................. 1-35
Battlefield Visualization ....................... 1-35
Battlespace ............................................ 1-36
Fratricide ............................................... 1-39
Navigation ................................................. 1-40
Maps and Overlays ............................... 1-40
Land Navigation .................................... 1-40

SECTION I – ROLE OF THE RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON

5-1. In simplest terms, the reconnaissance platoon serves as the


commander’s eyes and ears on the battlefield. The platoon is organized,
equipped, and trained to gather battlefield information, its primary

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

function. It employs the TTP of reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S),


as well as proper techniques of movement (both mounted and
dismounted) and stealth. Scouts provide current battlefield data to help
the commander plan and conduct tactical operations in stability
operations, support operations, smaller-scale contingencies (SSC), and
major theater of war (MTW) environments. The recce platoon is
specifically tailored to conduct the multidimensional aspect of
reconnaissance in complex terrain (refer to the discussion on the
multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance in Chapter 3 of this manual).
5-2. Reconnaissance platoons also conduct limited security missions,
but they are not organized and equipped to fight for extended periods or
to act as armor killers. Although they can employ a variety of antitank
(AT) weapons (TOWs, AT-4s, or Javelins), if so equipped, they normally
use these assets for defensive purposes (self-protection and breaking
contact), not for offensive reasons.

SECTION II – TYPES OF RECONNAISSANCE PLATOONS

5-3. There are two types of reconnaissance organizations. One type


relies solely on passive surveillance, human interaction (HUMINT), and
technical means to perform reconnaissance. The other type uses these
techniques and assets, but has the additional capability of fighting for
information.
5-4. In the first category, which focuses purely on information
gathering, are reconnaissance organizations such as task force scouts
found in armor or mechanized infantry battalions, BRTs, and light
cavalry units and recce units in the cavalry squadron (RSTA) of the
Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT). Because these organizations
conduct reconnaissance dismounted, or from lightly armored vehicles,
they are not capable of surviving protracted engagement with threat
forces. For this reason, they rely on stealth and the integration of other
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets for
survivability and success. These types of organizations avoid direct fire
contact and engage threat forces with direct fire weapons only in self-
defense. They lack the capability to fight for information.
5-5. Reconnaissance organizations such as armored cavalry regiments
(ACR) and division cavalry squadrons not only use the common
techniques and assets (HUMINT, passive surveillance, and technical
means) but also are capable of employing combat power to fight for
information. Because these units are usually the forward-most elements
in MTW environments, they must have the capability to survive meeting
engagements and to destroy or impede threat forces as necessary to
sustain operations in high-threat areas. These unique, combined arms
organizations employ tanks, attack helicopters and, usually, Bradley
cavalry fighting vehicles (CFV) to enhance survivability and to sustain
the aggressive tempo required for operations in this environment. The
capabilities of the integrated weapons platforms, working together, allow
these organizations to fight for information using a higher level of
engagement criteria and tempo than those reconnaissance organizations

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not organized in this manner. These units are capable of fighting through
threat reconnaissance (destroying the threat’s “eyes and ears”) to gain
combat information needed by higher unit commanders. In shaping
operations, the ability to fight for information is important in determining
the intent of a threat (for example, whether the threat is willing to
defend, withdraw, or fight when confronted) without committing main
body infantry or armor units.
5-6. These two types of reconnaissance organizations are mutually
supporting. Organizations working forward in an area of operations
provide the initial information that may allow the refinement of focus for
follow-on reconnaissance elements. This information can also enhance
survivability and mission success by enabling the follow-on organization
to maneuver out of contact (using stealthy movement) and then make
initial contact on the most favorable terms.
5-7. Unlike most other combat arms platoons, which maneuver
together in formation, the reconnaissance platoon normally maneuvers as
individual sections or squads (mounted, dismounted, or a combination)
under the direction and control of the platoon leader. A section may
consist of two vehicles plus any combat elements under the platoon’s
operational control (OPCON). Determining which organization best meets
his mission requirements is one of the key decisions the platoon leader
must make during his troop-leading procedures.

SECTION III – OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

5-8. Reconnaissance platoons provide accurate and timely information


over large operating environments. This is especially true for the recce
platoon operating as part of the cavalry squadron (RSTA) within the
SBCT. The current operational environment in which reconnaissance
platoons will operate is characterized by a new threat, armed with
advanced equipment as a result of global arms proliferation and using
unconventional terrorist/guerrilla operating tactics. Employing
asymmetrical tactics are regular and irregular forces, special forces,
terrorists, political factions, supporting government factions,
nongovernment agencies, transnational organizations, organized criminal
groups, and even refugee populations. The geographical area in which
these threats choose to operate is characterized by highly varied terrain,
from complex urban sprawl to regions of weak infrastructure supported
by inferior roads, bridges, and transportation networks.
5-9. These adaptive strategies are designed to counter or mitigate the
strengths of US forces. Being aware of their vulnerabilities to US
precision strikes and control of the air (as seen in US operations in
Afghanistan), adversaries may attempt to avoid massing their forces in
linear offensive and defensive echelons. Instead, they may employ
selective precision strikes, along with rapid tactical and operational
maneuver from areas of sanctuary and other asymmetric actions aimed at
continuous, nondecisive engagements. Today’s reconnaissance platoons
will most likely face a threat that knows more about the US than the US
knows about them.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

SCOPE OF OPERATIONS
CHARACTERISTICS OF STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS
5-10. Stability operations and support operations may precede and/or
follow war or occur simultaneously in the same theater. These operations
may be conducted in conjunction with wartime operations to complement
the achievement of strategic objectives, or they may support a
commander’s forward-presence operations or a US ambassador’s nation
plan. It is possible that they may even occur within the United States
itself. The Army conducts stability operations or support operations as
part of a joint team, often in conjunction with other US and foreign
government agencies. (NOTE: Refer to the discussion of stability
operations and support operations in Appendix E of this manual.)
Regardless of the location and context in which these operations are
conducted, they are designed to fulfill a number of important objectives,
including the following:

· Promote regional stability.


· Maintain or achieve democratic end states.
· Retain US influence and access abroad.
· Provide humanitarian assistance.
· Protect US interests, and to assist US civil authorities.

CHARACTERISTICS OF SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCIES


5-11. Historically, SSCs like those in Panama, Haiti, and Kosovo have
occurred in regions with weak infrastructure (especially roads, rail
facilities, and bridges), complex terrain with large urban areas, and
diverse weather patterns. A variety of humanitarian issues complicate
operations in these areas: overpopulation, resource shortages, natural
disasters, and inadequate local, regional, and global response capabilities.
5-12. Threats in these environments usually consist of mid- to low-end
industrial-age forces characterized by limited armor/mechanized
elements, mainly equipped with small numbers of early generation tanks
and some mechanized, but mostly motorized, infantry. There is a
pervasive presence of guerrilla, terrorist, paramilitary, special purpose,
special police, and militia organizations. These forces are equipped with
man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), antitank guided missiles
(ATGM), mortars, mines, explosives, and machine guns. They have
limited fixed- and rotary-wing aviation assets. These forces can be
expected to have robust communications, employing conventional
military devices augmented by commercial equipment such as cell
phones.
5-13. Most threats within an SSC environment are not capable of long-
term, sustained, high-tempo combat operations. They are capable of
brigade- and division-level operations of limited duration and with
limited objectives. Examples of these operations include destruction of a
weaker force, seizure of an area or region, or the seizure of an urban
center, often emphasizing the use of decentralized and distributed
operations. On the other hand, these threat forces are capable of
conducting highly effective defensive operations in complex and urban
terrain. They are also adept at conducting long-term, sustained,

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_______________________________________________________________ Chapter 1 – Introduction

unconventional terrorist and guerrilla operations. Present and future


trends indicate that friendly forces employed in SSCs can expect to face
the following threat capabilities and conditions:

· Employment of more sophisticated and advanced technology.


· Employment of more capable and secure command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I).
· Increased use of urban areas as a sanctuary and operating
base for conventional capabilities.
· Use of sophisticated tactics, with the ambush as a key
operating focus.

CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR THEATER OF WAR


5-14. MTW operations have the greatest potential of occurring in
regions containing moderate to well-developed infrastructure (especially
roads, rail, and bridges), complex and urban terrain with large urban
areas, and diverse weather patterns. Humanitarian issues would
probably complicate these operations in much the same fashion as they
would SSCs; examples include overpopulation; resource shortages;
natural disasters; and inadequate local, regional, and global response
capabilities.
5-15. Military threats in MTW operations usually include advanced
industrial-age forces, with some high-technology niches, characterized by
both armor and mechanized forces as well as motorized/light infantry.
These threats are capable of long-term, sustained, high-tempo operations
at brigade and/or division level. They can also conduct sustained,
unconventional combat operations and limited duration/objective attacks.
These forces are mostly equipped with newer generation tanks and
infantry fighting vehicles and have significant numbers of MANPADs,
ATGMs, missiles, rockets, artillery, mortars, and mines. They possess an
integrated air defense system and a robust military and civilian
communications capability. In addition, they have advanced fixed- and
rotary-wing aviation assets as well as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).
Most threats capable of initiating an MTW operation also possess
weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
5-16. Reconnaissance assets are the commander’s primary source for
information. The fundamental role of reconnaissance platoons is to
perform reconnaissance and security, as well as surveillance, target
acquisition, and battle damage assessment (BDA). These organizations
enhance the higher commander’s ability to retain freedom of maneuver,
which in turn allows him to concentrate combat power and apply assets
deliberately at the decisive time and place of his choosing. Stealth is the
reconnaissance platoon’s primary means of force protection; in most
cases, organic weapons are used only in self-defense.
5-17. It is important to note that the multidimensional aspect of
reconnaissance (as discussed in detail in Chapter 3 of this manual) is
integrated into all reconnaissance operations. All reconnaissance assets
must go beyond merely investigating terrain characteristics of an area.
They must also be prepared to assess infrastructure, demographics,

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

centers of influence, flash points, and personalities as part of their


traditional missions of zone, area, and route reconnaissance. To
accomplish his primary mission of providing continuous, accurate, and
timely information in complex environments, the commander enhances
his multidimensional reconnaissance capability by “nesting” collection
assets—either air/ground collectors or ISR assets from other units—with
ground reconnaissance platoons.

SECtion Iv – TACTICAL ORGANIZATION

RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON ORGANIZATIONS


5-18. There are several types of reconnaissance platoon organizations
in the force, including platoons in light and heavy divisions and those in
separate cavalry troops. The three most prominent types, however, are
the CFV platoon, the HMMWV platoon, and the reconnaissance vehicle
(RV) recce platoon. The platoons are organized by tables of organization
and equipment (TOE) into a headquarters element and scout sections.
When executing missions, the reconnaissance platoon is organized
according to the factors of mission, enemy, terrain (and weather), troops
and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-
TC) into an appropriate tactical organization consisting of a variable
number of scout sections or squads.

RECCE PLATOON
5-19. The recce platoon consists of one officer and 20 enlisted soldiers
manning four vehicles (see Figure 1-1). The recce platoon is equipped
with the Stryker RV. Refer to Figure 1-22 for an illustration of the
vehicle’s capabilities and specifications.

Figure 1-1. Recce Platoon

Platoon Headquaters

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_______________________________________________________________ Chapter 1 – Introduction

5-20. The recce platoon headquarters element provides command and


control (C2) for the platoon. It consists of the platoon leader, the platoon
sergeant (PSG), and their respective vehicle crews. The recce platoon
rarely uses a headquarters element during tactical operations, relying
instead on the leaders of its sections or squads as described in the
following discussion.

Recce Sections and Squads


5-21. The recce section is normally employed as the platoon’s basic
tactical maneuver organization. Each section is made up of a section
leader, squad leaders, and their crews manning two vehicles. The platoon
may also be task organized for maneuver purposes into elements known
as recce squads; the squad is normally a single vehicle and its crew.

Recce Platoon Dismounted Organization


5-22. Dismounted operations are the recce platoon’s primary means for
gathering information. The basic dismounted elements within the recce
platoon are the team, squad, section, and platoon. Each recce vehicle has
a designated dismounted team. (NOTE: Refer to discussions of
dismounted organization later in this chapter and in Chapter 5 for
detailed information on dismounted operations.)

Recce Platoon Vehicle Organization


5-23. Regardless of the mission it is executing or the formation or
movement technique it is using, the recce platoon normally operates in
one of three organizations during mounted operations: as three sections
with one vehicle in each section and the platoon leader’s vehicle providing
C2, as two sections with two vehicles in each section, or as a four-vehicle
platoon.
5-24. Three-Section Organization. The three-section organization is used
when the anticipated threat is low to medium. The key to this
organization rests in the use of dismounted elements and in ensuring that
adjacent vehicles mutually support each other. If mutual support is not
possible because of terrain or other mission constraints, vehicles must
have the ability to maneuver and support adjacent elements. This
organization allows the platoon leader to provide C2 for the platoon; he
can also provide additional support for any of the other three vehicles in
the platoon. On the other hand, this organization does not provide the
recce platoon with section overwatch capability, leaving elements
vulnerable to threat contact. (See Figure 1-2.)

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure 1-2. Recce Platoon Three-Section


Vehicle Organization

5-25. Two-Section Organization. The two-section organization is used


when increased security is required, when the area of operations can be
covered efficiently with only two elements, or when the threat situation is
unknown. This type of organization limits the amount of terrain the
platoon can cover and decreases the speed with which the platoon can
perform its tasks. On the other hand, it increases internal section security
by providing mutually supporting fires. It also gives the platoon leader
and PSG greater flexibility in performing C2 and combat service support
(CSS) requirements. (See Figure 1-3.)

Figure 1-3. Recce Platoon Two-Section


Vehicle Organization

5-26. Four-Vehicle Organization. The four-vehicle organization is the


most difficult to control (refer to Figure 1-4 for an illustration). The
platoon leader employs this organization when he must have four
separate information sources at the same time or when the platoon is
executing certain surveillance missions. This organization should be used
when the threat situation is known and/or the threat is low or
nonexistent. This formation may also be implemented during short-
duration security missions, allowing for depth in the platoon’s sector.

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_______________________________________________________________ Chapter 1 – Introduction

Figure 1-4. Recce Platoon Four-Vehicle Organization

CFV PLATOON
5-27. The CFV platoon, also known as the cavalry scout platoon, is
equipped with six M3 CFVs (as shown in Figure 1-5). The platoon is
found in the cavalry squadrons of an armored or mechanized division or
in an armored cavalry regiment (ACR); it may also be found in certain
mechanized battalions. Regardless of the mission it is executing or the
formation or movement technique it is using, the CFV platoon normally
operates in one of three organizations: as three sections with two vehicles
in each section, as two sections with three vehicles in each section, or as a
six-vehicle platoon.

Figure 1-5. CFV Scout Platoon

Three-Section Organization
5-28. This is the basic organization for the CFV scout platoon (see
Figure 1-6). This organization allows the platoon to achieve a good
compromise between the requirement of employing a maximum number
of elements during the reconnaissance or security mission and the need
for security. It is the ideal organization for the conduct of a route
reconnaissance mission. In a screen mission, this organization allows
employment of three long-duration OPs, which are occupied for 12 or
more hours; it also facilitates the simultaneous conduct of dismounted
patrols.

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Figure 1-6. CFV Scout Platoon Three-Section Organization

Two-Section Organization
5-29. The two-section organization is used when increased security is
required, when the area of operations can be covered efficiently with only
two elements, or when operational strength (less than six vehicles
operational) makes the three-section organization impossible. Refer to the
illustration in Figure 1-7.

Figure 1-7. CFV Scout Platoon Two-Section Organization

Six-Vehicle Organization
5-30. The six-vehicle organization is the most difficult to control (see
Figure 1-8). The platoon leader employs this organization when he must
have six separate information sources at the same time.

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_______________________________________________________________ Chapter 1 – Introduction

Figure 1-8. CFV Scout Platoon Six-Vehicle Organization

HMMWV RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON


5-31. With 6 or 10 vehicles (see Figures 1-9 and 1-10), the HMMWV
reconnaissance platoon has a wide variety of organizational options,
including the basic options covered in the following discussion. The
platoon leader may develop other combinations to meet unique METT-TC
requirements and to accommodate attachments. No matter how he
organizes his platoon, however, the HMMWV platoon leader has only a
limited number of soldiers to conduct dismounted operations.

Figure 1-9. Ten-HMMWV Reconnaissance Platoon

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Figure 1-10. Six-HMMWV Reconnaissance Platoon

Two-Section Organization
5-32. This is an effective organization when only two maneuver
corridors have to be observed or when two distinct reconnaissance
missions are required. This organization maximizes security at the
section level and gives the sections sufficient maneuver and C2 capability
to conduct limited separate missions. This organization allows the platoon
to put out two long-duration observation posts (OP); it is the best
organization for dismounted operations. (See Figures 1-11 and 1-12.)

Figure 1-11. HMMWV Reconnaissance Platoon


Two-Section Organization (10-HMMWV Platoon)

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_______________________________________________________________ Chapter 1 – Introduction

Figure 1-12. HMMWV Reconnaissance Platoon


Two-Section Organization (Six-HMMWV Platoon)

Three-Section Organization
5-33. This organization is ideal for reconnaissance along a single route.
It allows employment of three long-duration OPs in a 10-HMMWV
platoon and three short-duration OPs in a six-HMMWV platoon. The
ability to concurrently conduct dismounted patrols is very limited for six-
HMMWV platoons. (Refer to Figures 1-13 and 1-14.) (NOTE: A
consolidated headquarters section, with the platoon leader and PSG as
shown in Figure 1-14, increases C2 capability and is an optional
configuration.)

Figure 1-13. HMMWV Reconnaissance Platoon


Three-Section Organization (10-HMMWV Platoon)

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Figure 1-14. HMMWV Reconnaissance Platoon


Three-Section Organization (Six-HMMWV Platoon)

Five-Section Organization
5-34. This organization is used only by 10-HMMWV platoons in
reconnoitering large areas or multiple avenues of approach. Five short-
duration OPs can be established, allowing OPs to be structured in depth.
In this organization, sections have dismounted capability to conduct local
security only. (See Figure 1-15.)

Figure 1-15. HMMWV Reconnaissance Platoon


Four-Section Organization (10-HMMWV Platoon)

Six-Vehicle Organization
5-35. The six-vehicle organization is used only by six-HMMWV platoons
and is the most difficult to control (refer to Figure 1-16). The platoon
leader employs this organization when he must have six separate
information sources at the same time.

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_______________________________________________________________ Chapter 1 – Introduction

Figure 1-16. HMMWV Reconnaissance Platoon


Six-Vehicle Organization (Six-HMMWV Platoon)

Ten-Vehicle Organization
5-36. The 10-vehicle organization is used only by the 10-HMMWV
platoon. It gives the platoon an enhanced ability to conduct screening
missions in depth, although only for short durations. It also provides the
platoon with the ability to conduct numerous reconnaissance tasks
simultaneously. (See Figure 1-17.)
5-37. At the same time, however, the 10-vehicle organization is rarely
employed because it creates very difficult C2 challenges. It severely limits
the platoon’s overwatch capability; if the platoon is not echeloned in its
sector with an overwatch plan for follow-on squads, platoon elements are
left extremely vulnerable to threat contact. In addition, this organization
affords the platoon no ability to organize patrols of any type.

Figure 1-17. HMMWV Reconnaissance Platoon


10-Vehicle Organization (10-HMMWV Platoon)

DISMOUNTED ORGANIZATION
5-38. Every dismounted team consists of a reconnaissance element
and a security element. The purpose of the reconnaissance element is to
obtain data on information requirements. The security element’s primary
responsibility is to protect the reconnaissance element. The security
element may also serve as a reconnaissance element or have alternate
responsibilities. Whichever role the security element plays, its primary
objective is protecting the dismounted element. A two-man team is the
smallest dismounted element within the platoon (see Figure 1-18).

Figure 1-18. Dismounted Two-Man


Reconnaissance Organization

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DISMOUNTED THREE-MAN SQUAD ORGANIZATION


5-39. The three-man dismounted squad is the basic dismounted
element within a recce squad (single RV) and a three-vehicle HMMWV
section. It can perform reconnaissance tasks, security tasks, OP and
surveillance tasks, liaison, or a combination of these tasks. It is headed by
a 19D scout of grade E5 or higher. In this organization (as well as the
other dismounted organizations), the vehicle may provide security for the
entire element. (See Figure 1-19.)

Figure 1-19. Dismounted Three-Man Squad

DISMOUNTED FOUR-MAN SQUAD ORGANIZATION


5-40. The four-man organization is the basic dismounted section
configuration for the platoon leader’s RV in a recce platoon or a two-
vehicle CFV section. The four-man squad can perform reconnaissance
tasks, security tasks, OP/surveillance tasks, liaison, or a combination of
these tasks. It is headed by a 19D scout of grade E6 or higher. (Refer to
Figure 1-20.)

Figure1-20. Dismounted Four-Man


Reconnaissance Organization

DISMOUNTED SECTION ORGANIZATION


5-41. The dismounted section combines the strength of two dismounted
squads. It can also perform reconnaissance tasks, security tasks,
OP/surveillance tasks, liaison, or a combination of these tasks. The

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_______________________________________________________________ Chapter 1 – Introduction

platoon leader, PSG, or an E6 section sergeant heads this section. The


recce platoon’s dismounted section is large enough to have a reaction
team as part of its security element.

DISMOUNTED PLATOON ORGANIZATION


5-42. The dismounted platoon can perform reconnaissance tasks,
security tasks, OP/surveillance tasks, liaison, or a combination of these
tasks. The platoon leader/PSG heads the dismounted platoon element,
which always includes an element designated for security (reaction force)
and control. The dismounted platoon organization may be used if the
threat is high (security of the element requires mutual support) or
vehicular movement is impossible. Infiltration, for example, may require
the platoon to conduct dismounted tactical movement. The platoon’s
vehicles may provide security for the entire element; this organization
normally leaves two scouts mounted on each vehicle.

NOTE: For a detailed discussion of dismounted operations, refer to Chapter 5 of this manual.

TASK ORGANIZATION
5-43. METT-TC circumstances will often require the reconnaissance
platoon leader to employ variations of the basic platoon organizations
discussed previously. In addition, attachments such as tanks, mobile gun
systems (MGS), infantry, or engineers may change the composition and
number of reconnaissance squads or sections. Later chapters provide
further information regarding mission task organization.

SECTION V – RESPONSIBILITIES

5-44. The reconnaissance platoon leader and the platoon’s


noncommissioned officers (NCO) must be experts in the use of organic
weapons, indirect fires, land navigation, supporting fires, demolitions,
obstacles, communications, reconnaissance, HUMINT collection, liaison,
and security techniques. They must be familiar with infantry, mortar,
and combined arms tactics and be able to react to rapidly changing
situations; they must also know how to employ combat support (CS)
assets that are supporting or are attached to the platoon. Because of the
many missions the platoon must be capable of performing, the platoon
leader and PSG must be proficient in tasks at all skill levels of MOS 19D
and familiar with the capabilities, limitations, and deployment of ISR
assets, such as ground sensors and UAV sections.

PLATOON LEADER
5-45. The platoon leader is responsible to his higher commander for the
discipline, combat readiness, and training of the platoon as well as the
maintenance of its equipment. The platoon leader must have a thorough
knowledge of reconnaissance and security tactics. He works closely with
his higher commander during the mission analysis portion of the
planning process.

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5-46. The platoon leader must be proficient in the tactical employment


of the platoon. A solid understanding of troop-leading procedures and the
ability to apply them quickly and efficiently in the field are essential. The
platoon leader must also know the capabilities and limitations of the
platoon’s personnel and equipment. He must be an expert in threat
organizations, doctrine, and equipment.
5-47. Most of all, the platoon leader must be versatile. He must be able
to exercise sound judgment and make correct decisions quickly based on
his commander’s intent and the tactical situation. He must ensure that
he, and every member of the platoon, understands and can successfully
accomplish the following leadership competencies:

· Troop-leading procedures.
· Deployment.
· Tactical movement.
· OP establishment and operation.
· Patrolling and local security.
· Establishment and maintenance of effective communications.
· Employment of fires.
· Actions on contact.
· The multidimensional aspect of R&S.
· Reporting procedures.

NOTE: Refer to Chapter 2 of this manual for additional information on the leadership
competencies.

PLATOON SERGEANT
5-48. The PSG leads elements of the platoon as directed by the platoon
leader and assumes command of the platoon in the absence of the platoon
leader. During tactical operations, he may assist in the control of the
platoon, requiring him to be proficient in each of the platoon’s leadership
competencies (refer to Chapter 2 for additional discussion of these
competencies). The PSG assists the platoon leader in maintaining
discipline, as well as in coordinating training and controlling the platoon.
He supervises equipment maintenance, supply operations, and other CSS
activities.

SECTION AND SQUAD LEADERS


5-49. Section and squad leaders must be experts in mounted
operations, dismounted patrolling, and employment of HUMINT assets
(whether or not these are organic to the platoon). These leaders also must
be experts in conducting surveillance and establishing OPs. Section
leaders are responsible to the platoon leader for the training and
discipline of their sections. They are also responsible for the tactical
employment and control of the section, requiring proficiency in the
platoon’s leadership competencies (refer to the discussion in Chapter 2 of
this manual). Section leaders are responsible for the maintenance and
operation of all vehicles and equipment organic to their sections. Squad

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_______________________________________________________________ Chapter 1 – Introduction

leaders have the same responsibilities for their squads as section leaders
have for sections.

HUMINT COLLECTORS
5-50. HUMINT collectors within the recce platoon are tasked with
collecting information for intelligence use from people or related
documents. Their responsibilities are covered in detail in Chapter 3 of
this manual (in the discussion of the multidimensional aspect of
reconnaissance) as well as in Chapter 7 (urban operations). The HUMINT
collectors must be proficient in the following related procedures and
operations:

· Tactical questioning. This is an abbreviated form of


interrogation or debriefing used to collect information related
to the commander’s priority information requirements (PIR)
from human sources.
· Interrogation and debriefing. These involve the
systematic questioning of individuals to procure information
to answer specific collection requirements. Sources, such as
enemy prisoners of war (EPW) and civilian detainees who are
in the custody of US forces, are interrogated. All others are
debriefed, to include friendly forces, civilian refugees, and
local inhabitants. (NOTE: The role of interrogation in the
reconnaissance platoon is limited to the initial questioning
and evaluation of detainees. Debriefing is limited to gathering
information from internal patrols.)
· Source operations. These intelligence collection operations
use recruited and registered HUMINT sources. The
registration of sources is a legal requirement in any sustained
use of a specific individual as a source. (NOTE: The role of
recce platoon HUMINT collectors in source operations is
normally limited to identifying potential intelligence sources
for exploitation by HUMINT assets at higher levels.)

5-51. In reconnaissance platoons that do not have organic HUMINT


collectors, scouts should have an understanding of these functions of
information-gathering. A supportive civilian populous will likely pass
valuable information to the first soldiers with whom they come into
contact. In addition, all scouts should have an understanding of the roles
and duties of HUMINT collectors because these assets may be attached
once the platoon is deployed, even if they are not organic to the platoon.

SECTION VI – MISSIONS, CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS, AND


VEHICLE CHARACTERISTICS

MISSIONS
5-52. The reconnaissance platoon’s primary missions are
reconnaissance, surveillance, and security in support of its parent
unit. As part of R&S tasks, the platoon will conduct target acquisition,

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which will require it to detect, identify, and locate key targets for lethal
and nonlethal fire. The platoon is also trained and equipped to conduct
tactical BDA. It can perform these missions mounted or dismounted, day
or night, in various terrain conditions, and under all weather and
visibility conditions. In addition to the primary missions, the
reconnaissance platoon can perform the following tactical and support
missions:

· Liaison.
· Quartering party duties.
· Traffic control.
· Chemical detection and radiological survey and monitoring
operations as part of a nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)
defense.
· Limited obstacle construction and reduction.

CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS


5-53. The reconnaissance platoon is a reconnaissance force that
conducts operations as part of a larger combined arms force. Scouts in
general have capabilities and limitations that must be considered when
they are employed. Each type of reconnaissance platoon has
characteristics specific to its TOE. Characteristics of reconnaissance
platoons include the following:

· Employment considerations. Distance and mission


duration are critical considerations affecting employment of
the reconnaissance platoon away from the main body of its
parent unit. Fire support, CSS, and communications
requirements are also important factors when the platoon is
tasked to conduct sustained operations beyond the immediate
supporting range of the main body.
· Support. The reconnaissance platoon is dependent on its
parent unit for CS and CSS.
· Route reconnaissance. During route reconnaissance, the
platoon can reconnoiter only one route unless it is properly
augmented or is operating in a permissive environment.
· Zone reconnaissance. The following considerations apply
when the reconnaissance platoon is tasked to conduct zone
reconnaissance:
n Depending on METT-TC, the recce platoon can
reconnoiter a zone up to 2 to 3 kilometers wide. METT-TC
factors may increase or decrease the size of the zone.
n Depending on METT-TC, HMMWV and CFV platoons can
reconnoiter a zone up to 3 to 5 kilometers wide. METT-TC
may increase or decrease the size of the zone.
· Screening. During screening operations, recce and HMMWV
reconnaissance platoons are extremely limited in their ability
to destroy or repel threat reconnaissance units.

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_______________________________________________________________ Chapter 1 – Introduction

· OPs. The following considerations apply when the


reconnaissance platoon employs OPs during its operations:
n A recce platoon can man up to four OPs for short
durations (less than 12 hours) or two OPs for long
durations (over 12 hours).
n The CFV scout platoon can man up to six OPs for short
durations or three OPs for long durations.
n The 10-HMMWV reconnaissance platoon can man up to
10 short-duration OPs or up to three OPs for long
durations.
n The six-HMMWV reconnaissance platoon can man up to
six short-duration OPs or up to two OPs for long
durations.
· Patrolling. When properly organized, scouts can conduct
effective reconnaissance and security patrols. The CFV scout
platoon has 12 dedicated dismounted scouts, while the recce
platoon has 13 dismounts, including HUMINT collectors
(MOS 97B) organic to the platoon. The HMMWV scout
platoon has very limited dismounted capability; it must be
carefully task organized to conduct dismounted operations.
· Communications. While operating on the platoon net, the
reconnaissance platoon leader can monitor only two nets at
one time. This means he cannot operate continuously on all
necessary squadron or battalion nets, including the
squadron/battalion command, operations and intelligence
(OI), administrative/logistics (A/L), and mortar nets. Refer to
the discussion of platoon radio nets in Chapter 2 of this
manual.
· Obstacles. The reconnaissance platoon has the following
capabilities related to the employment and reduction of
obstacles during its operations.
n The reconnaissance platoon has limited obstacle
construction ability and carries only a basic load of
demolitions.
n The reconnaissance platoon has very limited obstacle
reduction capability; under most conditions, it can breach
only point obstacles.

VEHICLE CHARACTERISTICS
5-54. In many respects, the scout’s capability is dependent on his
equipment. The three types of reconnaissance platforms—the RV, the M3
CFV, and the M1025/1026 HMMWV—have distinctly different
characteristics. When employed with the appropriate TTP, all three
vehicles are highly effective reconnaissance and security platforms.
5-55. Every scout must understand his mount thoroughly so he can
maximize its capabilities and minimize its limitations. See Figures 1-21,
1-22, and 1-23 for illustrations of the three scout vehicles and summaries
of their capabilities and specifications.

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To be published upon selection of vehicle.

Figure 1-21. RV Characteristics

Figure 1-22. M3 CFV Characteristics

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_______________________________________________________________ Chapter 1 – Introduction

Figure 1-23. HMMWV Characteristics

SECTION VII – BATTLE COMMAND

5-56. Battle command is the process that leaders use to assimilate


information from many sources, to visualize the battlefield and assess the
situation, and then to direct military action as required to achieve victory.
Thinking and acting are simultaneous activities for leaders in battle.
5-57. The actions inherent in the C2 of combat elements on the modern
battlefield are the biggest challenges faced by combat leaders. Command
involves directing elements; control entails the steps taken to ensure that
the directions are carried out. The greatest tactician in the world would
be ineffective if he did not properly use the methods available to direct
and control his combat elements. C2 must be kept extremely simple to be
effective.

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5-58. Battle command is an important consideration for all types of


reconnaissance platoons in providing their higher commands with critical
battlefield information. The accuracy and timeliness of this information
will often have a direct impact on the success or failure of the troop,
squadron/battalion, and higher commands.

COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE PLATOON


5-59. The reconnaissance platoon leader leads his platoon and is
assisted by the PSG. He uses a variety of techniques to plan operations,
issue orders, employ the platoon, and communicate. At platoon level,
effective use of C2 is a function of several critical factors:

· The commander’s intent.


· Leadership.
· Training.
· Sound and thoroughly understood standing operating
procedures (SOP).
· The tactically sound employment of control measures and
communications equipment and techniques.

5-60. As noted, the reconnaissance platoon’s primary functions are to


gather information (reconnaissance), conduct surveillance, and perform
limited security missions. Except when they are operating as a part of a
larger force, the HMMWV and recce platoons are not organized and
equipped to undertake operations that entail a significant offensive
component, such as counterreconnaissance, armed reconnaissance,
reconnaissance by fire, or reconnaissance in force. The unique
information-gathering capabilities of these platoons should be preserved
by limiting direct contact with the threat force to that necessary for self-
defense.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
5-61. As part of a recce, reconnaissance, or cavalry troop, the
reconnaissance platoon is subject to command relationships similar to
those of other platoons in a company-size organization. In an armor or
infantry battalion, the reconnaissance platoon performs several critical
tasks in support of the battalion commander’s concept of the operation.
The reconnaissance platoon responds to its platoon leader, who receives
guidance from the troop or battalion commander, depending on their
command relationship.
5-62. As the commander’s eyes and ears, the reconnaissance platoon
leader must stay in contact with either the troop/battalion commander or
the troop command post (CP) or battalion tactical operations center
(TOC). This is necessary if the platoon leader is to keep the platoon
informed of the next higher commander’s current situation as well as the
current threat situation. He must also ensure that information gained by
the platoon is transmitted higher.
5-63. The commander must ensure that his initial operation order
(OPORD) and any following fragmentary orders (FRAGO) focus the
reconnaissance platoon on its mission by telling the platoon leader what
is expected of the reconnaissance or security effort in each phase of the

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_______________________________________________________________ Chapter 1 – Introduction

operation. The intent includes the commander’s criteria for recovering the
reconnaissance platoon as tactical operations progress. He must make it
clear whether he intends for the platoon to conduct stay-behind
operations if the threat main body has passed its locations or to pass
through friendly lines before the arrival of the threat main body.
5-64. The commander also specifies PIR for which the reconnaissance
platoon is responsible. PIR cover the information for which the
commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his planning and
decision-making. Often stated in question form, these tactical and
operational considerations are the foundation for development of R&S
plans and for execution of operations involved in the overall ISR effort.
5-65. In recce/reconnaissance/cavalry troop operations, the troop XO is
a battlefield manager for the troop commander. He operates from a
vehicle CP; this vehicle gives him the communications capability and
facilities to receive, collate, and pass to higher headquarters the routine
reconnaissance information processed by the troop’s reconnaissance
platoons. In this system, most of the routine reports are sent to the troop
XO rather than to the troop commander. The troop commander’s role is to
monitor the routine actions, receive high-priority information to transmit
on command nets, and control the troop once contact is gained. In armor
or infantry battalions, reconnaissance platoons generally report to their
TOCs, although they may report high-priority information directly to the
battalion commander or S3.

FBCB2 IN THE BATTLE COMMAND STRUCTURE


5-66. Employment of the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and
Below (FBCB2) system significantly enhances the reconnaissance
platoon’s battle command capability. FBCB2 is a network of computers,
global positioning system (GPS) equipment, and communication systems
that work together to provide combat leaders with real-time information
of unprecedented quantity and quality. FBCB2 affords the
reconnaissance platoon with a variety of capabilities, including the
following:

· Maintain friendly situational awareness (BLUE SA).


· Track actual and templated threat positions and obstacles
(RED SA).
· Submit preformatted standardized reports. These include
SALT reports (covering size, activity, location, and time of
enemy/threat forces), situation reports (SITREP), medical
evacuation (MEDEVAC) reports/requests, NBC reports, and
call for fire (CFF) reports.
· Rapidly disseminate graphic overlays and written FRAGOs.

FBCB2 ARCHITECTURE
5-67. Each of the vehicles in the reconnaissance platoon is equipped
with the three basic components of the FBCB2 system. First, the GPS
provides precise location and date/time information that is the basis for
reporting real-time friendly locations and for generating laser-designated
map spots for reporting purposes. Second, the single channel
ground/airborne radio system (SINCGARS) provides a secure means of

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

transmitting both voice and digital traffic between vehicles in the platoon.
In addition to the SINCGARS, platoon vehicles are also equipped with
the enhanced position location and reporting system (EPLRS). The
EPLRS provides a secure digital connection and serves as a router,
efficiently sending message traffic internally within the platoon and also
out to the higher command and fire support nets. This routing capability
ensures that information is passed even if the chain of command is
disrupted by physical separation on the battlefield, casualties, or
mechanical failures. Finally, the FBCB2 terminal includes a monitor,
keyboard, mouse, and a variety of computing functions; these features
provide the crew with direct access to the system. Together, these FBCB2
components form the lower tactical internet (TI). Figure 1-24 illustrates
FBCB2 architecture in a recce platoon.
5-68. The upper TI consists of a variety of tactical computer systems
and communications equipment located primarily at the
squadron/battalion level and higher. The most important of these are the
maneuver control system (MCS), the all source analysis system (ASAS),
the advanced field artillery tactical data system (AFATDS), and the
combat service support control system (CSSCS). These systems draw
upon the reports and positional data passed on the lower TI to provide
situational awareness at higher command levels. In turn, these systems
can push information such as location of adjacent units, known and
templated threat positions, graphics, and OPORDs down to FBCB2 users.

Figure 1-24. FBCB2 Architecture


for a Recce Platoon

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_______________________________________________________________ Chapter 1 – Introduction

FBCB2 CAPABILITIES
5-69. This discussion focuses on several areas in which FBCB2
enhances the reconnaissance platoon’s battle command capabilities.

Friendly Situational Awareness


5-70. To enhance friendly situational awareness (also referred to as
BLUE SA), the FBCB2 screen displays an icon for each individual vehicle
in the platoon. This provides the vehicle commander with a clear picture
of where he is located in relation to the platoon and the platoon leader
with a picture of where he is operating in relation to the rest of the higher
unit. While the system functions automatically for vehicles equipped to
operate on the TI, it does not provide locations for every friendly element
on the battlefield. For example, the system does not automatically track
dismounted scout teams operating at extended distances from their
vehicles. In addition, it does not cover infantry squads from the brigade,
nondigitally equipped units, or allied troops that may be operating in or
adjacent to the platoon’s battlespace. Icons representing these elements
may be imported into FBCB2 based on FM radio reports, but these are
not updated in real time. As a result, FBCB2 cannot be the sole
instrument used for clearing fires; it does not substitute for the leader’s or
commander’s judgment in preventing fratricide.

Threat Situational Awareness


5-71. FBCB2 creates threat situational awareness (RED SA) from both
top-down and bottom-up feeds. The higher unit S2 inputs threat icons
into the system based on spot reports (SPOTREP) generated by assets
outside the unit; these include the joint surveillance target attack radar
system (JSTARS) and sensor assets organic to recce troops, such as
tactical UAV (TUAV) flights, radio intercepts, and ground surveillance
radar (GSR). Based on his IPB, the S2 augments these actual locations
with templated positions in the form of a situation template (SITEMP).
5-72. As the reconnaissance platoon conducts operations, it adds to the
RED SA by sending SPOTREPs of threat activity and obstacles via the
FBCB2. When a vehicle commander sends a SPOTREP, he automatically
creates an icon representing the threat on FBCB2 systems in his platoon.
The platoon leader or PSG evaluates the validity of the report and
forwards it to the TOC. At the troop level, the report is evaluated to make
sure it is accurate and is subsequently forwarded to the other platoons in
the troop and higher to the squadron. (NOTE: This process is the same
for the reconnaissance platoon in a battalion.)
5-73. To keep the RED SA current, units must update SPOTREPs
concerning threat locations that are represented by icons on the FBCB2.
Updates must be sent whenever the threat situation changes, such as
when a threat element moves or is destroyed. Icons will “fade” and
eventually disappear from the FBCB2 screen as their information ages.
The unit SOP governs the rate at which icons fade.
5-74. Member of the reconnaissance platoon must remember that the
RED SA provided by FBCB2 is only as good as the reports that the
system receives. It will never give a 100-percent complete or accurate
threat picture. The platoon leader and his vehicle commanders must
ensure that vehicle scanning plans and the platoon R&S plan are
adequate to detect threat forces not yet reported by digital means.

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Standardized Reporting
5-75. FBCB2 streamlines the reporting process by providing the
reconnaissance platoon with the capability to send and receive
standardized reports. These include SALT reports, MEDEVAC requests,
NBC-1 reports, calls for fire, check fire reports, and SITREPs. (NOTE:
For more information on FBCB2 reporting capabilities, refer to Chapter 2
of this manual.) Figure 1-25 shows the FBCB2 screen for a SALT report.
Standardized reports afford several tactical advantages:

· They help to ensure that all required information is included


in a particular report or request.
· They reduce the chance of errors in transmission.
· They allow for the storage of messages for retrieval and
reference.

NOTE: There is still a requirement for FM voice message traffic. For example, leaders must
still transmit contact reports to initiate battle drills and cue leaders to check their
FBCB2 screens for updated information. Additionally, vehicle commanders may need
to send oral descriptions of threat locations, routes, or obstacles to help clarify the
situation. This is especially true in close or urban terrain where the FBCB2 cannot
display the terrain in sufficient detail to assist leaders in making effective decisions.

Figure 1-25. FBCB2 Display for Standardized Reports

Combat Orders and Graphics


5-76. FBCB2 greatly enhances the speed and precision of the orders
process. The system allows leaders to add or modify operational graphics
during the planning process or execution. This ensures that every
element has the most current information to control movement and fires.
In addition, commanders can use free text messages to transmit
OPORDs, FRAGOs, and battle update briefings over extended distances
without the loss of time and information inherent in FM voice
communications. Like standardized reports, graphics and orders can be
stored for retrieval and reference.

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_______________________________________________________________ Chapter 1 – Introduction

SECtion VIIi – INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

5-77. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is a systematic,


continuous process of analyzing the effects of the threat and the
environment on the unit. It is a dynamic staff process, driven by the
commander, that continually integrates new information into the unit’s
operational framework. Reconnaissance platoon leaders should have a
clear understanding of the IPB process, which in turn drives ISR focus
and synchronization. For a detailed discussion of IPB concepts and
procedures, refer to FM 2-01.3 (FM 34-130).

WHAT IPB ACCOMPLISHES


5-78. IPB identifies facts and clarifies assumptions about the threat
and the battlefield environment. The commander and his staff use the
IPB process to analyze the threat, weather, and terrain to determine and
evaluate the threat’s capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of
action (COA). The resulting information serves the following purposes:

· It facilitates staff planning and development of potential


friendly COAs for the operation.
· It provides the basis for directing and synchronizing the ISR
effort that supports the commander’s chosen COA.
· It contributes to thorough staff synchronization and
successful completion of several staff processes.
· In turn, it helps the commander to selectively apply and
maximize his combat power at critical points in time and
space on the battlefield.

SPECIAL NOTE
The most critical mission of the reconnaissance platoon is to gather information on
threat forces that the S2 then uses to assess threat disposition and intentions. IPB
is a disciplined staff procedure that provides the reconnaissance platoon leader
with formal ISR guidance in the form of reconnaissance objectives and PIR, as
contained in the R&S plan. The platoon leader then applies this information in
accomplishing the platoon’s assigned reconnaissance tasks.

5-79. Figure 1-26 illustrates the various phases and components of the
information-gathering process, including IPB.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure 1-26. The Information-Gathering Process

THE IPB PROCESS


STEP 1 – DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT
5-80. The first step of the IPB process focuses the staff on the
requirements of the initial ISR effort. During this step, the staff takes the
following actions:

· Identify battlefield characteristics, such as terrain and


weather, that will influence friendly and threat operations
and that require evaluation through the IPB process.
· Establish the area of interest (AI) to focus the IPB analysis
and the ISR effort.
· Identify gaps in current intelligence holdings that become the
initial information requirements.

STEP 2 – DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS


5-81. This step identifies general limitations that the environment
imposes on friendly and threat forces, as well as the tactical opportunities
it offers. IPB products developed during this step focus on these effects;
they include, but are not limited to, the following:

· Population status overlay.


· Overlays that depict the military aspects and effects of
terrain, including the factors of observation and fields of fire,
cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of
approach (OCOKA).

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_______________________________________________________________ Chapter 1 – Introduction

· Weather analysis matrix.


· Integrated staff products such as the modified combined
obstacle overlay (MCOO).

STEP 3 – EVALUATE THE THREAT


5-82. Step 3 includes analysis of current intelligence holdings to
determine how the threat normally organizes for and conducts combat
operations. The results are portrayed using threat models that depict how
the threat fights; these are the only products associated with this step.
Although they usually emphasize graphic representation of the threat
situation, such as doctrinal templates with high-value targets (HVT),
threat models sometimes entail use of matrices, simple narrative
descriptions, and depictions of threat obstacle systems.

STEP 4 – DETERMINE THREAT COAS


5-83. This step integrates the results of the first three steps of IPB into
a meaningful summary of likely objectives and COAs available to the
threat. IPB products, which are valid only if the staff establishes a solid
foundation during the first three steps, include the following:

· Models that depict the threat’s available COAs. These are


normally produced in the form of situation developments;
they may include associated matrices and/or text descriptions.
· Event templates and related matrices to focus the ISR effort.

FRIENDLY COA DEVELOPMENT AND WAR-GAMING


5-84. During threat COA development, the staff concurrently develops
friendly COAs based on the facts and assumptions identified during IPB
and mission analysis. Incorporating the results of IPB into COA
development ensures that each friendly COA takes into account the
opportunities and limitations related to the environment and the threat
situation.
5-85. During the war-gaming session, the staff fights the set of threat
COAs, developed in step 4 of the IPB process, against each potential
friendly COA. Targeting conferences often accompany or follow the war-
gaming session to refine selected HVTs from the threat COA models into
high-priority targets (HPT) that support the friendly COAs.
5-86. Based on the results of war-gaming, the staff takes the following
actions to finalize the COA development process:

· Construct a decision support template (DST) and its


associated matrix.
· Identify information requirements for each COA.
· Refine threat COA models and event templates (and their
related matrices), focusing on the intelligence required to
execute the friendly COAs.
· For each threat COA, determine the probability that the
threat will adopt it.
· Identify the most dangerous threat COA.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

5-87. After deciding on a COA and issuing orders, the commander


approves a list of information requirements; he identifies the most
important of these as the final PIR. During execution of the operation,
emerging intelligence will confirm or deny the assumptions and
information identified during the initial IPB.
5-88. The staff continues to evaluate the situation and update the
commander and staff. As necessary, he performs parts of the IPB process
to support new iterations of the decision-making process. Figures 1-27
through 1-29 provide examples of the templates developed during IPB
and the war-gaming of friendly COAs.

Figure 1-27. Example Situational Template

Figure 1-28. Example Event Template

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_______________________________________________________________ Chapter 1 – Introduction

Figure 1-29. Example Decision Support Template

RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE PLAN


5-89. The key purpose of the R&S plan is to organize collection of
information the commander needs to fight and win the battle. Like other
brigade- and battalion-size elements, the SBCT and cavalry squadron
(RSTA) will both produce R&S plans. The brigade plan will task the
squadron or battalion, and these tasks will be incorporated into the
squadron/battalion plan. Figure 1-26 shows how the R&S plan is
developed within the overall information-gathering process.

NOTE: The R&S plan is developed very early in the ISR planning process because it is
important to integrate the reconnaissance platoon with other information-gathering
assets, such as GSR and engineer reconnaissance teams. Because reconnaissance is
a continuous and dynamic process, the reconnaissance platoon is committed as soon
as possible in accordance with the commander’s intent and reconnaissance
objectives. Deployment of the platoon should not be delayed until the R&S plan has
been formulated.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE R&S PLAN


5-90. From the decision support template, the S3, in coordination with
the staff, prepares the detailed squadron/battalion R&S plan, which
graphically depicts where and when reconnaissance elements should look
for threat forces. The S3 should brief the R&S plan. In a squadron, the S3
should brief the plan to the recce troop commander, ensuring that the
troop commander understands all ISR objectives.

1-33
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

5-91. The staff uses an R&S tasking matrix to coordinate all available
assets for ISR operations. The R&S plan must direct specific tasks and
priorities to all ISR elements, including reconnaissance platoons, GSR,
and patrols.
5-92. R&S tasking, which is handled by the S3, can take the form of a
warning order, OPORD, R&S tasking matrix, or R&S overlay. The S3
translates the R&S plan into operational terms and graphics. For
example, in preparation for reconnaissance operations, the S3 designates
named areas of interest (NAI) in terms of reconnaissance objectives.

COORDINATION WITH SUPPORT ELEMENTS


Fire Support
5-93. To ensure the unit can provide responsive fire support to the
reconnaissance platoon, the fire support officer (FSO) stays abreast of
what the platoon will be doing throughout the conduct of the mission. The
platoon will receive indirect field artillery (FA) or mortar support and
joint fire support from 3 to 4 kilometers forward of the lead elements. The
reconnaissance platoon leader should coordinate with the FSO to discuss
his mission and the platoon’s unique fire support requirements. The
platoon leader finds out what support is available, where supporting
units are located, and what fire support restrictions exist. He will then
recommend preplanned targets and target priorities to be incorporated by
the FSO into the platoon fire support plan. The platoon leader should
receive an approved target list and/or overlay from the FSO.

Signal
5-94. The squadron/battalion signal officer (S6) must conduct additional
coordination with the troop commander and/or platoon leader if the
mission requires communications support. The reconnaissance platoon
leader must request retransmission (retrans) or relay support from the
squadron/battalion signal section if the mission dictates. Scouts should
not perform relay duties as their primary platoon mission.

Other Elements
5-95. The reconnaissance platoon leader also coordinates support with
any attached or assigned elements; examples include engineer
reconnaissance teams, fire support team (FIST), air defense artillery
(ADA) elements, Striker teams, GSR and/or remotely monitored
battlefield sensor system (REMBASS) teams, and aerial reconnaissance
elements (TUAVs). The platoon leader should be aware of how changes to
the organization affect his platoon. Ideally, linkup with support elements
should occur at the TOC in daylight and with sufficient time to conduct
thorough briefings and rehearsals.

PLATOON IPB EXECUTION


5-96. When the platoon leader leaves the TOC area to prepare for his
mission, he should, as a minimum, have the following materials:

· Operational and ISR/R&S graphics.


· The situational template, event template, and notes on the
current threat situation.
· Fire support overlay.

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_______________________________________________________________ Chapter 1 – Introduction

5-97. Once in the vicinity of their mission objectives, the scouts confirm
or deny the templated information. Additionally, if they find the threat,
the scouts look for possible weaknesses, gaps, and flanks of the threat
force. During screening operations, the commander directs the
reconnaissance platoon leader to report threat activity at designated
NAIs. The reconnaissance platoon leader uses OPs to observe and report
on these areas of command interest. The scouts must rapidly and
accurately report all information related to the commander’s critical
information requirements (CCIR) that they find during either
reconnaissance or screening operations.

SECTION IX – SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

5-98. Situational awareness is the ability to maintain a constant, clear


mental picture of the tactical situation. This picture includes an
awareness of both the friendly and threat situations and of relevant
terrain. It also entails the ability to relate battlefield information and
events through space and time to form logical conclusions and make
decisions that anticipate events. Since the platoon normally operates
dispersed as individual sections or squads, it is essential that all
reconnaissance leaders maintain situational awareness so they can make
sound, quick tactical decisions. Critical outcomes of situational awareness
on the part of all scouts are reduction in fratricide incidents and the
ability to stay one step ahead of the threat they are facing.

NOTE: The reconnaissance platoon and its higher element assess all information within
their area of operations. Their primary responsibility is to provide their squadron or
battalion with complete awareness of the situation based on their reported raw data
and assessments of information in their area of operations. In a cavalry squadron
(RSTA), the analysis section at the squadron headquarters gathers all the
information from its recce troops and surveillance troop assets. The
squadron/battalion analyzes this information and provides the SBCT/brigade with
situational understanding of the area of operations.

BATTLEFIELD VISUALIZATION
5-99. The commander will structure the battlefield based on the
conditions of METT-TC and his commander’s intent. How he does this
affects the reconnaissance platoon leader’s mission planning and his
ability to maintain situational awareness. The framework of the
battlefield can vary from a very rigid extreme with obvious front and rear
boundaries and closely tied adjacent units to a dispersed and
decentralized structure with few secure areas and unit boundaries and no
definable front or rear.
5-100. Between these extremes is an unlimited number of possible
variations. Maintaining situational awareness becomes more difficult as
the battlefield becomes less structured. Modern, highly mobile operations
with small forces lend themselves to a less rigid framework that
challenges the scout’s ability to maintain an accurate picture of the
battlefield.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

5-101. To have a clear picture of the battlefield, the reconnaissance


platoon leader must have virtually perfect knowledge of the friendly
situation one level higher than his own. The platoon leader must have a
relatively complete knowledge of the terrain, and he must know as much
as possible about the threat. It is important that the platoon leader use
this knowledge to update his section and squad leaders periodically
regarding the higher situation.

NOTE: The requirement to maintain a real-time picture of the battlefield one level higher
does not relieve the scout of the requirement to understand the situation and
commander’s intent two levels higher than his own. The difference is that his
understanding of the situation two levels higher does not have to be as specific or in
real time. FBCB2 will assist all vehicles in the platoon in maintaining a real-time
situational awareness.

5-102. Almost all of the information the platoon leader needs comes in
the form of reports over his FM communication system or FBCB2. He
receives many reports based on his platoon’s understanding of shared,
common graphics. Effective graphics require that the subordinate
elements report periodically as they accomplish requirements. The
platoon leader must be aware of when his scouts report so he can
maintain a current visualization of the situation. If an element does not
report in a timely manner, the platoon leader must quickly determine the
situation of the overdue element.

5-103. Although many reports are not addressed specifically to him,


particularly on the higher net, the reconnaissance platoon leader must
monitor them by eavesdropping on the nets as traffic is sent. How
effectively he can accomplish this is, to some degree, experience-
dependent. The platoon leader must learn how to relate the information
he is receiving to his map, which is perhaps his most important tool in
maintaining situational awareness. He should plot all friendly position
reports up to one level higher than his own. Information from SPOTREPs
should also be plotted.

5-104. The platoon leader can employ a variety of techniques in using his
map to track the tactical situation. For example, he should use different
colors for friendly and threat elements to allow quick recognition. To
avoid cluttering the map, he should place a dot or symbol on his map
where the element is located and label the point with a number. The
same number should then be written in the map margin (or beyond the
area of operations) with the complete SPOTREP or unit ID next to it. This
notation should also include the time of the report. As positions or reports
are updated, the platoon leader crosses off the old symbol and adds a new
one with a corresponding notation; it is critical that updates to previous
reports be clearly identified as such during transmission.
5-105. Even though it is relatively simple, this type of map notation
system can help all scouts in the platoon to easily track and monitor the
tactical situation. Maps can be augmented by a formal platoon log, kept
on the platoon leader’s or PSG’s vehicle or on both.

1-36
_______________________________________________________________ Chapter 1 – Introduction

BATTLESPACE
5-106. As discussed previously, an accurate picture of the battlefield
provides the reconnaissance platoon leader with important tactical
information, including friendly and threat positions and relevant terrain.
In turn, complete understanding of the military significance of this
picture requires knowledge of the concept of battlespace, the key
element in the intellectual process of visualizing the battlefield.
5-107. At the most fundamental level, battlespace is the three-
dimensional “bubble” or area in which the platoon can acquire threat
forces and influence them with effective fires. This space is defined by
numerous battlefield factors: the locations of friendly forces, including
the platoon’s individual sections, squads, OPs, and patrols; the effects of
terrain, weather, and movement; and the ranges of all available platoon
weapons and sensing systems. Each section or squad has its own
battlespace; the platoon battlespace is the sum of individual section/squad
battlespaces (see Figure 1-30). Platoon battlespace is not restricted by
boundaries; it can overlap with the battlespace of adjacent units.

Figure 1-30. Recce Platoon’s Battlespace

5-108. Battlespace has applications in all phases of mission planning and


execution. During the planning process, it is a critical factor in selection
of routes and tentative positions. Once mission execution begins, the
platoon leader’s knowledge of his battlespace is critical when he must
issue timely and effective orders as the situation changes.
5-109. The importance of battlespace demands that the platoon leader
direct most of his battle command effort toward managing, and
enhancing, his space. He must be aware at every moment how
battlespace is changing as friendly and threat forces move and as terrain
and visibility conditions change (as illustrated in Figures 1-31A and 1-
31B). He must evaluate how these changes affect his sections and squads.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure 1-31A. Effects of Movement


on Battlespace

Figure 1-31B. Effects of Movement


on Battlespace (Continued)

5-110. As the operation progresses, the platoon leader must take active
measures to shape the platoon’s battlespace to his best advantage. In
many situations, he should attempt to eliminate any gaps, or dead space,
that exist within the “bubble.” The platoon leader can accomplish this in
several ways, such as maneuvering sections or squads, repositioning OPs,
and deploying patrols or remote sensors. He must also ensure that
organic and attached assets are positioned to achieve overlapping
coverage of critical points within the platoon’s battlespace.
5-111. The purpose of overlapping coverage is to prevent the threat from
overcoming the friendly reconnaissance effort by degrading or destroying
a single platform or sensor. It also prevents the threat from gaining an
advantage during periods when environmental or weather conditions,
including limited visibility, degrade the platoon’s observation capability
or sensor performance. Refer to Figures 1-32A and 1-32B for an
illustration of how the platoon leader can optimize his battlespace.

1-38
_______________________________________________________________ Chapter 1 – Introduction

Figure 1-32A. Optimizing Battlespace

Figure 1-32B. Optimizing Battlespace (Continued)

FRATRICIDE
5-112. Recent experience has shown that fratricide is a significant
danger to all forces operating on a mobile battlefield where weapon
system lethality is significantly greater than identification friend or foe
(IFF) capability. Fratricide is the result of many factors, including
inadequate direct fire control plans, navigation errors, combat
identification failures, and incorrect or inadequate operational graphics.
For an in-depth discussion of fratricide and its prevention, refer to
Appendix I of this manual.

1-39
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

SPECIAL NOTE
In many situations, the primary cause of fratricide is the lack of positive
target identification. To prevent fratricide incidents, commanders and
leaders at all levels must ensure positive target identification before they
issue commands to fire. In addition, all units must accurately report their
locations during combat operations, and all TOCs and CPs must carefully
track the locations of all subordinate elements in relation to those of all
friendly forces.

SECTION X – NAVIGATION

MAPS AND OVERLAYS


5-113. The most important role of maps and their accompanying
overlays is in helping the reconnaissance platoon to understand and
visualize the scheme of maneuver. They are the platoon leader’s primary
tools in organizing information concerning the battlefield and in
synchronizing his assets once the battle begins. They also provide vehicle
commanders with a visual reference they can consult as needed. The
platoon leader must ensure that each vehicle commander has an updated
map with the latest graphic control measures posted on the overlay.
5-114. Overlays can be prepared either in traditional fashion or digitally.
The platoon leader may receive one or more types of overlays from the
squadron, covering such areas as maneuver, threat forces, obstacles, fire
support, and CSS. All of the information is important; the key for the
platoon leader is to combine, augment, and declutter the overlays so the
information needed for a specific situation is readily available to the
platoon on one simple, combined overlay.

LAND NAVIGATION
5-115. To protect the reconnaissance platoon, the platoon leader must
learn to use terrain to his advantage. Land navigation of reconnaissance
vehicles requires him to master the technique of terrain association. This
entails the ability to identify terrain features on the ground by the
contour intervals depicted on the map. The platoon leader analyzes the
terrain using the factors of OCOKA and identifies major terrain features,
contour changes, and man-made structures along his axis of advance. As
the platoon advances, he uses these features to orient the platoon and to
associate ground positions with map locations. (NOTE: Refer to Chapter
2 of this manual for a detailed description of the use of OCOKA factors in
the terrain analysis.)
5-116. The intellectual concept of battlespace is vital to the platoon’s
survival during navigation and movement. The platoon leader must
constantly be aware of key terrain and threat fields of observation and
fire that may create danger areas as the platoon advances. This allows
him to modify movement techniques, formations, and routes and to
maintain cross-talk with overwatch elements to ensure that the platoon is

1-40
_______________________________________________________________ Chapter 1 – Introduction

not surprised by the threat. (NOTE: Refer to the discussion of danger


areas in Chapter 2 of this manual.)
5-117. Navigation under limited visibility conditions is especially
challenging. Vehicle thermal sights and night vision goggles provide
assistance, but leaders nonetheless can easily confuse terrain features
and become disoriented. The platoon can employ a variety of techniques
and equipment to assist in navigation. For a detailed discussion of these
methods and assets, refer to ST 3-20.983.

1-41
Chapter 2

Leadership Competencies
As a tactical organization, the
reconnaissance platoon must CONTENTS
be proficient in certain tasks Troop-Leading Procedures .......................... 2-1
Operational Considerations ................. 2-2
and skills. While each platoon Military Decision-Making Process ........ 2-3
leader will establish his own Conduct of Troop-Leading
collective task list based on Procedures ......................................... 2-3
his commander’s mission Deployment ................................................... 2-19
essential task list (METL), Critical Tasks ......................................... 2-19
Platoon Guidelines ................................ 2-19
this chapter covers a roster of Tactical Movement ....................................... 2-20
established leadership com- Planning and Operational
petencies in which every Considerations ................................... 2-20
platoon and its leaders Fundamentals of Movement ................. 2-21
must train and maintain Danger Areas ......................................... 2-23
Platoon Formations ............................... 2-27
proficiency. Movement Techniques .......................... 2-30
Actions on Contact ....................................... 2-34
Contact Considerations ........................ 2-35
The Four Steps of
Actions on Contact ............................ 2-37
Examples of Actions on Contact ......... 2-45
Employment of Fires .................................... 2-48
Employment Considerations ................ 2-48
Critical Tasks ......................................... 2-48
Communications .......................................... 2-48
Means of Tactical Communications .... 2-49
Radio Net Organization
and Responsibilities .......................... 2-51
Net Control ............................................. 2-54
Techniques of Effective
Communications ................................ 2-55
Reporting ....................................................... 2-56
Operational Considerations ................. 2-57
Report Guidelines .................................. 2-57
Types of Reports ................................... 2-58
Digital Reporting and C2 Messages .... 2-59

SECTION I – TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES

2-1. Many platoons are not prepared to perform their mission


effectively because of inadequate planning. To prevent this from
happening, the reconnaissance platoon must be proficient in troop-
leading procedures. These are the basis of the dynamic process by which
units develop plans and orders at every level of leadership. The troop-
leading process consists of eight steps, which are discussed in this chapter
in the traditional order. The process, however, is not rigid, and the steps
are not necessarily sequential. The tasks involved in some steps (such as
initiate movement, issue the warning order, and conduct reconnaissance)

2-1
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

may recur several times during the process. Although listed as the last
step, activities associated with supervising and refining the plan and
other preparations occur throughout the troop-leading process.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
2-2. The following points summarize important factors involved in
troop-leading procedures:

· Time management. The platoon leader makes the most


efficient use of the time available for planning, preparation,
and issuing the order. He ensures that his subordinate
leaders then have sufficient time to conduct their own troop-
leading procedures. (Refer to the discussion of reverse
planning and timeline development later in this chapter.)
· IPB. The platoon leader must understand the IPB process.
He develops knowledge of how his platoon’s actions feed the
IPB for higher command elements. Likewise, it is critical for
the platoon leader to understand that IPB in not just a
process performed during the planning phase; rather, he is
prepared to continually update his IPB throughout the
mission.
· Understanding the mission. The platoon leader must
understand his mission; he develops this knowledge by
conducting an effective mission analysis to identify all
specified and implied tasks. At a minimum, he understands
the focus of the reconnaissance (terrain-, threat-, or
civilian-oriented, or a combination), the tempo of the
operation, and his engagement criteria. He also develops
the facts and assumptions related to his mission with regard
to the factors of METT-TC.
· Effective orders. The platoon leader must be able to issue
an OPORD or FRAGO (oral, digital, or both as applicable) to
convey the nature of the mission so his subordinates
understand the operations they will be conducting.
· Rehearsals. The platoon leader must be proficient in
conducting rehearsals. At a minimum, he conducts rehearsals
of major events in his mission (actions on expected contact
and actions on the objective), actions on contact/battle drills
(if different), and casualty evacuation.
· Precombat checks and inspections. Before execution
begins, soldiers must be prepared for their mission and have
confidence in their equipment. To accomplish this, the platoon
conducts precombat checks (PCC), as a minimum, and
precombat inspections (PCI) before the mission begins.

NOTE: For additional information on crew orders, rehearsals, PCCs, and PCIs, refer to the
discussion of the “supervise and refine” step of troop-leading procedures later in
this chapter.

2-3. The key to success is that the platoon is prepared to move by the
time specified in the order with operational weapons and equipment and
the basic load of supplies as specified by the order and/or the platoon

2-2
___________________________________________________ Chapter 2 – Leadership Competencies

leader. All personnel must be able to explain the higher unit’s mission,
the higher commander’s intent, the platoon mission, and their specified
tasks and duties to support the mission. All attachments must be
received, briefed, and inspected. The elements of SERE (survival, escape,
resistance, evasion) should also be considered and addressed. For further
information on SERE, refer to ST 3-20.983.

MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS


2-4. Decisions are the means by which a commander or leader
translates the information available to him and his vision of the desired
end state of an operation into the actions necessary to achieve that end
state. Decision-making is a conscious process for selecting a COA from
two or more alternatives. As outlined in FM 5-0 (FM 101-5), it is a
learned skill of knowing if to decide, then when and what to decide. The
process includes an understanding of the consequences of each decision.
2-5. The military decision-making process (MDMP) is the Army’s
adaptation of this analytical approach to decision-making and problem-
solving. It provides the commander or leader with a valuable tool in
developing his estimate of the situation and his plan. Although the
process begins with the receipt of the mission, the analytical aspects of
the MDMP continue at all levels throughout the operation. Refer to FM 5-
0 for a detailed examination of the MDMP.
2-6. At platoon level, many actions associated with the MDMP are
based on SOPs and standard unit drills; these include evacuation of
wounded soldiers, rearming and resupply procedures, and individual
crew responsibilities. This allows the platoon to operate quickly and
efficiently without constant guidance from the platoon leader. SOPs are
especially critical in helping to maintain combat preparedness when
leaders are tired as a result of the stress of continuous operations.
Because SOPs are so critical, it is absolutely necessary that everyone in
the platoon know and understand them.

CONDUCT OF TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES


2-7. Regardless of the time available, leaders must always remember
this principle: “see the terrain, see the enemy, see yourself.” Only after
they view and evaluate the terrain and the enemy, can they determine
what their own actions should be in that given situation. They update
this visualization continuously throughout the troop-leading process,
basing this new “picture” of the battlefield on their own refinements to
the plan, additional information from various sources, and/or
developments in the reconnaissance or security operation.
2-8. Troop-leading procedures begin when the platoon leader receives
the first indication of an upcoming operation (often by warning order
from higher) and continue throughout the planning, preparation, and
execution phases of the mission. The platoon leader maximizes the
available planning time by starting as soon as the first bit of information
becomes available. He normally uses one-third of the available time to
plan, prepare, and issue the order; his vehicle commanders then have the
remaining two-thirds of the time available to conduct their own troop-
leading procedures. This system of time allocation is known as the “one-
third/two-thirds” rule of planning and preparation.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

2-9. Figure 2-1 lists the eight troop-leading steps and illustrates their
role in relation to the MDMP, which plays an important role in the troop-
leading process. The following discussion provides a step-by-step overview
of troop-leading procedures.

NOTE: Refer to the appropriate platoon-level MTP for the training and evaluation outline
(T&EO) covering the task of conducting troop-leading procedures. The task,
included in Chapter 5 of the MTP, includes procedures involved in each of the
troop-leading steps.

Figure 2-1. Relationship of Troop-Leading Procedures


and the Military Decision-Making Process

RECEIVE AND ANALYZE THE MISSION


2-10. The reconnaissance platoon leader normally receives his orders as
an oral, written, and/or digital OPORD, as a FRAGO, or as a warning
order. Upon receipt of the order, he begins analyzing the mission using
the factors of METT-TC: mission, enemy (threat), terrain (and weather),
troops, time available, and civil considerations. Mission analysis is a
continuous process. The platoon leader constantly receives information
during the planning phase and must decide if it affects his mission. If it
does, he then decides how to adjust his plan to meet this new situation.

Initial Actions
2-11. Although mission analysis is continuously refined throughout the
troop-leading process, the platoon leader’s initial actions are normally
based only on the initial warning order from higher. These include an
initial METT-TC analysis covering the terrain and the threat and friendly
situations.

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2-12. The platoon leader may also conduct his initial time analysis,
develop an initial security plan, and issue his own initial warning order to
provide guidance and planning focus for his subordinates. At a minimum,
the initial platoon warning order should cover the threat and friendly
situations, movement instructions, and coordinating instructions such as
an initial timeline and security plan. (NOTE: The initial analysis is
normally conducted as quickly as possible to allow the platoon leader to
issue the initial warning order in a timely manner. He conducts a more
detailed METT-TC analysis after the initial warning order is put out.)

NOTE: The technique of using multiple warning orders is a valuable tool for the platoon
leader during the troop-leading process. He can issue warning orders for several
purposes: to alert subordinates of the upcoming mission, to initiate the parallel
planning process, and to put out tactical information incrementally as it is received
(ultimately reducing the length of the OPORD). Refer to FM 3-90.1 (FM 71-1) for a
discussion of how multiple warning orders are employed at various stages of the
troop-leading process.

METT-TC Analysis
2-13. The following discussion provides detailed information on the six
METT-TC factors. (NOTE: METT-TC factors are not necessarily
analyzed sequentially. How and when the platoon leader analyzes each
factor depends on when the information is made available to him.)
2-14. Mission. After receiving an essential task and purpose, either in
a warning order or the OPORD, the platoon leader can then begin the
analysis of his own mission. He may use a refined product to better
visualize the interrelationships of the terrain, the threat, and friendly
forces. These may include a MCOO and/or the SITEMP, if available. The
platoon leader’s goal in this analysis is to clarify what the platoon is to
accomplish and why the platoon must accomplish it. Key considerations
in the analysis include the following:

· What is my task and purpose for this operation?


· What is the commander’s intent?
· What are the specified tasks for the operation (those that the
commander stated must be accomplished)? (NOTE: In the
OPORD, these tasks are outlined in paragraph 3, which
comprises the commander’s intent, concept of the operation,
tasks to subordinate units, and coordinating instructions.)
· What are the implied tasks for the operation? These are other
tasks, not specifically noted by the commander, that must be
accomplished to achieve the purpose or specified tasks.
· What are the essential tasks for the operation? These are all
tasks, both specified and implied, that are absolutely required
to ensure mission success.
· What is the focus of the operation?
· What is the tempo of the operation?
· What are the engagement criteria for the platoon? For the
troop? For the squadron/battalion?

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

2-15. Enemy (Threat Forces). The platoon leader’s analysis of the


threat situation should focus on the areas outlined in FM 3-90.1 (FM 71-
1)—including doctrinal analysis and objectives, composition and
disposition, capabilities, weaknesses, anticipated COAs, and factors that
can influence these COAs—as well as those in FM 2-01.3 (FM 34-130),
which covers IPB. The analysis can focus on the following considerations:

· What types of threat units is the platoon up against?


· Where are these units? (NOTE: If possible, these locations
should be templated to vehicle level.)
· What is the threat doing?
· How strong is he?
· What kind of equipment does he have? What are his weapons
types and effective ranges?
· What are his capabilities and weaknesses?
· Where is he vulnerable?
· Where are his engagement areas?
· What are the threat’s intentions, doctrinal objectives, and
most probable COA(s)?
· How will he react to the eight forms of contact? These are the
following:
n Visual contact.
n Physical contact (direct fire).
n Indirect fire contact.
n Contact with obstacles of threat or unknown origin.
n Contact with threat or unknown aircraft.
n Contact involving NBC conditions.
n Situations involving electronic warfare tactics (such as
jamming, interference, and imitative deception).
n Situations involving nonhostile elements (such as
civilians).
· What can the threat do in response to friendly actions?

2-16. Terrain (and Weather). The platoon leader analyzes the terrain
using the factors of OCOKA: observation and fields of fire; cover and
concealment; obstacles; key terrain; and avenues of approach. The
following discussion focuses on questions the platoon leader can use in his
analysis.
2-17. Observation and fields of fire. The platoon leader should cover
the following considerations in his analysis:

· Where can the threat observe and engage my platoon, and


how do I counter this capability?
· Where can I establish OPs to maximize my ability to see the
battlefield?

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2-18. Cover and concealment. The platoon leader should include the
following considerations in his analysis of cover and concealment:

· What routes within the area of operations offer cover and


concealment for my platoon or for threat elements?
· What dismounted and/or mounted routes offer my platoon the
best available cover and concealment?

2-19. Obstacles. In terrain analysis, the platoon leader first identifies


existing and reinforcing obstacles that may limit mobility (affecting such
features as objectives, avenues of approach, and mobility corridors).
2-20. Existing obstacles include, but are not limited to, the following:
· Gullies, ravines, gaps, and ditches over 3 meters wide.
· Streams, rivers, and canals over 1 meter deep.
· Mountains or hills with a slope in excess of 60 percent.
· Lakes, swamps, and marshes over 1 meter deep.
· Tree stumps and large rocks over 18 inches high.
· Forest or jungles with trees 8 inches or more in diameter and
with less than 4 meters of space between trees.
· Man-made existing obstacles, including built-up areas such as
towns, cities, or railroad embankments.

2-21. Reinforcing obstacles include, but are not limited to, the
following:

· Minefields.
· Antitank ditches.
· Road craters.
· Abatises.
· Wire obstacles.

2-22. Based on the degree of obstruction posed by obstacles, terrain is


further classified in one of the following categories:

· Unrestricted. This is terrain that is free of any restriction to


movement; no actions are required to enhance mobility. For
wheeled vehicles, this terrain is typically flat or moderately
sloped, with scattered or widely spaced obstacles such as trees
or rocks. This type of terrain generally allows wide maneuver
and offers unlimited travel over well-developed road
networks.
· Restricted. Restricted terrain hinders movement to some
degree. Little effort is needed to enhance mobility, but units
may have to zigzag or make frequent detours. They may have
difficulty maintaining optimum speed, moving in some types
of combat formations, or transitioning from one formation to
another. For wheeled vehicles, restricted terrain typically
encompasses moderate to steep slopes and/or moderate to
dense spacing of obstacles such as trees, rocks, or buildings.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Swamps and rugged ground are examples of restricted terrain


for dismounted infantry forces. Logistical or rear area
movement in this type of terrain may be hampered by poorly
developed road systems.
· Severely restricted. This terrain severely hinders or slows
movement in combat formation unless some effort is made to
enhance mobility. This could require commitment of engineer
forces to improve mobility or deviation from doctrinal tactics,
such as using a column rather than a line formation or
moving at speeds much lower than otherwise preferred.
Severely restricted terrain for wheeled vehicles is typically
characterized by steep slopes, densely spaced obstacles, and/or
the virtual absence of a developed road system.

2-23. Key terrain. Key terrain is any location or area whose seizure,
retention, or control affords a marked advantage either to friendly forces
or to the threat. The platoon leader’s analysis should cover these factors:

· Where and what is the key terrain?


· How can the platoon use key terrain to support the mission?
· How will the threat use key terrain to support his mission?

2-24. Avenues of approach. These are areas through which a unit


can maneuver. The definition of an avenue of approach is an area that
provides sufficient ease of movement and enough width to allow passage
of a force large enough to significantly affect the outcome of the battle.
The platoon leader’s analysis should include these considerations:

· Where are the most favorable mounted and dismounted


avenues of approach for threat and friendly forces?
· Where are the best air avenues of approach for threat forces?

2-25. Weather. The platoon leader analyzes weather conditions as part


of his evaluation of the terrain. The following considerations should be
included in this evaluation:

· What are the light conditions (including percentage of night


illumination) and visibility?
· How has recent weather affected the area of operations?
· What are the times for beginning of morning nautical twilight
(BMNT), sunrise, sunset, end of evening nautical twilight
(EENT), moonrise, and moonset?
· Will weather become better or worse during the mission?
· How will fog, rain, dust, heat, snow, wind, or blowing sand
affect the troops and equipment of both friendly and threat
forces during the mission?
· How will weather conditions affect the employment of
chemical weapons and/or smoke?

2-26. Troops and Support Available. The platoon leader’s analysis of


troops and support available for an operation includes an assessment of

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the platoon’s vehicles and equipment. His analysis should include the
following considerations:

· What is the present condition of the platoon’s soldiers,


vehicles, and equipment?
· What is the supply status of ammunition, fuel, and other
necessary items?
· What is the turnaround time for resupply operations (time
between transmission of the request and delivery of supplies)?
· What is the state of training of the platoon?
· What is the state of morale?
· How much sleep have the soldiers had?
· How much sleep can they get before and during the operation?
· Does the platoon need any additional equipment to support or
accomplish its mission?
· What attachments does the platoon have (or require) to
accomplish its mission?
· How many OPs (mounted/dismounted and long-/short-
duration) can be manned with the available assets?
· How big a frontage can be covered with the available assets?

2-27. Time Available. The platoon leader’s analysis of the time


available for an operation begins with the “one-third/two-thirds” rule of
planning and preparation discussed earlier in this section. This principle
allows the platoon leader to use one-third of planning and preparation
time himself, then to allocate the remaining two-third to subordinates.
Additional considerations in the analysis should include the following:

· How much time is available to plan and conduct


reconnaissance?
· How much time is available for rearming, refueling, and
resupply?
· How long will it take the platoon to move to planned OPs, to
the line of departure (LD), and/or to the objective?
· Is there enough time for rehearsals?
· How much time is available to the threat for the activities
listed in the previous items?
· How does the potential threat timeline for planning and
preparation compare with that developed for friendly forces?

2-28. Civil Considerations. In his analysis of how the platoon will


handle situations involving civilians and other aspects of the civil
environment (including stability operations and support operations), the
platoon leader should assess the following considerations:

· How will existing civil considerations affect the mission?


What are the potential negative effects of civilian contact?
· What are the applicable rules of engagement (ROE) and/or
rules of interaction (ROI)?

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

· What procedures and guidelines will the platoon use in


dealing with refugees, prisoners, and other civilians?
· Will the platoon be working with civilian organizations, such
as governmental agencies, private groups, or the media?
· Will the platoon conduct stability operations (such as peace
operations or noncombatant evacuation) or support operations
(such as humanitarian or environmental assistance)? See the
discussion of the multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance
in Chapter 3 of this manual and the discussion of stability
operations and support operations in Appendix D.

Information Sources
2-29. In planning and preparing for the mission, the platoon leader
may find that he requires additional sources of information to help
answer some of the questions raised in the analysis of METT-TC. The
platoon can receive and/or request information from a variety of sources
to assist in planning and understanding the operational area, including
the following:

· Paragraph 1 of the OPORD (especially those portions covering


the threat and the applicable terrain and weather).
· UAV imagery and video (such as photos/video of a route or
danger area to assist with the METT-TC assessment).
· Satellite imagery (for example, showing locations of increased
military traffic).
· Engineer database information on terrain, such as from the
TERRABASE program.
· HUMINT reports from brigade and higher, such as a human
density overlay.
· Assessments on the operational area.
· Signal intelligence (SIGINT) and measurement and signal
intelligence (MASINT) reports from the surveillance troop.

Risk Management
2-30. Leaders must make a thorough risk assessment, identifying and
evaluating hazards the platoon will face during the operation. They then
develop risk management controls and ensures that all subordinate
leaders and individual scouts implement them to eliminate or reduce the
risks. Refer to Appendix H of this manual for a detailed discussion of the
risk management process.

Reverse Planning and Timeline Development


2-31. After completing his METT-TC analysis, the platoon leader
conducts reverse planning to ensure that all specified, implied, and
essential tasks can be accomplished in the time available. He develops a
reverse planning schedule (timeline), as illustrated in Figure 2-2.
Beginning with actions on the objective, he works backward through each
step of the operation and then through preparation and planning
activities to the present time. This process also helps the platoon in
making efficient use of planning and preparation time.

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NOTE: Simultaneous planning and preparation are key factors in effective time
management during the troop-leading process. The next five steps (issue a warning
order; make a tentative plan; initiate movement; conduct reconnaissance; complete
the plan) may occur simultaneously and/or in a different order. As noted, the final
troop-leading step, supervise and refine, is on-going throughout the process.

Figure 2-2. Example Reverse Planning Timeline

ISSUE THE WARNING ORDER


2-32. After the platoon leader has analyzed his orders and worked out
his mission and related tasks, he must quickly pass this information to
his subordinate leaders. This is accomplished through the warning order.
As a minimum, the following information must be included:

· Elements and individuals to whom the warning order applies.


· Threat situation as stated in the higher unit’s order.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

· The time and nature of the operation.


· The earliest time of movement.
· Coordinating instructions, including an initial timeline.
· The time and place the OPORD will be issued.

2-33. If possible, the platoon leader should issue a conventional


(analog) and/or digital overlay of the area of operations. In the absence of
further orders, this gives the platoon an idea of the scope of the operation.
Also, the platoon leader should inform his subordinates of the results of
his reverse planning process and delegate appropriate preparation tasks
to the PSG and to the section and squad leaders. If possible, the platoon
leader should also include the task organization of the platoon. In
addition to accounting for all required preparatory tasks, the reverse
planning schedule should include a sleep plan. All elements should
acknowledge receipt of the warning order.

NOTE: The sleep plan should be a 24-hour plan with the goal of maximizing available time
in the planning, preparation, and execution phases of the operation. It covers all
platoon members.

MAKE A TENTATIVE PLAN


2-34. Based on results of his mission analysis, the platoon leader
develops a tentative plan that addresses all specified, implied, and
essential tasks using the OPORD format (see Appendix A of this manual).

INITIATE MOVEMENT
2-35. After issuing a warning order and making a tentative plan, the
platoon leader may choose to initiate movement. The platoon leader
should at least be able to determine when the platoon will move. He
announces this in terms of a readiness condition (REDCON) level. Each
REDCON level indicates critical tasks and time available to prepare for
future operations. The following considerations apply:

· REDCON-1 (be prepared to move immediately). These


conditions are in effect:
n All personnel alert and ready for action.
n Vehicles loaded and secured, and weapons manned.
n Vehicle engines running and OPs not manned.
NOTE: A variant of REDCON-1 is REDCON-1(-); the same conditions apply except that
the vehicles are not started in REDCON-1(-).
· REDCON-2 (be prepared to move in 15 minutes).
n All personnel alert.
n OPs and wire pulled in.
· REDCON-3 (be prepared to move in half an hour).
n Fifty percent of each crew/squad stand down for rest,
feeding, and maintenance.
n Remaining 50 percent man vehicles, OPs, and weapons
and monitor radios/phones.

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· REDCON-4 (be prepared to move in one hour).


n Two men per platoon make dismounted checks of platoon
area.
n One man per vehicle monitors radios/phones and mans
turret weapon.

2-36. All personnel remain at 100 percent alert until prioritized mission
preparations are complete. The platoon leader initiates the appropriate
REDCON when the work is finished. As the time for mission execution
nears, he increases the REDCON in accordance with guidance from
higher, achieving REDCON-1 before the platoon must move.

CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE
2-37. This step of the troop-leading procedures allows the platoon
leader to confirm the validity of his tentative plan and to refine the plan.
The platoon leader should conduct the reconnaissance with his
subordinate leaders. This will allow them to see the terrain and develop a
better visualization of the projected plan. At a minimum, the platoon
leader conducts this step as a detailed map reconnaissance. He should at
least confirm his initial march route to the LD or start point (SP) and
check initial positions. If possible, he should also check some of the area
beyond the LD; this may require permission from the commander.
2-38. If the platoon leader cannot personally conduct on-site
reconnaissance, he should make the most efficient use of available time
by tasking his subordinates to accomplish specific reconnaissance
requirements. An example of this is tasking a squad leader to reconnoiter
and time routes to the SP. The platoon leader must conduct the
reconnaissance with an open mind; not everything he sees will match his
tentative plan. He must be flexible enough to change and competent
enough to work out new plans rapidly.

NOTE: For detailed discussions of reconnaissance procedures, refer to Chapter 3 of this


manual.

COMPLETE THE PLAN


2-39. The platoon leader refines his plan based on the results of the
reconnaissance. He then completes the plan using these results and any
new information from his commander and members of his platoon. He
should keep the plan as simple as possible, at the same time ensuring
that it effectively supports the commander’s intent.
2-40. As he completes and refines his plan, the platoon leader should
consider delegating planning responsibilities to other members of the
platoon. He can then use the information developed by these soldiers in
developing his order and in establishing an effective platoon SOP.
Examples of delegated planning responsibilities include the following:

· The HUMINT NCO researches and briefs the threat/civilian


situation.
· A section sergeant researches and briefs terrain and weather.
· An NCO sets up rehearsals.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

· The PSG researches, plans, and briefs CSS considerations


(such as MEDEVAC and vehicle recovery operations).
· An NCO translates graphics to FBCB2 and overlays.
· Section sergeants plan specific reconnaissance patrols in
support of the overall mission.
· An NCO plans and briefs occupation procedures for such areas
as objective rally points (ORP), OPs, and surveillance sites.
· An NCO plans and briefs specific communication issues
(paragraph 5 of the OPORD).
· An NCO plans and briefs specific coordinating instructions
(such as the collection plan, actions on contact, special
equipment, linkup tasks, and methods of handling EPWs).
· A leader finalizes the risk management process, as outlined in
Appendix J of this manual.

2-41. Using this type of planning delegation will help the platoon leader
to ensure that his subordinate leaders are in synch with the plan. It also
facilitates a more rapid planning process. The platoon leader must
remain fully aware of all facets of the plan and of the activities of his
subordinates. He must also give clear guidance for this technique to be
successful.

ISSUE THE ORDER


2-42. The platoon leader issues his finalized order in the five-paragraph
OPORD format, as discussed in Appendix A of this manual. He refers to
notes to make sure he does not forget anything. He ensures that all
subordinate leaders understand the entire plan as well as their particular
portion of it. To ensure complete understanding of the operation, the
platoon leader should end the order with a brief-back of key points by his
leaders.
2-43. Whenever possible, the platoon leader should issue his order to
the entire platoon. At a minimum, he should issue the order to his
subordinate leaders and vehicle commanders. Once everyone has arrived
at the place and time specified in the warning order, the platoon leader or
PSG should ensure that everyone has recorded the applicable graphic
control measures. The platoon leader should issue the revised operations
overlay before he starts; he should have a copy of the graphics for each of
his leaders. The PSG ensures that each subordinate leader’s overlay
matches the platoon leader’s overlay. To use his time most efficiently, the
platoon leader should use a walk-through rehearsal as part of his briefing
of paragraph 3 of the order.
2-44. If he can issue the order from a favorable vantage point, the
platoon leader can physically indicate the ground over which his scouts
will maneuver. If a vantage point is not available, he can use a terrain
cloth, sand table, or map as a reference. He leader should have a briefing
kit available to build a model of the area of operations; items in the kit
might include the following:

· Nylon rope and nails or spikes.


· “Micro” armor vehicles or other models.

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· Preconstructed plexiglas squares for units and equipment


(blue for friendly elements, red for threat forces).
· Pens and markers.
· Stakes.
· Engineer tape.
· Operational symbol cutouts.
· Dry eraser board.

2-45. In extreme situations, FBCB2 allows the platoon leader to issue


the OPORD to his sections or squads when they are widely dispersed and
cannot gather at a central point. The platoon leader must alert his
elements (via FM voice) that a new order is available on the FBCB2 and
direct each element to acknowledge receipt of the order.

SUPERVISE AND REFINE


2-46. Flexibility is the key to effective operations. The reconnaissance
platoon leader must be able to refine his plan whenever new information
becomes available. If he adjusts the plan, he must inform the platoon and
supervise implementation of the changes. Once the operation has begun,
the platoon leader must be able to direct his platoon in response to new
information and new situations.
2-47. Crew orders, rehearsals, and inspections are essential elements of
the supervision process as the platoon prepares for the mission. The
following discussion covers these procedures in detail.

Crew Orders
2-48. The platoon leader and PSG make sure all crewmembers have
been briefed by their leaders or vehicle commanders and understand the
platoon mission and concept of the operation. Combat orders are the
means by which the platoon leader receives and transmits information,
from the earliest notification that an operation will occur through the
final phases of execution. They are absolutely critical to mission success.
All members of the platoon must be familiar with the formats of warning
orders, OPORDs, and FRAGOs. For a detailed discussion of combat
orders, refer to Appendix A of this manual.

Rehearsals
2-49. The platoon leader should never underestimate the value of
rehearsals. They are his most valuable tools in preparing the platoon for
the upcoming operation. Refer to FM 101-5 for a detailed discussion of
rehearsal types, techniques, and procedures. The platoon leader uses
well-planned, efficiently run rehearsals to accomplish the following
purposes:

· Reinforce training and increase proficiency in critical tasks.


· Reveal weaknesses or problems in the plan.
· Synchronize the actions of subordinate elements.
· Improve each soldier’s understanding of the concept of the
operation.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

2-50. Rehearsal Types. The platoon leader can choose among several
types of rehearsals, each designed to achieve a specific result and with a
specific role in the planning and preparation timeline. The following
discussion focuses on the five rehearsal types.
2-51. Confirmation brief. The confirmation brief is, in effect, a
reverse briefing process routinely performed by subordinate leaders
immediately after receiving any instructions, such as an OPORD or
FRAGO. They confirm their understanding by repeating and explaining
details of the operation for their leader. In the reconnaissance platoon,
the platoon leader should conduct confirmation briefs after his
subordinate leaders have received the OPORD, but before other phases of
the platoon rehearsal begin.
2-52. Backbrief. Leaders perform this type of rehearsal throughout
the planning and preparation timeline to help clarify their intent for their
subordinates. The backbrief allows the platoon leader to identify
problems in his own concept of the operation and his subordinates’
understanding of the concept; he also uses the backbrief to learn how
subordinates intend to accomplish their missions.
2-53. Support rehearsal. Support rehearsals are normally conducted
within the framework of a single operating system, such as fire support or
CSS, or a limited number of operating systems. The goals are to ensure
that support elements can achieve their missions within the higher
commander’s plan and that their support plans are synchronized with the
overall maneuver plan. The rehearsals are conducted throughout the
planning and preparation timeline.
2-54. Battle drill or SOP rehearsal. This type of rehearsal is used to
ensure that all participants understand a technique or a specific set of
procedures. The platoon initiates battle drill and/or SOP rehearsals as
soon as possible after receipt of the mission; he then can continue to
conduct them as needed throughout the planning and preparation
timeline. This rehearsal does not necessarily cover a published drill or
SOP, giving the commander or leader flexibility in designing the
rehearsal. For example, the platoon leader could rehearse procedures for
marking obstacle lanes or establishing local security. (NOTE: It is
recommended that drills for actions on contact be rehearsed frequently
during planning and preparation.)
2-55. Rehearsal Techniques. The platoon leader can choose among
several techniques in conducting rehearsals, which should follow the
crawl-walk-run training methodology to prepare the platoon for
increasingly difficult conditions. As noted in FM 5-0 (FM 101-5),
techniques for conducting rehearsals are limited only by the
resourcefulness of the commander or leader; that manual outlines six
basic techniques (full dress, reduced force, terrain model, sketch map,
map, and radio). The following discussion covers these techniques, which
are listed in descending order in terms of the preparation time and
resources required to conduct them. Considerations in selecting a
rehearsal technique include the following:

· Time. How much time will be needed for planning,


preparation, and execution?
· Terrain. What are the applicable terrain considerations?

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· Multiechelon employment. How many echelons are


involved?
· Operations security (OPSEC). Will the rehearsal allow the
threat to gain intelligence about upcoming operations?

2-56. Full force rehearsal. This rehearsal produces the most detailed
understanding of the mission, but is the most difficult to conduct in terms
of preparation and resources. It involves every soldier and system
participating in the operation. If possible, units should conduct the full
force rehearsal under the same conditions (such as weather, time of day,
terrain, and use of live ammunition) that they will encounter during the
actual operation.
2-57. Reduced force rehearsal. This rehearsal normally involves
only key leaders of the unit and is thus less extensive than the full dress
rehearsal in terms of preparation time and resources. The commander
decides the level of leader involvement. The selected leaders then
rehearse the plan, if possible on the terrain to be used for the actual
operation. The reduced force rehearsal is often conducted to prepare
leaders for the full dress rehearsal.
2-58. Terrain model rehearsal. This is the most popular rehearsal
technique, employing an accurately constructed model to help
subordinates visualize the battle in accordance with the commander’s or
leader’s intent. When possible, the platoon leader places the terrain
model where it overlooks the actual terrain of the area of operations or is
within walking distance of such a vantage point. Size of the model can
vary, but it should be large enough to depict graphic control measures
and important terrain features for reference and orientation. Participants
walk or move “micro” armor around the table or model to practice the
actions of their own vehicles in relation to other members of the platoon.
2-59. Sketch map rehearsal. Units can use the sketch map technique
almost anywhere, day or night. Procedures are similar to those for the
terrain model rehearsal. The sketch must be large enough to allow all
participants to see as each subordinate “walks” through an interactive
oral presentation of his actions. Platoon elements can use symbols or
“micro” armor to represent their locations and maneuver on the sketch.
2-60. Map rehearsal. Procedures are similar to those for the sketch
map rehearsal except that the commander or leader uses a map and
operation overlay of the same scale as he used to plan and control the
operation. This technique is useful in conjunction with a confirmation
brief or backbrief involving subordinate leaders and vehicle commanders.
The platoon leader uses the map and overlay to guide participants as they
brief their role in the operation.
2-61. Radio rehearsal. The commander or leader conducts this
rehearsal by having his unit simulate critical portions of the operation
orally and interactively over established communications networks. The
radio rehearsal may be especially useful when the situation does not
allow the platoon to gather at one location. Subordinate elements check
their communications systems and rehearse events that are critical to the
platoon plan. To be effective, the radio rehearsal requires all participants

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

to have working communications equipment and a copy of the OPORD


and applicable overlays.

Inspections
2-62. PCCs and PCIs allow leaders to check the platoon’s operational
readiness. The key goal is to ensure that soldiers and vehicles are fully
prepared to execute the upcoming mission. The platoon leader makes
sure the entire chain of command conducts PCCs and PCIs in accordance
with ST 3-20.983 or his own SOP.
2-63. Precombat Checks. Equipment operators, vehicle crewmen, and
individual soldiers conduct PCCs before executing operations. These
checks are designed to ensure that equipment is in working order,
required supplies are on hand, and soldiers are ready to execute the
mission. PCCs are conducted in accordance with appropriate technical
manuals, supply catalogs, and unit SOPs. Areas covered by PCCs include
the following:

· Preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) of


essential equipment.
· Vehicle load plans.
· Inspections of TA-50 equipment.
· NBC protective equipment (known as the ICE pack) and
combat lifesaver bag inventories.
· Resupply of rations, water, fuel, oil, all weapons, ammunition,
pyrotechnics, first-aid kits, and equipment batteries (for such
items as flashlights, night-vision devices, mine detectors, and
NBC alarms).
· Individual readiness. This includes ensuring that
crewmembers understand the mission and tactical situation
and are in the correct uniform and mission-oriented protective
posture (MOPP) level.
· Vehicle readiness, including camouflage and light leaks.
· Prepare-to-fire checks for all weapons. This includes reporting
or repairing deficiencies and making sure that weapons are
boresighted and all sights are referred. Machine guns should
be test-fired, if possible.
· Communications checks, including radio, FBCB2, and tactical
satellite (TACSAT) systems. This includes verifying proper
uploading of data for digital equipment, proper filter settings,
and integration of attached assets in digital systems.

2-64. Precombat Inspections. Leaders in the reconnaissance platoon


conduct PCIs to ensure that subordinate leaders and soldiers have
executed the necessary PCCs. Obviously, leaders cannot possibly check
everything. They should focus on key pieces of equipment and details of
the plan that are critical to mission accomplishment. The platoon leader
and PSG should coordinate their inspections to make optimum use of
available time and to avoid redundant inspections. PCIs must be
completed in time to fix deficiencies before mission execution begins.

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NOTE: Refer to ST 3-20.983 for a comprehensive precombat checklist that can be employed
for both PCCs and PCIs.

SECTION II – DEPLOYMENT

2-65. Global commitments place requirements on the US Army to


conduct short-notice deployments. The American military is transforming
itself from a forward-deployed force to a power projection force. The
characteristics of this type of organization have generated new interest in
the TTP involved in deployment and in the process known as reception,
staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI). In planning and
preparing for future operations, the US military is focusing on the
strategy, tactics, and resources necessary to conduct two major,
simultaneous regional contingency force projection scenarios. Such a
situation will require forces to be at a high state of deployability.
2-66. The reconnaissance platoon will never deploy by itself; it will
always be part of a larger organization. To ensure that the platoon is
ready to fulfill its role in the power projection force, however, the platoon
leader must understand the fundamentals of deployment and RSOI.

CRITICAL TASKS
2-67. Execution of deployment and RSOI entails the following critical
tasks and purposes:

· Prepare for deployment. Purpose: To ensure necessary


personnel and equipment are on hand and fully mission capable.
· Execute deployment. Purpose: To carry out orders from
higher headquarters and protect US national interest.
· Conduct reception operations. Purpose: To receive all
unit resources, personnel, and equipment at the entry point to
the theater of operations.
· Conduct staging operations. Purpose: To incrementally
build forces capable of meeting the commander’s operational
and tactical mission requirements by organizing personnel and
material at designated areas and preparing them for movement.
· Execute onward movement. Purpose: To relocate forces
that are capable of meeting the commander’s operational and
tactical requirements to the initial point of their mission
execution by rail, road, boat, or air.
· Execute integration. Purpose: To provide the commander
with a synchronized force ready to conduct operations.

NOTE: For more detailed discussions of deployment tasks and procedures, refer to FM 3-35
(FM 100-17) and to the RSOI appendix in FM 3-20.96.

PLATOON GUIDELINES
2-68. The reconnaissance platoon leader should use the following
guidelines to help ensure successful completion of deployment and RSOI:

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

· Adhere strictly to established timelines.


· Maintain communications with higher headquarters
throughout the deployment/RSOI process.
· Conduct effective deployment preparations. Platoon
preparations include the following:
n The platoon is prepared to deploy 24 to 36 hours after
notification.
n Vehicles are loaded, inspected (using PCI procedures),
and prepared for shipment by the appropriate means
(rail, road, boat, or air).
n Soldiers are deployable, meeting the standards
established in the unit SOP.
· Track the platoon’s combat power throughout the process.
· Ensure that the platoon arrives at the area of operations
ready to execute the assigned missions.

SECTION III – TACTICAL MOVEMENT

2-69. To be successful, the reconnaissance platoon must be able to


conduct effective tactical movement. The platoon’s ability to conduct
stealthy movement, undetected by the threat, is critical to mission
accomplishment.

PLANNING AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS


2-70. This section focuses on several critical aspects of tactical
movement, including the following:

· Movement fundamentals and formations. The


reconnaissance platoon needs a thorough understanding of
the fundamentals of movement and proper employment of
movement formations. Use of formations must take into
account such factors as METT-TC, applicable troop-leading
procedures, and additional assets that influence the platoon’s
movement (such as FBCB2, ground sensors, TUAVs, and
GSR).
· Movement techniques. The platoon must be proficient at
using the appropriate movement technique for the specific
situation. Effectively employed, movement techniques
(traveling, traveling overwatch, bounding overwatch, move-
set techniques) allow the platoon to conduct reconnaissance
without becoming compromised. They also assist the platoon
leader in achieving a number of tactical purposes:
n Minimize the platoon’s exposure to threat observation
and/or fire.
n Help the platoon maintain freedom of movement.

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n Maximize the number of tactical options available to the


platoon.
· Mission considerations. The platoon applies movement
fundamentals, formations, and techniques in support of its
primary missions, such as reconnaissance and surveillance. It
can use an array of digital tools in the planning, preparation,
and execution of these operations. Such resources as TUAVs,
GSR, and FBCB2 assist the platoon in conducting stealthy
movement and in gaining visual contact with threat forces
before they can see the scouts.
· Chance contact. The reconnaissance platoon must take
steps to minimize chance contact with threat forces. (NOTE:
The use of national-level intelligence sources, coupled with
the available internal information from such assets as TUAVs
and ground sensors, can greatly increase the platoon’s
situational awareness and therefore decrease chance contact.)
· Timelines. The platoon conducts and completes tactical
movement in accordance with the timelines directed by the
higher commander.

FUNDAMENTALS OF MOVEMENT
2-71. Sound tactical movement is the essence of all reconnaissance
platoon operations. Effectively employed, the guidelines in this section
can help scouts to see the threat first and observe him undetected. The
scouts are then able to achieve a number of tactical goals, including
retaining the initiative and retaining freedom of movement to gain
information.

USE TERRAIN FOR COVER AND CONCEALMENT


2-72. Terrain offers concealment from threat observation and cover
from threat fire. Scouts must make maximum use of this natural
protection to survive and accomplish their mission; avoiding threat
detection is the key. Cover should be used whenever possible. When no
cover is available, however, scouts should use the concealment offered by
trees, shadows, brush, and man-made structures (see Figure 2-3). The
crest drills illustrated in Figures 2-4 and 2-5 are examples of using the
terrain to protect the vehicle from threat observation during movement.
2-73. During mounted or dismounted movement, individual vehicles
and personnel should avoid becoming silhouetted against a skyline. In
addition, they should never move directly forward from a defilade
position. Direct forward movement may enable the threat to pinpoint the
vehicle and engage it as it moves. Instead, vehicles should back up and
move left or right around the previous position to get to the next position.
2-74. Despite its obvious advantage, movement along covered and
concealed routes can present disadvantages that should be considered.
Speed is often reduced, and control problems increase. The possibility of
being ambushed by threat forces increases. In most situations, these
limitations must be accepted because the accuracy and lethality of long-
range weapons make exposed movement too dangerous. The vehicle
commander or dismounted leader must be careful to balance the need for

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

security with his ability to conduct required observation and


reconnaissance.

Figure 2-3. Use of Natural Concealment

Figure 2-4. Dismounted Crest Drill

Figure 2-5. Mounted Crest Drill

USE CAUTION AT DANGER AREAS


2-75. Scouts must be prepared to take necessary precautions when they
encounter danger areas. Based on terrain analysis and IPB, the
reconnaissance platoon leader considers where threat reconnaissance
assets will be focused and determines their fields of observation. The
platoon can then avoid movement through these areas. In addition, scouts

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should combine proper terrain driving techniques with carefully selected


routes to maximize security.
2-76. The reconnaissance platoon should stop short of danger areas and
use dismounted scouts to reconnoiter them. For example, when it
encounters an open area, the platoon should send dismounts to a
concealed position where they can observe the area. From that position,
scouts should carefully check the other side of the open area for threat
positions. The scouts must then cross the open area quickly, using
overwatch and following the folds in the terrain. (NOTE: Refer to the
discussion of danger areas later in this chapter.)

DISMOUNT VEHICLES
2-77. As a general rule, scouts dismount. This enhances mission
accomplishment and survivability. Vehicles are easily identified because
of their visual, sound, and exhaust signatures; vehicles that can be seen
(or otherwise detected) can be killed. Conversely, dismounted patrols and
OPs are very difficult to detect. Scouts should dismount their vehicles and
use optical devices to gain information on objectives or areas of interest.
2-78. As an example, during reconnaissance operations, the scouts
should dismount beyond the direct fire range of suspected threat
positions and weapon systems. Dismounted scouts can then move in front
of their vehicles using the cover and concealment of a dismounted avenue
adjacent to the mounted route. Additionally, dismounts can occupy OPs
while leaving the vehicles in a hide or overwatch position. These basic
actions enable the dismounted scouts to provide critical information while
enhancing the unit’s survivability and its ability to perform later
missions. (NOTE: Refer to Chapter 5 of this manual for further
discussion of dismounted operations.)

REDUCE VEHICLE-RELATED SIGNATURES


2-79. The reconnaissance platform’s major signatures (audible,
thermal, visual) can be reduced. Audible signature can be reduced simply
by shutting off the vehicle and related systems, such as heaters or
thermal sights, whenever the vehicle is not moving or the system is not
needed. Reduce visual and thermal signatures using these steps:

· Erect camouflage nets. This will help hide a stationary vehicle


both visually and thermally; nets tied to the vehicle can
reduce dust and exhaust signatures, as well as reduce the
thermal signature while moving.
· Keep hatches closed to reduce noise and light signatures.
· Prevent white light displays at night. Conduct careful PCIs of
flashlights and dome lights to check for leaks.
· Reduce vehicle glass reflection from periscopes and windows
by removing, covering, or camouflaging them (placing a net
over the windshield, for example).

DANGER AREAS
2-80. During the execution of reconnaissance and security missions,
scouts will encounter specific types of terrain or features that expose
them to threat fire. Known as danger areas, these are likely points of

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

threat contact due both to the reconnaissance platoon’s vulnerability and


to the cover, concealment, and observation these sites afford to the threat.
Danger areas should be identified and highlighted when the platoon
leader performs his map reconnaissance during troop-leading procedures.
Once these areas are identified, the platoon leader can employ specific
reconnaissance methods and movement techniques to move through them
quickly and with maximum security.

OPEN AREAS
2-81. Open areas frequently afford the reconnaissance platoon the
opportunity to observe the threat or objectives from long ranges.
Conversely, these areas often expose the platoon to possible threat
observation and fire for long periods of movement. The platoon, therefore,
must make maximum use of the terrain and employ effective observation
techniques to avoid exposing itself to a well-concealed and camouflaged
threat.
2-82. Before moving across a large open area, the platoon must make a
thorough visual scan of the area. This should be done both dismounted
and mounted. The platoon leader must use all available optics and other
assets, including TUAVs and GSR, to reconnoiter the open area and find
a bypass, if applicable. If a bypass cannot be found, he focuses not only on
finding potential threat positions, but also on locating covered and
concealed routes for bounding and covered and concealed positions to
which the unit can move. If time and terrain permit, dismounted scouts
may be used to move to the far side of the open area and secure it. In very
large open areas, use of dismounts may not be feasible because of the
distances between covered and concealed positions.
2-83. Once the area has been reconnoitered using visual, digital, and
sensor enablers, the scouts move across it. They use bounding overwatch
because of the possibility of threat contact. If the open area is very large,
the overwatch element should only remain stationary until the bounding
element has moved a distance equal to half the effective range of the
overwatching element’s weapon system. When that point is reached, the
overwatch element must move out, even if the bounding element has not
yet reached a position of cover and concealment.
2-84. When the platoon must move across large open areas with limited
cover and concealment and threat contact is likely, scouts should consider
the use of reconnaissance by indirect fire to provide additional security as
they move. The platoon must make the conscious decision to use this
method with the understanding that stealth is being sacrificed.
Additionally, indirect fire can provide concealment, with smoke either
used alone or mixed with suppressive fires. Use of smoke is feasible,
however, only for limited periods because of Class V supply restrictions
on supporting mortar or artillery units.

WOODED AREAS
2-85. Wooded areas provide a high degree of concealment to forces that
occupy them, particularly infantry. They must be approached and moved
through with extreme caution. Visibility within wooded areas is very
limited; therefore, reconnaissance is confined primarily to trafficable
routes and trails through the forest. In densely wooded areas, mounted

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scouts are extremely vulnerable to dismounted threat forces that can


close on them undetected.
2-86. Scouts should use available terrain to scan the wooded area
before entering. They should search for movement, reflections, smoke,
and any irregular shapes or colors indicating camouflage. Whenever
possible, the entire wood line should be reconnoitered with dismounts
prior to mounted movement to the wooded area.
2-87. The scouts should move mounted to the wooded area using
bounding overwatch. Once the vehicles are set inside the wood line
(approximately 100 to 200 meters), engines are shut off, dismounted
security maintained, and a listening/security halt conducted. Crewmen
wearing CVC helmets remove them. Radio speakers are turned off. The
halt should last approximately one to two minutes, with 360-degree
security maintained throughout. Similar halts must be conducted at
regular intervals during movement through the wooded area
(approximately every kilometer). At the same time, because
reconnaissance vehicles are most vulnerable in wooded areas when they
are stopped, halts should be kept to a minimum
2-88. During movement through a wooded area, scouts should move
using traveling overwatch. This technique is appropriate because of the
extremely short fields of view and the danger of dismounted ambush.
Exposed scouts should maintain a minimum silhouette in their vehicles
because of the danger from close-in snipers and ambush.
2-89. Scouts may encounter small clearings, buildings, or hills while
moving through a wooded area. Each must be treated as a separate task.
Small clearings may require crossing in the same manner as a large open
area. Isolated buildings must be checked by dismounted scouts. Hills and
curves must be approached cautiously; dismounted scouts must clear any
dead space.
2-90. Before leaving a wooded area, scouts must clear the open area to
the front. They stop inside the wood line (ensuring they are still within
the shadow line of the woods). Engines are turned off, and dismounted
scouts move to the edge of the wooded area to observe. If the area is
determined to be clear, vehicles are brought forward to observation
positions. As the dismounts remount, the vehicles use their optics to
again visually clear the open area. Once this is completed, the scouts
resume movement using their chosen movement technique.

URBAN AREAS
2-91. Urban areas, including towns and villages, pose many potential
dangers for the reconnaissance platoon. Troops can be garrisoned in
villages, snipers can dominate approaches, and buildings and roads can
be mined and booby-trapped. Cover and concealment are abundant, and it
is easy for the threat to remain undetected until he is at very close range.
Urban areas are ideal for effective ambush by small numbers of infantry.
Whenever possible, scouts should initially observe urban areas from a
distance. Detailed reconnaissance of urban areas during MTW operations
is extremely difficult and is usually beyond the capability of a
reconnaissance platoon.
2-92. During reconnaissance with a multidimensional focus, scouts may
be required to execute a reconnaissance of a town or village. They must

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

always remember that this is a very dangerous task, especially if the


threat is occupying the urban area in strength. They must take steps to
counter these dangers and ensure local security. The scouts should collect
tactical information and HUMINT before they enter the urban area,
observing it from a distance. They look for movement and evidence of
threat occupation, including track marks on pavement; lack of civilian
activity; and sandbags, stakes, timber, intentional building damage, or
any other sign of prepared fighting positions and obstacles.
2-93. The scouts should attempt to observe the area from multiple
vantage points. Scouts move through it using traveling overwatch,
ensuring that vehicles remain in mutual support and maintain 360-
degree security. Once in the town, all scouts must be alert to additional
signs of threat activity, including tactical markings or signaling devices,
antennas, spent shell casings and pyrotechnics, and damage to buildings
and streets. Dismounts can be used to reconnoiter major intersections
and provide security during halts. The scouts do not have the manpower
or time to clear buildings. They can, however, be employed dismounted
for limited search and secure tasks as needed to support the movement of
the mounted element or a particular reconnaissance mission. Vehicle-
mounted crews must reduce their silhouette to a minimum when moving
through a town.
2-94. As the platoon approaches the far side of the urban area, scouts
are employed to reconnoiter the area for threat movement. The platoon
should stop short and move dismounts to the edge of town. The dismounts
will secure the local area and observe the open area beyond the town; the
platoon should also use such assets as TUAVs to observe this area. When
this reconnaissance has been completed, the vehicles will move forward
and continue to observe from covered and concealed positions while the
dismounted elements remount. The platoon is then prepared to continue
its mission.

NOTE: Refer to Chapter 7 of this manual for specific information on urban operations.

LATERAL OR BOUNDARY ROUTES


2-95. As the platoon executes reconnaissance and security missions, it
will encounter routes or mobility corridors that provide access into the
area between the platoon and friendly elements to its rear. These lateral
corridors pose a security threat to both the platoon and the other friendly
elements.
2-96. It is critical that the scouts maintain continuous surveillance of
these mobility corridors to provide security against threat forces that
move into the sector after the reconnaissance platoon has moved on. This
is especially important when the scouts are moving through a threat
security area where threat forces are likely to respond to friendly activity
or when the platoon expects to encounter a moving threat force. If
necessary, the platoon can use a series of contact points and/or
coordination points to enhance security during movement through the
area.
2-97. To maintain surveillance, the platoon can use outposting to
maximize the reconnaissance effort forward. This security technique
involves the use of short-duration OPs consisting of two soldiers with

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___________________________________________________ Chapter 2 – Leadership Competencies

equipment. A reconnaissance section or squad should deploy an outpost


when it is at risk of losing observation on a possible threat approach route
that no other element can cover. Once deployed, the outpost maintains
surveillance of the avenue of approach until the rest of the
reconnaissance element returns. In doing so, the outpost can provide
security through early warning of threat activity that the mounted
element would not have detected.

PLATOON FORMATIONS
2-98. During either mounted or dismounted movement, the
reconnaissance platoon employs combat formations when terrain
supports their use or when the mission or reconnaissance objective is very
focused, such as in a route reconnaissance. In many situations, however,
platoon formations are not appropriate to the execution of a
reconnaissance or security mission.
2-99. There are six mounted reconnaissance platoon formations: line, vee, column,
staggered column, coil, and herringbone. Formations are intended to be
flexible. They can be modified to fit the situation, terrain, and combat
losses; they do not have exact geometric dimensions and design.
Movement into and out of the various formations must be second nature
to each squad. (NOTE: The following formation examples are based on
the four-vehicle recce platoon.)

LINE FORMATION
2-100. This formation (see Figure 2-6) can be used regardless of the
platoon organization and is applicable to most reconnaissance platoon
missions. It allows maximum reconnaissance forward.

Figure 2-6. Platoon Line Formation

VEE FORMATION
2-101. The vee formation, illustrated in Figure 2-7, uses the two-section
organization. The platoon maintains relative positioning based on terrain
and combat losses. The vee lends itself to immediate mutual support and
provides depth; it is very flexible. Using any of the techniques of
movement, the two forward vehicles perform all of the information
gathering and reporting. The rear vehicles provide overwatch and
command and control.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure 2-7. Platoon Vee Formation

COLUMN FORMATION AND STAGGERED COLUMN FORMATION


2-102. The platoon uses the column formation when speed is essential as
it moves on a designated route (see Figure 2-8). The column offers good
protection to the flanks, but little to the front and rear. Normally, the
platoon leader briefs the section leaders on the route and speed and then
allows the lead section to control the column movement. This frees the
platoon leader to concentrate on the subsequent mission, enhancing
command and control. It does not, however, relieve him of the
responsibility of tracking the move on his map.
2-103. The order of march in the column may depend on which
organization the platoon will use at the end of the movement; in addition,
the lead section may vary based on METT-TC considerations. When
conducting movement in a secure area, it is appropriate to specify the
order of march by SOP.

Figure 2-8. Platoon Column Formation

2-104. The staggered column is used for rapid movement across open
terrain. It affords all-around observation and fields of fire. Figure 2-9
shows the platoon in the staggered column in a two-section organization
with Alpha section leading.

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Figure 2-9. Platoon Staggered Column Formation

COIL FORMATION
2-105. The platoon coil is used to provide all-around security during
halts. Each vehicle has a particular position to occupy in the coil. The
platoon leader designates the orientation of the coil using a cardinal
direction; in the absence of orders, the direction of travel becomes 12
o’clock. The reconnaissance platoon must develop a coil SOP based on its
METL, war plans, and most frequently used organizations. The SOP
should be practiced as a drill so that correct execution of the coil becomes
automatic.
2-106. The coil is always executed from the column or staggered column,
with the lead vehicle occupying the 12 o’clock position. The other vehicles
occupy the 3, 9 and 6 o’clock positions in accordance with the order of
march. Vehicles are positioned 100 to 150 meters apart. An example is
illustrated in Figure 2-10.

Figure 2-10. Example Platoon Coil Formation

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HERRINGBONE FORMATION
2-107. The herringbone is used to provide 360-degree security during a
temporary halt from a march column (see Figure 2-11). Scouts should
dismount to provide greater security. The formation may be widened to
permit passage of vehicles down the center of the column. All vehicles
should move completely off the road if terrain allows.

Figure 2-11. Platoon Herringbone Formation

MOVEMENT TECHNIQUES
2-108. As noted earlier in this section, the reconnaissance platoon
employs movement techniques for a number of reasons (minimize
exposure, maintain freedom of movement, maximize available tactical
options, and react effectively to contact). Effectively employed, movement
techniques allow the platoon to find and observe threats without being
compromised.
2-109. At the same time, however, movement techniques alone are not
enough to guarantee accomplishment of these tactical goals. The platoon
must use them in conjunction with other movement- and security-related
measures. For example, scouts must make maximum use of all available
natural cover and concealment when moving. In addition, they must
avoid becoming vehicle-bound; they must dismount to improve
observation, prevent threat detection, and provide security.

TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
2-110. In conducting either mounted and dismounted movement on the
battlefield, the reconnaissance platoon uses three movement techniques:
traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch. These
techniques provide a standard method of movement, but the platoon
leader must use common sense in employing them as he performs his
missions and encounters different situations. The decision of which
technique to use is based in large part on the likelihood of threat contact;
in general, this can be summarized as whether contact is not likely
(traveling), possible (traveling overwatch), or expected (bounding
overwatch). Terrain considerations may also affect the choice of
movement technique.
2-111. In the conduct of most tactical missions, the reconnaissance
platoon will move as separate sections or squads under the command and
control of the platoon leader. Traveling overwatch and bounding
overwatch, therefore, are most often executed at the section or squad

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level. Traveling, which is usually employed in secured areas, is used


equally at the section and platoon levels.
2-112. Regardless of which technique is used, the section leader gives
the section an order explaining what each squad will do. This becomes
more critical as the likelihood of threat contact increases. If possible, the
section leader should provide his squads with the following information:

· The threat situation as he knows or suspects it to be.


· The next overwatch position (the objective for the bounding
element).
· The route of the bounding element to that position.
· What he wants the section to do after the bounding element
gets to the next position.

EXECUTION OF MOVEMENT TECHNIQUES


Traveling
2-113. In this technique, the lead and trail elements move together as a
unit. It is the fastest but least secure movement technique. It is used
when speed is important and threat contact is not likely. Movement is
continuous, and interval and dispersion are maintained between squads
as terrain and weather permit. The platoon does not intend to engage in
combat, but it is dispersed to prevent destruction in case of unexpected
air or ground attack. When using this technique, the platoon could be in a
column formation or dispersed in its other formations (see Figure 2-12).

Figure 2-12. Recce Platoon Using Traveling Technique


and Staggered Column Formation

Traveling Overwatch
2-114. Traveling overwatch is used when contact is possible but speed is
desirable (see Figures 2-13 and 2-14). The lead element moves
continuously along covered and concealed routes that afford the best
available protection from possible threat observation and direct fire. The
trail element moves at variable speeds, providing continuous overwatch.

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It normally maintains visual contact with the lead element and may stop
periodically for better observation. The trail element remains close
enough to provide immediate suppressive fire and to maneuver for
support. It must, however, be far enough to the rear to avoid contact in
case the lead element is engaged by a threat force.

Figure 2-13. Section Using Traveling Overwatch


Technique and Wedge Formation

Figure 2-14. Dismounted Traveling Overwatch

Bounding Overwatch
2-115. Employed when threat contact is expected, bounding overwatch is
the most deliberate and secure movement technique. It provides for
immediate direct fire suppression on a threat force that engages the
bounding element with direct fire. (NOTE: When sufficient time is

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available, bounding overwatch should always be used regardless of the


likelihood of threat contact.)
2-116. In bounding overwatch, one element is always stationary to
provide overwatch. The trail element first occupies a covered and
concealed position from which it can overwatch the lead element. Upon
completing its movement (bound), the lead element then occupies a
similar position and provides overwatch as the trail element bounds
forward to its next overwatch position. Bounding overwatch can be
executed using one of the following bounding methods:

· Alternate bounds. In this method, the trail element


advances past the lead element to the next overwatch
position. This is usually more rapid than successive bounds.
· Successive bounds. In successive bounding, the trail
element moves to an overwatch position that is approximately
abreast of the lead element. This method is easier to control
and more secure than alternate bounding, but it is slower.

2-117. As an example, a two-vehicle section may use bounding


overwatch with successive bounds (see Figure 2-15). The lead vehicle
advances to a point (first move) where it can support the advance of the
overwatch vehicle. On signal, the overwatch vehicle moves forward to a
position abreast of the lead vehicle (second move) and halts. During its
move, it is overwatched by the lead vehicle. The lead vehicle then moves
forward again, with the overwatch vehicle providing security. Maximum
use is made of folds of the earth and concealment to mask movement from
likely threat positions. (NOTE: See Figure 2-16 for an illustration of
dismounted bounding overwatch. This can also be conducted at squad
level with the vehicle providing overwatch and the dismounted team
moving as the lead bounding element.)

Figure 2-15. Section Movement Using


Bounding Overwatch Technique

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Figure 2-16. Dismounted Bounding Overwatch

Move-Set Technique
2-118. This method of movement is simply an organized way of
controlling the section when it moves in bounding overwatch. “Set” means
that the element has arrived at its destination and has occupied a
position from which it can observe to its front. This technique allows for
an absolute minimum of radio transmissions, positive control by the
section leader, and maximum security within the section. Preferably, the
section leader uses hand-and-arm signals within the section for C2. If the
section leader must use the radio, squad leaders should keep their radios
on the lowest possible power setting to minimize their signature and
reduce possible interference on the platoon net. The move-set method can
be used to control bounding overwatch within the section regardless of
the platoon organization.
2-119. When terrain permits sections to be mutually supporting (such as
in desert terrain) and other METT-TC factors are favorable, the platoon
leader can use this technique to control platoon bounding (by sections). In
such a situation, the sections would not be operating independently, but
rather would be directly controlled, and their movement coordinated, by
the platoon leader.

SECTION IV – ACTIONS ON CONTACT

2-120. Prior to any mission, the leadership of the reconnaissance platoon


must conduct a detailed IPB (covered in Chapter 1 of this manual) of the
area of operations as part of analyzing the mission during troop-leading
procedures (discussed in earlier in this chapter). The leaders must
determine the probability of contact and identify locations where contact
is most likely to occur. To do this, they use information from all available

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assets, to include TUAVs, GSR reports on the FBCB2, information


collected by dismounted patrols, and intelligence from the S2. The leaders
are then able to plan for contact and determine how to employ TTP, such
as the proper movement techniques, to avoid chance contact.

CONTACT CONSIDERATIONS
2-121. The ideal way for the platoon to make contact is by means of
reports from other ISR assets (such as TUAVs or GSR). FBCB2 will allow
immediate dissemination of this information. The platoon leader can then
evaluate and develop the situation out of contact. Based on this
evaluation and further guidance from higher, he can maneuver the
platoon out of contact and make contact either on his own terms or as
directed by the commander.

THE EIGHT FORMS OF CONTACT


2-122. No matter how thoroughly the platoon leader prepares for an
operation, direct contact with the threat is still a possibility, usually as a
result of chance contact. In all types of operations, contact occurs when an
individual soldier, squad, or section of the platoon encounters any
situation that requires an active or passive response to the threat. These
situations may entail one or more of the following forms of contact:

· Visual contact (friendly elements may or may not be observed


by the threat).
· Physical contact (direct fire) with a threat force.
· Indirect fire contact.
· Contact with obstacles of threat or unknown origin.
· Contact with threat or unknown aircraft.
· Situations involving NBC conditions.
· Situations involving electronic warfare tactics.
· Situations involving nonhostile elements, such as civilians.

INITIAL CONTACT AND REACTION


2-123. The platoon must be prepared to execute actions on contact under
any of the following conditions:

· Visual contact (the platoon is undetected by the threat force).


· Contact with an unknown or superior force.
· Contact with an inferior force.

2-124. Whether the platoon remains undetected or is identified by threat


forces, it must first take actions to protect itself, find out what it is up
against, and decide on a COA. To properly execute actions on contact, the
platoon must take action consistent with the fundamentals of
reconnaissance (refer to Chapter 3 of this manual for a detailed
discussion):

· Develop the situation rapidly.


· Report quickly and accurately.

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· Maintain contact with the threat in accordance with the


mission.
· Retain the freedom to maneuver.
· Remain focused on the reconnaissance objective.

SUMMARY OF ACTIONS ON CONTACT


2-125. When contact is made, the reconnaissance platoon executes battle
drills, designated by SOP, to maintain freedom of maneuver and avoid
becoming decisively engaged. It uses the four steps of actions on contact
(covered in detail later in this section) as the foundation for these drills:

· Deploy and report.


· Evaluate and develop the situation.
· Choose/recommend a COA and maneuver the force.
· Execute the COA.

2-126. The platoon leader will direct the platoon’s actions based on the
commander’s intent and guidance he receives from the OPORD/FRAGO.
These specific instructions must include focus of the reconnaissance,
tempo of the operation, engagement criteria, and the desired COA based
on the size and activity of the threat force encountered. By knowing these
details ahead of time, the platoon leader can develop the situation more
rapidly and arrive at and execute the desired COA. He strives to make
contact with combat multipliers (such as GSR assets or TUAVs) or with
its smallest possible internal element: the dismounted scout. The goal
is digital or visual contact in which the threat is observed but the platoon
remains undetected. This gives the platoon the greatest possible
flexibility to maneuver and develop the situation.
2-127. When the platoon deploys and reports, it employs the
fundamental techniques of tactical movement (dismounted/mounted) and
action drills, using the terrain to ensure effective cover and concealment.
As information becomes available, the element in contact sends a contact
report, followed by a SPOTREP (digital/analog). The platoon executes fire
and maneuver only when specifically directed by the platoon leader.
2-128. Developing the situation is a critical step in choosing the correct
COA and providing an accurate, timely report to the commander. Once
the platoon leader has enough information to make a decision, he selects
a COA that is within the capabilities of the platoon, that allows the
platoon to continue the reconnaissance as quickly as possible, and that
supports the commander’s concept of the operation. He considers various
possible COAs, based on well-developed TTP (including battle drills), to
meet the types of contact. At a minimum, the platoon must rehearse and
be ready to execute these potential COAs:

· Disengage from threat contact.


· Break contact and bypass.
· Maintain contact and bypass.
· Maintain contact to support an attack on an inferior force.
· Conduct an attack against an inferior force.

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· Conduct a hasty defense.


· Conduct reconnaissance handover.
· Conduct battle handover, if applicable.

THE FOUR STEPS OF ACTIONS ON CONTACT


2-129. The steps that make up actions on contact must be thoroughly
trained and rehearsed so that the platoon can react instinctively as a
team whenever it encounters threat forces. As noted, the four steps,
which are executed to allow the platoon to accomplish its mission in
accordance with reconnaissance fundamentals, are the following:

· Deploy and report.


· Evaluate and develop the situation.
· Choose and recommend a COA and maneuver the force.
· Execute the COA.

STEP 1 – DEPLOY AND REPORT


2-130. When a scout makes contact with the threat, he reacts according
to the circumstances of the contact. (NOTE: Refer to the eight general
categories of contact discussed earlier in this section.) The section or
squad that makes initial visual contact with the threat deploys to covered
terrain that affords good observation and fields of fire. If the scouts
receive fire from the threat, they return fire, but only with the intent of
breaking direct fire contact.
2-131. The scout or element in contact sends a contact report to the
platoon leader and follows as soon as possible with a SPOTREP using the
SALUTE format (size, activity, location, unit identification, time, and
equipment). If the scout or element in contact is unable to report or
cannot report quickly, another squad in the section must report.
2-132. Scouts that are not in contact temporarily halt in covered terrain,
monitor the incoming reports, and plot the situation on their maps. Once
they determine that they cannot be influenced by the threat or are not
needed to support the element in contact, they continue their mission
with the platoon leader’s approval. The platoon leader or PSG relays the
contact report to the commander, followed as soon as possible by a spot
report and updates.

STEP 2 – EVALUATE AND DEVELOP THE SITUATION


2-133. The scouts next concentrate on defining what they are up against.
If they have not sent a spot report to this point, they initially focus on
getting enough information to send one. If they have not been detected by
the threat and time is available, the scouts reconnoiter the threat
position, emphasizing stealth, dismounted reconnaissance, and use of
such assets as GSR and TUAVs.
2-134. If the threat is aware of their presence, the scouts use a
combination of mounted and dismounted reconnaissance. They conduct
dismounted reconnaissance to get detailed information on threat
dispositions. Mounted reconnaissance will be used to move additional
assets into the area to support the element in contact.

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2-135. When physical contact occurs, the reconnaissance platoon


employs indirect and direct fires to suppress the threat while
maneuvering to get information. The scouts attempt to confirm or
determine in detail threat size, composition, activity, orientation, and
weapon system locations. They search for AT ditches, minefields, wire, or
other obstacles that could force friendly elements into a fire sack. The
scouts find the flanks of the threat position and look for other threat
elements that could provide mutual support to the position. Once the
scouts determine what they are up against, the platoon leader updates
the spot report.

STEP 3 – CHOOSE AND RECOMMEND A COA AND MANEUVER THE FORCE


2-136. Once the element in contact has developed the situation and the
platoon leader has enough information to make a decision, he selects a
COA. He ensures the COA is within the capabilities of the platoon, that it
allows the scouts to continue the reconnaissance as quickly as possible,
and that it supports the commander’s concept of the operation. The
platoon leader should consider all available COAs, including those
outlined in the following discussion. Once he decides on a COA, he
recommends it to his commander, providing information on how the
platoon COA will affect the next higher echelon’s situation.

Disengage from Threat Contact


2-137. The reconnaissance platoon cannot conduct its mission if it
becomes decisively engaged. If it is engaged, the platoon must have a plan
to break contact with the threat. As a general rule, the platoon, section, or
squad should disengage from the threat as early in the contact as
possible. This will allow for continuation of the mission and reduce the
chance of any loss of combat power.
2-138. At platoon level, OPs or patrols gain contact with the threat, then
report and prepare to displace to successive positions. These platoon
members should report the threat contact to the overwatching vehicles
and to the platoon leader.
2-139. When the threat force reaches the OPs’ break point (the point at
which the OPs must displace or risk detection and/or engagement by the
threat), the OPs pass off responsibility for tracking the threat to other
OPs in depth. The platoon then displaces its OPs to successive positions
in depth while maintaining contact with the threat. Patrols request
permission to return to the platoon vehicles. When permission has been
granted, they use covered and concealed routes back to the vehicle
positions and remount the vehicles.
2-140. Once the initial contact has been reported to higher headquarters
and the order to break contact has been given, disengagement should be
executed with one section or squad acting as overwatch for the displacing
section/squad as it moves. The section or squad that moves first will keep
its weapon systems oriented on the threat as it uses covered and
concealed routes to move to a designated rally point that precludes threat
observation and provides cover and concealment. This element may also
use on-board smoke generators or smoke grenades to cover its movement.
The overwatching section/squad provides suppressive fires, both indirect
and if necessary direct, to cover the movement of the displacing
section/squad. Mortars can also provide effective and responsive support

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when elements must break contact. The overwatching section must also
employ its dismounts with the Javelin missile system.
2-141. Once the displacing section/squad has arrived at the rally point, it
takes up defensive positions and reports its arrival to the overwatch
section/squad. The overwatching element then calls for protective fires
and uses an alternate covered and concealed route to move to the rally
point. When the entire platoon or section has moved back to the rally
point, it consolidates and reorganizes, reports its status to the higher
headquarters, and continues the mission. Figure 2-17 illustrates a
situation in which a recce platoon breaks contact by sections.

Figure 2-17. Platoon Disengages by Section

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Break Contact and Bypass


2-142. This COA may be selected when the platoon does not have the
resources to leave an element in contact and still continue to accomplish
its priority reconnaissance tasks. It may also be selected when the
platoon has made contact with a threat force that cannot adversely affect
the mission of the platoon’s higher headquarters. Because breaking
contact is a violation of reconnaissance fundamentals, the platoon leader
must be sure that his higher headquarters is informed of and approves
this COA. (Refer to Figure 2-18.)

Figure 2-18. Break Contact and Bypass.

Maintain Contact and Bypass


2-143. This COA is appropriate when a threat force, based on its current
disposition, is not in a position to influence the platoon’s higher
commander. An element (normally a section or squad) will be left to
maintain contact while the rest of the platoon continues the
reconnaissance mission. The element that remains in contact will
maintain visual contact with the threat and report if the threat situation
changes. The platoon must keep scouts in contact with the threat unless
specifically authorized to do otherwise. Depending on the applicable task
organization, the platoon leader must carefully assess METT-TC before
selecting this COA. Mission constraints may force the platoon leader to
leave one vehicle in contact. If this is the case, he must ensure that the
vehicle is AT-heavy (Javelin/TOW). To regain the use of all his assets, the
platoon leader continues coordination to execute reconnaissance or battle
handover of the contact to a follow-on element. (Refer to Figure 2-19.)

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Figure 2-19. Maintain Contact and Bypass

Maintain Contact to Support a Hasty Attack


2-144. This COA is appropriate when the platoon discovers threat
elements the higher commander wants to destroy, but which the scouts
cannot destroy, either because they lack sufficient combat power or
because they have other tasks to perform. In this situation, the platoon
maintains contact by leaving a section or squad in contact. The rest of the
platoon continues on to establish far-side security, monitor any changes
in the threat situation, and support the hasty attack by a friendly unit.
2-145. The platoon focuses on requirements for supporting a successful
friendly attack, including the following:

· Locating covered and concealed movement routes for friendly


attacking units.
· Locating attack positions.
· Locating enemy positions (within capability).
· Establishing a contact point to link up with, brief, and guide
the friendly unit as necessary.
· Designating an LD to use as a handover line to the attacking
unit.
· Preparing and coordinating fire support for the friendly
attack.
· Locating and preparing to occupy base of fire positions, if
required.

2-146. It is essential that the section or squad left in contact understand


what needs to be accomplished, who will be executing the attack, and
when the friendly unit anticipates being in position to receive handover of
the threat. As the unit responsible for the attack moves into position, the
scouts in contact may rejoin the platoon or be placed OPCON to the
attacking unit to ease command, control, and coordination. (Refer to
Figure 2-20.)

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Figure 2-20. Maintain Contact to Support a Hasty Attack

Attack an Inferior Force


2-147. In most cases, the reconnaissance platoon cannot, or should not,
mass its combat power to defeat a threat force. If the scouts mass, they
risk losing the capability to complete their mission as well as jeopardizing
their ability to conduct subsequent missions. If the scouts are permitted
to attack a threat, they should only attack lightly armored or unarmored
reconnaissance vehicles, such as motorcycles or Soviet-style BRDMs and
BTRs. They should not engage more heavily armored vehicles except in
self-defense. (Refer to Figure 2-21.)

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Figure 2-21. Attack an Inferior Force

Establish a Hasty Defense


2-148. The platoon will establish a hasty defense if it cannot bypass the
threat, all the sections and/or squads are fixed or suppressed, and the
platoon no longer has the ability to move forward. A hasty defense will
also be used when the threat executes a hasty attack. The platoon
maintains contact or fixes the threat in place until additional combat
power arrives or the platoon is ordered to move. (Refer to Figure 2-22.) If
the platoon is required to conduct a hasty defense, the commander then
becomes responsible for continuing to develop the situation. (NOTE:
Without the use of indirect fires in this situation, the platoon will fail.)

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Figure 2-22. Establish a Hasty Defense

Conduct Reconnaissance Handover


2-149. The platoon leader will attempt to hand over responsibility for the
threat element. He does this for several tactical reasons: to continue
operations as directed, to regain use of all his elements, or to pass
reconnaissance responsibility to another friendly element. An example of
this is a BRT platoon handing over a threat element to a task force
reconnaissance platoon to maintain contact. Refer to the discussion of
reconnaissance handover in Chapter 3 of this manual.

Conduct Battle Handover


2-150. This COA is applicable when a reconnaissance platoon hands over
responsibility for a threat force to a friendly combat element. The platoon
does this for reasons similar to those for reconnaissance handover: to
continue operations, to regain use of all elements, or to hand over contact
to an element that usually will then engage and destroy the threat force.
An example of battle handover is a task force reconnaissance platoon
handing over a threat element to a tank company team for destruction.

STEP 4 – EXECUTE THE COA


2-151. The platoon leader updates his spot report to the commander with
any new information and then recommends a COA to the commander.
The commander approves or disapproves the recommended COA based on
how it will affect the parent unit’s mission.
2-152. If the commander and the S2 have anticipated the threat
situation the platoon is reporting, they will already have addressed the
contingency in the OPORD and given guidance to their subordinates on
what COA the platoon should execute. In such a case, the platoon leader
can evaluate the situation, choose a COA consistent with his higher
commander’s intent or concept, and execute it without further guidance.

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He keeps the commander informed of what he is doing as he executes the


COA.

EXAMPLES OF ACTIONS ON CONTACT


2-153. The following examples illustrate actions on contact in a variety
of tactical situations. They are organized using the four-step process.

VISUAL CONTACT (UNDETECTED BY THE THREAT)


Deploy and Report
2-154. A reconnaissance section or squad makes contact when its
dismounted element identifies a threat force. It immediately sends a
contact report informing the platoon leader that it has made visual
contact with the threat but is not being engaged. This report is quickly
followed by an initial spot report.

Evaluate and Develop the Situation


2-155. Based on the initial spot report of the section or squad in contact,
the platoon leader determines that he has located his primary
reconnaissance objective; he orders additional sections or squads to
maneuver into the area. These reconnaissance elements move to
dismount points, set their vehicles in hide positions, and send dismounted
patrols from different directions into the area of contact.
2-156. The patrols move to multiple vantage points using dismounted
reconnaissance techniques, with the emphasis on avoiding detection. As
they develop new information, they send spot reports to the platoon
leader. The platoon leader moves his element to a covered and concealed
hide position where he can maintain effective communications with both
subordinate elements and higher headquarters. From this position, he
establishes local security (a hasty OP) and monitors and controls the
efforts of his sections or squads.

Choose/Recommend a COA and Maneuver the Force


2-157. When the platoon leader receives sufficient reports to have a clear
picture of the situation, he chooses to prepare to support a hasty attack.
This choice is made because the platoon leader determines that the force
he has located is the objective of his commander; therefore, this COA is in
accordance with his commander’s intent. After determining that the
commander’s intent has not changed, the platoon leader recommends the
COA to the commander and requests that the platoon execute it. He
ensures that he receives clear guidance from the commander before
moving on to the execution step.

Execute the COA


2-158. The platoon leader issues appropriate orders directing his
subordinates to prepare to support the hasty attack. He continues to
inform his commander of the threat situation and the platoon’s actions.

CONTACT WITH AN UNKNOWN OR SUPERIOR FORCE


Deploy and Report
2-159. The scouts make contact as the lead platoon vehicle is engaged.
The lead scout and the overwatch see the signature of the threat weapon
system; since they do not have a clear idea of the size of the threat, they

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react as if it were a superior force. Simultaneously, the lead element


returns fire, sends a contact report, employs smoke grenades, and moves
to the nearest hide position. The overwatch vehicle engages the source of
threat fire by calling for mortar support and monitors to ensure the
contact report is sent. As soon as the lead vehicle is in a covered and
concealed position, the overwatch vehicle moves to an alternate firing
position and occupies a hide position while trying to maintain contact
with the smallest element, if possible.
2-160. The section or squad leader follows up on the contact report with
an initial spot report. This initial report may not be very detailed, but it
includes a description of what happened and the threat’s approximate
location.

Evaluate and Develop the Situation


2-161. Once the section or squad is set in cover and concealment and has
submitted its initial reports, it must develop the situation. The objective
is to determine exactly what the threat situation is by dismounted
reconnaissance or use of GSR/TUAVs. This can best be done by moving to
the threat’s flank or rear. The section/squad leader organizes a hasty
reconnaissance patrol that will attempt to move to the flank or rear of the
threat and observe the threat position. Simultaneously, the section or
squad maintains at least one hasty OP in contact with the threat. As the
dismounted element maneuvers, it is supported by direct fire from the
vehicles, by indirect fire called for by the OP, or by both. These fires serve
to suppress the threat, reducing his ability to observe the scouts; they
also fix the threat’s attention on the last known location of the mounted
element.
2-162. In the course of attempting to develop the situation, the section or
squad may determine that it is unable to determine the exact threat
situation for a number of possible reasons: suppressive fires by the
threat; obstacles; combat losses; or the size and extent of the threat
position. This information is sent to the platoon leader as soon as possible
in the form of updates to the original spot report.
2-163. If this occurs, the platoon leader must decide whether to commit
additional platoon assets to the contact to develop it further or to adopt a
COA based on the information he has discovered to that point. If the
platoon leader determines he needs more information, he may commit
additional assets to develop the situation further. He must also use
available combat multipliers such as GSR or TUAVs. The earlier in the
contact that the platoon leader can make this decision the better;
however, he must not commit unneeded resources to an action that will
detract from other reconnaissance tasks.
2-164. If he decides additional assets are required, the platoon leader
then orders other sections or squads not in contact to move to specific
locations and assist in developing the situation. As more than one section
or squad becomes involved in the situation, the platoon leader or PSG
(whoever is in the best location to do so) takes control of coordinating
their efforts. The elements conduct mounted movement to designated
dismount points, where they organize dismounted patrols to develop the
situation from a new direction. As these patrols discover the threat and
add additional information to the platoon leader’s picture, the platoon
leader may determine he has sufficient information to choose and execute

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a COA based on the commander’s engagement criteria or to recommend a


COA to the commander.

Choose/Recommend a COA and Maneuver the Force


2-165. Based on the available information and his commander’s intent
and guidance, the platoon leader determines to leave one section in
contact to support a hasty attack by a supporting element. His other
sections continue their reconnaissance mission.

Execute the COA


2-166. In this example, because the commander had specifically
addressed the contingency the platoon has developed, the platoon leader
neither makes a recommendation to his commander nor asks his
permission to execute the COA. Instead, the platoon leader immediately
issues orders to his sections and contacts the supporting element’s leader
to initiate coordination for handover of the threat and support of the
element’s hasty attack. He keeps the commander informed of his actions.

CONTACT WITH AN INFERIOR FORCE


Deploy and Report
2-167. A TUAV supporting the lead element (section or squad) identifies
a threat element, which consists of one reconnaissance vehicle. In the
commander’s order, the engagement criteria tasked the section or squad
to engage when the threat force consists of one wheeled vehicle or less
(dismounted troops), giving the section/squad the initiative to execute
immediate actions on contact. The section/squad leader sends a contact
report and quickly engages and destroys the threat vehicle. After the
engagement is complete, he sends an initial spot report.

Evaluate and Develop the Situation


2-168. The lead vehicle and the overwatch element occupy positions that
allow them to observe the destroyed vehicle while the TUAV provides
area security overhead. They look for any other signs of threat activity or
any threat response to the destruction of the vehicle. The lead vehicle
then bounds past the destroyed vehicle and establishes far-side security.
Once far-side security is established, a dismounted element moves to the
destroyed vehicle and conducts a thorough search for prisoners, items of
intelligence value, and any other information that can be gained from a
close examination of the threat. When this reconnaissance is complete,
the section or squad sends an updated report to higher headquarters.

Choose/Recommend a COA and Maneuver the Force


2-169. When engagement is complete and the threat is destroyed, the
COA is obvious: the section or squad will continue its mission.

Execute the COA


2-170. Since the destruction of the threat is in accordance with the
commander’s order, the section/squad leader simply informs higher
headquarters that he is continuing the mission.

SECTION V – EMPLOYMENT OF FIRES

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2-171. Future battles will be mobile and violent, with emphasis on rapid
fire capability, increased speed, and maneuverability. Under these
conditions, the reconnaissance platoon’s ability to direct indirect fires is
its primary asset in helping the higher commander to shape the
battlefield. To help defeat the threat while surviving on the battlefield,
the reconnaissance platoon must be fully prepared to take maximum
advantage of the indirect fire capabilities of the friendly forces at its
disposal.

EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
2-172. The reconnaissance platoon employs FA and mortars as its
primary means of fire support across a broad spectrum of operations.
Using effects in accordance with the fires paragraph of the OPORD, the
platoon uses Army and/or joint precision fires to support reconnaissance
and security missions, as well as to impede, harass, or destroy threat
forces without compromising its current position. The platoon also
employs other types of fires. These include helicopters and fixed-wing
aircraft, which provide close air support (CAS) and aviation close fires
(ACF), and naval gunfire (NGF) assets. Refer to Chapter 8 for a detailed
discussion of fire support assets.
2-173. Target acquisition is the detection, identification, and location of a
target in sufficient detail to permit the effective employment of weapons.
With advances in precision munitions and the systems to rapidly deliver
them from relatively safe locations, the likelihood of the reconnaissance
platoon’s mission being focused on target acquisition has increased. The
process itself is embedded in reconnaissance operations, and target
acquisition may be the focus of a reconnaissance mission. The platoon
works with other ISR assets to gather targeting information and identify
targets using all available means. These assets include, but are not
limited to, individual scouts, strikers, aviation elements (including
TUAVs), and radar. In the BRT, for example, scouts and strikers may
together to execute the brigade’s essential fire support tasks (EFST).

CRITICAL TASKS
2-174. The platoon’s critical tasks in employing fires on the battlefield
include the following:

· Conduct target acquisition.


· Conduct indirect fire planning.
· Call for and adjust indirect fires and joint fires.

SECTION VI – COMMUNICATIONS

2-175. The reconnaissance platoon’s primary mission is to provide


information to the commander about the threat and the battlefield
environment. Because of the extended frontages and distances over which
the platoon operates, it must rely heavily on effective communications
techniques. These techniques include not only the means of
communications (such as wire, visual signals, or radio and digital
systems) and the proper way of using them, but also the effective

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___________________________________________________ Chapter 2 – Leadership Competencies

application of operational terms, radiotelephone procedures (RTP), and


digital TTP.
2-176. The platoon leader must ensure that all of his soldiers understand
communications procedures. For radio systems, including TACSAT, this
includes the different nets on which the platoon operates, as well as siting
considerations, field-expedient communications techniques, and visual
signals. In employing the platoon’s digital systems, including FBCB2, the
platoon’s scouts must understand how to prepare and send reports,
orders, and overlays and how to use hot keys.

MEANS OF TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS


2-177. The reconnaissance platoon always has several available means of
communications. Whether it is using messenger, wire, visual, sound,
radio signals, or digital systems, the platoon must remain flexible enough
to react quickly to new situations. Use of each of these means of
communication must be carefully planned to avoid dependence on a
single method.
2-178. SOPs can afford the platoon a tremendous advantage in mission
accomplishment. Hand-and-arm and flag signals aid in platoon
movement. Clear and concise radio transmissions can reduce
transmission times.

MESSENGER
2-179. This is the most secure means of communications available to the
platoon. Messenger service is generally very flexible and reliable. In an
assembly area, it is the preferred means. On an infrequent basis,
members of the platoon may be called on to act as messengers to the
parent unit’s higher headquarters.

WIRE
2-180. This method of communications is especially effective in static
positions or during the conduct of a screening mission. It is very versatile
and can be used in many different situations. Using one of the many wire
devices available, the platoon establishes hot loops to communicate
within the platoon, with OPs, and with the parent unit CP in assembly
areas.

VISUAL
2-181. Visual communications are used to transmit prearranged
messages quickly over short distances. Reconnaissance sections or squads
may rely heavily on this type of communications. Since the platoon rarely
operates as a unit over short distances, however, visual signals are
seldom used at the platoon level. In those cases when the entire platoon is
together, such as in a coil, in an assembly area, or on a road march, all
vehicle commanders must stay alert so they can receive visual signals
from the platoon leader and pass them on to other vehicle commanders in
the platoon.
2-182. Whenever visual signals are used, they must be clear enough to
be understood by vehicle commanders as they operate in tactical
situations. Standard hand-and-arm or flag signals work well during
periods of good visibility. Flashlights, chemical lights, or other types of
lights are required during limited visibility. The platoon must exercise

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

extreme care when using lights to avoid alerting the threat to friendly
intentions.
2-183. Pyrotechnic ammunition can also be used for visual signaling.
The meanings of these signals are identified in paragraph 5 of the
OPORD and in the unit signal operation instructions (SOI). The main
advantage of pyrotechnics is the speed with which signals can be
transmitted. Key disadvantages are the threat’s ability to see them and,
potentially, to imitate them.

SOUND
2-184. This form of communications is used mainly to attract attention,
transmit prearranged messages, and spread alarms. Sound signals carry
only short distances; in addition, range and clarity are greatly reduced by
battle noise. Since they are open to threat interception, use of sound
signals may be restricted for security reasons. Prearranged meanings for
sound signals are outlined in the unit SOP and CEOI; they must be kept
simple to prevent misunderstandings.

RADIO
2-185. The radio is the platoon’s most flexible and most frequently used
form of communications. Types of radio communications include
electromagnetic transmissions over FM, AM, UHF, and VHF spectrums
and use of TACSAT systems.
2-186. The most effective way to use the radio is to follow standard
guidelines for effective RTP; these include brevity, proper use of
authentication tables, and the use of approved operational terms. Threat
direction-finding units can trace radio signals. Once found, the
transmitter can easily be destroyed. For this reason, the platoon leader
and PSG must strictly enforce radio discipline regardless of encryption
devices; survival of the platoon depends on good radio habits.

FM Communications
2-187. Operations normally depend on radio as the primary means of
communication for both voice and digital traffic. Net discipline and SOP
minimize needless traffic. To avoid detection by threat direction finding
equipment, the platoon uses other means of communication whenever
possible to supplement the radio and minimize emissions. Once in
contact, the primary means of communication will be FM voice.

TACSAT Communications
2-188. Because the platoon often conducts reconnaissance operations
over great distances, the unlimited range of TACSAT radios can prove
extremely valuable.

DIGITAL
2-189. FBCB2 is the digital system that enhances the reconnaissance
platoon’s battle command capability by linking the platoon internally and
to its higher headquarters. As noted in the discussion in Chapter 1 of this
manual, FBCB2 is part of the Army Battle Command System (ABCS), a
network of computers, GPS equipment, and communication systems that
work together to provide combat leaders with real-time information of
unprecedented quantity and quality. FBCB2 and the ABCS allow for

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___________________________________________________ Chapter 2 – Leadership Competencies

advanced reporting, orders and graphics sharing, and database


management.

COMMERCIAL LINES
2-190. The platoon may communicate via commercial lines when
approved by higher headquarters. Careful consideration must be given to
securing commercial lines and limiting the amount and type of classified
material sent over nonsecured lines. If the platoon is forced to withdraw,
existing wire lines, including commercial lines, are cut and sections
removed so the threat cannot use them.

RADIO NET ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES


RECCE, BRT, AND CAVALRY PLATOON NETS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
2-191. The following radio nets are employed and/or monitored by
leaders in recce, BRT, and cavalry reconnaissance platoons. (See Figure
2-23.)

NOTE: The platoon leader may assign section or squad leaders to monitor the nets of units
operating to the front and/or rear of the platoon. These would become the alternate
nets monitored by the leaders. This technique supports situational awareness and
facilitates reconnaissance or battle handover.

Figure 2-23. Reconnaissance Platoon Nets

Platoon
2-192. This net is used to conduct all platoon operations. All elements
within the reconnaissance platoon must have the ability to monitor and
transmit on this net at all times. Making sure this happens is one of the

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

keys to effective command and control during the conduct of tactical


operations. All scouts must also have the ability to rapidly change to any
other platoon net as required to coordinate contact points or handover of
threat targets.

Troop Command
2-193. This net is used to maneuver the reconnaissance or recce troop as
well as to process most routine reports not sent on FBCB2. The troop
TOC is the net control station (NCS), and the platoon leader or PSG
sends routine reports to the troop XO. This net can be used by
reconnaissance platoon leaders to talk to each other and coordinate key
tactical actions of their platoons; however, platoon leaders will use each
other’s platoon nets to pass routine messages not of interest to the
commander.
2-194. Both the platoon leader and PSG must always have the ability to
monitor and transmit on this net. All scouts must be able to move to this
net to send reports and receive guidance if they are unable to contact
their platoon leader or PSG.

Troop Fires
2-195. Many troops operate a troop fires net to send calls for fire to the
troop FSO or directly to the troop mortars. The reconnaissance platoon
leader should direct all radios not actively operating on another net to
enter this net. All scouts must have the ability to change to this net and
coordinate indirect fire. (NOTE: Scouts must also be prepared to change
to the nets of supporting elements such as tank, MGS, and AT platoons to
coordinate supporting fires.)

Administrative/Logistics
2-196. The PSG will usually monitor the A/L net for the platoon, but the
platoon leader must be familiar with it as well. The PSG uses it as
required to send routine A/L reports. This net is also used to coordinate
resupply operations and evacuation of casualties.

BATTALION RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON NETS


2-197. The following are the radio nets employed and/or monitored by
leaders in the battalion reconnaissance platoon. (See Figure 2-24.)

NOTE: The platoon leader may assign section or squad leaders to monitor the nets of units
operating to the front and/or rear of the platoon. These would become the alternate
nets monitored by the leaders. This technique supports situational awareness and
facilitates reconnaissance or battle handover.

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Figure 2-24. Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon Nets

Platoon
2-198. This net is used to conduct all platoon operations. All elements
within the reconnaissance platoon must have the ability to monitor and
transmit on this net at all times. Making sure this happens is one of the
keys to effective command and control during the conduct of tactical
operations.

Battalion Command
2-199. The battalion command net is the primary net used to direct the
tactical operations of the battalion. It is monitored continuously by all
subordinate commanders in the battalion, as well as by key staff
members and the TOC. As a key maneuver element of the battalion, the
reconnaissance platoon must monitor this net continuously. The platoon
leader and the PSG should both have the capability to monitor and
transmit on this net when the battalion is conducting tactical operations.

Operations and Intelligence


2-200. Many battalions operate an OI net to handle R&S reports and
thus make the command net more efficient. This net can also be used to
control the R&S effort before the battalion main body begins tactical
operations. If the battalion has not begun tactical operations but the
scouts are engaged in reconnaissance or surveillance operations, the
platoon may use this as its primary net. In such a case, both the platoon
leader and PSG would monitor, receive, and transmit on this net.
2-201. The reconnaissance platoon should continue to maximize the use
of the OI net to pass information while conducting reconnaissance in
support of the main body, even after the main body has begun its
operations. The platoon leader can monitor the command net at this time

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

or choose to remain on the OI net. If he continues to use the OI net, he


should designate a member of the platoon to eavesdrop on the command
net to alert him when the battalion commander needs to communicate
directly with the scouts or when critical traffic is being passed over the
command net.

Battalion Fires
2-202. Because rapidly coordinating for and adjusting indirect fires is
vital in all R&S operations, the fires net is extremely critical to the
success of scout platoon operations. The platoon should have all radios
that are not on the higher command net or the platoon net preset to this
net. All scouts, whether operating mounted or dismounted and regardless
of how many radios they have, must have the ability to quickly change to
this net and coordinate indirect fire. The scout platoon leader must
coordinate with the battalion FSO regarding the use of the fires net to
ensure that the platoon can use it to send voice call for fire messages.

Company Team
2-203. All scouts must have the ability to rapidly change to any of the
battalion company team nets. These nets are used to conduct coordination
for handing off enemy targets once the scouts make contact.

Administrative/Logistics
2-204. The scout PSG will usually monitor the A/L net for the platoon,
but the platoon leader must be familiar with it as well. The PSG uses it as
required to send routine A/L reports. This net is also used to coordinate
resupply operations and evacuation of casualties.

Retrans
2-205. When the scout platoon operates at extended distances from the
battalion TOC, it may use the battalion retrans net to facilitate effective
communications between the scout platoon leader and the TOC. The
platoon leader should request use of the retrans net during all missions
requiring FM communications at extended ranges.

NET CONTROL
2-206. The reconnaissance platoon net is the key to command and
control of the platoon. The smooth functioning of this net allows accurate
information to be passed quickly both to and from the platoon leader. This
information flow is critical in maintaining the platoon leader’s situational
awareness and in enhancing command and control. When contact is
made, the volume of traffic on the recce platoon net will increase
drastically. The platoon must be organized to control, understand, and
process this vast amount of information while engaging the threat and
possibly being engaged in turn. The following guidelines will help to
ensure that the information flowing over the net is organized and
controlled in a way that permits the platoon leader to both understand it
and issue orders in response to it.

FLASH TRAFFIC
2-207. The platoon leader should, in either the platoon order or the unit
SOP, establish criteria for flash traffic. For example, the flash traffic
criteria could dictate special handling of the platoon’s prescribed PIR.

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When a scout gains information relevant to a critical PIR item, he


interrupts any net traffic with a proword such as “FLASH—FLASH—
FLASH.” The use of such a proword immediately advises all other scouts
to get off the net, thus clearing it for the critical traffic to be passed.

NET DISCIPLINE
2-208. The PSG is responsible for net discipline. In this capacity, he will
challenge any violation of procedure as it occurs. Improper or inefficient
radio procedures, even in routine administrative reports, inhibit effective
command and control.

