Professional Documents
Culture Documents
98 [FM 17-98]
Field Manual Headquarters
No 3-20.98 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 2 December 2002
RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON
Contents
Page
PREFACE ............................................................................................. v
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FM 3-20.98 ___________________________________________________________________
Page
Chapter 3 RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS ................................................... 3-1
Section I Purpose and Fundamentals .................................... 3-1
Section II Reconnaissance Planning, Methods,
and Tactical Employment .................................. 3-3
Section III Multidimensional Aspects of Reconnaissance
and Surveillance ................................................. 3-29
Section IV Route Reconnaissance ............................................ 3-43
Section V Area Reconnaissance .............................................. 3-51
Section VI Zone Reconnaissance .............................................. 3-57
Section VII Obstacle/Restriction Reconnaissance ................... 3-64
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Page
Chapter 9 ESSENTIAL FIELD DATA ................................................................... 9-1
Section I Route Reconnaissance Symbols ............................ 9-1
Section II Route Classification ................................................. 9-7
Section III Curve Calculations ................................................... 9-12
Section IV Slope Estimation ...................................................... 9-15
Section V Constrictions ............................................................ 9-19
Section VI Stream Reconnaissance .......................................... 9-23
Section VII Ford Reconnaissance .............................................. 9-26
Section VIII Ferry Reconnaissance ............................................. 9-28
Section IX Bridge Classification and Reconnaissance ........... 9-30
Section X Bypasses ................................................................... 9-53
Section XI Measurement Conversions ..................................... 9-54
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Page
Appendix E ANTENNAS .......................................................................................... E-1
Section I Siting Considerations .............................................. E-1
Section II Field-Expedient Repair ............................................. E-2
Section III Field-Expedient Antennas ....................................... E-5
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Preface
On the ever-changing landscape of the modern battlefield, the reconnaissance
platoon remains one of the tactical commander’s most valued assets. This is
especially true in the traditional role of the cavalry: as the commander’s “eyes
and ears” on the forward edge of the battle. Today’s reconnaissance platoon
complements its strengths in mobility, speed, and stealth with the latest
technology to provide an accurate, timely picture of developments in the area
of operations.
This field manual describes how the reconnaissance platoon conducts its
primary missions, reconnaissance and security. The manual focuses on the
principles of platoon operations and on the tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTP) the platoon uses to acquire information and provide
security and protection for other units on the battlefield. It also covers a
variety of supporting tasks and operations the platoon must perform or
coordinate, either as part of its reconnaissance and security missions or as
assigned by the commander.
The US Army Armor Center is the proponent for this publication. Users and
readers are invited to submit comments and recommended changes. Prepare
comments using DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and
Blank Forms) or in a memorandum using a similar format. Send
recommendations to Commander, US Army Armor Center, ATTN: ATZK-
TDD-C, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5000, or e-mail the DA Form 2028 to Chief,
Cavalry Branch, from the Doctrine Division web site at
http://147.238.100.101/center/dtdd/doctrine/armordoc.htm. (After accessing
the web site, select “Organization” from the menu on the left side of the
screen to reach the Cavalry Branch site.)
The procedures described in this manual are intended as a guide only and
are not to be considered inflexible. Each situation in war and military
operations other than war must be resolved by intelligent interpretation and
application of the doctrine described here.
v
Chapter 1
Introduction
This manual is a doctrinal
CONTENTS
guide for reconnaissance
platoons. This field manual, Role of the Reconnaisssance Platoon ....... 1-1
Types of Reconnaisssance Platoons ......... 1-2
with ARTEP 17-97F-10 MTP Operational Environment ............................ 1-3
and ST 3-20.983, focuses on Scope of Operations ............................. 1-4
principles of reconnaissance Operational Concept ............................. 1-5
platoon operations and the Tactical Organization ................................... 1-6
tactics, techniques, and Reconnaissance Platoon
Organizations .................................... 1-6
procedures (TTP) the platoon Dismounted Organization .................... 1-15
uses to operate in a theater of Task Organization ................................. 1-17
operations and to acquire Responsibilities ........................................... 1-17
information for its higher Platoon Leader ...................................... 1-17
commander. The term “recon- Platoon Sergeant .................................. 1-18
Section and Squad Leaders ................. 1-18
naissance platoon” refers to HUMINT Collectors ............................... 1-19
all forms of the scout platoon, Missions, Capabilities and Limitations,
whether it is part of an armor and Vehicle Characteristics .......... 1-19
or infantry battalion, a Missions ................................................ 1-19
cavalry squadron, a brigade Capabilities and Limitations ................ 1-20
Vehicle Characteristics ........................ 1-21
reconnaissance troop (BRT), Battle Command .......................................... 1-23
or a cavalry squadron (recon- Command and Control
naissance, surveillance, and in the Platoon .................................... 1-24
target acquisition [RSTA]). Command Relationships ...................... 1-24
References to the “recce FBCB2 in the Battle Command
Structure ............................................ 1-25
platoon” in this manual apply Intelligence Preparation of the
specifically to reconnaissance Battlefield ....................................... 1-29
platoons that are organic to What IPB Accomplishes ....................... 1-29
the cavalry squadron (RSTA) . The IPB Process ................................... 1-30
Refer to Section II of this Friendly COA Development
and War-gaming ................................ 1-31
chapter for a discussion of the Reconnaissance and
various types of reconnais- Surveillance Plan ............................... 1-33
sance platoons. Platoon IPB Execution .......................... 1-34
Situational Awareness ................................. 1-35
Battlefield Visualization ....................... 1-35
Battlespace ............................................ 1-36
Fratricide ............................................... 1-39
Navigation ................................................. 1-40
Maps and Overlays ............................... 1-40
Land Navigation .................................... 1-40
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not organized in this manner. These units are capable of fighting through
threat reconnaissance (destroying the threat’s “eyes and ears”) to gain
combat information needed by higher unit commanders. In shaping
operations, the ability to fight for information is important in determining
the intent of a threat (for example, whether the threat is willing to
defend, withdraw, or fight when confronted) without committing main
body infantry or armor units.
5-6. These two types of reconnaissance organizations are mutually
supporting. Organizations working forward in an area of operations
provide the initial information that may allow the refinement of focus for
follow-on reconnaissance elements. This information can also enhance
survivability and mission success by enabling the follow-on organization
to maneuver out of contact (using stealthy movement) and then make
initial contact on the most favorable terms.
5-7. Unlike most other combat arms platoons, which maneuver
together in formation, the reconnaissance platoon normally maneuvers as
individual sections or squads (mounted, dismounted, or a combination)
under the direction and control of the platoon leader. A section may
consist of two vehicles plus any combat elements under the platoon’s
operational control (OPCON). Determining which organization best meets
his mission requirements is one of the key decisions the platoon leader
must make during his troop-leading procedures.
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SCOPE OF OPERATIONS
CHARACTERISTICS OF STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS
5-10. Stability operations and support operations may precede and/or
follow war or occur simultaneously in the same theater. These operations
may be conducted in conjunction with wartime operations to complement
the achievement of strategic objectives, or they may support a
commander’s forward-presence operations or a US ambassador’s nation
plan. It is possible that they may even occur within the United States
itself. The Army conducts stability operations or support operations as
part of a joint team, often in conjunction with other US and foreign
government agencies. (NOTE: Refer to the discussion of stability
operations and support operations in Appendix E of this manual.)
Regardless of the location and context in which these operations are
conducted, they are designed to fulfill a number of important objectives,
including the following:
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OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
5-16. Reconnaissance assets are the commander’s primary source for
information. The fundamental role of reconnaissance platoons is to
perform reconnaissance and security, as well as surveillance, target
acquisition, and battle damage assessment (BDA). These organizations
enhance the higher commander’s ability to retain freedom of maneuver,
which in turn allows him to concentrate combat power and apply assets
deliberately at the decisive time and place of his choosing. Stealth is the
reconnaissance platoon’s primary means of force protection; in most
cases, organic weapons are used only in self-defense.
5-17. It is important to note that the multidimensional aspect of
reconnaissance (as discussed in detail in Chapter 3 of this manual) is
integrated into all reconnaissance operations. All reconnaissance assets
must go beyond merely investigating terrain characteristics of an area.
They must also be prepared to assess infrastructure, demographics,
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RECCE PLATOON
5-19. The recce platoon consists of one officer and 20 enlisted soldiers
manning four vehicles (see Figure 1-1). The recce platoon is equipped
with the Stryker RV. Refer to Figure 1-22 for an illustration of the
vehicle’s capabilities and specifications.
Platoon Headquaters
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_______________________________________________________________ Chapter 1 – Introduction
CFV PLATOON
5-27. The CFV platoon, also known as the cavalry scout platoon, is
equipped with six M3 CFVs (as shown in Figure 1-5). The platoon is
found in the cavalry squadrons of an armored or mechanized division or
in an armored cavalry regiment (ACR); it may also be found in certain
mechanized battalions. Regardless of the mission it is executing or the
formation or movement technique it is using, the CFV platoon normally
operates in one of three organizations: as three sections with two vehicles
in each section, as two sections with three vehicles in each section, or as a
six-vehicle platoon.
Three-Section Organization
5-28. This is the basic organization for the CFV scout platoon (see
Figure 1-6). This organization allows the platoon to achieve a good
compromise between the requirement of employing a maximum number
of elements during the reconnaissance or security mission and the need
for security. It is the ideal organization for the conduct of a route
reconnaissance mission. In a screen mission, this organization allows
employment of three long-duration OPs, which are occupied for 12 or
more hours; it also facilitates the simultaneous conduct of dismounted
patrols.
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Two-Section Organization
5-29. The two-section organization is used when increased security is
required, when the area of operations can be covered efficiently with only
two elements, or when operational strength (less than six vehicles
operational) makes the three-section organization impossible. Refer to the
illustration in Figure 1-7.
Six-Vehicle Organization
5-30. The six-vehicle organization is the most difficult to control (see
Figure 1-8). The platoon leader employs this organization when he must
have six separate information sources at the same time.
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Two-Section Organization
5-32. This is an effective organization when only two maneuver
corridors have to be observed or when two distinct reconnaissance
missions are required. This organization maximizes security at the
section level and gives the sections sufficient maneuver and C2 capability
to conduct limited separate missions. This organization allows the platoon
to put out two long-duration observation posts (OP); it is the best
organization for dismounted operations. (See Figures 1-11 and 1-12.)
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Three-Section Organization
5-33. This organization is ideal for reconnaissance along a single route.
It allows employment of three long-duration OPs in a 10-HMMWV
platoon and three short-duration OPs in a six-HMMWV platoon. The
ability to concurrently conduct dismounted patrols is very limited for six-
HMMWV platoons. (Refer to Figures 1-13 and 1-14.) (NOTE: A
consolidated headquarters section, with the platoon leader and PSG as
shown in Figure 1-14, increases C2 capability and is an optional
configuration.)
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Five-Section Organization
5-34. This organization is used only by 10-HMMWV platoons in
reconnoitering large areas or multiple avenues of approach. Five short-
duration OPs can be established, allowing OPs to be structured in depth.
In this organization, sections have dismounted capability to conduct local
security only. (See Figure 1-15.)
Six-Vehicle Organization
5-35. The six-vehicle organization is used only by six-HMMWV platoons
and is the most difficult to control (refer to Figure 1-16). The platoon
leader employs this organization when he must have six separate
information sources at the same time.
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Ten-Vehicle Organization
5-36. The 10-vehicle organization is used only by the 10-HMMWV
platoon. It gives the platoon an enhanced ability to conduct screening
missions in depth, although only for short durations. It also provides the
platoon with the ability to conduct numerous reconnaissance tasks
simultaneously. (See Figure 1-17.)
5-37. At the same time, however, the 10-vehicle organization is rarely
employed because it creates very difficult C2 challenges. It severely limits
the platoon’s overwatch capability; if the platoon is not echeloned in its
sector with an overwatch plan for follow-on squads, platoon elements are
left extremely vulnerable to threat contact. In addition, this organization
affords the platoon no ability to organize patrols of any type.
DISMOUNTED ORGANIZATION
5-38. Every dismounted team consists of a reconnaissance element
and a security element. The purpose of the reconnaissance element is to
obtain data on information requirements. The security element’s primary
responsibility is to protect the reconnaissance element. The security
element may also serve as a reconnaissance element or have alternate
responsibilities. Whichever role the security element plays, its primary
objective is protecting the dismounted element. A two-man team is the
smallest dismounted element within the platoon (see Figure 1-18).
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NOTE: For a detailed discussion of dismounted operations, refer to Chapter 5 of this manual.
TASK ORGANIZATION
5-43. METT-TC circumstances will often require the reconnaissance
platoon leader to employ variations of the basic platoon organizations
discussed previously. In addition, attachments such as tanks, mobile gun
systems (MGS), infantry, or engineers may change the composition and
number of reconnaissance squads or sections. Later chapters provide
further information regarding mission task organization.
SECTION V – RESPONSIBILITIES
PLATOON LEADER
5-45. The platoon leader is responsible to his higher commander for the
discipline, combat readiness, and training of the platoon as well as the
maintenance of its equipment. The platoon leader must have a thorough
knowledge of reconnaissance and security tactics. He works closely with
his higher commander during the mission analysis portion of the
planning process.
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· Troop-leading procedures.
· Deployment.
· Tactical movement.
· OP establishment and operation.
· Patrolling and local security.
· Establishment and maintenance of effective communications.
· Employment of fires.
· Actions on contact.
· The multidimensional aspect of R&S.
· Reporting procedures.
NOTE: Refer to Chapter 2 of this manual for additional information on the leadership
competencies.
PLATOON SERGEANT
5-48. The PSG leads elements of the platoon as directed by the platoon
leader and assumes command of the platoon in the absence of the platoon
leader. During tactical operations, he may assist in the control of the
platoon, requiring him to be proficient in each of the platoon’s leadership
competencies (refer to Chapter 2 for additional discussion of these
competencies). The PSG assists the platoon leader in maintaining
discipline, as well as in coordinating training and controlling the platoon.
He supervises equipment maintenance, supply operations, and other CSS
activities.
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_______________________________________________________________ Chapter 1 – Introduction
leaders have the same responsibilities for their squads as section leaders
have for sections.
HUMINT COLLECTORS
5-50. HUMINT collectors within the recce platoon are tasked with
collecting information for intelligence use from people or related
documents. Their responsibilities are covered in detail in Chapter 3 of
this manual (in the discussion of the multidimensional aspect of
reconnaissance) as well as in Chapter 7 (urban operations). The HUMINT
collectors must be proficient in the following related procedures and
operations:
MISSIONS
5-52. The reconnaissance platoon’s primary missions are
reconnaissance, surveillance, and security in support of its parent
unit. As part of R&S tasks, the platoon will conduct target acquisition,
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which will require it to detect, identify, and locate key targets for lethal
and nonlethal fire. The platoon is also trained and equipped to conduct
tactical BDA. It can perform these missions mounted or dismounted, day
or night, in various terrain conditions, and under all weather and
visibility conditions. In addition to the primary missions, the
reconnaissance platoon can perform the following tactical and support
missions:
· Liaison.
· Quartering party duties.
· Traffic control.
· Chemical detection and radiological survey and monitoring
operations as part of a nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)
defense.
· Limited obstacle construction and reduction.
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VEHICLE CHARACTERISTICS
5-54. In many respects, the scout’s capability is dependent on his
equipment. The three types of reconnaissance platforms—the RV, the M3
CFV, and the M1025/1026 HMMWV—have distinctly different
characteristics. When employed with the appropriate TTP, all three
vehicles are highly effective reconnaissance and security platforms.
5-55. Every scout must understand his mount thoroughly so he can
maximize its capabilities and minimize its limitations. See Figures 1-21,
1-22, and 1-23 for illustrations of the three scout vehicles and summaries
of their capabilities and specifications.
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COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
5-61. As part of a recce, reconnaissance, or cavalry troop, the
reconnaissance platoon is subject to command relationships similar to
those of other platoons in a company-size organization. In an armor or
infantry battalion, the reconnaissance platoon performs several critical
tasks in support of the battalion commander’s concept of the operation.
The reconnaissance platoon responds to its platoon leader, who receives
guidance from the troop or battalion commander, depending on their
command relationship.
5-62. As the commander’s eyes and ears, the reconnaissance platoon
leader must stay in contact with either the troop/battalion commander or
the troop command post (CP) or battalion tactical operations center
(TOC). This is necessary if the platoon leader is to keep the platoon
informed of the next higher commander’s current situation as well as the
current threat situation. He must also ensure that information gained by
the platoon is transmitted higher.
5-63. The commander must ensure that his initial operation order
(OPORD) and any following fragmentary orders (FRAGO) focus the
reconnaissance platoon on its mission by telling the platoon leader what
is expected of the reconnaissance or security effort in each phase of the
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_______________________________________________________________ Chapter 1 – Introduction
operation. The intent includes the commander’s criteria for recovering the
reconnaissance platoon as tactical operations progress. He must make it
clear whether he intends for the platoon to conduct stay-behind
operations if the threat main body has passed its locations or to pass
through friendly lines before the arrival of the threat main body.
5-64. The commander also specifies PIR for which the reconnaissance
platoon is responsible. PIR cover the information for which the
commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his planning and
decision-making. Often stated in question form, these tactical and
operational considerations are the foundation for development of R&S
plans and for execution of operations involved in the overall ISR effort.
5-65. In recce/reconnaissance/cavalry troop operations, the troop XO is
a battlefield manager for the troop commander. He operates from a
vehicle CP; this vehicle gives him the communications capability and
facilities to receive, collate, and pass to higher headquarters the routine
reconnaissance information processed by the troop’s reconnaissance
platoons. In this system, most of the routine reports are sent to the troop
XO rather than to the troop commander. The troop commander’s role is to
monitor the routine actions, receive high-priority information to transmit
on command nets, and control the troop once contact is gained. In armor
or infantry battalions, reconnaissance platoons generally report to their
TOCs, although they may report high-priority information directly to the
battalion commander or S3.
FBCB2 ARCHITECTURE
5-67. Each of the vehicles in the reconnaissance platoon is equipped
with the three basic components of the FBCB2 system. First, the GPS
provides precise location and date/time information that is the basis for
reporting real-time friendly locations and for generating laser-designated
map spots for reporting purposes. Second, the single channel
ground/airborne radio system (SINCGARS) provides a secure means of
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transmitting both voice and digital traffic between vehicles in the platoon.
In addition to the SINCGARS, platoon vehicles are also equipped with
the enhanced position location and reporting system (EPLRS). The
EPLRS provides a secure digital connection and serves as a router,
efficiently sending message traffic internally within the platoon and also
out to the higher command and fire support nets. This routing capability
ensures that information is passed even if the chain of command is
disrupted by physical separation on the battlefield, casualties, or
mechanical failures. Finally, the FBCB2 terminal includes a monitor,
keyboard, mouse, and a variety of computing functions; these features
provide the crew with direct access to the system. Together, these FBCB2
components form the lower tactical internet (TI). Figure 1-24 illustrates
FBCB2 architecture in a recce platoon.
5-68. The upper TI consists of a variety of tactical computer systems
and communications equipment located primarily at the
squadron/battalion level and higher. The most important of these are the
maneuver control system (MCS), the all source analysis system (ASAS),
the advanced field artillery tactical data system (AFATDS), and the
combat service support control system (CSSCS). These systems draw
upon the reports and positional data passed on the lower TI to provide
situational awareness at higher command levels. In turn, these systems
can push information such as location of adjacent units, known and
templated threat positions, graphics, and OPORDs down to FBCB2 users.
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_______________________________________________________________ Chapter 1 – Introduction
FBCB2 CAPABILITIES
5-69. This discussion focuses on several areas in which FBCB2
enhances the reconnaissance platoon’s battle command capabilities.
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Standardized Reporting
5-75. FBCB2 streamlines the reporting process by providing the
reconnaissance platoon with the capability to send and receive
standardized reports. These include SALT reports, MEDEVAC requests,
NBC-1 reports, calls for fire, check fire reports, and SITREPs. (NOTE:
For more information on FBCB2 reporting capabilities, refer to Chapter 2
of this manual.) Figure 1-25 shows the FBCB2 screen for a SALT report.
Standardized reports afford several tactical advantages:
NOTE: There is still a requirement for FM voice message traffic. For example, leaders must
still transmit contact reports to initiate battle drills and cue leaders to check their
FBCB2 screens for updated information. Additionally, vehicle commanders may need
to send oral descriptions of threat locations, routes, or obstacles to help clarify the
situation. This is especially true in close or urban terrain where the FBCB2 cannot
display the terrain in sufficient detail to assist leaders in making effective decisions.
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SPECIAL NOTE
The most critical mission of the reconnaissance platoon is to gather information on
threat forces that the S2 then uses to assess threat disposition and intentions. IPB
is a disciplined staff procedure that provides the reconnaissance platoon leader
with formal ISR guidance in the form of reconnaissance objectives and PIR, as
contained in the R&S plan. The platoon leader then applies this information in
accomplishing the platoon’s assigned reconnaissance tasks.
5-79. Figure 1-26 illustrates the various phases and components of the
information-gathering process, including IPB.
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_______________________________________________________________ Chapter 1 – Introduction
NOTE: The R&S plan is developed very early in the ISR planning process because it is
important to integrate the reconnaissance platoon with other information-gathering
assets, such as GSR and engineer reconnaissance teams. Because reconnaissance is
a continuous and dynamic process, the reconnaissance platoon is committed as soon
as possible in accordance with the commander’s intent and reconnaissance
objectives. Deployment of the platoon should not be delayed until the R&S plan has
been formulated.
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5-91. The staff uses an R&S tasking matrix to coordinate all available
assets for ISR operations. The R&S plan must direct specific tasks and
priorities to all ISR elements, including reconnaissance platoons, GSR,
and patrols.
5-92. R&S tasking, which is handled by the S3, can take the form of a
warning order, OPORD, R&S tasking matrix, or R&S overlay. The S3
translates the R&S plan into operational terms and graphics. For
example, in preparation for reconnaissance operations, the S3 designates
named areas of interest (NAI) in terms of reconnaissance objectives.
Signal
5-94. The squadron/battalion signal officer (S6) must conduct additional
coordination with the troop commander and/or platoon leader if the
mission requires communications support. The reconnaissance platoon
leader must request retransmission (retrans) or relay support from the
squadron/battalion signal section if the mission dictates. Scouts should
not perform relay duties as their primary platoon mission.
Other Elements
5-95. The reconnaissance platoon leader also coordinates support with
any attached or assigned elements; examples include engineer
reconnaissance teams, fire support team (FIST), air defense artillery
(ADA) elements, Striker teams, GSR and/or remotely monitored
battlefield sensor system (REMBASS) teams, and aerial reconnaissance
elements (TUAVs). The platoon leader should be aware of how changes to
the organization affect his platoon. Ideally, linkup with support elements
should occur at the TOC in daylight and with sufficient time to conduct
thorough briefings and rehearsals.
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5-97. Once in the vicinity of their mission objectives, the scouts confirm
or deny the templated information. Additionally, if they find the threat,
the scouts look for possible weaknesses, gaps, and flanks of the threat
force. During screening operations, the commander directs the
reconnaissance platoon leader to report threat activity at designated
NAIs. The reconnaissance platoon leader uses OPs to observe and report
on these areas of command interest. The scouts must rapidly and
accurately report all information related to the commander’s critical
information requirements (CCIR) that they find during either
reconnaissance or screening operations.
NOTE: The reconnaissance platoon and its higher element assess all information within
their area of operations. Their primary responsibility is to provide their squadron or
battalion with complete awareness of the situation based on their reported raw data
and assessments of information in their area of operations. In a cavalry squadron
(RSTA), the analysis section at the squadron headquarters gathers all the
information from its recce troops and surveillance troop assets. The
squadron/battalion analyzes this information and provides the SBCT/brigade with
situational understanding of the area of operations.
BATTLEFIELD VISUALIZATION
5-99. The commander will structure the battlefield based on the
conditions of METT-TC and his commander’s intent. How he does this
affects the reconnaissance platoon leader’s mission planning and his
ability to maintain situational awareness. The framework of the
battlefield can vary from a very rigid extreme with obvious front and rear
boundaries and closely tied adjacent units to a dispersed and
decentralized structure with few secure areas and unit boundaries and no
definable front or rear.
5-100. Between these extremes is an unlimited number of possible
variations. Maintaining situational awareness becomes more difficult as
the battlefield becomes less structured. Modern, highly mobile operations
with small forces lend themselves to a less rigid framework that
challenges the scout’s ability to maintain an accurate picture of the
battlefield.
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NOTE: The requirement to maintain a real-time picture of the battlefield one level higher
does not relieve the scout of the requirement to understand the situation and
commander’s intent two levels higher than his own. The difference is that his
understanding of the situation two levels higher does not have to be as specific or in
real time. FBCB2 will assist all vehicles in the platoon in maintaining a real-time
situational awareness.
5-102. Almost all of the information the platoon leader needs comes in
the form of reports over his FM communication system or FBCB2. He
receives many reports based on his platoon’s understanding of shared,
common graphics. Effective graphics require that the subordinate
elements report periodically as they accomplish requirements. The
platoon leader must be aware of when his scouts report so he can
maintain a current visualization of the situation. If an element does not
report in a timely manner, the platoon leader must quickly determine the
situation of the overdue element.
5-104. The platoon leader can employ a variety of techniques in using his
map to track the tactical situation. For example, he should use different
colors for friendly and threat elements to allow quick recognition. To
avoid cluttering the map, he should place a dot or symbol on his map
where the element is located and label the point with a number. The
same number should then be written in the map margin (or beyond the
area of operations) with the complete SPOTREP or unit ID next to it. This
notation should also include the time of the report. As positions or reports
are updated, the platoon leader crosses off the old symbol and adds a new
one with a corresponding notation; it is critical that updates to previous
reports be clearly identified as such during transmission.
5-105. Even though it is relatively simple, this type of map notation
system can help all scouts in the platoon to easily track and monitor the
tactical situation. Maps can be augmented by a formal platoon log, kept
on the platoon leader’s or PSG’s vehicle or on both.
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_______________________________________________________________ Chapter 1 – Introduction
BATTLESPACE
5-106. As discussed previously, an accurate picture of the battlefield
provides the reconnaissance platoon leader with important tactical
information, including friendly and threat positions and relevant terrain.
In turn, complete understanding of the military significance of this
picture requires knowledge of the concept of battlespace, the key
element in the intellectual process of visualizing the battlefield.
5-107. At the most fundamental level, battlespace is the three-
dimensional “bubble” or area in which the platoon can acquire threat
forces and influence them with effective fires. This space is defined by
numerous battlefield factors: the locations of friendly forces, including
the platoon’s individual sections, squads, OPs, and patrols; the effects of
terrain, weather, and movement; and the ranges of all available platoon
weapons and sensing systems. Each section or squad has its own
battlespace; the platoon battlespace is the sum of individual section/squad
battlespaces (see Figure 1-30). Platoon battlespace is not restricted by
boundaries; it can overlap with the battlespace of adjacent units.
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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
5-110. As the operation progresses, the platoon leader must take active
measures to shape the platoon’s battlespace to his best advantage. In
many situations, he should attempt to eliminate any gaps, or dead space,
that exist within the “bubble.” The platoon leader can accomplish this in
several ways, such as maneuvering sections or squads, repositioning OPs,
and deploying patrols or remote sensors. He must also ensure that
organic and attached assets are positioned to achieve overlapping
coverage of critical points within the platoon’s battlespace.
5-111. The purpose of overlapping coverage is to prevent the threat from
overcoming the friendly reconnaissance effort by degrading or destroying
a single platform or sensor. It also prevents the threat from gaining an
advantage during periods when environmental or weather conditions,
including limited visibility, degrade the platoon’s observation capability
or sensor performance. Refer to Figures 1-32A and 1-32B for an
illustration of how the platoon leader can optimize his battlespace.
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_______________________________________________________________ Chapter 1 – Introduction
FRATRICIDE
5-112. Recent experience has shown that fratricide is a significant
danger to all forces operating on a mobile battlefield where weapon
system lethality is significantly greater than identification friend or foe
(IFF) capability. Fratricide is the result of many factors, including
inadequate direct fire control plans, navigation errors, combat
identification failures, and incorrect or inadequate operational graphics.
For an in-depth discussion of fratricide and its prevention, refer to
Appendix I of this manual.
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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
SPECIAL NOTE
In many situations, the primary cause of fratricide is the lack of positive
target identification. To prevent fratricide incidents, commanders and
leaders at all levels must ensure positive target identification before they
issue commands to fire. In addition, all units must accurately report their
locations during combat operations, and all TOCs and CPs must carefully
track the locations of all subordinate elements in relation to those of all
friendly forces.
SECTION X – NAVIGATION
LAND NAVIGATION
5-115. To protect the reconnaissance platoon, the platoon leader must
learn to use terrain to his advantage. Land navigation of reconnaissance
vehicles requires him to master the technique of terrain association. This
entails the ability to identify terrain features on the ground by the
contour intervals depicted on the map. The platoon leader analyzes the
terrain using the factors of OCOKA and identifies major terrain features,
contour changes, and man-made structures along his axis of advance. As
the platoon advances, he uses these features to orient the platoon and to
associate ground positions with map locations. (NOTE: Refer to Chapter
2 of this manual for a detailed description of the use of OCOKA factors in
the terrain analysis.)
5-116. The intellectual concept of battlespace is vital to the platoon’s
survival during navigation and movement. The platoon leader must
constantly be aware of key terrain and threat fields of observation and
fire that may create danger areas as the platoon advances. This allows
him to modify movement techniques, formations, and routes and to
maintain cross-talk with overwatch elements to ensure that the platoon is
1-40
_______________________________________________________________ Chapter 1 – Introduction
1-41
Chapter 2
Leadership Competencies
As a tactical organization, the
reconnaissance platoon must CONTENTS
be proficient in certain tasks Troop-Leading Procedures .......................... 2-1
Operational Considerations ................. 2-2
and skills. While each platoon Military Decision-Making Process ........ 2-3
leader will establish his own Conduct of Troop-Leading
collective task list based on Procedures ......................................... 2-3
his commander’s mission Deployment ................................................... 2-19
essential task list (METL), Critical Tasks ......................................... 2-19
Platoon Guidelines ................................ 2-19
this chapter covers a roster of Tactical Movement ....................................... 2-20
established leadership com- Planning and Operational
petencies in which every Considerations ................................... 2-20
platoon and its leaders Fundamentals of Movement ................. 2-21
must train and maintain Danger Areas ......................................... 2-23
Platoon Formations ............................... 2-27
proficiency. Movement Techniques .......................... 2-30
Actions on Contact ....................................... 2-34
Contact Considerations ........................ 2-35
The Four Steps of
Actions on Contact ............................ 2-37
Examples of Actions on Contact ......... 2-45
Employment of Fires .................................... 2-48
Employment Considerations ................ 2-48
Critical Tasks ......................................... 2-48
Communications .......................................... 2-48
Means of Tactical Communications .... 2-49
Radio Net Organization
and Responsibilities .......................... 2-51
Net Control ............................................. 2-54
Techniques of Effective
Communications ................................ 2-55
Reporting ....................................................... 2-56
Operational Considerations ................. 2-57
Report Guidelines .................................. 2-57
Types of Reports ................................... 2-58
Digital Reporting and C2 Messages .... 2-59
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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
may recur several times during the process. Although listed as the last
step, activities associated with supervising and refining the plan and
other preparations occur throughout the troop-leading process.
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
2-2. The following points summarize important factors involved in
troop-leading procedures:
NOTE: For additional information on crew orders, rehearsals, PCCs, and PCIs, refer to the
discussion of the “supervise and refine” step of troop-leading procedures later in
this chapter.
2-3. The key to success is that the platoon is prepared to move by the
time specified in the order with operational weapons and equipment and
the basic load of supplies as specified by the order and/or the platoon
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___________________________________________________ Chapter 2 – Leadership Competencies
leader. All personnel must be able to explain the higher unit’s mission,
the higher commander’s intent, the platoon mission, and their specified
tasks and duties to support the mission. All attachments must be
received, briefed, and inspected. The elements of SERE (survival, escape,
resistance, evasion) should also be considered and addressed. For further
information on SERE, refer to ST 3-20.983.
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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
2-9. Figure 2-1 lists the eight troop-leading steps and illustrates their
role in relation to the MDMP, which plays an important role in the troop-
leading process. The following discussion provides a step-by-step overview
of troop-leading procedures.
NOTE: Refer to the appropriate platoon-level MTP for the training and evaluation outline
(T&EO) covering the task of conducting troop-leading procedures. The task,
included in Chapter 5 of the MTP, includes procedures involved in each of the
troop-leading steps.
Initial Actions
2-11. Although mission analysis is continuously refined throughout the
troop-leading process, the platoon leader’s initial actions are normally
based only on the initial warning order from higher. These include an
initial METT-TC analysis covering the terrain and the threat and friendly
situations.
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2-12. The platoon leader may also conduct his initial time analysis,
develop an initial security plan, and issue his own initial warning order to
provide guidance and planning focus for his subordinates. At a minimum,
the initial platoon warning order should cover the threat and friendly
situations, movement instructions, and coordinating instructions such as
an initial timeline and security plan. (NOTE: The initial analysis is
normally conducted as quickly as possible to allow the platoon leader to
issue the initial warning order in a timely manner. He conducts a more
detailed METT-TC analysis after the initial warning order is put out.)
NOTE: The technique of using multiple warning orders is a valuable tool for the platoon
leader during the troop-leading process. He can issue warning orders for several
purposes: to alert subordinates of the upcoming mission, to initiate the parallel
planning process, and to put out tactical information incrementally as it is received
(ultimately reducing the length of the OPORD). Refer to FM 3-90.1 (FM 71-1) for a
discussion of how multiple warning orders are employed at various stages of the
troop-leading process.
METT-TC Analysis
2-13. The following discussion provides detailed information on the six
METT-TC factors. (NOTE: METT-TC factors are not necessarily
analyzed sequentially. How and when the platoon leader analyzes each
factor depends on when the information is made available to him.)
2-14. Mission. After receiving an essential task and purpose, either in
a warning order or the OPORD, the platoon leader can then begin the
analysis of his own mission. He may use a refined product to better
visualize the interrelationships of the terrain, the threat, and friendly
forces. These may include a MCOO and/or the SITEMP, if available. The
platoon leader’s goal in this analysis is to clarify what the platoon is to
accomplish and why the platoon must accomplish it. Key considerations
in the analysis include the following:
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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
2-16. Terrain (and Weather). The platoon leader analyzes the terrain
using the factors of OCOKA: observation and fields of fire; cover and
concealment; obstacles; key terrain; and avenues of approach. The
following discussion focuses on questions the platoon leader can use in his
analysis.
2-17. Observation and fields of fire. The platoon leader should cover
the following considerations in his analysis:
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___________________________________________________ Chapter 2 – Leadership Competencies
2-18. Cover and concealment. The platoon leader should include the
following considerations in his analysis of cover and concealment:
2-21. Reinforcing obstacles include, but are not limited to, the
following:
· Minefields.
· Antitank ditches.
· Road craters.
· Abatises.
· Wire obstacles.
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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
2-23. Key terrain. Key terrain is any location or area whose seizure,
retention, or control affords a marked advantage either to friendly forces
or to the threat. The platoon leader’s analysis should cover these factors:
2-8
___________________________________________________ Chapter 2 – Leadership Competencies
the platoon’s vehicles and equipment. His analysis should include the
following considerations:
2-9
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
Information Sources
2-29. In planning and preparing for the mission, the platoon leader
may find that he requires additional sources of information to help
answer some of the questions raised in the analysis of METT-TC. The
platoon can receive and/or request information from a variety of sources
to assist in planning and understanding the operational area, including
the following:
Risk Management
2-30. Leaders must make a thorough risk assessment, identifying and
evaluating hazards the platoon will face during the operation. They then
develop risk management controls and ensures that all subordinate
leaders and individual scouts implement them to eliminate or reduce the
risks. Refer to Appendix H of this manual for a detailed discussion of the
risk management process.
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___________________________________________________ Chapter 2 – Leadership Competencies
NOTE: Simultaneous planning and preparation are key factors in effective time
management during the troop-leading process. The next five steps (issue a warning
order; make a tentative plan; initiate movement; conduct reconnaissance; complete
the plan) may occur simultaneously and/or in a different order. As noted, the final
troop-leading step, supervise and refine, is on-going throughout the process.
2-11
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
NOTE: The sleep plan should be a 24-hour plan with the goal of maximizing available time
in the planning, preparation, and execution phases of the operation. It covers all
platoon members.
INITIATE MOVEMENT
2-35. After issuing a warning order and making a tentative plan, the
platoon leader may choose to initiate movement. The platoon leader
should at least be able to determine when the platoon will move. He
announces this in terms of a readiness condition (REDCON) level. Each
REDCON level indicates critical tasks and time available to prepare for
future operations. The following considerations apply:
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___________________________________________________ Chapter 2 – Leadership Competencies
2-36. All personnel remain at 100 percent alert until prioritized mission
preparations are complete. The platoon leader initiates the appropriate
REDCON when the work is finished. As the time for mission execution
nears, he increases the REDCON in accordance with guidance from
higher, achieving REDCON-1 before the platoon must move.
CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE
2-37. This step of the troop-leading procedures allows the platoon
leader to confirm the validity of his tentative plan and to refine the plan.
The platoon leader should conduct the reconnaissance with his
subordinate leaders. This will allow them to see the terrain and develop a
better visualization of the projected plan. At a minimum, the platoon
leader conducts this step as a detailed map reconnaissance. He should at
least confirm his initial march route to the LD or start point (SP) and
check initial positions. If possible, he should also check some of the area
beyond the LD; this may require permission from the commander.
2-38. If the platoon leader cannot personally conduct on-site
reconnaissance, he should make the most efficient use of available time
by tasking his subordinates to accomplish specific reconnaissance
requirements. An example of this is tasking a squad leader to reconnoiter
and time routes to the SP. The platoon leader must conduct the
reconnaissance with an open mind; not everything he sees will match his
tentative plan. He must be flexible enough to change and competent
enough to work out new plans rapidly.
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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
2-41. Using this type of planning delegation will help the platoon leader
to ensure that his subordinate leaders are in synch with the plan. It also
facilitates a more rapid planning process. The platoon leader must
remain fully aware of all facets of the plan and of the activities of his
subordinates. He must also give clear guidance for this technique to be
successful.
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___________________________________________________ Chapter 2 – Leadership Competencies
Crew Orders
2-48. The platoon leader and PSG make sure all crewmembers have
been briefed by their leaders or vehicle commanders and understand the
platoon mission and concept of the operation. Combat orders are the
means by which the platoon leader receives and transmits information,
from the earliest notification that an operation will occur through the
final phases of execution. They are absolutely critical to mission success.
All members of the platoon must be familiar with the formats of warning
orders, OPORDs, and FRAGOs. For a detailed discussion of combat
orders, refer to Appendix A of this manual.
Rehearsals
2-49. The platoon leader should never underestimate the value of
rehearsals. They are his most valuable tools in preparing the platoon for
the upcoming operation. Refer to FM 101-5 for a detailed discussion of
rehearsal types, techniques, and procedures. The platoon leader uses
well-planned, efficiently run rehearsals to accomplish the following
purposes:
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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
2-50. Rehearsal Types. The platoon leader can choose among several
types of rehearsals, each designed to achieve a specific result and with a
specific role in the planning and preparation timeline. The following
discussion focuses on the five rehearsal types.
2-51. Confirmation brief. The confirmation brief is, in effect, a
reverse briefing process routinely performed by subordinate leaders
immediately after receiving any instructions, such as an OPORD or
FRAGO. They confirm their understanding by repeating and explaining
details of the operation for their leader. In the reconnaissance platoon,
the platoon leader should conduct confirmation briefs after his
subordinate leaders have received the OPORD, but before other phases of
the platoon rehearsal begin.
2-52. Backbrief. Leaders perform this type of rehearsal throughout
the planning and preparation timeline to help clarify their intent for their
subordinates. The backbrief allows the platoon leader to identify
problems in his own concept of the operation and his subordinates’
understanding of the concept; he also uses the backbrief to learn how
subordinates intend to accomplish their missions.
2-53. Support rehearsal. Support rehearsals are normally conducted
within the framework of a single operating system, such as fire support or
CSS, or a limited number of operating systems. The goals are to ensure
that support elements can achieve their missions within the higher
commander’s plan and that their support plans are synchronized with the
overall maneuver plan. The rehearsals are conducted throughout the
planning and preparation timeline.
2-54. Battle drill or SOP rehearsal. This type of rehearsal is used to
ensure that all participants understand a technique or a specific set of
procedures. The platoon initiates battle drill and/or SOP rehearsals as
soon as possible after receipt of the mission; he then can continue to
conduct them as needed throughout the planning and preparation
timeline. This rehearsal does not necessarily cover a published drill or
SOP, giving the commander or leader flexibility in designing the
rehearsal. For example, the platoon leader could rehearse procedures for
marking obstacle lanes or establishing local security. (NOTE: It is
recommended that drills for actions on contact be rehearsed frequently
during planning and preparation.)
2-55. Rehearsal Techniques. The platoon leader can choose among
several techniques in conducting rehearsals, which should follow the
crawl-walk-run training methodology to prepare the platoon for
increasingly difficult conditions. As noted in FM 5-0 (FM 101-5),
techniques for conducting rehearsals are limited only by the
resourcefulness of the commander or leader; that manual outlines six
basic techniques (full dress, reduced force, terrain model, sketch map,
map, and radio). The following discussion covers these techniques, which
are listed in descending order in terms of the preparation time and
resources required to conduct them. Considerations in selecting a
rehearsal technique include the following:
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___________________________________________________ Chapter 2 – Leadership Competencies
2-56. Full force rehearsal. This rehearsal produces the most detailed
understanding of the mission, but is the most difficult to conduct in terms
of preparation and resources. It involves every soldier and system
participating in the operation. If possible, units should conduct the full
force rehearsal under the same conditions (such as weather, time of day,
terrain, and use of live ammunition) that they will encounter during the
actual operation.
2-57. Reduced force rehearsal. This rehearsal normally involves
only key leaders of the unit and is thus less extensive than the full dress
rehearsal in terms of preparation time and resources. The commander
decides the level of leader involvement. The selected leaders then
rehearse the plan, if possible on the terrain to be used for the actual
operation. The reduced force rehearsal is often conducted to prepare
leaders for the full dress rehearsal.
2-58. Terrain model rehearsal. This is the most popular rehearsal
technique, employing an accurately constructed model to help
subordinates visualize the battle in accordance with the commander’s or
leader’s intent. When possible, the platoon leader places the terrain
model where it overlooks the actual terrain of the area of operations or is
within walking distance of such a vantage point. Size of the model can
vary, but it should be large enough to depict graphic control measures
and important terrain features for reference and orientation. Participants
walk or move “micro” armor around the table or model to practice the
actions of their own vehicles in relation to other members of the platoon.
2-59. Sketch map rehearsal. Units can use the sketch map technique
almost anywhere, day or night. Procedures are similar to those for the
terrain model rehearsal. The sketch must be large enough to allow all
participants to see as each subordinate “walks” through an interactive
oral presentation of his actions. Platoon elements can use symbols or
“micro” armor to represent their locations and maneuver on the sketch.
2-60. Map rehearsal. Procedures are similar to those for the sketch
map rehearsal except that the commander or leader uses a map and
operation overlay of the same scale as he used to plan and control the
operation. This technique is useful in conjunction with a confirmation
brief or backbrief involving subordinate leaders and vehicle commanders.
The platoon leader uses the map and overlay to guide participants as they
brief their role in the operation.
2-61. Radio rehearsal. The commander or leader conducts this
rehearsal by having his unit simulate critical portions of the operation
orally and interactively over established communications networks. The
radio rehearsal may be especially useful when the situation does not
allow the platoon to gather at one location. Subordinate elements check
their communications systems and rehearse events that are critical to the
platoon plan. To be effective, the radio rehearsal requires all participants
2-17
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
Inspections
2-62. PCCs and PCIs allow leaders to check the platoon’s operational
readiness. The key goal is to ensure that soldiers and vehicles are fully
prepared to execute the upcoming mission. The platoon leader makes
sure the entire chain of command conducts PCCs and PCIs in accordance
with ST 3-20.983 or his own SOP.
2-63. Precombat Checks. Equipment operators, vehicle crewmen, and
individual soldiers conduct PCCs before executing operations. These
checks are designed to ensure that equipment is in working order,
required supplies are on hand, and soldiers are ready to execute the
mission. PCCs are conducted in accordance with appropriate technical
manuals, supply catalogs, and unit SOPs. Areas covered by PCCs include
the following:
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___________________________________________________ Chapter 2 – Leadership Competencies
NOTE: Refer to ST 3-20.983 for a comprehensive precombat checklist that can be employed
for both PCCs and PCIs.
SECTION II – DEPLOYMENT
CRITICAL TASKS
2-67. Execution of deployment and RSOI entails the following critical
tasks and purposes:
NOTE: For more detailed discussions of deployment tasks and procedures, refer to FM 3-35
(FM 100-17) and to the RSOI appendix in FM 3-20.96.
PLATOON GUIDELINES
2-68. The reconnaissance platoon leader should use the following
guidelines to help ensure successful completion of deployment and RSOI:
2-19
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
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___________________________________________________ Chapter 2 – Leadership Competencies
FUNDAMENTALS OF MOVEMENT
2-71. Sound tactical movement is the essence of all reconnaissance
platoon operations. Effectively employed, the guidelines in this section
can help scouts to see the threat first and observe him undetected. The
scouts are then able to achieve a number of tactical goals, including
retaining the initiative and retaining freedom of movement to gain
information.
2-21
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
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___________________________________________________ Chapter 2 – Leadership Competencies
DISMOUNT VEHICLES
2-77. As a general rule, scouts dismount. This enhances mission
accomplishment and survivability. Vehicles are easily identified because
of their visual, sound, and exhaust signatures; vehicles that can be seen
(or otherwise detected) can be killed. Conversely, dismounted patrols and
OPs are very difficult to detect. Scouts should dismount their vehicles and
use optical devices to gain information on objectives or areas of interest.
2-78. As an example, during reconnaissance operations, the scouts
should dismount beyond the direct fire range of suspected threat
positions and weapon systems. Dismounted scouts can then move in front
of their vehicles using the cover and concealment of a dismounted avenue
adjacent to the mounted route. Additionally, dismounts can occupy OPs
while leaving the vehicles in a hide or overwatch position. These basic
actions enable the dismounted scouts to provide critical information while
enhancing the unit’s survivability and its ability to perform later
missions. (NOTE: Refer to Chapter 5 of this manual for further
discussion of dismounted operations.)
DANGER AREAS
2-80. During the execution of reconnaissance and security missions,
scouts will encounter specific types of terrain or features that expose
them to threat fire. Known as danger areas, these are likely points of
2-23
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
OPEN AREAS
2-81. Open areas frequently afford the reconnaissance platoon the
opportunity to observe the threat or objectives from long ranges.
Conversely, these areas often expose the platoon to possible threat
observation and fire for long periods of movement. The platoon, therefore,
must make maximum use of the terrain and employ effective observation
techniques to avoid exposing itself to a well-concealed and camouflaged
threat.
2-82. Before moving across a large open area, the platoon must make a
thorough visual scan of the area. This should be done both dismounted
and mounted. The platoon leader must use all available optics and other
assets, including TUAVs and GSR, to reconnoiter the open area and find
a bypass, if applicable. If a bypass cannot be found, he focuses not only on
finding potential threat positions, but also on locating covered and
concealed routes for bounding and covered and concealed positions to
which the unit can move. If time and terrain permit, dismounted scouts
may be used to move to the far side of the open area and secure it. In very
large open areas, use of dismounts may not be feasible because of the
distances between covered and concealed positions.
2-83. Once the area has been reconnoitered using visual, digital, and
sensor enablers, the scouts move across it. They use bounding overwatch
because of the possibility of threat contact. If the open area is very large,
the overwatch element should only remain stationary until the bounding
element has moved a distance equal to half the effective range of the
overwatching element’s weapon system. When that point is reached, the
overwatch element must move out, even if the bounding element has not
yet reached a position of cover and concealment.
2-84. When the platoon must move across large open areas with limited
cover and concealment and threat contact is likely, scouts should consider
the use of reconnaissance by indirect fire to provide additional security as
they move. The platoon must make the conscious decision to use this
method with the understanding that stealth is being sacrificed.
Additionally, indirect fire can provide concealment, with smoke either
used alone or mixed with suppressive fires. Use of smoke is feasible,
however, only for limited periods because of Class V supply restrictions
on supporting mortar or artillery units.
WOODED AREAS
2-85. Wooded areas provide a high degree of concealment to forces that
occupy them, particularly infantry. They must be approached and moved
through with extreme caution. Visibility within wooded areas is very
limited; therefore, reconnaissance is confined primarily to trafficable
routes and trails through the forest. In densely wooded areas, mounted
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___________________________________________________ Chapter 2 – Leadership Competencies
URBAN AREAS
2-91. Urban areas, including towns and villages, pose many potential
dangers for the reconnaissance platoon. Troops can be garrisoned in
villages, snipers can dominate approaches, and buildings and roads can
be mined and booby-trapped. Cover and concealment are abundant, and it
is easy for the threat to remain undetected until he is at very close range.
Urban areas are ideal for effective ambush by small numbers of infantry.
Whenever possible, scouts should initially observe urban areas from a
distance. Detailed reconnaissance of urban areas during MTW operations
is extremely difficult and is usually beyond the capability of a
reconnaissance platoon.
2-92. During reconnaissance with a multidimensional focus, scouts may
be required to execute a reconnaissance of a town or village. They must
2-25
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
NOTE: Refer to Chapter 7 of this manual for specific information on urban operations.
2-26
___________________________________________________ Chapter 2 – Leadership Competencies
PLATOON FORMATIONS
2-98. During either mounted or dismounted movement, the
reconnaissance platoon employs combat formations when terrain
supports their use or when the mission or reconnaissance objective is very
focused, such as in a route reconnaissance. In many situations, however,
platoon formations are not appropriate to the execution of a
reconnaissance or security mission.
2-99. There are six mounted reconnaissance platoon formations: line, vee, column,
staggered column, coil, and herringbone. Formations are intended to be
flexible. They can be modified to fit the situation, terrain, and combat
losses; they do not have exact geometric dimensions and design.
Movement into and out of the various formations must be second nature
to each squad. (NOTE: The following formation examples are based on
the four-vehicle recce platoon.)
LINE FORMATION
2-100. This formation (see Figure 2-6) can be used regardless of the
platoon organization and is applicable to most reconnaissance platoon
missions. It allows maximum reconnaissance forward.
VEE FORMATION
2-101. The vee formation, illustrated in Figure 2-7, uses the two-section
organization. The platoon maintains relative positioning based on terrain
and combat losses. The vee lends itself to immediate mutual support and
provides depth; it is very flexible. Using any of the techniques of
movement, the two forward vehicles perform all of the information
gathering and reporting. The rear vehicles provide overwatch and
command and control.
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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
2-104. The staggered column is used for rapid movement across open
terrain. It affords all-around observation and fields of fire. Figure 2-9
shows the platoon in the staggered column in a two-section organization
with Alpha section leading.
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COIL FORMATION
2-105. The platoon coil is used to provide all-around security during
halts. Each vehicle has a particular position to occupy in the coil. The
platoon leader designates the orientation of the coil using a cardinal
direction; in the absence of orders, the direction of travel becomes 12
o’clock. The reconnaissance platoon must develop a coil SOP based on its
METL, war plans, and most frequently used organizations. The SOP
should be practiced as a drill so that correct execution of the coil becomes
automatic.
2-106. The coil is always executed from the column or staggered column,
with the lead vehicle occupying the 12 o’clock position. The other vehicles
occupy the 3, 9 and 6 o’clock positions in accordance with the order of
march. Vehicles are positioned 100 to 150 meters apart. An example is
illustrated in Figure 2-10.
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HERRINGBONE FORMATION
2-107. The herringbone is used to provide 360-degree security during a
temporary halt from a march column (see Figure 2-11). Scouts should
dismount to provide greater security. The formation may be widened to
permit passage of vehicles down the center of the column. All vehicles
should move completely off the road if terrain allows.
MOVEMENT TECHNIQUES
2-108. As noted earlier in this section, the reconnaissance platoon
employs movement techniques for a number of reasons (minimize
exposure, maintain freedom of movement, maximize available tactical
options, and react effectively to contact). Effectively employed, movement
techniques allow the platoon to find and observe threats without being
compromised.
2-109. At the same time, however, movement techniques alone are not
enough to guarantee accomplishment of these tactical goals. The platoon
must use them in conjunction with other movement- and security-related
measures. For example, scouts must make maximum use of all available
natural cover and concealment when moving. In addition, they must
avoid becoming vehicle-bound; they must dismount to improve
observation, prevent threat detection, and provide security.
TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
2-110. In conducting either mounted and dismounted movement on the
battlefield, the reconnaissance platoon uses three movement techniques:
traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch. These
techniques provide a standard method of movement, but the platoon
leader must use common sense in employing them as he performs his
missions and encounters different situations. The decision of which
technique to use is based in large part on the likelihood of threat contact;
in general, this can be summarized as whether contact is not likely
(traveling), possible (traveling overwatch), or expected (bounding
overwatch). Terrain considerations may also affect the choice of
movement technique.
2-111. In the conduct of most tactical missions, the reconnaissance
platoon will move as separate sections or squads under the command and
control of the platoon leader. Traveling overwatch and bounding
overwatch, therefore, are most often executed at the section or squad
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Traveling Overwatch
2-114. Traveling overwatch is used when contact is possible but speed is
desirable (see Figures 2-13 and 2-14). The lead element moves
continuously along covered and concealed routes that afford the best
available protection from possible threat observation and direct fire. The
trail element moves at variable speeds, providing continuous overwatch.
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It normally maintains visual contact with the lead element and may stop
periodically for better observation. The trail element remains close
enough to provide immediate suppressive fire and to maneuver for
support. It must, however, be far enough to the rear to avoid contact in
case the lead element is engaged by a threat force.
Bounding Overwatch
2-115. Employed when threat contact is expected, bounding overwatch is
the most deliberate and secure movement technique. It provides for
immediate direct fire suppression on a threat force that engages the
bounding element with direct fire. (NOTE: When sufficient time is
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Move-Set Technique
2-118. This method of movement is simply an organized way of
controlling the section when it moves in bounding overwatch. “Set” means
that the element has arrived at its destination and has occupied a
position from which it can observe to its front. This technique allows for
an absolute minimum of radio transmissions, positive control by the
section leader, and maximum security within the section. Preferably, the
section leader uses hand-and-arm signals within the section for C2. If the
section leader must use the radio, squad leaders should keep their radios
on the lowest possible power setting to minimize their signature and
reduce possible interference on the platoon net. The move-set method can
be used to control bounding overwatch within the section regardless of
the platoon organization.
2-119. When terrain permits sections to be mutually supporting (such as
in desert terrain) and other METT-TC factors are favorable, the platoon
leader can use this technique to control platoon bounding (by sections). In
such a situation, the sections would not be operating independently, but
rather would be directly controlled, and their movement coordinated, by
the platoon leader.
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CONTACT CONSIDERATIONS
2-121. The ideal way for the platoon to make contact is by means of
reports from other ISR assets (such as TUAVs or GSR). FBCB2 will allow
immediate dissemination of this information. The platoon leader can then
evaluate and develop the situation out of contact. Based on this
evaluation and further guidance from higher, he can maneuver the
platoon out of contact and make contact either on his own terms or as
directed by the commander.
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2-126. The platoon leader will direct the platoon’s actions based on the
commander’s intent and guidance he receives from the OPORD/FRAGO.
These specific instructions must include focus of the reconnaissance,
tempo of the operation, engagement criteria, and the desired COA based
on the size and activity of the threat force encountered. By knowing these
details ahead of time, the platoon leader can develop the situation more
rapidly and arrive at and execute the desired COA. He strives to make
contact with combat multipliers (such as GSR assets or TUAVs) or with
its smallest possible internal element: the dismounted scout. The goal
is digital or visual contact in which the threat is observed but the platoon
remains undetected. This gives the platoon the greatest possible
flexibility to maneuver and develop the situation.
2-127. When the platoon deploys and reports, it employs the
fundamental techniques of tactical movement (dismounted/mounted) and
action drills, using the terrain to ensure effective cover and concealment.
As information becomes available, the element in contact sends a contact
report, followed by a SPOTREP (digital/analog). The platoon executes fire
and maneuver only when specifically directed by the platoon leader.
2-128. Developing the situation is a critical step in choosing the correct
COA and providing an accurate, timely report to the commander. Once
the platoon leader has enough information to make a decision, he selects
a COA that is within the capabilities of the platoon, that allows the
platoon to continue the reconnaissance as quickly as possible, and that
supports the commander’s concept of the operation. He considers various
possible COAs, based on well-developed TTP (including battle drills), to
meet the types of contact. At a minimum, the platoon must rehearse and
be ready to execute these potential COAs:
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___________________________________________________ Chapter 2 – Leadership Competencies
when elements must break contact. The overwatching section must also
employ its dismounts with the Javelin missile system.
2-141. Once the displacing section/squad has arrived at the rally point, it
takes up defensive positions and reports its arrival to the overwatch
section/squad. The overwatching element then calls for protective fires
and uses an alternate covered and concealed route to move to the rally
point. When the entire platoon or section has moved back to the rally
point, it consolidates and reorganizes, reports its status to the higher
headquarters, and continues the mission. Figure 2-17 illustrates a
situation in which a recce platoon breaks contact by sections.
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2-171. Future battles will be mobile and violent, with emphasis on rapid
fire capability, increased speed, and maneuverability. Under these
conditions, the reconnaissance platoon’s ability to direct indirect fires is
its primary asset in helping the higher commander to shape the
battlefield. To help defeat the threat while surviving on the battlefield,
the reconnaissance platoon must be fully prepared to take maximum
advantage of the indirect fire capabilities of the friendly forces at its
disposal.
EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
2-172. The reconnaissance platoon employs FA and mortars as its
primary means of fire support across a broad spectrum of operations.
Using effects in accordance with the fires paragraph of the OPORD, the
platoon uses Army and/or joint precision fires to support reconnaissance
and security missions, as well as to impede, harass, or destroy threat
forces without compromising its current position. The platoon also
employs other types of fires. These include helicopters and fixed-wing
aircraft, which provide close air support (CAS) and aviation close fires
(ACF), and naval gunfire (NGF) assets. Refer to Chapter 8 for a detailed
discussion of fire support assets.
2-173. Target acquisition is the detection, identification, and location of a
target in sufficient detail to permit the effective employment of weapons.
With advances in precision munitions and the systems to rapidly deliver
them from relatively safe locations, the likelihood of the reconnaissance
platoon’s mission being focused on target acquisition has increased. The
process itself is embedded in reconnaissance operations, and target
acquisition may be the focus of a reconnaissance mission. The platoon
works with other ISR assets to gather targeting information and identify
targets using all available means. These assets include, but are not
limited to, individual scouts, strikers, aviation elements (including
TUAVs), and radar. In the BRT, for example, scouts and strikers may
together to execute the brigade’s essential fire support tasks (EFST).
CRITICAL TASKS
2-174. The platoon’s critical tasks in employing fires on the battlefield
include the following:
SECTION VI – COMMUNICATIONS
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MESSENGER
2-179. This is the most secure means of communications available to the
platoon. Messenger service is generally very flexible and reliable. In an
assembly area, it is the preferred means. On an infrequent basis,
members of the platoon may be called on to act as messengers to the
parent unit’s higher headquarters.
WIRE
2-180. This method of communications is especially effective in static
positions or during the conduct of a screening mission. It is very versatile
and can be used in many different situations. Using one of the many wire
devices available, the platoon establishes hot loops to communicate
within the platoon, with OPs, and with the parent unit CP in assembly
areas.
VISUAL
2-181. Visual communications are used to transmit prearranged
messages quickly over short distances. Reconnaissance sections or squads
may rely heavily on this type of communications. Since the platoon rarely
operates as a unit over short distances, however, visual signals are
seldom used at the platoon level. In those cases when the entire platoon is
together, such as in a coil, in an assembly area, or on a road march, all
vehicle commanders must stay alert so they can receive visual signals
from the platoon leader and pass them on to other vehicle commanders in
the platoon.
2-182. Whenever visual signals are used, they must be clear enough to
be understood by vehicle commanders as they operate in tactical
situations. Standard hand-and-arm or flag signals work well during
periods of good visibility. Flashlights, chemical lights, or other types of
lights are required during limited visibility. The platoon must exercise
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extreme care when using lights to avoid alerting the threat to friendly
intentions.
2-183. Pyrotechnic ammunition can also be used for visual signaling.
The meanings of these signals are identified in paragraph 5 of the
OPORD and in the unit signal operation instructions (SOI). The main
advantage of pyrotechnics is the speed with which signals can be
transmitted. Key disadvantages are the threat’s ability to see them and,
potentially, to imitate them.
SOUND
2-184. This form of communications is used mainly to attract attention,
transmit prearranged messages, and spread alarms. Sound signals carry
only short distances; in addition, range and clarity are greatly reduced by
battle noise. Since they are open to threat interception, use of sound
signals may be restricted for security reasons. Prearranged meanings for
sound signals are outlined in the unit SOP and CEOI; they must be kept
simple to prevent misunderstandings.
RADIO
2-185. The radio is the platoon’s most flexible and most frequently used
form of communications. Types of radio communications include
electromagnetic transmissions over FM, AM, UHF, and VHF spectrums
and use of TACSAT systems.
2-186. The most effective way to use the radio is to follow standard
guidelines for effective RTP; these include brevity, proper use of
authentication tables, and the use of approved operational terms. Threat
direction-finding units can trace radio signals. Once found, the
transmitter can easily be destroyed. For this reason, the platoon leader
and PSG must strictly enforce radio discipline regardless of encryption
devices; survival of the platoon depends on good radio habits.
FM Communications
2-187. Operations normally depend on radio as the primary means of
communication for both voice and digital traffic. Net discipline and SOP
minimize needless traffic. To avoid detection by threat direction finding
equipment, the platoon uses other means of communication whenever
possible to supplement the radio and minimize emissions. Once in
contact, the primary means of communication will be FM voice.
TACSAT Communications
2-188. Because the platoon often conducts reconnaissance operations
over great distances, the unlimited range of TACSAT radios can prove
extremely valuable.
DIGITAL
2-189. FBCB2 is the digital system that enhances the reconnaissance
platoon’s battle command capability by linking the platoon internally and
to its higher headquarters. As noted in the discussion in Chapter 1 of this
manual, FBCB2 is part of the Army Battle Command System (ABCS), a
network of computers, GPS equipment, and communication systems that
work together to provide combat leaders with real-time information of
unprecedented quantity and quality. FBCB2 and the ABCS allow for
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COMMERCIAL LINES
2-190. The platoon may communicate via commercial lines when
approved by higher headquarters. Careful consideration must be given to
securing commercial lines and limiting the amount and type of classified
material sent over nonsecured lines. If the platoon is forced to withdraw,
existing wire lines, including commercial lines, are cut and sections
removed so the threat cannot use them.
NOTE: The platoon leader may assign section or squad leaders to monitor the nets of units
operating to the front and/or rear of the platoon. These would become the alternate
nets monitored by the leaders. This technique supports situational awareness and
facilitates reconnaissance or battle handover.
Platoon
2-192. This net is used to conduct all platoon operations. All elements
within the reconnaissance platoon must have the ability to monitor and
transmit on this net at all times. Making sure this happens is one of the
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Troop Command
2-193. This net is used to maneuver the reconnaissance or recce troop as
well as to process most routine reports not sent on FBCB2. The troop
TOC is the net control station (NCS), and the platoon leader or PSG
sends routine reports to the troop XO. This net can be used by
reconnaissance platoon leaders to talk to each other and coordinate key
tactical actions of their platoons; however, platoon leaders will use each
other’s platoon nets to pass routine messages not of interest to the
commander.
2-194. Both the platoon leader and PSG must always have the ability to
monitor and transmit on this net. All scouts must be able to move to this
net to send reports and receive guidance if they are unable to contact
their platoon leader or PSG.
Troop Fires
2-195. Many troops operate a troop fires net to send calls for fire to the
troop FSO or directly to the troop mortars. The reconnaissance platoon
leader should direct all radios not actively operating on another net to
enter this net. All scouts must have the ability to change to this net and
coordinate indirect fire. (NOTE: Scouts must also be prepared to change
to the nets of supporting elements such as tank, MGS, and AT platoons to
coordinate supporting fires.)
Administrative/Logistics
2-196. The PSG will usually monitor the A/L net for the platoon, but the
platoon leader must be familiar with it as well. The PSG uses it as
required to send routine A/L reports. This net is also used to coordinate
resupply operations and evacuation of casualties.
NOTE: The platoon leader may assign section or squad leaders to monitor the nets of units
operating to the front and/or rear of the platoon. These would become the alternate
nets monitored by the leaders. This technique supports situational awareness and
facilitates reconnaissance or battle handover.
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Platoon
2-198. This net is used to conduct all platoon operations. All elements
within the reconnaissance platoon must have the ability to monitor and
transmit on this net at all times. Making sure this happens is one of the
keys to effective command and control during the conduct of tactical
operations.
Battalion Command
2-199. The battalion command net is the primary net used to direct the
tactical operations of the battalion. It is monitored continuously by all
subordinate commanders in the battalion, as well as by key staff
members and the TOC. As a key maneuver element of the battalion, the
reconnaissance platoon must monitor this net continuously. The platoon
leader and the PSG should both have the capability to monitor and
transmit on this net when the battalion is conducting tactical operations.
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Battalion Fires
2-202. Because rapidly coordinating for and adjusting indirect fires is
vital in all R&S operations, the fires net is extremely critical to the
success of scout platoon operations. The platoon should have all radios
that are not on the higher command net or the platoon net preset to this
net. All scouts, whether operating mounted or dismounted and regardless
of how many radios they have, must have the ability to quickly change to
this net and coordinate indirect fire. The scout platoon leader must
coordinate with the battalion FSO regarding the use of the fires net to
ensure that the platoon can use it to send voice call for fire messages.
Company Team
2-203. All scouts must have the ability to rapidly change to any of the
battalion company team nets. These nets are used to conduct coordination
for handing off enemy targets once the scouts make contact.
Administrative/Logistics
2-204. The scout PSG will usually monitor the A/L net for the platoon,
but the platoon leader must be familiar with it as well. The PSG uses it as
required to send routine A/L reports. This net is also used to coordinate
resupply operations and evacuation of casualties.
Retrans
2-205. When the scout platoon operates at extended distances from the
battalion TOC, it may use the battalion retrans net to facilitate effective
communications between the scout platoon leader and the TOC. The
platoon leader should request use of the retrans net during all missions
requiring FM communications at extended ranges.
NET CONTROL
2-206. The reconnaissance platoon net is the key to command and
control of the platoon. The smooth functioning of this net allows accurate
information to be passed quickly both to and from the platoon leader. This
information flow is critical in maintaining the platoon leader’s situational
awareness and in enhancing command and control. When contact is
made, the volume of traffic on the recce platoon net will increase
drastically. The platoon must be organized to control, understand, and
process this vast amount of information while engaging the threat and
possibly being engaged in turn. The following guidelines will help to
ensure that the information flowing over the net is organized and
controlled in a way that permits the platoon leader to both understand it
and issue orders in response to it.
FLASH TRAFFIC
2-207. The platoon leader should, in either the platoon order or the unit
SOP, establish criteria for flash traffic. For example, the flash traffic
criteria could dictate special handling of the platoon’s prescribed PIR.
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NET DISCIPLINE
2-208. The PSG is responsible for net discipline. In this capacity, he will
challenge any violation of procedure as it occurs. Improper or inefficient
radio procedures, even in routine administrative reports, inhibit effective
command and control.
EFFECTIVE MESSAGES
2-209. The best way to ensure effectiveness of a radio message is to write
it out before it is sent. This procedure yields a more accurate and,
ultimately, more timely tranmission. It also ensures that the message is
sent correctly, completely, and clearly in the shortest possible amount of
time. The message is easier to understand, and the duration of the
electronic signature of the sending station is minimized.
RADIOTELEPHONE PROCEDURES
2-210. Proper RTPs are the cornerstone of effective command and
control in the reconnaissance platoon. All scouts must be expert in
communications procedures. This not only ensures efficient
communications within the platoon, but also allows all members of the
platoon to communicate effectively with outside elements such as the
squadron, troop, other platoons, and subordinate and/or supporting
elements.
MINIMIZE DURATION
2-213. All messages sent within or from the platoon must be short and
informative. The longer the message, the greater the opportunity for
threat elements to electronically determine the platoon’s location.
Message length can be controlled in several ways:
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MINIMIZE SIGNATURE
2-214. When sending a message, every scout must be conscious of the
size and nature of the electronic signature that he is emitting. He must
consider the following methods for reducing the size of the signature:
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OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
2-219. Important considerations and guidelines for the reconnaissance
platoon in its reporting of tactical information include the following:
REPORT GUIDELINES
2-220. The reconnaissance platoon should follow these guidelines in
reporting tactical information:
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TYPES OF REPORTS
2-221. The following list covers the various reports available to the
reconnaissance platoon. Refer to Appendix B of this manual for a
discussion of these reports, including line-by-line formats and examples:
· Contact Report.
· Blue Reports (Operations).
n Blue 1 – Spot Report (SPOTREP).
n Blue 2 – Situation Report (SITREP).
n Blue 4 – Report for Bridge, Overpass, Culvert, Underpass,
or Tunnel (BRIDGEREP).
n Blue 5 – Report for Ford, Ferry, or Other Crossing Site
(CROSSREP).
n Blue 7 – Route Reconnaissance Report
(ROUTEREP).
n Blue 9 – Obstacle Report.
n Blue 10 – Bypass Report.
n Blue 11 – Stand-to Report (STANREP).
· Green Reports (Intelligence).
n Green 2 – Sensitive Items Report (SENSEREP).
n Green 3 – Splash Report.
n Green 4 – Patrol Report.
n Green 5 – Meaconing, Intrusion, Jamming, and
Interference (MIJI) Report.
n Green 6 – EPW/Captured Material Report.
· Yellow Reports (Logistics).
n Yellow 1 – Equipment Status Report (ESTAT).
n Yellow 1A – Battle Loss Spot Report.
n Yellow 2 – Ammunition Status Report.
n Yellow 2A – Ammunition Request.
n Yellow 3 – POL Status Report.
n Yellow 3A – POL Request.
· Red Reports (Personnel).
n Red 2 – Personnel Battle Loss Report.
n Red 3 – Medical Evacuation Request.
· NBC Reports.
n NBC-1 – Observer’s Initial Report.
n NBC-3 – Immediate Warning of Expected Contamination.
n NBC-4 – Report of Radiation Dose-Rate Measurement.
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· SALT.
· MEDEVAC.
· Fire mission (call for fire).
· Check fire.
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· SITREP.
Safety Radius
Message Type Type of Danger Zone
(Meters)
NBC-1 Chemical 500
Obstacle Report / NBC-1 Biological 500
Obstacle Report / NBC-1 / Strike Warning Nuclear 1000
Spot Report Aircraft 5000
Spot Report Formation 4000
Spot Report Field Fortifications 1500
Spot Report Multiple Rocket Launcher 4000
Spot Report Air Defense Artillery 4000
Spot Report Assembly Area 4000
Spot Report Buildings 1500
Spot Report Equipment 4000
Spot Report Command Center 1500
Spot Report Supply Dump 1500
Spot Report Rocket Missiles 4000
Spot Report Vehicles 4000
Spot Report Armor Combat 4000
Spot Report Artillery 4000
Spot Report Mortar 8000
Spot Report Weapons 1500
Spot Report Personnel 1500
Spot Report Unknown 4000
Spot Report Fire Mission 600
Obstacle Report Minefield, Antipersonnel 500
Obstacle Report Minefield, Antitank 500
Obstacle Report Minefield, Mixed 500
Obstacle Report Minefield, Unknown 500
Obstacle Report Chemical, Nerve 500
Obstacle Report Chemical, Blood 500
Obstacle Report Chemical, Blister 500
Obstacle Report Chemical, Choking 500
Obstacle Report Booby Traps 500
Obstacle Report Abatis 500
Obstacle Report Craters 500
Obstacle Report Antitank Ditch 500
Obstacle Report Scatterable Mines 500
Obstacle Report Bunker Strongpoint 1500
Strike Warning Conventional 1000
Threat Warning NBC 500
Threat Warning Antiaircraft Artillery 4000
Threat Warning Aircraft 10000
Threat Warning Air-to-Air Missile 10000
Threat Warning Surface-to-Air Missile 1500
Threat Warning Surface-to-Surface Missile 10000
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· Warning orders.
· Operational plans (OPLAN) and OPORDs.
· FRAGOs.
· Logistics orders and requests.
· Free text massages.
GEO-REFERENCED MESSAGES
2-227. These messages, which can be used in the C2 categories discussed
earlier, create icons linked to a location on the FBCB2 map. They are also
disseminated across the TI as situational awareness data. Geo-referenced
messages can be used for the following:
· Obstacle reports.
· NBC-1 reports.
· Bridge reports.
· Supply point status reports.
· Contact reports.
· Engagement reports.
2-228. FBCB2 users can choose to hide or display all geo-referenced data
from the filter dialog box. Geo-referenced messages contain “hook”
information—detailed information on the status of any icon. To access
“hook” information on a geo-referenced icon, however, the user must have
been a recipient of the message.
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Chapter 3
Reconnaissance Operations
Reconnaissance platoons
conduct reconnaissance to CONTENTS
provide their commander Purpose and Fundamentals ........................ 3-1
with information that has Purpose .................................................. 3-2
tactical value concerning the Fundamentals of Reconnaissance ...... 3-2
Reconnaissance Planning, Methods,
terrain, threat, social/human and Tactical Employment .............. 3-4
demographics, infrastructure, Reconnaissance Tempo ....................... 3-4
and effects of weather within Reconnaissance Pull/Push ................... 3-6
an area of operations. Scouts Planning Considerations ...................... 3-6
Reconnaissance Operational
reconnoiter terrain to deter- Environment ....................................... 3-8
mine movement and Reconnaissance Handover .................. 3-13
maneuver conditions. When Reconnaissance Methods .................... 3-17
they find the threat, they Tactical Employment ............................ 3-21
Multidimensional Aspects of
determine his disposition, Reconnaissance and
strengths, and weaknesses in Surveillance .................................... 3-32
detail. The reconnaissance Operational Considerations ................. 3-33
platoon provides information Intelligence Collection .......................... 3-33
Civil-Military Operations ....................... 3-42
necessary to allow combined Route Reconnaissance ................................ 3-48
arms forces to maneuver Critical Tasks ......................................... 3-48
against the threat, strike him Techniques ............................................ 3-49
Example of a Recce Platoon Route
where he is most vulnerable,
Reconnaissance ................................ 3-50
and apply overwhelming Example of a CFV Platoon Route
power to defeat him. In Reconnaissance ................................ 3-54
addition, scouts must be able Area Reconnaissance .................................. 3-57
Critical Tasks ......................................... 3-57
to perform the multi-
Techniques ............................................ 3-58
dimensional aspect of Example of an Area Reconnaissance .. 3-59
reconnaissance to gather the Zone Reconnaissance ................................. 3-62
information needed for Critical Tasks ......................................... 3-62
Techniques ............................................ 3-63
execution of such activities as Example of a Zone Reconnaissance ... 3-64
stability operations and Obstacle/Restriction Reconnaissance ....... 3-69
support operations. The Steps of Obstacle/Restriction
Reconnaissance ................................ 3-70
Examples of Obstacle/Restriction
Reconnaissance ................................ 3-74
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PURPOSE
3-3. Based on their commander’s intent and guidance, scouts conduct
reconnaissance forward of other friendly forces to provide current,
accurate information about the threat, terrain, weather, society,
infrastructure, and physical resources within a specified area of
operations. In simplest terms, the reconnaissance platoon and its higher
headquarters take steps to link the purpose of the reconnaissance to one
or more of the following requirements:
FUNDAMENTALS OF RECONNAISSANCE
3-5. Seven fundamentals are common to all successful reconnaissance
operations. Scout leaders must ensure that their plans adhere to these
fundamentals, which are covered in the following discussion, during the
execution of reconnaissance missions.
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3-3
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RECONNAISSANCE TEMPO
3-16. This discussion focuses on several reconnaissance methods that
scouts can employ. These methods have proven effective in a variety of
situations and form a foundation for how to conduct reconnaissance.
Scouts must use their experience, professional judgment, and common
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RECONNAISSANCE PULL/PUSH
3-24. There are two general forms of reconnaissance: push and pull.
3-25. Reconnaissance pull is used when the enemy situation is not well
known and/or the situation is rapidly changing. Reconnaissance pull
fosters planning and decision-making processes that are focused on
changing assumptions into confirmed information. Initial assumptions
and PIR are used to deploy reconnaissance assets early to collect
information for use in the development of COAs. The commander uses
R&S assets to confirm or deny initial PIR prior to the decision on a COA
or maneuver option, thus pulling the supported unit (battalion or
brigade) to the decisive point on the battlefield. Success of the
reconnaissance pull requires an integrated reconnaissance plan that can
be executed prior to the commander having to make a COA decision.
3-26. Reconnaissance push is used once the commander is committed to
a COA or maneuver option. The commander pushes his R&S assets
forward as necessary to gain greater visibility on specific NAIs and to
gain information that will confirm or deny the assumptions on which the
COA is based.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
3-27. The purpose of this section is to outline the planning, methods,
and tactical employment involved in executing reconnaissance missions.
Critical to the platoon leader’s ability to execute his mission is to clearly
understand the focus, tempo, and engagement criteria of the
reconnaissance mission. This information can be labeled as essential
commander’s guidance. It is an extension of the commander’s intent and
is meant to fully clarify the intent for the reconnaissance effort. It should
be received from higher as well as issued to subordinates. The essential
commander’s guidance answers the three basic questions the platoon
leader needs to know to plan his mission:
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NOTE: As noted throughout this chapter, the focus should be linked to the purpose of the
reconnaissance operation to accomplish any or all of the following tasks: answer
the CCIR, fill voids in the unit IPB (as related to the IR and specific information
requirements [SIR]), and/or support targeting operations through target
acquisition.
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OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
3-32. The Army has always focused its efforts on traditional combat
operations, based on open terrain, force-on-force battles, and symmetrical
enemy formations. The standard reconnaissance approach in this
environment has been simply to focus on gaining information on the
enemy and terrain. The Army’s thinking, however, must expand to
include nontraditional environmental variables that could influence its
operations. In the future, Army forces will not habitually face
conventional forces in open areas.
Asymmetric Warfare
3-33. The new millennium, coupled with the technological
developments of the information age, raises the specter of asymmetric
warfare, a concept in which a weak opponent successfully engages a
stronger opponent by using a variety of “offset” TTP for gaining
advantage in hopes of achieving its objectives and goals. As noted, the
reconnaissance platoon must be ready to concentrate both on the
traditional approach to reconnaissance (focused on gathering information
on enemy forces and terrain) and on the asymmetric aspects of the
operational environment that affect military operations. Asymmetric
threats include regional military forces, paramilitary forces, guerrillas
and insurgents, terrorists, criminal groups, and certain civilian groups
and individuals. Threat asymmetric approaches involve information
operations, weapons of mass destruction, operations in complex (mainly
urban) terrain, civilian involvement, and evasive attacks against US
forces and soldiers.
Urban Considerations
3-34. The urban environment confronts commanders with a
combination of difficulties rarely found in other settings in which the
Army is called upon to conduct operations. The distinct characteristics of
the urban environment are primarily a function of the following factors:
3-35. Of those factors, the third one, and the human dimension it
represents, is potentially the most important—and the most perplexing
for commanders to understand and evaluate. Although urban terrain is
complex, understanding it is a relatively straightforward process in
comparison to comprehending the multifaceted nature of urban society.
The urban environment is, first of all, a human environment. That makes
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Threat/Enemy
3-41. The platoon no longer faces a single, monolithic, well-defined
threat. During the Cold War, planning centered on confronting
numerically superior armored forces in Europe, the Far East, or
Southwest Asia. Today’s reconnaissance units must be able to conduct
operations across the range of military operations (MTW, SSC, stability
operations, and support operations) against threats ranging in size from
major regional powers to asymmetric threats. These may include
conventional threat forces, insurgents, paramilitary forces, guerrillas,
criminal groups, and certain civilian groups and individuals.
3-42. Because of the diversity of the threat, the IPB process becomes
even more important at the brigade, squadron, troop, and platoon levels.
No longer will the threat always fit into a neat time-distance scenario.
Potential adversaries may use a variety of doctrine, tactics, and
equipment. It is extremely important to quickly identify the threat/enemy
in a specific operational area. This will almost always be the major focus
of reconnaissance for the platoon. At times, however, the reconnaissance
focus may be the identification of the unknown threat as well. That is
why the understanding of the society and infrastructure of an area are
also important factors in the reconnaissance operational environment.
Society/Human Demographics
3-43. Because the focus of reconnaissance may be the society and
people of a given area, the reconnaissance platoon must be aware of the
full dimension of demographics in its area of operations. The
demographic framework is the basis of the characteristics of a specific
environment and determines many, if not most, of the platoon’s
reconnaissance objectives. Gaining an awareness of how the local society
affects military operations and of the impact of military operations on the
society is likely to be critical to the platoon leader and his subordinate
leaders as they make operational decisions. The following are examples of
the social/human dimensions of reconnaissance focus in the area of
operations:
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basis. The platoon leadership must become familiar with civic and
factional leaders such as mayors, police chiefs, local military
commanders, and political leaders. This knowledge, while important in
SSC and MTW operations, is critical in stability operations and support
operations where the platoon might have a permanent lodgment area
surrounded by diverse local communities.
Terrain
3-47. The reconnaissance platoon must never become complacent in
terrain analysis and the identification of key terrain. The platoon must
understand terrain factors as they pertain to friendly forces and threat
forces alike. It must also be able to evaluate the role of terrain not just in
traditional operations, but in stability, support, and SSC environments as
well. For example, in stability operations or support operations, key
terrain could be a religious or cultural monument or a historic
geographical boundary or town.
Infrastructure
3-48. For a platoon to operate successfully in an area, it must
understand the local infrastructure. The platoon must develop a general
understanding of facilities, institutions, and organizations; how each of
these entities fit into the community at large; and how they relate to one
another. Infrastructure considerations include the following:
RECONNAISSANCE HANDOVER
3-49. RHO is the action that occurs between two elements in order to
coordinate the transfer of information and/or responsibility for
observation (reconnaissance and/or surveillance) of potential threat
contact, or the transfer of an assigned area from one element to another.
The term “element” is all-inclusive of those involved in the handover,
whether it is OP to OP within the same platoon, sensors (such as GSR) to
a recce platoon, recce troop to infantry battalion, and so on.
3-50. RHO draws its origins from a World War II term “connecting file,”
which facilitated the linking of units to prevent seams between them.
RHO shares many critical tasks with battle handover: relief in place,
linkup, and passage of lines. Unlike battle handover, however, it does not
imply the assumption of a fight or being within direct fire range. Instead,
it focuses on planning for, preparing, and executing the passing of
information, threat contact, or an assigned area and the related
responsibility for it from one element to another.
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Planning
3-53. Responsibility for the coordination of RHO normally occurs from
higher to lower units. Planning for RHO may take place before an
operation or may be conducted during operations as part of a change of
mission. When planning is conducted before an operation, the completed
plan is reviewed, ensuring layered, redundant reconnaissance and
surveillance using all available ISR assets. This layered
reconnaissance/surveillance is then analyzed to determine where and
who may be required to conduct RHO. Once this is determined, the
locations and/or criteria for RHO are coordinated with higher
headquarters as applicable. Pertinent control measures related to RHO,
such as the RHOL (phase line) between units or the potential RHOCP to
facilitate ground linkup, are then added with other graphic control
measures to aid in command and control.
Preparation
3-54. Coordination begins as RHO requirements between units are
identified. The communications plan between the units is then identified.
The communications plan includes radio frequencies, net IDs, EPLRS
needlines, host files required to conduct the linkup (if units are from
different maneuver control systems), and COMSEC variables for
communications and establishment of the TI between the two forces.
Recognition signals must be implemented to prevent friendly troops from
exchanging fires. These signals may be pyrotechnics, armbands, vehicle
markings, panels, colored smoke, distinctive light patterns, and
passwords. The situational awareness provided by FBCB2 can
significantly enhance friendly recognition.
3-55. Indirect fires are coordinated, and fire support information is
exchanged between units, to include assets available, fire control
measures, critical friendly zones (CFZ), preplanned targets, final
protective fires (FPF), and smoke missions.
3-56. ISR (R&S) plans are exchanged allowing an understanding of how
higher information requirements (IR) may fulfill the lower unit’s or
passing unit’s IR needs. For example, this will allow the brigade
reconnaissance assets to understand the follow-on battalion IR needs
while still remaining focused on the brigade’s requirements. This
understanding may lead to the transfer of vital information collected by
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the brigade assets to the battalion during critical moments, such as the
RHO of an enemy target for destruction (this is further emphasized in the
example). The remarks block of the ISR (R&S) matrix may also be used to
identify established RHO coordination.
3-57. The criteria for target handover (engagement criteria) are
identified and coordinated, including who will interdict if the target
exceeds the unit’s engagement criteria. If follow-on forces are designated
to destroy the target (as a result of meeting their engagement criteria), a
forward passage of lines may need to be coordinated to support that unit’s
attack. The contact report of threat forces exceeding the engagement
criteria of the element/unit in contact may act as a trigger for follow-on
forces to initiate movement to conduct the forward passage of lines.
3-58. Coordination is conducted to identify the transfer and/or
acceptance of C2 of elements between units as necessary. On-order
missions may be identified for elements/units to support RHO. An
example of this would be a TUAV task to establish and maintain contact
with a moving contact while RHO of the contact is being conducted from
one unit to another. The initial contact report may act as a trigger to
prepare the TUAV for launch, allowing the supporting element/unit
(TUAV crew) time to prepare. As RHO becomes imminent and final
coordination begins, the TUAV is launched to support the handover. This
level of coordination will allow the TUAV maximum time on station,
ensuring redundant observation during handover.
3-59. Rehearsals are of paramount importance before executing any
plan. During rehearsals, RHO coordination is confirmed and practiced to
ensure clarity and understanding.
NOTE: Throughout RHO planning and preparation, all elements/units must be prepared to
transition to battle handover in the event they are engaged by threat forces.
Execution
3-60. Elements/units may conduct RHO with follow-on or security
(stationary) forces, accept RHO from a forward force, or provide C2 for
the handover.
3-61. During execution of RHO, liaison with a unit may consist of
collocating both units’ C2 nodes as well as attaching scouts to the forward
maneuver units to facilitate implementation of command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (C4ISR). Every effort should be made to establish a face-
to-face liaison. If this is not possible, establish a reliable digital and/or
voice linkup to exchange critical information. As the distance closes
between the forces, the requirement to maintain close liaison and
exchange information increases.
3-62. If face-to-face linkup is made at the RHOCP, final coordination is
completed and relevant information is exchanged. Confirmation is made
to ensure RHO is complete based on the specified criteria. If a target is
being handed over, the criteria should require the accepting unit to
acquire the target before handover is complete. The unit conducting RHO
may then be required to support the unit accepting the handover by
executing the responsibilities of the stationary unit while conducting a
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NOTE: The following example illustrates an RHO operation at a higher level, in this case
between a BRT and both division cavalry scouts (forward of the BRT) and task force
scouts (to the rear of the BRT). This type of higher-level handover would directly
affect the reconnaissance platoons within all of these elements.
Higher-Level Handover
3-64. A more detailed example entails a division cavalry squadron
conducting a zone reconnaissance forward of the brigade. The brigade’s
BRT has been given a mission to conduct area reconnaissance missions
behind the division cavalry to reconnoiter potential assault positions and
then conduct surveillance of TAIs in support of the brigade’s attack. This
technique will allow the BRT to conduct a thorough reconnaissance while
taking advantage of the security the ground cavalry troop (GCT)
provides. The BRT has been assigned a zone through which it will move
to its assigned areas. It conducts physical and FM/digital linkup with the
division cavalry troop directly to its front and with the lead task force’s
scout platoon following the BRT.
3-65. En route to their OPs, the BRT scouts maneuver into the
divisional scouts’ area of operations. They report real time information to
the brigade and its lead maneuver battalion. Once the conditions are set,
the BRT conducts RHO with the division cavalry troop to its front. The
divisional cavalry (DIV CAV) troop reports that it has bypassed a threat
OP consisting of two BRDM-type vehicles; it provides additional
information concerning the terrain and enemy on the brigade’s objective.
The DIV CAV troop and the BRT also coordinate passage of lines for the
BRT to move into OPs that observe the assigned TAIs. The BRT accepts
the handover from the DIV CAV. It reports the contact to the brigade and
the follow-on task force and updates both the FBCB2 overlay (adding the
OP contact) and the threat template on the objective. The brigade accepts
responsibility for the threat OP contact and directs the BRT bypass the
OP and continue the mission.
3-66. The BRT establishes OPs to observe the assigned TAIs and
support the brigade’s attack. The troop XO begins RHO with the lead
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task force scout platoon. The task force (TF) scout platoon leader
collocates with the troop CP and gathers the relevant information for his
task force. The BRT directs a section to establish a linkup point for the
lead TF scouts. The BRT identifies the best axis of advance for the task
force from its own observations and from information provided by DIV
CAV. The BRT also provides locations of passage lanes through the DIV
CAV and the threat’s security zone as well as the latest update on the
threat’s posture on the objective.
3-67. The BRT scouts provide an “eyes-on” SITREP and then lead the
task force scouts to the position of advantage using a covered and
concealed route identified en route to the linkup point. The scout platoon
leader now has enough information to point out the RHOL on the ground,
to identify enemy/friendly locations and routes to the flank and rear of
the enemy, and then to physically lead the formation to the RHOL. The
BRT is positioned to support the BCT fight, with scouts and Strikers
conducting target acquisition.
RECONNAISSANCE METHODS
RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS
3-68. Reconnaissance patrols provide timely and accurate information
about the threat and terrain. The reconnaissance platoon may be tasked
to conduct any of the three types of reconnaissance patrols (area, zone, or
route). The patrol leader must have specific intelligence collection
requirements for each mission. For a detailed discussion of
reconnaissance patrols, refer to Chapter 5 of this manual.
MOUNTED RECONNAISSANCE
3-69. Scouts frequently conduct mounted operations, which give
reconnaissance platoons the ability to conduct fairly detailed
reconnaissance while maintaining the speed and momentum required for
the operation. Mounted reconnaissance also allows the scouts to take
advantage of the protection afforded by their vehicles, although they
must still dismount when they cross danger areas.
Employment Considerations
3-70. Mounted reconnaissance is normally used under these conditions:
· Time is limited.
· Detailed reconnaissance is not required.
· IPB provides accurate information on the threat.
· The UAV platoon is performing coordinated reconnaissance
tasks in support of ground forces.
· Ground sensors (such as GSR elements) are conducting
reconnaissance activities in support of ground forces.
· Terrain is open.
Advantages
3-71. Speed and momentum are rarely necessary in a reconnaissance
operation, but they are often critical to the successful execution of
offensive operations that the reconnaissance mission may support. In
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Disadvantages
3-72. The disadvantages of mounted reconnaissance include the loss of
stealth due to the visual, noise, and thermal signatures of the vehicle and
the loss of some detail because of restricted vision and impairment of the
senses of smell and hearing. These disadvantages increase the risk to
scouts as they conduct reconnaissance.
DISMOUNTED RECONNAISSANCE
3-73. The primary purpose of dismounted reconnaissance is to obtain
detailed information about terrain features, obstacles, or threat forces. In
addition, scouts dismount and reconnoiter forward of their vehicle to
provide security before moving through danger areas such as open
spaces, hilltops, curves, or other blind spots on the battlefield. They also
dismount to set up short- or long-duration OPs. (NOTE: Refer to
Chapter 5 of this manual for additional information on dismounted
operations.)
Employment Considerations
3-74. In general, scouts conduct dismounted reconnaissance when the
following conditions apply:
3-75. Dismounted scouts provide security for each other as they move.
Ideally, at least two scouts work together when operating dismounted.
When only a single scout dismounts, he should never move out of
supporting distance of the vehicle.
Advantages
3-76. Dismounted reconnaissance is the preferred method when
stealthy movement is desired. Scouts on foot benefit from the
concealment offered by folds in the terrain; in addition, they do not emit a
significant visual or audio signature. Dismounted reconnaissance
techniques allow the reconnaissance platoon to observe threat vehicles
and soldiers at close range without being detected. Scouts conducting
dismounted reconnaissance can also quickly transition to a stationary OP
for a short period of time without suffering any loss of effectiveness.
Disadvantages
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· SOPs.
· Personal weapons.
· Communications equipment.
· SOI extracts.
· Maps.
· A compass.
· Binoculars (and night vision devices, if necessary).
RECONNAISSANCE BY FIRE
3-79. In reconnaissance by fire, indirect fire is used on positions where
there is a reasonable suspicion of threat occupation; the goal is to cause
the threat to disclose his presence by moving or by returning fire. In rare
circumstances, the reconnaissance platoon or section may use this
reconnaissance method when threat contact is expected and time is
limited or when the platoon cannot maneuver to develop the situation. In
such a situation, it is critical for the platoon leader to conduct thorough
war-gaming and rehearsals to prepare for the probable threat reaction.
Employment Considerations
3-80. Examples of threat locations and/or contact situations in which
reconnaissance by fire may be employed include the following:
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AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE
3-87. When available, aerial reconnaissance can be employed to
complement ground reconnaissance. Aerial assets are an integral part of
reconnaissance operations; ground scouts must synchronize their
reconnaissance efforts with that of available UAV assets if they are
operating in the same area.
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NOTE: Refer to Chapter 8 of this manual for further details on air/ground reconnaissance
integration.
TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT
INFILTRATION
3-91. Infiltration is a form of maneuver that the reconnaissance platoon
can use to penetrate the threat security zone or main battle area to
accomplish its mission. Entailing use of stealthy forms of movement,
infiltration is primarily conducted by, but not limited to, recce and
HMMWV mounted platoons due to their increased vulnerability, in high
threat environments, to direct and indirect fires. Although it is most
commonly used by ground reconnaissance assets, aerial and waterborne
platforms may also employ tactics based on infiltration techniques.
Purposes of infiltration include the following:
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Operational Considerations
3-94. Infiltration imposes a number of distinct, and often difficult,
operational considerations on the reconnaissance platoon.
3-95. Planning and Coordination. The amount of intelligence
information available to the reconnaissance platoon leader during the
planning process will determine the risk involved in conducting the
infiltration. The platoon leader must maximize the use of known
intelligence, including aerial photographs, for the area of operations. As
he plans the operation, the platoon leader must select appropriate routes
and movement techniques based on the mission, the terrain and weather,
the likelihood of threat contact, the expected and/or necessary speed of
movement, and the depth to which the platoon’s elements must
penetrate. Once these factors have been considered, the platoon leader
must make the decision to infiltrate either mounted or dismounted or a
combination of both. Even if he decides the platoon can conduct a
mounted infiltration, his plan must take into account that the situation
may require scouts to dismount and reconnoiter an area before the
vehicles move forward. The platoon leader’s infiltration plan must
provide platoon elements with enough time for preparation and initial
movement. The initial plan should also cover an evasion and extraction
plan, as well as any special equipment requirements.
3-96. The platoon leader must conduct detailed coordination with any
friendly elements through which the platoon will pass when executing
infiltration tactics; this includes integration of communications, fires, and
CSS activities. In addition, the platoon’s higher headquarters must
coordinate the activities of adjacent friendly units to ensure that they do
not compromise the platoon and its elements as they conduct the
infiltration.
3-97. Size of Infiltrating Elements. The size of the elements depends
on several factors: the assigned mission, time available, cover and
concealment, the target acquisition capabilities of both friendly and
threat forces, available communications assets, and navigation
capabilities and limitations. If the platoon is tasked to gather information
over a wide area, it may employ several small teams to cover the
complete sector. In most situations, smaller elements are better able to
take advantage of available cover and concealment. Another
consideration is that some elements of the platoon may not use
infiltration. If the platoon is moving into sector in echelon, the initial
echelons may infiltrate to a specific location and provide surveillance for
follow-on echelons that are moving into sector using a more conventional
movement technique.
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NOTE: Although doctrine prescribes the use of infiltration lanes, a specific route may be
identified, as described in this example, to increase survivability and the chance for
success.
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3-110. Once established, OP1 observes NAIs 1 and 2, OP2 observes NAIs
3 and 1, and OP3 observes NAIs 2 and 3 (see Figure 3-2B). This
observation plan allows redundancy of observation of the NAIs and
enhances the platoon’s ability to conduct handover of contact from one OP
to another. OP1 must also be prepared to conduct handover of contact
with the elements to its rear. These potential actions are coordinated
prior to execution of the infiltration.
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3-113. At 2017, the first mounted section begins its infiltration along the
designated route, moving to OP2 (see Figure 3-2D) with the dismounts at
OP1 providing surveillance. OP1 is also prepared to support the first
mounted section’s actions on contact with preplotted indirect fires if
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needed. Once the first mounted section is established at OP2, OP1 may
also handle communications retrans duty as required.
3-114. The second mounted section begins infiltration at 0115 along the
previously employed route. OP1 and OP2 provide surveillance for its
movement to OP3 (see Figure 3-2E).
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3-115. At 0325, the third section infiltrates along the same, successful
route with OP1, OP2, and OP3 providing surveillance. If OP1 is not
needed to conduct retrans, the third section picks the dismounted team
up and proceeds to OP4. Establishment of all OPs is completed no later
than 0500 with redundant observation on NAIs 1, 2, and 3 (refer to
Figure 3-2F).
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EXFILTRATION
3-116. The reconnaissance platoon and its elements may have to conduct
exfiltration in several types of tactical situations. For example,
reconnaissance forces that infiltrate the threat main battle area or rear
area must exfiltrate once they gather the required information. In
another instance, the platoon may be deliberately employed in a stay-
behind mode during defensive operations, forcing it to use exfiltration to
return to friendly lines.
Planning Considerations
3-117. In all situations, exfiltration must be planned as carefully as
infiltration. An effective exfiltration plan is essential in terms of mission
accomplishment and morale. In most cases, planning for an exfiltration
operation begins at the same time as planning for the infiltration (or
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other tactical operation) that precedes it. For example, the platoon leader
must anticipate contingency measures that may be required if his
elements must conduct an unplanned exfiltration during a
reconnaissance operation. His exfiltration plan should factor in additional
time that the platoon may need to react to unforeseen circumstances,
such as inadvertent contact with threat forces or unexpected restricted
terrain. Whether the platoon plans to exfiltrate on foot or by another
transport method (ground vehicles, aircraft, or watercraft), detailed
planning is required to establish criteria for a passage of lines to
minimize the chances of fratricide. The exfiltrating force must also be
prepared to conduct additional planning once the operation is under way,
particularly if threat contact occurs.
3-118. The exfiltration plan should also cover other types of
contingencies that will not require the platoon to exfiltrate. For example,
when a section or squad repeatedly misses mandatory radio contact, it
must be assumed that the element has a communications problem, is in
trouble, or both. The exfiltration plan might address this situation by
calling for a resupply drop of new batteries and another means of
communication at a predetermined location. The plan would mandate
that the resupply location be specially marked to ensure that the
equipment does not fall into threat hands.
Movement Considerations
3-119. The principles of route selection, movement formations, and
movement security are critical to the success of the exfiltration operation.
Plans for extraction by applicable means (ground, air, or water) must be
developed before the operation, covering procedural contingencies such as
the loss of vehicles, evacuation of sick and wounded personnel, and
disruption of communications. These plans should address various
contingencies for movement, such as the possibility that the platoon may
be able to exfiltrate intact or the option of breaking into smaller groups to
avoid detection. Elements may use successful infiltration routes as their
exfiltration routes as well. Planning should also include identifying
casualty collection points and emergency resupply points along
exfiltration routes, providing supporting elements with a more secure,
stealthy route into the sector to conduct these support operations.
Methods of Exfiltration
3-122. Exfiltration can be conducted by air, water, or land. Each
alternative presents the platoon with specific operational considerations
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Emergency Exfiltration
3-125. The platoon may have to conduct emergency exfiltration if it is
detected or engaged by a threat force. This type of operation requires
activation of an escape and evasion plan or deployment of a reaction or
support force to assist with the extraction of friendly elements.
Employment of the reaction force and supporting fires must be carefully
coordinated and rehearsed before the infiltration (or other tactical
mission, if applicable) is initiated.