EFFECTIVE MESSAGES
2-209. The best way to ensure effectiveness of a radio message is to write
it out before it is sent. This procedure yields a more accurate and,
ultimately, more timely tranmission. It also ensures that the message is
sent correctly, completely, and clearly in the shortest possible amount of
time. The message is easier to understand, and the duration of the
electronic signature of the sending station is minimized.

RADIOTELEPHONE PROCEDURES
2-210. Proper RTPs are the cornerstone of effective command and
control in the reconnaissance platoon. All scouts must be expert in
communications procedures. This not only ensures efficient
communications within the platoon, but also allows all members of the
platoon to communicate effectively with outside elements such as the
squadron, troop, other platoons, and subordinate and/or supporting
elements.

TECHNIQUES OF EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATIONS


2-211. The platoon leader and PSG are responsible for ensuring that
their scouts understand and adhere to the following guidelines, which can
contribute to more effective, more secure tactical communications.

KNOW THE SYSTEM


2-212. Each scout must be an expert at using and maintaining his FM
communications system. In particular, he must understand its
capabilities and limitations. He must also understand how to maintain
the system and how to troubleshoot it whenever he suspects it is not
functioning properly.

MINIMIZE DURATION
2-213. All messages sent within or from the platoon must be short and
informative. The longer the message, the greater the opportunity for
threat elements to electronically determine the platoon’s location.
Message length can be controlled in several ways:

· Write the message down and then eliminate all unnecessary


words from the written message before sending it.
· Read the message as written when sending it.
· Use a brevity code that reduces the need to explain the
tactical picture in detail.
· Break long messages into several parts and send each
separately.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

MINIMIZE SIGNATURE
2-214. When sending a message, every scout must be conscious of the
size and nature of the electronic signature that he is emitting. He must
consider the following methods for reducing the size of the signature:

· Use terrain to mask the signature from the direction of the


threat.
· Set the transmitter power to low if that setting will provide
sufficient range (as it often does within the reconnaissance
platoon, section, or squad).
· Whenever possible (particularly in stationary operations), use
an expedient directional antenna to restrict the threat’s
ability to monitor the signal. See Appendix E of this manual
for instructions on how to construct and use such an antenna.
USE AN EFFECTIVE FORMAT
2-215. A thorough knowledge of report formats is critical in ensuring
timely reporting of threat information, especially in fast-moving tactical
situations. Every scout should be familiar with the report formats that
are outlined later in this chapter and know how to use them effectively.
At the same time, however, they must never delay reports only to assure
the correct format; ALWAYS REPORT ACCURATE INFORMATION
AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE!
2-216. As a basic guideline, reports of threat activity follow the SALUTE
format, covering these factors:

· Size. This includes the number of sighted personnel, vehicles,


or other equipment.
· Activity. This covers what the threat is doing.
· Location. This is usually reported as the grid coordinates of
threat elements.
· Unit. This covers any indications useful in unit identification,
such as patches, signs, and vehicle markings.
· Time. This item details when threat activity was observed.
· Equipment. This includes description or identification of all
equipment associated with the threat activity.

SECTION VII – REPORTING

2-217. The reconnaissance platoon’s primary function is to gather and


report information (reconnaissance). The platoon reports information,
using either analog equipment or digital means (FBCB2), in a timely and
accurate manner that enhances the decision-making process of its higher
headquarters and/or that enables the higher headquarters to employ
effective fires to defeat the threat. The use of FBCB2 enhances the scouts’
capability to send timely and detailed reports to all elements of the
combined arms force, providing the winning edge on the battlefield.
Initial contact reports should still be analog, providing immediate

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___________________________________________________ Chapter 2 – Leadership Competencies

notification to all, yet allowing the element in contact to focus on his


actions in contact procedures. Once disengaged, or there is no further
threat to the element, he can follow up the initial contact report with a
detailed, digital report.
2-218. The reconnaissance platoon’s unique information-gathering
capabilities provide the commander with information that has tactical
value concerning the threat, terrain, and effects of weather within an
area of operations. Scouts reconnoiter terrain to determine movement
and maneuver conditions. When they find the threat, they determine his
disposition, strengths, and weaknesses in detail. The reconnaissance
platoon provides the information necessary to allow combined arms forces
to maneuver against the threat, strike him where he is most vulnerable,
and apply overwhelming power to defeat him. The platoon’s accurate and
timely reporting of threat locations and strength can make the difference
between victory and defeat.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
2-219. Important considerations and guidelines for the reconnaissance
platoon in its reporting of tactical information include the following:

· Conduct effective communications. This entails


understanding the means of tactical communications (such as
wire, visual signals, analog radio, or digital communications),
the correct application of operational terms, and the use of
effective RTPs. Refer to the discussion of communications
earlier in this chapter.
· Verify all information before reporting it higher.
· Report the following types of information as quickly as
possible:
n Information of potential intelligence value.
n Threat information.
n Requests for medical assistance and evacuation.
· As needed, use report formats and procedures to supplement
and enhance combat orders, including warning orders,
OPORDs, and FRAGOs.

REPORT GUIDELINES
2-220. The reconnaissance platoon should follow these guidelines in
reporting tactical information:

· Do not overload radio nets by repeating information.


· Use local time zones for all reports unless otherwise specified.
· Send only the parts or lines of a report that contain new
information or changes.
· Though each report has a prescribed format to ensure the
completeness of the information reported, users must
remember that timely reporting, especially of threat activity,
is critical in fast-moving tactical situations.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

· Do not delay reports only to assure correct format; REPORT


ACCURATE INFORMATION AS QUICKLY AS
POSSIBLE!

TYPES OF REPORTS
2-221. The following list covers the various reports available to the
reconnaissance platoon. Refer to Appendix B of this manual for a
discussion of these reports, including line-by-line formats and examples:

· Contact Report.
· Blue Reports (Operations).
n Blue 1 – Spot Report (SPOTREP).
n Blue 2 – Situation Report (SITREP).
n Blue 4 – Report for Bridge, Overpass, Culvert, Underpass,
or Tunnel (BRIDGEREP).
n Blue 5 – Report for Ford, Ferry, or Other Crossing Site
(CROSSREP).
n Blue 7 – Route Reconnaissance Report
(ROUTEREP).
n Blue 9 – Obstacle Report.
n Blue 10 – Bypass Report.
n Blue 11 – Stand-to Report (STANREP).
· Green Reports (Intelligence).
n Green 2 – Sensitive Items Report (SENSEREP).
n Green 3 – Splash Report.
n Green 4 – Patrol Report.
n Green 5 – Meaconing, Intrusion, Jamming, and
Interference (MIJI) Report.
n Green 6 – EPW/Captured Material Report.
· Yellow Reports (Logistics).
n Yellow 1 – Equipment Status Report (ESTAT).
n Yellow 1A – Battle Loss Spot Report.
n Yellow 2 – Ammunition Status Report.
n Yellow 2A – Ammunition Request.
n Yellow 3 – POL Status Report.
n Yellow 3A – POL Request.
· Red Reports (Personnel).
n Red 2 – Personnel Battle Loss Report.
n Red 3 – Medical Evacuation Request.
· NBC Reports.
n NBC-1 – Observer’s Initial Report.
n NBC-3 – Immediate Warning of Expected Contamination.
n NBC-4 – Report of Radiation Dose-Rate Measurement.

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___________________________________________________ Chapter 2 – Leadership Competencies

n NBC-5 – Report of Areas of Contamination.

DIGITAL REPORTING AND C2 MESSAGES


2-222. In addition to its capabilities related to providing situational
awareness data, FBCB2 offers a variety of functions that can enhance C2
in the reconnaissance platoon. The system has four categories of C2
messages:

· Alerts and warnings (examples include NBC reports and


warnings of danger zones such as NBC contaminated areas,
obstacles, or enemy locations).
· Joint support information (interfaces with other branches of
service). (NOTE: This type of digital information is not
covered in this discussion.)
· Combat reporting (such as the commander’s SITREP).
· Mission planning information (including OPORDs and
FRAGOs).

NOTE: This discussion also includes an explanation of geo-referenced messages, which


create icons linked to a location on the FBCB2 map. These messages can be used in
each of the C2 categories listed.

ALERTS AND WARNINGS


2-223. Alerts and warnings are sent via reports, free text messages, or
geo-referenced messages. They are posted on the flash immediate priority
routine (FIPR) message queue and are displayed on the function bar of
the main FBCB2 screen and as a symbol on the map screen.
2-224. When the platform penetrates the safety radius of a danger zone,
the FBCB2 alarm is triggered, an alert message is displayed on the
warnings/alerts marquee, and an entry is made in the warnings tab
group. The danger zone tab group will display the type, distance,
direction, location and originator of all danger zone information received.
Danger zone information is transmitted in specific joint variable message
format (JVMF) messages as situational awareness data. FBCB2 receives
the message and displays the situational awareness/danger zone
information in the danger zone tab group. Table 2-1 lists types of danger
zone messages as well as the safety radius within which FBCB2 will
trigger a danger zone alert.

COMBAT REPORTING REPORTING MESSAGESMESSAGES


2-225. These are JVMF messages that have been modified and grouped
together to provide single-button access to the message template,
requiring fewer keystrokes to complete and send the message. Combat
messages are the following:

· SALT.
· MEDEVAC.
· Fire mission (call for fire).
· Check fire.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

· SITREP.

Table 2-1. FBCB2 Danger Zone Messages

Safety Radius
Message Type Type of Danger Zone
(Meters)
NBC-1 Chemical 500
Obstacle Report / NBC-1 Biological 500
Obstacle Report / NBC-1 / Strike Warning Nuclear 1000
Spot Report Aircraft 5000
Spot Report Formation 4000
Spot Report Field Fortifications 1500
Spot Report Multiple Rocket Launcher 4000
Spot Report Air Defense Artillery 4000
Spot Report Assembly Area 4000
Spot Report Buildings 1500
Spot Report Equipment 4000
Spot Report Command Center 1500
Spot Report Supply Dump 1500
Spot Report Rocket Missiles 4000
Spot Report Vehicles 4000
Spot Report Armor Combat 4000
Spot Report Artillery 4000
Spot Report Mortar 8000
Spot Report Weapons 1500
Spot Report Personnel 1500
Spot Report Unknown 4000
Spot Report Fire Mission 600
Obstacle Report Minefield, Antipersonnel 500
Obstacle Report Minefield, Antitank 500
Obstacle Report Minefield, Mixed 500
Obstacle Report Minefield, Unknown 500
Obstacle Report Chemical, Nerve 500
Obstacle Report Chemical, Blood 500
Obstacle Report Chemical, Blister 500
Obstacle Report Chemical, Choking 500
Obstacle Report Booby Traps 500
Obstacle Report Abatis 500
Obstacle Report Craters 500
Obstacle Report Antitank Ditch 500
Obstacle Report Scatterable Mines 500
Obstacle Report Bunker Strongpoint 1500
Strike Warning Conventional 1000
Threat Warning NBC 500
Threat Warning Antiaircraft Artillery 4000
Threat Warning Aircraft 10000
Threat Warning Air-to-Air Missile 10000
Threat Warning Surface-to-Air Missile 1500
Threat Warning Surface-to-Surface Missile 10000

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Threat Warning Air-to-Surface Missile 15000


Threat Warning Unknown 4000

MISSION PLANNING INFORMATION


2-226. Mission planning information includes orders and request-type
messages that contain JVMF message templates. They include the
following:

· Warning orders.
· Operational plans (OPLAN) and OPORDs.
· FRAGOs.
· Logistics orders and requests.
· Free text massages.

GEO-REFERENCED MESSAGES
2-227. These messages, which can be used in the C2 categories discussed
earlier, create icons linked to a location on the FBCB2 map. They are also
disseminated across the TI as situational awareness data. Geo-referenced
messages can be used for the following:

· Obstacle reports.
· NBC-1 reports.
· Bridge reports.
· Supply point status reports.
· Contact reports.
· Engagement reports.

2-228. FBCB2 users can choose to hide or display all geo-referenced data
from the filter dialog box. Geo-referenced messages contain “hook”
information—detailed information on the status of any icon. To access
“hook” information on a geo-referenced icon, however, the user must have
been a recipient of the message.

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Chapter 3

Reconnaissance Operations
Reconnaissance platoons
conduct reconnaissance to CONTENTS
provide their commander Purpose and Fundamentals ........................ 3-1
with information that has Purpose .................................................. 3-2
tactical value concerning the Fundamentals of Reconnaissance ...... 3-2
Reconnaissance Planning, Methods,
terrain, threat, social/human and Tactical Employment .............. 3-4
demographics, infrastructure, Reconnaissance Tempo ....................... 3-4
and effects of weather within Reconnaissance Pull/Push ................... 3-6
an area of operations. Scouts Planning Considerations ...................... 3-6
Reconnaissance Operational
reconnoiter terrain to deter- Environment ....................................... 3-8
mine movement and Reconnaissance Handover .................. 3-13
maneuver conditions. When Reconnaissance Methods .................... 3-17
they find the threat, they Tactical Employment ............................ 3-21
Multidimensional Aspects of
determine his disposition, Reconnaissance and
strengths, and weaknesses in Surveillance .................................... 3-32
detail. The reconnaissance Operational Considerations ................. 3-33
platoon provides information Intelligence Collection .......................... 3-33
Civil-Military Operations ....................... 3-42
necessary to allow combined Route Reconnaissance ................................ 3-48
arms forces to maneuver Critical Tasks ......................................... 3-48
against the threat, strike him Techniques ............................................ 3-49
Example of a Recce Platoon Route
where he is most vulnerable,
Reconnaissance ................................ 3-50
and apply overwhelming Example of a CFV Platoon Route
power to defeat him. In Reconnaissance ................................ 3-54
addition, scouts must be able Area Reconnaissance .................................. 3-57
Critical Tasks ......................................... 3-57
to perform the multi-
Techniques ............................................ 3-58
dimensional aspect of Example of an Area Reconnaissance .. 3-59
reconnaissance to gather the Zone Reconnaissance ................................. 3-62
information needed for Critical Tasks ......................................... 3-62
Techniques ............................................ 3-63
execution of such activities as Example of a Zone Reconnaissance ... 3-64
stability operations and Obstacle/Restriction Reconnaissance ....... 3-69
support operations. The Steps of Obstacle/Restriction
Reconnaissance ................................ 3-70
Examples of Obstacle/Restriction
Reconnaissance ................................ 3-74

SECTION I – PURPOSE AND FUNDAMENTALS

3-1. Reconnaissance is conducted as part of all scout missions, both


mounted and dismounted, and always maximizes all available assets.
Scouts conduct dismounted reconnaissance to gather detailed
information, to enhance security, and to move with stealth or in rugged
terrain. They conduct mounted reconnaissance when time is critical and
they need to cover a large area quickly. Mounted reconnaissance allows
scouts to maintain a fast tempo in combat operations and to make

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maximum use of optics, firepower, communications, and protection


provided by scout vehicles.
3-2. Scouts must thoroughly understand how the threat deploys his
reconnaissance and security forces, as well as the sequence and timing of
their entry into battle. The scouts’ accurate and timely reporting of threat
locations and strength can make the difference between winning or losing
the main battle. At the same time, it is critical that scouts never lose
sight of their reconnaissance priorities and become involved in battles
that invariably wear down reconnaissance forces.

PURPOSE
3-3. Based on their commander’s intent and guidance, scouts conduct
reconnaissance forward of other friendly forces to provide current,
accurate information about the threat, terrain, weather, society,
infrastructure, and physical resources within a specified area of
operations. In simplest terms, the reconnaissance platoon and its higher
headquarters take steps to link the purpose of the reconnaissance to one
or more of the following requirements:

· Obtain information to answer the CCIR.


· Obtain information to fill voids in the unit IPB by answering
IR and SIR.
· Support targeting requirements by conducting target
acquisition.

3-4. These actions provide follow-on forces with an opportunity to


maneuver freely and rapidly to their objective. Scouts keep the follow-on
forces from being surprised or interrupted, and they prevent these forces
from losing men and equipment along the way to the objective.
Reconnaissance platoons perform three types of reconnaissance: route,
zone, and area.

FUNDAMENTALS OF RECONNAISSANCE
3-5. Seven fundamentals are common to all successful reconnaissance
operations. Scout leaders must ensure that their plans adhere to these
fundamentals, which are covered in the following discussion, during the
execution of reconnaissance missions.

MAXIMIZE RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS


3-6. Previous doctrine focused on maximum reconnaissance forward,
which may still be appropriate in many situations. With the increasing
likelihood of noncontiguous operations, however, reconnaissance and
security operations may be oriented in multiple directions. Planning must
also cover considerations for reconnaissance platoon operations in depth.
The platoon must be able to integrate a wide range of sensors, to include
TUAVs and ground sensors, to ensure maximum effectiveness and
survivability of ground scouts. In the recce platoon, the platoon
leadership must know how to focus platoon HUMINT collectors as well as
traditional scouts.

ORIENT ON THE RECONNAISSANCE OBJECTIVE


3-7. The reconnaissance platoon’s scheme of maneuver is focused
toward a reconnaissance objective or set of objectives. The objective may

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be a terrain feature, a specific area, an enemy formation, or other type of


threat force (such as a paramilitary element). It may be designated by an
NAI, target area of interest (TAI), checkpoint, or objective symbol. A
multidimensional reconnaissance objective, especially in stability
operations or support operations, may reflect some aspect of the society or
infrastructure within the area of operations. In Bosnia, for example,
reconnaissance objectives were based on considerations from the Dayton
Peace Accord; these included compliance with inspectors at weapons
storage site facilities, the disbanding of illegal factional checkpoints, or
the absence of police activity in the zone of separation.
3-8. The platoon must maintain its orientation toward the objective,
regardless of what it encounters, until the mission is complete or it is
directed otherwise. The platoon’s objective is covered in paragraph 3 of
the higher commander’s OPORD. It is critical that the reconnaissance
platoon leader and his subordinate leaders completely understand the
mission focus before they begin the planning process. As noted earlier,
the focus of the reconnaissance must be clearly linked to answering the
CCIR, to filling voids in the unit IPB (especially related to the IR and
SIR), and/or to supporting target acquisition.

REPORT ALL INFORMATION RAPIDLY AND ACCURATELY


3-9. Commanders base their decisions and plans on the battlefield
information that scouts find and report during reconnaissance.
Information loses value over time. Scouts must report all information
exactly as they see it and as fast as possible. They must never assume,
distort, or exaggerate; inaccurate information is dangerous. Information
that the threat is not in a certain location is just as vital as where the
threat is.

RETAIN FREEDOM TO MANEUVER


3-10. Scouts must be able to maneuver on the battlefield. If the threat
fixes them, the scouts must free themselves; otherwise, they can no
longer accomplish their mission. Scouts must continually maintain
awareness of tactical developments. They must employ effective
techniques of tactical movement and react appropriately to unexpected
situations. When contact is made, the platoon leader must seek to develop
the situation at the lowest possible level, retaining the initiative, the
ability to continue the mission, and the ability to maneuver his other
elements.

GAIN AND MAINTAIN THREAT CONTACT


3-11. Scouts seek visual contact with the threat. Ideally, the
reconnaissance platoon leader will gain a thorough understanding of the
threat situation before the operation starts by integrating ISR assets
(such as TUAVs and ground sensors) during the planning process. This
will enable him to maneuver the platoon out of contact so he can make
contact either on the most favorable terms or as directed by the
commander. He employs sound tactical movement, effective target
acquisition methods, and appropriate actions on contact to see the threat
first and thereby retain the initiative and control of the situation. Once
the scouts find the threat, they maintain contact using all available
means (sensors, radar, sound, and visual) until their commander orders
them to do otherwise or until a change of mission is specified by their

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specific instructions and/or engagement criteria. The platoon then


conducts reconnaissance handover (RHO) to pass responsibility for the
threat to other elements.

RAPIDLY DEVELOP THE SITUATION


3-12. Whether scouts run into a threat force or an obstacle, they must
quickly determine what they are up against. If it is the threat, the scouts
determine his size, composition, and activity. They find the flanks of the
threat force. They find any barriers or obstacles surrounding the threat
position and determine whether any other threat forces can support the
position. If the scouts encounter an obstacle, they find and mark a bypass
or, if appropriate, execute or assist in a breach. These actions all must be
done quickly, with a minimum of guidance from higher. Time is the
scout’s most precious resource; he cannot waste it if he is to achieve
mission success.

ENSURE CONTINUOUS RECONNAISSANCE


3-13. Units at battalion level and above conduct ISR before, during,
and after all types of operations. The reconnaissance platoon is integral
to the ISR effort; however, it is limited in its ability to conduct and
sustain continuous reconnaissance. When the platoon is involved in
reconnaissance conducted over extended time and distance, the higher
commander will have to pace his assets and rotate units to maintain
continuous reconnaissance coverage.

SECTION II – RECONNAISSANCE PLANNING, METHODS,


AND TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT

3-14. To reduce vulnerability on the battlefield, scouts employ


reconnaissance methods that achieve a balance between an acceptable
level of risk and the security necessary to ensure mission
accomplishment. Often this is expressed as a tradeoff between speed and
security. The faster the reconnaissance, the more risk the scout takes and
the less detailed the reconnaissance he conducts.
3-15. In conducting their missions, scouts must use all available
resources, including reconnaissance methods that have been trained and
rehearsed in detail. They must take every opportunity, both during
peacetime and on the battlefield, to hone their reconnaissance skills. By
the nature of their missions, scouts can never achieve perfect security;
however, thorough knowledge of the various reconnaissance methods and
their employment, combined with an understanding of a mission’s
particular METT-TC requirements, allows the scout leader to choose, and
mix, reconnaissance methods that both maximize security and ensure
mission accomplishment.

RECONNAISSANCE TEMPO
3-16. This discussion focuses on several reconnaissance methods that
scouts can employ. These methods have proven effective in a variety of
situations and form a foundation for how to conduct reconnaissance.
Scouts must use their experience, professional judgment, and common

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sense to analyze a given situation and employ the appropriate method.


Usually, a mission will require that these methods be applied using a
variety of techniques, combinations, and variations.
3-17. In executing a reconnaissance mission, the reconnaissance
platoon employs methods that reflect METT-TC considerations and that
are geared to the particular task or the platoon’s unique capabilities. The
types of methods and actions that the platoon may employ during the
course of a mission can be generally characterized as stealthy or forceful,
discreet or aggressive, and deliberate or rapid. The majority of platoon
missions will actually fall along a continuum with varying levels of these
three sets of extremes.
3-18. To help the platoon leader determine the appropriate
reconnaissance method, the commander should provide him with
pertinent information on the reconnaissance focus, tempo, and
engagement criteria. The focus and engagement criteria will dictate
whether the platoon reconnaissance will be stealthy or forceful and/or
aggressive or discreet. The tempo of the mission will determine whether
reconnaissance is deliberate or rapid. (NOTE: Reconnaissance focus,
tempo, and engagement criteria are covered in the discussion of planning
considerations later in this chapter.)
3-19. Stealthy and forceful describe the level of covertness required by
the commander. Stealthy reconnaissance is a time-consuming process
that emphasizes avoiding detection by the threat. To be effective, a
stealthy approach must rely on dismounted reconnaissance assets and
maximum use of covered and concealed terrain. Forceful operations,
which are conducted without regard for whether the reconnaissance force
will be detected, often involve mounted elements, including combat units
that do not ordinarily take part in reconnaissance.
3-20. Discreet and aggressive are terms describing the potential for
engagement by the threat. Discreet reconnaissance is conducted under
restrictive conditions, especially in relation to engagement criteria and
the ability of the reconnaissance force to fight for information. Aggressive
reconnaissance emphasizes identification of the threat’s combat power by
techniques that may include fighting for information. This method is
characterized by the employment of armored vehicles and the use of
supporting fires. The platoon leader must always remain aware that
aggressive information-gathering can provide the threat with an
indication of friendly capabilities and future intentions.
3-21. The terms deliberate and rapid relate directly to the tempo of a
particular reconnaissance and to the degree of completeness required by
the commander. A deliberate operation yields a thorough, detailed
reconnaissance of a particular area or zone. Rapid reconnaissance is
focused on one or two critical tasks, thus minimizing the time necessary
to cover a particular area or zone.
3-22. Because of the nature of their organizations, recce and HMMWV
mounted reconnaissance platoons will tend to conduct stealthy and/or
discreet reconnaissance. CFV mounted platoons, on the other hand, are
more likely to conduct forceful and/or aggressive reconnaissance.
3-23. At the same time, the reconnaissance platoon leader must realize
that the opposing approaches to reconnaissance (stealthy/forceful;

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discreet/aggressive; deliberate/rapid) are not mutually exclusive. For


example, there may be times when HMMWV mounted platoons, such as
battalion reconnaissance platoons, may choose to conduct aggressive
reconnaissance based on the efforts of division cavalry and the BRT,
which may already have operated in the area into which the HMMWV
platoon is moving. Any of the possible combinations can be useful based
on templated and actual threat dispositions, changing tactical situations,
varying weather and light conditions, and available resources.

RECONNAISSANCE PULL/PUSH
3-24. There are two general forms of reconnaissance: push and pull.
3-25. Reconnaissance pull is used when the enemy situation is not well
known and/or the situation is rapidly changing. Reconnaissance pull
fosters planning and decision-making processes that are focused on
changing assumptions into confirmed information. Initial assumptions
and PIR are used to deploy reconnaissance assets early to collect
information for use in the development of COAs. The commander uses
R&S assets to confirm or deny initial PIR prior to the decision on a COA
or maneuver option, thus pulling the supported unit (battalion or
brigade) to the decisive point on the battlefield. Success of the
reconnaissance pull requires an integrated reconnaissance plan that can
be executed prior to the commander having to make a COA decision.
3-26. Reconnaissance push is used once the commander is committed to
a COA or maneuver option. The commander pushes his R&S assets
forward as necessary to gain greater visibility on specific NAIs and to
gain information that will confirm or deny the assumptions on which the
COA is based.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
3-27. The purpose of this section is to outline the planning, methods,
and tactical employment involved in executing reconnaissance missions.
Critical to the platoon leader’s ability to execute his mission is to clearly
understand the focus, tempo, and engagement criteria of the
reconnaissance mission. This information can be labeled as essential
commander’s guidance. It is an extension of the commander’s intent and
is meant to fully clarify the intent for the reconnaissance effort. It should
be received from higher as well as issued to subordinates. The essential
commander’s guidance answers the three basic questions the platoon
leader needs to know to plan his mission:

· What is the focus of the reconnaissance? Considerations


related to the focus include the following (the first four items
are characteristics of the reconnaissance operational
environment, which are discussed later in this section):
n Threat/enemy (conventional and/or nonconventional
forces, terrorist organizations, criminal elements).
n Society/human demographics (HUMINT, civilian
considerations).
n Terrain (bridges, routes, defensible terrain).
n Infrastructure (political situation, facilities, food
distribution).

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n What reconnaissance critical tasks are to be conducted or


deleted?

NOTE: As noted throughout this chapter, the focus should be linked to the purpose of the
reconnaissance operation to accomplish any or all of the following tasks: answer
the CCIR, fill voids in the unit IPB (as related to the IR and specific information
requirements [SIR]), and/or support targeting operations through target
acquisition.

· What is the tempo of the reconnaissance?


Considerations related to the tempo include the following:
n Will the reconnaissance be conducted primarily
dismounted or mounted (stealthy or forceful)?
n Will the reconnaissance be discreet or aggressive (or a
combination)?
n Will the reconnaissance be deliberate or rapid?
· What are the engagement criteria (if any)?
Considerations related to the engagement criteria include the
following:
n What are the applicable ROE?
n What situations will lead to a fight for the supported
unit?
n What situations will lead to a reconnaissance platoon
fight?
n What weapon systems will be used to engage what types
of targets?

3-28. The focus of the reconnaissance allows the platoon leader to


determine which critical tasks he wants the platoon to accomplish first. It
helps him narrow the platoon’s scope of operations to get the information
that is most important to squadron and brigade operations. In SSC
operations the platoon focus might be terrain-oriented, or threat security-
force oriented. In an environment involving stability operations and
support operations, the platoon might be focused on determining local
populace sentiment or on identifying local paramilitary leaders. While all
critical tasks have some degree of applicability in any given operation,
certain ones are more important for specific missions; this must be clearly
articulated at each level. Given a specified amount of time, the
reconnaissance platoon accomplishes its specified critical tasks and then
accomplishes other tasks as instructed by the commander.
3-29. The tempo of the reconnaissance allows the platoon leader to
establish associated time requirements and correlate them with planning
time, movement formations, engagement criteria, and methods, such as
dismounted or mounted reconnaissance (see Figure 3-1). The platoon
leader establishes the tempo by answering two questions and articulating
the results to the platoon:
· Is the platoon conducting stealthy or forceful reconnaissance?
As noted, the term stealthy implies time-consuming,
primarily dismounted operations that minimize chance

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contact and observation of the platoon by threat forces. The


platoon conducts forceful reconnaissance when there is no
concern about being observed; it is usually mounted during
these operations.
· Does the reconnaissance require discreet or aggressive
methods? Discreet reconnaissance is characterized by very
restrictive engagement criteria, with reconnaissance forces
restrained from initiating combat to gain information.
Aggressive reconnaissance entails primarily mounted, fast-
paced operations with permissive engagement criteria that
allow the reconnaissance force to fight for information.
· Is the reconnaissance deliberate or rapid? Deliberate
reconnaissance entails slow, detailed, broad-based operations
that require accomplishment of numerous tasks and that
usually have no specific focus for the platoon. Rapid
reconnaissance operations focus the platoon on a few key
pieces of information required by the commander. They
usually take place in a time-constrained environment and
require completion of a small number of tasks.

Figure 3-1. Tempo of Reconnaissance

3-30. The engagement criteria establish which targets the platoon is


expected to destroy and which ones it is expected to hand off to higher
elements. Conversely, by coupling his understanding of what the
commander wants the platoon to destroy with his understanding of the
threat’s most likely COA, the platoon leader is able to break down what
he wants his sections to destroy. This enables him to focus the platoon’s
weapon systems, develop engagement areas, and plan for the destruction
of specified threat vehicles if the platoon encounters them.

RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT


3-31. The reconnaissance platoon must be prepared to operate beyond a
narrow focus on the adversary and his capabilities. The platoon, of
course, must excel in the traditional roles of reconnaissance, surveillance,
and target acquisition of threat forces. In addition, it must fulfill the
broader mission of providing situational awareness of the operational

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environment in all its dimensions, covering political, cultural, economic,


and demographic factors in addition to the military aspects of the area.
This multidimensional requirement means that the platoon must develop
an understanding not just of what is happening, but also of why. In the
asymmetric environment, identifying threat centers of gravity, decisive
points, and the means to influence the threat’s will and behavior is one of
the most important contributions that the platoon can make to the higher
unit’s success.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
3-32. The Army has always focused its efforts on traditional combat
operations, based on open terrain, force-on-force battles, and symmetrical
enemy formations. The standard reconnaissance approach in this
environment has been simply to focus on gaining information on the
enemy and terrain. The Army’s thinking, however, must expand to
include nontraditional environmental variables that could influence its
operations. In the future, Army forces will not habitually face
conventional forces in open areas.

Asymmetric Warfare
3-33. The new millennium, coupled with the technological
developments of the information age, raises the specter of asymmetric
warfare, a concept in which a weak opponent successfully engages a
stronger opponent by using a variety of “offset” TTP for gaining
advantage in hopes of achieving its objectives and goals. As noted, the
reconnaissance platoon must be ready to concentrate both on the
traditional approach to reconnaissance (focused on gathering information
on enemy forces and terrain) and on the asymmetric aspects of the
operational environment that affect military operations. Asymmetric
threats include regional military forces, paramilitary forces, guerrillas
and insurgents, terrorists, criminal groups, and certain civilian groups
and individuals. Threat asymmetric approaches involve information
operations, weapons of mass destruction, operations in complex (mainly
urban) terrain, civilian involvement, and evasive attacks against US
forces and soldiers.

Urban Considerations
3-34. The urban environment confronts commanders with a
combination of difficulties rarely found in other settings in which the
Army is called upon to conduct operations. The distinct characteristics of
the urban environment are primarily a function of the following factors:

· The increasing size and global prevalence of urban areas.


· The combinations of manmade features and supporting
infrastructure superimposed on the existing natural terrain.
· The density of civilians in close proximity to combat forces.

3-35. Of those factors, the third one, and the human dimension it
represents, is potentially the most important—and the most perplexing
for commanders to understand and evaluate. Although urban terrain is
complex, understanding it is a relatively straightforward process in
comparison to comprehending the multifaceted nature of urban society.
The urban environment is, first of all, a human environment. That makes

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it different from all other types. An urban environment is not defined by


its structures or systems but by the people who compose it. It reacts and
interacts with an army in ways that no natural environment can.
3-36. Military operations often require Army forces to operate in close
proximity to a high density of civilians, whose presence, attitudes,
actions, and needs in turn affect the conduct of operations. The behavior
of civilian populations within an urban area is dynamic and poses a
special challenge to commanders conducting military operations. Civilian
populations continually influence, to varying degrees, military operations
within an area of operations. As urban areas increase in size, they
become less and less homogenous; therefore, commanders must
understand and account for the characteristics of a diverse population
whose beliefs and actions may vary based on many factors.
3-37. The center of gravity during a military operation, particularly in
stability operations and support operations, may be the civilian
inhabitants themselves. The side that enjoys the support of the
population retains many advantages. To gain and/or retain this support,
commanders must first understand (through reconnaissance) the complex
nature and character of the urban society and its infrastructure, which
are covered later in this discussion. Second, they must understand and
accept that every military action (or inaction) may influence, positively or
negatively, the relationship between the urban population and Army
forces and, by extension, have a significant impact on mission success.
With this awareness, commanders visualize decisions they must make,
plan operations, implement programs, and/or take immediate action to
maintain support of a friendly populace, gain the support of neutral
factions, or neutralize hostile elements.
3-38. As noted, understanding how operations affect the urban society
(and vice versa) normally begins with reconnaissance of the society and
its infrastructure. As noted, these two characteristics of the
reconnaissance operational environment (covered later in this discussion)
allow the commander to determine the locations and numbers of civilians
as well as the infrastructure in relation to decisive points within the area
of operations. The commander can then decide whether civilian presence
and/or density represent a significant risk to the accomplishment of the
mission. He uses this knowledge to visualize what actions he must take
to influence and/or exploit the society and its infrastructure. It should
be emphasized that the society may assist friendly military operations by
providing information on threat forces or by supporting friendly forces
with its infrastructure resources. If civilians are the primary focus of the
operation, as in many stability and support operations, this analysis may
help to determine the decisive points.
3-39. In the broader mission of providing information for situational
understanding of the operational environment, the platoon must direct
its reconnaissance based on a number of dimensions—political, social,
cultural, and economic demographics; infrastructure; open and complex
terrain—as well as military factors. This multidimensional
reconnaissance is not a mission; rather, it expands on the traditional
focus of reconnaissance by concentrating on additional asymmetric
threats, urban factors (such as society and infrastructure), and other
considerations that can influence military operations. For the platoon to
make an effective contribution to the multidimensional reconnaissance

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effort, leaders must clearly understand this expanded focus for


reconnaissance in the operational environment. They must also
understand how to work with a variety of ISR assets (refer to Chapter 8
of this manual) that are fused at the lowest level to assist the platoon.
See the discussion later in this chapter for more information on
multidimensional reconnaissance.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT
3-40. To successfully accomplish the reconnaissance mission, the
platoon leadership must clearly understand the four characteristics of the
reconnaissance operational environment: threat/enemy, society/human
demographics, terrain, and infrastructure. These characteristics, when
applied to the fundamentals of reconnaissance, will enhance the platoon’s
ability to fully understand its environment and conduct a more detailed,
comprehensive reconnaissance and surveillance mission.

Threat/Enemy
3-41. The platoon no longer faces a single, monolithic, well-defined
threat. During the Cold War, planning centered on confronting
numerically superior armored forces in Europe, the Far East, or
Southwest Asia. Today’s reconnaissance units must be able to conduct
operations across the range of military operations (MTW, SSC, stability
operations, and support operations) against threats ranging in size from
major regional powers to asymmetric threats. These may include
conventional threat forces, insurgents, paramilitary forces, guerrillas,
criminal groups, and certain civilian groups and individuals.
3-42. Because of the diversity of the threat, the IPB process becomes
even more important at the brigade, squadron, troop, and platoon levels.
No longer will the threat always fit into a neat time-distance scenario.
Potential adversaries may use a variety of doctrine, tactics, and
equipment. It is extremely important to quickly identify the threat/enemy
in a specific operational area. This will almost always be the major focus
of reconnaissance for the platoon. At times, however, the reconnaissance
focus may be the identification of the unknown threat as well. That is
why the understanding of the society and infrastructure of an area are
also important factors in the reconnaissance operational environment.

Society/Human Demographics
3-43. Because the focus of reconnaissance may be the society and
people of a given area, the reconnaissance platoon must be aware of the
full dimension of demographics in its area of operations. The
demographic framework is the basis of the characteristics of a specific
environment and determines many, if not most, of the platoon’s
reconnaissance objectives. Gaining an awareness of how the local society
affects military operations and of the impact of military operations on the
society is likely to be critical to the platoon leader and his subordinate
leaders as they make operational decisions. The following are examples of
the social/human dimensions of reconnaissance focus in the area of
operations:

· Population demographics. Categories of interest in this area


include race, sex, age, religion, language, national origin,

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tribe, clan, class, political party affiliation, education, or any


significant social grouping.
· History.
· Government.
· Government or factional leaders, including the following:
n Mayors.
n Local police chiefs.
n Local political leaders.
n Local military commanders.
n Local religious leaders.
· Nongovernmental organizations (NGO).
· Economy.
· Media personnel and outlets, including the following:
n Organizations.
n Reporters.
n Publications.
n Broadcast outlets (TV and radio).
n Internet users and World Wide Web sites.

3-44. As noted, the center of gravity during operations may be the


civilian inhabitants themselves. Failure to understand the needs of the
society or to gain the support of the population may cause elements of the
society to become a threat to the unit during military operations. To gain
and/or retain this support, the platoon leader and his soldiers must
understand the complex nature and character of the society as well as the
relationship between the population and Army forces. In addition, an
understanding of the society (gained by effective reconnaissance) provides
the platoon leader with vital information he needs to shape the
operational environment.
3-45. An understanding of how operations affect the society (and vice
versa) normally begins with gaining information on the size, location, and
composition of the society. While traditional reconnaissance is focused
mainly on conventional threat forces and their personnel, the
multidimensional environment requires the platoon to clearly understand
all types of potential threat elements—conventional, paramilitary,
terrorist, or even organized crime groups that could undermine the
stability of the local economy. Even elements of a society that are not
normally considered hostile may pose a threat and consequently become a
specific focus for reconnaissance. Examples include a mob whose
demonstrations against US military presence disrupt military operations
or refugees clogging a route that higher headquarters plans to use for
combat operations. The platoon’s reconnaissance focus may then be to
identify and evaluate these groups; it will attempt to gain information
that will allow the higher unit to use nonlethal effects to deal with the
problem.
3-46. In addition, the platoon must understand the different cultural
and economic backgrounds of the people it encounters on a day-to-day

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basis. The platoon leadership must become familiar with civic and
factional leaders such as mayors, police chiefs, local military
commanders, and political leaders. This knowledge, while important in
SSC and MTW operations, is critical in stability operations and support
operations where the platoon might have a permanent lodgment area
surrounded by diverse local communities.

Terrain
3-47. The reconnaissance platoon must never become complacent in
terrain analysis and the identification of key terrain. The platoon must
understand terrain factors as they pertain to friendly forces and threat
forces alike. It must also be able to evaluate the role of terrain not just in
traditional operations, but in stability, support, and SSC environments as
well. For example, in stability operations or support operations, key
terrain could be a religious or cultural monument or a historic
geographical boundary or town.

Infrastructure
3-48. For a platoon to operate successfully in an area, it must
understand the local infrastructure. The platoon must develop a general
understanding of facilities, institutions, and organizations; how each of
these entities fit into the community at large; and how they relate to one
another. Infrastructure considerations include the following:

· Physical facilities like utilities, factories, transportation, and


food distribution points as well as the many services and
products that make a community function.
· Financial services and factors. What is the monetary base of
the different communities, the income demographics, and the
black market trade situation? Who can provide for the CSS
needs of friendly forces?
· The local community, political, and governmental structure.
This includes religious, military, and paramilitary
organizations, such as local security and police forces that
work independently of one another.

RECONNAISSANCE HANDOVER
3-49. RHO is the action that occurs between two elements in order to
coordinate the transfer of information and/or responsibility for
observation (reconnaissance and/or surveillance) of potential threat
contact, or the transfer of an assigned area from one element to another.
The term “element” is all-inclusive of those involved in the handover,
whether it is OP to OP within the same platoon, sensors (such as GSR) to
a recce platoon, recce troop to infantry battalion, and so on.
3-50. RHO draws its origins from a World War II term “connecting file,”
which facilitated the linking of units to prevent seams between them.
RHO shares many critical tasks with battle handover: relief in place,
linkup, and passage of lines. Unlike battle handover, however, it does not
imply the assumption of a fight or being within direct fire range. Instead,
it focuses on planning for, preparing, and executing the passing of
information, threat contact, or an assigned area and the related
responsibility for it from one element to another.

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3-51. This task provides the information connection, overlapping


communications, and commander’s focus (which may differ for each echelon)
required when planning and executing layered reconnaissance and
surveillance with multiple assets. RHO is normally associated with a
designated coordination point (RHOCP) or reconnaissance handover line
(RHOL), which is in effect a phase line; it may entail handover of a
sector/zone, NAI, TAI, and/or threat contact. RHO can involve visual,
electronic, digital, or analog information sources or any combination of these.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR RECONNAISSANCE HANDOVER


3-52. Reconnaissance and surveillance operations must be nested with
higher, lower, and adjacent units in order to provide a coordinated and
integrated effort. Planning for these operations includes coordinating
RHO from higher echelons to the lowest element, as well as coordination
with adjacent units/elements.

Planning
3-53. Responsibility for the coordination of RHO normally occurs from
higher to lower units. Planning for RHO may take place before an
operation or may be conducted during operations as part of a change of
mission. When planning is conducted before an operation, the completed
plan is reviewed, ensuring layered, redundant reconnaissance and
surveillance using all available ISR assets. This layered
reconnaissance/surveillance is then analyzed to determine where and
who may be required to conduct RHO. Once this is determined, the
locations and/or criteria for RHO are coordinated with higher
headquarters as applicable. Pertinent control measures related to RHO,
such as the RHOL (phase line) between units or the potential RHOCP to
facilitate ground linkup, are then added with other graphic control
measures to aid in command and control.

Preparation
3-54. Coordination begins as RHO requirements between units are
identified. The communications plan between the units is then identified.
The communications plan includes radio frequencies, net IDs, EPLRS
needlines, host files required to conduct the linkup (if units are from
different maneuver control systems), and COMSEC variables for
communications and establishment of the TI between the two forces.
Recognition signals must be implemented to prevent friendly troops from
exchanging fires. These signals may be pyrotechnics, armbands, vehicle
markings, panels, colored smoke, distinctive light patterns, and
passwords. The situational awareness provided by FBCB2 can
significantly enhance friendly recognition.
3-55. Indirect fires are coordinated, and fire support information is
exchanged between units, to include assets available, fire control
measures, critical friendly zones (CFZ), preplanned targets, final
protective fires (FPF), and smoke missions.
3-56. ISR (R&S) plans are exchanged allowing an understanding of how
higher information requirements (IR) may fulfill the lower unit’s or
passing unit’s IR needs. For example, this will allow the brigade
reconnaissance assets to understand the follow-on battalion IR needs
while still remaining focused on the brigade’s requirements. This
understanding may lead to the transfer of vital information collected by

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the brigade assets to the battalion during critical moments, such as the
RHO of an enemy target for destruction (this is further emphasized in the
example). The remarks block of the ISR (R&S) matrix may also be used to
identify established RHO coordination.
3-57. The criteria for target handover (engagement criteria) are
identified and coordinated, including who will interdict if the target
exceeds the unit’s engagement criteria. If follow-on forces are designated
to destroy the target (as a result of meeting their engagement criteria), a
forward passage of lines may need to be coordinated to support that unit’s
attack. The contact report of threat forces exceeding the engagement
criteria of the element/unit in contact may act as a trigger for follow-on
forces to initiate movement to conduct the forward passage of lines.
3-58. Coordination is conducted to identify the transfer and/or
acceptance of C2 of elements between units as necessary. On-order
missions may be identified for elements/units to support RHO. An
example of this would be a TUAV task to establish and maintain contact
with a moving contact while RHO of the contact is being conducted from
one unit to another. The initial contact report may act as a trigger to
prepare the TUAV for launch, allowing the supporting element/unit
(TUAV crew) time to prepare. As RHO becomes imminent and final
coordination begins, the TUAV is launched to support the handover. This
level of coordination will allow the TUAV maximum time on station,
ensuring redundant observation during handover.
3-59. Rehearsals are of paramount importance before executing any
plan. During rehearsals, RHO coordination is confirmed and practiced to
ensure clarity and understanding.

NOTE: Throughout RHO planning and preparation, all elements/units must be prepared to
transition to battle handover in the event they are engaged by threat forces.

Execution
3-60. Elements/units may conduct RHO with follow-on or security
(stationary) forces, accept RHO from a forward force, or provide C2 for
the handover.
3-61. During execution of RHO, liaison with a unit may consist of
collocating both units’ C2 nodes as well as attaching scouts to the forward
maneuver units to facilitate implementation of command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (C4ISR). Every effort should be made to establish a face-
to-face liaison. If this is not possible, establish a reliable digital and/or
voice linkup to exchange critical information. As the distance closes
between the forces, the requirement to maintain close liaison and
exchange information increases.
3-62. If face-to-face linkup is made at the RHOCP, final coordination is
completed and relevant information is exchanged. Confirmation is made
to ensure RHO is complete based on the specified criteria. If a target is
being handed over, the criteria should require the accepting unit to
acquire the target before handover is complete. The unit conducting RHO
may then be required to support the unit accepting the handover by
executing the responsibilities of the stationary unit while conducting a

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forward passage of lines or relief in place. If follow-on forces are


conducting an attack, the unit conducting the RHO may facilitate the
follow-on force’s attack by conducting reconnaissance pull and support by
executing targeting, to include previously coordinated indirect fires.

EXAMPLES OF RECONNAISSANCE HANDOVER


Handover in Urban Terrain
3-63. The platoon may conduct RHO during an area reconnaissance
mission in urban terrain. One of its squads makes contact with a
potential source that may be able to provide information relevant to the
brigade as it moves through the area. The squad reports this contact and
begins to exploit the source through tactical questioning. The platoon
leader forwards the reports higher. The brigade tasks a supporting
HUMINT asset (such as MP, MI, or civil affairs elements) to further
develop the contact. The squad then conducts RHO, passing
responsibility for the source and all information collected to that point to
the follow-on HUMINT asset.

NOTE: The following example illustrates an RHO operation at a higher level, in this case
between a BRT and both division cavalry scouts (forward of the BRT) and task force
scouts (to the rear of the BRT). This type of higher-level handover would directly
affect the reconnaissance platoons within all of these elements.

Higher-Level Handover
3-64. A more detailed example entails a division cavalry squadron
conducting a zone reconnaissance forward of the brigade. The brigade’s
BRT has been given a mission to conduct area reconnaissance missions
behind the division cavalry to reconnoiter potential assault positions and
then conduct surveillance of TAIs in support of the brigade’s attack. This
technique will allow the BRT to conduct a thorough reconnaissance while
taking advantage of the security the ground cavalry troop (GCT)
provides. The BRT has been assigned a zone through which it will move
to its assigned areas. It conducts physical and FM/digital linkup with the
division cavalry troop directly to its front and with the lead task force’s
scout platoon following the BRT.
3-65. En route to their OPs, the BRT scouts maneuver into the
divisional scouts’ area of operations. They report real time information to
the brigade and its lead maneuver battalion. Once the conditions are set,
the BRT conducts RHO with the division cavalry troop to its front. The
divisional cavalry (DIV CAV) troop reports that it has bypassed a threat
OP consisting of two BRDM-type vehicles; it provides additional
information concerning the terrain and enemy on the brigade’s objective.
The DIV CAV troop and the BRT also coordinate passage of lines for the
BRT to move into OPs that observe the assigned TAIs. The BRT accepts
the handover from the DIV CAV. It reports the contact to the brigade and
the follow-on task force and updates both the FBCB2 overlay (adding the
OP contact) and the threat template on the objective. The brigade accepts
responsibility for the threat OP contact and directs the BRT bypass the
OP and continue the mission.
3-66. The BRT establishes OPs to observe the assigned TAIs and
support the brigade’s attack. The troop XO begins RHO with the lead

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task force scout platoon. The task force (TF) scout platoon leader
collocates with the troop CP and gathers the relevant information for his
task force. The BRT directs a section to establish a linkup point for the
lead TF scouts. The BRT identifies the best axis of advance for the task
force from its own observations and from information provided by DIV
CAV. The BRT also provides locations of passage lanes through the DIV
CAV and the threat’s security zone as well as the latest update on the
threat’s posture on the objective.
3-67. The BRT scouts provide an “eyes-on” SITREP and then lead the
task force scouts to the position of advantage using a covered and
concealed route identified en route to the linkup point. The scout platoon
leader now has enough information to point out the RHOL on the ground,
to identify enemy/friendly locations and routes to the flank and rear of
the enemy, and then to physically lead the formation to the RHOL. The
BRT is positioned to support the BCT fight, with scouts and Strikers
conducting target acquisition.

RECONNAISSANCE METHODS
RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS
3-68. Reconnaissance patrols provide timely and accurate information
about the threat and terrain. The reconnaissance platoon may be tasked
to conduct any of the three types of reconnaissance patrols (area, zone, or
route). The patrol leader must have specific intelligence collection
requirements for each mission. For a detailed discussion of
reconnaissance patrols, refer to Chapter 5 of this manual.

MOUNTED RECONNAISSANCE
3-69. Scouts frequently conduct mounted operations, which give
reconnaissance platoons the ability to conduct fairly detailed
reconnaissance while maintaining the speed and momentum required for
the operation. Mounted reconnaissance also allows the scouts to take
advantage of the protection afforded by their vehicles, although they
must still dismount when they cross danger areas.

Employment Considerations
3-70. Mounted reconnaissance is normally used under these conditions:
· Time is limited.
· Detailed reconnaissance is not required.
· IPB provides accurate information on the threat.
· The UAV platoon is performing coordinated reconnaissance
tasks in support of ground forces.
· Ground sensors (such as GSR elements) are conducting
reconnaissance activities in support of ground forces.
· Terrain is open.

Advantages
3-71. Speed and momentum are rarely necessary in a reconnaissance
operation, but they are often critical to the successful execution of
offensive operations that the reconnaissance mission may support. In

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addition to speed, mounted reconnaissance offers scouts the advantages


of their reconnaissance vehicle. These advantages depend on the specific
vehicle employed, but they can include firepower, armor protection,
enhanced navigation and communications capability, and thermal optics.

Disadvantages
3-72. The disadvantages of mounted reconnaissance include the loss of
stealth due to the visual, noise, and thermal signatures of the vehicle and
the loss of some detail because of restricted vision and impairment of the
senses of smell and hearing. These disadvantages increase the risk to
scouts as they conduct reconnaissance.

DISMOUNTED RECONNAISSANCE
3-73. The primary purpose of dismounted reconnaissance is to obtain
detailed information about terrain features, obstacles, or threat forces. In
addition, scouts dismount and reconnoiter forward of their vehicle to
provide security before moving through danger areas such as open
spaces, hilltops, curves, or other blind spots on the battlefield. They also
dismount to set up short- or long-duration OPs. (NOTE: Refer to
Chapter 5 of this manual for additional information on dismounted
operations.)

Employment Considerations
3-74. In general, scouts conduct dismounted reconnaissance when the
following conditions apply:

· Detailed reconnaissance is required.


· Stealth is required.
· Threat contact is expected or visual contact has been
achieved.
· Restricted terrain is encountered.
· Time is available.
· Danger areas are encountered.
· Security is the primary concern.
· IPB indicates close proximity to threat positions.

3-75. Dismounted scouts provide security for each other as they move.
Ideally, at least two scouts work together when operating dismounted.
When only a single scout dismounts, he should never move out of
supporting distance of the vehicle.

Advantages
3-76. Dismounted reconnaissance is the preferred method when
stealthy movement is desired. Scouts on foot benefit from the
concealment offered by folds in the terrain; in addition, they do not emit a
significant visual or audio signature. Dismounted reconnaissance
techniques allow the reconnaissance platoon to observe threat vehicles
and soldiers at close range without being detected. Scouts conducting
dismounted reconnaissance can also quickly transition to a stationary OP
for a short period of time without suffering any loss of effectiveness.

Disadvantages

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3-77. Disadvantages of dismounted reconnaissance include a relatively


slow rate of movement for personnel on foot, extensive requirements for
detailed preliminary planning and coordination, and considerable risk to
scouts who are conducting dismounted operations. Unless they establish
a radio relay, scouts cannot conduct dismounted reconnaissance in depth
because of the relatively short range of man-portable FM communications
systems. When dismounted reconnaissance takes place during hours of
darkness, target acquisition depends largely on hand-held night vision
devices, whose capabilities can be degraded.

Tools for Dismounted Reconnaissance


3-78. Dismounted scouts employ a variety of equipment and other
tactical tools to enhance their capability to report information accurately
and to call for and adjust indirect fires. At a minimum, they carry the
following items:

· SOPs.
· Personal weapons.
· Communications equipment.
· SOI extracts.
· Maps.
· A compass.
· Binoculars (and night vision devices, if necessary).

RECONNAISSANCE BY FIRE
3-79. In reconnaissance by fire, indirect fire is used on positions where
there is a reasonable suspicion of threat occupation; the goal is to cause
the threat to disclose his presence by moving or by returning fire. In rare
circumstances, the reconnaissance platoon or section may use this
reconnaissance method when threat contact is expected and time is
limited or when the platoon cannot maneuver to develop the situation. In
such a situation, it is critical for the platoon leader to conduct thorough
war-gaming and rehearsals to prepare for the probable threat reaction.

Employment Considerations
3-80. Examples of threat locations and/or contact situations in which
reconnaissance by fire may be employed include the following:

· Contact with a natural or man-made obstacle.


· Detection of an obvious kill zone.
· A suspected threat position that fits the situational template.
· Signs of recent activity (such as track marks or trash).
· Bunker complexes that may or may not be occupied.

3-81. Reconnaissance by fire eliminates any element of surprise the


scouts may have had, and it is likely to give the threat detailed
knowledge of their location. It may, however, reduce the chance of scouts
being ambushed within established kill zones.
3-82. Reconnaissance by fire does not work in all cases. For example,
disciplined troops in prepared positions will not react to the scouts’ fires.

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As a result, reconnaissance by fire must not entail the indiscriminate use


of direct and indirect fires at all wood lines and hilltops in the hopes of
causing the threat to react. The threat will recognize this for what it is;
he will not react to it. This also wastes valuable ammunition.

Use of Indirect Fire


3-83. Scouts can conduct reconnaissance by fire by calling for and
adjusting indirect fire. Reconnaissance by indirect fire provides security
for the scouts because it does not disclose their exact position; in addition,
all scouts are available to observe the effects of the fire.
3-84. Reconnaissance by indirect fire has disadvantages as well.
Indirect fire requires more coordination and communication than direct
fire; it is also less responsive and may be less accurate. Indirect fire can
be subject to factors beyond the control of the platoon, such as the
supporting unit’s Class V supply status, counterbattery threats, and
command approval. Additionally, the effects of indirect fire may obscure
the scout’s vision.

FIGHTING FOR INFORMATION


3-85. As discussed earlier in this manual, reconnaissance organizations
such as ACRs and division cavalry squadrons not only use the common
techniques and assets (HUMINT, passive surveillance, and technical
means) to conduct reconnaissance operations, but also are capable of
employing combat power to fight for information. Because these units are
usually the forward-most elements in MTW environments, they must
have the capability to survive meeting engagements and to destroy or
impede threat forces as necessary to sustain operations in high-threat
areas. They can do this because of the platforms they operate and the
unique, combined arms organizations they employ. These units are
capable of fighting through threat reconnaissance (destroying the threat’s
“eyes and ears”) to gain combat information needed by higher unit
commanders. In shaping operations, the ability to fight for information is
important in determining the intent of a threat (for example, whether the
threat is willing to defend, withdraw, or fight when confronted) without
committing main body infantry or armor units.
3-86. The ability to fight for information is linked directly to the unit’s
engagement criteria and capabilities; therefore, the ability to fight for
information is not limited only to ACRs and division cavalry squadrons.
When an organization faces an inferior force that is within its
engagement criteria, it may have to fight for information even if it is not
traditionally equipped to fulfill this role. Because the ability to fight for
information is threat-based, a clear understanding of the threat and its
capabilities is required for units not normally conducting this form of
aggressive reconnaissance.

AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE
3-87. When available, aerial reconnaissance can be employed to
complement ground reconnaissance. Aerial assets are an integral part of
reconnaissance operations; ground scouts must synchronize their
reconnaissance efforts with that of available UAV assets if they are
operating in the same area.

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3-88. The ground scout must understand the capabilities and


limitations of aerial reconnaissance. Air-ground coordination is vital to
mission success and fratricide reduction. If possible, the platoon leader
should arrange to conduct face-to-face coordination with the UAV platoon
or section leader as well as with the leaders of any other aviation assets
in the area of operations. If this is not practical, analog or digital
coordination becomes essential.
3-89. When operating together, aerial and ground reconnaissance
assets can compensate for each other’s limitations and significantly
increase the effectiveness of their combined reconnaissance effort. Aerial
reconnaissance is the fastest form of reconnaissance. It is also terrain-
independent; air assets can reconnoiter areas that may be difficult or
impossible for ground scouts to reach.
3-90. On the other hand, aerial reconnaissance is limited by weather
conditions, the night-vision capability of the particular aircraft’s sensors,
fuel requirements, ADA threats, and the detail with which terrain can be
observed. Generally, aerial reconnaissance will not be able to identify
stationary threat elements smaller than platoon size or moving elements
of squad size or smaller, although this can vary widely depending on the
terrain and available equipment.

NOTE: Refer to Chapter 8 of this manual for further details on air/ground reconnaissance
integration.

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT
INFILTRATION
3-91. Infiltration is a form of maneuver that the reconnaissance platoon
can use to penetrate the threat security zone or main battle area to
accomplish its mission. Entailing use of stealthy forms of movement,
infiltration is primarily conducted by, but not limited to, recce and
HMMWV mounted platoons due to their increased vulnerability, in high
threat environments, to direct and indirect fires. Although it is most
commonly used by ground reconnaissance assets, aerial and waterborne
platforms may also employ tactics based on infiltration techniques.
Purposes of infiltration include the following:

· Reconnoiter a specified area and establish OPs.


· Emplace remote sensors.
· Establish communications relay capability for a specific
period in support of other reconnaissance operations.
· Determine threat strengths and weaknesses.
· Locate unobserved routes through threat positions.
· Determine the location of high-payoff threat assets.
· Provide surveillance for follow-on echelons moving into sector.

3-92. The primary focus of infiltration is to move to a designated point


without being detected or engaged by the threat. During infiltration, the
platoon’s elements use predesignated lanes to reach their objective. The

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infiltrating elements employ cover, concealment, and stealth to move


through identified or templated gaps in the threat array.
3-93. The platoon can infiltrate by dismounted teams; mounted by
vehicles, by sections, or as a complete platoon; or using a combination of
mounted and dismounted teams. It can infiltrate as an entire element at
one time or move into sector by echelon, at different times. Two examples
of infiltration operations follow the discussion of operational
considerations.

Operational Considerations
3-94. Infiltration imposes a number of distinct, and often difficult,
operational considerations on the reconnaissance platoon.
3-95. Planning and Coordination. The amount of intelligence
information available to the reconnaissance platoon leader during the
planning process will determine the risk involved in conducting the
infiltration. The platoon leader must maximize the use of known
intelligence, including aerial photographs, for the area of operations. As
he plans the operation, the platoon leader must select appropriate routes
and movement techniques based on the mission, the terrain and weather,
the likelihood of threat contact, the expected and/or necessary speed of
movement, and the depth to which the platoon’s elements must
penetrate. Once these factors have been considered, the platoon leader
must make the decision to infiltrate either mounted or dismounted or a
combination of both. Even if he decides the platoon can conduct a
mounted infiltration, his plan must take into account that the situation
may require scouts to dismount and reconnoiter an area before the
vehicles move forward. The platoon leader’s infiltration plan must
provide platoon elements with enough time for preparation and initial
movement. The initial plan should also cover an evasion and extraction
plan, as well as any special equipment requirements.
3-96. The platoon leader must conduct detailed coordination with any
friendly elements through which the platoon will pass when executing
infiltration tactics; this includes integration of communications, fires, and
CSS activities. In addition, the platoon’s higher headquarters must
coordinate the activities of adjacent friendly units to ensure that they do
not compromise the platoon and its elements as they conduct the
infiltration.
3-97. Size of Infiltrating Elements. The size of the elements depends
on several factors: the assigned mission, time available, cover and
concealment, the target acquisition capabilities of both friendly and
threat forces, available communications assets, and navigation
capabilities and limitations. If the platoon is tasked to gather information
over a wide area, it may employ several small teams to cover the
complete sector. In most situations, smaller elements are better able to
take advantage of available cover and concealment. Another
consideration is that some elements of the platoon may not use
infiltration. If the platoon is moving into sector in echelon, the initial
echelons may infiltrate to a specific location and provide surveillance for
follow-on echelons that are moving into sector using a more conventional
movement technique.

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3-98. Infiltration Lanes or Routes. The reconnaissance platoon’s


higher headquarters will assign the platoon an infiltration lane or zone,
requiring the platoon leader to gather the necessary information and
intelligence to prepare for the mission. The platoon leader must decide
whether to move the entire platoon along a single lane or assign separate
lanes for each section or vehicle.
3-99. Each alternative presents distinct advantages and disadvantages.
Moving the entire platoon on a single lane makes navigation and
movement easier to control, but it can increase the chance of the platoon
being detected by threat forces. Moving on multiple lanes may require
development of additional control measures, make command and control
more difficult, and create navigation problems. On the other hand, it can
reduce the chances of detection by the threat.
3-100. In choosing infiltration lanes, the platoon leader must ensure that
lanes afford sufficient width to allow each element to change its planned
route to avoid unexpected threat contact. He must also consider civilian
activity along each lane and within the infiltration zone as a whole. The
infiltration route should avoid obstacles, populated areas, and areas
occupied or covered by threat elements. The route should provide cover
and concealment by placing ridgelines, rivers, and other restrictive
terrain between the platoon and threat forces. The plan should also make
use of limited visibility and adverse weather.
3-101. As noted, the focus for the scout during infiltration is to remain
undetected and avoid contact with any threat elements. In conjunction
with intervisibility lines, the TERRABASE program can be used on
templated enemy positions and dominant terrain to help refine route
selection. Using TERRABASE at various points of the infiltration route,
the platoon leader can determine where the route can be observed by the
threat and identify potential danger areas prior to moving into the area of
operations. If time permits and assets are available, UAVs may be used
to proof the route and to survey danger areas and influencing terrain.
The use of UAVs, however, must be weighed carefully against the
potential for compromising the infiltration route.
3-102. Communications. In general, infiltrating elements should
maintain radio listening silence except to send critical information that the
commander has directed to be reported immediately or to report contact with
threat forces. When operating out of range of normal radio communications,
an infiltrating element that must transmit required information should
move to high ground or set up a long-range expedient antenna. (NOTE: See
Appendix F of this manual for information on repair of communications
equipment and construction of field expedient antennas.)
3-103. Fire Support. Infiltration plans always cover employment of
indirect fires, although these are used only in limited circumstances. The
most common use is when the infiltrating unit makes threat contact. The
commander or platoon leader may employ indirect fires in another sector
to divert attention from the infiltration lane. Indirect fires can also be
useful in degrading the threat’s acquisition and observation capabilities
by forcing him to seek cover.
3-104. Actions on Contact. Each infiltrating element must develop and
rehearse a plan that clearly defines its actions when faced with one or
more of the eight forms of contact discussed in Chapter 2 of this manual.

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If detected, an infiltrating element will return fire, break contact, and


report; these actions are also discussed in Chapter 2. Fighting through
the threat force, however, is the least preferred COA. Direct fire
engagements are normally limited to whatever actions are required to
break contact. To prevent compromise of their established locations,
elements already established in sector may choose not to provide direct
fire support for follow-on echelons in contact.
3-105. During infiltration using multiple lanes, the detection of one
platoon’s elements may alert the threat and compromise other units in
the infiltration zone. The OPORD must clearly state the criteria under
which elements will either continue the mission or return to friendly lines
if they are detected by the threat. If an element makes visual contact but
is not detected, it should continue the mission.

Examples of Infiltration Operations


3-106. The following examples focus on the reconnaissance platoon as it
conducts infiltration either as a unit or by echelon.
3-107. Mounted Infiltration of a Platoon Moving as a Unit. This
example has a reconnaissance platoon moving as a whole along a
predesignated infiltration route. Maximizing intervisibility lines and
using masking terrain are key considerations in selecting infiltration
routes. Units must maximize all available tools and assets that support
thorough IPB, with emphasis placed on OCOKA. (NOTE: Refer to the
discussions of IPB and OCOKA factors in Chapter 1 of this manual). The
TERRABASE program is a tremendous tool that can assist leaders in
terrain analysis. For example, TERRABASE can aid in analysis of
potential OP locations. In addition, it can be used on a potential
infiltration route to determine positions from which the route can be
observed; this will help identify danger areas and help focus the platoon’s
maneuver, observation, and indirect fire plans.
3-108. Prior to the infiltration, UAVs may be deployed to check these
danger areas and reconnoiter the infiltration route and influencing
terrain. This assists in refinement of the route. Coordination is made to
receive either video or photos from the UAV reconnaissance flights. GSR
and PROPHET are also deployed prior to infiltration to provide early
detection and location of possible threat forces operating in the area. The
platoon also requests intelligence updates through the S2 prior to
infiltration. The intelligence may come from numerous ISR assets that
have worked in the area in the past, to include prior HUMINT operations
that may have collected intelligence from the local inhabitants.
Checkpoints or TIRS/GIRS may be used to control and report movement
along the route. An initial rally point may be designated beyond the
passage lane; this point may also act as a casualty or maintenance
collection point. SOPs may dictate the use of checkpoints as rally points
as well. The quick reaction force (QRF) is also briefed and is provided
with an overlay of the infiltration route.
3-109. When the infiltration begins, the platoon, moving as a whole,
conducts a passage of lines and continues along the infiltration route (see
Figure 3-2A). Temporary halts are conducted throughout the movement
to allow dismounts to move forward of the vehicles to reconnoiter danger
areas. These danger areas may have been identified during the planning
phase through the use of TERRABASE or UAVs. Each section maneuvers

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to its proposed OP location and establishes the OP to observe its


designated NAIs. (NOTE: Refer to Chapter 5 of this manual for details
on occupying an OP.) As the initial section establishes its OP, it also
provides surveillance for those sections continuing on the infiltration
route. The next section follows the same procedures as the first section
until all sections have established their OPs. In the event COLTs/Strikers
are moving into sector to cover TAIs, which are tied to the scout NAIs,
they may use the same infiltration route and follow the same procedures
as the scout sections in establishing their positions.

NOTE: Although doctrine prescribes the use of infiltration lanes, a specific route may be
identified, as described in this example, to increase survivability and the chance for
success.

Figure 3-2A. Mounted Platoon Moving on an Infiltration Route

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3-110. Once established, OP1 observes NAIs 1 and 2, OP2 observes NAIs
3 and 1, and OP3 observes NAIs 2 and 3 (see Figure 3-2B). This
observation plan allows redundancy of observation of the NAIs and
enhances the platoon’s ability to conduct handover of contact from one OP
to another. OP1 must also be prepared to conduct handover of contact
with the elements to its rear. These potential actions are coordinated
prior to execution of the infiltration.

Figure 3-2B. NAI Observation Plan with Built-In Redundancy

3-111. Platoon Infiltration by Echelon. This example never has more


than one section moving at any time. Planning and coordination for the
infiltration is virtually the same as for the first example; the main
difference is that the platoon does not move as a whole. GSR, PROPHET,
and UAVs may be used throughout the infiltration process, but caution

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must be taken not to compromise the infiltration route by frequent UAV


flyovers.
3-112. At 1730 hours, a dismounted squad conducts a passage of lines
and moves along an infiltration route to establish OP1 (see Figure 3-2C).
Once established, this OP conducts surveillance along the mounted
infiltration route and reports its observations to assist the platoon leader
in refining the mounted infiltration plan. Elements of the platoon may act
as the QRF for this dismounted team.

Figure 3-2C. Initial Infiltration of Dismounted Team

3-113. At 2017, the first mounted section begins its infiltration along the
designated route, moving to OP2 (see Figure 3-2D) with the dismounts at
OP1 providing surveillance. OP1 is also prepared to support the first
mounted section’s actions on contact with preplotted indirect fires if

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needed. Once the first mounted section is established at OP2, OP1 may
also handle communications retrans duty as required.

Figure 3-2D. Infiltration of Mounted Section

3-114. The second mounted section begins infiltration at 0115 along the
previously employed route. OP1 and OP2 provide surveillance for its
movement to OP3 (see Figure 3-2E).

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Figure 3-2E. Infiltration by Second Mounted Section

3-115. At 0325, the third section infiltrates along the same, successful
route with OP1, OP2, and OP3 providing surveillance. If OP1 is not
needed to conduct retrans, the third section picks the dismounted team
up and proceeds to OP4. Establishment of all OPs is completed no later
than 0500 with redundant observation on NAIs 1, 2, and 3 (refer to
Figure 3-2F).

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Figure 3-2F. Completed Infiltration with


Redundant Observation of NAIs

EXFILTRATION
3-116. The reconnaissance platoon and its elements may have to conduct
exfiltration in several types of tactical situations. For example,
reconnaissance forces that infiltrate the threat main battle area or rear
area must exfiltrate once they gather the required information. In
another instance, the platoon may be deliberately employed in a stay-
behind mode during defensive operations, forcing it to use exfiltration to
return to friendly lines.

Planning Considerations
3-117. In all situations, exfiltration must be planned as carefully as
infiltration. An effective exfiltration plan is essential in terms of mission
accomplishment and morale. In most cases, planning for an exfiltration
operation begins at the same time as planning for the infiltration (or

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other tactical operation) that precedes it. For example, the platoon leader
must anticipate contingency measures that may be required if his
elements must conduct an unplanned exfiltration during a
reconnaissance operation. His exfiltration plan should factor in additional
time that the platoon may need to react to unforeseen circumstances,
such as inadvertent contact with threat forces or unexpected restricted
terrain. Whether the platoon plans to exfiltrate on foot or by another
transport method (ground vehicles, aircraft, or watercraft), detailed
planning is required to establish criteria for a passage of lines to
minimize the chances of fratricide. The exfiltrating force must also be
prepared to conduct additional planning once the operation is under way,
particularly if threat contact occurs.
3-118. The exfiltration plan should also cover other types of
contingencies that will not require the platoon to exfiltrate. For example,
when a section or squad repeatedly misses mandatory radio contact, it
must be assumed that the element has a communications problem, is in
trouble, or both. The exfiltration plan might address this situation by
calling for a resupply drop of new batteries and another means of
communication at a predetermined location. The plan would mandate
that the resupply location be specially marked to ensure that the
equipment does not fall into threat hands.

Movement Considerations
3-119. The principles of route selection, movement formations, and
movement security are critical to the success of the exfiltration operation.
Plans for extraction by applicable means (ground, air, or water) must be
developed before the operation, covering procedural contingencies such as
the loss of vehicles, evacuation of sick and wounded personnel, and
disruption of communications. These plans should address various
contingencies for movement, such as the possibility that the platoon may
be able to exfiltrate intact or the option of breaking into smaller groups to
avoid detection. Elements may use successful infiltration routes as their
exfiltration routes as well. Planning should also include identifying
casualty collection points and emergency resupply points along
exfiltration routes, providing supporting elements with a more secure,
stealthy route into the sector to conduct these support operations.

Routes and Pickup Points


3-120. The methods that the platoon uses for exfiltration route selection
are the same as those discussed for infiltration earlier in this section. The
platoon leader ensures that primary and alternate linkup points are not
on a single azimuth leading away from the OP or exfiltration route.
3-121. Exfiltration pickup points for dismounted personnel should be far
enough away from the OP to ensure that the threat does not hear vehicle
or helicopter noises. The exfiltrating force should use mountains, dense
foliage, and other terrain features to screen these noises. Under normal
conditions in flat, open terrain on a clear night, rotary-wing aircraft lose
most of their audio signature at a distance of approximately five
kilometers.

Methods of Exfiltration
3-122. Exfiltration can be conducted by air, water, or land. Each
alternative presents the platoon with specific operational considerations

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as well as tactical advantages and disadvantages. The exfiltration plan


and the OPORD must address these factors as well as operational
contingencies such as actions the reconnaissance unit will take if an
unplanned exfiltration becomes necessary.
3-123. Extraction by air or water means is favored when the resources
are available and their use will not compromise the mission. These
methods are used when long distances must be covered, when time of
return is essential, when the exfiltration zone lacks adequate cover and
concealment, when the threat does not have air or naval superiority, or
when complex terrain or heavily populated hostile areas obstruct ground
exfiltration.
3-124. Reconnaissance forces normally conduct exfiltration via land
routes when friendly lines are close or no other extraction method is
feasible. Ground exfiltration is preferred when areas along the route are
largely uninhabited, when threat forces are widely dispersed or under
such pressure that they cannot conduct counterreconnaissance and
security operations, or when terrain is sufficiently restricted to degrade
threat efforts to use mobile forces against the exfiltrating reconnaissance
unit.

Emergency Exfiltration
3-125. The platoon may have to conduct emergency exfiltration if it is
detected or engaged by a threat force. This type of operation requires
activation of an escape and evasion plan or deployment of a reaction or
support force to assist with the extraction of friendly elements.
Employment of the reaction force and supporting fires must be carefully
coordinated and rehearsed before the infiltration (or other tactical
mission, if applicable) is initiated.

SECTION III – MULTIDIMENSIONAL ASPECTS OF RECONNAISSANCE


AND SURVEILLANCE

3-126. The multidimensional aspect of operations is part of all


reconnaissance platoon missions. The term “multidimensional” refers to
the directed effort, during the conduct of reconnaissance or surveillance
operations, to obtain detailed information on an area. This effort covers
all types of threat forces (military, paramilitary, criminal, and other
types), civilian (social/human) demographics, infrastructure (including
utilities, transportation, and the political, economic, and agricultural
situation), routes, obstacles, and terrain. Planning and execution of any
reconnaissance or surveillance mission must always take into account the
multidimensional aspect of the operation. In turn, the multidimensional
aspect must include the effective integration and employment of the full
range of ISR assets, including TUAVs and sensors.
3-127. This discussion is primarily for recce platoons, even though all
reconnaissance platoons must understand the multidimensional aspect of
reconnaissance operations and be prepared to execute it to benefit their
operations. Because of its unique organization, which includes organic
HUMINT collectors, the recce platoon is ideally suited to focus on the

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multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance and surveillance operations.


Recce platoons primarily operate in areas with reduced threat levels.
They enhance situational awareness by working closely with their
HUMINT soldiers to collect and assess information through contact with
community leaders and the local populace. Reconnaissance platoons that
do not have organic HUMINT collectors must be prepared to have these
assets attached and then be able to employ them properly to execute
conduct liaison operations, conduct tactical questioning, or identify
HUMINT information requirements. In addition, it is extremely
important that all types of reconnaissance platoons fully understand the
commander’s focus for the reconnaissance two levels up and that they
understand the operational considerations of civil-military operations.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
3-128. The multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance is deliberate and
detailed. It requires the platoon leader and other leaders within the
platoon, specifically the HUMINT collectors, to develop relationships with
local military/civilian leaders to determine information that may be
pertinent to troop, squadron, and brigade operations. The HUMINT
collectors are the subject matter experts in dealing with the local
populace; they provide training so the platoon’s scouts can operate
effectively in large populated areas where multidimensional information
is key to operational success. In these areas, soldier-based, human-
intensive intelligence compensates for the limitations of equipment-based
sensors, which are better suited for providing situational awareness in
open and rolling terrain for conventional force-on-force operations.
3-129. The multidimensional facet of reconnaissance expands on the
traditional forms of reconnaissance by acquainting the platoon’s soldiers
with the local populace throughout the area of operations; the threat level
will greatly influence the level of interaction between reconnaissance
elements and the populace of the area. Understanding this human
dimension of the environment (political, religious, ethnic, criminal, and
transnational) will be a key factor in the analysis of threat centers of
gravity and the execution of decisive operations. The ability to conduct
the multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance can assist the commander
in defeating or countering asymmetrical threats. In addition, the
multidimensional aspect of any reconnaissance or surveillance mission
can greatly enhance situational awareness at all levels by gaining
operational information from previously untapped sources. On the other
hand, multidimensional reconnaissance can become an inordinately time-
consuming process without specific, precisely focused guidance from the
platoon’s higher command; refer to the discussion of essential
commander’s guidance earlier in this chapter.

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES
Human Intelligence
3-130. HUMINT is the intelligence, to include adversary intentions,
derived from information collected from people and related documents. It
is the oldest collection discipline and is a key contributor to the
intelligence picture of the battlefield. HUMINT uses passively and
actively acquired human sources to gather information to answer

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intelligence requirements and to cross-cue other intelligence disciplines.


HUMINT tasks include, but are not limited to, the following:

· Source operations using tactical and other developed sources.


· Liaison with host-nation (HN) officials and allied counterparts.
· Elicitation of information from the civilian populace,
including transients.
· Debriefing of US and allied forces and civilian personnel.
· Interrogation of EPWs and detainees.
· Exploitation of adversary and open-source documents, media,
and material.

Counterintelligence (Within the SBCT’s MI Company)


3-131. Counterintelligence (CI) is a multidiscipline function whose
purpose is to detect, identify, assess, counter, neutralize, or exploit the
intelligence collection efforts of competitors, opponents, adversaries, and
enemies. It is the key intelligence community asset to protect the force
against espionage and other intelligence activities, as well as against
sabotage or assassination. CI helps to guard against these dangers when
they are conducted by or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or
persons, or international terrorist groups. CI agents use HUMINT
collection in some aspects of their collection and investigative mission. CI
tasks include the following:

· Intelligence support to assessments of vulnerability and


OPSEC requirements.
· Investigations of security violations and employment
suitability of local nationals.
· Multidiscipline counterintelligence analysis.
· Liaison with other service and HN counterintelligence
organizations.
· Limited counter-HUMINT operations.

Intelligence Activities
3-132. HUMINT and CI operations may entail some or all of these
activities:
· Interrogation and debriefing. These activities involve the
systematic questioning of individuals to obtain information
related to specific collection requirements. Sources who are in
the custody of US forces, such as EPWs and civilian
detainees, are interrogated. All other sources are debriefed;
these include friendly forces, civilian refugees, and local
inhabitants.
· Tactical questioning. This is an abbreviated form of
interrogation or debriefing used to collect PIR-related
information from human sources.
· Source operations. These are collection operations using
recruited and registered HUMINT sources. The registration

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of sources is a legal requirement in any sustained use of a


specific individual as a source.

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PERSONNEL


3-133. The recce platoon’s organic HUMINT collectors, who are
specifically trained in military intelligence (MI) operations, maximize its
effectiveness in multidimensional aspects of reconnaissance missions. It
is impossible to overemphasize the importance of properly using these
personnel. While the platoon leader is not likely to have the time to be an
expert on every aspect of MI operations, he must be proficient in
HUMINT and CI training, operations, and implementation.

NOTE: Unless noted as otherwise, the term “HUMINT collector” refers to personnel in
MOSs 351E and 97E/B. The term “counterintelligence collector” or “CI agent” refers
strictly to those in MOSs 35E, 351B, and 97B.

HUMINT Personnel and Missions


3-134. HUMINT collectors, either through training or by occupying
specific positions such as an S2, are tasked with collecting information for
intelligence use from people or related documents. (NOTE: A HUMINT
source is anyone who can provide information to answer collection
requirements.) As noted, HUMINT collectors also assist CI personnel at
the MI company in detecting and countering the intelligence collection
efforts of outside elements, especially threat forces.
3-135. The four HUMINT collectors in the recce platoon provide the
squadron with an organic, trained HUMINT/CI collection capability. The
intelligence collectors will normally be distributed as one per recce squad,
but they can be task organized based on METT-TC to concentrate
collection capability as needed to meet specific mission parameters. The
senior HUMINT/CI collection NCO advises the platoon leader on
intelligence collection operations, provides initial assessment and quality
control of HUMINT/CI collection and source spotting, and acts as the
platoon HUMINT/CI trainer.
3-136. The HUMINT collector’s mission within the platoon includes the
following general tasks:

· Collect information of immediate tactical value from EPWs,


civilian detainees, refugees, and civilians on the battlefield.
· Collect information of immediate tactical value from foreign
documents.
· Assist in the debriefing of friendly forces, such as patrols.
· Identify individuals for potential detailed exploitation by the
CI teams in the brigade’s MI company.

3-137. Specific missions for HUMINT collectors (MOS 351E/97E) in an


MTW include, but are not limited to, the following:

· Conducting tactical questioning.


· Conducting interrogation of EPWs and civilian detainees.
· Debriefing or interviewing civilians on the battlefield.

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FM 3-20.98 ___________________________________________________________________________

· Debriefing friendly forces.


· Conducting HUMINT analysis.
· Conducting document exploitation.

CI Personnel and Missions


3-138. As noted, CI collectors/agents (MOS 351B/97B/35E) are organic to
the SBCT’s MI company. Specific missions for CI teams in the MTW
include, but are not limited to, these:

· Identifying and recommending countermeasures to threat


intelligence collection efforts.
· Conducting CI investigations.
· Conducting CI analysis.
· Providing CI support to threat and vulnerability analysis.

HUMINT OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS


3-139. The recce platoon leader conducts HUMINT collection activities
to gather the information he needs to make decisions in support of the
overall mission. HUMINT activities help the platoon leader shape the
battlefield by providing information that enables him to respond to
previously unforeseen threats. He focuses the HUMINT effort by
carefully assigning missions and clearly defining the desired results. In
orienting the unit’s HUMINT capabilities, he must decide who or what
will be advantageous targets for collection activities.

Role of HUMINT Collectors


3-140. The platoon’s HUMINT soldiers, who can be augmented by
interrogators (from the MI company) when available, conduct collection
operations in support of the overall mission. These operations rely on the
use of both casual and recruited sources of information. The collection
effort includes liaison activities; the debriefing of refugees, civilian
detainees, and EPWs; review of open source literature; and document
exploitation. These operations use the techniques identified in FM 2-22.2
(FM 34-5) (S). Other resources include AR 381-172 (S), which covers
policy concerning counterintelligence force protection source operations
(CFSO), and AR 381-10, which outlines policies and procedures governing
the conduct of intelligence activities by DA.
3-141. In addition, during the planning process, the platoon leader must
be aware of the combat multiplier capability that his HUMINT assets
provide. In this role, the platoon’s HUMINT personnel conduct the
following tasks:

· Support to combating terrorism.


· Support to rear operations.
· Support to civil-military operations (discussed later in this
section).
· Support to operations security (OPSEC).
· Support to information operations.
· Support to domestic civil disturbances.

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· Liaison.
· Local operational data collection.
· Debriefing and interrogation.
· Threat assessment.
· Assessment of the HUMINT threat in the area of operations.

HUMINT Sources
3-142. To satisfy command PIR, HUMINT personnel should be prepared
to use all sources of information consistent with mission, policy, and
resources. These sources include the following:

· Casual source. A casual source is one who, by social or


professional position, has access to information of CI interest,
usually on a continuing basis. Casual sources usually can be
relied on to provide information that is routinely available to
them. They are under no obligation to provide information.
Casual sources include private citizens, such as retired
officials or other prominent residents of an area. Members of
private organizations also may furnish information of value.
· Official sources. These are liaison contacts. CI personnel
conduct liaison with foreign and domestic CI intelligence,
security, and law enforcement agencies to exchange
information and obtain assistance. CI personnel are
interested in investigative, operational, and threat
information.
· Recruited sources. These include sources who support
CFSO, as identified in FM 34-5 (S). By design, CFSOs entail
the use of human source networks, dispersed throughout the
area, that can provide timely and pertinent force protection
information.
· Refugees, civilian detainees, and EPWs. Interrogators
normally conduct collection operations with these sources,
often with technical assistance from a CI agent. The key to
identifying the source of valuable CI force protection
information is in analyzing the information being sought and
predicting which potential sources, by virtue of their regular
duties, would have regular, frequent, and unquestioned
access to such information.
· Open source publications. These printed materials, as well
as radio and television broadcasts, are valuable sources of
information of CI interest and operational information. When
information is presented in a foreign language, linguist
support is required for timely translation. Depending on the
resources, this support can be provided by interrogation
personnel, allied personnel, indigenous employees, or reserve
component (RC) translators (MOS 97L).
· Documents not openly available. Such sources as
adversary plans and reports are exploited in much the same
way as open source publications.

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Reconnaissance Support Activities


3-143. In military urban operations, people (EPWs and civilians) are the
preeminent source of information. HUMINT collection provides
information not otherwise available through SIGINT and image
intelligence (IMINT). When a lodgment is made in a building, the
HUMINT collectors move in and are readily available to interrogate
EPWs, persuade holdouts to surrender, and help with the questioning
and evacuation of noncombatants that are encountered in the building.
They collect information on floor plans, defensive plans, and locations of
combatants and noncombatants in the building and surrounding
neighborhood.
3-144. Another focus of the HUMINT teams is intelligence support to
force protection. The teams establish a network of force protection
sources, debrief casual sources, and interview/debrief local national
employees. The information they collect helps to enhance the security
posture of US forces, to provide information in response to command
collection requirements, and to provide early warning of threats to US
forces.
3-145. As noted, the HUMINT collectors organic to the recce platoon will
normally be allocated to individual reconnaissance squads as necessary.
They provide the platoon with language and tactical questioning ability.
They also debrief friendly forces and translate and exploit foreign
documents. Another important function is to identify individuals as
potential force protection sources to be more fully exploited by the
HUMINT platoon in the brigade’s MI company.

HUMINT Assessment Forms


3-146. Higher headquarters may provide assessment forms to further
focus HUMINT collection efforts. These products help the platoon to
gather information on enemy, terrain, society, and/or infrastructure in an
urban environment. They also address the requirement to identify the
basic human needs of the society (such as food, water, and shelter). This
information gives the higher command the ability to influence the society
based on these identified needs. Figure 3-3 shows an example of a
HUMINT collection and assessment form. For further discussion of these
forms, refer to FM 3-20.971.

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Figure 3-3. HUMINT Urban Assessment Form

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FM 3-20.98 ___________________________________________________________________________

Figure 3-3. HUMINT Urban Assessment Form (Continued)

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Figure 3-3. HUMINT Urban Assessment Form (Continued)

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FM 3-20.98 ___________________________________________________________________________

Figure 3-3. HUMINT Urban Assessment Form (Continued)

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
3-147. When they take part in civil-military operations, military
elements, including the reconnaissance platoon, will encounter a number

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of factors that they seldom face in any other setting. This discussion
covers some of these crucial, but often subtle, considerations.

Local Cultural Factors


3-148. One problem encountered by the reconnaissance platoon is
adapting to the local culture. Each culture has its own peculiar customs
and courtesies. While they may seem insignificant to US personnel, these
customs and courtesies are very important to local nationals.
Understanding a country’s culture and adhering to its etiquette are very
important. What is socially acceptable behavior in the US could very well
be offensive in other cultures. Knowing the local culture helps the platoon
understand the behavior and mentality of a liaison source. It also helps in
gaining rapport and avoiding embarrassment for both the liaison source
and the platoon. In many cultures, embarrassing a guest causes “loss of
face.” This inevitably undermines rapport and may cause irreparable
harm to the liaison effort.
3-149. The platoon may have to adapt to unfamiliar food, drink,
etiquette, social customs, and protocol. While some societies make
adjustments for an “ignorant foreigner,” many expect an official visitor to
be aware of local customs. Platoon personnel must make an effort to
avoid cultural shock when confronted by situations completely alien to
their background. They also must be able to adjust to a wide variety of
personalities.

Local Agencies, Organizations, and Individuals


3-150. The platoon also must understand the capabilities of outside
agencies involved in civil-military operations. Knowledge of the liaison
source’s capabilities in terms of mission, human resources, equipment,
and training is essential in the process of requesting information or
services. Information exchanged during the conduct of liaison activities is
frequently sanitized. Information concerning sources, job specialties, and
other sensitive material relating to the originator’s operations may be
deleted. This practice is common to every intelligence organization
worldwide and should be taken into account when analyzing information
provided by another agency.
3-151. The platoon may also have to deal with individuals who have had
no previous contact with US agencies and who are unsure of how to deal
with a US intelligence soldier. In their work with liaison sources, platoon
soldiers must remember that they represent the people, culture, and
government of the entire nation. The liaison source assumes the behavior
of the platoon to be typical of all Americans. Once the American identity
becomes tarnished, it will be difficult to regain rapport, not only for the
platoon and its soldiers but for other American individuals and
organizations as well.
3-152. The platoon leader and his HUMINT soldiers must be aware of
any known or hidden agendas of the individuals or organizations with
which they conduct liaison. Furthermore, jealousy between agencies is
often a problem. Platoon personnel must never play favorites and never
play one agency against another.

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Corruption, Bribery, and Gifts


3-153. Corruption is the impairment of integrity, virtue, or moral
principle or the inducement to wrong by bribery or other unlawful or
improper means. In some countries, government corruption is a way of
life. The reconnaissance platoon must be familiar with these customs if
indications of bribery, extortion, petty theft of government goods and
funds, or similar incidents are discovered in the course of liaison. When
corruption is discovered, the platoon leader must request command
guidance before continuing liaison with the particular individual or
organization. Regardless of the circumstances, all platoon soldiers must
exercise caution and professionalism when they encounter corruption.
3-154. Occasionally, because of the close professional relationships
developed during civil-military operations, a source may wish to present a
personal gift. If possible, platoon personnel should diplomatically refuse
the gift. If that is not possible, such as when rapport might be
compromised, the soldier can accept the gift. Any gifts received must be
reported in accordance with AR 1-100; they can be kept only if higher
authorities approve a request to do so.

Records and Reporting


3-155. Complete and accurate records and reports are essential in
maintaining the continuity of civil-military operations, including
intelligence collection and liaison. All records must contain information
on agencies contacted. It is preferable to have a file on each organization
or individual contacted to provide a quick reference concerning location,
organization, mission, and similar intelligence-related information. Limit
information to name, position, organization, and contact procedures when
the liaison is a US representative. For contacts with foreign sources, use
the formal administrative, operational, and information reporting
procedures outlined in FM 2-22.2 (FM 34-5).

LIAISON OPERATIONS
3-156. Liaison with appropriate US, host-nation, and allied military and
civilian agencies is fundamental to the success of civil-military
operations, including the multidimensional effort. Without the support of
the local government and authorities, attempts to win the cooperation of
the populace are almost certainly doomed to failure. In many cases, full-
time liaison officers (LO) or sections are necessary to maintain regular
contact with appropriate organizations and individuals. In addition to
national agencies, numerous local agencies and organizations also
provide assistance and information.
3-157. A basic tenet of liaison is the quid pro quo (meaning “something
for something”) exchange. While the LO sometimes encounters
individuals who cooperate out of a sense of duty or for unknown reasons
of their own, an exchange of information, services, material, or other
assistance normally is part of the interaction. The nature of this
exchange varies widely, depending on the locations, cultures, and
personalities involved.

Critical Tasks
3-158. The recce platoon and its HUMINT assets may be tasked to
conduct liaison activities, either for the platoon’s own operations or in

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support of higher missions. The IR and PIR must be identified and


defined by the platoon. Critical tasks in liaison operations include the
following:

· Identify key authority figures. Purpose: To assist in


developing a list of priority contacts within the area of
operations to facilitate mission success.
· Match liaison personnel with each contact. Purpose: To
facilitate the communication between local factions and the
US forces operating in the area of operations.
· Evaluate contacts. Purpose: To determine the capabilities of
each contact within the area of operations and to ascertain
the influence the contact has within the community.
· Establish each liaison/contact agenda. Purpose: To
determine the end state for each contact. Once this is
established, the liaison officer knows how to conduct himself
at meetings.
· Identify information requirements. Purpose: To assist in
defining the scope of liaison activities. These can be developed
through liaison with the civilian/military agency based on
guidance from the higher and platoon OPORDs.
· Use available HUMINT collection assets. Purpose: To
assist with liaison, develop IR, or debrief reconnaissance
patrols.

Role of the Recce Platoon and its Intelligence Assets


3-159. The recce platoon’s HUMINT soldiers conduct liaison to obtain
information, gain assistance, coordinate or procure material, and
exchange views necessary to understand the liaison counterparts with
whom friendly forces must work. All of these activities are essential for
successful reconnaissance missions. Operational benefits derived from
using the platoon’s HUMINT assets in liaison activities include the
following:

· Establishing working relationships with various commands,


agencies, or governments.
· Exchanging operational information and intelligence within
policy guidelines.
· Facilitating access to records and personnel of other agencies
not otherwise available. Access includes gaining information
via other agencies when cultural or ethnic constraints
preclude effective use of US personnel.
· Acquiring information to satisfy troop and squadron
intelligence collection requirements.

3-160. Recce platoon leaders who task HUMINT assets with liaison
should provide the following guidance:

· Liaison objectives. Liaison objectives are the types of


information to be collected, the methods of operations unique
to the area, and the command objectives to be accomplished.

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· Limitations on liaison activities. These limitations


include the following:
n Prohibitions against collection of specific types of
information or against contacting certain types of
individuals or organizations.
n Delineation of areas of responsibility of other elements.
· Authority. The platoon leader must define the authority
under which the specific liaison program is conducted as well
as guidelines for joint and combined operations.
· Applicable ROE/ROI.
· Additional factors. The platoon leader should outline SOPs
for related aspects, such as intelligence information reporting
procedures and areas of responsibility and jurisdiction.

3-161. The nature of intelligence-collection activities and the many legal


restrictions imposed, including SOFAs or other agreements, make success
of these activities largely dependent on effective liaison. During
transition from increased tension to open hostilities, the liaison emphasis
shifts to support the platoon leader. HUMINT soldiers must establish
liaison with appropriate agencies before the outbreak of hostilities.
Information and cooperation gained during this period can have a major
impact on the effectiveness of both intelligence and combat operations.
3-162. Liaison with foreign organizations and individuals normally
requires foreign language proficiency, a highly desirable capability for
HUMINT soldiers. It is easier to deal with a liaison source if the LO or
intelligence collector can speak directly to the source rather than rely on
an interpreter. Even if the LO is not fluent, the liaison source usually
appreciates the LO’s effort to learn and speak the language. This often
enhances rapport.

Example Liaison Techniques and Procedures


3-163. The following example illustrates the techniques and steps
involved in liaison operations. It is meant to be a guide and should be
modified to fit individual METT-TC conditions. The majority of the steps
are geared toward a stability operation because, under these conditions,
there are more things to consider. This example liaison operation,
however, can and should be modified to meet the operational
requirements of the specific tactical situation. Steps in the liaison
operation may include the following:

· Higher headquarters determines liaison requirements, which


are then refined by the platoon leadership (platoon leader,
HUMINT NCO, PSG).
n Identifies military forces, civil authorities, religious
leaders, ethnic groups, local factions, and NGOs operating
in the area of responsibility (AOR).
n Develops liaison requirements and contact frequency for
elements in the AOR.
n Establishes times and locations for initial liaison contacts
with elements.

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· Unit conducts liaison activities.


n Maintains a positive, cooperative image of the unit and
other friendly forces with the population in the AOR.
- Ensures uniforms and personal appearance are
professionally maintained.
- Provides communication and transportation for
liaison elements.
- Ensures LOs and all soldiers know current political
and military situation.
- Enforces the mandate, ROI, ROE, terms of reference
(TOR), and status of forces agreement (SOFA) in all
dealings with liaison counterparts.
n Complies with requests for liaison assistance from the
civil population if consistent with unit constraints.
(NOTE: This may not be possible in SSC or similar
tactical environments.)
- Establishes an on-call liaison to respond to crises that
develop in the unit AOR.
- Updates the platoon/troop situation map for current
locations of liaison contacts.
- Ensures that LOs do not deploy beyond range of the
platoon/troop quick reaction force response.
- Ensures that LOs are prepared to cope with hijacking
or kidnapping.
n Coordinates with observer teams operating in the unit
AOR, as required.
- Identifies UN military observer (UNMO) teams
operating in the unit AOR.
- Establishes contact with UNMOs at checkpoints or as
specified in the regional force SOP.
- Exchanges information on military, paramilitary, and
mass civilian movements; minefields and obstacles;
intentions and missions of belligerents; and locations
of key faction force leaders.
n Stabilizes areas identified as having escalating tension.
- Identifies potential “hot spots” of increased tension.
- Determines which factions may be involved and the
regions affected.
- Designates forces to stabilize the area, within
capability, or requests additional support.
- Coordinates with belligerents to resolve real or
perceived problems.
- Reports developments of any destabilizing situation to
higher headquarters, as required.
- Contacts forces or civilians involved.

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- Establishes an upgraded alert status and security


awareness of units in the affected area and in
adjacent areas, as needed.
- Dispatches LOs to all elements involved.
· Unit employs LOs to initiate coordination for negotiations or
dispute resolution using neutral facilities.
n Identifies all units, agencies, and individuals within the
sector with whom liaison or coordination must be
conducted.
n Specifies linkup times and locations.
n Develops an agenda for liaison meetings.
n Complies with local protocols and established limits of
support in accordance with TORs, SOFAs, or other
directives.
n Maintains continuous contact until disputes are resolved
and/or tensions are reduced.
· Unit coordinates a meeting with local officials.
n Directs that only major problems be brought to the attention
of LOs and local liaison counterparts and then only after
subordinates have been unable to resolve the issues.
n Demonstrates resolve, confidence, commitment, and
concern for local customs and people living in the AOR by
attending major local events.
n Implements immediate response to any serious breach of
trust, confidence, or deception that has occurred.

SECTION IV – ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE

3-164. The reconnaissance platoon conducts a route reconnaissance to


gain detailed information about a specific route or axis as well as the
terrain on both sides of the route that the enemy could use to influence
movement on the route. The platoon is usually tasked with this type of
reconnaissance when the commander wants to use a certain route, but
first wants to make sure that the route is free of obstacles and threat
forces and that it will support the movement of his vehicles. Because of
the large number of critical tasks associated with route reconnaissance,
the platoon normally can conduct detailed reconnaissance of only one
route.
3-165. An exception is the recce platoon, which can conduct
reconnaissance of a single route by itself only in a permissive
environment. When contact is likely, the recce platoon requires
augmentation, either a section from another recce platoon or an engineer
attachment, to conduct the route reconnaissance. In the nonpermissive
environment, the platoon can assist in the troop mission of route
reconnaissance by conducting reconnaissance of the route or providing
security; this allows the troop to reconnoiter one or two routes depending

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on the likelihood of contact. As an alternative when augmentation is not


available, the recce platoon can conduct a route classification in which
lateral routes are not cleared.

CRITICAL TASKS
3-166. During a route reconnaissance, the reconnaissance platoon must
be prepared to accomplish a wide range of tasks. Based on the time
available and the commander’s intent, however, the platoon may be
directed to conduct the reconnaissance to acquire specific information
only. To be ready for either type of situation, the platoon leader must
clearly understand the following critical tasks that may have to be
accomplished in a route reconnaissance:

· Determine the trafficability of the route.


· Reconnoiter all built-up areas along the route.
· Reconnoiter, to the limit of direct fire range, terrain that
dominates the route.
· Reconnoiter, to the limit of direct fire range, all lateral routes.
· Inspect and classify all bridges on the route.
· Locate fords or crossing sites near all bridges on the route.
· Inspect and classify all overpasses, underpasses, and culverts.
· Reconnoiter all defiles along the route.
· Locate minefields, and other obstacles, along the route.
· Locate a bypass around built-up areas, obstacles, restrictions,
and contaminated areas.
· Report route information.
· Find and report all threat forces that can influence movement
along the route.

NOTE: Refer to Chapter 9 of this manual for a detailed discussion of route overlays and
related information.

TECHNIQUES
3-167. Because of the number of critical tasks that must be
accomplished, the reconnaissance platoon, such as a recce platoon(+), can
conduct a detailed reconnaissance of only one route. The following
discussion outlines techniques of getting all the tasks accomplished as
rapidly and securely as possible.
3-168. The order the platoon leader receives specifies the route the
platoon must reconnoiter and defines the route from the SP to the release
point (RP). Additionally, the order may specify platoon boundaries, phase
lines, an LD, and a limit of advance (LOA) or reconnaissance objective.
These control measures specify how much terrain on both sides of the
route the platoon must reconnoiter and where the operation must begin
and end.
3-169. The boundaries are drawn on both sides and include the terrain
that dominates the route. They usually extend out to include terrain from
which a threat force, based on the maximum effective range of its direct

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fire weapons, may influence the route. This ensures that the scouts
reconnoiter all terrain that the threat could use to influence movement
along the route. The LD is drawn from one boundary to the other behind
the SP. This allows the platoon to cross the LD and be fully deployed
before reaching the route. The LOA or objective is placed beyond the RP
on the last terrain feature that dominates the route or at a location out to
about 3 kilometers.
3-170. The platoon leader may add additional phase lines, contact
points, and checkpoints to the graphics he receives from his commander.
Phase lines are used to help control the maneuver of the platoon. The
contact points ensure that the sections or squads maintain contact at
particular critical points. Checkpoints are used along the route or on
specific terrain to control movement or to designate areas that must be
reconnoitered.
3-171. In coordination with the FSO, the platoon leader plans artillery
targets on known or suspected threat positions and on dominant terrain
throughout the area of operations. The platoon leader evaluates the
factors of METT-TC to select a platoon organization. He must ensure that
at least one section has responsibility for reconnoitering the route.
3-172. A three-section organization is usually the type best suited for
reconnaissance of one route. One section reconnoiters the terrain on the
left side of the route, another covers the terrain on the right side, and the
third section reconnoiters the route and controls the movement of the
other two. In this organization, the platoon leader’s section has specific
responsibility to reconnoiter the route.

NOTE: The first example of route reconnaissance in the following discussion is for a recce
platoon in a permissive environment. As noted, an unaugmented recce platoon
cannot reconnoiter a route by itself in a nonpermissive environment; it takes part in
a route reconnaissance as part of a larger force, such as a recce troop. This second
example is for a CFV platoon in a higher threat environment.

EXAMPLE OF A RECCE PLATOON ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE


3-173. In this low threat scenario, a recce platoon has been ordered to
conduct classification of a route in the troop sector. The situation is
permissive, and the troop’s area of operations is considered friendly. The
troop has one platoon conducting checkpoint operations and one acting as
squadron quick reaction force, leaving the route reconnaissance platoon
operating independently. The troop commander has provided the tempo
and engagement criteria and has focused the platoon leader on
confirming trafficability of the route to vehicles within the SBCT,
identifying key terrain along the route, and surveying the citizens of
communities along the route to determine their feelings concerning
upcoming elections. The troop commander is clear in his guidance that
the platoon leader is to stay on hard surface roads.
3-174. The platoon leader organizes the platoon into two sections, which
move using the traveling overwatch technique. Bravo section, consisting
of the PSG and his wingman, take the lead while Alpha section,
consisting of the platoon leader and his wingman, provide overwatch. The

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platoon leader reports when the platoon arrives at and crosses the SP.
(See Figure 3-4A.)

Figure 3-4A. Recce Route Reconnaissance (Part One)

3-175. The platoon leader is responsible for the recce platoon’s


movement through the sector. He uses checkpoints to control and report
the platoon’s movement and to focus on key terrain or features that may
influence movement along the route.
3-176. Bravo section moves along the route at a speed dictated by the
platoon leader in his OPORD. The platoon makes steady progress until
checkpoint 3, which is a small village. There the platoon halts,
consolidates, and conducts HUMINT operations. The platoon leader, two
scouts from his vehicle, his HUMINT collector, and his interpreter walk
to the police chief’s office to let him know their intentions and to find out
if he knows of any obstructions along the route. (See Figure 3-4B.)

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Figure 3-4B. Recce route reconnaissance (part two)

3-177. The police chief identifies an obstacle north of checkpoint 4 and


shows the platoon leader the route the locals use to bypass the obstacle.
Additionally, two dismounted patrols move through opposite sides of the
village conducting HUMINT operations and area assessment. One squad
is left to provide vehicle security and maintain communications with the
troop CP. The platoon leader contacts the troop commander and relays
the information he learned from the police chief. The troop commander
tells him to verify the obstacle and continue his mission on the new route.
The patrols return, and the platoon continues its mission. (NOTE: Refer
to the discussion of urban operations in Chapter 7 of this manual.) North
of checkpoint 4, the platoon identifies the complex wire and mine
obstacle. The platoon sketches the obstacle from the road, but based on

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the troop commander’s guidance, it does not search for an immediate


bypass. (See Figure 3-4C.)

Figure 3-4C. Recce Route Reconnaissance (Part Three)

3-178. When the sketch is complete, the platoon moves back along the
route to the bypass indicated by the police chief. The platoon continues its
mission, stopping one more time to conduct HUMINT operations at the
village west of checkpoint 6 before returning to the base camp. Once the
platoon has closed on the base camp, the platoon leader submits a
reconnaissance overlay (refer to the discussion and illustrations in
Chapter 9 of this manual) and reports to the troop CP to be debriefed by
the troop HUMINT NCO.

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EXAMPLE OF A CFV PLATOON ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE


3-179. The following example of route reconnaissance is for a cavalry
scout platoon. Refer to Figures 3-5A through 3-5H for an illustration of
this situation.
3-180. When the platoon conducts a route reconnaissance, it often
deploys in a vee formation because of the very focused nature of this
mission. Section A is positioned to the left of the route, Section B to the
right, and Section C in the center of the zone along Route SABER. The
platoon should deploy into formation before reaching LD PATTON so that
it crosses the LD at the specified time. The platoon leader reports
crossing the LD when the first element crosses it (see Figure 3-5A). The
platoon leader is responsible for the platoon’s movement through the
sector. He uses checkpoints to control the movement and to focus on key
terrain or features that may influence movement along the route.
3-181. Section C should be positioned along the route so it can observe
the route, and one element of the section must physically drive the entire
route. Unless the sector is very small or very open, the platoon will move
as individual sections. As the sections move to the checkpoints, they
maneuver in a zigzag pattern to reconnoiter the sector and accomplish all
critical tasks of a route reconnaissance. The lead sections, on the flanks,
must observe the route and report any restrictions or obstacles that may
restrict movement along the route. Visually clearing the route before
Section C travels it provides for better security and allows Section C to
concentrate on the critical reconnaissance tasks. As the lead sections
maneuver toward the checkpoints, they maintain visual contact with the
route (see Figure 3-5B).
3-182. After both lead sections report “SET” and are in overwatch
positions, Section C begins the route reconnaissance (see Figure 3-5C). As
the section leader moves along Route SABER, his wingman maneuvers to
provide overwatch for the section leader. During the reconnaissance, the
platoon leader normally must send a route classification of the
trafficability at intervals designated by the commander. A route report
may be required only if there is a significant or unexpected change in the
route’s makeup.
3-183. As Section C reconnoiters the route, the other sections move
ahead, reconnoitering critical and dominant terrain. The platoon leader
controls and coordinates the movement of all three sections. He must
ensure that the flank sections remain far enough forward of Section C to
provide security. The flank sections have also been assigned
responsibility for covering lateral routes. Section A is executing a lateral
route and will use contact point B to tie in with Section C on Route
SABER (see Figure 3-5D).

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Figure 3-5. CFV Route Reconnaissance (Part One)

3-184. The platoon order must address actions on the approach to the
stream. In this case, the two flank sections have been given the task of
locating bypasses in the form of fords or unmapped bridges. Section B is
successful in locating a ford; Section A is not. Section B conducts a ford
reconnaissance, following the steps used for obstacle and restriction
reconnaissance. It crosses the stream at the ford and then continues its
mission on the far side of the stream (see Figure 3-5E).
3-185. Section C continues its route reconnaissance along the route until
it approaches the bridge site. It then executes a bridge reconnaissance to
establish trafficability of the bridge. Section A occupies an overwatch
position while Section C reconnoiters the bridge. Section B continues its
reconnaissance one terrain feature beyond the stream and then occupies
a short-duration OP (see Figure 3-5F).

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3-186. Section C completes its bridge reconnaissance and establishes


local security on the approaches to the far side of the bridge. Once this is
complete, Section A passes across the bridge and through Section C,
continuing its reconnaissance of the dominant terrain on the left flank of
the route (see Figure 3-5G). Once Section A is set in sector, the platoon
resumes its route reconnaissance to the LOA (see Figure 3-5H).

Figure 3-5. CFV Route Reconnaissance (Part Two)

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SECTION V – AREA RECONNAISSANCE

3-187. Before moving forces into or near a specified area, the commander
may call on the reconnaissance platoon to conduct an area reconnaissance
to avoid being surprised by unsuitable terrain conditions or unexpected
threat forces. The area could be a town, ridgeline, woods, or another
feature that friendly forces intend to occupy, pass through, or avoid. Area
reconnaissance is the primary mission of the recce platoon, the BRT, the
task force scouts, and scouts in light cavalry organizations.
3-188. Area reconnaissance is frequently employed to gain information
on objective areas as well as to confirm IPB templates and provide
detailed information regarding threat dispositions. Within a zone of
operations, area reconnaissance can be used to focus the platoon on the
specific area that is critical to the commander. Examples include platoons
from the BRT directed to focus on areas that could hold brigade-size
threat targets or a battalion reconnaissance platoon directed to focus on
areas of dominant terrain that influence the battalion’s axis of advance
because division cavalry and BRT troops have already moved through the
area. This technique of focusing the reconnaissance also permits the
mission to be accomplished more quickly. Area reconnaissance can thus
be a stand-alone mission or a task to a section or platoon within the
larger context of a platoon or higher reconnaissance mission.
3-189. Area reconnaissance can be terrain-oriented, force-oriented
(threat), society-oriented, infrastructure-oriented, or a combination of any
of these factors. The commander analyzes the mission using METT-TC to
determine whether to conduct one of these types of reconnaissance
separately or to conduct them in conjunction with each other.
3-190. A recce platoon, or a reconnaissance platoon augmented with the
appropriate assets, conducts the multidimensional aspect of area
reconnaissance, if directed, to gain detailed information about the civilian
populace and infrastructure in a particular area.

CRITICAL TASKS
3-191. The reconnaissance platoon must accomplish numerous critical
tasks during the area reconnaissance. The platoon’s primary critical
tasks include the following (unless the commander directs otherwise):

· Reconnoiter all terrain within the area.


· Inspect and classify all bridges within the area.
· Locate fords or crossing sites near all bridges in the area.
· Inspect and classify all overpasses, underpasses, and culverts
in the area.
· Within capability, locate all minefields and other obstacles in
the area, reduce or breach them, and clear and mark lanes.
· Locate bypasses around built-up areas, obstacles, and
contaminated areas.
· Find and report all threat forces within the area.
· Report reconnaissance information.

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3-192. In addition to these tasks, the platoon must be prepared to


conduct other tasks that may be deemed as critical by the higher
commander. Additional tasks for the area reconnaissance may include
the following:

· Identify threat activities, countermeasures, and probable


COAs.
· Determine the size, location, and composition of
society/human demographics. Examples include race, sex,
age, religion, language, tribe, clan, class, education, history,
government, and/or factions.
· Establish and maintain contact with local civilian and
military leadership.
· Conduct reconnaissance of the society to determine the
regional, local, and neighborhood situations.
· Determine the needs of the society to assist friendly forces in
determining operations/actions needed to maintain support of
the friendly populace, gain support of neutral factions, and/or
neutralize hostile elements.
· Identify key infrastructure that could affect military
operations, including the following:
n Political, government, and religious organizations and
agencies.
n Financial and economic systems.
n Physical facilities and utilities (such as power generation,
transportation, and communications networks).
· Determine media activities (local, US, international).
· Identify organizations and methods of operation for terrorists,
transnational groups, and ethnic centers of power.
· Identify the allegiances of the local populace to factions,
religious groups, or other organizations.

TECHNIQUES
3-193. To conduct an area reconnaissance mission, the reconnaissance
platoon leader first identifies the area to be reconnoitered within a
continuous boundary. The platoon leader analyzes the mission, threat,
and terrain and completes his troop-leading procedures. He also plans the
movement to and, if necessary, from the area, following the basic rule of
using different routes to and from the area. The routes may be specified
for the platoon in the OPORD it receives from its higher command.
3-194. The platoon’s primary concern during movement to the area to be
reconnoitered is security rather than reconnaissance. If the platoon
leader feels there may be threat forces along the route to the area, the
platoon should employ the principles of tactical movement based on
METT-TC factors. The platoon leader must also incorporate information
from UAVs and ground sensor assets (such as GSR) into the operation.
During movement to the area, it may be appropriate (depending on the
commander’s intent) for the platoon to avoid contact. The platoon leader

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may also choose to orient and focus sections or squads on checkpoints as


the platoon moves to the area.
3-195. The platoon leader encloses the given area within a platoon zone;
he uses boundaries, an LD, and an LOA. He can divide the area into
section zones by placing boundaries on identifiable terrain; this ensures
that each section has responsibility for specific pieces of terrain.
3-196. The platoon leader places contact points at the intersections of
phase lines and boundaries and at any other locations where he wants
physical contact and coordination between his sections. He uses
GIRS/TIRS as necessary. He works with the FSO to plan indirect fires to
support the platoon’s scheme of maneuver.
3-197. The platoon can conduct area reconnaissance using any of the
platoon organizations. The platoon leader deploys his sections abreast
across the LD to accomplish their reconnaissance tasks. Formations are
often not appropriate to the area reconnaissance mission because the
area may be irregular in shape and because of the wide variety of METT-
TC considerations the platoon may encounter.

EXAMPLE OF AN AREA RECONNAISSANCE


3-198. The following example illustrates area reconnaissance by a recce
platoon; however, the mission may be conducted in similar fashion by any
type of reconnaissance platoon.
3-199. The platoon is operating within a troop conducting an area
reconnaissance in an SSC scenario. Each of the troop’s platoons has a
different reconnaissance objective. The focus and tempo of the operation
allow the troop to move to a dismount point close to its reconnaissance
objective. The engagement criteria allow the recce platoon to use indirect
fire on threat dismounts and vehicles only to break direct fire contact.
3-200. In this example, the recce platoon has been given the mission of
performing an area reconnaissance of OBJ IRON. A UAV overflew the
area several hours ago and confirmed threat soldiers in OBJ IRON, but it
could not remain on station to determine the direction in which threat
vehicles were being focused. The platoon will conduct stealthy
reconnaissance in establishing its OPs.
3-201. The platoon has been assigned a specific infiltration route. It is
believed that the threat has established a traffic control point at an
intersection, checkpoint 7, in OBJ IRON. From this intersection the
threat is deploying forces east or west into BPs. The platoon leader
decides, after analyzing METT-TC factors, to deploy his platoon to
maximize security. Based on his analysis of the terrain and his mission
requirements. he decides to use the two-section organization. He decides
to move with Alpha section on Lane SABER and assigns Bravo section,
with the PSG, to Lane SPUR. The platoon leader decides to move the
platoon using phase lines, allowing the sections more latitude in choosing
covered and concealed terrain rather than checkpoints.
3-202. Using the two-section organization, the platoon crosses PL RAY
at the time specified in the commander’s OPORD. It infiltrates in two
sections, with each section using internal bounding overwatch. (See
Figure 3-6A.)

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Figure 3-6A. Area Reconnaissance (Part One)

3-203. The recce sections continue their move to the designated


dismount points. Alpha section occupies its dismount point, checkpoint
12. Bravo section occupies its dismount point, checkpoint 15. Each section
sets its vehicles in hide positions, organizes a patrol, and deploys local
security.
3-204. The platoon leader notifies the UAV section assigned to his area
of operations that his elements are set in their dismount points. Based on
prior coordination, the UAV section sends a TUAV to reconnoiter OBJ
IRON before the recce platoon continues its move to establish its OPs.
The UAV section leader reports to the recce platoon leader that his
aircraft confirmed soldiers at the intersection, but detected no vehicle
movement or activity.
3-205. After evaluating the UAV update, each patrol moves on covered
and concealed dismounted routes to OBJ IRON, conducting dismounted
reconnaissance. Based on their commander’s guidance, each patrol
carries equipment to establish a 48-hour OP. Each four-man team
conducts stealthy movement, using traveling overwatch. Two of the men
focus on moving forward, conducting reconnaissance; the other two
provide security. (See Figure 3-6B.)

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Figure 3-6B. Area Reconnaissance (Part Two)

3-206. Each section places its OP where it can observe the objective area.
Alpha section establishes its OP at checkpoint 13; Bravo section
establishes its OP at checkpoint 14. Each OP establishes communications
back to its vehicles in the hide position.
3-207. The OPs send reports, in terms of content and frequency, as
outlined by the troop commander or unit SOP. The soldiers in the hide
position maintain communications with the troop CP and are prepared to
act as a quick reaction force for the dismounted OPs. The platoon
continues to observe the objective until relieved or assigned subsequent
tasks by the troop commander.

NOTE: For a detailed discussion of area reconnaissance in an urban environment, refer to


Chapter 7 of this manual.

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SECTION VI – ZONE RECONNAISSANCE

3-208. The commander normally assigns a zone reconnaissance to the


reconnaissance platoon when he needs detailed information before
maneuvering his forces through the zone. This reconnaissance provides
the commander with a detailed picture of how the threat plans to defend
the zone, enabling him to choose the appropriate COA. (NOTE: The
recce platoon will normally conduct zone reconnaissance as part of a
larger force; it will conduct the mission on its own only with sufficient
augmentation support.) Zone reconnaissance is a primary mission of
regimental and division cavalry reconnaissance elements.
3-209. As in area reconnaissance, the main types of zone reconnaissance
are terrain-oriented, force-oriented (threat), society-oriented, and
infrastructure-oriented. The specific zone reconnaissance mission may be
focused on one of these types or be a combination of any of them. The
techniques and objectives of terrain-oriented and force-oriented zone
reconnaissance missions are not mutually exclusive. The commander’s
intent, his guidance on the focus of the reconnaissance, and METT-TC
factors will dictate the priorities and critical tasks for the mission.
3-210. The platoon conducts terrain-oriented zone reconnaissance to
gain detailed information about routes, terrain, and resources within the
assigned zone. This is the most thorough and complete reconnaissance
mission and therefore is very time-intensive. It is common for scouts
executing a zone reconnaissance in terrain with heavy vegetation to
advance at only about 1 kilometer per hour.
3-211. The platoon conducts force-oriented zone reconnaissance to gain
detailed information about threat forces within the zone. As the platoon
conducts this type of zone reconnaissance, its emphasis is on determining
the threat’s locations, strengths, and weaknesses.
3-212. A recce platoon, or a reconnaissance platoon augmented with the
appropriate assets, conducts the multidimensional aspect of zone
reconnaissance, if directed, to gain detailed information about the civilian
populace and infrastructure in a particular zone.

CRITICAL TASKS
3-213. The reconnaissance platoon must accomplish numerous critical
tasks during the zone reconnaissance. Unless the commander directs
otherwise, the platoon’s primary critical tasks include the following:

· Reconnoiter all terrain within the zone.


· Inspect and classify all bridges within the zone.
· Locate fords or crossing sites near all bridges in the zone.
· Inspect and classify all overpasses, underpasses, and culverts
in the zone.
· Within capability, locate all minefields and other obstacles in
the zone, reduce or breach them, and clear and mark lanes
through the obstacles.

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· Locate bypasses around built-up areas, obstacles, and


contaminated areas.
· Find and report all threat forces within the zone.
· Report reconnaissance information.

3-214. In addition to these tasks, the platoon must be prepared to


conduct other tasks that may be deemed as critical by the higher
commander. Additional tasks for the zone reconnaissance may include
the following:

· Identify threat activities, countermeasures, and probable


COAs.
· Determine the size, location, and composition of
society/human demographics. Examples include race, sex,
age, religion, language, tribe, clan, class, education, history,
government, and/or factions.
· Establish and maintain contact with local civilian and
military leadership.
· Conduct reconnaissance of the society to determine the
regional, local, and neighborhood situations.
· Determine the needs of the society to assist friendly forces in
determining operations/actions needed to maintain support of
the friendly populace, gain support of neutral factions, and/or
neutralize hostile elements.
· Identify key infrastructure that could affect military
operations, including the following:
n Political, government, and religious organizations and
agencies.
n Financial and economic systems.
n Physical facilities and utilities (such as power generation,
transportation, and communications networks).
· Determine media activities (local, US, international).
· Identify organizations and methods of operation for terrorists,
transnational groups, and ethnic centers of power.
· Identify the allegiances of the local populace to factions,
religious groups, or other organizations.

TECHNIQUES
3-215. Zone reconnaissance is very time-consuming. Unless the orders
specify otherwise, all critical tasks listed in the previous discussion are
implied in the zone reconnaissance mission statement. When speed is the
primary concern, commanders must modify the focus, tempo, and
engagement criteria to prioritize the critical tasks for the platoon leader.
The width of the zone is determined by the road network, terrain
features, anticipated threat activity, and time available to accomplish the
mission. In general, reconnaissance platoons can reconnoiter a zone that
is 3 to 5 kilometers wide; however, a recce platoon can effectively
reconnoiter a zone only 2 to 3 kilometers wide. If the platoon is stretched

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any farther than this, it quickly loses the capability to accomplish critical
tasks and move securely.
3-216. When the platoon leader receives a zone reconnaissance mission,
the order will define the zone by lateral boundaries, an LD, and an LOA
or objective. The parent unit may include additional phase lines or other
graphic control measures within the zone to help control the maneuver of
the units.
3-217. The platoon leader analyzes the mission to determine what must
be accomplished. He analyzes the commander’s guidance on focus (the
reconnaissance objective: threat, terrain, social/human demographics,
infrastructure, or a combination), tempo (time allowed for mission
accomplishment: stealthy or forceful, aggressive or discrete, deliberate or
rapid), and the engagement criteria (What situations constitute a platoon
fight? In what situation will the platoon defer the fight to a higher
element?). He evaluates any information he has received about the threat
in the IPB to determine what threat activity he should expect to
encounter. He then analyzes the terrain by conducting a map
reconnaissance and by examining any IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, or
information from other units to determine what types of terrain the
platoon must operate over. This reconnaissance is important in
identifying areas the threat could occupy based on observation capability,
fields of fire, and natural obstacles. From these factors, the platoon leader
determines the manner in which the platoon will accomplish its mission.
3-218. The platoon leader completes troop-leading procedures and comes
up with a COA to accomplish his assigned mission. He may add phase
lines on easily identifiable terrain through the zone to help control the
maneuver. He places checkpoints in specific areas that must be
reconnoitered or where they will aid in controlling the operation. If the
terrain is mixed, with both extensive dead space and easily identifiable
features, he may use boundaries to designate areas of responsibility for
each section. He will place contact points at critical areas where he wants
to ensure that sections maintain contact.
3-219. The platoon leader works with the FSO to plan and refine indirect
fire targets to support the platoon’s scheme of maneuver. As a minimum,
they should plan targets on known or suspected threat positions.
3-220. Depending on applicable METT-TC considerations, the platoon
can conduct the zone reconnaissance using a two-section, three-section or
single-vehicle organization. It must deploy to cover the entire zone. It
usually operates in a zone it knows very little about, so the COA must
allow for flexibility, responsiveness, and security as it moves.
3-221. The platoon leader deploys his sections before reaching the LD to
prevent detection. He then moves the sections across the LD and assigns
each section a zone within the platoon zone for which it is responsible. He
uses phase lines, checkpoints, contact points, or GIRS/TIRS to ensure
that the platoon reconnoiters the entire zone. He ensures that the
sections remain generally on line; this prevents development of
significant gaps that a moving threat could exploit. Scouts dismount to
gather detailed information, reconnoiter danger areas, or move through
areas that are not accessible to the vehicles. The platoon continues to
reconnoiter the zone until it reaches the LOA or the final reconnaissance
objective.

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EXAMPLE OF A ZONE RECONNAISSANCE


3-222. The following example illustrates zone reconnaissance by a recce
platoon; however, the mission may be conducted in similar manner by
any type of reconnaissance platoons.
3-223. The recce platoon is operating within a troop, conducting a zone
reconnaissance in an SSC scenario. The focus and tempo of the operation
require the platoon to operate mounted, dismounting only to clear danger
areas and intervisibility lines. The engagement criteria allow the platoon
to use indirect fire on threat dismounts and vehicles. The troop
commander will mass platoons to destroy individual vehicles. A UAV
overflew the area several hours ago, but did not identify the threat
security zone.
3-224. Although recce platoons generally do not use strict formations
forward of the LD, the platoon leader in this example starts out with his
platoon on line. He will attempt to maintain this relationship even
though the sections will not always be mutually supporting. The platoon
deploys into formation prior to crossing the LD. It is operating in two
sections, with Alpha section consisting of the platoon leader and his
wingman and the PSG and his wingman in Bravo section. In this mission,
the platoon leader has chosen to position his section (Alpha) in the left
portion of the zone because of the importance of confirming the location of
a bridge in that area.
3-225. The platoon (3d Platoon in this example) crosses the LD at the
time prescribed in the commander’s OPORD, using the bounding
overwatch technique of movement within sections. The sections
maneuver through the zone in a zigzag pattern to ensure that the zone is
properly reconnoitered and to accomplish all critical tasks of a zone
reconnaissance. Security is maintained within sections because the width
and terrain of the zone prevent the sections from providing continuous
mutual support.
3-226. Depending on the factors of METT-TC, the platoon leader chooses
the movement technique best suited for command and control. He may
choose to have the sections secure the area and set at all checkpoints. As
an alternative, he may have the sections bound through the checkpoints,
report when they have been secured, and then set at the next phase line.
If the platoon leader has not assigned sections a particular checkpoint on
which to orient, the section leaders must plan their own graphic control
measures to control the movement. The sections make contact at contact
points to ensure that they remain abreast and to receive updates on the
current situation.
3-227. The recce platoon continues reconnaissance up to the river (PL
OHIO). As the platoon approaches the river, scouts move into covered and
concealed positions, dismount, and visually search the dominant terrain
on the north side of the river. Alpha section identifies the remains of the
bridge in its zone. Bravo section identifies a fording site with a rock
bottom just east of the blown bridge at checkpoint 32; the ford will
support heavy armored traffic (see Figure 3-7A). The platoon leader does
not allow any element to cross PL OHIO without permission from the
troop commander.

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Figure 3-7A. Zone Reconnaissance (Part One)

3-228. When the troop is set on PL OHIO, the platoon is given


permission to execute OHIO and move to PL BAMA. The sections
immediately begin reconnaissance of natural and man-made obstacles,
including the stream to their front. As the platoon continues
reconnaissance towards PL BAMA, the platoon leader learns that contact
has been made within the troop. He informs his platoon that they are
entering the threat security zone. Alpha section uses dismounts to
determine if the dominant terrain near checkpoint 33 is clear of threat
forces. The platoon continues its reconnaissance and sets at PL BAMA.

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3-229. When the troop is set on PL BAMA, the platoon is given


permission to execute BAMA and move to PL IDAHO. As the platoon
crosses the ridge at PL BAMA, Alpha section receives sporadic machine
gun fire from concealed positions south of checkpoint 34. The platoon
immediately deploys, reports the contact to the troop commander, and
calls for indirect fire to suppress the threat and enable the platoon to
break direct fire contact.
3-230. Under this protection, the platoon, primarily dismounted,
reconnoiters to the flanks and rear to develop the situation. The troop
commander acknowledges the contact report and moves immediately to
link up with the platoon leader. The troop commander orders the platoon
to continue its reconnaissance to locate the threat’s flank. The platoon
leader sends Bravo section forward on the threat’s left and his Alpha
section on the right flank to determine if the threat is mutually supported
by other forces from the flanks or rear. The Bravo section sergeant and a
three-man dismount team (two scouts as a security element and two for
reconnaissance) move in closer and determine that the threat consists of
one BRDM-2 and six dismounted soldiers. The scouts from the adjacent
2d Platoon identify the right flank of the threat and discover the flank is
unprotected by obstacles and exposed to direct fires.
3-231. The troop commander directs 2d Platoon to move to a designated
position and dismount two two-man Javelin teams to destroy the threat
OP. These teams move to checkpoint 24 and link up with the 3d Platoon
scouts, who guide them into position to attack the threat OP. (Refer to
Figure 3-7B.)
3-232. The 3d Platoon reports it is set with 2d Platoon dismounts in the
attack position. The platoon leader of 3d Platoon confirms that his
dismount teams are out of the target area and set and that his Bravo
section is providing overwatch. The platoon leader shifts mortar fire to
the rear of the threat position. Javelin teams from the 2d and 3d platoons
engage the threat from the flank to complete destruction of the OP. (See
Figure 3-7C.)
3-233. Scout dismount teams from 3d Platoon move in quickly, capture
two wounded prisoners, and search the vehicle and personnel. The
platoon HUMINT collectors conduct tactical interrogation to determine
the proximity and mission of other threat forces’ zones. The 3d Platoon
leader orders one scout dismount team to stay and secure the prisoners
and then completes his reconnaissance up to the LOA. Upon completion
of the zone reconnaissance, the platoon leader collects reports and
forwards them to the troop CP.

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Figure 3-7B. Zone Reconnaissance (Part Two)

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Figure 3-7C. Zone Reconnaissance (Part Three)

SECTION VII – OBSTACLE/RESTRICTION RECONNAISSANCE

3-234. One of the common tasks associated with reconnaissance


missions is the location and reconnaissance of obstacles and restrictions
that may affect the trafficability of a particular route or axis. The

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reconnaissance platoon may perform obstacle and restriction


reconnaissance as a stand-alone task or as part of a route, zone, or area
reconnaissance mission.
3-235. Obstacles and restrictions can be either natural or man-made.
Current threat doctrine emphasizes the use of man-made obstacles to
reinforce natural obstacles and of restrictions to slow, impede, and
canalize friendly forces. These obstacles and restrictions include the
following:

· Minefields.
· Bridges.
· Log obstacles such as abatises, log cribs, stumps, and posts.
· AT ditches.
· Wire entanglements.
· Defiles.
· Persistent agent contamination.
· Fills, such as a raised railroad track.

3-236. The reconnaissance platoon’s ability to deal with an obstacle or


restriction is extensive in certain areas and, at the same time, somewhat
limited in others. The platoon’s most important function is
reconnaissance of deliberate obstacles, including supporting threat
positions and possible breach sites. Another important platoon
reconnaissance task is to locate bypasses around obstacles and
restrictions.
3-237. The reconnaissance platoon has the capability to reduce or breach
small obstacles; however, this is generally limited to point obstacles that
are not integrated into the threat defense and are not covered by threat
fire and observation. When the scouts encounter obstacles that support a
threat defense, they have the capability to assist in breaching.

NOTE: An engineer reconnaissance team or squad may be task organized or attached to


the platoon to assist in obstacle/restriction reconnaissance. The engineer element
provides expertise in collecting pertinent intelligence, known as OBSTINTEL,
about the obstacle/restriction. The engineers also provide extremely limited
breaching capability.

THE STEPS OF OBSTACLE/RESTRICTION RECONNAISSANCE


3-238. How the platoon approaches obstacle and restriction
reconnaissance is highly dependent on METT-TC. In general, however,
the process of conducting this type of reconnaissance can be covered in
five steps that under most METT-TC conditions will ensure an organized
and efficient operation:

· Detection.
· Area security and reconnaissance.
· Obstacle reconnaissance.
· Selection of a COA.

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· Recommendation/execution of a COA.

DETECTION
3-239. During reconnaissance operations, the reconnaissance platoon
must locate and evaluate man-made and natural obstacles and
restrictions to support the movement of their parent unit. Detection of
obstacles and restrictions begins in the planning phase of an operation
when the S2 conducts IPB. The platoon combines the S2’s work with the
reconnaissance conducted during the troop-leading process (normally a
map reconnaissance only) to identify all possible obstacles and
restrictions within the area of operations. The platoon leader then plans
the obstacle/restriction reconnaissance based on the orders he receives
and on the IPB and map reconnaissance (both his own and from the S2).
3-240. Scouts use visual and physical means to detect mines and
obstacles while conducting their mission. They visually inspect terrain for
signs of mine emplacement and other reinforcing obstacles. They also
must be alert to dangerous battlefield debris such as bomblets from
cluster bomb units (CBU) or dual-purpose improved conventional
munitions (DPICM).
3-241. Mines and other types of obstacles can be difficult for mounted
elements to detect; therefore, scouts must also conduct obstacle detection
while dismounted. They may need to dismount their vehicles several
hundred meters short of a suspected obstacle and approach the obstacle
on foot to conduct reconnaissance. They look for disturbed earth, unusual
or out-of-place features, surface-laid mines, tilt rods, and tripwires. They
can incorporate vehicle-mounted thermal sights into the search to help
detect surface-laid mines.
3-242. Physical detection methods include detonating, probing, and
using a mine detector. Detection occurs when a vehicle, soldier, or
countermine system physically encounters a mine. This method does not
indicate the boundaries of the obstacle. The scouts must probe or conduct
additional visual inspection to define the extent of the minefield.

AREA SECURITY AND RECONNAISSANCE


3-243. Threat forces often cover their obstacles with observation and
fire. Whenever scouts encounter an obstacle, they must proceed with
their reconnaissance assuming the threat can observe and engage them.
The element that detects the obstacle establishes overwatch before it
proceeds with the reconnaissance. The scouts in overwatch look for signs
of threat forces in and around the obstacle or in positions that allow
observation of the obstacle. They visually search the dominant terrain on
the far side of the obstacle for evidence of threat positions or ambushes.
3-244. Once they confirm the threat situation from the near side, the
scouts not in overwatch move mounted and/or dismounted to find
bypasses around the obstacle. If they find a bypass, they move around the
obstacle and establish OPs on the far side to provide 360-degree security
of the obstacle. If the scouts are unable to find a bypass, they must
conduct their reconnaissance from the near side under the security of the
overwatch elements.

OBSTACLE RECONNAISSANCE

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3-245. Once security is established, scouts then move dismounted to the


obstacle. They must be cautious when reconnoitering the obstacle.
Tripwires or other signs may indicate the threat is using booby traps or
command-detonated mines to prevent friendly forces from determining
and collecting OBSTINTEL. The reconnaissance platoon must collect all
information that may be critical to the commander in such functions as
planning a breach and verifying the threat template. Examples of
OBSTINTEL include the following:

· Obstacle location.
· Obstacle orientation.
· Soil conditions.
· Presence of wire, gaps, and bypasses.
· Composition of complex obstacles.
· Minefield composition, including types of mines.
· Breaching requirements.
· Gaps between successive obstacle belts.
· Location of threat direct fire weapons.

3-246. The element reconnoitering the obstacle prepares an obstacle


report (Blue 9) with this information and forwards the report through the
platoon leader or PSG to the commander. (NOTE: For information on
obstacle report formats, refer to Appendix B of this manual.)

SELECTION OF A COA
3-247. The platoon leader analyzes the situation and METT-TC to
determine which COA to select. He has a choice of four COAs:

· Bypass the obstacle/restriction.


· Conduct obstacle reduction.
· Support a breaching operation.
· Continue the mission.

Bypass
3-248. A bypass is the preferred COA when it offers a quick, easy, and
tactically sound means of avoiding the obstacle. To be effective, a bypass
must allow the entire force to avoid the primary obstacle without risking
further exposure to threat ambush and without diverting the force from
its objective. Bypassing conserves reduction assets and maintains the
momentum of the moving unit. If the platoon leader decides to bypass
and his commander approves, scouts must mark the bypass and report it
to the commander. They may be required to provide guides for the main
body if the bypass is difficult to locate or visibility conditions are poor.
(NOTE: For bypass report formats, refer to Appendix B of this manual.)

NOTE: In some cases, bypassing is not possible, with breaching/reduction the best, or only,
tactical solution. Such situations may include the following:

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· The obstacle is integrated into a prepared defensive position


and the only available bypass canalizes friendly forces into a
fire sack or ambush.
· The platoon’s mission specifically tasks it to reconnoiter and
reduce any obstacle or to eliminate any threat forces located
on the original route, allowing follow-on forces to maintain
freedom of movement.
· The best available bypass route will not allow follow-on forces
to maintain their desired rate of movement.
· Improving the bypass may require more time and assets than
breaching the primary obstacle(s).

Conduct Obstacle Reduction


3-249. Obstacle reduction significantly degrades the platoon’s ability to
maintain momentum, either for its own reconnaissance effort or for
follow-on forces. Obstacles within the platoon’s breaching capability
include small minefields, simple wire obstacles, small roadblocks, craters,
and similar point-type obstacles. (NOTE: Refer to Appendix F of this
manual for information on obstacle reduction operations.) For other
types of obstacles, the scouts can support the breaching effort, as covered
in the following discussion.

Support a Breaching Operation


3-250. When the platoon locates a large obstacle that cannot be easily
bypassed, its primary option is to support a breaching operation. The
scouts perform additional reconnaissance and security tasks as
necessary; these may include determining the amount of time and
resources required to reduce the obstacle and locating the best available
reduction site. (NOTE: If he expects to encounter large obstacles during
an operation, the commander may direct engineer reconnaissance teams
to move with the scouts to determine much of this information.) The
platoon’s reconnaissance effort focuses on the following features:
· Fighting positions for support force weapons on the near side
of the obstacle.
· Trafficable routes to the reduction site and routes from the far
side leading to the objective.
· Dispersed covered and concealed areas near the reduction site.
· Work areas on the near side for reduction assets of the breach
force.
· Fighting positions on the far side once a foothold is
established.
· Positions on both sides of the obstacle that could facilitate
threat observation of the reduction site.
· Trafficability and soil conditions near the reduction site. This
is especially important for minefield reduction because mine-
clearing blades will not work properly in all soil conditions.
· Soil stability of wet and dry gaps.
· Width, depth, and bottom condition of wet and dry gaps.

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· Bank height and slope.


· Water velocity of wet gaps.
· Wind direction for obscuration of the obstacle.

3-251. Engineer assistance can make the process of gathering the


OBSTINTEL necessary for a breaching operation much easier and more
effective for the reconnaissance platoon. If he expects to encounter large
obstacles during a mission, the platoon leader should request an attached
engineer reconnaissance team or, as a minimum, an engineer NCO to
serve as a technical advisor. Scouts who have received sapper training
may also enhance the platoon’s capabilities.
3-252. After the platoon reports the necessary information to the
commander, the scouts maintain security of the obstacle and serve as
guides, if necessary, for the breach force. The information they provide is
used by the commander and his engineers to prepare the suppression,
obscuration, security, reduction, and assault (SOSRA) plans for the
breach. The platoon maintains security during the breaching operation
and calls for and adjusts indirect fires, as necessary, in support of the
breaching operation. The platoon must be in position to move rapidly
through the obstacle once a lane is created so it can continue its mission.

Continue the Mission


3-253. When the platoon encounters a restriction, such as a bridge or
defile, it may find that the restriction is not an obstacle to movement and
is not covered by threat fire or observation. Scouts may also discover
dummy minefields or obstacles that are incomplete and easily passed
through. Under these conditions, the platoon’s COA may be to report,
then continue its reconnaissance mission.

RECOMMENDATION/EXECUTION OF A COA
3-254. Once the platoon leader has determined the COA best suited to
the situation, he either executes it or recommends it to his higher
headquarters for approval. Generally, the platoon will execute a
particular COA without specific approval if it was addressed in the
OPORD received from higher or is covered in the unit SOP. In such a
case, the platoon leader will execute the COA and then inform the
commander of his actions. If the situation the platoon has discovered is
not covered by previous guidance, the platoon leader determines the best
COA and recommends it to his commander. He then executes the COA
specified by the commander.

EXAMPLES OF OBSTACLE/RESTRICTION RECONNAISSANCE


3-255. These examples illustrate reconnaissance of obstacles and
restrictions in two tactical situations. They are organized using the five-
step process.
RECONNAISSANCE OF A RESTRICTION (NOT COVERED BY FIRE OR
OBSERVATION)
3-256. Figures 3-8A through 3-8D illustrate this situation.
Detection

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3-257. A reconnaissance section detects a bridge when a dismounted


element observes it from an overwatch position (see Figure 3-8A). The
bridge was expected because it was also identified during the scout’s IPB
and map reconnaissance. A TUAV in the area of operations confirms the
bridge’s location and reports that it appears to be intact.

Area Security and Reconnaissance


3-258. The dismounted scouts bring the section’s vehicles into covered
and concealed overwatch positions; the section establishes near side
security of the bridge. A dismounted patrol is organized to conduct
reconnaissance up to the bridge, overwatched by the vehicles and by a
TUAV attached to augment the platoon’s security and reconnaissance
capability (see Figure 3-8B). The dismounted element reconnoiters for
both mounted and dismounted bypasses. The dismounts must determine
quickly if it is possible to bypass the bridge through the use of a ford in
the local area. The platoon leader monitors the situation and, if
necessary, may direct other sections to assume the mission of locating
other bridges or fords to serve as bypasses. The TUAV focuses on the far
side of the obstacle to identify threat positions and/or reinforcements.
3-259. If the water obstacle can be forded, the dismounts use the ford to
move to the far side. On the far side, they reconnoiter the terrain that
dominates the bridge. They establish far side security on terrain where
they can observe threat approach routes to the bridge. Once the far side
is secure, the section is ready to reconnoiter the bridge itself.
3-260. If the water obstacle cannot be easily forded in the local area, the
scouts may have to cross on the bridge itself. Before attempting to cross,
the dismounted scouts visually examine the bridge for structural damage
and rigged explosives. Because the bridge appears intact, the dismounted
element then crosses the bridge one scout at a time. The scouts move
quickly to the far side and take up covered and concealed positions that
provide local security on the opposite approach to the bridge. Once the
entire dismounted element is secure on the opposite side, it continues
beyond the immediate bank area to secure the far side.

Obstacle Reconnaissance
3-261. Once the area has been reconnoitered and secured, a dismounted
element moves to the bridge under the supervision of the senior scout and
conducts a detailed examination of the bridge (see Figure 3-8C). The
scouts examine the bridge for the following purposes:

· Ensure that the bridge is free of demolitions. This requires


examination of underwater pilings and the underside of the
bridge for hidden explosives. In addition, the scouts should
take a detailed look at the far side to find any electrical cables
or wires connecting the bridge to the shore.
· Find any structural damage. Scouts look for obvious signs of
threat destruction efforts and for less obvious signs of structural
damage, including cracks or fractures in stringers or supports
and twisted or untrue alignment of stringers or supports.
· Conduct a hasty classification of the bridge. The scouts
determine if it will support the largest vehicle in the unit. For

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additional information on bridge classification, refer to


Chapter 9 of this manual and to FM 3-34.343 (FM 5-446).

3-262. The section leader consolidates all appropriate and relevant


reports (for example, the bridge, ford, and bypass reports) and sends
them higher.

Selection of a COA
3-263. Based on results of the bridge reconnaissance, the section leader
determines that the restriction is secure, that he can safely move the
section across it, and that he can continue his mission.

Recommendation/Execution of a COA
3-264. In accordance with platoon SOP, the section leader now moves
the rest of his element across the bridge. The lead reconnaissance vehicle
moves across the bridge, overwatched by the other vehicles (refer to
Figure 3-8D). The vehicle crosses with only the driver on board. As he
observes the crossing, the section leader watches for any signs of damage
or stress on the bridge.
3-265. Once the lead vehicle is across, it moves to link up with the
dismounted element and assists in providing far side security. At this
point, the overwatch vehicles can cross the bridge, and the section can
continue its mission. The section leader also advises his platoon leader
that he is continuing his mission.
3-266. Once the lead vehicle is across, it moves to link up with the
dismounted element and assists in providing far side security. At this
point, the overwatch vehicles can cross the bridge, and the section can
continue its mission. The section leader also advises his platoon leader
that he is continuing his mission.

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Figure 3-8. Reconnaissance of a Restriction

RECONNAISSANCE OF A DELIBERATE OBSTACLE (COVERED BY FIRE)


3-267. Figures 3-9A through 3-9F illustrate this situation.

Detection
3-268. Dismounted scouts detect an extensive wire obstacle from a
covered and concealed position. From its vantage point, the
reconnaissance section cannot determine any additional details.

Area Security and Reconnaissance


3-269. The section brings vehicles up to covered and concealed positions
to overwatch the obstacle. It organizes a dismounted element to attempt
to locate a bypass and secure the far side. Because of the obstacle’s size,
the section also informs the platoon leader that it will take considerable
time for the section to reconnoiter the obstacle by itself. In the process of

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executing the patrol, the section discovers that the left flank of the
obstacle is tied into an impassable swamp (refer to Figure 3-9A).
3-270. Based on this initial evaluation, the platoon leader attempts to
increase the speed of the reconnaissance by sending the other section to
find a bypass around the right flank of the obstacle. That section moves
to a dismount point and sends a patrol around the right flank. The patrol
is engaged by threat machine guns. The overwatch vehicles suppress the
machine guns and then are engaged by threat vehicles in defensive
positions. The section reports that it can maintain contact with the threat
but can no longer maneuver (see Figure 3-9B). It can also observe the
threat from the rear and reports a company-size unit in defensive
positions overwatching the obstacle. It also reports that there are no
trafficable routes around the threat’s right flank (see Figure 3-9C).
3-271. At this point, the platoon leader determines that he does not have
the combat power to secure the far side of the objective. He also
determines that the only trafficable bypass is covered by threat direct
fires. He now must conduct a detailed reconnaissance of the obstacle
before he can recommend a COA to his commander.

Obstacle Reconnaissance
3-272. The reconnaissance section that originally detected the obstacle is
in the best position to reconnoiter it. It organizes a dismounted element
to move to the obstacle. Because there is enough light for the threat to
visually cover the obstacle, the platoon leader coordinates indirect fire to
support the patrol. As the patrol moves out, artillery lays suppressive
fires on the known threat positions, and mortars fire smoke into the area
between the threat positions and the obstacle (see Figure 3-9D).
3-273. The scouts move by covered and concealed dismounted routes to
the obstacle. Through probing and visual observation, they determine
that the wire obstacle is reinforced with buried mines. They are able to
determine that there is a mix of AT and AP mines with antihandling
devices, emplaced in 30-meter belts on both the near side and the far side
of the wire. Once they acquire this information, the scouts move laterally
along the obstacle to determine its length and to find out if its
composition is uniform. They look for the most favorable breaching
location (see Figure 3-9E).

Selection of a COA
3-274. The platoon leader evaluates the situation and determines that
he cannot bypass the obstacle and does not have the capability to breach
it. He decides to recommend a breach.

Recommendation/Execution of a COA
3-275. The platoon leader recommends to his commander that the
platoon prepare to support a breach. With higher approval, he orders the
platoon to continue the reconnaissance and security tasks necessary to
support a breach operation. He also begins coordinating with, and
passing information to, the element responsible for conducting the breach
(see Figure 3-9F).

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Figure 3-9. Reconnaissance of an Obstacle (Part One)

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Figure 3-9. Reconnaissance of an Obstacle (Part Two)

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Chapter 4

Security Operations
In security operations, CONTENTS
security forces protect the
Purpose and Fundamentals ........................ 4-1
main body from threat Purpose ................................................. 4-1
observation and surprise Fundamentals of Security ..................... 4-2
attack. They provide the main Planning Considerations ............................. 4-3
Screening Missions ..................................... 4-4
body commander with early
Critical Tasks ........................................ 4-4
warning, allowing him to Counterreconnaissance Techniques .. 4-14
concentrate his combat power Example of a Screen Operation ........... 4-17
at the right place and time to Convoy and Area Security Operations ...... 4-23
Convoy Security .................................... 4-23
defeat the threat. There are
Area and High-Value Asset Security ... 4-32
four types of security
missions:
· Screen.
· Guard.
· Cover.
· Area security.

SECTION I – PURPOSE AND FUNDAMENTALS

PURPOSE
4-1. All security missions serve the same general purpose: They
prevent the main body from being observed or attacked unexpectedly by
the threat. These operations are conducted forward, to the flanks, or to
the rear of the main body. The reconnaissance platoon may operate at
considerable distances from the main body it is screening (limited only by
communications capabilities and the range of indirect fire support). This
provides the main body with time and space to react and to position
forces to fight the threat.
4-2. The reconnaissance platoon can conduct screening and area
security operations independently or as part of a larger force such as a
reconnaissance troop or company team. In conducting guard missions, the
platoon works as part of a larger unit such as a battalion or squadron; in
addition, the platoon may be tasked to conduct screening or
reconnaissance missions in support of the larger unit’s guard or cover
mission.

SCREEN
4-3. A screening force provides early warning to the main body and
impedes and harasses the threat with direct and indirect fires. Within its
capabilities and based on the higher commander’s guidance, it destroys or
repels threat reconnaissance units in coordination with other combat
elements.

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4-4. Screening missions, which are defensive in nature, provide the


protected force with the lowest level of protection of any security mission.
They are conducted to the front, flanks, and rear of a stationary force and
to the flanks and rear of a moving force. The screening force normally
operates within the range of the supporting artillery. The reconnaissance
platoon generally accomplishes a screening mission by establishing a
series of OPs and conducting patrols to ensure adequate reconnaissance
and surveillance of the assigned sector.

GUARD
4-5. A guard force is deployed over a narrower front than is a
screening force. It accomplishes all the tasks of a screening force, with the
additional task of preventing threat ground observation of and direct fire
against the main body. A guard force reconnoiters, attacks, defends, and
delays as necessary to accomplish its mission. It normally operates within
the range of the supporting artillery. Guard operations are not conducted
below task force or squadron level.

COVER
4-6. A covering force accomplishes all the tasks of screening and guard
forces to deceive, disrupt, and destroy threat forces. The key distinction of
the cover mission is that the force operates apart from the main body to
allow early development of the situation. Unlike screening or guard
forces, a covering force is tactically self-contained; it is normally a
reinforced separate brigade or cavalry regiment. It is organized with
sufficient CS and CSS assets to operate independent of the main body.
Because the covering force (or a portion of it) can be decisively engaged by
a threat force, it must have sufficient combat power to effectively engage
the threat.

AREA SECURITY
4-7. Area security missions are conducted to provide reconnaissance
and security in support of designated personnel, facilities (including
airfields), unit convoys, main supply routes, lines of communications,
equipment, and critical points.

FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITY
4-8. Five fundamentals, described in the following paragraphs, are
common to all security missions. The platoon leader’s plans must adhere
to these fundamentals as the platoon executes its mission.

ORIENT ON THE MAIN BODY


4-9. If the main body moves, scouts must be aware of its move and
must reposition their forces accordingly. They must understand the main
body commander’s scheme of maneuver and where he wants his security
force in relation to his movement. The element must be positioned where
it can provide the needed security.

PERFORM CONTINUOUS RECONNAISSANCE


4-10. The reconnaissance platoon conducts continuous reconnaissance
during security operations to gain as much information as possible about
the area of operations and the threat.

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PROVIDE EARLY AND ACCURATE WARNINGS


4-11. Early and accurate warning of threat approach is essential to
successful operations. The main body commander needs this information
to shift and concentrate his forces to meet and defeat the threat. Scouts
occupy OPs and conduct patrols to provide long-range observation, to
observe threat movement, and to report the threat’s size, location, and
activity to the main body commander.

PROVIDE REACTION TIME AND MANEUVER SPACE


4-12. The reconnaissance platoon works at a distance from the main
body that is sufficient to enable the platoon to identify the threat force
and then report threat activities so the main body commander can react
accordingly. The platoon provides additional reaction time and/or
maneuver space by employing indirect fires to slow the threat’s rate of
advance.

MAINTAIN THREAT CONTACT


4-13. Scouts gain and maintain contact with the threat to provide the
commander with continuous information. If they lose contact, they take
steps to regain it. They then maintain contact until ordered to do
otherwise or until they conduct handover of the contact to another unit.
Ideally, the reconnaissance platoon leader gains a thorough
understanding of the threat situation before the operation starts by
integrating ISR assets (such as TUAVs and ground sensors) during the
planning process. This enables him to maneuver the platoon out of
contact so he can make contact either on the most favorable terms or as
directed by the commander.

SECTION II – PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

4-14. Critical to the reconnaissance platoon leader’s ability to execute


his mission is to clearly understand the focus, tempo, and
engagement/displacement criteria of the security mission. These factors,
labeled as the commander’s reconnaissance guidance, provide the basic
information the platoon leader needs to know for planning and executing
his mission. They are an extension of the commander’s overall guidance
clarifying the security mission. The platoon leader receives the
commander’s guidance from higher and then issues it to subordinates
within the platoon as part of his scheme of maneuver.
4-15. The focus of the security mission allows the commander to
determine which critical tasks he wants the platoons to accomplish. It
helps him narrow each platoon’s scope of operations to get the
information that is most important to battalion, squadron, and/or brigade
operations. In SSC operations, for example, the platoon focus might be
oriented on the threat, terrain, social/human demographics, or
infrastructure or on a combination of these factors. In stability operations
and support operations, the platoon might be focused on determining
local populace sentiment, identifying local paramilitary leaders, or
conducting checkpoint operations to determine the direction of movement

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of displaced persons in the area of operations. While all critical tasks


have some degree of applicability in any given operation, certain tasks
are more important for specific missions; this must be clearly articulated
at each level. Given its focus and a specific amount of time, the
reconnaissance platoon accomplishes its specified critical tasks as
instructed by the commander, then moves on to any other tasks within its
capabilities.
4-16. The tempo of the security mission allows the commander to
establish associated time requirements, such as the available planning
time, and applicable operational methods, such as dismounted or
mounted OPs, reconnaissance patrols, engagement criteria, and triggers
for displacement.
4-17. The engagement and displacement criteria establish what the
next higher unit is expected to destroy and what it is expected to hand
over. This is particularly important when the unit is conducting
counterreconaissance. At his level, the reconnaissance platoon leader
uses the engagement criteria, coupled with his understanding of the
threat’s most likely COA, to develop his understanding of what the
commander wants the platoon to destroy. He can then determine what he
wants the sections or squads to destroy. This enables the platoon leader
to focus certain weapon systems, develop engagement areas, and plan for
the destruction of specified threat vehicles. Displacement criteria inform
the platoon leader of the events that will trigger the collapse of the
screen. He uses them in planning how to occupy the area and in
determining when the platoon will execute displacement security drills.

SECTION III – SCREENING MISSIONS

4-18. The reconnaissance platoon conducts screen missions for its


parent unit or other combined arms forces to provide early warning of
threat approach and to provide real-time information, reaction time, and
maneuver space for the main body. The commander calls on the platoon
to screen for him when he needs advance warning of when and where the
threat is attacking. Operating over an extended area, the platoon fights
only for self-protection within its capabilities and to deny threat elements
close-in observation of the main body.

CRITICAL TASKS
4-19. During a screening mission, the platoon must accomplish the
following critical tasks:
· Maintain continuous surveillance of the area of operations,
including all assigned NAIs or avenues of approach into the
sector.
· Provide early warning of any threat approach.
· Within capability and based on the commander’s guidance,
identify threat reconnaissance units and, in coordination with
other combat elements, destroy them.

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· Gain and maintain contact with the threat main body, report
the threat activity, and conduct proper handover with other
elements.
· Impede and harass the threat main body by controlled use of
indirect fires.

4-20. The platoon maintains surveillance from a series of OPs. OPs are
positioned where they can best observe designated NAIs and/or avenues
of approach. The screen, normally identified by a phase line on a map,
designates the most forward location of the OPs. Commanders must
carefully weigh time and distance factors when choosing where to place
this line. The platoon covers the space between the screen line and the
supported/subsequent unit to the rear by establishing positions in depth.
This also supports reconnaissance handover, both within the platoon and
with the supported/subsequent unit to the rear of the screen line.
4-21. In executing a screen mission, scouts conduct active patrolling to
extend their observation range and/or to cover dead space and the area
between OPs. The platoon leader can request to place OPs forward of the
LOA if they can more effectively observe the NAI/avenue of approach.
Unless they have to, the scouts do not fight with their direct fire weapons.
Indirect fire is their primary means of engaging the threat. They use
direct fire for self-defense.
4-22. When planning a screen mission, the platoon leader uses the
critical task requirements covered in the following discussion as a guide
to prioritizing and sequencing the mission. He must address each
requirement.

CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE OF ASSIGNED AREAS


4-23. The first task for the reconnaissance platoon in the screening
mission is to provide surveillance of the assigned area of operations.

Surveillance Requirements
4-24. Generally, scouts are assigned to screen along a lateral line (the
screen line). This can be misleading, however. The screen is actually set
to observe specific avenues of approach or, more specifically, NAIs. The
screen line merely indicates the limit of the forward positioning of the
scouts. Along with the screen line graphic, the platoon leader must have
an event template/matrix; he may also have a decision support template.
4-25. The areas the platoon is tasked to observe should be identified in
either the reconnaissance and security plan the platoon leader receives or
in the OPORD from higher headquarters. If the platoon does not receive
an IPB product, the higher OPORD must specifically state where it must
focus the screening operation. If the platoon is assigned multiple
requirements, the higher headquarters must prioritize them.
4-26. The scout’s understanding of his commander’s intent and
guidance is the most critical aspect of planning the screen mission. More
important than the specifics of where to orient is the focus on what to
look for. There are three choices for this focus: the threat main body, the
threat reconnaissance effort, or both. The intent should specify on which
of these alternatives the platoon will focus or, if both are required (as is
often the case), which has priority.