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OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
3-128. The multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance is deliberate and
detailed. It requires the platoon leader and other leaders within the
platoon, specifically the HUMINT collectors, to develop relationships with
local military/civilian leaders to determine information that may be
pertinent to troop, squadron, and brigade operations. The HUMINT
collectors are the subject matter experts in dealing with the local
populace; they provide training so the platoon’s scouts can operate
effectively in large populated areas where multidimensional information
is key to operational success. In these areas, soldier-based, human-
intensive intelligence compensates for the limitations of equipment-based
sensors, which are better suited for providing situational awareness in
open and rolling terrain for conventional force-on-force operations.
3-129. The multidimensional facet of reconnaissance expands on the
traditional forms of reconnaissance by acquainting the platoon’s soldiers
with the local populace throughout the area of operations; the threat level
will greatly influence the level of interaction between reconnaissance
elements and the populace of the area. Understanding this human
dimension of the environment (political, religious, ethnic, criminal, and
transnational) will be a key factor in the analysis of threat centers of
gravity and the execution of decisive operations. The ability to conduct
the multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance can assist the commander
in defeating or countering asymmetrical threats. In addition, the
multidimensional aspect of any reconnaissance or surveillance mission
can greatly enhance situational awareness at all levels by gaining
operational information from previously untapped sources. On the other
hand, multidimensional reconnaissance can become an inordinately time-
consuming process without specific, precisely focused guidance from the
platoon’s higher command; refer to the discussion of essential
commander’s guidance earlier in this chapter.
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES
Human Intelligence
3-130. HUMINT is the intelligence, to include adversary intentions,
derived from information collected from people and related documents. It
is the oldest collection discipline and is a key contributor to the
intelligence picture of the battlefield. HUMINT uses passively and
actively acquired human sources to gather information to answer
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Intelligence Activities
3-132. HUMINT and CI operations may entail some or all of these
activities:
· Interrogation and debriefing. These activities involve the
systematic questioning of individuals to obtain information
related to specific collection requirements. Sources who are in
the custody of US forces, such as EPWs and civilian
detainees, are interrogated. All other sources are debriefed;
these include friendly forces, civilian refugees, and local
inhabitants.
· Tactical questioning. This is an abbreviated form of
interrogation or debriefing used to collect PIR-related
information from human sources.
· Source operations. These are collection operations using
recruited and registered HUMINT sources. The registration
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NOTE: Unless noted as otherwise, the term “HUMINT collector” refers to personnel in
MOSs 351E and 97E/B. The term “counterintelligence collector” or “CI agent” refers
strictly to those in MOSs 35E, 351B, and 97B.
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· Liaison.
· Local operational data collection.
· Debriefing and interrogation.
· Threat assessment.
· Assessment of the HUMINT threat in the area of operations.
HUMINT Sources
3-142. To satisfy command PIR, HUMINT personnel should be prepared
to use all sources of information consistent with mission, policy, and
resources. These sources include the following:
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CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
3-147. When they take part in civil-military operations, military
elements, including the reconnaissance platoon, will encounter a number
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of factors that they seldom face in any other setting. This discussion
covers some of these crucial, but often subtle, considerations.
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LIAISON OPERATIONS
3-156. Liaison with appropriate US, host-nation, and allied military and
civilian agencies is fundamental to the success of civil-military
operations, including the multidimensional effort. Without the support of
the local government and authorities, attempts to win the cooperation of
the populace are almost certainly doomed to failure. In many cases, full-
time liaison officers (LO) or sections are necessary to maintain regular
contact with appropriate organizations and individuals. In addition to
national agencies, numerous local agencies and organizations also
provide assistance and information.
3-157. A basic tenet of liaison is the quid pro quo (meaning “something
for something”) exchange. While the LO sometimes encounters
individuals who cooperate out of a sense of duty or for unknown reasons
of their own, an exchange of information, services, material, or other
assistance normally is part of the interaction. The nature of this
exchange varies widely, depending on the locations, cultures, and
personalities involved.
Critical Tasks
3-158. The recce platoon and its HUMINT assets may be tasked to
conduct liaison activities, either for the platoon’s own operations or in
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3-160. Recce platoon leaders who task HUMINT assets with liaison
should provide the following guidance:
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CRITICAL TASKS
3-166. During a route reconnaissance, the reconnaissance platoon must
be prepared to accomplish a wide range of tasks. Based on the time
available and the commander’s intent, however, the platoon may be
directed to conduct the reconnaissance to acquire specific information
only. To be ready for either type of situation, the platoon leader must
clearly understand the following critical tasks that may have to be
accomplished in a route reconnaissance:
NOTE: Refer to Chapter 9 of this manual for a detailed discussion of route overlays and
related information.
TECHNIQUES
3-167. Because of the number of critical tasks that must be
accomplished, the reconnaissance platoon, such as a recce platoon(+), can
conduct a detailed reconnaissance of only one route. The following
discussion outlines techniques of getting all the tasks accomplished as
rapidly and securely as possible.
3-168. The order the platoon leader receives specifies the route the
platoon must reconnoiter and defines the route from the SP to the release
point (RP). Additionally, the order may specify platoon boundaries, phase
lines, an LD, and a limit of advance (LOA) or reconnaissance objective.
These control measures specify how much terrain on both sides of the
route the platoon must reconnoiter and where the operation must begin
and end.
3-169. The boundaries are drawn on both sides and include the terrain
that dominates the route. They usually extend out to include terrain from
which a threat force, based on the maximum effective range of its direct
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fire weapons, may influence the route. This ensures that the scouts
reconnoiter all terrain that the threat could use to influence movement
along the route. The LD is drawn from one boundary to the other behind
the SP. This allows the platoon to cross the LD and be fully deployed
before reaching the route. The LOA or objective is placed beyond the RP
on the last terrain feature that dominates the route or at a location out to
about 3 kilometers.
3-170. The platoon leader may add additional phase lines, contact
points, and checkpoints to the graphics he receives from his commander.
Phase lines are used to help control the maneuver of the platoon. The
contact points ensure that the sections or squads maintain contact at
particular critical points. Checkpoints are used along the route or on
specific terrain to control movement or to designate areas that must be
reconnoitered.
3-171. In coordination with the FSO, the platoon leader plans artillery
targets on known or suspected threat positions and on dominant terrain
throughout the area of operations. The platoon leader evaluates the
factors of METT-TC to select a platoon organization. He must ensure that
at least one section has responsibility for reconnoitering the route.
3-172. A three-section organization is usually the type best suited for
reconnaissance of one route. One section reconnoiters the terrain on the
left side of the route, another covers the terrain on the right side, and the
third section reconnoiters the route and controls the movement of the
other two. In this organization, the platoon leader’s section has specific
responsibility to reconnoiter the route.
NOTE: The first example of route reconnaissance in the following discussion is for a recce
platoon in a permissive environment. As noted, an unaugmented recce platoon
cannot reconnoiter a route by itself in a nonpermissive environment; it takes part in
a route reconnaissance as part of a larger force, such as a recce troop. This second
example is for a CFV platoon in a higher threat environment.
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platoon leader reports when the platoon arrives at and crosses the SP.
(See Figure 3-4A.)
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3-178. When the sketch is complete, the platoon moves back along the
route to the bypass indicated by the police chief. The platoon continues its
mission, stopping one more time to conduct HUMINT operations at the
village west of checkpoint 6 before returning to the base camp. Once the
platoon has closed on the base camp, the platoon leader submits a
reconnaissance overlay (refer to the discussion and illustrations in
Chapter 9 of this manual) and reports to the troop CP to be debriefed by
the troop HUMINT NCO.
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3-184. The platoon order must address actions on the approach to the
stream. In this case, the two flank sections have been given the task of
locating bypasses in the form of fords or unmapped bridges. Section B is
successful in locating a ford; Section A is not. Section B conducts a ford
reconnaissance, following the steps used for obstacle and restriction
reconnaissance. It crosses the stream at the ford and then continues its
mission on the far side of the stream (see Figure 3-5E).
3-185. Section C continues its route reconnaissance along the route until
it approaches the bridge site. It then executes a bridge reconnaissance to
establish trafficability of the bridge. Section A occupies an overwatch
position while Section C reconnoiters the bridge. Section B continues its
reconnaissance one terrain feature beyond the stream and then occupies
a short-duration OP (see Figure 3-5F).
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3-187. Before moving forces into or near a specified area, the commander
may call on the reconnaissance platoon to conduct an area reconnaissance
to avoid being surprised by unsuitable terrain conditions or unexpected
threat forces. The area could be a town, ridgeline, woods, or another
feature that friendly forces intend to occupy, pass through, or avoid. Area
reconnaissance is the primary mission of the recce platoon, the BRT, the
task force scouts, and scouts in light cavalry organizations.
3-188. Area reconnaissance is frequently employed to gain information
on objective areas as well as to confirm IPB templates and provide
detailed information regarding threat dispositions. Within a zone of
operations, area reconnaissance can be used to focus the platoon on the
specific area that is critical to the commander. Examples include platoons
from the BRT directed to focus on areas that could hold brigade-size
threat targets or a battalion reconnaissance platoon directed to focus on
areas of dominant terrain that influence the battalion’s axis of advance
because division cavalry and BRT troops have already moved through the
area. This technique of focusing the reconnaissance also permits the
mission to be accomplished more quickly. Area reconnaissance can thus
be a stand-alone mission or a task to a section or platoon within the
larger context of a platoon or higher reconnaissance mission.
3-189. Area reconnaissance can be terrain-oriented, force-oriented
(threat), society-oriented, infrastructure-oriented, or a combination of any
of these factors. The commander analyzes the mission using METT-TC to
determine whether to conduct one of these types of reconnaissance
separately or to conduct them in conjunction with each other.
3-190. A recce platoon, or a reconnaissance platoon augmented with the
appropriate assets, conducts the multidimensional aspect of area
reconnaissance, if directed, to gain detailed information about the civilian
populace and infrastructure in a particular area.
CRITICAL TASKS
3-191. The reconnaissance platoon must accomplish numerous critical
tasks during the area reconnaissance. The platoon’s primary critical
tasks include the following (unless the commander directs otherwise):
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TECHNIQUES
3-193. To conduct an area reconnaissance mission, the reconnaissance
platoon leader first identifies the area to be reconnoitered within a
continuous boundary. The platoon leader analyzes the mission, threat,
and terrain and completes his troop-leading procedures. He also plans the
movement to and, if necessary, from the area, following the basic rule of
using different routes to and from the area. The routes may be specified
for the platoon in the OPORD it receives from its higher command.
3-194. The platoon’s primary concern during movement to the area to be
reconnoitered is security rather than reconnaissance. If the platoon
leader feels there may be threat forces along the route to the area, the
platoon should employ the principles of tactical movement based on
METT-TC factors. The platoon leader must also incorporate information
from UAVs and ground sensor assets (such as GSR) into the operation.
During movement to the area, it may be appropriate (depending on the
commander’s intent) for the platoon to avoid contact. The platoon leader
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3-206. Each section places its OP where it can observe the objective area.
Alpha section establishes its OP at checkpoint 13; Bravo section
establishes its OP at checkpoint 14. Each OP establishes communications
back to its vehicles in the hide position.
3-207. The OPs send reports, in terms of content and frequency, as
outlined by the troop commander or unit SOP. The soldiers in the hide
position maintain communications with the troop CP and are prepared to
act as a quick reaction force for the dismounted OPs. The platoon
continues to observe the objective until relieved or assigned subsequent
tasks by the troop commander.
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CRITICAL TASKS
3-213. The reconnaissance platoon must accomplish numerous critical
tasks during the zone reconnaissance. Unless the commander directs
otherwise, the platoon’s primary critical tasks include the following:
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TECHNIQUES
3-215. Zone reconnaissance is very time-consuming. Unless the orders
specify otherwise, all critical tasks listed in the previous discussion are
implied in the zone reconnaissance mission statement. When speed is the
primary concern, commanders must modify the focus, tempo, and
engagement criteria to prioritize the critical tasks for the platoon leader.
The width of the zone is determined by the road network, terrain
features, anticipated threat activity, and time available to accomplish the
mission. In general, reconnaissance platoons can reconnoiter a zone that
is 3 to 5 kilometers wide; however, a recce platoon can effectively
reconnoiter a zone only 2 to 3 kilometers wide. If the platoon is stretched
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any farther than this, it quickly loses the capability to accomplish critical
tasks and move securely.
3-216. When the platoon leader receives a zone reconnaissance mission,
the order will define the zone by lateral boundaries, an LD, and an LOA
or objective. The parent unit may include additional phase lines or other
graphic control measures within the zone to help control the maneuver of
the units.
3-217. The platoon leader analyzes the mission to determine what must
be accomplished. He analyzes the commander’s guidance on focus (the
reconnaissance objective: threat, terrain, social/human demographics,
infrastructure, or a combination), tempo (time allowed for mission
accomplishment: stealthy or forceful, aggressive or discrete, deliberate or
rapid), and the engagement criteria (What situations constitute a platoon
fight? In what situation will the platoon defer the fight to a higher
element?). He evaluates any information he has received about the threat
in the IPB to determine what threat activity he should expect to
encounter. He then analyzes the terrain by conducting a map
reconnaissance and by examining any IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, or
information from other units to determine what types of terrain the
platoon must operate over. This reconnaissance is important in
identifying areas the threat could occupy based on observation capability,
fields of fire, and natural obstacles. From these factors, the platoon leader
determines the manner in which the platoon will accomplish its mission.
3-218. The platoon leader completes troop-leading procedures and comes
up with a COA to accomplish his assigned mission. He may add phase
lines on easily identifiable terrain through the zone to help control the
maneuver. He places checkpoints in specific areas that must be
reconnoitered or where they will aid in controlling the operation. If the
terrain is mixed, with both extensive dead space and easily identifiable
features, he may use boundaries to designate areas of responsibility for
each section. He will place contact points at critical areas where he wants
to ensure that sections maintain contact.
3-219. The platoon leader works with the FSO to plan and refine indirect
fire targets to support the platoon’s scheme of maneuver. As a minimum,
they should plan targets on known or suspected threat positions.
3-220. Depending on applicable METT-TC considerations, the platoon
can conduct the zone reconnaissance using a two-section, three-section or
single-vehicle organization. It must deploy to cover the entire zone. It
usually operates in a zone it knows very little about, so the COA must
allow for flexibility, responsiveness, and security as it moves.
3-221. The platoon leader deploys his sections before reaching the LD to
prevent detection. He then moves the sections across the LD and assigns
each section a zone within the platoon zone for which it is responsible. He
uses phase lines, checkpoints, contact points, or GIRS/TIRS to ensure
that the platoon reconnoiters the entire zone. He ensures that the
sections remain generally on line; this prevents development of
significant gaps that a moving threat could exploit. Scouts dismount to
gather detailed information, reconnoiter danger areas, or move through
areas that are not accessible to the vehicles. The platoon continues to
reconnoiter the zone until it reaches the LOA or the final reconnaissance
objective.
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· Minefields.
· Bridges.
· Log obstacles such as abatises, log cribs, stumps, and posts.
· AT ditches.
· Wire entanglements.
· Defiles.
· Persistent agent contamination.
· Fills, such as a raised railroad track.
· Detection.
· Area security and reconnaissance.
· Obstacle reconnaissance.
· Selection of a COA.
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· Recommendation/execution of a COA.
DETECTION
3-239. During reconnaissance operations, the reconnaissance platoon
must locate and evaluate man-made and natural obstacles and
restrictions to support the movement of their parent unit. Detection of
obstacles and restrictions begins in the planning phase of an operation
when the S2 conducts IPB. The platoon combines the S2’s work with the
reconnaissance conducted during the troop-leading process (normally a
map reconnaissance only) to identify all possible obstacles and
restrictions within the area of operations. The platoon leader then plans
the obstacle/restriction reconnaissance based on the orders he receives
and on the IPB and map reconnaissance (both his own and from the S2).
3-240. Scouts use visual and physical means to detect mines and
obstacles while conducting their mission. They visually inspect terrain for
signs of mine emplacement and other reinforcing obstacles. They also
must be alert to dangerous battlefield debris such as bomblets from
cluster bomb units (CBU) or dual-purpose improved conventional
munitions (DPICM).
3-241. Mines and other types of obstacles can be difficult for mounted
elements to detect; therefore, scouts must also conduct obstacle detection
while dismounted. They may need to dismount their vehicles several
hundred meters short of a suspected obstacle and approach the obstacle
on foot to conduct reconnaissance. They look for disturbed earth, unusual
or out-of-place features, surface-laid mines, tilt rods, and tripwires. They
can incorporate vehicle-mounted thermal sights into the search to help
detect surface-laid mines.
3-242. Physical detection methods include detonating, probing, and
using a mine detector. Detection occurs when a vehicle, soldier, or
countermine system physically encounters a mine. This method does not
indicate the boundaries of the obstacle. The scouts must probe or conduct
additional visual inspection to define the extent of the minefield.
OBSTACLE RECONNAISSANCE
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· Obstacle location.
· Obstacle orientation.
· Soil conditions.
· Presence of wire, gaps, and bypasses.
· Composition of complex obstacles.
· Minefield composition, including types of mines.
· Breaching requirements.
· Gaps between successive obstacle belts.
· Location of threat direct fire weapons.
SELECTION OF A COA
3-247. The platoon leader analyzes the situation and METT-TC to
determine which COA to select. He has a choice of four COAs:
Bypass
3-248. A bypass is the preferred COA when it offers a quick, easy, and
tactically sound means of avoiding the obstacle. To be effective, a bypass
must allow the entire force to avoid the primary obstacle without risking
further exposure to threat ambush and without diverting the force from
its objective. Bypassing conserves reduction assets and maintains the
momentum of the moving unit. If the platoon leader decides to bypass
and his commander approves, scouts must mark the bypass and report it
to the commander. They may be required to provide guides for the main
body if the bypass is difficult to locate or visibility conditions are poor.
(NOTE: For bypass report formats, refer to Appendix B of this manual.)
NOTE: In some cases, bypassing is not possible, with breaching/reduction the best, or only,
tactical solution. Such situations may include the following:
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RECOMMENDATION/EXECUTION OF A COA
3-254. Once the platoon leader has determined the COA best suited to
the situation, he either executes it or recommends it to his higher
headquarters for approval. Generally, the platoon will execute a
particular COA without specific approval if it was addressed in the
OPORD received from higher or is covered in the unit SOP. In such a
case, the platoon leader will execute the COA and then inform the
commander of his actions. If the situation the platoon has discovered is
not covered by previous guidance, the platoon leader determines the best
COA and recommends it to his commander. He then executes the COA
specified by the commander.
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Obstacle Reconnaissance
3-261. Once the area has been reconnoitered and secured, a dismounted
element moves to the bridge under the supervision of the senior scout and
conducts a detailed examination of the bridge (see Figure 3-8C). The
scouts examine the bridge for the following purposes:
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Selection of a COA
3-263. Based on results of the bridge reconnaissance, the section leader
determines that the restriction is secure, that he can safely move the
section across it, and that he can continue his mission.
Recommendation/Execution of a COA
3-264. In accordance with platoon SOP, the section leader now moves
the rest of his element across the bridge. The lead reconnaissance vehicle
moves across the bridge, overwatched by the other vehicles (refer to
Figure 3-8D). The vehicle crosses with only the driver on board. As he
observes the crossing, the section leader watches for any signs of damage
or stress on the bridge.
3-265. Once the lead vehicle is across, it moves to link up with the
dismounted element and assists in providing far side security. At this
point, the overwatch vehicles can cross the bridge, and the section can
continue its mission. The section leader also advises his platoon leader
that he is continuing his mission.
3-266. Once the lead vehicle is across, it moves to link up with the
dismounted element and assists in providing far side security. At this
point, the overwatch vehicles can cross the bridge, and the section can
continue its mission. The section leader also advises his platoon leader
that he is continuing his mission.
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Detection
3-268. Dismounted scouts detect an extensive wire obstacle from a
covered and concealed position. From its vantage point, the
reconnaissance section cannot determine any additional details.
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executing the patrol, the section discovers that the left flank of the
obstacle is tied into an impassable swamp (refer to Figure 3-9A).
3-270. Based on this initial evaluation, the platoon leader attempts to
increase the speed of the reconnaissance by sending the other section to
find a bypass around the right flank of the obstacle. That section moves
to a dismount point and sends a patrol around the right flank. The patrol
is engaged by threat machine guns. The overwatch vehicles suppress the
machine guns and then are engaged by threat vehicles in defensive
positions. The section reports that it can maintain contact with the threat
but can no longer maneuver (see Figure 3-9B). It can also observe the
threat from the rear and reports a company-size unit in defensive
positions overwatching the obstacle. It also reports that there are no
trafficable routes around the threat’s right flank (see Figure 3-9C).
3-271. At this point, the platoon leader determines that he does not have
the combat power to secure the far side of the objective. He also
determines that the only trafficable bypass is covered by threat direct
fires. He now must conduct a detailed reconnaissance of the obstacle
before he can recommend a COA to his commander.
Obstacle Reconnaissance
3-272. The reconnaissance section that originally detected the obstacle is
in the best position to reconnoiter it. It organizes a dismounted element
to move to the obstacle. Because there is enough light for the threat to
visually cover the obstacle, the platoon leader coordinates indirect fire to
support the patrol. As the patrol moves out, artillery lays suppressive
fires on the known threat positions, and mortars fire smoke into the area
between the threat positions and the obstacle (see Figure 3-9D).
3-273. The scouts move by covered and concealed dismounted routes to
the obstacle. Through probing and visual observation, they determine
that the wire obstacle is reinforced with buried mines. They are able to
determine that there is a mix of AT and AP mines with antihandling
devices, emplaced in 30-meter belts on both the near side and the far side
of the wire. Once they acquire this information, the scouts move laterally
along the obstacle to determine its length and to find out if its
composition is uniform. They look for the most favorable breaching
location (see Figure 3-9E).
Selection of a COA
3-274. The platoon leader evaluates the situation and determines that
he cannot bypass the obstacle and does not have the capability to breach
it. He decides to recommend a breach.
Recommendation/Execution of a COA
3-275. The platoon leader recommends to his commander that the
platoon prepare to support a breach. With higher approval, he orders the
platoon to continue the reconnaissance and security tasks necessary to
support a breach operation. He also begins coordinating with, and
passing information to, the element responsible for conducting the breach
(see Figure 3-9F).
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Chapter 4
Security Operations
In security operations, CONTENTS
security forces protect the
Purpose and Fundamentals ........................ 4-1
main body from threat Purpose ................................................. 4-1
observation and surprise Fundamentals of Security ..................... 4-2
attack. They provide the main Planning Considerations ............................. 4-3
Screening Missions ..................................... 4-4
body commander with early
Critical Tasks ........................................ 4-4
warning, allowing him to Counterreconnaissance Techniques .. 4-14
concentrate his combat power Example of a Screen Operation ........... 4-17
at the right place and time to Convoy and Area Security Operations ...... 4-23
Convoy Security .................................... 4-23
defeat the threat. There are
Area and High-Value Asset Security ... 4-32
four types of security
missions:
· Screen.
· Guard.
· Cover.
· Area security.
PURPOSE
4-1. All security missions serve the same general purpose: They
prevent the main body from being observed or attacked unexpectedly by
the threat. These operations are conducted forward, to the flanks, or to
the rear of the main body. The reconnaissance platoon may operate at
considerable distances from the main body it is screening (limited only by
communications capabilities and the range of indirect fire support). This
provides the main body with time and space to react and to position
forces to fight the threat.
4-2. The reconnaissance platoon can conduct screening and area
security operations independently or as part of a larger force such as a
reconnaissance troop or company team. In conducting guard missions, the
platoon works as part of a larger unit such as a battalion or squadron; in
addition, the platoon may be tasked to conduct screening or
reconnaissance missions in support of the larger unit’s guard or cover
mission.
SCREEN
4-3. A screening force provides early warning to the main body and
impedes and harasses the threat with direct and indirect fires. Within its
capabilities and based on the higher commander’s guidance, it destroys or
repels threat reconnaissance units in coordination with other combat
elements.
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GUARD
4-5. A guard force is deployed over a narrower front than is a
screening force. It accomplishes all the tasks of a screening force, with the
additional task of preventing threat ground observation of and direct fire
against the main body. A guard force reconnoiters, attacks, defends, and
delays as necessary to accomplish its mission. It normally operates within
the range of the supporting artillery. Guard operations are not conducted
below task force or squadron level.
COVER
4-6. A covering force accomplishes all the tasks of screening and guard
forces to deceive, disrupt, and destroy threat forces. The key distinction of
the cover mission is that the force operates apart from the main body to
allow early development of the situation. Unlike screening or guard
forces, a covering force is tactically self-contained; it is normally a
reinforced separate brigade or cavalry regiment. It is organized with
sufficient CS and CSS assets to operate independent of the main body.
Because the covering force (or a portion of it) can be decisively engaged by
a threat force, it must have sufficient combat power to effectively engage
the threat.
AREA SECURITY
4-7. Area security missions are conducted to provide reconnaissance
and security in support of designated personnel, facilities (including
airfields), unit convoys, main supply routes, lines of communications,
equipment, and critical points.
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITY
4-8. Five fundamentals, described in the following paragraphs, are
common to all security missions. The platoon leader’s plans must adhere
to these fundamentals as the platoon executes its mission.
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CRITICAL TASKS
4-19. During a screening mission, the platoon must accomplish the
following critical tasks:
· Maintain continuous surveillance of the area of operations,
including all assigned NAIs or avenues of approach into the
sector.
· Provide early warning of any threat approach.
· Within capability and based on the commander’s guidance,
identify threat reconnaissance units and, in coordination with
other combat elements, destroy them.
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· Gain and maintain contact with the threat main body, report
the threat activity, and conduct proper handover with other
elements.
· Impede and harass the threat main body by controlled use of
indirect fires.
4-20. The platoon maintains surveillance from a series of OPs. OPs are
positioned where they can best observe designated NAIs and/or avenues
of approach. The screen, normally identified by a phase line on a map,
designates the most forward location of the OPs. Commanders must
carefully weigh time and distance factors when choosing where to place
this line. The platoon covers the space between the screen line and the
supported/subsequent unit to the rear by establishing positions in depth.
This also supports reconnaissance handover, both within the platoon and
with the supported/subsequent unit to the rear of the screen line.
4-21. In executing a screen mission, scouts conduct active patrolling to
extend their observation range and/or to cover dead space and the area
between OPs. The platoon leader can request to place OPs forward of the
LOA if they can more effectively observe the NAI/avenue of approach.
Unless they have to, the scouts do not fight with their direct fire weapons.
Indirect fire is their primary means of engaging the threat. They use
direct fire for self-defense.
4-22. When planning a screen mission, the platoon leader uses the
critical task requirements covered in the following discussion as a guide
to prioritizing and sequencing the mission. He must address each
requirement.
Surveillance Requirements
4-24. Generally, scouts are assigned to screen along a lateral line (the
screen line). This can be misleading, however. The screen is actually set
to observe specific avenues of approach or, more specifically, NAIs. The
screen line merely indicates the limit of the forward positioning of the
scouts. Along with the screen line graphic, the platoon leader must have
an event template/matrix; he may also have a decision support template.
4-25. The areas the platoon is tasked to observe should be identified in
either the reconnaissance and security plan the platoon leader receives or
in the OPORD from higher headquarters. If the platoon does not receive
an IPB product, the higher OPORD must specifically state where it must
focus the screening operation. If the platoon is assigned multiple
requirements, the higher headquarters must prioritize them.
4-26. The scout’s understanding of his commander’s intent and
guidance is the most critical aspect of planning the screen mission. More
important than the specifics of where to orient is the focus on what to
look for. There are three choices for this focus: the threat main body, the
threat reconnaissance effort, or both. The intent should specify on which
of these alternatives the platoon will focus or, if both are required (as is
often the case), which has priority.
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4-27. This guidance will then determine where the platoon will orient
and how it will allocate resources. If the commander’s priority is locating
the main body, the scout will focus most of his assets on the main avenues
of approach and accept risk on the reconnaissance avenues of approach
(RAA). If the commander’s priority is on counterreconnaissance, the scout
will put priority on the RAAs and accept some risk on the main avenue. If
the commander wants both choices, with equal priority, the scout must
plan to transition from the RAA to the main avenue at a designated point
in the battle. The commander will usually order this transition based on
the threat situation.
NOTE: A threat RAA may mirror or parallel the intended route of a threat maneuver force,
or it may follow a route that facilitates observation of key terrain or friendly forces
but is unrelated to the threat scheme of maneuver.
Surveillance Assets
4-28. Once the platoon leader has a thorough understanding of what
his surveillance requirements are, he must next determine what assets
he has available to execute these requirements. Availability of assets is
dependent on how long the screen must remain in place and how the
platoon is task organized. Among the assets that can enhance the
platoon’s surveillance capability are GSR, infantry squads, engineer
reconnaissance teams, artillery forward observers (FO), and TUAV
assets. If the screen will be of short duration (less than 12 hours),
individual squads can emplace and man separate OPs. If the duration of
the screen is unknown or longer than 12 hours, the platoon leader must
assign a two-vehicle section (CFV/RV platoons) or three-vehicle section
(HMMWV platoons) for each OP to facilitate continuous operations.
(NOTE: Refer to Chapter 8 of this manual for further details on
air/ground reconnaissance integration.)
Surveillance Techniques
4-29. To ensure that the critical task of surveillance of assigned
reconnaissance objectives is accomplished, the platoon leader and his
higher headquarters apply a combination of techniques to make the most
efficient use of their assets. (NOTE: Refer to Chapter 5 of this manual
for a discussion of surveillance methods, OPs, patrols, and use of
electronic and mechanical assets.)
4-30. Task Organization. The platoon leader will task organize the
platoon and any other assigned assets to achieve the most effective
surveillance of an NAI or avenue of approach. He may also employ assets
not under his direct control, but rather under the command of the next
higher unit. As noted, these assets could be engineer or infantry squads,
GSR, artillery observers, and TUAV assets. (NOTE: When the platoon
leader does not control the assets directly, he must ensure that his
dispositions complement those of the other forces in the screen and do not
duplicate them unnecessarily. In addition, he must ensure that all scouts
understand where these forces are and what role they are playing.)
4-31. The platoon leader may use these surveillance assets in a number
of ways. These may include adjusting the number of sections or squads in
a particular surveillance team; mixing scouts and other assets such as
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4-33. Redundancy. The platoon leader may task more than one
element to observe a particular assigned NAI or avenue. He does this
based on the nature of the NAI or avenue in terms of size, terrain, or
importance. For example, a very large avenue may require multiple
observation assets to ensure all aspects of the avenue are covered.
Terrain that is very broken or mixed with areas of thick vegetation may
require more than one asset to ensure that adequate continuous coverage
is achieved. Finally, if a particular NAI is assigned significant priority by
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the commander, the platoon leader may assign multiple elements to cover
it. Redundancy not only ensures that an NAI or avenue is adequately
observed, but also enables the unit to accomplish the mission even if
some assets are compromised by threat forces. Figure 4-2 illustrates
redundancy of observation assets.
4-34. Cueing. Cueing is a technique the platoon leader can use to cover
an NAI or avenue when assets are limited and he lacks the capability for
redundancy. He plans contingency tasks that will increase surveillance
on a particular NAI; his surveillance teams execute the tasks when
“cued” by activity at that NAI.
4-35. The NAI or avenue is covered initially either by a single
surveillance team or by a remote or electronic signaling device such as
GSR, REMBASS, trip flares, or the platoon early warning system
(PEWS). When activity is detected, other teams move into preselected
positions to add their capabilities to the surveillance of the NAI or
avenue. Refer to Figure 4-3.
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MAINTAIN CONTACT
4-43. After locating the main body of the threat, the platoon must
maintain contact with it until authorized to hand over contact to another
friendly element. This is one of the most difficult tasks for the individual
section or squad to accomplish and therefore is best accomplished
through a platoon effort.
4-44. The preferred method of maintaining contact with a moving
threat main body is to position echeloned OPs in depth along the avenue
of approach. This allows contact to be handed over from one OP to
another without the requirement for the OPs to physically displace. This
technique requires that the platoon have enough assets to pre-position
the OPs in depth. See Figure 4-6.
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COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE TECHNIQUES
4-50. Counterreconnaissance is a directed effort to prevent visual
observation or infiltration of friendly forces by threat reconnaissance
elements. It is a critical task in all reconnaissance platoon security
missions. Countering the threat’s mounted and dismounted
reconnaissance elements is the first and possibly most important step in
ensuring the friendly main body can successfully execute its mission. At
the same time, it can be extremely difficult to identify threat
reconnaissance forces, especially when they are dismounted. The platoon
may lack this capability. As a result, this task is most successfully
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PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
4-51. The troop or task force concept of executing
counterreconnaissance must address how the unit will accomplish the
two aspects of counterreconnaissance: acquiring the threat and then
killing it. At battalion/squadron level, the S2 provides key input in this
determination. He identifies where RAAs are located in the unit sector,
what type of threat reconnaissance elements might be used in the sector,
and when they are most likely to move into the sector. It is especially
important for the S2 to note the locations and activities of dismounted
threat elements, which present the greatest danger to the platoon and
the supported unit. Information from the S2 is integrated into the
OPORD and is part of the unit’s IPB.
4-52. The commander should discuss conduct of counterreconnaissance
in the OPORD or FRAGO, indicating in tactical terms how elements will
organize and conduct the operations throughout the depth of the area of
operations. This information should include planning considerations for
the operation, including the following:
ORGANIZATION
4-54. Several organizational options, which are described in the
following paragraphs, are available to the commander to counter the
threat reconnaissance effort.
Reconnaissance Platoon
4-55. This technique puts the entire burden for counterreconnaissance
on the reconnaissance platoon and attached CS assets. It requires
maximum use of the CS assets to acquire the threat, freeing the scouts to
perform the killing function of counterreconnaissance. The platoon leader
places acquiring assets along the screen line and positions his designated
killing teams in depth. The killing assets of the platoon occupy positions
on likely threat reconnaissance routes; however, they must be flexible to
respond to threat elements moving on other routes. (NOTE: When the
platoon operates with units that commonly have strikers or COLTs
attached, such as BRTs, the platoon leader may have to integrate NAIs to
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support the TAIs that are positioned in depth. This will place the scouts
in the role of acquiring the threat, with the strikers/COLTs as the killers
in depth.)
4-56. This technique requires that the platoon’s sections or squads
reconnoiter alternate positions and routes that permit quick repositioning
once contact is made by the acquiring elements. When it is used,
counterreconnaissance tasks must be prioritized in the early stages of the
screen mission.
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4-63. The primary focus of the 1st Platoon is on acquiring threat main
body elements moving along avenue of approach 2 or 2A (AA2 and AA2A
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4-73. After the initial engagement of the threat main body, the MGS
platoon displaces laterally toward Troop A to conduct a rearward passage
of lines (see Figure 4-18). OP H conducts target handover with OP J and
also moves toward Troop A. OP J maintains contact with the moving
threat main body until battle handover with the friendly unit to the south
is complete. The recce section at OP J then moves east to pass to the rear.
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CONVOY SECURITY
4-75. Convoy security missions are performed by recce troops, company
teams, cavalry troops, and larger organizations to provide protection for a
specific convoy. These missions include numerous tasks for elements such
as escort, reconnaissance, and combat reaction forces. The tasks in turn
become missions for the subordinate units. The recce platoon is
particularly well suited for outposting missions, whereas other types of
reconnaissance platoons are effective for both route reconnaissance and
outposting missions. All reconnaissance platoons can perform convoy
escort as well. The size of the unit performing the convoy security
operation is dependent on a number of factors, including the size of the
convoy, the terrain, and the length of the route. Refer to Figures 4-19A
and 4-19B for illustrations of recce troop and cavalry troop convoy
security missions.
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ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE
4-76. When route reconnaissance is conducted as part of a convoy
security operation, it is done in the same manner as discussed in Chapter
3 of this manual. In this mission, scouts focus on the trafficability of the
route and on threat forces that might influence the route. The platoon
must plan to call for engineer assets to assist in breaching point-type
obstacles. Command-detonated devices are a major threat during route
reconnaissance.
OUTPOSTING
4-77. Outposting is a technique used during convoy security to screen
the route after it has been reconnoitered. Its use is similar to the
technique for covering lateral and boundary routes in reconnaissance
operations. Outposting as part of convoy security, however, is generally
done by all elements of the platoon for the specific purpose of helping to
secure the convoy. It involves employing OPs on critical portions of the
route or on key avenues of approach to the route to provide early warning
of threat elements attempting to interdict the convoy.
4-78. Outposting differs from a conventional screen in that the outposts
are oriented on the route rather than on the friendly main body.
Normally, the outposting element follows the element that is executing
the route reconnaissance (see Figure 4-20). Outposts have a limited
ability to destroy small threat forces attempting to influence the route.
Their primary purpose is to acquire the threat and then to direct the
employment of reaction forces or indirect fire to destroy him.
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CONVOY ESCORT
4-79. The platoon may perform a convoy escort mission either
independently or as part of a larger unit’s convoy security mission. The
convoy escort mission requires that the platoon provide a convoy with
close-in protection from direct fire. The platoon can protect 5 to 10 convoy
vehicles per escort vehicle. These vehicles can include military vehicles
(CSS, command and control), civilian trucks, or buses. Among
reconnaissance platoons, those equipped with CFVs are best suited for
this mission because of their vehicles’ firepower and the armor protection
they provide against direct and indirect fires and mines. Leaders must
carefully evaluate the threat before assigning a convoy escort mission to
HMMWV- or RV-equipped platoons. The following considerations apply
during convoy escort operations.
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· Order of march.
· Actions on contact.
· Chain of command.
· Communications and signals.
· Actions on vehicle breakdown.
· Actions at a halt.
· Route of march (this should include a sketch for each vehicle
commander).
Tactical Disposition
4-82. Security during convoy escort missions must be in all directions
and throughout the length of the convoy. This requires that the elements
of the platoon and any combat or CS attachments be dispersed
throughout the convoy formation. Engineer assets should be located
toward the front to respond to obstacles; the fire support team (FIST) or
COLT should be located near the platoon leader. The platoon will
normally use the column formation because of its inherent speed and ease
of movement. If a HMMWV unit is used as the escort, a tracked, armored
vehicle should be attached to lead the convoy whenever possible because
of its superior protection against mines. Figures 4-20A, 4-20B, and 4-20C
illustrate convoy escort missions by various types of reconnaissance
platoon.
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Actions at an Ambush
4-83. Ambush is one of the most effective ways to interdict a convoy
and is therefore a threat the convoy escort must be prepared to counter.
Reaction to an ambush must be quick, overwhelming, and decisive. It
must be executed as a drill by all escort and convoy elements, with care
taken to avoid fratricide. The following actions should be included in the
convoy escort drill:
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Actions at an Obstacle
4-86. Obstacles are a major threat to convoys. They can be used to
delay the convoy; if the terrain is favorable, they may be able to stop the
convoy altogether. In addition, an obstacle or series of obstacles can be
used to channel or stop the convoy to set up an ambush. Generally, the
convoy should treat every obstacle as though the threat is overwatching it
with direct and/or indirect fires.
4-87. The purpose of the route reconnaissance ahead of the convoy is to
identify obstacles and either breach them or find bypasses. In some cases,
it is not possible to mount a route reconnaissance ahead of the convoy; in
other cases, the reconnaissance element may fail to detect the threat or
its obstacles. In either situation, the convoy must take actions to reduce
or bypass the obstacle.
4-88. When a convoy is dealing with an obstacle, it faces a two-sided
problem: it is more vulnerable because it is stopped, and its escort force
is occupied with tasks required to overcome or bypass the obstacle. For
these reasons, security becomes critical, and actions at the obstacle must
be accomplished very quickly. The convoy escort takes the following
actions when it encounters a point-type obstacle:
· When the lead security element identifies the obstacle, the
convoy commander directs a short halt. He establishes
dismounted local security and overwatch of the obstacle.
Convoy vehicles remain on the road, with the escort elements
moving to the flanks to provide security. (NOTE: All convoy
vehicles must be aware that the threat may have buried
mines in the area, especially on the flanks of the road.)
· The convoy commander relays a spot report to higher
headquarters and requests support from combat reaction
forces, engineer assets (if they are not already part of the
convoy), and aerial reconnaissance elements. In addition, he
alerts artillery units to be prepared to provide fire support.
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NOTE: Reconnaissance units without organic combat assets (such as the BRT, recce troop,
and task force reconnaissance platoon) rely on the brigade to provide the combat
assets needed to perform offensive and defensive actions if the enemy situation
dictates.
· Liaison.
· Compliance inspections.
· Presence patrols.
· Checkpoints.
· Roadblocks.
NOTE: See Appendix D of this manual for a more detailed discussion of platoon operations
in stability operations or support operations.
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
4-92. An area security force neutralizes or defeats enemy operations in
a specified area. It operates in an area delineated by the headquarters
assigning the area security mission. It screens, reconnoiters, attacks,
defends, and delays (within capability) as necessary to accomplish its
mission. Area security operations may be offensive or defensive in nature
and focus on the threat/enemy, on the force/element being protected, or
on a combination of the two. Commanders may balance the level of
security measures taken with the type and level of threat posed in the
specific area; however, all-around security is an essential consideration at
all times.
4-93. As noted, area security operations are conducted to deny the
threat/enemy the ability to influence friendly actions in a specific area or
to deny him use of an area for his own purposes. This may entail
occupying and establishing a 360-degree perimeter around the area being
secured or taking actions to destroy or neutralize enemy forces already
present. The area to be secured may range from specific points (bridges,
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support is available, the vehicle positions are dug in; if not, vehicles
occupy hasty fighting positions.
4-99. To further improve the position, the platoon employs hasty
protective minefields, wire, and other obstacles as appropriate and
available. Wire obstacles should be emplaced outside grenade range of
friendly positions. Once vehicle positions and obstacles are established,
the platoon develops a fire plan, including integrated indirect fires, and
submits it to its higher headquarters.
4-100. In addition to setting up the platoon position around the asset to
be secured, the platoon also employs patrols and OPs to enhance security
(see Figure 4-25). It employs reconnaissance patrols and combat patrols
as needed to become familiar with the area of operations, to gain
information on threat forces, and to destroy small threat dismounted
reconnaissance elements. OPs are deployed to observe likely avenues of
approach, to provide early warning of threat activity, and to assist in
controlling indirect fires.
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Chapter 5
Dismounted Operations
Dismounted operations, in CONTENTS
some form, are a critical
Troop-Leading Procedures .......................... 5-1
element in virtually every Tenets .................................................... 5-2
reconnaissance platoon Troop-Leading Steps in Dismounted
mission. The best scouting is Operations .......................................... 5-2
Patrolling Tasks ........................................... 5-15
done dismounted. It is critical
Movement Techniques .......................... 5-15
that all reconnaissance Security Halts ........................................ 5-18
leaders understand when and Departure from Friendly Lines ............. 5-19
how to employ dismounted Use of Rally Points ................................ 5-20
Contingency Plans ................................ 5-21
scouts to enhance the Leader’s Reconnaissance .................... 5-21
platoon’s effectiveness in Reentry to Friendly Lines ..................... 5-22
reconnaissance and security Debriefing .............................................. 5-23
tasks. This chapter focuses on Actions at Danger Areas ....................... 5-23
Actions on Contact ...................................... 5-26
the two major types of Battle Drills ............................................ 5-26
dismounted operations: Methods of Handling Casualties and
patrols and observation posts. Prisoners ............................................ 5-32
Types of Patrols ........................................... 5-33
Reconnaissance Patrol ......................... 5-33
Security Patrol ....................................... 5-39
Combat Patrol ........................................ 5-40
Presence Patrol ..................................... 5-51
Tracking Patrol ...................................... 5-51
Patrol Bases .................................................. 5-57
Site Selection ......................................... 5-57
Planning Considerations ...................... 5-58
Patrol Base Occupation ........................ 5-58
Patrol Base Activities ........................... 5-60
Passive (Clandestine) Patrol Base ...... 5-61
Observation Posts ........................................ 5-61
Critical Tasks ......................................... 5-62
Types of Observation Posts ................. 5-63
Positioning the OP ................................ 5-63
Selecting an OP Site ............................. 5-64
Occupying the OP ................................. 5-65
Manning the OP ..................................... 5-66
Improving the Position ......................... 5-67
OP Communications ............................. 5-68
OP Security ............................................ 5-68
Extended OP Operations ...................... 5-69
Remote Electronic/Mechanical
Surveillance ....................................... 5-80
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TENETS
5-2. The following considerations are basic to the platoon’s
understanding, planning, and execution for every patrol mission:
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5-6. The patrol leader also gives instructions to special purpose teams
and key men so they can get ready for the patrol by taking such actions
as preparing explosives, checking radios, and making a map study (point
and compass men).
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traverse, the threat forces it will pass near or through en route to its
objective, the effects of extensive dismounted work on the scouts, and the
amount of time available to conduct the mission.
Coordination
5-10. Patrols may act independently, may move beyond the direct fire
support of the parent unit, and may operate forward of friendly units. As
a consequence, their coordination effort must be thorough, detailed, and
continuous throughout the planning and preparation phases. The patrol
leader may perform coordination personally, or his superior may do it for
him. Keeping in mind that the entire platoon may be tasked to patrol, the
necessary coordination may be extensive. A checklist is a common tool
used to ensure that all items of vital importance are covered.
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Rally Points
5-14. A rally point is a place where a patrol can conduct these actions:
5-15. Types of Rally Points. The most common types of rally points
are initial, en route, objective, reentry, and near side and far side rally
points. Soldiers must know the rally point to which they are moving at
each phase of the patrol mission. They should know what actions are
required there and how long they are to wait at each rally point before
moving to another. Rally point considerations include the following:
· Initial rally point. An initial rally point is where a patrol
may assemble and reorganize if it is dispersed or makes
enemy contact before departing friendly lines or before
reaching the first en route rally point. Located within friendly
lines, the initial rally point is normally selected by the
commander of the friendly unit.
· En route rally point. An en route rally point is where a
patrol rallies if dispersed en route to or from its objective.
There may be several en route rally points along the patrol’s
route between friendly lines and the objective. They are either
planned or designated by the patrol leader en route every 100
to 400 meters (based on the terrain, vegetation, and
visibility). When the leader designates a new en route rally
point, the previously designated one goes into effect. This
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5-16. Rally Point Selection. The patrol leader should pick rally
points either during the patrol or by a map study before the patrol. Those
selected before the patrol begins are tentative and will remain so until
confirmed on the ground. In selecting rally points, the patrol leader
should look for locations with the following characteristics:
INITIATE MOVEMENT
5-17. The patrol leader may be required to direct the patrol to move
once he issues his warning order and is making his plan. This movement
may involve securing a passage point (PP) or moving to the SP.
CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE
5-18. The patrol leader must make a map, ground, or aerial
reconnaissance before completing his plan. This allows him to proof his
tentative plan and get an idea of the ground he will initially traverse. He
must keep an open mind during the reconnaissance; not everything he
sees will match his tentative plan.
Rations
5-20. The patrol leader must determine whether the men should carry
rations. If so, he specifies the type and amount and where to get them.
Signals
5-22. The signals to be used on the patrol must be planned and
rehearsed. Signals may be needed to lift or shift supporting fires, order
withdrawal from the objective, signal “all clear,” stop and start movement
of the patrol, and direct linkup of elements. Visual and audible signals
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Chain of Command
5-27. Everyone on the patrol must understand where he fits into the
patrol or his element of the patrol.
Location of Leaders
5-28. The locations of the patrol leader and assistant patrol leader are
planned for all phases of the patrol during movement, at danger areas,
and at the objective. These considerations apply:
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often the pace man is to report the pace to him. The pace man
should also report the pace at the end of each leg. The leader
should designate an alternate pace man.
Task Organization: Explain how the patrol is organized for the operation and confirm the composition of
each element. Identify time(s) of attachment and detachment. If there is no change to the previous task
organization, the patrol leader indicates that there is no change.
1. SITUATION.
A. Enemy Forces.
(1) Weather and light data.
· Precipitation.
· Temperature.
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· Current/last known location (only those forces that pertain to the specific mission of
the patrol).
B. Friendly Forces
(1) Concept of the operation for the next higher unit.
(2) Location and mission of the units on the left, right, front, rear and supporting.
(3) Missions and routes of adjacent patrols.
(4) Unit(s) providing fire support.
(5) Mission and commander’s intent for the rest of the platoon (in the event the platoon has
multiple missions).
C. Attachments and Detachments.
Include any special personnel or elements (such as engineers, medics, linguists, FOs) who
will accompany the patrol.
D. Civilian Population.
· Culture.
· Political/government/religious.
· Factional allegiances.
· Factions/groups/organizations/terrorists.
· Restrictions and curfews.
2. MISSION.
Include a clear and concise statement of the task and purpose, including the aspects of who, what
(including type of patrol), when, where, and why.
3. EXECUTION.
Commander’s Intent.
A. Concept of the Operation.
(1) Commander’s focus, tempo, and engagement criteria.
(2) In general terms, how the patrol will accomplish the mission.
· Mission essential tasks and other critical tasks.
· Duration of the patrol.
· Scheme of maneuver and graphics, sequentially, as they will occur during the patrol
(with simultaneous reference to a terrain board, dirt sketch, or map).
· Maneuver.
· Fires. Include team target overlay, with target numbers; who has priority of fires; use
and/or availability of special purpose fires (such as smoke, illumination, or CAS);
triggers; how and when fires will be used.
· Intelligence.
· Electronic warfare.
·
Engineering.
B. Tasks to Maneuver Units.
(1) Task and purpose of teams and sections.
(2) Task and purpose of special teams and key individuals.
(3) Task and purpose to support/attached personnel.
C. Coordinating Instructions.
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4. SERVICE SUPPORT.
A. Supply.
Include requirements for Classes I, III, V, and IX.
B. Transportation.
Include location and route of mounted elements of the platoon.
C. Personnel.
(1) Procedures for handling EPWs and captured documents and equipment.
(2) MEDEVAC/CASEVAC procedures.
(3) Personnel replacement (alternate team members or assignment changes based on the
loss of personnel).
D. Civil/military restrictions.
(1) Curfews.
(2) Collateral damage restrictions.
(3) Rules of interaction (ROI), engagement (ROE), and graduated response.
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B. Signal.
(1) Time zone used and time synchronization criteria.
(2) SOI and matrix used.
(3) Key hand-and-arm signals.
(4) Code words and reports.