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4-27. This guidance will then determine where the platoon will orient
and how it will allocate resources. If the commander’s priority is locating
the main body, the scout will focus most of his assets on the main avenues
of approach and accept risk on the reconnaissance avenues of approach
(RAA). If the commander’s priority is on counterreconnaissance, the scout
will put priority on the RAAs and accept some risk on the main avenue. If
the commander wants both choices, with equal priority, the scout must
plan to transition from the RAA to the main avenue at a designated point
in the battle. The commander will usually order this transition based on
the threat situation.

NOTE: A threat RAA may mirror or parallel the intended route of a threat maneuver force,
or it may follow a route that facilitates observation of key terrain or friendly forces
but is unrelated to the threat scheme of maneuver.

Surveillance Assets
4-28. Once the platoon leader has a thorough understanding of what
his surveillance requirements are, he must next determine what assets
he has available to execute these requirements. Availability of assets is
dependent on how long the screen must remain in place and how the
platoon is task organized. Among the assets that can enhance the
platoon’s surveillance capability are GSR, infantry squads, engineer
reconnaissance teams, artillery forward observers (FO), and TUAV
assets. If the screen will be of short duration (less than 12 hours),
individual squads can emplace and man separate OPs. If the duration of
the screen is unknown or longer than 12 hours, the platoon leader must
assign a two-vehicle section (CFV/RV platoons) or three-vehicle section
(HMMWV platoons) for each OP to facilitate continuous operations.
(NOTE: Refer to Chapter 8 of this manual for further details on
air/ground reconnaissance integration.)

Surveillance Techniques
4-29. To ensure that the critical task of surveillance of assigned
reconnaissance objectives is accomplished, the platoon leader and his
higher headquarters apply a combination of techniques to make the most
efficient use of their assets. (NOTE: Refer to Chapter 5 of this manual
for a discussion of surveillance methods, OPs, patrols, and use of
electronic and mechanical assets.)
4-30. Task Organization. The platoon leader will task organize the
platoon and any other assigned assets to achieve the most effective
surveillance of an NAI or avenue of approach. He may also employ assets
not under his direct control, but rather under the command of the next
higher unit. As noted, these assets could be engineer or infantry squads,
GSR, artillery observers, and TUAV assets. (NOTE: When the platoon
leader does not control the assets directly, he must ensure that his
dispositions complement those of the other forces in the screen and do not
duplicate them unnecessarily. In addition, he must ensure that all scouts
understand where these forces are and what role they are playing.)
4-31. The platoon leader may use these surveillance assets in a number
of ways. These may include adjusting the number of sections or squads in
a particular surveillance team; mixing scouts and other assets such as

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engineers, artillery, GSR, or infantry into the same team; or maintaining


elements in pure teams under the platoon leader’s control. The platoon
leader must consider the characteristics of the NAI or avenue when task
organizing for surveillance. These considerations will determine whether
the platoon will need to call for fire or conduct dismounted patrols; they
will also affect the field of view and applicability of GSR and TUAVs.
4-32. Figures 4-1A and 4-1B illustrate how the recce and HMMWV
platoons might be task organized for surveillance operations.

Figure 4-1A. Sample Recce Platoon Task Organization

Figure 4-1B. Sample HMMWV Platoon Task Organization

4-33. Redundancy. The platoon leader may task more than one
element to observe a particular assigned NAI or avenue. He does this
based on the nature of the NAI or avenue in terms of size, terrain, or
importance. For example, a very large avenue may require multiple
observation assets to ensure all aspects of the avenue are covered.
Terrain that is very broken or mixed with areas of thick vegetation may
require more than one asset to ensure that adequate continuous coverage
is achieved. Finally, if a particular NAI is assigned significant priority by

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the commander, the platoon leader may assign multiple elements to cover
it. Redundancy not only ensures that an NAI or avenue is adequately
observed, but also enables the unit to accomplish the mission even if
some assets are compromised by threat forces. Figure 4-2 illustrates
redundancy of observation assets.

Figure 4-2. Redundant Coverage of an Avenue of Approach

4-34. Cueing. Cueing is a technique the platoon leader can use to cover
an NAI or avenue when assets are limited and he lacks the capability for
redundancy. He plans contingency tasks that will increase surveillance
on a particular NAI; his surveillance teams execute the tasks when
“cued” by activity at that NAI.
4-35. The NAI or avenue is covered initially either by a single
surveillance team or by a remote or electronic signaling device such as
GSR, REMBASS, trip flares, or the platoon early warning system
(PEWS). When activity is detected, other teams move into preselected
positions to add their capabilities to the surveillance of the NAI or
avenue. Refer to Figure 4-3.

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Figure 4-3. Use of Trip Flare to Cue a Patrol

PROVIDE EARLY WARNING


4-36. The platoon’s second critical task is to provide early warning of a
threat approach. Effective early warning requires planning for
communications in detail. The platoon leader looks at communications
distances and significant terrain features to identify potential FM
communications problems. If he anticipates problems, he can address
them by requesting support from higher (in the form of battalion or
squadron retrans) or by planning for radio relays and directional
antennas. See Figure 4-4.

Figure 4-4. Platoon Communications Setup

PERFORM COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE (IF ORDERED)


4-37. Once the platoon leader has planned surveillance of assigned
reconnaissance objectives and has ensured that he can provide early
warning, he must next evaluate the threat’s reconnaissance effort and the
platoon’s assigned role in the conduct of counterreconnaissance. These
operations consist of two elements: acquiring and killing. The most
appropriate role for the platoon in the counterreconnaissance operation is
acquiring threat reconnaissance assets rather than killing them,
although it does have limited killing capability.
4-38. The commander’s guidance must specifically define the role of the
scouts in counterreconnaissance operations. Once he has a thorough
understanding of his commander’s intent, the platoon leader must
consider four factors when planning to acquire threat reconnaissance
elements:

· Threat RAAs (both mounted and dismounted).


· When and under what conditions the platoon is likely to
encounter threat reconnaissance forces.

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· Likely composition of threat reconnaissance forces in terms of


size, organization, and equipment.
· Identity and location of friendly reconnaissance-killing forces.

4-39. Threat reconnaissance forces are not likely to use primary


avenues of approach to execute their mission. To acquire their assigned
reconnaissance objectives, the scouts must be oriented on RAAs, which
may include trails, rough terrain, and dead space that allows mounted
movement, but only for small teams of vehicles. They must also realize
that threat reconnaissance is most likely to move during darkness and
periods of limited visibility. A thorough understanding of the composition
of threat reconnaissance elements will allow the scouts to more
accurately determine what the threat’s likely RAAs are and how best to
acquire them.
4-40. Other assets in the battalion, squadron or, more likely, the
brigade will be given the specific mission of killing threat reconnaissance
behind the screen line where initial acquisition occurs. Once the scouts
locate threat reconnaissance elements, they must use their thorough
knowledge of the terrain and of the location and capabilities of the
friendly killing force to coordinate handover of the threat forces.
4-41. The counterreconnaissance task is extremely resource-intensive.
It is generally most effective when conducted by an element larger than a
single reconnaissance platoon. Most often, the platoon by itself does not
have sufficient assets to both acquire and kill the threat. In addition, it
may not be able to cover all RAAs and still maintain surveillance on the
threat’s main avenues of approach. The commander’s intent is critical to
resolving this dilemma.
4-42. When the platoon must acquire both threat reconnaissance
elements and the main body, the priority in the early stages of the
mission will be on the reconnaissance forces, focusing on the RAAs. The
platoon will then track the echeloned arrival of threat elements on the
battlefield and shift priority to the main avenues of approach at the
appropriate time. This technique permits the platoon to time-phase its
priorities based on battlefield conditions. The platoon leader, however,
must recognize when to change priority to the main avenue and then
execute the change successfully. See Figures 4-5A and 4-5B.

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Figure 4-5A. Changing the Screen Priority (Initial Priority


to Counterreconnaissance)

Figure 4-5B. Changing the Screen Priority (Priority


Changed to Main Avenue of Approach) (Continued)

MAINTAIN CONTACT
4-43. After locating the main body of the threat, the platoon must
maintain contact with it until authorized to hand over contact to another
friendly element. This is one of the most difficult tasks for the individual
section or squad to accomplish and therefore is best accomplished
through a platoon effort.
4-44. The preferred method of maintaining contact with a moving
threat main body is to position echeloned OPs in depth along the avenue
of approach. This allows contact to be handed over from one OP to
another without the requirement for the OPs to physically displace. This
technique requires that the platoon have enough assets to pre-position
the OPs in depth. See Figure 4-6.

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Figure 4-6. Positioning OPs in Depth

4-45. Another technique used to maintain contact is to displace in front


of a moving threat. This technique is very difficult because the scouts
must move to the rear faster than the threat is moving forward. This
often exposes the scouts to threat fire. Additionally, if they attempt to use
covered and concealed routes only, they risk moving too slowly, being
outrun and/or overrun by the threat, and losing contact. Figure 4-7
illustrates how scouts can conduct displacement while maintaining
contact.

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Figure 4-7. Displacement while in Contact

4-46. A third technique is a combination of the two discussed earlier.


Leaving the original dismounted OP in position (with a vehicle in
support, if possible), the scouts detach a vehicle or vehicle section and
reposition it in depth as either a mounted or dismounted OP. This OP can
be established or reoriented to maintain contact until the threat force can
be handed over to a maneuver element. The platoon must maintain
observation of NAIs/avenues of approach or request that other assets
maintain the screen. The platoon leader can also request or coordinate
handover to maintain the screen. This technique reduces both the time
associated with moving OPs and the likelihood that any reconnaissance
element will be compromised. Refer to Figure 4-8A and 4-8B.
4-47. No matter how the platoon plans to maintain contact, the platoon
leader should attempt to rehearse the method, especially if it involves
displacement of reconnaissance elements. This will help him to validate
the method he has chosen or to choose another one if it becomes
necessary.

Figure 4-8A. Repositioning OPs in Depth

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Figure 4-8B. Repositioning OPs in Depth (Continued)

HARASS AND IMPEDE


4-48. Reconnaissance platoons should attempt to harass and impede
the threat using indirect fire. The platoon leader must plan carefully to
overcome the difficulties involved in effectively engaging a moving
mechanized element with indirect fire. He should focus on expected
avenues of approach, choke points, the threat rate of march, and artillery
time of flight to determine trigger lines (or points) that allow accurate
engagement of the threat. A technique for planning the use of triggers is
to have a dismounted OP, sited forward of its supporting vehicle, observe
the triggers and initiate fires, with the vehicle OP observing the impact
zone and adjusting the fires. Every scout in the reconnaissance platoon
must be proficient in planning, coordinating, and calling for indirect fires,
such as linear sheaths on main avenues of approach.
4-49. Accurate artillery fire will have an immediate effect on the threat
force. Formations will be disrupted as individual vehicles change speed,
button up, or are destroyed or disabled. Command and control will
deteriorate as vision is restricted and antennas are lost; this loss of vision
and command and control will restrict the threat’s ability to spot
displacing friendly forces. The threat may also compromise his
momentum and combat power if he attempts to locate the element
directing the fire.

COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE TECHNIQUES
4-50. Counterreconnaissance is a directed effort to prevent visual
observation or infiltration of friendly forces by threat reconnaissance
elements. It is a critical task in all reconnaissance platoon security
missions. Countering the threat’s mounted and dismounted
reconnaissance elements is the first and possibly most important step in
ensuring the friendly main body can successfully execute its mission. At
the same time, it can be extremely difficult to identify threat
reconnaissance forces, especially when they are dismounted. The platoon
may lack this capability. As a result, this task is most successfully

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executed when it is approached as a combined arms effort at troop and


battalion task force level.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
4-51. The troop or task force concept of executing
counterreconnaissance must address how the unit will accomplish the
two aspects of counterreconnaissance: acquiring the threat and then
killing it. At battalion/squadron level, the S2 provides key input in this
determination. He identifies where RAAs are located in the unit sector,
what type of threat reconnaissance elements might be used in the sector,
and when they are most likely to move into the sector. It is especially
important for the S2 to note the locations and activities of dismounted
threat elements, which present the greatest danger to the platoon and
the supported unit. Information from the S2 is integrated into the
OPORD and is part of the unit’s IPB.
4-52. The commander should discuss conduct of counterreconnaissance
in the OPORD or FRAGO, indicating in tactical terms how elements will
organize and conduct the operations throughout the depth of the area of
operations. This information should include planning considerations for
the operation, including the following:

· Direct fire planning and coordination.


· Observation planning and coordination.
· Command and control.
· Battle handover.

4-53. In all counterreconnaissance operations, the goal is to destroy the


threat reconnaissance forces after they have penetrated the initial screen
line. The reconnaissance platoon’s role in these operations will usually be
to conduct a screen mission to acquire and identify threat reconnaissance
forces. This requires that the acquiring elements of the platoon be well
hidden to prevent the threat from detecting the screen. In most cases, the
platoon cannot be expected to have the capability to acquire, identify, and
defeat the threat reconnaissance by itself. Other combat elements must
be tasked to fight and destroy the threat reconnaissance elements.

ORGANIZATION
4-54. Several organizational options, which are described in the
following paragraphs, are available to the commander to counter the
threat reconnaissance effort.

Reconnaissance Platoon
4-55. This technique puts the entire burden for counterreconnaissance
on the reconnaissance platoon and attached CS assets. It requires
maximum use of the CS assets to acquire the threat, freeing the scouts to
perform the killing function of counterreconnaissance. The platoon leader
places acquiring assets along the screen line and positions his designated
killing teams in depth. The killing assets of the platoon occupy positions
on likely threat reconnaissance routes; however, they must be flexible to
respond to threat elements moving on other routes. (NOTE: When the
platoon operates with units that commonly have strikers or COLTs
attached, such as BRTs, the platoon leader may have to integrate NAIs to

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support the TAIs that are positioned in depth. This will place the scouts
in the role of acquiring the threat, with the strikers/COLTs as the killers
in depth.)
4-56. This technique requires that the platoon’s sections or squads
reconnoiter alternate positions and routes that permit quick repositioning
once contact is made by the acquiring elements. When it is used,
counterreconnaissance tasks must be prioritized in the early stages of the
screen mission.

Reconnaissance Platoon and MGS/Tank Platoon


4-57. The team technique requires the close integration of a
reconnaissance platoon and an MGS/tank platoon to execute
counterreconnaissance tasks. The reconnaissance platoon is the acquiring
element, and the MGS/tank platoon is the killing element. The
reconnaissance platoon leader, whose element makes first contact,
commands the counterreconnaissance effort; the MGS/tank platoon is
placed OPCON to the reconnaissance platoon. In a cavalry troop, BRT, or
recce troop, the troop commander may control and coordinate the effort.
4-58. The scouts acquire the threat through the use of surveillance
techniques. The MGSs or tanks occupy a BP along likely reconnaissance
avenues, but they are prepared to move to previously reconnoitered
alternate positions based on reports coming from the reconnaissance
platoon. This organization will be most effective when the two platoons
establish a habitual relationship. Refer to Figure 4-9 for an illustration of
this technique using a counterreconnaissance team made up of recce and
MGS platoons.

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Figure 4-9. Recce/MGS Team Counterreconnaissance Array

Reconnaissance Platoon and Company Team


4-59. In this technique, a combined arms task force uses a company
team with an attached or OPCON reconnaissance platoon to execute
counterreconnaissance and security operations. This technique is
primarily executed by battalion reconnaissance platoons. The company
team commander controls the security effort. The reconnaissance platoon
is the primary acquiring element, but it can be supplemented with
infantry assets from the company team and CS assets from the battalion.
The commander uses all other assets as the killing element.
4-60. This is the most robust counterreconnaissance technique and has
the combat power to be very effective. It also has organic CSS assets,
making service support operations quicker and more responsive. Major
disadvantages of this technique are the combat power it diverts from the
main battle area (MBA) and the execution problems that may result if
the scouts and the killing elements have not trained together. Refer to
Figure 4-10.

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Figure 4-10. Reconaissance Platoon and Company Team


Counterreconnaissance Array

EXAMPLE OF A SCREEN OPERATION


4-61. The following example illustrates a screen operation by a recce
platoon; however, the mission can be conducted in similar fashion by all
types of reconnaissance platoons.
4-62. The recce platoon normally screens as part of a troop operation.
This example focuses on 1st Platoon, Troop B, operating as part of a
RSTA squadron (see Figure 4-11). The troop commander has been
assigned the mission to screen in his sector along PL BOB and between
PL BOB and PL SAM. The troop will hand over threat contact as the
threat crosses PL SAM. The troop commander decides to screen with his
three recce platoons on line and an attached MGS platoon in depth
behind the recce platoons.

Figure 4-11. Troop Screen Concept

4-63. The primary focus of the 1st Platoon is on acquiring threat main
body elements moving along avenue of approach 2 or 2A (AA2 and AA2A

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_________________________________________________________ Chapter 4 – Security Operations

in the accompanying illustrations). The platoon will also locate as many


threat reconnaissance elements as possible. Because of the width of the
sector, the recce platoons have permission to engage threat
reconnaissance patrols smaller than section size, but only under
favorable conditions. (NOTE: CFV-equipped scouts may be tasked to
engage enemy elements up to platoon size.) The MGS platoon’s primary
task is to destroy threat reconnaissance elements of section or platoon
size. In 1st Platoon’s area of operations, the attached MGS platoon has
been positioned in BP A6 and is prepared to occupy any other BP on
order.
4-64. With his troop commander’s guidance, the 1st Platoon leader
evaluates the resources available to accomplish his tasks. Because there
is no assigned time limit to the mission, he plans for long-duration OPs.
This consideration leads him to select a two-section organization. He
places one section to observe AA2A from OP A and positions the other
section at OP E (see Figure 4-12). Positioning of these OPs is critical. A
map reconnaissance indicates that RAAs are probably located along the
platoon’s boundaries and through the wooded area in the center of the
platoon screen (in the vicinity of checkpoints 7, 2, and 3).
4-65. Careful positioning of the OPs will allow continuous coverage of
AA2 and AA2A and some coverage of the RAAs. The platoon leader plans
to conduct patrols for further surveillance of the RAAs. In addition to his
primary positions, the platoon leader plans alternate and subsequent OPs
throughout the depth of his sector. He selects these positions based on his
requirements to reposition if an OP is compromised and to maintain
contact with the main body throughout the depth of his sector (as
illustrated in Figure 4-12).
4-66. If time permits, the platoon leader will report all his planned
positions to the troop TOC. As a minimum, he will send the exact
locations of the initial positions.

Figure 4-12. Recce Dispositions

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4-67. As the recce sections arrive at their assigned positions (OPs A


and E), they adjust the sites to best meet the intent of the platoon leader.
Upon arriving, the sections report “SET”; after the OP is completely
installed, they report “ESTABLISHED.” Once established, the recce
sections begin executing patrols in accordance with the platoon patrol
plan.
4-68. After a period of time, OP A reports contact with a threat
reconnaissance patrol consisting of two BRDMs (see Figure 4-13). Based
on the platoon leader’s guidance, the recce section takes no action,
remains hidden, and continues to report. The platoon leader forwards the
report to the troop commander and receives instructions to coordinate
target handover with the MGS platoon in BP A6. Based on his
commander’s guidance, the recce platoon leader has the MGS platoon
move to BP A5 to engage and destroy the threat.

Figure 4-13. Initial Contact and Engagement

4-69. A short time later, the scouts in OP E report artillery impact in


the vicinity of OP C and then contact with two BMPs, moving south just
west of AA2. Having monitored the developing threat situation, the troop
commander orders the MGS platoon to move to BP A6 and engage the
threat. The MGS platoon coordinates with the recce platoon leader, then
engages and destroys the second threat. See Figure 4-14.

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Figure 4-14. Scouts Acquire Combat Reconnaissance


Patrols (CRP); MGSs Destroy CRPs

4-70. Having engaged a significant number of threat elements from BP


A6 and/or BP A5, the MGS platoon is ordered by the troop commander to
reposition to BP A8. As that occurs, the recce section at OP E identifies
the first element of the threat main body, a company-size element. The
platoon leader decides to take a risk along AA2A. He requests to displace
from OP A to OP H or displaces in accordance with the established
displacement criteria. This gives him additional depth along AA2 and will
make it easier for the platoon to maintain contact with the threat main
body (see Figure 4-15). The platoon leader reports the displacement.

Figure 4-15. Scouts Acquire Threat Main Body

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4-71. The recce section formerly at OP A reports set at OP H. The


section at OP E maintains contact with the threat main body until it can
be observed by the section at OP H (as shown in Figure 4-16). Once that
occurs, the two OPs conduct target handover, with the section at OP E
beginning displacement in depth to OP J. The section at OP H begins to
harass the threat main body by calling for indirect fire. This fire not only
breaks up the momentum of the main body, but also helps cover the
displacement of OP E. OP H also reports threat artillery impact in the
vicinity of BP A6. Eavesdropping on the troop net, the recce platoon
learns that the MGS platoon is set at BP A8.

Figure 4-16. Scouts Harass Threat Main Body

4-72. OP H maintains contact with the threat and continues to harass


him with indirect fire (as illustrated in Figure 4-17). As the threat main
body continues to move, it is engaged with direct fire by the MGS platoon
in BP A8. These combined fires disrupt and significantly slow the threat
main body. The recce section reports set at OP J and begins coordinating
battle handover to the friendly unit south of PL SAM.

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Figure 4-17. MGSs and Scouts Engage Threat Main Body

4-73. After the initial engagement of the threat main body, the MGS
platoon displaces laterally toward Troop A to conduct a rearward passage
of lines (see Figure 4-18). OP H conducts target handover with OP J and
also moves toward Troop A. OP J maintains contact with the moving
threat main body until battle handover with the friendly unit to the south
is complete. The recce section at OP J then moves east to pass to the rear.

Figure 4-18. Scouts Execute Battle Handover


to Incoming Unit

SECTION IV – CONVOY AND AREA SECURITY OPERATIONS

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FM 3-20.98 ___________________________________________________________________________

4-74. Area security operations are designed to protect specific critical


and vulnerable assets or terrain from threat observation and direct fire.
They can involve escorting friendly convoys; protecting critical points
such as bridges, command and control installations, or other key and
vulnerable sites; or participating in protection of large areas such as
airfields. They are normally performed when conventional security or
combat operations are not appropriate to the situation. The
reconnaissance platoon may perform area security operations as part of a
larger force or as an independent platoon mission.

CONVOY SECURITY
4-75. Convoy security missions are performed by recce troops, company
teams, cavalry troops, and larger organizations to provide protection for a
specific convoy. These missions include numerous tasks for elements such
as escort, reconnaissance, and combat reaction forces. The tasks in turn
become missions for the subordinate units. The recce platoon is
particularly well suited for outposting missions, whereas other types of
reconnaissance platoons are effective for both route reconnaissance and
outposting missions. All reconnaissance platoons can perform convoy
escort as well. The size of the unit performing the convoy security
operation is dependent on a number of factors, including the size of the
convoy, the terrain, and the length of the route. Refer to Figures 4-19A
and 4-19B for illustrations of recce troop and cavalry troop convoy
security missions.

Figure 4-19A. Recce Troop Convoy Security Mission

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Figure 4-19B. Cavalry Troop Convoy Security Mission

ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE
4-76. When route reconnaissance is conducted as part of a convoy
security operation, it is done in the same manner as discussed in Chapter
3 of this manual. In this mission, scouts focus on the trafficability of the
route and on threat forces that might influence the route. The platoon
must plan to call for engineer assets to assist in breaching point-type
obstacles. Command-detonated devices are a major threat during route
reconnaissance.

OUTPOSTING
4-77. Outposting is a technique used during convoy security to screen
the route after it has been reconnoitered. Its use is similar to the
technique for covering lateral and boundary routes in reconnaissance
operations. Outposting as part of convoy security, however, is generally
done by all elements of the platoon for the specific purpose of helping to
secure the convoy. It involves employing OPs on critical portions of the
route or on key avenues of approach to the route to provide early warning
of threat elements attempting to interdict the convoy.
4-78. Outposting differs from a conventional screen in that the outposts
are oriented on the route rather than on the friendly main body.
Normally, the outposting element follows the element that is executing
the route reconnaissance (see Figure 4-20). Outposts have a limited
ability to destroy small threat forces attempting to influence the route.
Their primary purpose is to acquire the threat and then to direct the
employment of reaction forces or indirect fire to destroy him.

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Figure 4-20. Recce Platoon Conducts Outposting

CONVOY ESCORT
4-79. The platoon may perform a convoy escort mission either
independently or as part of a larger unit’s convoy security mission. The
convoy escort mission requires that the platoon provide a convoy with
close-in protection from direct fire. The platoon can protect 5 to 10 convoy
vehicles per escort vehicle. These vehicles can include military vehicles
(CSS, command and control), civilian trucks, or buses. Among
reconnaissance platoons, those equipped with CFVs are best suited for
this mission because of their vehicles’ firepower and the armor protection
they provide against direct and indirect fires and mines. Leaders must
carefully evaluate the threat before assigning a convoy escort mission to
HMMWV- or RV-equipped platoons. The following considerations apply
during convoy escort operations.

Command and Control


4-80. Command and control is especially critical during convoy escort
because of the task organization inherent to the mission. When the
reconnaissance platoon is executing the escort mission, it operates under
the control of the convoy commander. The relationship between the
platoon and the convoy commander must provide for unity of command
and effort if combat operations are required during the course of the
mission. (NOTE: The convoy commander must understand the
employment of combat assets while in contact. If the senior leader in the
convoy chain of command lacks such experience, the next most senior
leader with the appropriate qualifications should assume the duties of
convoy commander.)
4-81. The platoon leader must ensure that a complete OPORD is issued
to all vehicle commanders in the convoy prior to execution of the mission.
This is vital because the convoy may itself be task organized from a
variety of units and because many of the vehicles may not have tactical

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radios. The order should follow the standard five-paragraph OPORD


format, with special emphasis on the following subjects:

· Order of march.
· Actions on contact.
· Chain of command.
· Communications and signals.
· Actions on vehicle breakdown.
· Actions at a halt.
· Route of march (this should include a sketch for each vehicle
commander).
Tactical Disposition
4-82. Security during convoy escort missions must be in all directions
and throughout the length of the convoy. This requires that the elements
of the platoon and any combat or CS attachments be dispersed
throughout the convoy formation. Engineer assets should be located
toward the front to respond to obstacles; the fire support team (FIST) or
COLT should be located near the platoon leader. The platoon will
normally use the column formation because of its inherent speed and ease
of movement. If a HMMWV unit is used as the escort, a tracked, armored
vehicle should be attached to lead the convoy whenever possible because
of its superior protection against mines. Figures 4-20A, 4-20B, and 4-20C
illustrate convoy escort missions by various types of reconnaissance
platoon.

Figure 4-20A. Recce Platoon Escorts a Convoy

Figure 4-20B. CFV Platoon Escorts a Convoy

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FM 3-20.98 ___________________________________________________________________________

Figure 4-20C. HMMWV Platoon Escorts a Convoy

Actions at an Ambush
4-83. Ambush is one of the most effective ways to interdict a convoy
and is therefore a threat the convoy escort must be prepared to counter.
Reaction to an ambush must be quick, overwhelming, and decisive. It
must be executed as a drill by all escort and convoy elements, with care
taken to avoid fratricide. The following actions should be included in the
convoy escort drill:

· Upon detection of a threat force, escort vehicles action toward


the threat. They seek covered positions between the convoy
and the threat and suppress the threat with the highest
possible volume of fire. They send appropriate contact reports
to higher headquarters (as shown in Figure 4-21A).
NOTE: In some situations, elements of the escort force will be required to remain with the
convoy main body. This is especially true when the convoy comprises mainly
nonmilitary elements, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGO) or local
civilian agencies. In addition to being unarmed in most cases, these elements will
usually lack communications capabilities, making it difficult for escort elements to
link back up with the main body.
· The convoy commander retains control of the convoy vehicles
and maintains radio contact with the security force while
moving the convoy on the route at the highest possible speed.
· Convoy vehicles, if armed, may return fire only until the
escort has imposed itself between the convoy and the threat.
· Any damaged or disabled vehicles are abandoned and pushed
off the route (as illustrated in Figure 4-21B).
· The escort leader (reconnaissance platoon leader) submits
spot reports. If necessary, he requests reinforcement and calls
for and directs indirect fires and air support if they are
available.
· Once the convoy is clear of the kill zone, the escort leader
chooses one of the following COAs based on the composition of
the escort and the strength of the threat force:
n Continue to suppress the threat force while combat
reaction forces move to support (see Figure 4-22A).
n Assault the threat (see Figure 4-22B).
n Break contact and move out of the kill zone (as illustrated
in Figure 4-22C).

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4-84. Generally, CFV-equipped platoons will continue to suppress the


threat or execute an assault because of their vehicles’ capabilities.
HMMWV- and RV-equipped platoons are more likely to move out of the
kill zone as soon as the convoy is clear. Contact should be broken only
with the approval of the platoon’s higher commander.

Figure 4-21A. Convoy Escort Actions toward Ambush

Figure 4-21B. Convoy Continues to Move out of Kill Zone

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FM 3-20.98 ___________________________________________________________________________

Figure 4-22A. Escort Suppresses Ambush for Reaction Force

Figure 4-22B. Escort Vehicles Assault Ambush Position

Figure 4-22C. Escort Vehicles Break Contact

Actions at a Short Halt


4-85. The convoy may be required to make a short halt for a number of
reasons. During the short halt, the escorting unit is at REDCON-1
regardless of what actions convoy vehicles are taking. If the halt is for
any reason other than an obstacle, these actions should be taken:
· The convoy commander signals the short halt and transmits
the order via tactical radio.
· The convoy assumes a herringbone formation.
· Escort vehicles take up protective positions forward, to the
rear, and to the flanks (up to 100 meters beyond the convoy

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vehicles, as applicable) and orient their weapon systems


outward. They remain at REDCON-1, although they establish
dismounted local security (as illustrated in Figure 4-23A).
The vehicles being escorted pull into the protected area in the
center of the herringbone, between the escort vehicles.
(NOTE: Escort vehicles should not leave the roadway if there
is a possibility of threat mines.)
· When the order is given to move out, convoy vehicles first
reestablish the column formation, leaving space for the escort
vehicles (see Figure 4-23B). Once the convoy is in column, the
escort vehicles join the column, leaving local security
dismounted (shown in Figure 4-23C).
· Once all elements are in column, local security personnel
mount, and the convoy continues to move.

Figure 4-23A. Convoy Assumes Herringbone Formation

Figure 4-23B. Convoy Moves Back into Column Formation

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FM 3-20.98 ___________________________________________________________________________

Figure 4-23C. Escort Vehicles Rejoin Column

Actions at an Obstacle
4-86. Obstacles are a major threat to convoys. They can be used to
delay the convoy; if the terrain is favorable, they may be able to stop the
convoy altogether. In addition, an obstacle or series of obstacles can be
used to channel or stop the convoy to set up an ambush. Generally, the
convoy should treat every obstacle as though the threat is overwatching it
with direct and/or indirect fires.
4-87. The purpose of the route reconnaissance ahead of the convoy is to
identify obstacles and either breach them or find bypasses. In some cases,
it is not possible to mount a route reconnaissance ahead of the convoy; in
other cases, the reconnaissance element may fail to detect the threat or
its obstacles. In either situation, the convoy must take actions to reduce
or bypass the obstacle.
4-88. When a convoy is dealing with an obstacle, it faces a two-sided
problem: it is more vulnerable because it is stopped, and its escort force
is occupied with tasks required to overcome or bypass the obstacle. For
these reasons, security becomes critical, and actions at the obstacle must
be accomplished very quickly. The convoy escort takes the following
actions when it encounters a point-type obstacle:
· When the lead security element identifies the obstacle, the
convoy commander directs a short halt. He establishes
dismounted local security and overwatch of the obstacle.
Convoy vehicles remain on the road, with the escort elements
moving to the flanks to provide security. (NOTE: All convoy
vehicles must be aware that the threat may have buried
mines in the area, especially on the flanks of the road.)
· The convoy commander relays a spot report to higher
headquarters and requests support from combat reaction
forces, engineer assets (if they are not already part of the
convoy), and aerial reconnaissance elements. In addition, he
alerts artillery units to be prepared to provide fire support.

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Employment of these assets is designed to reduce the time the


convoy is halted and thus to reduce its vulnerability. The
convoy commander must always assume that the
obstacle is overwatched and covered by the threat.
· The escort forces form a reconnaissance team and begin
reconnaissance for a bypass while maintaining 360-degree
security of the convoy (see Figure 4-24).
· Simultaneously, an additional reconnaissance team made up
of escort elements and/or engineers moves forward to conduct
an obstacle reconnaissance. Because of limited time and
assets, the convoy does not need to establish far-side security
prior to reconnaissance of the obstacle (see Figure 4-24).
· Once all reconnaissance is completed, the convoy commander
determines which of the following COAs he will take:
n Bypass the obstacle.
n Breach the obstacle with the assets on hand.
n Breach the obstacle with reinforcing assets.
· The convoy commander executes the best COA and continues
the mission.

Figure 4-24. Escort Teams Conduct Obstacle


Reconnaissance and Reconnoiter for a Bypass

AREA AND HIGH-VALUE ASSET SECURITY


4-89. Units conduct area security missions in MTWs and SSCs to deny
the threat the ability to influence friendly actions in a specific area or to
deny the threat use of an area for its own purposes. This may entail
occupying and securing an area without the presence of the threat or
taking actions to destroy threat forces already present in the area. The
area security mission may provide protection of designated personnel,

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FM 3-20.98 ___________________________________________________________________________

airfields, unit convoys, facilities, main supply routes, lines of


communications, equipment, and critical points.

AREA SECURITY TASKS


4-90. Area security involves a variety of techniques and may include
reconnaissance, security, defensive, offensive, stability, and support
tasks. Reconnaissance organizations, including the platoon, may conduct
the following in support of area security:

· Area, route, and/or zone reconnaissance.


· Screening operations.
· Offensive and defensive tasks (within the platoon’s capability
based on METT-TC).
· Convoy security.
· High-value asset security.

NOTE: Reconnaissance units without organic combat assets (such as the BRT, recce troop,
and task force reconnaissance platoon) rely on the brigade to provide the combat
assets needed to perform offensive and defensive actions if the enemy situation
dictates.

4-91. The platoon may conduct or support the following additional


tasks in stability operations and support operations:

· Liaison.
· Compliance inspections.
· Presence patrols.
· Checkpoints.
· Roadblocks.

NOTE: See Appendix D of this manual for a more detailed discussion of platoon operations
in stability operations or support operations.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
4-92. An area security force neutralizes or defeats enemy operations in
a specified area. It operates in an area delineated by the headquarters
assigning the area security mission. It screens, reconnoiters, attacks,
defends, and delays (within capability) as necessary to accomplish its
mission. Area security operations may be offensive or defensive in nature
and focus on the threat/enemy, on the force/element being protected, or
on a combination of the two. Commanders may balance the level of
security measures taken with the type and level of threat posed in the
specific area; however, all-around security is an essential consideration at
all times.
4-93. As noted, area security operations are conducted to deny the
threat/enemy the ability to influence friendly actions in a specific area or
to deny him use of an area for his own purposes. This may entail
occupying and establishing a 360-degree perimeter around the area being
secured or taking actions to destroy or neutralize enemy forces already
present. The area to be secured may range from specific points (bridges,

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_________________________________________________________ Chapter 4 – Security Operations

defiles) to defined areas (terrain features such as ridgelines or hills) to


large population centers and adjacent areas.
4-94. Proper IPB is vital in providing adequate security for the
assigned area. Along with unit capability and the factors of METT-TC,
the following considerations, which are determined during the IPB, will
determine specific unit missions during area security operations:

· The natural defensive characteristics of the terrain.


· Existing roads and waterways for military lines of
communication and civilian commerce.
· Control of land and water areas and avenues of approach
surrounding the area to be secured extending to a range
beyond that of threat artillery, rockets, and mortars.
· Control of airspace.
· Proximity to critical sites such as airfields, power generation
plants, and civic buildings.

4-95. Because of the possibility of commanders tying their forces to


fixed installations or sites, area security missions may become defensive
in nature. This must be carefully balanced with the need for offensive
action. Early warning of enemy activity to provide the commander with
time to react to any potential threat is a paramount consideration in
effective area security missions. It requires thorough reconnaissance and
surveillance planning, coupled with employment of dismounted and
mounted patrols and aerial reconnaissance.
4-96. A perimeter is established when a unit must secure an area
where the defense is not tied into an adjacent unit. Perimeters vary in
shape depending on METT-TC. If the commander determines the most
probable direction of threat attack, he may weight that part of the
perimeter to cover the approach of threat forces. The perimeter shape
conforms to the terrain features that afford the most effective observation
and fields of fire.
4-97. Perimeters are divided into troop/platoon sectors with boundaries
and contact points. Mutual support and coordination between defensive
elements (usually combat elements within the brigade) require careful
planning, positioning, and coordination because of the circular aspects of
the perimeter. A screen line is established, integrating OPs, GSR, and
patrols. Tanks, MGSs, and/or antiarmor weapons systems are placed on
armor-restrictive terrain and high-speed avenues of approach. Likely
threat/enemy drop zones (DZ), landing zones (LZ), or bases are identified
and kept under observation. Air assets, if available, are integrated into
the R&S plan. (NOTE: Refer to FM 3-20.971 and FM 3-20.97 [FM 17-97]
for further discussion on area security at the troop level.)

PLATOON AREA SECURITY TECHNIQUES


4-98. The reconnaissance platoon may deploy to conduct area security
operations on its own or as part of a larger force. When the platoon
deploys to conduct area security on its own, it generally moves into a coil
formation around the point, area, or asset to be secured. Vehicle positions
are adjusted to orient on likely threat avenues of approach. If engineer

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FM 3-20.98 ___________________________________________________________________________

support is available, the vehicle positions are dug in; if not, vehicles
occupy hasty fighting positions.
4-99. To further improve the position, the platoon employs hasty
protective minefields, wire, and other obstacles as appropriate and
available. Wire obstacles should be emplaced outside grenade range of
friendly positions. Once vehicle positions and obstacles are established,
the platoon develops a fire plan, including integrated indirect fires, and
submits it to its higher headquarters.
4-100. In addition to setting up the platoon position around the asset to
be secured, the platoon also employs patrols and OPs to enhance security
(see Figure 4-25). It employs reconnaissance patrols and combat patrols
as needed to become familiar with the area of operations, to gain
information on threat forces, and to destroy small threat dismounted
reconnaissance elements. OPs are deployed to observe likely avenues of
approach, to provide early warning of threat activity, and to assist in
controlling indirect fires.

Figure 4-25. Platoon Area Security Dispositions

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Chapter 5

Dismounted Operations
Dismounted operations, in CONTENTS
some form, are a critical
Troop-Leading Procedures .......................... 5-1
element in virtually every Tenets .................................................... 5-2
reconnaissance platoon Troop-Leading Steps in Dismounted
mission. The best scouting is Operations .......................................... 5-2
Patrolling Tasks ........................................... 5-15
done dismounted. It is critical
Movement Techniques .......................... 5-15
that all reconnaissance Security Halts ........................................ 5-18
leaders understand when and Departure from Friendly Lines ............. 5-19
how to employ dismounted Use of Rally Points ................................ 5-20
Contingency Plans ................................ 5-21
scouts to enhance the Leader’s Reconnaissance .................... 5-21
platoon’s effectiveness in Reentry to Friendly Lines ..................... 5-22
reconnaissance and security Debriefing .............................................. 5-23
tasks. This chapter focuses on Actions at Danger Areas ....................... 5-23
Actions on Contact ...................................... 5-26
the two major types of Battle Drills ............................................ 5-26
dismounted operations: Methods of Handling Casualties and
patrols and observation posts. Prisoners ............................................ 5-32
Types of Patrols ........................................... 5-33
Reconnaissance Patrol ......................... 5-33
Security Patrol ....................................... 5-39
Combat Patrol ........................................ 5-40
Presence Patrol ..................................... 5-51
Tracking Patrol ...................................... 5-51
Patrol Bases .................................................. 5-57
Site Selection ......................................... 5-57
Planning Considerations ...................... 5-58
Patrol Base Occupation ........................ 5-58
Patrol Base Activities ........................... 5-60
Passive (Clandestine) Patrol Base ...... 5-61
Observation Posts ........................................ 5-61
Critical Tasks ......................................... 5-62
Types of Observation Posts ................. 5-63
Positioning the OP ................................ 5-63
Selecting an OP Site ............................. 5-64
Occupying the OP ................................. 5-65
Manning the OP ..................................... 5-66
Improving the Position ......................... 5-67
OP Communications ............................. 5-68
OP Security ............................................ 5-68
Extended OP Operations ...................... 5-69
Remote Electronic/Mechanical
Surveillance ....................................... 5-80

SECTION I – TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES

5-1. Patrols are missions to gather information or to conduct combat


operations. The platoon must be proficient at conducting the five types of
patrols: reconnaissance, security, combat, presence, and tracking. The
leaders understanding of how and when to employ dismounted scouts will

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FM 3-20.98 ___________________________________________________________________________

facilitate the successful accomplishment of any assigned reconnaissance


and security task. A mission to conduct a patrol may be given to a team,
section, squad, or the entire platoon. (NOTE: Refer to Chapter 7 of this
manual for a discussion of urban operations.)

TENETS
5-2. The following considerations are basic to the platoon’s
understanding, planning, and execution for every patrol mission:

· The platoon must plan and conduct the reconnaissance patrol


in accordance with the fundamentals of reconnaissance
outlined in Chapter 3 of this manual.
· Based on the higher commander’s guidance and intent, the
platoon leader must specify the following aspects of the
patrol:
n The focus of the patrol. In most cases, this is the
reconnaissance objective.
n The tempo. This includes the level of planning and
preparation (deliberate or hasty) and the methods and
actions to be employed (stealthy or aggressive).
n Engagement criteria, including applicable ROE and ROI.
· The platoon must execute the patrol using the correct
movement technique to prevent compromise of any patrol
element. It must always maintain local security by using
separate reconnaissance and security elements.
· The platoon must take advantage of available resources
(including TUAVs, GSR, FBCB2, and other enablers) to
develop the situation prior to threat contact.
· Threat contact is avoided unless specifically directed by the
platoon leader. In such a situation, the platoon gains contact
with its smallest element. Unexpected contact by
reconnaissance elements is absolutely minimized.
· Based on the higher commander’s intent and the platoon
order, the platoon reports all critical and information
requirements rapidly and accurately (by FM voice and/or
FBCB2, as applicable).
· The platoon can execute reconnaissance patrols to ensure the
security of OPs and integrity of the platoon area of operations.
For example, a section can send out a reconnaissance patrol
after establishing an OP to check all locations from which the
threat can observe the OP; this will ensure the OP position
was not detected as it was occupied. When executed as part of
a screen or other security mission, this type of patrol is
referred to a security patrol.
· The platoon accomplishes the assigned patrol mission within
the timeline specified by the higher commander.

TROOP-LEADING STEPS IN DISMOUNTED OPERATIONS


5-3. When ordered to lead a patrol, the patrol leader follows the troop-
leading procedures discussed in Chapter 2 of this manual. The following

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discussion focuses on how he can use the troop-leading process as a tool to


make and carry out tactical decisions quickly and effectively.

RECEIVE AND ANALYZE THE MISSION


5-4. Orders come in two forms: written OPORDs and FRAGOs. Once
an order is received, the first thing the patrol leader must do is clearly
understand what is required to accomplish the mission. First, he looks at
the order and jots down the tasks the commander told him to perform,
such as conduct reconnaissance of a bridge; these are called specified
tasks. Next, he identifies the tasks that must be done even though the
commander did not tell him to do them, such as cross a stream and an
open area en route to the patrol objective; these are called implied tasks.
The patrol leader does not list tasks that are part of the SOP. He takes a
hard look at the list of specified and implied tasks and puts a check mark
by those tasks that must be done for the unit to accomplish its mission.
These are called essential tasks. To identify these tasks accurately, the
patrol leader must thoroughly understand the commander’s intent. He
then restates the patrol mission in terms of WHO, WHAT, WHERE,
WHEN, and WHY.

ISSUE A WARNING ORDER


5-5. The patrol leader issues the warning order to all patrol members
whenever possible or, at a minimum, to key members of the patrol. It
should include the following:

· Elements/personnel to whom the warning order is issued.


This identifies the soldiers involved in the patrol and allows
them to prepare for the operation.
· The time and nature of the operation. This is a brief and clear
statement of' what the patrol must accomplish. It may tell
who, what, when, where, and why.
· The earliest time of movement. This helps the patrol
members prepare, inspect, and organize for movement by a
specified time.
· The time and place the OPORD will be issued.

5-6. The patrol leader also gives instructions to special purpose teams
and key men so they can get ready for the patrol by taking such actions
as preparing explosives, checking radios, and making a map study (point
and compass men).

MAKE A TENTATIVE PLAN


5-7. Once the warning order is issued, the patrol leader selects a COA
that will accomplish the assigned mission(s). To develop a COA, he must
consider all the things that will influence his patrol’s ability to
accomplish the mission. The primary influences on his decisions are the
factors of METT-TC: the mission; the known or expected enemy (threat);
terrain and weather; troops or combat power available; time available to
plan, prepare, and execute the mission; and civilian considerations.
5-8. The plan should take into account how each aspect of METT-TC
will influence the others regarding mission accomplishment. The patrol
leader should give special consideration to the terrain the patrol must

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traverse, the threat forces it will pass near or through en route to its
objective, the effects of extensive dismounted work on the scouts, and the
amount of time available to conduct the mission.

Patrol Time Schedule


5-9. A method the patrol leader uses to organize his time is to back-
plan from mission completion to the present time. This aids in mission
planning and provides a schedule of events for all patrol members. An
example of back-planning a time schedule is illustrated in Figure 5-1.

PATROL TIME SCHEDULE


0200 - Return Friendly Area
2330 - 0200 - Movement En Route
2300 - 2330 - Accomplish Mission, Reorganize
2230 - 2300 - Reconnaissance of Objective Area
2000 - 2230 - Movement En Route
2000 - Depart Friendly Area
1945 - 2000 - Movement to Departure Area
1930 - 1945 - Final Inspection
1845 - 1930 - Night Rehearsals
1800 - 1845 - Day Rehearsals
1745 - 1800 - Inspection
1700 - 1745 - Supper Meal
1515 - 1700 - Subunit Planning and Preparation
1445 - 1515 - Issue Operation Order
1400 - 1445 - Complete Detailed Plans
1315 - 1400 - Conduct Reconnaissance
1300 - 1315 - Issue Warning Order

Figure 5-1. Example Patrol Time Schedule


(Back-Planning)

Coordination
5-10. Patrols may act independently, may move beyond the direct fire
support of the parent unit, and may operate forward of friendly units. As
a consequence, their coordination effort must be thorough, detailed, and
continuous throughout the planning and preparation phases. The patrol
leader may perform coordination personally, or his superior may do it for
him. Keeping in mind that the entire platoon may be tasked to patrol, the
necessary coordination may be extensive. A checklist is a common tool
used to ensure that all items of vital importance are covered.

Times of Departure and Return


5-11. Times of departure and return are based on the amount of time
needed to accomplish the following:

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· Reach the objective. This is determined by considering the


distance, terrain, anticipated speed of movement, friendly and
threat situation, and (if applicable) the time at or by which
the mission must be accomplished.
· Accomplish essential tasks in the objective area. This includes
the leader’s reconnaissance and movement of elements and
teams into position, as well as the accomplishment of the
patrol’s mission.
· Return to a friendly area. This may be difficult to determine
because casualties, EPWs, or captured equipment may slow
the patrol. The use of a different return route may change the
time needed.

Primary and Alternate Routes


5-12. The patrol leader selects a primary route to and from the
objective. The return route should be different from the route to the
objective. The patrol leader also selects an alternate route that may be
used either to or from the objective. The alternate route is used when the
patrol has made contact with the threat on the primary route. It may also
be used when the patrol leader knows or suspects that the patrol has
been detected (see Figure 5-2).

Figure 5-2. Primary and Alternate Routes

Routes Divided into Legs


5-13. Routes are divided into legs with each leg starting, if possible, at
a point that can be recognized on the ground (see Figure 5-3). A pace
count and azimuth are used between points. This makes it easier to stay
oriented. When it is not possible to start and stop legs at recognizable
points, a continuous pace count and azimuth may be used.

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FM 3-20.98 ___________________________________________________________________________

Figure 5-3. Route Divided into Legs

Rally Points
5-14. A rally point is a place where a patrol can conduct these actions:

· Temporarily halt to prepare to depart from friendly lines.


· Reassemble and reorganize if dispersed during movement.
· Temporarily halt to reorganize and prepare for actions at an
objective.
· Temporarily halt to prepare to reenter friendly lines.

5-15. Types of Rally Points. The most common types of rally points
are initial, en route, objective, reentry, and near side and far side rally
points. Soldiers must know the rally point to which they are moving at
each phase of the patrol mission. They should know what actions are
required there and how long they are to wait at each rally point before
moving to another. Rally point considerations include the following:
· Initial rally point. An initial rally point is where a patrol
may assemble and reorganize if it is dispersed or makes
enemy contact before departing friendly lines or before
reaching the first en route rally point. Located within friendly
lines, the initial rally point is normally selected by the
commander of the friendly unit.
· En route rally point. An en route rally point is where a
patrol rallies if dispersed en route to or from its objective.
There may be several en route rally points along the patrol’s
route between friendly lines and the objective. They are either
planned or designated by the patrol leader en route every 100
to 400 meters (based on the terrain, vegetation, and
visibility). When the leader designates a new en route rally
point, the previously designated one goes into effect. This

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precludes uncertainty over which one soldiers should move to


if contact is made immediately after the leader designates a
new rally point. There are three ways to designate an en
route rally point:
n Physically occupy the rally point for a short period. This is
the preferred method.
n Pass by the rally point at a distance and designate it
using arm-and-hand signals.
n Walk through the rally point and designate it using arm-
and-hand signals.
· Objective rally point. An ORP is where the patrol halts to
prepare for actions on its objective. It is normally located in
the direction that the platoon plans to move after completing
its actions on the objective. The ORP must be located near the
objective. At the same time, it must be out of sight and sound
range of the objective area so that the patrol’s activities at the
ORP will not be detected by the threat. It must also be out of
small arms range of threat forces and far enough from the
objective that it will not be overrun if the patrol is forced off
the objective. The ORP is tentative until the objective is
pinpointed. The patrol uses the ORP as a base for conducting
the following actions:
n Reconnoiter the objective.
n Issue a FRAGO.
n Disseminate information from reconnaissance if contact
was not made.
n Make final preparations before continuing operations.
These may include applying or replenishing camouflage;
preparing demolitions; lining up rucksacks for quick
recovery; preparing EPW bindings, first aid kits, and
litters; and inspecting weapons.
n Account for soldiers and equipment after actions on the
objective are complete.
n Reestablish the chain of command after actions on the
objective are complete.
· Reentry rally point. A reentry rally point is where a patrol
halts to prepare to reenter friendly lines. It is located just
short of friendly lines and out of sight, sound, and small arms
range of friendly OPs. This also means that the reentry rally
point should be outside the limit of FPF of the friendly unit.
The patrol occupies the rally point as a security perimeter
while it awaits reentry.
· Near side and far side rally points. These rally points are
established on the near and far side of danger areas. If the
patrol makes contact while crossing the danger area and
control is lost, soldiers on either side move to the rally point
nearest them. They establish security, reestablish the chain of
command, and determine their personnel and equipment
status. They can then continue the patrol mission, link up at
the ORP, or complete their last instructions.

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FM 3-20.98 ___________________________________________________________________________

5-16. Rally Point Selection. The patrol leader should pick rally
points either during the patrol or by a map study before the patrol. Those
selected before the patrol begins are tentative and will remain so until
confirmed on the ground. In selecting rally points, the patrol leader
should look for locations with the following characteristics:

· Large enough for the patrol to assemble.


· Easily recognizable.
· Affording adequate cover and concealment.
· Defensible for a short time.
· Away from normal routes of troop movement and natural
lines of drift (streams, ridges).

INITIATE MOVEMENT
5-17. The patrol leader may be required to direct the patrol to move
once he issues his warning order and is making his plan. This movement
may involve securing a passage point (PP) or moving to the SP.

CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE
5-18. The patrol leader must make a map, ground, or aerial
reconnaissance before completing his plan. This allows him to proof his
tentative plan and get an idea of the ground he will initially traverse. He
must keep an open mind during the reconnaissance; not everything he
sees will match his tentative plan.

COMPLETE THE PLAN


5-19. After the warning order has been issued, reconnaissance has been
made, and patrol members are preparing themselves and their
equipment, the patrol leader completes his plan. He first assigns
essential tasks to be performed by elements and men in the objective
area. After this, he plans and assigns tasks that will help the patrol reach
the objective and return, such as navigation, security during movement
and halts, actions at danger areas, actions on threat contact, and stream
crossing. The following discussion focuses on additional planning
considerations.

Rations
5-20. The patrol leader must determine whether the men should carry
rations. If so, he specifies the type and amount and where to get them.

Weapons and Ammunition


5-21. This applies if there is something out of the ordinary that the
patrol needs to bring, such as significant amounts of demolitions.

Signals
5-22. The signals to be used on the patrol must be planned and
rehearsed. Signals may be needed to lift or shift supporting fires, order
withdrawal from the objective, signal “all clear,” stop and start movement
of the patrol, and direct linkup of elements. Visual and audible signals

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______________________________________________________ Chapter 5 – Dismounted Operations

such as hand-and-arm signals, flares, voice, whistles, radios, and infrared


equipment may be used. All patrol members must know the signals.

Communications with Higher Headquarters


5-23. The plan must include retrans sites, the correct FBCB2
programming, radio call signs, primary and alternate frequencies, times
to report, and codes.

Challenge and Password


5-24. The challenge and password from the SOI should not be used by a
patrol beyond the FEBA. The patrol leader may devise his own challenge
and password system.
5-25. The platoon can use the odd-number system. If the patrol leader
specifies 11 as the odd number, the challenge could be any number
between 1 and 10. The password would be the number which, when
added to the challenge, equals 11 (such as challenge 8, password 3).
5-26. The platoon leader can also designate a running password. This
code alerts a unit that friendly soldiers are approaching in a less than
organized manner and may be under pressure. This technique may be
used to get soldiers quickly through a compromised passage of lines. The
running password is followed by the number of soldiers approaching
(Dogwood, 6); this prevents threat soldiers from joining the group in an
attempt to penetrate friendly lines.

Chain of Command
5-27. Everyone on the patrol must understand where he fits into the
patrol or his element of the patrol.

Location of Leaders
5-28. The locations of the patrol leader and assistant patrol leader are
planned for all phases of the patrol during movement, at danger areas,
and at the objective. These considerations apply:

· The patrol leader plans to be where he can best control the


patrol during each event.
· The assistant patrol leader may have a specific job for each
phase of the patrol. He may help the patrol leader control the
patrol by being where he can best take command, if required.
· Duties and responsibilities for the assistant patrol leader
during actions on the objective area include these:
n Area reconnaissance in the ORP.
n Zone reconnaissance with a reconnaissance element that
has been directed to move to and establish the point at
which all elements are to link up after completing the
operation.
n Combat patrol (raid or ambush). The assistant patrol
leader normally controls the support element.
Patrol Organization
5-29. To accomplish the patrolling mission, a platoon or squad must
perform specific tasks. Examples include providing security for itself or at
danger area crossings or rally points; reconnoitering the patrol objective;

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FM 3-20.98 ___________________________________________________________________________

and conducting breach, support, or assault operations. As with other


missions, the leader tasks elements of his platoon in accordance with his
estimate of the situation. He identifies those tasks the platoon must
perform and decides which elements will perform them. If possible, the
patrol leader should maintain squad and fire team integrity in assigning
tasks. The chain of command continues to lead its elements during a
patrol.
5-30. The basic patrol configuration includes a reconnaissance element
and a security element. In turn, these elements are made of individual
soldiers with specific roles, as well as subordinate and supporting groups
known by the terms “element” and “team.” These refer to the squads, fire
teams, or buddy teams that perform the common and specific elements
for each type of patrol. Squads and fire teams may perform more than one
task in an assigned sequence; others may perform only one task. The
leader must plan carefully to ensure that he has identified and assigned
all required tasks in the most efficient way. The following elements are
common to all patrols:

· Headquarters element. The headquarters consists of the


platoon leader, PSG, and RTO. It may consist of any
attachments that the platoon leader decides that he or the
PSG must control directly, such as an FO.
· Aid and litter team. Aid and litter teams treat and evacuate
casualties.
· EPW team. EPW teams are responsible for controlling
prisoners in accordance with the “five-S” principles and the
leader’s guidance. This team may also be the search team. If
contact results in wounded and/or killed threat soldiers, this
team searches those individuals for information and material
they may have been carrying while the rest of the patrol
provides security.
· Surveillance team. The surveillance team keeps watch on
the objective from the time that the leader’s reconnaissance
ends until the unit deploys for actions on the objective. The
members of the team then join their elements.
· Point man. The point man selects the actual route through
the terrain, guided by the compass man or patrol leader. In
addition, he provides security to the front of the patrol.
· En route recorder. The en route recorder records all
information collected by the patrol.
· Compass man. The compass man assists in navigation by
ensuring that the lead fire team leader remains on course at
all times. Instructions to the compass man must include an
initial azimuth, with subsequent azimuths provided as
necessary. The compass man should preset his compass on
the initial azimuth before moving out, especially if the move
will be during limited visibility conditions. The platoon or
squad leader should also designate an alternate compass
man.
· Pace man. The pace man maintains an accurate pace at all
times. The platoon or squad leader should designate how

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often the pace man is to report the pace to him. The pace man
should also report the pace at the end of each leg. The leader
should designate an alternate pace man.

ISSUE THE ORDER


5-31. The order is issued in standard OPORD sequence. Terrain models
or sketches are used to illustrate the plan. Sketches to show planned
actions can be drawn in the sand, dirt, or snow. Figure 5-4 includes a
sample format for a patrol order. It is organized in the standard five-
paragraph outline and includes examples of information that can be
included. For detailed information on the annexes listed at the end of the
patrol order, refer to Appendix A of this manual.

PATROL OPERATION ORDER

Task Organization: Explain how the patrol is organized for the operation and confirm the composition of
each element. Identify time(s) of attachment and detachment. If there is no change to the previous task
organization, the patrol leader indicates that there is no change.
1. SITUATION.
A. Enemy Forces.
(1) Weather and light data.
· Precipitation.

· Temperature.

· Other weather conditions (such as wind, dust, or fog).


· Light data:
BMNT: _______. Sunrise: _______.
Sunset: _______. EENT: _______.
Moonrise: _______. Moonset: _______.
Percent Illumination: _______.
· How it will affect the patrol and threat forces.
(2) Terrain (factors of OCOKA).
· Observation and fields of fire.
· Cover and concealment.
· Obstacles.
· Key terrain.
· Avenues of approach.
· How it will affect the patrol and threat forces.
(3) Enemy forces.
· Identification, composition, disposition, and strength/weaknesses.
· Capabilities.
· Recent activities.
· Most probable course of action.

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FM 3-20.98 ___________________________________________________________________________

· Current/last known location (only those forces that pertain to the specific mission of
the patrol).

Figure 5-4. Patrol Order

B. Friendly Forces
(1) Concept of the operation for the next higher unit.
(2) Location and mission of the units on the left, right, front, rear and supporting.
(3) Missions and routes of adjacent patrols.
(4) Unit(s) providing fire support.
(5) Mission and commander’s intent for the rest of the platoon (in the event the platoon has
multiple missions).
C. Attachments and Detachments.
Include any special personnel or elements (such as engineers, medics, linguists, FOs) who
will accompany the patrol.
D. Civilian Population.
· Culture.
· Political/government/religious.
· Factional allegiances.
· Factions/groups/organizations/terrorists.
· Restrictions and curfews.

2. MISSION.
Include a clear and concise statement of the task and purpose, including the aspects of who, what
(including type of patrol), when, where, and why.

3. EXECUTION.
Commander’s Intent.
A. Concept of the Operation.
(1) Commander’s focus, tempo, and engagement criteria.
(2) In general terms, how the patrol will accomplish the mission.
· Mission essential tasks and other critical tasks.
· Duration of the patrol.
· Scheme of maneuver and graphics, sequentially, as they will occur during the patrol
(with simultaneous reference to a terrain board, dirt sketch, or map).
· Maneuver.
· Fires. Include team target overlay, with target numbers; who has priority of fires; use
and/or availability of special purpose fires (such as smoke, illumination, or CAS);
triggers; how and when fires will be used.
· Intelligence.
· Electronic warfare.
·
Engineering.
B. Tasks to Maneuver Units.
(1) Task and purpose of teams and sections.
(2) Task and purpose of special teams and key individuals.
(3) Task and purpose to support/attached personnel.
C. Coordinating Instructions.

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(1) Actions at the objective.


(2) Time line, covering the time sequence from issuance of the OPORD to actions at the
objective.
(3) Priority intelligence requirements (PIR).

Figure 5-4. Patrol Order (Continued)

(4) Movement techniques.


(5) Primary route.
(6) Alternate route.
(7) Departure and reentry of friendly lines.
· Linkup time and location.
· Departure point.
· Reentry point.
(8) Rally points and actions at rally points.
(9) Actions on contact (covering the eight forms of contact).
(10) Actions at danger areas.
(11) Actions at halts.
(12) Debriefing time and place.
(13) MOPP level, initiation time, and exposure guidance (in cGy).
(14) Rehearsals (prioritized).
(15) Inspections.
(16) Equipment (including special equipment) needed to accomplish the mission.
(17) Soldier safety.
(18) Rules of interaction (ROI), engagement (ROE), and graduated response.
(19) Annexes (air assault, airborne, stream crossing, vehicle movement, linkup, evasion and
escape, hide site, cache).

4. SERVICE SUPPORT.
A. Supply.
Include requirements for Classes I, III, V, and IX.
B. Transportation.
Include location and route of mounted elements of the platoon.
C. Personnel.
(1) Procedures for handling EPWs and captured documents and equipment.
(2) MEDEVAC/CASEVAC procedures.
(3) Personnel replacement (alternate team members or assignment changes based on the
loss of personnel).
D. Civil/military restrictions.
(1) Curfews.
(2) Collateral damage restrictions.
(3) Rules of interaction (ROI), engagement (ROE), and graduated response.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.


A. Command.
(1) Curfews.

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FM 3-20.98 ___________________________________________________________________________

(2) Locations of patrol leader and assistant patrol leader.


(3) Location of next higher commander.
(4) Succession of command.

Figure 5-4. Patrol Order (Continued)

B. Signal.
(1) Time zone used and time synchronization criteria.
(2) SOI and matrix used.
(3) Key hand-and-arm signals.
(4) Code words and reports.
(5) Times when radio listening silence is in affect.
(6) Alternate frequencies and time or condition for changing frequency.
(7) Challenge and password (regular, forward of friendly lines, running).
(8) Electronic protection.
(9) Visual and pyrotechnic signals (alternate means of control, emergency signaling).

ANNEXES
A. Air Assault and Airborne.
B. Stream Crossing.
C. Vehicle Movement.
D. Evasion and Escape.
E. Linkup.
F. Rest Overnight, Hide Site, Surveillance Site.
G. Cache Site.

Figure 5-4. Patrol Order (Continued)

SUPERVISE AND REFINE


5-32. Rehearsals and inspections are vital to proper preparation. They
must be well planned and conducted even though the men are
experienced in patrolling. Coordination is made with the commander or
S3 for use of a rehearsal area resembling the objective area. Inspections
determine the patrol’s physical and mental state of readiness. Inspections
before rehearsals ensure uniforms and equipment are complete and
correct. Each soldier is questioned to ensure that he knows the following:

· The plan.
· What he is to do and when he is to do it.
· What others are to do.
· Challenges and passwords, signals, codes, radio call signs,
frequencies, and reporting times.

5-33. Rehearsals help to ensure the proficiency of the patrol. They let
the patrol leader check plans and make any needed changes. The

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suitability of equipment is verified. It is through well-directed rehearsals


that soldiers become familiar with their actions and responsibilities
during the patrol.
5-34. If the patrol is to be at night, it is advisable to have both day and
night rehearsals. Terrain similar to that over which the patrol will
operate should be used. All actions are rehearsed when time permits.
When time is short, only the most critical actions are rehearsed. Actions
on the objective area are the most critical and should always be
rehearsed.
5-35. A good way to rehearse is to have the patrol leader walk and talk
the whole patrol through each action. He describes the actions of
elements, teams, and men and has them perform these actions. In this
“dry run,” patrol members take their positions in formations at reduced
distances. This can all be done with little or no distance separation so the
soldiers get the “feel” of the patrol. When the different actions are clear to
the patrol members, a complete rehearsal, at full speed, is conducted with
the whole patrol. This is a “wet run.” As many “dry runs” and “wet runs”
are conducted as are necessary to gain proficiency. When possible,
element and team leaders rehearse their units separately before the final
rehearsal of the entire patrol. Supervision is continuous by all leaders.
5-36. An inspection after the final rehearsal and just before departure
ensures that all equipment is still working, that nothing is being left
behind, and that each member of the patrol is ready.

SECTION II – PATROLLING TASKS

5-37. Scouts who work dismounted must know a variety of tasks that
are slightly different from the tasks they perform during mounted
operations. Although not every patrol requires the same tasks, those
discussed here are common to most patrols.

MOVEMENT TECHNIQUES
5-38. The selection of a movement technique is based on METT-TC.
Factors to consider for each technique are control, dispersion, speed, and
security. Movement techniques are not fixed formations. They refer to
the distances between soldiers, teams, and squads that vary based on
mission, enemy, terrain, visibility, and any other factor that affects
control. Soldiers must be able to see their patrol leaders, and the patrol
leader should be able to see his leaders. Leaders should control
movement with arm-and-hand signals and use radios only when needed.

FUNDAMENTALS OF MOVEMENT
Ensure that Patrol Members Can Navigate
5-39. Preparations are worthless if the patrol cannot find the objective
in time or if the patrol is compromised by enemy contact during
movement. Always plan to use a compass and pace man on a patrol.
(NOTE: The element point man must not be tasked to perform compass

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or pace duties. The point man’s sole responsibility is forward security for
the element.)

Avoid Detection
5-40. Patrols must use stealth and the cover and concealment of the
terrain to its maximum advantage. Whenever possible, move during
limited visibility to maximize technological advantages gained by night
vision devices and to hinder the enemy’s ability to detect the patrol.
Exploit the enemy’s weaknesses, and attempt to time movements to
coincide with other operations that will distract the enemy.

Maintain Constant Security


5-41. Always maintain 360-degree security. The patrol must constantly
use both active and passive security measures. Give elements or
individual soldiers responsibility for security en route, at danger areas, at
patrol bases, and most importantly, in the objective area.

Plan for Use of Support Fires


5-42. Patrol leaders must plan for fire support (artillery, tactical air,
attack helicopter, NGF) even if they think it may not be needed during
movement.

Use Appropriate Movement Techniques


5-43. The enemy situation determines which of the three movement
techniques will be used: traveling (when contact is not likely), traveling
overwatch (when contact is possible), or bounding overwatch (when
contact is expected). When manpower allows more than one team, the
patrol will usually move in traveling overwatch. Vary movement
techniques to meet changing situations.

Maintain Dispersion in Open Terrain


5-44. When enemy contact is possible and manpower permits, have one
team well forward and overwatch it with a security team. Assign duties
for the movement. Security teams maintain visual contact, but the
distance between them is such that the entire patrol does not become
engaged if contact is made. Patrols can spread their formations as
necessary to gain better observation to the flanks. Although widely
spaced, men must retain their relative position when in a wedge
formation. Only in extreme situations should the file formation be used in
the open

Assign Responsibilities and Positions


5-45. The lead elements must secure the front along with assuming
responsibility for navigation. For a long movement, the platoon leader
may rotate the lead squad’s responsibilities. The elements in the rear are
charged with rear security. Leaders should move inside the formation
where they can best maintain control of the patrol.

Use Control Measures


5-46. During movement, leaders use control measures (such as head
counts, rally points, or phase lines) to maintain the patrol’s effectiveness
and security.

Plan for Effective Contact

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5-47. Leaders maneuver the patrol to ensure that enemy contact is


made with the smallest element possible.

MOVEMENT FORMATIONS
5-48. Figures 5-5 through 5-8 illustrate patrol movement formations.

Figure 5-5. File Formation

Figure 5-6. Diamond Formation

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Figure 5-7. Alternate Diamond Formation

Figure 5-8. Four-Man Diamond Formation

SECURITY HALTS
5-49. During short halts, team members drop on one knee, face out, and
freeze in place. The security halt should not exceed five minutes. If the
halt exceeds five minutes, the team should move to the prone position.
For extended halts, team members may sit with their feet facing outward
and shoulders touching (see Figures 5-9 and 5-10). This aids quick and
quiet communication, and guarantees all-round security at all times. This
technique offers the smallest signature, and it is the most difficult to
detect and is best used in dense vegetation.

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Figure 5-9. Security/Extended Halt

Figure 5-10. Security/Extended Halt


(Four-Man)

DEPARTURE FROM FRIENDLY LINES


5-50. The departure from friendly lines must be thoroughly planned
and coordinated using considerations outlined in the following discussion.

PLANNING
5-51. In his plan for the departure of friendly lines, the leader should
consider the following sequence of actions:

· Make contact with friendly guides at the contact point.


· Move to the coordinated initial rally point.
· Complete final coordination.
· Move to and through the passage point.
· Establish a location for a security-listening halt beyond the
friendly unit’s limit of FPF.
COORDINATION
5-52. The platoon leader must coordinate with the commander of the
forward unit and the leaders of other units that will be patrolling in the
same or adjacent areas. The coordination includes SOI information,
signal plan, fire plan, running password, procedures for departure from
and reentry to friendly lines, departure and reentry points, dismount
points, initial rally points, and information about the threat. The
following actions take place:

· The platoon leader provides the forward unit leader with unit
identification, size of the patrol, departure and return times,
and information on the area of operations.

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· The forward unit leader provides the platoon leader with the
following:
n Additional information on terrain.
n Known or suspected threat positions.
n Likely threat ambush sites.
n Latest threat activity.
n Detailed information on friendly positions and obstacle
locations. This includes the location of OPs.
n Friendly unit fire plan.
n Support that the unit can provide, such as fire support,
litter teams, guides, communications, and reaction force.
EXECUTION
5-53. The platoon should remain in single file. The PSG, or the patrol
equivalent (such as assistant patrol leader), follows directly behind the
guide so he can count each soldier who passes through the PP. He gives
the count to the guide, tells him how long to wait at the PP (or when to
return), and confirms the running password. If the platoon makes contact
after it is past the departure point, it fights through. Soldiers return to
the departure point only if they become disorganized. They then reoccupy
the initial rally point, and the leader reports to higher headquarters.

USE OF RALLY POINTS


5-54. The patrol leader plans for the use and locations of rally points.
As noted, a rally point is a place designated by the leader where the
platoon moves to reassemble and reorganize if it becomes dispersed.
Refer to the discussion of the types and characteristics of rally points
earlier in this section.

OCCUPATION OF AN ORP BY A SQUAD


5-55. In planning the occupation of an ORP (see Figure 5-11), the squad
leader considers the following sequence:

· Halt beyond sight, sound, and small-arms weapons range of


the tentative ORP (200 to 400 meters in good visibility; 100 to
200 meters in limited visibility).
· Position security elements.
· Move forward with a compass man and one member of each
fire team to confirm the location of the ORP and determine its
suitability. Issue a five-point contingency plan before
departure.
· Position the Team A soldier at 12 o’clock and the Team B
soldier at 6 o’clock in the ORP. Issue them a contingency plan
and return with the compass man.
· Lead the squad into the ORP. Position Team A from 9 to 3
o’clock and Team B from 3 to 9 o’clock.

NOTE: The squad may also occupy the ORP by force. This requires more precise
navigation, but eliminates separating the squad.

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OCCUPATION OF AN ORP BY A PLATOON


5-56. In planning the occupation of an ORP, the platoon leader should
consider a sequence similar to that outlined for a squad (see Figure 5-11).
He brings a soldier from each squad on his reconnaissance of the ORP
and positions them at the 10, 2, and 6 o’clock positions. The first squad in
the order of march establishes the base leg (10 to 2 o’clock). The trailing
squads occupy from 2 to 6 o’clock and 6 to 10 o’clock.

Figure 5-11. Occupation of an Objective Rally Point

CONTINGENCY PLANS
5-57. The patrol leader leaves the main patrol body for many reasons
throughout the planning, preparation, and execution of the mission. One
of these departures, conducted after the ORP is occupied and secure, is
the leader’s reconnaissance by the patrol leader, compass man, and
element leaders. The assistant patrol leader remains in the ORP. Before
the patrol leader departs, he issues a five-point contingency plan.
5-58. The contingency plan covers the WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE,
and WHY by covering the following points:

· Who the leader will be taking with him.


· What actions are taken if the leader fails to return and the
actions of the unit and the leader on chance contact while the
leader is gone.
· When the leader is leaving and how long he will be gone.
· Where the leader is going (to include routes there and back).
· Why the leader is leaving (his mission).

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5-59. Consideration must always be given to the possibility of an


element becoming separated from the rest of the patrol. Refer to ST 3-
20.983 for a discussion of SERE situations and techniques.

LEADER’S RECONNAISSANCE
5-60. The plan must include a leader’s reconnaissance of the objective
once the platoon or squad establishes the ORP. During his
reconnaissance, the leader pinpoints the objective; selects positions for
his squads and teams; and adjusts his plan based on his observation of
the objective. Each type of patrol requires different tasks during the
leader’s reconnaissance, and the leader will take different elements with
him depending on the patrol’s mission. The leader must plan for adequate
time to return to the ORP, complete his plan, disseminate information,
issue orders and instructions, and allow his squads to make any
additional preparations.

REENTRY TO FRIENDLY LINES


5-61. The patrol leader’s initial planning and coordination must include
the reentry of friendly lines. He should consider a sequence for this
process similar to the one covered in the following discussion. (NOTE:
This example is for a patrol conducted by a platoon.)

WARNING
Reentry of friendly lines at night is dangerous and
should only be attempted when it is essential to
the success of the patrol.

5-62. The platoon halts in the reentry rally point (RRP) and establishes
security. The platoon leader communicates the code word advising the
friendly unit of patrol’s location and that it is ready to return. The
friendly unit must acknowledge the message and confirm that guides are
waiting before the platoon moves from the RRP.
5-63. If digital/radio communications are not possible, the platoon
leader, radiotelephone operator (RTO), and a two-man security element
(buddy team) move forward and attempt to contact an OP using the
challenge and password. The OP notifies the friendly unit that the
platoon is ready to return and requests a guide.
5-64. If the platoon leader cannot find an OP, he moves with the RTO
and security element to locate the coordinated reentry point. He must
move straight toward (and away from) friendly lines, never parallel to
them. All lateral movement should be outside small-arms weapons range.

NOTE: The platoon leader should only attempt this procedure during daylight. At night he
should use other backup signals to make contact with friendly units. The preferred
method is to wait until daylight if contact with the friendly unit cannot be made as
planned.

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5-65. Once the friendly unit acknowledges the return of the platoon, the
platoon leader issues a five-point contingency plan and moves with his
RTO and security element on a determined azimuth and pace to the
reentry point. The platoon leader uses far and near recognition signals to
establish contact with the guide.
5-66. The platoon leader signals the platoon forward (radio) or returns
and leads it to the reentry point. He may post the security element with
the guide at the threat side of the reentry point. The PSG counts and
identifies each soldier as he passes through the reentry point. The guide
leads the platoon to the assembly area.
5-67. The platoon leader reports to the CP of the friendly unit. He tells
the commander everything of tactical value concerning the friendly unit’s
area of responsibility. The platoon leader rejoins the platoon in the
assembly area and leads it to a secure area for debriefing.

DEBRIEFING
5-68. Immediately after the patrol element (platoon or squad) returns,
personnel from higher headquarters conduct a thorough debriefing. This
may include all members of the patrol or the leaders, RTOs, and any
attached personnel. Normally the debriefing is oral. Sometimes a written
report is required. Refer to Appendix J of this manual for a sample
debriefing format for the reconnaissance platoon. NATO forces use the
patrol report form specified by STANAG 2003.

ACTIONS AT DANGER AREAS


5-69. A danger area is an area that increases the chance of detection or
a direct fire engagement. When moving, the patrol tries to avoid danger
areas. Typical danger areas are the following:

· Known threat positions.


· Roads and trails.
· Streams.
· Open areas.
· Urban environments.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
5-70. Specific plans are made before crossing danger areas. These plans
are very similar to actions taken during mounted operations; however,
they require more practice and rehearsal because a dismounted patrol
does not have the same mobility, protection, and firepower to extract
itself should it encounter a threat. In addition, general plans are made for
crossing unexpected danger areas; these can be modified quickly to fit the
situation.
5-71. The patrol uses bounding overwatch or variations of it to cross a
danger area. The leader designates procedures the patrol will use based
on the time available, the size of the patrol, the size of the danger area,
the fields of fire into the area, and the amount of security he can post. A
small patrol may cross all at once, in pairs, or one man at a time. A large
patrol normally crosses its subordinate elements one at a time. As each

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element crosses, it moves to an overwatch position or to the far side rally


point until told to continue movement.
5-72. To cross a danger area, a patrol must take these actions:

· Designate near side and far side rally points.


· Secure the near side.
· Secure the far side.
· Cross the danger area.

5-73. Securing the near side may involve nothing more than observing
it. In some places, however, it may involve posting security teams far
enough out on both flanks and to the rear of the crossing point to give
warning of an approaching threat and to overwatch the crossing of the
rest of the patrol (see Figure 5-12).

Figure 5-12. Securing the Near Side of a Danger Area

5-74. Once flank and rear security elements are positioned, the danger
area is quickly crossed by a team that then reconnoiters and secures the
far side (see Figure 5-13). The area secured on the far side must be large
enough for the entire patrol to deploy. When the team leader is sure the
far side is safe, he sends two men back to signal the rest of the patrol to
cross. When the patrol has crossed the danger area, the security teams
cross and rejoin the patrol (see Figure 5-14).

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Figure 5-13. Securing the Far Side of a Danger Area

Figure 5-14. Crossing the Danger Area

SCROLL TO THE ROAD TECHNIQUE


5-75. The lead team member identifies the danger area and moves
across, placing his left or right shoulder toward the danger area (see
Figure 5-15). The second team member faces in the opposite direction
from the lead team member. This gives security in both directions. Each
member crosses in the same manner.

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Figure 5-15. Scroll to the Road Technique

SMALL OPEN AREA TECHNIQUE


5-76. When crossing a small open area, the team uses the contour or
detour bypass method (see Figure 5-16). They avoid crossing directly
through the open area, if possible.

Figure 5-16. Crossing a Small Open Area

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SECTION III – ACTIONS ON CONTACT

5-77. Unless required by the mission, the patrol avoids threat contact.
If it makes unexpected contact with a threat, it must quickly break
contact so it can continue its mission. The leader’s plan must address
actions on chance contact during each event of the mission. The patrol’s
ability to continue the mission will depend on how early contact is made,
whether the patrol is able to break contact successfully (so that its
subsequent direction of movement is undetected), and whether the patrol
suffers any casualties as a result of the contact. The plan must address
the handling of soldiers who are seriously wounded in action (WIA) and
killed in action (KIA) and the handling of prisoners who are captured as a
result of chance contact and are not part of the planned mission.

BATTLE DRILLS
5-78. Well-rehearsed battle drills are critical to the success of a
dismounted team. The team is lightly armed with a limited supply of
ammunition and can expect little or no fire support. If indirect fires are
precoordinated, they should be maximized while breaking contact. An
immediate suppression fire mission on a near target from the target
overlay may support the team breaking contact; then, once in a covered
and concealed position, adjusted fire missions may be executed against
the enemy. Indirect fires should be considered whenever breaking
contact, emphasizing the need for thorough fire support planning.

BREAK CONTACT
5-79. The team breaks contact as soon as possible because it lacks the
assets to stay and fight. METT-TC determines which drill is executed.

Break Contact (Front)


5-80. The team executes fire and movement by two- or three-man
teams until contact with the enemy is broken. When contacted from the
front, the senior observer and another observer return fire with one full
magazine each. An observer and the team leader move to a position to
provide support for the withdrawal of the senior observer and observer.
Once the senior observer and observer have fired a complete magazine,
team leader and observer begin firing, covering the withdrawal of the
senior observer and observer to the next firing position. The process of
fire and movement continues until contact is broken (see Figures 5-17
and 5-18). The RTO and assistant team leader may place a Claymore
with a time-delay fuze to slow the enemy. It is placed in the position
where the RTO was when the team began the break contact drill. When
using a Claymore mine in a battle drill, the mine is dual-primed
(electrically and time-delay fuze).

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Figure 5-17. Break Contact (Front)

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Figure 5-18. Break Contact (Front; Four-Man)

Break Contact Using Australian Peel (Front or Rear)


5-81. The Australian peel is a method to break contact from the front
or rear. This technique, which should be executed as a battle drill, is most
effective while the team is in a file formation, where the vegetation is
dense, or during limited visibility. The second through the sixth team
members take one or two steps to the left or right, depending on the
terrain. One member at a time passes back through the formation (see
Figure 5-19).
5-82. Front Contact. When contact occurs from the front, the first
member fires a full magazine (automatic or burst). Every other member
does the same, one at a time. Each member waits until the member in
front of him is even with him or on his left or right before firing a weapon.
Individuals move straight back through the inside of the formation,
avoiding masking the fires of the members providing covering fire. The
assistant team leader or the last member throws a hand grenade
(fragmentary). During limited visibility, the battle drill may be executed
without firing weapons. In this event, the battle drill is still executed in
the same sequence. Upon completion of the first iteration, the team can
emplace a Claymore mine with a time-delay fuze to slow the enemy. The
team initiates fires only if it has been compromised. If the enemy element
breaks contact and ceases fire, the team should cease fire immediately to
prevent revealing their new position.

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5-83. Rear Contact. If contact occurs from the rear, the Australian
peel technique is executed in the reverse sequence. The first member is
the last to throw a hand grenade (fragmentary). Once the drill is
completed, the team moves to the designated rally point.

Figure 5-19. Break Contact


(Front; Using Australian Peel)

Break Contact (Left or Right)


5-84. If a patrol finds itself in a threat ambush, it must get out of the
kill zone or face destruction. Team members in the kill zone, without
order or signal, immediately return fire, throw smoke, and move quickly
out of the kill zone by the safest route (refer to Figures 5-20 and 5-21).
There is no set procedure for this; each man must decide the best way for
his situation. For inferior-sized enemy force, a team may assault through
a near ambush. Soldiers not in the kill zone fire to support the
withdrawal or hasty assault of the men in the kill zone.

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Figure 5-20. Break Contact (Left or Right)

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FM 3-20.98 ___________________________________________________________________________

Figure 5-21. Break Contact (Left or Right; Four-Man)

REACT TO AIR ATTACK


5-85. The first soldier who hears or sees an aircraft signals, “FREEZE.”
The first soldier who sees an attacking aircraft alerts the patrol:
“AIRCRAFT, FRONT (LEFT, RIGHT, OR REAR).” Each soldier hits the
ground, using available cover, and returns fire. Between attacks, the
team should seek better cover and concealment. If the team leader wants
the team to move out of the area, he gives the clock direction and
distance. See Figure 5-22.

Figure 5-22. React to Air Attack

REACT TO INDIRECT FIRE


5-86. Upon receiving indirect fire, the team deploys and takes cover. If
more rounds impact, the team leader gives the clock position and the
direction and distance to move. The team consolidates while moving or at
a distance given by team leader. The team may elect to move to the last
rally point or as otherwise directed by the team leader (see Figure 5-23).

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Figure 5-23. React to Indirect Fire or Air Attack

REACT TO FLARES
5-87. If the team encounters flares, it should execute the following
actions:
· Ground flares. The team moves out of the illuminated area
and takes cover. Each soldier closes his firing eye to protect
his night vision.
· Overhead flare with warning. The team assumes a prone
position (behind concealment, when available) before the flare
bursts. Each soldier closes his firing eye to protect his night
vision.
· Overhead flare without warning. The team gets into a
prone position, making the most use of nearby cover,
concealment, and shadows until the flare burns out. Each
soldier closes his firing eye to protect his night vision.
REACT TO SNIPER FIRE
5-88. If the patrol comes under sniper fire, it immediately returns fire
in the direction of the sniper. The patrol then conducts fire and maneuver
to break contact with the sniper.

FREEZE
5-89. This immediate action drill is used when a patrol, not yet seen by
the threat, observes the threat and does not have time to take any other
action. All patrol members remain still until signaled to continue or take
another action as directed.

METHODS OF HANDLING CASUALTIES AND PRISONERS


5-90. Major tactical challenges may arise if members of the patrol are
WIA or KIA or the patrol encounters EPWs. Specific methods for

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handling such situations must be established prior to the patrol’s


departure. All patrol members must know what to do in each case.

HANDLING OF WIAs
5-91. The methods used for handling WIAs must not jeopardize the
mission. If patrol members become wounded during an engagement, they
are removed from the immediate area and given buddy-aid.
5-92. Walking wounded may be handled in the following ways:

· They can be evacuated by air. This is generally practical only


when the patrol is returning to friendly areas.
· They can accompany the patrol.
· They can conceal themselves for later pickup. Another soldier
should remain with the wounded soldier.
· They can return to friendly areas. Another soldier should
accompany the casualty.

5-93. Seriously wounded may be handled in the following ways:

· They can be evacuated by air, when available.


· They can be concealed for later pickup. Another soldier should
be left with the wounded soldier.

HANDLING OF KIAs
5-94. KIAs may be handled in the same way as the seriously wounded,
except that no one is left with the concealed remains. The grid location of
the remains is confirmed and is marked for later pickup.

HANDLING OF EPWs
5-95. EPWs are processed and handled in accordance with the “five-S”
procedures (search, segregate, silence, speed, and safeguard). They may
be taken under guard to a friendly area, or they may be evacuated by air,
taken with the patrol, or concealed for later pickup. (NOTE: See
Chapter 8 of this manual for a discussion of EPW handling, including the
“five-S” procedures.)

SECTION IV – TYPES OF PATROLS

5-96. This discussion focuses on the two primary types of patrols


employed by the reconnaissance platoon: reconnaissance and security. It
also includes details of procedures for combat patrols (including raids),
presence patrols, and tracking patrols, although these are relatively rare
assignments for the reconnaissance platoon.

RECONNAISSANCE PATROL
5-97. Reconnaissance patrols provide timely and accurate information
about the threat and terrain. The patrol leader must have specific
intelligence collection requirements for each mission. For example, a

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reconnaissance patrol objective might be a small mounted avenue of


approach that the platoon does not have assets to cover continuously. For
a more detailed discussion of reconnaissance, refer to Chapter 3 of this
manual.

TYPES OF RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS


5-98. The following discussion covers the three main types of
reconnaissance patrols.

Area Reconnaissance Patrol


5-99. In conducting an area reconnaissance, the patrol uses a series of
surveillance and vantage points around the objective. This type of patrol
is conducted to obtain information about a specific location (such as a
road junction, hill, bridge, or threat position) and the area immediately
around it. The location of the objective is designated either by grid
coordinates or by a map overlay with a boundary line encircling the area.
The reconnaissance platoon normally sends a squad or section on an area
patrol. In rare cases, the entire platoon may be required to conduct
reconnaissance of a large area.

Zone Reconnaissance Patrol


5-100. This patrol is conducted to obtain information on all threat forces,
terrain, and routes within a specific zone. The zone is defined by
boundaries.

Route Reconnaissance Patrol


5-101. This patrol focuses on obtaining information on one route and
adjacent terrain or on locating sites for friendly obstacles.
Reconnaissance is oriented on a road; on a narrow axis, such as an
infiltration lane; or on a general direction of attack. The route
reconnaissance patrol provides detailed information on trafficability,
threat activity, NBC contamination, and the adjacent terrain from the
viewpoint of both threat and friendly forces. The preferred method for
conducting a route reconnaissance is the fan method, described later in
this section. The patrol leader must ensure that the fans are extensive
enough to cover intersecting routes beyond direct fire range of the main
route. If all or part of the proposed route is a road, the patrol leader must
treat the road as a danger area. If possible, the platoon should move
parallel to the road using a covered and concealed route. As necessary,
reconnaissance and security teams move close to the road to reconnoiter
key areas and provide local security for reconnaissance teams and the
patrol main body.

RECONNAISSANCE PATROL PROCEDURES


5-102. Before occupying the ORP, the patrol conducts the leader’s recon-
naissance to ensure that no threat forces are in the area. Once this
reconnaissance is completed, the patrol is signaled to move forward; it
halts at the ORP and establishes security. The patrol leader and element
leaders conduct a leader’s reconnaissance of the objective to confirm the
plan and then return to the ORP. The security element departs the ORP
before the reconnaissance element. The security element leader positions
security teams at the ORP and on likely threat avenues of approach
leading into the objective area (as shown in Figure 5-24).

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Figure 5-24. Area Reconnaissance Using Separate


Reconnaissance and Security Elements

5-103. Once the security teams are in position, the reconnaissance


element departs the ORP, moving to several surveillance/vantage points
around the objective. The reconnaissance element leader may decide to
have a small reconnaissance team move to each surveillance/vantage
point instead of having the entire element move as a unit from point to
point. Once the objective has been reconnoitered, the elements return to
the ORP. The patrol leader collects information from the reconnaissance
element, report pertinent information higher, and disseminates any
required information within the patrol itself. The patrol then returns to
friendly lines.
5-104. The terrain may not allow the patrol to secure the objective area.
In this case, the patrol leader leaves a security team in the ORP and
combines his reconnaissance and security elements into several
reconnaissance and security teams (known as R&S teams) to reconnoiter
the objective. These teams move to different surveillance/vantage points,
from which they reconnoiter the objective. Once the objective has been
reconnoitered, the teams return to the ORP and report the information.
The patrol then returns to friendly lines (see Figure 5-25).

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Figure 5-25. Using Combined Reconnaissance and


Security Teams to Reconnoiter the Objective

DISTANCE FACTORS
5-105. A reconnaissance patrol can execute either long-range or short-
range observation or surveillance of the objective. The following
paragraphs examine factors that influence the distance at which the
reconnaissance is conducted.

Long-Range Observation/Surveillance
5-106. Whenever METT-TC permits the required information to be
gathered from a distance, the patrol executes long-range observation or
surveillance of the objective from an OP. The OP must be far enough from
the objective to be outside threat small arms range and local security
measures.
5-107. Since the patrol does not move in close enough to be detected,
long-range observation is the more desirable method for executing
reconnaissance. If the threat forces discover the patrol, friendly direct
and indirect fires can be employed on the objective without endangering
the patrol.
5-108. When information cannot be gathered from only one OP, multiple
OPs may be used. This is accomplished by squad-size reconnaissance
patrols. The OPs must use available cover and concealment and have an
unrestricted view of the objective.

Short-Range Observation/Surveillance
5-109. If it cannot obtain the required information by observing from a
distance, the patrol moves closer to the objective. Short-range observation
or surveillance is the technique of watching an objective from a position
that is within the range of threat local security measures and small arms
fire.
5-110. This method can be executed by the platoon as a whole or by an
individual section or squad. When the entire platoon is taking part in a

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short-range observation operation, the routes and area to be


reconnoitered must be clearly defined.

RECONNAISSANCE METHODS
5-111. Depending on the situation and patrol requirements, the patrol
leader has a choice of several reconnaissance methods, which are
described in the following discussion.

Fan Method
5-112. In this method, the patrol leader first selects a series of ORPs
throughout the zone from which to operate. When the patrol arrives at
the first ORP, it halts and establishes security. The patrol leader then
selects reconnaissance routes out from and back to the ORP, forming a
fan-shaped pattern around the ORP. The routes must overlap to ensure
that the entire area is reconnoitered.
5-113. The patrol leader then sends out reconnaissance elements along
the routes. He does not send out all of his elements at once, keeping a
small reserve in the ORP. (For example, if the patrol has three
reconnaissance elements, only two are sent out. The other is kept as a
reserve or quick reaction force). The patrol leader sends the elements out
on adjacent routes. This keeps the patrol from making contact in two
different directions. After the entire area (fan) has been reconnoitered,
the patrol leader reports the information. The patrol then moves to the
next ORP, and the fan process is repeated (see Figure 5-26).

Figure 5-26. Fan Reconnaissance Method

Box Method
5-114. The leader sends his reconnaissance and security teams from the
ORP along routes that form a boxed-in area. He sends other teams along
routes through the area within the box. All teams meet at a linkup point
at the far side of the box from the ORP (as shown in Figure 5-27).

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Figure 5-27. Box Reconnaissance Method

Converging Routes Method


5-115. The patrol leader first selects an ORP and then reconnaissance
routes out from the ORP to a rendezvous point, at which patrol members
will link up after completing the reconnaissance. Once the patrol arrives
at the ORP, it halts and establishes security. The patrol leader designates
the following:

· The element that will handle each reconnaissance route.


· A linkup time at the rendezvous point.

5-116. Each reconnaissance element reconnoiters its designated route,


normally using the fan method. The patrol leader usually moves with the
center element. The entire patrol links up at the rendezvous point at the
designated time. The rendezvous point is secured in the same way as the
ORP. The patrol reports its information at the rendezvous point, then
returns to friendly lines (see Figure 5-28).

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Figure 5-28. Converging Routes Reconnaissance Method

Successive Sector Method


5-117. This method is basically a continuation of the converging routes
method. The patrol leader selects an initial ORP and a series of
reconnaissance routes and rendezvous points. The actions of the patrol
from each ORP to each rendezvous point are the same as in the
converging routes method. Each rendezvous point becomes the ORP for
the next phase. When the patrol links up at a rendezvous point, the
patrol leader confirms the designated reconnaissance routes and the next
rendezvous point and designates a linkup time. This sequence continues
until the reconnaissance is complete. The patrol then returns to friendly
lines (see Figure 5-29).

Figure 5-29. Successive Sector Reconnaissance Method

SECURITY PATROL
5-118. The reconnaissance platoon conducts security patrols to prevent
threat infiltration of a screen or an assembly area (see Figure 5-30).
These patrols reconnoiter areas through which threat units may pass and
the routes they would use. The patrols prevent infiltration and surprise
attacks on stationary units by screening their front or flanks and by
reconnoitering gaps between OPs and around their positions. A
reconnaissance squad normally conducts a security patrol. The platoon
may be tasked to provide several squads to patrol and secure an area for
a battalion task force. The patrol leader picks a series of objectives in the
area in which the patrol must reconnoiter. The patrol moves from
objective to objective until the area has been reconnoitered. The intention
of the security patrol is to destroy or capture threat dismounted troops. If
the patrol makes contact, it reports to the commander and attacks or
withdraws according to the commander’s instructions.

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Figure 5-30. Integration of Patrols into a Screen

COMBAT PATROL
5-119. Combat patrols are a rare assignment for the reconnaissance
platoon, but they may be employed during a counterreconnaissance
mission. Combat patrols are generally categorized into two types of
missions: an ambush or a raid. They are generally conducted for the
following reasons:

· Capture threat soldiers.


· Capture threat equipment.
· Harass threat forces.
· Destroy threat soldiers, installations, or facilities.

5-120. Even though the primary mission of the reconnaissance platoon is


to conduct stealthy reconnaissance and surveillance, a thorough
understanding of the TTP involved in a combat patrol is essential.
Certain situations may require the platoon, or elements of the platoon, to
conduct a combat patrol. For example, one section might conduct a hasty
ambush to assist another section in breaking contact. Another case may
involve the platoon conducting a raid to capture specific threat personnel.
Some specific considerations for both ambushes and raids are included in
this discussion.

ORGANIZATION
5-121. Besides the common elements (discussed in the discussion of
patrol organization earlier in this section), combat patrols also have the
elements and teams covered in the following paragraphs.

Assault Element
5-122. The assault element seizes and secures the objective and protects
special teams as they complete their assigned actions on the objective.

Security Element
5-123. The security element provides security at danger areas, secures
the ORP, isolates the objective, and supports the withdrawal of the rest of

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the platoon once it completes its assigned actions on the objective. The
security element may have separate security teams, each with an
assigned task or sequence of tasks.

Support Element
5-124. The support element provides direct fire support and may control
indirect fires for the platoon.

Breach Element
5-125. The breach element breaches the threat’s obstacles when
required.

Demolition Team
5-126. Demolition teams are responsible for preparing and exploding the
charges to destroy equipment, vehicles, or facilities on the objective.

Search Team
5-127. The assault element may comprise two-man (buddy teams) or
four-man (fire team) search teams to search bunkers, buildings, or
tunnels on the objective. These teams may also search the objective or kill
zone for casualties, documents, or equipment.

TASKS TO SUBORDINATE UNITS


5-128. Normally the platoon headquarters element controls the platoon
on a combat patrol mission. The platoon leader must make every attempt
to maintain squad and fire team integrity as he assigns tasks to
subordinate units.
5-129. The platoon leader must consider the requirements for assaulting
the objective, supporting the assault by fire, and securing the platoon
throughout the mission. These factors include the following:

· For the assault on the objective, the leader must consider the
required actions on the objective, the size of the objective, and
the known or presumed strength and disposition of the threat
on and near the objective.
· The leader must consider the weapons available and the type
and volume of fires required to provide fire support for the
assault on the objective.
· The leader must consider the requirement to secure the
platoon at points along the route, at danger areas, at the
ORP, along threat avenues of approach into the objective, and
elsewhere during the mission.

5-130. The platoon leader must assign additional tasks to his squads for
demolition, search of threat KIAs, search and guarding of EPWs,
treatment and evacuation (litter teams) of friendly casualties, and other
tasks required for successful completion of the patrol mission. He must
also determine who will control any attachments of skilled personnel or
special equipment.

LEADER’S RECONNAISSANCE OF THE OBJECTIVE


5-131. In a combat patrol, the platoon leader must take into account
several additional considerations in the conduct of the leader’s

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reconnaissance of the objective from the ORP. He is normally the assault


element leader. He should also take the support element leader, the
security element leader, and a surveillance team (a two-man team from
the assault element).
5-132. The leader should designate an RP halfway between the ORP and
the objective. Squads and fire teams separate at the RP and move to their
assigned positions. The RP should have wire communications with the
ORP and be set up so that other elements can tie into a hot loop there.
5-133. During the leader’s reconnaissance, the platoon leader should
confirm the location the objective and determine whether it is suitable for
the assault or ambush. He notes the terrain and identifies where he can
place mines or Claymores to cover dead space. He notes any other
features of the objective that may cause him to alter his plan. The platoon
leader should confirm the suitability of the assault and support positions
and routes from them back to the ORP.
5-134. If the objective is the kill zone for an ambush, the leader’s
reconnaissance party should not cross the objective; to do so will leave
tracks that may compromise the mission. The platoon leader should post
the surveillance team and issue a five-point contingency plan before
returning to the ORP.

AMBUSH OPERATIONS
5-135. An ambush is a surprise attack from a concealed position on a
moving or temporarily halted target. Antiarmor ambushes are
established when the mission is to destroy threat armored or mechanized
forces. Ambushes are classified by formation (linear or L-shaped),
category (hasty or deliberate), or type (point, area, or antiarmor). The
platoon leader uses a combination of formation, category, and type in
developing his ambush plan.

Planning
5-136. The key planning considerations for an ambush, conducted as
thoroughly as time permits, include the following:

· Covering the entire kill zone by fire.


· Using existing or reinforcing obstacles (Claymores and other
mines) to keep the threat in the kill zone.
· Protecting the assault and support elements with mines,
Claymores, or explosives.
· Using security elements or teams to isolate the kill zone.
· Assaulting into the kill zone to search dead and wounded,
assemble prisoners, and collect equipment. (The assault
element must be able to move quickly through its own
protective obstacles.)
· Timing the actions of all elements of the platoon to preclude
loss of surprise.
· Using only one squad to conduct the entire ambush and
rotating squads over time from the ORP. This technique is
useful when the ambush position must be manned for a long
time.

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NOTE: For a more detailed explanation of planning considerations and procedures, refer to
the discussion of deliberate ambushes later in this section.

Ambush Formations
5-137. The leader considers the linear or L-shaped formations in
planning an ambush.
5-138. Linear. In an ambush using a linear formation, the assault and
support elements deploy parallel to the threat’s route (see Figure 5-31).
This positions both elements on the long axis of the kill zone and subjects
the threat to flanking fire. This formation can be used in close terrain
that restricts the threat’s ability to maneuver against the platoon or in
open terrain when there is a means of keeping the threat in the kill zone.

FLANKS RESTRICTED BY TERRAIN, MINES


MANTRAPS, OR COMBINATION

KILL ZONE

MAN TRAPS MAN TRAPS MAN TRAPS


ACCESS LANES
SECURITY ASSAULT ELEMENT SECURITY
TEAM TEAM

RALLY POINT

SECURITY
TEAM

Figure 5-31. Linear Ambush Formation

5-139. L-shaped. In an L-shaped ambush, the assault element forms


the long leg parallel to the threat’s direction of movement along the kill
zone. The support element forms the short leg at one end of and at right
angles to the assault element. This provides both flanking (long leg) and
enfilading fires (short leg) against the threat. The L-shaped ambush can
be used at a sharp bend in a trail, road, or stream. It should not be used
where the short leg would have to cross a straight road or trail (see
Figure 5-32).

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!R
LIMIT OF ADVANCE ! GRN
TEAM B
SECURITY
TEAM
! MG
KILL ZONE
! TEAM
! AR ! TL ! AR ! TL ! SL ! GRN !R
LEFT FLANK EPW/SEARCH
SECURITY DEMO TM TEAM A ASSUALT
TEAM AID/LITTER RP ELEMENT
ORP

Figure 5-32. L-shaped Ambush Formation

Ambush Categories
5-140. In planning the ambush, the leader evaluates the considerations
and requirements for the hasty or deliberate ambush.
5-141. Hasty Ambush. A platoon or squad conducts a hasty ambush
when it makes visual contact with a threat force and has time to
establish an ambush without being detected. The actions for a hasty
ambush must be well rehearsed so that soldiers know what to do on the
leader’s signal. They must also know what actions to take if detected
before they are ready to initiate the ambush. In planning and rehearsing
the conduct of a hasty ambush, the platoon leader should consider the
following sequence of actions:

· Using visual signals, a soldier alerts the platoon that a threat


force is in sight. The soldier continues to monitor the location
and activities of the threat force until he is relieved by his
team or squad leader.
· The platoon or squad halts and remains motionless.
· The leader determines the best nearby location for a hasty
ambush. He uses arm-and-hand signals to direct soldiers to
covered and concealed positions. The leader designates the
location and extent of the kill zone.
· Security elements move out to cover each flank and the rear.
The leader directs the security elements to move a given
distance, set up, and rejoin the platoon on order or after the
ambush is completed (when the sound of firing stops). At
section level, the two outside buddy teams normally provide
flank security as well as fires into the kill zone (as shown in
Figure 5-33). At platoon level, fire teams make up the security
elements (see Figure 5-34).
· Soldiers move quickly to covered and concealed positions,
normally 5 to 10 meters apart. Soldiers ensure that they have
good observation and fields of fire into the kill zone.
· The leader initiates the ambush when the majority of the
threat force has entered the kill zone. (If time and terrain
permit, the squad or platoon may emplace Claymores and use
them to initiate the ambush.)

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NOTE: If the threat detects a soldier, the soldier initiates the ambush by firing his weapon
and alerting the rest of the platoon, saying THREAT RIGHT (LEFT or FRONT).

· The leader controls the rate and distribution of fires. He


orders cease fire when the threat force is destroyed or ceases
to resist, then directs the assault element to move into the kill
zone and conduct a hasty search of the threat soldiers. All
other soldiers remain in place to provide security.
· The security elements rejoin the platoon after the assault
element has cleared the kill zone. The platoon withdraws
from the ambush site using a covered and concealed route.
The platoon returns to the applicable ORP, collects and
disseminates all information, reorganizes as necessary, and
continues the mission.

Figure 5-33. Section Hasty Ambush

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Figure 5-34. Platoon Hasty Ambush

5-142. Deliberate Ambush. A deliberate ambush is conducted against


a specific target at a predetermined location. In planning a deliberate
ambush, the leader requires detailed information on the following:

· Size and composition of the targeted threat unit.


· Weapons and equipment available to the threat.
· The threat’s route and direction of movement.
· Times that the targeted unit will reach or pass specified
points along the route.

5-143. In addition to key planning considerations listed earlier in this


discussion, the following planning factors and procedures also may apply,
especially when time is available to permit a deliberate ambush:
· The security or surveillance team(s) should be positioned
first. The support element should be in position before the
assault element moves forward of the RP. The support
element must overwatch the movement of the assault element
into position.
· Instructions to security teams must include how to notify the
platoon leader of the threat’s approach into the kill zone
(SALUTE report). The security element must also keep the
platoon leader informed if any threat forces are following the
lead force.
· The platoon leader is the leader of the assault element. He
must check each soldier once they establish the assault
position. He signals the surveillance team to rejoin the

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assault element. Tasks for the assault and support elements


include the following:
· Actions of the assault element include the following:
n Identify individual sectors of fire as assigned by the
platoon leader. Emplace aiming stakes.
n Emplace Claymores and other protective devices.
n Emplace Claymores, mines, or other explosives in dead
space within the kill zone.
n Camouflage positions.
n Move the selection lever on each weapon off SAFE.
Because this will cause a metallic click that could
compromise the ambush if soldiers wait until the threat is
in the kill zone, it must be the last action performed by all
soldiers before waiting to initiate the ambush.
· Actions of the support element include the following:
n Identify sectors of fire for all weapons, especially machine
guns. Emplace limiting stakes to prevent friendly fires
from hitting the assault element in an L-shaped ambush.
n Emplace Claymores and other protective devices.
· The platoon leader must determine how large a threat
element his ambush can engage successfully. He must be
prepared to let units pass that are too large. He must report
to higher headquarters any units that pass his ambush
unengaged.
· The platoon leader initiates the ambush. He may use a
command-detonated Claymore. He must also plan a backup
method for initiating the ambush should the primary means
fail; this should also be a casualty-producing device, such as a
machine gun. Information on how the ambush will be
initiated must be passed out to all soldiers; rehearsals must
cover initiation of the ambush.
· Soldiers must have a means of engaging the threat in the kill
zone during periods of limited visibility if it becomes
necessary to initiate the ambush then. Use of tracers must be
weighed against how it might help the threat to identify
friendly positions. The platoon leader may use handheld or
indirect illumination flares.
· The platoon leader should include indirect fire support as a
part of his plan. Indirect fires can cover the flanks of the kill
zone to help isolate it. They can also help the platoon to
disengage if the ambush is compromised or the platoon must
depart the ambush site under pressure.
· The platoon leader must have an effective plan to signal the
advance of the assault element into the kill zone to begin its
search and collection activities. For example, he must realize
that smoke may not be visible to the support element. All
soldiers must know and practice relaying the signal during
rehearsals.

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Ambush Types
5-144. This discussion focuses on considerations and procedures for the
three types of ambush operations (point, area, and antiarmor) conducted
by the combat patrol.
5-145. Point Ambush. In a point ambush, soldiers deploy to attack a
threat in a single kill zone. The platoon leader should consider the
following considerations and sequence of actions when planning a
deliberate point ambush:

· Once it begins its search, the assault element must be


prepared to move across the kill zone. Soldiers may have to
use individual movement techniques if there is any return
fire. Otherwise, the assault element moves across by
bounding fire teams. It uses the two-man search technique,
taking the following actions:
n Search from one side to the other and mark bodies that
have been searched to ensure the area is thoroughly
covered.
n As the search team approaches a dead threat soldier, one
man guards while the other man searches. First, he kicks
the threat weapon away. Second, he rolls the body over (if
on the stomach) by laying on top and, when given the go-
ahead by the guard (who is positioned at the threat’s
head), rolling the body over on him. This done for
protection in case the threat soldier has a grenade with
the pin pulled underneath him.
n The searchers then conduct a systematic search of the
dead soldier from head to toe, removing all papers and
anything new, such as different type or rank, shoulder
boards, different unit patch, pistol, weapon, or night
vision device (NVD). They note if the threat soldier has a
fresh or shabby haircut and the condition of his uniform
and boots. They take note of the radio frequency, SOI, and
maps. The search team will continue in this manner until
all threat personnel in and near the kill zone have been
searched. As noted, threat bodies should be marked (for
example, with arms folded over the chest) to avoid
duplication.
· Other assault element actions in the kill zone include the
following:
n Collect and secure all EPWs and move them out of the kill
zone before searching bodies. Establish a location for
EPWs. If there are threat WIAs who will not be taken
with the prisoners, find a location that provides them
with cover, yet allows them to be found easily by their
units.
n Identify and collect equipment to be carried back. Prepare
it for transport. (Clear all weapons and place them on
SAFE.)
n Identify and collect remaining equipment for destruction.
The demolition team prepares dual-primed explosives (C4

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with two M60 fuse lighters and time fuse) and awaits the
signal to initiate. This is normally the last action
performed before departing the objective and may signal
the security elements to return to the ORP.
n Treat friendly wounded first, then threat wounded, time
permitting.
· The flank security teams may emplace antiarmor mines after
the ambush has been initiated if the threat is known to have
armor capability. If a flank security team makes contact, it
fights as long as possible without becoming decisively
engaged. It uses a prearranged signal to let the platoon leader
know it is breaking contact. The platoon leader may direct a
portion of the support element to assist the security team in
breaking contact.
· The platoon leader must plan the withdrawal from the
ambush site, using these actions:
n Elements normally withdraw in the reverse order that
they established their positions.
n The elements may return first to the RP, then to the ORP,
depending on the distance between elements.
n The security element at the ORP must be alert to assist
the platoon’s return to the ORP. It maintains security for
the ORP while the rest of the platoon prepares to leave.
· Actions after return to the ORP include accountability of
personnel and equipment and recovery of rucksacks and other
equipment left at the ORP during the ambush.

5-146. Area Ambush. In an area ambush, soldiers deploy in two or


more related point ambushes. A platoon is the smallest unit to conduct an
area ambush. The platoon leader should consider the following
considerations and sequence of actions when planning a deliberate area
ambush.
5-147. Platoons conduct area ambushes where threat movement is
largely restricted to trails or streams (see Figure 5-35). The platoon
leader should select one principal ambush site around which he organizes
outlying ambushes. These secondary sites are located along the threat’s
most likely approach to and escape from the principal ambush site.
Squad-size elements are normally responsible for each ambush site. They
establish a point ambush as described earlier in this discussion.

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Figure 5-35. Area Ambush

5-148. The platoon leader must determine the best method for
employing his machine guns. He normally positions them both with the
support element of the principal site.
5-149. Squads responsible for outlying ambushes do not initiate their
ambushes until after the principal one is initiated. They then engage to
prevent threat forces from escaping the area or from reinforcing elements
in the kill zone.
5-150. Antiarmor Ambush. Platoons and squads conduct antiarmor
ambushes to destroy one or two armored vehicles. If a squad is given the
mission to conduct an antiarmor ambush, it should have an antiarmor
weapons team attached to it (refer to Figure 5-36). The leader considers
the following sequence and considerations when planning an antiarmor
ambush.

Figure 5-36. Antiarmor Ambush

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5-151. While the antiarmor ambush is built around the antiarmor


weapons team, the leader must consider additional weapons available to
supplement its fires. These are normally LAWs or AT4s. The leader must
carefully position all antiarmor weapons to ensure the best shot (rear,
flank, or top). The remainder of the platoon must function as support and
security elements as in other combat patrols.
5-152. In a squad antiarmor ambush, the platoon leader selects the
general site for the ambush. The squad leader must find a site that
restricts the movement of armored vehicles out of the kill zone. The
leader should attempt to place his elements so that an obstacle is
between them and the kill zone. Security elements must consider
dismounted avenues of approach into the ambush site.
5-153. The leader should consider the method for initiating the
antiarmor ambush. The preferred method is to use a command-detonated
antiarmor mine placed in the kill zone. An antiarmor weapon can be used
to initiate the ambush, but its signature and slow rate of fire make it less
desirable.
5-154. The antiarmor team attempts to kill the first and last vehicles in
the column, if possible. All other weapons open fire once the ambush has
begun. If the kill zone is within range of LAWs, each soldier fires one
during the ambush.
5-155. The leader must also consider how the presence of dismounted
threat elements with the tanks will affect the success of his ambush. If
the threat has a significant dismounted capability, the leader’s choices
include the following:

· Initiate the ambush as planned.


· Withdraw without initiating the ambush.
· Initiate the ambush using only automatic weapons, without
firing antiarmor weapons.
5-156. Because of the speed with which other armored forces can
reinforce the threat in the ambush site, the leader should plan to keep
the engagement short and the withdrawal quick. The platoon will not
clear through the kill zone as in other ambushes.

RAID
5-157. A raid is a combat operation to attack a position or installation,
followed by a planned withdrawal. Squads do not execute raids. The
sequence of platoon actions for a raid is similar to that for an ambush.
The platoon’s assault element may have to conduct a breach of an
obstacle; it may also have other tasks to perform on the objective, such as
demolition of freed facilities.

PRESENCE PATROL
5-158. The presence patrol is almost always used in urban
environments, particularly during stability operations and support
operations. Among the various types of patrol the reconnaissance patrol
may conduct, the presence patrol is unique in that its primary purpose is
to be seen by military forces and civilians in the area of operations.
Although this patrol does perform limited reconnaissance and security
functions, it usually is conducted to serve as evidence of the presence of

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US and allied forces. This patrol’s focus may be the society or its
infrastructure, with the purpose of conducting tactical questioning to
fulfill information requirements.

TRACKING PATROL
5-159. A platoon or squad may receive the mission to follow the trail of a
specific threat unit. Soldiers look for signs left by the threat. They gather
information about the threat unit, the route, and the surrounding terrain
as they track.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
5-160. Key considerations in conducting a tracking patrol include the
following:

· The soldiers move stealthily. The soldiers must be well


disciplined and well trained in tracking techniques.
· When the platoon receives the mission to conduct a tracking
patrol, it assigns the task of tracking to only one
squad/section. The remaining squads and attachments
provide security.
· The configuration of the platoon must provide security for the
tracking team to the front and flanks as it follows the trail.
The formation of a squad conducting a tracking patrol is
illustrated in Figure 5-37. Separate elements of the squad
must move as dispersed from each other as terrain and
vegetation allow while still maintaining visual contact.
Normally, the lead fire team is responsible for point security,
tracking, and navigation.

Figure 5-37. Tracking Organization and Formation

ORGANIZATION
5-161. Besides the common elements, tracking patrols include the
following elements:

· Security team. These teams provide security for the squad


leader, RATELO, and pace man and also provide rear and
flank security.

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· Tracking team. The tracking team reads signs and follows


the track of a specific threat unit.

TASKS TO SUBORDINATE UNITS


5-162. The most important consideration in assigning duties for the
tracking patrol is the requirement to make the best-trained soldier the
primary tracker. The squad leader attempts to maintain the integrity of
the fire teams and, if possible, buddy teams. He assigns the following
duties:
· Patrol leader. The squad leader is the patrol leader and the
main navigator. He has overall responsibility for mission
accomplishment.
· Primary tracker. This soldier’s only task is to follow the
main trail of the main body of the unit being tracked.
· Security man. This soldier provides security for the primary
tracker. When possible, he is the primary tracker’s buddy
team member.
· Security team. One buddy team provides security for the
squad leader, the pace man, and RTO.
· Rear security team. One buddy team provides rear security
for the squad.

TRAINING
5-163. Training is essential in developing and maintaining the necessary
tracking skills. Once deployed into an area of operations, the platoon
must continue its training activities to learn about local soil, climate,
vegetation, animals, vehicles, footwear, and other factors. The primary
tracker can prepare a tracking book showing specific signs and how they
weather or change over time.

INTELLIGENCE
5-164. Specific intelligence about threat habits, equipment, garment,
footwear, diet, or tactics is important. For example, reports might show
that the threat wears sandals like the natives in the area, while the units
being tracked show signs of one soldier wearing boots with an unfamiliar
tread. This could mean that the unit has a trained cadre, a foreign
advisor, or a prisoner with it. Any specific information about the threat is
also helpful. If possible, soldiers should interview someone who has seen
them.

TRAIL SIGNS
5-165. Humans, machines, and animals leave signs of their presence as
they move through an area. These signs can be as subtle as an odor or as
obvious as a well-worn path. All soldiers can read obvious signs such as
roads, worn trails, or tracks in sand or snow. To obtain better information
from signs they find in the battle area, however, soldiers must develop
and practice more refined attributes during tracking, including attention
to detail, common sense, staying alert, logic, and knowledge of the
environment and threat habits.

Finding the Trail

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5-166. This is the first task of the tracking team. When the trail cannot
be found in the immediate area, the tracking team can reconnoiter
around a known location of threat activity. There are two ways the team
can hunt for the trail:

· From a known location. Often there is a specific area or


location where the threat has been seen. Using that as a
starting point, the tracking team can locate and follow the
threat’s trail.
· Cutting trails. This occurs when the route of a friendly unit
crosses a trail left by another group (see Figure 5-38). This
can happen by chance, or the team can deliberately choose a
route that it believes will cut across one or more probable
threat routes.

Figure 5-38. Cutting Threat Trails

Trail and Sign Analysis


5-167. Once the first sign is discovered, it must not be disturbed or
covered. The tracking team analyzes it carefully before following the
threat. If the sign is found at the site of threat activity, the exact
occurrence can often be reconstructed. If a trail is the first sign found, the
tracker can still determine such facts as the size and composition of
groups being tracked, their directions, their general condition, and other
facts. The tracker determines as much as possible about the threat before
following them. As the patrol proceeds, analysis continues, increasing the
tracker’s knowledge of the threat.
5-168. At some point, it is likely that patrol will encounter any of several
potential problems in tracking, finding, and/or learning more about the
threat. These may include losing the trail of the threat force, often
because of actions the threat takes to evade tracking or detection, or
facing a threat attack. The patrol and the tracking team can use one or
more of the following techniques when the threat attacks or tries to evade
being tracked:

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· Regaining a lost trail. As soon as the tracker loses the trail,


he stops. The tracking team then retraces its path to the last
threat sign. It marks this point. The team studies the sign
and the area around it for any clue as to where the threat
went. It looks for signs of the threat scattering, backtracking,
doglegging, or using any other countertracking method. If the
trail is still lost, the team establishes security in a spot that
precludes destruction of any sign. The tracker and an
assistant look for the trail. They do this by “boxing” the area
around the last clear sign (see Figure 5-39) The tracking team
always returns to the same path, away from the last sign, to
avoid creating more trails than needed.
· Overcoming common countertracking techniques. Once
the threat realizes he is being followed, he will try to evade or
attack the tracking team. Figure 5-40 illustrates a number of
countertracking techniques that the patrol and/or the
tracking team must be prepared to handle.
· Multiple patrols. Two or more tracking teams can be used to
track the same threat unit. (NOTE: The use of multiple
patrols is illustrated in Figure 5-41, which accompanies the
example of tracking patrol operations that follows this
discussion.)

Figure 5-39. Boxing Technique

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Figure 5-40. Countertracking Techniques

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Figure 5-40. Countertracking Techniques (Continued)

EXAMPLE OF A TRACKING PATROL


5-169. The 1st Squad/Section is tracking a threat force (see Figure 5-41).
The squad/section leader contacts platoon headquarters (at the ORP) by
radio and tells them the estimated size, composition, rate of march, and
direction of travel of the threat. The platoon leader directs 2d
Squad/Section on a route that will cut the threat’s trail.
5-170. The 2d Squad/Section marks where they cut the trail (Point A)
and begins tracking. The mark is by prearranged signal. It can be a stake
driven into the ground, several stacked rocks, or a twist of grass tied up
and bent at an angle.
5-171. The 1st Squad/Section continues to follow the trail until it reaches
the mark left by 2d Squad/Section. This ensures that the threat unit is still
together and that 2d Squad/Section has found the correct trail. The 1st
Squad/Section leader then requests further orders from the ORP.
5-172. When 2d Squad/Section confirms the threat unit’s direction,
speed, and estimated distance, 2d Squad/Section gives this information to

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the ORP. The platoon leader directs 3d Squad/Section, which is patrolling


in sector, to set up an ambush along the probable threat avenue of
approach.

Figure 5-41. Multiple Tracking Teams

SECTION V – PATROL BASES

5-173. A patrol base is a position with a security perimeter that is set up


when a dismounted team conducting a patrol halts for an extended
period. Except in an emergency, patrol bases should be occupied no longer
than 24 hours. The platoon or squad never uses the same patrol base
twice. Platoons and squads use patrol bases to accomplish the following
purposes:

· Stop all movement to avoid detection.


· Hide during a long, detailed reconnaissance of an objective
area.
· Eat, clean weapons and equipment, and rest.
· Plan and issue orders.
· Reorganize after infiltrating a threat area.
· Establish a base from which to conduct several consecutive or
concurrent operations, such as ambush, raid, reconnaissance,
or security.

SITE SELECTION
5-174. The leader selects the tentative site from a map or by aerial
reconnaissance. The site’s suitability must be confirmed; it must be
secured before occupation. Plans to establish a patrol base must include

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selecting an alternate patrol base site. The alternate site is used if the
first site is unsuitable or if the patrol must unexpectedly evacuate the
first patrol base.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
5-175. Leaders planning for a patrol base must consider the mission and
passive and active security measures.

MISSION
5-176. A patrol base must be located so it allows the unit to accomplish
its mission.

SECURITY MEASURES
5-177. Security measures involve the following:
· The leader attempts to locate the patrol base on terrain that
will enhance its security. Whenever possible, the terrain
should meet the following criteria:
n Terrain that the threat would probably consider of little
tactical value.
n Terrain that is off main lines of drift and that affords
adequate drainage.
n Difficult terrain that would impede foot movement. An
example would be an area of dense vegetation, preferably
with bushes and trees that spread close to the ground.
n Terrain near a source of water.
n Terrain that can be defended for a short period and that
offers good cover and concealment.
· The leader avoids the following locations:
n Known or suspected threat positions.
n Built-up areas.
n Ridges and hilltops, except as needed for maintaining
communication.
n Roads and trails.
n Small valleys.
· The leader plans for the following security considerations:
n OPs.
n Communications with OPs.
n Defense of the patrol base.
n Withdrawal from the patrol base, to include withdrawal
routes and a rally point, a rendezvous point, or an
alternate patrol base.
n A security system to ensure that specific soldiers are
awake at all times.
n Enforcement of camouflage, noise, and light discipline.
n The conduct of required activities with minimum
movement and noise.

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PATROL BASE OCCUPATION


5-178. A patrol base is established using the steps covered in the
following discussion (see Figure 5-42). The patrol base is reconnoitered
and established using the same procedures and considerations as an ORP
or RRP. The exception is that the platoon will, when necessary, enter the
patrol base at a 90-degree turn.

NOTE: This action is METT-TC dependent; if there is nothing to be gained by doing this
step, then the unit does not do it (for example, in flat desert terrain).

Figure 5-42. Occupation of the Patrol Base

5-179. The platoon leader leaves a two-man OP at the turn. The PSG
and the last fire team will obliterate any tracks from the turn into the
patrol base. The platoon moves into the patrol base as depicted in Figure
5-42. All squad leaders move to the left flank of their squad sector.
5-180. The platoon leader and support element or weapons squad leader
start at 6 o’clock and move in a clockwise manner to adjust the perimeter
(meeting each squad leader at his squad’s left flank). If the platoon leader
and support element leader find a better location for one of the machine
guns, they reposition it.
5-181. After the platoon leader has checked each squad’s sector, the
squad leader and another squad member report to the CP as an R&S
team. The platoon leader issues a contingency plan to the three R&S
teams and reminds them that they are looking for the threat, water,
built-up areas or human habitat, roads and trails, and any possible rally
points. (Squads occupying a patrol base on their own do not send out R&S
teams at night.)
5-182. The R&S team departs from the left flank of its squad’s sector
and moves out a given distance, as stated by the platoon leader in his
instructions. The team moves in a clockwise direction and reenters the
patrol base at the right flank of the squad’s sector. Whenever possible,
the R&S team should prepare a sketch of the squad’s front and report to
the CP.

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NOTE: The distance the R&S team moves away from the squad’s sector will vary
depending on the terrain and vegetation (anywhere from 200 to 400 meters). All
members of the platoon are on 100 percent alert during this time. The R&S team is
of little value at night without the use of NVDs. The RTO must be able to establish
communications with higher headquarters using a directional antenna.

NOTE: If the platoon leader feels the platoon may have been tracked, he may elect to
maintain 100 percent security and wait a while in total silence before sending out
the R&S teams.

5-183. Once all squad leaders (through their R&S teams) have
completed their reconnaissance, they report back to the platoon leader at
the CP. The platoon leader gathers the information from his three R&S
teams and determines if the platoon will be able to use the location as a
patrol base.

PATROL BASE ACTIVITIES


5-184. If the platoon leader determines that he will be able to use the
location as a patrol base, he gives the following information to his PSG
and squad/section leaders. Platoon leader also disseminates other
information such as daily challenge and password, frequencies, and call
signs. Squad/section leaders return to their squads/sections, give out the
information, and begin the priorities of work as stated by the platoon
leader. The patrol base must be sterilized upon departure.

NOTE: Squads/sections have the same requirements with their squad/section patrol bases
as platoons.

SECURITY
5-185. Only one point of entry and exit is used. Noise and light discipline
is maintained at all times. Everyone is challenged. Squad leaders
supervise the placement of aiming stakes and ensure Claymores are put
out. Each squad/section establishes an OP and may quietly dig hasty
fighting positions. Squad/section leaders prepare and turn in sector
sketches, to include range cards and fire plans.

ALERT PLAN
5-186. The platoon leader states the alert posture (for example, 50
percent or 33 percent) and the stand-to time for day and night. He sets up
the plan to meet the following conditions:

· Positions are checked periodically.


· OPs are relieved periodically.
· At least one leader is awake at all times.

WITHDRAWAL PLAN
5-187. The platoon leader specifies the following information:
· Which signal to use if contact is made (for example, colored
star cluster).

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· The order of withdrawal if the unit is forced out of the patrol


base (for example, squads/sections not in contact will move
first).
· The platoon rendezvous point (if the platoon is not to link up
at an alternate patrol base).

MAINTENANCE PLAN
5-188. The platoon leader must ensure that machine guns, other weapon
systems, communications equipment, and NVDs are not broken down at
the same time for maintenance. He also redistributes ammunition.

NOTE: Weapons should not be disassembled at night.

SANITATION AND PERSONAL HYGIENE PLAN


5-189. The PSG ensures that the platoon slit trench is dug and marked
at night with a chemical light inside the trench. Squad/section leaders
designate squad urine areas. All soldiers accomplish the following
activities daily: shave; brush teeth; wash face, hands, armpits, groin, and
feet; and darken (polish) boots. Soldiers ensure that no trash is left
behind.

MESS PLAN
5-190. Leaders monitor mess activities to ensure not more than half the
platoon eats at one time.

WATER RESUPPLY
5-191. The PSG organizes a watering party. They carry canteens in an
empty rucksack.

PASSIVE (CLANDESTINE) PATROL BASE


5-192. The purpose of a passive patrol base is to give a smaller-size
element time to rest. A Claymore mine is emplaced on the route entering
the patrol base. Teams sit back-to-back facing outward, ensuring that at
least one individual per team is alert and providing security.

SECTION VI – OBSERVATION POSTS

5-193. Surveillance is the systematic observation of a specific area.


Scouts watch, listen, and employ electronic devices to observe their
assigned sector of responsibility. The OP, the primary means of
maintaining surveillance of an assigned avenue of approach or NAI, is a
position from which scouts observe the threat and direct and adjust
indirect fires against him. From the OP, the scouts send SALUTE reports
to their commander to provide early warning of threat activity.
5-194. The reconnaissance platoon can occupy one short-duration OP per
squad for up to 12 hours if the squads are at full strength. For extended
periods (12 hours or longer), the platoon occupies long-duration OPs by
sections; this limits long-duration OPs to a maximum of two for recce

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platoons and three for most other platoons. The general requirement for
each long-duration OP is two vehicles in CFV/RV platoons and three
vehicles in a HMMWV platoon. These guidelines are based on the
manpower requirements for OP operations (occupy the OP, provide
security, execute a proper sleep plan to sustain long-duration operations).
5-195. The platoon can array OPs either in linear positions or in depth.
Depth is the preferred method for maintaining contact with a moving
threat. Linear placement is effective when the threat is not moving; it
provides maximum eyes on the threat.

CRITICAL TASKS
5-196. Critical tasks for the platoon in employing OPs include the
following:

· Determine the type of OP (mounted, dismounted, or a


combination), depending on requirements for either
maximum stealth or rapid movement.
· Position the OPs either in linear positions or in depth to allow
for observation of the assigned sector. Several factors will
affect proper positioning, such as the following:
n The need for observation from several OPs to reduce the
chance of the threat entering the sector undetected.
n A requirement for the platoon to observe the entire sector
by placing OPs along the threat’s most likely avenues of
approach.
· Select a position for each OP that affords the best possible
force protection. Selection criteria include the following:
n Covered and concealed routes to and from the OP.
n Unobstructed observation of the assigned area.
n Effective cover and concealment.
n Sites that avoid natural lines of drift and that do not call
attention to or skyline observers.
· Occupy the OP. The platoon should employ the most secure
method of moving into position; dismounted occupation is the
preferred method. Occupation steps include these:
n Establish overwatch.
n Reconnoiter the position.
n Establish security.
n Clear the site and ensure sector visibility.
n Establish vehicle hide positions.
n Develop sector sketches.
· Man the OP. The platoon leader must ensure that each OP
has the necessary personnel and equipment to perform the
following tasks:
n Observe the assigned area.
n Provide local security (including planning and
preparation for contact and actions on contact).

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n Report information.
n Call for and adjust indirect fire.
· Conduct local reconnaissance patrols when necessary to cover
dead space, provide local security, and observe avenues of
approach and/or NAIs from different vantage points.
· Employ active and passive protective measures. Scouts are
extremely vulnerable in the OP. Their best self-defense is not
to be seen, heard, or otherwise located by the threat.
· Improve the position. The platoon can enhance OP protection
using the following steps:
n Dig in the OP position.
n Camouflage the position.
n Install communications equipment.
n Emplace hasty obstacles.

TYPES OF OBSERVATION POSTS


5-197. OPs can be executed dismounted or mounted, or as a combination
of these two types, as outlined in the following discussion.

DISMOUNTED OPs
5-198. The dismounted OP provides maximum stealth and thus has the
greatest likelihood of remaining undetected by the threat. The
disadvantages of the dismounted OP are the time it takes to remount and
move if necessary and, if a ground-mounted thermal device is not
available, the lack of optics capability. If rapid movement or displacement
is anticipated, the OP should mount or remain mounted.

MOUNTED OPs
5-199. These offer the advantages of rapid movement and vehicle optics
and protection. Because the threat can more easily detect them, however,
they are potentially much less effective than dismounted OPs.

COMBINATION OPs
5-200. The platoon can employ an OP that combines the advantages of
both the dismounted and mounted types. For example, the vehicle could
be used to monitor a particular NAI while other crewmen dismount to
observe a threat dismounted avenue of approach. The combination OP
can offset the limitations and vulnerabilities of the other types, but some
of these weaknesses may still apply, including lack of mobility and ease of
threat detection.

POSITIONING THE OP
5-201. As noted, OPs may be placed on the battlefield either in a linear
configuration or in depth. Linear placement (illustrated in Figure 5-43)
allows the platoon to observe the assigned sector from several OP sites,
reducing the chance of the threat entering the sector without being
observed. This method works well when the platoon has been assigned a
large sector with few avenues of approach or is in desert-type terrain. In-
depth OP placement (refer to Figure 5-44) allows the platoon to observe
the entire sector by placing OP sites where the platoon can observe the

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most likely avenues of approach in the sector as well as along the sector
flanks. This method works well when the platoon is assigned a sector
with several avenues of approach or is in heavily wooded terrain. In-
depth placement allows for redundancy in observation and better
coverage of the sector.

Figure 5-43. Linear Positioning of OPs

Figure 5-44. In-depth Positioning of OPs

SELECTING AN OP SITE
5-202. Based on his commander’s guidance, the platoon leader selects
the general location for the platoon’s OPs after analyzing METT-TC
factors. From his analysis, he determines how many OPs he must
establish; he also decides where they must be positioned to allow long-
range observation along the avenues of approach assigned by his
commander and to provide depth through the sector. Section and squad
leaders select the exact position for each OP on the ground. OPs should
have the following characteristics:

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· Covered and concealed routes to and from the OP. Scouts


must be able to enter and leave the OP without being seen by
the threat.
· Unobstructed observation of the assigned area or sector.
Ideally, the fields of observation of adjacent OPs overlap to
ensure full coverage of the sector.
· Effective cover and concealment. Scouts should select
positions with cover and concealment to reduce their
vulnerability on the battlefield. They may need to pass up a
position with favorable observation capability but with no
cover and concealment in favor of a position that affords
better survivability.
· A location that will not attract attention. OPs should not be
sited in such locations as a water tower, an isolated grove of
trees, or a lone building or tree; these positions draw threat
attention and may be used as threat artillery TRPs. The OPs
should also be located away from natural lines of drift along
which a moving threat force can be expected to travel. These
locations might include a route on the floor of a valley or a
site near a major highway.
· A location that does not skyline the observers. Avoid hilltops.
Position OPs farther down the slope of the hill or on the side,
provided there are covered and concealed routes into and out
of the position.

OCCUPYING THE OP
5-203. The reconnaissance platoon leader selects a technique to move to
the screen line based on his analysis of METT-TC. Unless the area has
already been cleared, the platoon should conduct a zone reconnaissance to
the screen line. This is the most secure method of moving to the screen
line, but also the most time-consuming. The following steps provide an
example of how the platoon’s elements, in this case a section, might
occupy an OP:

· The section stops short of its OP site. The section leader


directs the drivers into positions to overwatch the general OP
site and any terrain the threat could use to dominate
movement into or out of the position. (See Figure 5-45.)
· The section leader dismounts with scouts from each vehicle.
The squad leader stays with the vehicles. Drivers and
gunners remain on their vehicles to overwatch the
dismounted personnel as they move forward to reconnoiter
the OP. (NOTE: Because of the requirement to leave the
driver and gunner with each vehicle, only one scout per
vehicle can dismount in a HMMWV platoon.)
· The section leader moves the dismounted scouts to the OP
site, establishes security overwatching the far side of the site,
and checks the site for mines, booby traps, and threat
personnel. He verifies that he can observe his sector or area of
responsibility from this site and determines which exact
position is best for the OP.

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· The section leader selects hide positions and fighting


positions for his vehicles. Once the area around the OP is
cleared and secure, he signals the vehicles forward to move
into their fighting positions.
· The driver and a dismounted scout from each vehicle mark
their vehicle position with a ground stake. The stake, which
enables a vehicle to reoccupy the fighting position at a later
time, is centered on the driver’s station. It must be tall
enough for the driver to see as he drives into position. The
driver uses engineer tape or luminous tape on the stake so he
can see it during limited visibility operations.
· The gunner and vehicle commander for each vehicle complete
and check their sector sketch. Each vehicle then moves back
out of its fighting position into a hide position. The section
leader checks the sketches to ensure they provide complete
coverage of the sector. Sector sketches or range cards allow
the OP to use the vehicle’s thermal sights for observation;
they are also a valuable reference if the vehicle is ordered to
fight.

Figure 5-45. Vehicles Overwatching a Potential OP Site

MANNING THE OP
5-204. A minimum of two scouts man each OP. They must be equipped
to observe the area, report information, protect themselves, and call for
and adjust indirect fire. One scout observes the area while the other
provides local security, records information, and sends reports to the
section/squad leader or platoon leader. The two scouts should switch jobs
every 20 to 30 minutes because the observer’s effectiveness decreases
quickly after that time. Essential equipment for the OP includes the
following:

· Map of the area, with required graphic only.


· Compass.
· Communications equipment (wire and/or radio).
· Observation devices (binoculars, observation telescope, and/or
NVDs).
· SOI extract.

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· Report formats.
· Weapons, such personal, crew-served, and/or light antitank
weapons (LAW). Mines are included, if necessary.
· Seasonal uniform and load-bearing equipment (LBE).
· Appropriate NBC equipment and IPE to achieve the highest
MOPP level.

IMPROVING THE POSITION


5-205. Once the section leader has established the OP and assigned the
scouts their sectors of observation, the section improves the position. The
section leader prepares a sector sketch, an example of which is illustrated
in Figure 5-46. This sketch is similar to a fighting position sketch but
with some important differences. As a minimum, the sketch will include
the following:
· A sketch of key and significant terrain, including NAI and
avenues of approach.
· Location of the OP.
· Location of the hide position.
· Locations of vehicle fighting and observation positions.
· Alternate positions (hide, fighting, observation).
· Routes to and from the OP and fighting positions.
· Sectors of observation, with dead space identified.
· Preplanned artillery targets.
· TRPs for direct fire.
· Prepared spot reports and calls for fire, based on trigger lines
and projected locations where the threat will first be seen.
· Locations of protective obstacles, such as Claymores and trip
flares.

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Figure 5-46. Section Leader’s OP Sketch

5-206. Personnel manning the OP site begin digging in to provide


protection from indirect and direct fires. They also camouflage the
position, install wire communications equipment and directional
antennas for FM communications, and emplace hasty obstacles for local
protection. Vehicle commanders (or gunners) and drivers reconnoiter the
routes to their fighting/observation positions and alternate positions,
perform maintenance, and camouflage vehicles and positions.

OP COMMUNICATIONS
5-207. The scouts occupying the OP use wire, radio, or both as their
primary means of communications. Wire is preferred because it is secure
and is not vulnerable to threat direction-finding equipment or jamming.
The scouts can conceal the wire so the threat cannot see it. If possible, the
scouts in the OP use wire to communicate with their section/squad leader
or his representative, who is located with his vehicle in the hide position
behind the OP.
5-208. The scout in the vehicle in turn relays reports or information to
the platoon leader by radio. Ideally, if the vehicles are in a hide position,
their signals are masked from the threat by terrain. If they anticipate
being in the position for a long period of time and expect to have to use
the radio, scouts should construct a directional antenna to further reduce
their vulnerability to threat jamming or direction-finding. The scouts in
the OP should carry a radio as a backup means of communications; they
can use it to send reports or to talk directly to their FIST or mortar
section for indirect fire support.

OP SECURITY
5-209. As noted, scouts are extremely vulnerable in an OP; their best
self-defense is not to be seen, heard, or otherwise located by the threat.
They employ active and passive measures to protect themselves from
threat detection and direct and indirect fires.
5-210. The first step is to locate the OP in a covered and concealed
position to reduce the chance of being seen by the threat. The scouts add
camouflage to the position to enhance natural concealment. If they have
enough time, they dig in the position and add overhead cover to increase
survivability against threat fires. The scouts enforce strict light and noise
discipline and reduce activity in and around the OP to essential
movement only. All vehicles remain hidden because the threat can easily
identify their large signatures. Scouts in the OP also must maintain
secure communications; refer to the discussion earlier in this section.
5-211. To provide early warning of threat movement around the screen
line or OP position, the scouts emplace their PEWS in areas that they
cannot observe or in the dead spaces between OPs. Trip flares and
M18A1 claymore mines provide additional early warning and protection
from threat personnel.
5-212. Active patrolling around and between OPs also enhances security.
Patrols give the platoon the ability to observe areas that cannot be
observed from the OPs and to clear the area around the OP of threat
elements. A patrol can be executed by a minimum of two dismounted

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crewmen from the vehicles in the hide position. The platoon executes
security patrols as soon after occupation of the position as possible to
discover threat elements that might have observed the occupation. The
patrol reconnoiters favorable observation positions that might be
occupied by the threat. Route selection is critical when organizing patrols
because scouts must assume that the OP position is under observation.
(NOTE: Refer to the discussion of patrols earlier in this chapter.)
5-213. OPs cannot always avoid being seen by the threat, so they must
take actions to limit their vulnerability. Covered positions provide
protection from threat fires; vehicle dispersion further reduces the effects
of these fires. The vehicles in the fighting positions are used to extricate
the scouts from the OP when the position has been identified and
attacked by the threat.

EXTENDED OP OPERATIONS
5-214. Extended OPs are fixed surveillance positions that require the
scouts to remain at the site for up to 72 hours without relief or rotation of
scout teams. They provide the maximum degree of stealth available to the
scout from a stationary position. Vehicle placement will not be in direct
support of the OP. Infiltration and exfiltration, accomplished using any
method of aerial and dismounted movement, will be the primary method
of occupying and departing the OP. Once the OP is occupied, movement
around the OP ceases until mission is complete, evacuation is required,
and/or exfiltration begins.
5-215. This discussion addresses the process of selection, construction,
and occupation of extended OPs, as used in permissive and
nonpermissive operational environments. During this process, the scouts
should apply the principles summarized by the acronym BLUES, which is
illustrated in Figure 5-47.

B Blend in with the surrounding area. Does the site look natural? Does it attract unwanted attention?

Low-to-the-ground construction techniques must be used. Does the site provide protection against
L small arms and direct weapons fire?
Unexpected sites should be used. Will the threat forces expect you to look out the window or the
U small hole in the wall?
Evacuation routes must be planned during site selection. Where will you go to link up with friendly
E forces?
Avoid silhouetting of the site by using the sides of hills, not the crests. Can the sniper see you
S silhouetted against the skyline, wall, or other object?

Figure 5-47. BLUES Principles for Extended OPs

SITE SELECTION
5-216. In choosing where to position extended OPs, the reconnaissance
platoon must ensure that the sites meet the following requirements:

· Afford adequate visual and electronic line-of-sight target


observation and security for the observers.
· Have as wide a field of view and as little dead space as
possible.

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· Are not near natural lines of drift or in terrain that would


naturally draw the attention of threat forces, such as atop a
flat rock face on a hill.
· Have covered and concealed exit and entry points.
· Are far enough downwind from the target and inhabited areas
to minimize the olfactory detection of the position by dogs or
people. Keep in mind that wind direction often changes at
various times of the day.
· In general, are as close to, or distant from, the target as
mission and security considerations dictate.
· Afford effective overhead and side cover and concealment.
· Are capable of supporting execution of battle drills if the
observers must break threat contact.
· Support reliable communications between the observers and
their main body, security element, and/or communications
element.
· Are, above all, in a location that is not obvious to threat
forces.

5-217. If no single position affords all these features (for example,


daytime versus nighttime requirements), it may become necessary to
select separate positions suited to the type of surveillance performed.
Multiple positions must be mutually supporting so that if one position is
compromised, observers in the other position are able to continue the
surveillance mission and/or warn the rest of the platoon. Further, if
positions are not used during the day, they should be kept under
observation. If the positions cannot be secured by observation, they
should not be reused the following night. This practice prevents the
scouts from walking into an ambush while trying to reoccupy the
position. Another consideration in the use of separate positions is that
observers must avoid establishing patterns and trails while moving to
and from the different positions.

CONSTRUCTION TECHNIQUES
5-218. Several construction techniques are common to all observation
positions. These techniques are included in SOPs and practiced during
normal training.

Dirt Removal
5-219. The primary problem in constructing any position is the removal
of excess dirt. Excavated soil expands in volume. In dry climates, the
subsurface soil contains the most water. This water content causes the
soil to be a different color, meaning this soil must be camouflaged. Under
these conditions, construct underground positions before the early
morning dew develops. Discarding excess soil before the dew sets in aids
in the camouflage process. Consider the effect of the sun drying out the
excess soil. This dried soil may need to be camouflaged. The main
technique for camouflaging soil, using plastic sheeting or a poncho,
entails the following steps:

· Lay out the sheeting alongside the position.

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· Place the topsoil to one side of the sheeting. Remember that


the topsoil only extends a few centimeters below the surface.
Save as much of the vegetation as possible.
· Dig out the remaining soil. Do not mix the topsoil with subsoil
from the hole.
· Fill sandbags with the (loose) soil dug from the hole and use
them to reinforce the sides of the position.
· Fill surrounding depressions, ruts, or ditches with the
remaining excess soil. If this procedure is not possible, spread
the soil lightly on the surface in an area away from the
position. Avoid putting the excess soil in creeks or streams
that may wash the dirt down the waterway and attract
unwanted attention.
· After overhead cover is constructed and waterproofed, replace
the topsoil. Place vegetation, leaves, deadfall, or other local
materials around the area to finish camouflaging the position.
· The final step in the process is to recover the sheeting used to
contain the soil. Check the vegetation under the sheeting to
ensure that it was not matted down under the weight of the
soil. If matting has occurred, take the time to brush it with a
branch to return it to its natural state.
· As time passes, continually check the vegetation and soil
around the position to ensure that they appear natural. Loose
soil often falls through small holes and results in a strange-
looking, funnel-shaped hole. Check vegetation to ensure that
it blends in with the surrounding area. Remove or replace
dead vegetation.

Vegetation
5-220. When applying the “B” in the BLUES acronym, remember that
vegetation is critical to blending the OP with surrounding terrain.
Replanting and watering vegetation during initial position construction
can eliminate the need to continually replace wilted plants.
5-221. Grasses. When removing topsoil, save the grass. Remove the
grass in clumps by cutting a circle about 5 to 15 centimeters around the
section to be saved with an entrenching tool or shovel; then pry the roots
and soil up from the bottom. When replacing the grass around the
position, pattern the placement after the natural design. Shake the grass
slightly to loosen the roots, then replace it at ground level. If water is
available, a small amount placed on the grass will lessen the shock of
replanting and extend the life of the camouflage.
5-222. Plants and Bushes. Medium-sized plants or bushes will aid the
security of the position. Not only will the plants add to the camouflage of
the position, but they will also discourage vehicle and foot movement over
the top of the position. The main disadvantage to using plants on top of
the position is that the plants may die or fall over due to the shallow
depth of the overhead cover.
5-223. Deadfall. Deadfall can restrict movement in much the same way
as the plants and bushes discussed earlier. At the same time, the use of

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deadfall as part of the overall camouflage effort presents several


disadvantages, including the following:

· In most regions of the world, deadfall is used for home


heating, cooking, and construction. If the position has this
fuel near it, the risk of discovery is increased. The only
options available to OP personnel if a nonhostile civilian
discovers them are emergency exfiltration and activation of
the escape and evasion (E&E) plan. Either course of action
will result in the mission being terminated.
· Deadfall provides very limited cover against small arms fire.
Most trees decompose quickly on the ground. Modern small
arms fire will easily pass through these rotten trees. If
deadfall must be used, it is reinforced with dirt.

Sidewall Support
5-224. Depending on the soil condition in the area of operations, the
sidewall of the position may require some type of shoring or support to
prevent cave-ins. A variety of material for support of the walls is
available, such as local timber, branches, deadfall, plastic sheeting, and
ponchos. The primary means for supporting the sides, however, is the use
of sandbags. These lightweight bags serve a variety of uses and conform
to almost any shape required. The exact number of bags required depends
on the size and overall design of the position. When cross-bracing
sandbagged walls, use freshly cut green timber or a prefabricated support
such as PVC pipe, conduit, or other like items. Examples of cross-bracing
and revetments can be found in FM 3-34.310 (FM 5-34).

OP Kits
5-225. Whenever possible, the unit should assemble prefabricated kits to
aid in the construction of the required positions. These kits need not be
taken into the operational area; rather, they are assembled as a stockpile
from which elements can draw mission-specific equipment during
isolation. Items in these kits include the following:
· Schedule 80 PVC pipe (elbows, straight connectors, and three-
and four-way connectors) and PVC cement. This strong,
lightweight material can be formed into a multitude of shapes
and designs. It can be used to build a frame for the overhead
cover or to form cross-bracing.
· Parachute suspension line. This has many uses, such as being
interwoven to produce a frame for overhead cover.
· Sandbags.
· Assorted tapes, cords, and ropes.
· Plastic bags with press-together or slide-lock “zippers” for
closing. These items can be used for general storage.
· Half-meter square pieces of 1-centimeter plywood. This
lightweight material is excellent for constructing overhead
cover, platforms for use in trees, and insulation when
operating on ice and snow. The squares can be painted to
match the terrain in which they are used.

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· Plastic sheeting. Heavy-gauge plastic sheeting fills many


roles. If plastic sheeting is not available, the heavy-duty
plastic bags used to cover pallets work well.
· Hand tools, such as D-handle shovels, hack saws, hammers,
and small bow saws.
· Plastic or aluminum tent stakes. These items save time
during construction of the position.
· Canvas and camouflage netting.
· Plastic buckets with formaldehyde.
· Mirrors or periscopes.

EXTENDED OP EMPLOYMENT IN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS


Urban Environment
5-226. An urban or built-up area forms the economic and cultural focus
for the surrounding area. It is characterized by a concentration of people
and man-made structures and facilities. Because of the generally limited
fields of vision, urban operations normally require more positions than
rural operations. Refer to FM 3-06 (FM 90-10) and to the discussion of
urban operations in Chapter 7 of this manual.
5-227. Position Selection. As with other observation and surveillance
positions, METT-TC dictates the selection of urban OPs. Scouts can
construct fixed urban positions in occupied and abandoned buildings, on
water tanks, behind shrubbery, on factory chimneys, or in the attics of
multistory buildings or other tall structures. If the position is to be set up
in an undamaged part of the urban area, the scouts should select
buildings of solid construction with serviceable stairs and basements that
can be equipped for the rest and shelter of personnel.
5-228. Scouts should avoid wooden buildings and buildings in a
significantly deteriorated condition because of the risk of injury from fire
and/or structural failure. Fixed positions should not be located in
buildings that will attract the threat’s attention; instead, they should be
placed in rubble, yards, and gardens.
5-229. When occupying the position, scouts must look for booby traps
and mines. If they detect such devices, they must be prepared to take
proper precautions, including the following:

· Disable the devices, if possible.


· Mark the area if the devices cannot be disabled.
· Choose another position if the quantity of booby traps or
mines prevents safe operation within the position.

5-230. Construction. Position construction may consist simply of being


able to look out of a suitable viewing port, or it can be much more
elaborate. Considerations and actions should include the following:

· Construction of the position must be done with particular


emphasis on OPSEC.

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FM 3-20.98 ___________________________________________________________________________

· Fill windows, doors, and other openings (such as bullet holes


not used for observation) with bricks, fragments of building
materials, or sand bags if available.
· Remove flammable objects. These may be used for early
warning or defensive devices.
· Establish interbuilding communications by hard wire. Fiber
optic cables (telephones), if available, offer even better
security.
· Identify and construct rapid departure routes.

5-231. Avoiding Detection. Because of the higher concentration of


people, threat security elements, lighting sources, and movement,
friendly forces in urban areas must take additional precautions to avoid
detection during surveillance activities. Considerations for detection
avoidance include the following:

· A minimum of two scouts are required in occupying the OP.


· If operating from an occupied dwelling, do not consume more
electric power, water, and heat than average for the normal
occupants.
· Employ OPSEC to negate or evade threat electronic
countermeasures (ECM). For example, technological advances
make it possible for mobile units operating from the street to
electronically survey a building and detect and identify very
small sources of energy. Such capabilities are increasingly
widespread and are often found in built-up areas of even
marginally developed countries, especially in the “security
states” of the Third World.

Mountainous Environment
5-232. Rugged, poorly trafficable terrain, steep slopes, and elevations
that allow observation of surrounding terrain characterize mountainous
areas. This terrain may require more observers and positions than flat
areas because of the relatively limited fields of vision. On the other hand,
in areas above the tree line or where lower elevations lack vegetation, the
number of observers may be decreased. A careful study of the target area
will give a good indication of these requirements. For a general discussion
of operations in mountainous areas, see FM 3-97.6 (FM 90-6).
5-233. Position Selection. Mountain terrain provides many places for
cover and concealment. Position selection is not guided by the height of a
given mountain but by factors that include the following:

· Irregular fields of observation.


· Dead space.
· Cover and concealment.
· The limits of the observation equipment used by the scouts.

5-234. Scouts may employ a circular, multitiered system of observers. To


increase daytime viewing capability, positions are placed not only
laterally but also with vertical dispersion. This layering of positions also

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reduces the need for movement when changing from daytime to nighttime
operations. Since movement is the main cause of compromise, layering
positions also adds to the security effort of the deployed scouts. (See
Figure 5-48.)

Figure 5-48. Overlapping Mountain Observation Sites

5-235. Construction. Irregular terrain in mountains often affords


natural hiding places for observers. In most mountainous areas, the rocky
nature of the ground makes it difficult and often impossible to dig
belowground positions. In those cases, boulders and loose rocks can be
used in aboveground construction of low-walled positions called “scrapes.”
When these positions are constructed, scouts should take the same degree
of care in camouflaging the site as they use in all other types of
construction. The position must blend in with its surroundings and not be
detectable from any angle. Fields of view can often be enhanced if the
lower branches on the undergrowth are trimmed back with a wire saw,
shears, or knife.
5-236. Night Observation. At night, sending out additional observers
into valleys and hollows enhances observation. Observation from below,
facing upward against the background of the sky, often gives better
results. In addition, the scouts should supplement night observation by
monitoring. Monitoring is more effective in mountainous areas than on
flat terrain because sounds are often funneled to the head of valleys and
are perceptible at great distances. Sounds in the mountains can be
deceptive, however. Various obstructions can reduce their volume and
change their direction.
5-237. Snow. In mountainous areas, scouts can use certain tactics to
reduce the problems associated with operations where snow is expected
or known to be on the ground. Some of these tactics are discussed in the
following paragraphs.
5-238. Melting conditions. Observers should choose positions that are
in shaded areas, on slopes facing away from the equator (north in the
Northern Hemisphere, south in the Southern Hemisphere). In moderate
temperatures, the heat generated by the observers’ bodies melts the snow
on the cover of the position. The result is an unexplainable muddy area in
snow. Such melting is, however, common around trees. The melting snow
during the heat of the day often falls to the ground and, in turn, melts the
snow on the ground. The melting snow falling off the trees often can be
used as a water source; unlike snow on the ground, this water source does
not require melting over a heat source. The shadows found around rock
outcropping and trees also aid in hiding the foot trails leading to the work
area and position.

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FM 3-20.98 ___________________________________________________________________________

5-239. Taking advantage of shade also helps to assure even melting,


which can prevent compromise of the position. Walking compresses snow
under each footprint. The compressed snow melts at a slower rate than
the surrounding snow. This effect is like comparing the difference
between crushed ice and cubed ice in a drink. The loose, crushed ice melts
faster than the dense cubes. In areas where the snow melts fast, such as
the sunny side of a hill, the compressed snow will leave footprints or
trails leading to the position.
5-240. Avalanche danger. The constant daytime melting and
nighttime refreezing of snow on slopes can contribute to increased
avalanche danger. Scouts should use shadowed areas and slopes to
reduce the risk of starting or being caught in an avalanche. Most danger
areas with heightened avalanche risk are well known; these are often
plotted on military and civilian maps.

TYPES OF EXTENDED OPs


Aboveground Positions
5-241. These are the most common type of fixed observation and
surveillance positions. The advantages of selecting an aboveground
position are the ease and speed with which the position can be selected
and occupied and the simplicity of construction. The primary
disadvantages in these positions are easy detection and little protection
from small arms fire compared to belowground positions. The following
discussion focuses on the use of trees as OP positions.
5-242. Operational Considerations. Special skills and equipment are
required for operations in trees. The equipment requirements and
planning considerations are different from those of ground positions.
These considerations are as follows:

· Choose trees that are situated well within the forest.


· They should never stand out in height, shape, or color.
· Observers are well camouflaged in the crown of a tree.
· Further, the observer in the tree must be covered by fire that
permits him to exit his location if detected or engaged by
hostile forces.
· Observers must acquire the materials needed to improve the
position (such as flat wood pieces on which to stand or sit).

5-243. Advantages. Advantages inherent in positioning extended OPs


in trees include the following:
· These positions afford a long-range view in open areas. In
heavy-growth areas, however, the view may be nothing more
than the tops of trees.
· Most people do not look more than 2 to 3 feet above their
heads when walking. When a traveler is carrying a load on
his back, he often bends forward at the waist. As a result, he
can do little more than look at the ground at his feet to
maintain his footing.

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· Trees provide good concealment for the observer even if the


threat is trying to look in the trees for him. The key exception
is when the observer is moving about in the position.

5-244. Disadvantages. Disadvantages of using trees for extended OPs


include the following:
· Observers face potential problems in getting into and out of
the position.
· These positions often lack adequate cover.
· Slight movement in trees can be seen and heard at great
distances.

5-245. Monitoring the Target Area. Monitoring of the target area is


critical to accomplishing the mission and providing scouts with
operational security. Observers positioned in a tree OP can monitor the
target in several ways, including the following:
· Observers can sit quietly and listen to sounds with their eyes
closed. This works best using two scouts; one watches while
the other listens.
· Observers record the sounds of the area on a tape recorder
and play the sounds back at a louder volume into headphones.
· Remote sensors often play a key role in monitoring the target.