(5) Times when radio listening silence is in affect.
(6) Alternate frequencies and time or condition for changing frequency.
(7) Challenge and password (regular, forward of friendly lines, running).
(8) Electronic protection.
(9) Visual and pyrotechnic signals (alternate means of control, emergency signaling).
ANNEXES
A. Air Assault and Airborne.
B. Stream Crossing.
C. Vehicle Movement.
D. Evasion and Escape.
E. Linkup.
F. Rest Overnight, Hide Site, Surveillance Site.
G. Cache Site.
· The plan.
· What he is to do and when he is to do it.
· What others are to do.
· Challenges and passwords, signals, codes, radio call signs,
frequencies, and reporting times.
5-33. Rehearsals help to ensure the proficiency of the patrol. They let
the patrol leader check plans and make any needed changes. The
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5-37. Scouts who work dismounted must know a variety of tasks that
are slightly different from the tasks they perform during mounted
operations. Although not every patrol requires the same tasks, those
discussed here are common to most patrols.
MOVEMENT TECHNIQUES
5-38. The selection of a movement technique is based on METT-TC.
Factors to consider for each technique are control, dispersion, speed, and
security. Movement techniques are not fixed formations. They refer to
the distances between soldiers, teams, and squads that vary based on
mission, enemy, terrain, visibility, and any other factor that affects
control. Soldiers must be able to see their patrol leaders, and the patrol
leader should be able to see his leaders. Leaders should control
movement with arm-and-hand signals and use radios only when needed.
FUNDAMENTALS OF MOVEMENT
Ensure that Patrol Members Can Navigate
5-39. Preparations are worthless if the patrol cannot find the objective
in time or if the patrol is compromised by enemy contact during
movement. Always plan to use a compass and pace man on a patrol.
(NOTE: The element point man must not be tasked to perform compass
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or pace duties. The point man’s sole responsibility is forward security for
the element.)
Avoid Detection
5-40. Patrols must use stealth and the cover and concealment of the
terrain to its maximum advantage. Whenever possible, move during
limited visibility to maximize technological advantages gained by night
vision devices and to hinder the enemy’s ability to detect the patrol.
Exploit the enemy’s weaknesses, and attempt to time movements to
coincide with other operations that will distract the enemy.
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MOVEMENT FORMATIONS
5-48. Figures 5-5 through 5-8 illustrate patrol movement formations.
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SECURITY HALTS
5-49. During short halts, team members drop on one knee, face out, and
freeze in place. The security halt should not exceed five minutes. If the
halt exceeds five minutes, the team should move to the prone position.
For extended halts, team members may sit with their feet facing outward
and shoulders touching (see Figures 5-9 and 5-10). This aids quick and
quiet communication, and guarantees all-round security at all times. This
technique offers the smallest signature, and it is the most difficult to
detect and is best used in dense vegetation.
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PLANNING
5-51. In his plan for the departure of friendly lines, the leader should
consider the following sequence of actions:
· The platoon leader provides the forward unit leader with unit
identification, size of the patrol, departure and return times,
and information on the area of operations.
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· The forward unit leader provides the platoon leader with the
following:
n Additional information on terrain.
n Known or suspected threat positions.
n Likely threat ambush sites.
n Latest threat activity.
n Detailed information on friendly positions and obstacle
locations. This includes the location of OPs.
n Friendly unit fire plan.
n Support that the unit can provide, such as fire support,
litter teams, guides, communications, and reaction force.
EXECUTION
5-53. The platoon should remain in single file. The PSG, or the patrol
equivalent (such as assistant patrol leader), follows directly behind the
guide so he can count each soldier who passes through the PP. He gives
the count to the guide, tells him how long to wait at the PP (or when to
return), and confirms the running password. If the platoon makes contact
after it is past the departure point, it fights through. Soldiers return to
the departure point only if they become disorganized. They then reoccupy
the initial rally point, and the leader reports to higher headquarters.
NOTE: The squad may also occupy the ORP by force. This requires more precise
navigation, but eliminates separating the squad.
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CONTINGENCY PLANS
5-57. The patrol leader leaves the main patrol body for many reasons
throughout the planning, preparation, and execution of the mission. One
of these departures, conducted after the ORP is occupied and secure, is
the leader’s reconnaissance by the patrol leader, compass man, and
element leaders. The assistant patrol leader remains in the ORP. Before
the patrol leader departs, he issues a five-point contingency plan.
5-58. The contingency plan covers the WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE,
and WHY by covering the following points:
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LEADER’S RECONNAISSANCE
5-60. The plan must include a leader’s reconnaissance of the objective
once the platoon or squad establishes the ORP. During his
reconnaissance, the leader pinpoints the objective; selects positions for
his squads and teams; and adjusts his plan based on his observation of
the objective. Each type of patrol requires different tasks during the
leader’s reconnaissance, and the leader will take different elements with
him depending on the patrol’s mission. The leader must plan for adequate
time to return to the ORP, complete his plan, disseminate information,
issue orders and instructions, and allow his squads to make any
additional preparations.
WARNING
Reentry of friendly lines at night is dangerous and
should only be attempted when it is essential to
the success of the patrol.
5-62. The platoon halts in the reentry rally point (RRP) and establishes
security. The platoon leader communicates the code word advising the
friendly unit of patrol’s location and that it is ready to return. The
friendly unit must acknowledge the message and confirm that guides are
waiting before the platoon moves from the RRP.
5-63. If digital/radio communications are not possible, the platoon
leader, radiotelephone operator (RTO), and a two-man security element
(buddy team) move forward and attempt to contact an OP using the
challenge and password. The OP notifies the friendly unit that the
platoon is ready to return and requests a guide.
5-64. If the platoon leader cannot find an OP, he moves with the RTO
and security element to locate the coordinated reentry point. He must
move straight toward (and away from) friendly lines, never parallel to
them. All lateral movement should be outside small-arms weapons range.
NOTE: The platoon leader should only attempt this procedure during daylight. At night he
should use other backup signals to make contact with friendly units. The preferred
method is to wait until daylight if contact with the friendly unit cannot be made as
planned.
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5-65. Once the friendly unit acknowledges the return of the platoon, the
platoon leader issues a five-point contingency plan and moves with his
RTO and security element on a determined azimuth and pace to the
reentry point. The platoon leader uses far and near recognition signals to
establish contact with the guide.
5-66. The platoon leader signals the platoon forward (radio) or returns
and leads it to the reentry point. He may post the security element with
the guide at the threat side of the reentry point. The PSG counts and
identifies each soldier as he passes through the reentry point. The guide
leads the platoon to the assembly area.
5-67. The platoon leader reports to the CP of the friendly unit. He tells
the commander everything of tactical value concerning the friendly unit’s
area of responsibility. The platoon leader rejoins the platoon in the
assembly area and leads it to a secure area for debriefing.
DEBRIEFING
5-68. Immediately after the patrol element (platoon or squad) returns,
personnel from higher headquarters conduct a thorough debriefing. This
may include all members of the patrol or the leaders, RTOs, and any
attached personnel. Normally the debriefing is oral. Sometimes a written
report is required. Refer to Appendix J of this manual for a sample
debriefing format for the reconnaissance platoon. NATO forces use the
patrol report form specified by STANAG 2003.
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
5-70. Specific plans are made before crossing danger areas. These plans
are very similar to actions taken during mounted operations; however,
they require more practice and rehearsal because a dismounted patrol
does not have the same mobility, protection, and firepower to extract
itself should it encounter a threat. In addition, general plans are made for
crossing unexpected danger areas; these can be modified quickly to fit the
situation.
5-71. The patrol uses bounding overwatch or variations of it to cross a
danger area. The leader designates procedures the patrol will use based
on the time available, the size of the patrol, the size of the danger area,
the fields of fire into the area, and the amount of security he can post. A
small patrol may cross all at once, in pairs, or one man at a time. A large
patrol normally crosses its subordinate elements one at a time. As each
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5-73. Securing the near side may involve nothing more than observing
it. In some places, however, it may involve posting security teams far
enough out on both flanks and to the rear of the crossing point to give
warning of an approaching threat and to overwatch the crossing of the
rest of the patrol (see Figure 5-12).
5-74. Once flank and rear security elements are positioned, the danger
area is quickly crossed by a team that then reconnoiters and secures the
far side (see Figure 5-13). The area secured on the far side must be large
enough for the entire patrol to deploy. When the team leader is sure the
far side is safe, he sends two men back to signal the rest of the patrol to
cross. When the patrol has crossed the danger area, the security teams
cross and rejoin the patrol (see Figure 5-14).
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5-77. Unless required by the mission, the patrol avoids threat contact.
If it makes unexpected contact with a threat, it must quickly break
contact so it can continue its mission. The leader’s plan must address
actions on chance contact during each event of the mission. The patrol’s
ability to continue the mission will depend on how early contact is made,
whether the patrol is able to break contact successfully (so that its
subsequent direction of movement is undetected), and whether the patrol
suffers any casualties as a result of the contact. The plan must address
the handling of soldiers who are seriously wounded in action (WIA) and
killed in action (KIA) and the handling of prisoners who are captured as a
result of chance contact and are not part of the planned mission.
BATTLE DRILLS
5-78. Well-rehearsed battle drills are critical to the success of a
dismounted team. The team is lightly armed with a limited supply of
ammunition and can expect little or no fire support. If indirect fires are
precoordinated, they should be maximized while breaking contact. An
immediate suppression fire mission on a near target from the target
overlay may support the team breaking contact; then, once in a covered
and concealed position, adjusted fire missions may be executed against
the enemy. Indirect fires should be considered whenever breaking
contact, emphasizing the need for thorough fire support planning.
BREAK CONTACT
5-79. The team breaks contact as soon as possible because it lacks the
assets to stay and fight. METT-TC determines which drill is executed.
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5-83. Rear Contact. If contact occurs from the rear, the Australian
peel technique is executed in the reverse sequence. The first member is
the last to throw a hand grenade (fragmentary). Once the drill is
completed, the team moves to the designated rally point.
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REACT TO FLARES
5-87. If the team encounters flares, it should execute the following
actions:
· Ground flares. The team moves out of the illuminated area
and takes cover. Each soldier closes his firing eye to protect
his night vision.
· Overhead flare with warning. The team assumes a prone
position (behind concealment, when available) before the flare
bursts. Each soldier closes his firing eye to protect his night
vision.
· Overhead flare without warning. The team gets into a
prone position, making the most use of nearby cover,
concealment, and shadows until the flare burns out. Each
soldier closes his firing eye to protect his night vision.
REACT TO SNIPER FIRE
5-88. If the patrol comes under sniper fire, it immediately returns fire
in the direction of the sniper. The patrol then conducts fire and maneuver
to break contact with the sniper.
FREEZE
5-89. This immediate action drill is used when a patrol, not yet seen by
the threat, observes the threat and does not have time to take any other
action. All patrol members remain still until signaled to continue or take
another action as directed.
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HANDLING OF WIAs
5-91. The methods used for handling WIAs must not jeopardize the
mission. If patrol members become wounded during an engagement, they
are removed from the immediate area and given buddy-aid.
5-92. Walking wounded may be handled in the following ways:
HANDLING OF KIAs
5-94. KIAs may be handled in the same way as the seriously wounded,
except that no one is left with the concealed remains. The grid location of
the remains is confirmed and is marked for later pickup.
HANDLING OF EPWs
5-95. EPWs are processed and handled in accordance with the “five-S”
procedures (search, segregate, silence, speed, and safeguard). They may
be taken under guard to a friendly area, or they may be evacuated by air,
taken with the patrol, or concealed for later pickup. (NOTE: See
Chapter 8 of this manual for a discussion of EPW handling, including the
“five-S” procedures.)
RECONNAISSANCE PATROL
5-97. Reconnaissance patrols provide timely and accurate information
about the threat and terrain. The patrol leader must have specific
intelligence collection requirements for each mission. For example, a
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DISTANCE FACTORS
5-105. A reconnaissance patrol can execute either long-range or short-
range observation or surveillance of the objective. The following
paragraphs examine factors that influence the distance at which the
reconnaissance is conducted.
Long-Range Observation/Surveillance
5-106. Whenever METT-TC permits the required information to be
gathered from a distance, the patrol executes long-range observation or
surveillance of the objective from an OP. The OP must be far enough from
the objective to be outside threat small arms range and local security
measures.
5-107. Since the patrol does not move in close enough to be detected,
long-range observation is the more desirable method for executing
reconnaissance. If the threat forces discover the patrol, friendly direct
and indirect fires can be employed on the objective without endangering
the patrol.
5-108. When information cannot be gathered from only one OP, multiple
OPs may be used. This is accomplished by squad-size reconnaissance
patrols. The OPs must use available cover and concealment and have an
unrestricted view of the objective.
Short-Range Observation/Surveillance
5-109. If it cannot obtain the required information by observing from a
distance, the patrol moves closer to the objective. Short-range observation
or surveillance is the technique of watching an objective from a position
that is within the range of threat local security measures and small arms
fire.
5-110. This method can be executed by the platoon as a whole or by an
individual section or squad. When the entire platoon is taking part in a
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RECONNAISSANCE METHODS
5-111. Depending on the situation and patrol requirements, the patrol
leader has a choice of several reconnaissance methods, which are
described in the following discussion.
Fan Method
5-112. In this method, the patrol leader first selects a series of ORPs
throughout the zone from which to operate. When the patrol arrives at
the first ORP, it halts and establishes security. The patrol leader then
selects reconnaissance routes out from and back to the ORP, forming a
fan-shaped pattern around the ORP. The routes must overlap to ensure
that the entire area is reconnoitered.
5-113. The patrol leader then sends out reconnaissance elements along
the routes. He does not send out all of his elements at once, keeping a
small reserve in the ORP. (For example, if the patrol has three
reconnaissance elements, only two are sent out. The other is kept as a
reserve or quick reaction force). The patrol leader sends the elements out
on adjacent routes. This keeps the patrol from making contact in two
different directions. After the entire area (fan) has been reconnoitered,
the patrol leader reports the information. The patrol then moves to the
next ORP, and the fan process is repeated (see Figure 5-26).
Box Method
5-114. The leader sends his reconnaissance and security teams from the
ORP along routes that form a boxed-in area. He sends other teams along
routes through the area within the box. All teams meet at a linkup point
at the far side of the box from the ORP (as shown in Figure 5-27).
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SECURITY PATROL
5-118. The reconnaissance platoon conducts security patrols to prevent
threat infiltration of a screen or an assembly area (see Figure 5-30).
These patrols reconnoiter areas through which threat units may pass and
the routes they would use. The patrols prevent infiltration and surprise
attacks on stationary units by screening their front or flanks and by
reconnoitering gaps between OPs and around their positions. A
reconnaissance squad normally conducts a security patrol. The platoon
may be tasked to provide several squads to patrol and secure an area for
a battalion task force. The patrol leader picks a series of objectives in the
area in which the patrol must reconnoiter. The patrol moves from
objective to objective until the area has been reconnoitered. The intention
of the security patrol is to destroy or capture threat dismounted troops. If
the patrol makes contact, it reports to the commander and attacks or
withdraws according to the commander’s instructions.
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COMBAT PATROL
5-119. Combat patrols are a rare assignment for the reconnaissance
platoon, but they may be employed during a counterreconnaissance
mission. Combat patrols are generally categorized into two types of
missions: an ambush or a raid. They are generally conducted for the
following reasons:
ORGANIZATION
5-121. Besides the common elements (discussed in the discussion of
patrol organization earlier in this section), combat patrols also have the
elements and teams covered in the following paragraphs.
Assault Element
5-122. The assault element seizes and secures the objective and protects
special teams as they complete their assigned actions on the objective.
Security Element
5-123. The security element provides security at danger areas, secures
the ORP, isolates the objective, and supports the withdrawal of the rest of
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the platoon once it completes its assigned actions on the objective. The
security element may have separate security teams, each with an
assigned task or sequence of tasks.
Support Element
5-124. The support element provides direct fire support and may control
indirect fires for the platoon.
Breach Element
5-125. The breach element breaches the threat’s obstacles when
required.
Demolition Team
5-126. Demolition teams are responsible for preparing and exploding the
charges to destroy equipment, vehicles, or facilities on the objective.
Search Team
5-127. The assault element may comprise two-man (buddy teams) or
four-man (fire team) search teams to search bunkers, buildings, or
tunnels on the objective. These teams may also search the objective or kill
zone for casualties, documents, or equipment.
· For the assault on the objective, the leader must consider the
required actions on the objective, the size of the objective, and
the known or presumed strength and disposition of the threat
on and near the objective.
· The leader must consider the weapons available and the type
and volume of fires required to provide fire support for the
assault on the objective.
· The leader must consider the requirement to secure the
platoon at points along the route, at danger areas, at the
ORP, along threat avenues of approach into the objective, and
elsewhere during the mission.
5-130. The platoon leader must assign additional tasks to his squads for
demolition, search of threat KIAs, search and guarding of EPWs,
treatment and evacuation (litter teams) of friendly casualties, and other
tasks required for successful completion of the patrol mission. He must
also determine who will control any attachments of skilled personnel or
special equipment.
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AMBUSH OPERATIONS
5-135. An ambush is a surprise attack from a concealed position on a
moving or temporarily halted target. Antiarmor ambushes are
established when the mission is to destroy threat armored or mechanized
forces. Ambushes are classified by formation (linear or L-shaped),
category (hasty or deliberate), or type (point, area, or antiarmor). The
platoon leader uses a combination of formation, category, and type in
developing his ambush plan.
Planning
5-136. The key planning considerations for an ambush, conducted as
thoroughly as time permits, include the following:
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NOTE: For a more detailed explanation of planning considerations and procedures, refer to
the discussion of deliberate ambushes later in this section.
Ambush Formations
5-137. The leader considers the linear or L-shaped formations in
planning an ambush.
5-138. Linear. In an ambush using a linear formation, the assault and
support elements deploy parallel to the threat’s route (see Figure 5-31).
This positions both elements on the long axis of the kill zone and subjects
the threat to flanking fire. This formation can be used in close terrain
that restricts the threat’s ability to maneuver against the platoon or in
open terrain when there is a means of keeping the threat in the kill zone.
KILL ZONE
RALLY POINT
SECURITY
TEAM
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!R
LIMIT OF ADVANCE ! GRN
TEAM B
SECURITY
TEAM
! MG
KILL ZONE
! TEAM
! AR ! TL ! AR ! TL ! SL ! GRN !R
LEFT FLANK EPW/SEARCH
SECURITY DEMO TM TEAM A ASSUALT
TEAM AID/LITTER RP ELEMENT
ORP
Ambush Categories
5-140. In planning the ambush, the leader evaluates the considerations
and requirements for the hasty or deliberate ambush.
5-141. Hasty Ambush. A platoon or squad conducts a hasty ambush
when it makes visual contact with a threat force and has time to
establish an ambush without being detected. The actions for a hasty
ambush must be well rehearsed so that soldiers know what to do on the
leader’s signal. They must also know what actions to take if detected
before they are ready to initiate the ambush. In planning and rehearsing
the conduct of a hasty ambush, the platoon leader should consider the
following sequence of actions:
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NOTE: If the threat detects a soldier, the soldier initiates the ambush by firing his weapon
and alerting the rest of the platoon, saying THREAT RIGHT (LEFT or FRONT).
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Ambush Types
5-144. This discussion focuses on considerations and procedures for the
three types of ambush operations (point, area, and antiarmor) conducted
by the combat patrol.
5-145. Point Ambush. In a point ambush, soldiers deploy to attack a
threat in a single kill zone. The platoon leader should consider the
following considerations and sequence of actions when planning a
deliberate point ambush:
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with two M60 fuse lighters and time fuse) and awaits the
signal to initiate. This is normally the last action
performed before departing the objective and may signal
the security elements to return to the ORP.
n Treat friendly wounded first, then threat wounded, time
permitting.
· The flank security teams may emplace antiarmor mines after
the ambush has been initiated if the threat is known to have
armor capability. If a flank security team makes contact, it
fights as long as possible without becoming decisively
engaged. It uses a prearranged signal to let the platoon leader
know it is breaking contact. The platoon leader may direct a
portion of the support element to assist the security team in
breaking contact.
· The platoon leader must plan the withdrawal from the
ambush site, using these actions:
n Elements normally withdraw in the reverse order that
they established their positions.
n The elements may return first to the RP, then to the ORP,
depending on the distance between elements.
n The security element at the ORP must be alert to assist
the platoon’s return to the ORP. It maintains security for
the ORP while the rest of the platoon prepares to leave.
· Actions after return to the ORP include accountability of
personnel and equipment and recovery of rucksacks and other
equipment left at the ORP during the ambush.
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5-148. The platoon leader must determine the best method for
employing his machine guns. He normally positions them both with the
support element of the principal site.
5-149. Squads responsible for outlying ambushes do not initiate their
ambushes until after the principal one is initiated. They then engage to
prevent threat forces from escaping the area or from reinforcing elements
in the kill zone.
5-150. Antiarmor Ambush. Platoons and squads conduct antiarmor
ambushes to destroy one or two armored vehicles. If a squad is given the
mission to conduct an antiarmor ambush, it should have an antiarmor
weapons team attached to it (refer to Figure 5-36). The leader considers
the following sequence and considerations when planning an antiarmor
ambush.
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RAID
5-157. A raid is a combat operation to attack a position or installation,
followed by a planned withdrawal. Squads do not execute raids. The
sequence of platoon actions for a raid is similar to that for an ambush.
The platoon’s assault element may have to conduct a breach of an
obstacle; it may also have other tasks to perform on the objective, such as
demolition of freed facilities.
PRESENCE PATROL
5-158. The presence patrol is almost always used in urban
environments, particularly during stability operations and support
operations. Among the various types of patrol the reconnaissance patrol
may conduct, the presence patrol is unique in that its primary purpose is
to be seen by military forces and civilians in the area of operations.
Although this patrol does perform limited reconnaissance and security
functions, it usually is conducted to serve as evidence of the presence of
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US and allied forces. This patrol’s focus may be the society or its
infrastructure, with the purpose of conducting tactical questioning to
fulfill information requirements.
TRACKING PATROL
5-159. A platoon or squad may receive the mission to follow the trail of a
specific threat unit. Soldiers look for signs left by the threat. They gather
information about the threat unit, the route, and the surrounding terrain
as they track.
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
5-160. Key considerations in conducting a tracking patrol include the
following:
ORGANIZATION
5-161. Besides the common elements, tracking patrols include the
following elements:
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TRAINING
5-163. Training is essential in developing and maintaining the necessary
tracking skills. Once deployed into an area of operations, the platoon
must continue its training activities to learn about local soil, climate,
vegetation, animals, vehicles, footwear, and other factors. The primary
tracker can prepare a tracking book showing specific signs and how they
weather or change over time.
INTELLIGENCE
5-164. Specific intelligence about threat habits, equipment, garment,
footwear, diet, or tactics is important. For example, reports might show
that the threat wears sandals like the natives in the area, while the units
being tracked show signs of one soldier wearing boots with an unfamiliar
tread. This could mean that the unit has a trained cadre, a foreign
advisor, or a prisoner with it. Any specific information about the threat is
also helpful. If possible, soldiers should interview someone who has seen
them.
TRAIL SIGNS
5-165. Humans, machines, and animals leave signs of their presence as
they move through an area. These signs can be as subtle as an odor or as
obvious as a well-worn path. All soldiers can read obvious signs such as
roads, worn trails, or tracks in sand or snow. To obtain better information
from signs they find in the battle area, however, soldiers must develop
and practice more refined attributes during tracking, including attention
to detail, common sense, staying alert, logic, and knowledge of the
environment and threat habits.
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5-166. This is the first task of the tracking team. When the trail cannot
be found in the immediate area, the tracking team can reconnoiter
around a known location of threat activity. There are two ways the team
can hunt for the trail:
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SITE SELECTION
5-174. The leader selects the tentative site from a map or by aerial
reconnaissance. The site’s suitability must be confirmed; it must be
secured before occupation. Plans to establish a patrol base must include
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selecting an alternate patrol base site. The alternate site is used if the
first site is unsuitable or if the patrol must unexpectedly evacuate the
first patrol base.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
5-175. Leaders planning for a patrol base must consider the mission and
passive and active security measures.
MISSION
5-176. A patrol base must be located so it allows the unit to accomplish
its mission.
SECURITY MEASURES
5-177. Security measures involve the following:
· The leader attempts to locate the patrol base on terrain that
will enhance its security. Whenever possible, the terrain
should meet the following criteria:
n Terrain that the threat would probably consider of little
tactical value.
n Terrain that is off main lines of drift and that affords
adequate drainage.
n Difficult terrain that would impede foot movement. An
example would be an area of dense vegetation, preferably
with bushes and trees that spread close to the ground.
n Terrain near a source of water.
n Terrain that can be defended for a short period and that
offers good cover and concealment.
· The leader avoids the following locations:
n Known or suspected threat positions.
n Built-up areas.
n Ridges and hilltops, except as needed for maintaining
communication.
n Roads and trails.
n Small valleys.
· The leader plans for the following security considerations:
n OPs.
n Communications with OPs.
n Defense of the patrol base.
n Withdrawal from the patrol base, to include withdrawal
routes and a rally point, a rendezvous point, or an
alternate patrol base.
n A security system to ensure that specific soldiers are
awake at all times.
n Enforcement of camouflage, noise, and light discipline.
n The conduct of required activities with minimum
movement and noise.
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NOTE: This action is METT-TC dependent; if there is nothing to be gained by doing this
step, then the unit does not do it (for example, in flat desert terrain).
5-179. The platoon leader leaves a two-man OP at the turn. The PSG
and the last fire team will obliterate any tracks from the turn into the
patrol base. The platoon moves into the patrol base as depicted in Figure
5-42. All squad leaders move to the left flank of their squad sector.
5-180. The platoon leader and support element or weapons squad leader
start at 6 o’clock and move in a clockwise manner to adjust the perimeter
(meeting each squad leader at his squad’s left flank). If the platoon leader
and support element leader find a better location for one of the machine
guns, they reposition it.
5-181. After the platoon leader has checked each squad’s sector, the
squad leader and another squad member report to the CP as an R&S
team. The platoon leader issues a contingency plan to the three R&S
teams and reminds them that they are looking for the threat, water,
built-up areas or human habitat, roads and trails, and any possible rally
points. (Squads occupying a patrol base on their own do not send out R&S
teams at night.)
5-182. The R&S team departs from the left flank of its squad’s sector
and moves out a given distance, as stated by the platoon leader in his
instructions. The team moves in a clockwise direction and reenters the
patrol base at the right flank of the squad’s sector. Whenever possible,
the R&S team should prepare a sketch of the squad’s front and report to
the CP.
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NOTE: The distance the R&S team moves away from the squad’s sector will vary
depending on the terrain and vegetation (anywhere from 200 to 400 meters). All
members of the platoon are on 100 percent alert during this time. The R&S team is
of little value at night without the use of NVDs. The RTO must be able to establish
communications with higher headquarters using a directional antenna.
NOTE: If the platoon leader feels the platoon may have been tracked, he may elect to
maintain 100 percent security and wait a while in total silence before sending out
the R&S teams.
5-183. Once all squad leaders (through their R&S teams) have
completed their reconnaissance, they report back to the platoon leader at
the CP. The platoon leader gathers the information from his three R&S
teams and determines if the platoon will be able to use the location as a
patrol base.
NOTE: Squads/sections have the same requirements with their squad/section patrol bases
as platoons.
SECURITY
5-185. Only one point of entry and exit is used. Noise and light discipline
is maintained at all times. Everyone is challenged. Squad leaders
supervise the placement of aiming stakes and ensure Claymores are put
out. Each squad/section establishes an OP and may quietly dig hasty
fighting positions. Squad/section leaders prepare and turn in sector
sketches, to include range cards and fire plans.
ALERT PLAN
5-186. The platoon leader states the alert posture (for example, 50
percent or 33 percent) and the stand-to time for day and night. He sets up
the plan to meet the following conditions:
WITHDRAWAL PLAN
5-187. The platoon leader specifies the following information:
· Which signal to use if contact is made (for example, colored
star cluster).
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MAINTENANCE PLAN
5-188. The platoon leader must ensure that machine guns, other weapon
systems, communications equipment, and NVDs are not broken down at
the same time for maintenance. He also redistributes ammunition.
MESS PLAN
5-190. Leaders monitor mess activities to ensure not more than half the
platoon eats at one time.
WATER RESUPPLY
5-191. The PSG organizes a watering party. They carry canteens in an
empty rucksack.
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platoons and three for most other platoons. The general requirement for
each long-duration OP is two vehicles in CFV/RV platoons and three
vehicles in a HMMWV platoon. These guidelines are based on the
manpower requirements for OP operations (occupy the OP, provide
security, execute a proper sleep plan to sustain long-duration operations).
5-195. The platoon can array OPs either in linear positions or in depth.
Depth is the preferred method for maintaining contact with a moving
threat. Linear placement is effective when the threat is not moving; it
provides maximum eyes on the threat.
CRITICAL TASKS
5-196. Critical tasks for the platoon in employing OPs include the
following:
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n Report information.
n Call for and adjust indirect fire.
· Conduct local reconnaissance patrols when necessary to cover
dead space, provide local security, and observe avenues of
approach and/or NAIs from different vantage points.
· Employ active and passive protective measures. Scouts are
extremely vulnerable in the OP. Their best self-defense is not
to be seen, heard, or otherwise located by the threat.
· Improve the position. The platoon can enhance OP protection
using the following steps:
n Dig in the OP position.
n Camouflage the position.
n Install communications equipment.
n Emplace hasty obstacles.
DISMOUNTED OPs
5-198. The dismounted OP provides maximum stealth and thus has the
greatest likelihood of remaining undetected by the threat. The
disadvantages of the dismounted OP are the time it takes to remount and
move if necessary and, if a ground-mounted thermal device is not
available, the lack of optics capability. If rapid movement or displacement
is anticipated, the OP should mount or remain mounted.
MOUNTED OPs
5-199. These offer the advantages of rapid movement and vehicle optics
and protection. Because the threat can more easily detect them, however,
they are potentially much less effective than dismounted OPs.
COMBINATION OPs
5-200. The platoon can employ an OP that combines the advantages of
both the dismounted and mounted types. For example, the vehicle could
be used to monitor a particular NAI while other crewmen dismount to
observe a threat dismounted avenue of approach. The combination OP
can offset the limitations and vulnerabilities of the other types, but some
of these weaknesses may still apply, including lack of mobility and ease of
threat detection.
POSITIONING THE OP
5-201. As noted, OPs may be placed on the battlefield either in a linear
configuration or in depth. Linear placement (illustrated in Figure 5-43)
allows the platoon to observe the assigned sector from several OP sites,
reducing the chance of the threat entering the sector without being
observed. This method works well when the platoon has been assigned a
large sector with few avenues of approach or is in desert-type terrain. In-
depth OP placement (refer to Figure 5-44) allows the platoon to observe
the entire sector by placing OP sites where the platoon can observe the
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most likely avenues of approach in the sector as well as along the sector
flanks. This method works well when the platoon is assigned a sector
with several avenues of approach or is in heavily wooded terrain. In-
depth placement allows for redundancy in observation and better
coverage of the sector.
SELECTING AN OP SITE
5-202. Based on his commander’s guidance, the platoon leader selects
the general location for the platoon’s OPs after analyzing METT-TC
factors. From his analysis, he determines how many OPs he must
establish; he also decides where they must be positioned to allow long-
range observation along the avenues of approach assigned by his
commander and to provide depth through the sector. Section and squad
leaders select the exact position for each OP on the ground. OPs should
have the following characteristics:
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OCCUPYING THE OP
5-203. The reconnaissance platoon leader selects a technique to move to
the screen line based on his analysis of METT-TC. Unless the area has
already been cleared, the platoon should conduct a zone reconnaissance to
the screen line. This is the most secure method of moving to the screen
line, but also the most time-consuming. The following steps provide an
example of how the platoon’s elements, in this case a section, might
occupy an OP:
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MANNING THE OP
5-204. A minimum of two scouts man each OP. They must be equipped
to observe the area, report information, protect themselves, and call for
and adjust indirect fire. One scout observes the area while the other
provides local security, records information, and sends reports to the
section/squad leader or platoon leader. The two scouts should switch jobs
every 20 to 30 minutes because the observer’s effectiveness decreases
quickly after that time. Essential equipment for the OP includes the
following:
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· Report formats.
· Weapons, such personal, crew-served, and/or light antitank
weapons (LAW). Mines are included, if necessary.
· Seasonal uniform and load-bearing equipment (LBE).
· Appropriate NBC equipment and IPE to achieve the highest
MOPP level.
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OP COMMUNICATIONS
5-207. The scouts occupying the OP use wire, radio, or both as their
primary means of communications. Wire is preferred because it is secure
and is not vulnerable to threat direction-finding equipment or jamming.
The scouts can conceal the wire so the threat cannot see it. If possible, the
scouts in the OP use wire to communicate with their section/squad leader
or his representative, who is located with his vehicle in the hide position
behind the OP.
5-208. The scout in the vehicle in turn relays reports or information to
the platoon leader by radio. Ideally, if the vehicles are in a hide position,
their signals are masked from the threat by terrain. If they anticipate
being in the position for a long period of time and expect to have to use
the radio, scouts should construct a directional antenna to further reduce
their vulnerability to threat jamming or direction-finding. The scouts in
the OP should carry a radio as a backup means of communications; they
can use it to send reports or to talk directly to their FIST or mortar
section for indirect fire support.
OP SECURITY
5-209. As noted, scouts are extremely vulnerable in an OP; their best
self-defense is not to be seen, heard, or otherwise located by the threat.
They employ active and passive measures to protect themselves from
threat detection and direct and indirect fires.
5-210. The first step is to locate the OP in a covered and concealed
position to reduce the chance of being seen by the threat. The scouts add
camouflage to the position to enhance natural concealment. If they have
enough time, they dig in the position and add overhead cover to increase
survivability against threat fires. The scouts enforce strict light and noise
discipline and reduce activity in and around the OP to essential
movement only. All vehicles remain hidden because the threat can easily
identify their large signatures. Scouts in the OP also must maintain
secure communications; refer to the discussion earlier in this section.
5-211. To provide early warning of threat movement around the screen
line or OP position, the scouts emplace their PEWS in areas that they
cannot observe or in the dead spaces between OPs. Trip flares and
M18A1 claymore mines provide additional early warning and protection
from threat personnel.
5-212. Active patrolling around and between OPs also enhances security.
Patrols give the platoon the ability to observe areas that cannot be
observed from the OPs and to clear the area around the OP of threat
elements. A patrol can be executed by a minimum of two dismounted
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crewmen from the vehicles in the hide position. The platoon executes
security patrols as soon after occupation of the position as possible to
discover threat elements that might have observed the occupation. The
patrol reconnoiters favorable observation positions that might be
occupied by the threat. Route selection is critical when organizing patrols
because scouts must assume that the OP position is under observation.
(NOTE: Refer to the discussion of patrols earlier in this chapter.)
5-213. OPs cannot always avoid being seen by the threat, so they must
take actions to limit their vulnerability. Covered positions provide
protection from threat fires; vehicle dispersion further reduces the effects
of these fires. The vehicles in the fighting positions are used to extricate
the scouts from the OP when the position has been identified and
attacked by the threat.
EXTENDED OP OPERATIONS
5-214. Extended OPs are fixed surveillance positions that require the
scouts to remain at the site for up to 72 hours without relief or rotation of
scout teams. They provide the maximum degree of stealth available to the
scout from a stationary position. Vehicle placement will not be in direct
support of the OP. Infiltration and exfiltration, accomplished using any
method of aerial and dismounted movement, will be the primary method
of occupying and departing the OP. Once the OP is occupied, movement
around the OP ceases until mission is complete, evacuation is required,
and/or exfiltration begins.
5-215. This discussion addresses the process of selection, construction,
and occupation of extended OPs, as used in permissive and
nonpermissive operational environments. During this process, the scouts
should apply the principles summarized by the acronym BLUES, which is
illustrated in Figure 5-47.
B Blend in with the surrounding area. Does the site look natural? Does it attract unwanted attention?
Low-to-the-ground construction techniques must be used. Does the site provide protection against
L small arms and direct weapons fire?
Unexpected sites should be used. Will the threat forces expect you to look out the window or the
U small hole in the wall?
Evacuation routes must be planned during site selection. Where will you go to link up with friendly
E forces?
Avoid silhouetting of the site by using the sides of hills, not the crests. Can the sniper see you
S silhouetted against the skyline, wall, or other object?
SITE SELECTION
5-216. In choosing where to position extended OPs, the reconnaissance
platoon must ensure that the sites meet the following requirements:
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CONSTRUCTION TECHNIQUES
5-218. Several construction techniques are common to all observation
positions. These techniques are included in SOPs and practiced during
normal training.
Dirt Removal
5-219. The primary problem in constructing any position is the removal
of excess dirt. Excavated soil expands in volume. In dry climates, the
subsurface soil contains the most water. This water content causes the
soil to be a different color, meaning this soil must be camouflaged. Under
these conditions, construct underground positions before the early
morning dew develops. Discarding excess soil before the dew sets in aids
in the camouflage process. Consider the effect of the sun drying out the
excess soil. This dried soil may need to be camouflaged. The main
technique for camouflaging soil, using plastic sheeting or a poncho,
entails the following steps:
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Vegetation
5-220. When applying the “B” in the BLUES acronym, remember that
vegetation is critical to blending the OP with surrounding terrain.
Replanting and watering vegetation during initial position construction
can eliminate the need to continually replace wilted plants.
5-221. Grasses. When removing topsoil, save the grass. Remove the
grass in clumps by cutting a circle about 5 to 15 centimeters around the
section to be saved with an entrenching tool or shovel; then pry the roots
and soil up from the bottom. When replacing the grass around the
position, pattern the placement after the natural design. Shake the grass
slightly to loosen the roots, then replace it at ground level. If water is
available, a small amount placed on the grass will lessen the shock of
replanting and extend the life of the camouflage.
5-222. Plants and Bushes. Medium-sized plants or bushes will aid the
security of the position. Not only will the plants add to the camouflage of
the position, but they will also discourage vehicle and foot movement over
the top of the position. The main disadvantage to using plants on top of
the position is that the plants may die or fall over due to the shallow
depth of the overhead cover.
5-223. Deadfall. Deadfall can restrict movement in much the same way
as the plants and bushes discussed earlier. At the same time, the use of
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Sidewall Support
5-224. Depending on the soil condition in the area of operations, the
sidewall of the position may require some type of shoring or support to
prevent cave-ins. A variety of material for support of the walls is
available, such as local timber, branches, deadfall, plastic sheeting, and
ponchos. The primary means for supporting the sides, however, is the use
of sandbags. These lightweight bags serve a variety of uses and conform
to almost any shape required. The exact number of bags required depends
on the size and overall design of the position. When cross-bracing
sandbagged walls, use freshly cut green timber or a prefabricated support
such as PVC pipe, conduit, or other like items. Examples of cross-bracing
and revetments can be found in FM 3-34.310 (FM 5-34).
OP Kits
5-225. Whenever possible, the unit should assemble prefabricated kits to
aid in the construction of the required positions. These kits need not be
taken into the operational area; rather, they are assembled as a stockpile
from which elements can draw mission-specific equipment during
isolation. Items in these kits include the following:
· Schedule 80 PVC pipe (elbows, straight connectors, and three-
and four-way connectors) and PVC cement. This strong,
lightweight material can be formed into a multitude of shapes
and designs. It can be used to build a frame for the overhead
cover or to form cross-bracing.
· Parachute suspension line. This has many uses, such as being
interwoven to produce a frame for overhead cover.
· Sandbags.
· Assorted tapes, cords, and ropes.
· Plastic bags with press-together or slide-lock “zippers” for
closing. These items can be used for general storage.
· Half-meter square pieces of 1-centimeter plywood. This
lightweight material is excellent for constructing overhead
cover, platforms for use in trees, and insulation when
operating on ice and snow. The squares can be painted to
match the terrain in which they are used.
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Mountainous Environment
5-232. Rugged, poorly trafficable terrain, steep slopes, and elevations
that allow observation of surrounding terrain characterize mountainous
areas. This terrain may require more observers and positions than flat
areas because of the relatively limited fields of vision. On the other hand,
in areas above the tree line or where lower elevations lack vegetation, the
number of observers may be decreased. A careful study of the target area
will give a good indication of these requirements. For a general discussion
of operations in mountainous areas, see FM 3-97.6 (FM 90-6).
5-233. Position Selection. Mountain terrain provides many places for
cover and concealment. Position selection is not guided by the height of a
given mountain but by factors that include the following:
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reduces the need for movement when changing from daytime to nighttime
operations. Since movement is the main cause of compromise, layering
positions also adds to the security effort of the deployed scouts. (See
Figure 5-48.)
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Ground Positions
5-246. OPs on the ground are camouflaged to resemble such features as
stumps, fallen trees, and bushes. For enhanced surveillance, the scouts
locate the position to overwatch the intersection of fire lanes, roads, and
footpaths on the edge of sparsely wooded areas and natural clearings.
When available, obstacles such as creeks, ditches, or steep slopes should
be located between the position and the probable route of threat security
forces. At night, even a small creek will cause the threat to make noise; it
will also disrupt his formations and generally slow his progress.
5-247. Spider Hole. This type of position is similar to a fighting
position with overhead cover. The dimensions are normally about 0.75
meters wide by 1.2 meters long by 1 to 1.5 meters deep. The observer can
adjust the dimensions to meet his needs. This one-man position is
normally established on a line or ring to provide support and enhance
security. If the platoon uses this type of OP, a minimum of two mutually
supporting holes must be used. (See Figure 5-49.)
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Underground Positions
5-250. The safest type of OP for the scout is the underground position.
The complexity of design and the effort required to construct the position
are its primary disadvantages. When the scouts plan to use underground
positions, soil type is a critical planning consideration that must not be
overlooked during mission preparation. For example, when only light
equipment (such as shovels and entrenching tools) is available,
underground positions can only be constructed in loose soils.
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Chapter 6
CHARACTERISTICS
6-2. The reconnaissance platoon is often directed to find, secure, and
occupy an assembly area. There are certain characteristics the scouts
must look for when selecting the assembly area:
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excessive movement that could create a large unit signature. Unit SOP
should dictate the marking system to be used. Examples of markings
include chem lights, engineer tape, unit tactical signs, flashlights, VS-17
panels, and thermal tape.
OCCUPATION
6-13. When a unit arrives at an assembly area, all elements move off
the route of march and clear it without slowing or halting. The platoon
leader should keep this in mind as he posts guides, selects routes, and
allocates space in the assembly area. After a march serial has cleared the
route, it can adjust vehicle positions without holding up traffic.
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· Position vehicles.
· Establish local security.
· Establish lateral contact with vehicles on the flanks.
· Develop range cards or sector sketches and submit them to
the platoon leader for inclusion in the platoon fire plan.
Scouts may have to adjust their positions accordingly.
· Camouflage positions.
· Perform PMCS.
· Initiate and maintain OPSEC.
6-18. Units not engaged in combat may have to travel long distances to
position themselves for future operations. These movements are planned
at battalion/squadron and company/troop level, but they are executed by
the subordinate units involved, including the reconnaissance platoon.
Success depends largely on unit discipline and the platoon’s ability to
execute the plan with strict adherence to SOP.
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6-19. The road march differs from other forms of movement in these
ways:
6-20. The platoon may perform various duties during a road march,
including manning traffic control points (TCP), serving as road guides or
as a quartering party, or conducting route reconnaissance.
MARCH COLUMNS
6-22. A tactical march may be conducted in close column or open
column or by infiltration. In dusty conditions, vehicles must be spaced so
that the dust from one does not blind the driver of the next.
CLOSE COLUMN
6-23. Close column is normally used for marches during limited
visibility conditions. Under these conditions, vehicles are spaced so the
driver can see the two lights in the blackout marker of the vehicle ahead,
about 25 to 50 meters apart. Close column marching takes advantage of
the traffic capacity of the route, but it provides little dispersion. Traffic
density is approximately 20 to 40 vehicles per kilometer along the route of
march.
OPEN COLUMN
6-24. Open column is generally used during daylight. The distance
between vehicles is increased to provide greater dispersion; it varies from
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INFILTRATION
6-25. Infiltration provides the best possible passive defense against
threat observation and attack, but it may be difficult to control. It is
suited to tactical marches when sufficient time and road space are
available and maximum security, deception, and dispersion are desired.
The advance party usually infiltrates. Vehicles are dispatched
individually, in small groups, or at irregular intervals at a rate that
reduces traffic density and prevents undue massing of vehicles. (NOTE:
Refer to Chapter 3 of this manual for a discussion of infiltration.)
START POINT
6-27. An SP provides all vehicles of a march column with a common
point for starting their movement. The SP is a recognizable place along
the route of march, such as a road intersection. It should not be in a
defile, on a hill, or at a sharp curve in the road that could cause
movement to slow. It should be far enough from assembly areas to allow
vehicles to be organized and moving at the prescribed speed when they
reach it. Before starting a march, elements of the platoon should
reconnoiter the route to the SP to determine times for major units of the
serial to arrive at and clear the serial SP. When vehicles use more than
one route, each route has an SP.
RELEASE POINT
6-28. An RP gives all vehicles of the march column a common point for
reverting to control of the platoon leader. It is a point on the route of
march that is easy to recognize on the map and on the ground. Guides
should meet vehicles as they arrive at the RP and lead them to their new
positions, usually in an assembly area. Multiple routes and cross-country
movement from the RP to assembly areas allow vehicles to disperse
rapidly. In selecting an RP, leaders should avoid hills, defiles, and sharp
curves that may cause elements to slow or stop on the route. No vehicle
should be required to countermarch or pass through another element to
reach its new position.
CHECKPOINTS
6-29. Checkpoints on a route are used for reference in providing
instructions to vehicles in the march column. They also aid in identifying
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RESTRICTIONS
6-30. Restrictions are points along the route of march where movement
may be limited or obstructed during certain time periods; examples
include bridges, intersections, ferries, or bypasses. The march planner
should start the move early enough to pass such a point before a critical
time period begins, delay the start of the move to pass a restriction after
such a period has ended, or plan to halt the column along the route until
the restriction is lifted.
TRAFFIC CONTROL
6-31. The parent unit controlling the march normally provides traffic
control. TCPs manned by military police and/or other personnel,
including members of the reconnaissance platoon, may be located at
critical points along the route. Among the factors that can increase traffic
control problems are movement on multiple routes during periods of
limited visibility and the existence of major intersections, defiles, and
detours along routes. Road guides may lead serials or march units on a
particular route or portion of a route or through a critical area. These
guides must follow the same procedures and guidance as other TCP
personnel. Scouts may act as road guides to assist the military police.
6-32. TCP personnel should be employed in pairs, with one directing
traffic while the other provides security. They need to know the exact
number of vehicles in each march serial, the markings for each serial, and
the passing times so that they can adequately control and report the
movement of the unit. Considerations for manning the TCP include
weather, the marking system for the TCP and route (to include critical
turns), limited visibility procedures, and recovery of the TCPs. The
reconnaissance platoon leader or PSG has several options in deciding how
to man the TCP, to include manning with individual vehicles (up to six
TCPs), dropping off platoon personnel with FM communications at each
TCP, or requesting augmentation if needed.
SPEED CONTROL
6-33. Vehicles in a column of any length may simultaneously encounter
many different types of routes and obstacles. This causes different parts
of the column to move at different speeds at the same time, producing an
undesirable accordion or whip effect. The movement order specifies
march speed, rate of march, and maximum safe catch-up speed to reduce
“column whipping.” The lead vehicle must not exceed the authorized
maximum speed of the slowest vehicle in the column. To minimize vehicle
congestion on the near side of an obstacle, vehicle commanders and
drivers must be alert and maintain the prescribed minimum following
distance. Vehicles should make only gradual speed changes while
maintaining their prescribed interval. Vehicle commanders must
constantly be aware of the vehicle interval to their front and rear and
adjust their speed accordingly.
HALTS
6-34. Halts are conducted to allow following traffic to pass and to
provide time for rest, personal comfort and relief, mess activities,
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MISCELLANEOUS FACTORS
Disabled Vehicles
6-39. Disabled vehicles must not obstruct traffic. Their crews must
move them off the road and report their status immediately to the PSG.
Crews must immediately signal the follow-on vehicles to bypass and
continue movement. They then establish security and post guides to
direct traffic. If possible, the crews repair their vehicles and rejoin the
rear of the column just ahead of the trail element. Vehicles that have
dropped from the column should return to their positions only when the
column has halted. The trail party recovers vehicles that cannot be
repaired by their crews.
Start of Movement
6-40. Vehicle commanders must remain alert and exercise caution
whenever they start to move. Vehicles that move too soon or too late can
cause confusion in the formation. Lead vehicles must keep speeds low
until all vehicles have moved onto the route of march.
Obstacles
6-41. When obstacles are reported or encountered along the march
route, vehicles in the march column should bypass them whenever
possible. For additional information on how friendly elements react to
obstacles, refer to the discussion of actions on contact in Chapter 2 of this
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____________________________________________________ Chapter 6 – Other Tactical Operations
Observation
6-42. Each vehicle commander assigns sectors of observation to his
crewmen to provide 360-degree observation. He also designates one
observer as the air guard to provide air security. Each vehicle has a sector
of observation as shown in Figure 6-1.
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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
CRITICAL TASKS
6-49. There are three key elements in battle handover and passage of
lines: the stationary unit, the passing unit, and the common commander.
6-10
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6-11
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6-12
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6-13
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PREPARATION
6-55. Units are particularly vulnerable during a passage of lines.
Personnel and subordinate elements may be concentrated, stationary unit
fires may be masked temporarily, and the passing unit may not be
disposed properly to react to threat action. Effective preparation is critical
in overcoming such conditions and ensuring that the passage proceeds
quickly and smoothly. The commander may task the reconnaissance
platoon with a number of missions, including detailed reconnaissance and
coordination, to assist him in preparing for the passage.
COORDINATION
6-56. Coordination occurs at a preplanned contact point where critical
information is exchanged and coordinated. Coordination for battle
handover normally flows from the commander out of contact to the
commander in contact. Coordination for the handover and for the passage
of lines should be conducted simultaneously.
6-57. The reconnaissance platoon leader plays a major role in
coordination for handover and passage of lines. He is responsible for
conducting coordination and reconnaissance to obtain information for use
by both the platoon and its parent unit. He then uses this information in
the coordination process.
6-58. During his reconnaissance, the platoon leader must confirm the
following battlefield factors and information:
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NOTE: The parent unit commander may provide some of this information as part of his
order to the platoon.
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NBC CONSIDERATIONS
6-64. Because of potential congestion of units at PPs and along routes,
stationary and passing units must take protective measures against NBC
attack. Techniques to reduce vulnerability include the following:
6-16
____________________________________________________ Chapter 6 – Other Tactical Operations
FRATRICIDE AVOIDANCE
6-65. Since battle handover and passage of lines are usually conducted
in contact with the threat, extreme care must be taken to avoid fratricide.
Thorough coordination is critical; all units involved must know the correct
recognition signals as well as the exact number of vehicles and time of
passage. There will be times when some elements fail to receive necessary
information or when stragglers are unaware of the current operation.
Planning and coordination must cover the following considerations:
· Fratricide assessment.
· Vehicle marking systems.
· Navigational aids.
· Threat situation and composition.
· Obscuration (limited visibility).
· Identification friend or foe (IFF) expedients for ground forces.
· Effective SOPs.
· Direct fire plans for both units.
· Indirect fire considerations, including specific procedures for
requesting and clearing indirect fires.
· Communications procedures and potential problems.
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the operation of the scouts being relieved, or allowing the threat to detect
the operation. To reduce confusion and maintain security, the incoming
platoon leader must attempt to obtain the following information:
6-72. The actual relief in place can be conducted from a hide position
behind the relieved element, with individual relieving vehicles moving
forward. The relieving platoon can also occupy alternate positions within
the relieved element’s sector or zone. In some cases, the platoon may
move into the primary positions as soon as the relieved vehicles back out.
The relieved element may provide guides to ensure that relieving vehicles
can locate those they are replacing.
6-73. The most important transmission during the relief process is the
completion call to the incoming platoon’s commander. This is made when
the incoming platoon is fully set in position and is prepared to conduct its
next operation.
6-18
Chapter 7
Urban Operations
7-1
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PHASE ACTIONS
Collect and analyze existing intelligence
Planning
Develop the plan
Refine plan
Preparation
Rehearsals, PCI/PCC
Approach the urban area of operations
Execution Employ surveillance teams (mounted and/or dismounted)
Conduct reconnaissance *
Conduct assessment of the area of operations
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
7-3. Reconnaissance units conduct reconnaissance in urban
environments to gain critical information for the brigade or regiment. The
reconnaissance platoon must have a clear understanding of its
information requirements and how they relate to the higher
headquarters’ intent. The recce platoon may focus on using traditional
techniques of information-gathering, as well as such methods as
interaction with the society and tactical questioning. On the other hand,
CFV-mounted scouts may focus on the isolation of an urban area to
support an infantry assault in a high-threat environment. All
reconnaissance platoons, however, must be prepared to transition from
one extreme to another as the operational environment changes. No
matter the focus, the main goal of the platoon’s reconnaissance effort is to
provide the brigade or regiment with a thorough, accurate understanding
of the urban environment.
7-4. Crucial to planning operations in urban areas is the urban IPB.
Reconnaissance units must identify all relevant forces, along with their
strengths and critical vulnerabilities, and be able to identify the critical
nodes of the urban area that may provide tactical leverage when
controlled. The IPB effort must consider noncombatants, whose presence
in the urban area may be substantial and dynamic. Determining the
ethnic and religious composition of the population and, if possible, their
intent (for example, to flee or remain in the urban area) may prove
crucial. If combat operations in the urban area are necessary, the
platoon’s mission focuses on achieving informational and situational
understanding for the brigade/regiment. Among tasks the platoon may
perform for the brigade/regiment are determining trafficability of routes
and lateral routes, identifying subterranean entry points and systems,
developing communications architecture, and providing a C2 framework.
NOTE: Once the urban environment is understood, the brigade or regiment can begin its
urban operations. Refer to FM 3-90.3 (FM 71-3) for specifics on the brigade-level
framework.
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Buildings (Super-Surface)
7-9. Buildings provide cover and concealment, limit or enhance fields
of fire, and restrict or block movement of ground forces. Scouts must
identify buildings that serve as key terrain (for example, as
communications nodes or dominant vantage points) throughout the urban
area. Rooftops must be considered a separate and unique threat.
Whenever possible, TUAV or aviation reconnaissance of rooftops should
be employed to identify threats and to assist in preempting threat action.
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Streets (Surface)
7-10. Streets afford avenues of approach and are the primary means for
rapid ground movement in an urban area. Forces traveling along streets,
however, are often canalized by buildings and have little space for
maneuver off of the main thoroughfares. The reconnaissance platoon
must identify trafficability of streets (lateral and parallel) within the area
of operations. This includes determining width and weight capabilities of
streets and the limitations of bridges, culverts, and overpasses
throughout the urban area to assist follow-on forces in planning.
Closed-Orderly Block
7-14. This type of city block typically has wider streets that form
rectangular patterns. The buildings frequently form a continuous front
along the blocks. Inner-block courtyards are common.
High-Rise Area
7-16. High-rise areas are typical of modern construction in larger cities
and towns. This terrain consists of multistory apartments, separated open
areas, and single-story buildings. Wide streets are laid out in rectangular
patterns. These areas are often adjacent to industrial or transportation
areas or interspersed with closed-orderly block areas.
7-4
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Industrial-Transportation
7-17. This terrain is generally located on or along major rail and
highway routes in urban complexes. Older complexes may be located
within dense, random construction or closed-orderly block areas. New
construction normally consists of low, flat-roofed factory and warehouse
buildings. In the Orient, high-rise areas providing worker housing are
normally located adjacent to industrial-transportation complexes.
Identification of transportation facilities within these areas is critical.
These facilities, especially rail facilities, pose significant obstacles to
military movement.
· Unconventional forces.
· Paramilitary forces.
· Militia and special police organizations.
· Organized criminal organizations.
7-21. These forces employ the full range of military ordnance and
organizations, from small arms, mortars, machine guns, antiarmor
weapons, and mines to very capable mechanized and armored forces
equipped with current-generation equipment. The threat uses these
various approaches to counter the technological and numerical
advantages of US and allied systems and forces. In addition, threat forces
seek to exploit constraints placed on US forces because of cultural bias,
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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
media presence, ROE/ROI, and distance from the crisis location. Urban
environments also provide many passive dangers such as psychological
stresses and disease from unsanitary conditions.
7-22. The most dangerous potential opponents will remain those who
have the capacity to prosecute full-scale combat actions escalating to
MTW operations. These threat forces will employ weapons of mass
destruction wherever possible. Such organizations as SOF, state-
controlled terrorist elements, paramilitary units, and guerilla forces will
be a part of a strategy of simultaneous, distributed operations both inside
and outside the area of operations. Mines and unexploded ordnance will
be used to demoralize and hamper US forces.
“We have seen amazing things in Grozny. The guerrillas were hiding
in pits covered by reinforced concrete plates camouflaged under
masses of rubbish. They lifted the plates with jacks and shot at us.
When our attack jets appeared, the bandits drew the plate down.
Sometimes they let us pass over them and then (jumped out and) hit
our backs.”
Pavel, a 21-year-old Russian soldier wounded in Grozny
THREAT TACTICS
7-23. While the nature of active threats will vary widely among specific
urban areas, many principles and techniques will be common to all such
elements. This discussion examines several operational and tactical
tenets that may be used against US forces in the urban environment.
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___________________________________________________________ Chapter 7 – Urban Operations
CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS
7-29. The reconnaissance platoon must determine what civil
considerations its higher headquarters will encounter through the
multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance. Information requirements
when the platoon is assigned a multidimensional focus include the
following:
SECTION II – PLANNING
NOTE: As shown in Table 7-1, the planning phase entails two key actions, which are
examined in detail in this section:
· Collect and analyze existing intelligence.
· Develop the plan.
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URBAN MAPPING
7-32. Before entering an urban environment, reconnaissance units
develop urban operations sketches. These reconnaissance products,
usually created as overlays, serve several purposes. The sketches are an
important supplement to existing maps, which in most cases do not show
the level of detail necessary for effective situational awareness. They
allow the platoon leader to track his elements with greater accuracy and
to give precise location updates to higher headquarters. (NOTE: If such
materials are not available from other sources, the platoon may be
required to produce a sketch and hand it over to higher headquarters for
use by all leaders and soldiers taking part in the operation.)
7-33. In developing urban operations sketches and overlays, the platoon
should attempt to gain access to city planner or civil engineer maps,
which provide detailed information of the urban area. This information is
usually requested and obtained through a higher headquarters. The
platoon then conducts initial map and aerial photograph reconnaissance
to pinpoint key terrain and other important locations in the area of
operations. Figure 7-1 shows an example of this photo reconnaissance,
which focuses on areas such as the following:
· Sites that may serve as potential safe havens for threat forces,
including the following:
n Hospitals.
n Police stations.
n Embassies.
n Other facilities that are nominally friendly, but that could
harbor threat elements.
· Hazardous areas, such as the following:
n Construction sites.
n Dangerous intersections.
n Bridges.
n Areas of criminal activity.
· Major terrain features, including the following:
n Parks.
n Industrial complexes.
n Airports.
n Power plants and/or power distribution facilities.
n Dams.
n Water treatment plants.
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CITY HALL
HOSPITAL
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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
7-36. The sketches and overlays are distributed both within the unit
and to higher and adjacent elements. Because individual vehicles and
squads may have to execute operations on their own, the platoon leader
must ensure that every soldier has an understanding of the sketches and
overlays and of the reference system used to show information on them.
As the platoon conducts operations in the urban area, it confirms the
accuracy of the sketches and overlays, adding more detail as necessary.
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7-11
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Operational Considerations
7-38. Using his sources, the platoon leader identifies the best approach
route into the urban area, locations or obstacles to be avoided,
information sources within the urban area, and any other specific areas of
interest. The use of tactical questioning is an invaluable skill in
validating the information from HUMINT sources. For additional details,
refer to the discussion of HUMINT collection in Chapter 3 of this manual.
7-39. After analyzing the higher commander’s mission and intent, the
platoon leader determines how to gain the information required within its
area of operations. The platoon will use a combination of stealth,
HUMINT, and IMINT, when available, to develop the urban situation.
The information-gathering process is conducted progressively from
outside the urban area to inside the urban area. As information is gained
from the outer ring of the area of operations, the focus of the collection
plan is updated and reconnaissance and surveillance objectives within the
urban area are refined. It is essential that reconnaissance units
continuously maintain situational awareness; the urban situation can
change quickly, leading to compromise or attack. The platoon continues to
collect and corroborate information as it approaches the urban area.
Collection Methods
7-40. The platoon leader then determines whether to use
reconnaissance and/or surveillance to gather information on or in the
objective areas.
7-41. Reconnaissance. If the platoon leader conducts reconnaissance
operations, he must then decide on the movement technique used to enter
and move within the urban area. He makes this decision based on METT-
TC. Mounted or dismounted patrols are used in conjunction with
available surveillance assets, such as TUAVs or the RSTA squadron’s
surveillance troop, to gain information required by the mission. The air
and ground reconnaissance plans must be synchronized to be effective.
(NOTE: Urban patrols are discussed later in this chapter.) Although
reconnaissance elements can use stealth during limited visibility, the
human density within an urban area makes it difficult for these assets to
remain undetected.
7-42. Surveillance. When stealth is required, the platoon uses
surveillance to collect information on or in objectives. Locating
surveillance positions within the urban area requires thorough planning
to ensure that teams are not compromised and that the platoon can assist
in extraction if necessary. Communications are of vital importance to the
7-12
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Infiltration
7-44. Depending on the mission and the information gained initially,
the platoon may have to conduct infiltration using surveillance teams to
observe areas of interest or conduct target acquisition. Plans for
infiltration are based on the requirement for conducting movement to the
area of operations with the least risk of detection. Infiltration
considerations are the following:
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Exfiltration
7-45. The principles of route selection, movement formations, and
movement security are observed during movement to the extraction site.
Exfiltration considerations are the following:
NOTE: Infiltration and exfiltration are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3 of this
manual.
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CFV Capabilities
7-47. The CFV has these capabilities related to urban operations:
· It is armed with the 25-mm cannon and 7.62-mm coax
machine gun.
· It is capable of 60-degree elevation, allowing it to engage
targets on the upper floors of tall buildings.
· It can employ 25-mm AP or HE ammunition to penetrate
buildings.
· It provides armor protection for crew and passengers.
· It is equipped with multiple FM radios.
· It can assist in MEDEVAC/CASEVAC operations.
· It can assist in resupply operations.
CFV Limitations
7-48. The CFV has these vulnerabilities related to urban operations:
· It is restricted primarily to streets and lacks maneuverability
inside built-up areas.
· There is dead space around the CFV into which the vehicle
cannot fire its weapons.
· It is vulnerable to enemy infantry firing antiarmor weapons
from cellars and drains.
· It is dependent on dismounts for all-around protection.
· They are armed with the caliber .50 heavy machine gun
and/or the MK-19 40-mm machine gun with automatic
grenade launcher.
· They can suppress and destroy light armor vehicles.
· They are highly mobile and have a small thermal signature.
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COMMUNICATIONS
7-51. In the urban environment, effective communications require
detailed planning. Because of the effects of urban terrain, the
reconnaissance platoon leader must plan for redundant communications
that will allow the platoon freedom of movement. In simplest terms, to
communicate effectively and continuously, he must minimize the
limitations imposed by the urban environment and maximize the
advantages of existing civil communications. The platoon should follow
this general rule: If you cannot communicate where you are, move
until you can.
7-52. The first step is to identify terrain along the approach route and
in the urban area of operations that supports line of sight (LOS)
communications. Man-made structures can create problems for single-
channel radios; they may inhibit LOS radio communications by absorbing
or reflecting transmitted signals. One solution is to establish
retransmission (retrans) sites on supporting terrain or structures to
facilitate C2 during the platoon’s initial entry into the urban area. The
platoon will continue to identify structures within the urban area that
can support retrans sites as it moves within the area of operations. If
retrans teams are not available, unit vehicles must position themselves to
maintain communications with all elements. TUAV retrans capabilities
should be requested and coordinated for redundancy; the platoon should
also plan to request and coordinate use of aviation assets for C2 and
retrans if available.
7-53. At the same time, the urban environment may have exploitable
advantages such as the availability of electrical power and commercial
telecommunications networks. Electrical power generation stations and
other emergency power systems are normally found in protected
structures and are probably usable. Enclosed areas offer excellent
concealment and protection of communications and other C2 support
equipment. Extensive commercial communications networks composed of
miles of protected underground cable connecting central telephone
exchanges are likely to be available, as are numerous types of public
service radio nets (such as those used for police, fire, civil defense, and
taxi radios). These systems have existing antennas and retransmission
stations.
7-16
___________________________________________________________ Chapter 7 – Urban Operations
HELICOPTER SUPPORT
Attack Helicopters
7-54. Reconnaissance platoons may receive support from a variety of
attack and armed reconnaissance helicopters, ranging from AH-64s to
lightly armed but agile OH-58Ds. Regardless of the specific type of attack
helicopter available, the inherent flexibility of Army aviation units allows
them to accomplish the same missions and tasks in a variety of
situations. Because of the increased risk of small arms and MANPADS
engagements, aviation forces normally support urban operations by
operating away from built-up areas; their key role usually is isolation of
the objective. If risk analysis determines that the payoff is higher than
the risk, however, aviation forces can be employed in and around the
urban area.
7-55. Primary Missions. The most common missions assigned to
attack helicopters during urban operations are the following:
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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
7-18
___________________________________________________________ Chapter 7 – Urban Operations
· Conduct EW operations.
· Conduct combat search and rescue (CSAR) operations.
· Emplace Volcano minefields.
· Emplace large and/or heavy obstacles (such as abandoned
vehicles or concrete dividers).
7-19
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
NOTE: For a further discussion of aviation support and capabilities, refer to Chapter 8 of
this manual.
FIRE SUPPORT
7-65. The reconnaissance platoon leader must plan for employment of
indirect fires in the urban area of operations. Mortar fires are best suited
for urban environments because of their availability to the platoon and
their high-angle trajectory, which reduces the effect of tall buildings and
other structures. The platoon should coordinate for targets that will
support disengagement from unexpected contact. Mortars also will
produce less collateral damage than higher-caliber weapon systems.
7-66. The platoon must also be prepared to employ precision-guided
munitions from other sources, including Army artillery and joint and
allied military services. This may entail either use of laser or IR
designator equipment or special augmentation. The platoon leader must
ensure that no fire areas (NFA) are placed on all surveillance positions
and that CFZs are coordinated along reconnaissance routes. Fire support
considerations for urban operations include, but are not limited to, the
following:
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7-21
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
Maintenance
7-70. In the urban area of operations, self-recovery within the platoon
will be necessary. Vehicles should have a towbar or towing cables and
shackles attached and configured for immediate recovery. A secured
maintenance collection point outside the urban area is identified by the
troop or the supported unit during planning and is then coordinated with
the squadron/battalion for maintenance support. All vehicle crews must
know this location.
Medical
7-71. Organic medical support in the reconnaissance platoon is limited
to self aid and buddy aid. Due to the remote deployment of teams,
primary medical care is not readily available. Scouts should receive
combat lifesaver and emergency medical technician training.
7-72. Additional medical support is requested as needed. When
possible, medical evacuation of team members is delayed until the whole
team is evacuated from the area of operations. Wounded team members
are sent directly to the nearest medical facility that can provide definitive
care and treatment. Combat stress is another medical aspect with which
teams must cope. The nature of reconnaissance missions subjects the
teams to stress in many ways. These factors include the following:
NOTE: For a detailed discussion on preparing for an operation, refer to Chapter 2 of this
manual.
7-22
___________________________________________________________ Chapter 7 – Urban Operations
NOTE: As shown in Table 7-1, the execution phase entails four key actions, which are
examined in detail in this section:
· Approach the urban area of operations.
· Employ surveillance teams, both mounted and dismounted.
· Conduct reconnaissance.
· Conduct assessment of the area of operations.
NOTE: Refer to the end of the execution discussion for an explanation of actions the
reconnaissance platoon takes when it is tasked to support an assault in the urban
environment.
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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
HASTY SITES
7-79. These are sites the team plans to occupy for a short period
(generally less than six hours). This occurs most often during target
acquisition missions. Considerations for occupation of hasty sites include
these:
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7-25
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
7-26
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7-27
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
crucial factor. Windows, doors, and other openings (like bullet holes not
used for observation) are filled with bricks, fragments of building
materials, or sandbags if available. Flammable objects are removed.
Supplies of water and sand are assembled for fighting fires. If the threat
has previously occupied the building, the team takes precautions against
booby traps and mines. When the threat is near, several locations in the
building are prepared for observation and departure.
NOTE: The principles and fundamentals discussed here to assist scouts in moving through
a building while maintaining security are modifications of techniques in FM 3-06.11
(FM 90-10-1). Building clearance operations, which are conducted by the infantry,
are discussed in detail in FM 3-06.11.
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7-88. Use of Ladders. Ladders offer the quickest method to access the
upper levels of a building (as illustrated in Figure 7-8). Units can get
ladders from local civilians or stores, or materials to build ladders can be
obtained through supply channels. Although ladders will not permit
access to the tops of some buildings, the speed with which they can be
used afford a degree of security and safety.
7-89. Use of Grappling Hooks. The use of grappling hooks is the least
preferred method for gaining entry to upper levels of buildings. It should
be used only as a last resort and away from potential threat positions.
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7-32
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7-34
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7-35
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7-36
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7-37
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7-38
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after they have moved away from the door and reached their designated
point of domination.
7-107. The first man to enter moves in as straight a line as possible
toward the corner for which he is responsible. He may then turn and
move deep into the far corner of the room to the point of domination. The
depth of his movement is determined by the size of the room, any
obstacles in the room such as furniture, and by the number and location
of threat soldiers and noncombatants in the room. (See Figure 7-15,
which shows examples of both center-fed and corner-fed rooms.)
7-108. The second man enters and moves toward the corner in the
opposite direction from the number-1 man. He follows the wall, but does
not place himself directly against it (as shown in Figure 7-16).
7-39
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
7-109. The number-3 man (team leader) buttonhooks inside the room at
least 1 meter from the door, but between the number-1 man and the door
(see Figure 7-17).
7-40
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7-110. The team leader can either use the number-4 man (normally the
SAW/240B gunner) as rear security at the entry point of the room or have
him enter the room with the remainder of the team. If he enters, the
number-4 man moves in the direction of the number-2 man and
buttonhooks between the number-2 man and the door. Once he is no
longer needed, he immediately moves back and secures the room entry
point and hallway (see Figure 7-18).
7-41
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
7-111. To make this room entry technique work, each member of the
team must know his sector of fire and understand how his sector overlaps
and links with the sectors of the other team members. If engagement is
required, team members do not move to the point of domination and then
engage their targets. Rather, they engage targets as they move to their
designated point. At the same time, however, engagements must not slow
movement to their points of domination. Team members may shoot from
as short a range as 1 to 2 inches. They engage the most immediate
threats first. Examples of immediate threats are personnel who—
7-112. Each team member initially has a designated sector of fire unique
to him. This sector later expands to overlap the sectors of the other team
members.
7-113. The number-1 and number-2 men are initially concerned with the
area along the wall on either side of the door or entry point. This area is
in their path of movement, and it is their primary sector of fire. Their
alternate sector of fire is the wall they are moving toward, sweeping back
to the far corner.
7-114. The number-3 and number-4 men start at the center of the wall
opposite their point of entry and sweep to the left if moving toward the
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___________________________________________________________ Chapter 7 – Urban Operations
left or to the right if moving toward the right. They stop short of their
respective team member (either the number-1 man or the number-2
man).
7-115. The team members move toward their points of domination,
engaging all targets in their sectors. They must exercise fire control and
discriminate between hostile and noncombatant occupants of the room.
They shoot without stopping, using reflexive shooting techniques.
Because the scouts are moving and shooting at the same time, they must
move using the “careful hurry” concept. Figure 7-19 shows all four team
members at their points of domination and illustrates their overlapping
sectors of fire. Once again, the number 4 man may not be required to
enter the room, only secure the room door and hallway.
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7-116. When full four-man teams are not available, three-man and two-
man teams can be used. Figures 7-20 and 7-21 illustrate the paths, points
of domination, and sectors of fire for a three-man team. Figures 7-22 and
7-23 show the same thing for a two-man team.
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7-45
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7-46
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Reflexive Shooting
7-117. During room entry, there is little or no margin for error. Although
scouts only enter buildings in reduced threat environments, they must
always be prepared for threat contact. Too slow a shot at an enemy, too
fast a shot at a noncombatant, or inaccurate shots can all be disastrous
for a team. The process known as reflexive shooting entails an effective
combination of weapon ready position, stance, aiming, shot placement,
and trigger manipulation. Scouts must rehearse and perfect these skills
to enhance their survivability in urban operations.
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7-118. Weapon Ready Position. The two weapon ready positions are
the low ready position and the high ready position. These are illustrated
in Figure 7-24. The weapon position and orientation for each team
member should be identified prior to entering a building.
7-119. Low ready position. The butt of the weapon is placed firmly in
the pocket of the shoulder with the barrel pointed down at a 45-degree
angle. This is the safest carry position. Team member should use it while
inside a room, except when they are actually entering the room.
7-120. High ready position. The butt of the weapon is held under the
armpit, with the barrel pointed slightly up, keeping the front sight
assembly under the line of sight but within the gunner’s peripheral
vision. To engage a target, the gunner pushes the weapon out as if to
bayonet the target. When the weapon leaves the armpit, he slides it up
into the firing shoulder. This technique is best suited for the lineup
outside the door.
7-121. Stance. Feet are about shoulder-width apart. Toes are pointed to
the front (direction of movement). The firing side foot is slightly staggered
to the rear of the nonfiring side foot. Knees are slightly bent, and the
upper body leans slightly forward. Shoulders are square and pulled back,
not rolled over or slouched. The head is up, with both eyes open. When
engaging targets, the gunner holds the weapon with the butt in the
pocket of his shoulder.
7-122. Aim. Each of the four aiming techniques described in the
following discussion has a place in built-up areas. The aimed quick-kill
technique is the one most often used in checking rooms.
7-123. Slow aimed fire technique. This technique is the most
accurate. It entails taking up a steady, properly aligned sight picture and
squeezing off rounds. It is normally used for engagements beyond 25
meters or when the need for accuracy overrides speed.
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7-49
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7-129. Shots to the spinal column below the jaw and above the sternum
can neutralize a target immediately. The spinal column is a narrow
target. Shots that miss by only a few centimeters may cause only a
delayed reaction, or no immediate reaction at all, in the target. Even
though severely wounded, the enemy soldier may be able to return
effective fire.
7-130. Shots to the center of the chest that enter the lung/heart region
are normally fatal but may take several seconds to incapacitate the
target. During this time, the opponent may be able to return effective fire.
Military equipment or protective vests may also shield this region of the
body, deflecting or absorbing rounds and preventing immediate
incapacitation.
7-131. Even when they are ultimately fatal, shots to the abdomen or
lower extremities are rarely effective in rendering an opponent
immediately incapable of returning fire.
7-132. Trigger Manipulation. Rapid, aimed semiautomatic fire is the
most effective method of engaging targets. As each round is fired from the
aimed quick-kill position, the weapon’s recoil makes the front sight post
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___________________________________________________________ Chapter 7 – Urban Operations
move in a small natural arc. The gunner should not fight this recoil. He
should let the weapon make the arc and immediately bring the front sight
post back onto the target and take another shot. This two-shot
combination is known as a double tap. Soldiers must practice the double
tap until it becomes instinctive. Team members continue to fire double
taps until the target goes down. If there are multiple targets, team
members double tap each one and then return to reengage any threat
soldiers left standing or who are still trying to resist.
Target Discrimination
7-133. Target discrimination is the act of quickly distinguishing between
combatant and noncombatant personnel and engaging only the
combatants. US forces engage with precision fire to apply discriminating
combat power while limiting any unnecessary casualties among the
noncombatants. Target discrimination is vital. If no noncombatants are
present, there is less need for selective engagements. Even if an area is
known to be free of noncombatants, however, other friendly soldiers
moving through the area may be mistaken for threat elements; they may
be engaged unless team members are disciplined and well-trained in fire
control and target discrimination. Even with well-trained, disciplined
scouts, room checking can result in unintentional casualties among
noncombatants. Commanders must recognize this and take steps to
relieve the stress it causes scouts.
7-51
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
plastic knee and elbow protectors are also available on special request.
They are useful, especially during prolonged operations, in preventing
injury from rubble and broken glass when a soldier is kneeling or prone.
7-139. Knowledge of Weapons and Munitions. Detailed knowledge of
weapons and munitions effects is important to the safety of members of
the team, as well as to mission accomplishment. Most interior building
walls do not stop rifle fire. Fragments often penetrate interior walls.
Standard home furnishings or office furniture offer little protection from
high-velocity rounds.
Equipment
7-141. Several types of specialized night vision equipment are available
to scouts.
7-142. AN/PAQ-4 Aiming Light. This device projects a pulsing dot of
IR light along the weapons line of sight. The dot is invisible to the naked
eye, but personnel wearing NVGs can see it. Gunners with weapons
equipped with the AN/PAQ-4 aiming light simply place the projected spot
on the target and fire.
7-143. AN/PVS-5 and AN/PVS-7 Night Vision Goggles. These goggles
are lightweight, battery-powered passive devices worn on the head. Each
has an IR-emitting light source for close-up illumination.
7-144. Tactical Lights. These devices are small, lightweight, battery-
powered white lights that can be attached to weapons. Either a pressure
switch or an ON/OFF switch activates the light. An IR filter can be
attached to most tactical lights to provide covert illumination. The most
common example of a tactical light is sold under the name Maglite. These
lights can be attached to weapons using hose clamps or heavy tape. They
must be checked periodically because they can loosen and shift.
7-145. Red Dot Sights. These are lightweight, battery-powered optical
sights attached to the top of the weapon. A red dot in the sight aligns the
weapon and the target. These sights are for use in low light levels, not
total darkness. They do not assist in identifying targets.
7-146. Active Laser Devices. These lightweight, battery-powered
sights emit visible light, projecting a red dot onto the target that
corresponds to the point of bullet impact. These devices are not effective
in sunlight.
NOTE: In the near future, scouts will be able to use thermal weapons sights to detect
targets in total darkness.
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___________________________________________________________ Chapter 7 – Urban Operations
NOTE: Refer to Chapter 3 of this manual for a detailed discussion of the multidimensional
aspect of reconnaissance. The fundamentals of reconnaissance described in Chapter
3 are applicable in an urban environment, although the type of information and the
method by which it is collected takes on a new form.
URBAN PATROLLING
7-53
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7-154. Mounted patrols never enter an area via the route they will use to
exit it. Vehicles should travel at moderate speeds, with the lead vehicle
stopping only to investigate those areas that pose a potential threat or to
support the essential tasks of the patrol. Use a vehicle speed of 15 to 20
miles per hour to allow for adequate observation and quick reaction.
Slower speeds may allow noncombatants or a more aggressive group to
impede movement. On the other hand, vehicles should move at high
speeds only when responding to an incident. Equipment stored externally
should be secured high enough on the vehicle to prevent the problems of
locals trying to snatch equipment and weapons.
7-155. When vehicles must stop, designated crewmembers dismount to
provide security. The vehicle gunner is at the ready, and the driver
remains in his seat with the engine running. It is imperative that units
maintain situational awareness during patrols; this includes orientation
on other patrols in the urban area. If an element comes under fire, it
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7-55
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
SCOUT SCOUT
HUMINT HUMINT
LINGUIST
SCOUT SCOUT
SCOUT
SCOUT
INFORMATION GATHERING
SQUAD LDR
SCOUT
LINGUIST
HUMINT
SECURITY CONTROL
HUMINT
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7-57
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
the team leader then records. Recognition signals with friendly troops
must be coordinated to prevent fratricide as the point man opens the
manhole.
7-166. Once the patrol has returned and submitted its report, the
commander decides how to use the tunnel. Among his options are sealing
off manhole covers and emplacing obstacles in the tunnel. The patrol’s
report is converted into an overlay for the urban operations sketch and
sent higher.
NOTE: When it encounters obstacles or barricades, the patrol should move rapidly to an
alternate route and report the obstructions to higher headquarters. The patrol
should not try to clear obstacles or barricades, which are usually mined or booby-
trapped and covered by threat fire.
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7-59
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7-176. The following types of questions are most effective for use in
tactical questioning:
Effective Listening
7-179. Along with effective questioning, scouts must learn the skill of
effective listening. They must remain calm, gather the facts, and exploit
all leads completely. They cannot let excitement fog their judgment when
a source divulges information. Showing excitement (or undue interest)
may indicate what information the questioner is seeking or what
interrogation strategy he is attempting to exploit.
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7-180. Another important skill is learning not to jump the gun during
questioning (or listening). Cutting the source off before he finishes
answering may cut off a valuable lead. The questioner should ask the
question and observe the source. If the source answers and then pauses,
the questioner should simply wait, making sure he has finished his
thoughts. The source may have more to say. Silence can also be a strong
weapon. The interrogator should never put words in the source’s mouth.
· Gestures.
· Posture.
· Muscle tension.
· Skin color.
· Breathing.
· Voice characteristics, including tone, tempo, and volume.
NOTE: The model shown here is for a right-handed person. The cues can be reversed for a
left-handed person.
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DEBRIEFING
7-184. As soon as a team returns to an assembly area, it is directed to a
secure area to prepare for debriefing. In preparing for a debriefing, the
team takes the following actions:
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END STATE
7-187. The platoon achieves the end state of its reconnaissance effort
when the squadron/battalion is able to answer two critical questions for
the brigade:
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platoon may be able to prevent the threat from accomplishing his goals
and from withdrawing into the town; it surrounds the objective by seizing
key terrain and covering enemy avenues of approach (see Figure 7-29). In
addition to security, reconnaissance platoon tasks during the isolation
phase may include the following:
Secure a Foothold
7-192. The reconnaissance platoon can use its weapons sights, including
thermals, to conduct long-range reconnaissance and to locate enemy
positions and/or vehicles during periods of limited visibility. The platoon
can also provide fire support for infantry assaulting the objective. During
the assault, the attacking force penetrates the area on a narrow front,
concentrating all available supporting fires on the entry point. In support
of the assault during this phase, reconnaissance platoon tasks include the
following:
· Attack by fire.
· Support by fire.
· Attack with the infantry.
· Coordinate and control indirect fires.
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7-194. Support by Fire. The platoon can conduct support by fire during
the assault; this may include covering critical areas on the assault force’s
flanks. Once the assault force establishes a foothold, platoon vehicles
move forward to provide close-in support (see Figure 7-30).
7-195. Attack with the Infantry. Platoon vehicles and the infantry
advance together, with the infantry moving behind the vehicles for
protection from small arms fire. Infantry squads or fire teams protect the
vehicles from the enemy’s hand-held antiarmor weapons (as shown in
Figure 7-31). Attacking with infantry is difficult to coordinate and execute
because of differences in speed between the mounted and dismounted
forces.
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NOTE: Building clearance operations are covered in detail earlier in this chapter.
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___________________________________________________________ Chapter 7 – Urban Operations
· In clearance of streets:
n CFVs lead, closely followed and supported by infantry.
n CFVs work in pairs.
n CFVs concentrate fires on windows and rooftops.
n Infantry protects CFVs from close-in fires.
n Infantry moves alongside or directly behind CFVs and
scans for potential antiarmor positions.
· In seizure and clearance of building:
n CFVs provide suppressive fires, concentrating on
windows, doorways, and rooftops.
n CFVs create holes in building walls to allow the infantry
to enter through unexpected entrances.
7-67
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
Visual Signals
7-201. Visual signals are the most effective and reliable means of
communications between the infantry force and the reconnaissance
vehicles. Targets are identified with tracer fire, grenade launcher rounds,
smoke grenades, VS-17 panels, or hand-and-arm signals. Visual signals
are used to trigger specific actions such as initiating fires, lifting or
shifting fires, moving forward to the next position, and providing smoke
obscuration.
FIRE SUPPORT
7-203. Indirect fires are most effective when used against open spaces
within built-up areas; high-trajectory indirect fires are more effective
than lower-trajectory fires. Because of these factors, mortars are normally
more desirable than artillery for indirect fire support in urban operations.
7-204. Scouts can play a valuable role as the link between infantry
squads and platoons and the mortars of the cavalry troop or armored
battalion. Reconnaissance sections or squads are trained to call for and
adjust indirect fires from these assets in support of the infantry’s attack.
7-68
Chapter 8
8-1
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
8-1. Mortars and FA assets are the primary indirect fire support
means available to the reconnaissance platoon, although the platoon may
receive fire support from other assets as well, including aircraft and
ships. In addition to understanding the capabilities and limitations of
these assets, scouts must know what fire request channels to use to
request fires. The platoon leader must be prepared to work with both the
troop and/or squadron/battalion FSOs to plan and coordinate fire support.
MORTAR SUPPORT
8-2. Mortars can provide indirect fire support that is extremely
responsive to the scouts’ needs. They can provide a heavy volume of fires
and are ideal for attacking targets on reverse slopes, in narrow ravines or
trenches, and in forests, towns, and other areas that are difficult to strike
with low-angle fires. Each recce/cavalry troop or supported battalion has
an organic 120-mm mortar section dedicated to providing the responsive
fires that the platoon needs. The BRT does not have organic mortars, but
may obtain mortar support from the lead task force. The 120-mm mortar
has a maximum effective range of 7,200 meters and shoots a variety of
munitions. Table 8-1 lists capabilities of the various mortar systems and
munitions.
MORTARS
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___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support
Smoke
8-4. White phosphorus (WP) rounds are used for obscuration and
screening. In obscuration, smoke is placed on or just in front of threat
positions to obscure their vision. Screening is achieved by placing smoke
between the threat and the platoon position to conceal movement. Mortar
smoke can also be used to mark threat positions to enhance friendly
maneuver and orient direct fires. Scouts must be careful, however, not to
allow smoke to work against them by marking their own positions for
threat gunners.
Illumination
8-5. Illumination rounds are used to light an area or threat position
during periods of limited visibility. Scouts can increase the effectiveness
of their image intensification devices by using illumination. This helps
them in gathering information, adjusting artillery, or engaging threat
targets. Ground-burst illumination can also be used to mark threat
positions and to provide a thermal target reference point (TRP) for control
of direct fires. As with smoke, illumination is a double-edged sword; care
must be taken not to illuminate friendly positions. Also, because US night
vision devices are superior to those of most potential adversaries,
illuminating the battlefield may be unnecessary or even
counterproductive.
CAPABILITIES
8-6. Mortar capabilities include the following:
LIMITATIONS
8-7. Mortars have the following limitations:
8-3
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
FIELD ARTILLERY
CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS
FPF
MAXIMUM RANGES (M198) (meters) WIDTH RATES OF FIRE
ILLUMINATION
SMOKE
WP 30 seconds 1 to 1½
8-4
___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support
CAPABILITIES
8-9. In support of the platoon, FA elements have the following
capabilites:
LIMITATIONS
8-10. FA support has the following limitations:
· Limited capability against moving targets.
· Limited capability to destroy point targets without
considerable ammunition expenditure.
· Vulnerability to detection by threat target acquisition systems
because of its firing signature.
8-5
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
NAVAL GUNFIRE
5 in / 38 15,904 8,114 20 15
5 in / 54 23,133 12,215 35 20
16 in / 50 36,188 22,951 2 1
8-6
___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support
8-7
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8-8
___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support
8-16. The armored cavalry or recce troop FIST normally monitors the
following radio nets:
8-17. The FIST serves as the NCS on the troop fire support net. The
FSE is the NCS on the squadron or maneuver battalion fire support net.
The FIST relays the call for fire to supporting artillery on a digital net
(AFATDS) or sends the fire mission to the troop mortar section. The
command net allows the FIST to monitor operations and links the FIST to
the commander and platoon leaders for planning and coordination.
STRIKER TEAM
8-18. From company/troop to brigade level, a Striker team is placed
under the control of a fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) to enhance
the lasing capability and to function as a dedicated observation platform.
Striker teams are organic to each DS FA battalion and to the howitzer
battery of the armored cavalry squadron. The cavalry squadron has one
organic Striker team. Striker teams also work closely with BRTs.
8-19. Requests for indirect fire can be sent through the Striker team,
which has a secondary mission of processing these requests for the scouts.
The Striker team monitors the reconnaissance platoon net and handles
the fire request and subsequent adjustments in the same manner as a
normal FIST. It can enter the information gained through its primary
mission, lasing targets for advanced munitions, such as Copperhead
rounds and CAS, directly into initial fire support automated system
(IFSAS) channels.
8-20. When pushed forward with the scouts, the Striker team may
collocate with one of the reconnaissance platoon OPs for local security
and protection. The Striker team may occupy its own position to observe a
TAI; in turn, this TAI may be tied to an NAI covered by a scout team.
This technique allows the scout team to act as a trigger, with the Striker
team executing and adjusting fires. This type of integration is common in
BRT units.
8-9
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
8-10
___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support
Mortar Requests
8-23. The platoon can send requests for mortar fire directly to the
mortars on the battalion heavy mortar net; the FSE monitors these
requests. (See Figure 8-4.)
Artillery Requests
8-24. The platoon can send requests for artillery fire directly to the FA
battalion on a fire direction net; the FSE monitors the requests. (See
Figure 8-5.)
8-11
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
8-12
___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support
RADAR ZONES
8-30. In addition to the planning the platoon leader does for fires, he
must also be aware of and consider recommending the use of radar zones.
Radar zones are a means of prioritizing radar sectors of search. A zone is
a geometric figure placed around an area that designates that area as
more, or less, important than some other area.
8-31. There are four types of radar zones; however, the platoon leader
needs to be concerned with only one type, the CFZ. A CFZ is an area,
usually a friendly unit or location, that is critical. It is used to protect an
asset whose loss would seriously jeopardize the mission. Any threat
weapon firing into a CFZ will be fired upon. An immediate call for fire is
generated by the radar computer and sent to a friendly firing unit.
8-33. The exceptions to using the full call for fire, with all three
transmissions, are requests calling for “suppression” or “immediate
suppression” missions.
8-13
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
TARGET LOCATION
8-35. Following the type of mission, the method of target location is
announced; this prepares the FDC to receive the data sent by the
observer and apply it to locate the target. The three methods for locating
targets are grid, polar plot, and shift from a known point. Only the polar
plot and shift methods are initially announced to the FDC. If the observer
does not specify either polar or shift, the FDC knows the grid method is
being used; the word “grid” is not announced in the initial transmission.
Example: “H24 - THIS IS H67 - FIRE FOR EFFECT POLAR - OVER.”
(NOTE: The word “grid” is announced at the beginning of a subsequent
transmission calling for an adjustment of fires. Example: “H24 THIS IS
H67 - ADJUST FIRE OVER. H24 THIS IS H67 - GRID 123456 -
OVER.”)
Grid Method
8-36. When using the grid method, the target location is normally sent
in six digits (example: “180739”). The direction from the observer to the
target (in mils, if possible) must be given to the FDC after the call for fire,
but before the first adjusting rounds are shot.
8-14
___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support
8-39. The observer then determines the lateral and range shifts (see
Figure 8-8). Lateral shifts are left or right from the known point to the
OT line and are given to the nearest 10 meters. Range shifts are given as
“ADD” (when the target is beyond the known point) or “DROP” (when the
target is closer than the known point). Range shifts are given to the
nearest 100 meters. FM 6-30 explains in detail how to determine the
lateral and range shifts.
8-15
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
Description of Target
8-41. The observer describes the target to the FDC. The FDC then
determines the type and amount of ammunition needed. The target
description should be brief yet accurate. This is the last required element
in the call for fire.
Method of Engagement
8-42. The observer specifies how he wants to attack the target (type of
ammunition, fuze, distance from friendly troops). The FDC may change
the ammunition type and/or fuze based on ammunition constraints. If the
target is within 600 meters of friendly troops, the observer announces
“DANGER CLOSE” to supporting mortars and artillery. When “DANGER
CLOSE” is called, the initial rounds in adjustment should use a delay
fuze.
8-16
___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support
met, this task is relatively easy, and the observer requests fire for effect
in his initial call for fire. With so many variables affecting the accurate
delivery of initial rounds, however, observers must be prepared to adjust
subsequent rounds onto the target as quickly as possible. Normally, one
artillery piece or mortar is used in adjustment.
8-45. The observer must first pick an adjusting point. For a destruction
mission (precision fire), the target is the adjusting point. For an area
target (area fire), the observer must pick a well-defined adjusting point at
the center of the area or close to it. The observer must spot the first
adjusting round and each successive round and send range and deviation
corrections, as required, back to the FDC until fire hits the target. The
observer spots by relating the burst or group of bursts to the adjusting
point. For a further discussion of adjusting mortar and artillery fire, see
FM 3-09.3 (FM 6-30).
DEVIATION SPOTTING
8-46. As applied to deviation (left or right), spotting involves measuring
the horizontal angle (in mils) between the burst and the adjusting point.
An angle-measuring device or technique, such as the mil scale on military
binoculars (refer to Figure 8-9) or the hand-and-fingers method (see
Figure 8-10), is required to determine deviation. The horizontal scale,
divided into 10-mil increments, is used for measuring horizontal angles.
The vertical scales, in 5-mil increments in the center and on the left side
of the reticle, are used for measuring vertical angles. The scale on the
right, if present, is no longer used.
8-17
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
8-47. A burst to the right (or left) of the target is spotted as “(number)
MILS RIGHT (LEFT)” (as shown in Figures 8-11 and 8-12). A burst on
the OT line is spotted as “LINE.” Deviation to the left or right should be
measured to the nearest 5 mils for area targets, with measurements
taken from the center of the burst. Deviation for a destruction mission
(precision fire) is estimated to the nearest mil.
DEVIATION CORRECTION
8-48. Once the mil deviation has been determined, the observer must
convert it into a deviation correction (in meters). Deviation correction is
the distance in meters the burst must be moved to be on line between
8-18
___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support
observer and target. It is sent, with the range correction, to the FDC for
the next adjusting round or when calling for fire for effect.
8-49. Deviation correction is determined by multiplying the observed
deviation in mils by the distance from the observer to the target in
thousands of meters. This distance is expressed as the OT factor
(illustrated in Figure 8-13). The correction is expressed to the nearest 10
meters (see Figure 8-14).
8-19
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
RANGE SPOTTING
8-51. As applied to range (short or over), spotting is required to make
adjustments to place fire on the target. The following terminology is used
in this process:
RANGE CORRECTION
Bracketing
8-53. In this technique, the observer gives range corrections so that,
with each successive correction, the adjusting round intentionally lands
over or short of the adjusting point, closing on the target. Fire for effect is
called for when a range correction would bring the next round within 50
meters of the adjusting point. (See Figure 8-15.)
8-54. Successive bracketing is a safe technique in that it is sure to bring
fire on the target. Time is important, especially when targets are moving
or may move to seek cover when they find fire coming their way. Accurate
initial location information speeds adjustment and makes the requested
8-20
___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support
fire more effective. To shorten adjustment time, the observer should try to
bracket the target quickly (in the first two or three adjusting rounds),
then try to adjust on the target with as few subsequent rounds as
possible.
Hasty Bracketing
8-55. Experience has shown that effectiveness on the target decreases
as the number of rounds used in adjustment increases. An alternative to
successive bracketing is hasty bracketing. While successive bracketing
mathematically ensures that the fire-for-effect rounds will strike within
50 meters of the adjusting point, it is a slow and unresponsive technique.
Therefore, if the nature of the target dictates that effective fires are
needed faster than successive bracketing can provide them, hasty
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Creeping
8-56. The creeping method of adjustment is used in “DANGER CLOSE”
situations. Here, the initial round is fired beyond the target. Adjusting
rounds are brought in 100 meters or less until the target is engaged. This
method is slow and tends to use more ammunition than other
adjustments; therefore, it should be used only when soldier safety is a
major concern.
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PERMISSIVE MEASURES
Coordinated Fire Line
8-60. The CFL is a line beyond which conventional or improved
conventional indirect fire means (mortars, FA, and NGF) may fire at any
time within the zone of the establishing headquarters without additional
coordination. It covers surface-to-surface fires only. The purpose of the
CFL is to expedite the attack of targets beyond it. Usually, a brigade or a
division establishes the CFL, but a maneuver battalion may also establish
it. It is located as close to the establishing unit as is possible, without
interfering with maneuver forces, to open up the area beyond to fire
support. There is no requirement for the CFL to be placed on identifiable
terrain; however, additional considerations include the limits of ground
observation, the location of the initial objectives in the offense, and the
requirement for maximum flexibility of both maneuver and the delivery
of supporting fires. Higher headquarters may consolidate subordinate
CFLs.
8-61. A dashed black line graphically portrays the CFL, with the
notation “CFL” followed by the establishing headquarters (brigade or
division) in parentheses above the line and a date-time group below the
line. Locations for CFLs are disseminated by message and/or overlay
through both maneuver and fire support channels to higher, lower,
adjacent maneuver, and supporting units. (See Figure 8-17.)
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8-24
___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support
FFA
1ST CORPS
080800-081200Z AUG
OR
EFF 080800Z AUG
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RESTRICTIVE MEASURES
No-Fire Area
8-70. The NFA is an area into which no fires or effects of fires are
allowed. There are two exceptions:
8-71. The purpose of the NFA is to prohibit fires or their effects in the
area. Usually a division or corps establishes NFAs. NFAs are normally on
easily identifiable terrain; however, they may be located by grid or by a
radius (in meters) from a center point. Like other FSCMs, the location of
an NFA is disseminated through both maneuver and fire support
channels to concerned levels. (See Figure 8-20.)
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NOTE: A detailed discussion later in this chapter outlines helicopter support available to
the reconnaissance platoon from Army aviation assets.
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SENSOR CAPABILITIES
8-80. Several types of imagery sensors are available for use on TUAVs,
although sensors are currently limited to electro-optical (EO) and
infrared (IR). Each sensor has unique capabilities, with distinct
advantages and disadvantages. Table 8-5 is a matrix of characteristics for
the EO and IR sensors currently available. (NOTE: Additional types of
sensors and other TUAV payloads are currently under development and
may be fielded as their respective technologies mature.)
· Best tool for detailed analysis in · Not effective during thermal crossover
Infrared darkness with clear weather. (1 to 1.5 hours after sunrise or sunset).
· Passive sensor that is impossible to · Tactical platforms (TUAVs) can be
jam. threatened by threat air defenses.
· Offers camouflage penetration.
· Bad weather degrades quality of
· Provides good resolution. sensor images.
· Offers nighttime imaging capability.
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___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support
RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS
8-89. When the UAV platoon complements the reconnaissance platoon
during reconnaissance operations, the air assets, as noted, normally
operate 1 to 10 kilometers forward of the scouts, dependent on METT-TC.
The UAV platoon can conduct detailed reconnaissance of areas that are
particularly dangerous to ground reconnaissance elements, such as open
areas and defiles. Upon contact, the UAV platoon provides early warning
for the trailing reconnaissance platoon and then maintains contact until
the reconnaissance platoon moves up for handover.
SECURITY OPERATIONS
8-90. The UAV platoon can complement the reconnaissance platoon
during security operations by assisting in identifying threat
reconnaissance and main body elements and providing early warning
forward of the scouts. In addition to acquiring threat elements, TUAVs
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can play a critical role in providing security through the depth of the
screen by observing dead space between ground OPs.
8-91. Because of the range of its sensors, the UAV platoon does not
require positions forward of the reconnaissance platoon to acquire threat
elements. The preferred practice, however, is still to position the aerial
OPs forward of the ground OPs to provide added depth to the screen,
especially during daylight operations. During limited visibility, aerial
OPs may be deployed slightly to the rear of ground elements. Ultimately,
positioning of the UAV platoon will always depend on the specific METT-
TC situation. See Figure 8-26, which illustrates positioning of the UAV
platoon.
AREA SECURITY
8-92. The UAV platoon can complement the reconnaissance platoon
during area security missions by screening or conducting reconnaissance.
An air screen can provide early warning for a reconnaissance platoon
executing a convoy escort mission or securing a critical point (see Figure
8-27). TUAVs can identify threat ambush positions forward of the convoy
or find bypasses the convoy can use to move around an obstacle (as
illustrated in Figure 8-28).