Ground Positions
5-246. OPs on the ground are camouflaged to resemble such features as
stumps, fallen trees, and bushes. For enhanced surveillance, the scouts
locate the position to overwatch the intersection of fire lanes, roads, and
footpaths on the edge of sparsely wooded areas and natural clearings.
When available, obstacles such as creeks, ditches, or steep slopes should
be located between the position and the probable route of threat security
forces. At night, even a small creek will cause the threat to make noise; it
will also disrupt his formations and generally slow his progress.
5-247. Spider Hole. This type of position is similar to a fighting
position with overhead cover. The dimensions are normally about 0.75
meters wide by 1.2 meters long by 1 to 1.5 meters deep. The observer can
adjust the dimensions to meet his needs. This one-man position is
normally established on a line or ring to provide support and enhance
security. If the platoon uses this type of OP, a minimum of two mutually
supporting holes must be used. (See Figure 5-49.)

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FM 3-20.98 ___________________________________________________________________________

Figure 5-49. Spider Hole OP

5-248. Scrape. A scrape is the enlargement of a depression in the


ground to allow one man to occupy a position. Scrapes are hasty in nature
and require little preparation. Often used during darkness, scrapes
provide the observer with a position from which he can more effectively
use his optical devices. The observer removes as much evidence of
occupation as possible when he leaves. He obscures the area by brushing
matted grasses, displaced dirt, and footprints. Overhead cover such as a
poncho provides limited protection from the elements. If the platoon uses
this type of OP, a minimum of two mutually supporting scrapes must be
used. (See Figures 5-50 and 5-51.)

Figure 5-50. Scrape OP

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Figure 5-51. Example Scrape Plan

5-249. Tent-Type Position. Larger than a spider hole, this position is


constructed for more than one observer. Supports for the overhead cover
are made from a variety of material. Branches, aluminum conduit,
parachute suspension line, or fiberglass rods all work well as a frame for
the cover. A slight arch in the cover multiplies available space the inside
the position. The observer avoids grossly breaking the ground plane with
the apex of the position. (See Figure 5-52.)

Figure 5-52. Tent-Type OP

Underground Positions
5-250. The safest type of OP for the scout is the underground position.
The complexity of design and the effort required to construct the position
are its primary disadvantages. When the scouts plan to use underground
positions, soil type is a critical planning consideration that must not be
overlooked during mission preparation. For example, when only light
equipment (such as shovels and entrenching tools) is available,
underground positions can only be constructed in loose soils.

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5-251. Bunker-Type Position. This position requires extensive


construction time and material to complete. The observer can construct
the underground bunker-type position using a prefabricated kit. This kit
includes the tools needed to excavate and cut local materials such as trees
and logs. The kit also contains plastic sheeting for waterproofing the roof,
walls, and floor. The sheeting can also be used to reinforce loose soil in
the position. Depending on the soil in the area, however, sandbags are
often required to shore up the sides of the position; sandbags also lessen
the accumulation of condensation produced when plastic sheeting is used.
(See Figure 5-53.)

Figure 5-53. Bunker-Type Underground OP

5-252. Caves. Caves can provide the observer with a ready-made


observation position. They present special problems, however, and should
be avoided if possible. First, caves attract attention; using them for
tactical purposes may increase the chance of discovery for friendly forces.
Caves are often shown on maps or are known to the local populace. Locals
often use caves for shelter and sometimes for storage. They may have
equipped caves with early warning devices that could attract the
attention of threat forces. In addition, caves also attract animals. Bats,
birds, snakes, and larger animals use caves for shelter, posing potential
dangers and medical problems.

REMOTE ELECTRONIC/MECHANICAL SURVEILLANCE


5-253. In some cases, the reconnaissance platoon will not have the
resources to observe a particular area that is either tasked to the platoon
or important to its internal security. Other times, the terrain will not
permit such observation. In these situations, the platoon can use
mechanical warning devices such as trip flares or electronic devices (for
example, GSR, REMBASS, or PEWS) to monitor the area.
5-254. As a general consideration, remote surveillance devices allow the
platoon to put maximum effort into the commander’s or platoon leader’s
primary area of concern while still maintaining surveillance on secondary
reconnaissance objectives. The platoon will back up these devices with
patrols to investigate any alarms. An example of the use of mechanical
devices is an OP that uses trip flares in dead space along the avenue of
approach it is monitoring. When activated, the trip flare gives early

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warning of threat infiltration. A patrol will then be dispatched to verify


the warning. (See Figure 5-54.)

Figure 5-54. Integration of Remote Devices into the Screen

5-83
Chapter 6

Other Tactical Operations


Several combat operations
CONTENTS
are routinely associated with
successful accomplishment of Assembly Areas ............................................ 6-1
Characteristics ...................................... 6-1
the reconnaissance and Quartering Party Responsibilities ........ 6-2
security missions described in Occupation ............................................ 6-3
Chapters 3 and 4 of this Actions in the Assembly Area .............. 6-4
manual. These operations Departing the Assembly Area .............. 6-4
entail special planning and Road Marches ............................................... 6-4
Preparing for Road Marches ................ 6-5
training considerations March Columns ..................................... 6-5
because of their complexity. March Column Control ......................... 6-6
Reconnaissance platoons Road March Training ............................ 6-9
must execute them based on Battle Handover During
standardized procedures and Passage of Lines ............................ 6-10
Critical Tasks ......................................... 6-10
must support their parent Preparation ............................................ 6-14
units’ execution of these Conduct of the Passage ....................... 6-16
operations. NBC Considerations ............................. 6-16
Fratricide Avoidance ............................. 6-17
Relief in Place ............................................... 6-17

SECTION I – ASSEMBLY AREAS

6-1. An assembly area is a site where a unit regroups or prepares for


future operations. Normally, a reconnaissance platoon occupies an
assembly area as part of its parent unit, but it may occupy one
independently. Once in the assembly area, the platoon prepares and
issues orders, conducts resupply operations, repairs and maintains
vehicles and equipment, and feeds and rests its soldiers.

CHARACTERISTICS
6-2. The reconnaissance platoon is often directed to find, secure, and
occupy an assembly area. There are certain characteristics the scouts
must look for when selecting the assembly area:

· Concealment from overhead observation.


· Cover from direct fire.
· Good drainage and a ground surface that will support the
platoon’s and/or the parent unit’s vehicles.
· Adequate entrances, exits, and internal roads.
· Enough space for adequate dispersion of vehicles, personnel,
and equipment.
· Adequate defensibility and fields of fire.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

QUARTERING PARTY RESPONSIBILITIES


6-3. As part of its parent unit or on its own, the platoon may have to
assume quartering party duties. Understanding these duties makes
occupying the assembly area much easier. The quartering party’s mission
is to reconnoiter the area for threat presence and booby traps, designate
vehicle locations, prepare the area for occupation, and assist incoming
units during the occupation.
6-4. The platoon leader or PSG designates the vehicles and personnel
from the platoon that will be part of the troop quartering party. The
entire platoon may also serve as the troop quartering party. If the platoon
is part of a troop, the quartering party moves to the new assembly area
under the control of the troop XO or troop first sergeant (1SG). The
following discussion outlines the primary responsibilities of the
quartering party.

RECONNOITER THE AREA


6-5. The first task of the quartering party is to conduct an area
reconnaissance of the assembly area to find threat forces, obstacles, and
NBC contamination. This is a time-consuming process that must be
planned for by the parent unit. Once threat forces are eliminated, the
area must be secured to prevent threat infiltration. To do this, the
quartering party establishes OPs and/or conducts security patrols. If the
threat situation warrants, the officer in charge (OIC) or NCO in charge
(NCOIC) may need to enlarge the quartering party to include security
personnel who can provide adequate security while other members of the
party organize and mark the assembly area.

DETERMINE ASSEMBLY AREA SUITABILITY


6-6. Once the area is secure, the OIC or NCOIC must conduct a
reconnaissance to verify the area’s suitability and to position guides and
markings. This task can be conducted in conjunction with the initial area
reconnaissance. When checking the position for suitability, the quartering
party analyzes cover and concealment, drainage, routes into and out of
the area, internal routes, defensibility, and fields of fire. If the area is
unsatisfactory, the scouts should immediately begin looking for an
alternate site to recommend to the commander. The OIC or NCOIC
should notify the commander immediately, reporting his actions and
recommendations and requesting further instructions.

ORGANIZE THE AREA


6-7. The quartering party designates positions on the ground for the
various elements within the assembly area. The siting should be
consistent with the commander’s guidance, unit SOP, and follow-on
missions. The frontages selected for the various elements must be
consistent with terrain considerations and must allow adequate defensive
coverage.

IMPROVE AND MARK ENTRANCES, EXITS, AND INTERNAL ROUTES


6-8. Once the organization of the assembly area is complete, the
quartering party marks the positions. It also reconnoiters and marks
routes from the RP to the assembly area. The actual entrance and exit for
the assembly area must be well marked to facilitate easy movement. The
quartering party designates and marks internal routes to prevent

6-2
____________________________________________________ Chapter 6 – Other Tactical Operations

excessive movement that could create a large unit signature. Unit SOP
should dictate the marking system to be used. Examples of markings
include chem lights, engineer tape, unit tactical signs, flashlights, VS-17
panels, and thermal tape.

MARK OR REMOVE OBSTACLES AND MINES


6-9. Ideally, the commander should have some indication of current or
past presence of a threat in the proposed area. If there is a possibility of
mines or CBUs in the assembly area, additional scouts or combat
engineers with mine-detection equipment should be requested before the
quartering party departs. Obstacle and mine clearance requires prior
planning to ensure sufficient quantities of the proper equipment are
available. This equipment may include pioneer tools, demolitions, or
engineer vehicles. Sufficient time must also be allocated to allow the
quartering party to accomplish this mission before the main body arrives.
If the first area selected contains numerous obstacles, an alternate area
should be reconnoitered.

PERFORM GUIDE DUTIES


6-10. The quartering party prepares the assembly area to make the
occupation of the new positions swift and efficient. This can be a wasted
effort if the guides do not perform their duties properly. Because the
quartering party is familiar with the area and the vehicle positions, the
vehicle commanders rely, at least initially, on the guides to reach their
designated positions; therefore, guides must be thoroughly briefed prior
to the mission.
6-11. The guides are positioned between the RP and the assembly area
entrance so that each guide can meet his unit as it crosses the RP. The
guides must know the proper route from the RP to the new positions; they
quickly move their units through the RP and into the assembly area.
Once in the new area, the guides direct the vehicles to their tentative
positions. Immediately afterward, they walk the platoon leader through
the positions, briefing him on the individual vehicle positions, adjacent
units, fields of fire, location of the CP, and any other essential
information. The guides continue their occupation activities until all
vehicle positions are occupied.

ACCOMPLISH ADDITIONAL ASSIGNED TASKS


6-12. If the commander assigns any additional tasks, the quartering
party must accomplish them. The commander should prioritize these
tasks; if he does not, the quartering party leader must designate a
priority of tasks that allows for the most important to be accomplished
first. Examples of such additional tasks include establishing priorities of
work, providing security for the command group, test-firing weapons, and
assisting in traffic control.

OCCUPATION
6-13. When a unit arrives at an assembly area, all elements move off
the route of march and clear it without slowing or halting. The platoon
leader should keep this in mind as he posts guides, selects routes, and
allocates space in the assembly area. After a march serial has cleared the
route, it can adjust vehicle positions without holding up traffic.

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ACTIONS IN THE ASSEMBLY AREA


6-14. As soon as the platoon occupies its area, it must automatically
execute its priority of tasks. Initial tasks include the following:

· Position vehicles.
· Establish local security.
· Establish lateral contact with vehicles on the flanks.
· Develop range cards or sector sketches and submit them to
the platoon leader for inclusion in the platoon fire plan.
Scouts may have to adjust their positions accordingly.
· Camouflage positions.
· Perform PMCS.
· Initiate and maintain OPSEC.

6-15. Security is a constant concern in assembly areas. Noise and light


discipline are especially important, as is limiting the number of vehicles
that enter and exit the assembly area. The local security that is initially
established will be replaced by more permanent OPs once the platoon is
established in position; these OPs are deployed in accordance with
procedures outlined in Chapter 5 of this manual. The platoon leader or
higher commander may also require patrols (mounted and dismounted)
within the assembly area, especially in limited visibility periods. Wire
and messengers are the primary means of communications. How many
wire lines are laid depends on how long the platoon will be in the
assembly area. Radio is used only in emergencies when no other means of
communications is available.

DEPARTING THE ASSEMBLY AREA


6-16. Departing an assembly area is a critical and often overlooked
task. A well-organized departure sets up the platoon for its next mission.
A poorly organized departure can cause delays and other problems that
may adversely affect the platoon’s mission before it begins.
6-17. The departure requires thorough planning and preparation,
including a walk-through rehearsal. As part of the preparation, a
thorough police call must be conducted. This ensures that all evidence of
the unit’s occupation is removed and denies the threat any equipment,
supplies, or other items (including trash) that might be of tactical or
intelligence value. Leaders must carefully supervise execution of the
departure to ensure that no delays occur.

SECTION II – ROAD MARCHES

6-18. Units not engaged in combat may have to travel long distances to
position themselves for future operations. These movements are planned
at battalion/squadron and company/troop level, but they are executed by
the subordinate units involved, including the reconnaissance platoon.
Success depends largely on unit discipline and the platoon’s ability to
execute the plan with strict adherence to SOP.

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6-19. The road march differs from other forms of movement in these
ways:

· The purpose is relocation, not making contact.


· The primary consideration is rapid movement of vehicles.
· The road march is conducted at a prescribed speed.
· A prescribed interval is maintained between vehicles.

6-20. The platoon may perform various duties during a road march,
including manning traffic control points (TCP), serving as road guides or
as a quartering party, or conducting route reconnaissance.

PREPARING FOR ROAD MARCHES


6-21. The basic considerations in planning any road march are METT-
TC factors (especially the threat situation and the mission), the march
order, and the type, number, and characteristics of vehicles available for
the movement. When preparing for a tactical road march, the
reconnaissance platoon should use the following planning sequence if
time permits:

· Prepare and issue the warning order as early as possible to


allow maximum time for preparation.
· Prepare an estimate of the situation, specifying organization
of the march column.
· Organize and dispatch reconnaissance and quartering parties.
· Prepare detailed movement plans based on the organization
of the march column and a review of available reconnaissance
information.
· Prepare and issue the march order.
· Prepare overlays and issue them to all vehicle commanders
and subordinate leaders. The road march overlay should
include, as a minimum, the location of the SP, RP, scheduled
halts, and checkpoints at critical points along the route.

MARCH COLUMNS
6-22. A tactical march may be conducted in close column or open
column or by infiltration. In dusty conditions, vehicles must be spaced so
that the dust from one does not blind the driver of the next.

CLOSE COLUMN
6-23. Close column is normally used for marches during limited
visibility conditions. Under these conditions, vehicles are spaced so the
driver can see the two lights in the blackout marker of the vehicle ahead,
about 25 to 50 meters apart. Close column marching takes advantage of
the traffic capacity of the route, but it provides little dispersion. Traffic
density is approximately 20 to 40 vehicles per kilometer along the route of
march.

OPEN COLUMN
6-24. Open column is generally used during daylight. The distance
between vehicles is increased to provide greater dispersion; it varies from

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50 meters to 100 meters, or more if the situation requires. Open column


may also be used at night with infrared lights, blackout lights, or passive
night-vision equipment. Normal vehicle density is approximately 20
vehicles per kilometer when vehicles are 50 meters apart, 12 vehicles per
kilometer when the distance is 75 meters, and 10 vehicles per kilometer
when the distance is 100 meters. The increased dispersion of the vehicles
in open column movement enhances security.

INFILTRATION
6-25. Infiltration provides the best possible passive defense against
threat observation and attack, but it may be difficult to control. It is
suited to tactical marches when sufficient time and road space are
available and maximum security, deception, and dispersion are desired.
The advance party usually infiltrates. Vehicles are dispatched
individually, in small groups, or at irregular intervals at a rate that
reduces traffic density and prevents undue massing of vehicles. (NOTE:
Refer to Chapter 3 of this manual for a discussion of infiltration.)

MARCH COLUMN CONTROL


6-26. Column control is maintained through the chain of command.
Each scout vehicle has a prescribed place in the platoon march column as
described in the discussion of tactical movement in Chapter 2 of this
manual. This discussion covers a variety of control measures and
procedures for the march column.

START POINT
6-27. An SP provides all vehicles of a march column with a common
point for starting their movement. The SP is a recognizable place along
the route of march, such as a road intersection. It should not be in a
defile, on a hill, or at a sharp curve in the road that could cause
movement to slow. It should be far enough from assembly areas to allow
vehicles to be organized and moving at the prescribed speed when they
reach it. Before starting a march, elements of the platoon should
reconnoiter the route to the SP to determine times for major units of the
serial to arrive at and clear the serial SP. When vehicles use more than
one route, each route has an SP.

RELEASE POINT
6-28. An RP gives all vehicles of the march column a common point for
reverting to control of the platoon leader. It is a point on the route of
march that is easy to recognize on the map and on the ground. Guides
should meet vehicles as they arrive at the RP and lead them to their new
positions, usually in an assembly area. Multiple routes and cross-country
movement from the RP to assembly areas allow vehicles to disperse
rapidly. In selecting an RP, leaders should avoid hills, defiles, and sharp
curves that may cause elements to slow or stop on the route. No vehicle
should be required to countermarch or pass through another element to
reach its new position.

CHECKPOINTS
6-29. Checkpoints on a route are used for reference in providing
instructions to vehicles in the march column. They also aid in identifying

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places where interference with movement might occur or where timing


might be critical.

RESTRICTIONS
6-30. Restrictions are points along the route of march where movement
may be limited or obstructed during certain time periods; examples
include bridges, intersections, ferries, or bypasses. The march planner
should start the move early enough to pass such a point before a critical
time period begins, delay the start of the move to pass a restriction after
such a period has ended, or plan to halt the column along the route until
the restriction is lifted.

TRAFFIC CONTROL
6-31. The parent unit controlling the march normally provides traffic
control. TCPs manned by military police and/or other personnel,
including members of the reconnaissance platoon, may be located at
critical points along the route. Among the factors that can increase traffic
control problems are movement on multiple routes during periods of
limited visibility and the existence of major intersections, defiles, and
detours along routes. Road guides may lead serials or march units on a
particular route or portion of a route or through a critical area. These
guides must follow the same procedures and guidance as other TCP
personnel. Scouts may act as road guides to assist the military police.
6-32. TCP personnel should be employed in pairs, with one directing
traffic while the other provides security. They need to know the exact
number of vehicles in each march serial, the markings for each serial, and
the passing times so that they can adequately control and report the
movement of the unit. Considerations for manning the TCP include
weather, the marking system for the TCP and route (to include critical
turns), limited visibility procedures, and recovery of the TCPs. The
reconnaissance platoon leader or PSG has several options in deciding how
to man the TCP, to include manning with individual vehicles (up to six
TCPs), dropping off platoon personnel with FM communications at each
TCP, or requesting augmentation if needed.

SPEED CONTROL
6-33. Vehicles in a column of any length may simultaneously encounter
many different types of routes and obstacles. This causes different parts
of the column to move at different speeds at the same time, producing an
undesirable accordion or whip effect. The movement order specifies
march speed, rate of march, and maximum safe catch-up speed to reduce
“column whipping.” The lead vehicle must not exceed the authorized
maximum speed of the slowest vehicle in the column. To minimize vehicle
congestion on the near side of an obstacle, vehicle commanders and
drivers must be alert and maintain the prescribed minimum following
distance. Vehicles should make only gradual speed changes while
maintaining their prescribed interval. Vehicle commanders must
constantly be aware of the vehicle interval to their front and rear and
adjust their speed accordingly.

HALTS
6-34. Halts are conducted to allow following traffic to pass and to
provide time for rest, personal comfort and relief, mess activities,

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refueling, maintenance and inspection of equipment, and adjustments in


schedule. The time and duration of halts are usually specified in the
movement order or prescribed in unit SOP. The SOP should also
prescribe actions to be taken during halts. Vehicle crews perform
maintenance at scheduled halts.
6-35. A short rest halt of 15 minutes is usually taken after the first
hour of marching. A 10-minute short halt is taken every two hours
thereafter. The prescribed rate of march includes the time required for
short halts. When possible, march elements using the same route stop at
the same time. Route characteristics, however, may make it necessary to
halt at a particular point on the route rather than simultaneously at a
fixed time.
6-36. Long halts are planned in advance. The length of the halt is
added to the total travel time. Locations for long halts are normally
selected to allow all vehicles to clear the road and to permit proper
dispersion. Halts for refueling should be scheduled in advance by the unit
commander.
6-37. The herringbone formation is used to provide security for the
march column during unscheduled halts. All vehicles should move
completely off the road to permit passage of vehicles down the center of
the column. Movement commanders give permission for execution of
unscheduled halts. (NOTE: Refer to the discussion of tactical movement
in Chapter 2 of this manual. The herringbone is shown in Figure 2-11.)
6-38. The first priority at any halt is local security. OPs are established
and sectors of fire assigned to each vehicle. These actions should be
automatic and part of the unit SOP (see Chapter 4 of this manual for a
discussion of area security operations).

MISCELLANEOUS FACTORS
Disabled Vehicles
6-39. Disabled vehicles must not obstruct traffic. Their crews must
move them off the road and report their status immediately to the PSG.
Crews must immediately signal the follow-on vehicles to bypass and
continue movement. They then establish security and post guides to
direct traffic. If possible, the crews repair their vehicles and rejoin the
rear of the column just ahead of the trail element. Vehicles that have
dropped from the column should return to their positions only when the
column has halted. The trail party recovers vehicles that cannot be
repaired by their crews.

Start of Movement
6-40. Vehicle commanders must remain alert and exercise caution
whenever they start to move. Vehicles that move too soon or too late can
cause confusion in the formation. Lead vehicles must keep speeds low
until all vehicles have moved onto the route of march.

Obstacles
6-41. When obstacles are reported or encountered along the march
route, vehicles in the march column should bypass them whenever
possible. For additional information on how friendly elements react to
obstacles, refer to the discussion of actions on contact in Chapter 2 of this

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manual and to the discussion of actions at an obstacle (during convoy


escort operations) in Chapter 4.

Observation
6-42. Each vehicle commander assigns sectors of observation to his
crewmen to provide 360-degree observation. He also designates one
observer as the air guard to provide air security. Each vehicle has a sector
of observation as shown in Figure 6-1.

Figure 6-1. Sectors of Observation in a Road March

ROAD MARCH TRAINING


6-43. Overall success or failure of a mission could depend on the ability
of units to march rapidly and efficiently over long distances. The unit’s
level of road march training is thus a major factor in determining mission
success. Important factors in training for tactical road marches include
the following:

· Driver training. The vehicle driver can make or break a


road march. He must know the proper march interval and
following distances; he must understand the effect the speed
of his vehicle can have on the rest of the serial. Drivers can
use man-made features (such as utility poles) or time/distance
factors to gauge distance between vehicles. For example, at 15
miles per hour (mph) with a 100-meter interval, there are 15
seconds between vehicles; 20 mph and a 100-meter interval
equal 11 seconds between vehicles.
· NBC. All members of the organization must be trained in
NBC countermeasures and driving in NBC gear.
· Air guards. As noted, each vehicle commander designates an
air guard who is responsible for detecting threat aerial
platforms. Refer to Chapter 8 of this manual for a further
discussion of active and passive air defense measures.
· Actions on contact. The platoon must be ready to execute
immediate action drills in accordance with unit SOP at any
time during the road march. Refer to Chapter 2 of this
manual for a detailed discussion of actions on contact.

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· Constant practice. Road march training must be conducted


at every opportunity; road march techniques can be practiced
even in routine situations, such as two vehicles moving
together outside a motor pool.
· Systematic training. The unit should first master road
march techniques under good conditions (in the daytime, over
short distances, and with good communications). It then must
work toward mastering these skills under difficult conditions,
including operations involving limited visibility, blackout,
long distances, and radio listening silence.

SECTION III – BATTLE HANDOVER DURING PASSAGE OF LINES

6-44. Battle handover is an operation conducted by stationary and


passing units in a close-in battle to transfer responsibility for fighting a
threat force from one unit to another. Its purpose is to sustain continuity
of the combined arms fight and to prevent the threat from moving
unopposed on the battlefield as one force picks up the fight from another.
It also preserves the fighting capabilities of both friendly units.
6-45. A passage of lines is a tactical event associated with battle
handover. It is the controlled movement of one unit through the positions
of a stationary unit, conducted so that neither unit interferes with the
other’s scheme of maneuver. A passage of lines often becomes necessary
because the combat situation does not permit one unit to bypass another
unit’s position.
6-46. A unit may conduct either a rearward or forward passage of lines.
When a unit moves toward the threat through a stationary unit, it is
considered a forward passage. In a rearward passage, the unit moves
away from the threat through friendly units.
6-47. A passage of lines may be conducted for the following purposes:
· Continue an attack or counterattack.
· Envelop a threat force.
· Pursue a fleeing threat.
· Withdraw security forces or MBA forces.
· Facilitate route, zone, or area reconnaissance.
· Execute a defense or a delay.
· Execute a screen or guard operation.

6-48. The reconnaissance platoon may perform some of these


operations independently (screen and reconnaissance); otherwise, it
usually will take part in a passage of lines as part of a larger force.

CRITICAL TASKS
6-49. There are three key elements in battle handover and passage of
lines: the stationary unit, the passing unit, and the common commander.

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6-50. The commander exercising command authority over both the


stationary unit and the passing unit must designate the battle handover
line (BHL); this is a phase line forward of the stationary unit that is
recognizable on the ground. He normally does this in coordination with
the stationary unit commander, who will recommend the position of the
BHL. The line is drawn where elements of the passing unit can be
effectively protected by direct fires of the forward combat elements of the
stationary unit until the passage of lines is complete. The area between
the BHL and the stationary force is the responsibility of the stationary
unit commander. The common commander will provide the graphic
control measures that depict the BHL and contact points on an overlay
issued to subordinate units with the OPORD or FRAGO (see Figure 6-2).
6-51. Battle handover begins on order of the common commander.
Defensive handover is complete when the passing unit is clear and the
stationary unit is ready to engage the threat. Offensive handover is
complete when the passing unit has deployed and crossed the BHL. The
common commander prescribes the specific criteria that mark completion
of handover; he ensures that both subordinate commanders understand
these criteria.
6-52. The reconnaissance platoon, acting independently or as part of a
larger element, may be either the stationary or the passing unit. The
platoon will normally assist in some portion of the passage of lines and
may be required to coordinate the passage. In many cases, the platoon
will be required to conduct a passage separate from its higher
headquarters.

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Figure 6-2. Battle Handover and Passage of Lines Graphics

PASSING UNIT CRITICAL TASKS


6-53. The passing unit must accomplish several critical tasks during
battle handover and passage of lines, including the following:

· Immediately establish communications, entering the


command, OI, and fire support nets of the stationary unit.
· Collocate a section or vehicle (usually the platoon leader’s or
PSG’s vehicle) with the tactical command post (TAC CP) or
main CP of the stationary unit as soon as possible to enhance
communications and unity of effort.
· In a rearward passage, continuously report to the stationary
unit the location, size, and composition of all threat forces, as
well as the threat’s current activity. If the threat is attacking,
the passing unit reports the direction of movement, movement
formation, and estimated rate of advance of threat elements.
If the threat is defending, passing unit reports include threat
locations, orientation, composition, fire sacks, reserves (if
known), obstacle systems, and flanks.
· Continuously report to the stationary unit the location, size,
and activity of all parent unit elements, to include CS, CSS,
and command and control assets.

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· Based on the current dispositions of the parent unit and


elements of the platoon, coordinate with the stationary unit to
determine contact points at which subordinate elements (such
as reconnaissance sections) will physically coordinate
handover and passage of lines with representatives of the
stationary unit. Once contact points are determined, the
passing unit leader sends a FRAGO to all elements specifying
where they will physically coordinate the passage with the
stationary unit. In addition, the passing unit confirms
recognition signals that must be displayed during passage.
· Ensure that each subordinate element acknowledges where it
must physically coordinate the passage and that it dispatches
representatives to the assigned contact points to coordinate
passage for the element. At the contact points, the
representatives confirm recognition signals and exchange
required information with their counterparts from the
stationary unit.
· In a rearward passage, maintain visual contact with all threat
units and conduct movement back to the BHL, avoiding
decisive engagement.
· During the passage, display correct recognition signals and
use correct challenge and password as specified in the SOI.
· Maintain proper weapons orientation.

STATIONARY UNIT CRITICAL TASKS


6-54. The stationary unit must accomplish a variety of critical tasks
when ordered to conduct battle handover and passage of lines. These
tasks include the following:

· Establish communications with the passing unit, coordinate


necessary contact points, and direct the passing unit to the
contact points based on current dispositions of the designated
units.
· Ensure that contact points are manned and secured and that
passing elements have established personal communications
with their representatives.
· Ensure that representatives at the contact points assign each
passing element a PP into the area of operations and a route
that extends from the PPs to the rear boundary or assembly
area (in a rearward passage) or to the attack position (in a
forward passage).
· Ensure that representatives at the contact points exchange
required information with the passing unit as outlined in the
unit SOP. (NOTE: ST 3-20.983 lists examples of information
to be exchanged.)
· Position elements along the BHL where they have the best
possible observation of threat avenues of approach, adjusting
as necessary for limited visibility conditions.

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· If obstacles are emplaced between the FEBA and the BHL,


ensure that routes through the obstacle system are clearly
marked and physically controlled by guides or that escorts are
provided to the passing unit.
· Ensure that all routes of withdrawal obligated to the passing
unit are unobstructed and facilitate rapid movement to the RP.
· Ensure that obligated routes of advance, attack positions, and
routes to the BHL are clear and facilitate rapid movement.

PREPARATION
6-55. Units are particularly vulnerable during a passage of lines.
Personnel and subordinate elements may be concentrated, stationary unit
fires may be masked temporarily, and the passing unit may not be
disposed properly to react to threat action. Effective preparation is critical
in overcoming such conditions and ensuring that the passage proceeds
quickly and smoothly. The commander may task the reconnaissance
platoon with a number of missions, including detailed reconnaissance and
coordination, to assist him in preparing for the passage.

COORDINATION
6-56. Coordination occurs at a preplanned contact point where critical
information is exchanged and coordinated. Coordination for battle
handover normally flows from the commander out of contact to the
commander in contact. Coordination for the handover and for the passage
of lines should be conducted simultaneously.
6-57. The reconnaissance platoon leader plays a major role in
coordination for handover and passage of lines. He is responsible for
conducting coordination and reconnaissance to obtain information for use
by both the platoon and its parent unit. He then uses this information in
the coordination process.
6-58. During his reconnaissance, the platoon leader must confirm the
following battlefield factors and information:

· The disposition of the stationary force through which the


platoon and/or its parent unit must pass.
· The location of contact points where both units are required to
make physical contact at a predetermined time.
· The location of passage lanes that provide a clear route
through the stationary unit’s position to facilitate a smooth
and continuous passage. The areas selected for the passage
should be unoccupied or on the flanks of units in position. If
possible, the platoon leader should reconnoiter multiple
routes that can reduce vulnerability during the operation.
· The rear boundary or assembly area (in a rearward passage)
or the attack position (in a forward passage). This position
should provide cover and concealment and be located where
the passing unit will not interfere with the stationary unit.
· The initial locations for CS and CSS elements of the platoon’s
parent unit.

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6-59. Based on his reconnaissance, the platoon leader coordinates the


following information:

· Contact points (primary and alternate).


· Applicable PPs.
· Passage lanes, including the SP, RP, and critical points.
· The LD.
· Location and number of guides and guide vehicles.
· Routes through obstacles.
· Alternate routes.
· CSS plans, including resupply (Classes III and V),
maintenance, MEDEVAC and/or CASEVAC, and disposition
of EPWs.
· Traffic control factors, such as number of vehicles by type.
· Time of the passage.
· Rally points, the rear boundary or assembly area (rearward
passage), and/or the attack position (forward passage).
· Actions on contact if required during the passage.
· Times for transfer of responsibility for control of the sector
and for handover of the threat and BHL.
· Exchange of threat and friendly information.
· Fire support during the passage.
· Direct and indirect fire plans and obstacle plans.

NOTE: The parent unit commander may provide some of this information as part of his
order to the platoon.

ASSISTANCE TO THE COMMANDER


6-60. Given the capabilities of the reconnaissance platoon, many
commanders require the platoon to assist other units in the passage of
lines. Primarily, the platoon enhances the command and control function
for the commander. The platoon may be required to conduct one or more
of the critical tasks of a stationary or passing unit or may assist its parent
unit in the following ways:

· Elements of the platoon may assist in securing contact and


PPs where units will meet and pass.
· The platoon may reconnoiter possible passage lanes (primary
and alternate), clearing them of obstacles (within capability)
and marking their locations.
· The platoon may guide units from contact points to or through
passage lanes. The platoon may also control traffic at the PP
and in the lane.
· The platoon may conduct area reconnaissance of attack
positions (forward passage) and assembly area locations
(rearward passage). This may include a requirement to check
for NBC contamination.

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· Platoon elements may be positioned in the passage area to act


as a communications link in case units involved in the
passage have trouble communicating with each other.
· The platoon may assist the commander by occupying OPs or
conducting patrols to provide a continuous flow of information
about the threat situation.

CONDUCT OF THE PASSAGE


6-61. In a forward passage of lines, the platoon leader or unit
commander normally performs the coordination. For a rearward passage
of lines, the PSG or the commander’s liaison officer normally performs the
coordination. The stationary unit is responsible for designating PPs and
passage lanes and for providing guides. If contact points have not been
designated by higher headquarters, the stationary unit should coordinate
their locations with the passing unit. For ease of control, the passing
unit’s command group (TAC CP or main CP) temporarily collocates with
the stationary unit’s command group (TAC CP or main CP).
6-62. After coordination is made and the passage begins, guides pick up
the passing unit at the contact point or PP. Guides exchange recognition
signals with the passing unit and move it along the route(s) without
pausing, with the stationary unit overwatching the movement. Guides
leave the passing unit either at the RP or after it has passed the last
stationary unit position.
6-63. Disabled vehicles are recovered by self-recovery methods or by
organic recovery vehicles. The stationary unit provides the required
medical assistance, maintenance, and petroleum, oils, and lubricants
(POL) as far forward as possible. As a minimum, the stationary unit
should provide emergency medical support.

NBC CONSIDERATIONS
6-64. Because of potential congestion of units at PPs and along routes,
stationary and passing units must take protective measures against NBC
attack. Techniques to reduce vulnerability include the following:

· To minimize exposure time, passing units move as rapidly as


possible through PPs and along passage routes to their RPs.
· Passing and stationary units conduct radiological and
chemical monitoring.
· Stationary units disperse by posting one or two vehicles in
primary firing positions, with other vehicles in hide positions.
Elements in hide positions prepare for NBC attack.
· Passing and stationary units put on chemical-protective
clothing as prescribed by the commander.
· If required, the stationary unit requests assistance through
channels for decontamination of the passing unit Units
normally conduct operational decontamination and then move
to a rear assembly area for thorough decontamination. A
reconnaissance platoon does not have the internal assets for
thorough decontamination of personnel or equipment; it
requires assistance from a chemical defense company.

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FRATRICIDE AVOIDANCE
6-65. Since battle handover and passage of lines are usually conducted
in contact with the threat, extreme care must be taken to avoid fratricide.
Thorough coordination is critical; all units involved must know the correct
recognition signals as well as the exact number of vehicles and time of
passage. There will be times when some elements fail to receive necessary
information or when stragglers are unaware of the current operation.
Planning and coordination must cover the following considerations:

· Fratricide assessment.
· Vehicle marking systems.
· Navigational aids.
· Threat situation and composition.
· Obscuration (limited visibility).
· Identification friend or foe (IFF) expedients for ground forces.
· Effective SOPs.
· Direct fire plans for both units.
· Indirect fire considerations, including specific procedures for
requesting and clearing indirect fires.
· Communications procedures and potential problems.

6-66. For more detailed information concerning fratricide and risk


reduction measures, refer to Appendix H (risk management) and
Appendix I (fratricide prevention) of this manual.

SECTION IV – RELIEF IN PLACE

6-67. Relief in place is an operation in which one unit replaces another


unit in combat. It may be accomplished during offensive or defensive
operations. Its primary purpose is to sustain the combat effectiveness of
committed units. A relief may also be conducted to allow a relieved unit to
rest, reconstitute, or decontaminate or to change missions. For the
reconnaissance platoon, the relief operation may entail such tasks as
serving as road guides for the supported unit, performing liaison with the
relieved unit, or participating in the relief with its parent unit.
6-68. Relief in place is difficult to plan and conduct because of the
nature of the operation and the command, control, communications, and
coordination required. It is important that the operation not be disclosed
to the threat; security, secrecy, and speed are critical. Though the platoon
cannot always wait for optimum conditions, relief in place is best
conducted during periods of limited visibility and during lulls in battle.
Limited visibility may be achieved by using smoke to obscure the threat’s
vision. Using smoke over a large area can confuse the threat as to the
platoon’s actual location.
6-69. The relief must be conducted as quickly and as secretly as
possible. Relieving scouts must avoid sustaining casualties, hampering

6-17
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

the operation of the scouts being relieved, or allowing the threat to detect
the operation. To reduce confusion and maintain security, the incoming
platoon leader must attempt to obtain the following information:

· The time that responsibility for the sector or zone is to pass.


· OPSEC considerations.
· Deception plans.
· The time, method, and sequence of relief.
· Routes and critical control measures.
· Graphics for alternate and successive fighting positions.
· Contingency plans for changes of mission.
· Actions on threat contact, if required before completion of the
relief.
· Handover procedures for artillery and ADA.
· Obstacle locations and procedures covering the transfer of
responsibility.
· Procedures for transfer of ammunition, wire lines, POL, and
other items between outgoing and incoming units, if necessary.

6-70. Radio traffic must be kept to a minimum; light and noise


discipline must be strictly enforced. If possible, the relieving platoon
leader conducts a reconnaissance of the new positions. This is usually
accomplished with the relieved platoon leader.
6-71. Once the reconnaissance is complete and orders are finalized, the
platoon executes its mission. If it is participating in the relief, one of
several methods may be used:

· One vehicle at a time. This is the slowest, but most secure,


method.
· All vehicles simultaneously. This is the quickest, but least
secure, method.
· Occupying adjacent or in-depth positions that cover the same
area of responsibility.
· Exchange of vehicles and equipment. This is done when
secrecy is the overriding factor. This is the most difficult and
time-consuming method.

6-72. The actual relief in place can be conducted from a hide position
behind the relieved element, with individual relieving vehicles moving
forward. The relieving platoon can also occupy alternate positions within
the relieved element’s sector or zone. In some cases, the platoon may
move into the primary positions as soon as the relieved vehicles back out.
The relieved element may provide guides to ensure that relieving vehicles
can locate those they are replacing.
6-73. The most important transmission during the relief process is the
completion call to the incoming platoon’s commander. This is made when
the incoming platoon is fully set in position and is prepared to conduct its
next operation.

6-18
Chapter 7

Urban Operations

Throughout history, military


CONTENTS
planners have viewed cities as
centers of gravity and sources Understanding the Urban Environment ...... 7-1
Phases of Urban Operations ................ 7-1
of national strength. Cities Operational Considerations ................. 7-2
are population centers; Characteristics of the
transportation and commu- Urban Environment ............................ 7-3
nication hubs; key nodes of The Threat in the Urban Area ............... 7-5
industrial, financial, and Civil Considerations .............................. 7-7
Planning ........................................................ 7-7
information systems; seats of Collect and Analyze Existing
government; and repositories Intelligence ......................................... 7-8
of wealth. Because the US has Develop the Plan .................................... 7-11
worldwide interests that Execution ...................................................... 7-23
directly relate to global Approach the Urban Area
of Operations ...................................... 7-23
security, deployments into Employ Surveillance Teams ................. 7-23
urban environments are likely Conduct the Multidimensional
to become more frequent. Aspect of Reconnaissance ............... 7-53
Urban operations serve a Conduct Assessment of the
variety of tactical purposes: Area of Operations ............................. 7-62
End State ................................................ 7-63
· Neutralize or stabilize Support an Assault in
the Urban Area ................................... 7-63
extremely volatile
political situations.
· Defeat a threat force that has sought protection afforded by
urban terrain.
· Provide assistance to allies in need of support.

SECTION I – UNDERSTANDING THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT

7-1. The reconnaissance scout is the essential element in providing


friendly forces with real time information and in facilitating the
situational understanding they need to defeat the threat in the urban
environment. Cavalry squadrons (RSTA), with their recce platoons, are
specifically tailored to conduct the added multidimensional aspect of
reconnaissance operations in and around urban areas when the threat
level allows. Because of the increased likelihood of urban operations,
however, all reconnaissance platoons must understand how to operate in
this environment with varying threat levels.

PHASES OF URBAN OPERATIONS


7-2. This chapter focuses on the tools necessary for understanding the
urban environment and for planning and executing missions, including
reconnaissance, in the urban area. Table 7-1 summarizes the actions

7-1
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

involved in the planning, preparation, and execution phases of urban


reconnaissance.

Table 7-1. Phases of Urban Reconnaissance

PHASE ACTIONS
Collect and analyze existing intelligence
Planning
Develop the plan
Refine plan
Preparation
Rehearsals, PCI/PCC
Approach the urban area of operations
Execution Employ surveillance teams (mounted and/or dismounted)
Conduct reconnaissance *
Conduct assessment of the area of operations

* The multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance is also conducted in permissive and


semipermissive environments if executed by recce platoons or by reconnaissance
platoons augmented with supporting assets for this mission focus.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
7-3. Reconnaissance units conduct reconnaissance in urban
environments to gain critical information for the brigade or regiment. The
reconnaissance platoon must have a clear understanding of its
information requirements and how they relate to the higher
headquarters’ intent. The recce platoon may focus on using traditional
techniques of information-gathering, as well as such methods as
interaction with the society and tactical questioning. On the other hand,
CFV-mounted scouts may focus on the isolation of an urban area to
support an infantry assault in a high-threat environment. All
reconnaissance platoons, however, must be prepared to transition from
one extreme to another as the operational environment changes. No
matter the focus, the main goal of the platoon’s reconnaissance effort is to
provide the brigade or regiment with a thorough, accurate understanding
of the urban environment.
7-4. Crucial to planning operations in urban areas is the urban IPB.
Reconnaissance units must identify all relevant forces, along with their
strengths and critical vulnerabilities, and be able to identify the critical
nodes of the urban area that may provide tactical leverage when
controlled. The IPB effort must consider noncombatants, whose presence
in the urban area may be substantial and dynamic. Determining the
ethnic and religious composition of the population and, if possible, their
intent (for example, to flee or remain in the urban area) may prove
crucial. If combat operations in the urban area are necessary, the
platoon’s mission focuses on achieving informational and situational
understanding for the brigade/regiment. Among tasks the platoon may
perform for the brigade/regiment are determining trafficability of routes
and lateral routes, identifying subterranean entry points and systems,
developing communications architecture, and providing a C2 framework.

NOTE: Once the urban environment is understood, the brigade or regiment can begin its
urban operations. Refer to FM 3-90.3 (FM 71-3) for specifics on the brigade-level
framework.

7-2
___________________________________________________________ Chapter 7 – Urban Operations

7-5. During the preparation phase, the reconnaissance platoon will


determine reconnaissance objectives and conduct urban IPB; for more
information, refer to FM 2-01.3 (FM 34-130). To begin developing the
situation, the platoon will collect and analyze existing map and aerial
images (IMINT), as well as all available HUMINT (from such sources as
special operations forces [SOF] or the National Security Agency [NSA]).
Without proper preparation and planning, entering or operating within
an urban environment poses a significant threat to reconnaissance
soldiers. The urban environment and the threat must be thoroughly
analyzed before reconnaissance operations begin. This discussion
describes characteristics unique to the urban environment and the threat,
as well as considerations that the platoon must take into account during
planning and preparation.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT


7-6. Although each operational environment encountered by the
reconnaissance platoon has its own distinct characteristics, urban areas
are the most complex. There are two primary factors that influence the
complexity of urban operations. One is the man-made terrain and
supporting infrastructure, which is covered later in this discussion. The
other factor is the density of noncombatants in close proximity to combat
forces. Of these two key urban factors, noncombatants and the human
dimension are the most important and, potentially, the most confusing to
reconnaissance units. HUMINT, which focuses on gaining an
understanding of how the local populace feels toward friendly and threat
forces, is a major part of the RSTA squadron effort. The HUMINT process
is discussed later in this chapter and in the discussion in Chapter 3
covering the multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance.

PHYSICAL ASPECTS OF THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT


7-7. Urban terrain presents tactical and operational challenges in an
extraordinary mix of horizontal, vertical, interior, exterior, and
subterranean settings. Four aspects of this physical dimension merit
special consideration.

Airspace Over the City


7-8. Airspace provides a rapid avenue of approach into the urbanized
area. While aviation assets are unaffected by obstacles such as rubble,
they must consider towers, signs, power lines, and other obstructions to
flight. Scouts can locate these obstructions, determine how they can serve
as passive air defense measures, and provide a hazards overlay for the
UAV platoon and other aviation assets. The platoon can also identify and
mark potential PZs/LZs.

Buildings (Super-Surface)
7-9. Buildings provide cover and concealment, limit or enhance fields
of fire, and restrict or block movement of ground forces. Scouts must
identify buildings that serve as key terrain (for example, as
communications nodes or dominant vantage points) throughout the urban
area. Rooftops must be considered a separate and unique threat.
Whenever possible, TUAV or aviation reconnaissance of rooftops should
be employed to identify threats and to assist in preempting threat action.

7-3
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Streets (Surface)
7-10. Streets afford avenues of approach and are the primary means for
rapid ground movement in an urban area. Forces traveling along streets,
however, are often canalized by buildings and have little space for
maneuver off of the main thoroughfares. The reconnaissance platoon
must identify trafficability of streets (lateral and parallel) within the area
of operations. This includes determining width and weight capabilities of
streets and the limitations of bridges, culverts, and overpasses
throughout the urban area to assist follow-on forces in planning.

Subterranean Systems (Subsurface)


7-11. Subterranean systems can easily be employed as avenues of
approach and supply routes for dismounted elements. Friendly forces
must identify subways, sewers, cellars, and utility systems in the urban
area; they must also develop an understanding of how the threat may use
these systems to conduct ambushes, counterattacks, infiltration, and
sustainment operations. Entrances and exits to subterranean areas
should be mapped as part of an overlay.

“Most of the buildings in the city are equipped with concrete


basements. We used to hide there during the first war. Sometimes we
lived there for weeks. Many of the cellars are equipped with a water
supply. We kept food stocks there and some of the citizens even had
electric generators.”
Zumrud Alieva, refugee who fled Grozny, Russia (Chechnya)

TYPES OF URBAN TERRAIN


7-12. The urban area is classified into six types of urban terrain. For
more information, refer to FM 2-01.3 (FM 34-130).

Dense, Random Construction


7-13. Dense, random construction is typical of the old inner-city pattern
with narrow, winding streets radiating from a central area in an irregular
manner. Buildings are located close together and frequently close to the
edge of a roadway.

Closed-Orderly Block
7-14. This type of city block typically has wider streets that form
rectangular patterns. The buildings frequently form a continuous front
along the blocks. Inner-block courtyards are common.

Dispersed Residential Area


7-15. Normally adjacent to closed-orderly block areas in Europe, this
pattern consists of row houses or single-family dwellings with yards, gardens,
trees, and fences. Street patterns are normally rectangular or curving.

High-Rise Area
7-16. High-rise areas are typical of modern construction in larger cities
and towns. This terrain consists of multistory apartments, separated open
areas, and single-story buildings. Wide streets are laid out in rectangular
patterns. These areas are often adjacent to industrial or transportation
areas or interspersed with closed-orderly block areas.

7-4
___________________________________________________________ Chapter 7 – Urban Operations

Industrial-Transportation
7-17. This terrain is generally located on or along major rail and
highway routes in urban complexes. Older complexes may be located
within dense, random construction or closed-orderly block areas. New
construction normally consists of low, flat-roofed factory and warehouse
buildings. In the Orient, high-rise areas providing worker housing are
normally located adjacent to industrial-transportation complexes.
Identification of transportation facilities within these areas is critical.
These facilities, especially rail facilities, pose significant obstacles to
military movement.

Permanent or Fixed Fortifications and Other Military Installations


7-18. This classification covers several different types of terrain.
Prominent examples include isolated forts such as the Hue Citadel, the
German fortifications that surrounded Metz, and structures that form
part of a fortified line (such as the Siegfried and Maginot lines). While
most such fortifications are found in Western Europe, a number can be
found in the Balkans, Middle East, Asia, Africa, and South America.
Those in the United States were mostly used for coastal defense.
Permanent-type fortifications can be made of earth, wood, rock, brick,
concrete, steel-reinforced concrete, or a combination. Some recent
variants have been built underground and employ heavy tank or warship
armor, major caliber and other weapons, internal communications,
service facilities, and NBC overpressure systems. This category also
includes urban-area military installations such as Camp Lejeune, Fort
Huachuca, Travis Air Force Base, and Norfolk Navy Base.

THE THREAT IN THE URBAN AREA


7-19. Trends indicate increasing availability and integration of
sophisticated technology and unorthodox operational approaches by
potential opponents in urban operations. To offset their inherent
weaknesses, threat forces will seek the advantage in urban and complex
terrain by remaining dispersed and decentralized; they will adapt their
tactics to most effectively counter the response of US forces and their
allies.

ORGANIZATIONS AND CAPABILITIES


7-20. In addition to conventional forces, the threat in urban areas may
include the following:

· Unconventional forces.
· Paramilitary forces.
· Militia and special police organizations.
· Organized criminal organizations.

7-21. These forces employ the full range of military ordnance and
organizations, from small arms, mortars, machine guns, antiarmor
weapons, and mines to very capable mechanized and armored forces
equipped with current-generation equipment. The threat uses these
various approaches to counter the technological and numerical
advantages of US and allied systems and forces. In addition, threat forces
seek to exploit constraints placed on US forces because of cultural bias,

7-5
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

media presence, ROE/ROI, and distance from the crisis location. Urban
environments also provide many passive dangers such as psychological
stresses and disease from unsanitary conditions.
7-22. The most dangerous potential opponents will remain those who
have the capacity to prosecute full-scale combat actions escalating to
MTW operations. These threat forces will employ weapons of mass
destruction wherever possible. Such organizations as SOF, state-
controlled terrorist elements, paramilitary units, and guerilla forces will
be a part of a strategy of simultaneous, distributed operations both inside
and outside the area of operations. Mines and unexploded ordnance will
be used to demoralize and hamper US forces.

“We have seen amazing things in Grozny. The guerrillas were hiding
in pits covered by reinforced concrete plates camouflaged under
masses of rubbish. They lifted the plates with jacks and shot at us.
When our attack jets appeared, the bandits drew the plate down.
Sometimes they let us pass over them and then (jumped out and) hit
our backs.”
Pavel, a 21-year-old Russian soldier wounded in Grozny

THREAT TACTICS
7-23. While the nature of active threats will vary widely among specific
urban areas, many principles and techniques will be common to all such
elements. This discussion examines several operational and tactical
tenets that may be used against US forces in the urban environment.

Use the Local Populace to Best Advantage


7-24. The populace of a given urban area represents a form of key
terrain; the side that manages it best has a distinct advantage. Threat
forces will use the population to provide camouflage, concealment, and
deception for their operations. Guerilla and terrorist elements will look no
different from other members of the community. Even conventional and
paramilitary forces will often adopt a civilian look to confuse friendly
forces. The civilian populace can also actively provide cover for threat
forces, enhancing their mobility in proximity to US positions.
7-25. Threat forces will take advantage of moral responsibilities of US
and allies units, attempting to make the civilian populace a burden on the
friendly forces’ logistical and force protection resources. Local residents
will also serve as a key intelligence source for threat forces, which will
attempt to use civilians with access to US bases or perimeters to gain
information on friendly dispositions, readiness, and intent.

Win the Information War


7-26. Threat forces will take advantage of presence of the media to turn
the sentiments of the civilian populace other countries against US forces.
Print and broadcast reporters and photographers, video cameras,
Internet web sites, and cellular telephones are examples of tools the
threat will use to influence popular opinion.

7-6
___________________________________________________________ Chapter 7 – Urban Operations

Manipulate Key Facilities


7-27. Threat forces will identify key facilities and then use them to
shape the area of operations in their favor. Examples of facilities that the
threat will target to gain a position of advantage against US forces
include telecommunication sites, water treatment plants, and power
generation and transmission sites.

Use All Dimensions of the Physical Environment


7-28. Threat forces will take advantage of every aspect of the urban
environment to attack US forces. Rooftops and tall buildings afford
vantage points and ambush positions that exceed the maximum elevation
capability of many friendly weapon systems. Elevated attack positions
allow the threat to strike vehicles at their most vulnerable points and to
use enfilading fire against exposed dismounted soldiers. Basements and
other subterranean areas provide covered and concealed positions that
allow movement and access throughout the area of operations. Many of
these positions will be below the minimum depression capability of
friendly vehicles and weapons.

CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS
7-29. The reconnaissance platoon must determine what civil
considerations its higher headquarters will encounter through the
multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance. Information requirements
when the platoon is assigned a multidimensional focus include the
following:

· Political affiliations and grievances.


· Ethnicity.
· Factions.
· Cultural distinctions.
· Living conditions.
· Religious beliefs.
· Attitude toward US forces (friendly, neutral, hostile).

7-30. Analyzing the information gained on the civilian populace will be


an important factor in determining COAs for the higher headquarters.
The platoon leader analyzes the information collected and assesses what
actions are necessary to control the impact of civilians. Options that the
platoon leader can recommend to higher headquarters include screening
of civilians, prohibition of unauthorized movement, diversion or control of
refugee movements, and evacuation.

SECTION II – PLANNING

NOTE: As shown in Table 7-1, the planning phase entails two key actions, which are
examined in detail in this section:
· Collect and analyze existing intelligence.
· Develop the plan.

7-7
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

COLLECT AND ANALYZE EXISTING INTELLIGENCE


7-31. During the planning phase, the reconnaissance platoon leader
assesses his assigned reconnaissance objectives and conduct urban IPB.
The platoon collects and analyzes existing intelligence, including map and
aerial images (IMINT) and HUMINT, to begin developing the situation.
The platoon begins mapping of the urban area in the planning phase.

URBAN MAPPING
7-32. Before entering an urban environment, reconnaissance units
develop urban operations sketches. These reconnaissance products,
usually created as overlays, serve several purposes. The sketches are an
important supplement to existing maps, which in most cases do not show
the level of detail necessary for effective situational awareness. They
allow the platoon leader to track his elements with greater accuracy and
to give precise location updates to higher headquarters. (NOTE: If such
materials are not available from other sources, the platoon may be
required to produce a sketch and hand it over to higher headquarters for
use by all leaders and soldiers taking part in the operation.)
7-33. In developing urban operations sketches and overlays, the platoon
should attempt to gain access to city planner or civil engineer maps,
which provide detailed information of the urban area. This information is
usually requested and obtained through a higher headquarters. The
platoon then conducts initial map and aerial photograph reconnaissance
to pinpoint key terrain and other important locations in the area of
operations. Figure 7-1 shows an example of this photo reconnaissance,
which focuses on areas such as the following:

· Sites that may serve as potential safe havens for threat forces,
including the following:
n Hospitals.
n Police stations.
n Embassies.
n Other facilities that are nominally friendly, but that could
harbor threat elements.
· Hazardous areas, such as the following:
n Construction sites.
n Dangerous intersections.
n Bridges.
n Areas of criminal activity.
· Major terrain features, including the following:
n Parks.
n Industrial complexes.
n Airports.
n Power plants and/or power distribution facilities.
n Dams.
n Water treatment plants.

7-8
___________________________________________________________ Chapter 7 – Urban Operations

CITY HALL

HOSPITAL

Figure 7-1. Initial Photo Reconnaissance in Urban Operations

REFINING THE DATA


7-34. Once this basic reconnaissance is completed, the platoon uses the
available maps and photographs to refine the information and translate it
into a form that can be transferred to the urban operations sketch. This
process includes incorporating a reference system to identify buildings
and streets. Naming and numbering conventions should be simple (for
example, odd-numbered buildings on the left side of the street, even
numbers on the right side) to allow for ease of navigation and orientation
in the urban environment. Street names should not be used as references
as the signs can be missing or changed to confuse friendly forces. The
naming and numbering conventions should be standardized in the unit
SOP to ensure everyone involved understands the procedure.
7-35. Graphic control measures are added, and sites of tactical and
operations significance are identified (see Figure 7-2). The platoon leader
can then use the accumulated information to develop a detailed urban
operations sketch, as illustrated in Figure 7-3. He must ensure that the
sketches the platoon develops and uses are consistent with those used at
troop and squadron level. In addition, the platoon leader may develop one
or more types of operational overlays based on the information that has
been collected. Examples of these overlays, illustrated in Figure 7-4,
include terrain conditions, likely threat positions, and subterranean
infrastructure.

7-9
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

7-36. The sketches and overlays are distributed both within the unit
and to higher and adjacent elements. Because individual vehicles and
squads may have to execute operations on their own, the platoon leader
must ensure that every soldier has an understanding of the sketches and
overlays and of the reference system used to show information on them.
As the platoon conducts operations in the urban area, it confirms the
accuracy of the sketches and overlays, adding more detail as necessary.

HOME
HOM E OF
OF MOUNTED
MOU NTED W
WAR
ARFARE
FAR
FAREE

XXI
US A ARM O R CE NTER

CITY
HALL
33
17
PL CHAR LIE
15
31 12
13
10
D
RE

K 11
8
RT

29

9 PL BRAVO
27 6 ADA
25 7
4
K
5
23
2
21
TE
HI

PL ALPHA
W

3
HO SPITAL
RT

RT BLUE

Figure 7-2. Refinement of Urban Operations Photo Reconnaissance

U RB A N SK ETCH
GOAL: HANDOFF T HE URBAN
SK E T C H T O B D E FO R U SE D O W N T O
S Q D LEV E L T O A SS IST IN C 2
BRID G E – C L AS S 70

P L C H A R L IE

33 17
14 C ITY
HALL

15
12
31 13
10
29
8 11
27

9 PL B R A V O
6
25
4 7
ADA
23 5
RTE WHITE
RTE RED

RTE BLUE

PL A L PH A
21 2 H O S P ITA L
3
1

Figure 7-3. Urban Operations Sketch

7-10
___________________________________________________________ Chapter 7 – Urban Operations

Figure 7-4. Urban Operations Overlays (Terrain Classification, Top Left;


Threat Positions and Demonstration Locations, Top Right;
Subterranean Infrastructure, Bottom)

7-11
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

DEVELOP THE PLAN


INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
7-37. HUMINT collection begins with the platoon obtaining all
available information, including data from internal military forces and
SOF. In particular, the platoon gathers information on locations of
reliable sources near the urban area that can be used to gain the most
current situation within the area of operations. In diverse multiethnic
areas, it is important for platoon soldiers to have an understanding of
how the different segments of the local populace will react to them during
the course of operations.

Operational Considerations
7-38. Using his sources, the platoon leader identifies the best approach
route into the urban area, locations or obstacles to be avoided,
information sources within the urban area, and any other specific areas of
interest. The use of tactical questioning is an invaluable skill in
validating the information from HUMINT sources. For additional details,
refer to the discussion of HUMINT collection in Chapter 3 of this manual.
7-39. After analyzing the higher commander’s mission and intent, the
platoon leader determines how to gain the information required within its
area of operations. The platoon will use a combination of stealth,
HUMINT, and IMINT, when available, to develop the urban situation.
The information-gathering process is conducted progressively from
outside the urban area to inside the urban area. As information is gained
from the outer ring of the area of operations, the focus of the collection
plan is updated and reconnaissance and surveillance objectives within the
urban area are refined. It is essential that reconnaissance units
continuously maintain situational awareness; the urban situation can
change quickly, leading to compromise or attack. The platoon continues to
collect and corroborate information as it approaches the urban area.

Collection Methods
7-40. The platoon leader then determines whether to use
reconnaissance and/or surveillance to gather information on or in the
objective areas.
7-41. Reconnaissance. If the platoon leader conducts reconnaissance
operations, he must then decide on the movement technique used to enter
and move within the urban area. He makes this decision based on METT-
TC. Mounted or dismounted patrols are used in conjunction with
available surveillance assets, such as TUAVs or the RSTA squadron’s
surveillance troop, to gain information required by the mission. The air
and ground reconnaissance plans must be synchronized to be effective.
(NOTE: Urban patrols are discussed later in this chapter.) Although
reconnaissance elements can use stealth during limited visibility, the
human density within an urban area makes it difficult for these assets to
remain undetected.
7-42. Surveillance. When stealth is required, the platoon uses
surveillance to collect information on or in objectives. Locating
surveillance positions within the urban area requires thorough planning
to ensure that teams are not compromised and that the platoon can assist
in extraction if necessary. Communications are of vital importance to the

7-12
___________________________________________________________ Chapter 7 – Urban Operations

surveillance team; therefore, redundancy must be incorporated into the


collection plan. Other essential security considerations for the team
include exfiltration routes, immediate support (direct or indirect fires),
and evasion corridors. The duration of the surveillance mission must also
be considered for sustainment of the team, covering such requirements as
food, water, and batteries.
7-43. Surveillance positions should be placed in low-activity areas and
occupied during limited visibility to reduce possibility of compromise. The
selection of the hide site and surveillance site(s) is METT-TC dependent.
Considerations for site selection are the following:

· Can the team place the designated surveillance target(s)


under continuous and effective observation within the range
of surveillance devices to be used?
· Will the surveillance site have to be moved if weather and
light conditions change?
· Does the area provide concealment and entrance and exit
routes?
· Are there dominant or unusual terrain features nearby?
· Is the area wet? Is there adequate drainage? Is the area prone
to flooding?
· Is the site in a location the threat would want to occupy?
· Is the site silhouetted against the skyline or a contrasting
background?
· Are there roads or trails nearby?
· Are there other natural lines of movement nearby (gullies,
draws, any terrain easy for foot movement)?
· Could the team be easily trapped in the site?
· Are there any nearby obstacles that could impede or prevent
vehicle movement (roadside ditch, fence, wall, stream, river)?
· Are there any inhabited areas in the prevailing downwind
area?
· Are there any suitable communication sites nearby?
· Is the site in the normal line of vision of threat personnel in
the area?
· Is there a source of water in the area?

Infiltration
7-44. Depending on the mission and the information gained initially,
the platoon may have to conduct infiltration using surveillance teams to
observe areas of interest or conduct target acquisition. Plans for
infiltration are based on the requirement for conducting movement to the
area of operations with the least risk of detection. Infiltration
considerations are the following:

· Concealed primary or alternate routes are selected based on


detailed map reconnaissance, aerial photographs, ground
reconnaissance, and threat information from other sources.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

· Infiltrating elements must avoid obstacles, populated areas,


silhouetting locations, threat positions, main avenues of
approach, and movement on heavily populated routes and
trails.
· Infiltration should be during periods of reduced visibility and
reduced threat alertness. This is especially important in
critical phases such as moving through populated areas.
· Scouts must know routes, rally points (primary/alternate),
time schedules, danger areas, and the threat situation. These
are critical to an optimum balance of speed and stealth.
· The team should be provided with centralized coordination to
ensure that all scouts are acting in accordance with cover and
deception plans. Infiltration by land is characterized by
centralized planning and decentralized execution.

Exfiltration
7-45. The principles of route selection, movement formations, and
movement security are observed during movement to the extraction site.
Exfiltration considerations are the following:

· The amount of time that a team remains in the urban area of


operations depends on its mission, composition, and
equipment. The exfiltration is critical from a standpoint of
morale and mission accomplishment. Plans for extraction are
made before the operation, along with alternate plans for
contingencies such as the evacuation of sick or injured
personnel. During the mission, the team leader may be faced
with an unforeseen situation that may demand the utmost
flexibility, discipline, and leadership.
· Each team is given code words in the OPORD for use during
exfiltration. For example, one code word may mean that the
team is at its pickup zone. Another may mean that both the
primary and alternate pickup zones are compromised and to
abort the extraction.
· When a team has missed a certain number of required
transmissions, the command assumes that the team has a
communications problem, is in trouble, or both. At that time,
a no-communication resupply and exfiltration plan is used.
· Exfiltration of the team may be by means other than linkup
with the team’s vehicles. The OPORD may specify
dismounted exfiltration or linkup with friendly forces in an
offensive operation. Any of these means may also be planned
as alternatives in the event the team cannot be extracted by
its vehicles or must take action to avoid capture.
· Teams must be trained in exfiltration techniques so they can
walk out singly or in groups.

NOTE: Infiltration and exfiltration are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3 of this
manual.

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___________________________________________________________ Chapter 7 – Urban Operations

VEHICLE CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS


7-46. Urban combat operations are usually conducted by the infantry,
with reconnaissance assets providing support. Reconnaissance platoons
equipped with CFVs can be employed in built-up areas to assist
dismounted forces in seizing and clearing streets and buildings.
Reconnaissance platoons equipped with the HMMWV or RV may operate
within the urban area in a permissive environment. Once the operational
environment escalates to combat operations, however, these elements do
not normally operate inside the built-up area because of their lack of
armor protection; they may be used to secure the avenues of approach
around the perimeter of the area and to support isolation. The CFV,
HMMWV, and RV can provide limited suppressive fires for the initial
infantry assault on the built-up area during combat operations.

CFV Capabilities
7-47. The CFV has these capabilities related to urban operations:
· It is armed with the 25-mm cannon and 7.62-mm coax
machine gun.
· It is capable of 60-degree elevation, allowing it to engage
targets on the upper floors of tall buildings.
· It can employ 25-mm AP or HE ammunition to penetrate
buildings.
· It provides armor protection for crew and passengers.
· It is equipped with multiple FM radios.
· It can assist in MEDEVAC/CASEVAC operations.
· It can assist in resupply operations.

CFV Limitations
7-48. The CFV has these vulnerabilities related to urban operations:
· It is restricted primarily to streets and lacks maneuverability
inside built-up areas.
· There is dead space around the CFV into which the vehicle
cannot fire its weapons.
· It is vulnerable to enemy infantry firing antiarmor weapons
from cellars and drains.
· It is dependent on dismounts for all-around protection.

HMMWV and RV Capabilities


7-49. The HMMWV and the RV have these capabilities related to urban
operations:

· They are armed with the caliber .50 heavy machine gun
and/or the MK-19 40-mm machine gun with automatic
grenade launcher.
· They can suppress and destroy light armor vehicles.
· They are highly mobile and have a small thermal signature.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

· They are equipped with multiple FM radios.


· They present fewer logistical problems than the CFV.
· They can operate on narrow streets.

HMMWV and RV Limitations


7-50. The HMMWV and the RV have these vulnerabilities related to
urban operations:

· They provide armor protection only against small arms.


· The HMMWV lacks the ability to transport infantry soldiers.
· They have no antiarmor capability.

COMMUNICATIONS
7-51. In the urban environment, effective communications require
detailed planning. Because of the effects of urban terrain, the
reconnaissance platoon leader must plan for redundant communications
that will allow the platoon freedom of movement. In simplest terms, to
communicate effectively and continuously, he must minimize the
limitations imposed by the urban environment and maximize the
advantages of existing civil communications. The platoon should follow
this general rule: If you cannot communicate where you are, move
until you can.
7-52. The first step is to identify terrain along the approach route and
in the urban area of operations that supports line of sight (LOS)
communications. Man-made structures can create problems for single-
channel radios; they may inhibit LOS radio communications by absorbing
or reflecting transmitted signals. One solution is to establish
retransmission (retrans) sites on supporting terrain or structures to
facilitate C2 during the platoon’s initial entry into the urban area. The
platoon will continue to identify structures within the urban area that
can support retrans sites as it moves within the area of operations. If
retrans teams are not available, unit vehicles must position themselves to
maintain communications with all elements. TUAV retrans capabilities
should be requested and coordinated for redundancy; the platoon should
also plan to request and coordinate use of aviation assets for C2 and
retrans if available.
7-53. At the same time, the urban environment may have exploitable
advantages such as the availability of electrical power and commercial
telecommunications networks. Electrical power generation stations and
other emergency power systems are normally found in protected
structures and are probably usable. Enclosed areas offer excellent
concealment and protection of communications and other C2 support
equipment. Extensive commercial communications networks composed of
miles of protected underground cable connecting central telephone
exchanges are likely to be available, as are numerous types of public
service radio nets (such as those used for police, fire, civil defense, and
taxi radios). These systems have existing antennas and retransmission
stations.

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___________________________________________________________ Chapter 7 – Urban Operations

HELICOPTER SUPPORT
Attack Helicopters
7-54. Reconnaissance platoons may receive support from a variety of
attack and armed reconnaissance helicopters, ranging from AH-64s to
lightly armed but agile OH-58Ds. Regardless of the specific type of attack
helicopter available, the inherent flexibility of Army aviation units allows
them to accomplish the same missions and tasks in a variety of
situations. Because of the increased risk of small arms and MANPADS
engagements, aviation forces normally support urban operations by
operating away from built-up areas; their key role usually is isolation of
the objective. If risk analysis determines that the payoff is higher than
the risk, however, aviation forces can be employed in and around the
urban area.
7-55. Primary Missions. The most common missions assigned to
attack helicopters during urban operations are the following:

· Escort troop-carrying aircraft during air assaults.


· Conduct overwatch and support attacks integrated with the
ground commander’s maneuver.
· Interdict and destroy threat armored vehicles moving against
friendly forces.
· Isolate urban objectives.
· Conduct reconnaissance.
· Conduct security operations for friendly locations.
· Conduct convoy escort.
· Conduct precision engagement of hardened point targets.
· Participate in show of force operations.
· Escort mission aircraft during noncombatant evacuation
operations (NEO).

7-56. Other Missions. In addition to their primary missions,


helicopters may be called upon to perform additional, nontraditional roles
during urban operations. This is particularly true during stability
operations and support operations in urban areas. These additional
missions may include the following:

· Provide assistance for limited periods in the control and


coordination of fires in support of the maneuver of ground
forces.
· Provide limited relay of radio messages from isolated ground
units.
· Identify and/or mark specific buildings and areas using
smoke, fires, or targeting lasers.
· Videotape routes or objectives for later analysis by ground
commanders.
· Provide navigational and directional assistance to ground
units.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

· Provide limited area illumination using infrared or white


light from either on-board sources or illumination rockets.
· Conduct armed reconnaissance patrol operations around
friendly unit locations to provide countersniper and
countermortar support.

7-57. Weapons Limitations. Urban terrain limits the effectiveness of


weapons employment in a number of ways, including the following:

· The short arming and/or slant ranges available in the urban


area may limit employment and effectiveness of helicopter
weapons. Precision weapons, such as TOW and Hellfire
missiles, require a minimum range of about 500 meters to
reliably arm and stabilize on the intended target. Often, fire
from longer ranges actually improves accuracy.
· In urban structures, the shaped charge of the Hellfire
produces less damage and overpressurization than the TOW’s
high explosive (HE) round. Window engagements are
generally not recommended, since the missile will usually
strike the far wall of the structure, expending its blast energy
away from the structure. Missile impact on the facing
structure will normally cause overpressurization inside that
structure (in the vicinity of impact) as well as secondary
fragmentation of wood/concrete, which can neutralize or stun
occupants in the vicinity of the impact.
· Extensive use of precision weapons by several units in close
proximity may cause coordination problems in terms of target
identification and designation.
· The laser designation capability of either ground or aerial
systems may be degraded by the large expanses of polished,
flat reflective surfaces common in many urban areas. In
addition, high volumes of smoke and dust, associated with
burning buildings and other conditions of urban combat, can
hinder accurate laser designation, a necessity in precision
engagements.
· Aircraft cannon fire against buildings can be devastating. It
provides excellent suppression and can drive threat forces
away from firing positions or fix them in place until ground
maneuver forces can destroy them. On the other hand, threat
forces often are able to quickly reoccupy positions that have
been struck by fire. In addition, it is common for aircraft-fired
rounds to ricochet off urban structures, causing additional
collateral damage and posing danger to nearby friendly forces.
· Target identification and marking may be difficult because of
heavy smoke and dust rising from urban fires and explosions.
Some smoke from fires in industrial areas may be highly toxic
or irritating. Pilots may have to don chemical protective
equipment that hinders target detection and engagement.
Friendly unit locations and personnel can be marked with
colored panels, glint tape, strobe lights, and colored smoke.
Targets can be marked with infrared laser pointers (such as
the GCP-1 ground commander pointer/illuminator), colored

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___________________________________________________________ Chapter 7 – Urban Operations

M203 smoke rounds, M203 or mortar flares burning on the


ground, or tracer fires. In some situations, improvised
spotlights can also be used.
· Although firing from stationary positions is more accurate,
running fire is normally safer for the aircraft because of
threat ground fires. If possible, ground commanders should
avoid directing pilots along a gun-target line that passes over
friendly troops.
· Aircraft-fired 2.75-inch rockets with HE warheads (area fire)
have a burst radius in excess of 50 meters; they are effective
in destroying structures, thin-skinned vehicles, and ADA
positions and in damaging and/or breaching concrete and
wood structures. When fired in pairs or more, however, the
rockets have a large dispersion pattern and can pose problems
in terms of accuracy and fratricide.

Assault and Lift Helicopters


7-58. The reconnaissance platoon may receive support from a variety of
assault and/or lift helicopters, most commonly the UH-60 and CH-47.
These assets can be crucial to effective C2 and in the flexible and
responsive movement of troops and supplies.
7-59. Primary Missions. The most common missions assigned to
assault and/or lift helicopters during urban operations are the following:

· Conduct air assault operations.


· Conduct casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) and/or MEDEVAC
operations.
· Conduct air movement of troops and supplies.
· Emplace logistical resupply points.
· Conduct C2 operations.
· Conduct NEOs.

7-60. Other Missions. In addition to their primary missions, assault


and lift helicopters may be called upon during urban operations to
perform additional, nontraditional roles, including some that require
special mission equipment. These additional missions may include the
following:

· Conduct EW operations.
· Conduct combat search and rescue (CSAR) operations.
· Emplace Volcano minefields.
· Emplace large and/or heavy obstacles (such as abandoned
vehicles or concrete dividers).

7-61. Aircraft Limitations. The need to deliver hovering fires from


temporary BPs may require the aircraft to carry less than a full load of
munitions or fuel. This is especially true in hot climates and high
altitudes. Reduced loads mean more frequent trips to forward area refuel
and rearm points (FARP) and less time on station. In addition, long route

7-19
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

distances during air movements may require the establishment of FARPs


along the route prior to operations. Climate will also affect the number of
troops and/or amount of supplies the aircraft can transport.

Command and Support Relationships


7-62. From the ground unit perspective, helicopters are most effective
when they operate under OPCON of the ground unit commander or
leader located closest to the threat force. Normally, the RSTA squadron is
the lowest level granted formal OPCON of helicopters. During attack
helicopter operations, however, the squadron commander is rarely able to
identify the precise location of threat forces or to coordinate aerial fires
with friendly squad and platoon maneuver. He often must pass the
responsibility for close coordination of attack helicopter fires to the troop
commander or platoon leader on the scene. Generally, the smaller and
more decentralized the combat actions, the better it is to have armed
aircraft coordinate directly with the small-unit leader on the ground.
7-63. On the other hand, the ground maneuver leader can effectively
direct only a few aircraft at a time. In larger, more centralized combat
actions, aviation headquarters will usually find it advantageous to retain
control of armed aircraft. It may be more effective for the aviation unit to
retain control of its individual aircraft and operate by continuously
rotating attack helicopter elements into the battle area where they then
coordinate their attacks with the ground commander’s maneuver.
7-64. Whichever command and support relationship is chosen, both the
ground leader and the aviation headquarters must understand what is
expected of each other. Close liaison and clear, concise oral
communications are important.

NOTE: For a further discussion of aviation support and capabilities, refer to Chapter 8 of
this manual.

FIRE SUPPORT
7-65. The reconnaissance platoon leader must plan for employment of
indirect fires in the urban area of operations. Mortar fires are best suited
for urban environments because of their availability to the platoon and
their high-angle trajectory, which reduces the effect of tall buildings and
other structures. The platoon should coordinate for targets that will
support disengagement from unexpected contact. Mortars also will
produce less collateral damage than higher-caliber weapon systems.
7-66. The platoon must also be prepared to employ precision-guided
munitions from other sources, including Army artillery and joint and
allied military services. This may entail either use of laser or IR
designator equipment or special augmentation. The platoon leader must
ensure that no fire areas (NFA) are placed on all surveillance positions
and that CFZs are coordinated along reconnaissance routes. Fire support
considerations for urban operations include, but are not limited to, the
following:

· Determine who controls each fire support asset.


· Exchange fire plans and observer plans with adjacent units.

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___________________________________________________________ Chapter 7 – Urban Operations

· Develop the observer plan to include OPs in buildings,


location of laser designators, and overwatch of trigger points.
· Identify locations of hazardous sites, both above and below
ground, including fuel and industrial storage tanks, gas
distribution lines, and any other area where incendiary effects
of detonating artillery and mortar rounds will start fires.
· Identify the general construction or composition of buildings
and road surfaces in the area of operations. (NOTE: This
may affect the type of munitions used.)
· Determine where building masking, overhead power lines, or
towers may degrade GPS and compass functioning.
· Determine whether use of obscurants and illumination will
favor friendly units or the threat.
· Determine whether buildings or structures will require fire
support personnel to carry/use equipment not normally
carried (for example, field expedient antennas, climbing rope,
wire gloves, axes, or sledgehammers).
· Determine the requirements for radar coverage. Do radar
zones need to be established? If so, where and for how long?

7-67. In addition to the use of conventional munitions, precision-guided


munitions (PGM) must also be carefully considered. The biggest
consideration in using PGMs is that some sort of laser or IR designator
equipment must be available. If these assets are not available, personnel
augmentation may be required.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT


Resupply
7-68. To preclude compromise, surveillance teams may carry required
supplies into the urban environment on their vehicles, allowing them to
avoid unnecessary movement in the area of operations. Some missions,
however, may require additional supplies that cannot be carried on the
vehicles. Resupply operations for deployed surveillance teams are
planned and coordinated during the planning phase.
7-69. When resupply is required, a drop point is established. It should
be well away from the hide site and the surveillance site, but in a position
that is available to all teams. Caches should be used in these instances.
Units should standardize the contents of caches so all teams understand
what is available. Example items to be carried in the cache include the
following:

· Emergency Class I items.


· Batteries (for radios, NVDs, and other devices).
· Class VIII items, to include intravenous (IV) bags.
· Nonsensitive mission-specific items.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Maintenance
7-70. In the urban area of operations, self-recovery within the platoon
will be necessary. Vehicles should have a towbar or towing cables and
shackles attached and configured for immediate recovery. A secured
maintenance collection point outside the urban area is identified by the
troop or the supported unit during planning and is then coordinated with
the squadron/battalion for maintenance support. All vehicle crews must
know this location.

Medical
7-71. Organic medical support in the reconnaissance platoon is limited
to self aid and buddy aid. Due to the remote deployment of teams,
primary medical care is not readily available. Scouts should receive
combat lifesaver and emergency medical technician training.
7-72. Additional medical support is requested as needed. When
possible, medical evacuation of team members is delayed until the whole
team is evacuated from the area of operations. Wounded team members
are sent directly to the nearest medical facility that can provide definitive
care and treatment. Combat stress is another medical aspect with which
teams must cope. The nature of reconnaissance missions subjects the
teams to stress in many ways. These factors include the following:

· Limited visibility. Operations in darkness, smoke, fog, rain,


snow, ice, and glare require the extended use of night-vision
goggles.
· Disrupted sleep cycles. Performance suffers from the
disruption of the normal sleep schedule.
· Mental fatigue. This results from having to make decisions
of serious consequences in too little time with too little
information and while exposed to danger.
· Physical fatigue. This can result from conducting physical
activity excessive to current conditioning or at a strenuous
level without rest.

7-73. Combat stress, however, is not solely a medical problem. It is also


a command problem in terms of reduced performance and personnel lost
from duty. It is a command responsibility to take actions to increase the
individual team member’s resistance to stress. This can be done through
extensive training under simulated combat conditions and by ensuring all
personnel maintain a high level of physical fitness. Proper nutrition is
also a major factor in coping with stress. This requires soldiers to have a
healthy, balanced diet not only during combat operations, but also before
the missions begin.

NOTE: For a detailed discussion on preparing for an operation, refer to Chapter 2 of this
manual.

SECTION III – EXECUTION

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___________________________________________________________ Chapter 7 – Urban Operations

NOTE: As shown in Table 7-1, the execution phase entails four key actions, which are
examined in detail in this section:
· Approach the urban area of operations.
· Employ surveillance teams, both mounted and dismounted.
· Conduct reconnaissance.
· Conduct assessment of the area of operations.

7-74. The efforts of the reconnaissance platoon can be a critical factor in


shaping the urban area of operations and in maximizing the effectiveness
of the squadron/battalion and, in turn, the brigade. A summary of the
platoon’s tasks in the urban environment includes the following:

· Develop and distribute urban operations sketches.


· Reconnoiter recommended entry points and routes.
· Locate and recommend breach points or points of penetration
for assault operations.
· Maintain surveillance on key objectives.
· Conduct target acquisition.
· Assist in isolation of the area of operations by conducting
screening operations or establishing checkpoints on the
perimeter.
· Perform continuous HUMINT collection during the operation.
Especially vital to the brigade effort is information on
personnel attempting to leave or enter the urban area.

NOTE: Refer to the end of the execution discussion for an explanation of actions the
reconnaissance platoon takes when it is tasked to support an assault in the urban
environment.

APPROACH THE URBAN AREA OF OPERATIONS


7-75. The reconnaissance platoon conducts HUMINT collection and
reconnaissance outside the urban area to gain information on the
objective. Depending on the time available, the platoon develops the
urban situation progressively as it moves from the surrounding area
toward the city. The commander may refine objectives and routes as he
gains and analyzes information. If available, TUAVs are employed to
conduct aerial reconnaissance of routes and objective areas. TUAVs are
focused on unit entry points to determine the threat situation, including
obstacles in the urban area, ambush positions on rooftops, and movement
of personnel and vehicles as reconnaissance units approach. As discussed
earlier, the aerial and ground reconnaissance plans must be synchronized
to be effective.

EMPLOY SURVEILLANCE TEAMS


7-76. The primary method of employing surveillance teams is in a hide
or surveillance site. The terrain, mission, and location of the site,
however, may dictate that the teams establish one or more separate
surveillance sites to effectively observe the area. A minimum of two
soldiers is required to conduct surveillance. One observes while the other
records the information in the surveillance log. Because observer

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

efficiency decreases rapidly after 30 minutes, the observer and the


recorder switch duties about every 30 minutes. When using NVDs, the
observer’s initial period of viewing is 10 minutes followed by a 15-minute
rest period. After several periods of viewing, the period is extended to 15
to 20 minutes. Hide site personnel should be rotated every 24 hours.
7-77. During limited visibility, two to three (normally three) members
may be required to set up a new surveillance site. The site is near the
target area so that information can be collected through close-in
observation and sound detection. The remainder of the team stays in the
hide site. The surveillance site and the routes to and from it are selected
during periods of good visibility. Members move into and out of the
surveillance site during limited visibility. One member observes, one
records, and one maintains security to the rear and flanks. Only passive
NVDs are used to help prevent detection.
7-78. The hide site may not be suitable for transmission of the team’s
reports. When this is the case, a separate communication sites is needed.
A minimum of two personnel is required at this location, one to send the
message and erect an antenna, if necessary, and one to provide security.
The communications site is occupied long enough to transmit the message
and then to conceal any signs of the team’s presence.

HASTY SITES
7-79. These are sites the team plans to occupy for a short period
(generally less than six hours). This occurs most often during target
acquisition missions. Considerations for occupation of hasty sites include
these:

· The team makes the best use of natural cover and


concealment. It uses man-made camouflage materials as
required to improve concealment, keeping movement to a
minimum.
· Generally, two or three scouts are positioned forward to
observe the target area and record information.
· The hasty hide site is positioned far enough to the rear so it is
out of the direct line of threat observation. The distance
normally depends on terrain and vegetation. It must be far
enough away from the surveillance element so that if a threat
force discovers one of the two elements, the other element has
enough standoff to prevent it from being discovered as well.
· The surveillance and hide positions allow the elements to fire
on the threat to enable one or both to break contact. Team
members in the hasty hide site maintain rear and flank
security. Communications are normally conducted after the
team moves away from the area.

7-80. A hasty subsurface site is constructed when there is not enough


time to construct a complete subsurface site. The site is especially useful
when there is little natural cover and concealment. Considerations in the
employment of hasty subsurface sites include the following:

· Lower profile than surface surveillance site.

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___________________________________________________________ Chapter 7 – Urban Operations

· Better protection against small-arms weapons and indirect


fires.
· Excellent camouflage.
· Requirement to conceal soil.
· Additional time required for construction.
· Construction noise.

7-81. Figures 7-5 and 7-6 illustrate construction of hasty subsurface


sites. Materials that may prove useful in building the position include the
following:

· Ponchos or other waterproofing.


· Yetti net or small camouflage net to assist in camouflage.
· Entrenching tool.
· 550 cord or bungee cord.
· Chicken wire (optional).
· Burlap or canvas (optional).
· Sandbags.
· PVC pipe with connectors.
· Fiberglass rod.
· Plywood.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure 7-5. Hasty Subsurface Site Using PVC Pipe

7-26
___________________________________________________________ Chapter 7 – Urban Operations

Figure 7-6. Hasty Subsurface Site


Using Suspension Lines

URBAN SURVEILLANCE SITES


7-82. Surveillance teams can construct fixed urban hide sites in
occupied and abandoned buildings, in water tanks, behind shrubbery, on
warehouse rooftops, or in attics of multistory buildings or other tall
structures. If possible, teams should avoid wooden buildings and
buildings in a significantly deteriorated condition because of the risk of
injury from fire and structural failure. Fixed sites should not be in
buildings that may attract the threat’s attention, but they can be placed
in rubble, yards, and gardens. If a site is to be set up in an undamaged
part of the urban area, teams select buildings of solid construction with
serviceable stairs and basements that can be equipped for the rest and
shelter of personnel during artillery bombardments.
7-83. Site construction may consist simply of taking a position at a
suitable viewing port, or it can be much more elaborate, with time a

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

crucial factor. Windows, doors, and other openings (like bullet holes not
used for observation) are filled with bricks, fragments of building
materials, or sandbags if available. Flammable objects are removed.
Supplies of water and sand are assembled for fighting fires. If the threat
has previously occupied the building, the team takes precautions against
booby traps and mines. When the threat is near, several locations in the
building are prepared for observation and departure.

BUILDING ENTRY TECHNIQUES


7-84. Scouts traditionally do not clear buildings. Rather, they
reconnoiter buildings, primarily to determine suitability for potential OPs
or while conducting compliance inspections. Scouts enter buildings only
when there is a minimum risk of encountering threat forces or when the
known size of the threat forces falls within the unit’s engagement criteria.
Because stealth is a priority, entry is done quietly, through unsecured
doors and windows, with the least amount of exposure possible. If threat
forces expect their arrival, however, scouts may not be able to enter
buildings with stealth because of booby traps; this must always be a
consideration in building entry regardless of the permissive level of the
environment in which the unit is operating.

NOTE: The principles and fundamentals discussed here to assist scouts in moving through
a building while maintaining security are modifications of techniques in FM 3-06.11
(FM 90-10-1). Building clearance operations, which are conducted by the infantry,
are discussed in detail in FM 3-06.11.

Entry at Upper Building Levels


7-85. Entering a building from any level other than the ground floor is
difficult. At the same time, gravity and the building’s floor plan become
assets when moving from floor to floor in ensuring there is no threat
present within the building. A threat element that is forced to the top of a
building may be cornered and fight desperately or escape over the roof. A
threat unit forced down to ground level may withdraw from the building,
thus exposing itself to friendly supporting forces outside.
7-86. Various means can be used to reach the top floor or roof of a
building, such as ladders, drainpipes, vines, helicopters, or the roofs and
windows of adjoining buildings. One scout can climb onto the shoulders of
another and reach high enough to pull himself up. Another method is to
attach a grappling hook to the end of a scaling rope so that a scout can
scale a wall, spring from one building to another, or gain entrance
through an upstairs window.
7-87. Use of Helicopters. If there is no risk of threat air defense
weapons, troops can be transported to the rooftops by helicopter (see
Figure 7-7). Helicopters should land only on those buildings that have
special heliports on the roofs or parking garages. Scouts can fast-rope
onto the roof or dismount as the helicopter hovers a few feet above the
roof. Troops then can use ropes to enter the lower floors if necessary.

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Figure 7-7. Occupying a Building Rooftop by Helicopter

7-88. Use of Ladders. Ladders offer the quickest method to access the
upper levels of a building (as illustrated in Figure 7-8). Units can get
ladders from local civilians or stores, or materials to build ladders can be
obtained through supply channels. Although ladders will not permit
access to the tops of some buildings, the speed with which they can be
used afford a degree of security and safety.

Figure 7-8. Using Ladders to Reach Upper Levels of a Building

7-89. Use of Grappling Hooks. The use of grappling hooks is the least
preferred method for gaining entry to upper levels of buildings. It should
be used only as a last resort and away from potential threat positions.

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This method may potentially be used on adjacent buildings offering


concealed locations and a connecting roof to possible positions.
7-90. If this method is used, a suitable grappling hook and rope are
selected. The grappling hook should be sturdy, portable, easily thrown,
and equipped with hooks that can hold inside a window. The scaling rope
should be 5/8 inch to 1 inch in diameter and long enough to reach the
objective window. Knots are tied in the rope at 1-foot intervals to make
climbing easier. The soldier should follow the procedures outlined in the
following discussion.
7-91. Stand as close to the building as possible when throwing the
grappling hook (Figure 7-9). The closer you stand, the less exposure to
possible threat elements in the building and the less horizontal distance
the hook must be thrown. Making sure there is enough rope to reach the
target, hold the hook and a few coils of rope in the throwing hand. The
remainder of the rope, in loose coils, should be in the other hand. Allow
the rope to play out freely. The throw should be a gentle, even, upward
lob of the hook with the other hand releasing the rope as it plays out.
7-92. Once the grappling hook is inside the window or on the roof, pull
on the rope to obtain a good hold before beginning to climb. When using a
window, pull the hook to one corner to enhance the chances of a good
“bite” and to reduce exposure to lower windows during the climb.

Figure 7-9. Grappling Hook Thrown at Close Range

7-93. Rappelling. Rappelling is an entry technique that soldiers can


use to descend from the rooftop of a tall building into a window (as shown
in Figure 7-10). Refer to TC 21-24 for more information on rappelling.

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Figure 7-10. Rappelling

Entry at Lower Building Levels


7-94. Scouts entering through windows and doors on the lower levels of
a building must be aware of the possibility of booby traps. Specific lower-
level entry techniques are shown in Figure 7-11.

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Figure 7-11. Lower-Level Entry Techniques

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PARTNER ASSISTED LIFT

Figure 7-11. Lower-Level Entry Techniques (Continued)

Principles of Building Entry


7-95. Movement in close quarters, such as within a room or hallway,
must be planned and executed with care. Reconnaissance units must
train and rehearse movement techniques until each team operates
smoothly. Each team member must understand the following principles of
building reconnaissance, which are similar to those for precision room
clearance:

· Surprise. This is the key to successful operations in close


quarters. The team checking the rooms must achieve surprise,
if only for seconds, by deceiving, distracting, or startling any
potential threat. Silent building entry also supports surprise
when individual rooms are entered.
· Speed. Speed provides a measure of security to the team. It
allows scouts to use the first few vital seconds provided by
surprise to maximum advantage. In movement in close
quarters, however, speed does not mean incautious haste. It is
best described as “careful hurry.” There is security in
continuous, fluid motion. Never remain in one location within
the building too long until the building has been checked for
threat presence.
· Controlled violent action. If contact occurs and
termination of threat forces is required, the scouts use
controlled violent action to eliminate or neutralize the threat
while giving him the least chance of inflicting friendly
casualties. This principle primarily applies to, but is not
limited to, MTW environments. Its use is based on the
ROE/ROI and the commander’s engagement criteria.
Controlled violent action is not limited to the application of

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firepower. It involves a soldier mindset of complete


domination.

7-96. Each of the listed principles has a synergistic relationship with


the others. Controlled violence coupled with speed increases surprise. At
the same time, successful surprise allows increased speed.

FUNDAMENTALS OF CHECKING ROOMS AND CORRIDORS


7-97. The fundamentals covered in this discussion address actions
scouts take while moving along confined corridors to the room to be
checked, while preparing to enter the room, during room entry and target
engagement (if necessary), and after contact. The examples show various
combinations of squad and section configurations (including four-man,
three-man, and two-man techniques) used in different types of platoons.
(NOTE: These variations may also be used when teams split up to secure
the building entry point, various floors, and other sites.)
7-98. The steps are based on infantry fundamentals of precision room
clearing, modified so that they may apply to scouts moving through a
building. These fundamentals are the following:

· Move tactically and silently while scanning the corridors to


the room to be checked. Carry only the minimum amount of
equipment. Rucksacks and loose items carried by scouts tire
them, slow their pace, and cause noise.
· Remember that bullets follow walls, whether in an alley or
the hallway of a building.
· Arrive undetected at the entry to the room in the correct
order of entrance. Be prepared to enter the room on a single
command.
· Enter quickly and dominate the room. Move immediately to
positions that allow complete control of the room and provide
unobstructed fields of fire.
· If necessary, eliminate all threat elements in the room by fast,
accurate, and discriminating fires.
· Gain and maintain immediate control of the situation and all
personnel in the room.
· Confirm whether threat casualties are wounded or dead.
Disarm and segregate the wounded. Search all threat
casualties.
· Perform a cursory search of the room. Determine if a detailed
search is required.
· Evacuate all wounded and any friendly dead.
· Based on unit SOP, mark rooms as checked using simple,
clearly identifiable markings.
· Maintain security and be prepared to react to additional
threat contact at any moment.
· Do not neglect rear security.

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7-99. Scouts must remain alert throughout movement in buildings and


searches of corridors and rooms. Team members provide security at the
entry point and to the rear, laterally down corridors, and upward near
stairs or landings. Use these basic techniques of hallway movement:

· Serpentine technique. This is used in narrow hallways.


The number-1 man provides security to the front. His sector
of fire includes any threat soldiers who appear at the far end
of the hall or from any doorways near the end. The number-2
and number-3 men cover the left and right flanks of the
number-1 man. Their sectors of fire include any threat
soldiers who appear suddenly from nearby doorways on either
side of the hall. The number-4 man, normally carrying the
squad automatic weapon (SAW)/240B, provides rear
protection against any threat soldiers suddenly appearing
behind the team.
· Rolling-T technique. This is used in wide hallways. The
number-1 and number-2 men move abreast, each covering the
opposite side of the hallway from the one on which he is
walking. The number-3 man covers the far end of the hallway
from a position behind the number-1 and number-2 men,
firing between them if necessary. The number-4 man provides
rear security.

7-100. The two techniques for moving in hallways are illustrated in


Figure 7-12. Hallway intersections are dangerous areas and should be
approached cautiously as shown in Figures 7-13 and 7-14.

Figure 7-12. Hallway Movement Techniques:


Serpentine Technique for Narrow Hallways (Left)
and Rolling-T Technique for Narrow Hallways (Right)

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Figure 7-13. T-shaped Hallway Intersection Positions

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Figure 7-14. Hallway Intersection Positions (Top)


and Sectors of Fire (Bottom)

INDIVIDUAL MOVEMENT AND WEAPONS CONTROL


7-101. As in all operations, scouts involved in operations inside a
building must move tactically and safely. Individuals who are part of a
team must move in a standard manner, using practiced techniques.
Movement and weapons control fundamentals include the following:

· When moving, team members hold their weapons with


muzzles pointed in the direction of travel. They keep the butt
of the rifle in the pocket of their shoulder, with the muzzle
slightly down to allow unobstructed vision. Soldiers keep both
eyes open and swing the muzzle with their head so the rifle is
always aimed where the soldier is looking.
· Team members avoid “flagging” (leading with the weapon)
when working around windows, doors, corners, or areas
where obstacles must be negotiated. Flagging the weapon
gives advance warning to anyone looking in the scout’s
direction, making it easier for a threat soldier to grab the
weapon.

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· Team members should keep weapons safe (selector switch on


SAFE and index finger outside of trigger guard) until a hostile
target is identified and engaged. After a team member clears
his sector of all targets, he returns his weapon to the SAFE
position.
· If a scout has a weapon malfunction while checking a room
and becomes engaged, he should immediately drop to one
knee and conduct immediate action to reduce the malfunction.
Once the weapon is operational, there is no need to return to
the standing position to engage targets unless the scout must
move to another firing position. Resuming target engagement
from the kneeling position saves valuable time. When other
members of the team see a soldier drop to one knee, they
know immediately that he has a malfunction requiring them
to engage targets in his sector.

Actions Outside the Point of Entry


7-102. Actions outside the point of entry must be quick and well
rehearsed. The doorway or entry point is a dangerous position. The team
is focused on entry and could be surprised by a threat appearing
unexpectedly in the corridor. Team members’ positions relative to the
door are important as are their weapons’ carry positions. Team members
stand as close to the entry point as possible, staying in a semicrouched
position. They hold their weapons either in the high-carry or the low-
carry position. Each must ensure that his muzzle is not pointed at
another team member.
7-103. All team members must signal one another that they are
prepared before the team enters the room. The last man taps or squeezes
the arm of the man in front of him, and each one passes this signal along.
Team members avoid the use of a verbal signal, which may alert threat
elements and destroy the element of surprise.
7-104. All individual equipment must be selected carefully and prepared
properly to ensure it is quiet and not cumbersome. The team should carry
essential items only while checking rooms. All team members should
wear protective vests and helmets. Additional protective equipment such
as gloves, kneepads, or goggles may be worn, depending on the situation
and the unit’s level of training.

Actions Upon Entry


7-105. The team should enter the room as quickly and smoothly as
possible and move through the doorway immediately. The door is the
focal point of anyone in the room. It is known as the “fatal funnel”
because it focuses attention at the precise point where the individual
team members are the most vulnerable. Moving into the room quickly
reduces the chance that team members will be hit by threat fire directed
at the doorway. The sequence of movements described in the following
discussion is shown in Figures 7-15 through 7-23.
7-106. On the signal to go, the team moves through the door quickly and
takes up positions inside the room that allow it to completely dominate
the room and eliminate the threat. Team members stop movement only

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after they have moved away from the door and reached their designated
point of domination.
7-107. The first man to enter moves in as straight a line as possible
toward the corner for which he is responsible. He may then turn and
move deep into the far corner of the room to the point of domination. The
depth of his movement is determined by the size of the room, any
obstacles in the room such as furniture, and by the number and location
of threat soldiers and noncombatants in the room. (See Figure 7-15,
which shows examples of both center-fed and corner-fed rooms.)

Figure 7-15. Path of Number-1 Man


for Center Door (Top) and Corner Door (Bottom)

7-108. The second man enters and moves toward the corner in the
opposite direction from the number-1 man. He follows the wall, but does
not place himself directly against it (as shown in Figure 7-16).

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Figure 7-16. Path of Number-2 Man


for Center Door (Top) and Corner Door (Bottom)

7-109. The number-3 man (team leader) buttonhooks inside the room at
least 1 meter from the door, but between the number-1 man and the door
(see Figure 7-17).

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Figure 7-17. Path of Number-3 Man


for Center Door (Top) and Corner Door (Bottom)

7-110. The team leader can either use the number-4 man (normally the
SAW/240B gunner) as rear security at the entry point of the room or have
him enter the room with the remainder of the team. If he enters, the
number-4 man moves in the direction of the number-2 man and
buttonhooks between the number-2 man and the door. Once he is no
longer needed, he immediately moves back and secures the room entry
point and hallway (see Figure 7-18).

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Figure 7-18. Path of Number-4 Man


for Center Door (Top) and Corner Door (Bottom)

7-111. To make this room entry technique work, each member of the
team must know his sector of fire and understand how his sector overlaps
and links with the sectors of the other team members. If engagement is
required, team members do not move to the point of domination and then
engage their targets. Rather, they engage targets as they move to their
designated point. At the same time, however, engagements must not slow
movement to their points of domination. Team members may shoot from
as short a range as 1 to 2 inches. They engage the most immediate
threats first. Examples of immediate threats are personnel who—

· Are armed and prepared to return fire immediately.


· Block movement to the positions of domination.
· Are within arm’s reach of a team member.
· Are within 3 to 5 feet of the entry point.

7-112. Each team member initially has a designated sector of fire unique
to him. This sector later expands to overlap the sectors of the other team
members.
7-113. The number-1 and number-2 men are initially concerned with the
area along the wall on either side of the door or entry point. This area is
in their path of movement, and it is their primary sector of fire. Their
alternate sector of fire is the wall they are moving toward, sweeping back
to the far corner.
7-114. The number-3 and number-4 men start at the center of the wall
opposite their point of entry and sweep to the left if moving toward the

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left or to the right if moving toward the right. They stop short of their
respective team member (either the number-1 man or the number-2
man).
7-115. The team members move toward their points of domination,
engaging all targets in their sectors. They must exercise fire control and
discriminate between hostile and noncombatant occupants of the room.
They shoot without stopping, using reflexive shooting techniques.
Because the scouts are moving and shooting at the same time, they must
move using the “careful hurry” concept. Figure 7-19 shows all four team
members at their points of domination and illustrates their overlapping
sectors of fire. Once again, the number 4 man may not be required to
enter the room, only secure the room door and hallway.

Figure 7-19. Four-Man Team


Points of Domination and Sectors of Fire for
Corner Door (Top) and Center Door (Bottom)

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7-116. When full four-man teams are not available, three-man and two-
man teams can be used. Figures 7-20 and 7-21 illustrate the paths, points
of domination, and sectors of fire for a three-man team. Figures 7-22 and
7-23 show the same thing for a two-man team.

Figure 7-20. Points of Domination and Sectors of Fire


(Three-Man Team, Corner Door)

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Figure 7-21. Points of Domination and Sectors of Fire


(Three-Man Team, Center Door)

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Figure 7-22. Points of Domination and Sectors of Fire


(Two-Man Team, Corner Door)

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Figure 7-23. Points of Domination and Sectors of Fire


(Two-Man Team, Center Door)

Reflexive Shooting
7-117. During room entry, there is little or no margin for error. Although
scouts only enter buildings in reduced threat environments, they must
always be prepared for threat contact. Too slow a shot at an enemy, too
fast a shot at a noncombatant, or inaccurate shots can all be disastrous
for a team. The process known as reflexive shooting entails an effective
combination of weapon ready position, stance, aiming, shot placement,
and trigger manipulation. Scouts must rehearse and perfect these skills
to enhance their survivability in urban operations.

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7-118. Weapon Ready Position. The two weapon ready positions are
the low ready position and the high ready position. These are illustrated
in Figure 7-24. The weapon position and orientation for each team
member should be identified prior to entering a building.
7-119. Low ready position. The butt of the weapon is placed firmly in
the pocket of the shoulder with the barrel pointed down at a 45-degree
angle. This is the safest carry position. Team member should use it while
inside a room, except when they are actually entering the room.
7-120. High ready position. The butt of the weapon is held under the
armpit, with the barrel pointed slightly up, keeping the front sight
assembly under the line of sight but within the gunner’s peripheral
vision. To engage a target, the gunner pushes the weapon out as if to
bayonet the target. When the weapon leaves the armpit, he slides it up
into the firing shoulder. This technique is best suited for the lineup
outside the door.

Figure 7-24. Weapon Ready Positions: Low Ready Position (Left)


and High Ready Position (Right)

7-121. Stance. Feet are about shoulder-width apart. Toes are pointed to
the front (direction of movement). The firing side foot is slightly staggered
to the rear of the nonfiring side foot. Knees are slightly bent, and the
upper body leans slightly forward. Shoulders are square and pulled back,
not rolled over or slouched. The head is up, with both eyes open. When
engaging targets, the gunner holds the weapon with the butt in the
pocket of his shoulder.
7-122. Aim. Each of the four aiming techniques described in the
following discussion has a place in built-up areas. The aimed quick-kill
technique is the one most often used in checking rooms.
7-123. Slow aimed fire technique. This technique is the most
accurate. It entails taking up a steady, properly aligned sight picture and
squeezing off rounds. It is normally used for engagements beyond 25
meters or when the need for accuracy overrides speed.

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7-124. Rapid aimed fire technique. This technique features an


imperfect sight picture in which windage is critical but elevation is of
lesser importance. When the front sight post is in line with the target, the
gunner squeezes the trigger. This technique, used against targets out to
15 meters, is fairly accurate and very fast.
7-125. Aimed quick-kill technique. This technique entails using a
good spot weld and placing the front sight post flush on top of the rear
peep sight. It is used for very quick shots out to 12 meters. Windage is
important, but elevation is not critical with relation to the target. This
technique is the fastest and most accurate. With practice, soldiers can
become deadly shots at close range.
7-126. Instinctive fire technique. This technique is the least
desirable. The gunner focuses on the target and points the weapon in the
target’s general direction, using muscle memory to compensate for lack of
aim. This technique should be used only in emergencies.
7-127. Shot Placement. When the team is checking rooms, all threat
soldiers it encounters must be incapacitated immediately. Shots that
wound or are mortal but do not incapacitate the target instantaneously
are better than misses, but they may allow the enemy to return fire.
Team members should concentrate on achieving solid, well-placed
headshots. This shot placement is difficult for some scouts to learn
because they previously have been taught to aim at center of mass. Only
practice can guarantee that they learn the techniques of accurate shot
placement.
7-128. The only shot placement that guarantees immediate and total
incapacitation is one roughly centered in the face, below the middle of the
forehead and above the upper lip. Shots to the side of the head above the
horizontal line passing through the ear opening to just below the crown of
the skull and from the cheekbones rearward to the occipital lobe are also
effective. Figure 7-25 shows proper head shot placement.

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Figure 7-25. Proper Head Shot Placement


(Immediate Incapacitation Zones)

7-129. Shots to the spinal column below the jaw and above the sternum
can neutralize a target immediately. The spinal column is a narrow
target. Shots that miss by only a few centimeters may cause only a
delayed reaction, or no immediate reaction at all, in the target. Even
though severely wounded, the enemy soldier may be able to return
effective fire.
7-130. Shots to the center of the chest that enter the lung/heart region
are normally fatal but may take several seconds to incapacitate the
target. During this time, the opponent may be able to return effective fire.
Military equipment or protective vests may also shield this region of the
body, deflecting or absorbing rounds and preventing immediate
incapacitation.
7-131. Even when they are ultimately fatal, shots to the abdomen or
lower extremities are rarely effective in rendering an opponent
immediately incapable of returning fire.
7-132. Trigger Manipulation. Rapid, aimed semiautomatic fire is the
most effective method of engaging targets. As each round is fired from the
aimed quick-kill position, the weapon’s recoil makes the front sight post

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move in a small natural arc. The gunner should not fight this recoil. He
should let the weapon make the arc and immediately bring the front sight
post back onto the target and take another shot. This two-shot
combination is known as a double tap. Soldiers must practice the double
tap until it becomes instinctive. Team members continue to fire double
taps until the target goes down. If there are multiple targets, team
members double tap each one and then return to reengage any threat
soldiers left standing or who are still trying to resist.

Target Discrimination
7-133. Target discrimination is the act of quickly distinguishing between
combatant and noncombatant personnel and engaging only the
combatants. US forces engage with precision fire to apply discriminating
combat power while limiting any unnecessary casualties among the
noncombatants. Target discrimination is vital. If no noncombatants are
present, there is less need for selective engagements. Even if an area is
known to be free of noncombatants, however, other friendly soldiers
moving through the area may be mistaken for threat elements; they may
be engaged unless team members are disciplined and well-trained in fire
control and target discrimination. Even with well-trained, disciplined
scouts, room checking can result in unintentional casualties among
noncombatants. Commanders must recognize this and take steps to
relieve the stress it causes scouts.

Safety and Force Protection


7-134. Room entry is extremely dangerous, and even training for it can
be hazardous. Only well-trained, disciplined scouts will be able to
successfully execute the techniques and procedures required to ensure
safety and force protection.
7-135. Weapons Handling. Leaders at all levels must enforce safe
handling of weapons. The concern that individual scouts not be injured in
accidents is essential to mission accomplishment. Unintentional and
unsafe weapons fire can jeopardize the mission of the team and
subsequently the entire unit.
7-136. Protective Equipment. If a commander knows his unit will be
conducting lengthy room checking operations, he should request a special
issue of threat level III or IV protective equipment. This equipment is
excellent, but scouts must train and rehearse wearing it before they enter
a real theater of operations. All room checking is tiring, and scouts
wearing threat level III or IV protection will tire or overheat quickly.
7-137. Scouts entering buildings should wear all appropriate types of
protective equipment. For example, soft body armor, such as the standard
Army-issue Kevlar vest, is effective in preventing death or serious injury
from high-velocity fragments that strike the torso area. Although the
Kevlar protective vest is effective, flexible, and relatively comfortable, it
is not designed to stop bullets. As a rule, soft body armor will stop some
low-power handgun rounds but not rifle or carbine ammunition. On the
other hand, some types of hard body armor will stop almost any round
fired at them. They tend to be heavy and stiff, but they have been proven
effective.
7-138. The standard Army Kevlar helmet and ballistic protective
eyeglasses have been proven to significantly reduce casualties. Hard

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plastic knee and elbow protectors are also available on special request.
They are useful, especially during prolonged operations, in preventing
injury from rubble and broken glass when a soldier is kneeling or prone.
7-139. Knowledge of Weapons and Munitions. Detailed knowledge of
weapons and munitions effects is important to the safety of members of
the team, as well as to mission accomplishment. Most interior building
walls do not stop rifle fire. Fragments often penetrate interior walls.
Standard home furnishings or office furniture offer little protection from
high-velocity rounds.

BUILDING OPERATIONS DURING DARKNESS


7-140. Mission accomplishment is the most important criterion of night
operations. All the specialized night vision equipment in the US armory
can never replace a trained, skilled scout intent on mission
accomplishment. No failsafe system exists to allow an individual scout to
effectively identify and engage targets in total darkness. The commander
must carefully consider the situation and the equipment available to him
before he decides whether to use visible, invisible, or no artificial light
when checking a building in darkness.

Equipment
7-141. Several types of specialized night vision equipment are available
to scouts.
7-142. AN/PAQ-4 Aiming Light. This device projects a pulsing dot of
IR light along the weapons line of sight. The dot is invisible to the naked
eye, but personnel wearing NVGs can see it. Gunners with weapons
equipped with the AN/PAQ-4 aiming light simply place the projected spot
on the target and fire.
7-143. AN/PVS-5 and AN/PVS-7 Night Vision Goggles. These goggles
are lightweight, battery-powered passive devices worn on the head. Each
has an IR-emitting light source for close-up illumination.
7-144. Tactical Lights. These devices are small, lightweight, battery-
powered white lights that can be attached to weapons. Either a pressure
switch or an ON/OFF switch activates the light. An IR filter can be
attached to most tactical lights to provide covert illumination. The most
common example of a tactical light is sold under the name Maglite. These
lights can be attached to weapons using hose clamps or heavy tape. They
must be checked periodically because they can loosen and shift.
7-145. Red Dot Sights. These are lightweight, battery-powered optical
sights attached to the top of the weapon. A red dot in the sight aligns the
weapon and the target. These sights are for use in low light levels, not
total darkness. They do not assist in identifying targets.
7-146. Active Laser Devices. These lightweight, battery-powered
sights emit visible light, projecting a red dot onto the target that
corresponds to the point of bullet impact. These devices are not effective
in sunlight.

NOTE: In the near future, scouts will be able to use thermal weapons sights to detect
targets in total darkness.

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Use of White Light


7-147. Although not covert, white light has several advantages in night
operations:

· The equipment is readily available and reliable.


· No additional training is required.
· It offers the fastest means of identifying targets and searching
a room.
· It allows color vision.

7-148. The main disadvantage of white light is that an active light


source can compromise the team’s position inside a room or building.
Another disadvantage is that a light may be activated too soon and alert
threat elements.

CONDUCT THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL ASPECT OF


RECONNAISSANCE
7-149. The reconnaissance platoon then conducts the multidimensional
aspect of reconnaissance of the urban area. The platoon will develop an
understanding of the regional, local, and neighborhood level situation.
The platoon’s soldiers and leaders generate a sense for their area of
operations similar to the awareness of a “cop on the beat” or street
detective. The scouts must learn how the urban area operates and
identify the sources of power or influence. Examples of this information
include the following:

· The formal and informal political power structure.


· Police, secret police, and intelligence agencies.
· Criminal organizations.
· Military and paramilitary structures.
· Key terrain.
· Sensitivities of the populace.

7-150. The recce platoon is ideally suited to conduct the


multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance, but any reconnaissance
platoon may be tasked to conduct this type of reconnaissance with
augmentation. Although each vehicle in a recce platoon contains a
HUMINT specialist, scouts in all types of reconnaissance platoon must
possess the ability to gain information on the local area.

NOTE: Refer to Chapter 3 of this manual for a detailed discussion of the multidimensional
aspect of reconnaissance. The fundamentals of reconnaissance described in Chapter
3 are applicable in an urban environment, although the type of information and the
method by which it is collected takes on a new form.

URBAN PATROLLING

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7-151. As noted earlier in this chapter, reconnaissance units will


normally not perform building-to-building clearance in urban areas. They
may, however, perform urban patrolling to accomplish reconnaissance
missions. (NOTE: Chapter 5 of this manual includes a detailed
examination of patrolling techniques and procedures.) Detailed planning,
as discussed earlier in this chapter, is accomplished before execution of a
patrol. Using maps, aerial photography, and any known intelligence, the
platoon leader will conduct preliminary route reconnaissance to identify
the following features:

· Preliminary route reconnaissance.


· Insertion and extraction routes.
· Choke points along the routes.
· Escape and evasion directions or corridors.

Organization of Urban Patrols


7-152. Urban patrols can be conducted either as a mounted operation or
dismounted with vehicles in support. Patrols should never be conducted
lower than section level.
7-153. Mounted Patrolling. Mounted patrols capitalize on the mobility
of the unit’s vehicles. Mounted urban patrolling principles include the
following:

· Ensure mutual support and depth by maintaining constant


observation among vehicles.
· Coordinate a supporting fire plan with any dismounted units
in the area.
· Maintain all-around security.
· Develop a reliable communications plan for mounted and
dismounted elements.
· Adjust patrol routes and speed to promote deception and
avoid repetitive patterns.
· Maintain situational awareness.

7-154. Mounted patrols never enter an area via the route they will use to
exit it. Vehicles should travel at moderate speeds, with the lead vehicle
stopping only to investigate those areas that pose a potential threat or to
support the essential tasks of the patrol. Use a vehicle speed of 15 to 20
miles per hour to allow for adequate observation and quick reaction.
Slower speeds may allow noncombatants or a more aggressive group to
impede movement. On the other hand, vehicles should move at high
speeds only when responding to an incident. Equipment stored externally
should be secured high enough on the vehicle to prevent the problems of
locals trying to snatch equipment and weapons.
7-155. When vehicles must stop, designated crewmembers dismount to
provide security. The vehicle gunner is at the ready, and the driver
remains in his seat with the engine running. It is imperative that units
maintain situational awareness during patrols; this includes orientation
on other patrols in the urban area. If an element comes under fire, it

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___________________________________________________________ Chapter 7 – Urban Operations

should be capable of communicating with other patrols to obtain


assistance and support. Figure 7-26 illustrates a mounted patrol.

Figure 7-26. Mounted Urban Patrol

7-156. Dismounted Patrolling. In support of the multidimensional


aspect of reconnaissance, dismounted patrolling is used to collect
HUMINT. At a minimum, patrols are organized at squad level (three
soldiers). Section-size patrols (six soldiers) are the preferred organization
for security purposes; they can maintain both an information-gathering
team and a security team.
7-157. Leaders of dismounted patrols must maintain communications
with vehicles and the patrol headquarters throughout the mission. In the
reconnaissance platoon, vehicles must be prepared to react to any
situation the dismounted element may encounter. Patrols should avoid
areas with large masses of civilians, who could quickly turn against the
presence of foreign soldiers. As with mounted patrols, dismounted patrol
leaders must be ready to contact other patrols or supporting elements for
support in unfavorable or dangerous situations.
7-158. Figure 7-27 shows how a dismounted recce patrol would operate
with vehicles in support. Figure 7-28 depicts a patrol with dismounted
soldiers only.

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SCOUT SCOUT

HUMINT HUMINT

LINGUIST

SCOUT SCOUT

SCOUT

SCOUT

Figure 7-27. Dismounted Urban Patrol


with Vehicle Support

INFORMATION GATHERING

SQUAD LDR

SCOUT

LINGUIST

HUMINT

SECURITY CONTROL

HUMINT

SCOUT SECTION LDR

Figure 7-28. Dismounted Urban Patrol


without Vehicle Support

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___________________________________________________________ Chapter 7 – Urban Operations

7-159. Subterranean Patrolling. Reconnaissance of subterranean


systems is accomplished to identify threat use of a passageway, to
determine how a subterranean area may contribute to friendly
capabilities, or to support isolation of the urban area. The team leader
organizes his patrol with one soldier tasked with security to the front (the
point man) and one tasked with rear security. If available, an engineer
should assist the team leader in classifying the passageway or in
neutralizing mines at obstacles. The team leader navigates and records
data through the passage. Two soldiers are left as a security post at the
point of entry. They are responsible for detecting any threats that come
upon the unit’s rear and as a communications link between the team
leader and higher headquarters.
7-160. The team leader should carry a map or sketch, compass, street
plan, and information requirements. A team member should carry the
tools needed to open manhole covers. The point man is equipped with
NVGs as well as a feeler for trip wires. All soldiers entering the
passageway should carry a sketch of the sewer system, to include
magnetic north, azimuths, distances, and manholes. They should also
have protective masks, flashlights, gloves, and chalk for marking features
along the route. The team should be equipped with a 120-foot safety rope
to which each man is tied. The safety rope assists the team in retrieving
members who may slip or fall.
7-161. A constant concern to troops conducting a subterranean patrol is
chemical defense. When used in tunnels, chemical agents are normally
encountered in dense concentrations with no chance of dissipating. A
suitable NBC detection system carried by the point man (such as detector
paper or a CAM) can provide warning for team members to don their
masks.
7-162. In addition to chemical agents, noxious gases from decomposing
sewage, especially methane gas, can pose a threat. These gases are not
detected by NBC detection systems, nor are they completely filtered out
by the protective mask. Physical signs that indicate their prescience in
harmful quantities are nausea and dizziness. Team leaders should be
constantly alert to these signs and know the shortest route to the surface
for fresh air.
7-163. Once the team is organized and equipped, it moves to the
entrance of the tunnel, which is usually a manhole. Once the manhole is
removed, the team waits 15 minutes to allow any gases to dissipate. The
point man then descends into the tunnel to determine whether the air is
safe to breathe and if movement is restricted. The point man should
remain in the tunnel for 10 minutes before the rest of the team follows. If
he becomes ill or is exposed to danger, he can be pulled out by the safety
rope.
7-164. When the patrol is moving through the tunnel, the point man
moves about 10 meters in front of the team leader. Other team members
maintain 5-meter intervals. If the water in the tunnel is fast-moving or if
the sewer is slippery or threat obstacles, the intervals should be increased
to prevent all members from falling if one man slips.
7-165. The team leader should note the azimuth and pace count of each
turn he takes in the tunnel. When the team encounters a manhole to the
surface, the point man should open it and determine the location, which

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the team leader then records. Recognition signals with friendly troops
must be coordinated to prevent fratricide as the point man opens the
manhole.
7-166. Once the patrol has returned and submitted its report, the
commander decides how to use the tunnel. Among his options are sealing
off manhole covers and emplacing obstacles in the tunnel. The patrol’s
report is converted into an overlay for the urban operations sketch and
sent higher.

Mobile Patrol Immediate Action Drills


7-167. Reconnaissance units must always resist becoming decisively
engaged. At times, however, contact with hostile elements will be
unavoidable. In such situations, immediate action drills are essential to
the survivability of the unit and the ultimate success of the mission. As
the basis for immediate action drills, all soldiers must have a clear
understanding of the applicable ROE, which may limit the response to a
given situation but do not prevent a soldier from protecting himself or his
unit members. The following steps provide an example of an immediate
action drill when the reconnaissance platoon encounters a sniper or
antiarmor weapon:

· Upon contact, make positive confirmation of the position or


direction from which the fire came.
· Move the vehicles quickly out of the line of direct fire while
returning fire if the threat position can be identified.
· Use other vehicles to envelop or cut off the sniper’s or
antiarmor gunner’s avenue of escape.
· If vehicles are caught in an area and become decisively
engaged, the vehicles must suppress the threat while moving
out of the potential kill zone as quickly as possible.

NOTE: When it encounters obstacles or barricades, the patrol should move rapidly to an
alternate route and report the obstructions to higher headquarters. The patrol
should not try to clear obstacles or barricades, which are usually mined or booby-
trapped and covered by threat fire.

Tactics of Urban Swarm


7-168. Urban swarm is similar to the tactic used by police forces
responding to an emergency that requires backup. The swarm concept is
applicable when numerous teams are operating in a dispersed,
noncontiguous fashion in the urban environment. As each unit patrols its
assigned area, it must be prepared to respond rapidly to a call for
assistance by neighboring teams. The patrol’s ability to respond will
depend on its own current situation and its distance from the element
making the request.
7-169. A call for assistance should include an estimate of the support
required. This request is transmitted to all other teams on the platoon
and higher nets. The commander directs the appropriate teams to
respond and adjusts other teams to fill or cover gaps that are created. An
alternative method is for the teams closest to the requesting unit to
respond without direction, although these teams should report their

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intention to respond. Situational awareness is critical in avoiding


fratricide.
7-170. Command of the teams that respond can be accomplished in
several ways. The leader of the requesting unit who has the best
situational awareness could assume tactical command of responding
units. Another option is to have the higher commander or XO maintain
C2 of the responding teams. The commander must guard against having
too many leaders on the ground in one area.
7-171. The key to this tactic is speed and flexibility. The requesting
group has to be able to quickly and concisely inform the responding units
of the situation and maneuver them to positions of advantage as they
arrive. Again, the need for an urban operations sketch is of the utmost
importance for C2. The responding units also need to have the flexibility
and training to enter an emerging situation effectively. Implicit in this
concept is the capability of junior leaders to assume increased levels of
responsibility and command.
7-172. At all costs, units executing an urban swarm must avoid
establishing patterns. If elements respond to crisis situations in similar
patterns, threat forces will quickly identify them and deliberately create
crises. This can allow the threat to lure responding units into ambushes
or to exploit the temporary void created in the area of operations by
responding units.

METHODS OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION


Tactical Questioning
7-173. When conducted properly, tactical questioning will elicit valuable,
timely, and accurate information from the local populace. On the other
hand, improper questioning will confuse the subject, waste time, and
provide information of little or no tactical value.
7-174. While the primary goal of tactical questioning is to learn the
WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, and HOW of a situation, the
process involves more than merely asking questions. Because the
questioner is conducting a hasty and often unconventional interrogation,
he must know how to tailor the questions to the person who is the subject
of the session. For example, a civilian may not understand questions
laced with military jargon; a local may not be able to follow a questioner
who speaks too quickly.
7-175. At all times, the interrogator must maintain control of the
interview. He must stay on guard not to lose the initiative to an
uncooperative subject, adhering to these principles of productive
interrogation:

· All questions should be brief and to the point.


· All questions should be simple.
· Questions should be clear and in one complete thought.
· Ask for narrative responses.
· Use of follow-up questions is essential.

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7-176. The following types of questions are most effective for use in
tactical questioning:

· Direct questions. Examples: What is your name? Who is


your organization’s leader?
· Follow-up questions. These are used to exploit a topic of
interest. Questions usually flow from one to another based on
the answer to the previous question.
· Control questions. These are used to maintain control and
to check the accuracy and truthfulness of the source’s
statements. Control questions should be mixed in with normal
questions throughout the interview/interrogation.
· Repeat questions. The interrogator uses this technique to
ensure accuracy, particularly when he suspects that the
source is lying. Since a lie is more difficult to remember than
the truth, errors can often be uncovered when questions that
the source has already answered are rephrased or disguised.

7-177. Conversely, there are several types of questions to be avoided:


· Negative questions. Avoid questions that contain the words
“not,” “no,” or “none.”
· Leading questions. These tend to prompt the source to give
the reply he believes the interrogator wants to hear or simply
to answer “yes” or “no,” requiring the questioner to ask more
leading questions to complete the facts.
· Compound questions. A compound question contains two or
more parts. It can cause the source either to become confused
or to intentionally provide incomplete responses.
· Vague questions. These elicit very broad and general
answers. They may enable the source to go on a tangent,
giving answers totally unrelated to the topic and providing
false or misleading information.

7-178. The questioner should adhere to these deceptively simple


guidelines: Ask the obvious, and never take anything for granted.
Attempt to have the source clarify vague or ambiguous statements
immediately. Ask for specifics when the response includes words like
“possible,” “always,” “everywhere,” “everything,” “a few,” “far,” or “near.”
If a point is still unclear, try to have the source make a drawing.
Annotate the drawing with the source’s name, what the drawing
represents, where the drawing was made (such as a hilltop looking
south), a directional arrow (pointing north), and the date-time group.

Effective Listening
7-179. Along with effective questioning, scouts must learn the skill of
effective listening. They must remain calm, gather the facts, and exploit
all leads completely. They cannot let excitement fog their judgment when
a source divulges information. Showing excitement (or undue interest)
may indicate what information the questioner is seeking or what
interrogation strategy he is attempting to exploit.

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7-180. Another important skill is learning not to jump the gun during
questioning (or listening). Cutting the source off before he finishes
answering may cut off a valuable lead. The questioner should ask the
question and observe the source. If the source answers and then pauses,
the questioner should simply wait, making sure he has finished his
thoughts. The source may have more to say. Silence can also be a strong
weapon. The interrogator should never put words in the source’s mouth.

Understanding Human Reactions


7-181. Along with effective questioning and listening, the skill of
“reading” and understanding human reactions can provide valuable
information about the source’s responses. During an interaction, people
will often break eye contact and avert their eyes momentarily as they
search for information to answer a question or think about what they are
going to say. Generally, individuals will shift their eyes and take other
actions according to the internal system they are accessing.
7-182. In addition to watching eye movements, the observer should take
note of the following behavior:

· Gestures.
· Posture.
· Muscle tension.
· Skin color.
· Breathing.
· Voice characteristics, including tone, tempo, and volume.

7-183. The model in the following example is a generalization; therefore,


it may be unreliable in some cases. What is reliable is that every person
has a unique pattern of accessing internal information. Possible cues to a
person’s reactions might include the following:

· The subject looks up and to the right, indicating he is


visualizing something that has not been seen before. He may
be creating images.
· The subject looks up and to the left, indicating he is recalling
something he has seen before. He may be recalling a visual
memory.
· The subject stares into space, his eyes not focused, with some
pupil dilation. This may signal either visual recall or
visualization of something he has seen before.
· The subject looks directly to the right, indicating he is
imagining sounds and creating spoken language.
· The subject looks directly to the left, indicating he is recalling
sounds from memory.

NOTE: The model shown here is for a right-handed person. The cues can be reversed for a
left-handed person.

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DEBRIEFING
7-184. As soon as a team returns to an assembly area, it is directed to a
secure area to prepare for debriefing. In preparing for a debriefing, the
team takes the following actions:

· Accounts for all team and individual equipment.


· Reviews and discusses the events listed in the team notebook,
from infiltration to return to the assembly area, including the
details of each threat sighting.
· Prepares overlays of the team’s route, area of operations,
infiltration point, exfiltration point, and sighting locations.

7-185. Operations and intelligence personnel or the commander


normally conducts the debriefing. A communications representative
debriefs the team separately after the team debriefing to obtain
information related to the communications architecture within the urban
area. The team leader gives a step-by-step discussion of every event listed
in the team notebook, from the infiltration until the return to the
assembly area. When the debriefing is over, the team is released for
equipment maintenance and recovery. See Appendix J of this manual for
a sample debriefing format.

CONDUCT ASSESSMENT OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS


7-186. The platoon leader receives and analyzes the information
gathered by the reconnaissance and surveillance teams. The platoon
leader will then assess the area of operations according to the mission
and the intent of the higher commander. The assessment will include, but
is not limited to, these elements:

· Threat composition and activity.


· Areas of vulnerability to friendly forces.
· Key terrain.
· Approach routes for mounted and dismounted forces.
· Entry points or points of penetration.
· Support positions for direct and indirect fire systems.
· Civilian disposition.
· Density and composition of the urban area.
· Hazard areas (fuel storage, natural gas lines, chemical
production sites).
· Communication facilities.
· Retrans sites.
· Intent of the civilian populace (such as stay or flee).

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___________________________________________________________ Chapter 7 – Urban Operations

END STATE
7-187. The platoon achieves the end state of its reconnaissance effort
when the squadron/battalion is able to answer two critical questions for
the brigade:

· Is it essential to conduct operations in the urban environment?


· If so, how can the brigade employ combat power in the most
efficient manner?

SUPPORT AN ASSAULT IN THE URBAN AREA


7-188. The reconnaissance platoon may be required to support assaults
in urban areas. Units at battalion level and below conduct offensive
urban operations through assessing, shaping, dominating, and
transitioning the urban area. Reconnaissance platoons support
assessment by reconnoitering both avenues to the urban area and the
area itself. They then support shaping by pulling the infantry to the
enemy weak points as it moves to secure a foothold. The platoons also
assist in isolation of the urban area and support the infantry with
precoordinated direct and indirect fires. They facilitate the domination
phase by continuing these isolation and support actions. Reconnaissance
platoons then support transition by consolidating, reorganizing, and
preparing for potential stability operations or support operations as the
operational environment changes.

THE SEVEN PHASES OF URBAN ASSAULT OPERATIONS


7-189. When infantry forces conduct an assault of a built-up area, the
reconnaissance platoon can support all seven phases of the operation:

· Reconnoiter the objective.


· Move to the objective.
· Isolate the objective.
· Secure a foothold.
· Clear a built-up area.
· Consolidate.
· Reorganize.

Reconnoiter the Objective and Move to the Objective


7-190. Considerations and actions involved in planning and executing
the first two phases of the assault operation are covered earlier in this
chapter. For information on other operational factors, refer to discussions
in Chapter 2 (tactical movement), Chapter 3 (reconnaissance operations),
and Chapter 5 (dismounted operations).

Isolate the Objective


7-191. The reconnaissance platoon is effective in this phase of the
operation, which may entail isolation of a building, village, small town, or
large built-up area. Operating outside the town allows the platoon to use
its speed, mobility, and if applicable, firepower. The threat force
defending the urban area will often position elements outside the town to
disrupt an attack and to limit friendly reconnaissance and mobility. The

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platoon may be able to prevent the threat from accomplishing his goals
and from withdrawing into the town; it surrounds the objective by seizing
key terrain and covering enemy avenues of approach (see Figure 7-29). In
addition to security, reconnaissance platoon tasks during the isolation
phase may include the following:

· Prevent enemy forces from escaping.


· Prevent reinforcement of the built-up area.
· Protect the assault force from counterattack.
· Call for and adjust indirect fires.

Figure 7-29. Isolating the Objective

Secure a Foothold
7-192. The reconnaissance platoon can use its weapons sights, including
thermals, to conduct long-range reconnaissance and to locate enemy
positions and/or vehicles during periods of limited visibility. The platoon
can also provide fire support for infantry assaulting the objective. During
the assault, the attacking force penetrates the area on a narrow front,
concentrating all available supporting fires on the entry point. In support
of the assault during this phase, reconnaissance platoon tasks include the
following:

· Attack by fire.
· Support by fire.
· Attack with the infantry.
· Coordinate and control indirect fires.

7-193. Attack by Fire. If applicable, platoon vehicles such as the CFV


can attack by fire while the infantry assaults the objective. Once the
assault force establishes a foothold, the vehicles move forward to provide
close-in support. This method is used when enemy antiarmor fires or
obstacles block the only possible armor avenue of approach.

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___________________________________________________________ Chapter 7 – Urban Operations

7-194. Support by Fire. The platoon can conduct support by fire during
the assault; this may include covering critical areas on the assault force’s
flanks. Once the assault force establishes a foothold, platoon vehicles
move forward to provide close-in support (see Figure 7-30).

Figure 7-30. Gaining a Foothold (Reconnaissance


Platoon Provides Support by Fire)

7-195. Attack with the Infantry. Platoon vehicles and the infantry
advance together, with the infantry moving behind the vehicles for
protection from small arms fire. Infantry squads or fire teams protect the
vehicles from the enemy’s hand-held antiarmor weapons (as shown in
Figure 7-31). Attacking with infantry is difficult to coordinate and execute
because of differences in speed between the mounted and dismounted
forces.

Figure 7-31. Gaining a Foothold (Reconnaissance


Platoon Attacks with Infantry)

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Clear a Built-up Area


7-196. Once the infantry seizes its initial foothold, the reconnaissance
platoon provides supporting fires while the infantry clears each building.
Because of the danger of ambush, scout vehicles should support by fire, if
applicable, from cleared positions rather than moving ahead of the
infantry. They can sometimes provide fire support without entering the
built-up area.
7-197. Because target identification and fire control measures change
rapidly as clearance progresses, vehicles in the built-up area must be
closely controlled by the infantry leader in charge (see Figure 7-32).
Platoon vehicles provide suppressive fires to allow the infantry to
establish a foothold in each building. To isolate buildings, vehicles engage
known or suspected enemy locations. Once the infantry is inside the
building, the vehicles continue to suppress enemy positions on other
floors or in adjacent buildings. Specific actions of the reconnaissance
platoon in clearing a building include the following:

· Fire into the upper stories of the buildings to drive enemy


forces to lower floors or the basement, where the infantry can
trap and destroy them.
· Suppress and destroy enemy weapons and personnel.
· Provide antitank protection.
· Use direct fires to open holes in walls and reduce barricades.

NOTE: Building clearance operations are covered in detail earlier in this chapter.

Figure 7-32. CFV Section Supporting Isolation


and Seizure of a Building

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___________________________________________________________ Chapter 7 – Urban Operations

7-198. Seizure and clearance operations can range between two


extremes: a systematic, block-by-block, house-by-house reduction of the
built-up area or a rapid advance with friendly forces concentrating on
seizing and clearing critical areas and buildings. The reconnaissance
platoon’s role is roughly the same in either type of operation. For
example, Figure 7-33 shows a CFV supporting an infantry squad in
seizing and clearing an urban area. The following guidelines, tailored to a
CFV-equipped platoon, apply in seizure and clearance operations:

· In clearance of streets:
n CFVs lead, closely followed and supported by infantry.
n CFVs work in pairs.
n CFVs concentrate fires on windows and rooftops.
n Infantry protects CFVs from close-in fires.
n Infantry moves alongside or directly behind CFVs and
scans for potential antiarmor positions.
· In seizure and clearance of building:
n CFVs provide suppressive fires, concentrating on
windows, doorways, and rooftops.
n CFVs create holes in building walls to allow the infantry
to enter through unexpected entrances.

Figure 7-33. CFV Provides Support as Infantry Squad


Seizes and Clears a Building

Consolidate and Reorganize


7-199. Once the assault operation is complete, the reconnaissance
platoon and other elements conduct consolidation activities to co-locate
forces, secure the objective area, and guard against enemy counterattack.
They conduct reorganization activities to redistribute personnel,
equipment, and supplies in support of continued operations.

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COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS


7-200. Combat power is difficult to mass during urban operations
because fighting is isolated. C2 is further aggravated because units can
easily become separated. Such conditions make it necessary to
decentralize the fight down to the smallest unit. These small units,
reconnaissance sections and infantry squads, must communicate
continuously and effectively if they are to survive and win on the urban
battlefield.

Visual Signals
7-201. Visual signals are the most effective and reliable means of
communications between the infantry force and the reconnaissance
vehicles. Targets are identified with tracer fire, grenade launcher rounds,
smoke grenades, VS-17 panels, or hand-and-arm signals. Visual signals
are used to trigger specific actions such as initiating fires, lifting or
shifting fires, moving forward to the next position, and providing smoke
obscuration.

FM Radio and Wire


7-202. The infantry leader and reconnaissance vehicles can use FM
radios and/or land lines to communicate while stationary. FM
communications may be affected by the terrain; land lines can be used
when FM communications are disrupted. To use land lines, run wire
through the hatch to the inside of the vehicle or, if applicable (as on the
CFV), connect it to the sponson box on the rear of the vehicle. A TA-1 is
used to relay fire control instructions to the vehicle.

FIRE SUPPORT
7-203. Indirect fires are most effective when used against open spaces
within built-up areas; high-trajectory indirect fires are more effective
than lower-trajectory fires. Because of these factors, mortars are normally
more desirable than artillery for indirect fire support in urban operations.
7-204. Scouts can play a valuable role as the link between infantry
squads and platoons and the mortars of the cavalry troop or armored
battalion. Reconnaissance sections or squads are trained to call for and
adjust indirect fires from these assets in support of the infantry’s attack.

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Chapter 8

Combat Support and Combat Service Support


The reconnaissance
CONTENTS
platoon must take full
Employ Fire Support........................................... 8-2
advantage of available CS
Mortar Support ............................................ 8-2
assets to accomplish its Field Artillery Support ................................ 8-3
mission and to reduce its Naval Surface Fire Support ........................ 8-6
vulnerability on the Fire Support Team ...................................... 8-8
battlefield. It may receive Striker Team ................................................ 8-9
Fire Request Channels ............................... 8-10
CS from mortars, FA,
Fire Planning in Support of
ADA, combat engineers, Reconnaissance Missions ..................... 8-12
GSR, and TUAV assets. Radar Zones ................................................ 8-13
These assets are not Call for Fire .................................................. 8-13
organic to the platoon, but Adjusting Indirect Fire ................................ 8-16
Refinement and Surveillance ..................... 8-22
they will be available
Fire Support Coordination Measures ........ 8-23
through the platoon’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles ................................ 8-28
parent squadron, battalion, The UAV Platoon ......................................... 8-28
or troop. To make effective Sensor Capabilities .................................... 8-29
use of them, scouts must Relationship of the UAV Platoon and
the Reconnaissance Platoon ................. 8-29
understand the capabilities
Command and Control ............................... 8-31
and limitations of the CS Reconnaissance Operations ...................... 8-31
assets. Security Operations .................................... 8-31
Area Security ............................................... 8-32
Air-Ground Reconnaissance Handover .... 8-33
CSS elements provide the Combat Engineers ............................................. 8-35
Engineer Support in Reconnaissance
platoon with support in the Operations ............................................... 8-36
form of resupply, Engineer Support in Security
maintenance, medical Operations ............................................... 8-36
services, and handling of Air Defense ......................................................... 8-37
prisoners and captured Passive Air Defense .................................... 8-38
Active Air Defense ...................................... 8-38
materials. The PSG has Short-Range Air Defense Systems ............ 8-40
the primary responsibility Aviation Support ................................................ 8-41
for coordinating and Fixed-Wing Support .................................... 8-41
managing these support Attack Helicopter Support .......................... 8-44
functions for the platoon, Utility and Cargo Helicopter Support ........ 8-56
Air Assault Operations (Air Infiltration) .... 8-59
which has no organic CSS Resupply Operations .................................. 8-65
assets. Medical Evacuation .................................... 8-66
Multicapable Sensor Teams .............................. 8-68
Capabilities and Limitations ...................... 8-68
Employment ................................................ 8-68
GSR .............................................................. 8-69
REMBASS .................................................... 8-71
IREMBASS ................................................... 8-72
Combat Service Support ................................... 8-73
Supply Operations ...................................... 8-73
Maintenance Operations ............................ 8-81
Personnel Operations ................................. 8-85
Medical Treatment and Evacuation ........... 8-86
Prisoners and Captured Material ............... 8-88

8-1
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

SECTION I – EMPLOY FIRE SUPPORT

8-1. Mortars and FA assets are the primary indirect fire support
means available to the reconnaissance platoon, although the platoon may
receive fire support from other assets as well, including aircraft and
ships. In addition to understanding the capabilities and limitations of
these assets, scouts must know what fire request channels to use to
request fires. The platoon leader must be prepared to work with both the
troop and/or squadron/battalion FSOs to plan and coordinate fire support.

MORTAR SUPPORT
8-2. Mortars can provide indirect fire support that is extremely
responsive to the scouts’ needs. They can provide a heavy volume of fires
and are ideal for attacking targets on reverse slopes, in narrow ravines or
trenches, and in forests, towns, and other areas that are difficult to strike
with low-angle fires. Each recce/cavalry troop or supported battalion has
an organic 120-mm mortar section dedicated to providing the responsive
fires that the platoon needs. The BRT does not have organic mortars, but
may obtain mortar support from the lead task force. The 120-mm mortar
has a maximum effective range of 7,200 meters and shoots a variety of
munitions. Table 8-1 lists capabilities of the various mortar systems and
munitions.

Table 8-1. Fire Support Capabilities (Mortars)

MORTARS

Munition Max Min Max Rate Burst Sustained


Weapon Rate
available Range (m) Range (m) (rds per min) Radius
(rds per min)

60-mm HE, WP, 3,500 (HE) 70 (HE) 30 for 4 min 30 m 20


ILLUM

81-mm HE, WP, 5,600 (HE) 70 (HE) 25 for 2 min 38 m 8


ILLUM

107-mm HE, WP, 6,840 (HE) 770 (HE) 18 for 1 min, 40 m 3


ILLUM 9 for 5 min

120-mm HE, SMK, 7,200 (HE) 180 (HE) 15 for 1 min 60 m 5


ILLUM

TYPES OF MORTAR SUPPORT


Suppression
8-3. HE rounds can be used to force the threat to button up or move to
less advantageous positions. Unless a direct hit is achieved, however, HE
mortar rounds will not destroy armored vehicles.

8-2
___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support

Smoke
8-4. White phosphorus (WP) rounds are used for obscuration and
screening. In obscuration, smoke is placed on or just in front of threat
positions to obscure their vision. Screening is achieved by placing smoke
between the threat and the platoon position to conceal movement. Mortar
smoke can also be used to mark threat positions to enhance friendly
maneuver and orient direct fires. Scouts must be careful, however, not to
allow smoke to work against them by marking their own positions for
threat gunners.

Illumination
8-5. Illumination rounds are used to light an area or threat position
during periods of limited visibility. Scouts can increase the effectiveness
of their image intensification devices by using illumination. This helps
them in gathering information, adjusting artillery, or engaging threat
targets. Ground-burst illumination can also be used to mark threat
positions and to provide a thermal target reference point (TRP) for control
of direct fires. As with smoke, illumination is a double-edged sword; care
must be taken not to illuminate friendly positions. Also, because US night
vision devices are superior to those of most potential adversaries,
illuminating the battlefield may be unnecessary or even
counterproductive.

CAPABILITIES
8-6. Mortar capabilities include the following:

· A close working relationship with reconnaissance platoons.


· Fast response time.
· Availability for low-density targets.

LIMITATIONS
8-7. Mortars have the following limitations:

· They have only short-range capability.


· Only limited types of ammunition are available.
· Are extremely vulnerable to threat counterfire radars due to
the high angle of fire.
· Mortar elements can carry only limited amounts of
ammunition.

FIELD ARTILLERY SUPPORT


8-8. The brigade, and hence the reconnaissance platoon, is supported
by an FA battalion. As part of its unit basic load, this FA battalion has
several different munitions available to support the platoon. It has lethal
munitions such as HE, DPICM, Copperhead, WP, and scatterable mines.
It also has nonlethal munitions, including smoke and illumination. Tables
8-2 and 8-3 list capabilities of the various FA systems and munitions.

8-3
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Table 8-2. Fire Support Capabilities (Field Artillery Systems)

FIELD ARTILLERY

Max Min Max Rate Burst Sustained


Weapon Rate
Range (m) Range (m) (rds per min) Radius
(rds per min)

105-mm Howitzer 11,500


M102, Towed 0 10 for 3 min 35 m 3
14,500 (RAP)

105-mm Howitzer 3 rds for 30


14,000 0 6 for 2 min 35 m min, then 1 rd
M119, Towed
per min

155-mm Howitzer 18,100 4 for 3 min, 1 rd per min


0 50 m (temperature
M198, Towed 30,000 (RAP) 2 for 30 min dependent)

155-mm Howitzer 18,100 1 for 60 min,


M109A2/A3, SP 0 4 for 3 min 50 m
23,500 (RAP) then 0.5

203-mm Howitzer 22,900


M110A2, SP 0 1.5 for 3 min 80 m 0.5
30,000 (RAP)

Table 8-3. Field artillery capabilities (conventional munitions)

CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS

FPF
MAXIMUM RANGES (M198) (meters) WIDTH RATES OF FIRE

HE/DPICM ERDPICM RAP SUSTAINED MAXIMUM


400m
18,100 28,400 30,000 Variable 4 rounds/minute

ILLUMINATION

RATE OF FIRE FOR ILLUMINATION


MAXIMUM RANGE BURN TIME CONTINUOUS DIAMETER
ILLUMINATION

17,500 2 minutes 1 round/minute 1,000 m

SMOKE

TYPE TIME TO BUILD AVERAGE BURN TIME


EFFECTIVE SMOKE (minutes)

WP 30 seconds 1 to 1½

Smoke 60-90 seconds 5 to 10

8-4
___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support

CAPABILITIES
8-9. In support of the platoon, FA elements have the following
capabilites:

· Provide fire support in all weather conditions and types of


terrain.
· Shift and mass fires rapidly.
· Support the battle in depth with long-range fires.
· Provide a variety of conventional shell and fuze combinations.
· Provide continuous fire support.

LIMITATIONS
8-10. FA support has the following limitations:
· Limited capability against moving targets.
· Limited capability to destroy point targets without
considerable ammunition expenditure.
· Vulnerability to detection by threat target acquisition systems
because of its firing signature.

COMMON USES OF AVAILABLE MUNITIONS


8-11. FA employs a wide variety of munitions that can be tailored for
the engagement of different types of targets (refer to Table 8-3). These
ammunition types include the following:

· HE, for use against personnel, field fortifications, and


vehicles.
· Smoke, for obscuration and screening.
· Illumination.
· WP, for obscuration, burning, and marking.
· Cannon-launched guided projectiles (Copperhead), for use
against point targets.
· DPICM, for use against personnel and light armored vehicles
in the open.
· Scatterable mines. These include area denial munitions
(ADAM) for use against personnel and remote antiarmor mine
systems (RAAMS) for use against armored vehicles. When an
FA battery is firing a scatterable mines mission, it is not
available for other fire missions. Scatterable mines require
slightly more lead time than do other FA-delivered munitions.

8-12. In addition to the supporting cannon units, multiple launch


rocket system (MLRS) elements may also provide fires. Unlike cannon
artillery, MLRS units do not fire a variety of munitions. They provide
either rocket or missile fires, but do not offer special munitions, such as
smoke, illumination, or WP. The maximum range of MLRS rockets is
32,000 meters. The planning range for MLRS missiles in the Army
tactical missile system (ATACMS) is 100,000 meters. Both of these
munitions are DPICM.

8-5
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

NAVAL SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT


8-13. Destroyers and cruisers are the predominant ships used in NGF
roles. Both types of vessels employ 5-inch guns to provide fires. (Table 8-4
provides NGF data for the available types of munitions.) Reconnaissance
units will normally receive augmentation from the Marines for NGF
missions. These personnel will be used at platoon level for the actual
conduct of the NGF mission. In the event this augmentation does not
occur and the platoon leader determines that NGF is required, he should
request the support using the format illustrated in Figure 8-1.

Table 8-4. Fire Support Capabilities (Naval Gunfire)

NAVAL GUNFIRE

Weapon Full Charge Reduced Charge Max Rate Sustained Rate


(rds per min) (rds per min)

5 in / 38 15,904 8,114 20 15

5 in / 54 23,133 12,215 35 20

16 in / 50 36,188 22,951 2 1

8-6
___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support

Figure 8-1. Naval Gunfire Call for Fire Format

8-7
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure 8-1. Naval Gunfire Call for Fire Format (Continued)

FIRE SUPPORT TEAM


8-14. Except for the BRT, each troop has an organic FIST specifically
designed to assist in the planning, coordination, and integration of fire
support during operations. (NOTE: The BRT may use the attached
Striker platoon leader/PSG for this purpose.) Elements from the FIST
may be pushed forward with the reconnaissance platoon in support of
security operations when target designation is required for special
munitions engagements. The FIST’s C2 link with the artillery makes it a
valuable resource; it should not be exposed to direct fire except when
absolutely necessary. The FIST is organized, equipped, and trained to
provide the following:

· A fire support advisor and coordinator.


· A communications link to all available fire support assets.

8-8
___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support

8-15. The armor and mechanized infantry company team FIST


normally monitors the following nets:

· Attached unit command net (battalion, company team, or


scout platoon).
· Battalion mortar fire direction net.
· Direct support (DS) battalion fire direction net (digital).
· Battalion fire support net (voice).

8-16. The armored cavalry or recce troop FIST normally monitors the
following radio nets:

· Troop command net.


· Troop fire support net.
· Supporting artillery fire direction net (digital and voice).
· Squadron fire support net.

8-17. The FIST serves as the NCS on the troop fire support net. The
FSE is the NCS on the squadron or maneuver battalion fire support net.
The FIST relays the call for fire to supporting artillery on a digital net
(AFATDS) or sends the fire mission to the troop mortar section. The
command net allows the FIST to monitor operations and links the FIST to
the commander and platoon leaders for planning and coordination.

STRIKER TEAM
8-18. From company/troop to brigade level, a Striker team is placed
under the control of a fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) to enhance
the lasing capability and to function as a dedicated observation platform.
Striker teams are organic to each DS FA battalion and to the howitzer
battery of the armored cavalry squadron. The cavalry squadron has one
organic Striker team. Striker teams also work closely with BRTs.
8-19. Requests for indirect fire can be sent through the Striker team,
which has a secondary mission of processing these requests for the scouts.
The Striker team monitors the reconnaissance platoon net and handles
the fire request and subsequent adjustments in the same manner as a
normal FIST. It can enter the information gained through its primary
mission, lasing targets for advanced munitions, such as Copperhead
rounds and CAS, directly into initial fire support automated system
(IFSAS) channels.
8-20. When pushed forward with the scouts, the Striker team may
collocate with one of the reconnaissance platoon OPs for local security
and protection. The Striker team may occupy its own position to observe a
TAI; in turn, this TAI may be tied to an NAI covered by a scout team.
This technique allows the scout team to act as a trigger, with the Striker
team executing and adjusting fires. This type of integration is common in
BRT units.

8-9
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

FIRE REQUEST CHANNELS


RECCE OR ARMORED CAVALRY PLATOON
8-21. The scouts in a recce or armored cavalry troop normally request
all indirect fire support through their troop FIST on the troop fire support
net. The FIST selects the best available fire support to engage the target.
If the FIST passes the fire mission to the troop mortars, the scouts send
all adjustments of the fire mission directly to the mortars (see Figure 8-2).
If the FIST passes the fire mission to a supporting artillery unit, the
scouts send all adjustments of the fire mission to the FIST, which relays
the message to the artillery unit on a digital fire direction net (as shown
in Figure 8-3).

Figure 8-2. Recce or Armored Cavalry Scouts


Requesting Fire from Mortars

Figure 8-3. Recce or Armored Cavalry Scouts


Requesting Fire from Field Artillery

8-10
___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support

BATTALION RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON


8-22. There are several ways the battalion task force scouts can request
indirect fire. The task force SOP should specify which method they will
use. The scout platoon leader must also coordinate with the task force
FSO and/or FSE on which of these methods, described in the following
paragraphs, the scouts will employ.

Mortar Requests
8-23. The platoon can send requests for mortar fire directly to the
mortars on the battalion heavy mortar net; the FSE monitors these
requests. (See Figure 8-4.)

Figure 8-4. Battalion scouts requesting fire


from task force mortars

Artillery Requests
8-24. The platoon can send requests for artillery fire directly to the FA
battalion on a fire direction net; the FSE monitors the requests. (See
Figure 8-5.)

BRIGADE RECONNAISSANCE TROOP


8-25. Scouts in the BRT’s platoons normally request all indirect fire
support through the platoon leader or PSG of the attached STRIKER
platoon. If STRIKER elements are not attached to the troop, the scouts
usually request indirect fires on the troop command net, coordinating the
fires with the XO.

8-11
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure 8-5. Battalion scouts requesting fire


from the FA battalion

FIRE PLANNING IN SUPPORT OF RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS


8-26. The reconnaissance platoon leader must be prepared to use both
hasty fire planning and deliberate fire planning in support of the
platoon’s missions. He should pay particular attention to the
identification of priority targets and to the procedures used to shift
priority targets whenever necessary. He forwards all planned targets in
support of the scout mission to the FIST, which in turn forwards them to
the supporting FSO. The nature of platoon operations dictates that
primary consideration for fires should be focused on avenues of approach,
OPs, and other key or decisive terrain.
8-27. The platoon leader coordinates priority of fires through normal
fire support channels. He should concentrate on placing effective fires in
several key locations: short of the line of departure is line of contact
(LD/LC), from the LD/LC to the objective, on the objective, and beyond
the objective (in case of threat counterattack). He must also coordinate
with adjacent units to ensure overlapping fires prior to execution of
operations.
8-28. During reconnaissance, the platoon leader uses these doctrinal
targeting tasks when the platoon has target responsibilities. The two key
areas of concern for the platoon will be short of the LD/LC and from the
LD/LC to the objective. The fire support plan must also support the
platoon during movement along assigned routes and while it is occupying
OPs; fires may be used against threat reconnaissance elements or
forward security elements. In the defense, the platoon leader must
coordinate with the higher commander for planned targets.

8-12
___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support

8-29. During security operations, it is particularly important for the


platoon leader to plan fires in support of point obstacles. The locations of
obstacles should be refined and passed to the troop FIST or the battalion
and/or brigade FSCOORD at the earliest possible time. As much as
possible, the platoon leader should ensure that the platoon has mortar
priority of fires if available.

RADAR ZONES
8-30. In addition to the planning the platoon leader does for fires, he
must also be aware of and consider recommending the use of radar zones.
Radar zones are a means of prioritizing radar sectors of search. A zone is
a geometric figure placed around an area that designates that area as
more, or less, important than some other area.
8-31. There are four types of radar zones; however, the platoon leader
needs to be concerned with only one type, the CFZ. A CFZ is an area,
usually a friendly unit or location, that is critical. It is used to protect an
asset whose loss would seriously jeopardize the mission. Any threat
weapon firing into a CFZ will be fired upon. An immediate call for fire is
generated by the radar computer and sent to a friendly firing unit.

CALL FOR FIRE


8-32. The standard call for fire for artillery and mortars consists of
three basic transmissions, consisting of six elements as follows:

· Observer identification and warning order (first


transmission).
· Target location (second transmission).
· Target description, method of engagement, and method of fire
and control (third transmission).

8-33. The exceptions to using the full call for fire, with all three
transmissions, are requests calling for “suppression” or “immediate
suppression” missions.

OBSERVER IDENTIFICATION AND WARNING ORDER


8-34. The observer identification tells the fire direction center (FDC)
who is calling. It also clears the net for the rest of the call. The warning
order tells the FDC the type of fire support mission and the method of
locating the target. The types of missions are the following:

· Adjust fire. This is used when the observer is uncertain of


the exact target location. Example: “G24 THIS IS G59 -
ADJUST FIRE - OVER.”
· Fire for effect. The observer should always try first-round
fire for effect if he is sure that his target location is correct.
He should also be sure that the rounds of the first volley will
have the desired effect on the target so that little or no
adjustment will be required. Example: “G24 THIS IS G59 -
FIRE FOR EFFECT - OVER.”

8-13
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

· Suppression. The word “SUPPRESS” is used to quickly


bring fire on a preplanned target only. This is a simplified call
for fire and is sent in one transmission. Example: “G24 THIS
IS G59 - SUPPRESS AF2401 - OVER.”
· Immediate suppression. This is used to bring fire quickly
on a planned target or a target of opportunity that is firing at
a friendly unit or aircraft. As with suppression, this mission
uses a simplified call for fire that is sent in one transmission.
Examples:
n Preplanned target example: “G24 THIS IS G59 -
SUPPRESS AF2401 - OVER.” Target description is not
announced.
n Target of opportunity example: “G24 THIS IS G59 -
IMMEDIATE SUPPRESSION GRID 123456 - OVER.”

TARGET LOCATION
8-35. Following the type of mission, the method of target location is
announced; this prepares the FDC to receive the data sent by the
observer and apply it to locate the target. The three methods for locating
targets are grid, polar plot, and shift from a known point. Only the polar
plot and shift methods are initially announced to the FDC. If the observer
does not specify either polar or shift, the FDC knows the grid method is
being used; the word “grid” is not announced in the initial transmission.
Example: “H24 - THIS IS H67 - FIRE FOR EFFECT POLAR - OVER.”
(NOTE: The word “grid” is announced at the beginning of a subsequent
transmission calling for an adjustment of fires. Example: “H24 THIS IS
H67 - ADJUST FIRE OVER. H24 THIS IS H67 - GRID 123456 -
OVER.”)