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8-96. The ground section or squad moves to its initial hide positions
along the route selected by the UAV platoon. Scouts then move
dismounted to make contact with the threat. Once contact is established,
the ground leader sends a SPOTREP to the air mission commander via
FM or FBCB2. When the UAV platoon/team leader confirms that the
ground scouts can observe all threat elements and have a clear picture of
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8-98. The commander will decide how best to use attached engineer
assets. He has several options for engineer employment: as a distinct
unit, attached to the higher unit’s subordinate elements, or in DS of the
subordinate elements. The basic engineer unit with which the
reconnaissance platoon is likely to operate is a sapper squad from a
combat engineer platoon. A parallel consideration is that sapper-qualified
scouts enhance reconnaissance platoon capabilities and can provide
support to attached engineer assets.
8-99. In offensive operations, engineers are task organized to maneuver
units using the breaching operation planning process, based on templated
and confirmed threat obstacles. One technique is to attach engineers to a
troop or company team in a mobility team configuration. In the defense,
commanders generally keep engineer units centralized; this allows the
engineers to mass their effort during countermobility operations and to
focus on their established priorities of work.
8-100. Engineers are prepared to reorganize and fight as infantry as a
secondary mission; however, they are employed as infantry only as a last
resort because of resource limitations. Only commanders who maintain a
command relationship with engineer elements can make this decision.
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___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support
obstacles, and call for indirect fires. It also may be designated to guard,
execute, and overwatch reserve demolition targets that engineers have
prepared. The process by which the platoon assumes responsibility for the
targets is called target turnover. Refer to FM 3-34-214 (FM 5-250) for
detailed instructions for completing target turnover reports. A summary
of procedures and considerations for this mission is as follows:
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friendly forces. The threat may also employ TUAVs to accomplish RISTA,
attack, and deception missions; the TUAVs’ small size and radar cross
section and their ability to fly low and slow make them very difficult to
detect track and engage.
ATTACK AVOIDANCE
8-111. If the threat pilot cannot find you, he cannot attack you. Scouts
use concealment, camouflage, deception, and any other necessary action
to prevent the threat from seeing them. When they are moving, they must
also make effective use of air guards to provide early warning of threat
aircraft to allow the platoon to avoid detection.
8-112. Reconnaissance positions must provide effective concealment.
One technique is to position vehicles inside woodlines and erase vehicle
track marks leading to the woods. When concealment is not available,
however, vehicles must be camouflaged to blend into the natural
surroundings. All shiny objects that could reflect light and attract
attention must be covered.
DAMAGE-LIMITING MEASURES
8-113. Dispersion is one of the most effective ways to reduce the effects
of threat air attack. It is essential when a unit is occupying static
positions such as an assembly area or is preparing to cross a water
obstacle or a breached obstacle. When the platoon is on the move and air
guards identify a threat air attack, vehicles disperse quickly, move to
concealed positions if possible, and stop (a stationary vehicle is more
difficult to see than a moving vehicle).
8-114. Another measure is the use of natural or man-made cover to
reduce the effects of threat munitions. Folds in the earth, depressions,
buildings, and sandbagged positions can provide this protection.
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lists guidelines for selecting aim points. These procedures are simple and
logical; they must be learned and retained by everyone in the platoon.
8-117. Vehicle commanders should instruct their gunners to fire 20- to
25-round bursts at a high rate to sustain the proper volume of fire when
engaging aerial platforms. Accurate target identification is essential in
determining which type of ammunition to employ.
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___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support
8-120. If the brigade has an attached SHORAD battery, the platoon will
receive early warning alerts from the battery and its elements. The
SHORAD C3I Sentinel radar can broadcast early warning of threat air
activity to SHORAD elements (battery, platoon, section), FA fire units, and
air defense LOs. The battery then provides voice early warning on the
brigade command net. When METT-TC permits, the SHORAD platoon may
provide voice early warning to maneuver battalions.
8-121. The C3I Sentinel provides 360-degree detection capability for
various air tracks (rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, TUAVs, and cruise
missiles) to a range of 40 kilometers. Normally OPCON to the respective
SHORAD battery commander, it should be integrated into the R&S plan
in accordance with the IPB.
FIXED-WING SUPPORT
8-122. The US Air Force (USAF), Navy, and Marine Corps provide the
Army with five types of fixed-wing air support:
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USMC, USN VSTOL CAS aircraft; subsonic; typical load 4,000 lbs. Maximum load
AV-8B1
9,200 lbs; 25-mm Gatling gun.
A-10 or USAF, USAF Specialized CAS aircraft; subsonic; typical load 6,000 lbs. Maximum
O/A-101 Res, USAF NG load 16,000 lbs; 30-mm gun.
8-124. The platoon may also receive CAS (or related support known as
aviation close fires, or ACF) from Army or Marine helicopters. Refer to
the discussion of attack helicopter support later in this section.
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* 3. Distance: "______________________________________________________"
(IP-to-target in nautical miles/BP-to-target in meters)
9. Egress: "_________________________________________________________"
NOTE: For AC-130 employment, lines 5, 6, and 8 are mandatory briefing items. Remarks should
also include detailed threat description, marking method of friendly locations (including magnetic
bearing and distance in meters from the friendly position to the target, if available), identifiable
ground features, danger close acceptance.
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NOTE: Most aspects of ACF employment and target effects are similar to those for CAS
that is provided by fixed-wing aircraft, in most cases from the US Air Force.
Because CAS entails specialized planning and request procedures, the
reconnaissance platoon normally will not be involved directly in obtaining this
support.
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___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support
Employment Considerations
8-129. Mission success in ACF employment is a function of two primary
factors. First, detailed coordination must be conducted between the aerial
attack team and the ground unit already engaged in close combat. Once
execution begins, there must be effective integration of the fires and
movement of both elements.
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___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support
GROUND BURST Day/night All N/A Good Easily identified. May wash out NVDs.
ILLUMINATION
IR LASER
Effectiveness dependent on degree of
POINTER Night All NVDs Good Marginal
urban lighting.
(below .4 watts)
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___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support
NOTE: This discussion of air/ground coordination also focuses on other aspects of attack
aviation in the close fight, including aviation employment considerations and
coordination requirements for the maneuver brigade LO.
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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
Figure 8-34. Example Radio Transmissions for a Squadron/Battalion Close Fight SITREP
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___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support
NOTE: In the event a ground holding area is not available because of METT-TC
considerations, the attack team will select and occupy an aerial holding area within
FM communications range of the ground unit. The attack team will normally
remain in the holding area until all required coordination and planning are
complete. Figure 8-35 illustrates the radio transmissions for attack team check-in.
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Figure 8-35. Example Initial Radio Transmission and Attack Team Check-In
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Figure 8-37. Example Radio Transmissions in Coordinating Immediate Aviation Close Fires
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8-158. After receiving the request for ACF, the attack team leader
informs the ground unit leader of the BP or attack by fire/support by fire
position (or series of positions) his team will occupy. This position, which
ideally affords the best available observation and fields of fire into the
engagement area or target area, is the location from which the attack
aircraft will engage the threat with direct fire. It includes a number of
individual aircraft firing positions. It may be preplanned or established as
the situation dictates. Size will vary depending on the number of aircraft
using the position, the size of the engagement area, and the type of
terrain. The BP or attack by fire/support by fire position is normally offset
from the flank of the friendly ground position. This helps to ensure that
rotor wash, ammunition casing expenditure, and the general signature of
the aircraft do not interfere with operations on the ground. The offset
position allows the aircraft to engage the threat on his flanks rather than
his front. It also reduces the risk of fratricide along the helicopter gun-
target line. (NOTE: In addition to these considerations, however, the BP
or attack by fire/support by fire position must be close enough to the
position of the requesting unit to facilitate efficient target handover.)
8-159. The attack team leader then provides the ground maneuver unit
leader with his concept for the team’s attack on the objective. This may be
as simple as relaying the direction or attack route the aircraft will follow,
the time required to move forward from their current position, and the
location of the BP. Only on completion of coordination with the lowest-
level unit in contact does the attack team depart the holding area for the
BP. As the team moves out of the holding area, it uses nap of the earth
(NOE) flight along attack routes to mask itself from threat ground
observation and direct fire systems. The attack team leader maintains
FM communications with the ground unit leader while conducting
internal communications on either his VHF or UHF net.
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Platoon Responsibilities
8-165. As the receiving unit in aerial resupply or another utility/cargo
helicopter operation, the platoon will have the following responsibilities
at the PZ/LZ:
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DAYTIME OPERATIONS
UH-60 and like aircraft 50 meters
CH-47 and like (or unknown) aircraft 100 meters
NIGHT OPERATIONS
UH-60 and like aircraft 75 meters
CH-47 and like (or unknown) aircraft 150 meters
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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
Figure 8-39. Example Radio Transmissions for Terminal Guidance to Landing Site
8-172. When more than one aircraft will be landing in the same PZ or
LZ, there will be at least one additional light for each aircraft. For
observation, utility, and attack aircraft, each additional aircraft landing
point will be marked with a single light, emplaced at the exact point that
each aircraft is to land. For cargo aircraft (such as the CH-47, CH-53, or
CH-54), each additional landing point will be marked with two lights. The
two lights will be placed 10 meters apart and will be aligned in the
aircraft direction of flight.
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ACTIONS AT THE PZ
8-174. Prior to arrival of the aircraft involved in an air assault operation,
the PZ must be secured, the PZ control party positioned, and the troops
and equipment positioned in a unit assembly area. Air assault elements
then move to and occupy the chalk assembly area, where they load the
aircraft for departure to the LZ. The final step in this phase is closure of
the PZ.
PZ Organization
8-175. The PZ for the air assault operation may be either one-sided or
two-sided. A one-sided PZ has all unit assembly areas and chalk assembly
areas on one side of the zone, with security teams usually located on the
opposite side beyond where the aircraft will land (see Figure 8-41). In a
two-side PZ, unit assembly areas and chalk assembly areas are located on
both sides of the aircraft landing site, with security elements interspersed
around the site as necessary. Figure 8-42 illustrates a two-sided PZ.
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· Prior to loading, ensure that all troop gear is tied down and
checked; short antennas should be placed in radios, folded
down, and secured.
· Direct squad and team leaders to check their soldiers’
equipment to ensure it is complete and operational.
· Turn radios on and perform communications checks (unless
directed otherwise).
· Assign specific aircraft seats to all personnel.
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NOTE: The far side group will always move around to the front of the aircraft.
PZ Closure
8-181. During platoon air assault operations, the PSG is responsible for
ensuring that all personnel and equipment are loaded (clearing the PZ)
and that security is maintained. The PSG can use either the single lift or
multiple lift technique in completing the closure.
8-182. Single Lift. The PSG positions himself at the last aircraft and
collects “bumped” personnel, if required. He will be the last man to load
on the aircraft. Once on the aircraft, the PSG will notify the crew chief
and/or air mission commander (AMC) that all personnel and equipment
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are loaded, using the troop commander’s radio handset. The aircraft door
gunners will provide close-in security.
8-183. Multiple Lift. The duties of the PSG are the same as for a single
lift. In a multiple lift, the security teams will maintain security of the PZ
and be the last element to depart with the PSG. Depending on their
initial locations, the security teams may have to reposition closer to the
PZ. Whenever possible, the aircraft will land as close to the security team
positions as possible to enhance security and minimize the movement
required by the teams.
ACTIONS AT THE LZ
8-184. All elements and personnel involved in the air assault operation
must adhere strictly to the priority of actions upon landing at the LZ.
Unloading
8-185. Unloading of the aircraft does not begin until directed by the crew
chief or pilot. The following actions occur (see Figure 8-45):
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the aircraft. They immediately return enemy fire to allow the aircraft to
depart. The following actions occur:
RESUPPLY OPERATIONS
8-188. As noted, the helicopter resupply assets available to the
reconnaissance platoon are limited. Refer to FM 4-20.197 (FM 10-450-3),
FM 4-20.198 (FM 10-450-4), and FM 4-20.199 (FM 10-450-5) for
discussions of various aspects of aerial resupply and slingload operations.
PLANNING
8-189. Planning for aerial resupply requires close coordination, with
elements reviewing the entire mission and resolving all limitations and
problem areas. If a resupply item poses a problem that cannot be
resolved, another mode of transport should be considered. Planning
factors include the following:
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PLATOON RESPONSIBILITIES
8-191. The reconnaissance platoon receiving the supplies is responsible
for preparing the PZ/LZ. In addition to the general PZ/LZ responsibilities
covered earlier in this discussion, the platoon will perform the following
specific tasks for aerial resupply:
MEDICAL EVACUATION
8-192. The reconnaissance platoon will contact the medical company on
the medical company command frequency for all ambulance requests.
(NOTE: If it is unable to contact the medical company on that frequency,
the platoon should attempt to relay the request on the next higher
command frequency.) Refer to Figure 8-46 for an example of the radio
transmission for initial contact and terminal guidance during evacuation
operations. The platoon then uses the standard nine-line air evacuation
request format (see Figure 8-47).
8-193. The medical company will prioritize the request with others it
receives to determine if air evacuation is possible. In conducting the
evacuation operation, the reconnaissance platoon must accomplish the
following tasks:
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8-194. Sensor teams employing GSR and REMBASS can enhance the
surveillance capability of the reconnaissance platoon. The teams can
detect targets and provide accurate range and azimuth readings to threat
locations during limited visibility conditions. A sensor team consists of
five soldiers, one AN/PPS-5b, one REMBASS, and a HMMWV. Refer to
Figure 8-48 (GSR) and Figure 8-49 (REMBASS) for a summary of
features and capabilities of the two systems.
8-195. The teams may be attached or OPCON to troops or platoons for
specific missions. When a sensor team is attached or OPCON to the
reconnaissance platoon, the platoon leader must plan its employment. He
should work with the commander to position the GSR/REMBASS assets
in conjunction with reconnaissance OPs to provide local security and
protection.
EMPLOYMENT
8-199. The sensor team should be assigned a specific sector of surveillance
and frequency of coverage. Because the threat can detect radar signals,
however, the GSR cannot be used for continuous surveillance. Surveillance
tasks assigned to sensor teams include these:
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GSR
8-200. GSR must be positioned in an area that is free of ground clutter
such as trees, thick vegetation, and buildings and that affords long-range
observation and a wide field of view. Normally, the team will be assigned
a general area, and the GSR team leader will select the specific position.
To avoid threat suppressive fires, the team should be prepared for rapid
displacement and have several alternate positions selected and
reconnoitered. See Figure 8-48 for a summary of the GSR system.
8-201. During reconnaissance operations, GSR is best employed to the
flanks of the reconnaissance platoon or oriented on potential threat
locations. Since reconnaissance is a moving operation, the GSR teams will
have to move as necessary to support the scouts.
8-202. In security operations, GSR teams can be used to provide
redundancy in surveillance of NAIs and to add depth to the screen line by
supplementing OPs.
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COMPONENTS
8-203. The AN/PPS-5B is a portable, battery-powered, line-of-sight radar
set. It is used in battlefield surveillance to detect, locate, identify, and
track moving ground targets at ranges up to 10,000 meters; it can do this
under various conditions of terrain, visibility, and weather. To detect the
presence of moving targets, the radar set transmits pulses of radio
frequency (RF) energy out to 10,000 meters away. Between pulses, it
listens for RF energy reflected back from the target(s). The energy
reflected back by a target is called an echo. The radar set receives these
echoes and presents them in four ways:
8-204. Once a target has been detected, it can be located by using the
counter type indicators on the radar set to obtain the azimuth and range
of the target(s). Target identification is accomplished by the operator’s
recognition of characteristics sounds heard in the electrical headsets. The
operator can track the target by means of a control switch; he can turn
the antenna either to the left or to the right and stop it at any azimuth.
8-205. When emplaced, the radar set consists of two major operating
assemblies, the tripod-mounted components and the control indicator.
These are connected by the remote cable, which permits the control
indicator to be placed as far as 50 feet away from the tripod.
8-206. The tripod-mounted components are the tripod, column assembly,
antenna drive, and the receiver-transmitter, which in turn supports the
waveguide horn, antenna reflectors, battery box, telescope, and two
electrical headsets. (NOTE: When needed, the radar set mount adapter
allows the radar set receiver-transmitter to be mounted on a stationary
vehicle with a 50-caliber machinegun mount.)
8-207. The control indicator components are the control indicator and
the viewing hood. The power supply provided with the equipment can be
used instead of the battery when a 24-volt DC source is available.
8-208. The carrying packs are designed for backpacking the radar set.
The transport case is a protective enclosure to house the radar set during
transit or storage.
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REMBASS
8-213. Refer to Figure 8-49 for a summary of the REMBASS, which
consists of a variety of components: sensors, radio repeater, code
programmer, sensor monitoring set, portable monitoring set, power
supply, and the antenna group. The following list outlines the functions
and capabilities of these parts:
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IREMBASS
8-214. The improved remotely monitored battlefield sensor system
(IREMBASS) consists of the following components:
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8-215. CSS elements arm, fuel, fix, feed, and provide transportation and
personnel for the reconnaissance platoon. The platoon, however, has no
organic CSS assets. This creates unique planning and operational
challenges, with most of the responsibility falling to the PSG.
8-216. The PSG is the CSS coordinator for the platoon; in supervising
CSS within the platoon, his role is similar to that of the 1SG in the
company and troop. He is responsible for advising the platoon leader of
the platoon’s logistical requirements during preparation for combat
operations as well as its current logistical status once operations are
under way. The platoon’s NCOs assist the PSG in executing resupply
operations and in determining the platoon’s logistical needs. In combat
operations, the PSG coordinates directly with the 1SG, informing him of
requirements and problems. (NOTE: Platoons in the BRT will
coordinate for CSS using this procedure.) With prior coordination,
elements such as the task force reconnaissance platoon can coordinate
support with the 1SG of the company team that is nearest them.
SUPPLY OPERATIONS
8-217. Reconnaissance platoons have a large amount of equipment and
require frequent resupply to accomplish their mission. Periodic checks are
required by all leaders to make sure the platoon’s equipment, especially
high-use items, is accounted for and ready to use. Leaders must
anticipate expenditures and request supplies before an operation begins.
SQUADRON SUPPORT
8-218. The recce platoon in a RSTA squadron or the reconnaissance
platoon in a divisional or regimental squadron receives all of its CSS
through its parent troop. The PSG coordinates with his 1SG for
everything the platoon requires. The 1SG is thus the key operator in the
service support chain. He does most of the coordination with the squadron
combat trains command post (CTCP) and controls the logistics package
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(LOGPAC) and its operation. Based on the tactical situation, the 1SG will
also choose the techniques of resupply.
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Basic Load
8-225. The basic load is the quantity of supplies in Classes I, II, III, IV,
V, and VIII that the platoon is required to have on hand to initiate
combat operations. The platoon’s higher headquarters designates the
basic load based on analysis of the platoon’s mission and the anticipated
threat.
Combat Load
8-226. The combat load is the quantity of supplies, in all classes, that the
platoon must have on hand to sustain operations in combat for a
prescribed number of days. Like the basic load, the platoon’s combat load
is designated by higher headquarters. The platoon’s parent unit must be
capable of moving the combat load, using organic transportation assets,
into combat in a single delivery.
CLASSES OF SUPPLY
Class I
8-227. This class includes subsistence items. Meals, ready to eat (MRE)
rations are stocked on each vehicle, usually a three- to five-day supply.
Hot meals are brought forward when possible, if only to supplement
MREs. Potable water should be replenished daily, either by refilling from
the water trailer or by rotating 5-gallon cans with the 1SG or supply
sergeant. Each combat vehicle should maintain a minimum of 30 gallons
of potable water; it must have more water on hand during operations in
arid climates or in MOPP gear. (NOTE: Recce vehicles with five- or six-
man crews may also require more water.)
8-228. All meals should be eaten in shifts, and they should never be
served at one centralized location. The platoon leader and PSG must
make sure not only that the platoon is fed, but also that the scouts eat
nutritious meals to maintain the energy levels required in combat.
During continuous or cold-weather operations, soldiers will eat more than
three meals per day; the platoon leader and PSG must plan for this extra
allowance.
Class II
8-229. This class includes field sanitation, cleaning, and administrative
items, as well as organizational clothing and individual equipment
(OCIE). Sanitation, cleaning, and administrative supplies are requested
and received from the troop or company supply NCO and can be brought
forward with the LOGPAC. OCIE items are replaced on an individual, as-
needed basis.
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Class IV
8-235. This class includes construction and barrier materials. Barrier
materials such as lumber, sandbags, concertina or barbed wire, and
pickets are used by the platoon to construct OPs and obstacles and to
improve fighting positions. These materials are requested through the
platoon’s higher headquarters.
Class VI
8-236. This class covers personal demand items. Tobacco products,
candy, and toiletry articles are normally sold through the exchange
system during peacetime or for units not in a combat environment. In a
combat environment, these items are sent with Class I as health and
comfort packs.
Class VII
8-237. Class VII includes major end items. These pieces of equipment,
assembled and ready for intended use, include combat vehicles, missile
launchers, and major weapon systems. Major end items that are
destroyed are reported immediately by means of logistical reports (as
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Class VIII
8-238. This class includes medical supplies, which are provided through
the squadron/battalion medical platoon. These supplies include individual
medical supplies such as first-aid dressings, refills for first-aid kits, water
purification tablets, and foot powder.
Class IX
8-239. This class comprises repair parts. Class IX supplies are
requisitioned through the higher unit maintenance section. Common
items such as patches and clamps may be distributed in a battle damage
repair kit that vehicles can carry to sustain operations and minimize
maintenance support.
Class X
8-240. Class X includes most of the material necessary to support
nonmilitary programs, such as agriculture and economic development,
not covered in other supply classes. Class X items are requested,
obtained, and delivered by the S4 based on requirements from civil-
military and/or operations channels. Specific instructions for request and
issue of these supplies are provided at troop level and higher.
TECHNIQUES OF RESUPPLY
8-241. The tactical situation is the major factor dictating which
technique of resupply each type of reconnaissance platoon will use. The
most common techniques are those involved in routine resupply using a
LOGPAC: tailgate resupply, service station resupply, a variation of one
type, or a combination of both types. The platoon may also receive
supplies by other techniques, such pre-positioning or aerial resupply.
8-242. The situation will also dictate when resupply takes place. Medical
support should be brought forward with the LOGPAC as needed.
Generally, scouts attempt to avoid resupply during reconnaissance
operations; rather, they should conduct resupply during mission
transition. Resupply is unavoidable during security missions of long
duration.
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MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS
8-252. Proper maintenance keeps equipment and materiel in serviceable
condition. It includes PMCS, as well as the functions of inspecting,
testing, servicing, repairing, requisitioning, recovering, and evacuating
equipment and materiel whenever necessary.
8-253. Maintenance operations are divided into several distinct levels:
unit (operator and organizational), intermediate (direct support and
general support), and depot levels. The reconnaissance platoon leader is
concerned primarily with unit maintenance and repair of equipment in
intermediate (DS) maintenance.
8-254. Repair and recovery are accomplished as far forward as possible.
When equipment cannot be repaired on site, it is moved to the rear (but
only as far as necessary for repair) to the unit maintenance collection
point (UMCP), which is established and operated by squadron/battalion
maintenance support.
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LEADER RESPONSIBILITIES
Platoon Leader
8-255. The platoon leader has ultimate responsibility for the condition
and performance of the platoon’s equipment and material. In that role,
his duties include the following:
Platoon Sergeant
8-256. The PSG has primary responsibility for most of the platoon’s
maintenance activities. His duties include the following:
· Ensure that DA Forms 5988-E and 2408-18 are filled out and
updated in accordance with DA Pam 738-750.
· Direct and supervise unit maintenance of platoon equipment,
vehicles, and weapon systems.
· Assist the platoon leader in complying with his
responsibilities and assuming these responsibilities in his
absence.
· Coordinate with the maintenance representative to arrange
unit repairs or to request intermediate (DS) maintenance.
· Supervise and account for platoon personnel during
maintenance periods.
· Ensure that repair parts are used or stored on a timely basis
as they are received.
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Vehicle Commander
8-257. Vehicle commanders are the platoon’s first-line maintenance
supervisors. In large part, the platoon’s maintenance status, and thus its
combat readiness, depends on their commitment to proper maintenance
procedures. The vehicle commander’s duties in this area include the
following:
· Ensure that DA Forms 5988-E and 2408-18 are filled out and
updated in accordance with DA Pam 738-750.
· Ensure that the crew is properly trained in PMCS procedures
and that PMCS are performed on the vehicle and all assigned
equipment in accordance with the appropriate technical
manuals.
· Ensure that, as a minimum, the assigned vehicle driver or
equipment operator is properly trained and licensed. In
preparing for continuous operations, vehicle commanders
must ensure that all crewmembers are trained and licensed
as drivers.
· Ensure that repair parts are installed upon receipt or are
stored in authorized locations.
· Ensure that all tools and basic issue items (BII) are properly
marked, stored, maintained, and accounted for.
· Ensure that the vehicle is always topped off in garrison and
that it receives as much fuel as possible at every opportunity
in the field.
· Constantly update the PSG on the maintenance and logistics
status of the vehicle.
LEVELS OF MAINTENANCE
Operator Level Maintenance
8-258. Operator maintenance includes proper care, use, and
maintenance of assigned vehicles and crew equipment such as weapons,
NBC equipment, and night vision devices. The driver and other
crewmembers perform daily services on the vehicle and equipment, to
include inspecting, servicing, tightening, performing minor lubrication,
cleaning, preserving, and adjusting. The driver and gunner are required
to use DA Form 5988-E to record these checks and services, as well as all
equipment faults that they cannot immediately correct. The driver’s and
gunner’s reports are the primary means of reporting equipment faults
through the vehicle commander to the PSG, platoon leader, and
ultimately to organizational maintenance personnel.
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EVACUATION
8-266. Evacuation is necessary when a vehicle is damaged and cannot be
repaired on site within two hours or when it is the only means available
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DESTRUCTION
8-269. When evacuation of damaged or inoperable equipment is
impossible, it must be destroyed to prevent it from falling into the threat’s
hands. The platoon leader must get the commander’s permission before
destroying any equipment. Every reasonable effort must be made to
evacuate secure equipment, classified materials, and all weapons.
PERSONNEL OPERATIONS
SERVICES
8-270. Personnel services include awards and decorations, leaves and
passes, command information, mail, religious services, financial services,
legal assistance, welfare, rest and relaxation, and any other service
designed to maintain the health, welfare, and morale of the soldier. Many
of these services are provided automatically by higher-level support
elements; nonetheless, the platoon leader is ultimately responsible for
arranging for and providing them to his platoon.
MANAGEMENT
8-271. Personnel management includes classification, assignment,
promotions, and reenlistment. Although the platoon leader requests these
actions through the troop/battalion, they are normally performed by the
squadron/battalion staff or by a division-level organization. The platoon
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WOUNDED SOLDIERS
8-273. Battlefield positioning and dispersion make treatment and
evacuation of wounded personnel two of the most difficult tasks the
reconnaissance platoon must execute. Operational planning or SOPs
must cover evacuation procedures in detail.
8-274. In the reconnaissance platoon, the combat lifesaver and/or the
vehicle commander are almost always the first ones on the scene to begin
the process of treating WIA personnel. With the help of the vehicle
commander, the combat lifesaver provides initial first aid to wounded or
injured soldiers. He prepares them for medical evacuation or returns
them to duty status after rendering first aid. There should be at least one
combat lifesaver on each platoon vehicle at all times.
8-275. Vehicle commanders and their crews must be prepared to give
immediate first aid as necessary and to continue the mission, without
stopping, with a limited crew. The vehicle commander is responsible for
ensuring that the PSG is informed of casualties. He coordinates with the
PSG for ground or aerial evacuation.
8-276. Evacuation procedures must be part of the platoon plan and
should be rehearsed as part of mission preparation. Regardless of the
method of evacuation, all reconnaissance leaders must have the necessary
CSS graphics available, including the locations of higher headquarters
casualty collection points. When wounded crewmen require evacuation,
the platoon leader or PSG can take one of the following steps:
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8-286. The senior officer or NCO on the scene is legally responsible for
the care of EPWs. If the unit cannot evacuate a prisoner within a
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· Date of capture.
· Name of prisoner.
· Prisoner’s rank.
· Prisoner’s serial number.
· Prisoner’s date of birth.
· Prisoner’s unit.
· Location of capture.
· Capturing unit.
· Special circumstances of capture.
· List of weapons or documents in the prisoner’s possession at
the time of capture.
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CIVILIANS
8-293. Civilians who are captured as the result of curfew violations or
suspicious actions are treated the same as EPWs. The platoon evacuates
them quickly to higher headquarters using the “five-S” principles
discussed earlier in this section. They should be tagged in the same
manner as prisoners.
8-90
Chapter 9
9-1. Figure 9-1 outlines a variety of symbols that the platoon can use
to illustrate reconnaissance data on its overlays. Figure 9-2 shows
symbols for various materials, facilities, equipment, and services. An
9-1
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ROUTE WIDTH
9-5. The route width is the narrowest width of traveled way on a route
(see Figure 9-4). This narrow width may be the width of a bridge, a
tunnel, a road, an underpass, or other constriction that limits the traveled
way. The number of lanes is determined by the traveled-way width. The
lane width normally required for wheeled vehicles is 3.5 meters; for
tracked vehicles, this width is 4 meters.
9-9
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ROUTE TYPE
9-7. The route type defines the ability of the route surface to
withstand various types of weather. It is determined for the worst section
of road on the entire route and is categorized as follows:
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9-9. When a unit’s vehicles have a higher MLC than the route, its first
alternative may be to seek an alternate route. On the other hand, the unit
may conduct additional reconnaissance of the roads within the original
route to determine whether a change in traffic flow (such as single-flow
crossing of a weak point) will permit heavier vehicles on the route.
Whenever possible, the unit should ensure that the route network
includes a number of heavy-traffic roads as well as average-traffic roads.
This helps staff planners to manage heavy-traffic loads and to decrease
the bottleneck effect.
OVERHEAD CLEARANCE
9-10. The lowest overhead clearance is the vertical distance between
the road surface and any overhead obstacle (power lines, overpasses,
tunnels, and so forth) that denies the use of the road to some vehicles.
Use the infinity symbol ( ) for unlimited clearance in the route
classification formula. (NOTE: Any point along the route where the
minimum overhead clearance is less than 4.3 meters is considered to be
an obstruction.)
ROUTE OBSTRUCTIONS
9-11. Route obstructions restrict the type, amount, or speed of traffic
flow. They are indicated in the route classification formula by the
abbreviation “OB.” The platoon must depict the exact nature of each
obstruction it encounters on the route classification overlay.
9-12. Specific types of obstructions that the platoon may face on a route
include the following:
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MEASURING METHODS
9-16. The platoon can use several methods to measure curves:
· Tape measure.
· Triangulation.
· Formula.
TRIANGULATION METHOD
9-18. You can determine a curve’s approximate radius by “laying out”
right triangles (3:4:5 proportion) at the point of curvature (PC) and point
of tangency (PT) locations (see Figure 9-6). The intersection (o), which is
formed by extending the legs of each triangle, represents the center of the
circle. The distance (R) from point o to either point PC or PT represents
the curve’s radius.
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FORMULA METHOD
9-19. This method of determining the curve’s radius (illustrated in
Figure 9-7) is based on the following formula (all measurements are in
meters):
R = (C2/8M) + (M/2)
R = radius of the curve.
C = the distance from the centerline of the road to the centerline
of the road at the outer extremities of the curve.
M = the perpendicular distance from the center of the tape to
the centerline of the road.
NOTE: When conditions warrant, set M at 2 meters from the centerline, then
measure C 2 meters from the centerline. Use this method when there is a
time limitation or when natural or man-made restrictions prevent proper
measurements.
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CURVE SYMBOL
9-22. Sharp curves with a radius of 45 meters or less are symbolically
represented on maps or overlays by a triangle that points to the curve’s
exact map location. In addition, the measured value (in meters) for the
radius of curvature is written outside the triangle (as shown in the top
drawing in Figure 9-8). All curves with a radius of 45 meters or less are
reportable.
9-15
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9-24. The rise and fall of the ground is known as the slope or gradient
(grade). The percentage of the slope is used to describe the effect that
inclines have on movement rates. It is the ratio of the change in elevation
(the vertical distance divided by the horizontal ground distance)
multiplied by 100 (see Figure 9-9). It is important to express the vertical
distance and the horizontal distance in the same unit of measure. Slopes
of 7 percent or greater affect the platoon’s movement speed along a route
and are considered an obstruction. Record all slopes greater than 5
percent on the route classification overlay.
SLOPE PERCENTAGE
9-25. The following discussion focuses on four methods for determining
the percent of slope.
CLINOMETER METHOD
9-26. A clinometer is an instrument that directly measures percent of
slope. It can be found in engineer survey units, as part of an artillery
compass, and as part of an engineer platoon sketch set. Follow the
instructions included with the instrument.
PACE METHOD
9-27. The pace method is a quick way to estimate percent of slope. The
first step in using this method is to accurately determine the height and
pace of each soldier of a reconnaissance team. As a rule of thumb, the eye
level of the average soldier is 1.75 meters above the ground. The pace of
the average soldier is 0.75 meter. Determine the percent of slope using
these steps:
· Stand at the bottom of the slope with head and eyes level.
· Sight a spot on the slope. This spot should be easily
identifiable. If it is not, another member of the team should go
forward to mark the location.
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MAP METHOD
9-28. The platoon can use a large-scale map (such as 1:50,000) to
estimate the percent of slope quickly. After identifying the slope on the
map, find the difference in elevations between the top and bottom of the
slope by reading the elevation contours or spot elevation; then measure
and convert the horizontal distance (usually road distance) to the same
unit of measurement as the elevation difference. Substitute the vertical
and horizontal distances in the percent-of-slope formula as shown in
Figure 9-11.
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SLOPE SYMBOL
9-30. Most vehicles will be slowed when they must negotiate slopes of 7
percent or greater for a significant distance. Such slope characteristics
must be accurately reported. The symbols illustrated in Figure 9-13 are
used to represent various slope percentages.
9-19
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NOTE: Slopes of 7 percent or greater are obstructions to traffic flow and are
indicated by the abbreviation “OB” in the route classification formula.
SECTION V – CONSTRICTIONS
CONSTRICTION SYMBOL
9-34. Constrictions that reduce the traveled-way width to below
minimum requirements are depicted on maps and overlays by two
opposing shaded triangles. The width of the usable traveled way (in
meters) is written next to the left triangle. The length of the constriction
(in meters) is written next to the right triangle (see Figure 9-14).
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NOTE: Constrictions of traveled-way widths below the minimum standard for the
type and flow of traffic are obstructions; they are indicated by the symbol
“OB” in the route classification formula.
UNDERPASSES
9-35. An underpass is depicted on a map or overlay by a symbol that
depicts the structure’s ceiling. The symbol is drawn over the route at the
map location of the underpass. The width (in meters) is written to the left
of the underpass symbol, and the overhead clearance (in meters) is
written to the right of the underpass symbol (see Figure 9-15).
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TUNNELS
9-38. A tunnel is a section of roadway along the route that is either
artificially covered (such as a covered bridge or a snowshed) or
underground. A tunnel reconnaissance determines essential information
such as the serial number, location, type, length, width (including
sidewalks), bypasses, alignment, gradient, and cross section. A tunnel
consists of a bore, a tunnel liner, and a portal.
TUNNEL SYMBOL
9-40. Basic tunnel information is recorded on maps or overlays using
symbols (as shown in Figure 9-17). The location of the tunnel entrance is
shown by an arrow from the symbol to the location of the entrance. For
long tunnels (more than 30.5 meters), both tunnel entrance locations are
indicated.
9-41. For later reference purposes, each tunnel on a particular map or
overlay is assigned a serial number. (NOTE: Check for an existing fixed
serial number on the actual tunnel or map sheet; if there is no serial
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number, assign a number based on unit SOP.) Serial numbers are not
duplicated on any one map sheet, overlay, or document. The number is
recorded inside the symbol. The traveled-way width is shown in meters
and is recorded below the symbol.
OVERHEAD CLEARANCE
9-43. Overhead clearance is the shortest distance between the surface
of a traveled way and any obstruction vertically above it. The
measurement of overhead clearance must be accurate. Figures 9-18 and
9-19 show methods and considerations for obtaining these measurements.
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MEASUREMENTS
9-45. Stream depth is usually measured using field-expedient devices
such as poles or weighted ropes. Measure the depth every 3 meters along
the planned stream crossing route. Recheck depths and currents
frequently during inclement weather. Sudden, heavy rainfall may turn a
sluggish stream or river into a torrent very quickly, particularly in
tropical and arid regions. Monitor weather reports of the surrounding
area. Storms occurring miles away can cause flash flooding. Always
consider the importance of upstream dams and locks that may cause
elevated levels or flooding when opened or destroyed. (NOTE: When
there is little time for reconnaissance, the actual measured depth should
be recorded as the normal depth.)
PREEXISTING DATA
9-46. In developed areas of the world, special water navigation maps
containing data on specific bodies of water are available through
government agencies. The S2 can obtain copies of such maps. When using
these maps, however, check the actual site whenever possible; there is no
substitute for in-person reconnaissance.
STREAM WIDTH
9-47. Determine stream width using one of several available methods:
the compass method; an aiming circle, azimuth indicator, or alidade; the
GPS; or a direct measurement.
COMPASS METHOD
9-48. In this method, use a compass to take an azimuth from a point on
the near shore, close to the water’s edge, to a point on the opposite shore,
also close to the water’s edge (as illustrated in Figure 9-21). On the near
shore, establish another point that is on a line with and at a right angle to
the azimuth selected. The azimuth to the same point on the far shore is +
or - 45 degrees (800 mils) from the previous azimuth. Measure the
distance between the two points on the near shore. This distance is equal
to the distance across the stream.
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DIRECT MEASUREMENT
9-51. Measure short gaps with a tape measure or a dark rope that is
accurately measured and marked.
CURRENT VELOCITY
9-52. Current velocity varies in different parts of a stream. Velocity is
usually slower near the shore and faster in the main channel. Perform
the following procedure to determine stream velocity:
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STREAM APPROACHES
9-53. Gently sloping stream approaches are desirable for fording and
swimming operations. Slope is expressed in percentage. Slope-climbing
capability must be considered for the vehicles that are expected to
ford/swim the stream. This information is found on the vehicle’s data
plate or dash plate or in the vehicle’s technical manual (TM). When
considering slope-climbing capability, consider the degrading effects of
weather, the condition of the vehicle’s tires or tracks, and the condition of
the ground surface of both sides of the stream.
9-54. The platoon should avoid the following obstacles during stream
crossing operations:
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9-60. The composition of the ford’s stream bottom largely determines its
trafficability. It is important to determine whether the bottom is
composed of sand, gravel, silt, clay, or rock and in what proportions.
Record whether the ford’s natural river bottom has been improved to
increase the load-bearing capacity or to reduce the water depth. Improved
fords may have gravel, macadam, or concrete surfacing; layers of
sandbags; metal screening or matting; or timber (corduroy) planking.
Determine if material is available nearby that can be used to improve the
ford. Record limited ford information, such as the following, on maps or
overlays using symbols as illustrated in Figure 9-24:
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9-61. All elements of the ford symbol are separated by slashes. If you do
not know or cannot determine any item of the ford symbol, substitute a
question mark for the required information.
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9-62. Ferries are considered obstructions to traffic flow and are indicated
by the abbreviation “OB” in the route classification formula. Ferryboat
construction varies widely and ranges from expedient rafts to ocean-going
vessels. Ferries differ in physical appearance and capacity depending upon
the waterway’s width, depth, and current and the characteristics of the
traffic to be moved. Ferries may be propelled by oars; cable and pulleys;
poles; the stream current; or steam, gasoline, or diesel engines.
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FERRY INFORMATION
9-69. Record limited ferry information on maps or overlays by using the
symbol shown in Figure 9-25. Refer to Figure 9-26 for examples of
completed ferry symbols. Ferry information includes the following:
9-70. When drawing the approach condition portion of the symbol, pay
attention to the direction of stream flow. Left and right banks are
determined by looking downstream. Approach conditions are determined
in the same manner as for fords. Use irregular lines on the corresponding
side of the basic symbol to show a difficult approach.
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REQUIRED INFORMATION
9-74. To classify a bridge, you must acquire the necessary information
concerning the bridge’s basic components, including the following:
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NOTE: Figure 9-27 illustrates various types of bridges, by span type, that the
platoon may encounter. Figure 9-28 shows components of the bridge
superstructure.
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MINIMUM DECK
SPAN LENGTH
THICKNESS
30 feet 18 inches
20 feet 13 inches
10 feet 8 inches
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MINIMUM STRINGER
SPAN LENGTH
DEPTH
20 feet 15 inches
30 feet 20 inches
40 feet 25 inches
50 feet 30 inches
60 feet 35 inches
70 feet 40 inches
80 feet 44 inches
90 feet 50 inches
100 feet 57 inches
9-39
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MINIMUM
SPAN LENGTH ARCH RING MINIMUM FILL
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8-FOOT
STRINGER 24-1/4 24-1/8 17-3/4 16-3/4 15
x9 x9 x 6-5/8 x 6-1/2 x 5-7/8
SECTION
6-FOOT
STRINGER 24-1/8 24 16 15-3/4 14
x9 x7 x 8-1/2 x 6-1/8 x6
SECTION
4-FOOT
STRINGER 21-1/4 18-1/4 16-3/4 15 13-3/8
x 8-1/4 x7 x 6-1/2 x 5-7/8 x 5-3/8
SECTION
2-FOOT
STRINGER 18-1/4 16-1/4 15 14 12
x7 x 7-1/8 x 5-7/8 x 5-1/2 x5
SECTION
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9-45
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MINIMUM DECK
SPAN LENGTH
THICKNESS
30 feet 22 inches
20 feet 17 inches
10 feet 12 inches
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MINIMUM STRINGER
SPAN LENGTH
DEPTH
20 feet 20 inches
30 feet 26 inches
40 feet 32 inches
50 feet 39 inches
60 feet 45 inches
70 feet 50 inches
80 feet 55 inches
90 feet 61 inches
100 feet 66 inches
9-47
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Step 2. Measure the span length, arch ring, and fill (as shown
in Figure 9-38). Compare these measurements to
minimum standards using Table 9-15. Do the arch ring
and fill meet minimum required dimensions for the
designated span? If the answer is yes, it is safe to cross
MLC 70 traffic; if the answer is no, go to step 3.
MINIMUM
SPAN LENGTH MINIMUM FILL
ARCH RING
10 feet 9 inches 6 inches
15 feet 9 inches 12 inches
20 feet 9 inches 24 inches
30 feet 13.5 inches 24 inches
40 feet 18 inches 24 inches
50 feet 22.5 inches 24 inches
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2-FOOT
STRINGER 22 x 12 20 x 8 14 x 8
SECTION
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_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data
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BRIDGE CONDITION
9-91. It is essential to note the bridge’s general condition, paying
particular attention to evidence of damage from natural causes (such as
rot, rust, and deterioration) or combat action. Classification procedures
presume that a bridge is in good condition. If the bridge is in poor
condition, the class determined through mathematical computations must
be reduced according to the classifier’s judgment.
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_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data
MLC 60 vehicle
CAPABILITIES One vehicle at a time can cross the AVLB
AVLB is 19.2 meters (63 feet) long. It spans these gaps:
· 18.3 meters (60 feet) using prepared abutments
· 17 meters (57 feet) using unprepared abutments
BRIDGE CLASSIFICATION
ROADWAY WIDTH
(meters) One-way Two-way
2.75 to 3.34 12 0
3.35 to 3.99 30 0
4 to 4.49 60 0
4.5 to 4.99 100 0
5 to 5.4 150 0
5.5 to 7.2 150 30
7.3 to 8.1 150 60
8.2 to 9.7 150 100
Over 9.8 150 150
NOTE: Minimum overhead clearance for all classes is
4.3 meters.
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MINIMUM
BRIDGE CLASSIFICATION
OVERHEAD CLEARANCE
Up to MLC 70 4.5 meters
Above MLC 70 4.5 meters
9-100. Bypasses around the bridge site are indicated using arrows
similar to (and branching away from) the arrow connecting the bridge
symbol to its location on the map. Bypass arrows should show the
approximate route of the bypass. Refer to the discussion of bypasses in
the following section.
NOTE: Railway bridges that could be used by road vehicles in an emergency should
be classified and identified on the map or overlay. The symbol for a railway
bridge should indicate whether it is “use easy” or “use difficult.”
SECTION X – BYPASSES
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_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data
9-103. This section includes tables covering the basic computations for
converting English measurements to their metric equivalents. The
following conversions are included:
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9-61
Appendix A
Combat Orders
Combat orders are the means
CONTENTS
by which the reconnaissance
platoon leader receives and Warning Orders ............................................ A-1
Operation Orders .......................................... A-2
transmits information, from Fragmentary Orders ..................................... A-6
the earliest notification that Patrol Orders ................................................ A-7
an operation will occur
through the final phases of
execution. They are absolutely critical to mission success. All
members of the platoon must be familiar with the formats of warning
orders, OPORDs, and FRAGOs, as well as the format of patrol orders
and the information included in them.
A-1
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
TASK ORGANIZATION
· Time(s) of attachment.
· Time(s) of detachment.
· Support relationship(s).
PARAGRAPH 1 - SITUATION
a. Enemy (threat) forces (and battlefield conditions).
(1) Weather and light data.
· Precipitation.
· Temperature.
· Other weather conditions (such as wind, dust, or fog).
· Light data:
BMNT: _____________________. Sunrise: _________________ .
Sunset: _____________________. EENT: __________________ .
Moonrise: ___________________. Moonset: ________________ .
Percent Illumination: ____________________.
(2) Terrain (factors of OCOKA).
· Observation and fields of fire.
· Cover and concealment.
· Obstacles.
· Key terrain.
· Avenues of approach.
A-2
___________________________________________________________ Appendix A – Combat Orders
PARAGRAPH 2 - MISSION
The aspects of WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, and WHY for the mission.
PARAGRAPH 3 - EXECUTION
Commander’s intent.
a. Concept of the operation.
(1) Commander’s focus, tempo and engagement criteria.
(2) Scheme of maneuver.
· Offensive operations.
- Passage of lines.
- Axis or route.
- Movement formations.
- Movement techniques.
- Actions on contact (prior to the objective).
- Actions at obstacles.
- Actions on the objective (decisive point).
- Consolidation and reorganization.
- On-order and be-prepared missions.
· Defensive operations.
- Security operations.
- Passage of lines of forward forces.
- Battle handover.
- Defense of initial and successive BPs.
- Displacement.
- Counterattack.
A-3
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(3) Fires.
· Purpose of indirect fires.
· Priority of fires.
· Allocation, including use of special fires (such as smoke, illumination, or CAS).
· Triggers.
· Restrictions/coordinating instructions.
(4) Engineer support.
· Priority of effort.
· Priority of support.
b. Tasks to maneuver units.
(1) Task for each of the platoon's sections/squads.
(2) Purpose for each of the platoon's sections/squads.
c. Tasks to combat support units.
(1) Engineers.
(2) ADA.
d. Coordinating instructions.
(1) Movement instructions.
· SP/RP time and location.
· Order of march.
· Movement route.
· RP time and location.
· Limit of advance (attack position, tactical assembly area, or other control measure).
(2) Passage of lines.
· Linkup time and location.
· Passage point/passage lane locations.
(3) Priority intelligence requirements (PIR).
(4) Troop safety.
· Exposure guidance (in cGy).
· MOPP level(s) and initiation times.
· Direct fire weapons control status and warnings.
· ADA weapons control status and warnings.
A-4
___________________________________________________________ Appendix A – Combat Orders
A-5
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
b. Signal.
· SOI in effect.
· Radio communications restrictions.
- Radio listening silence and the time it is in effect.
- Alternate frequencies and time or condition for changing frequency.
· Visual and pyrotechnic signals.
- During passage of lines.
- During movement.
- During breaching operations.
- On the objective.
- During defensive operations.
- Emergency signals.
· Code words and reports specific to the operation.
· Electronic protection, including COMSEC guidelines and procedures.
A-4. The FRAGO is a brief oral or written order that serves to update
or clarify a previous order. During the execution of an operation, FRAGOs
are the medium of battle command. The commander uses them to
communicate changes in the threat or friendly situation and to retask his
subordinate elements based on changes in the situation. FRAGOs can
serve any of the following purposes:
A-6
___________________________________________________________ Appendix A – Combat Orders
TASK ORGANIZATION
Explain how the patrol is organized for the operation and confirm the composition of each element.
Identify time(s) of attachment and detachment. If there is no change to the previous task organization, the
patrol leader indicates that there is no change.
PARAGRAPH 1 - SITUATION
a. Enemy (threat) forces (and battlefield conditions).
(1) Weather and light data.
· Precipitation.
· Temperature.
· Other weather conditions (such as wind, dust, or fog).
· Light data:
BMNT: ___________________ . Sunrise: _________________ .
Sunset: ___________________ . EENT: __________________ .
Moonrise: _________________ . Moonset: ________________ .
Percent Illumination: _____________________ .
· How will weather and light factors affect the patrol and threat forces?
(2) Terrain (factors of OCOKA).
· Observation and fields of fire.
· Cover and concealment.
· Obstacles.
· Key terrain.
· Avenues of approach.
· How will terrain factors affect the patrol and threat forces?
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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
b. Friendly forces.
· Mission and commander’s intent two levels higher.
· Concept of the operation for the next higher unit.
· Location and mission of units on the left, right, front, and rear and of support units.
· Missions and routes of adjacent patrols.
· Unit(s) providing fire support.
· Mission and commander’s intent of the rest of the platoon (in the event the platoon
has multiple missions.
c. Attachments and detachments.
Any special personnel or elements (such as engineers, medics, linguists, FOs) who will
accompany the patrol.
d. Civilian populace.
· Culture.
· Political, government, and religious institutions and organizations.
· Factions/groups/organizations/terrorists.
· Restrictions and curfews.
PARAGRAPH 2 - MISSION
The aspects of WHO, WHAT (including the type of patrol), WHEN, WHERE, and WHY for the
mission. This includes a clear and concise statement of the platoon’s task and purpose.
PARAGRAPH 3 - EXECUTION
Commander’s intent.
a. Concept of the operation.
(1) Commander’s focus, tempo and engagement criteria. Explain, in general terms, how the
patrol will accomplish the mission. Identify the mission essential tasks and other critical tasks. Specify the
duration of the patrol.
(2) Scheme of maneuver. Explain the scheme of maneuver and graphics (described
sequentially as they will occur during the patrol) while simultaneously referencing a terrain board, dirt sketch
or map.