Grid Method
8-36. When using the grid method, the target location is normally sent
in six digits (example: “180739”). The direction from the observer to the
target (in mils, if possible) must be given to the FDC after the call for fire,
but before the first adjusting rounds are shot.

Polar Plot Method


8-37. This method requires that the observer and the FDC know the
observer’s exact location. The observer determines the direction (to the
nearest 10 mils) of the observer-target (OT) line and the distance (to the
nearest 100 meters) from his position to the target (see Figure 8-6).

Figure 8-6. Polar Plot Method of Target Location

8-14
___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support

Shift from a Known Point Method


8-38. This method can be used if the observer and the FDC have a
common known point. To locate the target, the observer must first
determine the direction to the nearest 10 mils. If the observer has no
compass, he can determine the direction by using a map and protractor or
by using his binocular reticle pattern and a known direction to the known
point. He should remember to apply the RALS rule (right add, left
subtract) in determining direction to the target (see Figure 8-7).

Figure 8-7. Shift from a Known Point Method


Using Direction (in Mils)

8-39. The observer then determines the lateral and range shifts (see
Figure 8-8). Lateral shifts are left or right from the known point to the
OT line and are given to the nearest 10 meters. Range shifts are given as
“ADD” (when the target is beyond the known point) or “DROP” (when the
target is closer than the known point). Range shifts are given to the
nearest 100 meters. FM 6-30 explains in detail how to determine the
lateral and range shifts.

8-15
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure 8-8. Lateral and Range Shifts from a Known Point

DESCRIPTION OF TARGET, METHOD OF ENGAGEMENT,


AND METHOD OF FIRE AND CONTROL
8-40. The observer includes these elements in his call for fire using the
guidelines discussed in the following paragraphs.

Description of Target
8-41. The observer describes the target to the FDC. The FDC then
determines the type and amount of ammunition needed. The target
description should be brief yet accurate. This is the last required element
in the call for fire.

Method of Engagement
8-42. The observer specifies how he wants to attack the target (type of
ammunition, fuze, distance from friendly troops). The FDC may change
the ammunition type and/or fuze based on ammunition constraints. If the
target is within 600 meters of friendly troops, the observer announces
“DANGER CLOSE” to supporting mortars and artillery. When “DANGER
CLOSE” is called, the initial rounds in adjustment should use a delay
fuze.

Method of Fire and Control


8-43. The observer states who will give the command for fire to begin. If
the observer wants to control the time of firing, he will say, “AT MY
COMMAND.” The FDC will tell the observer when the unit is ready to
fire. At the proper time, the observer will say, “FIRE.” If the observer
does not say, “AT MY COMMAND,” the FDC will fire as soon as the
platoon/battery is ready.

ADJUSTING INDIRECT FIRE


8-44. The goal of every observer is to put rounds on target as quickly as
possible. If the five requirements for accurate predicted fire have been

8-16
___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support

met, this task is relatively easy, and the observer requests fire for effect
in his initial call for fire. With so many variables affecting the accurate
delivery of initial rounds, however, observers must be prepared to adjust
subsequent rounds onto the target as quickly as possible. Normally, one
artillery piece or mortar is used in adjustment.
8-45. The observer must first pick an adjusting point. For a destruction
mission (precision fire), the target is the adjusting point. For an area
target (area fire), the observer must pick a well-defined adjusting point at
the center of the area or close to it. The observer must spot the first
adjusting round and each successive round and send range and deviation
corrections, as required, back to the FDC until fire hits the target. The
observer spots by relating the burst or group of bursts to the adjusting
point. For a further discussion of adjusting mortar and artillery fire, see
FM 3-09.3 (FM 6-30).

DEVIATION SPOTTING
8-46. As applied to deviation (left or right), spotting involves measuring
the horizontal angle (in mils) between the burst and the adjusting point.
An angle-measuring device or technique, such as the mil scale on military
binoculars (refer to Figure 8-9) or the hand-and-fingers method (see
Figure 8-10), is required to determine deviation. The horizontal scale,
divided into 10-mil increments, is used for measuring horizontal angles.
The vertical scales, in 5-mil increments in the center and on the left side
of the reticle, are used for measuring vertical angles. The scale on the
right, if present, is no longer used.

Figure 8-9. Mil Scale in Binocular Reticle

Figure 8-10. Use of Hand And Fingers Method


to Determine Deviation

8-17
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

8-47. A burst to the right (or left) of the target is spotted as “(number)
MILS RIGHT (LEFT)” (as shown in Figures 8-11 and 8-12). A burst on
the OT line is spotted as “LINE.” Deviation to the left or right should be
measured to the nearest 5 mils for area targets, with measurements
taken from the center of the burst. Deviation for a destruction mission
(precision fire) is estimated to the nearest mil.

Figure 8-11. Deviation Spotting

Figure 8-12. Deviation Spotting with Binoculars

DEVIATION CORRECTION
8-48. Once the mil deviation has been determined, the observer must
convert it into a deviation correction (in meters). Deviation correction is
the distance in meters the burst must be moved to be on line between

8-18
___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support

observer and target. It is sent, with the range correction, to the FDC for
the next adjusting round or when calling for fire for effect.
8-49. Deviation correction is determined by multiplying the observed
deviation in mils by the distance from the observer to the target in
thousands of meters. This distance is expressed as the OT factor
(illustrated in Figure 8-13). The correction is expressed to the nearest 10
meters (see Figure 8-14).

Figure 8-13. Determining the OT Factor

Figure 8-14. Converting Mil Deviation


to Deviation Correction

8-19
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

8-50. Minor deviation corrections (10 to 20 meters) are necessary to


adjust precision fire. In adjustment of area fire, however, deviation
corrections of 20 meters or less should be ignored except when such a
small change is necessary to determine a definite range spotting.
Throughout the adjustment, the observer should move the adjusting
rounds close enough to the OT line so that range spotting can be made
accurately.

RANGE SPOTTING
8-51. As applied to range (short or over), spotting is required to make
adjustments to place fire on the target. The following terminology is used
in this process:

· OVER. This term is used for a round that appears to impact


beyond the adjusting point.
· SHORT. This is used for a round that appears to strike
between the observer and the adjusting point.
· TARGET. This spotting term describes a round that hits the
target; it is used only in precision fire (destruction missions).
· RANGE CORRECT. This is used for a round that appears to
be at the correct range.
· DOUBTFUL. This is used for a round that can be observed
but cannot be spotted in one of the previous categories (over,
short, target, or range correct).
· LOST. This describes a round whose location cannot be
determined.
· LOST OVER or LOST SHORT. These terms are used for a
round that is not observed but that is definitely known to be
beyond or short of the adjusting point.

8-52. Any range spotting other than “DOUBTFUL” or “LOST” is


definite. Usually, an adjusting round’s burst that is on or near the OT line
will give a definite range spotting. The observer can make a definite
range spotting even when the burst is not on or near the OT line. He uses
his knowledge of the terrain or wind and observes debris scattered by the
impact; however, if the observer is not sure (“DOUBTFUL”), the
correction he sends to the FDC should be for deviation (“LEFT” or
“RIGHT”) only. This is done to bring the burst on line to get a definite
range spotting (“OVER, ” “SHORT, ” or “TARGET”).

RANGE CORRECTION
Bracketing
8-53. In this technique, the observer gives range corrections so that,
with each successive correction, the adjusting round intentionally lands
over or short of the adjusting point, closing on the target. Fire for effect is
called for when a range correction would bring the next round within 50
meters of the adjusting point. (See Figure 8-15.)
8-54. Successive bracketing is a safe technique in that it is sure to bring
fire on the target. Time is important, especially when targets are moving
or may move to seek cover when they find fire coming their way. Accurate
initial location information speeds adjustment and makes the requested

8-20
___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support

fire more effective. To shorten adjustment time, the observer should try to
bracket the target quickly (in the first two or three adjusting rounds),
then try to adjust on the target with as few subsequent rounds as
possible.

Figure 8-15. Bracketing

Hasty Bracketing
8-55. Experience has shown that effectiveness on the target decreases
as the number of rounds used in adjustment increases. An alternative to
successive bracketing is hasty bracketing. While successive bracketing
mathematically ensures that the fire-for-effect rounds will strike within
50 meters of the adjusting point, it is a slow and unresponsive technique.
Therefore, if the nature of the target dictates that effective fires are
needed faster than successive bracketing can provide them, hasty

8-21
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

bracketing should be used. The success of hasty bracketing depends on a


thorough terrain analysis that gives the observer an accurate initial
target location. The observer obtains a bracket on his first correction in a
manner similar to that used for successive bracketing. Once the observer
has this initial bracket, he uses it as a yardstick to determine his
subsequent correction. He then sends the FDC the correction to move the
rounds to the target and fire for effect. Hasty bracketing improves as the
observer gains experience and judgment. Every observer must strive to
improve his abilities and increase his responsiveness on the battlefield.

Creeping
8-56. The creeping method of adjustment is used in “DANGER CLOSE”
situations. Here, the initial round is fired beyond the target. Adjusting
rounds are brought in 100 meters or less until the target is engaged. This
method is slow and tends to use more ammunition than other
adjustments; therefore, it should be used only when soldier safety is a
major concern.

REFINEMENT AND SURVEILLANCE


8-57. The observer should note the results of the fire for effect and then
take whatever action is necessary to complete the mission. Figure 8-16
shows the observer’s actions after fire-for-effect rounds have been fired.

Figure 8-16. Observer's Actions after Fire for Effect

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FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION MEASURES


8-58. Once established, fire support coordination measures (FSCM) are
displayed on maps, firing charts, and overlays and are stored in
computers. Graphic portrayal includes, as a minimum, the visual code,
the abbreviation for the measure, the establishing headquarters, and the
effective date-time group (DTG). Often, the DTG is shown as a from-to
time. Usually, coordination measures are labeled at each end of a line or
within the graphic, space permitting. Both the graphics and the lettering
are in black for all measures.
8-59. With the exception of boundaries, FSCMs are either permissive or
restrictive. In essence, the primary purpose of a permissive measure is to
facilitate the attack of targets. The establishment of a restrictive measure
imposes certain requirements for specific coordination before the
engagement of those targets affected by the measure; therefore, the
primary purpose of a restrictive measure is to safeguard friendly forces.

PERMISSIVE MEASURES
Coordinated Fire Line
8-60. The CFL is a line beyond which conventional or improved
conventional indirect fire means (mortars, FA, and NGF) may fire at any
time within the zone of the establishing headquarters without additional
coordination. It covers surface-to-surface fires only. The purpose of the
CFL is to expedite the attack of targets beyond it. Usually, a brigade or a
division establishes the CFL, but a maneuver battalion may also establish
it. It is located as close to the establishing unit as is possible, without
interfering with maneuver forces, to open up the area beyond to fire
support. There is no requirement for the CFL to be placed on identifiable
terrain; however, additional considerations include the limits of ground
observation, the location of the initial objectives in the offense, and the
requirement for maximum flexibility of both maneuver and the delivery
of supporting fires. Higher headquarters may consolidate subordinate
CFLs.
8-61. A dashed black line graphically portrays the CFL, with the
notation “CFL” followed by the establishing headquarters (brigade or
division) in parentheses above the line and a date-time group below the
line. Locations for CFLs are disseminated by message and/or overlay
through both maneuver and fire support channels to higher, lower,
adjacent maneuver, and supporting units. (See Figure 8-17.)

Figure 8-17. Coordinated Fire Line

Fire Support Coordination Line


8-62. The FSCL facilitates the rapid attack of targets of opportunity
beyond the coordination measure. It is a line established and adjusted by

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

the appropriate land or amphibious force commander within his


boundaries in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and
affected commanders. In the Army, this is usually the corps commander;
in amphibious operations, it is usually the commander of the landing
force (CLF) after coordination with the commander, amphibious task
force (CATF). Forces attacking targets beyond an FSCL must inform all
affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to
avoid fratricide, both in the air and on the ground. Supporting elements
may attack targets beyond the FSCL, provided the attack will not
produce adverse effects on, or to the rear of, the line that may affect
current tactical operations. The FSCL is used to coordinate all fires of air,
ground, or sea weapons systems using any type of ammunition against
surface targets. The FSCL should follow well-defined terrain features to
ease identification from the air.

8-63. The FSCL is not a boundary. The synchronization of operations


on either side of the FSCL is the responsibility of the establishing
commander out to the limits of the land or amphibious force boundary.

8-64. The decision on where to place an FSCL or even whether to use it


requires careful consideration. If used, its location is based on estimates
of the situation and the concept of operations. Location of threat forces,
anticipated rates of movement, weapons capabilities, and tempo of the
operation are considered in the commander’s estimate, along with other
factors deemed appropriate. The FSCL is normally positioned closer to
the forward line of own troops (FLOT) in the defense than in the offense.
The exact positioning is situation-dependent.

8-65. Land or amphibious force commanders attempt to establish the


FSCL at sufficient depth so as not to limit high-tempo maneuver. FSCLs
established at sufficient depth assist them in easing the coordination
requirements for attack operations within their area of operations by
forces not under their control, such as NGF. (NOTE: The FSCL is a
term oriented to air-land operations; there is no similar term used at sea.)

8-66. An associated benefit of employing an FSCL is the reduction in


potential for fratricide. Short of an FSCL, the appropriate land or
amphibious force commander controls all air-to-ground and surface-to-
surface attack operations.
8-67. Coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL is especially critical to
commanders of air, land, and special operations forces. They employ
restrictive measures to improve the protection of friendly forces operating
beyond the FSCL or planning to maneuver on that territory in the future.
Coordination is also important when attacking forces employ wide-area
munitions or munitions with delayed effects. Finally, this coordination
assists in avoiding conflicting or redundant attack operations. In
exceptional circumstances, the inability to conduct this coordination will
not preclude the attack of targets beyond the FSCL; however, failure to
conduct coordination may increase the risk of fratricide and could waste
limited resources.

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8-68. The land or amphibious force commander adjusts the location of


the FSCL as required to keep pace with operations. In high-tempo
maneuver operations, the FSCL may change every few hours. The
establishing commander quickly transmits the change to higher, lower,
adjacent, and supporting headquarters to ensure attack operations are
properly coordinated. Anticipated adjustments to the FSCL are normally
transmitted to other elements of the joint force sufficiently early to reduce
potential disruptions in their current and near-term operations. (See
Figure 8-18.)

Figure 8-18. Fire Support Coordination Line

Free Fire Area


8-69. The FFA is a specific area into which any weapon system may fire
without additional coordination with the establishing headquarters. It is
used to expedite fires and to facilitate the jettison of munitions when
aircraft are unable to drop them on a target area. Usually, a division or
higher commander establishes the FFA. It is located on identifiable
terrain when possible or by grid designation when necessary. It is
disseminated through both maneuver and fire support channels. Aircraft
operations in a FFA may be extremely hazardous since there is no
deconfliction of fires into the FFA. (See Figure 8-19.)

FFA
1ST CORPS
080800-081200Z AUG
OR
EFF 080800Z AUG

Figure 8-19. Free Fire Area

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

RESTRICTIVE MEASURES
No-Fire Area
8-70. The NFA is an area into which no fires or effects of fires are
allowed. There are two exceptions:

· When the establishing headquarters approves fires


temporarily within the NFA on a mission-by-mission basis.
· When a threat force within the NFA engages a friendly force.
In this situation, the commander may engage the threat to
defend his force.

8-71. The purpose of the NFA is to prohibit fires or their effects in the
area. Usually a division or corps establishes NFAs. NFAs are normally on
easily identifiable terrain; however, they may be located by grid or by a
radius (in meters) from a center point. Like other FSCMs, the location of
an NFA is disseminated through both maneuver and fire support
channels to concerned levels. (See Figure 8-20.)

Figure 8-20. No-Fire Area

Restrictive Fire Area


8-72. The RFA is an area in which specific restrictions are imposed and
in which fires that exceed those restrictions will not be delivered without
coordination with the establishing headquarters. The purpose of the RFA
is to regulate fires into an area according to the stated restrictions.
Maneuver battalion or higher echelons of command establish the RFA,
although on occasion, a company operating independently may establish
one. Usually, the RFA is located on identifiable terrain, by a grid, or by
radius (in meters) from a center point. Its location is disseminated in the
same manner as that of the CFL. Restrictions may be shown on a map or
overlay, or reference can be made to an OPORD stating the restrictions.
RFAs are suited for aircraft operations since fires into an RFA can be
controlled and deconflicted from the aircraft. (See Figure 8-21.)

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Figure 8-21. Restrictive Fire Area

Restrictive Fire Line


8-73. The RFL is a line established between converging friendly forces
(one or both may be moving) that prohibits fires or the effects of fires
across the line without coordination with the affected force. The purpose
of the line is to prevent interference between the converging friendly
forces. The commander common to the converging forces establishes it. Its
location is disseminated in the same manner as that of a CFL. (See
Figure 8-22.)

Figure 8-22. Restrictive Fire Line

Airspace Coordination Area


8-74. The ACA is a block of airspace in the target area in which friendly
aircraft are reasonably safe from surface fires. Occasionally, it may be a
formal measure (a three-dimensional box in the sky); more commonly, it
is an informal space. The purpose of the ACA is to allow the simultaneous
attack of targets near each other by multiple fire support means, one of
which normally is an airborne asset. For example, aircraft, FA, and NGF
can attack the same target complex or targets close to one another while
operating within the parameters of an established ACA.
8-75. Implementation of the formal ACA takes a significant amount of
time; therefore, informal ACAs are most often used and are the preferred

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

method. The informal ACA can be established by using time, lateral


separation, or altitude to provide separation between surface-to-surface
and air-delivered fires. An example would be to designate a road as the
lateral separation feature, with air support then directed to stay north of
the road and FA and NGF restricted to airspace and targets south of the
road. The informal ACA established at task force or higher level is
normally temporary in nature and is not normally displayed on maps,
charts, or overlays.
8-76. Occasionally, there may be a requirement for a separate brigade
or higher-level commander to establish a formal ACA. The FSE with the
Army airspace command and control (A2C2) element and the FDC
coordinates the location of the ACA. It is located above the target area as
recommended to the FSE by the air liaison element. The type of aircraft
and the ordnance in use dictates the size of the area.
8-77. Vital information defining the formal ACA includes minimum and
maximum altitudes, a baseline designated by grid coordinates at each
end, the width (either side of the baseline), and the effective times.
Information concerning the area is disseminated in the same way as for
the CFL. (See Figure 8-23.)

Figure 8-23. Airspace Coordination Area

SECTION II – UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

NOTE: A detailed discussion later in this chapter outlines helicopter support available to
the reconnaissance platoon from Army aviation assets.

THE UAV PLATOON


8-78. The UAV platoon, which is led by a lieutenant, consists of four
TUAVs. It includes a headquarters element, a mission planning team,

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two ground control teams, a launch and recovery section, and a


maintenance team. Its primary mission is to conduct ISR missions. Recce
platoons in RSTA squadrons must establish a close working relationship
with the surveillance troop’s UAV platoon. In addition, reconnaissance
platoons that are not part of RSTA squadrons must also understand UAV
support capabilities so they can take advantage of this asset if available.
8-79. Through their mobility and speed, TUAVs provide the ground
commander or reconnaissance platoon leader with flexible, versatile
platforms that are suitable for employment in numerous types of
situations and operations. Employment of TUAVs can increase the speed
with which reconnaissance is conducted. These aircraft are also useful in
screening between and forward of OPs established by the platoon.

SENSOR CAPABILITIES
8-80. Several types of imagery sensors are available for use on TUAVs,
although sensors are currently limited to electro-optical (EO) and
infrared (IR). Each sensor has unique capabilities, with distinct
advantages and disadvantages. Table 8-5 is a matrix of characteristics for
the EO and IR sensors currently available. (NOTE: Additional types of
sensors and other TUAV payloads are currently under development and
may be fielded as their respective technologies mature.)

Table 8-5. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Sensor Characteristics

SENSOR TYPE ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES

· Best tool for detailed analysis during · Can be deceived by employment of


Electro-optical daytime and clear weather. camouflage and concealment
(visible light) · Affords a familiar view of a scene. techniques.
· Offers system resolution that cannot be · Restricted by weather conditions;
achieved with other optical systems, visible light cannot penetrate clouds or
thermal images, or radar. fog.
· Preferred for detailed analysis and · Restricted by terrain and vegetation.
mensuration.
· Limited to daytime use only.
· Offers stereoscopic viewing.

· Best tool for detailed analysis in · Not effective during thermal crossover
Infrared darkness with clear weather. (1 to 1.5 hours after sunrise or sunset).
· Passive sensor that is impossible to · Tactical platforms (TUAVs) can be
jam. threatened by threat air defenses.
· Offers camouflage penetration.
· Bad weather degrades quality of
· Provides good resolution. sensor images.
· Offers nighttime imaging capability.

RELATIONSHIP OF THE UAV PLATOON


AND THE RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON
8-81. TUAVs are a significant asset in support of the ground
commander’s requirements for his scouts. When operating with ground
scouts, the platoon is normally OPCON to the squadron or battalion. To
be successful, however, the UAV platoon must communicate and
coordinate directly with the most forward ground scouts.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

8-82. Complementing ground scouts with the UAV platoon maximizes


the capabilities of both elements while minimizing their limitations.
When it works with the reconnaissance platoon, the UAV platoon
normally operates forward of the ground elements (see Figure 8-24). The
exact distances are determined through a thorough METT-TC analysis.
8-83. In a complementary relationship, the UAV and reconnaissance
platoons are assigned different objectives or tasks; they work
independently as required to support their common commander. This
permits more tasks or separate missions to be accomplished
simultaneously. Often, the UAV platoon complements ground scouts by
performing missions to the flank of or adjacent to the reconnaissance
platoon (as illustrated in Figure 8-25). In addition, the UAV platoon may
provide the scouts with valuable reconnaissance information acquired
during flights to and from its objective.

Figure 8-24. UAV Platoon Operating Forward of a Recce Platoon

Figure 8-25. UAV Platoon Operating on the Flank of a Recce Platoon

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COMMAND AND CONTROL


8-84. C2 is essential to effective air-ground coordination. The command
relationship is particularly critical when air and ground elements are
complementing each other’s operations. Two different command
relationships can be used to coordinate the efforts of the UAV platoon and
the reconnaissance platoon: the reconnaissance platoon under OPCON of
the surveillance troop commander (this primarily applies to the recce
platoon) or both the reconnaissance platoon and the UAV platoon
working independently for a common higher commander.
8-85. Although air elements are not placed OPCON to the
reconnaissance platoon, the ground scouts and the UAV platoon must
closely coordinate their actions. The situation will determine whether the
air mission commander is the UAV platoon leader or the surveillance
troop commander in the RSTA squadron.

RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON OPCON TO THE SURVEILLANCE TROOP


COMMANDER
8-86. The OPCON relationship is used when the reconnaissance
platoon is operating separately from its parent unit with the surveillance
troop commander. The platoon has the preponderance of combat power,
leadership, and C2 resources in the area of operations.

RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON AND UAV PLATOON UNDER CONTROL


OF A COMMON COMMANDER
8-87. This relationship is the most common and is usually the most
effective. The reconnaissance platoon and UAV platoon operate
independently, allowing each to freely and quickly employ its elements to
take maximum advantage of their unique capabilities. Further, the next
higher common commander can ensure that guidance is provided to both
the UAV platoon and ground scouts so their efforts are coordinated.
8-88. In this relationship, informal coordination also occurs directly
between the reconnaissance platoon and the UAV platoon. This is done
over the reconnaissance platoon net.

RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS
8-89. When the UAV platoon complements the reconnaissance platoon
during reconnaissance operations, the air assets, as noted, normally
operate 1 to 10 kilometers forward of the scouts, dependent on METT-TC.
The UAV platoon can conduct detailed reconnaissance of areas that are
particularly dangerous to ground reconnaissance elements, such as open
areas and defiles. Upon contact, the UAV platoon provides early warning
for the trailing reconnaissance platoon and then maintains contact until
the reconnaissance platoon moves up for handover.

SECURITY OPERATIONS
8-90. The UAV platoon can complement the reconnaissance platoon
during security operations by assisting in identifying threat
reconnaissance and main body elements and providing early warning
forward of the scouts. In addition to acquiring threat elements, TUAVs

8-31
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

can play a critical role in providing security through the depth of the
screen by observing dead space between ground OPs.
8-91. Because of the range of its sensors, the UAV platoon does not
require positions forward of the reconnaissance platoon to acquire threat
elements. The preferred practice, however, is still to position the aerial
OPs forward of the ground OPs to provide added depth to the screen,
especially during daylight operations. During limited visibility, aerial
OPs may be deployed slightly to the rear of ground elements. Ultimately,
positioning of the UAV platoon will always depend on the specific METT-
TC situation. See Figure 8-26, which illustrates positioning of the UAV
platoon.

Figure 8-26. TUAVs Complementing a Ground Screen

AREA SECURITY
8-92. The UAV platoon can complement the reconnaissance platoon
during area security missions by screening or conducting reconnaissance.
An air screen can provide early warning for a reconnaissance platoon
executing a convoy escort mission or securing a critical point (see Figure
8-27). TUAVs can identify threat ambush positions forward of the convoy
or find bypasses the convoy can use to move around an obstacle (as
illustrated in Figure 8-28).

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___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support

Figure 8-27. TUAVs Screening for a Recce Platoon

Figure 8-28. TUAVs Feconnoitering for a Bypass

AIR-GROUND RECONNAISSANCE HANDOVER


8-93. When the UAV platoon makes contact, particularly during
reconnaissance operations, it will update its FBCB2 and will hand over
the contact to the ground scouts via FM as quickly as possible. A speedy
handover allows the TUAVs to avoid threat air defense weapons and also
helps to maintain the tempo of the operation.
8-94. During the handover, the UAV platoon is in charge and provides
direction to the ground section or squad charged with establishing contact
with the threat. The UAV platoon also is responsible for ensuring the
protection of both ground and air assets in that it must maintain contact
with the threat until the ground unit is in position and has also
established contact.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

8-95. The first action in the handover process is a SPOTREP and a


SITREP from the UAV platoon/team leader to the ground section or
squad leader (see Figure 8-29A). These reports are sent by FM voice
(when immediate communications are necessary) or FBCB2 (when time is
available to use the digital system). Next, the UAV platoon reconnoiters
the area for secure positions for the ground scouts. If possible, the UAV
platoon identifies hide positions, overwatch positions, OP positions, and
mounted and dismounted routes into the area (see Figure 8-29B).

Figure 8-29A. Air-Ground Reconnaissance Handover

Figure 8-29B. Air-Ground Reconnaissance Handover


(Continued)

8-96. The ground section or squad moves to its initial hide positions
along the route selected by the UAV platoon. Scouts then move
dismounted to make contact with the threat. Once contact is established,
the ground leader sends a SPOTREP to the air mission commander via
FM or FBCB2. When the UAV platoon/team leader confirms that the
ground scouts can observe all threat elements and have a clear picture of

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the situation, he announces that handover is complete; the ground section


or squad leader acknowledges the transmission.
8-97. After handover is completed, the UAV platoon may, if directed,
break contact and continue its follow-on missions. As noted previously,
the reconnaissance handover sequence may be executed on the
reconnaissance platoon’s internal frequency (see Figure 8-29C.)

Figure 8-29C. Air-Ground Reconnaissance


Handover (Continued)

SECTION III – COMBAT ENGINEERS

8-98. The commander will decide how best to use attached engineer
assets. He has several options for engineer employment: as a distinct
unit, attached to the higher unit’s subordinate elements, or in DS of the
subordinate elements. The basic engineer unit with which the
reconnaissance platoon is likely to operate is a sapper squad from a
combat engineer platoon. A parallel consideration is that sapper-qualified
scouts enhance reconnaissance platoon capabilities and can provide
support to attached engineer assets.
8-99. In offensive operations, engineers are task organized to maneuver
units using the breaching operation planning process, based on templated
and confirmed threat obstacles. One technique is to attach engineers to a
troop or company team in a mobility team configuration. In the defense,
commanders generally keep engineer units centralized; this allows the
engineers to mass their effort during countermobility operations and to
focus on their established priorities of work.
8-100. Engineers are prepared to reorganize and fight as infantry as a
secondary mission; however, they are employed as infantry only as a last
resort because of resource limitations. Only commanders who maintain a
command relationship with engineer elements can make this decision.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

ENGINEER SUPPORT IN RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS


8-101. In reconnaissance operations, an engineer reconnaissance team
may be placed in DS to a reconnaissance platoon. The engineers should
remain attached to the platoon for the duration of the reconnaissance.
The engineer team’s primary objective is to collect OBSTINTEL and
report the information back to the squadron/battalion engineer to
facilitate breach planning and preparation. The engineer team may
perform the following functions:

· Conduct limited reduction of obstacles, such as log cribs,


abatises, and minefields. The actual reduction capabilities of
the engineer reconnaissance team are limited to manual and
explosive methods. Scouts must provide security for the
engineer team while it reduces obstacles.
· Conduct tactical or technical reconnaissance.
· Conduct route and bridge classification.
· Assist in locating and marking bypasses around obstacles.
· Identify the exact composition and dimensions of an obstacle.
· Identify breach points and points of penetration.

8-102. Engineers conduct tactical reconnaissance in the offense as part


of the combined arms team reconnaissance effort; normally, they are
attached to reconnaissance elements to facilitate C2 and logistical
support. The engineers’ key tactical reconnaissance objective is to provide
the commander with OBSINTEL within the area of operations. This
information, combined with intelligence obtained by the scouts, allows the
brigade to maneuver more effectively against the threat. It tells the
commander whether a bypass is possible or, if not, how to conduct
breaching operations with the right equipment at the right location.
8-103. Engineers conduct technical reconnaissance to collect specialized
information about a designated target, area, or route. This mission is
usually conducted under a low level of threat in areas physically
controlled by friendly forces to the rear of the FLOT. The technical
reconnaissance mission is normally a specified task from higher
headquarters or is derived from mission analysis.
8-104. Whenever possible, engineer elements should have a habitual
relationship with the scouts to whom they are attached. They should be
task organized with the reconnaissance platoon as early as possible in an
operation so they can be integrated into the platoon leader’s troop-leading
procedures, rehearsals, OPORD, and movement plans.

ENGINEER SUPPORT IN SECURITY OPERATIONS


8-105. In security operations, the reconnaissance platoon does not
usually have any engineer assets operating under its control. Engineer
assets normally work under squadron/battalion or troop control. The
platoon leader must have access to the squadron/battalion or troop
obstacle plan, including the locations of lanes and gaps.
8-106. The reconnaissance platoon may interact with the engineers in
several roles during security operations. The platoon may be designated
to observe NAIs to trigger scatterable mine missions, overwatch

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obstacles, and call for indirect fires. It also may be designated to guard,
execute, and overwatch reserve demolition targets that engineers have
prepared. The process by which the platoon assumes responsibility for the
targets is called target turnover. Refer to FM 3-34-214 (FM 5-250) for
detailed instructions for completing target turnover reports. A summary
of procedures and considerations for this mission is as follows:

· Prior face-to-face coordination between the senior member of


the emplacing unit (normally an engineer squad leader) and
the demolition guard force commander (normally a
reconnaissance squad leader) speeds the turnover process.
Prior coordination is always conducted if the tactical situation
permits.
· The senior member of the emplacing unit must require
positive identification from the demolition guard commander.
This may be by means of sign/countersign procedures or by
personal recognition.
· Once identification is established, the emplacing unit gives
the demolition guard commander a completed target folder for
the target being turned over. The folder contains orders to the
demolition guard commander (and to the firing party
commander, if one is separately designated). The demolition
guard commander reviews the orders to ensure he thoroughly
understands them and then signs the orders.
· The senior member of the emplacing unit then describes the
obstacle in detail to the demolition guard commander.
· Once the demolition guard commander fully understands his
responsibilities and he (or the firing party commander, if
applicable) is capable of executing the target, the emplacing
unit may depart to conduct further operations.

SECTION IV – AIR DEFENSE

8-107. There are no air defense assets organic to squadrons or


battalions. Consequently, the reconnaissance platoon must be able to
protect itself from threat air attacks during all combat operations.
Passive air defense measures employed by the platoon include actions to
avoid detection and air attack and actions to limit the damage if attacked.
If necessary, the platoon takes active air defense measures to fight back
against the threat aircraft.
8-108. The platoon must be aware when the threat is employing airborne
reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA)
systems that can detect and pinpoint the location of friendly ground
forces. These systems emphasize rapid downlink of collected information
to artillery and tactical ballistic missile (TBM) fire control centers and to
threat maneuver forces.
8-109. Armed utility and attack helicopters are the principal threat CAS
weapon systems. They pose a major threat to the platoon and other

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

friendly forces. The threat may also employ TUAVs to accomplish RISTA,
attack, and deception missions; the TUAVs’ small size and radar cross
section and their ability to fly low and slow make them very difficult to
detect track and engage.

PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE


8-110. Passive air defense is the reconnaissance platoon’s first line of
defense against threat air attack and TUAVs. It includes all measures,
other than active defense, taken to minimize the effects of hostile air
action. There are two types of passive air defense: attack avoidance and
damage-limiting measures.

ATTACK AVOIDANCE
8-111. If the threat pilot cannot find you, he cannot attack you. Scouts
use concealment, camouflage, deception, and any other necessary action
to prevent the threat from seeing them. When they are moving, they must
also make effective use of air guards to provide early warning of threat
aircraft to allow the platoon to avoid detection.
8-112. Reconnaissance positions must provide effective concealment.
One technique is to position vehicles inside woodlines and erase vehicle
track marks leading to the woods. When concealment is not available,
however, vehicles must be camouflaged to blend into the natural
surroundings. All shiny objects that could reflect light and attract
attention must be covered.

DAMAGE-LIMITING MEASURES
8-113. Dispersion is one of the most effective ways to reduce the effects
of threat air attack. It is essential when a unit is occupying static
positions such as an assembly area or is preparing to cross a water
obstacle or a breached obstacle. When the platoon is on the move and air
guards identify a threat air attack, vehicles disperse quickly, move to
concealed positions if possible, and stop (a stationary vehicle is more
difficult to see than a moving vehicle).
8-114. Another measure is the use of natural or man-made cover to
reduce the effects of threat munitions. Folds in the earth, depressions,
buildings, and sandbagged positions can provide this protection.

ACTIVE AIR DEFENSE


8-115. Although passive measures are the first line of defense against air
attack, the platoon must be prepared to engage threat aircraft. The
decision to fight back against an air threat is based on the situation and
the capabilities of organic weapon systems. (NOTE: All platoon
members must understand that they can defend against a direct attack
but cannot engage aircraft that are not attacking them unless the
applicable weapons control status allows it.)
8-116. Scouts may have one of several weapon systems (chain guns,
machine guns, and small arms) that can be used against aircraft when
they must fight back. Engaging aircraft with volume fire is the key to
effective use of small arms and machine gun fires against an air attack.
These fires must be coordinated to be effective. Delivered on the platoon
leader’s command, they are directed at an aim point in front of the target
(see Figure 8-30); gunners do not attempt to track the target. Figure 8-31

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___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support

lists guidelines for selecting aim points. These procedures are simple and
logical; they must be learned and retained by everyone in the platoon.
8-117. Vehicle commanders should instruct their gunners to fire 20- to
25-round bursts at a high rate to sustain the proper volume of fire when
engaging aerial platforms. Accurate target identification is essential in
determining which type of ammunition to employ.

Figure 8-30. Aim Points

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure 8-31. Guidelines for Selecting Aim Points

SHORT-RANGE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS


8-118. Although other short-range air defense (SHORAD) systems
support divisional units, reconnaissance platoons with dedicated ADA
systems are most likely to be supported by MANPADS. Figure 8-32 shows
the Stinger MANPADS, which is designed to counter high-performance,
low-level, ground attack aircraft; helicopters; and observation and
transport aircraft.
8-119. The Stinger missile system employs a two-man crew (crew chief
and gunner). The MANPADS crew will normally have a wheeled vehicle
(HMMWV) as its assigned transportation. Unit leaders must carefully
consider the consequences before separating a Stinger team from its
vehicle. Stinger teams operating away from their vehicles have no more
than two missiles available for resupply.

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___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support

Figure 8-32. Stinger Air Defense System

8-120. If the brigade has an attached SHORAD battery, the platoon will
receive early warning alerts from the battery and its elements. The
SHORAD C3I Sentinel radar can broadcast early warning of threat air
activity to SHORAD elements (battery, platoon, section), FA fire units, and
air defense LOs. The battery then provides voice early warning on the
brigade command net. When METT-TC permits, the SHORAD platoon may
provide voice early warning to maneuver battalions.
8-121. The C3I Sentinel provides 360-degree detection capability for
various air tracks (rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, TUAVs, and cruise
missiles) to a range of 40 kilometers. Normally OPCON to the respective
SHORAD battery commander, it should be integrated into the R&S plan
in accordance with the IPB.

SECTION V – AVIATION SUPPORT

FIXED-WING SUPPORT
8-122. The US Air Force (USAF), Navy, and Marine Corps provide the
Army with five types of fixed-wing air support:

· Close air support (CAS).


· Combat air reconnaissance.
· Tactical airlift.
· Electronic combat.
· Air interdiction.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

CAS EMPLOYMENT AND CAPABILITIES


8-123. The reconnaissance platoon primarily needs to understand the
terminology and concepts for CAS, which is defined as air attacks on
hostile ground forces that are in close proximity of friendly troops. CAS
can be employed to blunt a threat attack, support the momentum of the
ground attack, or provide cover for friendly movements. Nomination of
CAS targets is the responsibility of the commander, air liaison officer, and
S3 at each level; however, the input received from the platoon leader is
very valuable. To make an educated recommendation to the commander
regarding the use of CAS aircraft, the platoon leader must know the
characteristics of the aircraft predominantly used in the CAS role. Table
8-6 outlines characteristics and capabilities of fixed-wing aircraft
available for CAS.

Table 8-6. Characteristics and Capabilities of Fixed-Wing Aircraft

AIRCRAFT SERVICE CHARACTERISTICS (Typical Munitions)

USMC, USN VSTOL CAS aircraft; subsonic; typical load 4,000 lbs. Maximum load
AV-8B1
9,200 lbs; 25-mm Gatling gun.
A-10 or USAF, USAF Specialized CAS aircraft; subsonic; typical load 6,000 lbs. Maximum
O/A-101 Res, USAF NG load 16,000 lbs; 30-mm gun.

USAF Multi-role aircraft; priority is air-to-ground; supersonic; maximum load


F-15E
24,500 lbs; 20mm cannon w/ 512 rounds.
Multi-role aircraft; complements the F-15 in an air-to-air role; most
F-161 USAF, USAF
Res, USAF NG accurate air to ground delivery system in the inventory; supersonic;
typical load 6,000 lbs. Maximum load 10,500 lbs.
Multi-role fighter; wide variety of air-to-surface weapons; typical load
F/A-181 USN, USMC
7,000 lbs. maximum load 17,000 lbs; 20-mm gun mounted in the nose
and air-to-air missiles.
Specialized CAS/RACO aircraft, propeller driven, two models. The A
AC-1301 USAF, USAF
Res model is equipped with two 40-mm guns, two 20-mm guns, and two
7.62-mm miniguns. The H model is similar, except it has no 7.62
miniguns and one of the 40-mm guns is replaced with a 105-mm
howitzer. Both models have advanced sensors and target acquisition
system including forward-looking infrared and low-light TV. Weapons
employment accuracy is outstanding. This aircraft is vulnerable to threat
air defense systems and must operate in a low ADA threat environment.
1
Aircraft with FM communications.
NOTE: Typical load is average load for typical support mission; maximum load is the amount the aircraft can
carry in an ideal situation.

8-124. The platoon may also receive CAS (or related support known as
aviation close fires, or ACF) from Army or Marine helicopters. Refer to
the discussion of attack helicopter support later in this section.

CAS BRIEFING FORM


8-125. Air Force and Marine Corps personnel have the primary
responsibility for requesting and controlling their respective service’s
aircraft. If no personnel augmentation by the other services is available,
however, the reconnaissance platoon must employ organic fire support
personnel as its primary means of coordinating and controlling CAS
aircraft.

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8-126. If Air Force or Marine personnel do not augment the platoon to


assist in controlling CAS, the platoon should use a CAS briefing form. An
example is shown in Figure 8-33.

CAS Briefing Form (9-Line)


Omit data not required. Do not transmit line numbers. Units of measure are standard unless
otherwise specified. An asterisk (*) denotes minimum essential items in limited communications
environment. Bold denotes read-back items when requested.

Terminal controller: "___________________, this is ________________________"


(aircraft call sign) (terminal controller)
* 1. IP/BP: "___________________________________________________"

* 2. Heading: "____________________________________________" (magnetic).


(IP/BP to target)

Offset: "________________________________________________ (left/right)"

* 3. Distance: "______________________________________________________"
(IP-to-target in nautical miles/BP-to-target in meters)

* 4. Target elevation: "___________________________________" (in feet MSL)

* 5. Target description: "_____________________________________________"

* 6. Target location: "________________________________________________"


(latitude/longitude or grid coordinates or offsets or visual)

7. Type mark: "______________________ " Code: " ______________________"


(WP, laser, IR, beacon) (actual code)

* 8. Location of friendly forces: "______________________________________"

Position marked by: "______________________________________________

9. Egress: "_________________________________________________________"

Remarks (as appropriate): "_____________________________________________"


(threats, restrictions, danger close, attack clearance, SEAD, abort codes, hazards)

NOTE: For AC-130 employment, lines 5, 6, and 8 are mandatory briefing items. Remarks should
also include detailed threat description, marking method of friendly locations (including magnetic
bearing and distance in meters from the friendly position to the target, if available), identifiable
ground features, danger close acceptance.

Time on target (TOT): "_____________________________________________"


OR
Time to target (TTT): "Stand by ______________ plus ______________, Hack."

Figure 8-33. Close Air Support Briefing Form.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

ATTACK HELICOPTER SUPPORT


AIRCRAFT WEAPON SYSTEMS

8-127. Table 8-7 provides a comparison of the weapon systems,


ammunition capacities, and weapons ranges for the AH-64A Apache, AH-
64D Longbow Apache, and OH-58D Kiowa Warrior attack helicopters.
(NOTE: The table also lists weaponry for the AH-1 Cobra, which is no
longer in the active Army inventory, and the AH-1W, a version of the
Cobra employed by the US Marine Corps.)

Table 8-7. Helicopter Weapon Systems

WEAPON Hellfire Air-to-air 2.75-inch Caliber .50 20-mm 30-mm


SYSTEM or missiles (70-mm) machine gun cannon chain gun
TOW ** rockets (rounds) (rounds) (rounds)
AIRCRAFT TYPE * ***
AH-1 **** 8 TOW 76 750
8 TOW or 2
AH-1W **** 76 750
8 Hellfire Sidewinder
AH-64A ***** 16 Hellfire 76 1,200
16 Hellfire/
AH-64D ***** 4 Stinger 76 1,200
Hellfire II
OH-58D **** ***** 4 Hellfire 4 Stinger 14 500
Hellfire
WEAPONS RANGE 8 km max 5+ km 8 km max 2 km max 2 km max 4 km max
TOW max
3,750 m max
NOTES: * Numbers in each column indicate the maximum load for each system. The total amount of
ordnance carried will vary based on METT-TC and the aircraft’s weapons configuration.
** The AH-1 uses the TOW missile as its armor engagement weapon rather than the Hellfire missile.
*** The AH-1W can carry a four-shot, 5-inch rocket pod.
**** One weapon system per side for Hellfire/TOW, air-to-air Stinger/Sidewinder, and 2.75-inch rocket.
***** Aircraft has a laser for target designation and an airborne target handover system (ATHS).

TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR AVIATION CLOSE FIRES


8-128. The platoon may require ACF on the battlefield. These are air
actions taken by rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in
close proximity to friendly ground forces. In most cases, Army attack
helicopters provide this support, which can be preplanned or provided on
request on an immediate or emergency basis. Both types of ACF
represent a powerful battlefield asset, capable of destroying threat
elements of varying sizes, including large armor formations.

NOTE: Most aspects of ACF employment and target effects are similar to those for CAS
that is provided by fixed-wing aircraft, in most cases from the US Air Force.
Because CAS entails specialized planning and request procedures, the
reconnaissance platoon normally will not be involved directly in obtaining this
support.

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___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support

Employment Considerations
8-129. Mission success in ACF employment is a function of two primary
factors. First, detailed coordination must be conducted between the aerial
attack team and the ground unit already engaged in close combat. Once
execution begins, there must be effective integration of the fires and
movement of both elements.

8-130. Planning and Reconnaissance. Planning for attack helicopter


support normally begins at squadron/battalion level or above. The
squadron/battalion provides the aviation brigade or task force with
information on locations, routes, and communications before the attack
team’s departure from its assembly area. As part of this effort, the
reconnaissance platoon may be tasked to provide information for ACF
employment. Scouts should familiarize themselves with the procedures
used to call for attack helicopter support. If attack helicopter assets are
working for their squadron/battalion, the scouts should be prepared to
provide suppressive fires on any known or suspected threat ADA
locations.
8-131. A critical element of the planning process is the procedures and
resources to be used in marking and identifying targets and friendly
positions; these factors must be considered thoroughly regardless of the
time available to the ground and air commanders. Refer to the discussion
of target identification and friendly position marking later in this section.
8-132. Coordination. The aerial attack team coordinates directly with
the lowest-level unit in contact on the ground troop FM command net.
Before the attack team launches the ACF operation, final coordination is
conducted with the attack helicopters in a concealed position known as
the aerial holding area. The holding area is a point in space within the
supported unit’s area of operations that is oriented toward the threat; it
allows the attack team to receive requests for immediate ACF and
expedite the attack. The aerial holding area may be an alternate BP
positioned out of range of the threat’s direct fire and indirect fire weapons
ranges.
8-133. Final coordination between the ground and helicopter units must
include agreement on methods of identifying and marking friendly and
threat positions. This should take advantage of the equipment and
capabilities of the attack team, including the forward-looking infrared
(FLIR) system, the thermal imaging system (TIS), and NVDs. (NOTE:
Refer to the discussion of target and friendly position identification and
marking later in this section.)
8-134. Coordination should also cover the BP and/or support by fire
positions to be used by the attack helicopters. These positions should be
offset from the ground maneuver unit to maximize the effects of the
attack team’s weapons and to minimize the risk of fratricide. To prevent
indirect fires within the sector or zone from posing a danger to the
helicopters, the ground commander should inform DS artillery and
organic mortars of the aerial positions.

Target Identification and Friendly Position Marking


8-135. In simplest terms, aircraft crews require positive identification of
targets and friendly positions before firing their weapons. Aircrews must

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

be able to easily observe and then to effectively identify the ground


signals marking targets and friendly positions. This capability is a critical
factor in reducing fratricide and maximizing the responsiveness and
accuracy of aerial fires. The proximity of friendly forces to targets on the
modern battlefield makes positive marking and identification especially
critical. This discussion addresses several factors that operators should
consider when marking targets and friendly positions; the equipment
covered includes target-marking devices, NVGs, FLIR, TIS, television
(TV) and EO systems, electronic beacons, and laser designators.

8-136. Planning Considerations. As noted, aircrews must work closely


with the ground forces to accomplish positive marking and identification
of targets and friendly positions. This coordination requires the ground
and air commanders to determine all required marking/identification
procedures based on several tactical factors:

· The signal, or combination of signals, to be used must be


generated using devices and items commonly carried by
ground maneuver units.
· Aircrews must be able to acquire signals using available
resources on the aircraft, including normal vision, NVDs, and
TISs.
· Signals must be recognizable by the aircrews.

8-137. All participants, ground and airborne, must clearly understand


the marking and identification procedures. They must also be issued the
appropriate devices and materials necessary to implement the marking
system. Accurate and detailed maps, charts, or other types of imagery
will assist the aircrews in learning the friendly ground scheme of
maneuver.

8-138. Marking/Identification Techniques. The methods used to


identify and mark targets and friendly positions are limited only by the
creativity of the ground forces and aircrews. Table 8-8 outlines a variety
of marking techniques. Ground and air commanders should use the table
as a reference, but they need not limit themselves only to these methods.
In any situation, marking methods must be adapted to the conditions
prevalent at the time. Positive air-to-ground communications are also
essential in coordinating and authenticating marking procedures.
8-139. Often, the simplest methods are the best. Traditional signaling
devices such as flares, strobes, and signaling mirrors may be quite
effective in marking friendly positions. Common signaling techniques
that can be used in target marking or orienting aircrews on threat
positions include smoke, laser pointers, and tracers.
8-140. Other devices are available to aid in the recognition of friendly
forces and equipment where the fluid tactical situation or the
intermingling of friendly and threat forces in the close fight makes
identification difficult. For example, the use of glint tape, combat
identification panels (CIP), and infrared beacons can assist in the clear
identification of friendly ground forces. (NOTE: Such factors as ground

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___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support

lighting, thermal contrast, and intermediate obstructions can influence


the effectiveness of these devices.)
8-141. All aerial crewmen and ground maneuver leaders should
understand the strengths and weaknesses of available aviation sensors
when employed in conjunction with a variety of target-marking
equipment and methods. Time permitting, attack aircraft may input a
target grid into the aircraft GPS/inertial navigation system (INS) to
provide fire control cues to the target (such as range, heading, and time);
these cues can result in quicker target acquisition and help to distinguish
friendly positions from targets and threat positions. (NOTE: Because
ACF missions may be “danger close” with short firing ranges, both
aircrews and ground forces should expect to have minimum tracking time
and thus minimum time to optimize the aircraft sensors.)

Table 8-8. Target and Friendly Position Marking Methods

METHOD DAY/ ASSETS FRIENDLY TARGET REMARKS


NIGHT MARKS MARKS

Easily identifiable. May compromise


SMOKE Day/night All Good Good friendly position, obscure target, or warn
of fire support employment. Structures
may make placement difficult.
Easily identifiable. May compromise
SMOKE (IR) Day/night All/ Good Good friendly position, obscure target, or
NVD at warn of fire support employment.
night Structures may make placement
difficult. Night marking is greatly
enhanced using IR reflective smoke.

GROUND BURST Day/night All N/A Good Easily identified. May wash out NVDs.
ILLUMINATION

Avoids compromise of friendly


SIGNAL MIRROR Day All Good N/A location. Dependent on weather and
available light and may be lost in
reflections from other reflective
surfaces (such as windshields,
windows, or water).
Highly visible to all. Compromises
SPOTLIGHT Night All Good Marginal friendly position and warns of fire
support employment. Effectiveness
dependent on degree of urban lighting.
Visible to all with NVDs. Less likely to
IR SPOTLIGHT Night All NVDs Good Marginal compromise than overt light.
Effectiveness dependent on degree of
urban lighting.

IR LASER
Effectiveness dependent on degree of
POINTER Night All NVDs Good Marginal
urban lighting.
(below .4 watts)

Less affected by ambient light and


IR LASER weather conditions. Highly effective
POINTER Night All NVDs Good Good
under all but the most highly lit or
(above .4 watts) worst weather conditions. IZLID-2 is
the current example.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Table 8-8. Target and Friendly Position Marking Methods (Continued)

METHOD DAY/ ASSETS FRIENDLY TARGET REMARKS


NIGHT MARKS MARKS

Highly visible to all. Risk of


VISUAL LASER Night All Good Marginal compromise is high. Effectiveness
dependent on degree of urban lighting.

PGM- or Highly effective with PGM. Because of


LASER Day/night N/A Good very restrictive laser acquisition cone,
DESIGNATOR LST-
equipped requires line of sight to target. May
require precoordination of laser codes.
May compromise position. May be
TRACERS Day/night All N/A Marginal difficult to distinguish marking rounds
from other gunfire. During daytime
use, may be more effective when used
to kick up dust surrounding target.
Easily masked by urban structures
CHEMICAL HEAT Day/night All FLIR Poor N/A and lost in thermal clutter. Difficult to
SOURCES acquire, but can be effective when
used to contrast cold background or
when ACFT indicates general location.

STROBE Visible by all. Effectiveness dependent


(OVERT) Night All Marginal N/A on degree of urban lighting.
Visible to all NVDs. Effectiveness
STROBE Night All NVDs Good N/A dependent up degree of urban lighting.
(IR) Coded strobes aid in acquisition.
Ideal friendly marking device for
ELECTRONIC Day/night See Excellent Good AC-130 and some USAF fixed-wing
BEACON remarks aircraft (not compatible with Navy or
Marine aircraft). Least impeded by
urban terrain. Can be used as a TRP
for target identification. Coordination
with aircrews essential to ensure
equipment and training compatibility.
Visible by all. Easily identified by
FLARE (OVERT) Day/night All Good N/A
aircrews.
Visible to all NVDs. Easily identified by
FLARE (IR) Night All NVDs Good N/A
aircrews.
Not readily detectable by threat. Very
GLINT/IR PANEL Night All NVDs Good N/A effective except in highly lit areas.

COMBAT Provides temperature contrast on


IDENTIFICATION Day/night All FLIR Good N/A vehicles or building. May be obscured
PANEL by urban terrain.

Only visible during daylight. Easily


VS-17 PANEL Day All Marginal N/A obscured by structures.
Provides unique signature. May be
SPINNING Night All Marginal N/A obscured by structures. Provides a
CHEM LIGHT distinct signature easily recognized.
(OVERT) Effectiveness dependent on degree of
urban lighting.

SPINNING Provides unique signature. May be


CHEM LIGHT Night All NVDs Marginal N/A obscured by structures. Effectiveness
(IR) dependent on degree of urban lighting.

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AIR/GROUND COORDINATION PROCEDURES FOR AVIATION CLOSE FIRES


8-142. Effective integration of air and ground assets begins with the
ground maneuver brigade. When the aviation brigade or task force
receives a mission to provide assistance to a ground unit engaged in close
combat and planning time is minimal, the brigade in contact should
provide the air unit with initial information on the situation. This
information should be sufficient to get the aviation attack team out of the
aviation tactical assembly area to a holding area for direct coordination.
The attack team is normally placed OPCON to the unit in contact.
Air/ground coordination consists of five major steps:

· Maneuver brigade planning requirements.


· Squadron/battalion close fight SITREP.
· Attack team check-in.
· Employment of aviation close fires.
· BDA/reattack.

NOTE: This discussion of air/ground coordination also focuses on other aspects of attack
aviation in the close fight, including aviation employment considerations and
coordination requirements for the maneuver brigade LO.

Step 1 – Maneuver Brigade Planning Requirements


8-143. The maneuver brigade, through the aviation LO, provides the
necessary planning requirements to the aviation brigade headquarters.
Initial information to be passed to the aviation brigade headquarters
should include the following:

· Current situation. This should include friendly situation


and positions; threat situation, highlighting the known ADA
threat in the area of operations; and tentative engagement
area coordinates.
· Brigade-, squadron-, and/or battalion-level graphics
update. This can be sent via the MCS-P and/or ASAS to
assist in integrating the air unit into the friendly scheme of
maneuver. It covers critical items such as the LOA, fire
control measures, and base maneuver graphics.
· Fire support coordination information. This can include
such information as call signs, frequencies, and locations of
DS artillery and organic mortars.
· Ingress/egress routes for the area of operations.
Developed by the LO and the S3-Air, this includes passage
points into the sector or zone and air routes to the holding
area.
· Holding area information. The holding area, where face-to-
face coordination is conducted between the attack team and
the battalion in contact, is similar to the assault position for
ground units. It must be adequate in size to accommodate the
number of aircraft assigned the mission. It must be out of
range of threat direct fire systems.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

· Call signs and frequencies. Air/ground coordination must


cover all applicable command frequencies, normally down to
troop level, to provide situational awareness for all elements
involved.
· Time check. All units should synchronize their watches by
conducting a “time hack” via the SINCGARS radio.

Step 2 – Squadron/Battalion Close Fight SITREP


8-144. En route to the holding area, the attack team leader contacts the
ground maneuver squadron or battalion on its FM command net to receive
a close fight SITREP. (NOTE: By this time, the ground maneuver
squadron/battalion has contacted the ground maneuver unit leader to
inform him that the attack aviation element is en route to conduct a hasty
attack.) A close fight SITREP includes this information:

· Threat situation. The SITREP focuses on such information


as threat ADA in the area of operations, type and number of
threat vehicles and equipment, and position (center mass) and
direction of movement of the threat force. If the threat is
dispersed, the SITREP should provide a front line trace.
· Friendly situation. This information may include the
location of units in contact, the mission assigned to them, and
the method of marking their positions.
· Call signs and frequencies. The SITREP verifies these
items for the unit in contact.
· Holding area verification. The SITREP lists the location of
the holding area and any other pertinent information. If the
holding area will be used for face-to-face coordination, ground
and air units must agree on a sign/countersign system to
identify each other. For example, the ground element could
use a light or heat source to provide a recognizable signature,
which would then be answered by either aircraft IR lights or
visible light flashes to signify which aircraft are approaching.

8-145. Figure 8-34 illustrates an example of the radio transmissions for a


close fight SITREP.

ATTACK TEAM GROUND SQUADRON

“Bulldog 06, this is Blackjack 26, over.”

“Blackjack 26, this is Bulldog 06, L/C, over.”

“Bulldog 06, Blackjack 26 en route to holding area at grid


VQ 98454287. Request SITREP, over.”

“Blackjack 26, this is Bulldog 06; threat situation follows.


Hardrock 06 is taking direct fire from a platoon-size armor
element at grid VQ 96204362. Hardrock O6 elements are
established on PL Nevada, center mass VQ 96000050.
Holding area is at grid VQ 94004000; expect radio
coordination only. Contact Hardrock 06 on FH 478, over.”

Figure 8-34. Example Radio Transmissions for a Squadron/Battalion Close Fight SITREP

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8-146. Upon receiving the required information from the ground


maneuver squadron/battalion, the attack team leader changes frequency,
entering the ground unit’s FM command net. He conducts final
coordination before following the ingress route to the established BPs or
attack by fire/support by fire positions. Coordination begins with the
ground maneuver unit commander, such as the troop commander, and
ends with the leader of the lowest-level unit in contact. For those
reconnaissance platoons that are not organic to a troop, coordination will
begin at battalion level and end with the reconnaissance platoon if the
platoon is the unit in contact.
8-147. Regardless of which key ground leaders conduct coordination with
the attack team leader, the ground command net is the most suitable net
for both the coordination process and conduct of the operation. It allows
all key leaders on the ground, including the FIST chief and the attack
team leader and his attack crews, to communicate on one common net
throughout the operation. Operating on the ground command net also
allows the attack team to request responsive mortar fire to suppress
threat elements (including immediate suppression missions). The AH-64
Apache and the AH-1 Cobra each have only one FM radio. The OH-58D
Kiowa is dual-FM capable, enabling the attack team leader to maintain
communications with the ground maneuver unit, its higher headquarters,
and/or a fire support element.
8-148. Figure 8-35 illustrates an example of the initial radio
transmissions between the attack team and the ground unit, in this case
a troop.

Step 3 – Attack Team Check-in


8-149. When he makes initial radio contact with the ground maneuver
unit in contact, the attack team leader executes a check-in. This process
allows him to provide the ground leader with a succinct summary of
tactical information, including the following:

· Current location of aircraft. This is normally the attack


team’s ground or aerial holding area.
· Composition. This is the number and type of attack team
aircraft.
· Available munitions. The attack team specifies its
armament load and weapons configuration.
· Total station time. This is the amount of time the attack
team will be available to remain on station to conduct ACF.
(NOTE: USAF elements use the term “loiter time” in this
context during CAS missions.)
· Night vision capability. The attack team lists available
NVDs.

NOTE: In the event a ground holding area is not available because of METT-TC
considerations, the attack team will select and occupy an aerial holding area within
FM communications range of the ground unit. The attack team will normally
remain in the holding area until all required coordination and planning are
complete. Figure 8-35 illustrates the radio transmissions for attack team check-in.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

ATTACK TEAM GROUND TROOP

“Hardrock 06, Blackjack 26 is currently in holding area at


grid VQ 98454287 with two Kiowa Warriors, each with
450 rounds of cal .50 and two Hellfires. Station time is 30
minutes. All aircraft are NVG- and FLIR-capable, over.”

“Blackjack 26, this is Hardrock 06, stand by, over.”

“Blackjack 26, roger.”

Figure 8-35. Example Initial Radio Transmission and Attack Team Check-In

Step 4 – Employment of Aviation Close Fires


8-150. After the attack team completes its check-in procedures, the
ground maneuver unit can use either of two methods in requesting,
planning, and employing attack aviation support: preplanned ACF,
normally entailing face-to-face contact with the attack team leader, and
immediate ACF, which usually is completed using only radio
communications.
8-151. The preplanned method is preferred. A major benefit of this face-
to-face coordination is the air leader’s ability to talk directly to the ground
commander with a map and other resources available. It also allows the
attack team to update its maps with the maneuver battalion’s latest
graphics. The result is usually more effective integration of the attack
team into the ground scheme of maneuver. At times, however, METT-TC
factors will dictate the use of immediate ACF. Both ACF methods are
covered later in this discussion.
8-152. Weapons Considerations. The attack team’s armaments and
munitions are a key factor in coordination and planning for ACF
operations. The attack team leader and the ground unit’s key leaders
must consider, prior to target selection and engagement, the effects on
friendly forces of the various weapons carried by the attack aircraft. The
selection of weapon systems and munitions for a given engagement is
highly dependent on METT-TC. Point target weapon systems, such as
Hellfire or TOW, are preferred when aircraft must engage armor or
hardened targets in the close fight. On the other hand, aircraft gun
systems and the 2.75-inch rocket are the preferred systems/munitions for
engaging troops in the open and soft targets such as trucks and
trenchworks. These area-fire weapon systems pose a danger to friendly
soldiers who may be in the lethality zone of the rounds or rockets. In this
case, the leader on the ground must be extremely precise in describing
the target he wants the aircraft to engage.
8-153. Aviation Close Fires Request Procedures. The basic format
for ACF requests, which can be adapted as necessary for preplanned and
immediate missions, includes the following items:

· Friendly location. This is normally the position of the


individual requesting ACF support.
· Heading to target. This is usually the magnetic (compass)
heading, although a heading based on grid coordinates can be
used if necessary.

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· Distance to target. This is given in kilometers.


· Target description.
· Target coordinates.
· Method of target designation or marking.
· Remarks. This includes any additional information
necessary to orient the attack team on the target or friendly
forces.
· Flight hazards.
· Restrictive fire control measures.
· Enemy threats. This includes threat ADA positions and
capabilities.
· Clearance for fire authority.

8-154. Coordination for Preplanned Aviation Close Fires. When


employing preplanned ACF, the ground company commander and attack
team leader meet at the holding area, face to face whenever possible, and
plan the attack. This coordination must cover certain elements of the
operation; Figure 8-36 illustrates a sample preplanned ACF checklist.

PREPLANNED AVIATION CLOSE FIRES CHECKLIST


Areas to be covered in coordination for preplanned ACF include the following:
· Threat situation and target identification. This item details threat activity in
the area of operations and identifies specific targets relative to the threat
situation.
· Friendly situation. This covers the locations of friendly positions, which ideally
are identified on a map. The ground and air elements must agree on a method of
visually marking these positions.
· Engagement area and aircraft fighting positions. As necessary, the ground
and air units must verify and/or define the engagement area. The attack team
leader then establishes his unit’s BPs or attack by fire/support by fire positions.
· Ground maneuver mission/scheme of maneuver. The ground unit provides
details of its scheme of maneuver, including the commander’s intent and a
description of what is expected to be the decisive point on the battlefield.
· Aerial scheme of maneuver. Based on the ground unit’s scheme of maneuver,
the attack team leader provides a supporting scheme of maneuver.
· Fire coordination and fire restrictions. The ground and air units coordinate
the fire control measures necessary to minimize the potential for fratricide.
· Map graphics update. The ground commander and attack team leader develop
key maneuver graphics as required to support or clarify the scheme of
maneuver. They must ensure that all subordinate leaders update their maps with
these graphics.
· Method of target designation. The ground and air leaders coordinate the
required method(s) to be used in designating targets. Refer to the discussion
earlier in this section, including information on specific marking methods outlined
in Table 8-6.
· Request for aviation close fires. The final item in the coordination process is
submission of the ACF request; the discussion of request procedures earlier in
this section lists items to be covered.

Figure 8-36. Example Preplanned Aviation Close Fires Checklist

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

8-155. Consideration of the time available for ACF planning is critical.


METT-TC will dictate the extent of preplanning that can be accomplished
and the length of time the holding area can be occupied without
compromising security. The ground and air commanders must accept
increased risk in the holding area if the position is maintained for more
than 15 minutes.
8-156. Coordination for Immediate Aviation Close Fires. As noted,
immediate ACF differs from a preplanned mission in that coordination is
conducted by radio communications only, rather than through face-to-face
contact between the ground and air leaders. Basic areas of coordination
remain the same, as outlined in the preplanned ACF checklist (see Figure
8-36). In immediate ACF, however, portions of the checklist are omitted
as necessary based on METT-TC considerations and the need to provide
fires on short notice. (NOTE: The request for ACF, the final item in the
preplanned ACF checklist, is always the final step in immediate ACF as
well.)
8-157. The coordination process for immediate ACF begins after attack
team check-in has been completed. The attack team maintains its position
in the holding area. (NOTE: This will be either a ground or aerial
holding area, depending on the attack team’s ability to maintain FM
communications with the ground element in contact.) Based on METT-
TC and the specific situation, the ground maneuver leader provides a
basic update containing essential elements from the preplanned ACF
checklist. He succinctly outlines the concept of his ground tactical plan.
This includes updates on threat composition, disposition, and most recent
activities, particularly the location of air defense weapons. The ground
leader also outlines the friendly situation, including the composition,
disposition, and location of his forces and supporting artillery or mortar
positions. After providing this information, the ground maneuver leader
uses the ACF request format to call for the attack. Figure 8-37 illustrates
the ground unit’s information update and request for immediate ACF
support.

ATTACK TEAM GROUND TROOP

“Blackjack 26, this is Hardrock 06, stand by for update.


Friendly platoon in contact is located at VQ 96000050,
marked by IR strobes. The threat is a platoon-size armor
element 800 meters due north. There has been sporadic
heavy machine gun fire and tank main gun fire into our
position. Fire appears to be coming from road
intersection vic VQ 96204362. Negative knowledge on
disposition of threat ADA. I'll be handing you down to
Hardrock 16 for the ACF request, over.”

“Hardrock 06, this is Blackjack 26. Good copy. Standing


by at holding area for aviation close fires request, over.”

“Roger, Blackjack 26, Hardrock 16 request follows.


Friendly location is VQ 96000050, 360 degrees to target.
Range is 800 meters. Target is two T-80s at the road
intersection, grid VQ 96000850. PAQ-4 spot is on. No
friendly forces north of the 00 grid line. Low wires directly
over our position, over."

Figure 8-37. Example Radio Transmissions in Coordinating Immediate Aviation Close Fires

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8-158. After receiving the request for ACF, the attack team leader
informs the ground unit leader of the BP or attack by fire/support by fire
position (or series of positions) his team will occupy. This position, which
ideally affords the best available observation and fields of fire into the
engagement area or target area, is the location from which the attack
aircraft will engage the threat with direct fire. It includes a number of
individual aircraft firing positions. It may be preplanned or established as
the situation dictates. Size will vary depending on the number of aircraft
using the position, the size of the engagement area, and the type of
terrain. The BP or attack by fire/support by fire position is normally offset
from the flank of the friendly ground position. This helps to ensure that
rotor wash, ammunition casing expenditure, and the general signature of
the aircraft do not interfere with operations on the ground. The offset
position allows the aircraft to engage the threat on his flanks rather than
his front. It also reduces the risk of fratricide along the helicopter gun-
target line. (NOTE: In addition to these considerations, however, the BP
or attack by fire/support by fire position must be close enough to the
position of the requesting unit to facilitate efficient target handover.)

8-159. The attack team leader then provides the ground maneuver unit
leader with his concept for the team’s attack on the objective. This may be
as simple as relaying the direction or attack route the aircraft will follow,
the time required to move forward from their current position, and the
location of the BP. Only on completion of coordination with the lowest-
level unit in contact does the attack team depart the holding area for the
BP. As the team moves out of the holding area, it uses nap of the earth
(NOE) flight along attack routes to mask itself from threat ground
observation and direct fire systems. The attack team leader maintains
FM communications with the ground unit leader while conducting
internal communications on either his VHF or UHF net.

8-160. Conduct of the Aviation Close Fires Operations. After


completing the coordination for ACF, the ground maneuver unit and
attack team can execute their synchronized attack plan. Execution
procedures are virtually identical whether the mission is preplanned or
conducted on an immediate basis. The attack team engages targets of
opportunity on a case-by-case basis based on information covered in the
ACF checklist, the ACF request, and/or subsequent coordination.

8-161. Refer to Figure 8-38 for an example of radio transmissions during


execution of an ACF operation. In this case, the ground unit in contact is
a platoon. (NOTE: This scenario shows ACF conducted with no
operational friction between units. Such ideal conditions are rare. For
example, depending on the intensity of the ongoing engagement, grid
positions may be difficult for the ground maneuver unit to determine, and
actual FM communications between the ground and air elements may not
work this well.)

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

ATTACK TEAM GROUND MANEUVER PLATOON

“Hardrock 16, Blackjack elements will attack from the


southeast. Turn on IR strobes at this time. We will
establish a BP 50 meters to the west of your position,
over.”

“Blackjack 26, this is Hardrock 16. Strobes on at this


time, over.”

“Roger, Hardrock. Blackjack has your position. Aircraft


are en route for attack in 30 seconds, over.”

“Hardrock 16, roger.”

“Hardrock 16, this is Blackjack 26. Engagement


complete. Two T-80s destroyed, over.”

“Blackjack 26, this is Hardrock 16, roger. Two T-80s


destroyed. End of mission, out.”

Figure 8-38. Example Radio Transmissions in Aviation Close Fires Execution

Step 5 – Battle Damage Assessment and Reattack


8-162. After the attack team completes the requested ACF mission, the
attack team leader provides a BDA to the ground maneuver commander.
Based on his intent, the ground maneuver commander will determine if a
reattack is required to achieve his desired end state. The ACF operation
can continue until the attack team has expended all available munitions
or fuel. If he receives a request for reattack, however, the attack team
leader must carefully consider how the longer duration will affect the
operation; he must determine whether he can continue to provide
effective support to the ground commander.

UTILITY AND CARGO HELICOPTER SUPPORT


REQUEST PROCEDURES
8-163. Organic Army aviation brigade assets at division, corps, and
echelons above corps (EAC) levels can provide utility/cargo support to
reconnaissance units, including the platoon. (NOTE: Helicopter
resupply assets are limited, normally to support provided by corps
aviation assets.) Requests for support are routed through the parent unit
S3 to the division G3 for action. Refer to the appropriate brigade or
division SOP for the request format.

PICKUP ZONE/LANDING ZONE OPERATIONS


8-164. The reconnaissance platoon may be required to establish a PZ or
LZ for resupply or for MEDEVAC or CASEVAC operations. In addition,
the platoon may be tasked to establish its own PZ to conduct insertion of
scouts.

Platoon Responsibilities
8-165. As the receiving unit in aerial resupply or another utility/cargo
helicopter operation, the platoon will have the following responsibilities
at the PZ/LZ:

· Select and control the PZ/LZ.


· Secure the PZ/LZ.

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· Provide limited weather observations, such as wind velocity


and direction, cloud cover, visibility, and approximate ceiling.
· Provide terminal guidance with appropriate advisories. This
information covers such areas as obstacles, wire hazards, and
the threat situation, including ADA threats.

Conditions in the PZ/LZ


8-166. This discussion focuses on several key considerations in selecting,
securing, and operating the PZ/LZ.
8-167. Size of the PZ/LZ. As a general rule, the PZ/LZ must provide for
adequate space to allow aircraft separation, load/passenger avoidance,
and obstacle avoidance (refer to the following discussion of helicopter
landing sites). If night operations are scheduled, a larger area is normally
needed.
8-168. Helicopter Landing Site Requirements. A key consideration
in PZ/LZ selection is the number and type of aircraft that will be using
the site at one time. Table 8-9 lists recommended minimum distances
between landing points within a PZ/LZ. Distances are measured from
center of load to center of load. (NOTE: The minimum planning
distances in Table 8-9 include the distances required between loads
during external load operations, which are also called slingload
operations.) Refer to FM 1-113 for additional information.

Table 8-9. Minimum Distances between Helicopter Landing Points

AIRCRAFT/OPERATION TYPE MINIMUM LANDING DISTANCE

DAYTIME OPERATIONS
UH-60 and like aircraft 50 meters
CH-47 and like (or unknown) aircraft 100 meters

NIGHT OPERATIONS
UH-60 and like aircraft 75 meters
CH-47 and like (or unknown) aircraft 150 meters

NOTE: Height of ground/rooftop obstructions must not exceed 18 inches.

8-169. Surface Conditions. The surface within the PZ/LZ should be


solid enough to prevent the helicopter, its load, and/or vehicles that are
picking up the load from sinking into the ground. Selection of the site
must also take into account the strong winds produced by the helicopter
wash; these can stir up blowing dust, sand, snow, gravel, or loose debris
that may injure personnel and cause damage to equipment and/or
aircraft. In addition, these conditions can cause “brownout” or “whiteout”
conditions that can temporarily blind aircrews and ground support
personnel. Helicopters cannot land if the site has a slope of 15 degrees or
more. The PZ/LZ must have no obstacles or obstructions (such as trees,
stumps, bushes, or man-made objects) that could cause damage to the
helicopter rotor systems or the load itself. A general guideline is that
ground or rooftop obstructions can be no more than 18 inches tall.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Immovable objects must be clearly marked with a secured VS-17 panel,


red chem light, or other marking materials.
8-170. Approach/Departure Direction. When carrying external loads,
aircrews prefer to use gradual approach and departure angles (not a
vertical ascent or descent). The avenues of approach and departure for
the PZ/LZ should be over the lowest obstacle in the direction of the
prevailing winds. Arrival and departure obstacle clearance and wind
direction are especially important when visibility is reduced. Figure 8-39
shows a sample radio transmission for terminal guidance as a helicopter
approaches the PZ/LZ.

AIRCRAFT RECCE PLATOON

“Hardrock 16, Comanchero 26 is 30 seconds inbound to


your location. Request terminal guidance, over.”

“Comanchero 26, this is Hardrock 16. Signal is displayed,


over.” (NOTE: Use a prearranged signaling method if
possible.)

“Roger, Hardrock. Comanchero has green smoke, over.”

“Comanchero 26, roger green smoke. Be advised there is


a large boulder at the far end of the LZ and a suspected
ZSU 23-4 located 5 kilometers to the east, over.”

Figure 8-39. Example Radio Transmissions for Terminal Guidance to Landing Site

8-171. Marking of the PZ/LZ. Considerations for marking the PZ/LZ


include the following:

· Daylight operations. A ground guide will mark the PZ or


LZ for the lead aircraft by holding an M16Al rifle over his
head, by displaying a folded VS-17 panel chest high, or by
other identifiable means.
· Night operations. The code letter Y (actually, an inverted Y)
is used to mark the landing point of the lead aircraft at night
(see Figure 8-40). Chem lights or “beanbag” lights may be
used to maintain light discipline.

8-172. When more than one aircraft will be landing in the same PZ or
LZ, there will be at least one additional light for each aircraft. For
observation, utility, and attack aircraft, each additional aircraft landing
point will be marked with a single light, emplaced at the exact point that
each aircraft is to land. For cargo aircraft (such as the CH-47, CH-53, or
CH-54), each additional landing point will be marked with two lights. The
two lights will be placed 10 meters apart and will be aligned in the
aircraft direction of flight.

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Figure 8-40. Inverted Y Marking Signal for PZ/LZ

AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS (AIR INFILTRATION)


8-173. These operations entail the integration of air assault forces
(combat, CS, and CSS) with helicopter assets to maneuver on the
battlefield, engage and destroy threat forces, and/or seize and hold key
terrain. The reconnaissance platoon may be part of the air assault force.
In addition, helicopter assets may support the platoon in a variety of
roles, including mobility (insertion, infiltration), MEDEVAC, and
resupply. Refer to FM 3-18.12 (FM 90-4) for further discussion of air
assault operations.

ACTIONS AT THE PZ
8-174. Prior to arrival of the aircraft involved in an air assault operation,
the PZ must be secured, the PZ control party positioned, and the troops
and equipment positioned in a unit assembly area. Air assault elements
then move to and occupy the chalk assembly area, where they load the
aircraft for departure to the LZ. The final step in this phase is closure of
the PZ.

PZ Organization
8-175. The PZ for the air assault operation may be either one-sided or
two-sided. A one-sided PZ has all unit assembly areas and chalk assembly
areas on one side of the zone, with security teams usually located on the
opposite side beyond where the aircraft will land (see Figure 8-41). In a
two-side PZ, unit assembly areas and chalk assembly areas are located on
both sides of the aircraft landing site, with security elements interspersed
around the site as necessary. Figure 8-42 illustrates a two-sided PZ.

Occupation of the Unit Assembly Area


8-176. Once the PZ is secured, the next step in the execution of the air
assault is occupation of the unit assembly area. Unit leaders should
accomplish the following:

· Maintain all-round security of the assembly area.


· Maintain communications.
· Organize soldiers and equipment into chalks and loads in
accordance with the unit air movement plan.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

· Conduct safety briefings and equipment checks for soldiers.


· Establish priority of loading for each soldier and identify
bump personnel.
· Brief the location of the straggler control points as necessary.

Figure 8-41. One-Sided PZ

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Figure 8-42. Two-Sided PZ

Movement to and Occupation of the Chalk Assembly Area


8-177. Linkup guides from the PZ control party will meet with
designated units in the unit assembly area and coordinate movement of
chalks to an RP. As chalks arrive at the RP, chalk guides will move each
chalk to its assigned chalk assembly area. (NOTE: To reduce the
number of personnel required, the same guide may be used to move the
unit from the unit assembly area to the chalk assembly area.) If the unit
is part of a larger air assault, no more than three chalks should be located
in the chalk assembly area at one time. Noise and light discipline will be
maintained throughout movement to maintain the security of the PZ.
Additionally, no personnel should be allowed on the PZ unless they are
loading the aircraft, rigging vehicles for a slingload, or acting as directed
by PZ control. While remaining in chalk order, each soldier is assigned a
security (firing) position by the chalk leader; he assumes a prone position,
with weapon at the ready and facing out (away from the PZ) to provide
immediate close-in security.

Loading of the Aircraft


8-178. After reaching their chalk assembly areas, units should adhere to
the following principles for loading the aircraft:

· Maintain tactical integrity by keeping fire teams and squads


intact.
· Maintain self-sufficiency by loading a weapon and its
ammunition on the same aircraft (for example, the Javelin
and its individual missiles).
· Ensure that key personnel, weapons, and equipment are
cross-loaded among aircraft to prevent the loss of control, or of
all of a particular asset, if an aircraft is lost.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

· Prior to loading, ensure that all troop gear is tied down and
checked; short antennas should be placed in radios, folded
down, and secured.
· Direct squad and team leaders to check their soldiers’
equipment to ensure it is complete and operational.
· Turn radios on and perform communications checks (unless
directed otherwise).
· Assign specific aircraft seats to all personnel.

8-179. UH-60 Loading Sequence (Split Chalk). These considerations


and procedures apply (see Figure 8-43):

· The chalk leader (squad leader) initiates movement once the


aircraft has landed.
· The far side and near side groups move to the aircraft in file,
with the chalk leader always leading the near side group.
· The chalk leader should take the following actions:
n Ensure that all personnel know which aircraft and which
position to load.
n Ensure that all personnel wear or carry rucksacks on the
aircraft.
n Notify the crew chief when all chalk members are on
board and are ready for liftoff.
· All personnel buckle up as soon as they are seated in their
assigned seats. The chalk leader will always sit in the left
front seat unless a platoon leader or company commander is
on the same aircraft.
· The chalk leader hands the chalk card to the pilot and
answers any questions the pilot may have, using the aircraft
intercommunications (troop commander’s) handset.

Figure 8-43. UH-60 Loading Diagram (Split Chalk)

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8-180. UH-60 Loading Sequence (Whole Chalk). These


considerations and procedures apply (see Figure 8-44):

· The chalk leader (squad leader) initiates movement once the


aircraft has landed.
· The far side and near side groups move to the aircraft in file,
with the No. 1 man leading the load to the appropriate side.

NOTE: The far side group will always move around to the front of the aircraft.

· The chalk leader stops at the near side of the aircraft to


ensure that the near side group loads properly; then he moves
around the front of the aircraft to the far side and checks the
other half of the chalk.
· All personnel buckle up as soon as they are seated in the
correct seats.
· The chalk leader hands the chalk card to the pilot and
answers any questions the pilot may have, using the aircraft
intercommunications (troop commander’s) handset.

Figure 8-44. UH-60 Loading Diagram (Whole Chalk)

PZ Closure
8-181. During platoon air assault operations, the PSG is responsible for
ensuring that all personnel and equipment are loaded (clearing the PZ)
and that security is maintained. The PSG can use either the single lift or
multiple lift technique in completing the closure.
8-182. Single Lift. The PSG positions himself at the last aircraft and
collects “bumped” personnel, if required. He will be the last man to load
on the aircraft. Once on the aircraft, the PSG will notify the crew chief
and/or air mission commander (AMC) that all personnel and equipment

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

are loaded, using the troop commander’s radio handset. The aircraft door
gunners will provide close-in security.
8-183. Multiple Lift. The duties of the PSG are the same as for a single
lift. In a multiple lift, the security teams will maintain security of the PZ
and be the last element to depart with the PSG. Depending on their
initial locations, the security teams may have to reposition closer to the
PZ. Whenever possible, the aircraft will land as close to the security team
positions as possible to enhance security and minimize the movement
required by the teams.

ACTIONS AT THE LZ
8-184. All elements and personnel involved in the air assault operation
must adhere strictly to the priority of actions upon landing at the LZ.

Unloading
8-185. Unloading of the aircraft does not begin until directed by the crew
chief or pilot. The following actions occur (see Figure 8-45):

· Once an aircraft lands, personnel unbuckle their seatbelts


and exit as quickly as possible with all equipment.
· Prior to leaving the aircraft, the chalk leader obtains the
landing direction from the pilot (if it was not determined
during the approach into the LZ). This will aid in orientation
to the LZ, particularly at night.
· Individuals move 15 to 20 meters out from the side of the
aircraft and assume the prone position, facing away from the
aircraft with weapons at the ready, until the aircraft has
departed the LZ.

Figure 8-45. UH-60 Unloading Diagram

Immediate Actions on a Hot LZ


8-186. If the decision is made to use a hot LZ or if contact is made upon
landing, troops quickly dismount and move 15 to 20 meters away from

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the aircraft. They immediately return enemy fire to allow the aircraft to
depart. The following actions occur:

· If the contact is similar to a far ambush, troops fire and


maneuver off the LZ to the closest location offering cover and
concealment.
· If troops are engaged from nearby enemy positions, they treat
it as a near ambush by immediately returning fire. Soldiers
who consider themselves in the kill zone may assault the
enemy positions or attempt to get out of the kill zone. Soldiers
not in the kill zone provide supporting fire to facilitate
movement of troops in the kill zone.
· The squad or platoon leader calls for fire support, if available.
· Once friendly elements disengage from the enemy force, the
squad or platoon leader moves the unit to a covered and
concealed position, accounts for personnel and equipment,
and assesses the situation as to whether or not the unit can
continue the mission.

Chalk Assembly on a Cold LZ


8-187. After the aircraft is unloaded, the chalk leader (squad leader)
moves the chalk to its predetermined locations using the traveling
overwatch movement technique. All soldiers and/or elements move at a
fast pace to the nearest concealed position. Once at the concealed
assembly point, the chalk leader makes a quick count of personnel and
equipment and then proceeds with the mission.

RESUPPLY OPERATIONS
8-188. As noted, the helicopter resupply assets available to the
reconnaissance platoon are limited. Refer to FM 4-20.197 (FM 10-450-3),
FM 4-20.198 (FM 10-450-4), and FM 4-20.199 (FM 10-450-5) for
discussions of various aspects of aerial resupply and slingload operations.

PLANNING
8-189. Planning for aerial resupply requires close coordination, with
elements reviewing the entire mission and resolving all limitations and
problem areas. If a resupply item poses a problem that cannot be
resolved, another mode of transport should be considered. Planning
factors include the following:

· Priorities of cargo/unit resupply.


· Integration of the resupply operation into the tactical plan.
· Selection, identification, and marking of the PZ/LZ.
· Type/amount of cargo to be carried.
· Helicopter assets available.
· Requirements for slings, cargo nets, and/or cargo containers.
· Ground crew training requirements, such as those for ground
guides and hookup personnel.
· PZ/LZ security.
· Flight routes.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

8-190. The selection of a usable PZ or LZ is extremely important.


Logistical and tactical considerations must be analyzed and taken into
account to ensure that the PZ/LZ is positioned at the right place to
support the ground unit. The area must also be accessible to the aircraft
involved in the resupply operation. The final decision on PZ/LZ selection
and acceptance will be made by the AMC, the pilot in command (PIC), an
aviation LO, or a Pathfinder-qualified officer or NCO.

PLATOON RESPONSIBILITIES
8-191. The reconnaissance platoon receiving the supplies is responsible
for preparing the PZ/LZ. In addition to the general PZ/LZ responsibilities
covered earlier in this discussion, the platoon will perform the following
specific tasks for aerial resupply:

· Recover and assemble equipment and supplies.


· Train available ground crews. Tasks include the following:
n Guide the aircraft during approach, landing,
unloading/loading, and departure.
n Derig the load.
· Train hookup personnel.
· Coordinate with the sending unit for the control and return of
that unit’s transport equipment, such as slings and A-22 bags.
· Prepare, coordinate, and inspect backloads (such as slings and
A-22 bags) and have them ready for hookup or loading when
the aircraft arrives.

MEDICAL EVACUATION
8-192. The reconnaissance platoon will contact the medical company on
the medical company command frequency for all ambulance requests.
(NOTE: If it is unable to contact the medical company on that frequency,
the platoon should attempt to relay the request on the next higher
command frequency.) Refer to Figure 8-46 for an example of the radio
transmission for initial contact and terminal guidance during evacuation
operations. The platoon then uses the standard nine-line air evacuation
request format (see Figure 8-47).
8-193. The medical company will prioritize the request with others it
receives to determine if air evacuation is possible. In conducting the
evacuation operation, the reconnaissance platoon must accomplish the
following tasks:

· Prepare a suitable PZ/LZ for the aircraft.


· Secure the PZ/LZ.
· Provide terminal guidance during the aircraft’s approach to
the PZ/LZ.

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EVACUATION AIRCRAFT RECCE PLATOON

“Hardrock 16, Dustoff 26 is 30 seconds inbound to your


location. Request terminal guidance, over.”

“Dustoff 26, this is Hardrock 16. Signal is displayed,


over.” (NOTE: Use the signaling method specified in the
nine-line evacuation request.)

“Roger, Hardrock. Dustoff has red smoke, over.”

“Dustoff 26, roger red smoke, over.”

Figure 8-46. Example Radio Transmissions


for Terminal Guidance to an Air Evacuation Site

NINE-LINE AIR EVACUATION REQUEST FORMAT


Units must use the following nine-line format to provide the necessary information when
requesting air evacuation (either MEDEVAC or CASEVAC) for casualties.
LINE 1 – LOCATION. ___________________________________________________
Specify the grid coordinates for the six-digit grid location, preceded by the 100,000-meter
grid identification.
LINE 2 – RADIO FREQUENCY/CALL SIGN. _________________________________
The frequency and call sign should be that of the radio at the site of the unit requesting
evacuation.
LINE 3 – PATIENT CATEGORY OF PRECEDENCE. ___________________________
Classify the casualties’ priority for evacuation using the following terms:
· Urgent. Evacuation required within 2 hours to save life or limb.
· Priority. Patient’s medical condition will deteriorate, becoming urgent within 4
hours.
· Routine. Evacuation required, but patient’s condition is not expected to deteriorate
for several hours.
· Tactical immediate. Evacuation required so casualties do not endanger the
tactical mission.
LINE 4 – SPECIAL EQUIPMENT/EMERGENCY MEDICAL SUPPLIES. ____________
List all requirements.
LINE 5 – NUMBER AND TYPE OF CASUALTIES. ____________________________
Provide a complete, accurate list.
LINE 6 – SECURITY OF PICKUP SITE. _____________________________________
Describe conditions for security at the LZ/PZ.
LINE 7 – SIGNALING AND SITE MARKING. _________________________________
Specify the signaling and marking methods to be used.
LINE 8 – PATIENT NATIONALITY AND STATUS. _____________________________
Provide a complete, accurate list.
LINE 9 – NBC CONTAMINATION AREA. ____________________________________
Specify locations of any contaminated areas affecting the evacuation operation.

Figure 8-47. Format for Air Evacuation Requests

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SECTION VI – MULTICAPABLE SENSOR TEAMS

8-194. Sensor teams employing GSR and REMBASS can enhance the
surveillance capability of the reconnaissance platoon. The teams can
detect targets and provide accurate range and azimuth readings to threat
locations during limited visibility conditions. A sensor team consists of
five soldiers, one AN/PPS-5b, one REMBASS, and a HMMWV. Refer to
Figure 8-48 (GSR) and Figure 8-49 (REMBASS) for a summary of
features and capabilities of the two systems.
8-195. The teams may be attached or OPCON to troops or platoons for
specific missions. When a sensor team is attached or OPCON to the
reconnaissance platoon, the platoon leader must plan its employment. He
should work with the commander to position the GSR/REMBASS assets
in conjunction with reconnaissance OPs to provide local security and
protection.

CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS


8-196. Sensor teams provide mobile, all-weather battlefield surveillance.
When employed, they can provide observation from a given vantage point
24 hours a day.
8-197. GSR/REMBASS targets are classified as dismounted, light
vehicle, heavy vehicle, or tracked vehicle. The AN/PPS-5b (GSR) has a
line-of-sight range of 10,000 meters against vehicles and 6,000 meters
against personnel. It can detect targets through light camouflage, smoke,
haze, light snow and rain, and darkness. Foliage, heavy rain, and snow
seriously reduce its capability.
8-198. Both GSR and the REMBASS are designed to detect targets
moving against a background. They are generally ineffective against an
air target unless the aircraft is flying close to the ground. They are
vulnerable to threat direction-finding and jamming equipment. The
sensor team is normally equipped with a single radio. If employed
forward with the scouts, the team should send all reports to the platoon
leader to be passed higher.

EMPLOYMENT
8-199. The sensor team should be assigned a specific sector of surveillance
and frequency of coverage. Because the threat can detect radar signals,
however, the GSR cannot be used for continuous surveillance. Surveillance
tasks assigned to sensor teams include these:

· Search avenues of approach or possible threat positions on a


scheduled or random basis to determine location, size, and
composition of threat forces and the nature of their activity.
· Monitor point targets such as bridges, defiles, or road
junctions and reporting quantity, type, and direction of threat
vehicles and personnel moving through the target area.
· Extend the observation capabilities of the scouts by enabling
them to survey distant points and areas of special interest.
· Vector patrols to keep them oriented during limited visibility.

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GSR
8-200. GSR must be positioned in an area that is free of ground clutter
such as trees, thick vegetation, and buildings and that affords long-range
observation and a wide field of view. Normally, the team will be assigned
a general area, and the GSR team leader will select the specific position.
To avoid threat suppressive fires, the team should be prepared for rapid
displacement and have several alternate positions selected and
reconnoitered. See Figure 8-48 for a summary of the GSR system.
8-201. During reconnaissance operations, GSR is best employed to the
flanks of the reconnaissance platoon or oriented on potential threat
locations. Since reconnaissance is a moving operation, the GSR teams will
have to move as necessary to support the scouts.
8-202. In security operations, GSR teams can be used to provide
redundancy in surveillance of NAIs and to add depth to the screen line by
supplementing OPs.

GSR SYSTEM SUMMARY


FEATURES:
· Portable, battery-powered radar set.
· Locates and identifies ground targets at ranges up to
10,000 meters.
· Discriminates between personnel and vehicular traffic.
· Remote operations.
TABULATED DATA:
Detection range:
With control indicator
Personnel: 50 to 10,000 m
Vehicles: 50 to 10,000 m
Without control indicator
Personnel: 50 to 3,000 m
Vehicles: 50 to 5,000 m
Range Accuracy: +/- 20 m
Frequency:
Tunable: 16.0 to 16.5 GHz
Power:
Battery: 6 volt DC vehicle or 24 volt DC
Azimuth:
Automatic sensor scanning: 533; 1,067; 1,600; 1,955 mils
Accuracy: +/- 10 mils
Elevation:
Coverage: -600 mils to +400 mils
Accuracy: +/- 10 mils

Figure 8-48. GSR System Summary

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COMPONENTS
8-203. The AN/PPS-5B is a portable, battery-powered, line-of-sight radar
set. It is used in battlefield surveillance to detect, locate, identify, and
track moving ground targets at ranges up to 10,000 meters; it can do this
under various conditions of terrain, visibility, and weather. To detect the
presence of moving targets, the radar set transmits pulses of radio
frequency (RF) energy out to 10,000 meters away. Between pulses, it
listens for RF energy reflected back from the target(s). The energy
reflected back by a target is called an echo. The radar set receives these
echoes and presents them in four ways:

· As a bright spot on a B-scope display.


· As a waveform on an A-scope display.
· As a tone in the headphones.
· As a deflection of a meter pointer.

8-204. Once a target has been detected, it can be located by using the
counter type indicators on the radar set to obtain the azimuth and range
of the target(s). Target identification is accomplished by the operator’s
recognition of characteristics sounds heard in the electrical headsets. The
operator can track the target by means of a control switch; he can turn
the antenna either to the left or to the right and stop it at any azimuth.
8-205. When emplaced, the radar set consists of two major operating
assemblies, the tripod-mounted components and the control indicator.
These are connected by the remote cable, which permits the control
indicator to be placed as far as 50 feet away from the tripod.
8-206. The tripod-mounted components are the tripod, column assembly,
antenna drive, and the receiver-transmitter, which in turn supports the
waveguide horn, antenna reflectors, battery box, telescope, and two
electrical headsets. (NOTE: When needed, the radar set mount adapter
allows the radar set receiver-transmitter to be mounted on a stationary
vehicle with a 50-caliber machinegun mount.)
8-207. The control indicator components are the control indicator and
the viewing hood. The power supply provided with the equipment can be
used instead of the battery when a 24-volt DC source is available.
8-208. The carrying packs are designed for backpacking the radar set.
The transport case is a protective enclosure to house the radar set during
transit or storage.

DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS


8-209. The AN/PPS-5B can be unpacked and set up or taken down in
about 10 minutes by two persons. It can be operated using either battery
or vehicular power. Remote operation allows each GSR team to acquire
targets up to 50 meters from the power source. To detect the presence of
moving targets, the radar set searches an area either by sector scanning
or by searchlighting.
8-210. In sector scanning, the antenna can be set to automatically scan,
by azimuth, over sector widths of 533 mils, 1,067 mils, 1,600 mils, and
1,955 mils. This allows the GSR team to search for threat activity on

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likely avenues of approach, withdrawal, or counterattack. It also allows


for the monitoring of key terrain, areas of interest, and route
surveillance.
8-211. In searchlighting, the operator can use the control switch to turn
the antenna either to the left or to the right and stop it at any azimuth.
This allows the GSR team to monitor point targets and gaps between
friendly units, to vector friendly units and fire control support, and to
track moving targets.
8-212. The GSR system requires an unimpeded line of sight. It can
detect moving targets only and cannot distinguish between threat and
friendly targets. Weather also affects the system’s performance; heavy
rain, snow, or winds in excess of 25 knots seriously degrade the radar
set’s ability to acquire targets.

REMBASS
8-213. Refer to Figure 8-49 for a summary of the REMBASS, which
consists of a variety of components: sensors, radio repeater, code
programmer, sensor monitoring set, portable monitoring set, power
supply, and the antenna group. The following list outlines the functions
and capabilities of these parts:

· Magnetic sensor (MAG), DT-561/GSQ. The MAG is a count


indicator sensor. It is able to detect, count, and determine the
direction of travel when objects containing ferrous metal
(iron) come within its detection radius.
· Seismic acoustic sensor (SA), DT-562/GSQ. The SA is
classification sensor. It is able to detect and classify targets by
analyzing the targets’ ground vibrations and acoustic signals.
It classifies targets with one of the following codes: P for
personnel, V for vehicles, W for wheeled vehicles, T for
tracked vehicles, and – (a dash) for unidentified.
· Infrared-passive sensor (IR), DT-565/GSQ. The IR is
count indicator sensor, capable of detecting, counting, and
determining the direction of travel by sensing the
temperature change of a target against a steady thermal
background.
· Radio repeater (RT-1175/GSQ). The repeater relays data
transmission between the sensors and the monitoring site.
· Code programmer (C-10434/GSQ). The code programmer
allows the team members to manually program frequencies,
identification codes, and other parameters into the memory of
the sensors and repeaters.
· Sensor monitoring set (SMS), AN/GSQ-187. The SMS
receives, decodes, and displays up to 70 sensor and repeater
messages on two separate channels. It records up to 60 sensor
and repeater messages on a hard-copy printout.
· Portable monitoring set (PMS), R-2016 GSQ. The PMS
can receive, decode, and display up to 10 sensor and repeater
messages on a single channel.

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· Power supply (PP-8080/GSQ). The power supply is used as


an alternate source to power the SMS, radio repeater, and
sensor signal simulator when a suitable source (115 volt AC,
220 volt AC, or 24 volt DC) is available.
· Antenna group (OE-239/GSQ). The antenna group provides
up to four SMSs with adequate signal strength to receive
transmissions from extended ranges.

REMBASS SYSTEM SUMMARY


FEATURES:
· Ground-based, all-weather, day and night battlefield surveillance
system.
· Detects targets and classifies them as dismounted personnel,
wheeled vehicles, or tracked vehicles.
· Provides information for use in determining target location,
direction of travel, rate of speed, length of march column, and
number of targets.
TABULATED DATA:
Detection range:
DT-561/561A magnetic sensor
Personnel: 0 to 3 m
Wheeled vehicles: 0 to 15 m
Tracked vehicles: 0 to 25 m
DT-562/562A seismic-acoustic sensor
Personnel: 0 to 50 m
Wheeled vehicles: 0 to 250 m
Tracked vehicles: 0 to 350 m
DT-565/565A infrared-passive sensor
Personnel: 3 to 20 m
Vehicles: 3 to 50 m
Frequency:
138 to 153 MHz

Figure 8-49. REMBASS Summary

IREMBASS
8-214. The improved remotely monitored battlefield sensor system
(IREMBASS) consists of the following components:

· Magnetic sensor (MAG), DT-561A/GSQ.


· Seismic acoustic sensor (SA), DT-562A/GSQ.
· Infrared-passive sensor (IR), DT-565A/GSQ.
· Radio repeater (RT-1175A/GSQ). The sensors and radio
repeater perform and operate the same as in the REBASS.
The major differences are that the IREMBASS components
are smaller and lighter than the REMBASS components.

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· Monitor programmer set (AN/PSQ-7). This unit combines


the functions of the REMBASS code programmer and PMS
into one component. It also has the ability to output data into
a field tactical computer system or communications interface.
· Advanced monitoring display system (AMDS). The
Windows 95-based AMDS software provides the IREMBASS
hardware with real-time data display, logging analysis, and
graphing and reporting capability. The system also provides
support of tactical digital maps depicting a mission’s region of
interest. IREMBASS sensors can be displayed as icons on the
screen. Full real-time sensor activation alerting is provided,
with color code flashing of sensor icons and message displays.
AMDS software can also be operated in no-map mode; if
needed, user-drawn maps can be created.

SECTION VII – COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

8-215. CSS elements arm, fuel, fix, feed, and provide transportation and
personnel for the reconnaissance platoon. The platoon, however, has no
organic CSS assets. This creates unique planning and operational
challenges, with most of the responsibility falling to the PSG.
8-216. The PSG is the CSS coordinator for the platoon; in supervising
CSS within the platoon, his role is similar to that of the 1SG in the
company and troop. He is responsible for advising the platoon leader of
the platoon’s logistical requirements during preparation for combat
operations as well as its current logistical status once operations are
under way. The platoon’s NCOs assist the PSG in executing resupply
operations and in determining the platoon’s logistical needs. In combat
operations, the PSG coordinates directly with the 1SG, informing him of
requirements and problems. (NOTE: Platoons in the BRT will
coordinate for CSS using this procedure.) With prior coordination,
elements such as the task force reconnaissance platoon can coordinate
support with the 1SG of the company team that is nearest them.

SUPPLY OPERATIONS
8-217. Reconnaissance platoons have a large amount of equipment and
require frequent resupply to accomplish their mission. Periodic checks are
required by all leaders to make sure the platoon’s equipment, especially
high-use items, is accounted for and ready to use. Leaders must
anticipate expenditures and request supplies before an operation begins.

SQUADRON SUPPORT
8-218. The recce platoon in a RSTA squadron or the reconnaissance
platoon in a divisional or regimental squadron receives all of its CSS
through its parent troop. The PSG coordinates with his 1SG for
everything the platoon requires. The 1SG is thus the key operator in the
service support chain. He does most of the coordination with the squadron
combat trains command post (CTCP) and controls the logistics package

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(LOGPAC) and its operation. Based on the tactical situation, the 1SG will
also choose the techniques of resupply.

BATTALION TASK FORCE SUPPORT


8-219. The battalion task force reconnaissance platoon presents complex
logistical problems for the task force staff. As explained in previous
chapters, the platoon normally operates to the front of the task force. It
will probably move earlier and stay away longer than any other battalion
element. It can be resupplied in one of several ways.
8-220. One method entails the battalion dedicating a LOGPAC to the
platoon. The LOGPAC responds to the platoon’s needs and is brought
forward by the headquarters company 1SG, the support platoon leader,
the headquarters company XO, or another responsible individual. The
support package is small and flexible, tailored specifically to the platoon’s
requirements. One technique, designed to limit the size of the LOGPAC,
is to have it provide three days of supplies. Load capability of the platoon
vehicles must be taken into consideration when pushing this type of
package forward; an important factor in reducing the size of this package
is developing an understanding of what supplies scouts still have on their
vehicles. (NOTE: The LOGPAC may have a maintenance team; refer to
the discussion of maintenance operations later in this chapter.) The
LOGPAC links up with the scout PSG at a specifically designated RP as
far forward as possible. The PSG is then responsible for distribution of
supplies to the scout sections and/or squads. He may distribute supplies
by himself or be assisted by the individual who brought the LOGPAC
forward; the latter choice is significantly faster. This resupply method is
best for the scout platoon, but is difficult for the battalion because of its
own limited CSS resources.
8-221. The platoon can also use the nearest company team’s CSS assets
for its resupply and maintenance. If this technique is used, the HHC
commander and reconnaissance platoon leader should coordinate with the
company team commander for support. The HHC commander and
battalion S4 should ensure that the supplies dedicated for the resupply of
the platoon are forwarded with the company team’s regular LOGPAC. If
possible, scout supplies pushed forward with the company team LOGPAC
should be separated to ensure rapid resupply of the scouts.
8-222. Another method is to make the scouts responsible for their own
supplies. Not only must the PSG coordinate for supplies, but he also must
pick up the LOGPAC, distribute the supplies, and return the LOGPAC to
its parent-unit location. This method requires the reconnaissance platoon
to operate without the PSG for extended periods of time. In addition, it
does not provide dedicated CSS assets to the platoon. As a result, this is
the easiest method of resupply for the battalion but the worst for
the platoon.
8-223. Whatever support the reconnaissance platoon receives must be
keyed to a fast transfer of supplies. The scouts must be able to pull in,
resupply, and leave as quickly as possible. The actual time when the
scouts need to conduct resupply operations often does not coincide with
the standard LOGPAC times for the rest of the battalion. The battalion
S4, the support platoon leader, the reconnaissance platoon leader and
PSG, and any other key leaders must anticipate events to coordinate for
the best time of resupply.

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BASIC AND COMBAT LOADS


8-224. Two sets of guidelines, for the basic load and the combat load,
prescribe the quantities of supplies required by the reconnaissance
platoon during tactical operations. (NOTE: A summary of the classes of
supply follows this discussion.)

Basic Load
8-225. The basic load is the quantity of supplies in Classes I, II, III, IV,
V, and VIII that the platoon is required to have on hand to initiate
combat operations. The platoon’s higher headquarters designates the
basic load based on analysis of the platoon’s mission and the anticipated
threat.

Combat Load
8-226. The combat load is the quantity of supplies, in all classes, that the
platoon must have on hand to sustain operations in combat for a
prescribed number of days. Like the basic load, the platoon’s combat load
is designated by higher headquarters. The platoon’s parent unit must be
capable of moving the combat load, using organic transportation assets,
into combat in a single delivery.

CLASSES OF SUPPLY
Class I
8-227. This class includes subsistence items. Meals, ready to eat (MRE)
rations are stocked on each vehicle, usually a three- to five-day supply.
Hot meals are brought forward when possible, if only to supplement
MREs. Potable water should be replenished daily, either by refilling from
the water trailer or by rotating 5-gallon cans with the 1SG or supply
sergeant. Each combat vehicle should maintain a minimum of 30 gallons
of potable water; it must have more water on hand during operations in
arid climates or in MOPP gear. (NOTE: Recce vehicles with five- or six-
man crews may also require more water.)
8-228. All meals should be eaten in shifts, and they should never be
served at one centralized location. The platoon leader and PSG must
make sure not only that the platoon is fed, but also that the scouts eat
nutritious meals to maintain the energy levels required in combat.
During continuous or cold-weather operations, soldiers will eat more than
three meals per day; the platoon leader and PSG must plan for this extra
allowance.

Class II
8-229. This class includes field sanitation, cleaning, and administrative
items, as well as organizational clothing and individual equipment
(OCIE). Sanitation, cleaning, and administrative supplies are requested
and received from the troop or company supply NCO and can be brought
forward with the LOGPAC. OCIE items are replaced on an individual, as-
needed basis.

Class III and Class V


8-230. Class III comprises all types of POL products. Class V covers all
types of ammunition, including small arms, artillery and tank rounds,
mines and demolitions, fuzes, missiles, and bombs. For optimum security,

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rearming and refueling should occur simultaneously under cover of


darkness. This usually occurs daily or at the conclusion of major
operations. The techniques of refueling and rearming are covered later in
this section.
8-231. The platoon leader must control the redistribution of supplies
when fuel and ammunition cannot be delivered or when only limited
quantities of supplies are available. The PSG continuously monitors the
platoon’s supply status through logistical reports (NOTE: Refer to the
outlines and examples of report formats in Appendix B of this manual.)
He notifies the platoon leader when a specific vehicle or the platoon as a
whole is critically short of these major classes of supply. The PSG should
make sure ammunition is equally distributed throughout the platoon
before any tactical operation and during consolidation on an objective.
8-232. When planning for refueling, the platoon leader should keep the
range and fuel capacity of his vehicles and the requirements of future
operations in mind. The amount of fuel required determines how much
time it will take to refuel. The platoon leader must realize that the
cruising range and estimated fuel consumption of a vehicle are only
approximations, subject to the effects of weather, terrain, and other
factors. The platoon must top off vehicles whenever the tactical situation
permits.
8-233. When time is limited, the platoon leader must choose between
topping off vehicles that need the most fuel first or giving limited
amounts to each vehicle. Every vehicle must maintain a stock of oil,
grease, and hydraulic fluid, replenishing these POL products each time
refueling takes place.
8-234. RSTA units with OPCON air assets have the flexibility to conduct
resupply operations by helicopter. This is done when distance or time
would severely tax conventional resupply methods. Leaders should
consider location and security of the resupply site, types of supplies to be
delivered, signals, and assistance required by the delivering unit.

Class IV
8-235. This class includes construction and barrier materials. Barrier
materials such as lumber, sandbags, concertina or barbed wire, and
pickets are used by the platoon to construct OPs and obstacles and to
improve fighting positions. These materials are requested through the
platoon’s higher headquarters.

Class VI
8-236. This class covers personal demand items. Tobacco products,
candy, and toiletry articles are normally sold through the exchange
system during peacetime or for units not in a combat environment. In a
combat environment, these items are sent with Class I as health and
comfort packs.

Class VII
8-237. Class VII includes major end items. These pieces of equipment,
assembled and ready for intended use, include combat vehicles, missile
launchers, and major weapon systems. Major end items that are
destroyed are reported immediately by means of logistical reports (as

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outlined in Appendix B of this manual). They are replaced by the parent


unit as they are reported.

Class VIII
8-238. This class includes medical supplies, which are provided through
the squadron/battalion medical platoon. These supplies include individual
medical supplies such as first-aid dressings, refills for first-aid kits, water
purification tablets, and foot powder.

Class IX
8-239. This class comprises repair parts. Class IX supplies are
requisitioned through the higher unit maintenance section. Common
items such as patches and clamps may be distributed in a battle damage
repair kit that vehicles can carry to sustain operations and minimize
maintenance support.

Class X
8-240. Class X includes most of the material necessary to support
nonmilitary programs, such as agriculture and economic development,
not covered in other supply classes. Class X items are requested,
obtained, and delivered by the S4 based on requirements from civil-
military and/or operations channels. Specific instructions for request and
issue of these supplies are provided at troop level and higher.

TECHNIQUES OF RESUPPLY
8-241. The tactical situation is the major factor dictating which
technique of resupply each type of reconnaissance platoon will use. The
most common techniques are those involved in routine resupply using a
LOGPAC: tailgate resupply, service station resupply, a variation of one
type, or a combination of both types. The platoon may also receive
supplies by other techniques, such pre-positioning or aerial resupply.
8-242. The situation will also dictate when resupply takes place. Medical
support should be brought forward with the LOGPAC as needed.
Generally, scouts attempt to avoid resupply during reconnaissance
operations; rather, they should conduct resupply during mission
transition. Resupply is unavoidable during security missions of long
duration.

Routine Resupply Techniques


8-243. In the tailgate technique, fuel and ammunition are brought to the
reconnaissance sections or squads by the PSG or another responsible
individual who is assisting him (see Figure 8-50). This technique is used
when routes leading to vehicle positions are available (including
successful infiltration routes) and the unit is not under direct threat
observation and fire. Tailgate resupply is time-consuming, but it is useful
in security missions when the scouts are not moving because stealth is
more easily maintained. If necessary, supplies can be hand-carried to
vehicle positions to further minimize signatures.
8-244. In the service station technique, vehicles move to a centrally
located rearm and refuel point, either by squad or section or as an entire
platoon (refer to Figure 8-51). Service station resupply is inherently
faster than the tailgate technique. Because vehicles must move and
concentrate, however, it can create security problems. During screening

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missions, the platoon must be careful not to compromise the location of


OPs. This technique is commonly used during mission transition.
8-245. The platoon leader can vary the specifics of the two basic
techniques, or he can use them in combination. During a screening
mission, for example, he may use the tailgate method for his most
forward OPs and the service station method for his OPs in depth (see
Figure 8-52).

Figure 8-50. Tailgate Resupply Technique

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Figure 8-51. Service Station Resupply Technique

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure 8-52. Combination of Resupply Techniques

Other Resupply Techniques


8-246. In addition to the techniques of routine resupply, the
reconnaissance platoon can use several other methods of obtaining
needed materials.
8-247. Aerial Resupply. Helicopters can be a vital lifeline when scouts
are forced to operate forward of friendly lines for extended periods; they
reduce the risks associated with conducting ground resupply operations
under such conditions. Aerial assets are also useful in resupplying
dismounted scouts in OPs in restricted terrain. On the other hand, aerial
resupply sometimes will not be feasible because helicopters are not
available. In addition, the signature of resupply helicopters can
compromise scout positions. Careful choice of resupply routes and landing
zones helps to minimize this risk. Refer to the discussion of utility and
cargo helicopter support earlier in this chapter.

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8-248. Pre-positioning and Cache. These resupply techniques, also


called prestock resupply, differ in the level of security provided for the
supplies. In pre-positioning, supplies are generally left unattended,
without security, although steps should be taken to prevent detection of
the location by threat elements. When it resupplies by cache, the unit
should leave security personnel to guard the site.
8-249. Both pre-positioning and cache techniques can be used in a
variety of reconnaissance platoon operations. During reconnaissance,
prestock positions can be established along the intended route of advance
or near the objective by advance elements. In security operations, the
platoon can set up prestock points throughout the area of operations.
These points should be in each alternate or supplementary OP, in
addition to other locations throughout the depth of the sector. Scouts can
also use prestock to provide resupply for patrols.
8-250. Prestock operations must be carefully planned and executed at
every level. Prestock points should be placed where they can be found by
simple instructions that are clear to someone who has never visited the
site. All leaders, down to squad leader and vehicle commander, must
know the exact locations of prestock points. As noted, the platoon leader
must take steps to ensure security and survivability of the supplies by
digging in prestock positions, selecting covered and concealed positions,
and considering the effects of weather and terrain. He must also have a
plan to remove or destroy prestock supplies to prevent the threat from
capturing them. The discussion of the cache site annex (Annex G) to
patrol orders, found in Appendix A of this manual, lists considerations
and procedures for establishing and reporting a cache site.

8-251. Medical Resupply. Because the reconnaissance platoon does not


have an attached medic or medical vehicle, it must depend on its parent
unit for medical services, including resupply. The PSG is responsible for
monitoring the platoon’s medical supply status (Class VIII) and for
ensuring that the combat lifesavers are resupplied through the LOGPAC.

MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS
8-252. Proper maintenance keeps equipment and materiel in serviceable
condition. It includes PMCS, as well as the functions of inspecting,
testing, servicing, repairing, requisitioning, recovering, and evacuating
equipment and materiel whenever necessary.
8-253. Maintenance operations are divided into several distinct levels:
unit (operator and organizational), intermediate (direct support and
general support), and depot levels. The reconnaissance platoon leader is
concerned primarily with unit maintenance and repair of equipment in
intermediate (DS) maintenance.
8-254. Repair and recovery are accomplished as far forward as possible.
When equipment cannot be repaired on site, it is moved to the rear (but
only as far as necessary for repair) to the unit maintenance collection
point (UMCP), which is established and operated by squadron/battalion
maintenance support.

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LEADER RESPONSIBILITIES
Platoon Leader
8-255. The platoon leader has ultimate responsibility for the condition
and performance of the platoon’s equipment and material. In that role,
his duties include the following:

· Coordinate with the XO in planning, directing, and


supervising unit maintenance for the platoon.
· Develop and supervise an ongoing maintenance training
program.
· Ensure that all platoon vehicles, weapon systems, and
equipment such as night observation devices (NOD), mine
detectors, NBC equipment, and communications equipment
are combat-ready at all times within the platoon’s
maintenance capabilities. The platoon leader also ensures
that equipment that cannot be repaired at platoon level is
reported to the commander as soon as possible.
· Know the current status of equipment, to include document
numbers, job order numbers, and the stage of maintenance of
his vehicles. The platoon leader keeps the parent unit XO
informed of the current maintenance status.
· Ensure that crews have the appropriate technical manuals
and are trained and supervised to complete the required level
of maintenance properly.
· Ensure that unit-level PMCS are performed on all assigned
equipment in accordance with the appropriate operator’s
manuals.
· Ensure that drivers and assistant drivers are trained and
licensed to operate platoon vehicles and equipment.
· Plan and rehearse a maintenance evacuation plan for every
mission.

Platoon Sergeant
8-256. The PSG has primary responsibility for most of the platoon’s
maintenance activities. His duties include the following:

· Ensure that DA Forms 5988-E and 2408-18 are filled out and
updated in accordance with DA Pam 738-750.
· Direct and supervise unit maintenance of platoon equipment,
vehicles, and weapon systems.
· Assist the platoon leader in complying with his
responsibilities and assuming these responsibilities in his
absence.
· Coordinate with the maintenance representative to arrange
unit repairs or to request intermediate (DS) maintenance.
· Supervise and account for platoon personnel during
maintenance periods.
· Ensure that repair parts are used or stored on a timely basis
as they are received.

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· Collect and consolidate reports of the platoon’s maintenance


status in the field and send the appropriate reports to higher
maintenance personnel.
· Ensure that vehicles are always topped off with fuel in
garrison and that they receive fuel in the field.
· Keep the platoon leader informed of the platoon’s
maintenance and logistics status.

Vehicle Commander
8-257. Vehicle commanders are the platoon’s first-line maintenance
supervisors. In large part, the platoon’s maintenance status, and thus its
combat readiness, depends on their commitment to proper maintenance
procedures. The vehicle commander’s duties in this area include the
following:

· Ensure that DA Forms 5988-E and 2408-18 are filled out and
updated in accordance with DA Pam 738-750.
· Ensure that the crew is properly trained in PMCS procedures
and that PMCS are performed on the vehicle and all assigned
equipment in accordance with the appropriate technical
manuals.
· Ensure that, as a minimum, the assigned vehicle driver or
equipment operator is properly trained and licensed. In
preparing for continuous operations, vehicle commanders
must ensure that all crewmembers are trained and licensed
as drivers.
· Ensure that repair parts are installed upon receipt or are
stored in authorized locations.
· Ensure that all tools and basic issue items (BII) are properly
marked, stored, maintained, and accounted for.
· Ensure that the vehicle is always topped off in garrison and
that it receives as much fuel as possible at every opportunity
in the field.
· Constantly update the PSG on the maintenance and logistics
status of the vehicle.

LEVELS OF MAINTENANCE
Operator Level Maintenance
8-258. Operator maintenance includes proper care, use, and
maintenance of assigned vehicles and crew equipment such as weapons,
NBC equipment, and night vision devices. The driver and other
crewmembers perform daily services on the vehicle and equipment, to
include inspecting, servicing, tightening, performing minor lubrication,
cleaning, preserving, and adjusting. The driver and gunner are required
to use DA Form 5988-E to record these checks and services, as well as all
equipment faults that they cannot immediately correct. The driver’s and
gunner’s reports are the primary means of reporting equipment faults
through the vehicle commander to the PSG, platoon leader, and
ultimately to organizational maintenance personnel.

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8-259. Checks and services prescribed for the automotive system,


weapon systems, and turret are divided into three groups:

· Before-operation checks and services.


· During-operation checks and services.
· After-operation checks and services.
8-260. These services are explained in every operator’s manual and
should be conducted as stated in the manual. Although operators must
learn to operate equipment without referring to the manual, maintenance
must always be performed using the appropriate technical manual.

Organizational Level Maintenance


8-261. The RSTA squadron has small, light armored vehicle (LAV)-based
battle damage assessment and repair (BDAR) teams attached from the
base support company (BSC) and controlled by the squadron S4. These
teams are the first echelon of organizational-level maintenance for the
recce platoon. They provide maintenance at the site of a breakdown using
a limited number of combat spares and BDAR kits. Their objective is to
quickly return vehicles to mission capable status using accurate
diagnostics (preferably embedded) and limited tools. If the BDAR team is
unable to repair a system quickly, the maneuver unit (usually the
platoon) is responsible for like-vehicle recovery to the BSA.
8-262. In non-RSTA units, organizational maintenance is also the
responsibility of the unit assigned the equipment. It is performed by the
operators and unit mechanics. Because the CFV’s design allows rapid
modular replacement of parts, many faults can be corrected, and the
vehicle returned to the platoon, rapidly.
8-263. When the operator identifies a problem that is beyond his level of
maintenance capability, he notifies his chain of command so the problem
can be isolated and corrected. The company or troop maintenance team
has trained mechanics who are authorized to perform unit maintenance
tasks as prescribed in the technical manuals for the vehicle. When
company, troop, battalion, or squadron maintenance teams are not
authorized to make a particular repair, they will arrange to have it done
by DS maintenance assets.

Intermediate (Direct Support) Maintenance


8-264. Once a vehicle reaches the BSA, the maintenance control section
will assess it to determine if it can be returned to mission capable status.
If not, the vehicle will be moved to a cannibalization point and stripped of
parts that can be used on other vehicles. Vehicles that cannot be returned
to mission capable status in the area of operations are taken rearward to
a sustainment maintenance facility as time permits.
8-265. Replacement vehicles will be brought forward as the situation
permits. Given their austere organic maintenance capabilities, the RSTA
squadron and recce platoon will depend on replacement vehicles in
maintaining their combat readiness.

EVACUATION
8-266. Evacuation is necessary when a vehicle is damaged and cannot be
repaired on site within two hours or when it is the only means available

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to prevent capture or destruction by the threat. (NOTE: Repair times


are dependent on METT-TC; the two-hour limit is only a guideline for
planning purposes.) With the exception of an entire vehicle, most
damaged equipment can be transported by the platoon until it can be
picked up by the troop or squadron/battalion support elements. It is then
evacuated by troop or squadron/battalion maintenance personnel or by
the DS maintenance unit.
8-267. When a vehicle must be evacuated, the platoon leader or PSG
reports the exact location, vehicle type, and extent of damage, if known,
on the proper net to personnel designated in the unit SOP. Two soldiers
should remain with the vehicle to assist in evacuation and repair, provide
security, and deliver the repaired vehicle back to the platoon as soon as
possible. A recovery vehicle from the higher-level maintenance team will
evacuate the damaged vehicle. It is vital that the damaged vehicle be
placed in a covered position that allows the recovery vehicle to reach it
without exposing the recovery crew to threat fire.
8-268. If a recovery vehicle is not available or if time is critical, self-
recovery will be the platoon’s primary method of vehicle evacuation.
Other platoon vehicles can evacuate the damaged vehicle for short
distances. Self-evacuation is a last resort that should be considered only
to avoid losing the damaged vehicle to the threat. The decision to do this
rests with the platoon leader. Procedures for towing are covered in the
operator’s manual. If the damaged vehicle will be lost for an extended
period, the platoon can replace other vehicles’ damaged equipment (such
as weapons and radios) with properly functioning items from the
damaged vehicle. Damaged equipment can then be repaired or replaced
while the vehicle is being repaired.

DESTRUCTION
8-269. When evacuation of damaged or inoperable equipment is
impossible, it must be destroyed to prevent it from falling into the threat’s
hands. The platoon leader must get the commander’s permission before
destroying any equipment. Every reasonable effort must be made to
evacuate secure equipment, classified materials, and all weapons.

PERSONNEL OPERATIONS
SERVICES
8-270. Personnel services include awards and decorations, leaves and
passes, command information, mail, religious services, financial services,
legal assistance, welfare, rest and relaxation, and any other service
designed to maintain the health, welfare, and morale of the soldier. Many
of these services are provided automatically by higher-level support
elements; nonetheless, the platoon leader is ultimately responsible for
arranging for and providing them to his platoon.

MANAGEMENT
8-271. Personnel management includes classification, assignment,
promotions, and reenlistment. Although the platoon leader requests these
actions through the troop/battalion, they are normally performed by the
squadron/battalion staff or by a division-level organization. The platoon

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leader must submit accurate strength reports to make sure critical


personnel shortages, such as vehicle commanders and gunners, are filled
with qualified personnel.

MEDICAL TREATMENT AND EVACUATION


HEALTH AND HYGIENE
8-272. The platoon leader and PSG must emphasize and enforce high
standards of health and hygiene at all times. This “preventive
maintenance” approach should cover all aspects of the soldier’s health
and well-being, including the following:

· Daily shaving to ensure proper fit of the protective mask.


· Regular bathing and changing of clothes.
· Prevention of weather-related problems. These include cold-
weather injuries like frostbite, trench foot, and immersion foot
and heat-related injuries such as heat exhaustion and heat
stroke. Soldiers must understand the effects of such
conditions as sunburn and windchill.
· Battle fatigue prevention, including strict implementation of
the unit sleep plan.

WOUNDED SOLDIERS
8-273. Battlefield positioning and dispersion make treatment and
evacuation of wounded personnel two of the most difficult tasks the
reconnaissance platoon must execute. Operational planning or SOPs
must cover evacuation procedures in detail.
8-274. In the reconnaissance platoon, the combat lifesaver and/or the
vehicle commander are almost always the first ones on the scene to begin
the process of treating WIA personnel. With the help of the vehicle
commander, the combat lifesaver provides initial first aid to wounded or
injured soldiers. He prepares them for medical evacuation or returns
them to duty status after rendering first aid. There should be at least one
combat lifesaver on each platoon vehicle at all times.
8-275. Vehicle commanders and their crews must be prepared to give
immediate first aid as necessary and to continue the mission, without
stopping, with a limited crew. The vehicle commander is responsible for
ensuring that the PSG is informed of casualties. He coordinates with the
PSG for ground or aerial evacuation.
8-276. Evacuation procedures must be part of the platoon plan and
should be rehearsed as part of mission preparation. Regardless of the
method of evacuation, all reconnaissance leaders must have the necessary
CSS graphics available, including the locations of higher headquarters
casualty collection points. When wounded crewmen require evacuation,
the platoon leader or PSG can take one of the following steps:

· Coordinate for aerial evacuation through the troop or


battalion.
· Conduct self-evacuation with organic platoon assets.

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· Request that higher command task organize a dedicated


ambulance to the platoon for operations forward of the larger
element.
· Coordinate with the closest troop/company team for ground
evacuation.

8-277. Aerial evacuation, if it is available, is preferred because of its


speed. The scouts coordinate with their higher command and then switch
to the designated frequency to coordinate directly with the MEDEVAC or
CASEVAC aircraft. They must pick a relatively flat, open position with
adequate cover and concealment for the aircraft’s LZ. The location should
be given to the aircraft by radio and marked with colored smoke when the
aircraft has the area in sight. (NOTE: This type of double-check
identification, using both the radio and smoke, should always be used,
even though all Army aircraft have GPS and should have no difficulty in
spotting the LZ. Threat elements may release smoke of the same color to
confuse the aircraft crew and draw it to the wrong area.) The platoon
provides local security of the LZ until the evacuation is complete.
8-278. A wounded crewman’s individual weapon becomes the
responsibility of the vehicle commander. Personal effects, weapons, and
equipment are turned in to the company or troop supply sergeant at the
earliest opportunity. The crewman’s protective mask stays with him at all
times. All sensitive items such as maps, overlays, and SOPs should also
remain with the vehicle.
8-279. The vehicle commander ensures that casualty feeder and witness
statement forms are completed. The casualty feeder card stays with the
wounded soldier; witness statements are given to the PSG. The PSG
ensures that the witness statements are turned over to the 1SG.

SOLDIERS KILLED IN ACTION


8-280. The squadron/battalion S4 designates the location of the collection
point for soldiers who are KIA. The reconnaissance platoon leader selects
the location of a platoon KIA collection point and reports its eight-digit
grid to higher headquarters. This collection point will be used only as a
last resort when KIA soldiers must be left on the battlefield. The name of
each dead solider, the exact location of the body, and the circumstances
are reported higher as soon as possible within the limits of the mission.
8-281. The platoon leader designates a primary and alternate vehicle to
extract KIAs from the battlefield to the next scheduled LOGPAC location.
The remains of these personnel are placed in a body bag or sleeping bag
or rolled in a poncho for evacuation. The lower dog tag is removed for
turn-in to the PSG; he forwards it to the 1SG during the next resupply
operation along with witness statements from those who witnessed the
action. The personal effects of the KIA soldier remain with the body. The
soldier’s weapon, equipment, and issue items become the responsibility of
the vehicle commander until they can be turned over to the supply
sergeant or 1SG by the PSG.
8-282. As a rule, every effort must be made not to place the bodies of
KIA soldiers on the same vehicle as wounded soldiers. If the platoon
leader or 1SG cannot expedite evacuation, however, KIAs and WIAs may

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

be carried together on a vehicle until it reaches its next stop. In the


attack, this destination may be the objective. In the defense, it may be the
next BP.

PRISONERS AND CAPTURED MATERIAL


8-283. EPWs and captured threat equipment, materiel, and documents
are excellent sources of combat intelligence; they must be processed and
evacuated to the rear quickly. If threat soldiers want to surrender, it is
the responsibility of the reconnaissance platoon or individual vehicle crew
to take them into custody and control them until they can be evacuated.
The reconnaissance platoon leader will employ a HUMINT soldier, if
available, to perform an initial assessment and screening of all EPWs and
captured materials to aid in processing and information-gathering.
(NOTE: Refer to Chapter 3 of this manual for additional information on
the HUMINT collection process.)
8-284. The platoon leader will designate a primary and alternate vehicle
responsible for the handling of EPWs as well as the transportation of the
EPWs to the collection point designated in paragraph 4 of the
troop/battalion OPORD. The prisoners are then evacuated to the rear for
interrogation.

HANDLING PRISONERS OF WAR


8-285. The basic principles for handling EPWs are covered by the “five-
S” procedures: search, segregate, silence, speed, and safeguard. See
Figure 8-53 for a summary of these procedures. In addition to these steps,
the reconnaissance platoon leader must ensure that prisoners are tagged
with all necessary information before they are transported to the rear;
refer to the discussion later in this chapter.

Figure 8-53. The “Five-S” Principles for Handling EPWs

8-286. The senior officer or NCO on the scene is legally responsible for
the care of EPWs. If the unit cannot evacuate a prisoner within a

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reasonable time, he must be provided with food, water, and medical


treatment.
8-287. The rights of EPWs have been established by international law,
and the United States has agreed to obey these laws. Once a threat
soldier shows he wants to surrender, he must be treated humanely. It is a
court-martial offense to physically or mentally harm or mistreat an EPW
or to needlessly expose him to fire. In addition, mistreated EPWs or those
who receive special favors are not good interrogation subjects.
8-288. Scouts should never make the initial approach to a threat soldier.
He may have a weapon hidden nearby, or he may be booby-trapped. To be
safe, the scouts should gesture for him to come forward until it is clear
that he is honestly surrendering and not trying to lure friendly troops
into an ambush. They can use a thermal sight to locate possible
ambushes. The scout who searches the prisoner should always have
another friendly soldier cover him with a weapon. The searcher must not
get between the threat soldier and the soldier covering him.
8-289. If an EPW is wounded and cannot be evacuated through medical
channels, a combat lifesaver will treat the wounds and attempt to
stabilize the prisoner. The supporting troop/battalion XO or 1SG will be
notified of the prisoner’s status, and evacuation will be coordinated using
other means.
8-290. Before evacuating the EPW, the platoon leader must ensure that
a tag is attached to him listing all pertinent information and procedures.
A copy of this tag is forwarded to higher headquarters. Tags may be
obtained through supply channels or made from materials available on
the battlefield. The tag should contain the following information:

· Date of capture.
· Name of prisoner.
· Prisoner’s rank.
· Prisoner’s serial number.
· Prisoner’s date of birth.
· Prisoner’s unit.
· Location of capture.
· Capturing unit.
· Special circumstances of capture.
· List of weapons or documents in the prisoner’s possession at
the time of capture.

CAPTURED THREAT DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT


8-291. Captured threat documents (such as maps, orders, records, and
photographs) and equipment are excellent sources of intelligence. If
captured items are not handled properly, however, the information in
them may be lost or delayed until it is useless. These items must be
evacuated to the next level of command as rapidly as possible.
8-292. The platoon should tag each captured item. If the item is found in
the EPW’s possession, include the prisoner’s name on the tag and give the
item to the guard. The guard delivers the item with the EPW to the next

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higher headquarters. The captured items should be tagged with the


following information:

· Type of item (such as document or piece of equipment).


· Date and time of capture.
· Location of capture.
· Capturing unit.
· Special circumstances of capture, including the names of
EPWs in possession of the captured items.

CIVILIANS
8-293. Civilians who are captured as the result of curfew violations or
suspicious actions are treated the same as EPWs. The platoon evacuates
them quickly to higher headquarters using the “five-S” principles
discussed earlier in this section. They should be tagged in the same
manner as prisoners.

8-90
Chapter 9

Essential Field Data


This chapter includes
CONTENTS
information that will be
useful to the reconnaissance Route Reconnaissance Symbols ................ 9-1
Route Classification .................................... 9-7
platoon’s leaders and Route Classification Overlay ............... 9-8
crewmen during execution of Route Classification Formula .............. 9-9
platoon missions. It covers Examples of Route Classification
TTP the platoon will need to Formula .............................................. 9-12
conduct an effective route Curve Calculations ...................................... 9-13
Measuring Methods .............................. 9-13
reconnaissance operation, in Curve Symbol ........................................ 9-15
particular the tasks involved Series of Sharp Curves ........................ 9-15
in route classification and Slope Estimation .......................................... 9-16
inspection and classification Slope Percentage .................................. 9-16
of bridges. Slope Symbol ........................................ 9-19
Constrictions ................................................ 9-20
Constriction Symbol ............................. 9-20
Underpasses ......................................... 9-21
NOTE: For quick-reference infor- Tunnels .................................................. 9-22
mation in other areas Overhead Clearance ............................. 9-23
critical to reconnaissance Stream Reconnaissance ............................. 9-24
Measurements ....................................... 9-25
platoon operations, refer to Preexisting Data .................................... 9-25
ST 3-20.983. Stream Width ......................................... 9-25
Current Velocity .................................... 9-26
Stream Approaches .............................. 9-27
Ford Reconnaissance .................................. 9-27
Ferry Reconnaissance ................................. 9-30
Civil Ferries and Ferry Sites ................. 9-30
Military Ferries and Rafting .................. 9-30
Ferry Information .................................. 9-31
Bridge Classifications and
Reconnaissance ............................ 9-32
Required Information ............................ 9-33
Hasty Bridge Classification
Techniques ........................................ 9-35
AVLB Crossing Reconnaissance ........ 9-53
Bridge Condition ................................... 9-53
Weight and Height Restrictions ........... 9-53
Bridge Traffic Control Procedures ...... 9-55
Full NATO Bridge Symbol .................... 9-55
Bypasses ...................................................... 9-57
Measurement Conversions ......................... 9-58

SECTION I – ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE SYMBOLS

9-1. Figure 9-1 outlines a variety of symbols that the platoon can use
to illustrate reconnaissance data on its overlays. Figure 9-2 shows
symbols for various materials, facilities, equipment, and services. An

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

example of how these graphics are used in overlays is illustrated in


Figure 9-3. The graphics in this section are adapted from information
provided in FM 3-34.212 (FM 5-170).

Figure 9-1. Reconnaissance Overlay Symbols

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_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data

Figure 9-1. Reconnaissance Overlay Symbols (Continued)

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure 9-1. Reconnaissance Overlay Symbols (Continued)

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_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data

Figure 9-1. Reconnaissance Overlay Symbols (Continued)

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure 9-1. Reconnaissance Overlay Symbols (Continued)

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_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data

Figure 9-2. Material, Facility, Equipment,


and Service Symbols

SECTION II – ROUTE CLASSIFICATION

9-2. This section describes how to perform the technical aspects of a


route reconnaissance. Route classification is a tool that helps a unit
determine what vehicles can travel on a particular road network and how
fast they can travel. The results of route reconnaissance are displayed on
map overlays. During SSC operations, stability operations, and support
operations, only the necessary and essential facts about a route are
gathered. The goal is to assemble this information as quickly and safely
as possible. (NOTE: This information is recorded on a route
classification overlay and supplemented by additional reports.) During
peacetime operations, detailed route classification missions are performed
to obtain in-depth information for future use.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

ROUTE CLASSIFICATION OVERLAY


9-3. The first step in understanding the technical portions of a route
reconnaissance is understanding what information is needed to complete
a route classification overlay. This overlay graphically depicts a route’s
entire network of roads, bridge sites, and other key locations and terrain
features. (NOTE: These items are reconnoitered, and the data recorded
as support documentation for the complete route.) A route classification
gives specific details on what obstructions will slow down a convoy or
maneuver force along the route. As a minimum, the following information
will be included on the route classification overlay (see Figure 9-3 for an
illustration of how the information is recorded on the overlay):

· The route classification formula.


· The name, rank, and social security number (SSN) of the
person in charge of performing the classification.
· The unit conducting the classification.
· The DTG showing when the classification was conducted.
· The map name, edition, and scale.
· Any remarks necessary to ensure complete understanding of
the information on the overlay.

Figure 9-3. Route Classification Overlay

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_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data

ROUTE CLASSIFICATION FORMULA


9-4. A route classification must cover the primary route (such as a
road, highway, street, or trail), as well as every alternate route on which
movement can be made, to determine what type of vehicles and traffic
load each specific portion of the route can handle. Routes are classified by
obtaining, through the route reconnaissance, all pertinent information
concerning trafficability and applying it to the route classification
formula. The formula, which is recorded on the route classification
overlay (see Figure 9-3), consists of the following elements (an example of
these items follows this listing):
(1) Route width, in meters.
(2) Route type (based on ability to withstand various types of
weather conditions).
(3) Lowest military load classification (MLC).
(4) Lowest overhead clearance, in meters.
(5) Obstructions to traffic flow (OB), if applicable.
(6) Special conditions, such as snow blockage (T) or flooding
(W).

Example: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)


5.5/ Y/ 30/ 4.6 (OB) (T or W)

ROUTE WIDTH
9-5. The route width is the narrowest width of traveled way on a route
(see Figure 9-4). This narrow width may be the width of a bridge, a
tunnel, a road, an underpass, or other constriction that limits the traveled
way. The number of lanes is determined by the traveled-way width. The
lane width normally required for wheeled vehicles is 3.5 meters; for
tracked vehicles, this width is 4 meters.

Figure 9-4. Route Width

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9-6. Based on the number of lanes, route width is classified as follows:

· Limited access. This type of route permits passage of


isolated vehicles of appropriate width in one direction only.
· Single lane. A single-lane route permits use in only one
direction at any one time. Passing or movement in the
opposite direction is impossible.
· Single flow. This route permits the passage of a column of
vehicles and allows isolated vehicles to pass or travel in the
opposite direction at predetermined points. It is preferable
that such a route be at least 1.5 lanes wide.
· Double flow. This route permits two columns of vehicles to
proceed simultaneously. It must be at least two lanes wide.

ROUTE TYPE
9-7. The route type defines the ability of the route surface to
withstand various types of weather. It is determined for the worst section
of road on the entire route and is categorized as follows:

· Type X. This is an all-weather route that, with reasonable


maintenance, is passable throughout the year to a volume of
traffic never appreciably less than its maximum capacity.
This type of route is normally formed of roads having
waterproof surfaces that are only slightly affected by rain,
frost, thaw, or heat. This route is never closed because of
weather effects other than snow or flood blockage.
· Type Y. This is a limited, all-weather route that, with
reasonable maintenance, is passable throughout the year but
at times is limited to a volume of traffic considerably less than
maximum capacity. This type of route is normally formed of
roads that do not have waterproof surfaces and that are
considerably affected by rain, frost, thaw, or heat. A type Y
route is likely to be closed for short periods (up to one day at a
time) by adverse weather conditions, during which heavy use
of the road would probably lead to complete collapse.
· Type Z. This type of route is passable only in fair weather. It
is so seriously affected by adverse weather conditions that it
may remain closed for long periods. Improvement of a type Z
route is possible only through construction or realignment.

MILITARY LOAD CLASSIFICATION


9-8. A route’s MLC number represents its safe load-carrying capacity
and indicating the maximum vehicle class that the route can accept under
normal conditions. Usually, the lowest bridge MLC (regardless of the
vehicle type or conditions of traffic flow) determines the route’s MLC. If
there is no bridge on the route, the worst section of road will determine
the route’s overall classification. These are the broad MLC categories:

· Class 50. This is an average-traffic route.


· Class 80. This is a heavy-traffic route.
· Class 120. This is a very heavy-traffic route.

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9-9. When a unit’s vehicles have a higher MLC than the route, its first
alternative may be to seek an alternate route. On the other hand, the unit
may conduct additional reconnaissance of the roads within the original
route to determine whether a change in traffic flow (such as single-flow
crossing of a weak point) will permit heavier vehicles on the route.
Whenever possible, the unit should ensure that the route network
includes a number of heavy-traffic roads as well as average-traffic roads.
This helps staff planners to manage heavy-traffic loads and to decrease
the bottleneck effect.

OVERHEAD CLEARANCE
9-10. The lowest overhead clearance is the vertical distance between
the road surface and any overhead obstacle (power lines, overpasses,
tunnels, and so forth) that denies the use of the road to some vehicles.
Use the infinity symbol ( ) for unlimited clearance in the route
classification formula. (NOTE: Any point along the route where the
minimum overhead clearance is less than 4.3 meters is considered to be
an obstruction.)

ROUTE OBSTRUCTIONS
9-11. Route obstructions restrict the type, amount, or speed of traffic
flow. They are indicated in the route classification formula by the
abbreviation “OB.” The platoon must depict the exact nature of each
obstruction it encounters on the route classification overlay.
9-12. Specific types of obstructions that the platoon may face on a route
include the following:

· Overhead obstructions with a clearance of less than 4.3


meters. Examples include tunnels, underpasses, overhead
wires, and overhanging buildings.
· Reductions in traveled-way widths that are below the
standard minimums prescribed for the type of traffic flow (see
Table 9-1 for examples). This category includes reductions
caused by bridges, tunnels, craters, lanes through mined
areas, projecting buildings, or rubble.
· Slopes (gradients) of 7 percent or greater.
· Curves with a radius of 25 meters and less. Curves with a
radius between 25.1 and 45 meters are not considered to be
obstructions; however, they must be recorded on the route
reconnaissance overlay.
· Ferries.
· Fords.

9-11
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Table 9-1. Traffic-Flow Capability Based on Route Width

Limited Single Single Double


Access Lane Flow Flow
Wheeled
At least 3.5 m 3.5 to 5.5 m 5.5 to 7.3 m Over 7.3 m
vehicles
Tracked and
combination At least 4.0 m 4.0 to 6.0 m 6.0 to 8.0 m Over 8 m
vehicles

SNOW BLOCKAGE AND FLOODING


9-13. In cases where snow blockage is serious and is blocking traffic on
a regular and recurrent basis, the symbol used in the route classification
formula is “T.” When flooding is serious and is blocking traffic on a
regular and recurrent basis, the symbol in the route classification formula
is “W.”

EXAMPLES OF ROUTE CLASSIFICATION FORMULA


9-14. The following are examples illustrating the use of the route
classification formula:

· 6.1m/Z/40/ . This is a fair-weather route (type Z) with a


minimum traveled way of 6.1 meters, and an MLC of 40.
Overhead clearance is unlimited ( ). There are no
obstructions to traffic flow. Based on its minimum traveled-
way width, this route accommodates both wheeled and
tracked, single-flow traffic without obstruction.
· 6.1m/Z/40/ (OB). This formula indicates a fair-weather route
(type Z) similar to the previous example, except that there is
an obstruction. This obstruction could consist of overhead
clearances of less than 4.3 meters, grades of 7 percent or
greater, curves with a radius of 25 meters and less, or fords
and ferries. A traveled way of 6.1 meters limits this route to
one-way traffic if there is no width obstruction. If the route is
used for double-flow traffic, 6.1 meters of traveled way is
considered an obstruction and is indicated in the formula as
an obstruction.
· 7m/Y/50/4.6(OB). This limited, all-weather route (type Y) has
a minimum traveled way of 7 meters, an MLC of 50, an
overhead clearance of 4.6 meters, and an obstruction. This
route width is not suitable for double-flow traffic (wheeled or
tracked). This width constriction is indicated as OB in the
route classification formula if the route is intended to be used
for double-flow traffic.
· 10.5m/X/120/ (OB)(W). This formula shows an all-weather
route (type X) with a minimum traveled-way width of 10.5
meters, which is suitable for two-way traffic of both wheeled
and tracked vehicles. The route has an MLC of 120, unlimited
overhead clearance, an obstruction, and regular, recurrent
flooding.

9-12
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SECTION III – CURVE CALCULATIONS

9-15. The speed at which vehicles move along a route is affected by


sharp curves. Curves with a radius of 25 meters and less are obstructions
to traffic and are indicated by the abbreviation “OB” in the route
classification formula. Curves with a radius between 25.1 and 45 meters
are recorded on the overlay but are not considered obstructions.

MEASURING METHODS
9-16. The platoon can use several methods to measure curves:
· Tape measure.
· Triangulation.
· Formula.

TAPE MEASURE METHOD


9-17. A quick way to estimate the radius of a sharp curve is by using a
tape measure to find the radius (see Figure 9-5). Imagine the outer edge
of the curve as the outer edge of a circle. Find (estimate) the center of this
imaginary circle; then measure the radius using a tape measure. Start
from the center of the circle and measure to the outside edge of the curve.
The length of the tape measure from the center of the imaginary circle to
its outer edge is the curve’s radius. This method is practical for curves
located on relatively flat ground and having a radius of up to 15 meters.

Figure 9-5. Tape Measure Method

TRIANGULATION METHOD
9-18. You can determine a curve’s approximate radius by “laying out”
right triangles (3:4:5 proportion) at the point of curvature (PC) and point
of tangency (PT) locations (see Figure 9-6). The intersection (o), which is
formed by extending the legs of each triangle, represents the center of the
circle. The distance (R) from point o to either point PC or PT represents
the curve’s radius.

9-13
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure 9-6. Triangulation Method

FORMULA METHOD
9-19. This method of determining the curve’s radius (illustrated in
Figure 9-7) is based on the following formula (all measurements are in
meters):
R = (C2/8M) + (M/2)
R = radius of the curve.
C = the distance from the centerline of the road to the centerline
of the road at the outer extremities of the curve.
M = the perpendicular distance from the center of the tape to
the centerline of the road.

9-20. Example: If C is 15 meters and M is fixed at 2 meters, the


formula becomes the following:
R = (152/16) + 2/2 = 15.0625

9-21. The result of this calculation (a radius of slightly more than 15


meters) would be an obstruction to traffic flow, and “OB” would be
entered in the route classification formula.

NOTE: When conditions warrant, set M at 2 meters from the centerline, then
measure C 2 meters from the centerline. Use this method when there is a
time limitation or when natural or man-made restrictions prevent proper
measurements.

9-14
_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data

Figure 9-7. Formula Method

CURVE SYMBOL
9-22. Sharp curves with a radius of 45 meters or less are symbolically
represented on maps or overlays by a triangle that points to the curve’s
exact map location. In addition, the measured value (in meters) for the
radius of curvature is written outside the triangle (as shown in the top
drawing in Figure 9-8). All curves with a radius of 45 meters or less are
reportable.

SERIES OF SHARP CURVES


9-23. A series of sharp curves is represented by two triangles, one
drawn inside the other. The outer triangle points to the location of the
first curve. The number of curves and the radius of curvature for the
sharpest curve in the series are written to the outside of the triangle
(bottom drawing in Figure 9-8).

Figure 9-8. Curve Symbols

9-15
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SECTION IV – SLOPE ESTIMATION

9-24. The rise and fall of the ground is known as the slope or gradient
(grade). The percentage of the slope is used to describe the effect that
inclines have on movement rates. It is the ratio of the change in elevation
(the vertical distance divided by the horizontal ground distance)
multiplied by 100 (see Figure 9-9). It is important to express the vertical
distance and the horizontal distance in the same unit of measure. Slopes
of 7 percent or greater affect the platoon’s movement speed along a route
and are considered an obstruction. Record all slopes greater than 5
percent on the route classification overlay.

Figure 9-9. Formula for Slope Percentage

SLOPE PERCENTAGE
9-25. The following discussion focuses on four methods for determining
the percent of slope.

CLINOMETER METHOD
9-26. A clinometer is an instrument that directly measures percent of
slope. It can be found in engineer survey units, as part of an artillery
compass, and as part of an engineer platoon sketch set. Follow the
instructions included with the instrument.

PACE METHOD
9-27. The pace method is a quick way to estimate percent of slope. The
first step in using this method is to accurately determine the height and
pace of each soldier of a reconnaissance team. As a rule of thumb, the eye
level of the average soldier is 1.75 meters above the ground. The pace of
the average soldier is 0.75 meter. Determine the percent of slope using
these steps:

· Stand at the bottom of the slope with head and eyes level.
· Sight a spot on the slope. This spot should be easily
identifiable. If it is not, another member of the team should go
forward to mark the location.

9-16
_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data

· Walk forward and stand on the marked spot. Record the


number of paces. Repeat this procedure until you reach the
top of the slope (estimate fractions of an eye level).
· Compute the vertical distance by multiplying the number of
sightings by the eye-level height (1.75 meters). Compute the
horizontal distance by totaling the number of paces and
converting them to meters by multiplying by 0.75 (or the
known pace-to-meter conversion factor).
· Calculate the percent of slope by substituting the values into
the percent-of-slope formula (see Figure 9-10). Because this
method considers horizontal ground distance and incline
distance as equal, you can obtain reasonable accuracy only for
slopes of less than 30 percent. This method requires practice
to achieve acceptable accuracy. A line level and string can be
used to train this method.

Figure 9-10. Pace Method for Percent of Slope

MAP METHOD
9-28. The platoon can use a large-scale map (such as 1:50,000) to
estimate the percent of slope quickly. After identifying the slope on the
map, find the difference in elevations between the top and bottom of the
slope by reading the elevation contours or spot elevation; then measure
and convert the horizontal distance (usually road distance) to the same
unit of measurement as the elevation difference. Substitute the vertical
and horizontal distances in the percent-of-slope formula as shown in
Figure 9-11.

9-17
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure 9-11. Map Method for Percent of Slope

ANGLE OF SLOPE METHOD


9-29. The angle of slope method is a quick way to estimate the percent
of slope. The angle of slope is first measured by using an elevation
quadrant, aiming circle, M2 compass, or binoculars with a standard
reticle. If the instrument used to take the angle of measurement is
mounted above ground level, the sighting must be taken a corresponding,
and equal, distance higher on the slope to compensate for the height
difference. (NOTE: This corresponding distance is the height of the
instrument above the ground.) You must take the angle of measurement
at the base of the slope. Once you obtain the angle of measurement,
consult Table 9-2 and enter the column corresponding to the measured
angle of slope. You can then read the percent of slope directly from the
table. Figure 9-12 illustrates this method.

9-18
_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data

Table 9-2. Conversion of Degrees and Mils to Percent of Slope

DEGREES OF SLOPE MILS OF SLOPE PERCENT OF SLOPE


1 18 1.7
2 36 3.5
3 53 5.2
4 71 7.0
5 89 8.7
10 175 17.6
15 267 26.7
20 356 36.4
25 444 46.6
30 533 57.7
35 622 70.0
40 711 83.9
45 800 100.0
50 889 108.7
55 978 117.6
60 1,067 126.7

Figure 9-12. Angle of Slope Method for Percent of Slope

SLOPE SYMBOL
9-30. Most vehicles will be slowed when they must negotiate slopes of 7
percent or greater for a significant distance. Such slope characteristics
must be accurately reported. The symbols illustrated in Figure 9-13 are
used to represent various slope percentages.

9-19
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure 9-13. Percent-of-Slope Symbols

9-31. A single arrowhead along the trace of a route pointing in the


uphill direction indicates a grade of at least 5 percent but less than 7
percent. Two arrowheads represent a grade of at least 7 percent but less
than 10 percent. Three arrowheads represent a grade of at least 10
percent but less than 14 percent. Four arrowheads represent a grade of
14 percent or more. As noted previously, no symbol is required for slopes
of less than 5 percent.
9-32. The percent of slope is written to the right of the arrow. When the
map scale permits, the length of the arrow shaft will be drawn to map
scale to represent the approximate length of the grade.

NOTE: Slopes of 7 percent or greater are obstructions to traffic flow and are
indicated by the abbreviation “OB” in the route classification formula.

SECTION V – CONSTRICTIONS

9-33. Reductions in the traveled-way width, known as constrictions,


include narrow streets in built-up areas, drainage ditches, embankments,
and war damage. Constrictions may limit vehicle movement; therefore,
the physical dimensions of the vehicles that will be using the route must
be known and considered when conducting the route classification.

CONSTRICTION SYMBOL
9-34. Constrictions that reduce the traveled-way width to below
minimum requirements are depicted on maps and overlays by two
opposing shaded triangles. The width of the usable traveled way (in
meters) is written next to the left triangle. The length of the constriction
(in meters) is written next to the right triangle (see Figure 9-14).

9-20
_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data

Figure 9-14. Route Constriction Symbol

NOTE: Constrictions of traveled-way widths below the minimum standard for the
type and flow of traffic are obstructions; they are indicated by the symbol
“OB” in the route classification formula.

UNDERPASSES
9-35. An underpass is depicted on a map or overlay by a symbol that
depicts the structure’s ceiling. The symbol is drawn over the route at the
map location of the underpass. The width (in meters) is written to the left
of the underpass symbol, and the overhead clearance (in meters) is
written to the right of the underpass symbol (see Figure 9-15).

Figure 9-15. Underpass Symbols

9-36. If sidewalks permit emergency passage of wider vehicles, the


sidewalks are symbolically represented. The traveled-way width is
recorded first, followed by a slash, then the structure’s total width,
including sidewalks.

9-21
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

NOTE: Features that result in a decrease in overhead clearance, such as arched


ceilings or irregularities in ceilings, must be noted. In such cases, an
extension of width does not necessarily mean that the structure will
accommodate wider vehicles.

9-37. Both minimum and maximum overhead clearances, if different,


will be recorded. The minimum will be recorded first, followed by a slash,
then the maximum overhead clearance.

TUNNELS
9-38. A tunnel is a section of roadway along the route that is either
artificially covered (such as a covered bridge or a snowshed) or
underground. A tunnel reconnaissance determines essential information
such as the serial number, location, type, length, width (including
sidewalks), bypasses, alignment, gradient, and cross section. A tunnel
consists of a bore, a tunnel liner, and a portal.

TUNNEL BORE TYPES


9-39. Common shapes of tunnel bores are semicircular, elliptical,
horseshoe, and square with an arched ceiling (see Figure 9-16).

Figure 9-16. Types of Tunnel Bores

TUNNEL SYMBOL
9-40. Basic tunnel information is recorded on maps or overlays using
symbols (as shown in Figure 9-17). The location of the tunnel entrance is
shown by an arrow from the symbol to the location of the entrance. For
long tunnels (more than 30.5 meters), both tunnel entrance locations are
indicated.
9-41. For later reference purposes, each tunnel on a particular map or
overlay is assigned a serial number. (NOTE: Check for an existing fixed
serial number on the actual tunnel or map sheet; if there is no serial

9-22
_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data

number, assign a number based on unit SOP.) Serial numbers are not
duplicated on any one map sheet, overlay, or document. The number is
recorded inside the symbol. The traveled-way width is shown in meters
and is recorded below the symbol.

Figure 9-17. Tunnel Symbols

9-42. If sidewalks permit the emergency passage of wider vehicles, they


are symbolically represented. The traveled-way width is written first,
followed by a slash, then the total width including the sidewalks.

NOTE: Structures with arched or irregular ceilings will decrease overhead


clearance. An extension of width does not necessarily mean that the
structure will accommodate wider vehicles.

OVERHEAD CLEARANCE
9-43. Overhead clearance is the shortest distance between the surface
of a traveled way and any obstruction vertically above it. The
measurement of overhead clearance must be accurate. Figures 9-18 and
9-19 show methods and considerations for obtaining these measurements.

9-23
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure 9-18. Overhead Clearance Measurements

Figure 9-19. Overhead Clearance in Tunnels

SECTION VI – STREAM RECONNAISSANCE

9-44. A stream crossing site is a location at a body of water where


vehicles can “swim” across and not touch the bottom. Identify and report
locations that permit smooth traffic flow and reduce route obstructions as
much as possible. When conducting reconnaissance of a stream crossing
area, record the stream’s depth, width, approaches, velocities, and
natural and man-made obstacles (see Figure 9-20).

9-24
_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data

Figure 9-20. Dimensions Required for Streams

MEASUREMENTS
9-45. Stream depth is usually measured using field-expedient devices
such as poles or weighted ropes. Measure the depth every 3 meters along
the planned stream crossing route. Recheck depths and currents
frequently during inclement weather. Sudden, heavy rainfall may turn a
sluggish stream or river into a torrent very quickly, particularly in
tropical and arid regions. Monitor weather reports of the surrounding
area. Storms occurring miles away can cause flash flooding. Always
consider the importance of upstream dams and locks that may cause
elevated levels or flooding when opened or destroyed. (NOTE: When
there is little time for reconnaissance, the actual measured depth should
be recorded as the normal depth.)

PREEXISTING DATA
9-46. In developed areas of the world, special water navigation maps
containing data on specific bodies of water are available through
government agencies. The S2 can obtain copies of such maps. When using
these maps, however, check the actual site whenever possible; there is no
substitute for in-person reconnaissance.

STREAM WIDTH
9-47. Determine stream width using one of several available methods:
the compass method; an aiming circle, azimuth indicator, or alidade; the
GPS; or a direct measurement.

COMPASS METHOD
9-48. In this method, use a compass to take an azimuth from a point on
the near shore, close to the water’s edge, to a point on the opposite shore,
also close to the water’s edge (as illustrated in Figure 9-21). On the near
shore, establish another point that is on a line with and at a right angle to
the azimuth selected. The azimuth to the same point on the far shore is +
or - 45 degrees (800 mils) from the previous azimuth. Measure the
distance between the two points on the near shore. This distance is equal
to the distance across the stream.

9-25
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure 9-21. Measuring Stream Width with a Compass

AIMING CIRCLE, AZIMUTH INDICATOR, OR ALIDADE


9-49. Use an aiming circle, azimuth indicator, or alidade to measure the
angle between two points that are a known distance apart on the near
shore and a third point directly across the river from one of these points
(see Figure 9-22). Using trigonometric relationships, compute the
distance across the stream.

Figure 9-22. Measuring Stream Width


with a Surveying Instrument

GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM


9-50. In this method, calculate the distance using two known grid
points taken from the GPS.

DIRECT MEASUREMENT
9-51. Measure short gaps with a tape measure or a dark rope that is
accurately measured and marked.

CURRENT VELOCITY
9-52. Current velocity varies in different parts of a stream. Velocity is
usually slower near the shore and faster in the main channel. Perform
the following procedure to determine stream velocity:

· Measure a distance along a riverbank.


· Throw a light, floating object (not affected by the wind) into
the stream.
· Record the time it takes for the object to travel the measured
distance. Repeat the procedure at least three times. Use the
average time of the test in the following formula (also
illustrated in Figure 9-23) to determine the stream’s velocity:
Stream velocity (in meters per second) =
measured distance (in meters) divided by
average time (in seconds)

9-26
_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data

Figure 9-23. Measuring Stream Velocity

STREAM APPROACHES
9-53. Gently sloping stream approaches are desirable for fording and
swimming operations. Slope is expressed in percentage. Slope-climbing
capability must be considered for the vehicles that are expected to
ford/swim the stream. This information is found on the vehicle’s data
plate or dash plate or in the vehicle’s technical manual (TM). When
considering slope-climbing capability, consider the degrading effects of
weather, the condition of the vehicle’s tires or tracks, and the condition of
the ground surface of both sides of the stream.
9-54. The platoon should avoid the following obstacles during stream
crossing operations:

· High, vertical banks.


· Mines and booby traps that are located at the entrance and
exit points or at likely approaches to the stream; that are
submerged in the stream itself; or that are attached to poles
or floating logs.
· Debris and floating objects such as logs and brush, poles, or
floating objects with wire attached that could foul propellers
and suspension systems.
· Ice crusts.

SECTION VII – FORD RECONNAISSANCE

9-55. A ford is a location in a water barrier where the current, bottom,


and approaches allow personnel, vehicles, and other equipment to cross
while remaining in contact with the bottom during the crossing. Fords are
obstructions to traffic flow and are shown by the abbreviation “OB” in the
route classification formula.

9-27
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

9-56. During high-water periods, low-water bridges are easily confused


with paved fords because both are completely submerged. It is important
to know the difference between this type of bridge and a paved ford
because of corresponding military load limitations.
9-57. Fords are classified according to their crossing potential (or
trafficability) for pedestrians or vehicles. Fordable depths for vehicular
traffic can be increased by providing suitable waterproofing and by
adding deep-water fording kits. These kits permit fording depths up to an
average of 4.3 meters. Check vehicle TMs for further fording information.
9-58. Record the composition of the approaches. They may be paved or
covered with mat or track materials, but they are usually unimproved.
The composition and the slope of the approaches to a ford should be
carefully noted to determine the trafficability after fording vehicles
saturate the surface material of the approaches. Identify the ford’s left
and right approaches when looking downstream.
9-59. Record the current velocity and the presence of debris to
determine their effect, if any, on the ford’s condition and trafficability.
Estimate the current velocity using the following categories:

· Swift (more than 1.5 meters per second).


· Moderate (1 to 1.5 meters per second).
· Slow (less than 1 meter per second).

9-60. The composition of the ford’s stream bottom largely determines its
trafficability. It is important to determine whether the bottom is
composed of sand, gravel, silt, clay, or rock and in what proportions.
Record whether the ford’s natural river bottom has been improved to
increase the load-bearing capacity or to reduce the water depth. Improved
fords may have gravel, macadam, or concrete surfacing; layers of
sandbags; metal screening or matting; or timber (corduroy) planking.
Determine if material is available nearby that can be used to improve the
ford. Record limited ford information, such as the following, on maps or
overlays using symbols as illustrated in Figure 9-24:

· Use an arrow to show the ford’s geographic location from the


symbol to the ford location on a map or overlay. The symbol is
drawn on either side of the stream.
· Assign a serial number to each ford for reference (if the map
sheet has a preassigned serial number, use it). Follow the
unit’s SOP in assigning serial numbers. They must not be
duplicated within any one map sheet, overlay, or document.
· Use the letters “V” for vehicular or “P” for pedestrian to show
the ford type. The type of ford is determined by bottom
conditions, width, and water depth. Approaches are not
considered in determining the ford type.
· Express the stream’s normal velocity in meters per second.
Following the stream-velocity notation, list any seasonal
limitations, summarizing the factors with these letters:
n X. No seasonal limitations except for sudden flooding of
limited duration (such as flash floods).

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_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data

n Y. Serious, regular, or recurrent flooding or snow


blockage. (NOTE: If the “Y” symbol is used, the route
type in the route-classification formula automatically
becomes type Z.)
· List the length of the ford, in meters; this is the distance from
the near to far shores. Also list the width of the ford, which is
the traveled-way width of the ford’s bottom.
· Indicate the nature of the bottom by the most appropriate
letter symbol:
n M. Mud.
n C. Clay.
n S. Sand.
n G. Gravel.
n R. Rock.
n P. Artificial paving.
· Express the normal depth of the ford, in meters. This is the
depth of water at the deepest point. During a hasty
reconnaissance, the actual water depth, as measured, is used.
· Label the stream’s left and right banks, as determined looking
downstream. Imagine yourself in the middle of the stream
and looking downstream. Your left arm would indicate the left
bank and the right arm the right bank. In drawing this
portion of the symbol, pay attention to the direction of the
stream flow. Irregular lines placed on the corresponding side
of the basic symbol show a difficult approach.

9-61. All elements of the ford symbol are separated by slashes. If you do
not know or cannot determine any item of the ford symbol, substitute a
question mark for the required information.

Figure 9-24. Ford Symbols

9-29
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

SECTION VIII – FERRY RECONNAISSANCE

9-62. Ferries are considered obstructions to traffic flow and are indicated
by the abbreviation “OB” in the route classification formula. Ferryboat
construction varies widely and ranges from expedient rafts to ocean-going
vessels. Ferries differ in physical appearance and capacity depending upon
the waterway’s width, depth, and current and the characteristics of the
traffic to be moved. Ferries may be propelled by oars; cable and pulleys;
poles; the stream current; or steam, gasoline, or diesel engines.

CIVIL FERRIES AND FERRY SITES


9-63. The capacity of a civil ferryboat is normally expressed in tons and
its capacity (total number of passengers and/or vehicles, as well as cargo).
In addition, it is often assigned an MLC number. Because ferries vary in
capacity, be sure to record the capacity of each ferry when more than one
is used at a given site.
9-64. Ferry slips (or piers) are usually provided on each shore to permit
easy loading of passengers, cargo, and vehicles. The slips may range from
simple log piers to elaborate terminal buildings. A distinguishing
characteristic of a ferry slip is often the floating pier that adjusts, with
changes in the water depth, to the height of the ferryboat.
9-65. Approach routes to ferry installations have an important bearing
on use of the ferry. Reconnoitering and recording the conditions of the
approaches (including the load-carrying capacity of landing facilities) is
very important.
9-66. Limiting characteristics of ferry sites that should be considered
include the following:

· Width of the water barrier from bank to bank.


· Distance and time required for the ferryboat to travel from
one bank to the other.
· Depth of the water at each ferry slip.
· Factors influencing the possible defense of each landing site.

9-67. Climatic conditions affect ferry operations. The platoon must


consider data on tide fluctuations, freezing periods, floods, excessive dry
spells, and their effects on ferry operations. For example, fog and ice
substantially reduce the total traffic-moving capacity of the water route
and increase the danger associated with movement across the water.

MILITARY FERRIES AND RAFTING


9-68. Reconnaissance personnel will be required to locate and report
suitable sites for military rafting or ferrying operations. Military floating
bridges are currently available for such operations. Desirable site
characteristics include the following:

· Current velocity between 0 and 1.6 meters per second.


· Banks that permit loading without a great deal of
preparation.

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_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data

· Approaches that permit easy access and egress.


· Strong, natural holdfasts.
· Sites with no shoals, sandbars, or snags.
· Sites clear of obstacles immediately downstream.
· Sites clear of mines and booby traps.
· Sites with sufficient depth to prevent grounding of the raft or
ferry during loading, unloading, or crossing operations.
· Suitable raft-construction sites (dependent on type of raft).
· Holding areas for vehicles awaiting passage.
· A suitable road network to support crossing traffic.

FERRY INFORMATION
9-69. Record limited ferry information on maps or overlays by using the
symbol shown in Figure 9-25. Refer to Figure 9-26 for examples of
completed ferry symbols. Ferry information includes the following:

· Use an arrow to connect the ferry symbol to the geographic


location of the ferry on a map or overlay. The symbol may be
drawn on the map or overlay on either side of the stream.
· Assign a serial number to each ferry, using unit SOP, for later
reference. Numbers must not be duplicated within any one
map sheet, overlay, or document. Some maps will already
show a ferry serial number; if so, use this number for the
reconnaissance.
· Identify the type of ferry, listing “V” for vehicular or “P” for
pedestrian after the serial number. If the ferry can haul
vehicles, it can also haul pedestrians.
· List the deck’s MLC in the bottom left box of the symbol. Most
ferries have this information on their data plate.
· List the dead-weight capacity of the ferry. This is the MLC
plus the actual weight of the ferry, in short tons.
· Show turnaround time, in minutes, required to cross the
waterway, unload, and return.

9-70. When drawing the approach condition portion of the symbol, pay
attention to the direction of stream flow. Left and right banks are
determined by looking downstream. Approach conditions are determined
in the same manner as for fords. Use irregular lines on the corresponding
side of the basic symbol to show a difficult approach.

9-31
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure 9-25. Basic Ferry Symbol

Figure 9-26. Sample Ferry Symbols

SECTION IX – BRIDGE CLASSIFICATION AND RECONNAISSANCE

9-71. Commanders must conduct a bridge reconnaissance to ensure


that they know the load-carrying capabilities of each bridge are along a
specific certain route and/or to determine what material is needed to
destroy a bridge.
9-72. This section reviews the basics of hasty bridge load classification
procedures and reconnaissance procedures for bridge destruction. It will
help vehicle operators to avoid bridge failure by outlining procedures for
determining what vehicles can cross a bridge without causing damage.
Vehicle operators may cross without restrictions if their vehicle’s load
class (including the load) is less than or equal to the bridge’s load class.
The vehicle’s load class can be found in the appropriate TM.
9-73. Common types of bridges that the platoon may encounter include
the following (see Figure 9-27 for an illustration of bridges, by span type):

· Timber or steel trestle bridge with timber deck.


· Steel stringer bridge with concrete deck.

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_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data

· Concrete-steel stringer bridge.


· Concrete T-beam bridge with asphalt surface.
· Masonry arch bridge.

REQUIRED INFORMATION
9-74. To classify a bridge, you must acquire the necessary information
concerning the bridge’s basic components, including the following:

· Approaches (the portions of a route leading to a


bridge). Approaches may be mined or booby-trapped,
requiring thorough investigation during a reconnaissance.
· Substructure (lower part of a bridge). The substructure
consists of the abutments and intermediate supports that
transfer the bridge’s load to the ground. It is important to
measure all aspects of an abutment, including its height,
width, and length; the abutment wings; and the intermediate
supports for bridge demolition missions. It may be more
feasible to destroy the intermediate supports or abutments
when compared to the rest of the bridge structure.
· Superstructure (upper part of a bridge). The
superstructure consists of the following components (see
Figure 9-28):
n Stringers. These rest on and span the distance between
the intermediate supports or abutments. Stringers are the
superstructure’s main load-carrying members. They
receive the load from the flooring and the vehicles and
transfer it to the substructure.
n Flooring system. This often consists of both decking and
tread. The decking is laid directly over the stringers at
right angles to the centerline of the bridge. The tread is
laid parallel to the centerline of the bridge and between
the curbs.
n Curbs. These are placed at both edges of the flooring to
guide the vehicles. A vehicle with an axle that is wider
than the traveled-way width (between the curbs) cannot
cross the bridge. Most bridges, however, allow for
vehicular overhang beyond the normal traveled area. This
allowance is called horizontal clearance above the curbs
and is a safety factor. Commanders must perform a risk
analysis before attempting such a crossing.
n Railings. These are located along the bridge to guide
drivers and to protect vehicular and foot traffic.
n Trusses. These are used in some bridge superstructures,
either above or below the traveled way, to increase the
load-carrying capacity. A truss is a structural element
made of several members joined together to form a series
of triangles.
n Number of members in each span. This is noted where
applicable (for example, for stringer bridges and concrete

9-33
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

T-beam bridges). Exact dimensions of specific bridge


members are taken as outlined later in this section.
n Span length. This is measured from center to center of
the supports. The bridge’s classification is usually based
on the weakest span. If the weakest span is apparent, no
other spans need to be reconnoitered. If the weakest span
is difficult or impossible to locate, however, all spans must
be classified. Even if several spans look identical, actual
measurements should be taken to prevent error.
n Traveled-way width. This is measured between the
inside faces of the curbs. On a truss bridge, however, the
horizontal clearance is measured from a point 1.21 meters
(4 feet) above the roadway.

NOTE: Figure 9-27 illustrates various types of bridges, by span type, that the
platoon may encounter. Figure 9-28 shows components of the bridge
superstructure.

9-34
_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data

Figure 9-27. Typical Bridges (by Type of Span)

9-35
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure 9-28. Bridge Components

HASTY BRIDGE CLASSIFICATION TECHNIQUES


9-75. In wartime, the platoon will sometimes have to cross underclass
bridges. To determine whether the bridge can be crossed safely, assess it
using the following considerations:

· Is there a data plate on the side of or underneath the bridge?


· Can the unit’s largest vehicle cross with at least two of the
bridge supports under it? (See Figure 9-29.)
· If the bridge fails, will the vehicle fall a distance not
exceeding its own length? The risk is minimized if the drop is
shallow enough that the vehicle can be easily retrieved and
the crew can avoid serious injury.
· What does the bridge span? If it spans a railroad track or a
highway, the risk of crossing is probably too great. If the
bridge crosses a stream, small ravine, or creek, however, it
may be worth the risk to attempt a crossing.

9-36
_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data

Figure 9-29. BFV Crossing a Bridge with Two Supports under It

9-76. If the risk is acceptable, the senior member of the crossing


element should observe the bridge while the first vehicle crosses. If the
first vehicle causes no visible damage to the bridge, subsequent vehicles
should cross one at a time, in the center of the bridge, at a constant speed,
and without stopping or accelerating. An observer should watch each
vehicle from the side of the bridge to detect any sign of bridge damage.
9-77. The following discussion focuses on hasty bridge classification
techniques for MLC 30 and MLC 70 bridges.

CONCRETE SLAB MLC 30 BRIDGE


9-78. Before crossing a concrete slab MLC 30 bridge, use the following
evaluation steps to determine if it is safe to cross:
Step 1. Is the roadway width 4.5 meters (14.75 feet) or greater?
Is there 4.3 meters (14 feet) of overhead clearance? If
the answer to both of these questions is yes, go to step
2; if the answer to either question is no, do not cross.
Step 2. Measure the span length and deck thickness (as
illustrated in Figure 9-30). Compare the span length
and deck thickness to minimum standards using Table
3. Does the slab meet minimum deck thickness for the
corresponding span? If the answer is yes, it safe to cross
MLC 30 traffic; if the answer is no, go to step 3.

Table 9-3. Measurement Correlations for


a Concrete Slab MLC 30 Bridge

MINIMUM DECK
SPAN LENGTH
THICKNESS
30 feet 18 inches
20 feet 13 inches
10 feet 8 inches

Step 3. Take into account the following special condition: For


each foot under the closest higher span length shown,
the deck thickness can decrease by no more than ½

9-37
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

inch. Does the slab meet minimum deck thickness


required according to this special condition? If the
answer is yes, it is safe to cross MLC 30 traffic; if the
answer is no, do not cross.

Figure 9-30. Concrete Slab MLC 30 Bridge

CONCRETE T-BEAM MLC 30 BRIDGE


9-79. Before crossing a concrete T-beam MLC 30 bridge, use the
following evaluation steps to determine if it is safe to cross:
Step 1. Is the roadway width 4.5 meters (14.75 feet) or greater?
Is there 4.3 meters (14 feet) of overhead clearance? Is
the deck at least 6 inches thick? If the answer to all
three questions is yes, go to step 2; if the answer to any
question is no, do not cross.
Step 2. Measure the span length, stringer spacing, and depth of
the stringer (as illustrated in Figure 9-31). Is the
stringer spacing no less than 6 feet and no more than 8
feet? If the answer is yes, go to step 3; if the answer is
no, do not cross.
Step 3. Does the stringer depth meet the minimum dimension
for the corresponding span length shown in Table 9-4?
(NOTE: If the span length falls between designated
lengths, use the next higher value.) If the answer is
yes, it is safe to cross MLC 30 traffic; if the answer is no,
do not cross.

9-38
_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data

Table 9-4. Measurement Correlations for


a Concrete T-beam MLC 30 Bridge

MINIMUM STRINGER
SPAN LENGTH
DEPTH
20 feet 15 inches
30 feet 20 inches
40 feet 25 inches
50 feet 30 inches
60 feet 35 inches
70 feet 40 inches
80 feet 44 inches
90 feet 50 inches
100 feet 57 inches

Figure 9-31. Concrete T-beam MLC 30 Bridge

MASONRY ARCH MLC 30 BRIDGE


9-80. Before crossing a masonry arch MLC 30 bridge, use the following
evaluation steps to determine if it is safe to cross:
Step 1. Is the roadway width 4.5 meters (14.75 feet) or greater?
Is there 4.3 meters (14 feet) of overhead clearance? If
the answer to both questions is yes, go to step 2; if the
answer to either question is no, do not cross.
Step 2. Measure the span length, arch ring, and fill (as shown
in Figure 9-32). Compare these measurements to
minimum standards using Table 9-5. Do the arch ring
and fill meet minimum required dimensions for the
designated span? If the answer is yes, it safe to cross
MLC 30 traffic; if the answer is no, go to step 3.

9-39
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Table 9-5. Measurement Correlations for


a Masonry Arch MLC 30 Bridge

MINIMUM
SPAN LENGTH ARCH RING MINIMUM FILL

10 feet 9 inches None


15 feet 9 inches 6 inches
20 feet 9 inches 12 inches
30 feet 13.5 inches 18 inches
40 feet 18 inches 12 inches
50 feet 22.5 inches 12 inches

Step 3. Take into account the following special condition: Fill


can be reduced if the thickness of the arch ring exceeds
the specifications above. Compare these measurements
using Table 9-6. Does the bridge span meet the
minimum fill requirements for the corresponding arch
ring thickness according to this special condition? If the
answer is yes, it is safe to cross MLC 30 traffic; if the
answer is no, do not cross.

Table 9-6. Special Conditions for Minimum Fill


on a Masonry Arch MLC 30 Bridge

FOR EACH 1-INCH


INCREASE ABOVE THE
SPAN LENGTH
MINIMUM ARCH RING, FILL
CAN DECREASE BY:
15 feet 3 inches
20 feet 2-2/3 inches
30 feet 2-2/3 inches
40 feet 1-1/3 inches
50 feet 2-2/3 inches

Figure 9-32. Masonry Arch MLC 30 Bridge

9-40
_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data

STEEL STRINGER MLC 30 BRIDGE WITH CONCRETE DECK


9-81. Before crossing a steel stringer MLC 30 bridge with a concrete
deck, use the following evaluation steps to determine if it is safe to cross:
Step 1. Is the roadway width 4.5 meters (14.75 feet) or greater?
Is there 4.3 meters (14 feet) of overhead clearance? Is
the deck at least 5 inches and no more than 8 inches
thick? If the answer to all three questions is yes, go to
step 2; if the answer to any question is no, do not
cross.
Step 2. Measure the span length, stringer spacing, and stringer
height and width (as illustrated in Figure 9-33). Using
Table 9-7, find the row and column corresponding to the
bridge’s span length and stringer spacing. (NOTE: If
these measurements fall between the values given, use
the next higher measurement.) Does the stringer meet
the minimum requirements for overall height and
width? If the answer is yes, it is safe to cross MLC 30
traffic; if the answer is no, do not cross.

Table 9-7. Measurement Correlations for a Steel Stringer


MLC 30 Bridge with Concrete Deck

50-FOOT 40-FOOT 30-FOOT 25-FOOT 20-FOOT


SPAN SPAN SPAN SPAN SPAN

STRINGER HEIGHT x WIDTH (inches)

8-FOOT
STRINGER 24-1/4 24-1/8 17-3/4 16-3/4 15
x9 x9 x 6-5/8 x 6-1/2 x 5-7/8
SECTION

6-FOOT
STRINGER 24-1/8 24 16 15-3/4 14
x9 x7 x 8-1/2 x 6-1/8 x6
SECTION

4-FOOT
STRINGER 21-1/4 18-1/4 16-3/4 15 13-3/8
x 8-1/4 x7 x 6-1/2 x 5-7/8 x 5-3/8
SECTION

2-FOOT
STRINGER 18-1/4 16-1/4 15 14 12
x7 x 7-1/8 x 5-7/8 x 5-1/2 x5
SECTION

9-41
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure 9-33. Steel Stringer MLC 30 Bridge


with Concrete Deck

TIMBER/STEEL TRESTLE MLC 30 BRIDGE


9-82. Before crossing a timber/steel trestle MLC 30 bridge, use the
following evaluation steps to determine if it is safe to cross:
Step 1. Is the roadway width 4.5 meters (14.75 feet) or greater?
Is there 4.3 meters (14 feet) of overhead clearance? Is
the deck at least 8 inches thick (for 6-foot stringer
sections) or at least 6 inches thick (for stringer sections
of 4 feet of less)? If the answer to all three questions is
yes, go to step 2 for a timber trestle bridge or step 3 for
a steel trestle bridge. If the answer to any question is
no, do not cross.
Step 2. For a timber trestle bridge, measure the span length,
stringer spacing, and stringer height and width (refer to
Figure 9-34). Using Table 9-8, find the row and column
corresponding to the bridge’s span length and stringer
spacing. (NOTE: If these measurements fall between
the values given, use the next higher measurement.)
Does the timber stringer meet the minimum
requirements for overall height and width? If the
answer is yes, it is safe to cross MLC 30 traffic; if the
answer is no, do not cross.

Table 9-8. Measurement Correlations for


a Timber Trestle MLC 30 Bridge

20-FOOT 15-FOOT 10-FOOT


SPAN SPAN SPAN
STRINGER HEIGHT x WIDTH (inches)
6-FOOT
STRINGER 22 x 8 18 x 8 16 x 6
SECTION
4-FOOT
STRINGER 20 x 8 16 x 8 14 x 6
SECTION
2-FOOT
STRINGER 16 x 8 14 x 8 12 x 6
SECTION

9-42
_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data

Step 3. For a steel trestle bridge, measure the span length,


stringer spacing, and stringer height and width (refer to
Figure 9-34). Using Table 9-9, find the row and column
corresponding to the bridge’s span length and stringer
spacing. (NOTE: If these measurements fall between
the values given, use the next higher measurement.)
Does the steel stringer meet the minimum requirements
for overall height and width? If the answer is yes, it is
safe to cross MLC 30 traffic; if the answer is no, do not
cross.

Table 9-9. Measurement Correlations for


a Steel Trestle MLC 30 Bridge

50-FOOT 40-FOOT 30-FOOT 25-FOOT 20-FOOT


SPAN SPAN SPAN SPAN SPAN
STRINGER HEIGHT x WIDTH (inches)
6-FOOT
24 24 18-1/8 15 14-1/8
STRINGER x 7-3/8 x7 x 7-1/2 x 5-7/8 x 5-5/8
SECTION
4-FOOT
24 22 15 14-1/8 14
STRINGER x7 x7 x 5-7/8 x 5-5/8 x 5-1/2
SECTION
2-FOOT
20 18 14 13 10
STRINGER x 6-1/2 x6 x 5-1/2 x5 x5
SECTION

Figure 9-34. Timber/Steel Trestle MLC 30 Bridge

COMPOSITE STEEL-CONCRETE STRINGER MLC 30 BRIDGE


9-83. Before crossing a composite steel-concrete stringer MLC 30
bridge, use the following evaluation steps to determine if it is safe to
cross:
Step 1. Is the roadway width 4.5 meters (14.75 feet) or greater?
Is there 4.3 meters (14 feet) of overhead clearance? Is
the deck at least 5 inches thick? If the answer to all

9-43
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

three questions is yes, go to step 2; if the answer to any


question is no, do not cross.
Step 2. Inspect the stringer to see if there is a plate on the
bottom. There are three possible configurations: no
plate, a plate one-half or less the thickness of the flange,
or a plate more than one-half the thickness of the
flange. Measure the span length, stringer spacing, and
stringer height and width (as illustrated in Figure 9-35).
Using one of the tables included here, find the row and
column corresponding to the bridge’s span length and
stringer spacing. (NOTE: Use Table 9-10 for no plate,
Table 9-11 for a plate one-half or less the thickness of
the flange, or Table 9-12 for a plate more than one-half
the thickness of the flange. If the span length or
stringer spacing falls between the values given, use the
next higher measurement.) Does the stringer meet the
overall height and width requirements for its
corresponding span length, stringer spacing, and plate
status? If the answer is yes, it is safe to cross MLC 30
traffic; if the answer is no, do not cross.

Figure 9-35. Composite Steel-Concrete Stringer MLC 30 Bridge

Table 9-10. Measurement Correlations for a Composite


Steel-Concrete Stringer MLC 30 Bridge (with No Plate)

50-FOOT 40-FOOT 30-FOOT 25-FOOT 20-FOOT


SPAN SPAN SPAN SPAN SPAN

STRINGER HEIGHT x WIDTH (inches)


10-FOOT STRINGER 33-1/8 27-1/8 23-7/8 18 18
SECTION x 11-1/2 x 10 x9 x 7-1/2 x 7-1/2
8-FOOT STRINGER 30-1/8 26-7/8 21-1/4 18 18
SECTION x 10-1/2 x 10 x 8-1/4 x 7-1/2 x 7-1/2
6-FOOT STRINGER 30 24-1/8 18-1/4 18 18
SECTION x 10-1/2 x9 x 7-1/2 x 7-1/2 x 7-1/2
4-FOOT STRINGER 26-3/4 21-1/4 18-1/8 18 18
SECTION x 10 x 8-1/4 x 7-1/2 x 7-1/2 x 7-1/2

9-44
_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data

Table 9-11. Measurement Correlations for a Composite


Steel-Concrete Stringer MLC 30 bridge (with a Plate
One-Half or Less the Thickness of the Flange)

50-FOOT 40-FOOT 30-FOOT 25-FOOT 20-FOOT


SPAN SPAN SPAN SPAN SPAN

STRINGER HEIGHT x WIDTH (inches)

10-FOOT STRINGER 30-1/8 26-7/8 21-1/4 18 18


SECTION x 10-1/2 x 10 x 8-1/4 x 7-1/2 x 7-1/2

8-FOOT STRINGER 30 24-1/8 21-1/8 18 18


SECTION x 10-1/2 x 9-1/8 x 8-1/4 x 7-1/2 x 7-1/2

6-FOOT STRINGER 27-1/8 24-1/8 21 18 18


SECTION x 10 x9 x 8-1/4 x 7-1/2 x 7-1/2

4-FOOT STRINGER 26-3/4 21-1/8 18 18 18


SECTION x 10 x 8-1/4 x 7-1/2 x 7-1/2 x 7-1/2

Table 9-12. Measurement Correlations for a Composite


Steel-Concrete Stringer MLC 30 Bridge (with a Plate
More than One-Half the Thickness of the Flange)

50-FOOT 40-FOOT 30-FOOT 25-FOOT 20-FOOT


SPAN SPAN SPAN SPAN SPAN

STRINGER HEIGHT x WIDTH (inches)

10-FOOT STRINGER 30 24-1/4 21-1/4 18 18


SECTION x 10-1/2 x 9-1/8 x 8-1/4 x 7-1/2 x 7-1/2

8-FOOT STRINGER 29-7/8 24-1/4 21-1/8 18 18


SECTION x 10-1/2 x 9-1/8 x 8-1/4 x 7-1/2 x 7-1/2

6-FOOT STRINGER 27-1/8 23-7/8 18-1/4 18 18


SECTION x 10 x9 x 7-1/2 x 7-1/2 x 7-1/2

4-FOOT STRINGER 24-1/8 21-1/8 18 18 18


SECTION x9 x 8-1/4 x 7-1/2 x 7-1/2 x 7-1/2

CONCRETE SLAB MLC 70 BRIDGE


9-84. Before crossing a concrete slab MLC 70 bridge, use the following
evaluation steps to determine if it is safe to cross:
Step 1. Is the roadway width 4.5 meters (14.75 feet) or greater?
Is there 4.3 meters (14 feet) of overhead clearance? If
the answer to both questions is yes, go to step 2; if the
answer to either question is no, do not cross.
Step 2. Measure the span length and deck thickness (refer to
Figure 9-36). Compare the span length and deck
thickness to minimum standards using Table 9-13. Does
the slab meet minimum deck thickness for the
corresponding span? If the answer is yes, it safe to cross
MLC 70 traffic; if the answer is no, go to step 3.

9-45
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Table 9-13. Measurement Correlations for


a Concrete Slab MLC 70 Bridge

MINIMUM DECK
SPAN LENGTH
THICKNESS

30 feet 22 inches
20 feet 17 inches
10 feet 12 inches

Step 3. Take into account the following special condition: For


each foot under the closest higher span length shown
the deck thickness can decrease by no more than ½
inch. Does the slab meet minimum deck thickness
required according to this special condition? If the
answer is yes, it is safe to cross MLC 70 traffic; if the
answer is no, do not cross.

Figure 9-36. Concrete Slab MLC 70 Bridge

CONCRETE T-BEAM MLC 70 BRIDGE


9-85. Before crossing a concrete T-beam MLC 70 bridge, use the
following evaluation steps to determine if it is safe to cross:
Step 1. Is the roadway width 4.5 meters (14.75 feet) or greater? Is
there 4.3 meters (14 feet) of overhead clearance? Is the
deck at least 6 inches thick? If the answer to all three
questions is yes, go to step 2; if the answer to any
question is no, do not cross.
Step 2. Measure the span length, stringer spacing, and depth of
the stringer (as illustrated in Figure 9-37). Is the
stringer spacing no less than 6 feet and no more than 8
feet? If the answer is yes, go to step 3; if the answer is
no, do not cross.

9-46
_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data

Step 3. Does the stringer depth meet the minimum dimension


for the corresponding span length in Table 9-14?
(NOTE: If the span length falls between designated
lengths, use the next higher value.) If the answer is
yes, it is safe to cross MLC 70 traffic; if the answer is no,
do not cross.

Table 9-14. Measurement Correlations for


a Concrete T-beam MLC 70 Bridge

MINIMUM STRINGER
SPAN LENGTH
DEPTH
20 feet 20 inches
30 feet 26 inches
40 feet 32 inches
50 feet 39 inches
60 feet 45 inches
70 feet 50 inches
80 feet 55 inches
90 feet 61 inches
100 feet 66 inches

Figure 9-37. Concrete T-beam MLC 70 Bridge

MASONRY ARCH MLC 70 BRIDGE


9-86. Before crossing a masonry arch MLC 70 bridge, use the following
evaluation steps to determine if it is safe to cross:
Step 1. Is the roadway width 4.5 meters (14.75 feet) or greater?
Is there 4.3 meters (14 feet) of overhead clearance? If
the answer to both questions is yes, go to step 2; if the
answer to either question is no, do not cross.

9-47
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Step 2. Measure the span length, arch ring, and fill (as shown
in Figure 9-38). Compare these measurements to
minimum standards using Table 9-15. Do the arch ring
and fill meet minimum required dimensions for the
designated span? If the answer is yes, it is safe to cross
MLC 70 traffic; if the answer is no, go to step 3.

Table 9-15. Measurement Correlations for


a Masonry Arch MLC 70 Bridge

MINIMUM
SPAN LENGTH MINIMUM FILL
ARCH RING
10 feet 9 inches 6 inches
15 feet 9 inches 12 inches
20 feet 9 inches 24 inches
30 feet 13.5 inches 24 inches
40 feet 18 inches 24 inches
50 feet 22.5 inches 24 inches

Step 3. Take into account the following special condition: Fill


can be reduced if the thickness of the arch ring exceeds
the specifications above. Compare these measurements
using Table 9-16. Does the bridge span meet the
minimum fill requirements for the corresponding arch
ring thickness according to this special condition? If the
answer is yes, it is safe to cross MLC 70 traffic; if the
answer is no, do not cross.

Table 9-16. Special Conditions for Minimum Fill


on a Masonry Arch MLC 70 Bridge

FOR EACH 1-INCH INCREASE ABOVE THE MINIMUM


SPAN LENGTH
ARCH RING, FILL CAN DECREASE BY:

10 feet Not applicable; fill must be no less than 6 inches

15 feet 1-1/4 inches

If arch rings are 9 to 13.5 inches thick, fill can decrease


20 feet by 2-1/2 inches (total)
If arch rings are more than 13.5 inches thick, fill can
decrease by 1-1/4 inches per inch above minimum

If arch rings are 13.5 to 18 inches thick, fill can decrease


30 feet by 2-1/2 inches (total)
If arch rings are more than 18 inches thick, fill can
decrease by 1-1/4 inches per inch above minimum

40 feet and 50 feet 1-1/4 inches

9-48
_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data

Figure 9-38. Masonry Arch MLC 70 Bridge

STEEL STRINGER MLC 70 BRIDGE WITH CONCRETE DECK


9-87. Before crossing a steel stringer MLC 70 bridge with a concrete
deck, use the following evaluation steps to determine if it is safe to cross:
Step 1. Is the roadway width 4.5 meters (14.75 feet) or greater?
Is there 4.3 meters (14 feet) of overhead clearance? Is
the deck at least 5 inches and no more than 8 inches
thick? If the answer to all three questions is yes, go to
step 2; if the answer to any question is no, do not
cross.
Step 2. Measure the span length, stringer spacing, and stringer
height and width (as illustrated in Figure 9-39). Using
Table 9-17, find the row and column corresponding to
the span length and stringer spacing of the bridge.
(NOTE: If these measurements fall between the values
given, use the next higher measurement.) Does the
stringer meet the minimum requirements for overall
height and width? If the answer is yes, it is safe to cross
MLC 70 traffic; if the answer is no, do not cross.

Table 9-17. Measurement Correlations for a Steel Stringer


MLC 70 Bridge with Concrete Deck

50-FOOT 40-FOOT 30-FOOT 25-FOOT 20-FOOT


SPAN SPAN SPAN SPAN SPAN

STRINGER HEIGHT x WIDTH (inches)

8-FOOT STRINGER 29-1/2 23-5/8 21-5/8 16-3/4 14-1/4


SECTION x 11-3/4 x 11-3/4 x 11-3/4 x 11-3/4 x 11-3/4

6-FOOT STRINGER 27-1/2 21-5/8 21-5/8 16-3/4 13-3/8


SECTION x 11-3/4 x 11-3/4 x 11-3/4 x 11-3/4 x 11-3/4

4-FOOT STRINGER 23-5/8 19-5/8 16-3/4 14-1/4 13-3/8


SECTION x 11-3/4 x 11-3/4 x 11-3/4 x 11-3/4 x 11-3/4

2-FOOT STRINGER 17-3/4 16-3/4 13-3/8 13-3/8 11


SECTION x 11-3/4 x 11-3/4 x 11-3/4 x 11-3/4 x 11

9-49
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure 9-39. Steel Stringer MLC 70 Bridge


with Concrete Deck

TIMBER/STEEL TRESTLE MLC 70 BRIDGE


9-88. Before crossing a timber/steel trestle MLC 70 bridge, use the
following evaluation steps to determine if it is safe to cross:
Step 1. Is the roadway width 4.5 meters (14.75 feet) or greater?
Is there 4.3 meters (14 feet) of overhead clearance? Is
the deck at least 8 inches thick (for 6-foot stringer
sections) or at least 6 inches thick (for stringer sections
of 4 feet of less)? If the answer to all three questions is
yes, go to step 2 for a timber trestle bridge or step 3 for
a steel trestle bridge. If the answer to any question is
no, do not cross.
Step 2. For a timber trestle bridge, measure the span length,
stringer spacing, and stringer height and width (as
illustrated in Figure 9-40). Using Table 9-18, find the
row and column corresponding to the bridge’s span
length and stringer spacing. (NOTE: If these
measurements fall between the values given, use the
next higher measurement.) Does the timber stringer
meet the minimum requirements for overall height and
width? If the answer is yes, it is safe to cross MLC 70
traffic; if the answer is no, do not cross.

Table 9-18. Measurement Correlations for


a Timber Trestle MLC 70 Bridge

20-FOOT 15-FOOT 10-FOOT


SPAN SPAN SPAN
STRINGER HEIGHT x WIDTH (inches)
6-FOOT
STRINGER 24 x 12 24 x 10 18 x 8
SECTION
4-FOOT
STRINGER 22 x 12 22 x 8 16 x 8
SECTION

9-50
_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data

2-FOOT
STRINGER 22 x 12 20 x 8 14 x 8
SECTION

Step 3. For a steel trestle bridge, measure the span length,


stringer spacing, and stringer height and width (refer to
Figure 9-40). Using Table 9-19, find the row and column
corresponding to the bridge’s span length and stringer
spacing. (NOTE: If these measurements fall between
the values given, use the next higher measurement.)
Does the steel stringer meet the minimum requirements
for overall height and width? If the answer is yes, it is
safe to cross MLC 70 traffic; if the answer is no, do not
cross.

Table 9-19. Measurement Correlations for


a Steel Trestle MLC 70 Bridge

50-FOOT 40-FOOT 30-FOOT 25-FOOT 20-FOOT


SPAN SPAN SPAN SPAN SPAN
STRINGER HEIGHT x WIDTH (inches)
6-FOOT
27-1/2 23-5/8 19-5/8 16-3/4 13-3/8
STRINGER x 11-3/4 x 11-3/4 x 11-3/4 x 11-3/4 x 11-3/4
SECTION
4-FOOT
23-5/8 19-5/8 16-3/4 15-3/4 13-3/8
STRINGER x 11-3/4 x 11-3/4 x 11-3/4 x 11-3/4 x 11-3/4
SECTION
2-FOOT
19-5/8 16-3/4 13-3/8 11 11
STRINGER x 11-3/4 x 11-3/4 x 11-3/4 x 11 x 11
SECTION

Figure 9-40. Timber/Steel Trestle MLC 70 Bridge

9-51
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

COMPOSITE STEEL-CONCRETE STRINGER MLC 70 BRIDGE


9-89. Before crossing a composite steel-concrete stringer MLC 70
bridge, use the following evaluation steps to determine if it is safe to
cross:
Step 1. Is the roadway width 4.5 meters (14.75 feet) or greater? Is
there 4.3 meters (14 feet) of overhead clearance? Is the
deck at least 5 inches thick? If the answer to all three
questions is yes, go to step 2; if the answer to any
question is no, do not cross.
Step 2. Inspect the stringer to see if there is a plate on the
bottom. There are three possible configurations: no
plate, a plate one-half or less the thickness of the flange,
or a plate more than one-half the thickness of the
flange. Measure the span length, stringer spacing, and
stringer height and width (as shown in Figure 9-41).
Using one of the tables included here, find the row and
column corresponding to the bridge’s span length and
stringer spacing. (NOTE: Use Table 9-20 for no plate,
Table 9-21 for a plate one-half or less the thickness of
the flange, or Table 9-22 for a plate more than one-half
the thickness of the flange. If the span length or
stringer spacing falls between the values given, use the
next higher measurement.) Does the stringer meet the
overall height and width requirements for its
corresponding span length, stringer spacing, and plate
status? If the answer is yes, it is safe to cross MLC 70
traffic; if the answer is no, do not cross.

Table 9-20. Measurement Correlations for a Composite


Steel-Concrete Stringer MLC 70 Bridge (with No Plate)

50-FOOT 40-FOOT 30-FOOT 25-FOOT 20-FOOT


SPAN SPAN SPAN SPAN SPAN
STRINGER HEIGHT x WIDTH (inches)
10-FOOT
33-7/8 36 30-1/8 24-1/8 18
STRINGER x 15-3/4 x 12 x 10-1/2 x9 x 7-1/2
SECTION
8-FOOT
36-1/2 35-7/8 30 23-7/8 18
STRINGER x 12-1/8 x 12 x 10-1/2 x9 x 7-1/2
SECTION
6-FOOT
36-1/8 33-1/4 29-7/8 21-1/4 18
STRINGER x 12 x 11-1/2 x 10-1/2 x 8-1/4 x 7-1/2
SECTION
4-FOOT
35-7/8 30 26-3/4 18-1/4 18
STRINGER x 12 x 10-1/2 x 10 x 7-1/2 x 7-1/2
SECTION

9-52
_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data

Table 9-21. Measurement Correlations for a Composite


Steel-Concrete Stringer MLC 70 Bridge (with a Plate
One-Half or Less the Thickness of the Flange)

50-FOOT 40-FOOT 30-FOOT 25-FOOT 20-FOOT


SPAN SPAN SPAN SPAN SPAN
STRINGER HEIGHT x WIDTH (inches)
10-FOOT
36-3/4 35-7/8 30 24-1/8 18
STRINGER x 16-5/8 x 12 x 10-1/2 x9 x 7-1/2
SECTION
8-FOOT
36-3/8 35-7/8 29-7/8 23-7/8 18
STRINGER x 12-1/8 x 12 x 10-1/2 x9 x 7-1/2
SECTION
6-FOOT
36 33-1/8 27-1/8 21-1/8 18
STRINGER x 12 x 11-1/2 x 10 x 8-1/2 x 7-1/2
SECTION
4-FOOT
33-1/4 30 24-1/4 18-1/4 18
STRINGER x 11-1/2 x 10-1/2 x9 x 7-1/2 x 7-1/2
SECTION

Table 9-22. Measurement Correlations for a Composite


Steel-Concrete Stringer MLC 70 Bridge (with a Plate
More than One-Half the Thickness of the Flange)

50-FOOT 40-FOOT 30-FOOT 25-FOOT 20-FOOT


SPAN SPAN SPAN SPAN SPAN
STRINGER HEIGHT x WIDTH (inches)
10-FOOT
36-1/2 35-7/8 30 23-7/8 18
STRINGER x 12-1/8 x 12 x 10-1/2 x9 x 7-1/2
SECTION
8-FOOT
36-3/8 33-1/4 29-7/8 23-7/8 18
STRINGER x 12-1/8 x 11-1/2 x 10-1/2 x9 x 7-1/2
SECTION
6-FOOT
36 33-1/8 27-1/8 21-1/8 18
STRINGER x 12 x 11-1/2 x 10 x 8-1/4 x 7-1/2
SECTION
4-FOOT
33-1/4 30 26-7/8 18-1/4 18
STRINGER x 11-1/2 x 10-1/2 x 10 x 7-1/2 x 7-1/2
SECTION

9-53
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure 9-41. Composite Steel-Concrete Stringer MLC 70 Bridge

AVLB CROSSING RECONNAISSANCE


9-90. Generally, the best site to deploy an AVLB is across a span where
a bridge has been destroyed or across an existing bridge that will not hold
the unit’s vehicles. In both cases, abutments on both sides should be
intact, in good shape, and less than 80 feet apart. Crossing at areas
without bridge abutments requires a detailed evaluation of both sides to
ensure the ground is firm enough to hold both the bridge and the heaviest
vehicle in the unit. Once a bridge has been buried in the mud at both
ends, it is difficult to retrieve. Refer to Table 9-23 for a summary of AVLB
characteristics.

BRIDGE CONDITION
9-91. It is essential to note the bridge’s general condition, paying
particular attention to evidence of damage from natural causes (such as
rot, rust, and deterioration) or combat action. Classification procedures
presume that a bridge is in good condition. If the bridge is in poor
condition, the class determined through mathematical computations must
be reduced according to the classifier’s judgment.

WIDTH AND HEIGHT RESTRICTIONS


9-92. Table 9-24 summarizes width restrictions for bridges. If a one-
lane bridge does not meet width requirements, post a rectangular
warning sign under the classification sign showing the actual clear width
(see Figure 9-42). If it is a route restriction, annotate it in the route
classification formula. For a two-lane bridge, downgrade the two-way
classification to the highest class for which it does qualify (one-way
classification is not affected). Post a limited-clearance sign if the overhead
clearance is less than 4.3 meters. These signs must be a minimum of 40
centimeters in height or width, with a yellow background and the
appropriate description in black letters. Separate rectangular signs are
used if necessary to denote width limitations, height limitations, or other
technical information. (NOTE: The same signs are used for tunnels, if
applicable.)

9-54
_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data

Table 9-23. AVLB Characteristics

Engineer battalion of a heavy division:


ALLOCATION · 12 launchers
· 12 bridges
Engineer company of an armor/infantry (M) separate brigade:
· 4 launchers
· 4 bridges

Bridge carried on launcher (modified M48 or M60A1 chassis)


TRANSPORTATION Bridge weights 15 tons
20-ton crane transfers bridge to launcher in 20 to 30 minutes

MLC 60 vehicle
CAPABILITIES One vehicle at a time can cross the AVLB
AVLB is 19.2 meters (63 feet) long. It spans these gaps:
· 18.3 meters (60 feet) using prepared abutments
· 17 meters (57 feet) using unprepared abutments

Launched in 2 to 5 minutes by buttoned-up 2-man crew


ASSEMBLY/ Retrieved from either end; one soldier exposed; guide and
PROPULSION connect
Allow 0.9 meter (3 feet) bearing for unprepared abutment, 0.5
meter (1.5 feet) for prepared abutment

M48A2 requires gas; M60 and M48A5 are diesel


REMARKS/ Scissors launch requires 10 meters (32.8 feet) overhead
LIMITATIONS clearance
Maximum launch slope:
· Uphill – 2.7 meters (9 feet)
· Downhill – 2.7 meters (9 feet)
· Sideslope – 0.3 meters (1 feet)
AVLB fords water 1.2 meters (4 feet) deep

Table 9-24. Minimum Roadway Widths

BRIDGE CLASSIFICATION
ROADWAY WIDTH
(meters) One-way Two-way
2.75 to 3.34 12 0
3.35 to 3.99 30 0
4 to 4.49 60 0
4.5 to 4.99 100 0
5 to 5.4 150 0
5.5 to 7.2 150 30
7.3 to 8.1 150 60
8.2 to 9.7 150 100
Over 9.8 150 150
NOTE: Minimum overhead clearance for all classes is
4.3 meters.

9-55
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure 9-42. Width and Height Signs

BRIDGE TRAFFIC CONTROL PROCEDURES


9-93. Posting standard bridge signs and other signs needed for proper
and efficient traffic control across a bridge is the engineer’s responsibility.
Additional signs are used when vehicles require special controls while
crossing. When necessary, holding areas, turnouts for parking and
unloading vehicles, and checkpoints are installed near bridges to provide
the necessary control during crossings.

FULL NATO BRIDGE SYMBOL


9-94. Bridge information is recorded on a map or overlay using the full
NATO bridge symbol (refer to Figure 9-43). It is different from an on-site
bridge classification sign; do not confuse the two. The information
necessary for the full NATO bridge symbol includes the following:

· Bridge’s serial number.


· Geographic location.
· Bridge’s MLC.
· Overall length.
· Traveled-way width.
· Overhead clearance.
· Available bypasses.

9-56
_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data

Figure 9-43. Full NATO Bridge Symbol

9-95. A bridge serial number is assigned for future reference and is


recorded in the symbol’s lower portion (assign a number according to unit
SOP). For proper identification, do not duplicate serial numbers within
any single map sheet, overlay, or document. The unit S2 can obtain
special maps containing bridge information for developed areas of the
world.
9-96. An arrow extending from the symbol to the exact map location
shows the bridge’s geographic location. The bridge’s MLC number is
shown in the symbol’s top portion. This number indicates the bridge’s
carrying capacity; classifications for both single- and double-flow traffic
are included. In those instances where dual classifications for wheeled
and tracked vehicles exist, both classifications are shown.
9-97. The bridge’s overall length is the distance between abutments,
measured along the bridge’s centerline. This figure is placed to the right
of the circle and is expressed in meters.
9-98. The minimum lane width is the clear distance between curbs.
Place this figure below the symbol and express it in meters. Bridges may
be obstructions to traffic flow when the traveled-way width on the bridge
is less than the minimum standard prescribed for the overall route. Refer
to the minimum roadway widths listed earlier in Table 9-24.
9-99. The overhead clearance is the minimum distance between the
bridge’s surface and any obstruction above it. This figure is shown (in
meters) to the left of the symbol. Underline any overhead clearance less
than the minimum required by the bridge classification number (refer to
Table 9-25). Unlimited overhead clearance is indicated by the infinity
symbol ( ). Often, a telltale (see Figure 9-44) or other warning device can
be posted before the bridge to indicate overhead clearance limitations.
Report any overhead clearance less than 4.3 meters as an obstruction in
the route classification formula. A question mark is used to indicate
information that is unknown or undetermined and is included as part of
the bridge reconnaissance symbol.

9-57
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Table 9-25. Minimum Overhead Clearances

MINIMUM
BRIDGE CLASSIFICATION
OVERHEAD CLEARANCE
Up to MLC 70 4.5 meters
Above MLC 70 4.5 meters

Figure 9-44. Use of Telltale for Bridge Restrictions

9-100. Bypasses around the bridge site are indicated using arrows
similar to (and branching away from) the arrow connecting the bridge
symbol to its location on the map. Bypass arrows should show the
approximate route of the bypass. Refer to the discussion of bypasses in
the following section.

NOTE: Railway bridges that could be used by road vehicles in an emergency should
be classified and identified on the map or overlay. The symbol for a railway
bridge should indicate whether it is “use easy” or “use difficult.”

SECTION X – BYPASSES

9-101. Bypasses are detours along a route allowing traffic to avoid an


obstruction. Bypasses limited to specific vehicle types, such as those
capable of swimming or deep-water fording, are noted in the
reconnaissance report. Each bypass is represented symbolically as an
arrow. The bypass arrow extends either from the tunnel, ford, bridge, or
overpass symbol itself or from the arrow that connects the symbol to the
map location of the tunnel, ford, bridge, or overpass. The arrow should
indicate the approximate route of the bypass.

9-58
_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data

9-102. Bypasses are classified as easy, difficult, or impossible. Table 9-26


illustrates the map symbols used to indicate each bypass classification.
Considerations for the bypass categories include the following:

· A bypass is considered easy when a 5-ton vehicle can cross the


obstacle within the immediate vicinity without work to
improve the bypass.
· A difficult bypass also allows vehicles to cross the obstacle
within the immediate vicinity; however, some work will be
necessary to prepare the bypass. (NOTE: An estimation of
the time, manpower, and equipment necessary to prepare the
bypass must be included in the reconnaissance report.)
· The bypass is considered impossible when it would entail
repairing an existing route feature (such as a bridge or
tunnel) to cross the obstacle, building a new feature, or
providing a detour to cross or move around the obstacle
outside the immediate vicinity of the original route.

Table 9-26. Bypass Symbols

SYMBOL CLASSIFICATION AND DESCRIPTION

BYPASS EASY. Use when the obstacle can be


crossed in the immediate vicinity by a US 5-ton truck
without work to improve the bypass.

BYPASS DIFFICULT. Use when the obstacle can


be crossed in the immediate vicinity, but some work
is necessary to improve the bypass.

BYPASS IMPOSSIBLE. Use when the obstacle can


be crossed only by repairing or constructing a route
feature or by detouring around the obstacle.

SECTION XI – MEASUREMENT CONVERSIONS

9-103. This section includes tables covering the basic computations for
converting English measurements to their metric equivalents. The
following conversions are included:

· Table 9-27 lists conversions for common distance


measurements (inches to centimeters; feet to meters; yards to
meters; miles to kilometers).
· Table 9-28 shows conversions of miles per hour to kilometers
per hour.

9-59
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Table 9-27. English to Metric Distance Measurement Conversions

INCHES to CENTIMETERS FEET to METERS


1 inch = 2.54 centimeters 1 foot = 0.30 meters
2 inches = 5.08 centimeters 2 feet = 0.61 meters
3 inches = 7.62 centimeters 3 feet = 0.91 meters
4 inches = 10.16 centimeters 4 feet = 1.22 meters
5 inches = 12.70 centimeters 5 feet = 1.52 meters
6 inches = 15.24 centimeters 6 feet = 1.83 meters
7 inches = 17.78 centimeters 7 feet = 2.13 meters
8 inches = 20.32 centimeters 8 feet = 2.44 meters
9 inches = 22.86 centimeters 9 feet = 2.74 meters
10 inches = 25.40 centimeter 10 feet = 3.05 meters
20 inches = 50.80 centimeters 20 feet = 6.10 meters
30 inches = 76.20 centimeters 30 feet = 9.14 meters
40 inches = 101.60 centimeters 40 feet = 12.19 meters
50 inches = 127.00 centimeters 50 feet = 15.24 meters
60 inches = 152.40 centimeters 60 feet = 18.29 meters
70 inches = 177.80 centimeters 70 feet = 21.34 meters
80 inches = 203.20 centimeters 80 feet = 24.38 meters
90 inches = 228.60 centimeters 90 feet = 27.43 meters
100 inches = 254.00 centimeters 100 feet = 30.48 meters

YARDS to METERS MILES to KILOMETERS


1 yard = 0.91 meters 1 mile = 1.61 km
2 yards = 1.83 meters 2 miles = 3.22 km
3 yards = 2.74 meters 3 miles = 4.83 km
4 yards = 3.66 meters 4 miles = 6.44 km
5 yards = 4.57 meters 5 miles = 8.05 km
6 yards = 5.49 meters 6 miles = 9.66 km
7 yards = 6.40 meters 7 miles = 11.27 km
8 yards = 7.32 meters 8 miles = 12.87 km
9 yards = 8.23 meters 9 miles = 14.48 km
10 yards = 9.14 meters 10 miles = 16.09 km
20 yards = 18.29 meters 20 miles = 32.19 km
30 yards = 27.43 meters 30 miles = 48.28 km
40 yards = 36.58 meters 40 miles = 64.37 km
50 yards = 45.72 meters 50 miles = 80.47 km
60 yards = 54.86 meters 60 miles = 96.56 km
70 yards = 64.00 meters 70 miles = 112.65 km
80 yards = 73.15 meters 80 miles = 128.75 km
90 yards = 82.30 meters 90 miles = 144.84 km
100 yards = 91.44 meters 100 miles = 62.14 km

9-60
_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data

Table 9-28. Miles per Hour to


Kilometers per Hour Conversions

MILES PER HOUR KILOMETERS PER HOUR


1 mph 1.609 kmph
2 mph 3.22 kmph
3 mph 4.83 kmph
4 mph 6.44 kmph
5 mph 8.05 kmph
6 mph 9.66 kmph
7 mph 11.27 kmph
8 mph 12.87 kmph
9 mph 14.48 kmph
10 mph 16.09 kmph
15 mph 24.14 kmph
20 mph 32.19 kmph
25 mph 40.23 kmph
30 mph 48.28 kmph
35 mph 56.33 kmph
40 mph 64.37 kmph
45 mph 72.42 kmph
50 mph 80.47 kmph
55 mph 88.51 kmph
60 mph 96.56 kmph
65 mph 104.61 kmph
70 mph 112.65 kmph
75 mph 120.70 kmph
100 mph 160.94 kmph

9-61
Appendix A

Combat Orders
Combat orders are the means
CONTENTS
by which the reconnaissance
platoon leader receives and Warning Orders ............................................ A-1
Operation Orders .......................................... A-2
transmits information, from Fragmentary Orders ..................................... A-6
the earliest notification that Patrol Orders ................................................ A-7
an operation will occur
through the final phases of
execution. They are absolutely critical to mission success. All
members of the platoon must be familiar with the formats of warning
orders, OPORDs, and FRAGOs, as well as the format of patrol orders
and the information included in them.

SECTION I – WARNING ORDERS

A-1. The reconnaissance platoon leader will use warning orders to


alert his platoon of upcoming missions. The guidelines and directions in
the warning order will allow the platoon to begin its planning and
preparation activities. The platoon leader then uses a series of warning
orders to provide additional information to the platoon as he receives it or
as he further develops his plan. The warning order provides answers to
the following questions:

· WHO is involved in the mission?


· WHAT is the nature of the mission and what are we tasked to
accomplish?
· WHY are we performing the mission?
· WHEN is the earliest starting time expected for the mission?
· WHERE is location of the area of operations and where and
when will the OPORD be issued?

A-2. At a minimum, all platoon warning orders will include the


following elements:

· Situation. The warning order covers the following situational


factors:
n Threat. Define the area of operations and the area of
interest. Give a brief description of the terrain layout
using OCOKA factors.
n Friendly. State your intent and the mission statements
for the next two higher levels. Explain the next higher
commander’s concept of the operation and provide a copy
of the available operational graphics.
· Mission. Give the restated reconnaissance platoon mission.

A-1
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

· Coordinating instructions. Provide the platoon with all of


the limitations identified up to this point and any other
instructions that allow for proactive planning and preparation,
including priorities of work. The following elements are
included:
n Timeline. Update your earlier timeline(s). Outline all
known beginning and ending times, to include those for
the next higher unit.
n Rehearsals. Specify what type of mission-specific
rehearsals or drills you expect subordinate units to
conduct within the framework of the timeline.
n Security. Brief the security plan.
n Service support. Address changes to support
requirements for which the platoon may have to plan, such
as attachment of an engineer platoon or infantry squad.

SECTION II – OPERATION ORDERS

A-3. The OPORD provides the reconnaissance platoon with the


essential information required to conduct the operation and to carry out
the higher commander’s intent. The platoon leader should provide
subordinate leaders with a copy of his OPORD format to facilitate note-
taking. All platoon OPORDs will use the format shown in Figure A-1 to
present the necessary operational information.

TASK ORGANIZATION
· Time(s) of attachment.
· Time(s) of detachment.
· Support relationship(s).

PARAGRAPH 1 - SITUATION
a. Enemy (threat) forces (and battlefield conditions).
(1) Weather and light data.
· Precipitation.
· Temperature.
· Other weather conditions (such as wind, dust, or fog).
· Light data:
BMNT: _____________________. Sunrise: _________________ .
Sunset: _____________________. EENT: __________________ .
Moonrise: ___________________. Moonset: ________________ .
Percent Illumination: ____________________.
(2) Terrain (factors of OCOKA).
· Observation and fields of fire.
· Cover and concealment.
· Obstacles.
· Key terrain.
· Avenues of approach.

A-2
___________________________________________________________ Appendix A – Combat Orders

Figure A-1. Sample Reconnaissance Platoon OPORD Format

(3) Threat forces.


· Identification.
· Composition/order of battle.
· Recent activities.
· Strength/weaknesses.
· Current location.
· Most probable course of action.
(4) Civil considerations.
· Overview of society/social conditions.
· Infrastructure.
· Negative effects on military operations.
b. Friendly forces.
· Brigade mission and commander’s intent.
· Squadron mission and commander’s intent.
· Squadron commander’s concept of the operation.
· Adjacent unit missions/locations.
· Unit(s) providing fire support.
· Other units supporting the squadron.

PARAGRAPH 2 - MISSION
The aspects of WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, and WHY for the mission.

PARAGRAPH 3 - EXECUTION
Commander’s intent.
a. Concept of the operation.
(1) Commander’s focus, tempo and engagement criteria.
(2) Scheme of maneuver.
· Offensive operations.
- Passage of lines.
- Axis or route.
- Movement formations.
- Movement techniques.
- Actions on contact (prior to the objective).
- Actions at obstacles.
- Actions on the objective (decisive point).
- Consolidation and reorganization.
- On-order and be-prepared missions.
· Defensive operations.
- Security operations.
- Passage of lines of forward forces.
- Battle handover.
- Defense of initial and successive BPs.
- Displacement.
- Counterattack.

A-3
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

- Consolidation and reorganization.

Figure A-1. Sample Reconnaissance Platoon OPORD Format (Continued)

(3) Fires.
· Purpose of indirect fires.
· Priority of fires.
· Allocation, including use of special fires (such as smoke, illumination, or CAS).
· Triggers.
· Restrictions/coordinating instructions.
(4) Engineer support.
· Priority of effort.
· Priority of support.
b. Tasks to maneuver units.
(1) Task for each of the platoon's sections/squads.
(2) Purpose for each of the platoon's sections/squads.
c. Tasks to combat support units.
(1) Engineers.
(2) ADA.
d. Coordinating instructions.
(1) Movement instructions.
· SP/RP time and location.
· Order of march.
· Movement route.
· RP time and location.
· Limit of advance (attack position, tactical assembly area, or other control measure).
(2) Passage of lines.
· Linkup time and location.
· Passage point/passage lane locations.
(3) Priority intelligence requirements (PIR).
(4) Troop safety.
· Exposure guidance (in cGy).
· MOPP level(s) and initiation times.
· Direct fire weapons control status and warnings.
· ADA weapons control status and warnings.

PARAGRAPH 4 - SERVICE SUPPORT


a. Concept of support.

A-4
___________________________________________________________ Appendix A – Combat Orders

· Current location of squadron combat field trains.


· Current location of squadron umcp.
· Current location of squadron/battalion aid station(s).
· Scheme of support.

Figure A-1. Sample Reconnaissance Platoon OPORD Format (Continued)

b. Materiel and services.


(1) Supply.
· Class I.
· Class III.
· Class V.
· Class IX.
(2) Transportation.
· Location of squadron supply route.
· Location of LRPs and collection points.
· Priority of movement on squadron MSR.
(3) Service.
· Location of mortuary services.
· Procedures for evacuation of KIA personnel.
(4) Maintenance.
· Location of UMCP during the battle.
· Method of marking damaged vehicles.
· Squadron recovery plan.
c. Medical evacuation and hospitalization.
· Location of squadron aid station(s) during the battle.
· Method of marking vehicles carrying WIA/KIA personnel.
· Procedures for evacuation of WIA/KIA personnel.
d. Personnel.
· Procedures for handling EPWs.
· Location of squadron EPW collection point.
· Personnel replacement.
e. Civil/military cooperation.
· Curfews.
· Collateral damage restrictions.
· Rules of engagement (ROE).
· Graduated response guidelines.

PARAGRAPH 5 - COMMAND AND SIGNAL


a. Command.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

· Location of platoon leader and PSG.


· Location of squadron commander.
· Location of squadron TAC CP.
· Succession of command.

Figure A-1. Sample Reconnaissance Platoon OPORD Format (Continued)

b. Signal.
· SOI in effect.
· Radio communications restrictions.
- Radio listening silence and the time it is in effect.
- Alternate frequencies and time or condition for changing frequency.
· Visual and pyrotechnic signals.
- During passage of lines.
- During movement.
- During breaching operations.
- On the objective.
- During defensive operations.
- Emergency signals.
· Code words and reports specific to the operation.
· Electronic protection, including COMSEC guidelines and procedures.

Time check (for synchronization)

Figure A-1. Sample Reconnaissance Platoon OPORD Format (Continued)

SECTION III – FRAGMENTARY ORDERS

A-4. The FRAGO is a brief oral or written order that serves to update
or clarify a previous order. During the execution of an operation, FRAGOs
are the medium of battle command. The commander uses them to
communicate changes in the threat or friendly situation and to retask his
subordinate elements based on changes in the situation. FRAGOs can
serve any of the following purposes:

· Implement timely changes to existing orders.


· Provide pertinent extracts from more detailed orders.
· Provide instructions until a detailed order is developed.
· Provide specific instructions to subordinates who do not
require a complete order.

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___________________________________________________________ Appendix A – Combat Orders

A-5. The content of each FRAGO will depend on the specific


operational and tactical situation. In general, reconnaissance platoon
FRAGOs will include the following information:

· Updated threat or friendly situation.


· Mission (ensure platoon tasks and purpose are clear).
· Scheme of maneuver.
· Specific instructions as necessary.

SECTION IV – PATROL ORDERS

A-6. Patrol orders provides the reconnaissance platoon with the


essential information required to conduct a patrol in accordance with the
higher commander’s intent. The platoon leader should provide
subordinate leaders with a copy of his patrol order format to facilitate
note-taking. The patrol order format used in this discussion serves as a
type of checklist for dismounted operations. This format is not all-
inclusive; units should tailor it to their specific situations and operations.

TASK ORGANIZATION
Explain how the patrol is organized for the operation and confirm the composition of each element.
Identify time(s) of attachment and detachment. If there is no change to the previous task organization, the
patrol leader indicates that there is no change.

PARAGRAPH 1 - SITUATION
a. Enemy (threat) forces (and battlefield conditions).
(1) Weather and light data.
· Precipitation.
· Temperature.
· Other weather conditions (such as wind, dust, or fog).
· Light data:
BMNT: ___________________ . Sunrise: _________________ .
Sunset: ___________________ . EENT: __________________ .
Moonrise: _________________ . Moonset: ________________ .
Percent Illumination: _____________________ .
· How will weather and light factors affect the patrol and threat forces?
(2) Terrain (factors of OCOKA).
· Observation and fields of fire.
· Cover and concealment.
· Obstacles.
· Key terrain.
· Avenues of approach.
· How will terrain factors affect the patrol and threat forces?

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(3) Threat forces.


· Identification.
· Disposition, composition, and/or order of battle.
· Recent activities.
· Strength/weaknesses.
· Current/last known location. This covers only forces that will directly affect
the specific mission of the patrol.
· Most probable course of action.

Figure A-2. Sample Reconnaissance Platoon Patrol Order Format

b. Friendly forces.
· Mission and commander’s intent two levels higher.
· Concept of the operation for the next higher unit.
· Location and mission of units on the left, right, front, and rear and of support units.
· Missions and routes of adjacent patrols.
· Unit(s) providing fire support.
· Mission and commander’s intent of the rest of the platoon (in the event the platoon
has multiple missions.
c. Attachments and detachments.
Any special personnel or elements (such as engineers, medics, linguists, FOs) who will
accompany the patrol.
d. Civilian populace.
· Culture.
· Political, government, and religious institutions and organizations.
· Factions/groups/organizations/terrorists.
· Restrictions and curfews.

PARAGRAPH 2 - MISSION
The aspects of WHO, WHAT (including the type of patrol), WHEN, WHERE, and WHY for the
mission. This includes a clear and concise statement of the platoon’s task and purpose.

PARAGRAPH 3 - EXECUTION
Commander’s intent.
a. Concept of the operation.
(1) Commander’s focus, tempo and engagement criteria. Explain, in general terms, how the
patrol will accomplish the mission. Identify the mission essential tasks and other critical tasks. Specify the
duration of the patrol.
(2) Scheme of maneuver. Explain the scheme of maneuver and graphics (described
sequentially as they will occur during the patrol) while simultaneously referencing a terrain board, dirt sketch
or map.
(3) Fires. Explain how and when fires will be used. Provide the patrol with the target overlay, to
include target numbers. Specify priority of fires, use of/availability of special purpose fires (such as smoke,
illumination, or CAS), and triggers.

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___________________________________________________________ Appendix A – Combat Orders

(4) Intelligence.
(5) Electronic warfare.
(6) Engineers.
b. Tasks to maneuver units.
(1) Task and purpose for each of the platoon's teams/sections/squads.
(2) Task and purpose for special teams and key individuals.
(3) Task and purpose for support/attached personnel.

Figure A-2. Sample Reconnaissance Platoon Patrol Order Format (Continued)

c. Coordinating instructions.
(1) Actions at the objective.
(2) Time line. Explain the time sequence from the time the patrol order is issued to actions at
the objective.
(3) Priority intelligence requirements (PIR).
(4) Movement techniques.
(5) Primary route.
(6) Alternate route.
(7) Departure and reentry of friendly lines.
· Linkup time and location.
· Departure point.
· Reentry point.
(8) Rally points and actions at rally points.
(9) Actions on contact (for the eight forms of contact).
(10) Actions at danger areas.
(11) Actions at halts.
(12) Debriefing time and place.
(13) MOPP level, initiation time, and exposure guidance (in cGy).
(14) Rehearsals (prioritized).
(15) Inspections.
(16) Equipment/special equipment needed to accomplish the mission.
(17) Soldier safety.
(18) Rules of interaction (ROI), engagement (ROE), and graduated response.
(19) Annexes (air assault, airborne, stream crossing, vehicle movement, linkup, evasion and
escape, hide site, cache).

PARAGRAPH 4 - SERVICE SUPPORT


a. Supply. Focus on supply requirements in Classes I, III, V, and IX.
b. Transportation. Specify location and route(s) of mounted elements of the platoon.
c. Medical evacuation. Specify procedures for evacuation of WIAs/KIAs.
d. Personnel.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

· Procedures for handling friendly and threat wia/kia personnel.


· Procedures for handling epws and captured documents and equipment.
· Procedures for personnel replacement (alternate team members or assignment
changes based on the loss of personnel).
e. Civil/military restrictions.
· Curfews.
· Collateral damage restrictions.
· Rules of interaction (ROI), engagement (ROE), and graduated response.

Figure A-2. Sample Reconnaissance Platoon Patrol Order Format (Continued)

PARAGRAPH 5 - COMMAND AND SIGNAL


a. Command.
· Location of patrol leader and assistant patrol leader.
· Location of next higher commander.
· Succession of command.
b. Signal.
· Time zone used.
· SOI and matrix in effect.
· Key hand-and-arm signals.
· Code words and reports specific to the operation.
· Time(s) radio listening silence is in effect.
· Alternate frequencies and times and/or conditions for changing frequency.
· Challenge and password (regular; forward of friendly lines; running).
· Electronic protection, including COMSEC guidelines and procedures.
· Visual and pyrotechnic signals (alternate means of control, emergency signaling).

Time check (for synchronization)

Annexes:
a. Air assault and airborne.
b. Stream crossing.
c. Vehicle movement.
d. Evasion and escape.
e. Linkup.
f. Rest overnight, hide site, and surveillance site.
g. Cache site.

NOTE: The following discussion covers formats for the seven listed annexes to the patrol order. These
annexes may also be applicable to the OPORDs for other operations as well.

Annex A to the Patrol Order

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___________________________________________________________ Appendix A – Combat Orders

AIR ASSAULT AND AIRBORNE

PARAGRAPH 1 - SITUATION
a. Enemy forces (threat).
(1) Disposition, composition, strength, and identification (air defense).
(2) Weather (how it will affect the air operation).
(3) Terrain (how it will affect the air operation).
b. Friendly forces (includes units supporting the operation, such as helicopters, artillery, air defense,
electronic countermeasures, and USAF assets).

Figure A-2. Sample Reconnaissance Platoon Patrol Order Format (Continued)

PARAGRAPH 2 - MISSION
Include only information pertaining to the air operation.

PARAGRAPH 3 - EXECUTION
Commander’s intent.
a. Concept of the operation.
(1) Maneuver.
(2) Fires.
(3) Intelligence.
(4) Electronic warfare.
(5) Other.
b. Tasks to maneuver units.
c. Tasks to combat support units.
d. Coordinating instructions.
(1) Time(s) aircraft are available and location of pickup sites.
(2) Organization for movement.
(3) Time and location for rehearsals, jump refresher, and jumpmaster prejump inspection.
(4) Time over FLOT.
(5) Information on the landing zone (LZ), drop zone (DZ), and/or pickup zone (PZ).
· Grid (primary and alternate, if applicable).
· Marking procedures.
- Long-range (terrain feature, radio, mirror, flare).
- Short-range (terrain feature, radio, man-made feature, VS-17 panels,
smoke, light, infrared strobe, chemical light).
(6) Flight route from the PZ to the LZ or DZ.
· General.
· Checkpoints.
· Prelanding and/or prejump warning.
(7) Formations.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

· At pickup site.
· En route.
· At the LZ, DZ, and/or PZ.
(8) Actions on enemy contact and actions for downed aircraft.
· En route.
· At the LZ, DZ, and/or PZ.
(9) Assembly area (grid, terrain feature, marking, assembly technique).
(10) Method for destruction and cache of special equipment.
(11) Rehearsal plan.

Figure A-2. Sample Reconnaissance Platoon Patrol Order Format (Continued)

PARAGRAPH 4 - SERVICE SUPPORT


a. Special equipment needed at LZ, DZ, and/or PZ.
b. Special equipment needed for airborne operations.

PARAGRAPH 5 - COMMAND AND SIGNAL


a. Command.
(1) Location of the team leader, assistant team leader, and RTO in the air and at the LZ/PZ.
(2) Location of the jumpmaster, rappel master, SPIES master, FRIES master, pathfinder, and
safeties in the aircraft.
(3) Location of controlling personnel (platoon leader and PSG).
b. Signal.

Annex B to the Patrol Order


STREAM CROSSING

PARAGRAPH 1 - SITUATION
a. Enemy forces (threat).
(1) Disposition, composition, strength, and identification.
(2) Weather (how it will affect the stream and the crossing operation).
(3) Terrain (how it will affect the stream and the crossing operation).
· River width.
· River depth.
· Information on river current.
· Vegetation.
· Obstacles.
b. Friendly forces.

PARAGRAPH 2 - MISSION
Include only information pertaining to the stream crossing operation.

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___________________________________________________________ Appendix A – Combat Orders

PARAGRAPH 3 - EXECUTION
Commander’s intent.
a. Concept of the operation.
(1) Maneuver.
(2) Fires.
(3) Intelligence.
(4) Electronic warfare.
(5) Other.

Figure A-2. Sample Reconnaissance Platoon Patrol Order Format (Continued)

b. Tasks to maneuver units.


(1) Elements.
(2) Individuals.
c. Tasks to combat support units.
d. Coordinating instructions.
(1) Crossing procedures.
(2) Security.
(3) Order of crossing.
(4) Actions on enemy contact.
(5) Alternate plan.
(6) Rally points.
(7) Rehearsal plan.

PARAGRAPH 4 - SERVICE SUPPORT


This paragraph is optional in stream crossing operations.

PARAGRAPH 5 - COMMAND AND SIGNAL


a. Command. Location of the team leader, assistant team leader, and RTO.
b. Signal. This subparagraph is optional in stream crossing operations.

Annex C to the Patrol Order


VEHICLE MOVEMENT

PARAGRAPH 1 - SITUATION
a. Enemy forces (threat).
(1) Disposition, composition, strength, and identification.
(2) Weather (how it will affect movement).
(3) Terrain along and adjacent to the route of movement (how it will affect movement).

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

(4) Vegetation.
(5) Obstacles and potential ambush sites.
b. Friendly forces.
(1) Units along the route.
(2) Unit(s) providing transportation.

PARAGRAPH 2 - MISSION
Include only information pertaining to the vehicle movement operation.

Figure A-2. Sample Reconnaissance Platoon Patrol Order Format (Continued)

PARAGRAPH 3 - EXECUTION
Commander’s intent.
a. Concept of the operation.
(1) Maneuver.
(2) Fires.
(3) Intelligence.
(4) Electronic warfare.
(5) Engineers.
(6) Route-related information.
(7) Other.
b. Tasks to maneuver units.
(1) Teams.
(2) Elements.
(3) Individuals. Brief vehicle drivers on routes, actions on enemy contact, and vehicle interval
and speed.
c. Tasks to combat support units.
d. Coordinating instructions.
(1) Time of departure and/or return.
(2) Loading instructions and order of movement.
(3) Actions on enemy contact.
(4) Actions at the dismount point.
(5) Rehearsal plan.
(6) Inspection plan. Inspect vehicles for the following:

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___________________________________________________________ Appendix A – Combat Orders

· Serviceability (DA Form 5988-E).


· Fuel.
· Trucks (canvas and bows off; troop seats up; safety straps on; air guards up;
sandbags on floor).
· Physical condition of drivers.
· Serviceability and location of fire extinguishers.

PARAGRAPH 4 - SERVICE SUPPORT


Specify special equipment needed, such as sandbags.

PARAGRAPH 5 - COMMAND AND SIGNAL


a. Command. Location of the team leader, assistant team leader, and RTO.
b. Signal.
(1) Special signals for the movement operation only.
(2) Communcations in and between vehicles.

Figure A-2. Sample Reconnaissance Platoon Patrol Order Format (Continued)

Annex D to the Patrol Order


EVASION AND ESCAPE

PARAGRAPH 1 - SITUATION
a. Enemy forces (threat).
(1) Disposition, composition, strength, and identification.
(2) Weather.
(3) Terrain along the evasion route (route should be broken into sections).
(4) Vegetation (along route).
(5) Obstacles (along route; rivers; mountains; built-up areas).
(6) Identification of other potential enemy pursuers.
b. Friendly forces.
(1) Potential units providing exfiltration support.
(2) Potential partisans providing exfiltration support.
(3) Survival features.

PARAGRAPH 2 - MISSION
Include only information pertaining to the evasion and escape operation.

PARAGRAPH 3 - EXECUTION
Commander’s intent.
a. Concept of the operation.
(1) Corridor (provided by operations element).
(2) Designated area of recovery locations (selected by team leader).
b. Coordinating instructions.
(1) Primary route in the corridor.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

(2) Alternate route in the corridor.


(3) Security.
(5) Actions at the designated area of recovery.
(6) Time the designated area of recovery will be active and closed.
(7) How and when the team will rally if separated.
(8) Where and when the isolated personnel report will be completed and reviewed.

PARAGRAPH 4 - SERVICE SUPPORT


Specify special equipment needed for survival.

PARAGRAPH 5 - COMMAND AND SIGNAL


a. Command. Location of the team leader, assistant team leader, and RTO.
b. Signal.
(1) Special signals for evasion and escape only.
(2) Isolated personnel report.
(3) Information on signals for partisan elements.

Figure A-2. Sample Reconnaissance Platoon Patrol Order Format (Continued)

Annex E to the Patrol Order


LINKUP

PARAGRAPH 1 - SITUATION
a. Enemy forces (threat).
(1) Disposition, composition, strength, and identification.
(2) Terrain at linkup site.
(3) Vegetation at linkup site.
(4) Obstacles at and/or near linkup site.
b. Friendly forces.
(1) Linkup unit.
(2) Designated liaison team.

PARAGRAPH 2 - MISSION
Include only information pertaining to the linkup operation.

PARAGRAPH 3 - EXECUTION
Commander’s intent.
a. Concept of the operation.
(1) Maneuver.
(2) Fires.
(3) Intelligence.

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___________________________________________________________ Appendix A – Combat Orders

(4) Electronic warfare.


(5) Engineers.
(6) Other.
b. Tasks to maneuver units.
(1) Elements (hide sites; reconnaissance and security).
(3) Individuals (security).
c. Tasks to combat support units.
d. Coordinating instructions.
(1) Time of linkup.
(2) Location of linkup site.
(3) Rally points.
(4) Actions on enemy contact.
(5) Actions at the linkup site.
(6) Rehearsal plan.

Figure A-2. Sample Reconnaissance Platoon Patrol Order Format (Continued)

PARAGRAPH 4 - SERVICE SUPPORT


This paragraph is optional for linkup operations.

PARAGRAPH 5 - COMMAND AND SIGNAL


a. Command. .
(1) Location of the team leader, assistant team leader, and RTO at the linkup site.
(2) Location of the designated liaison team.
b. Signal.
(1) Frequencies and call signs.
(2) Long-range recognition signal and identification.
· Day.
· Night.
(3) Short-range recognition signal and identification.
· Day.
· Night.
(4) Posting authentication (oral).

Annex F to the Patrol Order


REST OVERNIGHT, HIDE SITE, AND SURVEILLANCE SITE

PARAGRAPH 1 - SITUATION
a. Enemy forces (threat).
(1) Disposition, composition, strength, and identification.
(2) Terrain at the site.
(3) Vegetation at the site.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

(4) Obstacles at or near the site.


(5) Soil conditions at the site.
b. Friendly forces.

PARAGRAPH 2 - MISSION
Include only information pertaining to the rest overnight, hide site, or surveillance site.

PARAGRAPH 3 - EXECUTION
Commander’s intent.
a. Concept of the operation.
(1) Maneuver.
(2) Fires.
(3) Intelligence.
(4) Electronic warfare.
(5) Engineers.
(6) Other.

Figure A-2. Sample Reconnaissance Platoon Patrol Order Format (Continued)

b. Tasks to maneuver units.


(1) Elements.
(2) Individuals.
c. Tasks to combat support units.
d. Coordinating instructions.
(1) Occupation plan.
(2) Operation plan.
(3) Security plan.
(4) Alert plan.
(5) Priority of work.
(6) Evacuation plan.
(7) Alternate site.

PARAGRAPH 4 - SERVICE SUPPORT


a. Water plan.
b. Mess plan.
c. Hygiene plan.
d. Maintenance plan.
e. Rest plan.

PARAGRAPH 5 - COMMAND AND SIGNAL


a. Command. Location of the team leader, assistant team leader, and RTO at the site.
b. Signal.

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___________________________________________________________ Appendix A – Combat Orders

(1) Location of communications site.


(2) Antennas used.

Annex G to the Patrol Order


CACHE SITE

PARAGRAPH 1 - SITUATION
a. Enemy forces (threat).
(1) Disposition, composition, strength, and identification.
(2) Terrain at the cache site.
(3) Vegetation at the cache site.
(4) Obstacles at or near the cache site.
(5) Soil conditions at the cache site.
b. Friendly forces.

Figure A-2. Sample Reconnaissance Platoon Patrol Order Format (Continued)

PARAGRAPH 2 - MISSION
Include only information pertaining to the cache site and the cache operation.

PARAGRAPH 3 - EXECUTION
Commander’s intent.
a. Concept of the operation.
(1) Maneuver.
(2) Fires.
(3) Intelligence.
(4) Other.
b. Tasks to maneuver units.
(1) Elements (security, digging).
(2) Individuals (report recorder).
c. Tasks to combat support units.
d. Coordinating instructions.
(1) Security plan.
(2) Recording plan.
(3) Site preparation plan.
(4) Site digging plan.
(5) Spoil disposal plan.
(6) Actions on enemy contact.
(7) Rehearsal plan.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

PARAGRAPH 4 – SERVICE SUPPORT


a. Recording materials.
b. Digging materials.
c. Spoil containers.
d. Cache containers.

PARAGRAPH 5 – COMMAND AND SIGNAL


a. Command. Location of the team leader, assistant team leader, and RTO at the cache site.
b. Signal. The key signal consideration is the 12-point cache report. The following discussion covers
the format of the report and key operational considerations in the cache operation. Items in the cache report
are the following:
(1) Type of cache. The element for which the cache is established (guerrilla unit, sabotage
cell, operator) and the type of cached material (weapons, demolitions, communications).
(2) Method of caching. Burial, concealment, or submersion.

Figure A-2. Sample Reconnaissance Platoon Patrol Order Format (Continued)

(3) Contents. An itemized list of all materials in each container with a description of how each
item is packaged.

(4) Description of containers. Size, weight, and other descriptive details. If several
containers are included in the cache, each container should be numbered. Each container can be
referenced by its number on the sketch of the cache.

(5) General area. The easily recognizable names of places, which include the country,
province, and smaller political divisions, down to the nearest town or village.

(6) Immediate area. Description of the area, focusing on the immediate reference point and
instructions for proceeding from this point to the final reference point. All landmarks that aid visual
recognition of the route should be described.

(7) Cache location. Description of the final reference point, with the exact sightings and linear
measurements required to pinpoint the cache. All measurements must be stated in the linear units (meters,
feet) that the recovery agent can understand and use.

(8) Emplacement details. All features of the site or natural conditions that must be
considered for retrieving the cache. Essential considerations for emplacement and retrieval, based on the
method of caching, include the following:

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___________________________________________________________ Appendix A – Combat Orders

· Burial. Exact depth underground of each container. Precise description of shoring (if
used). All seasonal variations (surface vegetation, date and depth of ground freezing and thawing). The
type of soil and the time required for emplacement also provide useful guides for planning the recovery
operation.
· Concealment. Exactly how the cache is emplaced at the site, including any covering
(plaster, bricks) that must be penetrated or removed to recover the cache. Full instructions should be
provided if removing or replacing the covering involves any special problems or techniques (matching the
plaster or mortar). All necessary information about the cache custodian, if one is used, should be included.
· Submersion. Depth of the water (including high- and low-water marks); submersion
depth (if the container does not rest on the bottom of the water); type of bottom; water motion; clearness of
the water; usual freezing and thawing dates.

(9) Operational data and remarks. List of equipment needed for recovery of the cache.
(NOTE: Special consideration should be given to any equipment that may be needed for recovery, even
though it was not used in emplacement.) Description of at least two routes to the site that offer maximum
natural concealment and means of escape in case of sudden attack. Location of nearby houses and
thoroughfares. Description of local security forces, including their regular posts and patrol routes near the
cache. Suggestions for cover when visiting the site, including warning of what cover to avoid. Any other
information that may aid planning the recovery operation.

(10) Dates of emplacement and duration of the cache. Duration estimate based on how
long the contents of the cache will remain usable. Pertinent factors include the normal shelf life of items that
deteriorate with time (medicine, batteries), the expiration date of official documents (such as driver’s
licenses), and how long the packaging will withstand moisture penetration or corrosion.

(11) Sketches and diagrams. Whatever sketches and diagrams are necessary to clarify the
description of the cache and illustrate the instructions for locating and recovering the cache. These
considerations should include at least an area sketch, showing the route from the immediate reference
point to the final reference point (see sketch A), and a site diagram showing precisely how the cache is
pinpointed (see sketch B). Photographs of the immediate area, immediate reference point, final reference
point, and other landmarks near the site are not essential, but they may be helpful.

Figure A-2. Sample Reconnaissance Platoon Patrol Order Format (Continued)

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Sketch A. Route from Immediate Reference


Point to Final Reference Point

Sketch B. Cache Site Diagram

(12) Radio message for recovery. A radio message should be drafted in case there is an
emergency during the emplacement/recovery process. The best time for drafting the message is when
details are fresh in the mind of the emplacer. The message should include type of cache, method of
caching, and concise instructions for locating the site. These instructions must be clear and brief enough for
secure radio transmission. The preparer considers the intended recovery agent’s familiarity with the area as
well as the maps and makeshift surveying instruments that will be available to him. The message must be
in a language he is sure to understand; it must be drafted or translated by someone who is fluent in the
language.

Figure A-2. Sample Reconnaissance Platoon Patrol Order Format (Continued)

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___________________________________________________________ Appendix A – Combat Orders

The following example radio message gives instructions for recovering the cache shown in
sample sketches A and B. This sample message illustrates the minimum information needed for recovery.
Additional data should be included in a radio message only when special circumstances require it. For
instance, if a cached package is too heavy or too large for one person to carry, the weight or the exterior
dimensions should be included. The depth of a submerged cache ordinarily should be specified, but the
depth of a buried cache should not be included unless it is buried deeper than the usual 45 centimeters.
Example radio message: “Communications cache is in three holes in Y (province), X
(country) in graveyard three kilometers east of A (city) on north side of Route 5. Cache is in northeast
corner near walled plot. Container 1 is west of the plot one-two (12) meters from northwest corner and one-
six (16) meters from southwest corner. Container 2 is four meters west of southwest corner in line with
south side. Container 3 is on south side adjacent to southeast corner of plot.”

NOTE: Success of the caching operation may depend on attention to details that may seem minor to a
nonprofessional. Security factors such as the cover of the caching party, the sterility of the
material cached, and the obliteration of the slightest trace of the operation are vital. Important,
too, are the technical factors that govern the preservation of the material in usable condition and
the recording of data essential for recovery. Successful caching demands adherence to the basic
principles of clandestine operations as well as knowledge of the technicalities of the operation.
These high standards of security and “know-how” must be instilled through meticulous training of
the elements responsible for both the emplacement and the recovery of the cache.

Figure A-2. Sample Reconnaissance Platoon Patrol Order Format (Continued)

A-23
Appendix B

Report Formats
This appendix focuses on
CONTENTS
specific formats for reports
used by the reconnaissance Contact and Blue Reports (Operations) ..... B-2
Contact Report ...................................... B-2
platoon. Reports are outlined Blue 1 – Spot Report (SPOTREP) ........ B-2
in outline form, with a Blue 2 – Situation Report (SITREP) ..... B-3
description of how and when Blue 4 – Report for Bridge, Overpass,
each report is used and a line- Culvert, Underpass, or Tunnel
by-line explanation of (BRIDGEREP) ..................................... B-4
Blue 5 – Report for Ford, Ferry, or
information to be covered. Other Crossing Site (CROSSREP) .... B-5
Examples of some reports are Blue 7 – Route Reconnaissance Report
included. (NOTE: Refer to (ROUTEREP) ...................................... B-5
Chapter 2 of this manual for Blue 9 – Obstacle Report ...................... B-6
a discussion of digital Blue 10 – Bypass Report ...................... B-6
Blue 11 – Stand-to Report
reporting procedures using (STANREP) ......................................... B-7
FBCB2.) Green Reports (Intelligence) ....................... B-7
Green 2 – Sensitive Items Report
(SENSEREP) ....................................... B-7
Green 3 – Splash Report ...................... B-8
Green 4 – Patrol Report ........................ B-8
Green 5 – Meaconing, Intrusion, Jamming,
and Interference (MIJI) Report .......... B-10
Green 6 – EPW/Captured Material
Report ................................................. B-10
Yellow Reports (Logistics) .......................... B-11
Yellow 1 – Equipment Status
Report (ESTAT) .................................. B-11
Yellow 1A – Battle Loss Spot Report .. B-13
Yellow 2 – Ammunition Status
Report ................................................. B-14
Yellow 2A – Ammunition Request ....... B-14
Yellow 3 – POL Status Report .............. B-16
Yellow 3A – POL Request ..................... B-16
Red Reports (Personnel) .............................. B-17
Red 2 – Personnel Battle Loss
Report ................................................. B-17
Red 3 – Medical Evacuation Request .. B-18
NBC Reports ................................................. B-18
NBC-1 – Observer’s Initial Report ........ B-19
NBC-3 – Immediate Warning of
Expected Contamination ................... B-21
NBC-4 – Report of Radiation Dose-Rate
Measurement ..................................... B-21
NBC-5 – Report of Areas of
Contamination .................................... B-22
Digital Reporting and C2 Messages ........... B-23
Alerts and Warnings ............................. B-23
Combat Reporting Messages ............... B-23
Mission-Planning Information .............. B-25
Geo-referenced Messages ................... B-25
Digital Reports ....................................... B-25

B-1
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

SECTION I – CONTACT AND BLUE REPORTS (OPERATIONS)

B-1. This category of reports is particularly useful in reporting


reconnaissance information. Contact reports provide an instant means of
reporting encounters with threat or unknown forces. Blue reports cover
various aspects of platoon tactical operations.

CONTACT REPORT
WHEN USED
B-2. A contact report is issued immediately upon contact with a threat
or unknown force in the area of operations. This alert, which can be very
brief, takes priority over all other communications traffic.

FORMAT
B-3. State “CONTACT,” followed by a description of the threat or
unknown force and the cardinal direction from the sender.

EXAMPLE
B-4. “THIS IS YANKEE 23. CONTACT, TANK, NORTH, OUT.”

BLUE 1 – SPOT REPORT (SPOTREP)


WHEN USED
B-5. A SPOTREP is used when scouts observe any known or suspected
threat activity, when they observe any characteristic of the area of
operations likely to affect accomplishment of the mission, or when
required by the OPORD. Always send threat information in the clear. A
SPOTREP takes priority over all other routine radio traffic. The initial
SPOTREP should follow no more than 1 minute after the contact report.

FORMAT
B-6. State "SPOTREP" or "UPDATED SPOTREP," followed by
pertinent information on these lines:
Line ALPHA: Observer or source (omit if it is the calling station;
use call signs or description otherwise).
Line BRAVO: Activity or characteristic being observed. Use the
SALUTE format:
· Size: The number of sighted personnel, vehicles, or other
equipment.
· Activity: What the threat is doing.
· Location: Grid coordinates.
· Unit: Patches, signs, or markings.
· Time: Time the activity was observed.
· Equipment: Description or identification of all
equipment associated with the activity.
Line CHARLIE: Actions you have taken and your
recommendations. Actions usually involve conducting

B-2
___________________________________________________________ Appendix B – Report Formats

additional reconnaissance to determine the complete threat


situation or recommending and executing a specific course of
action.
Line DELTA: Self-authentication (if required).

NOTE: Report the center of mass of identical, closely grouped items. Otherwise, report
multiple grid coordinates of traces (from ________to ________).

EXAMPLE
B-7. “YANKEE 27, THIS IS YANKEE 23. SPOTREP, OVER. ONE
BRDM, STATIONARY, ORIENTED SOUTH AT GRID MS289546; 1725
HOURS. CONTINUING TO OBSERVE, OVER.”

BLUE 2 – SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)


WHEN USED
B-8. The SITREP is submitted by subordinate units to their higher
headquarters to report their tactical situation and status. It is submitted
daily at 0600 and 1800 hours, after significant events, or as otherwise
requested by the platoon leader or commander.

FORMAT
B-9. State "SITREP," followed by pertinent information on these lines:
Line 1: The as-of date-time group (DTG).
Line 2: Brief summary of threat activity, casualties inflicted, and
prisoners captured.
Line 3: Friendly locations (encoded using control measures or
TIRS points). The following can be listed:
· CP locations.
· First subelement’s center of mass.
· Second subelement’s center of mass.
· Third subelement’s center of mass.
· Any additional elements as necessary.
Line 4: Combat vehicles operational. The following types
of vehicles can be listed:
· Tanks.
· CFVs.
· APCs.
· ITVs.
· Mortar vehicles.
· AVLBs.
· HMMWVs.

B-3
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Line 5: Defensive obstacles (encoded using codes, control


measures, or TIR points). The following can be listed:
· Type and location of obstacles. Abbreviations can include
MF (minefield), TD (tank ditch), AB (abatis), RC (road
crater), and CW (concertina wire).
· Type and location of executed demoliton targets.
· Type and location of reserved demolition targets.
Line 6: Personnel strength, classified using these status levels:
· GREEN: full strength; 90% or more fit for duty.
· AMBER: reduced strength; 80 to 89% fit for duty.
· RED: reduced strength; 60 to 79% fit for duty; the unit is
mission-capable.
· BLACK: reduced strength; 59% or less fit for duty.
Line 7: Classes III and V supplies available for combat vehicles.
Status levels for ammunition and fuel are the same (GREEN,
AMBER, RED, OR BLACK) as for personnel strength, with
percentages referring to the amount of basic load level
available. Refer to Line 6 of this report.

NOTE: If an item is reported as status level BLACK on lines 6 or 7, the appropriate yellow
report (logistics) must follow.

Line 8: Summary of tactical intentions.


EXAMPLE
B-10. “YANKEE 21, THIS IS YANKEE 02, SITREP, OVER. LINE 1:
062230. LINE 2: NEGATIVE CONTACT. LINE 3: VISIT 7. LINE 4B:
2. LINE 5: ABATIS, FROM X19 EAST ZERO POINT THREE NORTH
ONE POINT SEVEN. LINE 6: GREEN. LINE 7A: GREEN. LINE 7B:
AMBER. LINE 8: CONTINUING MISSION.”

BLUE 4 – REPORT FOR BRIDGE, OVERPASS, CULVERT,


UNDERPASS, OR TUNNEL (BRIDGEREP)
B-11. To send this report, state “BRIDGEREP,” followed by pertinent
information on these lines:
Line ALPHA: Type and location (for a long tunnel, include both
entrance and exit locations). Use either a TIRS point or grid
coordinates.
Line BRAVO: Overall length.
Line CHARLIE: Width of roadway.
Line DELTA: Height restrictions.
Line ECHO: Length and number of spans.
Line FOXTROT: Computed classification.
Line GOLF: Bypass locations and conditions. Use a Blue 5
report if necessary.

B-4
___________________________________________________________ Appendix B – Report Formats

BLUE 5 – REPORT FOR FORD, FERRY, OR


OTHER CROSSING SITE (CROSSREP)
B-12. To send this report, state “CROSSREP,” followed by pertinent
information on these lines:
Line ALPHA: Type and location, using either a TIRS point or
grid coordinates.
Line BRAVO: Length of crossing in meters.
Line CHARLIE: Usable width.
Line DELTA: Current speed in meters per second.
Line ECHO: Maximum depth in meters.
Line FOXTROT: Bottom material and condition.
Line GOLF: Capacity classification of any existing ferry
equipment.
Line HOTEL: Slope of entry bank.
Line INDIA: Slope of exit bank.
Line KILO: Other comments as necessary.

BLUE 7 – ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE REPORT (ROUTEREP)


WHEN USED
B-13. To report the results of a route reconnaissance, scouts should
send an initial report at the SP. As a minimum, the initial report should
be followed by updates at any obstructions, at each phase line, and
whenever a route change becomes necessary. These update reports
should include only the line(s) that have changed from the initial
ROUTEREP.

FORMAT
B-14. To send this report, state “ROUTEREP,” followed by pertinent
information on these lines:
Line ALPHA: “From” location, reported using a control measure
or TIRS point.
Line BRAVO: “To” location, reported using a control measure or
TIRS point.
Line CHARLIE: Type of route, reported using the following
designations:
· Highway, reported using the number “1.”
· Road, number “2.”
· Trail, number “3.”
· Cross-country, number “4.”
Line DELTA: Classification of route. Check for height, width,
and weight restrictions to determine the appropriate class,

B-5
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

and report what vehicles the route is capable of handling


using the following designations:
· All squadron/battalion vehicles (70 class minimum),
reported using the number “1.”
· Tracked vehicles only, number “2.”
· CFVs only (35 class restriction), number “3.”
Line ECHO: Seasonal limitations of route based on weather-
support capability, reported as follows:
· All-weather (usable year-round), reported using the letter
“X.”
· Limited all-weather (use limited during bad weather),
letter “Y.”
· Fair weather (may be impassable during bad weather),
letter “Z.”
Line FOXTROT: Rate of movement the route will support,
reported as follows:
· Fast, reported using the number “1.”
· Slow, number “2.”
Line GOLF: Location and type of any critical points (send the
applicable report). Report the following obstructions in all
cases: curves with a radius of 45 meters or less; uphill slopes
with grades of 5 percent or greater; width restrictions of 6
meters or less for one-way traffic, 10 meters or less for two-
way traffic; and overhead clearance of 4.3 meters or less.

BLUE 9 – OBSTACLE REPORT


B-15. Report all pertinent information using the following format:
Line ALPHA: Type of obstacle or obstruction.
Line BRAVO: Location, using grid coordinates. For large,
complex obstacles, send the coordinates of the ends and of all
turn points.
Line CHARLIE: Dimensions and orientation.
Line DELTA: Composition.
Line ECHO: Threat weapons influencing obstacle.
Line FOXTROT: Observer’s actions.

BLUE 10 – BYPASS REPORT


B-16. Report all pertinent information using the following format:
Line ALPHA: Observer or source.
Line BRAVO: Length; width; surface type; grade.
Line CHARLIE: Coordinates of “from” and “to” locations.

B-6
___________________________________________________________ Appendix B – Report Formats

Line DELTA: Seasonal/weather limitations. Use letter


designation (X, Y, or Z) as described for the Blue 7 report
(ROUTEREP).
Line ECHO: Bypass markings.
Line FOXTROT: Observer’s actions.

BLUE 11 – STAND-TO REPORT (STANREP)


WHEN USED
B-17. The STANREP is sent to the platoon leader or TOC, as applicable,
when stand-to is completed.

FORMAT
B-18. To send this report, state “STANREP,” followed by pertinent
information on these lines:
Line ALPHA: Time stand-to was completed.
Line BRAVO: Weapons on hand and functional. Use the term
“UP” for functional weapons on hand. Use "EXCEPTION" for
weapons either not on hand or not functional.
Line CHARLIE: Sensitive and accountable items on hand. Use
“UP” or “EXCEPTION” as applicable.
Line DELTA: Vehicles and radios on hand and functional. Use
“UP” or “EXCEPTION” as applicable.
Line ECHO: Report the on-hand/functional status of any other
equipment using “UP” or “EXCEPTION.”

NOTE: For lines B, C, D, and E, refer to the Yellow 1 report (ESTAT) for equipment line
numbers.

EXAMPLE
B-19. “BLACK 3, THIS IS RED 1; BLUE 11. LINE ALPHA:
COMPLETE TIME 0600. LINE BRAVO: UP. LINE CHARLIE: ITEM
38, MISSING 1 EACH. LINE DELTA: RED 3 WILL NOT START.”

SECTION II – GREEN REPORTS (INTELLIGENCE)

B-20. Green reports cover various areas of the intelligence-gathering


process. They are used to report both intelligence information itself and
factors that influence and interfere with the collection process.

GREEN 2 – SENSITIVE ITEMS REPORT (SENSEREP)


WHEN USED
B-21. This report is sent daily at 0600 and 1800 hours or at other
prescribed times (before and after significant movement, after significant
events, and after any consolidation or reorganization). Items covered

B-7
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

include machine guns, personal weapons, night vision devices, binoculars,


NBC equipment, CEOI materials, maps/graphics, and special equipment
assigned to platoons for particular operations.

FORMAT
B-22. To send this report, state “SENSEREP,” followed by pertinent
information on these lines:
Line ALPHA: Reporting unit (use call sign).
Line CHARLIE: Results of sensitive items check. Use the term
"UP" for on-hand/functional items. For missing items, report
the line description and serial number and provide an
explanation. Use additional lines from the Yellow 1 report.
Line ECHO: Initials of person sending report.

EXAMPLES
B-23. “THIS IS RED 1. SENSEREP. LINE ALPHA: RED. LINE
CHARLIE: ALL 'UP.' LINE ECHO: RWS.”
B-24. When sent over a wire net: “THIS IS RED ONE WITH A
SENSEREP. LINE ALPHA: ONE. LINE CHARLIE: MISSING ONE
IM-93 DOSIMETER, NUMBER 64, SEARCH IN PROGRESS. LINE
ECHO: TDB.”

GREEN 3 – SPLASH REPORT


WHEN USED
B-25. The splash report is used to report downed or missing aircraft.
FORMAT
B-26. To send this report, provide all pertinent information on these
lines:
Line 1: Call sign.
Line 2: Aircraft data (type and status).
Line 3: Pilot status, reported as follows:
· Recovered/good condition.
· Recovered/WIA.
· Recovered/KIA.
· Unknown or captured.

GREEN 4 – PATROL REPORT


WHEN USED
B-27. Information collected by combat units is normally submitted
using SPOTREPs as events occur. The duration and activity of
dismounted reconnaissance patrols make a debriefing desirable. In such
cases, the report format helps ensure that the patrol reports all important
information it has collected. The patrol report may be submitted by radio
or wire when required.

B-8
___________________________________________________________ Appendix B – Report Formats

FORMAT
B-28. This debriefing format can be used to ensure all pertinent
information is provided in the patrol report. (NOTE: See Appendix J of
this manual for a more detailed debriefing format.)
Designation of patrol. Include these elements:
· To: _______________
· From: _______________
· Maps: _______________

Size and composition of patrol.

Task.

Time of departure.

Time of return.

Routes (out and back).

Terrain. This includes a description of terrain by type (dry,


swampy, jungle, thickly wooded, high brush, rocky), depth of
ravines and draws, condition of bridges (type, size, and
strength), and effect of terrain on tracked and wheeled
vehicles.

Threat. This includes details of threat strength, disposition,


defenses, equipment, weapons, attitude, morale, exact
location, and movements. The report should include the time
threat activity was observed and coordinates of the location
where activity occurred.

Any map corrections.

Miscellaneous information. This includes pertinent details of


NBC warfare, if applicable.

Results of encounters with the threat. This includes threat


prisoners and casualties, captured documents and equipment,
identification of threat elements, and threat disposition after
the contact.

Condition of the patrol. This includes disposition


arrangements for any dead or wounded.

Conclusions and recommendations. This includes the extent


to which the mission was accomplished and any
recommendations as to patrol equipment and tactics.

Additional remarks by the debriefer.

NOTE: The report should conclude with the name, rank/grade, and organization/unit of the
patrol leader.

B-9
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

GREEN 5 – MEACONING, INTRUSION, JAMMING,


AND INTERFERENCE (MIJI) REPORT
WHEN USED
B-29. MIJI are forms of electronic warfare (EW). Whenever the
reception of radio signals is hindered, confused, or prevented by any type
of disruption, the radio operator first follows the unit SOP to confirm that
the disruption is the result of an external signal. Upon confirmation, the
operator is responsible for reporting the incident immediately to the
troop/battalion TOC; the TOC will forward the report to the S2 and the
signal officer. The MIJI report also covers incidents in which imitative
deception is suspected (especially when instructions are received from a
source that cannot be authenticated).

FORMAT
B-30. Report all pertinent information in this format:
Line 1: Unit identification.
Line 2: Type of interference.
Line 3: Location.
Line 4: “On” time (DTG interference started).
Line 5: “Off” time (DTG interference ended).
Line 6: Effects of interference, including operations or equipment
affected.
Line 7: Frequency (or frequency range) of interference, if known.
Line 8: Narrative or additional information.
Line 9: Time (when required).
Line 10: Authentication.

GREEN 6 – EPW/CAPTURED MATERIAL REPORT


WHEN USED
B-31. Use this report only to inform the troop or battalion TOC of EPWs
or captured material of immediate tactical value. Normally, EPWs and
captured material are tagged immediately to show the place, time, and
circumstances of capture. This ensures information of intelligence value
is not lost during evacuation of the EPW or material.

FORMAT
Format for Reporting EPW Capture
B-32. Provide all pertinent information on the following lines (examples
in parentheses):
Line 1: State “GREEN 6.”
Line 2: Item captured (state “EPW”).
Line 3: DTG of capture (“260845SEP83”).
Line 4: Place of capture, using grid coordinates (“NS 621434”).
Line 5: Capturing unit (appropriate call sign).
Line 6: Circumstances of capture, described as briefly as possible.

B-10
___________________________________________________________ Appendix B – Report Formats

Format for Reporting Captured Material


B-33. Provide all pertinent information on the following lines (examples
in parentheses):
Line 1: State “GREEN 6.”
Line 2: Item captured (state “MATERIAL”).
Line 3: Type of document or equipment (“CEOI”).
Line 4: DTG of capture (“160900JUN83”).
Line 5: Place of capture, using grid coordinates (“NE 824615”).
Line 6: Capturing unit (appropriate call sign).
Line 7: Circumstances of capture, described as briefly as possible.

NOTE: After sending the report to the company team or troop commander, provide
disposition instructions or recommendations, if necessary.

SECTION III – YELLOW REPORTS (LOGISTICS)

B-34. Yellow reports cover various areas of the reconnaissance platoon’s


logistics status. They are used to report both tactical information and to
request logistics support for ammunition and POL resupply.

YELLOW 1 – EQUIPMENT STATUS REPORT (ESTAT)


WHEN USED
B-35. Each PSG sends this report by courier or FM radio to the
troop/task force TOC between 1200 hours and 1300 hours daily. The
information will be as of 1200 hours that same day.

FORMAT
B-36. Equipment status is recorded using one of these terms:
operational, inoperative, or combat loss. Provide all pertinent
information using the following categories and lines:

Weapons
Line 1: Bayonet knife, with scabbard, for M16A2.
Line 2: Pistol, 9-mm, automatic, M9.
Line 3: Rifle, 5.56-mm, with equipment.
Line 4: Launcher, grenade, 40-mm, single shot, rifle mounted,
detachable, with equipment.
Line 5: Machine gun, M2, caliber .50, heavy barrel (HB).
Line 6: Machine gun, 7.62-mm, light flexible.
Line 7: Squad automatic weapon, M249.
Line 8: Grenade launcher, 40-mm, MK19.

B-11
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Line 9: Machine gun, 7.62-mm, fixed M24OC RH feed F/FVS.


Line 10: Launcher, grenade, smoke, screening, RP M250.
Line 11: Mortar, 4.2-inch, on mount.
Line 12: Command launch unit, AAWS-M.

NOTE: Lines 13, 14, 15, and 16 are used as needed for additional weapons assigned to the
platoon.

Vehicles and Vehicle Equipment


Line 17: CFV, M3.
Line 18: Carrier, 107-mm mortar, self-propelled (less mortar),
M106.
Line 19: Carrier, personnel, full-tracked, armored, M113.
Line 20: HMMWV, M1025/M1026.
Line 21: Tank, M1/M1A1/M1A2/M8-AGS.

NOTE: Lines 22, 23, and 24 are used as needed for additional vehicles and/or vehicle
equipment assigned to the platoon.

NBC Equipment
Line 25: Alarm, chemical agent, automatic, portable, for full-
tracked APC and armored recovery vehicle (ARV).
Line 26: Alarm, chemical agent, automatic, portable, with power
supply, for track, utility, 1/4-ton.
Line 27: Charger, radiac detector, PP-1578/PD.
Line 28: Mask, chemical-biological, multipurpose.
Line 29: Radiacmeter, AN/UDR-13.
Line 30: Alarm, chemical agent, automatic, portable, manpack.
Line 31: Radiacmeter, IM-93/UD.
Line 32: Radiacmeter, IM-174/PD.
Line 33: Radiacmeter, AN/VDR-2.

NOTE: Lines 34, 35, and 36 are used as needed for additional NBC equipment assigned to
the platoon.

Radios
Line 37: Radio set, AN/GRC-160.
Line 38: Radio set, AN/VRC-46.
Line 39: Radio set, AN/VRC-47.
Line 40: Radio set, AN/VRC-64.
Line 41: Radio set, AN/PRC-77.

B-12
___________________________________________________________ Appendix B – Report Formats

Line 42: Radio set, AN/VRC-12.


Line 43: Secure set, AN/PRC-91.
Line 44: Secure set, AN/PRC-126.
Line 45: Secure set, KY-57.

NOTE: Lines 46, 47, and 48 are used as needed for additional radios assigned to the
platoon.

Miscellaneous Equipment
Line 49: Demolition set, explosive, initiating, nonelectric.
Line 50: Detecting set, mine, portable, metallic and non-metallic.
Line 51: Detecting set, mine, portable, metallic, AN/PSS-11.
Line 52: Night vision goggles, AN/PVS-7B.
Line 53: Night vision sight, crew-served weapon, AN/TVS-5.
Line 54: Night vision sight, individual-served weapon, AN/PVS-4.
Line 55: Platoon early warning system (PEWS), AN/TRS-2(V).
Line 56: Binoculars, modular construction, military scale reticle,
7x50-mm, with equipment.
Line 57: Telescope, straight, military.
Line 58: Detector, radar signal, AN/PSS-10.
Line 59: Position locating reporting system, basic user unit.
Line 60: Position locating reporting system, surface vehicle
installation kit.

NOTE: Lines 61, 62, and 63 are used as needed for any other equipment assigned to the
platoon.

EXAMPLE
B-37. “THIS IS RED 3. YELLOW 1. LINE 12: ALPHA. LINE 33:
BRAVO. LINE 38: CHARLIE. LINE 55: CHARLIE. OVER.”

YELLOW 1A – BATTLE LOSS SPOT REPORT


WHEN USED
B-38. The Yellow 1A report is transmitted by the platoon leader or PSG
as soon as possible after items are lost or damaged in battle. Losses are
reported using line numbers from the Yellow 1 report.

FORMAT
B-39. Provide pertinent information on the following lines:
Line 1: Time of loss.
Line 2: Number of pieces of equipment to be evacuated to
troop/battalion or higher for maintenance. Refer to the
appropriate line numbers from the Yellow 1 report.

B-13
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Line 3: Number of pieces of equipment destroyed and


abandoned in pieces. Refer to the appropriate line
numbers from the Yellow 1 report.
Line 4: Location (encoded) of abandoned equipment.

EXAMPLE
B-40. “BLACK 3, THIS IS RED 4. YELLOW ONE ALPHA, BREAK.
LINE 1: ONE FOUR THREE ZERO HOURS. LINE 2: REFERENCE
SIX SLANT ONE; REFERENCE TWO-NINER SLANT THREE. LINE 3:
REFERENCE TWO-NINER SLANT ONE. LINE 4: I SET VB, IDVRTG.”

NOTE: Yellow 1A reports are not cumulative. A Yellow 1 report showing total unit status is
sent daily not later than 1300 hours. It gives equipment status as of 1200 hours that
day.

YELLOW 2 – AMMUNITION STATUS REPORT


B-41. This report is transmitted once daily at 1300 hours or
immediately upon completion of threat contact. The following status
codes are used:
GREEN: 90% or more on hand, all ammunition types.
AMBER: 80% to 89% on hand, all ammunition types.
RED: 60% to 79% on hand, all ammunition types.
BLACK: 59% or less on hand, all ammunition types.

NOTE: BLACK status in a Yellow 2 report requires immediate follow-up with a Yellow 2A
report. GREEN, AMBER, or RED status does not require submission of a Yellow 2A.

YELLOW 2A – AMMUNITION REQUEST


FORMAT
B-42. The required quantity of each type of ammunition will be
requested using the following line numbers:
Line 1: Report as-of DTG.
Line 2: 105-mm/120-mm, HEAT.
Line 3: 105-mm/120-mm, HEP.
Line 4: 105-mm/120-mm, APERS.
Line 5: 105-mm/120-mm, WP.
Line 6: 105-mm/120-mm, APDS.
Line 7: 40-mm, HEDP.
Line 8: Caliber .50 (M85).
Line 9: Caliber .50 (M2).
Line 10: 25-mm.
Line 11: 7.62-mm (coax/M60).

B-14
___________________________________________________________ Appendix B – Report Formats

Line 12: 4.2-inch HE with fuze.


Line 13: 4.2-inch WP with fuze.
Line 14: 4.2-inch illumination with fuze.
Line 15: 81-mm, HE with fuze.
Line 16: 81-mm, WP with fuze.
Line 17: 81-mm, illumination with fuze.
Line 18: Fuze, prox (4.2-inch).
Line 19: Fuze, PD (4.2-inch).
Line 20: Fuze, prox (81-mm).
Line 21: Fuze, PD (8l-mm).
Line 22: Fuze, blast, time.
Line 23: Blasting cap, nonelectric.
Line 24: Fuze, igniter.
Line 25: 5.56-mm ball.
Line 26: 5.56-mm tracer.
Line 27: Redeye, XM41E2.
Line 28: Grenade, fragmentation.
Line 29: Grenade, smoke.
Line 30: Grenade, thermite.
Line 31: Grenade, 40-mm, HE.
Line 32: Grenade, 40-mm, WP.
Line 33: Grenade, 40-mm, AP.
Line 34: Javelin.
Line 35: AT-4.
Line 36: Dragon.
Line 37: TOW.
Line 38: Stinger missile.
Line 39: Mine, AT.
Line 40: Mine, AP.
Line 41: Mine, Claymore.
Line 42: 25-mm HE.
Line 43: 25-mm AP.
Line 44: 165-mm HE (CEV).

NOTE: All Yellow 2A requests will be for the quantity of ammunition required by the
platoon unless otherwise specified.

B-15
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

NOTE: When sending a Yellow 2A report, use only the lines required for specific requests.
Additional lines (beginning with Line 45) are used to request any other types of
ammunition required by the platoon. Attached units should coordinate with the S4
for additional line numbers for their ammunition requirements.

EXAMPLE
B-43. “BLACK 3, THIS IS RED 4. YELLOW TWO ALPHA, BREAK.
LINE 1: CVB GHJ. LINE 37: RTY UOL. LINE 42: ERF WDS QTR.”

YELLOW 3 – POL STATUS REPORT


WHEN USED
B-44. This report is sent twice daily or as required.
FORMAT
B-45. The following status codes are used:
GREEN: 90% or more of the required quantity on hand.
AMBER: 80% to 89% on hand.
RED: 60% to 79% on hand.
BLACK: 59% or less on hand.

EXAMPLE
B-46. “BLACK 3, THIS IS RED 4. YELLOW THREE, AMBER, OVER.”

YELLOW 3A – POL REQUEST


FORMAT
B-47. The required quantity of each type of POL product will be
requested using the following line numbers:
Line 1: Report as-of DTG.
Line 2: MOGAS (gal).
Line 3: Diesel (gal).
Line 4: Oil, OE-10 (gal).
Line 5: Oil, OE-30 (gal).
Line 6: Oil, OE-50 (gal).
Line 7: Oil, OE-90 (gal).
Line 8: Antifreeze (gal).
Line 9: Brake fluid (gal).
Line 10: Hydraulic fluid, OHA (qt).
Line 11: Hydraulic fluid, OHT (qt).
Line 12: Hydraulic fluid, FRH (qt).
Line 13: Oil, penetrating (qt).

B-16
___________________________________________________________ Appendix B – Report Formats

Line 14: Oil, PL-special (qt).


Line 15: Oil, PL-medium (qt).
Line 16: Bore cleaner (gal).
Line 17: Oil, LSA (qt).
Line 18: Grease, GAA (lb).
Line 19: Grease, wheel bearing (lb).
Line 20: Solvent (gal).

NOTE: Lines 21, 22, and 23 are used as needed for any other equipment assigned to the
platoon. Additional lines (beginning with Line 24) are used to request any other
POL products required by the platoon or attached elements.

EXAMPLE
B-48. “BLACK 3, THIS IS RED 1. YELLOW THREE ALPHA, BREAK.
LINE 1: 112000 NOV. LINE 3: 900. LINE l8: 15.”

SECTION IV – RED REPORTS (PERSONNEL)

B-49. Red reports cover various areas of the reconnaissance platoon’s


personnel status. The reports included here cover battle losses and
requests for medical evacuation.

RED 2 – PERSONNEL BATTLE LOSS REPORT


WHEN USED
B-50. A Red 2 report is transmitted to the troop/task force TOC as
casualties occur. The unit must also complete DA Form 1156, with
witness statements, and DA Form 1155 and submit them to the 1SG. Red
2 is an interim report to update information sent in the last Red 1 report.

FORMAT
B-51. Provide all pertinent information using the following lines:
Line 1: Battle roster number.
Line 2: DTG of the incident.
Line 3: Location of the incident (encoded).
Line 4: Type of casualties, encoded by letter as follows:
· ALPHA: KIA, hostile action.
· BRAVO: KIA, nonhostile action.
· CHARLIE: Body recovered.
· DELTA: Body not recovered.
· ECHO: Body identified.

B-17
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

· FOXTROT: Body not identified.


· GOLF: MIA.
· HOTEL: Captured.
· INDIA: WIA, slight, hostile action.
· JULIET: WIA, serious, hostile action.
· KILO: WIA, slight, nonhostile action.
· LIMA: WIA, serious, nonhostile action.
· MIKE: Accident.
Line 5: Location to which casualties are evacuated.

RED 3 – MEDICAL EVACUATION REQUEST


WHEN USED
B-52. A Red 3 report is sent to the medical team on the troop/company
command net to request MEDEVAC support.

FORMAT
Ground Evacuation Format
B-53. Provide pertinent information on the following lines:
Line 1: State “EVAC.”
Line 2: Location for pickup (encoded).
Line 3: Number of casualties.
Line 4: Category of patient condition, encoded by letter designation
as follows:
· ALPHA: Urgent.
· BRAVO: Priority.
· CHARLIE: Routine.

NOTE: Use the letter designation with the number of patients in each category; for
example, "TWO ALPHA" indicates that two patients require evacuation on an
urgent basis.

Air Evacuation Format


B-54. Use a format as prescribed in the appropriate SOI, or use the
ground evacuation format as above, specifying air evacuation.

SECTION V – NBC REPORTS

PURPOSE
B-55. The reconnaissance platoon uses NBC reports to provide the TOC
with accurate and timely information on all shelling and NBC activity

B-18
___________________________________________________________ Appendix B – Report Formats

within the squadron or battalion area of operations. These reports are


used for the following specific purposes:

· NBC-1. Used by the observing unit to report initial and


subsequent data of an NBC attack.
· NBC-2. Used for passing evaluated data of an NBC attack.
(NOTE: The format for the NBC-2 report is not included in
this discussion.)
· NBC-3. Used for immediate warning of expected NBC
contamination.
· NBC-4. Used to report radiation dose rate measurements.
· NBC-5. Used to report locations of NBC contamination or
hazards.

RESPONSIBILITY
B-56. The squadron/battalion S3 is responsible for collecting,
monitoring, and distributing shelling and NBC information. The chemical
officer and chemical NCO are responsible for evaluating NBC reports,
formulating NBC reports for lower and higher units, and recommending
COAs to the commander.

REPORTING SYSTEM
B-57. All shelling and NBC reports are forwarded to the TOC over the
command net.

NBC-1 – OBSERVER’S INITIAL REPORT


Format
B-58. To send this report, state “NBC ONE” and give the type of NBC
incident (nuclear, biological, or chemical). Other information that may be
sent includes precedence of the report, date and time of the report (ZULU
time), and security classification with "from" and "to" times the
classification is applicable. Provide all pertinent information on the
following lines:
Line ALPHA: Strike serial number (if known).
Line BRAVO: Position of observer (UTM coordinates or name of
place).
Line CHARLIE: Grid or magnetic bearing (specify which is used)
or azimuth of attack from observer (in degrees or mils; specify
which is used).
Line DELTA: DTG attack started (ZULU).
Line ECHO: Illumination time in seconds (for nuclear burst);
time the attack ended (toxic agent attack only).
Line FOXTROT: Location of attack (UTM coordinates) and/or
vicinity of attack (actual or estimated; specify which is given).
Line GOLF: Means of delivery (if known).

B-19
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Line HOTEL: Type of burst (air, surface, unknown), type of toxic


agent, or type of attack.
Line INDIA: Number of shells; other data (for toxic attack only).
Line JULIET: Flash-to-bang time (in seconds).
Line KILO: Crater present or absent; diameter in meters (if
known).
Line LIMA: Cloud width (degrees or mils; specify which) 5
minutes after burst.
Line MIKE: Cloud height (top or bottom; specify which) 10
minutes after burst (degrees or mils; specify which).
Line SIERRA: DTG of reading (local or ZULU time).

NOTE: DO NOT DELAY REPORTS in an attempt to provide complete format


information. Omit information that is not applicable or available. Items that must
always be reported are the type of report; lines D and H; and one of the following
lines: B, C, F, or G.

NOTE: Carefully specify the units of measure used (such as degrees, mils, or grid azimuth).

EXAMPLES
B-59. Table B-1 shows sample transmissions sent in NBC-1 reports for
the three types of NBC attack. Note that some lines are omitted when
information is not applicable or available.

Table B-1. Example NBC-1 Reports

LINE NUCLEAR CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL

B "TU 440810" "MARBERG"

"GRID 242 "MAGNETIC 2650


C
DEGREES" MILS"

D "270400 ZULU" "270400 ZULU" "270400 ZULU"

E "270410 ZULU" "270412 ZULU"

"TU459830, "OBERG,
F
ESTIMATED" ACTUAL"

G "ROCKET" "AERIAL"

H "UNKNOWN" "NERVE" "BIOLOGICAL"

I "135"

J "65"

K
L "100 MILS"

M
S "270445 ZULU" "270430 ZULU"

B-20
___________________________________________________________ Appendix B – Report Formats

B-60. “THIS IS RED 1. NBC-1, NUCLEAR. LINE BRAVO: I SET DX,


lMNUWS. LINE DELTA: 020945 ROMEO. LINE HOTEL: AIR. LINE
LIMA: 100 MILS, ESTIMATED.”
B-61. “THIS IS RED 1. NBC-1, CHEMICAL. LINE DELTA: 261003
ROMEO. LINE FOXTROT: NB783089. LINE GOLF: ARTILLERY.
LINE HOTEL: VAPOR.”

NBC-3 – IMMEDIATE WARNING OF EXPECTED CONTAMINATION


FORMAT
B-62. This report is sent by radio. State "NBC THREE," followed by
pertinent information on these lines:
Line ALPHA: Strike serial number (if known).
Line DELTA: DTG when attack started.
Line FOXTROT: Location of attack (actual or estimated; specify
which).
Line PAPA: Area of expected contamination.
Line YANKEE: Bearing or azimuth of left, then right radial lines
(specify degrees or mils; use 4 digits for each line).
Line ZULU: Effective downwind speed (in kmph; use 3 digits),
downwind effective distance of zone (in km; use 3 digits), and
cloud radius (in km; use 2 digits).

EXAMPLES
B-63. Table B-2 shows sample transmissions sent in NBC-3 reports for
nuclear and chemical/biological attacks. Note that lines are omitted
whenever information is not applicable or available.

Table B-2. Example NBC-3 Reports

LINE NUCLEAR CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL


A "54-1" "23"

D "270400 LOCAL" "270400 ZULU"

F "LB 187486, ESTIMATED" "LB 206300, ACTUAL"

P "LB 208320, LB 210320,


LB 206310, LB 204310"
Y "02700310"

Z "01902505" or "011"

NBC-4 – REPORT OF RADIATION DOSE-RATE MEASUREMENT


WHEN USED
B-64. The NBC-4 report, used for nuclear activity only, is submitted
immediately after any radiation is detected and thereafter as required by
the OPORD.

B-21
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

FORMAT
B-65. To send this report, state "NBC FOUR," followed by pertinent
information on these lines:
Line QUEBEC: Location of reading; use friendly graphics or
encryption. Omit this line when transmitting on a wire net.
Line ROMEO: Dose rate in cGy/hr (average total dose rounded to
the nearest 10 cGy). Specify whether the dose rate is "INITIAL,"
"INCREASING," "PEAK," or "DECREASING"; specify
"SHIELDED" if the dose rate is measured inside a vehicle.
Line SIERRA: DTG of reading. Specify the time zone.

NOTE: Repeat lines Q, R, and S as often as necessary. Radiation dose rates ideally are
measured in the open, one meter above the ground; if the rate must be measured in
a shielded location, it is converted (as accurately as possible) to a rate in the open.

EXAMPLES
B-66. “THIS IS RED 1. NBC FOUR. LINE QUEBEC: LB 123987.
LINE ROMEO: 1, INITIAL. LINE SIERRA: 201735 LOCAL.”
B-67. “THIS IS RED 1. NBC FOUR. LINE QUEBEC: LB 123987.
LINE ROMEO: 60, PEAK. LINE SIERRA: 201805 LOCAL.”

NOTE: Users of NBC-4 reports are not confined solely to the use of the letter items shown
in these examples.

NBC-5 – REPORT OF AREAS OF CONTAMINATION


B-68. To send this report, state “NBC FIVE.” Other information that
may be sent includes precedence of the report, date and time of the report
(ZULU), and security classification with “from” and “to” times the
classification is applicable. Provide all pertinent information on the
following lines:
Line ALPHA: Strike serial number, if known.
Line OSCAR: Reference DTG for estimated contours of
contaminated areas.
Line SIERRA: DTG when contamination was initially detected.
Line TANGO: H+1 DTG or DTG of latest reconnaissance of
contamination in the area.
Line UNIFORM: Coordinates of contour lines marking a dose
rate of 1,000 cGy/hr.
Line VICTOR: Coordinates of contour lines marking a dose rate
of 300 cGy/hr.
Line WHISKEY: Coordinates of contour lines marking a dose
rate of 100 cGy/hr.
Line X-RAY: Coordinates of contour lines marking a dose rate of
20 cGy/hr.

B-22
___________________________________________________________ Appendix B – Report Formats

SECTION VI – DIGITAL REPORTING AND C2 MESSAGES

B-69. In addition to its capabilities related to providing situational


awareness data, FBCB2 offers a variety of functions that can enhance C2
in the reconnaissance platoon. The system has four categories of C2
messages:

· Alerts and warnings. Examples include NBC reports and


warnings of danger zones such as NBC contaminated areas,
obstacles, or enemy locations.
· Joint support information. This covers interfaces with
other branches of service. (NOTE: This type of digital
information is not covered in this discussion.)
· Combat reporting. This includes the commander’s SITREP.
· Mission planning information. Examples include OPORDs
and FRAGOs.

ALERTS AND WARNINGS


B-70. Alerts and warnings are sent via reports, free text messages, or
geo-referenced messages (see Table B-3). They are posted on the FIPR
message queue and are displayed on the function bar of the main FBCB2
screen and as a symbol on the map screen.
B-71. When the platform penetrates the safety radius of a danger zone,
the FBCB2 alarm is triggered, an alert message is displayed on the
warnings/alerts marquee, and an entry is made in the warnings tab
group. The danger zone tab group will display the type, distance,
direction, location and originator of all danger zone information received.
Danger zone information is transmitted in specific JVMF messages as
situational awareness data. FBCB2 receives the message and displays the
situational awareness/danger zone information in the danger zone tab
group.

COMBAT REPORTING MESSAGES


B-72. These JVMF messages have been modified and grouped together
to provide single-button access to the message template, requiring fewer
keystrokes to complete and send the message. Combat messages are the
following:

· SALT.
· MEDEVAC.
· Fire mission (call for fire).
· Check fire.
· SITREP.

B-23
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Table B-3. FBCB2 Danger Zone Messages

Safety Radius
Message Type Type of Danger Zone
(Meters)
NBC-1 Chemical 500
Obstacle Report /
Biological 500
NBC-1
Obstacle Report /
NBC-1 / Strike Nuclear 1000
Warning
Spot Report Aircraft 5000
Spot Report Formation 4000
Spot Report Field Fortifications 1500
Spot Report Multiple Rocket Launcher 4000
Spot Report Air Defense Artillery 4000
Spot Report Assembly Area 4000
Spot Report Buildings 1500
Spot Report Equipment 4000
Spot Report Command Center 1500
Spot Report Supply Dump 1500
Spot Report Rocket Missiles 4000
Spot Report Vehicles 4000
Spot Report Armor Combat 4000
Spot Report Artillery 4000
Spot Report Mortar 8000
Spot Report Weapons 1500
Spot Report Personnel 1500
Spot Report Unknown 4000
Spot Report Fire Mission 600
Obstacle Report Minefield, Antipersonnel 500
Obstacle Report Minefield, Antitank 500
Obstacle Report Minefield, Mixed 500
Obstacle Report Minefield, Unknown 500
Obstacle Report Chemical, Nerve 500
Obstacle Report Chemical, Blood 500
Obstacle Report Chemical, Blister 500
Obstacle Report Chemical, Choking 500
Obstacle Report Booby Traps 500
Obstacle Report Abatis 500
Obstacle Report Craters 500
Obstacle Report Antitank Ditch 500
Obstacle Report Scatterable Mines 500
Obstacle Report Bunker Strongpoint 1500
Strike Warning Conventional 1000
Threat Warning NBC 500
Threat Warning Antiaircraft Artillery 4000
Threat Warning Aircraft 10000
Threat Warning Air-to-Air Missile 10000
Threat Warning Surface-to-Air Missile 1500
Threat Warning Surface-to-Surface Missile 10000
Threat Warning Air-to-Surface Missile 15000
Threat Warning Unknown 4000

MISSION PLANNING INFORMATION

B-24
___________________________________________________________ Appendix B – Report Formats

B-73. Mission planning information includes orders and request-type


messages that contain JVMF message templates. They include the
following:

· Warning orders.
· OPLANs and OPORDs.
· FRAGOs.
· Logistics orders and requests.
· Free text massages.

GEO-REFERENCED MESSAGES
B-74. These messages, which can be used in the C2 categories discussed
earlier, create icons linked to a location on the FBCB2 map. They are also
disseminated across the TI as situational awareness data. Geo-referenced
messages can be used for the following:

· Obstacle reports.
· NBC-1 reports.
· Bridge reports.
· Supply point status reports.
· Contact reports.
· Engagement reports.

DIGITAL REPORTS
B-75. The following are example FBCB2 reports, included are
illustrations showing FBCB2 report screens for sample situations.

DIGITAL BLUE-1 REPORT (SPOTREP)


B-76. The digital Blue-1 report (Figure B-2) is sent to the entire platoon
and company/troop when contact occurs. The best way to send this report
is by using the far target locator. In addition, if approved by the platoon
leader, a call for fire can be requested simultaneously with the Blue-1.

B-25
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure B-2. Digital Blue-1 Report (SPOTREP)

DIGITAL BLUE-2 (SITREP)


B-77. The digital SITREP (Figure B-3) is sent twice daily to the PSG
(for example, at 0600 and 1800) or as necessary during tactical situations.
The criteria for each category (GREEN, AMBER, RED, and BLACK) are
the same as in analog SITREPs; refer to the discussion earlier in this
section. Each vehicle will send the Blue-2 to the platoon leader and PSG
for consolidation. The PSG will forward the consolidated report to the
company/troop commander, XO, and 1SG.

Figure B-3. Digital Blue-2 Report (SITREP)

B-26
___________________________________________________________ Appendix B – Report Formats

DIGITAL YELLOW REPORT


B-78. The digital Yellow report (Figure B-4) is a combination of the
analog Yellow 1, 2, and 3 reports. When sending this report, all classes of
supply are reported. Each vehicle sends this report to the platoon leader
and PSG. The PSG consolidates this information and forwards a platoon
rollup to the 1SG, XO, maintenance team chief, and medics. At a
minimum, this report is sent once daily before 0900 hours.

Figure B-4. Digital Yellow Report (Logistics Report)

DIGITAL RED-3 REPORT (MEDICAL EVACUATION REQUEST)


B-79. The digital Red-3 MEDEVAC request (Figure B-5) is sent to the
PSG, 1SG, medics, and maintenance team.

Figure B-5. Digital Red-3 Report (MEDEVAC Request)

B-27
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

DIGITAL NBC-1 REPORT (OBSERVER’S INITIAL REPORT)


B-80. The digital NBC-1 report (Figure B-6) is sent on confirmation of
contact with NBC weapons. The report is sent to the entire
company/troop.

Figure B-6. Digital NBC-1 Report (Observer’s Initial Report)

DIGITAL OBSTACLE REPORT


B-81. The digital obstacle report (Figure B-6) is sent by the vehicle that
can best identify the dimensions and type of the obstacle. The report is
sent to the entire company/troop.

Figure B-6. Digital Obstacle Report

B-28
Appendix C

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations


Military planners rec- CONTENTS
ognize that enemies of the Principles of NBC Defense ................................... C-2
United States have Introduction .................................................... C-2
learned many lessons in Understanding the NBC Environment .......... C-2
Adapting to the NBC Environment ............... C-2
the years since the Gulf NBC Protection ............................................... C-2
War deployment. Rogue Decontamination Considerations ................. C-5
nations or insurgent Contamination Avoidance .................................... C-5
elements, for example, Active Defensive Measures ........................... C-6
may attempt to use the Passive Defensive Measures ........................ C-6
Locating, Indentifying, Tracking,
media to create psycho- and Predicting Hazards .............................. C-12
logical leverage to sway NBC Hazard Warning and Reporting ............ C-12
public opinion and create NBC Equipment ..................................................... C-12
public discontent. At the M256A1 Chemical Agent Detector Kit .......... C-13
same time, they may M8 Chemical Agent Detector Paper .............. C-14
M9 Chemical Agent Detector Paper .............. C-15
support such information- M8A1 Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm ...... C-16
oriented efforts with M22 ACADA System ....................................... C-17
nontraditional forms of Chemical Agent Monitor ................................ C-19
combat, such as NBC Improved Chemical Agent Monitor ............... C-20
operations. The ultimate AN/VDR-2 Radiac Set ..................................... C-21
AN/UDR-13 Radiac Set ................................... C-22
goal may be to break up IM-93/UD Dosimeter ....................................... C-23
an alliance or neutralize PP-1578A/PD Radiac Detector Charger ........ C-23
the commitment of an AN/PDR-75 Radiac Detector Reader
international coalition to (for DT-236 Dosimeter) ............................... C-24
a particular region. Such DT-236 Dosimeter ........................................... C-25
M272 Water Testing Kit .................................. C-26
factors, coupled with US M34 CM Agent Sampling Kit .......................... C-27
involvement in worldwide Reconnoitering an NBC Environment ................. C-28
operational or support The Operational Environment
contingencies, increase and the NBC Threat .................................... C-28
the probability that U.S. NBCRS Platoon .............................................. C-29
NBC Movement Patterns ............................... C-31
forces will encounter NBC Surveillance ........................................... C-36
asymmetrical threats, NBC Warning and Reporting ......................... C-38
including NBC situations. Locating and Marking NBC Hazards ............ C-42
To accomplish missions NBC Protection (Reducing NBC Vulnerability) ... C-44
on contaminated battle- General Protection Considerations .............. C-44
Pretreatment Activities .................................. C-46
fields, reconnaissance Nuclear Hazards and Protective Measures .. C-47
platoons must take Biological Hazards and Protective
precautions to avoid or Measures ..................................................... C-53
minimize the effects of Chemical Hazards and Protective
NBC hazards. Properly Measures ..................................................... C-56
Decontamination and First Aid ............................ C-59
executed, the defensive Leadership Considerations ........................... C-59
measures in this appendix Decontamination Operations ........................ C-60
will help the platoon to NBC First Aid .................................................. C-67
survive, fight, and win. Unmasking Procedures ................................. C-67
Managing NBC Casualties ............................. C-69

C-1
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

SECTION I – PRINCIPLES OF NBC DEFENSE

INTRODUCTION
C-1. A motivated and determined threat may use NBC weapons to
gain strategic leverage and to provide a counterbalance to the precision-
guided munitions and sophisticated weaponry of the United States and
its allies. NBC hazards could result from terrorist aggression, collateral
damage from conventional weapons, or other sources of environmental
contamination.
C-2. Units at all levels, including the reconnaissance platoon, must be
proficient in executing the three principles of NBC defense:
contamination avoidance, NBC protection, and decontamination. Coupled
with proper tactics and effective retaliatory response, these actions will
increase the likelihood of victory in the contaminated environment.

UNDERSTANDING THE NBC ENVIRONMENT


C-3. The primary aspect of understanding the NBC environment in
the battlespace entails the identification of hazards. It is the key to
shaping the NBC defense, enabling the platoon to avoid the hazard or to
enhance its protective posture if avoidance is not possible.
C-4. NBC situational understanding includes detection of trace
fugitive emissions (for example, those escaping from hazardous materials
production facilities or during transportation of munitions/materials)
prior to deployment. A typical troop or company team is equipped with
hand-held and remote automatic alarms, hazard monitors, and detector
kits. In addition, organic NBC reconnaissance vehicles, in the
squadron/battalion or from division/corps augmentation assets, are
equipped with sophisticated detection, identification, and sampling
equipment. Significant warning improvements evolve from the ability to
interconnect many of these detection devices.
C-5. A discussion later in this appendix lists available NBC detection
devices and provides a brief description of their capabilities. It also
describes how the information from these devices is input into the FBCB2
and the MCS at squadron/battalion level using the multiintegrated
chemical agent alarm (MICAD) detection and warning hardware.

ADAPTING TO THE NBC ENVIRONMENT


C-6. Adapting the NBC environment to meet the unit’s mission
requirements entails the orchestration of NBC defensive assets in
support of the principles of contamination avoidance, NBC protection,
and decontamination. This requires the unit to employ NBC
visualization. This process allows the commander to develop a clear
understanding of the current and predicted NBC situation, to envision
the end state (mission accomplishment without NBC casualties), and to
visualize the operational sequence that moves the commander’s forces
from their current state to the end state.

NBC PROTECTION
C-7. NBC protection prevents or reduces casualties through reduction
of the NBC threat, practice of contamination avoidance measures,

C-2
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

physical protection, and initiation of medical pretreatment procedures.


Emerging technologies will enhance the commander’s situational
understanding of the NBC environment and allow him to employ an
NBC-focused defense. The goal is to increase the MOPP level only for
units affected by an NBC event. As noted, refer to the discussion of
current NBC defense equipment later in this appendix.

DEPLOYMENT VULNERABILITY
C-8. During a major conflict, NBC weapons may be employed early to
disrupt and delay the build-up of friendly forces. The areas of greatest
vulnerability are large fixed sites such as an aerial port of debarkation
(APOD) or seaport of debarkation (SPOD); staging and marshalling areas;
hubs and bases; assembly areas; and MSRs adjacent to sites involved in
early entry force build-up activities. The hazards and potential damage
caused by NBC attack may require relocation of bases and health service
support facilities, major redirection of supply flow, reallocation of
transportation and engineering services, and short-notice transfer of
replacement personnel or units from one part of the battlefield to another.
C-9. Given the importance and size of potential NBC NAIs and high-
risk locations, the reconnaissance platoon must be proficient in NBC
reconnaissance and surveillance tactics and techniques so it can
independently execute NBC missions in the ISR plan. Additionally, recce
platoons must be trained to integrate with the NBC reconnaissance and
surveillance (NBCRS) platoon assigned to the surveillance troop and with
other theater NBCRS augmentation assets to assist in the conduct of
multiple, wide-area NBC reconnaissance and surveillance missions.
(NOTE: Other types of reconnaissance platoons must be trained to
accomplish similar integration with theater NBCRS augmentation assets
to assist in NBC missions.)

NBC DEFENSE DURING FORCE PROJECTION


C-10. Force projection usually begins as a contingency operation—a
rapid response to a crisis. Forces committed to these operations are
tailored and task organized for rapid deployment, forcible entry (if
needed), effective employment, and mission accomplishment.
Contingency operations may be executed by joint or combined forces.

Leader and Unit Requirements


C-11. Leaders in the squadron/battalion, troop/company team, and
platoon must understand the potential NBC missions and know how to
synchronize their operations closely with chemical staff members. The
reconnaissance platoon must be prepared to operate under NBC
conditions across the range of military operations.

Phases of Force Protection Operations


C-12. Ideally, force projection operations are phased. There are
generally eight phases to a force projection operation (mobilization,
predeployment, deployment, entry operations, operations, postconflict
operations, redeployment, demobilization), although a particular crisis
response may not be included every phase.
C-13. Mobilization and Predeployment. Chemical staff members
work closely with the brigade and squadron/battalion S2 and other
intelligence centers and/or agencies. Their mission is to determine and

C-3
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

predict the NBC threat and nonstandard hazards presented by accidental


or incidental bombing or destruction of laboratories, nuclear facilities,
industrial plants, or commercial and military factories. The
reconnaissance platoon can expect that most of these will be deemed
NFAs and must be coordinated accordingly to avoid or predict targeting.
C-14. Once the threat is understood and the risks considered, chemical
units are identified to provide tailoring and/or augmentation of the
brigade. Chemical defense equipment (CDE) undergoes premovement
precombat inspections, testing, and packaging. Soldiers receive final
inoculations (as required), draw individual protective equipment (IPE),
and conduct limited training of perishable NBC individual and collective
tasks. A chemical staff may be part of the brigade early entry command
center (EECP) if one is required to establish the C2 architecture and
facilitate rapid introduction of air-land combat forces.
C-15. Deployment. If the threat has the capability to employ WMD,
the use of these weapons during this phase may provide him with the
optimum payoff against US forces. While the NBCRS platoon may deploy
with other units, decontamination and smoke assets typically arrive later,
based on the time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD).
C-16. Brigade and/or squadron/battalion commanders will weigh the
risks and approve the airflow of NBC assets. To provide effective
augmentation to NBC defense units, chemical staffs must monitor force
projection plans and consider the capabilities of host nation, allied, or
coalition forces.
C-17. Entry Operations. Force protection is key to success in the
entry of US forces into the theater. NBC staffs contribute to stabilization
efforts for whatever challenge is presented. As soon as the NBC staff
members arrive in theater, they reexamine the threat, define the COP,
assess the risk, and track arrival and integration of NBCRS vehicles.
When NBC defense augmentation assets arrive, they are integrated into
a defense network that maximizes the capabilities of host nation, allied,
and coalition forces.
C-18. Scouts and the NBCRS platoon arrive in theater prepared to
move out quickly, deploy, and engage the threat if necessary. After their
arrival, they rapidly maneuver to expand the security zone.
C-19. Tactical Operations. The brigade commander will employ
conventional and NBC reconnaissance and surveillance assets as he seeks
to gain information dominance and positional advantage. When this is
accomplished, the commander can conduct multiple and simultaneous
decisive operations to shape the battlespace and sustain his forces,
unhindered by the threat of NBC hazards and the reduced operational
tempo (OPTEMPO) and increased logistical burden they impose.
C-20. Postconflict, Redeployment, and Demobilization.
Postconflict threat levels dictate which conventional and NBC units are
no longer required and can thus be redeployed. Before redeployment,
decontamination units may participate in vehicle washdown to bring
vehicles, equipment, and supplies to environmentally acceptable
“peacetime clean” levels. Both conventional and NBC reconnaissance and
surveillance elements may be tasked to conduct BDA, environmental
monitoring, and continued surveillance of areas of suspected or actual

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_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

contamination. Postconflict missions may also include sensing to


substantiate agreements for the destruction of WMD and related storage
and production facilities. Once forces return to their home stations,
reserve component units are returned to the appropriate status. All units
conduct AARs and prepare written summaries of lessons learned.

DECONTAMINATION CONSIDERATIONS
C-21. Despite avoidance efforts, reconnaissance elements may become
contaminated. This may occur either by direct attack or by accidental
exposure, such as when the mission dictates movement through a
previously unidentified contaminated area.
C-22. Following NBC contamination, reconnaissance forces must
quickly restore combat power by conducting decontamination operations
and providing medical treatment for soldiers incapacitated due to
exposure. Immediate decontamination procedures and operational
decontamination, which entails MOPP gear exchange and vehicle
washdown, will restore a degree of combat power. Full restoration,
however, will require reconnaissance units to conduct thorough
decontamination. The key to effective medical intervention is quick
diagnosis of NBC exposure.
C-23. The evolving warfighting trends of smaller, more widely dispersed
reconnaissance elements and use of advanced visualization assets should
serve to reduce the percentage of a unit that is actually contaminated.
The keys to maintaining OPTEMPO are timely and accurate BDA and
employment of decontamination triage to sort equipment according to the
type and extent of decontamination required. Rapid identification of
uncontaminated equipment will allow units to recover quickly, resume
normal operations with the clean equipment, and focus needed
decontamination efforts only on contaminated vehicles and equipment. In
turn, this will enable commanders to best allocate scarce decontamination
assets. Decentralized decontamination as far forward as possible will
remain a critical factor in limiting the spread of contamination and in
preserving combat power and OPTEMPO.

SECTION II – CONTAMINATION AVOIDANCE

C-24. Avoiding contamination, the most important principle of NBC


defense, requires the ability to recognize the presence or absence of NBC
hazards in the air and on water, land, personnel, equipment, and
facilities. If an NBC hazard cannot be avoided, the reconnaissance
platoon must be prepared to protect personnel and equipment from the
effects of exposure.
C-25. Contamination avoidance is absolutely critical to the success of
the reconnaissance platoon. The platoon should constantly analyze its
vulnerability to NBC attack and take appropriate actions. This discussion
focuses on four measures the platoon can take for contamination
avoidance:

· Employ active defensive measures.


· Employ passive defensive measures.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

· Locate, identify, track, and predict contamination.


· Warn and report.

ACTIVE DEFENSIVE MEASURES


C-26. The reconnaissance platoon may conduct active NBC defense
measures to seek out and find threat chemical munitions, production
facilities, storage depots, or delivery systems and to coordinate with
higher headquarters for destruction of weapons and facilities before they
are used against friendly forces. Because some NBC NAIs pose significant
hazards if targeted by threat or friendly forces, the platoon may be
required to conduct surveillance of such locations or facilities to provide
early warning of the hazard. This can be best achieved through
augmentation of the reconnaissance platoon by NBCRS platoons, which
are organic to Chemical Corps units and to the surveillance troop within
the SBCT’s cavalry squadron (RSTA). See the discussion later in this
appendix covering NBC reconnaissance and surveillance with and
without NBCRS platoon augmentation.

PASSIVE DEFENSIVE MEASURES


C-27. Passive measures are those the reconnaissance platoon takes to
avoid being targeted and to mitigate the effects of an NBC attack. This
discussion focuses on a variety of passive measures.

PLAN AHEAD
C-28. Leaders of the reconnaissance platoon must have a clear
understanding of the NBC threat, the level of platoon training and
preparedness, and the risks associated with each mission. They then
must develop battle drills and conduct rehearsals of them until the
platoon’s reaction becomes instinctive should NBC hazards arise. The
platoon’s leaders must remain aware of the physiological and
psychological impact of wearing IPE or MOPP gear for extended periods
in difficult climates. Prolonged periods in MOPP may result in
degradation of the platoon’s combat power.

AVOID DETECTION
C-29. This is the best way to prevent NBC attacks, with OPSEC the
most effective defense. Specific measures include camouflage, well-
executed tactical movements (stealth), and noise and light discipline.

PROVIDE EARLY WARNING


C-30. When the reconnaissance platoon is stationary, it can position
remote chemical agent alarms upwind to provide early warning of a
chemical attack. While it is on the move, especially when conducting NBC
reconnaissance and surveillance, the NBCRS platoon uses on-board and
stand-off NBC sensors to detect and identify most chemical warfare
agents and radiological hazards. Prompt and accurate NBC-1 reports
and/or SPOTREPs enhance situational awareness by providing “need-to-
know” warnings (and “de-warnings,” if applicable) to units in the affected
area and to adjacent and follow-on elements. Instinctive dissemination of
these reports represents a fundamental discipline of contamination
avoidance. The goal is a set of streamlined messages that define a

C-6
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

common operational picture and prevent panic and unnecessary


overreaction in the execution of NBC defense.

MAINTAIN DISCIPLINE
C-31. Discipline is a must if the platoon is to survive and overcome the
shock of an NBC attack. Soldiers must be physically and mentally capable
of functioning in an NBC environment for extended periods. MOPP
acclimation training is essential to developing stamina, teamwork,
confidence, trust, and reliability for soldiers and the platoon leadership.
Risk assessment and rest cycle management must become fundamental
disciplines during mission planning.

SEEK PROTECTION
C-32. When the platoon is mobile, natural cover may provide some
shelter from chemical agents; however, the platoon must be aware of low-
lying areas such as ditches, valleys, depressions, and ravines. Like fog,
chemical agents are frequently released early in the morning and late in
the afternoon, when they are likely to linger for longer periods. When the
platoon is in the defense or is halted, leaders should remember that
heavily wooded areas provide limited protection from liquid agents. At
the same time, however, some semipersistent agents, uninhibited by
climatic conditions, may prove more lasting, with toxic vapors lingering
for unpredictable periods. MOPP gear, overhead cover, and mounted
operations afford the best, most reliable protection.

DISPERSE
C-33. Effective dispersion should reduce the platoon’s vulnerability
without compromising the tactical mission. Leaders must understand the
advantages of dispersing combat forces, as well as equipment and critical
classes of supply, when the threat of NBC attack is high. In such a
situation, using dispersion to create multiple targets increases platoon
survivability and sustainability and presents a more formidable challenge
for the threat. Conversely, the disadvantages of dispersing the platoon
must be weighed against the risk of NBC attack. Extended distances may
have a detrimental impact on the conduct of C4ISR, on treatment and
handling of conventional and NBC casualties, and on logistics operations,
including necessary decontamination operations. Reconnaissance platoon
leaders must know how to use METT-TC to develop an effective
dispersion plan.

REMAIN MOBILE
C-34. The platoon’s primary function is to maneuver to gain positional
advantage for reconnaissance and surveillance. Should crews or leaders
determine that the threat has detected the platoon and may target it
using NBC or conventional weapons, maintaining tactical mobility is the
best method of contamination avoidance. The FBCB2 provides the
platoon with information and situational understanding on battlefield
debris and contaminated areas. Leaders should use this information to
assist them in maintaining mobility, weighing mission objectives against
the risk of exposure before deciding on the best COA.

COVER SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT


C-35. If an NBC attack is imminent, the platoon should cover its
supplies and equipment to avoid contamination. This is especially critical

C-7
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

when the platoon is in the defense. Tarpaulins and plastic sheeting can be
used, as well as field expedient items such as canvas and cardboard.
Leaders should remember that expedient NBC protective covers provide
protection but must be monitored closely because contamination will seep
through covers over time. After exposure to heavy contamination, covers
should be replaced as soon as possible, ideally within one hour after
contamination.

CONDUCT PREMOVEMENT/PRECOMBAT ACTIONS


C-36. Actions taken by the platoon before departing for a mission
include premovement/precombat inspections, evaluation of the potential
for an NBC attack, and identification of mitigation techniques (such as
cover, close, seal) that may be required Leaders must determine what
items cannot be decontaminated and then take steps to guard or protect
them (as well as platoon personnel) from accidental exposure. Measures
that the platoon (or attached elements) should take before crossing or
operating in an NBC environment include the following:

· Update the COP and/or FBCB2 to reflect the tactical situation


and identify NBC hazards.
· Select the most favorable route(s) using principles of
contamination avoidance.
· Notify higher headquarters of the platoon plan. Include
checkpoints and halt positions.
· Rehearse passage of lines and coordination procedures, to
include communications frequencies, call signs, and
passwords.
· Conduct inventory and PMCS activities for NBC sensors and
detection equipment.
· Apply NBC detection tape (M9 paper) so that it can be
observed by vehicle occupants and/or dismounted soldiers.
· Remove gear, supplies, and equipment affixed to the vehicle
exterior. Secure them inside or leave them at the base camp.
Chemical protective covers may be used to retard hazards or
to improve the chance that items can be effectively
decontaminated.
· Install and test NBC detectors and sensors.
· Rehearse the designated crossing technique or method.
· Rehearse casualty treatment and evacuation plans.
· Rehearse techniques and procedures of the NBC warning and
reporting system (NBCWRS).
· Conduct risk assessment and MOPP analysis.
· Upgrade to the appropriate MOPP level to prevent troop
exposure. (NOTE: Overpressurized vehicles may require a
lower level of protection.)
· Secure hatches and doors before entering or crossing the
contaminated area.

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_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

LIMIT EXPOSURE
C-37. While the FBCB2 helps to improve NBC situational
understanding, leaders of the reconnaissance platoon may be required to
plot a course through contaminated areas to achieve their mission goals.
In doing so, they should evaluate METT-TC to guide conventional tactical
considerations. They must be prepared to use their experience and
leadership, coupled with focused terrain analysis, to minimize exposure to
NBC hazards, to maintain platoon lethality, and to avoid degradation as
a result of wearing NBC protective equipment. The following discussion
covers specific measures and considerations for limiting exposure to
contamination in various NBC environments.

Radiological Environment
C-38. US forces continue to face radiation dangers from a variety of
sources: nuclear weapons, depleted uranium, damaged research facilities,
damaged power plants, and the release of radiological isotopes. Scout
elements must be prepared to take measures before, during, and after
operations to reduce the consequences of incidental or accidental
exposure.
C-39. Radiation presents a penetrating hazard, and the only complete
protection from radiological contamination is avoidance of the area
entirely. The purpose of nuclear reconnaissance is ONLY to detect the
outermost low-level readings or the extent of the hazard. The
reconnaissance concentrates on location of the radiation rather than
intensity or dose rate, regardless of the source. This helps to limit crew
exposure. The impact of radiation exposure on combat power can be
further mitigated by establishing and employing appropriate operational
exposure guidance (OEG). Setting the OEG too high or failing to adhere
to the guidance may result in severe loss of combat power or even the loss
of reconnaissance and surveillance teams.
C-40. Radiation Risk. The brigade commander will make a decision,
based on METT-TC and previous unit exposure criteria, on the amount or
degree of continued radiation exposure (total dose) for his units. See
Table C-1 for the risk categories associated with total dose exposure.

Table C-1. Radiation Risk Categories

TOTAL RADIATION DOSE RISK CATEGORY


Up to 50 cGy Negligible Risk
51 to 70 cGy Moderate Risk
71 to 150 cGy Emergency Risk

C-41. Radiation Exposure Criteria. The reconnaissance platoon will


report its cumulative radiation exposure and it radiation exposure status
(RES) to the next higher commander in the daily NBC summary report.
Table C-2 outlines the RES categories used to report exposure.

C-9
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Table C-2. Radiation Exposure Status Categories

TOTAL RADIATION DOSE RES CATEGORY


No exposure RES-0
Greater than 0, equal to or less RES-1
than 70 cGy
Greater than 70, equal to or less RES-2
than 150 cGy
Greater than 150 cGy RES-3

C-42. To determine the RES, the platoon leader collects readings from
each of his sections and/or squads, adds the individual readings together,
and then divides to calculate a platoon average. As an example, the
platoon leader receives the following readings from squad leaders
through the NBC NCO:

· 1st Squad dosimeter reading average (total dose) = 60 cGy.


· 2d Squad dosimeter reading average (total dose) = 90 cGy.
· 3d Squad dosimeter reading average (total dose) = 70 cGy.
· 4th Squad dosimeter reading average (total dose) = 30 cGy.

C-43. The platoon average (total dose) is 63 cGy. The platoon exposure
status is RES-1.

Chemical Environment
C-44. The longer a platoon is exposed to chemical contamination, the
greater the casualty rate. If the mission requires exposure to chemical
hazards, only mission-essential personnel should be required to dismount
or enter the contaminated area. Many times, the effects of weather and
time will act as a natural decontaminant; unless the mission dictates
otherwise, the reconnaissance platoon can reduce contamination and
exposure levels simply by waiting to enter a contaminated area.
C-45. Preventing the Spread of Contamination. Contaminated
environments pose a significant hazard to combat, CS, and CSS vehicles,
which in turn can easily spread contamination over the battlefield. While
METT-TC does not always allow for consideration of an alternate scheme
of maneuver, leaders must take steps to reduce the contamination
footprint, coordinating with higher echelons to verify the proper course of
action as necessary. For example, mission orders may dictate a “dirty”
route or MSR for contaminated vehicles.
C-46. Protecting Dismounts. Dismounted troops pose particular
problems and risks for the reconnaissance platoon. The platoon’s NBC
battle drills must include procedures to be followed by potentially
contaminated dismounts before they attempt to reenter troop carriers.
Leaders must consider trace hazards, both visible and invisible, that
dismounts may bring inside the vehicle. Suits and boots can pick up
hazardous substances from ground residue, resulting in the emission of
toxic vapors inside the vehicle. Dismounts with gross contamination may
require MOPP gear exchange. Weapons and gear should also be
monitored for visible and toxic vapor hazards. Battle drills also must

C-10
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

address procedures used to monitor for safe “all clear” conditions before
reconnaissance platoon soldiers unmask. These steps may include
employing the chemical agent monitor (CAM) or improved CAM (ICAM)
and the M256A1 kit.
C-47. Preventing Exposure of Externally Stored Materials.
Reconnaissance platoon crews frequently store gear, equipment, and
some supplies on the external hull of their vehicles; these materials can
be splattered with hazardous substances when the platoon crosses or
maneuvers in a contaminated area. During preparations for such
operations, each crew must ensure that anything stored on the outside of
the vehicle is wrapped in garbage bags or some type of chemical
protective container. An important consideration for leaders is that some
materials cannot be adequately decontaminated and therefore will have
to be discarded if they become contaminated. They must take preventive
contamination avoidance measures, covering both predeployment and
preexposure actions, to safeguard these materials for later use in a clear
environment.