(3) Fires. Explain how and when fires will be used. Provide the patrol with the target overlay, to
include target numbers. Specify priority of fires, use of/availability of special purpose fires (such as smoke,
illumination, or CAS), and triggers.
A-8
___________________________________________________________ Appendix A – Combat Orders
(4) Intelligence.
(5) Electronic warfare.
(6) Engineers.
b. Tasks to maneuver units.
(1) Task and purpose for each of the platoon's teams/sections/squads.
(2) Task and purpose for special teams and key individuals.
(3) Task and purpose for support/attached personnel.
c. Coordinating instructions.
(1) Actions at the objective.
(2) Time line. Explain the time sequence from the time the patrol order is issued to actions at
the objective.
(3) Priority intelligence requirements (PIR).
(4) Movement techniques.
(5) Primary route.
(6) Alternate route.
(7) Departure and reentry of friendly lines.
· Linkup time and location.
· Departure point.
· Reentry point.
(8) Rally points and actions at rally points.
(9) Actions on contact (for the eight forms of contact).
(10) Actions at danger areas.
(11) Actions at halts.
(12) Debriefing time and place.
(13) MOPP level, initiation time, and exposure guidance (in cGy).
(14) Rehearsals (prioritized).
(15) Inspections.
(16) Equipment/special equipment needed to accomplish the mission.
(17) Soldier safety.
(18) Rules of interaction (ROI), engagement (ROE), and graduated response.
(19) Annexes (air assault, airborne, stream crossing, vehicle movement, linkup, evasion and
escape, hide site, cache).
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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
Annexes:
a. Air assault and airborne.
b. Stream crossing.
c. Vehicle movement.
d. Evasion and escape.
e. Linkup.
f. Rest overnight, hide site, and surveillance site.
g. Cache site.
NOTE: The following discussion covers formats for the seven listed annexes to the patrol order. These
annexes may also be applicable to the OPORDs for other operations as well.
A-10
___________________________________________________________ Appendix A – Combat Orders
PARAGRAPH 1 - SITUATION
a. Enemy forces (threat).
(1) Disposition, composition, strength, and identification (air defense).
(2) Weather (how it will affect the air operation).
(3) Terrain (how it will affect the air operation).
b. Friendly forces (includes units supporting the operation, such as helicopters, artillery, air defense,
electronic countermeasures, and USAF assets).
PARAGRAPH 2 - MISSION
Include only information pertaining to the air operation.
PARAGRAPH 3 - EXECUTION
Commander’s intent.
a. Concept of the operation.
(1) Maneuver.
(2) Fires.
(3) Intelligence.
(4) Electronic warfare.
(5) Other.
b. Tasks to maneuver units.
c. Tasks to combat support units.
d. Coordinating instructions.
(1) Time(s) aircraft are available and location of pickup sites.
(2) Organization for movement.
(3) Time and location for rehearsals, jump refresher, and jumpmaster prejump inspection.
(4) Time over FLOT.
(5) Information on the landing zone (LZ), drop zone (DZ), and/or pickup zone (PZ).
· Grid (primary and alternate, if applicable).
· Marking procedures.
- Long-range (terrain feature, radio, mirror, flare).
- Short-range (terrain feature, radio, man-made feature, VS-17 panels,
smoke, light, infrared strobe, chemical light).
(6) Flight route from the PZ to the LZ or DZ.
· General.
· Checkpoints.
· Prelanding and/or prejump warning.
(7) Formations.
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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
· At pickup site.
· En route.
· At the LZ, DZ, and/or PZ.
(8) Actions on enemy contact and actions for downed aircraft.
· En route.
· At the LZ, DZ, and/or PZ.
(9) Assembly area (grid, terrain feature, marking, assembly technique).
(10) Method for destruction and cache of special equipment.
(11) Rehearsal plan.
PARAGRAPH 1 - SITUATION
a. Enemy forces (threat).
(1) Disposition, composition, strength, and identification.
(2) Weather (how it will affect the stream and the crossing operation).
(3) Terrain (how it will affect the stream and the crossing operation).
· River width.
· River depth.
· Information on river current.
· Vegetation.
· Obstacles.
b. Friendly forces.
PARAGRAPH 2 - MISSION
Include only information pertaining to the stream crossing operation.
A-12
___________________________________________________________ Appendix A – Combat Orders
PARAGRAPH 3 - EXECUTION
Commander’s intent.
a. Concept of the operation.
(1) Maneuver.
(2) Fires.
(3) Intelligence.
(4) Electronic warfare.
(5) Other.
PARAGRAPH 1 - SITUATION
a. Enemy forces (threat).
(1) Disposition, composition, strength, and identification.
(2) Weather (how it will affect movement).
(3) Terrain along and adjacent to the route of movement (how it will affect movement).
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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
(4) Vegetation.
(5) Obstacles and potential ambush sites.
b. Friendly forces.
(1) Units along the route.
(2) Unit(s) providing transportation.
PARAGRAPH 2 - MISSION
Include only information pertaining to the vehicle movement operation.
PARAGRAPH 3 - EXECUTION
Commander’s intent.
a. Concept of the operation.
(1) Maneuver.
(2) Fires.
(3) Intelligence.
(4) Electronic warfare.
(5) Engineers.
(6) Route-related information.
(7) Other.
b. Tasks to maneuver units.
(1) Teams.
(2) Elements.
(3) Individuals. Brief vehicle drivers on routes, actions on enemy contact, and vehicle interval
and speed.
c. Tasks to combat support units.
d. Coordinating instructions.
(1) Time of departure and/or return.
(2) Loading instructions and order of movement.
(3) Actions on enemy contact.
(4) Actions at the dismount point.
(5) Rehearsal plan.
(6) Inspection plan. Inspect vehicles for the following:
A-14
___________________________________________________________ Appendix A – Combat Orders
PARAGRAPH 1 - SITUATION
a. Enemy forces (threat).
(1) Disposition, composition, strength, and identification.
(2) Weather.
(3) Terrain along the evasion route (route should be broken into sections).
(4) Vegetation (along route).
(5) Obstacles (along route; rivers; mountains; built-up areas).
(6) Identification of other potential enemy pursuers.
b. Friendly forces.
(1) Potential units providing exfiltration support.
(2) Potential partisans providing exfiltration support.
(3) Survival features.
PARAGRAPH 2 - MISSION
Include only information pertaining to the evasion and escape operation.
PARAGRAPH 3 - EXECUTION
Commander’s intent.
a. Concept of the operation.
(1) Corridor (provided by operations element).
(2) Designated area of recovery locations (selected by team leader).
b. Coordinating instructions.
(1) Primary route in the corridor.
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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
PARAGRAPH 1 - SITUATION
a. Enemy forces (threat).
(1) Disposition, composition, strength, and identification.
(2) Terrain at linkup site.
(3) Vegetation at linkup site.
(4) Obstacles at and/or near linkup site.
b. Friendly forces.
(1) Linkup unit.
(2) Designated liaison team.
PARAGRAPH 2 - MISSION
Include only information pertaining to the linkup operation.
PARAGRAPH 3 - EXECUTION
Commander’s intent.
a. Concept of the operation.
(1) Maneuver.
(2) Fires.
(3) Intelligence.
A-16
___________________________________________________________ Appendix A – Combat Orders
PARAGRAPH 1 - SITUATION
a. Enemy forces (threat).
(1) Disposition, composition, strength, and identification.
(2) Terrain at the site.
(3) Vegetation at the site.
A-17
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
PARAGRAPH 2 - MISSION
Include only information pertaining to the rest overnight, hide site, or surveillance site.
PARAGRAPH 3 - EXECUTION
Commander’s intent.
a. Concept of the operation.
(1) Maneuver.
(2) Fires.
(3) Intelligence.
(4) Electronic warfare.
(5) Engineers.
(6) Other.
A-18
___________________________________________________________ Appendix A – Combat Orders
PARAGRAPH 1 - SITUATION
a. Enemy forces (threat).
(1) Disposition, composition, strength, and identification.
(2) Terrain at the cache site.
(3) Vegetation at the cache site.
(4) Obstacles at or near the cache site.
(5) Soil conditions at the cache site.
b. Friendly forces.
PARAGRAPH 2 - MISSION
Include only information pertaining to the cache site and the cache operation.
PARAGRAPH 3 - EXECUTION
Commander’s intent.
a. Concept of the operation.
(1) Maneuver.
(2) Fires.
(3) Intelligence.
(4) Other.
b. Tasks to maneuver units.
(1) Elements (security, digging).
(2) Individuals (report recorder).
c. Tasks to combat support units.
d. Coordinating instructions.
(1) Security plan.
(2) Recording plan.
(3) Site preparation plan.
(4) Site digging plan.
(5) Spoil disposal plan.
(6) Actions on enemy contact.
(7) Rehearsal plan.
A-19
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
(3) Contents. An itemized list of all materials in each container with a description of how each
item is packaged.
(4) Description of containers. Size, weight, and other descriptive details. If several
containers are included in the cache, each container should be numbered. Each container can be
referenced by its number on the sketch of the cache.
(5) General area. The easily recognizable names of places, which include the country,
province, and smaller political divisions, down to the nearest town or village.
(6) Immediate area. Description of the area, focusing on the immediate reference point and
instructions for proceeding from this point to the final reference point. All landmarks that aid visual
recognition of the route should be described.
(7) Cache location. Description of the final reference point, with the exact sightings and linear
measurements required to pinpoint the cache. All measurements must be stated in the linear units (meters,
feet) that the recovery agent can understand and use.
(8) Emplacement details. All features of the site or natural conditions that must be
considered for retrieving the cache. Essential considerations for emplacement and retrieval, based on the
method of caching, include the following:
A-20
___________________________________________________________ Appendix A – Combat Orders
· Burial. Exact depth underground of each container. Precise description of shoring (if
used). All seasonal variations (surface vegetation, date and depth of ground freezing and thawing). The
type of soil and the time required for emplacement also provide useful guides for planning the recovery
operation.
· Concealment. Exactly how the cache is emplaced at the site, including any covering
(plaster, bricks) that must be penetrated or removed to recover the cache. Full instructions should be
provided if removing or replacing the covering involves any special problems or techniques (matching the
plaster or mortar). All necessary information about the cache custodian, if one is used, should be included.
· Submersion. Depth of the water (including high- and low-water marks); submersion
depth (if the container does not rest on the bottom of the water); type of bottom; water motion; clearness of
the water; usual freezing and thawing dates.
(9) Operational data and remarks. List of equipment needed for recovery of the cache.
(NOTE: Special consideration should be given to any equipment that may be needed for recovery, even
though it was not used in emplacement.) Description of at least two routes to the site that offer maximum
natural concealment and means of escape in case of sudden attack. Location of nearby houses and
thoroughfares. Description of local security forces, including their regular posts and patrol routes near the
cache. Suggestions for cover when visiting the site, including warning of what cover to avoid. Any other
information that may aid planning the recovery operation.
(10) Dates of emplacement and duration of the cache. Duration estimate based on how
long the contents of the cache will remain usable. Pertinent factors include the normal shelf life of items that
deteriorate with time (medicine, batteries), the expiration date of official documents (such as driver’s
licenses), and how long the packaging will withstand moisture penetration or corrosion.
(11) Sketches and diagrams. Whatever sketches and diagrams are necessary to clarify the
description of the cache and illustrate the instructions for locating and recovering the cache. These
considerations should include at least an area sketch, showing the route from the immediate reference
point to the final reference point (see sketch A), and a site diagram showing precisely how the cache is
pinpointed (see sketch B). Photographs of the immediate area, immediate reference point, final reference
point, and other landmarks near the site are not essential, but they may be helpful.
A-21
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
(12) Radio message for recovery. A radio message should be drafted in case there is an
emergency during the emplacement/recovery process. The best time for drafting the message is when
details are fresh in the mind of the emplacer. The message should include type of cache, method of
caching, and concise instructions for locating the site. These instructions must be clear and brief enough for
secure radio transmission. The preparer considers the intended recovery agent’s familiarity with the area as
well as the maps and makeshift surveying instruments that will be available to him. The message must be
in a language he is sure to understand; it must be drafted or translated by someone who is fluent in the
language.
A-22
___________________________________________________________ Appendix A – Combat Orders
The following example radio message gives instructions for recovering the cache shown in
sample sketches A and B. This sample message illustrates the minimum information needed for recovery.
Additional data should be included in a radio message only when special circumstances require it. For
instance, if a cached package is too heavy or too large for one person to carry, the weight or the exterior
dimensions should be included. The depth of a submerged cache ordinarily should be specified, but the
depth of a buried cache should not be included unless it is buried deeper than the usual 45 centimeters.
Example radio message: “Communications cache is in three holes in Y (province), X
(country) in graveyard three kilometers east of A (city) on north side of Route 5. Cache is in northeast
corner near walled plot. Container 1 is west of the plot one-two (12) meters from northwest corner and one-
six (16) meters from southwest corner. Container 2 is four meters west of southwest corner in line with
south side. Container 3 is on south side adjacent to southeast corner of plot.”
NOTE: Success of the caching operation may depend on attention to details that may seem minor to a
nonprofessional. Security factors such as the cover of the caching party, the sterility of the
material cached, and the obliteration of the slightest trace of the operation are vital. Important,
too, are the technical factors that govern the preservation of the material in usable condition and
the recording of data essential for recovery. Successful caching demands adherence to the basic
principles of clandestine operations as well as knowledge of the technicalities of the operation.
These high standards of security and “know-how” must be instilled through meticulous training of
the elements responsible for both the emplacement and the recovery of the cache.
A-23
Appendix B
Report Formats
This appendix focuses on
CONTENTS
specific formats for reports
used by the reconnaissance Contact and Blue Reports (Operations) ..... B-2
Contact Report ...................................... B-2
platoon. Reports are outlined Blue 1 – Spot Report (SPOTREP) ........ B-2
in outline form, with a Blue 2 – Situation Report (SITREP) ..... B-3
description of how and when Blue 4 – Report for Bridge, Overpass,
each report is used and a line- Culvert, Underpass, or Tunnel
by-line explanation of (BRIDGEREP) ..................................... B-4
Blue 5 – Report for Ford, Ferry, or
information to be covered. Other Crossing Site (CROSSREP) .... B-5
Examples of some reports are Blue 7 – Route Reconnaissance Report
included. (NOTE: Refer to (ROUTEREP) ...................................... B-5
Chapter 2 of this manual for Blue 9 – Obstacle Report ...................... B-6
a discussion of digital Blue 10 – Bypass Report ...................... B-6
Blue 11 – Stand-to Report
reporting procedures using (STANREP) ......................................... B-7
FBCB2.) Green Reports (Intelligence) ....................... B-7
Green 2 – Sensitive Items Report
(SENSEREP) ....................................... B-7
Green 3 – Splash Report ...................... B-8
Green 4 – Patrol Report ........................ B-8
Green 5 – Meaconing, Intrusion, Jamming,
and Interference (MIJI) Report .......... B-10
Green 6 – EPW/Captured Material
Report ................................................. B-10
Yellow Reports (Logistics) .......................... B-11
Yellow 1 – Equipment Status
Report (ESTAT) .................................. B-11
Yellow 1A – Battle Loss Spot Report .. B-13
Yellow 2 – Ammunition Status
Report ................................................. B-14
Yellow 2A – Ammunition Request ....... B-14
Yellow 3 – POL Status Report .............. B-16
Yellow 3A – POL Request ..................... B-16
Red Reports (Personnel) .............................. B-17
Red 2 – Personnel Battle Loss
Report ................................................. B-17
Red 3 – Medical Evacuation Request .. B-18
NBC Reports ................................................. B-18
NBC-1 – Observer’s Initial Report ........ B-19
NBC-3 – Immediate Warning of
Expected Contamination ................... B-21
NBC-4 – Report of Radiation Dose-Rate
Measurement ..................................... B-21
NBC-5 – Report of Areas of
Contamination .................................... B-22
Digital Reporting and C2 Messages ........... B-23
Alerts and Warnings ............................. B-23
Combat Reporting Messages ............... B-23
Mission-Planning Information .............. B-25
Geo-referenced Messages ................... B-25
Digital Reports ....................................... B-25
B-1
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
CONTACT REPORT
WHEN USED
B-2. A contact report is issued immediately upon contact with a threat
or unknown force in the area of operations. This alert, which can be very
brief, takes priority over all other communications traffic.
FORMAT
B-3. State “CONTACT,” followed by a description of the threat or
unknown force and the cardinal direction from the sender.
EXAMPLE
B-4. “THIS IS YANKEE 23. CONTACT, TANK, NORTH, OUT.”
FORMAT
B-6. State "SPOTREP" or "UPDATED SPOTREP," followed by
pertinent information on these lines:
Line ALPHA: Observer or source (omit if it is the calling station;
use call signs or description otherwise).
Line BRAVO: Activity or characteristic being observed. Use the
SALUTE format:
· Size: The number of sighted personnel, vehicles, or other
equipment.
· Activity: What the threat is doing.
· Location: Grid coordinates.
· Unit: Patches, signs, or markings.
· Time: Time the activity was observed.
· Equipment: Description or identification of all
equipment associated with the activity.
Line CHARLIE: Actions you have taken and your
recommendations. Actions usually involve conducting
B-2
___________________________________________________________ Appendix B – Report Formats
NOTE: Report the center of mass of identical, closely grouped items. Otherwise, report
multiple grid coordinates of traces (from ________to ________).
EXAMPLE
B-7. “YANKEE 27, THIS IS YANKEE 23. SPOTREP, OVER. ONE
BRDM, STATIONARY, ORIENTED SOUTH AT GRID MS289546; 1725
HOURS. CONTINUING TO OBSERVE, OVER.”
FORMAT
B-9. State "SITREP," followed by pertinent information on these lines:
Line 1: The as-of date-time group (DTG).
Line 2: Brief summary of threat activity, casualties inflicted, and
prisoners captured.
Line 3: Friendly locations (encoded using control measures or
TIRS points). The following can be listed:
· CP locations.
· First subelement’s center of mass.
· Second subelement’s center of mass.
· Third subelement’s center of mass.
· Any additional elements as necessary.
Line 4: Combat vehicles operational. The following types
of vehicles can be listed:
· Tanks.
· CFVs.
· APCs.
· ITVs.
· Mortar vehicles.
· AVLBs.
· HMMWVs.
B-3
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
NOTE: If an item is reported as status level BLACK on lines 6 or 7, the appropriate yellow
report (logistics) must follow.
B-4
___________________________________________________________ Appendix B – Report Formats
FORMAT
B-14. To send this report, state “ROUTEREP,” followed by pertinent
information on these lines:
Line ALPHA: “From” location, reported using a control measure
or TIRS point.
Line BRAVO: “To” location, reported using a control measure or
TIRS point.
Line CHARLIE: Type of route, reported using the following
designations:
· Highway, reported using the number “1.”
· Road, number “2.”
· Trail, number “3.”
· Cross-country, number “4.”
Line DELTA: Classification of route. Check for height, width,
and weight restrictions to determine the appropriate class,
B-5
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
B-6
___________________________________________________________ Appendix B – Report Formats
FORMAT
B-18. To send this report, state “STANREP,” followed by pertinent
information on these lines:
Line ALPHA: Time stand-to was completed.
Line BRAVO: Weapons on hand and functional. Use the term
“UP” for functional weapons on hand. Use "EXCEPTION" for
weapons either not on hand or not functional.
Line CHARLIE: Sensitive and accountable items on hand. Use
“UP” or “EXCEPTION” as applicable.
Line DELTA: Vehicles and radios on hand and functional. Use
“UP” or “EXCEPTION” as applicable.
Line ECHO: Report the on-hand/functional status of any other
equipment using “UP” or “EXCEPTION.”
NOTE: For lines B, C, D, and E, refer to the Yellow 1 report (ESTAT) for equipment line
numbers.
EXAMPLE
B-19. “BLACK 3, THIS IS RED 1; BLUE 11. LINE ALPHA:
COMPLETE TIME 0600. LINE BRAVO: UP. LINE CHARLIE: ITEM
38, MISSING 1 EACH. LINE DELTA: RED 3 WILL NOT START.”
B-7
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
FORMAT
B-22. To send this report, state “SENSEREP,” followed by pertinent
information on these lines:
Line ALPHA: Reporting unit (use call sign).
Line CHARLIE: Results of sensitive items check. Use the term
"UP" for on-hand/functional items. For missing items, report
the line description and serial number and provide an
explanation. Use additional lines from the Yellow 1 report.
Line ECHO: Initials of person sending report.
EXAMPLES
B-23. “THIS IS RED 1. SENSEREP. LINE ALPHA: RED. LINE
CHARLIE: ALL 'UP.' LINE ECHO: RWS.”
B-24. When sent over a wire net: “THIS IS RED ONE WITH A
SENSEREP. LINE ALPHA: ONE. LINE CHARLIE: MISSING ONE
IM-93 DOSIMETER, NUMBER 64, SEARCH IN PROGRESS. LINE
ECHO: TDB.”
B-8
___________________________________________________________ Appendix B – Report Formats
FORMAT
B-28. This debriefing format can be used to ensure all pertinent
information is provided in the patrol report. (NOTE: See Appendix J of
this manual for a more detailed debriefing format.)
Designation of patrol. Include these elements:
· To: _______________
· From: _______________
· Maps: _______________
Task.
Time of departure.
Time of return.
NOTE: The report should conclude with the name, rank/grade, and organization/unit of the
patrol leader.
B-9
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
FORMAT
B-30. Report all pertinent information in this format:
Line 1: Unit identification.
Line 2: Type of interference.
Line 3: Location.
Line 4: “On” time (DTG interference started).
Line 5: “Off” time (DTG interference ended).
Line 6: Effects of interference, including operations or equipment
affected.
Line 7: Frequency (or frequency range) of interference, if known.
Line 8: Narrative or additional information.
Line 9: Time (when required).
Line 10: Authentication.
FORMAT
Format for Reporting EPW Capture
B-32. Provide all pertinent information on the following lines (examples
in parentheses):
Line 1: State “GREEN 6.”
Line 2: Item captured (state “EPW”).
Line 3: DTG of capture (“260845SEP83”).
Line 4: Place of capture, using grid coordinates (“NS 621434”).
Line 5: Capturing unit (appropriate call sign).
Line 6: Circumstances of capture, described as briefly as possible.
B-10
___________________________________________________________ Appendix B – Report Formats
NOTE: After sending the report to the company team or troop commander, provide
disposition instructions or recommendations, if necessary.
FORMAT
B-36. Equipment status is recorded using one of these terms:
operational, inoperative, or combat loss. Provide all pertinent
information using the following categories and lines:
Weapons
Line 1: Bayonet knife, with scabbard, for M16A2.
Line 2: Pistol, 9-mm, automatic, M9.
Line 3: Rifle, 5.56-mm, with equipment.
Line 4: Launcher, grenade, 40-mm, single shot, rifle mounted,
detachable, with equipment.
Line 5: Machine gun, M2, caliber .50, heavy barrel (HB).
Line 6: Machine gun, 7.62-mm, light flexible.
Line 7: Squad automatic weapon, M249.
Line 8: Grenade launcher, 40-mm, MK19.
B-11
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
NOTE: Lines 13, 14, 15, and 16 are used as needed for additional weapons assigned to the
platoon.
NOTE: Lines 22, 23, and 24 are used as needed for additional vehicles and/or vehicle
equipment assigned to the platoon.
NBC Equipment
Line 25: Alarm, chemical agent, automatic, portable, for full-
tracked APC and armored recovery vehicle (ARV).
Line 26: Alarm, chemical agent, automatic, portable, with power
supply, for track, utility, 1/4-ton.
Line 27: Charger, radiac detector, PP-1578/PD.
Line 28: Mask, chemical-biological, multipurpose.
Line 29: Radiacmeter, AN/UDR-13.
Line 30: Alarm, chemical agent, automatic, portable, manpack.
Line 31: Radiacmeter, IM-93/UD.
Line 32: Radiacmeter, IM-174/PD.
Line 33: Radiacmeter, AN/VDR-2.
NOTE: Lines 34, 35, and 36 are used as needed for additional NBC equipment assigned to
the platoon.
Radios
Line 37: Radio set, AN/GRC-160.
Line 38: Radio set, AN/VRC-46.
Line 39: Radio set, AN/VRC-47.
Line 40: Radio set, AN/VRC-64.
Line 41: Radio set, AN/PRC-77.
B-12
___________________________________________________________ Appendix B – Report Formats
NOTE: Lines 46, 47, and 48 are used as needed for additional radios assigned to the
platoon.
Miscellaneous Equipment
Line 49: Demolition set, explosive, initiating, nonelectric.
Line 50: Detecting set, mine, portable, metallic and non-metallic.
Line 51: Detecting set, mine, portable, metallic, AN/PSS-11.
Line 52: Night vision goggles, AN/PVS-7B.
Line 53: Night vision sight, crew-served weapon, AN/TVS-5.
Line 54: Night vision sight, individual-served weapon, AN/PVS-4.
Line 55: Platoon early warning system (PEWS), AN/TRS-2(V).
Line 56: Binoculars, modular construction, military scale reticle,
7x50-mm, with equipment.
Line 57: Telescope, straight, military.
Line 58: Detector, radar signal, AN/PSS-10.
Line 59: Position locating reporting system, basic user unit.
Line 60: Position locating reporting system, surface vehicle
installation kit.
NOTE: Lines 61, 62, and 63 are used as needed for any other equipment assigned to the
platoon.
EXAMPLE
B-37. “THIS IS RED 3. YELLOW 1. LINE 12: ALPHA. LINE 33:
BRAVO. LINE 38: CHARLIE. LINE 55: CHARLIE. OVER.”
FORMAT
B-39. Provide pertinent information on the following lines:
Line 1: Time of loss.
Line 2: Number of pieces of equipment to be evacuated to
troop/battalion or higher for maintenance. Refer to the
appropriate line numbers from the Yellow 1 report.
B-13
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
EXAMPLE
B-40. “BLACK 3, THIS IS RED 4. YELLOW ONE ALPHA, BREAK.
LINE 1: ONE FOUR THREE ZERO HOURS. LINE 2: REFERENCE
SIX SLANT ONE; REFERENCE TWO-NINER SLANT THREE. LINE 3:
REFERENCE TWO-NINER SLANT ONE. LINE 4: I SET VB, IDVRTG.”
NOTE: Yellow 1A reports are not cumulative. A Yellow 1 report showing total unit status is
sent daily not later than 1300 hours. It gives equipment status as of 1200 hours that
day.
NOTE: BLACK status in a Yellow 2 report requires immediate follow-up with a Yellow 2A
report. GREEN, AMBER, or RED status does not require submission of a Yellow 2A.
B-14
___________________________________________________________ Appendix B – Report Formats
NOTE: All Yellow 2A requests will be for the quantity of ammunition required by the
platoon unless otherwise specified.
B-15
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
NOTE: When sending a Yellow 2A report, use only the lines required for specific requests.
Additional lines (beginning with Line 45) are used to request any other types of
ammunition required by the platoon. Attached units should coordinate with the S4
for additional line numbers for their ammunition requirements.
EXAMPLE
B-43. “BLACK 3, THIS IS RED 4. YELLOW TWO ALPHA, BREAK.
LINE 1: CVB GHJ. LINE 37: RTY UOL. LINE 42: ERF WDS QTR.”
EXAMPLE
B-46. “BLACK 3, THIS IS RED 4. YELLOW THREE, AMBER, OVER.”
B-16
___________________________________________________________ Appendix B – Report Formats
NOTE: Lines 21, 22, and 23 are used as needed for any other equipment assigned to the
platoon. Additional lines (beginning with Line 24) are used to request any other
POL products required by the platoon or attached elements.
EXAMPLE
B-48. “BLACK 3, THIS IS RED 1. YELLOW THREE ALPHA, BREAK.
LINE 1: 112000 NOV. LINE 3: 900. LINE l8: 15.”
FORMAT
B-51. Provide all pertinent information using the following lines:
Line 1: Battle roster number.
Line 2: DTG of the incident.
Line 3: Location of the incident (encoded).
Line 4: Type of casualties, encoded by letter as follows:
· ALPHA: KIA, hostile action.
· BRAVO: KIA, nonhostile action.
· CHARLIE: Body recovered.
· DELTA: Body not recovered.
· ECHO: Body identified.
B-17
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
FORMAT
Ground Evacuation Format
B-53. Provide pertinent information on the following lines:
Line 1: State “EVAC.”
Line 2: Location for pickup (encoded).
Line 3: Number of casualties.
Line 4: Category of patient condition, encoded by letter designation
as follows:
· ALPHA: Urgent.
· BRAVO: Priority.
· CHARLIE: Routine.
NOTE: Use the letter designation with the number of patients in each category; for
example, "TWO ALPHA" indicates that two patients require evacuation on an
urgent basis.
PURPOSE
B-55. The reconnaissance platoon uses NBC reports to provide the TOC
with accurate and timely information on all shelling and NBC activity
B-18
___________________________________________________________ Appendix B – Report Formats
RESPONSIBILITY
B-56. The squadron/battalion S3 is responsible for collecting,
monitoring, and distributing shelling and NBC information. The chemical
officer and chemical NCO are responsible for evaluating NBC reports,
formulating NBC reports for lower and higher units, and recommending
COAs to the commander.
REPORTING SYSTEM
B-57. All shelling and NBC reports are forwarded to the TOC over the
command net.
B-19
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
NOTE: Carefully specify the units of measure used (such as degrees, mils, or grid azimuth).
EXAMPLES
B-59. Table B-1 shows sample transmissions sent in NBC-1 reports for
the three types of NBC attack. Note that some lines are omitted when
information is not applicable or available.
"TU459830, "OBERG,
F
ESTIMATED" ACTUAL"
G "ROCKET" "AERIAL"
I "135"
J "65"
K
L "100 MILS"
M
S "270445 ZULU" "270430 ZULU"
B-20
___________________________________________________________ Appendix B – Report Formats
EXAMPLES
B-63. Table B-2 shows sample transmissions sent in NBC-3 reports for
nuclear and chemical/biological attacks. Note that lines are omitted
whenever information is not applicable or available.
Z "01902505" or "011"
B-21
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
FORMAT
B-65. To send this report, state "NBC FOUR," followed by pertinent
information on these lines:
Line QUEBEC: Location of reading; use friendly graphics or
encryption. Omit this line when transmitting on a wire net.
Line ROMEO: Dose rate in cGy/hr (average total dose rounded to
the nearest 10 cGy). Specify whether the dose rate is "INITIAL,"
"INCREASING," "PEAK," or "DECREASING"; specify
"SHIELDED" if the dose rate is measured inside a vehicle.
Line SIERRA: DTG of reading. Specify the time zone.
NOTE: Repeat lines Q, R, and S as often as necessary. Radiation dose rates ideally are
measured in the open, one meter above the ground; if the rate must be measured in
a shielded location, it is converted (as accurately as possible) to a rate in the open.
EXAMPLES
B-66. “THIS IS RED 1. NBC FOUR. LINE QUEBEC: LB 123987.
LINE ROMEO: 1, INITIAL. LINE SIERRA: 201735 LOCAL.”
B-67. “THIS IS RED 1. NBC FOUR. LINE QUEBEC: LB 123987.
LINE ROMEO: 60, PEAK. LINE SIERRA: 201805 LOCAL.”
NOTE: Users of NBC-4 reports are not confined solely to the use of the letter items shown
in these examples.
B-22
___________________________________________________________ Appendix B – Report Formats
· SALT.
· MEDEVAC.
· Fire mission (call for fire).
· Check fire.
· SITREP.
B-23
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
Safety Radius
Message Type Type of Danger Zone
(Meters)
NBC-1 Chemical 500
Obstacle Report /
Biological 500
NBC-1
Obstacle Report /
NBC-1 / Strike Nuclear 1000
Warning
Spot Report Aircraft 5000
Spot Report Formation 4000
Spot Report Field Fortifications 1500
Spot Report Multiple Rocket Launcher 4000
Spot Report Air Defense Artillery 4000
Spot Report Assembly Area 4000
Spot Report Buildings 1500
Spot Report Equipment 4000
Spot Report Command Center 1500
Spot Report Supply Dump 1500
Spot Report Rocket Missiles 4000
Spot Report Vehicles 4000
Spot Report Armor Combat 4000
Spot Report Artillery 4000
Spot Report Mortar 8000
Spot Report Weapons 1500
Spot Report Personnel 1500
Spot Report Unknown 4000
Spot Report Fire Mission 600
Obstacle Report Minefield, Antipersonnel 500
Obstacle Report Minefield, Antitank 500
Obstacle Report Minefield, Mixed 500
Obstacle Report Minefield, Unknown 500
Obstacle Report Chemical, Nerve 500
Obstacle Report Chemical, Blood 500
Obstacle Report Chemical, Blister 500
Obstacle Report Chemical, Choking 500
Obstacle Report Booby Traps 500
Obstacle Report Abatis 500
Obstacle Report Craters 500
Obstacle Report Antitank Ditch 500
Obstacle Report Scatterable Mines 500
Obstacle Report Bunker Strongpoint 1500
Strike Warning Conventional 1000
Threat Warning NBC 500
Threat Warning Antiaircraft Artillery 4000
Threat Warning Aircraft 10000
Threat Warning Air-to-Air Missile 10000
Threat Warning Surface-to-Air Missile 1500
Threat Warning Surface-to-Surface Missile 10000
Threat Warning Air-to-Surface Missile 15000
Threat Warning Unknown 4000
B-24
___________________________________________________________ Appendix B – Report Formats
· Warning orders.
· OPLANs and OPORDs.
· FRAGOs.
· Logistics orders and requests.
· Free text massages.
GEO-REFERENCED MESSAGES
B-74. These messages, which can be used in the C2 categories discussed
earlier, create icons linked to a location on the FBCB2 map. They are also
disseminated across the TI as situational awareness data. Geo-referenced
messages can be used for the following:
· Obstacle reports.
· NBC-1 reports.
· Bridge reports.
· Supply point status reports.
· Contact reports.
· Engagement reports.
DIGITAL REPORTS
B-75. The following are example FBCB2 reports, included are
illustrations showing FBCB2 report screens for sample situations.
B-25
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
B-26
___________________________________________________________ Appendix B – Report Formats
B-27
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
B-28
Appendix C
C-1
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
C-1. A motivated and determined threat may use NBC weapons to
gain strategic leverage and to provide a counterbalance to the precision-
guided munitions and sophisticated weaponry of the United States and
its allies. NBC hazards could result from terrorist aggression, collateral
damage from conventional weapons, or other sources of environmental
contamination.
C-2. Units at all levels, including the reconnaissance platoon, must be
proficient in executing the three principles of NBC defense:
contamination avoidance, NBC protection, and decontamination. Coupled
with proper tactics and effective retaliatory response, these actions will
increase the likelihood of victory in the contaminated environment.
NBC PROTECTION
C-7. NBC protection prevents or reduces casualties through reduction
of the NBC threat, practice of contamination avoidance measures,
C-2
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
DEPLOYMENT VULNERABILITY
C-8. During a major conflict, NBC weapons may be employed early to
disrupt and delay the build-up of friendly forces. The areas of greatest
vulnerability are large fixed sites such as an aerial port of debarkation
(APOD) or seaport of debarkation (SPOD); staging and marshalling areas;
hubs and bases; assembly areas; and MSRs adjacent to sites involved in
early entry force build-up activities. The hazards and potential damage
caused by NBC attack may require relocation of bases and health service
support facilities, major redirection of supply flow, reallocation of
transportation and engineering services, and short-notice transfer of
replacement personnel or units from one part of the battlefield to another.
C-9. Given the importance and size of potential NBC NAIs and high-
risk locations, the reconnaissance platoon must be proficient in NBC
reconnaissance and surveillance tactics and techniques so it can
independently execute NBC missions in the ISR plan. Additionally, recce
platoons must be trained to integrate with the NBC reconnaissance and
surveillance (NBCRS) platoon assigned to the surveillance troop and with
other theater NBCRS augmentation assets to assist in the conduct of
multiple, wide-area NBC reconnaissance and surveillance missions.
(NOTE: Other types of reconnaissance platoons must be trained to
accomplish similar integration with theater NBCRS augmentation assets
to assist in NBC missions.)
C-3
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
C-4
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
DECONTAMINATION CONSIDERATIONS
C-21. Despite avoidance efforts, reconnaissance elements may become
contaminated. This may occur either by direct attack or by accidental
exposure, such as when the mission dictates movement through a
previously unidentified contaminated area.
C-22. Following NBC contamination, reconnaissance forces must
quickly restore combat power by conducting decontamination operations
and providing medical treatment for soldiers incapacitated due to
exposure. Immediate decontamination procedures and operational
decontamination, which entails MOPP gear exchange and vehicle
washdown, will restore a degree of combat power. Full restoration,
however, will require reconnaissance units to conduct thorough
decontamination. The key to effective medical intervention is quick
diagnosis of NBC exposure.
C-23. The evolving warfighting trends of smaller, more widely dispersed
reconnaissance elements and use of advanced visualization assets should
serve to reduce the percentage of a unit that is actually contaminated.
The keys to maintaining OPTEMPO are timely and accurate BDA and
employment of decontamination triage to sort equipment according to the
type and extent of decontamination required. Rapid identification of
uncontaminated equipment will allow units to recover quickly, resume
normal operations with the clean equipment, and focus needed
decontamination efforts only on contaminated vehicles and equipment. In
turn, this will enable commanders to best allocate scarce decontamination
assets. Decentralized decontamination as far forward as possible will
remain a critical factor in limiting the spread of contamination and in
preserving combat power and OPTEMPO.
C-5
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
PLAN AHEAD
C-28. Leaders of the reconnaissance platoon must have a clear
understanding of the NBC threat, the level of platoon training and
preparedness, and the risks associated with each mission. They then
must develop battle drills and conduct rehearsals of them until the
platoon’s reaction becomes instinctive should NBC hazards arise. The
platoon’s leaders must remain aware of the physiological and
psychological impact of wearing IPE or MOPP gear for extended periods
in difficult climates. Prolonged periods in MOPP may result in
degradation of the platoon’s combat power.
AVOID DETECTION
C-29. This is the best way to prevent NBC attacks, with OPSEC the
most effective defense. Specific measures include camouflage, well-
executed tactical movements (stealth), and noise and light discipline.
C-6
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
MAINTAIN DISCIPLINE
C-31. Discipline is a must if the platoon is to survive and overcome the
shock of an NBC attack. Soldiers must be physically and mentally capable
of functioning in an NBC environment for extended periods. MOPP
acclimation training is essential to developing stamina, teamwork,
confidence, trust, and reliability for soldiers and the platoon leadership.
Risk assessment and rest cycle management must become fundamental
disciplines during mission planning.
SEEK PROTECTION
C-32. When the platoon is mobile, natural cover may provide some
shelter from chemical agents; however, the platoon must be aware of low-
lying areas such as ditches, valleys, depressions, and ravines. Like fog,
chemical agents are frequently released early in the morning and late in
the afternoon, when they are likely to linger for longer periods. When the
platoon is in the defense or is halted, leaders should remember that
heavily wooded areas provide limited protection from liquid agents. At
the same time, however, some semipersistent agents, uninhibited by
climatic conditions, may prove more lasting, with toxic vapors lingering
for unpredictable periods. MOPP gear, overhead cover, and mounted
operations afford the best, most reliable protection.
DISPERSE
C-33. Effective dispersion should reduce the platoon’s vulnerability
without compromising the tactical mission. Leaders must understand the
advantages of dispersing combat forces, as well as equipment and critical
classes of supply, when the threat of NBC attack is high. In such a
situation, using dispersion to create multiple targets increases platoon
survivability and sustainability and presents a more formidable challenge
for the threat. Conversely, the disadvantages of dispersing the platoon
must be weighed against the risk of NBC attack. Extended distances may
have a detrimental impact on the conduct of C4ISR, on treatment and
handling of conventional and NBC casualties, and on logistics operations,
including necessary decontamination operations. Reconnaissance platoon
leaders must know how to use METT-TC to develop an effective
dispersion plan.
REMAIN MOBILE
C-34. The platoon’s primary function is to maneuver to gain positional
advantage for reconnaissance and surveillance. Should crews or leaders
determine that the threat has detected the platoon and may target it
using NBC or conventional weapons, maintaining tactical mobility is the
best method of contamination avoidance. The FBCB2 provides the
platoon with information and situational understanding on battlefield
debris and contaminated areas. Leaders should use this information to
assist them in maintaining mobility, weighing mission objectives against
the risk of exposure before deciding on the best COA.
C-7
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
when the platoon is in the defense. Tarpaulins and plastic sheeting can be
used, as well as field expedient items such as canvas and cardboard.
Leaders should remember that expedient NBC protective covers provide
protection but must be monitored closely because contamination will seep
through covers over time. After exposure to heavy contamination, covers
should be replaced as soon as possible, ideally within one hour after
contamination.
C-8
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
LIMIT EXPOSURE
C-37. While the FBCB2 helps to improve NBC situational
understanding, leaders of the reconnaissance platoon may be required to
plot a course through contaminated areas to achieve their mission goals.
In doing so, they should evaluate METT-TC to guide conventional tactical
considerations. They must be prepared to use their experience and
leadership, coupled with focused terrain analysis, to minimize exposure to
NBC hazards, to maintain platoon lethality, and to avoid degradation as
a result of wearing NBC protective equipment. The following discussion
covers specific measures and considerations for limiting exposure to
contamination in various NBC environments.
Radiological Environment
C-38. US forces continue to face radiation dangers from a variety of
sources: nuclear weapons, depleted uranium, damaged research facilities,
damaged power plants, and the release of radiological isotopes. Scout
elements must be prepared to take measures before, during, and after
operations to reduce the consequences of incidental or accidental
exposure.
C-39. Radiation presents a penetrating hazard, and the only complete
protection from radiological contamination is avoidance of the area
entirely. The purpose of nuclear reconnaissance is ONLY to detect the
outermost low-level readings or the extent of the hazard. The
reconnaissance concentrates on location of the radiation rather than
intensity or dose rate, regardless of the source. This helps to limit crew
exposure. The impact of radiation exposure on combat power can be
further mitigated by establishing and employing appropriate operational
exposure guidance (OEG). Setting the OEG too high or failing to adhere
to the guidance may result in severe loss of combat power or even the loss
of reconnaissance and surveillance teams.
C-40. Radiation Risk. The brigade commander will make a decision,
based on METT-TC and previous unit exposure criteria, on the amount or
degree of continued radiation exposure (total dose) for his units. See
Table C-1 for the risk categories associated with total dose exposure.
C-9
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
C-42. To determine the RES, the platoon leader collects readings from
each of his sections and/or squads, adds the individual readings together,
and then divides to calculate a platoon average. As an example, the
platoon leader receives the following readings from squad leaders
through the NBC NCO:
C-43. The platoon average (total dose) is 63 cGy. The platoon exposure
status is RES-1.
Chemical Environment
C-44. The longer a platoon is exposed to chemical contamination, the
greater the casualty rate. If the mission requires exposure to chemical
hazards, only mission-essential personnel should be required to dismount
or enter the contaminated area. Many times, the effects of weather and
time will act as a natural decontaminant; unless the mission dictates
otherwise, the reconnaissance platoon can reduce contamination and
exposure levels simply by waiting to enter a contaminated area.
C-45. Preventing the Spread of Contamination. Contaminated
environments pose a significant hazard to combat, CS, and CSS vehicles,
which in turn can easily spread contamination over the battlefield. While
METT-TC does not always allow for consideration of an alternate scheme
of maneuver, leaders must take steps to reduce the contamination
footprint, coordinating with higher echelons to verify the proper course of
action as necessary. For example, mission orders may dictate a “dirty”
route or MSR for contaminated vehicles.
C-46. Protecting Dismounts. Dismounted troops pose particular
problems and risks for the reconnaissance platoon. The platoon’s NBC
battle drills must include procedures to be followed by potentially
contaminated dismounts before they attempt to reenter troop carriers.
Leaders must consider trace hazards, both visible and invisible, that
dismounts may bring inside the vehicle. Suits and boots can pick up
hazardous substances from ground residue, resulting in the emission of
toxic vapors inside the vehicle. Dismounts with gross contamination may
require MOPP gear exchange. Weapons and gear should also be
monitored for visible and toxic vapor hazards. Battle drills also must
C-10
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
address procedures used to monitor for safe “all clear” conditions before
reconnaissance platoon soldiers unmask. These steps may include
employing the chemical agent monitor (CAM) or improved CAM (ICAM)
and the M256A1 kit.
C-47. Preventing Exposure of Externally Stored Materials.
Reconnaissance platoon crews frequently store gear, equipment, and
some supplies on the external hull of their vehicles; these materials can
be splattered with hazardous substances when the platoon crosses or
maneuvers in a contaminated area. During preparations for such
operations, each crew must ensure that anything stored on the outside of
the vehicle is wrapped in garbage bags or some type of chemical
protective container. An important consideration for leaders is that some
materials cannot be adequately decontaminated and therefore will have
to be discarded if they become contaminated. They must take preventive
contamination avoidance measures, covering both predeployment and
preexposure actions, to safeguard these materials for later use in a clear
environment.
Biological Environment
C-48. Reconnaissance platoon crews must prepare themselves and their
vehicles for operation and movement in a biologically contaminated
environment using the same procedures as in a chemical environment.
The contamination avoidance procedures employed before, during, and
after exposure are identical.
NOTE: Carbon-based filters used in military protective masks provide poor to medium
protection against toxic industrial materials (TIM) and toxic industrial chemicals
(TIC). The masks should be used only during evacuation of the immediate hazard
zone following the release of industrial chemicals or materials. DO NOT conduct
reconnaissance missions or stay for any length of time in industrial hazard areas
with these masks or filter systems. Many hazard areas are oxygen-depleting and
require self-contained breathing apparatuses (SCBA), which most units do not have
in their TOE authorization. Additionally, some TIMs and TICs can easily degrade
the performance of pass-through filters due to molecular size and weight. Standard
military masks and/or filters have not been tested against these industrial
chemicals. Refer to FM 3-11.4 (FM 3-4) for additional information.
C-11
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
C-12
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
DESCRIPTION
C-57. This kit consists of a carrying case, 12 sampler-detectors,
instruction cards, and ABC-M8 chemical agent detector paper. See Figure
C-2.
C-13
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
LIMITATIONS
C-58. The M256A1 cannot be used to detect chemical agents in water. High
temperatures, DS2, and petroleum products can cause false readings. The kit
is not operable at temperatures below 25 degrees Fahrenheit.
UNIT ISSUE
C-59. Standard issue is one per squad, crew, or section.
DECONTAMINATION
C-60. Decontamination is not applicable for this item.
DESCRIPTION
C-62. M8 paper comes in a book of 25 perforated sheets. A color-
comparison bar chart is printed on the inside front cover for identification
of chemical agents. The sheets turn dark green (V), yellow (G), or red (H)
upon contact with liquid chemical agents. See Figures C-3 and C-4. The
NSN is 6665-00-050-8529.
LIMITATIONS
C-63. The paper must touch the liquid agent, so soldiers must use
caution when attempting to take a sample. M8 paper does not detect
vapor or chemical agents in water. Exposure to high temperatures, DS2,
or petroleum products may cause false readings.
C-14
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
UNIT ISSUE
C-64. Standard issue is one per soldier.
DECONTAMINATION
C-65. Decontamination is not applicable for this item.
M9 CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTOR PAPER
USE
C-66. This detector paper is actually a tape that identifies the presence
of liquid chemical agent aerosols. M9 is primarily used attached directly
to the soldier’s body; it has a sticky backside allowing the individual to
place strips on his nonfiring arm, one leg, and backside, as well as other
places expected to be exposed to potential hazards. The tape strips should
be positioned with protruding flaps that are long enough to be observed
by protected troops, such as those who are masked or buttoned up inside
tactical vehicles. Doors, hatches, and areas with which troops come into
frequent contact should be considered the first choice when applying M9
tape to tactical vehicles.
C-67. M9 paper will turn pink, red, reddish brown, or red-purple when
exposed to liquid chemical agents. It cannot, however, identify the specific
agent. As soon as the paper indicates the presence of chemical agents,
protective action must be taken.
DESCRIPTION
C-68. M9 paper is issued in a 7-ounce dispenser box that contains one
30-foot roll of 2-inch-wide detector paper and a plastic storage bag. See
Figure C-5. The
NSN is 6665-01-
226-5589.
C-15
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
LIMITATIONS
C-69. M9 paper must be read with a white light. It can be used in rain,
snow, and sleet, but cannot be used to detect vapors or chemical agents in
water. It will not stick to dirty, oily, or greasy surfaces. A colorblind
soldier may not be able to read contamination indications. Do not attempt
to read M9 with a red flashlight lens. False readings can be caused by
temperatures above 125 degrees F (52 degrees C), brake fluid, DS2,
petroleum products, and insect repellent. M9 has a six-year shelf life.
UNIT ISSUE
C-70. Standard issue is one per soldier.
DECONTAMINATION
C-71. Decontamination is not applicable for this item.
M8A1 AUTOMATIC CHEMICAL AGENT ALARM
USE
C-72. Positioned upwind from defensive positions, the remote detector
(M43A1) is connected, using WD-1 communications wire, to the alarm
unit (M42). It can provide early warning of potential nerve agents (vapor
only).
DESCRIPTION
C-73. As illustrated in Figure C-6, the M43A1 detector (larger unit;
NSN 6665-01-081-8140) and M42 alarm unit (smaller unit; NSN 6665-
0859-2215) are the major components of the M8A1. When the M43A1
detects a nerve agent, it sends an electronic signal along the
communications wire to the M42 alarm, setting off a remote
audible/visual signal (or visual signal only when noise discipline is a
concern). The M10A1 power supply (NSN 6135-00-859-2225) provides DC
power to the detector from an AC source (115 or 220V). The detector uses
one BA-3517/U battery; the alarm uses four BA-3030 or BB-3203/UF (D
cell) batteries.
C-16
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
LIMITATIONS
C-74. Accidental or incidental destruction of this detector must be
reported immediately to the NBC officer or NCO. It contains Americium
241, a radiation hazard. False alarms may result from screening and
signaling smoke, engine exhaust, rocket/missile propellant smoke, and
electromagnetic pulse (EMP). The M8A1 is being replaced by the M22
ACADA (covered later in this discussion).
UNIT ISSUE
C-75. Standard issue is one per platoon, subject to the applicable
modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE).
DECONTAMINATION
C-76. The M8A1 can be decontaminated using the M295/M291
decontamination kit(s) or using a nonstandard decontamination solution
consisting of one part household bleach and three parts hot water.