Biological Environment
C-48. Reconnaissance platoon crews must prepare themselves and their
vehicles for operation and movement in a biologically contaminated
environment using the same procedures as in a chemical environment.
The contamination avoidance procedures employed before, during, and
after exposure are identical.

Toxic Industrial Materials


C-49. Preparations and procedures used before, during, and after
exposure to mitigate the effects of toxic industrial materials (TIM) are
similar to those for chemical and biological hazards. Like those agents,
some TIMs are invisible, although they can be detected by other methods
(HUMINT, NBCRS). If TIMs are detected by a sensor external to the
battalion/squadron, the brigade NBC officer or S2 will use the most
expedient method to warn the platoon and advise crews to immediately
exchange vehicle or masks filters that have been damaged or defeated by
accidental or incidental toxic exposure. Actions taken to prevent the
spread of contamination and to minimize or avoid accidental or incidental
exposure are the same as for chemical and biological threats.

NOTE: Carbon-based filters used in military protective masks provide poor to medium
protection against toxic industrial materials (TIM) and toxic industrial chemicals
(TIC). The masks should be used only during evacuation of the immediate hazard
zone following the release of industrial chemicals or materials. DO NOT conduct
reconnaissance missions or stay for any length of time in industrial hazard areas
with these masks or filter systems. Many hazard areas are oxygen-depleting and
require self-contained breathing apparatuses (SCBA), which most units do not have
in their TOE authorization. Additionally, some TIMs and TICs can easily degrade
the performance of pass-through filters due to molecular size and weight. Standard
military masks and/or filters have not been tested against these industrial
chemicals. Refer to FM 3-11.4 (FM 3-4) for additional information.

C-11
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

LOCATING, IDENTIFYING, TRACKING,


AND PREDICTING HAZARDS
C-50. Many types of friendly and threat NBC sensors and detectors
exist on the modern battlefield. Refer to the discussion later in this
appendix for a detailed description of the NBC defense equipment that
may be authorized for the reconnaissance platoon.
C-51. The platoon may receive notification of NBC hazards from any of
several types of sensor-detectors: remote (M22 alarm), standoff (NBCRS),
or point (CAM, M256A1 kit, M8 paper). When a sensor-detector indicates
potential contamination, the platoon prepares NBC reports and/or
SPOTREPs as required and submits them via FBCB2 to the prescribed
and, if indicated, restricted audience. The platoon must practice and
develop instinctive warning procedures to alert units in proximity to the
hazard and to notify units affected by the downwind hazard. At the same
time, exercising discipline in the warning and reporting process allows
the platoon to exploit the full potential of the modern digital battlefield
technologies. Reporting procedures must include prudent “stove-piped”
NBC reports aimed at higher headquarters. Discreet warning up the
chain of command can guard against overreaction by unaffected units,
prevent unnecessary force degradation, and contribute to the
preservation of friendly force combat lethality.
C-52. Leaders in the reconnaissance platoon will monitor reports from
human, sensor-detector (MICAD), and digital (FBCB2) sources. They use
this information to track the movement or redistribution of hazards and
to predict the impact on existing combat forces and future operations. To
further develop NBC situational awareness and protect friendly forces,
the commander may direct the platoon to conduct or assist in a variety of
actions, including the following:

· Detailed NBC survey and marking missions.


· ISR missions for NBC NAIs.
· Missions to monitor hazards using standoff sensors on board
NBCRS vehicles.

NBC HAZARD WARNING AND REPORTING


C-53. With the ultimate objective of protecting the force and preventing
the spread of contamination, the reconnaissance platoon will use the
NBCWRS. In the near term, digitized platoons may use various appliqué
systems to automate the process of detection, reporting, analysis, and
information distribution for NBC attacks. Used in conjunction with tools
embedded in the MCS, these appliqué assets will allow for a rapid flow of
information to digitized units. At present, the NBCWRS consists of six
manual and digitized reports. For more information on the NBCWRS,
refer to the discussion later in this appendix.

SECTION III – NBC EQUIPMENT

C-54. This section describes NBC defense equipment that may be


organic to the reconnaissance platoon. For a complete updated list of NBC

C-12
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

defense equipment, refer to the appropriate unit MTOE authorizations, to


CTA 50-970, and to the appropriate Chemical Corps field manuals,
including FM 3-11.4 (FM 3-4).
C-55. Leaders in the platoon are responsible for ensuring that their
soldiers conduct required maintenance for organic NBC defense
equipment. They should inspect the equipment for serviceability,
completeness, batteries (as required), test samples (as required), and a
technical manual. The troop/company NBC NCO is the subject matter
expert (SME) for NBC defense equipment.

M256A1 CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTOR KIT


USE
C-56. The platoon uses the M256A1kit (see Figure C-1) in detecting and
identifying field concentrations of nerve, blister, and blood agents and in
conducting unmasking procedures. The kit’s detector paper changes color
upon contact with harmful chemical agent concentrations. Tests take 20
to 25 minutes to complete. Positive readings must be promptly reported to
higher headquarters using the appropriate report (NBC-1, NBC-4, or
SPOTREP). The national stock number (NSN) for the field kit is 6665-01-
133-5639. The NSN for the training kit is 6665-01-293-2149.

Figure C-1. M256 Sampler

DESCRIPTION
C-57. This kit consists of a carrying case, 12 sampler-detectors,
instruction cards, and ABC-M8 chemical agent detector paper. See Figure
C-2.

Figure C-2. M256A1 Chemical Agent Detector Kit

C-13
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

LIMITATIONS
C-58. The M256A1 cannot be used to detect chemical agents in water. High
temperatures, DS2, and petroleum products can cause false readings. The kit
is not operable at temperatures below 25 degrees Fahrenheit.

UNIT ISSUE
C-59. Standard issue is one per squad, crew, or section.
DECONTAMINATION
C-60. Decontamination is not applicable for this item.

M8 CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTOR PAPER


USE
C-61. Soldiers in the reconnaissance platoon use M8 paper to detect and
identify liquid V- or G-type nerve agents or H-type blister agents.

DESCRIPTION
C-62. M8 paper comes in a book of 25 perforated sheets. A color-
comparison bar chart is printed on the inside front cover for identification
of chemical agents. The sheets turn dark green (V), yellow (G), or red (H)
upon contact with liquid chemical agents. See Figures C-3 and C-4. The
NSN is 6665-00-050-8529.

LIMITATIONS
C-63. The paper must touch the liquid agent, so soldiers must use
caution when attempting to take a sample. M8 paper does not detect
vapor or chemical agents in water. Exposure to high temperatures, DS2,
or petroleum products may cause false readings.

Figure C-3. M8 Chemical Agent Detector Paper

C-14
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

Figure C-4. Chemical Agent Identification


Chart for M8 Paper

UNIT ISSUE
C-64. Standard issue is one per soldier.
DECONTAMINATION
C-65. Decontamination is not applicable for this item.
M9 CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTOR PAPER
USE
C-66. This detector paper is actually a tape that identifies the presence
of liquid chemical agent aerosols. M9 is primarily used attached directly
to the soldier’s body; it has a sticky backside allowing the individual to
place strips on his nonfiring arm, one leg, and backside, as well as other
places expected to be exposed to potential hazards. The tape strips should
be positioned with protruding flaps that are long enough to be observed
by protected troops, such as those who are masked or buttoned up inside
tactical vehicles. Doors, hatches, and areas with which troops come into
frequent contact should be considered the first choice when applying M9
tape to tactical vehicles.
C-67. M9 paper will turn pink, red, reddish brown, or red-purple when
exposed to liquid chemical agents. It cannot, however, identify the specific
agent. As soon as the paper indicates the presence of chemical agents,
protective action must be taken.

DESCRIPTION
C-68. M9 paper is issued in a 7-ounce dispenser box that contains one
30-foot roll of 2-inch-wide detector paper and a plastic storage bag. See
Figure C-5. The
NSN is 6665-01-
226-5589.

C-15
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure C-5. M9 Chemical Agent Detector Paper

LIMITATIONS
C-69. M9 paper must be read with a white light. It can be used in rain,
snow, and sleet, but cannot be used to detect vapors or chemical agents in
water. It will not stick to dirty, oily, or greasy surfaces. A colorblind
soldier may not be able to read contamination indications. Do not attempt
to read M9 with a red flashlight lens. False readings can be caused by
temperatures above 125 degrees F (52 degrees C), brake fluid, DS2,
petroleum products, and insect repellent. M9 has a six-year shelf life.

UNIT ISSUE
C-70. Standard issue is one per soldier.
DECONTAMINATION
C-71. Decontamination is not applicable for this item.
M8A1 AUTOMATIC CHEMICAL AGENT ALARM
USE
C-72. Positioned upwind from defensive positions, the remote detector
(M43A1) is connected, using WD-1 communications wire, to the alarm
unit (M42). It can provide early warning of potential nerve agents (vapor
only).

DESCRIPTION
C-73. As illustrated in Figure C-6, the M43A1 detector (larger unit;
NSN 6665-01-081-8140) and M42 alarm unit (smaller unit; NSN 6665-
0859-2215) are the major components of the M8A1. When the M43A1
detects a nerve agent, it sends an electronic signal along the
communications wire to the M42 alarm, setting off a remote
audible/visual signal (or visual signal only when noise discipline is a
concern). The M10A1 power supply (NSN 6135-00-859-2225) provides DC
power to the detector from an AC source (115 or 220V). The detector uses
one BA-3517/U battery; the alarm uses four BA-3030 or BB-3203/UF (D
cell) batteries.

C-16
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

Figure C-6. M8A1 Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm

LIMITATIONS
C-74. Accidental or incidental destruction of this detector must be
reported immediately to the NBC officer or NCO. It contains Americium
241, a radiation hazard. False alarms may result from screening and
signaling smoke, engine exhaust, rocket/missile propellant smoke, and
electromagnetic pulse (EMP). The M8A1 is being replaced by the M22
ACADA (covered later in this discussion).

UNIT ISSUE
C-75. Standard issue is one per platoon, subject to the applicable
modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE).

DECONTAMINATION
C-76. The M8A1 can be decontaminated using the M295/M291
decontamination kit(s) or using a nonstandard decontamination solution
consisting of one part household bleach and three parts hot water.

M22 ACADA SYSTEM


USE
C-77. Positioned upwind from platoon defensive positions, this remote
detector is connected by WD-1 communications wire to the alarm unit
(M42). It provides early warning of potential nerve and blister agents
(vapor only).

DESCRIPTION
C-78. The M22 ACADA (NSN 6665-01-438-6983) is an advanced man-
portable, point sampling, chemical agent alarm system. See Figure C-7.
The system will detect and identify all standard nerve and blister agents
in vapor form. The detector provides unit warning through the MICAD. It
replaces the M8A1 alarm as a point detector and will augment the ICAM.
The M22 uses one nonrechargeable lithium battery (BA-5590/U) and the
XM28 power supply kit (NSN 6665-01-438-6960)

C-17
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure C-7. M22 ACADA System

LIMITATIONS
C-79. Accidental or incidental destruction of this detector must be
reported immediately to the NBC officer or NCO. It contains a beta
radiation hazard. False alarms may result from screening and signaling
smoke, engine exhaust, rocket/missile propellant smoke, and EMP.

UNIT ISSUE
C-80. Standard issue is one per platoon.
DECONTAMINATION
C-81. The M22 can be decontaminated using the M295/M291
decontamination kit(s) or using a nonstandard decontamination solution
consisting of one part household bleach and three parts hot water.

NOTE: The following procedures and considerations, illustrated in Figure C-8, are
applicable in the positioning of chemical agent detectors and alarms, including the
M8A1 and M22 systems:
· The NBC detector unit (powered by a larger battery) is
positioned upwind from the platoon defensive position and
can support up to five alarm units. It is connected to the
smaller alarm unit (M42), which is powered by D cell or BA-
3030 batteries. The maximum distance between detector and
alarm, connected by communications wire, is 400 meters.
· Detector units are positioned no more than 300 meters apart
from each other.
· Position detector units upwind at least 150 meters from the
platoon defensive position to provide adequate time to mask if
the alarm units sound. To ensure survivability, check wire
and batteries frequently, and camouflage the detector units.

C-18
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

Figure C-8. Positioning of Chemical Agent


Alarm Systems

CHEMICAL AGENT MONITOR


USE
C-82. The CAM is a hand-held device used to monitor personnel,
equipment, vehicles, buildings, and other specific locations for the
presence of nerve and blister agent (vapor only).

DESCRIPTION
C-83. The CAM (NSN 6665-01-199-4153) weighs about 2 kilograms (4.5
pounds). Refer to Figure C-9.

Figure C-9. Chemical Agent Monitor

LIMITATIONS
C-84. Troops must use caution to avoid touching the “nose” of the CAM
with whatever is being monitored. This is not an area monitor or device.
CAM operators must be in full MOPP gear when operating the device.

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UNIT ISSUE
C-85. Standard issue is one per troop/company.
DECONTAMINATION
C-86. The CAM can be decontaminated using the M295/M291
decontamination kit(s) or using a nonstandard decontamination solution
consisting of one part household bleach and three parts hot water.

IMPROVED CHEMICAL AGENT MONITOR


USE
C-87. The ICAM provides the reconnaissance platoon with
instantaneous feedback of chemical hazard levels by means of real-time
detection of nerve and blister agents. This can reduce the need for
decontamination operations.

DESCRIPTION
C-88. The ICAM (NSN 6665-01-357-8502) is more reliable and needs
less maintenance than the CAM. During routine maintenance, the
platoon can use the battery assembly training (BAT) kit and inexpensive
D cell batteries or AC power instead of the more expensive lithium
batteries (NSN 6910-01-333-3631). See Figure C-10.

Figure C-10. Improved Chemical Agent Monitor

LIMITATIONS
C-89. Limitations for the ICAM are the same as those for the CAM.
UNIT ISSUE
C-90. Standard issue is one per troop/company.
DECONTAMINATION
C-91. The ICAM can be decontaminated using the M295/M291
decontamination kit(s) or using a nonstandard decontamination solution
consisting of one part household bleach and three parts hot water.

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_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

AN/VDR-2 RADIAC SET


USE
C-92. Soldiers in the reconnaissance platoon use this NBC instrument
for several purposes:

· Detect and measure gamma radiation dose rates (how much


radiation an individual can expect to absorb in one hour at a
specific point).
· Measure total dose (how much total radiation the individual
has absorbed).
· Monitor for turn-back dose rates during radiological survey
missions.
· Provide a means for dismounted monitoring and surveying of
personnel, equipment, supplies, buildings, and other specific
locations.

NOTE: The AN/VDR2 can detect but not measure beta radiation.

DESCRIPTION
C-93. The AN/VDR-2 is a lightweight, EMP-hardened, tactical dose rate
meter. It is composed of one radiacmeter (IM-243) (illustrated at the
circled “1” in Figure C-11), a radiac probe (DT-616), and one carrying
pouch with strap. The hand-held probe (the circled “2” in Figure C-11) is
used for monitoring personnel, supplies, or equipment. The AN/VDR-2 set
also has a carrying case (the circled “3” in Figure C-11) with shoulder
straps (the circled “4” in Figure C-11). Power comes from three 9-volt DC
batteries (BA-3090) or vehicle power (24-volt DC). The NSN is 6665-01-
222-1425.

Figure C-11. AN/VDR-2 Radiac Set (Complete)

LIMITATIONS
C-94. The AN/VDR-2 cannot detect or measure alpha contamination
resulting from nuclear fallout, as a byproduct from depleted uranium

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munitions, or from melting/destruction of depleted uranium armaments


by kinetic energy munitions.

UNIT ISSUE
C-95. Standard issue is one per platoon.
DECONTAMINATION
C-96. The AN/VDR-2 can be decontaminated using the M295/M291
decontamination kit(s) or using a nonstandard decontamination solution
consisting of one part household bleach and three parts hot water.

AN/UDR-13 RADIAC SET


USE
C-97. This instrument measures gamma radiation only, with the
capability to monitor total dose (how much total radiation an individual
has absorbed) or dose rate (how much radiation the individual can expect
to absorb in one hour).

DESCRIPTION
C-98. The AN/UDR-13 (NSN 6665-01-407-1237) is a compact,
lightweight device that replaces the IM-93 dosimeter. It uses four AAA
alkaline batteries (NSN 6135-00-826-4798). See Figure C-12.

Figure C-12. AN/UDR-13 Radiac Set

LIMITATIONS
C-99. The AN/UDR-13 will not detect or measure alpha or beta
radiation.

UNIT ISSUE
C-100. Standard issue is one per platoon and one per troop/company
headquarters.

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_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

DECONTAMINATION
C-101. The AN/UDR-13 can be decontaminated using the M295/M291
decontamination kit(s) or using a nonstandard decontamination solution
consisting of one part household bleach and three parts hot water.

IM-93/UD DOSIMETER
USE
C-102. This is currently the Army’s standard tactical dosimeter for
measuring total radiation dose (how much radiation a unit has absorbed).
It is not designed to monitor total dose for a single soldier. The IM-93/UD
is worn as close to the body as possible.

DESCRIPTION
C-103. The IM-93/UD is a tubular device, about the size of a fountain
pen. The user points one end toward a light source and reads the
illuminated scale from the other end. The optical end has a dust cap. The
device requires a charging unit (PP1578A/PD). See Figure C-13.

Figure C-13. IM-93/UD Dosimeter

LIMITATIONS
C-104. The IM-93/UD is being replaced by the AN/UDR-13 radiac set,
covered earlier in this discussion.

UNIT ISSUE
C-105. Standard issue is one per platoon and one per troop/company
headquarters.

DECONTAMINATION
C-106. Denatured alcohol can be used to decontaminate the IM-93/UD.

PP-1578A/PD RADIAC DETECTOR CHARGER


USE
C-107. The PP-1578A/PD provides the electrical charge required to zero
the IM-93 dosimeter.

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DESCRIPTION
C-108. The charger is a small, electrostatic-charge generator designed to
serve all US and certain NATO combat dosimeters. The NSN is 6665-00-
542-1177. See Figure C-14.

LIMITATIONS
C-109. Users must have direct light (such as from sunlight, flashlight, or
vehicle headlights) to obtain a reading.

UNIT ISSUE
C-110. Standard issue is one per platoon and one per troop/company
headquarters.

Figure C-14. PP-1578A/PD Radiac Detector Charger

DECONTAMINATION
C-111. The PP-1578A/PD can be decontaminated using the M295/M291
decontamination kit(s) or using a nonstandard decontamination solution
consisting of one part household bleach and three parts hot water.

AN/PDR-75 RADIAC DETECTOR READER


(FOR DT-236 DOSIMETER)
USE
C-112. The meter on this device reads and displays accumulated neutron
and gamma radiation recorded by the DT-236 dosimeter (worn by each
soldier in the reconnaissance platoon). Leaders and medical personnel
can use this reading as an indication of the total gamma and neutron
dose received by exposed personnel. The AN/PDR-75 is maintained by the
troop NBC NCO.

DESCRIPTION
C-113. The AN/PDR-75 is housed in a heavy green box approximately 2
feet long by 1½ feet tall. The set consists of the radiac computer indicator
(reader) (CP696/PDR-75), carrying case (CY-8420/PDR-75), two-piece

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_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

battery box, and three power cables. It can be powered by a 24-volt DC


source, either a 12/24-volt DC lithium battery (BA-5590/U) or a 24-volt
DC vehicular battery. The NSN is 6665-01-211-4217. The reader is shown
in Figure C-15.

LIMITATIONS
C-114. The reader measures from 1 to 1,000 cGy.

Figure C-15. AN/PDR-75 Radiac Detector Reader

UNIT ISSUE
C-115. Standard issue is one per troop/company.
DECONTAMINATION
C-116. The AN/PDR-75 can be decontaminated using the M295/M291
decontamination kit(s) or using a nonstandard decontamination solution
consisting of one part household bleach and three parts hot water. Refer
to the appropriate TM for more specific information on decontamination
of the internal tray, external parts and carrying case, and electronic
components.

DT-236 DOSIMETER
USE
C-117. Worn by every soldier in the reconnaissance platoon, this
wristwatch-like instrument measures total dose radiation. It is worn
under MOPP gear. See Figure C-16. The soldier wearing the dosimeter
cannot read it; it requires the AN/PDR-75 reader (discussed earlier and
illustrated in Figure C-15) to determine cumulative gamma and neutron
radiation exposure levels. The reader is maintained by the troop NBC
NCO.

DESCRIPTION
C-118. The DT-236 looks and is worn like a wristwatch. Readings are
used to determine a unit’s RES. The NSN is 6665-01-043-2191.

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LIMITATIONS
C-119. This device is not designed to act as a stand-alone radiac
instrument; instead, it augments the IM-93 dosimeter or UDR-13 radiac
set. Together, these tactical radiation meters help to paint a clear picture
of how much radiation (total dose) soldiers have accumulated.

Figure C-16. DT-236 Dosimeter

UNIT ISSUE
C-120. Standard issue is one per soldier.
DECONTAMINATION
C-121. The DT-236 can be decontaminated using the M295/M291
decontamination kit(s) or using a nonstandard decontamination solution
consisting of one part household bleach and three parts hot water.

M272 WATER TESTING KIT


USE
C-122. The M272 detects and identifies dangerous levels of chemical
contamination in either raw or treated water sources.

DESCRIPTION
C-123. The kit consists of a variety of easy-to-use collection and testing
materials contained in a lightweight carrying case. The NSN is 6665-01-
143-0885. See Figure C-17.

LIMITATIONS
C-124. The kit requires soldiers to dismount to collect water samples.
UNIT ISSUE
C-125. Standard issue is one per troop/company.

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_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

Figure C-17. M272 Water Testing Kit

DECONTAMINATION
C-126. External decontamination of the kit is possible using the
M295/M291 decontamination kit(s) or using a nonstandard
decontamination solution consisting of one part household bleach and
three parts hot water.

M34 CM AGENT SAMPLING KIT


USE
C-127. This lightweight kit contains materials used to collect soil, surface
matter, and even water and to test these samples for hazardous agents
and contamination.

DESCRIPTION
C-128. Contents of the M34 kit include a carrier, a plastic scoop, 2
extraction fluid bottles, 2 soil extraction bags, 16 individually wrapped
ampoules, 6 soil collection bags, 10 plastic-covered wire ties, M8 chemical
agent detector paper, 3 radiation hazard tags, and 8 shipping tags with
envelopes. See Figure C-18.

LIMITATIONS
C-129. The kit requires soldiers to dismount to collect samples.
UNIT ISSUE
C-130. Standard issue is one per team that is conducting sample
collection.

DECONTAMINATION
C-131. The interior of the M34 kit cannot be sufficiently decontaminated
for safe use once contamination occurs. The exterior of the kit can be
decontaminated using the M295/M291 kit(s) and/or hot soapy water.

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Figure C-18. M34 CM Agent Sampling Kit

SECTION IV – RECONNOITERING AN NBC ENVIRONMENT

C-132. This section focuses on assets, processes, and procedures for NBC
reconnaissance in an NBC environment. Considerations include the NBC
threat in the operational environment; the NBCRS platoon’s role; NBC
reconnaissance movement patterns; NBC surveillance techniques; the
NBCWRS; and location and marking of NBC hazards.

THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE NBC THREAT


C-133. The modern battlefield will challenge reconnaissance elements to
fight within a multidimensional area of operations that goes beyond the
traditional dimensions of height, width, and depth in both contiguous and
noncontiguous environments. The employment or threat of NBC weapons
and other toxic materials pose unique challenges to reconnaissance units
and the units they support.
C-134. In NBC environments, successful battle command requires
synchronization and proper integration of ISR capabilities. The brigade
battlestaff assesses NBC threat considerations and develops the NBC
COP using data gathered from a wide variety of sources that provide
improved NBC situational awareness and early warning. These assets
include the following:

· Government and nongovernment agencies.


· Remote NBC sensing devices and standoff NBC detectors.
· Weather and terrain mapping satellites and aircraft imagery.
· HUMINT.
· SIGINT.

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_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

C-135. The nature and scope of the NBC threat may force commanders to
reallocate forces and priorities based on their NBC situational awareness.
In doing this, they must employ the visualization process described
earlier, using intelligence information gathered by the assets outlined
earlier. They may determine, for example, that the NBC hazards have
rendered MOPP gear incapable of providing the necessary protection. In
such cases, avoiding the hazard may be the only acceptable course of
action.
C-136. Risk and vulnerability assessments often overlook hazards that
result from collateral damage. The leaders of the reconnaissance platoon
and ISR mission planners must carefully address these dangers, which
can result when toxic materials are released following accidental friendly
and threat conventional bombing, targeting mishaps, or incidental
(terrorist) sabotage of civil and military facilities or industrial complexes.
Assessments must identify the immediate impact on military operations
(air, land, sea) and the short- and long-term consequences to deployed
forces, population centers, and the environment if these facilities are
degraded or destroyed.

NBCRS PLATOON
C-137. The NBCRS platoon, which is part of the surveillance troop
within the SBCT’s cavalry squadron (RSTA), is a valuable and critical
asset in helping reconnaissance units to maintain a high state of
situational understanding (both friendly and threat). The platoon is
capable of day or night operations, in all geographical areas, in adverse
weather, and under all types of battlefield conditions. NBCRS vehicle
commanders are challenged to maintain a constant state of readiness.
They remain postured to respond quickly in investigating WMD attacks,
industrial hazards, and/or accidental or incidental release of toxic
material. Enhanced NBCRS systems are capable of detecting and
identifying NBC materials and hazards that may go undetected by
standard sensors and detectors. As a result, commanders at every level
must carefully weigh the risks when NBCRS vehicles conduct these
critical functions while being required to execute multiple, flawless, and
daring operations (such as day/night passages of lines, tactical movement
over complex terrain, and navigation) on an extended, high-risk
battlefield.

NBCRS VEHICLE
C-138. The NBCRS platoon is equipped with three NBCRS vehicles (see
Figure C-19), a wheeled, light-armored reconnaissance platform equipped
with a medium-caliber machine gun. This high-speed, highly mobile
vehicle is capable of performing NBC reconnaissance on primary,
secondary, or cross-country routes throughout the battlefield. The current
NBCRS vehicle, however, cannot collect vapor samples or monitor hazard
density over time; in addition, its ability to detect and identify vapor
agents is severely limited. The NBCRS vehicle protects its crew of four
from NBC contamination by means of an overpressure system. Refer to
Table C-3 for a summary of the vehicle’s capabilities and limitations.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure C-19. NBCRS Vehicle

Table C-3. NBCRS Vehicle Capabilities and Limitations

Key Performance Parameters Specifics / Comments


Traveling Range (one tank of fuel) 400 km
No (without extensive preparation and JI
C130 Transportability
authorization)
Maximum Land Speed 80 kmph (50 mph)

Weapon System 7.62-mm M240E1

Armor Protection 7.62-mm (including glass)

Swim Capability Yes; maximum speed 6 mph

FBCB2 Yes

Communications 3 FM SINCGARS radios

Standoff Sensing Yes; out to 5 km, but not while mobile

Biological Vapor Sample No

Biological Matter Collection for Limited to vectors and small soil and
Analysis vegetation samples

Climate Control System Cooling and heating

Marking System Yes (large missions require more vehicles)

Self-Recovery Yes

Towing 2 NBCRS vehicles required for towing

Water Analysis Yes; requires crews to exit vehicle

Decontamination Between gross contamination missions

NBCRS TASK ORGANIZATION


C-139. The NBCRS platoon can be organized to operate as a pure
element or, depending on the factors of METT-TC, decentralized to
respond to asymmetrical threats over a large operating environment. The

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_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

platoon normally operates as one of three configurations: team, squad, or


platoon.

NBC MOVEMENT PATTERNS


C-140. This discussion focuses on the movement patterns used by the
reconnaissance platoon, NBCRS platoon, and supporting elements during
NBC-related operations.

ROUTE
C-141. NBC route reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain
information on a specific route. The route may encompass a single road or
an axis of advance. This mission is appropriate when there is a likelihood
of encountering contamination along the route. Once contamination is
found, the NBC reconnaissance unit can take any or all of the following
actions:

· Conduct a survey to define the extent of contamination.


· Locate and mark clean bypass routes.
· Terminate the mission with permission of the controlling
headquarters.
· Continue the mission.

C-142. NBC route reconnaissance entails a number of critical tasks,


including the following:

· Reconnoiter the route and determine the location of any


contamination.
· Locate and mark bypass routes if contamination is
encountered.
· Report and mark all NBC hazards along the route.

ZIGZAG
C-143. The zigzag pattern may be used when NBC reconnaissance
elements are on line. The pattern is most commonly employed during
zone reconnaissance. An example would be reconnaissance of a mobility
corridor or an axis of advance; Figure C-20 shows an NBC reconnaissance
squad/team conducting a zone NBC reconnaissance of a mobility corridor
using the zigzag pattern. Vehicles will normally move parallel to each
other, but in a staggered formation, along the corridor. The element
checks all key terrain throughout the area for NBC contamination
hazard. Key terrain includes road networks, low-lying areas, and
designated critical points (choke points).
C-144. In the example in Figure C-20, Team 1 detects contamination in
its assigned lane or sector. Team 1 stops, and the vehicle commander
notifies Team 2. Team 1 verifies the presence of contamination and sends
an NBC-4 report to higher headquarters. Team 2 continues to check for
contamination in the assigned sector. Team 1 moves back approximately
200 meters to the last clean point in the azimuth of travel and emplaces a
contamination marker. (NOTE: The contamination marker must be
visible.) Team 1 then moves laterally 100 to 200 meters (left or right),
turns in the azimuth of travel, and continues the zigzag pattern. If

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contamination is encountered again, Team 1 moves laterally (100 to 200


meters or until there is no longer a reading on the MM-1), emplaces
another marker, and sends an NBC-4 report to higher headquarters.
Team 1 again turns and continues on the original azimuth of travel in the
zigzag pattern. At the end of the survey, the team will have marked the
outer boundary of the NBC contaminated area.

Figure C-20. NBC Reconnaissance in the Zigzag Pattern

BOX
C-145. The unit uses the box pattern when the commander wants to
know the limits of contamination (boundaries). The box pattern (see
Figure C-21) is time-consuming, however, and is not normally a stand-
alone task for reconnaissance platoon elements or for the NBCRS platoon.
This pattern is normally used to mark large areas in “pass-back” missions
conducted with theater NBC reconnaissance augmentation or by follow-
on elements in rear areas.

Figure C-21. NBC Marking Mission


Employing the Box Pattern

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_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

C-146. In the example in Figure C-21, two vehicles conduct the survey
while moving in a staggered column formation. Team 2, which is in the
lead, encounters contamination and notifies Team 1. Team 1 stops and, if
no contamination is detected, emplaces a contamination marker. Team 2
backs out of the contamination until it is even with the Team 1 marker
and turns to the right 90 degrees. Team 1 makes a 90-degree left turn.
The teams move along the new azimuth until contamination is found
again. If no contamination is found after 100 to 200 meters of travel, they
each drop a marker and make a 90-degree turn along the original
azimuth. They again travel 100 to 200 meters and take a measurement.
C-147. The following actions then take place as each team reconnoiters
for the limits of the contaminated area:

· If the team detects contamination, it returns to the last clean


point and makes another bound (100 to 200 meters) in the
direction perpendicular to the original azimuth. It emplaces a
marker if no contamination is detected, then moves again 100
to 200 meters along the original azimuth. The team follows
this procedure until it obtains a negative reading along the
original azimuth, indicating the lateral boundary of the
contaminated area. A contamination marker is emplaced for
each negative reading.
· After each 100- to 200-meter bound along the lateral
boundary with no contamination detected, the team turns 90
degrees and makes a bound perpendicular to the original
azimuth and “inward” toward the contaminated area. If it
detects contamination in the new location, the team
backtracks to the last clean point and continues its bounds
along the original azimuth, emplacing markers at each new
clean point.
· If no contamination is found at the new, inward location, the
team emplaces a marker and makes another 100- to 200-
meter bound perpendicular to the original azimuth. Again, a
positive reading will cause the team to return to the last clean
point, while a negative reading will indicate continued
movement in the same direction.
· Teams continue this process until they link up on the far side
of the contaminated area.

STAR
C-148. The star pattern enables the commander to determine the
approximate size of a contaminated area. It is normally used when a
small area of contamination is suspected. It is, however, one of least
preferable search techniques because it exposes the teams executing the
mission to more contamination than other methods. One vehicle moves
forward, using the star pattern to detect and verify the presence of
contamination. If the area is large enough, more teams or vehicles should
be used to check the area. The reconnaissance team also marks the
boundaries of the contaminated area, updates the COP using the FBCB2,
and submits an NBC-4 report to higher headquarters. If only one NBCRS
team is used to conduct the star pattern of the area, the wingman
assigned provides security.

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C-149. Once the area is reconnoitered, the NBCRS element links back up
with its assigned unit and continues with the mission. Figure C-22
illustrates NBC reconnaissance vehicles using the star pattern to
determine the boundaries of the contamination.

Figure C-22. NBC Survey Missions


Employing the Star Pattern

C-150. The reconnaissance team uses NBC SPOTREPs or NBCWRS


messages (NBC-4 reports) to notify friendly elements that will be affected
by the hazard, either immediately and in the near term, and to warn
follow-on forces where to look for the NBC contaminated area. At the
same time, it must take extreme caution to tailor these reports and
messages to prevent panic and overprotective measures by the forces that
receive them; improper reporting could lead to unnecessary force
degradation and a decrease in combat effectiveness.

CLOVERLEAF
C-151. The commander can employ the cloverleaf when he wants to
know the limits of the NBC contamination hazard at a specific location.
Reconnaissance/NBCRS teams, squads, sections, or platoons can use the
cloverleaf pattern, with vehicles checking for NBC ground contamination
by moving around the point of interest in four different directions. This
pattern is time-consuming and is most likely to be used when the area is
secured; however, it provides detailed coverage and information about the
contaminated area. Refer to Figure C-23 for an example of an NBC
reconnaissance element using the cloverleaf pattern while conducting a
survey.

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_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

Figure C-23. NBC Survey Missions


Employing the Cloverleaf Pattern

BOUNCE AND BYPASS


C-152. This is the best pattern when the reconnaissance team wants to
avoid unnecessary contamination exposure. It allows the team to quickly
find the outer edges of the contamination for avoidance marking and/or
an uncontaminated bypass route around the contamination, at the same
time helping to prevent the loss of maneuver force momentum.
Reconnaissance/NBCRS teams that encounter contamination “bounce”
laterally, moving 100 to 200 meters to the left or right, and then resume
movement in the original direction of travel. If contamination is
encountered again, the team repeats the lateral movement (see Figure C-
24). Depending on the tactical situation, the maneuver commander will
specify whether the unit will bypass the contamination to the right or left.
In addition, the commander must provide direct fire overwatch to
independent reconnaissance/NBCRS teams as they use the bounce and
bypass pattern. In turn, reconnaissance teams must be prepared to react
effectively to threat contact (direct and indirect fire, mines, and
obstacles).

Figure C-24. Bounce and Bypass


NBC Reconnaissance Pattern

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NBC SURVEILLANCE
C-153. It is impossible to understate the importance of NBC surveillance.
If deterrence fails, the maneuver commander must be able to observe and
understand the threat’s NBC intent and to conduct subsequent electronic
analysis or searches for WMD precursors. In many cases, NBC NAIs
become the center of gravity on the battlefield, affecting friendly force
maneuver and skewing planners’ attempts at time-sequencing combat
and CS operations. Some toxic emissions are invisible to other collection
media (satellite or air photography); therefore, mission success may hinge
on surveillance teams as they sense, identify, and provide timely and
accurate NBC reporting and warning. Effective NBC surveillance allows
the commander to detect threat weapons, WMD facilities, and
contaminated areas and then to neutralize them before they can affect
friendly forces.
C-154. Surveillance of threat infrastructure for presence of NBC or toxic
industrial materials should cover such facilities as hydroelectric or
nuclear power plants, water treatment facilities, and rail cars and land
transportation vehicles used to transport hazardous and explosive cargo.
Other potential NAIs that may be specified in the NBC section of the
battalion/squadron ISR plan include factories that use harmful or toxic
solutions, storage depots for petroleum or agricultural products, and
commercial and military research facilities.

THE ISR PLAN


C-155. Commanders use the NBC ISR plan to guide their NBCRS assets
and reconnaissance elements as they attempt to detect threat capabilities
and then destroy the threat’s ability to use NBC weapons and toxic
materials against friendly forces. In the event of threat activity, the ISR
plan will specify how subordinate leaders are to array their conventional
and NBCRS reconnaissance teams. It outlines surveillance procedures
and positions that will enable NBCRS assets to most effectively perform
critical tasks, including the following:

· Detect NBC hazards and toxic materials.


· Warn (and “dewarn”) friendly forces in the immediate area so
they can avoid contamination and the consequences of
employment of toxic materials.
· Establish threshold and toxicity levels as quickly as possible.

C-156. In developing their ISR plans, commanders must carefully


consider the NBC surveillance capabilities and limitations of all
applicable assets This evaluation covers technological capabilities as well
as logistical considerations, such as manpower. Several factors influence
the decision of which of the NBC surveillance methods (covered later in
this discussion) the unit will employ, including IPB and the brigade
commander’s PIR and IR.

SURVEILLANCE TECHNIQUES
Upwind Surveillance
C-157. This technique, shown in Figure C-25, reduces the likelihood that
the NBC surveillance asset (reconnaissance element and/or NBCRS team)
will be exposed when conducting NBC surveillance. On modern

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_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

contiguous and noncontiguous battlefields, which may require elements


to conduct NBC surveillance of a threat several kilometers from the
brigade main body, WMDs and NBC contamination can pose a significant
downwind environmental hazard to exposed or unprotected soldiers and
civilians.

Figure C-25. Upwind Surveillance Technique

Downwind Surveillance
C-158. While this technique offers early warning in NBC situations,
reconnaissance crews may be exposed to hazards that are sometimes
invisible and that potentially can quickly break down or defeat vehicle
and protective mask filtration systems. Application of this technique must
weigh these risks against the potential benefits of identifying the threat.
The IPB, risk assessment, and vulnerability analysis processes must
consider the cost-benefit factors, as well as the likelihood and impact of
NBC exposure on reconnaissance vehicles and crews.
C-159. Reconnaissance platoons and NBCRS teams may employ the
downwind surveillance technique when they operate forward of the main
body, executing the ISR plan to contribute to COP development; this will
include actions taken to enhance NBC situational awareness. The ISR
plan should identify the most effective location at which NBC and
conventional reconnaissance assets can be positioned both to gain
situational understanding and to provide critical operational information
to friendly forces (detect to avoid, detect to warn, and identify to treat).
Figure C-26 illustrates a reconnaissance element located downwind, but
well forward of the main body.

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Figure C-26. Downwind Surveillance Technique

Neutral Wind Surveillance


C-160. When conventional reconnaissance or NBCRS teams conduct
neutral wind surveillance, they are positioned to observe NBC NAIs
without regard to head or tail winds. This technique is recommended for
situations in which contamination avoidance is the foremost
consideration, with the unit capable of conducting observation and
sensing using standoff sensors and dismounts. See Figure C-27.

Figure C-27. Neutral Wind Surveillance Technique

NBC WARNING AND REPORTING


C-161. The Army’s NBCWRS comprises six basic reports covering actual
or predicted NBC hazards. This system helps the reconnaissance platoon

C-38
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

and associated elements plan what protective measures to take before,


during, and after exposure to an NBC hazard. Refer to Appendix B of this
manual and to GTA 3-6-8 for formats, letter codes, and other information
on the six standardized NBC reports:

· NBC-1 – Observer’s initial report. Used by the observing


unit to report initial and subsequent data of an NBC attack.
· NBC-2. Used for passing evaluated data of an NBC attack.
· NBC-3 – Immediate warning of expected contamination.
Used for immediate warning of expected NBC contamination.
· NBC-4 - Report of radiation dose-rate measurement.
Used to report radiation dose rate measurements.
· NBC-5 - Report of areas of contamination. Used to report
locations of NBC contamination or hazards.
· NBC-6 - Detailed NBC plots.

NOTE: The reconnaissance platoon sends the NBC 1 and NBC 3 reports to higher
headquarters. All other reports are sent to the platoon from higher headquarters or
other elements.

DIGITAL WARNING AND REPORTING (FBCB2)


C-162. When so equipped, reconnaissance platoons send NBC-1 reports
using the FBCB2 (see Figure C-28). This is the most expeditious method,
allowing immediate use of data in digital systems. NBC-1 reports sent by
nondigital means (free text or voice) to the next echelon will require MCS
operators to execute a time-consuming process of manually entering the
data. This in turn slows the warning process to other brigade and
squadron/battalion units. Initial NBC reports will be sent with FLASH
precedence.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure C-28. FBCB2 Screens for NBC-1 Report

C-163. The squadron/battalion may direct its reconnaissance platoons to


conduct an NBC survey to validate reports from specified locations. An
NBCRS team/vehicle may be task organized down to the reconnaissance
platoon to assist in the conduct of this survey. The element(s) conducting
the survey will use FBCB2 to send NBC-4 reports to define the type of
agent, location of contamination and/or its boundaries, dose rate, and the
date and time the contamination was identified. (NOTE: NBC-4 reports
may be used as often as necessary to provide a comprehensive report of
the contamination.) See Figures C-29 and C-30.

C-40
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

Figure C-29. FBCB2 Screen for Creating an NBC-4 Report

Figure C-30. FBCB2 Screen with NBC-4 Report Displayed

AUTOMATIC WARNING AND REPORTING


C-164. In the near future, NBC staffs and NBCRS vehicles will have the
joint warning and reporting network (JWARN) or a similar appliqué
system. Other near-term technologies will combine electronic systems
linking NBC detectors to tactical communications to enhance NBC

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warning, “dewarning,” reporting, and battlespace management. These


technological improvements will assist commanders and leaders in
developing the COP of the NBC battlespace, portraying all detected NBC
hazards for consideration and assessment.
C-165. Versions of the MICAD system, which is illustrated in Figure C-
31, are being developed to interface with existing and developmental
NBC sensors, detectors, alarms, and communication systems at battalion
level and below. MICAD automates several aspects of the NBCWRS
throughout the battlefield, including the gathering of NBC contamination
data from NBC detectors and sensors and the formatting and
transmission of NBC-1 and NBC-4 reports up the command chain.

Figure C-31. Multipurpose Integrated Chemical Agent Alarm (MICAD)

LOCATING AND MARKING NBC HAZARDS


C-166. NBC marking procedures are the same regardless of who
conducts them. The purpose is to find contamination boundaries and/or
routes around or through a contaminated area. Reconnaissance teams
may have an ICAM, M256 detector kit, M8 and M9 paper, M272 water
test kit, automatic chemical agent alarm, M34 soil sampling kit, and
M274 marking set (shown in Figure C-32). They use this equipment to
determine the following:

· Are chemical agents present?


· If an agent is present, what type is it?
· Where and when was the agent first detected?
· Where are the boundaries of the contamination?
· Are there clean routes through area? If so, where are they?

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_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

Figure C-32. M274 Marking Set

C-167. Marking contaminated areas prevents friendly units from


entering them. Once contamination is found, the reconnaissance team
reports it and asks for guidance on marking the area. NATO units use
standard marking signs and/or symbols. The color of the sign identifies
contamination types. Figures C-33 and C-34 illustrate standard NBC
contamination marking signs.

Figure C-33. NBCRS


Standard Marker

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Figure C-34. Standard NATO Marking Signs

SECTION V – NBC PROTECTION (REDUCING NBC VULNERABILITY)

C-168. Shielding the force entails the action necessary to reduce the NBC
threat and prevent NBC casualties, including medical pretreatment,
contamination avoidance, and physical protection. Shielding begins in the
predeployment phase, when units pretreat soldiers to minimize the
chemical, biological, and residual radiation threat. Contamination
avoidance allows the reconnaissance platoon to move around hazards or
to relocate before the occurrence or arrival of a hazard. Physical
protection, which covers both units and individuals, provides a
contamination-free environment in which the platoon and its soldiers can
operate successfully. Enhanced sensing and shaping capabilities will
allow commanders and platoon leaders to use scientific concepts and
methods to achieve an effective NBC-focused defense.

GENERAL PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS


CHEMICAL PROTECTIVE CLOTHING
C-169. Reconnaissance soldiers may train and practice combat
operations in one of several types of chemical protective overgarments
included in the Army inventory. The two types that soldiers use in
training are the battledress overgarment (BDO) and the chemical
protective overgarment (CPOG). Each has characteristics that may make
it the protective suit of choice.
C-170. A new type of chemical protective overgarment, known as joint
service lightweight integrated suit technology (JSLIST), will be issued
should the reconnaissance platoon deploy to combat operations. JSLIST
will provide 24 hours of protection for soldiers exposed to NBC hazards.
See Figure C-35. Deploying soldiers are issued two chemical protective
packages with overgarments, replacement hoods, filters, gloves, tinted
mask eye lens, overboots, individual decontamination kits, detection
paper, antidotes, and pretreatments.

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_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

Figure C-35. Joint Service Lightweight


Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST)

MOPP LEVELS
C-171. In an NBC environment, the reconnaissance platoon will operate
using the seven MOPP levels: MOPP READY, MOPP ZERO, MOPP 1,
MOPP 2, MOPP 3, MOPP 4, and MASK ONLY. These graduated levels
are characterized by the extent to which the MOPP uniform and
equipment (protective mask, overgarment, overboots, and gloves) are
carried and/or worn. Figure C-36 illustrates the standardized MOPP
levels; Figure C-37 shows mounted soldiers operating in MOPP 4.

Figure C-36. MOPP Levels

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure C-37. Mounted Operations in MOPP Level 4

PRETREATMENT ACTIVITIES
C-172. Medical pretreatment for potential hazards is a passive defensive
measure. Reconnaissance leaders can initiate several types of
pretreatment procedures on order or when they anticipate chemical or
biological threats.
C-173. The platoon can greatly enhance survivability in an NBC
environment with nerve agent pyridostigmine pills (NAPP), used in
conjunction with the nerve agent antidote kit (NAAK). NAPPs, also
known as pyridostigmine bromide (PB) pills, are issued to soldiers on
cards with 21 tablets (see Figure C-38); pills are carried in any hook-and-
pile pocket on the overgarment. The commander will order the platoon to
start taking the pills in the event of imminent threat (in the next few
hours or days) of nerve agent exposure. Pills are taken every eight hours
until the 21 tablets on the card have been taken or the unit is ordered to
discontinue use.

Figure C-38. Pyridostigmine Bromide Tablets

C-174. Rogue nations may counter precision guided munitions and U.S.
military superiority through covert dissemination of biological weapons.
They may introduce biological weapons against early entry forces in an
attempt to sway public opinion and create discontent among coalition,
NATO, and host nation forces. Passive biological defensive measures by
the platoon may include using plague vaccines or other immunizations
during predeployment operations (in H-minus sequences).

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_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

NUCLEAR HAZARDS AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES

US POLICY STATEMENT
The United States reserves the right to use nuclear weapons.

C-175. Soldiers cannot taste, feel, or see radioactivity; radiation can be


lethal to unprotected, untrained, and unwarned troops. As a result, the
reconnaissance platoon must be prepared to take contingency actions to
reduce the effects of accidental or deliberate dissemination of radioactive
material on the battlefield. Nuclear risks can result from several types of
events: nuclear weapon detonations, discharge of radioactive munitions,
environmental exposure of research isotopes or materials, and nuclear
plant by-product spills or radiation releases. Each of these presents
formidable and difficult challenges.

TYPES OF NUCLEAR BURSTS


C-176. The altitude at which a nuclear device is detonated determines
blast, heat, and nuclear radiation effects. The four fundamental types of
nuclear detonations are air, surface, subsurface, and high-altitude.

Air Burst
C-177. The following considerations and characteristics apply for this
type of nuclear detonation (illustrated in Figure C-39):

· Detonation occurs at an altitude of 30 km or less.


· Fireball remains in the air.
· Blast causes significant damage and injuries.
· Thermal radiation is significant.
· Initial radiation is significant.
· Produces no local fallout.
· Used against ground troops.

Figure C-39. Nuclear Air Burst

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Surface Burst
C-178. The following considerations and characteristics apply for this
type of nuclear detonation (illustrated in Figure C-40):

· Detonated on or slightly above the surface of the earth.


· Fireball touches the surface.
· Blast is less powerful than with air burst.
· Thermal radiation and initial radiation are less extensive
than with air burst.
· Local fallout is significant.
· Cratering occurs.

Figure C-40. Nuclear Surface Burst

Subsurface Burst
C-179. The following considerations and characteristics apply for this
type of nuclear detonation (illustrated in Figure C-41):

· Detonates beneath the surface of the earth.


· Cratering occurs.
· Blast is less powerful than with air burst.
· Thermal radiation and initial radiation are less extensive
than with air burst.
· If penetration occurs (breaking the surface of the earth), local
fallout can be extensive.

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_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

Figure C-41. Nuclear Subsurface Burst

High-Altitude Burst
C-180. The following considerations and characteristics apply for this
type of nuclear detonation (illustrated in Figure C-42):

· Detonation occurs at an altitude of 30 km or more.


· Produces a larger fireball than other types, but with less
debris and less “nuclear darkness” than air burst or surface
burst.
· Ionizing radiation travels for miles.
· Produces severe communication failures.
· Produces larger EMP effects than other types.

Ground
level

Figure C-42. Nuclear High-Altitude Burst

NUCLEAR HAZARDS
C-181. This discussion focuses on the immediate and subsequent effects
of a nuclear detonation, as well as the nuclear material hazards a blast
can create.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Blast
C-182. The blast, or shock wave, from a nuclear air burst causes
equipment damage and casualties. It occurs a fraction of a second after
detonation. The front of the wave moves like a wall of compressed air
from ground zero.

Thermal Radiation
C-183. Thermal radiation, the heat and light produced from an air burst
nuclear detonation, can cause significant additional damage after the
blast effect has passed. The strength of thermal radiation is directly
proportional to the yield of the detonation. The higher the nuclear yield,
the greater the thermal radiation. Ranging into the millions of degrees,
thermal radiation travels at light speed, burning anything in its path. It
causes skin burns and eye injuries. One key side effect, flash blindness, is
caused by the flash’s extreme brightness; it takes two primary forms:

· Dazzle. The most common type of flash blindness, dazzle


impairs the victim’s vision for a period ranging from minutes
to days.
· Retinal burns. A more serious cause of flash blindness,
retinal burns occur when the eye lens focuses the fireball
image onto the back of the eyes. Small, pinpoint retinal burns
may heal; however, more severe burns may cause greater
damage, including permanent blind spots.

C-184. Initial Radiation. This occurs within the first minute after
detonation. It consists mostly of gamma rays and neutrons, with few
alpha and beta particles. Its impact on electronic equipment, especially
communications devices and computers, is known as transient radiation
effects on electronics (TREE). Damage can be temporary or permanent.
C-185. Residual Ionizing Radiation. This radiation occurs after the
first minute following detonation. The primary hazard of residual
radiation is fallout. After detonation, primarily in surface and subsurface
bursts, a mushroom-shaped cloud forms containing radioactive debris and
particles, which can be spread over an area possibly extending tens of
thousands of meters from ground zero. This radioactive material reaches
the earth’s surface primarily in two ways:

· Fallout. This occurs when the radioactive debris and/or


particles from the nuclear mushroom cloud fall to the ground.
· Rainout. This term applies when radioactive material from
the nuclear cloud is carried to earth with rainfall or when rain
occurs after fallout has already reached the earth. As noted,
this threat results primarily from a surface or subsurface
burst. Rainout may increase or decrease the size of the fallout
area and can cause hot spots in the fallout area. Rain can
wash radioactive particles from such locations as hillsides,
mountains, and buildings, decreasing the intensity; however,
it may increase radioactive intensity in low-lying areas,
ditches, or drainage systems.

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_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

Electromagnetic Pulse
C-186. EMP produces an electric and magnetic field that can burn out
electronic components and upset system operations. It poses an injury
risk for soldiers only if they are touching metallic collectors, such as
cables, during an EMP surge. Secondary hazards can result when
electronic equipment catches fire. EMP effects can be reduced by
shielding electrical and electronic components and disconnecting antenna
cables.

Depleted Uranium (DU)


C-187. Leaders must remain aware of equipment or vehicles hit by DU
munitions. Smoke and dust clouds formed by DU munitions will contain
DU and mixed waste. This can result in a radioactive hazard, especially
for soldiers downwind or in the vicinity of burning vehicles. Like lead, DU
is a heavy metal that can poison the body. Kidney damage, tissue decay,
and other effects on body processes can result. When operating around
DU smoke and residue, soldiers must wear MOPP 4 gear.

ACTIONS BEFORE A NUCLEAR ATTACK


C-188. The best defense against a nuclear attack is distance, combined
with protection from natural terrain and/or reinforced structures
(preferably below ground). If the tactical situation or other circumstances
do not allow the reconnaissance platoon to move an adequate distance
away from a detonation, the best defense against the effects of a nuclear
attack is to get below ground with overhead cover and improved
shielding. Use of natural terrain can also reduce nuclear casualties;
effective terrain features include the reverse slopes of hills and
mountains; low areas such as gullies, ravines, ditches, and natural
depressions; fallen trees; and caves. Sandbags and blocking and bracing
material can improve shelter and vehicle shielding. Wet sandbags
enhance neutron radiation shielding.

ACTIONS DURING A NUCLEAR ATTACK (WITH ADVANCE STRIKEWARN)


C-189. The platoon should receive a STRIKEWARN message detailing
the known direction of the strike, expected yield, and minimum safe
distances (if known). METT-TC will dictate whether the commander can
afford to direct dispersal and evacuation of soldiers and civilians.
Additional actions include the following:

· Disconnect the FBCB2. Operate only one radio for C2;


otherwise, disconnect radios, cease traffic, lower antennas,
and move radios below ground level to avoid EMP effects.
· Orient vehicles with the front facing the blast, gun tubes to
the rear, and the breach closed (if applicable). Vehicle crews
should remove anything from the outside of the vehicle/trailer
that could become a projectile in strong winds.
· Soldiers in the open will seek shelter below ground with
overhead cover.
· Separate food, water, ammunition, and other critical supplies
and equipment. Move them below ground under cover.
· Separate flammable material and keep it away from shelters
for soldiers.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

· Conduct rapid, but thorough, PMCS of radiac equipment,


then begin continuous monitoring. Identify leaders to count
flash-to-bang time.
· Use sandbags to increase shielding of vehicles and reinforced
masonry building floors, ceilings, and windows. Wet sandbags
reduce the effects of neutron radiation.
· Do not don IPE/MOPP gear. Use goggles, handkerchiefs or
surgical masks to protect eyes, nose, and mouth from fallout.
If you don’t have these, wear the protective mask.
· Follow this bottom-line guideline for a nuclear strike: If you
cannot relocate to gain distance between your vehicle/unit
and the burst effects, take immediate action to relocate below
ground, ensuring you have overhead cover.

ACTIONS DURING A NUCLEAR ATTACK (WITHOUT


ADVANCE STRIKEWARN)
C-190. The following actions apply when the unit fails to receive a
STRIKWARN report of an impending nuclear attack:

· If in the open, take the following actions:


n Keep your eyes tightly closed and hit the ground face
down. NEVER RUN FOR COVER OR ATTEMPT TO
FACE AWAY FROM THE BLAST.
n Start counting flash-to-bang time.
n While still laying down, secure your Kevlar helmet and
cover exposed skin.
n Secure your weapon under your body.
n When winds from the blast arrive, try to orient your body
slowly to face the blast, making yourself more
aerodynamic and less susceptible to flying objects.
n Keep your eyes closed until you no longer feel forced to do
so. Squint before totally opening your eyes.

· If in an armored vehicle, take the following actions:


n Do not peer through driver or optical devices. Keep your
eyes tightly closed, and start counting flash-to-bang time.
n Feel and reach to find open hatch doors, and if necessary,
close them.
n Close the weapons breach, and traverse gun tube(s) away
from the direction of the blast or high winds.
n Attempt to turn the vehicle and orient the front to face
the blast. Then quickly turn off electronic equipment and
the vehicle engine.
n Keep your eyes closed until you no longer feel forced to do
so. Squint before totally opening your eyes.

C-52
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

ACTIONS AFTER A NUCLEAR ATTACK


C-191. The following actions apply once the nuclear attack has
concluded:

· Wait for both shock waves to pass and debris to stop falling.
· Record the flash-to-bang time.
· Cover your mouth with a handkerchief, and wear goggles to
protect your eyes from fallout contamination. If you do not
have these items, put on the protective mask. Take these
precautions quickly before fallout arrives.
· Seek shelter from fallout.
· If fallout arrives while you are exposed, routinely shake the
handkerchief or the mask filter element to remove dust
particles and to prevent accumulation of contamination.
· Treat casualties. Refer to the discussion later in this appendix
for information on treatment of casualties from nuclear
detonations.
· Reconnect the FBCB2, radios, and antennas, and attempt to
reestablish communications.
· Prepare and submit an NBC-1 nuclear report. Make sure it
has “flash” precedence if it is the first reported attack in
theater.
· Begin monitoring for radiation. Report the arrival of fallout
using an NBC-4 report when the radiation level reaches 1
cGy/hr.
· Never relocate your vehicle or unit based on a fallout
prediction (NBC-3 report).
· Reorganize, consolidate, and continue your mission.
· Conduct PMCS on tactical dosimeters.
· Consider previous exposure (total dose) and report new
exposure in accordance with the OPORD or unit SOP.
· Regardless of the applicable exposure criteria, never move
until the crossing risk is known and NBC personnel have
developed evacuation procedures.
· Improve shelter and shielding.

BIOLOGICAL HAZARDS AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES

US POLICY STATEMENT
The United States will not use biological weapons
under any circumstances.

C-192. Biological attacks against US forces are more likely on the


modern battlefield than in the past. In 1998, Defense Secretary William
Cohen cited “the danger of biological and chemical weapons as the chief
threat to US security today.”

C-53
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

C-193. Biological agents are often referred to as the “poor man’s weapon”
because they are easy and cheap to produce and dispense. In addition,
biological attacks are hard to disseminate, detect, and identify. Small,
even tiny, doses of biological agents can infect thousands of personnel.
Counteracting these agents may require extensive use of quarantine.

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CONSIDERATIONS


C-194. Biological warfare is defined as the employment of living
organisms, toxic biological products, and biological plant growth
regulators to injure, incapacitate, or kill. Biological agents are generally
created to target the respiratory system, skin, or digestive tract. The
capability to directly enter the bloodstream and body tissue maximizes
their effectiveness.

Types of Agents
C-195. Biological agents are divided into the following categories:
· Pathogens. These are disease-causing substances. There are
over 150 known infectious diseases; they are either contagious
or noncommunicable.
· Toxins. These are poisonous chemicals derived from
biological sources. Toxins can be natural or synthetic.

NOTE: Both types of biological agents are derived from a range of sources, including
animals, plants (including fungi), and microorganisms (bacteria, viruses,
rickettsiae, protozoa).

Dissemination and Delivery of Biological Hazards


C-196. Numerous crude, low-tech methods (dry powders, droplets) exist
to disseminate biological agents. For example, water and food supplies
can be contaminated by human means. In general, however, there are
two primary methods for disseminating biological agents:

· Aerosol attacks. There are numerous devices and media


capable of disseminating agents in quasigaseous form,
including aircraft spray tanks, boat- or truck-mounted aerosol
generators, and explosive bomblets in air- or ground-burst
munitions.
· Vectors. These are carriers that spread disease. Examples
include infected insects or rodents that bite humans or
parasites that invade the human body through exposed
scratches or cuts in the skin.

Criteria (Signs, Symptoms, and Effects) of a Biological Attack


C-197. Observable criteria for a biological warfare incident include the
following:

· Large numbers of sick or dead animals.


· Sudden appearance of a large number of strange insects or
ticks.

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_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

· Epidemic number of casualties occurring within a short time


of each other (mostly within 24 hours, although the time
frame may range up to three days).
· Generalized outbreaks of diseases, or increased outbreaks of a
particular disease not normally encountered in a particular
region or country.
· High number of respiratory aliments reported.

ACTIONS BEFORE A BIOLOGICAL ATTACK


C-198. The effects of biological agents are extremely unpredictable.
Vulnerability reduction methods include the following:

· Identify regional biological hazards and threat biological


threats.
· Complete immunizations.
· Maintain a high order of health, personal hygiene, and
sanitation discipline.
· Limit exposure to hazards. Develop methods to reduce dirt
and dust collection in vehicles and closed quarters. Wear a
handkerchief, scarf, surgical mask and goggles, or protective
mask (when necessary).
· Never occupy buildings with animal or rodent droppings and
urine. Structures must be washed down with chlorine bleach
or detergent to kill germs. NEVER sweep with a straw or
push broom before decontamination is completed.
· Rehearse medical treatment plans and NBCWRS procedures.
· Button clothing and cover skin to avoid unnecessary exposure
to insects.
· Eat only food from sealed containers or with protective
wrappers.
· Drink only purified potable water that has been boiled for at
least 15 minutes.
· Conduct PMCS on NBC defense sensors, detectors, and kits.
· Periodically monitor for suspected hazards.

ACTIONS DURING A SUSPECTED BIOLOGICAL ATTACK


C-199. The following actions apply when commanders or leaders suspect
a biological attack is under way:

· Stay alert to suspicious activity.


· When signs, symptoms, and effects are recognized, STOP
BREATHING and quickly don protective gear. This includes
handkerchief, scarf, surgical mask and goggles, or protective
mask (when necessary).
· Sound visual, vocal, or mechanical alarms to warn others.
· Inspect detectors and sensors.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

· Ready treatment and decontamination equipment, and be


prepared to request for external assistance.
· Dismounted personnel go to MOPP 4.

ACTIONS AFTER A SUSPECTED BIOLOGICAL ATTACK


C-200. Once the suspected attack has concluded, the unit takes the
following steps:

· Submit an NBC-1 report using the FBCB2. Indicate


symptoms or signs you observe.
· Begin continuous monitoring using existing NBC defense
sensors, detection materials, and kits. If you do not have these
items, request assistance from higher headquarters.
· Report and seek treatment for illness, scratches, or cuts
promptly. Refer to the discussion later in this appendix
covering treatment of casualties resulting from biological
agents.

CHEMICAL HAZARDS AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES

US POLICY STATEMENT
The United States will never use chemical weapons.

C-201. Chemical warfare is widely regarded as brutal and barbaric.


Nonetheless, the worldwide availability of advanced military and
commercial technologies permits adversaries to develop and employ
chemical weapons. This leaves open the potential for use of chemical
weapons in a wide range of actions: terrorism during peacetime, limited
use during urban operation, even large-scale employment during conflict
or war.

CLASSIFICATION OF CHEMICAL AGENTS


C-202. Chemical agents are classified according to their effect on the
body. There are six major types: nerve, blood, blister, choking, irritants,
and vomiting. The terms persistent (P) and nonpersistent (NP) describe
chemical agent duration.
C-203. The threat employs nonpersistent agents over areas that it
believes friendly forces will use for crossing or occupation. These agents
provide the threat with flexibility to use the terrain because it knows the
duration of the chemical effects. On the other hand, nonpersistent agents
may force friendly soldiers into protective posture for long periods, thus
degrading combat effectiveness.
C-204. Persistent agents are employed to produce casualties, deny
terrain use, force opposing soldiers into protective posture for extended
periods, degrade combat effectiveness, force decontamination operations,
disrupt LOGPACs, and deny entry points.

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_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

ACTIONS BEFORE A CHEMICAL ATTACK


C-205. Friendly forces can use the following actions to limit vulnerability
to the effects of chemical weapons:

· At a minimum, commanders and leaders should consider


using MOPP level 2 if soldiers must conduct operations in
anything other than overpressurized vehicles or shelters.
Soldiers should apply M9 detector paper to their chemical
protective overgarments. They attach one strip on the bicep of
the nonfiring arm, one on the forearm of the firing arm, one
on the calf of the nonfiring side, and one on the ankle of the
firing side.
· Prepare to initiate entry and exit procedures for personnel in
vehicles and shelters.
· Alert adjacent friendly forces, especially analog (nondigital)
units.
· If a vehicle or shelter is unavailable, the next best solution is
some type of overhead cover.
· Heavy canvas, plastic bags, or chemical resistant covers are
required for combat gear, ammunition, supplies or equipment
stored on the outside of vehicles.
· Ensure that vehicle decontamination materials are
serviceable and adequate.
· Secure water and other valuable commodities inside the
vehicle or structure.
· Conduct PMCS NBC sensors and alarms and test them for
accuracy.
· Position M9 detector paper so that protruding tabs are visible
to personnel inside vehicles or shelters through windows,
firing port glass windows, and driver and TC stations.
· Inspect for adequate supplies of antidotes, such as the Mark 1
NAAK and the convulsant antidote for nerve agents (CANA).
· Rehearse self-aid, buddy-aid, and medical evacuation
procedures.

ACTIONS DURING A CHEMICAL ATTACK


C-206. Whether they are mounted or dismounted, reconnaissance
platoon soldiers must be prepared to react promptly to protect themselves
and warn others of the dangers.

Dismounted Actions
C-207. The following steps apply for dismounted leaders, soldiers, and
elements:

· Stop breathing; close eyes and mouth; and don, clear, and seal
the protective mask.
· Give visual and vocal alarms.
· Upgrade to MOPP level 4.

C-57
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

· Perform immediate decontamination as required using the


M291 decontamination kit.
· Seek shelter.
· Prepare and submit NBC-1 reports and/or SPOTREPs as
necessary using the most expedient means available.

Mounted Actions
C-208. The following steps apply for mounted leaders, soldiers, and
elements:

· Stop breathing; close eyes and mouth; and don, clear, and seal
the protective mask.
· Close vehicle hatches, and activate the overpressurization
system (if applicable).

CAUTION
In an overpressurized vehicle, DO NOT unmask until
sensors and alarms are reset; use the ICAM to confirm “all
clear” conditions and to verify the reliability of vehicle sensors
and alarms. If the vehicle interior is exposed to a chemical
hazard, assume MOPP 4 regardless of the availability of
overpressurization.

· Wake sleeping personnel.


· Observe crewmembers for symptoms of chemical poisoning.

ACTIONS AFTER A CHEMICAL ATTACK


C-209. The following actions and procedures apply after the commander
or leader determines that the chemical attack has concluded:

· Conduct self-aid and buddy-aid and administer antidotes as


required. A discussion later in this appendix covers treatment
information for casualties of a chemical attack.
· If the tactical situation permits, provide responsible and
disciplined digital warning (NBC-1 or SPOTREP) via
SINCGARS and/or FBCB2 to friendly forces in the attack
area and to elements potentially downwind of the hazard.
(NOTE: Avoid sending poorly worded or overdramatic
warnings that might prompt elements that are not in the
attack area or downwind to assume an inappropriate MOPP
level. The result could be degradation of their combat
effectiveness.)
· Activate or reset detectors and sensors.
· Gather information on the attack, including means of
delivery, number of munitions, and direction of attack; note
the DTG for the start and end of the attack. Prepare and
submit an NBC-1 follow-up report.

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_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

· If the tactical situation permits, perform operator spraydown


with available decontamination supplies and equipment.
· When the tactical situation permits, coordinate for thorough
decontamination.
· Conduct MOPP gear exchange as necessary to avoid hazards
that may result from exceeding the “wear-out” or maximum
usage time for overgarments. See Figure C-43.

Figure C-43. MOPP Gear Exchange

SECTION VI – DECONTAMINATION AND FIRST AID

C-210. Sustaining the force includes decontamination, medical


intervention, and unmasking. These operations, coupled with effective
leadership, facilitate the rapid return of reconnaissance platoon personnel
to a near-normal operating capability after an NBC attack.

LEADERSHIP CONSIDERATIONS
C-211. When confronted with an NBC situation, reconnaissance platoon
leaders face major decisions. It is impossible to predict when or where
nuclear, biological, chemical, or other toxic hazards will occur; to the
contrary, leaders must face the reality that many potential enemies have
NBC capability and may use it at virtually any moment. In the face of
such demands, the ability to exercise steadfast, determined, and proactive
leadership can make an incalculable difference. At the bottom line, every
reconnaissance platoon leader must have confidence in his soldiers, his
equipment, and his own ability to lead.
C-212. The maxim “know your soldiers” has always summarized a key
component of successful leadership. Under NBC conditions, this quality

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

becomes even more important in the reconnaissance platoon. Some


soldiers, for example, have difficulty operating in chemical protective
overgarments and NBC gear. A leader who knows his soldiers can
develop realistic NBC training situations that provide an indication of
performance in combat. This will allow him to anticipate behaviors and
responses to battlefield stress. He can then direct subordinate leaders and
medical personnel to closely monitor the soldiers identified as having
potential problems and to assist them as necessary.
C-213. Reconnaissance platoon leaders must also consider the impact of
NBC defense operations on logistics, mission continuation, and mission
success. In most cases, the platoon will operate well forward of CS and
CSS functions. Based on METT-TC, a clear understanding of the NBC
threat is the leader’s first step in determining what will be needed; how
long protective equipment, gear, and supplies will last; when to expect
resupply; and whether the platoon’s on-hand quantities of NBC defense
supplies and equipment will be sufficient until decontamination functions
can take place. Troop/company, squadron/battalion, and brigade chemical
personnel provide expert advice to assist leaders at each level in
developing plans and actions to meet the challenges of operating in a
toxic and hazardous environment.

DECONTAMINATION OPERATIONS
C-214. Decontamination is the removal, destruction, or neutralization of
contamination. Its purposes are to reduce the impact of an NBC attack,
prevent erosion of platoon combat power, and reduce casualties.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
C-215. The reconnaissance platoon leader must take into account several
important factors in planning, preparing, and conducting
decontamination operations.

Principles of Decontamination
C-216. There are four principles of decontamination:
· Conduct decontamination as soon as possible.
· Decontaminate whatever is necessary.
· Conduct decontamination as far forward as possible.
· Conduct decontamination by priority.

Planning Factors
C-217. Before decontamination occurs, the platoon leader must consider
a variety of conditions that will affect the operation, including the
following:

· The toxicity/lethality of the NBC agents involved.


· Actual and anticipated performance degradation.
· Equipment and personnel limitations.
· Actual and potential transfer and spread of contamination.

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_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

LEVELS OF DECONTAMINATION
C-218. The three levels of decontamination are immediate, operational,
and thorough. Battlefield elements, including the reconnaissance platoon,
conduct immediate decontamination virtually automatically and
instantaneously whenever they encounter NBC conditions. Operational
level decontamination is accomplished with organic assets located at the
squadron/battalion. Thorough and fixed site decontamination will require
augmentation by a chemical decontamination platoon, host nation
emergency response assets, or other service, coalition, or NATO unit. The
platoon may have to provide augmentation support at operational and
thorough decontamination sites.

Immediate Decontamination
C-219. Units and soldiers conduct immediate decontamination as
necessary using supplies and equipment they have on hand. This
discussion focuses on the elements of immediate decontamination: skin
decontamination, personal equipment wipedown, operator’s vehicle
spraydown (when applicable), and removal of biological and radiological
agents (when applicable).
C-220. Skin Decontamination. This is a basic soldier survival skill
that is conducted as an immediate action drill. Some chemical agents can
kill if they remain on the skin for longer than a minute, making removal
or neutralization of the agent a must for survival. This can be done with
the new M291 skin decontamination kit, shown in Figure C-44. Leaders
must ensure that their soldiers are trained to execute skin
decontamination automatically and without orders. Soldiers who have
conducted skin decontamination should be observed for symptoms.
C-221. Each soldier is issued two M291 kits. One is carried in the mask
carrier, the other in the right cargo pocket of the BDU/BDO trousers or
according to unit SOP. Each kit contains six individual decontamination
packets. Units maintain at least one M291 kit per soldier for resupply.

Figure C-44. M291 Skin Decontamination Kit

C-222. Personal Equipment Wipedown. Reconnaissance platoon


soldiers must devote care and consideration to personal gear, supplies,
and equipment that have been exposed to NBC hazards. These items are
often stored on the outside of vehicles, where they are threatened by

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

whatever environment exists. Once a soldier recognizes or suspects the


presence of contamination, he conducts immediate decontamination to
neutralize harmful agents. Prompt action may prevent unnecessary
destruction or disposal of critical supplies and equipment that cannot
later be rendered safe for continued use.
C-223. The M295 individual equipment decontamination kit (IEDK),
illustrated in Figure C-45, removes or neutralizes contamination on the
soldier’s hood, mask, gloves, and personal weapon. One M295 IEDK is
issued to each soldier in the platoon; it is stored in the right cargo
BDU/BDO pocket or according to unit SOP. Units maintain at least one
IEDK per soldier for resupply.

Figure C-45. M295 Individual Equipment


Decontamination Kit

C-224. As noted, soldiers use the M295 kit to wipe down their masks,
hood, gloves, and other essential gear. If the chemical agent is thickened
or present in large globules on the BDO or CPOG, however, they must
scrape it off with a stick or other object. They should not attempt to
decontaminate the agent on the BDO/CPOG. Chemical agents are easily
absorbed in the stocks and handgrips of weapons and may present a
vapor hazard. For biological agents, plain soap and water will remove the
contamination. Radiological contamination dust can be brushed, washed,
or shaken off equipment.
C-225. Operator’s Spraydown/Wipedown. The platoon conducts
operator’s spraydown/wipedown to remove or neutralize chemical agents
on frequently touched or occupied equipment surfaces and to prevent
contamination spread. The process is most effective when accomplished
within 15 minutes of contamination. It is done using the M13
decontamination apparatus, portable (DAP) and DS2 decontamination
solution, the ABC-M11 DAP and DS2, or the M100 sorbent
decontamination system (SDS).
C-226. M13 DAP. The man-portable M13 consists of a vehicle mounting
bracket, a prefilled fluid container containing 14 liters of DS2, and a
brush-tipped pumping handle connected to the fluid container by a hose.
The fluid container and brush head are both disposable. The M13 can
decontaminate 1,200 square feet per fluid container. The combination of

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_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

spray pump and brush allows personnel to decontaminate hard-to-reach


surfaces and remove thickened chemical agent residue, as well as mud,
grease, and other material. The primary users include US Army, Marine,
and Air Force units. (See Figure C-46.)
C-227. Before departing for the linkup point at the decontamination site,
the vehicle crew sprays DS2 onto all contaminated surfaces and scrubs
the DS2 into the surfaces, allowing 30 minutes for contact time.
Decontamination crews will wash the surfaces to remove excess DS2.

Figure C-46. M13 Decontamination Apparatus, Portable

C-228. ABC-M11 DAP. The ABC-M11 decontaminates small areas, such


as steering wheels or other equipment operating areas with which
personnel may come into contact. It is a steel container with an
aluminum spray-head assembly and a nitrogen gas cylinder that provides
the pressure. It is filled with 1-1/3 quarts of DS2, which is sufficient for
decontaminating 135 square feet. The effective spray range is 6 to 8 feet.
Refer to the previous discussion of the M13 DAP for guidelines on
application of the DS2. (See Figure C-47.)

Figure C-47. ABC-M11 Decontamination


Apparatus, Portable

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

C-229. M100 SDS. The M-100 is intended to replace the M11 and M13
units currently employed in operator’s spraydown operations associated
with immediate decontamination. (NOTE: It is not approved for skin
decontamination.) The system uses powdered sorbent to remove chemical
agent residue from surfaces. The reactive sorbent is nontoxic and
noncorrosive and requires no water. The SDS is designed to operate at
temperatures between –25 and 120 ° F. (See Figure C-48.)

Figure C-48. M100 Sorbent Decontamination System

C-230. Biological Agents. A bleach solution is the preferred means for


neutralizing and removing biological agents; if it is not available, hot,
soapy water will suffice. The crew applies the solution or water with
brushes, scrubs all surfaces well, and rinses. The 30-minute wait is not
required for biological agents.
C-231. Radiological Agents. Radiological contamination can be
removed by brushing or scraping. Water is effective for flushing the
contamination, but runoff must be carefully controlled using a ditch or
sump setup. The vehicle crew must remember that the runoff is still
hazardous because contamination is not destroyed, only moved. If time
permits, brushing or removing an inch of topsoil from fighting positions
lowers the radiological contamination hazard.

Operational Decontamination
C-232. If immediate decontamination is insufficient to quickly return
platoon vehicles and personnel to action, the flow of battle may require
the unit to conduct operational level decontamination. Also known as
operational decontamination, this level of decontamination limits the
spread of contamination and allows temporary relief from MOPP 4
restrictions and limitations; in doing so, it helps to sustain the platoon’s
combat capability and increase its maneuverability. MOPP gear exchange
and vehicle washdown, covered later in this discussion, are the two most
common techniques of operational decontamination.
C-233. The reconnaissance platoon conducts operational level
decontamination, which is less resource-intensive than thorough
decontamination, either unsupported, using only squadron/battalion

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_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

assets, or with external support from the chemical platoon.


Decontamination usually takes place in the platoon’s area of operations.
The squadron/battalion augments the operational level decontamination
site with personnel to facilitate rapid turnaround of platoon combat
power. The platoon will run MOPP gear exchange using the buddy
system; it may have to provide soldiers to augment squadron/battalion
operational decontamination stations and to provide security.
C-234. Preparations. As they get ready for operational
decontamination, the troop/company and squadron/battalion battlestaffs
should have a clear understanding of the type of contamination, number
of vehicles and soldiers to be decontaminated, and the route “dirty” crews
will travel to the operational decontamination linkup point.
Squadron/battalion planners should ensure that all operational
decontamination sites have sufficient quantities of decontamination
solutions and water to complete the mission; they should also be prepared
to augment the site with medical personnel should an emergency occur.
Reconnaissance platoon leaders focus their planning on how to avoid the
spread of gross contamination on the battlefield.
C-235. Before departure for the operational decontamination linkup
point, platoon leaders must take extensive measures to prepare their
vehicles and crews for the decontamination operation. If MOPP gear
exchange is planned, the dirty platoon elements will arrange for adequate
quantities of replacement gear to facilitate overgarment exchange. They
will also make the necessary coordination for replacement of equipment
and supplies.
C-236. Vehicles without overpressure systems will dismount at least one
crewmember to conduct spraydown at least 20 minutes prior to arrival at
the operational decontamination linkup point. This allows for sufficient
contact time and increases the chances of neutralizing harmful agents.
Focus of the spraydown should be directed to areas with which crews
frequently come into contact (doors, hatches, crew compartments).

NOTE: To prevent crews from coming into contact with harmful and sometimes invisible
agents or vapors, the platoon leader must ensure that equipment, gear, rations, or
ammunition secured on the exterior of vehicles is decontaminated and checked with
monitors (ICAM, M8 paper) before being moved inside the vehicles.

C-237. MOPP Gear Exchange. As noted in the discussion of shielding


the force earlier in this appendix, this procedure entails soldiers
exchanging contaminated MOPP gear for new, uncontaminated gear at
squad level (see Figure C-49). MOPP gear exchange is conducted upwind
from the vehicle washdown site. The squadron/battalion provides
decontaminants and replacement overgarments. MOPP gear exchange
removes nearly all liquid and solid contamination from soldiers and their
individual equipment. Refer to FM 3-11.5 (FM 3-5) for detailed
procedures.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure C-49. MOPP Gear Exchange

C-238. Vehicle Washdown. This procedure, which limits contamination


spread and transfer, should be conducted between one to six hours after
contamination and as soon as possible after the operator’s spraydown
portion of immediate decontamination. Vehicle washdown uses hot, soapy
water to speed the weathering process. The squadron NBC
decontamination specialist operates power driven decontamination
equipment (PDDE) to conduct washdown. His primary tool is the M17
lightweight decontamination system.

NOTE: When the platoon has completed operational decontamination and soldiers face
little, if any, vapor hazard, they may use hazard-free areas to temporarily unmask
to eat, drink, and rest. Operational decontamination, however, does not guarantee
that conditions are safe enough to allow unmasking on or near equipment. Before
unmasking and lowering the MOPP level for temporary relief, the platoon must
conduct unmasking procedures using the CAM or M256-series chemical detector
kit. In addition, leaders must conduct continuous contamination checks and
monitoring to ensure that soldiers unmask in clean areas. Units must develop
effective SOPs and training for unmasking. Refer to the discussion of unmasking
procedures later in this section.

Thorough Decontamination
C-239. This is the most effective and resource-intensive level of
decontamination, requiring external support by platoon- or company-size
NBC elements. It takes place after combat operations, during
reconstitution, and after a passage of lines to restore combat power by
removing nearly all contamination from unit and individual equipment;
this allows soldiers to operate equipment safely for extended periods at
reduced MOPP levels.
C-240. Thorough decontamination techniques are detailed troop
decontamination (DTD) and detailed equipment decontamination (DED).
During DTD, soldiers remove contaminated MOPP gear, to include

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_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

protective masks. The decontamination unit can provide technical


assistance. DED procedures remove or neutralize contamination on
interior and exterior equipment surfaces. The decontamination unit
performs DED with some assistance from contaminated unit.
C-241. Before their units take part in thorough decontamination,
reconnaissance platoon leaders must accomplish several activities,
including the following:

· Segregate equipment according to priority or degree of


decontamination required.
· Prepare vehicles and crews for decontamination.
· Coordinate with the decontamination unit leader (platoon or
company).
· Prepare the platoon or individual soldiers as necessary to
support operation of the DTD site.

NBC FIRST AID


C-242. Nerve agent poisoning requires immediate first-aid treatment.
Soldiers are issued three Mark 1 NAAKs (see Figure C-50). The kit
consists of one small autoinjector containing atropine and a second
autoinjector containing pralidoxime chloride. The NAAK is stored in the
accessory storage pocket inside the mask carrier. The CANA, used when
nerve agent poisoning incapacitates a soldier, uses a disposable device to
provide intramuscular delivery of diazepam to the casualty (as shown in
Figure C-51). It is administered only through buddy-aid and in
conjunction with the NAAK.

Figure C-50. Mark 1 Nerve Agent Antidote Kit (NAAK)

Figure C-51. Convulsant Antidote for Nerve Agents (CANA)

UNMASKING PROCEDURES
C-243. Leaders should conduct unmasking procedures only after all
applicable NBC chemical agent detection procedures indicate that no

C-67
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

hazard is present. Once the environment in which soldiers will operate


(area, vehicle, or building/shelter) is determined to be free of
contamination, unmasking should be conducted as soon as possible to
reduce the MOPP level.

NOTE: Unmasking procedures for biological agents must be coordinated through the
troop/company headquarters.

C-244. Unmasking procedures are conducted either with the aid of NBC
detection equipment (such as an M256A1-series chemical detector kit, a
CAM, or an NBCRS vehicle) or without such equipment. The following
discussion describes the steps for both types of unmasking.

UNMASKING PROCEDURES USING DETECTION EQUIPMENT


C-245. This 15-minute procedure is conducted after all detection
equipment and liquid contamination checks are negative. At the same
time, however, leaders must remain on guard because current equipment
cannot detect all chemical agents. The senior leader takes the following
steps for this procedure:

· Select one or two soldiers and instruct them to disarm.


· Position the selected soldiers in a shady area; bright light will
constrict pupils, potentially giving false nerve agent
symptoms.
· Direct the soldiers to unmask for five minutes, then to reseal
and clear their masks.
· Observe the soldiers for chemical agent symptoms for 10
minutes.
· If no symptoms appear, give the all-clear signal.
· Continue to watch all soldiers for any delayed symptoms;
have immediate first-aid treatment available.

UNMASKING PROCEDURES WITHOUT DETECTION EQUIPMENT


C-246. If detection equipment is not available, unmasking procedures
will take about 25 minutes. Use M8 paper to check for liquid
contamination. Only then should the platoon leader or other senior leader
initiate unmasking procedures using the following steps:

· Select one or two soldiers and instruct them to disarm.


· Move the soldiers to a shady area; have immediate first-aid
treatment available.
· Direct the soldiers to take a deep breath and break their mask
seal for 15 seconds, keeping their eyes wide open. Then direct
them to clear and reseal the masks.
· Observe soldiers for chemical agent symptoms for 10 minutes.
· If no symptoms occur, direct the soldiers to unmask for five
minutes and then remask.
· Observe the soldiers for 10 minutes.
· If no symptoms appear, give all-clear signal.

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_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

· If symptoms appear, decide whether to move to a new area


and retest. If movement is not possible, however, conduct a
retest after one hour.
· Continue to observe all soldiers, especially those involved in
the unmasking procedure, for delayed symptoms.

MANAGING NBC CASUALTIES


C-247. Leaders must ensure that their soldiers can correctly identify and
treat NBC casualties. This discussion describes both how to recognize
NBC symptoms and how to provide first aid and treatment for victims.

NUCLEAR CASUALTIES
C-248. The majority of casualties from a nuclear detonation will be from
the blast damage, thermal radiation, or heat burns. These can be treated
by the reconnaissance platoon’s combat lifesavers. Medical personnel,
however, will usually be required to treat radiation victims. Nuclear
fallout creates dust similar to volcanic ash that can travel great distances.
It collects and creates many types of environmental hazards not related
to radiation; these hazards, such as limited visibility and slick roads, can
result in further casualties. The international symbol for nuclear hazards
is shown in Figure C-52.

Figure C-52. Symbol for


Nuclear Hazards

Symptoms
C-249. Refer to Figure C-53 for a list of conditions related to radiation
poisoning.

Nausea and vomiting Hair loss Bloody stool


Nose mouth, lung ulcers Vomiting blood Skin burns
Bruising, redness, blistering Diarrhea Weakness, fatigue
Exhaustion, fainting Dehydration Open skin sores
Inflammation Tenderness Swelling
Esophagus ulcers Gastrointestinal ulcers Rectal bleeding
Bleeding gums Bleeding of the mouth Nose bleeds

Figure C-53. Symptoms of Radiation Poisoning and Sickness

C-69
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

First aid
C-250. As noted, medical professionals should treat radiation
poisoning/sickness; however, reconnaissance platoon leaders and soldiers
(especially combat lifesavers) can perform the following first aid before
medical personnel arrive:

· Check the victim’s breathing and circulation.


· Remove contaminated clothing.
· Vigorously wash the victim’s body with soap and water
(handle affected areas gently). The goal is to remove dust that
is potentially radioactive. Prevent dust from coming in contact
with open wounds, eyes, nose, and mouth.
· Place the victim in a protective environment (such as MOPP
or an overpressurized vehicle).
· DO NOT apply ointments to burned areas.
· DO NOT remain in exposed clothing (change into clean,
serviceable MOPP gear, if necessary).

BIOLOGICAL CASUALTIES
C-251. In terms of military purposes, the most significant biological
agents are anthrax, Q fever, botulism, tularemia, and staphylococcal
enterotoxin B (SEB). Figure C-54 shows the symbol for biological hazards.

Figure C-54. Symbol for


Biological Hazards

Anthrax
C-252. Anthrax, an infectious disease caused by a bacterium, is not only
highly lethal, but also easy to produce and deliver. The reconnaissance
platoon should deploy only after all soldiers have been inoculated with
the anthrax vaccine as a preventive measure. Anthrax has three forms:
cutaneous (absorbed through the skin), inhalation, and digestive.
C-253. Symptoms. Inhalation anthrax, the deadliest and most militarily
significant form, produces symptoms in two stages:

· Stage one. These symptoms appear 24 to 48 hours after


exposure:
n Mild fever.
n Fatigue.
n Myalgia (muscle pain).

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_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

n Headache.
n Congestion.
n Dry cough.
· Stage two. These symptoms appear more than 24 to 48 hours
after exposure, followed in most cases by the death of the
victim:
n Severe shortness of breath.
n Cyanosis.
n Low or high body temperature.
n Profuse perspiration.
n Pleural effusion.
n Stupor.

C-254. Mortality. Without effective treatment (covered later in this


discussion), the mortality rate for persons exposed to anthrax is generally
80 to 90 percent.
C-255. Disinfection. The anthrax pathogen can be destroyed only
through steam sterilization or burning of contaminated materials.
C-256. Treatment. If nonvaccinated personnel are not treated
immediately after exposure and BEFORE the first symptoms occur, death
is virtually inevitable. Vaccinations taken prior to exposure, coupled with
antibiotic treatment, can decrease the mortality rate to less than 10
percent.

Q Fever
C-257. This is an incapacitating condition that is acquired through
inhalation.
C-258. Symptoms. Symptoms of Q fever exposure, which appear 10 to
20 days after inhalation, include the following:

· Fever.
· Chills.
· Headache.
· Fatigue.
· Muscle aches.
· Pneumonia (detected by chest x-rays).

C-259. Duration. Symptoms usually last from two days to two weeks.
C-260. Mortality. Fewer than 1 percent of Q fever victims die from its
effects.
C-261. Disinfection. Materials exposed to the Q fever pathogen can be
disinfected using a 0.05 percent bleach solution (1 tablespoon of bleach
per gallon of water).
C-262. Treatment. A 10-day course of antibiotics, administered
beginning 8 or more days after exposure, can prevent Q fever from

C-71
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

occurring. Antibiotics given in the first 8 days following exposure will


delay symptoms for three weeks.

Botulism
C-263. The toxin produced by the botulism bacterium is one of the most
toxic substances known. The likely method of dissemination would be as a
toxic cloud, but food and water supplies could be sabotaged as well.
C-264. Symptoms. Symptoms of botulism normally appear 24 to 36
hours after exposure. They include the following:

· Drooping eyelids.
· Dry mouth and throat.
· Difficulty in talking or swallowing.
· Blurred or double vision.
· Muscle weakness.
· Muscle paralysis.

C-265. Disinfection. Materials exposed to botulism can be disinfected


using a 0.05 percent bleach solution (1 tablespoon of bleach per gallon of
water).
C-266. Treatment. Antibiotics are ineffective against botulism. Use of
antitoxins and mechanical ventilation (breathing), however, can reduce
the mortality rate from around 60 percent to 5 percent.

Tularemia
C-267. The tularemia pathogen, a bacterium, is transmitted to humans
by animal contact, flea and tick bites, contaminated food and water, and
inhalation.
C-268. Symptoms. Symptoms of tularemia, which appear 2 to 10 days
after exposure, include the following:

· Fever.
· Dry cough.
· Pneumonia.
· Skin sores.
· Abdominal pains.
· Diarrhea.
· Chills.
· Chest discomfort.
· Weight loss.
· Swollen lymph nodes.
· Nausea and vomiting.

C-269. Disinfection. Materials exposed to tularemia can be disinfected


using a 0.05 percent bleach solution (1 tablespoon of bleach per gallon of
water).
C-270. Treatment. Antibiotics are effective against tularemia.

C-72
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

CHEMICAL CASUALTIES
C-271. As noted previously, chemical agents are classified as either
persistent or nonpersistent. This discussion covers the militarily
significant types: nerve, blood, and blister agents. Refer to Figure C-55,
which shows the symbol for chemical hazards.

Figure C-55. Symbol for


Chemical Hazards

Nerve Agents
C-272. These typically enter the body by skin absorption or inhalation.
They can be delivered by missile, rocket, artillery, mines, spray tanks, or
cruder, lower-tech dissemination methods.
C-273. Symptoms. Symptoms of nerve agent poisoning appear within
seconds of exposure. They include the following:

· Dizziness.
· Blurred vision and pinpoint pupils.
· Runny nose.
· Uncontrolled salivation.
· Difficult breathing.
· Tightness in the chest.
· Stomach cramps.
· Muscular twitching.

C-274. Treatment. The most common forms of treatment for nerve


agent victims are the Mark 1 NAAK and the CANA, which are covered in
the discussion of NBC first aid earlier in this section.

Blood Agents
C-275. These agents, which emit a smell of like bitter almonds, enter the
body by skin absorption or inhalation. Blood agents attack the way the
body transfers oxygen in the blood stream. Death can occur within
minutes within minutes of exposure. Delivery methods include missiles,
rockets, artillery, mines, spray tanks, and crude, low-tech dissemination
systems. Blood agents evaporate quickly.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

C-276. Symptoms. Symptoms of blood agent poisoning appear within


seconds of exposure. They include the following:

· Dizziness.
· Blurred vision and dilated pupils.
· Runny nose.
· Chills.
· Slowed breathing.
· Pink fingernails, lips, and skin.
· Nausea.
· Vomiting.

C-277. Treatment. THERE IS NO ANTIDOTE FOR BLOOD


AGENTS. Soldiers exposed to them must immediately put on (or be
helped into) MOPP 4 gear and move into a clean environment. They must
receive medical attention and/or be evacuated as quickly as possible.

Blister Agents
C-278. These enter the body by absorption and inhalation. Their odor can
vary from garlic to freshly mown hay to a fruity smell. The inventory
includes persistent, nonpersistent, and semipersistent blister agents,
which can be delivered by missiles, rockets, artillery, and mines.
C-279. Symptoms. Timing for the appearance of blister agent symptoms
is highly variable, from almost immediate to a delay of four to six hours.
Symptoms include the following:

· Headache and dizziness.


· Intense pain.
· Runny nose.
· Difficult breathing.
· Eye and nose irritation.
· Skin, nose, and throat irritation, including reddening of the
skin and blister formation.
· Nausea.
· Vomiting.
· Sever diarrhea.

C-280. Treatment. If a blister agent comes in contact with skin or eyes,


remove it immediately. To remove an agent from the eyes, flush
repeatedly with plain water. Decontaminate the skin using the
M258A1/M291 kit. If severe blisters form, seek medical attention as soon
as possible.

C-74
Appendix D

Stability Operations and Support Operations


Each type of reconnais-
sance platoon, especially CONTENTS
the recce platoon, has Introduction ........................................................... D-1
General Considerations ........................................ D-2
unique capabilities that
The Range of Military Operations ................. D-2
make it an important Activities in Stability Operations and
asset to Army units Support Operations .................................... D-4
executing missions as Planning and Operational Considerations ... D-4
part of stability Stability Operations ............................................... D-11
Characteristics of Stability Operations ........ D-11
operations and support
The Army’s Role in Stability Operations ...... D-12
operations. The platoon Types of Stability Operations ........................ D-13
may be called upon to Considerations for Stability Operations ....... D-16
perform a variety of Support Operations ............................................... D-17
missions in a wide range Characteristics of Support Operations ........ D-17
The Army’s Role in Support Operations ...... D-17
of political, military, and
Categories of Support Operations ................ D-18
geographical environ- Types of Support Operations ........................ D-18
ments and in both combat Considerations for Support Operations ....... D-21
and noncombat situations Role of the Reconnaissance Platoon in Stability
(see Table D-1). These Operations and Support Operations ..... D-22
Platoon Employment Considerations ........... D-22
operations will almost
Specific Platoon Tasks .................................. D-23
always be decentralized Roadblocks ..................................................... D-23
and can require the Checkpoints .................................................... D-25
platoon leader to make Searches of Personnel and Vehicles ........... D-32
immediate decisions that Cordon and Search Operations .................... D-39
Light/Medium Operations in Stability and
may have strategic or
Support Environments ........................... D-41
operational consequences. Role of the Reconnaissance Platoon ........... D-41
The distinction between The Threat ....................................................... D-41
these roles and situations Capabilities and Limitations of the
will not always be clear, Reconnaissance Platoon ........................... D-42
Light/Medium Urban Operations ................... D-42
presenting unique chal-
lenges for the platoon, its
leaders, and its soldiers.

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

NOTE: US Army policy normally does not allow a unit to modify its warfighting METL
unless and until the unit is selected for stability operations and support operations.
Only then should a unit train for specific mission-related tasks. Chief among these
are operations with very restrictive ROE/ROI and orientation on the area, its
culture, and the nature of the conflict.

D-1. Stability operations apply military power to influence the political


environment, to facilitate diplomacy, or to interrupt or prevent specific
illegal activities. These operations cover a broad spectrum. At one end are

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

development and assistance activities aimed at enhancing a government’s


willingness and ability to care for its people. At the other are coercive
military actions; these involve the application of limited, carefully
prescribed force, or the threat of force, to achieve specific objectives.
D-2. US military forces conduct support operations to assist designated
groups by providing essential supplies and services in the face of adverse
conditions, usually those created by man-made or natural disasters.
Mission success in support operations, which are normally characterized
by the lack of an active opponent, is measured in terms of the ability to
relieve suffering and to help civil authorities respond to crises. Primary
goals of these operations are to meet the immediate needs of the
supported groups and to transfer responsibility quickly and efficiently to
appropriate civilian authorities.
D-3. The general considerations discussion of this appendix focuses on
several important aspects of stability operations and support operations.
Later segments examine stability operations and support operations,
respectively, in greater detail, followed by discussions of tasks specific to
the reconnaissance platoon and of the role of light/heavy operations in
stability and support environments. Refer to Chapter 6 of this manual for
a discussion of urban operations, which provide the operational
framework for many types of stability operations and support operations.

SECTION II – GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

D-4. Stability operations and support operations entail the adaptation


of capabilities developed for warfighting to the political and military
environments of peace and conflict. The warfighting doctrine described in
this manual is used, with suitable modification, to accommodate such
situations.

THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS


D-5. Stability operations and support operations that take place in the
peacetime and conflict environments may entail the full range of military
operations (refer to Table D-1). These operations may also require
working closely with other state and/or federal agencies, civilian agencies,
and host-nation governments if the operation is outside the United
States.

PEACETIME
D-6. In peacetime, a variety of measures are employed to achieve
national objectives; these include political, economic, and informational
measures, as well as military actions short of combat operations or active
support of warring parties. Within this environment, US forces may
conduct training exercises to demonstrate national resolve; conduct
peacekeeping operations; participate in nation-building activities; conduct
disaster relief and humanitarian assistance; provide security assistance
to friends and allies; or execute shows of force. Confrontations and
tensions may escalate during peacetime to reach a point of transition into
a state of conflict.

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__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations

Table D-1. The Range of Military Operations

STATES OF THE
MILITARY RECENT
OPERATIONAL GOALS MISSIONS
OPERATIONS OPERATIONS
ENVIRONMENT

· Large-scale combat
WAR Fight and win WAR operations DESERT
· Attack STORM
· Defend

· Strikes and raids


CONFLICT Deter war and STABILITY AND · Peacekeeping or peace RESTORE
resolve conflict SUPPORT enforcement HOPE
· Support to insurgency
· Antiterrorism
· NEOs

· Counterdrug operations
PEACETIME Promote peace STABILITY AND · Disaster relief HURRICANE
SUPPORT · Civil support ANDREW
· Peace-building RELIEF
· Nation-building
assistance

CONFLICT
D-7. Conflict can encompass numerous types of situations, including
the following:

· Clashes or crises over boundary disputes and land and water


territorial claims.
· Situations in which opposing political factions engage in
military actions to gain control of political leadership within a
nation.
· Armed clashes between nations or between organized parties
within a nation to achieve limited political or military
objectives.

D-8. While regular military forces are sometimes involved, the use of
irregular forces frequently predominates in conflict actions. Conflict is
often protracted, confined to a restricted geographic area, and limited in
weaponry and level of violence. In this state, military response to a threat
is exercised indirectly, usually in support of other elements of national
power. Limited objectives, however, may be achieved by the short,
focused, and direct application of military force. Conflict approaches the
threshold of a state of war as the number of nations and/or troops, the
frequency of battles, and the level of violence increase over an extended
time.

IMPACT ON THE RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON


D-9. Stability operations and support operations involving the
reconnaissance platoon will occur most often in the state of peacetime.
The platoon can assist in a variety of activities during these operations,
such as populace and movement control (checkpoints and roadblocks), the

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

handling of EPWs or refugees, or EPW exchanges. Refer to the discussion


later in this appendix for specific examples of stability and support
situations in which the platoon may participate.

NOTE: Military operations involving reconnaissance platoons occur most often in the state
of conflict. These may include standard security and reconnaissance missions in
support of offensive and defensive operations. Refer to the appropriate portions of
this manual for information on these operations.

ACTIVITIES IN STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT


OPERATIONS
D-10. As outlined in FM 100-5, the Army’s missions in stability
operations and support operations are categorized into several types of
activities. Examples of these missions are listed in Figure D-1; for
additional details, refer to the discussions of stability operations and
support operations later in this appendix.
D-11. Although the activities of stability operations and support
operations have distinct characteristics, they often overlap in execution.
For example, forces involved in a peacekeeping operation must protect
themselves and the local populace against terrorism; conversely, a
terrorist incident may result in the execution of a specific operation to
combat terrorism.

Figure D-1. Military Activities in Stability Operations


and Support Operations

PLANNING AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS


D-12. Although stability operations and support operations can take
place in any part of the world, they are most likely to occur in third world
countries, where social, political, economic, and psychological factors
contribute to political instability. Each country or region is unique, with
its own history, culture, goals, and problems. US forces deployed to these
areas can be subject to rapid and dramatic changes in situations and
missions. The reconnaissance platoon leader must understand this
environment; he must plan for rapid changes in the situation or mission
and constantly be prepared to adapt to them. In addition, the platoon
must be prepared to operate in any type of terrain and climate.
D-13. The following paragraphs examine several important
considerations that will influence planning and preparation for stability
operations and support operations. For a detailed discussion of these
subjects, refer to FM 3-07.3 (FM 100-23).

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__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations

ENVIRONMENT

NOTE: The term “environment” in the following discussion is not equivalent to the states of
the operational environment (peace, conflict, war) examined earlier in this
appendix. As an operational consideration, the environment refers to the cultural,
political, and military context in which stability operations and support operations
take place, as well as to terrain and weather in the area of operations.

D-14. Stability operations and support operations can take place in any
part of the world. To deal effectively with the diverse situations they may
face, US forces must undergo orientation training on the complex
conditions and factors at work in a specific region. Each soldier must
understand the political and economic situation, as well as the cultures,
climates, and terrain of the region. He should understand the military
situation, especially the doctrine, tactics, and equipment that are
employed by belligerent, guerrilla, and terrorist forces. Orientation
training should also clarify the following environmental factors as well as
the planning and operational considerations covered in the remainder of
this discussion.

Tempo
D-15. Although extreme tension may underlie stability operations and
support operations, the tempo of these operations is generally slow.
Nonetheless, the speed of military action can vary widely, from fast,
violent tactical movement by a reaction force for the purpose of relieving
encircled friendly forces to the deliberate occupation of stationary
defensive positions to provide overwatch at traffic control points.
D-16. Throughout stability operations and support operations, the
threat can be expected to execute both overt and covert operations to test
friendly reaction times and security procedures. Units that are
predictable or that lack sound OPSEC leave themselves susceptible to
attack. For the reconnaissance platoon, the key to a secure environment
is not only to maintain the highest possible level of OPSEC, but also to
vary the techniques by which security procedures are executed.

Role of US Forces
D-17. All soldiers should be aware of the role US forces will play in the
overall mission. This is especially vital when Americans are part of a
combined force that requires constant interaction and coordination with
the soldiers of foreign nations. In all cases, the commander’s intent and
his projected end state should be simplified and presented in a way that
gives soldiers the guidance they need to accomplish the mission.

Peacekeeping versus Peace Enforcement


D-18. Training for stability operations and support operations should
also focus on the distinction between peacekeeping and peace
enforcement. Peacekeeping is a highly visible activity; force protection is
often more difficult. Peace enforcement operations are more likely to
involve the use of force, cover and concealment, and the tactical
considerations of OPSEC. Leaders at every level must understand the
role of U.S. forces based on the commander’s intent. If this role is not
clear, they must seek clarification.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

INTELLIGENCE
D-19. Intelligence is crucial during the execution of stability operations
and support operations. The threats faced by military forces in these
operations are more ambiguous than those in other situations because
combatants, guerrillas, and terrorists can easily blend with the civilian
population. Before forces are committed, intelligence must be collected,
processed, and focused to support all planning, training, and operational
requirements. (NOTE: For additional information, refer to FM 3-07 [FM
100-20].)

DECENTRALIZED OPERATIONS
D-20. Although stability operations and support operations are
normally centrally planned, execution often takes the form of small-scale,
decentralized actions conducted over extended distances. Responsibility
for making decisions on the ground will fall to junior leaders. Effective
command guidance and a thorough understanding of the applicable ROE
(refer to the following discussion) are critical at each operational level.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
D-21. ROE are politically imposed restrictions on military operations.
The ROE are directed by higher military authorities based on the political
and tactical situations and the level of threat. For example, these
restrictions may require that the forces involved limit their use of
firepower to a certain geographical area or that they limit the duration of
their operations. Refer to Figure D-2 for an example of ROE for one
possible situation.
D-22. ROE must be considered during the planning and execution of all
operations. The unit’s TTP will require adjustment based on each
particular situation’s ROE. Understanding, adjusting for, and properly
executing ROE are especially important to success in stability operations
and support operations. The restrictions change whenever the political
and military situations change; this means ROE must be explained to
friendly soldiers continuously.

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__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations

Figure D-2. Example Rules of Engagement

D-23. ROE provide the authority for the soldier’s right to self-defense.
Each soldier must understand the ROE and be prepared to
execute them properly in every possible confrontation. In addition,
ROE violations can have operational, strategic, and political
consequences that may affect national security; the threat can be
expected to exploit such violations.

RULES OF INTERACTION AND GRADUATED RESPONSE


D-24. ROI and graduated response embody the human dimension of
stability operations and support operations; they lay the foundation for
successful relationships with the myriad of factions and individuals that
play critical roles in these operations. ROI encompass an array of
interpersonal communication skills, such as persuasion and negotiation.
Graduated response deals with the process of applying greater levels of
force to a situation in response to the changes in that situation; refer to
Figure D-3 for an example of a graduated response card.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Graduated Response Card


Situation: Your unit is conducting an operation (i.e.. secure a
weapons storage facility). Signs have been posted that no crowds
are allowed near the facility. After a period of time, a crowd of
civilians begins to gather. You are given the order to disperse the
crowd as quickly and safely as possible. Use the following steps,
listed in ascending order of intensity, either independently or in
combination to disperse the crowd:

1. Employ linguists assigned to your unit to inform the crowd


that it must disperse.
2. Employ airborne speaker teams to transmit instructions to
the crowd to disperse.
3. Employ bullhorns to relay instructions to the crowd to
disperse.
4. Use loud noise speaker teams to assist in dispersing the
crowd.
5. Honk the horns of unit vehicles to disperse the crowd.
6. Emplace concertina wire to keep the crowd from gaining
access to the area.
7. Start the unit vehicles to show the crowd that you will move
on them if necessary.
8. Employ mechanized vehicles (RVs) as a show of force to the
crowd.
9. Take pictures or videotape of instigators in the crowd.
10. Employ military working dogs to disperse the crowd.
11. Fix bayonets.
12. Conduct procedures as prescribed in civil disturbance
drills.
13. Use pepper spray to disperse the crowd.
14. Show the crowd that you have CS gas canisters.
15. Employ CS gas to disperse the crowd.
16. Employ helicopter blade wash to disperse the crowd.
17. Fire rounds into the air.
18. Employ the use of deadly force.

Figure D-3. Example Graduated Response Card

D-25. These are tools the individual soldier will need to deal with the
nontraditional threats that are prevalent in stability operations and
support operations, including political friction, unfamiliar cultures, and
conflicting ideologies. In turn, ROI and graduated response enhance the
soldier’s survivability in such situations. They are based on the applicable
ROE for a particular operation; they must be tailored to the specific
regions, cultures, and/or populations affected by the operation. Like ROE,
ROI and graduated response can be effective only if they are thoroughly
rehearsed and understood by every soldier in the unit.

FORCE PROTECTION
D-26. Because of the influence of local politics and news media in
stability operations and support operations, precautions and operations

D-8
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations

required to minimize casualties and collateral damage become


particularly important operational considerations during these
operations. At the same time, however, force protection must be a
constant priority. Reconnaissance forces are commonly employed in a
force protection role.
D-27. In attempting to limit the level and scope of violence used in
stability operations and support operations, leaders must avoid making
tactically unsound decisions or exposing the force to unnecessary risks.
On the contrary, an overpowering use of force, correctly employed and
surgically applied, can reduce subsequent violence or prevent a response
from the opposing force. This must be covered in the ROE and the
OPORD from higher headquarters.
D-28. OPSEC, tempered by restrictions in the ROE and ROI, is an
important tool for the platoon leader in accomplishing his force protection
goals. Security procedures should encompass the full range of
antiterrorist activities for every soldier and leader. Examples include
proper RTP; strict noise, light, and litter discipline; proper wear of the
uniform; display of the proper demeanor for the situation; as well as
effective use of cover and concealment, obstacles, OPs and early warning
devices, the protection afforded by armor vehicles, and safe locations for
eating and resting.
D-29. A final consideration in force protection is hygiene. Many stability
operations and support operations take place in underdeveloped nations;
proper field sanitation and personal hygiene are mandatory if soldiers are
to stay healthy.

TASK ORGANIZATION
D-30. Because of the unique requirements of stability operations and
support operations, the reconnaissance platoon may be task organized to
operate with a variety of units. Examples may include an armor or
mechanized company team or a light infantry company or battalion.

CSS CONSIDERATIONS
D-31. The operational environment the reconnaissance platoon faces
during stability operations and support operations may be very austere,
creating special CSS considerations. These factors include, but are not
limited to, the following:

· Reliance on local procurement of certain items.


· Shortages of critical items, including repair parts, Class IV
supply materials, and lubricants.
· Special Class V supply requirements, such as pepper spray.
· Reliance on bottled water.

MEDIA CONSIDERATIONS
D-32. The presence of the media is a reality that confronts every soldier
involved in stability operations and support operations. All leaders and
soldiers are subject to instantaneous worldwide scrutiny as a result of the
growth of news coverage via international television and radio broadcasts
and the Internet. They must realize that operations that run counter to

D-9
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

official US policy may damage the nation’s interests and international


standing.
D-33. Reconnaissance platoon soldiers must learn how to deal
effectively with broadcast and print reporters and photographers.
Training should cover any information restrictions imposed on the media.
Soldiers must also gain an understanding of which subjects they are
authorized to discuss and which ones they must refer to higher
authorities, such as their chain of command or the public affairs office
(PAO). PAOs usually issue daily guidance dealing with these subjects.

OPERATIONS WITH OUTSIDE AGENCIES


D-34. US Army units may conduct certain stability operations and
support operations in coordination with a variety of outside
organizations. These include other US armed services or government
agencies as well as international organizations, including private
volunteer organizations (PVO), such as Doctors Without Borders; NGOs,
such as the Red Cross; and UN military forces or agencies.

SOLDIERS’ RESPONSIBILITIES
D-35. US soldiers may have extensive contact with host-nation civilians
during stability operations and support operations. As a result, their
personal conduct has a significant impact on the opinions, and thus the
support, of the local population. As noted, soldiers must understand that
misconduct by US forces (even those deployed for only a short time) can
damage rapport that took years to develop. US soldiers must treat local
civilians and military personnel as personal and professional equals,
affording them the appropriate customs and courtesies.
D-36. Every soldier must be updated continuously on changes to
operational considerations (such as environment, ROE/ROI, media, and
force protection). Such changes can have immediate impact on his
freedom to react to a given situation. Keeping the soldier informed of
changes enhances his situational awareness and his ability to adapt to
changing conditions. Leaders must disseminate this information quickly
and accurately.
D-37. Every individual is an intelligence-collecting instrument. The
collection of information is a continuous process, and all information must
be reported. Intelligence is provided by many sources, including friendly
forces, threat elements, and the local populace. From the friendly
standpoint, each soldier must be familiar with the local PIR and other
applicable intelligence requirements. At the same time, threat soldiers
will be continuously seeking intelligence on US actions, often blending
easily into the civilian population. US soldiers must be aware of this and
use OPSEC procedures at all times.
D-38. To emphasize soldier responsibilities, leaders conduct PCCs and
PCIs that focus on each soldier’s knowledge of the environment and
application of the ROE. These checks and inspections should also identify
possible OPSEC violations and deficiencies that could place the soldier
and his equipment at risk. Leaders should stress that terrorists and
thieves may attempt to infiltrate positions or mount vehicles either to
steal equipment and supplies or to cause harm to US forces or facilities.

D-10
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations

D-39. To enhance civilian cooperation and support, the reconnaissance


platoon leader is responsible for obtaining a key word and phrase card
from the S2 to assist in translation of key English phrases into the
language of the host nation. These phrases should apply specifically to
the area of operations.

SECTION III – STABILITY OPERATIONS

D-40. The overall purpose of stability operations is to promote and


sustain regional and global stability. At the same time, stability
operations are conducted outside the United States and US territories to
promote and protect US national interests by influencing political, civil,
and military environments and by disrupting specific illegal activities.
These goals are accomplished by supporting diplomatic initiatives, by
improving military-to-military relations, and by deterring or resolving
conflict.
D-41. Stability operations encompass a range of actions that shape the
strategic environment and respond to developing crises. The military
activities that support stability operations are diverse, continuous, and
often long-term in nature.
D-42. This section provides an introductory discussion of the activities
associated with stability operations; for detailed information, see FM 3-0
(FM 100-5) and FM 3-21.98 (FM 7-98).

CHARACTERISTICS OF STABILITY OPERATIONS


D-43. Stability operations are normally executed in the context of the
geographic combatant commander’s theater strategy. Commanders
employ military forces to complement and reinforce other elements of
national power as part of their theater engagement plan (TEP).

OPERATIONAL GOALS
D-44. Stability operations may include both developmental and coercive
actions. Developmental actions enhance a host-nation government’s
willingness and ability to care for its people. Coercive actions apply
carefully prescribed limited force or threat of force to change the
environment of the area of operations. Military forces conduct stability
operations to accomplish one or more of the following activities:

· Protect national interests (as defined by the National


Command Authority).
· Promote peace and/or deter aggression.
· Satisfy treaty obligations or enforce agreements and policies.
· Reassure allies, friendly governments, and agencies.
· Encourage a weak or faltering government.
· Maintain or restore order.
· Protect life and property.
· Demonstrate resolve.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

· Prevent, deter, or respond to terrorism.


· Reduce the threat of conventional arms and WMD to regional
security.
· Eliminate or contain subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

OPERATIONAL CATEGORIES
Peacetime Military Engagement
D-45. Peacetime military engagement (PME) activities are stability
operations designed to have a positive impact on the regional security
environment and preclude conflict. The objectives of peacetime military
engagements are to open communication, increase interoperability,
increase regional military professionalism, educate a host-nation’s forces
on the role of the military in a democracy, and increase regional stability.
Examples of PME activities include multinational training exercises,
individual training and observers, medical and engineer projects and
exercises, and staff information exchanges.

Rapid Response and Preclusion


D-46. Rapidly responding in the early stages of an imminent or on-going
crisis is a critical component of stability operations. For example, rapidly
responding to an SSC can defuse a crisis situation and restore regional
stability. The deployed force must be capable of conducting decisive
offensive and defensive operations to achieve successful preclusion.

Presence and Deterrence


D-47. Presence promotes a secure environment in which diplomatic and
economic programs designed to eliminate root causes of instability may
flourish. It can take the form of forward basing, forward deploying, or
pre-positioning assets in an area of operations.
D-48. Deterrence for both smaller regional conflicts and MTWs is the
sustainable presence of strong, capable ground forces. If deterrence fails,
or if required, military forces, including the reconnaissance platoon, must
be ready to transition to decisive combat operations. Effective deterrent
forces should ideally be capable of conducting decisive operations
immediately.

THE ARMY’S ROLE IN STABILITY OPERATIONS


D-49. Army forces are particularly well suited for stability operations
because they are trained, equipped, and organized to control land,
populations, and situations for extended periods of time. The depth and
breadth of Army force capabilities provide the commander with vital
options in meeting theater operational requirements. This routinely
includes conducting peace operations, military-to-military contacts,
humanitarian demining operations, and multinational training exercises
or exchanges.
D-50. Stability operations are inherently complex and place greater
demands at the small-unit level. Junior leaders are required to develop
engagement skills while maintaining warfighting skills. Capable, trained,
disciplined, high-quality leaders, soldiers, and teams are especially
critical to success. Soldiers and units at every level must be flexible and

D-12
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations

adaptive. Stability operations often require the mental and physical


agility to shift from noncombat to combat operations and back again.
D-51. Stability operations conducted by Army forces complement and
are complemented by offensive, defensive, and support operations. The
ability of Army forces to stabilize a crisis is directly related to their ability
to attack and defend. Offensive and defensive operations may be
necessary to defeat adversaries intent on preventing the success of a
stability operation. Shows of force often precede offensive and defensive
operations in attempts to deter aggression and provide opportunities for
diplomatic and economic solutions. During support operations in unstable
areas, stability operations can be conducted to help restore law and order.
D-52. Army forces may conduct stability operations before hostilities, in
crisis situations, during hostilities, and after hostilities. Before hostilities
begin, stability operations focus on deterring or preempting conflict. In a
crisis situation, they may resolve a potential conflict or prevent
escalation. During hostilities, stability operations can help keep armed
conflict from spreading and assist and encourage committed partners.
Following hostilities, they can provide a secure environment that allows
civil authorities to regain control.

TYPES OF STABILITY OPERATIONS


PEACE OPERATIONS
D-53. Peace operations encompass three general areas: diplomatic
activities (peacemaking and peace-building), traditional peacekeeping,
and threatened or actual forceful military actions (peace enforcement).
The reconnaissance platoon may participate in peacekeeping or peace
enforcement operations.

Peacekeeping Operations
D-54. A peacekeeping force facilitates truce negotiations and political
settlement of disputes. In doing so, it must assure each side in the dispute
that other parties are not taking advantage of settlement terms to their
own benefit. Peacekeeping differs from internal security in that the force
does not act in support of a government. Rather, the peacekeeping force
must remain entirely neutral; if it loses a reputation for impartiality, its
usefulness within the peacekeeping mission is destroyed.

Peace Enforcement
D-55. Several unique characteristics distinguish peace enforcement
activities from wartime operations and from other stability operations.
The purpose of peace enforcement is to maintain or restore peace under
conditions broadly defined at the international level. It may entail
combat, armed intervention, or physical threat of armed intervention.
Under provisions of an international agreement, the squadron/battalion
and its subordinate elements, including the reconnaissance platoon, may
be called upon to use coercive military power to compel compliance with
international sanctions or resolutions.

OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS


D-56. Forces may conduct operations in support of diplomatic efforts to
establish peace and order before, during, and after a conflict. These
operations include preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace

D-13
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

building. Military support of diplomatic activities improves the chances


for success by lending credibility to diplomatic actions and demonstrating
resolve to achieve viable political settlements.

Preventive Diplomacy
D-57. Preventive diplomacy is diplomatic action taken in advance of a
predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence. Army forces are not
normally directly involved in preventive diplomacy but may support a
state department effort by providing transportation and communications
assets. In some cases, military forces may conduct a preventive
deployment or show of force as part of the overall effort to deter conflict.

Peacemaking
D-58. Peacemaking is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation,
or other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges an end to a dispute
and resolves the issue that led to the conflict. It includes military actions
that support the diplomatic process. Army forces participate in these
operations primarily by performing military-to-military contacts,
exercises, peacetime deployments, and security assistance.

Peace Building
D-59. Peace building consists of post-conflict actions, predominantly
diplomatic and economic in nature, that strengthen and rebuild
governmental infrastructure and institutions to avoid a relapse into
conflict. Military actions that support peace building are designed to
identify, restore, and support structures that strengthen and solidify
peace. Typical peace building activities include restoring civil authority,
rebuilding physical infrastructure, providing structures and training for
schools and hospitals, and helping reestablish commerce.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE


D-60. Foreign internal defense is participation by civilian and military
agencies of a government in any action programs taken by another
government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness,
and insurgency. The main objective is to promote stability by helping a
host nation establish and maintain institutions and facilities responsive
to its people’s needs.
D-61. Army forces in foreign internal defense normally advise and
assist host-nation forces conducting operations to increase their
capabilities. When conducting foreign internal defense, all Army forces
provide indirect or direct support (not involving combat operations) or
conduct combat operations to support a host nation’s efforts.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE
D-62. Security assistance refers to a group of programs by which the
United States provides defense articles, military training, and other
defense-related services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash
sales. The primary object is to further national policies and objectives.
Army forces support security assistance efforts through military training
teams (MTT), maintenance support personnel and training, and related
activities.

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__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations

HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ACTION


D-63. Humanitarian and civic action programs consist of assistance
provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises. They are
planned activities. Humanitarian and civic actions are limited to the
following categories:

· Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of


a country.
· Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
· Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
· Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

SUPPORT TO INSURGENCIES
D-64. This type of support includes assistance provided by US forces to
help a friendly nation or group that is attempting to combat insurgent
elements or to stage an insurgency itself. This type of stability action is
normally conducted by SOF.

COMBATING TERRORISM
D-65. In all types of stability operations, antiterrorism and
counterterrorism activities are a continuous requirement in protecting
installations, units, and individuals from the threat of terrorism.
Antiterrorism focuses on defensive measures. Counterterrorism
encompasses a full range of offensive measures to prevent, deter, and
respond to terrorism. Refer to JCS Publication 3-07.2 for more
information on these activities.

SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS


D-66. U.S. military forces may be tasked for a variety of counterdrug
activities, which are always conducted in conjunction with another
government agency. These activities include destroying illicit drugs and
disrupting or interdicting drug manufacturing, cultivation, processing,
and smuggling operations. Counterdrug support may take the form of
advisory personnel, mobile training teams, offshore training activities,
and assistance in logistics, communications, and intelligence.

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS


D-67. NEOs are primarily conducted to evacuate US citizens whose
lives are in danger, although they may also include natives of the host
nation and third-country aliens friendly to the United States. NEOs
involve swift insertion and temporary occupation of an objective, followed
by a planned withdrawal. Leaders use only the amount of force required
for self-defense and protection of evacuees.

ARMS CONTROL
D-68. The reconnaissance platoon may work with another nation’s
military to conduct arms control or nation assistance activities. These are
usually entail short-term, high-impact operations.

SHOW OF FORCE
D-69. Forces deployed abroad lend credibility to a nation’s promises and
commitments. In support of this principle, show-of-force operations are

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meant to reassure a friendly nation or ally through a display of credible


military force directed at potential adversaries. These operations may
also be conducted to influence foreign governments or political-military
organizations to respect U.S. interests.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS


D-70. The process used in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing
stability operations is fundamentally identical to that for offensive,
defensive, and support operations. Army forces, however, can use the
following considerations to help develop tailored concepts and schemes for
stability operations.

LEVERAGE INTERAGENCY, JOINT, AND MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION


D-71. Unity of effort is fundamental to success in stability operations.
Achieving unity of effort requires constant coordination with all involved
agencies. Commanders must adapt to situations where there may not be
a clear delineation of authority and responsibility. This is especially
important in stability operations since the military is often the supporting
rather than the supported agency.

ENHANCE THE CAPABILITIES AND LEGITIMACY OF THE HOST NATION


D-72. Army forces must demonstrate the proper respect for the host
nation’s government, police, and military forces. The host nation’s
military and police forces must be integrated as much as possible with all
aspects of planning, preparing, executing, and assessing every operation.
D-73. When host-nation capabilities are inadequate for the task, Army
forces focus on enhancing those capabilities through training, advice, and
assistance. Commanders make maximum use of host-nation forces and
personnel as lead for all possible activities. These include offensive and
defensive operations, protection of the civilian populace, security of
critical facilities and installations, intelligence and counterintelligence
tasks, new construction and reconstruction, psychological operations,
police duties, and civil affairs.

UNDERSTAND THE POTENTIAL FOR UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES


OF INDIVIDUAL AND SMALL-UNIT ACTIONS
D-74. Individual and small-unit actions can have consequences
disproportionate to the level of command or amount of force involved. In
some cases, tactical operations and individual actions can have strategic
impact. Recognizing and avoiding these potential problems requires
trained, disciplines, and knowledgeable leaders and soldiers at every
level. Every soldier must be aware of the operational and strategic
context of the mission. Additionally, each soldier must understand the
potential military, political, and legal consequences of the actions they
take or fail to take. Dissemination of this information throughout the
force minimizes any possible confusion regarding desired objectives.

DISPLAY THE CAPABILITY TO USE FORCE WITHOUT THREATENING


D-75. Army forces conducting stability operations must be capable of
limited combat operations for self-defense. The intent is to demonstrate
strength and resolve without provoking an unintended response. To be
effective, shows of force in stability operations cannot be perceived as
attempts to goad or bully an opponent into an attack.

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__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations

D-76. Units can display preparedness by routinely conducting


demanding combat training in the area of operations. Training should
include challenging soldiers to react to situations involving weapons use,
levels of force, and rules of engagement.

ACT DECISIVELY TO PREVENT ESCALATION


D-77. Army forces must always be prepared to act with speed and
determination when carrying out assigned tasks. Opponents of stability
may perceive hesitation to act decisively as weakness. Units and
individuals must pursue military objectives energetically and apply
military power forcefully. By doing so, Army forces assure friend and foe
alike that they not only can protect themselves and the people and
facilities under their charge but also achieve stability objectives.

APPLY SELECTIVE AND DISCRIMINATIVE FORCE


D-78. Commanders must make sure their units apply force consistent
with and adequate to the assigned objectives. In addition, they must
employ combat power selectively in accordance with assigned missions
and prescribed legal and policy limitations. They use the ROE to guide
the tactical application of combat power. The commander on the ground is
best qualified to estimate the correct degree of force that must be used,
consistent with the ROE.

SECTION IV – SUPPORT OPERATIONS

D-79. Domestic support operations are always conducted in support of


local, state, and federal civil authorities. Overseas support operations are
almost always conducted in support of and in concert with other agencies;
these may be American or international organizations of either
governmental or private affiliation.
D-80. Support operations may be independent actions. Conversely, they
may complement offensive or defensive operations or stability operations.
FM 3-0 (FM 100-5) provides a detailed examination of support operations.

CHARACTERISTICS OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS


D-81. Support operations involve Army forces providing essential
supplies, capabilities, and services to help civil authorities deal with
situations beyond their control. Army forces may provide relief or
assistance directly. Army force activities in support operations, however,
most often involve setting the conditions that facilitate civil authorities or
nongovernment organizations in providing required direct support to the
affected population.

THE ARMY’S ROLE IN SUPPORT OPERATIONS


D-82. The Army is not specifically organized, trained, or equipped for
support operations. Instead, Army elements and forces, tailored for
warfighting, are rapidly adapted to dominate a crisis or disaster
situation. In support operations, Army forces apply decisive military
capabilities to set the conditions for the supported civil authorities to
achieve success. In most situations, Army forces involved in the support

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operations covered in the following discussion will execute combinations


of multiple overlapping activities.

CATEGORIES OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS


DOMESTIC SUPPORT OPERATIONS
D-83. Domestic support operations (DSO) are those activities and
measures taken by the US Department of Defense (DoD) to foster mutual
assistance and support between DoD and any civil government agency.
The objective is to ensure planning or preparedness for, or the application
of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or
attacks, including national security emergencies or major disasters.
D-84. Domestic support operations focus on the condition of all types of
natural and man-made properties, with the goal of helping to protect
and/or restore these properties as requested. Typically, these operations
are conducted in response to such events as forest and grassland fires,
hazardous material releases, floods, and earthquakes.

FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE


D-85. Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations are people-
oriented operations, focusing on the well-being of supported populations;
they provide critical supplies to designated groups at the request of local,
state, federal, or international agencies.
D-86. FHA is conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or
man-made disaster or other endemic conditions such as human pain,
disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or
loss of property. FHA is limited in scope and duration and focuses
exclusively on prompt aid to resolve an immediate crisis.

TYPES OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS


D-87. Support operations generally fall into the eight categories covered
in this discussion. Of these, only relief operations apply to both DSO and
FHA equally. Support operations may be independent actions, or they
may complement offensive, defensive, and stability operations.

RELIEF OPERATIONS
Types of Relief Operations
D-88. The actions Army forces execute during relief operations can be
characterized as either humanitarian relief, which focuses on the well
being of supported populations, or disaster relief, which focuses on
recovery of critical infrastructure after a natural or man-made disaster.
Most relief operations combine both types of actions. Considerations
include the following:

· Humanitarian relief focuses on life-saving measures to


alleviate the immediate needs of a population in crisis. It
often includes the provision of medical support, food, water,
medicines, clothing, blankets, shelter, and heating/cooking
fuel. In some cases, it involves transportation support to move
affected people from a disaster area.
· Disaster relief encompasses those actions taken to restore or
recreate the minimum infrastructure to allow effective

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__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations

humanitarian relief to be accomplished and set the conditions


for longer-term recovery. This includes establishing and
maintaining the minimum safe working conditions, minus
security measures necessary to protect relief workers and the
affected population from additional harm. Disaster relief may
involve repairing or demolishing damaged structures,
restoring or building bridges, roads and airfields, and
removing debris from critical routes and relief sites.

Phases of Relief Operations


D-89. Although each operation is unique, support operations are
generally conducted in three broad phases:

· Response.
· Recovery.
· Restoration.

D-90. Army elements can expect to be most heavily committed during


the response phase. They will be progressively less involved during the
recovery phase, with only very limited activity, if any, during restoration.
D-91. Response Phase. In the response phase, commanders focus on
life-sustaining functions that are required by those in the disaster area.
The following functions dominate these response operations:

· Search and rescue.


· Emergency flood control.
· Hazard identification.
· Food distribution.
· Water production, purification, and distribution.
· Temporary shelter construction and administration.
· Transportation support.
· Fire fighting.
· Medical support.
· Power generation.
· Communications support.

D-92. Recovery Phase. This phase begins the process of returning the
community infrastructure and related services to a status that meets the
population’s immediate needs. Typical recovery operations include these:

· Continuation of response operations as needed.


· Damage assessment.
· Power distribution.
· Water and sanitation services.
· Debris removal.

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D-93. Restoration Phase. Restoration is a long-term process to return


the community to normal predisaster status. Restoration activities do not
generally involve large numbers of military forces. When they are involved,
Army elements generally work with affected communities in the transfer of
responsibility to other agencies as military support forces redeploy.

SUPPORT TO CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT


D-94. Consequence management entails those services and activities
essential to mitigating damage, loss, hardship, or suffering resulting from
disasters or catastrophes, either man-made or natural. It is primarily a
state and local responsibility. Military forces may be employed in support
of the lead agency after an event to save lives, to prevent human
suffering, and to mitigate property loss.

SUPPORT TO INCIDENTS INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION


D-95. Military operations that assist civil authorities in protecting US
territory, population, and infrastructure against hostile attacks involving
WMD are similar to other consequence management situations. In
addition, they include operations that are designed to deter and mitigate
the effects of such an attack both inside and outside the United States.

DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS
D-96. Domestic preparedness includes training, exercises, expert
assistance, and response.

SUPPORT TO CRISES MANAGEMENT


D-97. Crisis management includes measures to resolve a hostile
situation and to investigate a criminal case for prosecution under federal
laws. Army forces provide military capabilities that support the
achievement of defusing or resolving a crisis situation.

PROTECTION OF CRITICAL ASSETS


D-98. The purpose of these support operations is to identify critical
assets and to assure their integrity, availability, survivability, and
capability to support vital DoD missions across the full spectrum of
military operations.

SUPPORT TO CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT


D-99. Support to domestic civil law enforcement generally involves
activities related to counterterrorism, counterdrug, or civil disturbance
operations. Army support may involve providing resources, training, or
direct support.

Support to Counterterrorism
D-100. Military units in support of the lead agency may operate to
eliminate identified threats. Assistance may be provided in the areas of
transportation, equipment, training, and personnel. When terrorists pose
an imminent threat to US territory, its people, and critical assets, the US
military may be used to support operations to counter these threats,
using ground, air, space, special operations, or maritime forces.

Support to Counterdrug Operations


D-101. Army support to domestic counterdrug operations is very limited
and will usually be in a support role only.

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__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations

Civil Disturbance Operations


D-102. The Army assists civil authorities in restoring law and order
when local and state law enforcement agencies are unable to quell civil
disturbances. Federal military forces assist in restoring law and order
when the magnitude of a disturbance exceeds the capabilities of local and
state law enforcement agencies, including the National Guard. The Army
is usually tasked to apply the minimum force necessary to restore order
to the point where civilian authorities no longer require military
assistance.

COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE
D-103. Community assistance is a broad range of activities in which
Army personnel and organizations provide support and maintain a strong
connection between the military and civilian communities.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR SUPPORT OPERATIONS


D-104. The process of planning and executing support operations is
fundamentally similar to that involved in planning, preparing, executing,
and assessing offensive, defensive, and stability operations. While each
support operation is unique, however, the following broad considerations
can help forces develop mission-specific concepts and schemes for
executing support operations.

PROVIDE ESSENTIAL SUPPORT TO THE LARGEST NUMBER OF PEOPLE


D-105. Commanders will be required to allocate finite resources to
achieve the greatest good. To do this, they must have an accurate
assessment of what needs to be done to effectively employ military power.
They must determine how and where to apply limited assets to benefit
the most people in the most efficient way.

COORDINATE ACTIONS WITH OTHER AGENCIES


D-106. DSOs are typically joint and interagency, while FHA operations
are usually multinational as well. Achieving unity of effort and efficient
use of resources requires constant coordination.

HAND OVER THE MISSION TO CIVILIAN AGENCIES AS SOON AS FEASIBLE


D-107. Army support operations are almost always designed to assist
government and nongovernment agencies in accomplishing their
missions. The following considerations determine handover feasibility:

· Condition of supported population and governments.


· Competing mission requirements.
· Domestic and international political environments.
· Specified and implied commitment levels in terms of time,
resources, and forces.
· Maturity of the support effort.

ESTABLISH MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS


D-108. A critical aspect of mission handover is to have objective
standards for measuring progress.

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SECTION V – ROLE OF THE RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON


IN STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

D-109. Because military operations involving the reconnaissance platoon


occur most often in the state of conflict, the platoon is most likely to
operate in support of peacekeeping and peace enforcement. In addition to
executing standard platoon missions, reconnaissance platoons must be
prepared to execute missions or tasks unique to stability operations and
support operations. (NOTE: Many of the tasks required during stability
operations and support operations will be performed in an urban
environment. Refer to Chapter 7 of this manual for information on urban
operations.)

PLATOON EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS


D-110. As noted, the reconnaissance platoon has unique capabilities that
make it an important asset to US and combined forces executing missions
in stability operations and support operations. Whether it is operating
organic to the troop/company or squadron/battalion or task organized to
another light or heavy force, the platoon may be called upon to support a
wide range of operations in various political and geographical
environments.

USING THE PLATOON’S CAPABILITIES


D-111. Because of the resources necessary to deploy, operate, and sustain
forces in stability and support environments, the reconnaissance platoon
is used to execute activities that take maximum advantage of its inherent
capabilities of stealth, reconnaissance, surveillance, and HUMINT
collection (if this asset is organic or attached). On the other hand, the
factors of METT-TC and the operational considerations prevalent in
stability operations and support operations may modify the conditions for
successful mission accomplishment. This means the platoon occasionally
may be assigned operations that are normally handled by specially
trained and equipped elements. For example, the platoon could be tasked
for crowd and riot control if a shortage of military police exists.

TRAINING FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS


D-112. Disciplined, well-trained, combat-ready leaders and soldiers can
adapt to the specialized demands of stability operations and support
operations. To achieve this degree of readiness, however, the platoon
must be thoroughly trained before deployment on such factors as the
operational environment, the ROE and ROI, force protection, and
individual soldier responsibilities. Refer to the discussion of these
operational considerations earlier in this appendix. The training must be
updated continuously after deployment.

LEADER REQUIREMENTS
D-113. Flexibility and situational awareness are paramount
requirements, especially for the reconnaissance platoon leader. The
platoon’s role and/or objectives in stability operations and support
operations will not always be clear. The platoon leader will sometimes be
called upon to make on-the-spot decisions that could have an immediate,

D-22
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations

dramatic effect on the strategic or operational situation. In this uniquely


tense setting, leaders who disregard the will of belligerent parties and the
lethality of these groups’ weapons compromise the success of their
mission and risk the lives of their soldiers.

SPECIFIC PLATOON TASKS


D-114. As part of a force involved in stability operations and support
operations, the reconnaissance platoon can expect to perform these tasks:

· Security operations, including the following:


n Convoy security (refer to Chapter 4 of this manual).
n Checkpoints.
n Roadblocks.
n Searches of personnel and vehicles.
n Cordon and search operations.
· Reconnaissance operations, including the following:
n Route reconnaissance (refer to Chapter 3 of this manual).
n Building searches (refer to Chapter 7 of this manual,
covering urban operations).

D-115. Roadblocks, checkpoints, and searches are used to control the


movement of vehicles, personnel, or material along a specific route.
Roadblocks and checkpoints help to prevent trafficking in contraband and
stop the movement of known or suspected belligerents. They are used to
control access into restricted or contested areas by individuals or
elements that could cause hostilities between warring parties. They also
assist friendly forces in detecting and evaluating the behavior patterns of
the local populace, a critical part of the intelligence process.
D-116. Roadblocks and checkpoints are either deliberate or hasty and
can be established on a permanent, temporary, or surprise basis.
Individual roadblocks and checkpoints can be established and manned by
reconnaissance platoons, sections, or squads, depending on the
operational environment and the amount of traffic expected to move
through the checkpoint.

ROADBLOCKS
D-117. A roadblock is used to stop the movement of vehicles along a route
or to close access to certain areas or roads. Roadblocks can be established
separate from checkpoints or used to channel traffic into a checkpoint.
These factors apply in positioning a roadblock:

· It must be covered by observation and direct fire.


· It must be positioned so that it cannot be bypassed.
· If required, positioning must channel traffic into a checkpoint.

D-118. A roadblock is considered an obstacle and is set up or constructed


like an obstacle. Figures D-4 and D-5 illustrate types of organization that
can be used in establishing a roadblock. Armored vehicles make excellent
roadblocks, but local dismounted security must be established to protect

D-23
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

vehicles from dismounted attack. Concertina wire should be used to


prevent vehicles from running through the roadblock (see Figure D-6).

Figure D-4. Recce Platoon Roadblock

Figure D-5. Two-Vehicle Recce Section Roadblock

D-24
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations

Figure D-6. Concertina Wire Roadblock

CHECKPOINTS
D-119. Checkpoints are manned locations used to accomplish the
following:

· Control movement along specific routes.


· Maintain continuous monitoring of road movement.
· Apprehend suspects.
· Prevent smuggling of controlled items.
· Prevent infiltration of unauthorized civilians or military
forces into or through a controlled area.
· Check vehicles and personnel for weapons, ammunition, and
explosives.
· Ensure proper use of routes by civilian and military traffic.

DELIBERATE CHECKPOINTS
D-120. The deliberate checkpoint is a relatively fixed position established
in a town or in open country, often on a main road (see Figure D-7).
Deliberate checkpoints are classified to handle either heavy traffic or
light traffic, based on the amount of traffic expected to pass through
them. Reconnaissance sections and squads can operate only light traffic
checkpoints (see Figure D-8). The reconnaissance platoon can operate
both heavy and light traffic checkpoints; Figure D-9 shows a platoon-
operated heavy traffic checkpoint.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure D-7. Deliberate Checkpoint Organization

Figure D-8. Reconnaissance Section Manning


a Light Traffic Checkpoint

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__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations

Figure D-9. Recce Platoon Manning a Heavy Traffic Checkpoint

Establishing a Deliberate Checkpoint


D-121. The physical layout and level of preparation of the checkpoint
depend on the amount of traffic expected to pass through it and the
duration of its operation. Regardless of the type, all checkpoints have
common characteristics and organization. A checkpoint consists of the
following parts:

· Obstacles (barriers).
· Search areas.
· Security overwatch and fighting positions.
· Holding area.

D-122. Obstacles. A checkpoint is established by placing two parallel


obstacles (each with a gap) across the road. These obstacles should be
large enough and deep enough to prevent vehicles from running over or
through them. The gap must be negotiable by slow-moving vehicles only.
The distance between obstacles depends on the amount of traffic that is
held in the search area. A barrier pole is placed midway between
obstacles to control movement from the search area to the exit obstacle.
D-123. Search Areas. The amount of traffic held in the search areas is
determined by the type of search (see Figures D-7 through D-9 earlier in
this discussion for illustrations of the various checkpoint search areas).
Separate search areas for the following should be set up as needed:

· Vehicles.
· Females.
· Other individuals. These include suspects and other persons
detained for further interrogation.

D-124. Fighting Positions. Fighting positions for vehicles, automatic


weapons, and individuals must be emplaced to overwatch, protect, and
secure the checkpoint.

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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

D-125. Holding Area. A holding area is established several hundred


meters forward of the checkpoint to control the flow of traffic so that the
checkpoint is not overwhelmed.

Task Organization
D-126. Personnel manning the checkpoint are organized into the
following teams or elements to accomplish specific tasks:

· Headquarters element.
· Security force.
· Search teams.
· Sentry teams.

D-127. Headquarters Element. The headquarters element consists of


the reconnaissance platoon leader, PSG, or section leader; an RTO; and
medical personnel.
D-128. Security Force. The security force consists of a security element
and a checkpoint reaction force.
D-129. The checkpoint security element mans overwatch positions and/or
perimeter security positions. Security element personnel maintain
overwatch of activities in the search area and provide security for
personnel operating the checkpoint. Overwatch positions also provide
security for sentry teams and the holding area.
D-130. The checkpoint reaction force is a concealed element whose
purpose is to prevent traffic from avoiding or bypassing the checkpoint.
This force can be part of the perimeter security and can react to surprise
attacks against the checkpoint or to other emergency situations. It can be
located at a position away from the checkpoint, but it must be able to
quickly move to the checkpoint to provide necessary support. The reaction
force should be no smaller than a reconnaissance section.
D-131. Search Teams. The search team, comprising two to three
soldiers, searches vehicles and personnel. The team is organized into a
guard security element and a search element. The guard element
provides security during the searches; at least one member of the guard
element guards or observes the individuals or vehicles being searched at
all times while the searcher conducts the search.
D-132. Sentry Teams. Sentry teams secure the entrance and exit of the
checkpoint and the holding area. They control the flow of traffic through
the checkpoint, including movement from the entrance into the search
area and from the search area to the exit point.
D-133. Other Personnel. Whenever possible, the following should be on
hand to assist reconnaissance platoon personnel with checkpoint
activities:

· A civil affairs officer, a liaison officer, or a member of the


civilian police or other local authority.
· An interpreter.
· A trained female searcher.

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__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations

HASTY CHECKPOINTS
D-134. Hasty checkpoints are set up to achieve surprise. They are
established in locations where they cannot be observed by approaching
traffic until it is too late to withdraw and escape without being observed.
Possible locations for hasty checkpoints include the following:

· Tunnels and large culverts.


· Bridges.
· Defiles.
· Positions beyond sharp curves.
· Highway intersections.
· Key terrain on highways.
· Reverse slopes of hills.
· Other locations that limit detection from long distances.

D-135. The hasty checkpoint has the same basic layout as a deliberate
checkpoint; however, because hasty checkpoints are temporary and
mobile, the platoon or section establishing the checkpoint must carry the
materials necessary to construct it.

D-136. The reconnaissance platoon or section uses its vehicles, reinforced


with concertina wire, as the obstacle. The vehicles are positioned to
partially block the road or route (see Figure D-10). The search area is the
space between the vehicles. Sentries are positioned at each end of the
checkpoint and are covered by mounted or dismounted automatic weapon
positions. A reaction force is designated and concealed nearby.

Figure D-10. Recce Platoon Manning a Hasty Checkpoint

D-29
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS


Signs
D-137. Portable signs in the local language and in English are required.
Signs should denote the speed limit of approach, as well as the vehicle
search area, male and female search areas, and dismount point.

Communications
D-138. Communications must be established between the checkpoint or
roadblock and higher headquarters. FM radios and wire are used within
the checkpoint and between the checkpoint and overwatch positions,
reaction forces, the checkpoint CP, and sentry posts. Checkpoint
personnel also plan for additional means of communications, such as
pyrotechnics, flags, hand-and-arm signals, or code words.

Lighting and Night Observation Devices


D-139. Adequate lighting for the obstacle, search area, and perimeter area
is necessary during night operations. Reaction forces and overwatch
elements use NODs to observe outside the perimeter; however, these
elements must consider how white light will affect operation of the devices.

Barriers
D-140. Obstacles should be positioned across the road and around the
search area. These can include barrels filled with concrete or sand,
barrier poles, clearly marked barbed wire, buses parked sideways in the
road, felled trees, abandoned or disabled vehicles, or other readily
available items strong enough and big enough to prevent motorists from
driving through or around them. Hasty minefields, both dummy and
actual, can be used to reinforce an obstacle.

Weapons
D-141. Soldiers must have adequate firepower to withstand an attack or to
stop a vehicle that is attempting to flee or crash through the checkpoint.
Crew-served weapons must be loaded and manned at all times.

Linguists
D-142. Soldiers familiar with the local language are valuable in all
roadblock or checkpoint operations. If they are not available, soldiers
must be familiar with basic phrases necessary for the operation. They
should have a printed reference such as a key word and phrase card; this
should be obtained from the civil affairs section, translation detachment,
local authorities, or liaison officers as soon as the mission is received.

Other Equipment
D-143. Other specialized equipment may be required to support the
checkpoint. Figure D-11 provides a list of equipment that may be helpful.

OTHER PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS


D-144. The reconnaissance platoon leader must take the following
requirements into account when planning the checkpoint mission:

· Obtain indirect fire support on key terrain near the checkpoint.


· Ensure that checkpoints are designed so that the minimum
number of soldiers are exposed at any given time.

D-30
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations

· Position automatic weapons to provide protection when


soldiers are exposed.
· Ensure that reinforcement and counterattack plans are
developed and rehearsed.
· Ensure that ROE/ROI are clear and understood by all soldiers
manning the checkpoint.
· Plan for 24-hour operation of the checkpoint.
· Obtain logistical support.
· Coordinate for medical assistance and MEDEVAC and
CASEVAC assets.

Figure D-11. Equipment List for Roadblocks and Checkpoints

PREPARING FOR CONTINGENCIES AT CHECKPOINTS


D-145. The reconnaissance platoon leader must develop tactics and
procedures to respond to various situations that can develop at a
checkpoint. For example, a high volume of pedestrian and vehicle traffic
can be expected to pass through a checkpoint; this congestion can be
compounded by undisciplined driving habits of the local population and
by the shortage of soldiers able to speak the local language. Belligerents
can use the resulting confusion to smuggle weapons and explosives
through the checkpoints. In addition, checkpoints face the constant threat
of violence.
D-146. Leaders must plan for these contingencies when preparing
personnel to man checkpoints. The ROE/ROI must be clear and flexible
enough to accommodate rapid changes in any situation that may develop.

D-31
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Figure D-12 lists some examples of situations encountered at checkpoints,


along with possible responses.

Figure D-12. Responses to Situations at a Checkpoint

SEARCHES OF PERSONNEL AND VEHICLES


D-147. Searches of people, material, and vehicles are commonly used at
roadblocks and checkpoints to control unauthorized movement of
individuals and prohibited items (contraband).

PLANNING GUIDELINES FOR SEARCH OPERATIONS


D-148. Planning for a search operation should cover these points:
· Search authority.
· Conduct of the search.
· Search rates.
· Use of force.
· Courtesy.

Search Authority
D-149. Checkpoint personnel perform searches to apprehend suspects or
confiscate contraband only in areas within their military jurisdiction (or
where otherwise lawful). Proper use of search procedures gains the
respect and support of the local population, enhances credibility, and
demonstrates impartiality. Conversely, misuse of search authority can
undermine the credibility of forces conducting operations in the area; it

D-32
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations

can also affect future operations. Checkpoint personnel must ensure that
search procedures are conducted in accordance with established
guidelines and the applicable ROE/ROI.

Conduct of the Search


D-150. All checkpoint personnel must thoroughly understand the
instructions issued for the conduct of searches. Instructions may cover,
but are not limited to, the following points:

· Personnel, vehicles, and/or items allowed to pass through the


checkpoint.
· Personnel and/or vehicles not allowed to pass through the
checkpoint.
· Procedures for detaining vehicles or personnel.
· Items to be confiscated.
· Procedures for handling confiscated items.

Search Rates
D-151. Search operations are conducted slowly enough to allow for a
thorough search but rapidly enough to prevent the threat from reacting to
the threat of the search.

Use of Force
D-152. In accordance with established ROE, minimum essential force is
used to eliminate any active resistance encountered during the search.

Courtesy
D-153. Search personnel should remain polite and considerate at all
times. Refer to Figure D-13 for a list of guidelines for personal conduct
during search operations.

D-33
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure D-13. “Dos” and “Don’ts” of Search Operations

SEARCH PROCEDURES
Search of Individuals
D-154. To avoid making a threat of a person passing through a
checkpoint, searchers must be polite, considerate, patient, and tactful.
Since the very presence of checkpoints can cause uneasiness or fear, it is
during the initial handling of a person about to be searched that the
greatest caution is required. At least one member of the search team
must provide security at all times while others conduct the search. The
following methods can be used to search an individual:

· Frisk search.
· Wall search.
· Strip search.
· Female search.

D-155. Frisk Search. This is a quick search of an individual for


weapons, evidence, or contraband. It should be conducted in the presence
of an assistant (guard) and a witness, when available. In conducting the
frisk search, the searcher positions himself to prevent possible
endangerment (see Figure D-14). The searcher’s guard takes a position
from which he can cover the individual with his weapon. The searcher
must avoid moving between the guard and the individual being searched.
The searched individual is required to raise his arms above his head. The
searcher slides his hands over the individual’s entire body, crushing the
clothing to locate concealed objects. If the individual being searched is

D-34
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations

carrying a bag or wearing a coat or hat, these are also searched, with
special attention given to the linings.

Figure D-14. Frisk Search

D-156. Wall Search. The wall search affords the searcher some safety by
placing the individual being searched in a strained, awkward position
(see Figure D-15). This search method is useful when two searchers must
search several individuals. The individuals to be searched can be
positioned against any upright surface, such as a wall, vehicle, tree, or
telephone pole. The following discussion covers factors that must be
considered during the wall search.
D-157. Position of individual being searched. The individual must
face the wall (or other object) and lean against it, supporting himself with
his hands over his head, placed far apart with fingers spread. His feet are
placed well apart as far from the wall as possible; they are turned
outward so they are parallel to the wall. The individual must keep his
head down as illustrated in Figure D-15.
D-158. Position of the searcher’s guard. The searcher’s guard stands
to the rear of the individual being searched on the opposite side from the
searcher (see Figure D-15). The guard uses his weapon to cover the
individual being searched. When the searcher moves from his original
position to the opposite side of the individual being searched, the guard
also changes position. The searcher walks around the guard to avoid
coming between the guard’s weapon and the individual being searched.

D-35
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure D-15. Wall Search

D-159. Position of the searcher. The searcher approaches the


individual being searched from the right side. The searcher must secure
his weapon so that the individual being searched cannot grab it.
D-160. When searching from the right side, the searcher places his right
foot in front of the individual’s right foot, making and maintaining ankle-
to-ankle contact. If the individual offers resistance, this position allows
the searcher to push the individual’s right foot back and out from under
him, causing him to fall to the ground. When searching from the left side,
the searcher places his left foot in front of the individual’s left foot and
makes and maintains ankle-to-ankle contact. Figure D-16 illustrates the
ankle-to-ankle position.

Figure D-16. Ankle-to-Ankle Position for a Wall Search

D-161. Wall search procedures. In taking his initial position, the


searcher must remain alert to prevent the individual being searched from

D-36
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations

making a sudden move to disarm or injure him. The searcher first


searches the individual’s headgear. Then he checks, in sequence, the
individual’s hands and arms, the right side of his body, and his right leg.
The searcher repeats the procedure on the left side of the individual. He
crushes the person’s clothing between his fingers rather than merely
patting the surface of the clothing. The searcher pays close attention to
the armpits, back, waist, legs, groin area, and tops of boots or shoes. Any
item that is not considered a weapon or evidence is replaced in the
individual’s pocket. If the individual resists, attempts to escape, or must
be thrown down before the search is completed, the search is restarted
from the beginning.
D-162. Search of multiple individuals. When two or more individuals
are to be searched, they must all assume a position against the same wall
or object but far enough apart that they cannot reach each other. The
guard takes a position a few paces to the rear of the line with his weapon
ready. The search starts with the person on the right end of the line.
Upon completing the search of the first individual, the searcher moves
that individual to the left end of the line; the individual assumes the
proper position against the wall. The searcher resumes with the
individual now on the right end of the line. The searcher must be careful
to approach and search the remaining individuals without coming
between them and the guard (as illustrated in Figure D-17).

Figure D-17. Wall Search of Multiple Subjects

D-163. Strip Search. This extreme search is used only when the
individual is suspected of carrying documents or other contraband on his
person. The search is conducted in an enclosed area such as a room or
tent. Several search techniques are available. One method is to use two
unarmed searchers while an armed guard provides security. The
individual’s clothing is removed and searched carefully. A search is then
made of all possible concealment areas, including the mouth, nose, ears,
hair, armpits, and groin area. A medic is a good choice to conduct this
search. Care must be taken not to subject the individual to unnecessary
embarrassment. Searchers must ensure that the person’s privacy and
dignity are maintained as much as possible.
D-164. Search of Females. Women should be used to search other
females whenever possible. If female searchers are not available, consider

D-37
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

using doctors, medics, or designated males from the local population. If


male soldiers must search females, all possible measures must be taken
to prevent any action that could be interpreted as sexual molestation or
assault.

Search of Vehicles
D-165. Vehicles searches may require special equipment such as metal
detection devices and mirrors. Because a thorough vehicle search is a
time-consuming process, a separate search area should be established to
prevent unnecessary delays. Table D-2 shows an example of a search rate
planning guide.

Table D-2. Example Rate Planning Guide for Vehicle Searches

D-166. Searchers instruct all occupants to get out and stand clear of the
vehicle. The driver should be made to watch the search of the vehicle. A
guard watches the passengers and provides additional security at all
times. If sufficient searchers are available, the passengers should be
searched at the same time. Figure D-18 lists some examples of vehicle
search procedures.

Figure D-18. Example Vehicle Search Procedures

D-38
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations

CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS


D-167. When intelligence identifies and locates members of an insurgent
infrastructure, cordon and search operations are mounted to neutralize
them. This discussion covers procedures for the reconnaissance platoon in
support of the company/troop or battalion/squadron conducting these
operations. (NOTE: The discussion and accompanying illustrations
cover the role of a recce platoon in the cordon and search.)

TASK ORGANIZATION
D-168. Task organization for cordon and search operations includes a
security force (cordon force), a search force, and a reserve force. The
reconnaissance platoon will normally operate as part of the security force
or the reserve force; if required, however, it can operate either by itself as
the search force or as part of a larger search force.

CONDUCT OF THE OPERATION


D-169. Search zones are designated; a search party is assigned to each
zone. Each search party has its own search force, security force, and
reserve force.

Procedures
D-170. An effective cordon is critical to the success of the search effort.
Cordons isolate the search area, prevent the escape of individuals, and
protect the forces conducting the operation. Deployment to the search
area is rapid and is synchronized so it does not provide early warning to
the local population; the security force surrounds the area while the
search force moves in (see Figure D-19).

Figure D-19. Recce Platoon Establishes 360-Degree Security

D-39
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

D-171. Checkpoints and roadblocks are established along roads entering


and exiting the area (as shown in Figure D-20). OPs are established, and
security patrols are executed in the surrounding area. Members of the
security force orient mainly on people or vehicles attempting to escape or
evade the search in the populated area; however, the security force can
also cut off elements or individuals trying to reinforce threat forces in the
search area.

Figure D-20. Recce Sections Establish Hasty Roadblocks

Reserve Force
D-172. A mobile reserve force is located near the search zone. Its specific
mission is to reinforce OPs, patrols, or the search force and to assist the
other elements as required by the mission. Figure D-21 shows the recce
platoon operating as the reserve.

Figure D-21. Recce Platoon Operates as the Reserve Force

D-40
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations

SECTION VI – LIGHT/MEDIUM OPERATIONS IN STABILITY


AND SUPPORT ENVIRONMENTS

D-173. During stability operations and support operations, situations


may arise requiring medium and light forces to operate together. The use
of a mixed force capitalizes on the strengths of both forces while offsetting
their respective weaknesses. Light/medium operations take advantage of
the light unit’s ability to operate in restricted terrain (such as urban
areas, forests, and mountains), while increasing the light unit’s
survivability. Conversely, the medium unit’s mobility, protection, and
firepower complement the light infantry unit’s capabilities.
D-174. The reconnaissance platoon may operate with light infantry
forces in various task organizations. Examples of these organizations
include the following:

· The squadron/battalion or troop is attached or OPCON to a


light infantry brigade.
· A light infantry company is attached to the
squadron/battalion.
· The reconnaissance platoon is attached to a light infantry
brigade as part of a company team.

D-175. Regardless of the task organization, the key challenge in


light/medium operations is to understand the capabilities and limitations
of light and medium forces, to develop plans that take full advantage of
their capabilities, and to correctly employ the two types of forces for
maximum effectiveness. The goal of this section is to assist the
reconnaissance platoon leader in understanding the platoon’s role in the
light/medium force and in planning and executing the platoon’s missions
during these operations. (NOTE: FM 3-21.10 [FM 7-10] provides
detailed information on light infantry organizations.)

ROLE OF THE RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON


D-176. The reconnaissance platoon normally does not conduct close
support of infantry operations. In stability operations and support
operations, however, the platoon can use its unique capabilities to conduct
combat operations in support of or in conjunction with light infantry.
D-177. Along with conventional reconnaissance and security missions,
the platoon can support infantry in urban operations and in cordon and
search operations. A CFV reconnaissance platoon can also provide limited
protection against threat armored forces.

THE THREAT
D-178. Light infantry fights a variety of threat forces. These may range
from crudely equipped insurgents to technologically advanced
conventional forces. Potential threat targets include the following:

· Nonarmored targets, including the following:


n Bunkers.
n Automatic weapon positions.

D-41
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

n Buildings and walls.


n Roadblocks and obstacles.
· CPs.
· Logistical positions.
· Light-skinned vehicles.
· Armored vehicles.

CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE RECONNAISSANCE


PLATOON
CAPABILITIES
D-179. Reconnaissance platoon capabilities in support of light/medium
operations include the following:

· Ability to suppress or destroy threat positions with direct


fires.
· Ability to breach walls and reduce some obstacles with direct
fire.
· Enhanced communications assets.
· Thermal sights and NODs.
· Capability for rapid movement and limited penetrations.
· Use of vehicles to provide protection against small arms and
fragments.

LIMITATIONS
D-180. The reconnaissance platoon’s limitations in light/medium
operations include these:

· Restricted mobility and fields of fire in close or urban terrain.


· Vulnerability to antiarmor weapons in built-up areas.
· The consumption of large quantities of Classes III, V, and IX,
in some situations requiring daily resupply.
· Need for augmentation of transportation assets to support
CSS requirements.
· Inability to move over heavily wooded terrain traversable by
light infantry.
· Inability of bridges and roads to support certain types of
reconnaissance vehicles.

LIGHT/MEDIUM URBAN OPERATIONS


D-181. Urban battlefields are complex and three-dimensional; they are
characterized by the close, restricted terrain typical of built-up areas,
resulting in severely limited fields of fire and maneuver space. Mounted
avenues of approach, restricted mostly to streets and alleys, are narrow,
canalized, and easily obstructed. On the other hand, cover and
concealment are plentiful for dismounted forces. Dismounted avenues of

D-42
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations

approach are literally everywhere: underground, through buildings,


along edges of streets, over rooftops.
D-182. While urban operations are predominantly an infantry fight, the
reconnaissance platoon can support light infantry units by providing
security, protection, mobility, and firepower. The platoon can perform the
following tasks to increase the combat power of the light infantry force:

· Isolate objectives with direct fire to prevent threat


withdrawal, reinforcement, or counterattack.
· Suppress or destroy threat positions.
· Breach walls and blocked doorways.
· Reduce some barricades and obstacles with direct fires.
· Reduce threat strongpoints.
· Establish roadblocks.
· Protect against threat light armored attacks or
counterattacks.
· Suppress sniper fires.
· Use vehicles to provide protection from small arms and
fragmentation rounds.
· Overwatch likely armor avenues of approach.

NOTE: Chapter 7 of this manual provides a detailed discussion of the reconnaissance


platoon’s role in urban operations.

D-43
Appendix E

Antennas
In its role of providing
battlefield information to the CONTENTS
commander, the reconnais- Siting Considerations ................................... E-1
sance platoon operates along Field-Expedient Repairs ............................... E-2
Repair Techniques ................................. E-2
extended frontages and over Field-Expedient Repair Items ............... E-4
long distances. To perform its Field-Expedient Antennas ............................ E-5
missions successfully, the Advantages and Disadvantages ........... E-5
platoon must employ effective Determining Antenna Lengths ............. E-6
communications systems, Omnidirectional Antennas .................... E-6
Bidirectional Antennas .......................... E-9
equipment, and techniques. Unidirectional Antennas ....................... E-12
This appendix covers Field-Expedient 500- to 600-Ohm/2-Watt
antennas, a critical aspect of Resistor ............................................... E-16
the communications system. Antenna Connections ............................ E-17
(NOTE: Refer to Chapter 2
of this manual for a discussion of the means of communications and
the correct application of operational terms and effective RTP.
Appendix B includes formats and employment considerations for
reports the platoon uses.) The discussion focuses on considerations
related to the employment of radio antennas, a critical factor in the
effectiveness of the reconnaissance platoon’s communications
capabilities. Included are discussions on how to site antennas for best
results, how to make field-expedient antenna repairs, and how to
construct a variety of field-expedient antennas.

SECTION I – SITING CONSIDERATIONS

E-1. A radio station should be located in a position for best


communications while maintaining a degree of physical and
communications security. Hills and mountains between stations normally
limit the range of radio sets. Whenever possible, select a location that will
allow line-of-sight communications. Avoid locations that provide the
threat with jamming capability, visual sighting, or easy interception of
friendly transmissions.
E-2. Dry ground has high resistance and limits the range of the radio
set. If possible, locate the station near moist ground, which has much less
resistance. Water, particularly salt water, greatly increases the range of
the radio set.
E-3. Trees with heavy foliage absorb radio waves. Leafy trees have
more of an adverse effect than evergreens. Keep the antenna clear of all
foliage and dense brush, but try to use available trees and shrubs for
cover and concealment and for screening from threat jamming.

E-1
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

E-4. Do not select an antenna position in a tunnel or beneath an


underpass or steel bridge. Transmission and reception under these
conditions are almost impossible because of high absorption of radio-
finding energy.
E-5. Buildings located between radio stations, particularly steel and
reinforced concrete structures, hinder transmission and reception. Try to
use buildings, however, to camouflage antennas from the threat.
E-6. Avoid all types of poles that carry wires. Wires absorb power from
radiating antennas located in their vicinity. They also introduce hum and
other noise interference in receiving antennas.
E-7. Avoid positions adjacent to heavily traveled roads and highways.
In addition to the noise and confusion caused by tanks and trucks,
ignition systems in these vehicles may cause electrical interference.
E-8. Do not locate battery-charging units and generators close to the
radio stations. Do not locate radio stations close to each other.

SECTION II – FIELD-EXPEDIENT REPAIR

E-9. Antennas are sometimes broken or damaged, causing either a


communications failure or poor communications, When there is no spare,
you may have to construct an emergency antenna. The following
paragraphs are suggestions on repairing antennas and antenna supports,
and on constructing and adjusting emergency antennas.

REPAIR TECHNIQUES
WHIP ANTENNAS
E-10. As an example, for a metallic whip antenna broken into two
pieces, a splint job is the quickest type of repair. Scrape off the paint 3 to
6 inches from the broken ends; use sand, rocks, metal, or a knife to scrape
the ends clean. Using about 1 foot of copper wire (stripped WD-1 if
available), overlay the cleaned ends and wrap them together tightly with
the copper wire. Place a dry stick, pole, or branch on each side of the
break and wrap the splint tightly with WD-1, rope, tape, or whatever is
available. If everything else is working right, the radio should be ready to
use.
E-11. In combat, a common emergency would be for the 9-foot whip
antenna getting knocked off in an artillery barrage. To get back on the
air, you will need a pole about 10 feet long, about 9 feet of WD-1, and
some tape. First, scrape off the paint from the top 2 inches of the whip’s
stub. Tightly wrap 12 inches of bare wire around the scraped portion of
the stub. Pass the wire over the top of the stub, jam it in the hole with a
wooden peg, and tape it to hold it securely. Then take the 10-foot pole and
tie it tightly to the antenna base and stub. Attach the WD-1 along the
length of pole with tape. The total length of the upright WD-1 and
antenna stub should not be more than 9 feet. Trim away any extra wire,
and you are ready to communicate. This makeshift mast will not
withstand abuse like the original, but it will serve you well in an
emergency.

E-2
________________________________________________________________ Appendix E – Antennas

E-12. You cannot splint an AT-912 or AS-1729 fiberglass whip antenna,


but you can construct a makeshift whip antenna. Measure off a 5-foot
length of coaxial cable. Strip the rubber sleeve from the cable, and
separate the braided shield from the center conductor. Lash a dry, 10-foot
pole to the antenna base. Tape the center conductor to the top of the pole
and the braided shield to the bottom. Tape the stripped cable several
more places along the pole so it will stay in place. If there is a BNC (twist-
lock type) connector on the cable, attach it to the radio; if not, wedge the
center conductor firmly into the antenna connector and attach the
braided shield to a screwhead on the radio case. This is an ideal system,
but it will work as a temporary solution. Replace it as soon as possible.

WIRE ANTENNAS
E-13. Emergency repair of a wire antenna may involve the repair or
replacement of the wire used as the antenna or transmission line or the
repair or replacement of the assembly used to support the antenna.
E-14. When one or more wires of an antenna are broken, the antenna
can be repaired by reconnecting the broken wires. To do this, lower the
antenna to the ground, clean the ends of the wires, and twist the wires
together. Whenever possible, solder the connection. Use electrical tape, if
available, for added support.
E-15. If the antenna is damaged beyond repair, construct a new
antenna. Make sure the length of the wires for the substitute antenna is
the same as on the original.
E-16. Antenna supports may also require repair or replacement. A
substitute item may be used in place of a damaged support; if properly
insulated, it can be made of any material of adequate strength. If the
radiating element is not properly insulated, field antennas may be
improperly grounded and therefore ineffective. Many common items can
be used as field-expedient insulators. The best items are plastic or glass,
such as plastic spoons, buttons, bags, and bottle necks. Wood and rope, or
both, are less effective than plastic or glass but still are better than no
insulator at all. The radiating element (the actual antenna wire) should
touch only the antenna terminal and should be physically separated from
all other objects (other than the supporting insulator). Figure E-1 shows
various improvised insulators.

NOTE: Insulation materials (ranked by effectiveness as an insulator) include the following:


· Best insulation properties: plastic, glass.
· Good insulation properties: wood.
· Fair insulation properties: cloth, rope.

E-3
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure E-1. Improvised Insulators

FIELD-EXPEDIENT REPAIR ITEMS


E-17. The items listed in Table E-1 may be valuable in field-expedient
repairs.

Table E-1. Example Field-Expedient Repair Items

ORIGINAL ISSUE ITEM FIELD-EXPEDIENT REPAIR ITEMS

Antenna wire WD-1, barbed wire electrical wire, coaxial


cable

Antenna mast Tree, stick, lance pole, telephone pole

Coaxial cable WD-1, electrical wire

Antenna guy rope Wire, cloth belt

Guy stakes Rocks, vehicles, trees, tent pins

Whip antenna Wire, WD-1, coaxial cable

Pulleys Wire, nylon rope

Insulators Plastic rings, plastic spoons, plastic bags,


wood, rope, glass/plastic bottles

SECTION III – FIELD-EXPEDIENT ANTENNAS

E-4
________________________________________________________________ Appendix E – Antennas

E-18. Direction and distance are critical factors in determining how well
the reconnaissance platoon is able to communicate. There are three basic
types of antennas, based on their directional features:

· Omnidirectional. These antennas transmit in all directions.


· Bidirectional. These antennas transmit in any two opposite
directions.
· Unidirectional. These antennas transmit in any one
direction.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES


E-19. Each type of antenna has advantages and disadvantages. The
omnidirectional or whip antenna enables the sender to communicate
without worrying about the location of the receiving station, but it makes
him vulnerable to threat radio direction-finding capability. The
bidirectional antenna allows communications with two or more stations in
opposite directions, but the sender must make sure the antennas at these
stations are parallel to his. The antenna should be positioned at 90
degrees to the threat lines to reduce the possibility of interception. A
terminated long-wire antenna is unidirectional and is the least open to
threat interception if positioned properly. One disadvantage is that the
radio can transmit and receive best in only one direction. Also, the
transmissions are affected by whether the antenna is located vertically or
horizontally to the ground. Waves from a vertical antenna are vertically
polarized; waves from a horizontal antenna are horizontally polarized. A
vertical antenna receives from a radio with a vertical antenna, with a
corresponding match required for radios with horizontal antennas. The
sender must make sure that his own antenna and the antenna at the
distant station are either both vertical or both horizontal. Figure E-2
shows examples of each type of antenna.

Figure E-2. Antenna Types

DETERMINING ANTENNA LENGTHS

E-5
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

E-20. To determine the length of the antenna you need, use the proper
formula below:

· To calculate a quarter-wavelength antenna in feet, divide 234


(constant) by the operating frequency (in MHz). Example:
234 divided by 44.8 = 5.22 or 5 feet, 2 inches.
· To calculate a half-wavelength antenna in feet, divide 468
(oonstant) by the operating frequency (in MHz). Example:
468 divided by 56 = 8.36 or 8 feet, 5 inches.
· To calculate a full-wavelength antenna in feet, divide 936
(constant) by the operating frequency (in MHz). Example:
936 divided by 45 = 20.8 or 20 feet, 10 inches.

OMNIDIRECTIONAL ANTENNAS
MOBILE WIRE ANTENNA
E-21. The mobile wire antenna is basically a whip antenna without the
stiffness of a fiberglass whip. With the appropriate insulators and a
support system, it can become a vertical whip antenna (see Figure E-3).
This antenna is severely degraded when the range is unknown. Since the
vehicle acts as a reflector, the loose wire should be laid over the portion of
the vehicle that faces the receiving station. This ensures that the
reflected radio waves are radiated toward the receiving station. The
coaxial 52-ohm RF cable can be the same cable that is installed in the
vehicle (from the radio antenna receptacle to the antenna matching unit),
or it can be fabricated by the unit communications platoon. If fabricated,
the cable should be only long enough to reach from the radio to the
outside of the vehicle.

QUARTER-WAVELENGTH VERTICAL ANTENNA


E-22. Vertical antennas are omnidirectional. Most tactical antennas are
vertical, including the man-pack portable radio and the radios in tactical
vehicles. A vertical antenna can be improvised by using a metal pipe or
rod of the right length, held erect by guy wires. The lower end of the
antenna should be insulated from the ground by placing it on a large
block of wood or other insulating material. A vertical antenna may also be
a wire supported by a tree or a wooden pole (see Figure E-4). For short
vertical antennas, the pole may be used without guy wires (if properly
supported at the base). If the length of the vertical mast is not long
enough to support the wire upright, it may be necessary to modify the
connection at the top of the antenna (see Figure E-5).

E-6
________________________________________________________________ Appendix E – Antennas

Figure E-3. Examples of Mobile Wire Antennas

Figure E-4. Field-Expedient Substitutes for


Support of Vertical Wire Antennas (Part One)

E-7
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure E-5. Modified Support Substitutes


for Vertical Wire Antennas (Part Two)

E-23. A quarter-wavelength antenna may be used to replace a regular


whip antenna. The following steps explain how to erect a quarter-
wavelength vertical antenna:

· Step 1. Using the reference chart in Table E-2 or the formula


for a quarter-wavelength antenna provided earlier in this
discussion, determine the length of WD-1 wire needed.
· Step 2. Attach an insulator to one end of the wire and insert the
other end (stripped) into the antenna connector on the radio.
· Step 3. Tie a rope to the insulator end and throw the rope
over a limb.
· Step 4. Pull the insulator up until it is vertical.

Table E-2. Quarter-Wavelength Antenna Reference Chart

ELEMENT LENGTH
OPERATING FREQUENCY
(radiating element and
(in MHz)
ground-plane elements
30 2.38 m (7 ft 10 in)
32 2.23 m (7 ft 4 in)
34 2.1 m (6 ft 11 in)
36 1.98 m (6 ft 6 in)
38 1.87 m (6 ft 2 in)
40 1.78 m (5 ft 10 in)
43 1.66 m (5 ft 5 in)
46 1.55 m (5 ft 1 in)
49 1.46 m (4 ft 9 in)
52 1.37 m (4 ft 6 in)
55 1.3 m (4 ft 3 in)
58 1.23 m (4 ft)
61 1.17 m (3 ft 10 in)
64 1.12 m (3 ft 8 in)
68 1.05 m (3 ft 5 in)
72 .99 m (3 ft 3 in)
76 .94 m (3 ft 1 in)

E-24. If insulated wire is used, be sure to loop the wire around the
handle of the radio before attaching it to the antenna connector. If the
antenna is made of bare wire, use a stake and insulator to keep the
antenna wire from pulling out of the antenna connector on the radio.

BIDIRECTIONAL ANTENNAS
END-FED HALF-WAVELENGTH ANTENNA

E-8
________________________________________________________________ Appendix E – Antennas

E-25. An emergency end-fed hail-wavelength antenna can be


constructed from available materials such as field wire, rope, and wooden
insulators. The electrical length of this antenna is measured from the
antenna terminal on the radio set to the far end of the antenna. The
antenna should be constructed longer than necessary and then shortened,
as required, until best results are obtained. For this antenna to function
efficiently, the ground terminal of the radio set should be connected to a
good earth ground. This type of bidirectional antenna will normally be
used as a field-expedient retrans station. The user must position his
antenna parallel to the ground between the sender and the receiver
stations. (See Figure E-6.)

Figure E-6. Field-Expedient End-Fed


Half-Wavelength Antenna

E-26. Long-wire antennas of unspecified length are bidirectional. They


are most effective along a line extending from the two ends of the wire. A
100-foot, long-wire antenna will work when the radio is operating in the
30 to 80 MHz frequency range. For high-frequency operation, the antenna
wire must be longer. This antenna will improve the range of the radio in
the directions in which the wire is stretched. The following steps explain
how the bidirectional antenna works:

· Step 1. Erect a pole or select a tree in line with the direction


you want to communicate. The antenna should be at least 20

E-9
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

feet high. If you use a tree, make sure the antenna does not
touch any of the branches.
· Step 2. Tie the rope to the pole or tree. While holding the
other end of the antenna wire, pace off 100 feet from the
direction in which you want to communicate. Tie an insulator
to the end of the wire.
· Step 3. Prepare a mast or pole for the second support. To
make a substitute pulley, tie a length of WD-1 wire or nylon
rope to the top of the mast. Leave a good, firm loop.
· Stop 4. Put a rope or wire halyard through the loop and
attach it to the other aide of the insulator. Leave enough rope
to pull the antenna up once the mast is erected.
· Stop 5. Attach 25 feet of WD-1 wire to the antenna side of the
insulator. Make a good electrical connection because this is
the antenna lead-in.
· Stop 6. Put up the second support about 6 feet beyond the
end of the 100-foot antenna. This allows for the insulators at
each end.
· Step 7. Attach guy supports to both sides of the antenna. This
will not be necessary if a tree is used, but any pole you put up
will require a back guy wire because stretching the antenna
puts considerable strain on it.
· Step 8. Pull on the halyard until the antenna is level, then tie
the halyard to the supporting pole.
· Step 9. Connect the WD-1 wire lead-in to the radio.

VERTICAL HALF-WAVELENGTH ANTENNA


E-27. Figure E-7 shows an improvised vertical half-wavelength
antenna. This technique is used primarily with FM radios. It is effective
in heavily wooded areas to increase the range of portable radios. The top
guy wire can be connected to a limb or passed over the limb and
connected to the tree trunk or a stake.

E-10
________________________________________________________________ Appendix E – Antennas

Figure E-7. Improvised Vertical


Half-Wavelength Antenna

WIRE ANTENNA
E-28. Pick a support that is at least 15 feet high and pointed in the
direction you need to communicate. Move your vehicle/radio so the
support is on a line with the station you need to reach and 100 feet from
you. Tie a piece of rope or WD-1 wire to the tree or pole you have selected
as a support. Attach an insulator to the rope or WD-1 wire tied to the
support. Connect 100 feet of WD-1 wire (antenna) to the insulator. Pull
the slack out of the antenna. Wrap the other end of the WD-1 wire around
the lower part of the broken whip to secure it, and connect the wire to the
antenna connector on the radio. Make sure you remove the control cable
and antenna cable connecting the matching unit and radio. You are now
ready to operate, as illustrated in Figure E-8. Remember to point your
antenna in the right direction. In addition, do not tie the antenna close to
the tree’s foliage. Also remember that you have converted the original
omnidirectional antenna into a bidirectional antenna.

Figure E-8. Field-Expedient Wire Antenna

E-29. Note that the antenna you have constructed has a long piece of
wire as a replacement for the whip. Long-wire antennas are covered later
in this discussion. Do not expect optimum transmission quality in all
directions from this antenna.

UNIDIRECTIONAL ANTENNAS
E-30. Dismounted patrols can greatly improve their communications in
the jungle by using field-expedient antennas. While moving, you are
generally restricted to using the short and long antennas that come with

E-11
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

your radios. When you are not moving, however, a field-expedient


antenna will allow you to broadcast farther and receive more clearly.
Keep this fact in mind: an antenna that is not tuned to the
operating frequency is not as effective as the whip antennas that
are supplied with your radio. Circuits inside the radio load the whip
antennas properly so that they are tuned to give maximum output. A
whip antenna is not as effective as a tuned doublet or tuned ground-
plane, but the doublet or ground-plane must be tuned to the operating
frequency.

VERTICAL HALF-RHOMBIC AND LONG-WIRE ANTENNAS


E-31. The vertical half-rhombic (VHR) antenna (see Figure E-9) and the
long-wire antenna (see Figure E-10) are unidirectional. These antennas
consist of a single wire, preferably two or more wavelengths long. The
wire is supported on poles and hung 3 to 7 meters (approximately 10 to 20
feet) above the ground. The antennas will, however, operate satisfactorily
as low as 1 meter (approximately 3 feet) above the ground. The far end of
the wire is connected to the ground through a noninductive resistor of 500
to 600 ohms. To make sure the resistor is not burned out by the power
output of the transmitter, use a resistor rated at one-half or more of the
wattage output of your transmitter. A reasonably good ground, such as
several ground rods or a counterpoise, should be used at both ends of the
antenna. The radiation pattern is directional. The antennas are used
primarily for transmitting or receiving high-frequency signals.

Figure E-9. Vertical Half-Rhombic Antenna

E-12
________________________________________________________________ Appendix E – Antennas

Figure E-10. Long-Wire Antenna

Vertical Half-Rhombic Antenna


E-32. If you need more distance and direction than your whip antenna
will allow, try making a VHR antenna. Before building the antenna,
determine the direction of the station you need to reach. Line up your
antenna and plan all of your work in that direction. Use the following
steps to build a VHR antenna:

· Cut 100 feet of wire for the antenna itself.


· Cut 91 feet of wire for a counterpoise. This is a wire stretched
across the bottom of the antenna that acts as an artificial
ground to help produce the required radiation pattern. This
antenna can be used without the counterpoise, but it will not
work as well.
· Connect an insulator to each end of the antenna wire and one
at the middle as illustrated in Figure E-9. Add a tie-down
wire outside the insulators on each end of the antenna wire.
· Connect the counterpoise to the insulators at the same point
as the tie-down wire.
· Select or erect a middle support (a tree, a pole, or a wire or
rope suspended between two trees or structures). The
midpoint must be at least 30 feet high.
· Stretch the counterpoise in the direction of the target station,
with the middle of the counterpoise at the center support.
Drive stakes near each tie-down wire. Stretch the
counterpoise tightly and tie it to the stakes. Elevate the
center of the antenna until it is tight.
· Run a wire from the antenna terminal and connect it to the
antenna above the insulator. Run a second wire from a
screwhead on your radio case to the bottom of the insulator.
· Place a 600-ohm, 2-watt carbon resistor at the end toward the
desired station; this will allow the antenna to transmit toward
the desired station only. Make sure the resistor is carbon and
not wire wound. A 2-watt resistor will work for the AN/PRC-
77, but a resistor with a wattage rating of half the power
output is needed for higher-power radios.

Long-Wire Antenna
E-33. When erecting a long-wire antenna, do not forget the basics. The
overall length of the antenna wire must be 3 to 7 wavelengths of the
operating frequency. Use the reference chart in Table F-3 or the
appropriate formula provided earlier in this discussion to calculate the

E-13
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

correct wire length for the frequency on which you are operating. This
antenna is unidirectional for low power VHF radios if you use the 500- to
600-ohm, 2-watt carbon resistor. It is bidirectional, however, for high-
power VHF and HF, because in the field you will not be able to obtain a
carbon resistor large enough to terminate the higher-powered radios. Set
it up for the direction in which you want to communicate because it is
definitely not omnidirectional.
E-34. Erect the antenna as shown in Figure E-10. You will have to use
some side guys on the 9- to 10-foot poles to hold them up firmly. You will
find you can communicate over longer distances in either one or two
directions.

V-ANTENNAS
E-35. The V-antenna is another field-expedient unidirectional antenna.
It consists of two wires forming a V, with the open area of the V pointing
toward the desired direction of transmission/reception (see Figure E-11).
To make construction easier, the legs may slope downward from the apex
of the V. This is called a sloping-V antenna (see Figure E-12).
E-36. To achieve maximum performance, the angle between the legs
varies with the length of the legs. Use Table E-3 to determine the angle
and length of the legs. When the antenna is used with more than one
frequency or wavelength, use an apex angle that is midway between the
extreme angles indicated in the chart.
E-37. To make the antenna radiate in only one direction, connect
noninductive terminating resistors from the end of each leg (not at the
apex) to the ground. The resistors should be approximately 500 ohms and
have a power rating at least half that of the power output of the
transmitter being used. Without the resistors, the antenna radiates
bidirectionally, both front and back.
E-38. The V-antenna must be fed by a balanced transmission line.

Figure E-11. V-Antenna

E-14
________________________________________________________________ Appendix E – Antennas

Figure E-12. Sloping-V Antenna

Table E-3. Leg Angle for V-Antennas

ANTENNA LENGTH OPTIMUM APEX ANGLE


(wavelength) (degrees)
1 90
2 70
3 58
4 50
6 40
8 35
10 33

VERTICAL WHIP ANTENNA WITH REFLECTOR


E-39. A reflector placed approximately one-quarter wavelength behind
a vertical whip antenna may also improve the performance of a whip
antenna. A reflector is a vertical wire or metallic pole (or another whip)
that is insulated from the ground. It is placed so that the reflector, the
whip, and the distant station are on a straight line. The reflector will
reflect radio energy striking it and will cause the energy to travel toward
the distant station, thereby increasing the total energy radiated in the
desired direction. To work properly, the reflector must be longer than the
whip. If the reflector is shorter, it will act as a director and cause the
radio signal to be directed away from the distant station. Remember: a
reflector is longer and is placed behind the whip; a director is shorter and
is placed between the whip and the distant station. While listening to the

E-15
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

distant station, adjust the position of the reflector until the strongest
signal is received. (See Figure E-13.)

Figure E-13. Vertical Whip Antenna with Reflector

FIELD-EXPEDIENT 500- TO 600-OHM/2-WATT RESISTOR


E-40. The following materials are needed to construct a field-expedient
resistor:

· One BA-30 (D size) battery.


· Two nails or metal spikes.
· Tape or wire.
· One wood insulator.

E-41. The following steps (illustrated in Figure E-14) explain how to


make the resistor and how to attach it to the antenna and counterpoise
wires:

· Step 1. Drive nails into each end of the BA-30, leaving room
to attach a wire at each end.
· Step 2. Attach a wire (approximately 6 inches long) to each
nail (metal-to-metal contact must be made).
· Step 3. Secure the BA-30 to the wooden insulator with tape
or wire.
· Step 4. Attach the antenna wire to the insulator while
simultaneously attaching the wire from the BA-30 to the
antenna wire (metal-to-metal contact must be made).
· Step 5. Attach the counterpoise wire to the insulator while
simultaneously attaching the loose wire from the BA-30 to the
counterpoise wire (metal-to-metal contact must be made).

E-16
________________________________________________________________ Appendix E – Antennas

Figure E-14. Field-Expedient Resistor

ANTENNA CONNECTIONS
E-42. Of all the antennas used In the Army, the whip antenna is the
most common. It is omnidirectional and can be used to communicate
while on the move. The OE-254 antenna takes a little time to set up, but
it produces a stronger signal than the vehicle-mounted whip and is
omnidirectional. Bidirectional and unidirectional antennas are somewhat
more difficult to construct and align, but the security gained from being
less open to the threat may be worth the effort. On the other hand, no
antenna is worth much if you do not have a good connection. You must
make sure the antenna’s lead connections are clean and free of corrosion.

E-17
Appendix F

Demolitions and Obstacles


This appendix deals with
CONTENTS
demolitions and obstacles
that scouts may have to Demolitions ................................................... F-1
Priming Explosives ............................... F-2
breach or construct. A Firing Systems ....................................... F-3
reconnaissance section’s basic Safety ...................................................... F-3
load of demolitions will Modern Demolition Initiator Firing
provide enough explosives Systems .............................................. F-5
and mines to breach or Fundamental Considerations ............... F-11
Selection and Calculation of Charges . F-12
construct an obstacle during a Placement of Charges .......................... F-16
mission. Steel-Cutting Charges .......................... F-17
Bridge Abutment Destruction .............. F-20
Timber-Cutting Charges ....................... F-20
Obstacle Destruction ............................ F-22
Cratering Charges ................................. F-25
Mines .......................................................... F-26
Mines Employed by US Forces ............ F-27
Types of Minefields ............................... F-33
Minefield Emplacement
Requirements ..................................... F-33
Hasty Protective Minefield .................... F-34
Minefield Marking .................................. F-35
Obstacle Characteristics and Report
Formats ........................................... F-36
Obstacle Types ...................................... F-36
Report Formats ..................................... F-36
Obstacle Turnover ........................................ F-38
Obstacle Breaching Capabilities ................ F-38
Actions on Contact (with Obstacles) ... F-38
Breaching and Clearing Operations .... F-40
Obstacle-Crossing Capabilities ........... F-41
Field-Expedient Mines and Demolitions .... F-42
Expedient Mines .................................... F-42
Expedient Demolitions ......................... F-47
Miscellaneous Improvised
Demolitions ........................................ F-49
Field-Expedient Delays ......................... F-55
Common Chemicals in
Field-Expedient Demolitions ............ F-55

SECTION I – DEMOLITIONS

F-1. This discussion outlines basic guidelines for the employment of


demolitions in military operations. Table F-1 summarizes the
characteristics and uses of military explosives.

F-1
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

WARNING
The following discussion and accompanying
illustrations may not provide enough information to
allow safe employment of explosives; therefore,
scouts must be thoroughly familiar with fuzes,
charge settings, and firing demolitions before using
this information. For further information, refer to FM
3-34.310 (FM 5-34) and FM 3-34.214 (FM 5-250).

Table F-1. Characteristics of Military Explosives

PRIMING EXPLOSIVES
F-1. Explosives may be primed, either electrically or nonelectrically, with a detonating cord.
Refer to the illustration in Figure F-1.

Figure F-1. Detonating Cord Priming

F-2
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles

FIRING SYSTEMS
F-2. Firing systems may be electric or nonelectric. A dual-firing
system is composed of two completely separate systems. They may be
dual electric, dual nonelectric, or a combination of electric and
nonelectric. Figure F-2 illustrates a combination dual-firing system.

Figure F-2. Combination Dual-Firing System

SAFETY
F-3. To ensure safety in the employment of explosives, scouts must
maintain a minimum safe distance. Table F-2 lists the minimum safe
distances for detonation of explosives in the open.
F-4. Explosives may be prematurely detonated by induced currents.
Figure F-3 shows the distances at which transmitters can detonate
explosives by transmitted induced currents. The left column indicates
average power and peak power for all other transmissions.
F-5. Electric firing should not be performed within 155 meters (504
feet) of energized power transmission lines. When it is necessary to
conduct blasting operations at distances closer than 155 meters,
nonelectric firing systems should be used or the power lines de-energized.

F-3
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Table F-2. Minimum Safe Distances for Explosives

EXPLOSIVES SAFE DISTANCE EXPLOSIVES SAFE DISTANCE


(pounds of charge) in meters (feet) (pounds of charge) in meters (feet)

1 to 22 300 (900) 120 534 (1,590)

24 311 (930) 140 560 (1,690)

28 327 (980) 160 585 (1,750)

32 342 (1,020) 180 609 (1,820)

36 356 (1,070) 200 630 (1,890)

40 369 (1,100) 220 651 (1,950)

48 392 (1,170) 240 670 (2,000)

56 413 (1,240) 260 688 (2,070)

64 431 (1,290) 280 705 (2,100)

72 449 (1,330) 300 722 (2,160)

80 465 (1,390) 320 737 (2,210)

100 500 (1,500) 340 750 (2,250)

NOTE: The safe distances listed in this table will normally apply to peacetime conduct of ranges. To
detonate a road crater (about 4 X 40 pounds of cratering charges), it would not be appropriate
to move 800 meters away, especially when using an electric circuit to detonate it.

Figure F-3. Premature Detonation by Induced Current

CAUTION
If electric blasting caps are to be transported near
operating transmitters or vehicles (including helicopters)
in which a transmitter is to be operated, the caps must
be placed in a metal can. The cover of the can must be
snug and lap over the body of the can to a minimum
depth of 1/2 inch. Caps should not be removed from the
container in proximity of the operating transmitters. The
metal container must have metal-to-metal contact with
the lid.

F-4
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles

F-6. Misfires should be handled by the person who placed the charge.
For safety purposes, allow 30 minutes before investigating the misfire on
all nonelectric or buried charges. Aboveground misfires should be blown
in place by priming at least 1 pound of explosive and placing it as close as
possible to the charge without disturbing it. When dealing with buried
misfires, remove excess earth, except for at least 1 foot of earth around
the charge. Then blow the charge in place with at least 2 pounds of
explosive. Do not attempt to move or disarm a misfire, and do not
abandon misfired explosives.

MODERN DEMOLITION INITIATOR FIRING SYSTEMS


F-7. Modern demolition initiators (MDI), a family of nonelectric
blasting caps and associated items described in Table F-3, have been used
in the civilian sector for more than 20 years. The snap-together
components simplify initiation systems and some types of explosive
priming. The MDI system was developed to effectively replace electric
demolition systems. It removes the requirement to dual-initiate
demolition systems except when there is a high probability of the system
becoming cut. Refer to FM 3-34.310 (FM 5-34) and FM 3-34.214 (FM 5-
250) for more information on MDI.
F-8. Nonelectric priming with MDIs is safer and more reliable than
the current nonelectric priming methods. MDI blasting caps are factory-
crimped to precut lengths of shock tube or time-blasting fuse. Because the
caps are sealed units, they are moisture-resistant and will not misfire in
damp conditions. A shock tube may be spliced using excess shock tube
from an M12 or M13 or a precut splicing-tube splicing kit. Every splice in
a shock tube reduces the reliability of the priming system. Prime military
explosives with the MDI the same as with standard, nonelectric initiation
systems. Use only high-strength MDI blasting caps (M11, M14, M15) to
prime explosive charges. M12 and M13 relay-type blasting caps do not
have sufficient power to detonate most explosives, although you can use
all MDI blasting caps to initiate a shock tube. Use only the M11, M14, or
M15 blasting caps to initiate detonating cord or military explosives
directly.

WARNING
Use care when cutting and splicing the shock tube.
When cutting the shock tube, always tie an overhand
knot in the left over shock tube.

F-5
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Table F-3. MDI Components

TYPES OF MDI FIRING SYSTEMS


F-9. With the introduction of MDI components, there will be two types
of firing systems: a stand-alone firing system and a combination firing
system. Both systems can be emplaced as single- or dual-firing systems.
The choice of which system to use for a particular demolition mission is
left to the experience of the reconnaissance leader. The combination firing
system, however, is the preferred method for reserved demolition targets.
See FM 3-34.214 (FM 5-250) for detailed instructions on both systems.

Stand-Alone System

F-6
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles

F-10. The stand-alone firing system is one in which the initiation sets
and transmission and branch lines are constructed using only MDI
components and the explosive charges are primed with MDI blasting
caps. It is important to ensure that the firing system is balanced. All
charges must have the same distance in shock-tube length from the firing
point to the charge. Figure F-4 shows the single-firing MDI system;
Figure F-5 shows the dual-firing MDI system; and Figure F-6 shows a
branch-line array.

Figure F-4. MDI Single-Firing System (Single-Primed)

Figure F-5. MDI Dual-Firing System (Single-Primed)

F-7
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure F-6. Branch-Line Array (M11s or M16s)

F-11. The disadvantage of a single-firing system is that if the


transmission line is cut, any charges down line from the cut will not
detonate. If there is a possibility of the transmission lines being cut (for
example, through artillery fires), a second firing system should be added
as shown in Figure F-5. Note that the charges in this case are now dual-
primed. The transmission line is laid in the opposite direction of the first
transmission line to create a balanced system.

CAUTION
When making multiple shock tube installations, take care
to protect the shock tubes from the effects of nearby
relay caps and charges. The shrapnel produced by a cap
or charge could easily cause a (partial or complete)
misfire. When there are many shock tubes involved in a
shot, place them carefully away from the junction.

F-12. Use the stand-alone MDI firing system for all types of demolition
missions, including bridge demolitions. The MDI firing system can be
used to initiate reserved demolition targets; however, under current
internationally agreed-upon doctrine, charges cannot be primed with
blasting caps until a change of readiness from state 1 (safe) to state 2
(armed) is ordered. Priming every charge with MDI blasting caps at this
critical moment would take a considerable amount of time and be
unacceptable to the maneuver commander. Priming charges with
detonating cord is the preferred method on reserved demolition targets.

Combination Firing System


F-13. A combination firing system is one that consists of the MDI
initiation set; either a detonating-cord line or ring main; and branch lines
that can be either MDI, detonating cord, or a mix of both. Figure F-7
shows a combination firing system.

F-8
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles

F-14. Use the combination firing system (MDI and detonating cord) for
all types of demolition missions. It combines the advantages of MDI
components with the simplicity and flexibility of detonating cord. The
combination firing system is the preferred method for reserved demolition
targets, underwater operations, and operations where subsurface-laid
charges are used.

WARNING
Do not dispose of used shock tubes by burning
them because of potentially toxic fumes given off
from the burning plastic.

Figure F-7. Combination Firing System


(MDI and Detonating Cord; Dual-Primed)

SPLICING THE SHOCK TUBE


F-15. MDIs are extremely reliable because all of the components are
sealed. Unlike standard nonelectric priming components, they cannot be
easily degraded by moisture. Cutting the shock tube makes the open ends
vulnerable to moisture. Dampening the explosive film on the inside of the
shock tube will stop a detonation from going beyond such a damp spot.
Use care when cutting and splicing the shock tube. When cutting the
shock tube, always tie an overhand knot in the leftover shock tube. Use
splicing to repair a break in the shock tube of a transmission or branch
line (caused, for example, by shrapnel from artillery fires) or to extend
the shock tube of another MDI blasting cap, but only when necessary.
This is done by using excess shock tube from an M12 or M13 shock-tube
blasting cap when the entire length is not needed.
F-16. Every splice in the shock tube reduces the reliability of the firing
system. Keep the number of splices in a shock-tube line to as few as
practicable. Unless splicing is absolutely necessary, use of a full, sealed
MDI component is recommended. (NOTE: Do not splice the shock tube
while conducting water or diving demolition missions.)

F-9
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

CAUTION
Taping two cut ends of the shock tube together does not
make a reliable splice.

SAFETY PROCEDURES
F-17. When conducting training and missions with MDIs, follow the
general safety considerations for demolitions as given in FM 3-34.310
(FM 5-34), FM 3-34.214 (FM 5-250), and AR 385-63. Because MDI
components are delivered from the factory precrimped, they are more
reliable and safer to handle and use than the current standard military
blasting caps. Test results for MDI components have shown that the
blasting caps always function correctly if the shock tube is properly
initiated. Misfires normally occur only under the following conditions:

· The M81 fuse igniter is not properly connected to the shock


tube before initiation.
· The shock tube is cut by shrapnel during the initiation
process.
· The shock tube is incorrectly inserted into the holders on the
M12 or M13 blasting caps or into the M9 holder.
· The shock tube is cut using crimpers.

WARNING
Use of MDIs is not authorized for belowground or
internal charges.

F-18. Transportation and storage of blasting caps require special


consideration. When transporting or storing MDI blasting caps, do not
mix them with other explosives. The caps must be placed in a suitable
container or in a separate vehicle.

MDI MISFIRE CLEARING PROCEDURES


F-19. In most misfires of shock tube blasting caps, which are
nonelectric, these standard rules apply:

· If the primer in the M81 does not fire (the most common
problem), recock the M81 by pushing in on the pull rod to
reset the firing pin, and then actuate the igniter again. If two
or three retries result in a nonfiring, cut the shock tube,
replace the igniter with a new one, and repeat the firing
procedure.
· If the M81 fires and blows the shock tube out of its securing
mechanism without it firing, cut about 3 feet from the end of
the shock tube, replace with a new igniter, and repeat the
firing procedure.

F-10
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles

· If the M81 appears to have functioned properly but the charge


did not fire, cut a 1-foot section from the shock tube starting 6
inches from the igniter. Hold the 1-foot piece of shock tube so
one end is over your palm; gently blow through the other end.
If a fine powder comes out from the shock tube, it has not
fired. Install a new igniter on the freshly cut end of the
priming shock tube and repeat the firing procedure. If no fine
powder comes out from the shock tube or the shock tube was
heard to fire or its flash was seen, wait for 30 minutes before
moving downrange to check the components in the firing
system.
· After waiting 30 minutes, proceed downrange and check all
components in the firing system. The most likely cause of a
misfire is the incorrect placement of the shock tube in the
plastic connectors of the M12/13s or the M9 holder. If
incorrect placement was the problem, replace the fired section
and properly connect and refire the device.
· If the first component of the firing train did not fail, check out
each succeeding component until you find the one that failed.
Replace the failed or fired relay components back to the
initiating site and refire.
· If the final high-strength blasting cap seems to be the failed
component, replace it if it is easily accessible. However, if it is
used to prime an explosive charge, do not disturb it. Place a
new, primed 1-pound explosive charge next to the misfired
charge and detonate it when it is safe.

FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
F-20. The amount of explosive used in any demolition project is
determined by the demolition charts. The following critical factors apply:

· Type and strength of material. A demolition target may be


constructed of timber, steel, or other material. Concrete
reinforced with steel increases the strength of the target.
· Size and shape of target. Large targets, such as concrete
piers and steel I-beams, may be attacked more economically
using multiple charges rather than a single charge.
· Desired demolition effect. Consider the extent of
demolition and other desired effects. For example, in
constructing an abatis, consider which direction the trees
should fall.
· Type of explosive. All charts in this chapter reflect the
number of M112 (1¼-pound) blocks of C4 to be used.
· Size and shape of charge. Use the demolition charts in this
chapter to calculate the amount of explosive needed. When
external charges are used without special placement
techniques, a flat, square charge with a thickness-to-width
ratio of 1-to-3 or more will give acceptable results.
· Charge placement. For cratering, place charges in holes
below the ground. For breaking or collapsing stone or

F-11
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

concrete, locate charges on the surface or in boreholes. For


cutting timber, tie charges on the outside surface or place
them in boreholes, whichever is more practical. Fasten
charges to the target by wire, adhesive compound, tape, or
string. Prop charges against the target with a frame made of
scrap wood or metal or other available materials.
· Method of initiation. The method of initiation is not critical
except for special types of charges, such as shaped charges or
diamond charges.
· Method of tamping. Detonating an explosive produces
pressure in all directions. If the charge is not completely
sealed or confined or if material surrounding the explosive is
not equally strong on all sides, the explosive force will escape
through the weakest point. To keep as much explosive force as
possible on the desired objective, pack the material around
the charge. This material is called tamping material; the
process is tamping.

F-21. For the most destructive effect, an explosive charge must be of the
size and shape that best fits the target; it must be detonated in close
contact with the target. Any significant air or water gap between the
target and the explosive will lessen the force of the shock wave. Several
types of charges, such as sheet explosives or plastic explosives, can be cut
or molded to fit odd-shaped targets.
F-22. Whenever possible, place explosive charges to act on or through
the smallest or weakest part of the target. Internal charges produce the
greatest destructive effect for the least amount of explosive. Internal
charges are placed in boreholes in the target. They are confined by tightly
packed sand, wet clay, or other material. This is called stemming. Tamp
and pack the stemming material against the explosive to fill the hole to
the surface.
F-23. Place external charges on the surface of the target. Tamp the
charges by covering them with packed sand, clay, or other dense material.
This increases their destructive effect. Tamping may be loose or in
sandbags. To be most effective, the thickness of the tamping should at
least equal the breaching radius. Small breaching charges on horizontal
surfaces are sometimes tamped by packing several inches of wet clay or
mud around them. This process is called mudcapping.

SELECTION AND CALCULATION OF CHARGES


F-24. Figure F-8 shows charge calculation steps. Tables F-4 through F-7
provide solutions for the number of C4 M112 (1¼-pound) blocks/boxes of
C4 explosive that are required to destroy or neutralize a target.

F-12
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles

Figure F-8. Explosive Calculation Steps

BREACHING CHARGE TABLES


F-25. To use the tables for calculating breaching charges (Tables F-4
through F-7), determine the type of material in the object you plan to
destroy. If in doubt, assume the material to be the stronger type. The four
tables cover breaching charges to be used in destroying the following
materials:

· Reinforced concrete (Table F-4).


· Dense concrete or first-class masonry (Table F-5).
· Ordinary masonry, hardpan, shale, rock, good timber,
ordinary concrete, or earth construction (Table F-6).
· Earth (Table F-7).

Table F-4. Breaching Charges for Reinforced Concrete

F-13
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Table F-5. Breaching Charges for Dense Concrete


or First-Class Masonry

Table F-6. Breaching Charges for Ordinary Masonry,


Hardpan, Shale, Rock, Good Timber, Ordinary Concrete,
or Earth Construction

F-14
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles

Table F-7. Breaching Charges for Earth Structures

CORRELATING THICKNESS OF OBJECT AND PLACEMENT OF CHARGE


F-26. In deciding how to place the charge against the object, compare
the method of placement with the diagrams in Figure F-9. Use the letter
matching the diagram to select the appropriate column in the breaching
charge tables (NOTE: Refer to Tables F-4 through F-7; as noted, the
tables are based on the material to be destroyed.) Then determine the
thickness of the material. On the breaching charge tables, find the
intersection of these two factors (placement and thickness) to determine
how many M112 (1¼-pound) blocks of C4 it will take to destroy the object.

F-15
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure F-9. Methods of Placement for Explosive Charges

NUMBER OF CHARGES
F-27. Calculate the number of charges required to demolish a pier, slab,
or wall using this formula:

N = W/2R
N = Number of charges
W = Width of pier, slab, or wall (in feet)
R = Breaching radius (in feet)
NOTE: The multiplier 2 in the formula is constant.

F-28. If the calculated value of N is between zero and 1¼, use one
charge. If the value is between 1¼ and 2½, use two charges. If the value
is greater than 2½, round it to the nearest whole number.

PLACEMENT OF CHARGES
F-29. For best results, arrange the charges in a flat square shape with
the flat side toward the target. The first charge is placed in from one side
of the target; the remainder of the charges are spaced at a distance of 2R
apart. When breaching hard-surface pavements, use one M112 (1¼-

F-16
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles

pound) block of C4 for each 2 inches of surface. If you are breaching


concrete-beam bridges, breach each beam individually. Figure F-10 lists
the thickness of the charge relative to the number of charges used.

Figure F-10. Thickness of Breaching Charge

F-30. The positions available for placement of explosive charges on


piers and walls are limited. Unless a demolition chamber is available,
place the charge (or charges) against one face of the target. A charge
placed above ground level is more effective than one placed directly on
the ground. When several charges are required to destroy a pier, slab, or
wall and elevated charges are desired, they are distributed equally at no
less than one breaching radius above the base of the object to be
demolished. This method makes best use of the shock wave of the blast. If
time permits, tamp all charges thoroughly with damp soil or filled
sandbags. Tamping must be equal to or greater than the breaching
radius. For piers, slabs, or walls that are partially submerged in water,
place charges equal to or greater than the breaching radius below the
waterline, if possible.

STEEL-CUTTING CHARGES
F-31. In the employment steel-cutting charges, the type of explosive is
critical to success. Confinement or tamping of the charge is rarely
practical or possible. Placement of the charge in direct contact with the
target is more important with steel than with other materials.
F-32. Select steel-cutting charges for their cutting effect and
adaptability to placement. The M112 block (C4) is a highly adaptable
explosive. Its size and shape are suitable for most steel-cutting
operations, and it can be used without cutting or reshaping. In addition,
the M112 block adapts well to steel targets because of the adhesive
compound on one face, which allows it to be affixed securely to the target.
F-33. The amount of steel-cutting charge to be used depends on the type
and size of steel and the kind of charge to be used. Figure F-11 shows
formulas for the use of TNT in steel-cutting operations. Table F-8 lists the
amount of C4 explosive required in steel-cutting operations.

F-17
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure F-11. Formulas for Use of TNT in Steel-Cutting Charges

Table F-8. Amount of C4 (M112) Required


to Cut Steel Sections

RULES OF THUMB FOR STEEL-CUTTING CHANGES


F-34. In the following examples of steel-cutting situations, the required
explosive is either TNT or plastic explosive (the RE factor is not needed).

Rails
F-35. Cut rails at crossings, switches, or curves. Cut at alternate rail
splices for a distance of 500 feet. The rules of thumb are the following:

· For rails less than 5 inches high, use ½ pound.


· For rails 5 inches or higher, use 1 pound.
· At crossings and switches, use 1 pound.

Cables, Chains, Rods, and Bars


F-36. To cut through these items, use the following rules of thumb:
· Up to 1 inch in diameter, use 1 pound.
· From 1 inch to 2 inches in diameter, use 2 pounds.

F-18
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles

· Over 2 inches in diameter, use the formula P = 3/8 A. (Refer


to Figure F-11.)

NOTE: These guidelines apply to chains and cables that are under tension. Both sides of
the chain link must be cut.

CHARGE PLACEMENT
F-37. The size and type of steel section will determine the placement of
the explosive charge. Cut extended sections by placing all of the explosive
on one side of the section along the proposed line of rupture. In some steel
trusses with individual members fabricated from two or more primary
sections (such as angle irons or bars separated by spacer washers or
gusset plates), place the charge with opposing portions offset the same
distance as the thickness of the section being cut. This will produce a
shearing action. Heavier I-beams, wide flange beams, and columns can
also require auxiliary charges. Never place the charges directly opposite
each other because this tends to neutralize the explosive effect.
F-38. For an illustration of charge placement for cutting steel members
and railroad rails, refer to Figure F-12.

Figure F-12. Placement of Charges on Steel Members

BUILT-UP MEMBERS
F-39. Built-up members frequently have an irregular shape, making it
difficult to obtain close contact between the explosive charge and a
sufficient portion of the surface. If it is impractical to distribute the
charge properly to obtain close contact, increase the amount of explosive.

IRREGULARLY SHAPED STEEL


F-40. Composition C4 is effective for cutting irregularly shaped steel
because it can be easily molded or pressed into place to give maximum
contact. The M112 block explosive has an adhesive coating on one side,
which makes placement easier.

F-19
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

PRECAUTIONS
F-41. Place the steel-cutting charge on the same side as the firing party
because explosive charges throw steel fragments (missiles) long distances
at high velocities.

BRIDGE ABUTMENT DESTRUCTION


F-42. Procedures for destroying bridge abutments vary depending on
the thickness of the abutment. Refer to Figure F-13 for an illustration of
charge placement.

THICKNESS OF 1.5 METERS (5 FEET) OR LESS


F-43. Beginning 1.5 meters (5 feet) in from one side of the road, place
18.1 kilograms (40 pounds) of cratering charges in holes that are 1.5
meters (5 feet) deep, 1.5 meters (5 feet) on centers, and 1.5 meters (5 feet)
behind the river face of the abutment. If the abutments are over 6.1
meters (20 feet) high, add a row of breaching charges on the river face of
the abutment.

THICKNESS OF 1.5 METERS (5 FEET) OR MORE


F-44. Calculate charges using the breaching charge tables (see Tables
F-4 through F-7) and information provided earlier in this chapter. Place
the charges against the rear face at a depth equal to the thickness of the
abutment and space them the same as other breaching charges. When the
abutments are more than 6.1 meters (20 feet) high, add a row of
breaching charges on the river face at the base of the abutment and fire
all charges simultaneously.

Figure F- 13. Charge


Placement for Bridge
Abutment Destruction

TIMBER-CUTTING CHARGES
F-45. Use composition C4 for untamped, concentrated, external charges
because it can be easily tied or fastened to the target. Because types of
timber vary widely from locality to locality, it is impractical to try to cut
all kinds of timber with charges calculated from a single table. It may be
necessary, therefore, to make test shots to determine the size of charge

F-20
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles

needed to cut a specific type of timber. Table F-9 shows the amount of
M112 (1¼-pound blocks) C4 needed for the various sizes of timber. Figure
F-14 provides several formulas for determining timber-cutting charges
and illustrates charge placement.
F-46. Place the charge in a borehole parallel to the greatest dimension
of the cross section and tightly tamp it with moist earth. If the charge is
too large for one borehole, make two boreholes side by side in the
dimensional timber. For round timber, make two boreholes at
approximate right angles to each other, but do not intersect them (see
Figure F-15). Tamp both boreholes and fire the charges simultaneously.

Table F-9. Amount of C4 (M112) Required


for Timber-Cutting Charges

F-21
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure F-14. Timber-Cutting Formulas and Charge Placement

Figure F-15. Internal Timber-Cutting Charges

OBSTACLE DESTRUCTION
F-47. The reconnaissance platoon may be tasked to destroy obstacles.
The illustrations in Figures F-16 through F-20 show the recommended
methods for explosives placement to achieve the greatest destructive
effect with various types of obstacles.

Figure F-16. Breaching of a Backfilled Log Wall

F-22
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles

Figure F-17. Breaching of a Log Crib

F-23
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure F-18. Placement of Charges for Breaching of Walls

Figure F-19. Explosive Packs Required to Destroy


Typical Small Concrete Obstacles

F-24
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles

Figure F-20. Placement of Charges for Destruction


of Steel and Log Obstacles

CRATERING CHARGES
F-48. The explanation and sketches in Figure F-21 includes
explanations and illustrations for procedures to be used in creating
various types of road craters.

F-25
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure F-21. Road Cratering Charges

SECTION II – MINES

F-49. This discussion provides examples of mines employed by US


forces, including the reconnaissance platoon. The discussion also
examines the types of minefields the platoon may encounter on the

F-26
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles

battlefield. It covers how to record minefields after they have been


emplaced and how to mark and record lanes that have been cleared
through a minefield.

MINES EMPLOYED BY US FORCES


F-50. Figure F-22 illustrates various aspects of mine employment by
the US military, including the reconnaissance platoon. The information
covers characteristics of mines and firing devices and procedures for mine
installation, arming, and disarming.

F-27
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure F-22. US Mines

Figure F-22. US Mines (Continued)

F-28
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles

Figure F-22. US Mines (Continued)

F-29
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure F-22. US Mines (Continued)

F-30
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles

Figure F-22. US Mines (Continued)

F-31
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

NOTE: M = Mobility kill.


K = Crew kill.

CAUTION
1. Antipersonnel tripwire may not deploy properly if mines land in mud or snow.
2. Mine antihandling devices may cause premature destruction of mines if placed on snow.
3. Mine self-destruct times are classified CONFIDENTIAL and are available through unit.

Figure F-22. US Mines (Continued)

F-32
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles

TYPES OF MINEFIELDS
F-51. The reconnaissance platoon may employ or encounter one of four
main types of minefields. Refer to Table F-10 for a summary of
characteristics and uses of these minefields.

Table F-10. Minefield Types and Characteristics

AUTHORITY
TYPE DESCRIPTION TACTICAL REPORTS RECORDS MINES USED (Delegated
USE REQUIRED REQUIRED to)
AP AT S* **

Protective
Hasty Above-ground; Aids in unit’s Intention DA Form Brigade
X X X
protective random pattern; local, close-in Initiation 1355-1-R commander
no antihandling protection of (to parent (Battalion or
Completion
devices defensive unit) company
perimeter Change/
removal commander)

Deliberate Standard Same as hasty As above DA Form Division


X X
protective pattern; fenced deliberate (to author- 1355 (to commander
and marked minefield izing HQ) authorizing (Installing
HQ) commander)

Tactical Standard or As part of As above DA Form Division


random pattern; obstacle plan 1355 (to X X X commander
scatterable authorizing (Brigade
HQ) commander)

Nuisance Random Enhance As above As above Brigade


pattern; surface obstacles; X X X commander
or buried hinder use of (Battalion
key areas commander)

Phony Same as live Simulate other Same as Same as Same as


minefield being types of simulated simulated simulated
simulated minefields minefield minefield minefield

* Use the scatterable minefield report and records for all scatterable minefields (under “S” column).
** The corps commander is the initial employment authority for all scatterable minefields (“S” column). Long
self-destruct minefields (more than 24 hours) may be delegated to division and brigade level. Short self-
destruct minefields (24 hours or less) may be delegated to battalion/task force level.

MINEFIELD EMPLACEMENT REQUIREMENTS


F-52. Of the four types of minefields, the reconnaissance platoon will
most frequently be tasked to emplace a hasty protective minefield. It will
rarely emplace a deliberate protective minefield. Scouts may employ a row
minefield and, occasionally, if time allows, a standard pattern minefield.
F-53. Emplacement of a row minefield (three rows, 60 meters by 100
meters, 100 AT mines) consumes about 30 platoon minutes (30 scouts) if
done by hand. This time does not include fuzing and uncrating of the
mines.

HASTY PROTECTIVE MINEFIELD

F-33
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

F-54. Hasty protective minefields are generally emplaced by small units


at outposts, work sites, bivouac areas, or ambush sites. The
reconnaissance platoon may also use them to supplement manned
weapons, prevent tactical surprise, or provide early warning of threat
advances.
F-55. Mines should be readily detectable and removable. They should
be sited across likely avenues of approach and within range of organic
weapons and visual observation. If the minefield includes M18A1 AP
mines or will be employed for more than 72 hours, it should be marked by
signs or fences or have guards to warn friendly troops.
F-56. The hasty protective minefield must be recorded on DA Form
1355-1-R, which is illustrated in Figure F-23. If the form is not available,
improvise one. The unit that installs the minefield should warn adjacent
units and inform higher headquarters. This unit must either remove the
field before leaving the area or transfer the responsibility to the relieving
unit commander.

Figure F-23. Hasty


Protective Minefield Record

MINEFIELD MARKING

F-34
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles

F-57. Figure F-24 shows a standard pattern minefield with appropriate


markings. Figure F-25 illustrates several methods of marking lanes
through a minefield.

Figure F-24. Standard Pattern Minefield


(Fenced, Marked, and Referenced)

Figure F-25. Standard Rear Area Lane Marking Procedures

F-35
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

SECTION III – OBSTACLE CHARACTERISTICS AND REPORT FORMATS

OBSTACLE TYPES
F-58. Figure F-26 shows various obstacles that the reconnaissance
platoon may encounter during combat operations.

Figure F-26. Common Obstacle Types

REPORT FORMATS
OBSTACLE REPORT
F-59. Table F-11 shows a sample format for an obstacle report. For
further information on reporting procedures for obstacles, refer to
Appendix B of this manual.

F-36
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles

Table F-11. Obstacle Report Format

REPORT LINE INFORMATION

ALPHA Map sheets

BRAVO Date-time group for observation of obstacle

CHARLIE Location (grid reference)

DELTA Type of obstacle

ECHO Threat elements -and/or weapons with coverage of the obstacle


(if applicable)

Any other information that could affect breaching or bypassing; for


FOXTROT example, terrain restricts bypass or work required (in personnel
hours) to breach obstacle

DEMOLITION RECONNAISSANCE REPORT


F-60. Figure F-27 outlines information to be included in the critical
items of the demolition reconnaissance report (DA Form 2203-R).

ITEM
INFORMATION REQUIRED
NO
8 Provide details of what and where the target is
(such as town, bridge, or general vicinity).
11 Sketch must show relative position of objects to
be demolished, terrain features, safe distances,
routes, avenues of approach, and location of
features of the site. One sketch must show fully
dimensioned plan view, side views, and cross
sections of object and each member to be cut
(this may be listed under item 12).
12 Show the plan and cross-sectional sketch of
each member to be cut. Show details of
chambers, line of cut, and location of charges.
Show quantity of explosive per charge and
method of ignition. Sketch must show firing
circuits and firing points.
13 Describe each item in detail and show location
on the situation map sketch.

Figure F-27. Demolition Reconnaissance Report

F-37
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

SECTION IV – OBSTACLE TURNOVER

F-61. A target prepared for demolition by engineers may be turned over


to another unit for safeguarding or execution provided the following
turnover procedures are followed:

· The senior member of the emplacing unit (normally an


engineer squad leader) and the demolition guard commander
(normally a reconnaissance squad leader) will conduct face-to-
face coordination before the turnover if the tactical situation
permits. This prior coordination greatly aids and speeds the
turnover process.
· The senior member of the emplacing unit will require positive
identification of the demolition guard commander by means of
sign/countersign or by personal recognition.
· Once identification is established, the emplacing unit will give
the demolition guard commander a completed target folder for
the target being turned over. The folder contains orders to the
demolition guard commander and the firing party
commander. These orders must be signed and thoroughly
understood by the demolition guard commander.
· The senior member of the emplacing unit will then describe
the obstacle, in detail, to the demolition guard commander.
· Once the demolition guard commander fully understands his
responsibilities and he (or the firing party commander, if
separately designated) is capable of executing the target, the
emplacing unit may depart to conduct further operations.

SECTION V – OBSTACLE BREACHING CAPABILITIES

F-62. This section provides information on breaching capabilities. It will


assist the reconnaissance platoon in determining fordability and
trafficability, as well as in determining what types of equipment and/or
vehicles can be used for certain situations.

ACTIONS ON CONTACT (WITH OBSTACLES)


F-63. Use this format to conduct actions on contact with obstacles:
· Reconnoiter the obstacle and report.
· Seek a bypass.
· If a bypass is impossible, attempt a breach.
· As a last resort, force through the obstacle. All reconnaissance
sections should have a chain saw (issued or locally procured)
for clearing roads wooden obstacles from roads or trails.
· If the obstacle is covered by fire, use smoke to cover
movement.

F-38
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles

MINE DETECTORS
F-64. The reconnaissance platoon may use mine detectors to help
detect mines and clear lanes in minefields.

AN/PSS-12 CHARACTERISTICS
F-65. The AN/PSS-12 mine detector (see Figure F-28) is a man-portable
metallic mine-detection system that is used to detect AT and AP land
mines. Its search head contains two concentric coils—the transmitting
coil and the receiving coil. During operation, the transmitting coil is
energized with electric pulses to build up a magnetic field. The magnetic
field induces currents in metal objects near the search head, and the
currents build up a magnetic field in the metal objects. Depending on the
metal's composition and quantity, the magnetic field may be strong
enough to be picked up by the receiving coil. The signals from the
receiving coil are processed in the AN/PSS-12's electronics. When a signal
is considered positive, the electronic unit provides an audible alarm to the
operator.

Figure F-28. AN/PSS-12 Metallic Mine Detector

WARNING
Users must keep in mind that magnetic detection is
effective only when there is a sufficient amount of
alloy in the mine to trigger an alarm from the
detector.

The detector’s sensitivity control may require


frequent adjustment during operation.

SEARCH METHODS
Use the following procedures and guidance in searching for mines using
the AN/PSS-12:
· Move the search head in sweeping motions a maximum of 5
centimeters above the ground. Sweeping speed should be
approximately 0.3 meter per second.

F-39
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

· Listen for an audible tone indicating that the inner ring of the
magnetic search head is over a metal object. The intensity of
the tone depends on the size, the shape, the content, the
depth, and the position of the object.
· Make an X-pattern sweeping movement (Figure F-29) across
the area when a tone is heard. The tone will be loudest when
the search head is immediately above the object.
· For small, horizontal metal pins, the tone will be louder when
the inner ring is near the pin rather than when the pin is in
the center of the ring.
· If you are searching for large, metal objects, detecting and
localizing is faster when the sensitivity control is turned down
(counterclockwise).

Figure F-29. X-Pattern Sweeping Movement

· Keep mine detectors at least 2 meters apart during setting


and adjustment phases to prevent interference.
· Change the batteries and readjust the unit if the indicator
lamp flashes. The search sensitivity is not affected when the
lamp is flashing; if searching continues, a constant audible
tone will sound and the unit will be unusable until fresh
batteries are installed.
· Discontinue searching and readjust the unit's sensitivity if
the check tone disappears or its frequency decreases.
· Ensure that only the inner part of the telescopic pole is used
when the equipment is operated by a soldier in the prone
position.
· Turn the unit off after completing the search operations.

BREACHING AND CLEARING OPERATIONS


F-66. Table F-12 illustrates the characteristics and capabilities of
explosive and manual breaching methods. Table F-13 summarizes the

F-40
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles

characteristics of several types of obstacle breaching equipment. Although


the reconnaissance platoon does not have direct access to such assets, the
platoon can take advantage of these capabilities by calling on other
elements for assistance in breaching operations.

Table F-12. Breaching Assets and Methods

EXPLOSIVE BREACHING ASSETS/METHODS

LANE CLEARED EMPLOYMENT


MINES WEIGHT in meters (feet) ASSEMBLY TIME in
NOMENCLATURE TYPE
CLEARED (pounds) TIME minutes
Width Length (speed)

M58A3 Trailer- AT/AP 3,100 8 (26) 100 Crane and 4 (25 mph)
(MICLIC) mounted (328) crew – 35
minutes

M1A1 Portable AP 130 per 0.6 (2) 15 (50) 1 squad – 5


(Bangalore kit 5 minutes
torpedo)

Antipersonnel Portable AP 115 0.6 (2) 45 (140) 2 soldiers – 2


obstacle (in 2 2 minutes
breaching system manpack
(APOBS) units)

MANUAL BREACHING ASSETS/METHODS

BREACHING PROCEDURE LANE CLEARED MAN-HOURS


REQUIRED (per 100
Width (type of lane) meters of lane)

Location by probing 1 meter (footpath) 16 to 22

Removal by rope or explosives 1 meter (footpath) 38 to 44

Location by detector, assisted by probing 8 meters (one-way vehicle lane) 27 to 33

Removal by rope or explosives 8 meters (one-way vehicle lane) 220 to 247

F-41
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Table F-13. Nonexplosive Obstacle Breaching Equipment

MILITARY HEIGHT WIDTH SPEED MOBILITY


NOMENCLATURE LOAD in meters in meters in kmph ARMAMENT
EMPLOYMENT
CLASS (feet) (feet) (mph)

Fill craters and ditches


18 2.3 3.2 48 None
M9 Remove road blocks,
(7.5) (10.5) (30+)
armored combat trees, and rubble
earthmover (ACE)
Prepare river and ford
access
Prepare and maintain
routes

Cut tactical routes


D7F 28 2.4 3.48 10 None
(7.9) (11.4) (6) Fill craters and ditches
dozer
Remove rubble and
trees

20 3.7 2.6 NA None Fill craters and ditches


Loader (2½-ton)
(12) (8.5) Remove wire obstacles

57 (with 5 4 48 None Bridge gaps of 18


AVLB
bridge) (16.4) (13.1) (30) meters or less
37 Bridge gaps of 15
(without meters or less for Load
bridge) Class 70

NOTE: Another nonexplosive breaching asset is the M1-series tank equipped with either
the mine-clearing blade or mine-clearing roller. Use of the tank affords a
combination of breaching capability, firepower, and mobility. The primary
disadvantage is the vehicle’s weight. The blade adds 3.5 tons and the roller 10 tons
to the tank’s base weight of more than 60 tons. An M1 equipped with the roller
exceeds the weight capacity of the AVLB.

OBSTACLE-CROSSING CAPABILITIES
F-67. Table F-14 summarizes the obstacle-crossing capabilities of
selected vehicles and equipment of the US Army and allied nations.

F-42
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles

Table F-14. Vehicle/Equipment Obstacle-Crossing Capabilities

in meters (inches)

in meters (inches)
FORDING DEPTH

MAX STRADDLE
MILITARY LOAD

MAX GRADIENT
in meters (feet)

in meters (feet)

in meters (feet)

in meters (feet)

in meters (feet)
CLASS (MLC)

CLEARANCE
HEIGHT TO

TRAVERSE

MAX STEP
WIDTH TO

MAX GAP

MAX TILT
GROUND
CLEAR

CLEAR

(%)

(%)
COUNTRY/
VEHICLE

US / M113 13 No 2.13 2.68 1.60 0.29 0.64 30 60 1.78


limit (7.0) (8.8) (5.2) (11) (25) (5.8)

US/ M2 and 24 No 2.92 3.04 2.54 0.45 0.91 40 60 1.87


M3 limit (9.6) (10.0) (8.3) (18) (36) (6.1)

US / M60 54 1.22 3.26 3.63 2.66 0.41 0.91 30 60 2.21


(4.0) (10.7) (12.0) (8.7) (16) (36) (7.3)

US / M48A5 1.22 3.12 3.63 2.59 0.41 0.91 30 60 2.21


(4.0) (10.2) (12.0) (8.5) (16) (36) (7.3)

US / M1 series 70 1.22 2.89 3.60 2.74 0.48 1.24 40 60 2.14


(M1A2) (4.0) (9.5) (11.8) (9.0) (19) (49) (7.0)

Germany / 46 2.25 2.93 3.71 3.00 0.48 1.15 30 60 2.15


Leopard 2 (7.4) (9.6) (12.2) (10.0) (19) (45) (7.1)

UK / Centurian 60 1.20 2.96 3.40 3.35 0.51 0.90 30 60 2.19


(3.9) (9.7) (11.2) (11.0) (20) (35) (7.2)

UK / Chieftain 45 1.07 2.90 3.66 3.15 0.51 0.91 30 60 2.44


(3.5) (9.5) (12.0) (10.3) (20) (36) (8.0)

France / AMX30 38 2.00 2.86 3.10 2.90 0.45 0.93 30 60 1.96


(6.6) (9.4) (10.2) (9.5) (18) (37) (6.4)

SECTION VI – FIELD-EXPEDIENT MINES AND DEMOLITIONS

F-68. This discussion describes a variety of field-expedient methods for


constructing mines and demolitions.

CAUTION
The field-expedient devices and techniques described in
this discussion are intended for use only by personnel
who are experienced in mine and demolition employment
and safety. Other units/personnel should NEVER use
expedient mines and demolitions in place of standard
devices and methods.

F-43
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

EXPEDIENT MINES
F-69. When constructing and employing improvised mines, the
reconnaissance platoon must consider safety, neutralization, and
disarming requirements. Authorization of employment depends on the
minefield in which the mine is to be used. Figures F-29 through F-36
provide design and function guidance for expedient mines. Actual
construction will depend on several factors, including the availability of
materials.

Figure F-29. Antitank Mine Using High-Explosive Artillery Shell


(with Three Different Firing Systems)

Figure F-30. Grapeshot Antipersonnel Mine

F-44
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles

Figure F-31. Plate Charge Expedient Mine

F-45
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure F-32. Improvised Claymore Mine

Figure F-33. Fragmentation Grenade Mine


(with 5-Second Delay)

F-46
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles

Figure F-34. Barbed Wire Expedient Mine

F-47
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure F-35. Improvised Flame Mines

Figure F-36. Expedient Firing Devices

EXPEDIENT DEMOLITIONS
CRATERING CHARGE
F-70. To make a cratering charge, use a mixture of dry fertilizer (at
least one-third nitrogen; refer to the package contents list) and liquid

F-48
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles

(diesel fuel, motor oil, or gasoline) at a ratio of 25 pounds of fertilizer to a


quart of liquid. Mix the fertilizer and liquid and allow the mixture to soak
for an hour. Place half of the charge in a hole; add 1 pound of primed
explosive, and then pour in the other half of the charge.

SHAPED CHARGE
F-71. Figure F-37 illustrates how to construct an expedient shaped
charge.

Figure F-37. Improvised Shaped Charge

SATCHEL CHARGE
F-72. Melt ordinary paraffin (wax) and stir in ammonium nitrate
(fertilizer) pellets. Make sure the paraffin is hot while mixing. Before the
mixture hardens, add a ½-pound block of TNT, or its equivalent, as a
primer. Pour the mixture into a container. Shrapnel material can be
added to the mixture if desired, or it can be attached on the outside of the
container to give a shrapnel effect.

IMPROVISED BANGALORE TORPEDO


F-73. The principal use of an improvised bangalore torpedo is to clear
paths through barbed-wire entanglements using one of the following
methods:

· Use any length of pipe with an approximate inside diameter


of 2 inches and a wall thickness of at least .025 inch (24
gauge). Pack the pipe with 2 pounds of explosive per foot of
length. Close one end of the pipe with a threaded cap, wooden
plug, or damp earth.
· Use any length of U-shaped picket. Pack the inside section of
the picket with 2 pounds of explosives per foot of length. Place
the steel section of the U-shaped picket upward.
· Use any length of board. Attach 4 pounds of explosive per foot
of length. Place the explosives to the top side of the board.

DETONATING CORD WICK


F-74. Use a detonating cord wick to widen the boreholes; one strand
will generally widen a hole by 1 inch. Tape the desired number of strands

F-49
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

together, and prime one stick of dynamite with one of the strands. (The
dynamite is used to clean the hole.) Place the wick and the dynamite in a
hole. The wick must extend from the bottom of the hole to the surface.
Prime the wick and detonate the dynamite. Make sure the hole is “cold”
before putting in any other explosives.

EXPEDIENT TIME FUZE


F-75. Soak a length of clean string (1/8 inch in diameter) in gasoline.
Hang it to dry; then store it in a tightly sealed container. Handle
expedient fuzes as little as possible, and test them extensively before use.

MISCELLANEOUS IMPROVISED DEMOLITIONS


THERMITE
F-76. Using any size can, tie or tape sticks to the sides, and cut a small
hole in the bottom. Cover the bottom with paper. Place a round stick
wrapped in paper in the middle of the can. Fill the bottom of the can with
¼ inch of magnesium. Over this, place a mixture of three parts ferric
oxide and two parts aluminum powder. Remove the stick, and fill the hole
with a mixture of three parts potassium chlorate and one part sugar. On
top of this, place a paper bag containing the chlorate-sugar mixture. Place
a fuze in the top, and tamp with dirt or clay. Refer to Figure F-38.

Figure F-38. Thermite Demolition

MOLOTOV COCKTAIL
F-77. Fill a bottle with napalm, jelly gas, or a 2-to-1 mixture of gas and
oil. Insert a rag wick dipped in wax. Light the wick before throwing the
bottle. (NOTE: Cotton rags burn slower than some other materials, such
as silk. Use a rag wick that will burn long enough so the Molotov cocktail
reaches the target before exploding.) Refer to Figure F-39.

F-50
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles

Figure F-39. Molotov Cocktail

SATCHEL CHARGE
F-78. Fill a #10 can with a mixture of ammonium nitrate and melted
wax; stir vigorously to ensure a complete mix. Add a small amount of C4
or TNT, and prime the charge with a time-fuze cord before the mixture
hardens. A rope handle creates a convenient improvised satchel charge.

IMPROVISED BLACK POWDER DEMOLITIONS


F-79. Table F-15 lists materials required for improvised black powder
demolitions.

Table F-15. Materials in Black Powder Demolitions

PERCENT PARTS
MATERIALS REQUIRED
(by weight) (by volume)
POTASSIUM NITRATE 74 28

POWDERED CHARCOAL 16 3

SULFUR 10 2

F-80. Dissolve the potassium nitrate using a ratio (by weight) of three
parts water to one part nitrate. In a second container, dry-mix the
powdered charcoal and sulfur by stirring with a wooden stick or swirling
or shaking them in a tightly closed container. Add a few drops of the
potassium nitrate solution to the dry mixture, and blend to obtain a
thoroughly wet paste. Then add the rest of the solution and stir. Pour the
mixture into a shallow dish or pan and allow it to stand until it has a
paste-like consistency. Mix the paste thoroughly with a wooden stick to
assure uniformity, and set it aside for further drying. When the mixture
is nearly dried, granulate it by forcing it through a piece of wire screen.
Spread the granules thinly, and allow them to dry.

IMPROVISED FUZES
F-81. The following are three methods for making improvised string
fuzes:

· Put a string in a mixture of ¾ cup water and 1 teaspoon


potassium chlorate. Boil for 30 minutes.
· Soak a string in gasoline, and allow it to dry. This fuse will
burn slowly.
· Soak a string in a mixture of ¾ cup cold water and 2
teaspoons potassium nitrate.

F-51
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

IMPROVISED GRENADES
F-82. Use the following steps to make two types of improvised grenades:
· Combine 7.8 parts potassium nitrate or sodium nitrate, 1.6
parts charcoal, and 1 part sulfur. No detonator is required,
just a fuse.
· Combine 3 parts sodium chlorate and 3 parts sugar. Load the
mixture into a lead pipe. No detonator is required, just a fuse.

IMPROVISED DELAY MECHANISMS


F-83. Figure F-40 shows three types of delay mechanisms that can be
used with improvised demolitions.

Figure F-40. Types of Delay Mechanisms

FLAME ILLUMINATOR
F-84. Fill a container to 3 inches from the top with thickened fuel, and
seal the container tightly. Put three wraps of detonating cord on the top
inside rim, and pack with dirt or mud. Wrap a grenade with detonating
cord. Place the grenade next to the container, and tie it to the main
detonating cord line. See Figure F-41.

F-52
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles

Figure F-41. Flame Illuminator

HUSCH FLARE
F-85. To construct a Husch flare, which burns for 90 minutes and lights
a diameter of 50 meters, remove the crossbars from a metal 60-mm
mortar can. Punch three 3/8-inch holes in each side of the can halfway
between the top and bottom. Punch a hole no bigger than 1/8 inch in the
bottom of a metal 81-mm mortar shell container. Temporarily fill the
holes; then fill the 81-mm container three-fourths full with thickened
fuel. Apply heavy grease to the cap, and tighten it. Place the 81-mm
container cap-down in the 60-mm container, and use stones or other
materials to wedge it tightly. Then fill the 60-mm mortar can up to the
holes with thickened fuel. Remove the plug from the hole in the bottom of
the 81-mm shell container. Tie an illumination hand grenade between the
81-mm shell containers just above the level of the 60-mm mortar can.
Run a trip wire from the grenade pin.

DRIED SEED TIMER


F-86. The reconnaissance platoon can use the properties of dried seeds,
which expand when they are soaked, to create a time delay device for
electrical firing circuits. Required materials are the following:

· Dried peas or beans or other dehydrated seeds.


· Wide-mouthed glass jar with nonmetal cap.
· Two screws or bolts.
· Thin metal plate.
· Hand drill.
· Screwdriver.

F-87. Use the following steps to construct the dried seed timer:
· Step 1. Determine the rate of rise of the dried seeds selected;
this is necessary to determine the amount of seeds needed to
provide the required delay time. Use these steps:
n Place a sample of dried seeds in the jar that will be used
as the timer. Cover the seeds with water.
n Measure the time it takes for the seeds to rise a given
height. Most dried seeds increase in volume by 50 percent
in 1 to 2 hours.
· Step 2. Cut a disk from a thin metal plate. The disk should fit
loosely inside the jar. (NOTE: If the metal is painted, rusty,

F-53
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

or otherwise coated, it must be scraped or sanded to create a


clean metal surface.) Refer to Figure F-42.
· Step 3. Drill two holes in the cap of the jar about 2 inches
apart. The diameter of the holes should be such that screws or
bolts will thread tightly into them. If the jar has a metal cap
or no cap, a piece of wood or plastic (NOT METAL) can be
used as a cover. See Figure F-42.
· Step 4. Turn the two screws or bolts through the holes in the
cap. The bolts should extend about 1 inch (2½ cm) into the jar.
(IMPORTANT NOTE: Both bolts must extend the same
distance below the container cover.) See Figure F-43 (top).
· Step 5. Pour the required quantity of dried seeds into the
container. The level will depend on the previously measured
rise time and the desired delay. Refer to Figure F-43
(middle).
· Step 6. Place the metal disk in the jar on top of the seeds.
Refer to Figure G-43 (middle).

F-88. Use the following steps to activate and employ the dried seed
timer:

· Step 1. Add just enough water to completely cover the seeds,


and place the cap on the jar. Refer to Figure F-43 (bottom).
· Step 2. Attach the connecting wires from the firing circuit to
the two screws on the cap. Refer to Figure F-43 (bottom).
· Step 3. Expansion of the seeds will raise the metal disk until
it makes contact with the screws and closes the circuit,
triggering the explosive. Figure F-44 illustrates the complete
explosive device with a dried seed timer.

Figure F-42. Cutting and Drilling Metal Plate

F-54
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles

Figure F-43. Inserting Bolts, Seeds, and Metal Disc;


Completed Timer with Water Added and Wires Connected

Figure F-44. Explosive Device with Dried Seed Timer Attached

TIN CAN GRENADE


F-89. Construction of a tin can grenade requires the following
materials:

· Tin can, jar, or similar container.


· Bolts, nuts, metal scrap, and/or other solid objects.
· Commercial or improvised black powder.

F-55
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

· Commercial or improvised fuse cord.


· Cardboard or heavy paper and tape.

F-90. Construct a cardboard or heavy-paper cylinder using tape that is


approximately one-half the diameter of the tin can or other container.
Insert the fuze into one end of the paper cylinder, pack the cylinder
tightly with black powder, and tape the ends closed. Insert the cylinder
into the can as shown in Figure F-45, and surround it with such items as
bolts, nuts, metal scrap, or stones. Close the can with a lid that has a hole
in the center through which to pass the fuze. If the container has no lid, it
may be closed with a piece of wood, metal, or cardboard of the required
size taped in place.

Figure F-45. Tin Can Grenade

FIELD-EXPEDIENT DELAYS
F-91. The reconnaissance platoon can take advantage of a variety of
materials for use as expedient delay mechanisms in the employment of
demolitions. Examples include the following:

· Cigarette (in matchbook or box).


· Candle (surrounded by flammable material).
· Spark (from short-circuited electrical wires).
· Sulfuric acid (sugar chlorate mixture).
· Glycerine (sugar permangate mixture).
· Nitrate acid (sugar chlorate mixture).
· Water delay (see Figure F-40).
· Watch delay (see Figure F-40).

COMMON CHEMICALS IN FIELD-EXPEDIENT DEMOLITIONS


F-92. Table F-16 lists a number of chemicals that are commonly used in
expedient demolitions. The table includes sources for these substances,

F-56
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles

including local sites that may provide the reconnaissance platoon with
access to necessary chemicals.

Table F-16. Common Chemicals in Expedient Demolitions

CHEMICAL SYMBOL POSSIBLE SOURCES

Potassium permanganate KMNO4 Drug store, hospital, gym

Potassium chlorate KCLO3 Drug store, hospital, gym

Potassium nitrate KNO3 Fertilizer or explosives factory

Sodium nitrate NgNO3 Fertilizer or glass factory

Ammonium nitrate (NH4)NO3 Fertilizer or explosives factory

Ferric oxide Fe2O3 Hardware or paint store

Powdered aluminum Al Paint, electric, or auto parts store

Magnesium Mg Auto, machine, or chemical


factory

Glycerin C3H5(OH)3 Drug store, soap/candle factory

Sulfuric acid H2SO4 Garage, machine shop, hospital

Sodium chlorate NgClO3 Match or explosives factory

Sulfur S Drug store, match factory

F-57
Appendix G

Environmental Protection
Protection of natural
resources is an ever- CONTENTS
increasing concern. It is Environmental Risk Management Process .......... G-1
Step 1 – Identify Environmental Hazards ..... G-1
the responsibility of all
Step 2 – Assess Environmental Hazards ..... G-1
unit leaders to decrease Step 3 – Develop Controls and
and, if possible, eliminate Make Decisions ........................................... G-2
damage to the Step 4 – Implement Controls ......................... G-2
environment when Step 5 – Supervise and Evaluate .................. G-2
Environmental Risk Assessment Worksheet ..... G-2
conducting all types of
operations. This
appendix focuses on measures the reconnaissance platoon must
understand and implement to accomplish that objective. TC 5-400
provides a comprehensive listing of procedures and considerations
applicable when operating in environmentally sensitive areas.

SECTION I – ENVIRONMENTAL RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS

G-1. Environmental risk management is similar to safety risk


management and is based on the same philosophy and principles.
(NOTE: Refer to the discussion of safety risk management in Appendix H
of this manual.) The environmental risk assessment and management
process consists of the five steps outlined in the following paragraphs.

STEP 1 – IDENTIFY ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS


G-2. The platoon leader must identify potential sources of
environmental degradation during his analysis of METT-TC factors.
These environmental hazards are conditions with the potential for
polluting air, soil, or water and/or destroying cultural or historical
structures, sites, or artifacts. Figure G-1 lists procedures and
considerations for identifying possible sources of environmental risks that
the platoon may face during a typical tactical operation. The list is
organized according to METT-TC factors.

STEP 2 – ASSESS ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS


G-3. Leaders of the reconnaissance platoon can use the environmental
risk assessment worksheet (Figure G-3), along with the worksheet
instructions (Figure G-2), to analyze the potential severity of
environmental degradation for each training activity. The worksheet
allows them to quantify the risk to the environment as extremely high,
high, moderate, or low. The risk impact value is an indicator of these
levels of severity. (NOTE: An example of a completed environmental
risk assessment worksheet is shown in Figure G-4.)

G-1
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

IDENTIFYING SOURCES OF BATTLEFIELD RISK (BY METT-TC)

MISSION
· Identify and assess known environmental risks during planning.
· Determine environmental impact on mission execution.
· Specify areas of risk and/or concern to minimize the impact on the unit’s scheme of maneuver.
· Select alternate training methods or goals as necessary.
· Develop maps and/or sketches with detailed areas of environmental concern.
· Emphasize the importance of every soldier playing an active role in the identification and timely
reporting of new environmental risk elements.
· Rapidly and effectively respond to all petroleum, oil, and lubricants, and/or hazardous waste
accidents.

ENEMY (THREAT FORCES)


· Identify probable areas of environmental contamination that could affect friendly force movement.
· Evaluate intelligence reports of how the threat will employ his equipment and/or capabilities to
overcome or take advantage of environmental factors.
· Develop threat target options to minimize environmental effects.
· Maneuver friendly forces in such a way as to direct threat action away from environmentally
sensitive areas, when feasible.

TERRAIN AND WEATHER


· Provide recommended paths of movement to avoid environmentally sensitive areas.
· Identify well-defined terrain features to assist in navigation accuracy.
· Obtain and analyze weather data to diminish possible environmental risks, focusing on predominant
and developing weather patterns.

TROOPS AND SUPPORT AVAILABLE


· Brief all soldiers thoroughly on environmental risks, concerns, and/or points of interest.
· Develop a detailed and accurate SOP that identifies guidelines for avoiding risk areas with inhibiting
mission accomplishment.
· Brief troops on how to prevent environmental damage based on anticipated areas of probable risk.
· Employ practice scenarios that test soldier response to changing environmental risks and that
promote use of the decision-making process in dealing with risks.
· Require accurate and timely reporting pertaining to all environmental issues (friendly or threat).

TIME AVAILABLE
· Maximize planning time. (NOTE: One key step is to minimize the complexity and length of the
mission briefing as much as possible.)
· Practice and develop various mission profiles that emphasize adjusting for changing environmental
factors, while maintaining the desired momentum.

CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS
· Identify and emphasize rules of engagement and/or rules of interaction that minimize environmental
damage.
· Expect media coverage and analysis of troop actions that affect the environment.
· Anticipate and limit collateral damage to civil infrastructure (such as agriculture and other food
production, delivery and supply systems, and hazardous chemical storage facilities).
· Identify environmental targets of value that the threat might attack.

Figure G-1. Example Procedures for Identifying Environmental Risks

G-2
__________________________________________________ Appendix G – Environmental Protection

STEP 3 – DEVELOP CONTROLS AND MAKE DECISIONS


G-4. Based on the results of the risk assessment, the reconnaissance
platoon leader makes decisions and develops measures to reduce
significant environmental risks. Risk decisions are made at a level of
command that corresponds to the degree of risk. Leaders should brief all
responsible individuals and agencies (to include the installation
environmental office, if applicable) on the proposed operational and
training plans and on pertinent high-risk environmental factors.

STEP 4 – IMPLEMENT CONTROLS


G-5. The reconnaissance platoon leader and subordinate leaders
implement environmental protection measures at all stages of operational
planning, preparation, and execution. They integrate these measures into
plans, orders, SOPs, training performance standards, and rehearsals.

STEP 5 – SUPERVISE AND EVALUATE


G-6. The reconnaissance platoon leader must enforce environmental
protection standards during supervision of all training activities.

SECTION II – ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

G-7. To use the environmental risk assessment worksheet (Figure G-3;


refer to Figure G-4 for a sample, completed worksheet) for a specific
operation or training event, the reconnaissance platoon leader and
subordinate leaders first conduct an operational analysis to break down
the exercise into events, allowing them to manage the risks for the
various tasks. They also identify particular tasks for the operation using
the troop’s mission training plan (MTP). Leaders develop the hazard list
using their experience, lessons learned, unit SOPs, applicable references,
and guidance from the chain of command. They identify applicable
environmental standards, laws, and ROE that affect the mission. Leaders
annotate each task and associated environmental hazards on the risk
management worksheet in blocks E and F.
G-8. The platoon leader and NCOs assess each hazard to determine
the risk for potential harm to the environment. Their assessment is based
upon how often the environmental hazard occurs during the operation
(probability) and what effect the hazard has on the environment
(severity). They use the probability and severity definitions that are
covered in FM 3-100.4.
G-9. They develop controls to eliminate or reduce the probability or
severity of each hazard. They identify a mix of educational-, physical-,
and avoidance-type controls and annotate them in block H (see the
example worksheet in Figure G-4). Once all risk control measures are in
place, any residual risk is annotated in block I (as shown in Figure G-4).
The platoon leader informs the commander of the residual risk and its
implications.
G-10. Leaders identify how each control would be implemented and
assign responsibility to unit personnel. The “how to” for each control is

G-3
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

annotated in block J. In the sample worksheet (Figure G-4), fueling


during resupply operations was identified as a possible environmental
concern for the platoon. Leaders identified control measures to include
ensuring that operators were properly trained to dispense fuel, and
appropriate spill equipment was available. This process requires leaders
to anticipate environmental requirements and incorporate them as part
long-range, short-range, and near-term planning.

WORKSHEET INSTRUCTIONS

Block

A–E Self-explanatory.

F Identify Hazards. Identify hazards by reviewing METT-TC factors for the mission or
task. Additional factors include historical lessons learned, experience, judgment,
equipment characteristics and warnings, and environmental considerations.

G Assess Hazards. Assessment includes historical lessons learned, intuitive analyses,


experience, judgment, equipment characteristics and warnings, and environmental
considerations. Determine initial risk for each hazard by applying the risk assessment
matrix (refer to Chapter 2, FM3-100.4). Enter the risk level for each hazard.

H Develop Controls. Develop one or more controls for each hazard to either eliminate the
hazard or reduce the risk (probability and/or severity) of a hazardous incident. Specify
who, what, where, when, and how for each control. Enter controls.

I Determine Residual Risk. Determine the residual risk for each hazard by applying the
risk assessment matrix (refer to Chapter 2, FM 3-100.4). Enter the residual risk level
for each hazard.

J Implement Controls. Decide how each control will be put into effect or communicated
to the personnel who will make it happen (written or verbal instruction: tactical, safety,
garrison SOPs, rehearsals). Enter controls.

K Determine Overall Mission/Task Risk. Select the highest residual risk level and circle it.
This level becomes the overall mission or task risk level. The commander decides
whether the controls are sufficient to accept the residual risk. If the risk is too great to
continue the mission or task, the commander directs development of additional
controls or modifies, changes, or rejects the COA.

Supervise and Evaluate. This last step is not on the worksheet. Plan how each control
will be monitored for implementation (continuous supervision, spot checks), and
reassess hazards as the situation changes. Determine if the controls worked and if
they can be improved. Communicate lessons learned.

Figure G-2. Instructions for Risk Management Worksheet

G-4
A. Mission or Task: B. Date/Time Group C. Date Prepared:
Begin:
End:

D. Prepared By: (Rank, Last Name, Duty Position)


Page _____ of _____

E. Task: F. Identify G. Assess H. Develop I. Determine J. Implement


Hazards: Hazards: Controls: Residual Risk: Controls
(“How To”):

Figure G-3. Environmental Risk Assessment Worksheet


K. Determine overall mission/task risk level after controls are implemented (circle one):
LOW (L) MODERATE (M) HIGH (H) EXTREMELY HIGH (E)

G-5
__________________________________________________ Appendix G – Environmental Protection
A. Mission or Task: B. Date/Time Group C. Date Prepared:

G-6
Platoon STX Lanes Begin: 010600 JUN XX 22 MAY XX
End: 020100 JUN XX
FM 3-20.98

D. Prepared By: (Rank, Last Name, Duty Position)


SFC Smith, PSG Page 1 of 1.

E. Task: F. Identify G. Assess H. Develop I. Determine J. Implement


Hazards: Hazards: Controls: Residual Risk: Controls
(“How To”):
Conduct resupply Fuel spills during Moderate (M) 1. Train drivers and Low (L) Troop SOP,
refueling fuel handlers on paragraph 8,
proper fuel handling conduct training
procedures prior to STX.
2. Provide spill
equipment.
3. Locate refueling
sites away from
waterways.

Establish a tactical Starting range and Moderate (M) 1. Inform soldiers Low (L) Troop SOP para
assembly area. training area fires. that no open fires 7(a), Range
are allowed. regulations.
2. Brief soldiers on
use of pyrotechnics.

Figure G-4. Sample Environment Risk Assessment Worksheet (Completed)


K. Determine overall mission/task risk level after controls are implemented (circle one):
LOW (L) MODERATE (M) HIGH (H) EXTREMELY HIGH (E)
__________________________________________________________________________
1 Appendix H

2 Risk Management
4 Risk is the chance of
6 injury or death for CONTENTS
8 individuals and damage Risk Management Procedures ............................. H-1
Step 1 – Identify Hazards ............................... H-1
10 to or loss of vehicles and Step 2 – Assess Hazards to Determine
12 equipment. Risks, and/or Risks ............................................................ H-3
14 the potential for risks, Step 3 – Develop Controls and
16 are always present in Make Risk Decisions .................................. H-4
18 every combat and Step 4 – Implement Controls ......................... H-5
Step 5 – Supervise and Evaluate .................. H-5
20 training situation the Implementation Responsibilities ........................ H-6
22 reconnaissance platoon
24 faces. Risk management
25 must take place at all levels of the chain of command during each
26 phase of every operation; it is an integral part of all tactical planning.
27 The reconnaissance platoon leader, his NCOs, and all other platoon
28 soldiers must know how to use risk management, coupled with
29 fratricide reduction measures, to ensure that the mission is executed
30 in the safest possible environment within mission constraints.

31 SECTION I – RISK MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES

32 H-1. The primary objective of risk management is to help units protect


33 their combat power through accident prevention, enabling them to win
34 the battle quickly and decisively, with minimum losses. This appendix
35 outlines the process that leaders can use to identify hazards and
36 implement a plan to address each identified hazard. It also includes a
37 detailed discussion of the responsibilities of the platoon’s leaders and
38 individual soldiers in implementing a sound risk management program.
39 Refer to FM 5-19 (FM 100-14) for additional information on risk
40 management.
41 H-2. This discussion outlines the five steps of risk management.
42 Leaders of the reconnaissance platoon must always remember that the
43 effectiveness of the process depends on situational awareness. They
44 should never approach risk management with “one size fits all” solutions
45 to the hazards the platoon will face. Rather, in performing the steps, they
46 must keep in mind the essential tactical and operational factors that
47 make each situation unique.
48
49 STEP 1 – IDENTIFY HAZARDS
50 H-3. A hazard is a source of danger. It is any existing or potential
51 condition that could entail injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to
52 or loss of equipment and property; or some other sort of mission
53 degradation. Tactical and training operations pose many types of hazards.

H-1
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

1 H-4. The reconnaissance platoon leader must identify the hazards


2 associated with all aspects and phases of the platoon’s mission, paying
3 particular attention to the factors of METT-TC. Risk management must
4 never be an afterthought; leaders must begin the process during their
5 troop-leading procedures and continue it throughout the operation.
6 H-5. Figure H-1 lists possible sources of risk that the reconnaissance
7 platoon might face during a typical tactical operation. The list is
8 organized according to the factors of METT-TC.
9
SOURCES OF BATTLEFIELD RISK (BY METT-TC)

MISSION
· Duration of the operation.
· Complexity/clarity of the plan. (Is the plan well developed and easily understood?)
· Proximity and number of maneuvering units.

ENEMY (THREAT FORCES)


· Knowledge of the threat situation.
· Threat capabilities.
· Availability of time and resources to conduct reconnaissance.

TERRAIN AND WEATHER


· Visibility conditions, including light, dust, fog, rain, snow, and smoke.
· Precipitation and its effect on mobility.
· Extreme heat or cold.
· Additional natural hazards (broken ground, steep inclines, water obstacles).

TROOPS AND SUPPORT AVAILABLE


· Equipment status.
· Experience the units conducting the operation have working together.
· Danger areas associated with the platoon’s weapon systems.
· Soldier/leader proficiency.
· Soldier/leader rest situation.
· Degree of acclimatization to environment.
· Impact of new leaders and/or crewmembers.
· Impact of operating and/or interacting with NATO, UN, or other multination forces.

TIME AVAILABLE
· Time available for troop-leading procedures and rehearsals by subordinates.
· Time available for PCCs/PCIs.

CIVILIAN CONSIDERATIONS
· Applicable ROE and/or ROI.
· Potential stability and/or support operations involving contact with civilians (such
as NEOs, refugee or disaster assistance, or counterterrorism).
· Potential for media contact/inquiries.
· Interaction with civilians from the host nation or from organizations participating in
nation support.

10 Figure H-1. Examples of Potential Hazards

11

H-2
_________________________________________________________ Appendix H – Risk Management

1 STEP 2 – ASSESS HAZARDS TO DETERMINE RISKS


2 H-6. Hazard assessment is the process of determining the direct
3 impact of each hazard on an operation (in the form of hazardous
4 incidents). Use the following steps:

5 · Determine which hazards can be eliminated, minimized, or


6 avoided.
7 · Assess each hazard that cannot be eliminated, minimized, or
8 avoided to determine the probability that the hazard can
9 occur.
10 · Assess the severity of hazards that cannot be eliminated,
11 minimized, or avoided. Severity, defined as the result or
12 outcome of a hazardous incident, is expressed by the degree of
13 injury or illness (including death), loss of or damage to
14 equipment or property, environmental damage, or other
15 mission-impairing factors (such as unfavorable publicity or loss
16 of combat power).
17 · Taking into account both the probability and severity of a
18 hazard, determine the associated risk level (extremely high,
19 high, moderate, and low). Table H-1 summarizes the four risk
20 levels.
21 · Based on the factors of hazard assessment (probability,
22 severity, and risk level, as well as the operational factors
23 unique to the situation), complete the risk management
24 worksheet. Figure H-2 shows an example of a completed risk
25 management worksheet.
26

27 Table H-1. Risk Levels and Impact on Mission Execution

RISK LEVEL MISSION EFFECTS

Extremely high (E) Mission failure if hazardous incidents occur in execution.

Significantly degraded mission capabilities in terms of


High (H) required mission standards. Not accomplishing all parts of
the mission or not completing the mission to standard (if
hazards occur during mission).

Expected degraded mission capabilities in terms of required


Moderate (M) mission standards. Reduced mission capability (if hazards
occur during the mission).

Low (L) Expected losses have little or no impact on mission success.

28

H-3
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

1
2 Figure H-2. Example Risk Management Worksheet

3 STEP 3 – DEVELOP CONTROLS AND MAKE RISK DECISIONS


4 DEVELOPING CONTROLS
5 H-7. After assessing each hazard, develop one or more controls that
6 will either eliminate the hazard or reduce the risk (probability and/or
7 severity) of potential hazardous incidents. When developing controls,
8 consider the reason for the hazard, not just the hazard by itself.

9 MAKING RISK DECISIONS


10 H-8. A key element in the process of making a risk decision is
11 determining whether accepting the risk is justified or, conversely, is
12 unnecessary. The decision-maker (the reconnaissance platoon leader, if
13 applicable) must compare and balance the risk against mission

H-4
_________________________________________________________ Appendix H – Risk Management

1 expectations. He alone decides if the controls are sufficient and acceptable


2 and whether to accept the resulting residual risk. If he determines the
3 risk is unnecessary, he directs the development of additional controls or
4 alternative controls; as another option, he can modify, change, or reject
5 the selected COA for the operation. The decision-maker must always keep
6 in mind that an important step in reducing or eliminating risk factors is
7 to keep the next higher level of command involved in and informed of the
8 risk management process.
9
10 STEP 4 – IMPLEMENT CONTROLS
11 H-9. Controls are the procedures and considerations the unit uses to
12 eliminate hazards or reduce their risk. Implementing controls is the most
13 important part of the risk management process; this is the chain of
14 command’s contribution to the safety of the unit. Implementing controls
15 includes coordination and communication with appropriate superior,
16 adjacent, and subordinate units and with individuals executing the
17 mission. The reconnaissance platoon leader must ensure that specific
18 controls are integrated into OPLANs, OPORDs, SOPs, and rehearsals.
19 The critical check for this step is to ensure that controls are converted
20 into clear, simple execution orders understood by all levels.
21 H-10. When the leaders conduct a thoughtful risk assessment, the
22 controls will be easy to implement, enforce, and follow. Examples of risk
23 management controls include the following:

24 · Thoroughly brief all aspects of the mission, including related


25 hazards and controls.
26 · Conduct thorough PCCs and PCIs.
27 · Allow adequate time for rehearsals at all levels.
28 · Drink plenty of water, eat well, and get as much sleep as
29 possible (at least 4 hours in any 24-hour period).
30 · Use buddy teams.
31 · Enforce speed limits, use of seat belts, and driver safety.
32 · Establish recognizable visual signals and markers to
33 distinguish maneuvering units.
34 · Enforce the use of ground guides in assembly areas and on
35 dangerous terrain.
36 · Establish marked and protected sleeping areas in assembly
37 areas.
38 · Limit single-vehicle movement.
39 · Establish SOPs for the integration of new personnel.
40 · Ensure that all soldiers are in the proper uniform and/or at
41 the correct MOPP level.
42 · Ensure that all leaders maintain situational awareness while
43 staying alert to prevent complacency among their soldiers.
44
45 STEP 5 – SUPERVISE AND EVALUATE
46 H-11. During mission execution, it is imperative for leaders to ensure
47 that risk management controls are properly understood and executed.

H-5
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

1 Leaders must continuously evaluate the unit’s effectiveness in managing


2 risks to gain insight into areas that need improvement.

3 SUPERVISION
4 H-12. Leadership and unit discipline are the keys to ensuring that
5 effective risk management controls are implemented. In general, a
6 constant concern for soldier health and welfare is the key to fostering an
7 environment for successful, risk-free operations. All leaders are
8 responsible for supervising mission rehearsals and execution to ensure
9 standards and controls are enforced. In particular, NCOs must enforce
10 established safety policies as well as controls developed for a specific
11 operation or task. Techniques include spot checks, inspections, SITREPs,
12 confirmation briefs, buddy checks, and close supervision.
13 H-13. During mission execution, leaders must continuously monitor risk
14 management controls, both to determine whether they are effective and
15 to modify them as necessary. Leaders must also anticipate, identify, and
16 assess new hazards. They ensure that imminent danger issues are
17 addressed on the spot and that ongoing planning and execution reflect
18 changes in hazard conditions.

19 EVALUATION
20 H-14. Whenever possible, the risk management process should also
21 include an after-action review (AAR) to assess unit performance in
22 identifying risks and preventing hazardous situations. Leaders should
23 then incorporate lessons learned from the process into unit SOPs and
24 plans for future missions.
25

26 SECTION II – IMPLEMENTATION RESPONSIBILITIES

27 H-15. Leaders and individuals at all levels are responsible and


28 accountable for managing risk. They must ensure that hazards and
29 associated risks are identified and controlled during planning,
30 preparation, and execution of operations. The reconnaissance platoon
31 leader and his senior NCOs must look at both tactical risks and accident
32 risks. The same risk management process is used to manage both types.
33 The platoon leader alone determines how and where he is willing to take
34 tactical risks. With the assistance of his PSG, NCOs, and individual
35 soldiers, the platoon leader manages accident risks.
36 H-16. Sometimes, despite the need to advise higher headquarters of a
37 risk taken or about to be assumed, the risk management process may
38 break down. Such a failure can be the result of several factors; most often,
39 it can be attributed to the following:

40 · The risk denial syndrome in which leaders do not want to


41 know about the risk.
42 · A soldier who believes that the risk decision is part of his job
43 and does not want to bother his platoon leader or section
44 leader.

H-6
_________________________________________________________ Appendix H – Risk Management

1 · Outright failure to recognize a hazard or the level of risk


2 involved.
3 · Overconfidence on the part of an individual or the unit in the
4 capability to avoid or recover from a hazardous incident.
5 · Subordinates not fully understanding the higher commander’s
6 guidance regarding risk decisions.
7
8 H-17. The platoon leader gives the platoon direction, sets priorities, and
9 establishes the command climate (values, attitudes, and beliefs).
10 Successful preservation of combat power requires him to embed risk
11 management into individual behavior. To fulfill this commitment, the
12 platoon leader must exercise creative leadership, innovative planning,
13 and careful management. Most important, he must demonstrate support
14 for the risk management process. The platoon leader and others in the
15 platoon chain of command can establish a command climate favorable to
16 risk management integration by taking the following actions:

17 · Demonstrate consistent and sustained risk management


18 behavior through leading by example and by stressing active
19 participation throughout the risk management process.
20 · Provide adequate resources for risk management. Every
21 leader is responsible for obtaining the assets necessary to
22 mitigate risk and for providing them to subordinate leaders.
23 · Understand their own and their soldier’s limitations, as well
24 as their unit’s capabilities.
25 · Allow subordinates to make mistakes and learn from them.
26 · Prevent a “zero defects” mindset from creeping into the
27 platoon’s culture.
28 · Demonstrate full confidence in subordinates’ mastery of their
29 trade and their ability to execute a chosen COA.
30 · Keep subordinates informed.
31 · Listen to subordinates.
32
33 H-18. For the platoon leader, his subordinate leaders, and individual
34 soldiers alike, responsibilities in managing risk include the following:

35 · Make informed risk decisions; establish and then clearly


36 communicate risk decision criteria and guidance.
37 · Establish clear, feasible risk management policies and goals.
38 · Train the risk management process. Ensure that subordinates
39 understand the who, what, when, where, and why of
40 managing risk and how these factors apply to their situation
41 and assigned responsibilities.
42 · Accurately evaluate the platoon’s effectiveness, as well as
43 subordinates’ execution of risk controls during the mission.
44 · Inform higher headquarters when risk levels exceed
45 established limits.

H-7
1 Appendix I

3 Fratricide Prevention
5 Fratricide is defined as
CONTENTS
7 the employment of
9 friendly weapons that General Considerations ...................................... I-1
The Reconnaissance Platoon’s
11 results in the unforeseen Fratricide Risk ............................................ I-1
13 and unintentional death Role of Training in Fratricide Prevention .... I-2
15 or injury of friendly Effects of Fratricide .............................................. I-2
17 personnel or damage to Causes of Fratricide ............................................. I-3
19 friendly equipment. Failures in the Direct Fire Control Plan ....... I-3
Land Navigation Failures .............................. I-3
21 Fratricide prevention is Failures in Combat Identification ................. I-3
23 the commander’s Inadequate Control Measures ...................... I-3
25 responsibility. He is Failures and Reporting and
27 assisted by all leaders Communications ........................................ I-3
29 across all operating Weapons Errors ............................................. I-4
Battlefield Hazards ........................................ I-4
31 systems in accomplishing Reliance on Instruments ............................... I-4
33 this mission. This Fratricide Risk Assessment ................................. I-4
35 appendix focuses on Fratricide Prevention Measures .......................... I-6
37 actions the reconnais- Principles of Fratricide Prevention .............. I-6
39 sance platoon leader and Additional Guidelines .................................... I-7
Stopping a Friendly Fire Incident ........................ I-8
41 his subordinate leaders Actions as Victim of Friendly Fire ................ I-8
43 can take with current Actions as Firing Element ............................. I-8
45 resources to reduce the Actions as Observer of Friendly Fire ........... I-8
47 risk of fratricide. Leader Responsibilities ................................ I-9

48
49

50 SECTION I – GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

51 I-1. The underlying principle of fratricide prevention is simple:


52 Leaders who know where their soldiers are, and where they want them to
53 fire, can keep those soldiers alive to kill the threat. At the same time,
54 leaders must avoid at all costs any reluctance to employ, integrate, and
55 synchronize all required operating systems at the critical time and place.
56 They must avoid becoming tentative out of fear of fratricide; rather, they
57 strive to eliminate fratricide risk through tough, realistic, combined arms
58 training in which each soldier and unit achieves the established standard.
59
60 THE RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON’S FRATRICIDE RISK
61 I-2. More than any other maneuver element, the reconnaissance
62 platoon is at risk of being the victim of fratricide. The platoon is
63 particularly vulnerable because it often maneuvers in dispersed elements
64 forward and to the flanks of other friendly combat forces. In a battalion,
65 company teams often do not keep up with the plan or with the disposition

I-1
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

1 of the reconnaissance platoon. For these reasons, situational awareness


2 on the part of all reconnaissance leaders, particularly the platoon leader,
3 is critical not only to mission success but also to survival.
4 I-3. In any tactical situation, it is critical that all scouts know where
5 other friendly elements are operating. With this knowledge, they must
6 anticipate dangerous conditions and take steps to either avoid or mitigate
7 them. The platoon leader must always be vigilant of changes and
8 developments in the situation that may place his elements in danger. He
9 must also ensure that all section or squad positions are constantly
10 reported to higher headquarters so that all other friendly elements are
11 aware of where the scouts are and what they are doing. At troop level,
12 NFAs can be designated to control friendly direct and indirect fire into
13 areas in which the platoon is or will be operating. When the platoon
14 leader perceives a potential fratricide situation, he must personally use
15 the higher net to coordinate directly with the friendly element involved.

16 ROLE OF TRAINING IN FRATRICIDE PREVENTION


17 I-4. Training allows units and soldiers to make mistakes, with the
18 goal of reducing or eliminating the risk of errors occurring in combat. A
19 key role of the reconnaisance platoon training program is to teach vehicle
20 crews what targets to engage and when to engage them. Just as
21 important, crews must learn and practice restraint in what and when to
22 engage; for example, every vehicle commander must know that he must
23 confirm the target as hostile before issuing and executing any fire
24 command.
25 I-5. Eliminating the risk of fratricide is no less critical as a training
26 standard than are other mission requirements. All leaders must know all
27 aspects of the applicable training standard, including fratricide
28 prevention, and then ensure that their soldiers train to that standard.
29

30 SECTION II – EFFECTS OF FRATRICIDE

31 I-6. Fratricide results in unacceptable losses and increases the risk of


32 mission failure; it almost always affects the unit’s ability to survive and
33 function. Units experiencing fratricide suffer these consequences:

34 · Loss of confidence in the unit’s leadership.


35 · Increasing self-doubt among leaders.
36 · Hesitancy in the employment of supporting combat systems.
37 · Oversupervision of units.
38 · Hesitancy in the conduct of night operations.
39 · Loss of aggressiveness in maneuver (fire and movement).
40 · Loss of initiative.
41 · Disrupted operations.
42 · General degradation of unit cohesiveness, morale, and combat
43 power.
44

I-2
_______________________________________________________ Appendix I – Fratricide Prevention

1 SECTION III – CAUSES OF FRATRICIDE

2 I-7. The following discussion covers the primary causes of fratricide.


3 Leaders must identify any of the factors that may affect their units and
4 then strive to eliminate or correct them.
5
6 FAILURES IN THE DIRECT FIRE CONTROL PLAN
7 I-8. These occur when units do not develop effective fire control plans,
8 particularly in the offense. Units may fail to designate target engagement
9 areas or adhere to target priorities, or they may position their weapons
10 incorrectly. Under such conditions, fire discipline often breaks down upon
11 contact.
12 I-9. The reconnaissance platoon can use a number of techniques and
13 procedures to help prevent such incidents. An example is “staking in”
14 vehicle and individual positions in the defense, using pickets to indicate
15 the left and right limits of each position. An area of particular concern is
16 the additional planning that must go into operations requiring close
17 coordination between mounted elements and infantry squads. For
18 example, because of the danger posed by discarding petals, sabot rounds
19 should be fired over friendly infantry elements only in extreme
20 emergencies.
21
22 LAND NAVIGATION FAILURES
23 I-10. Units often stray out of assigned sectors, report wrong locations,
24 and become disoriented. Much less frequently, they employ fire support
25 weapons from the wrong locations. In either type of situation, units that
26 unexpectedly encounter an errant unit may fire their weapons at the
27 friendly force.
28
29 FAILURES IN COMBAT IDENTIFICATION
30 I-11. Vehicle commanders and gunners cannot accurately identify
31 thermal or optical signatures near the maximum range of their systems.
32 In limited visibility, units within that range may mistake one another for
33 a threat target.
34
35 INADEQUATE CONTROL MEASURES
36 I-12. Units may fail to disseminate the minimum necessary maneuver
37 fire control measures and fire support coordination measures; they may
38 also fail to tie control measures to recognizable terrain or events. As the
39 battle develops, the plan then cannot address obvious branches and
40 sequels as they occur. When this happens, synchronization fails.
41
42 FAILURES IN REPORTING AND COMMUNICATIONS
43 I-13. Units at all levels may fail to generate timely, accurate, and
44 complete reports as locations and tactical situations change. This distorts

I-3
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

1 the tactical “picture” available at each level and can lead to erroneous
2 clearance of supporting fires.
3
4 WEAPONS ERRORS
5 I-14. Lapses in individual discipline can result in fratricide. These
6 incidents include charge errors, accidental discharges, mistakes with
7 explosives and hand grenades, and use of incorrect gun data.
8
9 BATTLEFIELD HAZARDS
10 I-15. A variety of explosive devices and materiel may create danger on
11 the battlefield: unexploded ordnance; unmarked or unrecorded
12 minefields, including scatterable mines; booby traps. Failure to mark,
13 record, remove, or otherwise anticipate these threats will lead to
14 casualties.
15
16 RELIANCE ON INSTRUMENTS
17 I-16. A unit that relies too heavily on systems such the FBCB2 and
18 GPS devices will find its capabilities severely degraded if these systems
19 fail. The unit will be unable to maintain situational awareness. To
20 prevent potential dangers when system failure occurs, the reconnaissance
21 platoon leader must ensure that his he and his scouts use a balance of
22 technology and traditional basic soldier skills in observation, navigation,
23 and other critical activities.
24

25 SECTION IV – FRATRICIDE RISK ASSESSMENT

26 I-17. Figure I-1 is a worksheet for evaluating fratricide risk in the


27 context of mission requirements. The worksheet lists six mission-
28 accomplishment factors that affect the risk of fratricide, along with
29 related considerations for each factor. Leaders should assess the potential
30 risk in each area (low, medium, or high) and assign a point value to each
31 (one point for low risk, two for medium risk, three for high risk). They
32 then add the point values to calculate the overall fratricide assessment
33 score.
34 I-18. The resulting score is used only as a guide, however. The leader’s
35 final assessment must be based both on observable risk factors, such as
36 those listed on the worksheet, and on his “feel” for the intangible factors
37 affecting the operation. Note that descriptive terms are listed only in the
38 low- and high-risk columns of the worksheet. The assessment of each
39 factor will determine whether the risk matches one of these extremes or
40 lies somewhere between them as a medium risk.
41
42
43
44
45

I-4
_______________________________________________________ Appendix I – Fratricide Prevention

1
Potential risk categories
(with variable conditions and point values)
Factors affecting Low risk Medium risk High risk
fratricide (1 point) (2 points) (3 points)

UNDERSTANDING OF THE PLAN

Commander’s intent Clear Vague


Complexity Simple Complex
Threat situation Known Unknown
Friendly situation Clear Unclear
ROE/ROI Clear Unclear

ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

Intervisibility Favorable Unfavorable


Obscuration Clear Obscured
Battle tempo Slow Fast
Positive target ID 100 % None (0 %)

CONTROL MEASURES

Command relationships Organic Joint/combined


Audio communications Loud / clear Jammed
Visual communications Easily seen Obscured
Graphics Standard Not understood
SOPs Standard Not used
Liaison personnel Proficient Untrained
Location/navigation Sure Unsure

EQUIPMENT (compared to US equipment)

Friendly Similar Different


Threat Different Similar
TRAINING

Individual proficiency MOS-qualified Untrained


Unit proficiency Trained Untrained
Rehearsals Realistic None
Habitual relationships Yes No
Endurance Alert Fatigued

PLANNING TIME (based on 1/3 - 2/3 rule)

Higher headquarters Adequate Inadequate


Own unit Adequate Inadequate
Subordinate elements Adequate Inadequate

Overall risk assessment Low risk Medium risk High risk


(by total point value) 26 - 46 points 42 - 62 points 58 - 78 points

NOTE: Point values alone may not accurately reflect fratricide risk. The commander
must tailor his assessment to the unit’s requirements.

2 Figure I-1. Fratricide Risk Assessment Worksheet

I-5
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

1 SECTION V – FRATRICIDE PREVENTION MEASURES

2 SPECIAL NOTE
3 In many situations, the primary cause of fratricide is the
4 lack of positive target identification. To prevent fratricide
5 incidents, commanders and leaders at all levels must
6 ensure positive target identification before they issue
7 commands to fire. In addition, all units must accurately
8 report their locations during combat operations, and all
9 TOCs and CPs must carefully track the location of all
10 subordinate elements in relation to all friendly forces.

11
12 I-19. The measures outlined in this section, including those listed in
13 the special note above, provide the platoon with a guide to actions it can
14 take to reduce and/or prevent fratricide risk. These guidelines are not
15 directive in nature, nor are they intended to restrict initiative.
16 Commanders and leaders must learn to apply them as appropriate based
17 on the specific situation and METT-TC factors.
18
19 PRINCIPLES OF FRATRICIDE PREVENTION
20 I-20. At the heart of fratricide reduction and prevention are five key
21 principles.

22 IDENTIFY AND ASSESS POTENTIAL FRATRICIDE RISKS


23 IN THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
24 I-21. Express these risks in the OPORD and/or applicable FRAGOs.

25 MAINTAIN SITUATIONAL AWARENESS


26 I-22. Focus on such areas as current intelligence; unit locations and/or
27 dispositions; denial areas (minefields/scatterable mines); contaminated
28 areas, such as ICM and NBC; SITREPs; and METT-TC factors. FBCB2
29 will provide the reconnaissance platoon with a distinct advantage in
30 situational awareness.

31 ENSURE POSITIVE TARGET IDENTIFICATION


32 I-23. Review vehicle and weapons identification (ID) cards. Become
33 familiar with the characteristics of potential friendly and threat vehicles,
34 including silhouettes and thermal signatures. Learn the conditions,
35 including distance (range) and weather, under which positive
36 identification of various vehicles and weapons is possible. Enforce the use
37 of challenge and password, especially during dismounted operations.
38 (NOTE: Refer to the special note earlier in this discussion.)

39 MAINTAIN EFFECTIVE FIRE CONTROL


40 I-24. Ensure fire commands are accurate, concise, and clearly stated.
41 Make it mandatory for crewmen to ask for clarification of any portion of
42 the fire command they do not completely understand. Stress the
43 importance of the chain of command in the fire control process; ensure

I-6
_______________________________________________________ Appendix I – Fratricide Prevention

1 crewmen get in the habit of obtaining target confirmation and permission


2 to fire from their leaders before engaging targets they assume are threat
3 elements. Know who will be in and around the area of operations.

4 ESTABLISH A COMMAND CLIMATE THAT EMPHASIZES FRATRICIDE


5 PREVENTION
6 I-25. Enforce fratricide prevention measures, placing special emphasis
7 on the use of doctrinally sound TTP. Ensure constant supervision in the
8 execution of orders and in the performance of all tasks and missions to
9 standard.
10
11 ADDITIONAL GUIDELINES
12 I-26. Additional guidelines and considerations fratricide reduction and
13 prevention include the following:

14 · Recognize the signs of battlefield stress. Maintain unit


15 cohesion by taking quick, effective action to alleviate stress.
16 · Conduct individual, leader, and collective (unit) training
17 covering fratricide awareness, target identification and
18 recognition, and fire discipline.
19 · Develop a simple, decisive plan.
20 · Strive to provide maximum planning time for leaders and
21 subordinates.
22 · Give complete and concise mission orders. Include all
23 appropriate recognition signals in paragraph 5 of the OPORD.
24 · To simplify mission orders, use SOPs that are consistent with
25 doctrine. Periodically review and update SOPs as needed.
26 · Use common language/vocabulary and doctrinally correct
27 standard terminology and control measures, such as the
28 FSCL, zone of engagement, and RFL.
29 · Ensure thorough coordination is conducted at all levels.
30 · Plan for and establish effective communications.
31 · Plan for collocation of CPs whenever it is appropriate to the
32 mission, such as during a passage of lines.
33 · Designate and employ LOs as appropriate.
34 · Make sure ROE are clear.
35 · Conduct rehearsals whenever the situation allows the platoon
36 adequate time to do so.
37 · Be in the right place at the right time. Use position
38 location/navigation devices (GPS and POSNAV); know your
39 location and the locations of adjacent units (left, right,
40 leading, and follow-on); and synchronize tactical movement. If
41 the platoon or any element becomes lost or misoriented,
42 leaders must know how to contact higher headquarters
43 immediately for instructions and assistance.
44 · Establish, execute, and enforce strict sleep and rest plans.
45 · Include a discussion of fratricide incidents in all AARs.
46

I-7
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

1 SECTION VI – STOPPING A FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT

2 I-27. The reconnaissance platoon may become involved in a friendly


3 fire incident in one of several ways: as the victim of the fire; as the firing
4 element; or as an observer intervening in an attack of one friendly
5 element on another. This section covers actions that leaders and crewmen
6 must be prepared to take when they encounter such situations.
7
8
9 ACTIONS AS VICTIM OF FRIENDLY FIRE
10 I-28. The following are recommended actions at crew and leader level
11 in the event the crew falls victim to friendly fires:

12 · React to contact until you recognize friendly fire.


13 · Cease-fire.
14 · Take immediate actions to protect soldiers and vehicles.
15 · Use a visual recognition signal directing the firing unit to
16 cease fire.
17 · Report the following on the next higher unit net:
18 n Announce that you are receiving friendly fire.
19 n Request medical assistance as needed.
20 n Give the location and direction of the firing vehicles.
21 n Warn the higher unit not to return fire if you identify the
22 firing unit as friendly.
23
24 ACTIONS AS FIRING ELEMENT
25 I-29. The following are recommended actions at crew and leader level
26 when the crew has engaged friendly forces:

27 · Cease-fire.
28 · Report the following on the next higher net:
29 n Identification of the engaged friendly force (if the unit is
30 unidentified, report number and type of vehicles).
31 n The location of the incident.
32 n Direction and distance to the engaged force.
33 n The type of fire.
34 n The target effects.
35
36 ACTIONS AS OBSERVER OF FRIENDLY FIRE
37 I-30. The following are recommended actions at crew and leader level
38 in the event the crew observes a friendly fire incident:

39 · Seek cover and protect yourself.


40 · Use a visual recognition signal directing the firing unit to
41 cease-fire.

I-8
_______________________________________________________ Appendix I – Fratricide Prevention

1 · Report the following on the next higher net:


2 n Identification of the engaged friendly force (if the unit is
3 unidentified, report number and type of vehicles).
4 n The location of the incident.
5 n Direction and distance to the victim and the firing unit.
6 n The type of fire.
7 n The target effects.
8 · Provide assistance as needed (when it is safe to do so).
9
10 LEADER RESPONSIBILITIES
11 I-31. In all situations involving the risk of fratricide and friendly fire,
12 leaders must be prepared to take immediate actions to prevent casualties
13 as well as equipment damage or destruction. Recommended actions in
14 fratricide situations include the following:

15 · Identify the incident and order the parties involved to cease-


16 fire.
17 · Conduct an in-stride risk assessment.
18 · Identify and implement controls to prevent the incident from
19 recurring.

I-9
1 Appendix J

2 Debriefing Format
3
4
5 5-1. This appendix outlines information that should be included in the
6 debriefing of friendly personnel following the completion of tactical
7 operations. The information and format are applicable to virtually every
8 type of operation. The reconnaissance platoon leader can adapt the
9 format according to the commander’s intent, unit SOP, and other
10 operational requirements.
11
12
13
14 Team Number: __________ DTG: __________

15 Maps Used: 1:25,000


16 1:50,000

17 A. Size and composition of team.

18 B. Mission.

19 C. Time of departure (DTG).


20 1. Method of infiltration.
21 2. Point of departure.

22 D. Threat forces observed en route.


23 1. Ground activity.
24 2. Air activity.
25 3. Miscellaneous activity.

26 E. Routes out. (Team provides a detailed description, written and overlay,


27 of routes from assembly area to objective.)
28 1. Planned primary and alternate routes.
29 2. Actual routes taken and reason for deviation from planned routes.
30 3. Halts en route, to include security and objective.
31 4. DTG arrived at objective area.

J-1
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

1 F. Terrain throughout the objective area.


2 1. Roads, trails, railroad tracks.
3 a. Type (single or multilane, hard, gravel, or dirt surface).
4 b. Condition (dry, wet, muddy, well-used, seldom used).
5 c. Trafficability (types of vehicle terrain will support).
6 d. Trails or roads not on the map.
7 e. Bypasses and/or alternate routes.
8 2. All open areas.
9 a. Type (pasture, cultivated, new tree farm).
10 b. Suitability for use as a PZ, LZ, or DZ.
11 c. Will the ground support tracked or wheeled vehicles?
12 3. Forested areas.
13 a. Type of trees.
14 b. Thickness.
15 c. Undergrowth.
16 d. Effects on maneuverability of vehicles and dismounted
17 soldiers.
18 e. Thickness of overhead cover.
19 4. Rivers, streams, and lakes.
20 a. Length.
21 b. Width.
22 c. Depth.
23 d. Fordability to vehicles and soldiers.
24 e. Bridges (classification report).
25 f. Trafficability under the bridge for boats or barges.
26 5. Key terrain.
27 6. Restrictive terrain.
28 7. Major obstacles to vehicles and soldiers.
29 8. Availability of cover and concealment.
30 9. Major avenues of approach (any that an attacking element,
31 battalion-size or larger, could maneuver through).
32 10. Any map corrections not already given.

J-2
_________________________________________________________ Appendix J – Debriefing Format

1 G. Threat forces and installations (include sketches).

2 H. Miscellaneous information.
3 1. NBC.
4 2. Abandoned equipment (type, number, location, and markings).
5 a. Out of fuel.
6 b. Destroyed or damaged.
7 c. Abandoned towns or villages.

8 I. Results of encounters with threat forces or local populace.


9 1. All sightings (DTG, activity, location).
10 a. Did soldiers appear clean-shaven? What was morale?
11 b. Did uniforms appear clean? Were all soldier in the same
12 uniform? List types of uniforms.
13 c. Weapons (type; locked and loaded?).
14 d. Conditions of vehicles and equipment.
15 e. Nationality and language.
16 f. Actions of local populace (friendly, confrontational,
17 oblivious).
18 2. Results of threat contact (DTG; location; EPWs; personnel killed,
19 wounded, or MIA).

20 J. Captured threat equipment and material.

21 K. Routes back.
22 1. Planned primary and alternate routes.
23 2. Actual routes taken and reason for deviation from planned routes.
24 3. Halts en route, to include security and linkup with vehicle.
25 4. DTG arrived at assembly area.

26 L. Exfiltration.
27 1. DTG of exfiltration.
28 2. Method of exfiltration.
29 3. Point of exfiltration.

30 M. Time and point of return.

J-3
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

1 N. Condition of team.
2 1. Disposition of dead and wounded personnel.
3 2. Team leader’s estimate of when team will be ready to start a new
4 mission.
5 3. Personnel and equipment shortages.

6 O. Items of potential tactical value.


7 1. Were all maps and any other identifiable material returned with the
8 team?
9 2. If not, what is missing? (State item and approximately where lost.)

10 P. Conclusions and recommendations.


11 1. To what extent was the mission accomplished?
12 2. Recommended changes in tactics or procedures.
13 3. What additional information is needed in the OPORD?
14 4. Recommended equipment changes.
15 5. Effects of weather on team’s operational capability.
16 6. What else should another team know before going into this area?
17 7. Additional areas or information that has not been covered. Is there
18 something that should be highlighted?

19 Team Leader (print name and grade): ___________________________

20 Unit: _____________ Signature: ___________________________

21 Debriefer (print name and grade): ______________________________

22 Unit: _____________ Signature: ___________________________

23 Additional remarks by debriefer:

24 Enclosures:
25 Patrol log
26 Communications log
27 Surveillance log
28 Photograph log

J-4
Glossary
A
A2C2 Army airspace command and control
AA avenue of approach; assembly area
AAR after-action review
ABCS Army Battle Command System
ABF attack by fire (position)
ACA airspace coordination area
ACE armored combat earthmover
ACF aviation close fires
ACR armored cavalry regiment
ADA air defense artillery
ADAM area denial munitions
AFATDS advanced field artillery tactical data system
AGMB advance guard main body (enemy force)
AI area of interest
A/L administrative/logistics
ALICE all-purpose lightweight individual carrying case
AM amplitude modulation (radio)
AMC air mission commander
AMDS advanced monitoring display system
ammo ammunition
AO area of operations
AOR area of responsibility
AP antipersonnel
APC armored personnel carrier
APDS armor-piercing, discarding-sabot (ammunition)
APOBS antipersonnel obstacle breaching system
APOD aerial port of debarkation
ARTEP Army Training and Evaluation Program
ASAS all-source analysis system
AT antitank
ATACMS Army tactical missile system
ATGM antitank guided missile
ATHS airborne target handover system
AVLB armored vehicle launched bridge

B
BAT battery assembly training
BCT brigade combat team
BDA battle damage assessment

Glossary-1
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

BDAR battle damage assessment and repair


bde brigade
BDO battle dress overgarment
BDU battle dress uniform
BFV Bradley (infantry) fighting vehicle
BHL battle handover line
BII basic issue item
BMNT beginning of morning nautical twilight
bn battalion
BP battle position
BRIDGEREP report of bridge, overpass, culvert, underpass, or tunnel
BRT brigade reconnaissance team
BSA brigade support area
BSC base support company
BSFV Bradley Stinger (missile) fighting vehicle

C
C2 command and control
C4I command, control, communications, computers, and
intelligence
C4ISR command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance,and reconnaissance
cal caliber
CAM chemical agent monitor
CANA convulsant antidote for nerve agent
CAS close air support
CASEVAC casualty evacuation
CATF commander, amphibious landing force
cav cavalry
CBU cluster bomb unit
CCIR commander’s critical information requirements
CDE chemical defense equipment
cdr commander
CEOI communications-electronic operation instructions
CFF call for fire
CFL coordinated fire line
CFSO counterintelligence force protection source operations
CFV (Bradley) cavalry fighting vehicle
CFZ critical friendly zone
cGy/hr centigray(s) per hour
CI counterintelligence
CIP combat identification panel
CITV commander’s independent thermal viewer

Glossary-2
_____________________________________________________________________________ Glossary

CLF commander, landing force


co tm; co/tm company team
COA course of action
COLT combat observation lasing team
COMSEC communications security
COP common operational picture
CP command post; checkpoint (graphics only)
CPOG chemical protective overgarment
CROSSREP report of ford, ferry, or other water crossing site
CRP combat reconnaissance patrol (threat unit)
CS combat support; O-chlorobenzyl-malononitrile (CS gas)
CSAR combat search and rescue
CSS combat service support
CSSCS combat service support control system
CTA common table of allowances
CTCP combat trains command post
CVC combat vehicle crewman

D
DA Department of the Army
DAP decontamination apparatus, portable
DC direct current
DD; DoD Department of Defense
DED detailed equipment decontamination
div division
div cav division cavalry
DoD (United States) Department of Defense
DP decision point (illustration text)
DPICM dual-purpose improve conventional munitions
DS direct support
DSO domestic support operations
DST decision support template
DTD detailed troop decontamination
DTG date-time group
DU depleted uranium
DZ drop zone

E
E&E evasion and escape
EA engagement area
EAC echelons above corps
ECM electronic countermeasures
EECP early entry command center

Glossary-3
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

EENT end of evening nautical twilight


EFST essential fire support task
EMP electromagnetic pulse
en; EN enemy
engr engineer(s)
EO electro-optical
EPLRS enhanced position location and reporting system
EPW enemy prisoner of war
ESTAT equipment status report
EW electronic warfare

F
1LT first lieutenant
1SG first sergeant
FA field artillery
FAC forward air controller
FARP forward area refuel and rearm point
FBCB2 Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (system)
FCR fire control radar
FDC fire direction center
FEBA forward edge of the battle area
FFA free fire area
FHA foreign humanitarian assistance
FIPR flash immediate priority routine
FIST fire support team
FKSM Fort Knox Supplemental Material
FLIR forward-looking infrared (system)
FLOT forward line of own troops
FM frequency modulation (radio); field manual
FO forward observer
FPF final protective fires
FRAGO fragmentary order
FS fire support
FSCL fire support coordination line
FSCM fire support control measure
FSCOORD fire support coordinator
FSE fire support element; forward security element (threat forces
only)
FSO fire support officer
ft foot; feet
FWF former warring factions
FY fiscal year

Glossary-4
_____________________________________________________________________________ Glossary

G
GCT ground cavalry troop
GHz gigahertz
GIRS grid index reference system
gpm gallons per minute
GPS global positioning system
GS general support
GSR ground surveillance radar

H
H hour (used for timeline designation)
HAB heavy assault bridge
HE high explosive
HEI-T high explosive incendiary tracer (ammunition)
HEP-T high explosive plastic tracer (ammunition)
HHC headquarters and headquarters company
HMMWV high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle
HN host nation
hp horsepower
HPT high-priority target
HQ headquarters
hr hour(s)
HUMINT human intelligence
HVT high-value target

I
ICAM improved chemical agent monitor
ICE individual chemical equipment
ICM improved conventional munitions
ICOM integrated communications security (COMSEC)
ID identification
IEDK individual equipment decontamination kit
IFF identification friend or foe
IFSAS initial fire support automated system
illum illumination
IMINT image intelligence
in inch(es)
INS inertial navigation system
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IPE individual protective equipment
IR infrared; information requirements
IREMBASS improved remotely monitored battlefield sensor system

Glossary-5
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance


IV intravenous

J K
JAAT joint air attack team
JSLIST joint service lightweight integrated suit technology
JSTARS joint surveillance target attack radar system
JVMF joint variable message format
JWARN joint warning and reporting network

KIA killed in action


kmph kilometer(s) per hour

L
LAV light armored vehicle
LAW light antiarmor weapon
lb pound(s)
LBE load-bearing equipment
LBV load-bearing vest
LD line of departure
LD/LC line of departure is line of contact
LO liaison officer
LOA limit of advance
LOGPAC logistics package
LOS line of sight
LP listening post
LRP logistic release point
LT lieutenant
LU linkup (point)
LZ landing zone

M
m meter(s)
MAG magnetic sensor
MANPADS man-portable air defense system
MASINT measurement and signal intelligence
MBA main battle area
MC mobility corridor
MCOO modified combined obstacle overlay
MCS maneuver control system
MDI modern demolition initiator
MDMP military decision-making process
mech mechanized

Glossary-6
_____________________________________________________________________________ Glossary

MEDEVAC medical evacuation


MELIOS miniature eye-safe laser infrared observation set
METL mission essential task list
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain (and weather), troops and support
available, time available, and civil considerations (factors
taken into account in situational awareness and in the
mission analysis process)
MFD multifunction display
MGS mobile gun system
MHz megahertz
mi mile(s)
MI military intelligence
MICAD multiintegrated chemical agent alarm (device)
MIJI meaconing, intrusion, jamming, and interference
min minute(s)
MLC military load classification
MLRS multiple launch rocket system
mm millimeter(s)
MMS mast mounted sight
MOPMS modular pack mine system
MOPP mission-oriented protective posture
MOS military occupational specialty
MOUT military operations on urbanized terrain
MP military police
mph mile(s) per hour
MRE meals, ready to eat
MSR main supply route
MTOE modified table(s) of organization and equipment
MTP mission training plan
MTT military training teams
MTW major theater of war

N
NA not applicable
NAAK nerve agent autoinjector kit
NAI named area(s) of interest
NAPP nerve agent pyridostigmine pill
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC nuclear, biological, chemical
NBCRS NBC reconnaissance and surveillance
NBCWRS NBC warning and reporting system
NCO noncommissioned officer
NCOIC noncommissioned officer in charge

Glossary-7
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

NCS net control station


NEO noncombatant evacuation operation
NFA no-fire area
NGF naval gunfire
NGO nongovernmental organization
NLT not later than
NOD night observation device
NOE nap of the earth
NP nonpersistent chemical agent (abbreviation on overlays)
NSA National Security Agency
NSN national stock number
NVD night vision device
NVG night vision goggles

O
ob obstruction (in route classification)
obj objective
OBSTINTEL obstacle intelligence
OCIE organization clothing and individual equipment
OCOKA observation and fields of fire; cover and concealment;
obstacles; key terrain; and avenues of approach
(considerations in evaluating terrain as part of METT-T
analysis)
OEG operational exposure guidance
OI operations and intelligence
OIC officer in charge
OP observation post
OPCON operational control
OPLAN operational plan
OPORD operation order
OPSEC operations security
OPTEMPO operational tempo
ORP objective rally point
OT observer-target

P
P persistent chemical agent (abbreviation on overlays)
PAO public affairs office; public affairs officer
PB pyridostigmine bromide
PC point of curvature (in curve calculation)
PCC precombat check
PCI precombat inspection
PDDE power-driven decontamination equipment

Glossary-8
_____________________________________________________________________________ Glossary

PEWS platoon early warning system


PFC private first class
PGM precision-guided munitions
PIC pilot in command
PIR priority information requirements
PL phase line; platoon leader
PLGR precision lightweight GPS receiver (“Plugger”)
PLL prescribed load list
plt platoon
PMCS preventive maintenance checks and services
PME peacetime military engagement
PMS portable monitoring set
POC point of contact
POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants
PP passage point (abbreviation on overlays)
PSG platoon sergeant
psi pounds per square inch
PT point of tangency (in curve calculation)
PVO private volunteer organization
PX post exchange
PZ pickup zone

Q
QRF quick reaction force

R
R&S reconnaissance and surveillance; reconnaissance and security
(patrol elements)
RAA reconnaissance avenue of approach
RAAMS remote antiarmor mine system
RC reserve component
recon reconnaissance; reconnoiter
rd; rds round; rounds
recce reconnaissance
REDCON readiness condition
regt regiment
REMBASS remotely monitored battlefield sensor system
RES radiation exposure status
retrans retransmission
RF radio frequency
RFA restrictive fire area
RFL restrictive fire line

Glossary-9
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

RHO reconnaissance handover


RHOCP reconnaissance handover coordination point
RHOL reconnaissance handover line
RISTA reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target
acquisition
ROE rules of engagement
ROI rules of interaction
ROUTEREP route (reconnaissance) report
RP release point
RRP reentry rally point
RSI reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence
RSOI reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
RSTA reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
RT receiver-transmitter
rte route
RTO radiotelephone operator
RTP radiotelephone procedure
RV reconnaissance vehicle
RVT remote video terminal

S
2LT second lieutenant
S1 personnel staff officer (US Army)
S2 intelligence staff officer (US Army)
S3 operations and training staff officer (US Army)
S3-Air air operations staff officer (US Army)
S4 logistics staff officer (US Army)
S5 civil-military operations staff officer (US Army)
S6 signal staff officer (US Army)
SA situational awareness
SALT size, activity, location, and time (simplified format for the
initial contact report of enemy information; used in FBCB2
reporting)
SALUTE size, activity, location, unit identification, time, and
equipment (complete format for reporting enemy information)
SAW squad automatic weapon
SBCT Stryker brigade combat team
SCBA self-contained breathing apparatus
sct scout
SDS sorbent decontamination system
SEB staphylococcal enterotoxin B
sec section; second(s)
SENSEREP sensitive items report

Glossary-10
_____________________________________________________________________________ Glossary

SERE survival, escape, resistance, evasion


SFC sergeant first class
SGT sergeant
SHORAD short-range air defense
SIGINT signal intelligence
SINCGARS single channel ground/airborne radio system
SIR specific information requirements
SITEMP situational template
SITREP situation report
SME subject matter expert
smk smoke
SMS sensor monitoring set
SOF special operations forces
SOFA status of forces agreement
SOI signal operation instructions
SOP standing operating procedure
SOR specific orders and requests
SOSRA suppression, obscuration, security, reduction, and assault
(actions executed during breaching operations)
SP start point
SPEC specialist
SPOD seaport of debarkation
SPOTREP spot report
sqd squad
SSC small-scale contingency
SSG staff sergeant
SSN social security number
ST special text
STANREP stand-to report

T
T snow blockage (in route classification)
T&EO training and evaluation outline
TAC CP tactical command post
TACFIRE tactical fire direction system
TACSAT tactical satellite
TAI target area(s) of interest
TBM tactical ballistic missile
TC technical circular
TCP traffic control point
TEP theater engagement plan
TF task force
TI tactical internet

Glossary-11
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

TIC toxic industrial chemical


TIM toxic industrial material
TIRS terrain index reference system
TIS thermal imaging system
TM technical manual
TOC tactical operations center
TOE table(s) of organization and equipment
TOR terms of reference
TOT time on target
TOW tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (missile)
TPFDD time-phased force deployment data
TP-T target practice-tracer (ammunition)
TREE transient radiation effects on electronics
TRP target reference point
TSOP tactical standing operating procedure
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
TTT time to target
TUAV tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
TV television

U
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
UHF ultra high frequency
UMCP unit maintenance collection point
UN United Nations
UNMO United Nations military observer
US United States (of America)
USAARMC US Army Armor Center
USAARMS US Army Armor School
USAF US Air Force
USAR US Army Reserve
USMC US Marine Corps

VWX
veh vehicle
VHF very high frequency
VHR vertical half-rhombic (antenna)

W flooding (in route classification)


WIA wounded in action
WMD weapons of mass destruction
WP white phosphorus

XO executive officer

Glossary-12
Bibliography
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Practice, and Combat. October 1983.
ARTEP 17-97F-10-MTP. Mission Training Plan for the Reconnaissance Platoon.
July 2002 (Final Draft). DA-authorized edition to be published FY 2003.
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DA Form 1156. Casualty Feeder Report. June 1966.
DA Form 1355-1-R. Hasty Protective Minefield Record. September 2001.
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1974.
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FM 3-15.3 [TC 20-32-3]. Foreign Mine Handbook (Balkan States). 15 August 1997.
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FM 3-20.15 [FM 17-15]. Tank Platoon. 1 November 2001.
FM 3-20.95 [FM 17-95]. Cavalry Operations. 24 December 1996.

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FM 3-20.96. Cavalry Squadron (RSTA). September 2002 (Final Draft). DA-authorized


edition to be published FY 2003.
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FM 3-20.151. MGS Platoon. June 2002 (Final Draft). DA-authorized edition to be
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Assault, Light Infantry). 23 December 1992, Change 1, 13 December 2001.
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FM 3-34.343 [FM 5-446]. Military Nonstandard Fixed Bridging. 3 June 1991.
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Bibliography-2
Index
brigade reconnaissance troop multisensor ground platoon,
A (BRT), 1-2, 1-11 – 1-12, ground sensor platoon, NBC
3-1, 3-13, 3-22 – 3-23, 4-36 reconnaissance platoon,
actions on contact, 3-15 –
engineer operations (BCT),
3-21, 3-32, 7-29 – 7-30
air defense.
eight forms of contact, C
command and control (C2),
3-16 cavalry squadron (RSTA), 1-2,
2-6 – 2-12
advanced field artillery tactical 1-3 – 1-8
digital systems, 2-31 –
data system, (AFATDS), CHAT, 2-38
2-38
1-13, 2-31, 6-8, 6-12 COLT, 1-8, 1-12, 5-32, 6-12 –
FM radio nets, 2-29 – 2-30
air defense, 6-60 – 6-62 6-13
troop-leading procedures,
all source analysis system combat service support, 6-57,
2-12 – 2-28
(ASAS), 2-31, 3-29 7-31
command post, 1-6, 1-11, 2-6,
analysis and control team combat health support,
2-33
(ACT), 3-29 8-26 – 8-28
battle drills, F-5 – F-6
area of responsibility (AOR), enemy prisoners of war
1-22 – 1-23 (EPW), 8-29 BRT, 1-11 – 1-12
Army aviation, 6-25 evacuation, 8-26 – 8-27 communications, F-6 –
F-11
air cavalry, 6-25 – 6-26 FBCB2 role, 8-5 – 8-6
continuous operations, F-3
air-ground integration, for brigade
6-26 –6-32, 7-18 – 7-20 reconnaissance troop, displacing, F-5
attack helicopter support, 8-13 positioning, F-4
5-32, 6-33 –6-41 for RSTA squadron , 8-10 responsibilities, F-1 – F-2
assault and cargo graves registration SOP, F-11 – F-19
helicopter support, (GRREG), 8-24 – 8-25 security, F-4 – F-5
6-42 – 6-44 maintenance and recovery recce troop, 1-6
Army battle command system, operations, 8-22 – 8-24
commander’s critical
2-31 – 2-32 personnel and information requirements
Army tactical command and administration center (CCIR), 1-2, 3-1
control system (ATCCS), (PAC), 8-25
commander’s reconnaissance
2-31 resupply operations, guidance, 3-4, 3-11, 4-3
assembly area, 5-33 – 5-36, 6-42 – 6-44, 8-16 – 8-22
engagement criteria,
5-41 in stability and support 3-12
operations, D-25
focus, 3-11
B supply operations, 8-14 –
tempo, 3-11 – 3-12
battle command methodology, 8-16
common operational picture
2-2 – 2-5 tactical functions, 8-2 – 8-4
(COP), 1-1, 2-7
battle handover, 5-43, 5-46 troop trains, 8-7 – 8-10
communications, 2-28 – 2-30,
breaching, 5-45 – 5-47 unit ministry team, 8-28 7-3, 7-6, 7-10, 7-12 – 7-14,
brigade combat team (BCT), combat service support control 7-17, 7-19, 7-24, 7-25, 7-27,
1-9 – 1-12, 3-2 – 3-11, 3-13, system (CSSCS), 2-31, 8-2 7-28
3-15 – 3-17, 3-19, 3-22 – combat support. See compliance inspection. See
3-23, 3-31, 3-39, 3-45, 3-50, intelligence, fire support, stability operations and
4-3 – 4-5, 4-9 – 4-11, target acquisition, army support operations,
4-18 – 4-19, 4-29, 4-31 aviation, unmanned aerial reconnaissance troop
ISR operations, 1-10 vehicle (UAV) platoon, employment.

Index-1
FM 3-20.971_______________________________________________________________________________

contiguous operations, (FBCB2), 2-4, 2-31, 2-33 – multiple lane, 3-31


1-21 – 1-22, 3-35 2-42, 4-10, 5-7 single-lane, 3-31
counterreconnaissance, 2-37, forward area air defense intelligence, 6-1 – 6-7, 6-57.
3-34, 4-2, 4-5, 4-8, 4-11, command, control, See also human intelligence.
4-12, 5-17, 5-20 communications, and
intelligence preparation of the
control measures. See graphic intelligence system
battlefield (IPB), 1-2, 1-3
control measures. (FAADC3I) 2-31
intelligence, surveillance, and
course of action (COA), 3-17, fratricide, 2-41, 5-22, 5-29,
reconnaissance (ISR), 1-1,
3-20, 7-2 B-6 – B-13
1-3, 1-10, 2-3, 2-5, 2-6,
full spectrum operations, 1-30 2-13, 2-19 – 2-22, 2-28,
D 2-30, 3-2, 3-3 – 3-4, 3-13,
G 7-2, 7-21
decontamination. See nuclear,
biological, chemical (NBC). global command and control
defensive operations, system–Army (GCCS-A), J
1-26 – 1-28, 6-11, 6-58, 2-31 joint surveillance and target
8-10. See also economy of graphic control measures, attack radar system
force. 2-35 – 2-37, 4-20, (JSTARS), 3-4, 3-18, 3-23
engagement area 5-41 – 5-43
development, 5-21 ground sensor platoon, 1-4, L
deployment, E-1 – E-5 1-9, 6-48 – 6-50
linear operations, 1-21 – 1-23
ground surveillance radar,
local area network (LAN), 2-31
3-24, 3-29, 4-8, 6-50 – 6-51
E
economy of force 5-15 – 5-31 M
H
defend an AO, 5-19 major theater of war (MTW),
hasty attack, 5-11 – 5-14
defend a troop BP, 5-18 1-1, 1-31, 3-8, 3-50
human intelligence (HUMINT),
engagement area maneuver control system
1-7, 3-11, 3-36, 6-1 – 6-7,
development, 5-21 – (MCS), 2-31
7-2
5-31 medical evacuation, 6-44 –
collection operations, 6-3 –
engineer operations (BCT), 6-45, 7-19
6-4
3-42, 3-48, 3-53, 4-8, mission, enemy, terrain, troops
6-56 – 6-60 document exploitation
and support available, time
(DOCEX), 6-4
environmental risk available, and civil
management, G-1 – G-6 tactical questioning, 6-4 – considerations (METT-TC),
6-6 2-13 – 2-18
exfiltration, 3-33 – 3-34, 7-23
mortar section, 1-8, 4-20, 4-33
I multisensor ground platoon,
F
improved remotely monitored 1-4, 1-9, 6-51 – 6-54
fire control, 5-19 – 5-21
battlefield sensor system
fire support, 6-8, 7-12, 7-14, (IREMBASS), 1-8, 3-29, 4-8,
7-18 N
6-49
assets and capabilities, noncontiguous operations,
infiltration, 3-28 – 3-33, 4-12,
6-13 – 6-25 1-21 – 1-22, 3-35
5-42, 7-23
coordination measures, nonlinear operations, 1-21 –
actions on contact, 3-32
6-19 – 6-25 1-23
aerial insertion, 3-31
fire support coordinator nuclear, biological, chemical
dismounted, 3-30 (NBC) operations, 3-16,
(FSCOORD), 6-8
employment by section, 3-27, 3-53, C-1
fire support team (FIST), 1-7,
3-30 casualties, C-7
1-17, 5-32, 6-9
employment by unit, 3-30 decontamination, C-11 –
Force XXI Battle Command
Brigade and Below mounted, 3-30 C-13

Index-2
_____________________________________________________________________________________Index

defense, C-1 – C-3, and security, 3-16. See screen, 1-4, 4-10 – 4-30
C-5 – C-6 also nuclear, biological, situational awareness, 1-6,
operations, 6-54 – 6-56 and chemical (NBC). 1-11, 1-16, 1-30, 2-5, 2-7,
marking, C-8 – C-9 and surveillance (R&S), 2-27, 4-4, 4-8, 4-10, 4-18,
3-13 – 3-15, 4-22, 4-30, 4-30, 4-34, 5-1, 5-10, 5-15
mission-oriented protective
4-36 situational understanding, 1-2,
posture (MOPP), C-4
aerial, 3-26 – 3-27 1-31, 2-3, 2-5, 2-7, 3-5, 3-6,
protection, C-3
area, 1-4, 3-43 – 3-49 3-20, 4-3
reconnaissance and
dismounted, 3-28 smaller-scale contingencies
security, C-13 – C-14
(SSC), 1-1, 1-3, 1-30 – 1-31,
reconnaissance platoon, engagement criteria, 3-13
3-8, 3-10, 3-50, 6-3, 6-7
1-4, 1-9 focus of, 3-1, 3-7, 3-11
stability operations, D-1 – D-9.
reports, C-10 fundamentals of, 3-2 – 3-6 See also stability operations
unmasking, C-9 – C-10 handover, 3-21 – 3-26, and support operations.
5-36 arms control, D-7
O missions, 1-13 combating terrorism, D-6 –
observation and fields of fire, mounted, 3-28 D-7
cover, obstacles, key terrain, multidimensional, 3-7, diplomatic effort
and avenues of approach 7-25 operations, D-4 – D-5
(OCOKA), 2-15, 3-10, B-9 planning, 3-11 – 3-14, peace enforcement
obstacles, 3-16, 3-19, 3-32, A-11 – A-19 operations, D-4
3-33, 3-38, 3-42, 3-44, 3-48, platoon, 1-7 – 1-8, 1-12 peacekeeping operations,
3-50, 3-51, 3-53, 5-25 D-4
route, 3-49 – 3-54
offensive operations, 1-25 – show of force, D-7
sensor, 3-26
1-26, 5-9 – 5-14, 6-10, 6-57,
tempo, 3-11 – 3-12 stability operations and support
8-9
operations, D-1
operational environment, zone, 1-4, 3-38 – 3-43,
4-12 compliance inspections,
1-20 – 1-32, 3-6 – 3-7, D-16,
D-32 – D-33
D-25 rehearsals, 2-24 – 2-27, 4-8,
4-30, 5-32, 5-37 environment, D-16
orders 2-5, 2-10 – 2-12, 2-35
relief in place, 5-36 – 5-40 intelligence, D-17
FRAGO, A-8 – A-9
risk management, B-1 – B-6 media interviews, D-39 –
OPORD, 2-22 – 2-23,
D-40
2-35, A-1 – A-7, B-10 – rules of engagement (ROE),
B-13 3-11, 3-18, 3-46, minefield clearance,
D-22 – D-23 D-42 – D-43
WARNO, A-9 – A-11
rules of interaction (ROI), D-24 presence operations,
D-30 – D-32
P
reconnaissance troop
passage of lines, 5-40 – 5-45 S
employment, D-15
PROPHET, 3-29, 5-32, 6-52 – security drill, 4-26 – 4-30 tempo, D-17
6-54 security operations, 1-28 – Stryker brigade combat team
1-29, 4-1 – 4-5, 4-31 – 4-32, (SBCT), 1-2, 1-3, 1-4,
R 8-10, 8-13, 8-21 3-23 – 3-24, 4-16
security missions, 1-4, 1-10, support operations, D-9 –
readiness condition
1-13, 4-2 D-15. See also stability
(REDCON), 5-35
area security, 4-30 – 4-34 operations and support
recce troop, 1-2, 3-1, 3-6, 3-23,
3-36, 4-36, 4-38 convoy security, 4-34 – operations.
organization structure and 4-38 domestic support, D-10
personnel responsibilities, drill, 4-26 – 4-30 foreign humanitarian
1-5 – 1-9, 1-15 – 1-19 fundamentals, 4-3 – 4-5 assistance, D-11
reconnaissance, 1-1, 7-24 – high-value asset, 4-33 relief operations, D-11
7-31

Index-3
FM 3-20.971_______________________________________________________________________________

surveillance troop, 1-8 – 1-9, threat, 1-20, 1-25, 1-28, 3-8, patrolling, 7-25 – 7-29
7-22 – 7-23 4-26 physical environment,
troop-leading procedures, 7-6 – 7-10
T 2-12 – 2-28, 3-11, 3-13, society, 3-8, 7-10
3-14, 3-17, 3-39, 3-44, 3-45,
tactical internet, 2-31 – 2-32 terrain, 3-10, 7-5
3-51, A-1
tactical movement, 1-29 – threat, 3-8, 7-10 – 7-11
1-30, 5-3. See also tactical
road march. U
W
tactical road march, 4-12, 5-4 – unmanned aerial vehicle,
(UAV), 1-4, 1-9, 3-2, 3-4, wide area network, 2-31
5-9
3-14, 3-17, 3-18, 3-22 –
target acquisition, 5-27, 5-32 –
3-24, 3-27, 3-29, 3-40, 3-42,
5-33, 6-8 – 6-9
3-45, 3-46, 3-48, 3-51,
terrain, 3-3, 3-4, 3-6, 3-7, 3-10, 3-53, 4-9, 5-32
3-11, 3-13, 3-14, 3-18, 3-19,
platoon, 6-45 – 6-48
3-27 – 3-30, 3-34, 3-36,
3-38, 3-39, 3-42 – 3-46, urban operations, 3-7
3-48 – 3-51, 3-53, 5-2 – 5-5, infrastructure, 3-9, 7-10
5-7, 5-9, 5-10, 5-17, 5-18,
5-20, 5-21, 5-23, 5-29, 5-33,
5-35, 5-38, 5-40, 5-42,
5-46 – 5-48

Index-4
FM 3-20.98
2 December 2002

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

ERIC K. SHINSEKI
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

JOEL B. HUDSON
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0232407

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, Army National Guard, and US Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with
the initial distribution number 111041, requirements for FM 3-20.98.
PIN: 080503-000

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