DESCRIPTION
C-78. The M22 ACADA (NSN 6665-01-438-6983) is an advanced man-
portable, point sampling, chemical agent alarm system. See Figure C-7.
The system will detect and identify all standard nerve and blister agents
in vapor form. The detector provides unit warning through the MICAD. It
replaces the M8A1 alarm as a point detector and will augment the ICAM.
The M22 uses one nonrechargeable lithium battery (BA-5590/U) and the
XM28 power supply kit (NSN 6665-01-438-6960)
C-17
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
LIMITATIONS
C-79. Accidental or incidental destruction of this detector must be
reported immediately to the NBC officer or NCO. It contains a beta
radiation hazard. False alarms may result from screening and signaling
smoke, engine exhaust, rocket/missile propellant smoke, and EMP.
UNIT ISSUE
C-80. Standard issue is one per platoon.
DECONTAMINATION
C-81. The M22 can be decontaminated using the M295/M291
decontamination kit(s) or using a nonstandard decontamination solution
consisting of one part household bleach and three parts hot water.
NOTE: The following procedures and considerations, illustrated in Figure C-8, are
applicable in the positioning of chemical agent detectors and alarms, including the
M8A1 and M22 systems:
· The NBC detector unit (powered by a larger battery) is
positioned upwind from the platoon defensive position and
can support up to five alarm units. It is connected to the
smaller alarm unit (M42), which is powered by D cell or BA-
3030 batteries. The maximum distance between detector and
alarm, connected by communications wire, is 400 meters.
· Detector units are positioned no more than 300 meters apart
from each other.
· Position detector units upwind at least 150 meters from the
platoon defensive position to provide adequate time to mask if
the alarm units sound. To ensure survivability, check wire
and batteries frequently, and camouflage the detector units.
C-18
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
DESCRIPTION
C-83. The CAM (NSN 6665-01-199-4153) weighs about 2 kilograms (4.5
pounds). Refer to Figure C-9.
LIMITATIONS
C-84. Troops must use caution to avoid touching the “nose” of the CAM
with whatever is being monitored. This is not an area monitor or device.
CAM operators must be in full MOPP gear when operating the device.
C-19
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
UNIT ISSUE
C-85. Standard issue is one per troop/company.
DECONTAMINATION
C-86. The CAM can be decontaminated using the M295/M291
decontamination kit(s) or using a nonstandard decontamination solution
consisting of one part household bleach and three parts hot water.
DESCRIPTION
C-88. The ICAM (NSN 6665-01-357-8502) is more reliable and needs
less maintenance than the CAM. During routine maintenance, the
platoon can use the battery assembly training (BAT) kit and inexpensive
D cell batteries or AC power instead of the more expensive lithium
batteries (NSN 6910-01-333-3631). See Figure C-10.
LIMITATIONS
C-89. Limitations for the ICAM are the same as those for the CAM.
UNIT ISSUE
C-90. Standard issue is one per troop/company.
DECONTAMINATION
C-91. The ICAM can be decontaminated using the M295/M291
decontamination kit(s) or using a nonstandard decontamination solution
consisting of one part household bleach and three parts hot water.
C-20
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
NOTE: The AN/VDR2 can detect but not measure beta radiation.
DESCRIPTION
C-93. The AN/VDR-2 is a lightweight, EMP-hardened, tactical dose rate
meter. It is composed of one radiacmeter (IM-243) (illustrated at the
circled “1” in Figure C-11), a radiac probe (DT-616), and one carrying
pouch with strap. The hand-held probe (the circled “2” in Figure C-11) is
used for monitoring personnel, supplies, or equipment. The AN/VDR-2 set
also has a carrying case (the circled “3” in Figure C-11) with shoulder
straps (the circled “4” in Figure C-11). Power comes from three 9-volt DC
batteries (BA-3090) or vehicle power (24-volt DC). The NSN is 6665-01-
222-1425.
LIMITATIONS
C-94. The AN/VDR-2 cannot detect or measure alpha contamination
resulting from nuclear fallout, as a byproduct from depleted uranium
C-21
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
UNIT ISSUE
C-95. Standard issue is one per platoon.
DECONTAMINATION
C-96. The AN/VDR-2 can be decontaminated using the M295/M291
decontamination kit(s) or using a nonstandard decontamination solution
consisting of one part household bleach and three parts hot water.
DESCRIPTION
C-98. The AN/UDR-13 (NSN 6665-01-407-1237) is a compact,
lightweight device that replaces the IM-93 dosimeter. It uses four AAA
alkaline batteries (NSN 6135-00-826-4798). See Figure C-12.
LIMITATIONS
C-99. The AN/UDR-13 will not detect or measure alpha or beta
radiation.
UNIT ISSUE
C-100. Standard issue is one per platoon and one per troop/company
headquarters.
C-22
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
DECONTAMINATION
C-101. The AN/UDR-13 can be decontaminated using the M295/M291
decontamination kit(s) or using a nonstandard decontamination solution
consisting of one part household bleach and three parts hot water.
IM-93/UD DOSIMETER
USE
C-102. This is currently the Army’s standard tactical dosimeter for
measuring total radiation dose (how much radiation a unit has absorbed).
It is not designed to monitor total dose for a single soldier. The IM-93/UD
is worn as close to the body as possible.
DESCRIPTION
C-103. The IM-93/UD is a tubular device, about the size of a fountain
pen. The user points one end toward a light source and reads the
illuminated scale from the other end. The optical end has a dust cap. The
device requires a charging unit (PP1578A/PD). See Figure C-13.
LIMITATIONS
C-104. The IM-93/UD is being replaced by the AN/UDR-13 radiac set,
covered earlier in this discussion.
UNIT ISSUE
C-105. Standard issue is one per platoon and one per troop/company
headquarters.
DECONTAMINATION
C-106. Denatured alcohol can be used to decontaminate the IM-93/UD.
C-23
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
DESCRIPTION
C-108. The charger is a small, electrostatic-charge generator designed to
serve all US and certain NATO combat dosimeters. The NSN is 6665-00-
542-1177. See Figure C-14.
LIMITATIONS
C-109. Users must have direct light (such as from sunlight, flashlight, or
vehicle headlights) to obtain a reading.
UNIT ISSUE
C-110. Standard issue is one per platoon and one per troop/company
headquarters.
DECONTAMINATION
C-111. The PP-1578A/PD can be decontaminated using the M295/M291
decontamination kit(s) or using a nonstandard decontamination solution
consisting of one part household bleach and three parts hot water.
DESCRIPTION
C-113. The AN/PDR-75 is housed in a heavy green box approximately 2
feet long by 1½ feet tall. The set consists of the radiac computer indicator
(reader) (CP696/PDR-75), carrying case (CY-8420/PDR-75), two-piece
C-24
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
LIMITATIONS
C-114. The reader measures from 1 to 1,000 cGy.
UNIT ISSUE
C-115. Standard issue is one per troop/company.
DECONTAMINATION
C-116. The AN/PDR-75 can be decontaminated using the M295/M291
decontamination kit(s) or using a nonstandard decontamination solution
consisting of one part household bleach and three parts hot water. Refer
to the appropriate TM for more specific information on decontamination
of the internal tray, external parts and carrying case, and electronic
components.
DT-236 DOSIMETER
USE
C-117. Worn by every soldier in the reconnaissance platoon, this
wristwatch-like instrument measures total dose radiation. It is worn
under MOPP gear. See Figure C-16. The soldier wearing the dosimeter
cannot read it; it requires the AN/PDR-75 reader (discussed earlier and
illustrated in Figure C-15) to determine cumulative gamma and neutron
radiation exposure levels. The reader is maintained by the troop NBC
NCO.
DESCRIPTION
C-118. The DT-236 looks and is worn like a wristwatch. Readings are
used to determine a unit’s RES. The NSN is 6665-01-043-2191.
C-25
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
LIMITATIONS
C-119. This device is not designed to act as a stand-alone radiac
instrument; instead, it augments the IM-93 dosimeter or UDR-13 radiac
set. Together, these tactical radiation meters help to paint a clear picture
of how much radiation (total dose) soldiers have accumulated.
UNIT ISSUE
C-120. Standard issue is one per soldier.
DECONTAMINATION
C-121. The DT-236 can be decontaminated using the M295/M291
decontamination kit(s) or using a nonstandard decontamination solution
consisting of one part household bleach and three parts hot water.
DESCRIPTION
C-123. The kit consists of a variety of easy-to-use collection and testing
materials contained in a lightweight carrying case. The NSN is 6665-01-
143-0885. See Figure C-17.
LIMITATIONS
C-124. The kit requires soldiers to dismount to collect water samples.
UNIT ISSUE
C-125. Standard issue is one per troop/company.
C-26
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
DECONTAMINATION
C-126. External decontamination of the kit is possible using the
M295/M291 decontamination kit(s) or using a nonstandard
decontamination solution consisting of one part household bleach and
three parts hot water.
DESCRIPTION
C-128. Contents of the M34 kit include a carrier, a plastic scoop, 2
extraction fluid bottles, 2 soil extraction bags, 16 individually wrapped
ampoules, 6 soil collection bags, 10 plastic-covered wire ties, M8 chemical
agent detector paper, 3 radiation hazard tags, and 8 shipping tags with
envelopes. See Figure C-18.
LIMITATIONS
C-129. The kit requires soldiers to dismount to collect samples.
UNIT ISSUE
C-130. Standard issue is one per team that is conducting sample
collection.
DECONTAMINATION
C-131. The interior of the M34 kit cannot be sufficiently decontaminated
for safe use once contamination occurs. The exterior of the kit can be
decontaminated using the M295/M291 kit(s) and/or hot soapy water.
C-27
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
C-132. This section focuses on assets, processes, and procedures for NBC
reconnaissance in an NBC environment. Considerations include the NBC
threat in the operational environment; the NBCRS platoon’s role; NBC
reconnaissance movement patterns; NBC surveillance techniques; the
NBCWRS; and location and marking of NBC hazards.
C-28
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
C-135. The nature and scope of the NBC threat may force commanders to
reallocate forces and priorities based on their NBC situational awareness.
In doing this, they must employ the visualization process described
earlier, using intelligence information gathered by the assets outlined
earlier. They may determine, for example, that the NBC hazards have
rendered MOPP gear incapable of providing the necessary protection. In
such cases, avoiding the hazard may be the only acceptable course of
action.
C-136. Risk and vulnerability assessments often overlook hazards that
result from collateral damage. The leaders of the reconnaissance platoon
and ISR mission planners must carefully address these dangers, which
can result when toxic materials are released following accidental friendly
and threat conventional bombing, targeting mishaps, or incidental
(terrorist) sabotage of civil and military facilities or industrial complexes.
Assessments must identify the immediate impact on military operations
(air, land, sea) and the short- and long-term consequences to deployed
forces, population centers, and the environment if these facilities are
degraded or destroyed.
NBCRS PLATOON
C-137. The NBCRS platoon, which is part of the surveillance troop
within the SBCT’s cavalry squadron (RSTA), is a valuable and critical
asset in helping reconnaissance units to maintain a high state of
situational understanding (both friendly and threat). The platoon is
capable of day or night operations, in all geographical areas, in adverse
weather, and under all types of battlefield conditions. NBCRS vehicle
commanders are challenged to maintain a constant state of readiness.
They remain postured to respond quickly in investigating WMD attacks,
industrial hazards, and/or accidental or incidental release of toxic
material. Enhanced NBCRS systems are capable of detecting and
identifying NBC materials and hazards that may go undetected by
standard sensors and detectors. As a result, commanders at every level
must carefully weigh the risks when NBCRS vehicles conduct these
critical functions while being required to execute multiple, flawless, and
daring operations (such as day/night passages of lines, tactical movement
over complex terrain, and navigation) on an extended, high-risk
battlefield.
NBCRS VEHICLE
C-138. The NBCRS platoon is equipped with three NBCRS vehicles (see
Figure C-19), a wheeled, light-armored reconnaissance platform equipped
with a medium-caliber machine gun. This high-speed, highly mobile
vehicle is capable of performing NBC reconnaissance on primary,
secondary, or cross-country routes throughout the battlefield. The current
NBCRS vehicle, however, cannot collect vapor samples or monitor hazard
density over time; in addition, its ability to detect and identify vapor
agents is severely limited. The NBCRS vehicle protects its crew of four
from NBC contamination by means of an overpressure system. Refer to
Table C-3 for a summary of the vehicle’s capabilities and limitations.
C-29
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
FBCB2 Yes
Biological Matter Collection for Limited to vectors and small soil and
Analysis vegetation samples
Self-Recovery Yes
C-30
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
ROUTE
C-141. NBC route reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain
information on a specific route. The route may encompass a single road or
an axis of advance. This mission is appropriate when there is a likelihood
of encountering contamination along the route. Once contamination is
found, the NBC reconnaissance unit can take any or all of the following
actions:
ZIGZAG
C-143. The zigzag pattern may be used when NBC reconnaissance
elements are on line. The pattern is most commonly employed during
zone reconnaissance. An example would be reconnaissance of a mobility
corridor or an axis of advance; Figure C-20 shows an NBC reconnaissance
squad/team conducting a zone NBC reconnaissance of a mobility corridor
using the zigzag pattern. Vehicles will normally move parallel to each
other, but in a staggered formation, along the corridor. The element
checks all key terrain throughout the area for NBC contamination
hazard. Key terrain includes road networks, low-lying areas, and
designated critical points (choke points).
C-144. In the example in Figure C-20, Team 1 detects contamination in
its assigned lane or sector. Team 1 stops, and the vehicle commander
notifies Team 2. Team 1 verifies the presence of contamination and sends
an NBC-4 report to higher headquarters. Team 2 continues to check for
contamination in the assigned sector. Team 1 moves back approximately
200 meters to the last clean point in the azimuth of travel and emplaces a
contamination marker. (NOTE: The contamination marker must be
visible.) Team 1 then moves laterally 100 to 200 meters (left or right),
turns in the azimuth of travel, and continues the zigzag pattern. If
C-31
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
BOX
C-145. The unit uses the box pattern when the commander wants to
know the limits of contamination (boundaries). The box pattern (see
Figure C-21) is time-consuming, however, and is not normally a stand-
alone task for reconnaissance platoon elements or for the NBCRS platoon.
This pattern is normally used to mark large areas in “pass-back” missions
conducted with theater NBC reconnaissance augmentation or by follow-
on elements in rear areas.
C-32
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
C-146. In the example in Figure C-21, two vehicles conduct the survey
while moving in a staggered column formation. Team 2, which is in the
lead, encounters contamination and notifies Team 1. Team 1 stops and, if
no contamination is detected, emplaces a contamination marker. Team 2
backs out of the contamination until it is even with the Team 1 marker
and turns to the right 90 degrees. Team 1 makes a 90-degree left turn.
The teams move along the new azimuth until contamination is found
again. If no contamination is found after 100 to 200 meters of travel, they
each drop a marker and make a 90-degree turn along the original
azimuth. They again travel 100 to 200 meters and take a measurement.
C-147. The following actions then take place as each team reconnoiters
for the limits of the contaminated area:
STAR
C-148. The star pattern enables the commander to determine the
approximate size of a contaminated area. It is normally used when a
small area of contamination is suspected. It is, however, one of least
preferable search techniques because it exposes the teams executing the
mission to more contamination than other methods. One vehicle moves
forward, using the star pattern to detect and verify the presence of
contamination. If the area is large enough, more teams or vehicles should
be used to check the area. The reconnaissance team also marks the
boundaries of the contaminated area, updates the COP using the FBCB2,
and submits an NBC-4 report to higher headquarters. If only one NBCRS
team is used to conduct the star pattern of the area, the wingman
assigned provides security.
C-33
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
C-149. Once the area is reconnoitered, the NBCRS element links back up
with its assigned unit and continues with the mission. Figure C-22
illustrates NBC reconnaissance vehicles using the star pattern to
determine the boundaries of the contamination.
CLOVERLEAF
C-151. The commander can employ the cloverleaf when he wants to
know the limits of the NBC contamination hazard at a specific location.
Reconnaissance/NBCRS teams, squads, sections, or platoons can use the
cloverleaf pattern, with vehicles checking for NBC ground contamination
by moving around the point of interest in four different directions. This
pattern is time-consuming and is most likely to be used when the area is
secured; however, it provides detailed coverage and information about the
contaminated area. Refer to Figure C-23 for an example of an NBC
reconnaissance element using the cloverleaf pattern while conducting a
survey.
C-34
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
C-35
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
NBC SURVEILLANCE
C-153. It is impossible to understate the importance of NBC surveillance.
If deterrence fails, the maneuver commander must be able to observe and
understand the threat’s NBC intent and to conduct subsequent electronic
analysis or searches for WMD precursors. In many cases, NBC NAIs
become the center of gravity on the battlefield, affecting friendly force
maneuver and skewing planners’ attempts at time-sequencing combat
and CS operations. Some toxic emissions are invisible to other collection
media (satellite or air photography); therefore, mission success may hinge
on surveillance teams as they sense, identify, and provide timely and
accurate NBC reporting and warning. Effective NBC surveillance allows
the commander to detect threat weapons, WMD facilities, and
contaminated areas and then to neutralize them before they can affect
friendly forces.
C-154. Surveillance of threat infrastructure for presence of NBC or toxic
industrial materials should cover such facilities as hydroelectric or
nuclear power plants, water treatment facilities, and rail cars and land
transportation vehicles used to transport hazardous and explosive cargo.
Other potential NAIs that may be specified in the NBC section of the
battalion/squadron ISR plan include factories that use harmful or toxic
solutions, storage depots for petroleum or agricultural products, and
commercial and military research facilities.
SURVEILLANCE TECHNIQUES
Upwind Surveillance
C-157. This technique, shown in Figure C-25, reduces the likelihood that
the NBC surveillance asset (reconnaissance element and/or NBCRS team)
will be exposed when conducting NBC surveillance. On modern
C-36
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
Downwind Surveillance
C-158. While this technique offers early warning in NBC situations,
reconnaissance crews may be exposed to hazards that are sometimes
invisible and that potentially can quickly break down or defeat vehicle
and protective mask filtration systems. Application of this technique must
weigh these risks against the potential benefits of identifying the threat.
The IPB, risk assessment, and vulnerability analysis processes must
consider the cost-benefit factors, as well as the likelihood and impact of
NBC exposure on reconnaissance vehicles and crews.
C-159. Reconnaissance platoons and NBCRS teams may employ the
downwind surveillance technique when they operate forward of the main
body, executing the ISR plan to contribute to COP development; this will
include actions taken to enhance NBC situational awareness. The ISR
plan should identify the most effective location at which NBC and
conventional reconnaissance assets can be positioned both to gain
situational understanding and to provide critical operational information
to friendly forces (detect to avoid, detect to warn, and identify to treat).
Figure C-26 illustrates a reconnaissance element located downwind, but
well forward of the main body.
C-37
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
C-38
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
NOTE: The reconnaissance platoon sends the NBC 1 and NBC 3 reports to higher
headquarters. All other reports are sent to the platoon from higher headquarters or
other elements.
C-39
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
C-40
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
C-41
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
C-42
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
C-43
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
C-168. Shielding the force entails the action necessary to reduce the NBC
threat and prevent NBC casualties, including medical pretreatment,
contamination avoidance, and physical protection. Shielding begins in the
predeployment phase, when units pretreat soldiers to minimize the
chemical, biological, and residual radiation threat. Contamination
avoidance allows the reconnaissance platoon to move around hazards or
to relocate before the occurrence or arrival of a hazard. Physical
protection, which covers both units and individuals, provides a
contamination-free environment in which the platoon and its soldiers can
operate successfully. Enhanced sensing and shaping capabilities will
allow commanders and platoon leaders to use scientific concepts and
methods to achieve an effective NBC-focused defense.
C-44
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
MOPP LEVELS
C-171. In an NBC environment, the reconnaissance platoon will operate
using the seven MOPP levels: MOPP READY, MOPP ZERO, MOPP 1,
MOPP 2, MOPP 3, MOPP 4, and MASK ONLY. These graduated levels
are characterized by the extent to which the MOPP uniform and
equipment (protective mask, overgarment, overboots, and gloves) are
carried and/or worn. Figure C-36 illustrates the standardized MOPP
levels; Figure C-37 shows mounted soldiers operating in MOPP 4.
C-45
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
PRETREATMENT ACTIVITIES
C-172. Medical pretreatment for potential hazards is a passive defensive
measure. Reconnaissance leaders can initiate several types of
pretreatment procedures on order or when they anticipate chemical or
biological threats.
C-173. The platoon can greatly enhance survivability in an NBC
environment with nerve agent pyridostigmine pills (NAPP), used in
conjunction with the nerve agent antidote kit (NAAK). NAPPs, also
known as pyridostigmine bromide (PB) pills, are issued to soldiers on
cards with 21 tablets (see Figure C-38); pills are carried in any hook-and-
pile pocket on the overgarment. The commander will order the platoon to
start taking the pills in the event of imminent threat (in the next few
hours or days) of nerve agent exposure. Pills are taken every eight hours
until the 21 tablets on the card have been taken or the unit is ordered to
discontinue use.
C-174. Rogue nations may counter precision guided munitions and U.S.
military superiority through covert dissemination of biological weapons.
They may introduce biological weapons against early entry forces in an
attempt to sway public opinion and create discontent among coalition,
NATO, and host nation forces. Passive biological defensive measures by
the platoon may include using plague vaccines or other immunizations
during predeployment operations (in H-minus sequences).
C-46
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
US POLICY STATEMENT
The United States reserves the right to use nuclear weapons.
Air Burst
C-177. The following considerations and characteristics apply for this
type of nuclear detonation (illustrated in Figure C-39):
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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
Surface Burst
C-178. The following considerations and characteristics apply for this
type of nuclear detonation (illustrated in Figure C-40):
Subsurface Burst
C-179. The following considerations and characteristics apply for this
type of nuclear detonation (illustrated in Figure C-41):
C-48
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
High-Altitude Burst
C-180. The following considerations and characteristics apply for this
type of nuclear detonation (illustrated in Figure C-42):
Ground
level
NUCLEAR HAZARDS
C-181. This discussion focuses on the immediate and subsequent effects
of a nuclear detonation, as well as the nuclear material hazards a blast
can create.
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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
Blast
C-182. The blast, or shock wave, from a nuclear air burst causes
equipment damage and casualties. It occurs a fraction of a second after
detonation. The front of the wave moves like a wall of compressed air
from ground zero.
Thermal Radiation
C-183. Thermal radiation, the heat and light produced from an air burst
nuclear detonation, can cause significant additional damage after the
blast effect has passed. The strength of thermal radiation is directly
proportional to the yield of the detonation. The higher the nuclear yield,
the greater the thermal radiation. Ranging into the millions of degrees,
thermal radiation travels at light speed, burning anything in its path. It
causes skin burns and eye injuries. One key side effect, flash blindness, is
caused by the flash’s extreme brightness; it takes two primary forms:
C-184. Initial Radiation. This occurs within the first minute after
detonation. It consists mostly of gamma rays and neutrons, with few
alpha and beta particles. Its impact on electronic equipment, especially
communications devices and computers, is known as transient radiation
effects on electronics (TREE). Damage can be temporary or permanent.
C-185. Residual Ionizing Radiation. This radiation occurs after the
first minute following detonation. The primary hazard of residual
radiation is fallout. After detonation, primarily in surface and subsurface
bursts, a mushroom-shaped cloud forms containing radioactive debris and
particles, which can be spread over an area possibly extending tens of
thousands of meters from ground zero. This radioactive material reaches
the earth’s surface primarily in two ways:
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_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
Electromagnetic Pulse
C-186. EMP produces an electric and magnetic field that can burn out
electronic components and upset system operations. It poses an injury
risk for soldiers only if they are touching metallic collectors, such as
cables, during an EMP surge. Secondary hazards can result when
electronic equipment catches fire. EMP effects can be reduced by
shielding electrical and electronic components and disconnecting antenna
cables.
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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
C-52
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
· Wait for both shock waves to pass and debris to stop falling.
· Record the flash-to-bang time.
· Cover your mouth with a handkerchief, and wear goggles to
protect your eyes from fallout contamination. If you do not
have these items, put on the protective mask. Take these
precautions quickly before fallout arrives.
· Seek shelter from fallout.
· If fallout arrives while you are exposed, routinely shake the
handkerchief or the mask filter element to remove dust
particles and to prevent accumulation of contamination.
· Treat casualties. Refer to the discussion later in this appendix
for information on treatment of casualties from nuclear
detonations.
· Reconnect the FBCB2, radios, and antennas, and attempt to
reestablish communications.
· Prepare and submit an NBC-1 nuclear report. Make sure it
has “flash” precedence if it is the first reported attack in
theater.
· Begin monitoring for radiation. Report the arrival of fallout
using an NBC-4 report when the radiation level reaches 1
cGy/hr.
· Never relocate your vehicle or unit based on a fallout
prediction (NBC-3 report).
· Reorganize, consolidate, and continue your mission.
· Conduct PMCS on tactical dosimeters.
· Consider previous exposure (total dose) and report new
exposure in accordance with the OPORD or unit SOP.
· Regardless of the applicable exposure criteria, never move
until the crossing risk is known and NBC personnel have
developed evacuation procedures.
· Improve shelter and shielding.
US POLICY STATEMENT
The United States will not use biological weapons
under any circumstances.
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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
C-193. Biological agents are often referred to as the “poor man’s weapon”
because they are easy and cheap to produce and dispense. In addition,
biological attacks are hard to disseminate, detect, and identify. Small,
even tiny, doses of biological agents can infect thousands of personnel.
Counteracting these agents may require extensive use of quarantine.
Types of Agents
C-195. Biological agents are divided into the following categories:
· Pathogens. These are disease-causing substances. There are
over 150 known infectious diseases; they are either contagious
or noncommunicable.
· Toxins. These are poisonous chemicals derived from
biological sources. Toxins can be natural or synthetic.
NOTE: Both types of biological agents are derived from a range of sources, including
animals, plants (including fungi), and microorganisms (bacteria, viruses,
rickettsiae, protozoa).
C-54
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
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US POLICY STATEMENT
The United States will never use chemical weapons.
C-56
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
Dismounted Actions
C-207. The following steps apply for dismounted leaders, soldiers, and
elements:
· Stop breathing; close eyes and mouth; and don, clear, and seal
the protective mask.
· Give visual and vocal alarms.
· Upgrade to MOPP level 4.
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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
Mounted Actions
C-208. The following steps apply for mounted leaders, soldiers, and
elements:
· Stop breathing; close eyes and mouth; and don, clear, and seal
the protective mask.
· Close vehicle hatches, and activate the overpressurization
system (if applicable).
CAUTION
In an overpressurized vehicle, DO NOT unmask until
sensors and alarms are reset; use the ICAM to confirm “all
clear” conditions and to verify the reliability of vehicle sensors
and alarms. If the vehicle interior is exposed to a chemical
hazard, assume MOPP 4 regardless of the availability of
overpressurization.
C-58
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
LEADERSHIP CONSIDERATIONS
C-211. When confronted with an NBC situation, reconnaissance platoon
leaders face major decisions. It is impossible to predict when or where
nuclear, biological, chemical, or other toxic hazards will occur; to the
contrary, leaders must face the reality that many potential enemies have
NBC capability and may use it at virtually any moment. In the face of
such demands, the ability to exercise steadfast, determined, and proactive
leadership can make an incalculable difference. At the bottom line, every
reconnaissance platoon leader must have confidence in his soldiers, his
equipment, and his own ability to lead.
C-212. The maxim “know your soldiers” has always summarized a key
component of successful leadership. Under NBC conditions, this quality
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DECONTAMINATION OPERATIONS
C-214. Decontamination is the removal, destruction, or neutralization of
contamination. Its purposes are to reduce the impact of an NBC attack,
prevent erosion of platoon combat power, and reduce casualties.
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
C-215. The reconnaissance platoon leader must take into account several
important factors in planning, preparing, and conducting
decontamination operations.
Principles of Decontamination
C-216. There are four principles of decontamination:
· Conduct decontamination as soon as possible.
· Decontaminate whatever is necessary.
· Conduct decontamination as far forward as possible.
· Conduct decontamination by priority.
Planning Factors
C-217. Before decontamination occurs, the platoon leader must consider
a variety of conditions that will affect the operation, including the
following:
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_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
LEVELS OF DECONTAMINATION
C-218. The three levels of decontamination are immediate, operational,
and thorough. Battlefield elements, including the reconnaissance platoon,
conduct immediate decontamination virtually automatically and
instantaneously whenever they encounter NBC conditions. Operational
level decontamination is accomplished with organic assets located at the
squadron/battalion. Thorough and fixed site decontamination will require
augmentation by a chemical decontamination platoon, host nation
emergency response assets, or other service, coalition, or NATO unit. The
platoon may have to provide augmentation support at operational and
thorough decontamination sites.
Immediate Decontamination
C-219. Units and soldiers conduct immediate decontamination as
necessary using supplies and equipment they have on hand. This
discussion focuses on the elements of immediate decontamination: skin
decontamination, personal equipment wipedown, operator’s vehicle
spraydown (when applicable), and removal of biological and radiological
agents (when applicable).
C-220. Skin Decontamination. This is a basic soldier survival skill
that is conducted as an immediate action drill. Some chemical agents can
kill if they remain on the skin for longer than a minute, making removal
or neutralization of the agent a must for survival. This can be done with
the new M291 skin decontamination kit, shown in Figure C-44. Leaders
must ensure that their soldiers are trained to execute skin
decontamination automatically and without orders. Soldiers who have
conducted skin decontamination should be observed for symptoms.
C-221. Each soldier is issued two M291 kits. One is carried in the mask
carrier, the other in the right cargo pocket of the BDU/BDO trousers or
according to unit SOP. Each kit contains six individual decontamination
packets. Units maintain at least one M291 kit per soldier for resupply.
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C-224. As noted, soldiers use the M295 kit to wipe down their masks,
hood, gloves, and other essential gear. If the chemical agent is thickened
or present in large globules on the BDO or CPOG, however, they must
scrape it off with a stick or other object. They should not attempt to
decontaminate the agent on the BDO/CPOG. Chemical agents are easily
absorbed in the stocks and handgrips of weapons and may present a
vapor hazard. For biological agents, plain soap and water will remove the
contamination. Radiological contamination dust can be brushed, washed,
or shaken off equipment.
C-225. Operator’s Spraydown/Wipedown. The platoon conducts
operator’s spraydown/wipedown to remove or neutralize chemical agents
on frequently touched or occupied equipment surfaces and to prevent
contamination spread. The process is most effective when accomplished
within 15 minutes of contamination. It is done using the M13
decontamination apparatus, portable (DAP) and DS2 decontamination
solution, the ABC-M11 DAP and DS2, or the M100 sorbent
decontamination system (SDS).
C-226. M13 DAP. The man-portable M13 consists of a vehicle mounting
bracket, a prefilled fluid container containing 14 liters of DS2, and a
brush-tipped pumping handle connected to the fluid container by a hose.
The fluid container and brush head are both disposable. The M13 can
decontaminate 1,200 square feet per fluid container. The combination of
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_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
C-229. M100 SDS. The M-100 is intended to replace the M11 and M13
units currently employed in operator’s spraydown operations associated
with immediate decontamination. (NOTE: It is not approved for skin
decontamination.) The system uses powdered sorbent to remove chemical
agent residue from surfaces. The reactive sorbent is nontoxic and
noncorrosive and requires no water. The SDS is designed to operate at
temperatures between –25 and 120 ° F. (See Figure C-48.)
Operational Decontamination
C-232. If immediate decontamination is insufficient to quickly return
platoon vehicles and personnel to action, the flow of battle may require
the unit to conduct operational level decontamination. Also known as
operational decontamination, this level of decontamination limits the
spread of contamination and allows temporary relief from MOPP 4
restrictions and limitations; in doing so, it helps to sustain the platoon’s
combat capability and increase its maneuverability. MOPP gear exchange
and vehicle washdown, covered later in this discussion, are the two most
common techniques of operational decontamination.
C-233. The reconnaissance platoon conducts operational level
decontamination, which is less resource-intensive than thorough
decontamination, either unsupported, using only squadron/battalion
C-64
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
NOTE: To prevent crews from coming into contact with harmful and sometimes invisible
agents or vapors, the platoon leader must ensure that equipment, gear, rations, or
ammunition secured on the exterior of vehicles is decontaminated and checked with
monitors (ICAM, M8 paper) before being moved inside the vehicles.
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FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
NOTE: When the platoon has completed operational decontamination and soldiers face
little, if any, vapor hazard, they may use hazard-free areas to temporarily unmask
to eat, drink, and rest. Operational decontamination, however, does not guarantee
that conditions are safe enough to allow unmasking on or near equipment. Before
unmasking and lowering the MOPP level for temporary relief, the platoon must
conduct unmasking procedures using the CAM or M256-series chemical detector
kit. In addition, leaders must conduct continuous contamination checks and
monitoring to ensure that soldiers unmask in clean areas. Units must develop
effective SOPs and training for unmasking. Refer to the discussion of unmasking
procedures later in this section.
Thorough Decontamination
C-239. This is the most effective and resource-intensive level of
decontamination, requiring external support by platoon- or company-size
NBC elements. It takes place after combat operations, during
reconstitution, and after a passage of lines to restore combat power by
removing nearly all contamination from unit and individual equipment;
this allows soldiers to operate equipment safely for extended periods at
reduced MOPP levels.
C-240. Thorough decontamination techniques are detailed troop
decontamination (DTD) and detailed equipment decontamination (DED).
During DTD, soldiers remove contaminated MOPP gear, to include
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_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
UNMASKING PROCEDURES
C-243. Leaders should conduct unmasking procedures only after all
applicable NBC chemical agent detection procedures indicate that no
C-67
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
NOTE: Unmasking procedures for biological agents must be coordinated through the
troop/company headquarters.
C-244. Unmasking procedures are conducted either with the aid of NBC
detection equipment (such as an M256A1-series chemical detector kit, a
CAM, or an NBCRS vehicle) or without such equipment. The following
discussion describes the steps for both types of unmasking.
C-68
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
NUCLEAR CASUALTIES
C-248. The majority of casualties from a nuclear detonation will be from
the blast damage, thermal radiation, or heat burns. These can be treated
by the reconnaissance platoon’s combat lifesavers. Medical personnel,
however, will usually be required to treat radiation victims. Nuclear
fallout creates dust similar to volcanic ash that can travel great distances.
It collects and creates many types of environmental hazards not related
to radiation; these hazards, such as limited visibility and slick roads, can
result in further casualties. The international symbol for nuclear hazards
is shown in Figure C-52.
Symptoms
C-249. Refer to Figure C-53 for a list of conditions related to radiation
poisoning.
C-69
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
First aid
C-250. As noted, medical professionals should treat radiation
poisoning/sickness; however, reconnaissance platoon leaders and soldiers
(especially combat lifesavers) can perform the following first aid before
medical personnel arrive:
BIOLOGICAL CASUALTIES
C-251. In terms of military purposes, the most significant biological
agents are anthrax, Q fever, botulism, tularemia, and staphylococcal
enterotoxin B (SEB). Figure C-54 shows the symbol for biological hazards.
Anthrax
C-252. Anthrax, an infectious disease caused by a bacterium, is not only
highly lethal, but also easy to produce and deliver. The reconnaissance
platoon should deploy only after all soldiers have been inoculated with
the anthrax vaccine as a preventive measure. Anthrax has three forms:
cutaneous (absorbed through the skin), inhalation, and digestive.
C-253. Symptoms. Inhalation anthrax, the deadliest and most militarily
significant form, produces symptoms in two stages:
C-70
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
n Headache.
n Congestion.
n Dry cough.
· Stage two. These symptoms appear more than 24 to 48 hours
after exposure, followed in most cases by the death of the
victim:
n Severe shortness of breath.
n Cyanosis.
n Low or high body temperature.
n Profuse perspiration.
n Pleural effusion.
n Stupor.
Q Fever
C-257. This is an incapacitating condition that is acquired through
inhalation.
C-258. Symptoms. Symptoms of Q fever exposure, which appear 10 to
20 days after inhalation, include the following:
· Fever.
· Chills.
· Headache.
· Fatigue.
· Muscle aches.
· Pneumonia (detected by chest x-rays).
C-259. Duration. Symptoms usually last from two days to two weeks.
C-260. Mortality. Fewer than 1 percent of Q fever victims die from its
effects.
C-261. Disinfection. Materials exposed to the Q fever pathogen can be
disinfected using a 0.05 percent bleach solution (1 tablespoon of bleach
per gallon of water).
C-262. Treatment. A 10-day course of antibiotics, administered
beginning 8 or more days after exposure, can prevent Q fever from
C-71
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
Botulism
C-263. The toxin produced by the botulism bacterium is one of the most
toxic substances known. The likely method of dissemination would be as a
toxic cloud, but food and water supplies could be sabotaged as well.
C-264. Symptoms. Symptoms of botulism normally appear 24 to 36
hours after exposure. They include the following:
· Drooping eyelids.
· Dry mouth and throat.
· Difficulty in talking or swallowing.
· Blurred or double vision.
· Muscle weakness.
· Muscle paralysis.
Tularemia
C-267. The tularemia pathogen, a bacterium, is transmitted to humans
by animal contact, flea and tick bites, contaminated food and water, and
inhalation.
C-268. Symptoms. Symptoms of tularemia, which appear 2 to 10 days
after exposure, include the following:
· Fever.
· Dry cough.
· Pneumonia.
· Skin sores.
· Abdominal pains.
· Diarrhea.
· Chills.
· Chest discomfort.
· Weight loss.
· Swollen lymph nodes.
· Nausea and vomiting.
C-72
_________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
CHEMICAL CASUALTIES
C-271. As noted previously, chemical agents are classified as either
persistent or nonpersistent. This discussion covers the militarily
significant types: nerve, blood, and blister agents. Refer to Figure C-55,
which shows the symbol for chemical hazards.
Nerve Agents
C-272. These typically enter the body by skin absorption or inhalation.
They can be delivered by missile, rocket, artillery, mines, spray tanks, or
cruder, lower-tech dissemination methods.
C-273. Symptoms. Symptoms of nerve agent poisoning appear within
seconds of exposure. They include the following:
· Dizziness.
· Blurred vision and pinpoint pupils.
· Runny nose.
· Uncontrolled salivation.
· Difficult breathing.
· Tightness in the chest.
· Stomach cramps.
· Muscular twitching.
Blood Agents
C-275. These agents, which emit a smell of like bitter almonds, enter the
body by skin absorption or inhalation. Blood agents attack the way the
body transfers oxygen in the blood stream. Death can occur within
minutes within minutes of exposure. Delivery methods include missiles,
rockets, artillery, mines, spray tanks, and crude, low-tech dissemination
systems. Blood agents evaporate quickly.
C-73
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
· Dizziness.
· Blurred vision and dilated pupils.
· Runny nose.
· Chills.
· Slowed breathing.
· Pink fingernails, lips, and skin.
· Nausea.
· Vomiting.
Blister Agents
C-278. These enter the body by absorption and inhalation. Their odor can
vary from garlic to freshly mown hay to a fruity smell. The inventory
includes persistent, nonpersistent, and semipersistent blister agents,
which can be delivered by missiles, rockets, artillery, and mines.
C-279. Symptoms. Timing for the appearance of blister agent symptoms
is highly variable, from almost immediate to a delay of four to six hours.
Symptoms include the following:
C-74
Appendix D
SECTION I – INTRODUCTION
NOTE: US Army policy normally does not allow a unit to modify its warfighting METL
unless and until the unit is selected for stability operations and support operations.
Only then should a unit train for specific mission-related tasks. Chief among these
are operations with very restrictive ROE/ROI and orientation on the area, its
culture, and the nature of the conflict.
D-1
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
PEACETIME
D-6. In peacetime, a variety of measures are employed to achieve
national objectives; these include political, economic, and informational
measures, as well as military actions short of combat operations or active
support of warring parties. Within this environment, US forces may
conduct training exercises to demonstrate national resolve; conduct
peacekeeping operations; participate in nation-building activities; conduct
disaster relief and humanitarian assistance; provide security assistance
to friends and allies; or execute shows of force. Confrontations and
tensions may escalate during peacetime to reach a point of transition into
a state of conflict.
D-2
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations
STATES OF THE
MILITARY RECENT
OPERATIONAL GOALS MISSIONS
OPERATIONS OPERATIONS
ENVIRONMENT
· Large-scale combat
WAR Fight and win WAR operations DESERT
· Attack STORM
· Defend
· Counterdrug operations
PEACETIME Promote peace STABILITY AND · Disaster relief HURRICANE
SUPPORT · Civil support ANDREW
· Peace-building RELIEF
· Nation-building
assistance
CONFLICT
D-7. Conflict can encompass numerous types of situations, including
the following:
D-8. While regular military forces are sometimes involved, the use of
irregular forces frequently predominates in conflict actions. Conflict is
often protracted, confined to a restricted geographic area, and limited in
weaponry and level of violence. In this state, military response to a threat
is exercised indirectly, usually in support of other elements of national
power. Limited objectives, however, may be achieved by the short,
focused, and direct application of military force. Conflict approaches the
threshold of a state of war as the number of nations and/or troops, the
frequency of battles, and the level of violence increase over an extended
time.
D-3
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
NOTE: Military operations involving reconnaissance platoons occur most often in the state
of conflict. These may include standard security and reconnaissance missions in
support of offensive and defensive operations. Refer to the appropriate portions of
this manual for information on these operations.
D-4
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations
ENVIRONMENT
NOTE: The term “environment” in the following discussion is not equivalent to the states of
the operational environment (peace, conflict, war) examined earlier in this
appendix. As an operational consideration, the environment refers to the cultural,
political, and military context in which stability operations and support operations
take place, as well as to terrain and weather in the area of operations.
D-14. Stability operations and support operations can take place in any
part of the world. To deal effectively with the diverse situations they may
face, US forces must undergo orientation training on the complex
conditions and factors at work in a specific region. Each soldier must
understand the political and economic situation, as well as the cultures,
climates, and terrain of the region. He should understand the military
situation, especially the doctrine, tactics, and equipment that are
employed by belligerent, guerrilla, and terrorist forces. Orientation
training should also clarify the following environmental factors as well as
the planning and operational considerations covered in the remainder of
this discussion.
Tempo
D-15. Although extreme tension may underlie stability operations and
support operations, the tempo of these operations is generally slow.
Nonetheless, the speed of military action can vary widely, from fast,
violent tactical movement by a reaction force for the purpose of relieving
encircled friendly forces to the deliberate occupation of stationary
defensive positions to provide overwatch at traffic control points.
D-16. Throughout stability operations and support operations, the
threat can be expected to execute both overt and covert operations to test
friendly reaction times and security procedures. Units that are
predictable or that lack sound OPSEC leave themselves susceptible to
attack. For the reconnaissance platoon, the key to a secure environment
is not only to maintain the highest possible level of OPSEC, but also to
vary the techniques by which security procedures are executed.
Role of US Forces
D-17. All soldiers should be aware of the role US forces will play in the
overall mission. This is especially vital when Americans are part of a
combined force that requires constant interaction and coordination with
the soldiers of foreign nations. In all cases, the commander’s intent and
his projected end state should be simplified and presented in a way that
gives soldiers the guidance they need to accomplish the mission.
D-5
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
INTELLIGENCE
D-19. Intelligence is crucial during the execution of stability operations
and support operations. The threats faced by military forces in these
operations are more ambiguous than those in other situations because
combatants, guerrillas, and terrorists can easily blend with the civilian
population. Before forces are committed, intelligence must be collected,
processed, and focused to support all planning, training, and operational
requirements. (NOTE: For additional information, refer to FM 3-07 [FM
100-20].)
DECENTRALIZED OPERATIONS
D-20. Although stability operations and support operations are
normally centrally planned, execution often takes the form of small-scale,
decentralized actions conducted over extended distances. Responsibility
for making decisions on the ground will fall to junior leaders. Effective
command guidance and a thorough understanding of the applicable ROE
(refer to the following discussion) are critical at each operational level.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
D-21. ROE are politically imposed restrictions on military operations.
The ROE are directed by higher military authorities based on the political
and tactical situations and the level of threat. For example, these
restrictions may require that the forces involved limit their use of
firepower to a certain geographical area or that they limit the duration of
their operations. Refer to Figure D-2 for an example of ROE for one
possible situation.
D-22. ROE must be considered during the planning and execution of all
operations. The unit’s TTP will require adjustment based on each
particular situation’s ROE. Understanding, adjusting for, and properly
executing ROE are especially important to success in stability operations
and support operations. The restrictions change whenever the political
and military situations change; this means ROE must be explained to
friendly soldiers continuously.
D-6
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations
D-23. ROE provide the authority for the soldier’s right to self-defense.
Each soldier must understand the ROE and be prepared to
execute them properly in every possible confrontation. In addition,
ROE violations can have operational, strategic, and political
consequences that may affect national security; the threat can be
expected to exploit such violations.
D-7
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
D-25. These are tools the individual soldier will need to deal with the
nontraditional threats that are prevalent in stability operations and
support operations, including political friction, unfamiliar cultures, and
conflicting ideologies. In turn, ROI and graduated response enhance the
soldier’s survivability in such situations. They are based on the applicable
ROE for a particular operation; they must be tailored to the specific
regions, cultures, and/or populations affected by the operation. Like ROE,
ROI and graduated response can be effective only if they are thoroughly
rehearsed and understood by every soldier in the unit.
FORCE PROTECTION
D-26. Because of the influence of local politics and news media in
stability operations and support operations, precautions and operations
D-8
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations
TASK ORGANIZATION
D-30. Because of the unique requirements of stability operations and
support operations, the reconnaissance platoon may be task organized to
operate with a variety of units. Examples may include an armor or
mechanized company team or a light infantry company or battalion.
CSS CONSIDERATIONS
D-31. The operational environment the reconnaissance platoon faces
during stability operations and support operations may be very austere,
creating special CSS considerations. These factors include, but are not
limited to, the following:
MEDIA CONSIDERATIONS
D-32. The presence of the media is a reality that confronts every soldier
involved in stability operations and support operations. All leaders and
soldiers are subject to instantaneous worldwide scrutiny as a result of the
growth of news coverage via international television and radio broadcasts
and the Internet. They must realize that operations that run counter to
D-9
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
SOLDIERS’ RESPONSIBILITIES
D-35. US soldiers may have extensive contact with host-nation civilians
during stability operations and support operations. As a result, their
personal conduct has a significant impact on the opinions, and thus the
support, of the local population. As noted, soldiers must understand that
misconduct by US forces (even those deployed for only a short time) can
damage rapport that took years to develop. US soldiers must treat local
civilians and military personnel as personal and professional equals,
affording them the appropriate customs and courtesies.
D-36. Every soldier must be updated continuously on changes to
operational considerations (such as environment, ROE/ROI, media, and
force protection). Such changes can have immediate impact on his
freedom to react to a given situation. Keeping the soldier informed of
changes enhances his situational awareness and his ability to adapt to
changing conditions. Leaders must disseminate this information quickly
and accurately.
D-37. Every individual is an intelligence-collecting instrument. The
collection of information is a continuous process, and all information must
be reported. Intelligence is provided by many sources, including friendly
forces, threat elements, and the local populace. From the friendly
standpoint, each soldier must be familiar with the local PIR and other
applicable intelligence requirements. At the same time, threat soldiers
will be continuously seeking intelligence on US actions, often blending
easily into the civilian population. US soldiers must be aware of this and
use OPSEC procedures at all times.
D-38. To emphasize soldier responsibilities, leaders conduct PCCs and
PCIs that focus on each soldier’s knowledge of the environment and
application of the ROE. These checks and inspections should also identify
possible OPSEC violations and deficiencies that could place the soldier
and his equipment at risk. Leaders should stress that terrorists and
thieves may attempt to infiltrate positions or mount vehicles either to
steal equipment and supplies or to cause harm to US forces or facilities.
D-10
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations
OPERATIONAL GOALS
D-44. Stability operations may include both developmental and coercive
actions. Developmental actions enhance a host-nation government’s
willingness and ability to care for its people. Coercive actions apply
carefully prescribed limited force or threat of force to change the
environment of the area of operations. Military forces conduct stability
operations to accomplish one or more of the following activities:
D-11
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OPERATIONAL CATEGORIES
Peacetime Military Engagement
D-45. Peacetime military engagement (PME) activities are stability
operations designed to have a positive impact on the regional security
environment and preclude conflict. The objectives of peacetime military
engagements are to open communication, increase interoperability,
increase regional military professionalism, educate a host-nation’s forces
on the role of the military in a democracy, and increase regional stability.
Examples of PME activities include multinational training exercises,
individual training and observers, medical and engineer projects and
exercises, and staff information exchanges.
D-12
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations
Peacekeeping Operations
D-54. A peacekeeping force facilitates truce negotiations and political
settlement of disputes. In doing so, it must assure each side in the dispute
that other parties are not taking advantage of settlement terms to their
own benefit. Peacekeeping differs from internal security in that the force
does not act in support of a government. Rather, the peacekeeping force
must remain entirely neutral; if it loses a reputation for impartiality, its
usefulness within the peacekeeping mission is destroyed.
Peace Enforcement
D-55. Several unique characteristics distinguish peace enforcement
activities from wartime operations and from other stability operations.
The purpose of peace enforcement is to maintain or restore peace under
conditions broadly defined at the international level. It may entail
combat, armed intervention, or physical threat of armed intervention.
Under provisions of an international agreement, the squadron/battalion
and its subordinate elements, including the reconnaissance platoon, may
be called upon to use coercive military power to compel compliance with
international sanctions or resolutions.
D-13
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Preventive Diplomacy
D-57. Preventive diplomacy is diplomatic action taken in advance of a
predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence. Army forces are not
normally directly involved in preventive diplomacy but may support a
state department effort by providing transportation and communications
assets. In some cases, military forces may conduct a preventive
deployment or show of force as part of the overall effort to deter conflict.
Peacemaking
D-58. Peacemaking is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation,
or other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges an end to a dispute
and resolves the issue that led to the conflict. It includes military actions
that support the diplomatic process. Army forces participate in these
operations primarily by performing military-to-military contacts,
exercises, peacetime deployments, and security assistance.
Peace Building
D-59. Peace building consists of post-conflict actions, predominantly
diplomatic and economic in nature, that strengthen and rebuild
governmental infrastructure and institutions to avoid a relapse into
conflict. Military actions that support peace building are designed to
identify, restore, and support structures that strengthen and solidify
peace. Typical peace building activities include restoring civil authority,
rebuilding physical infrastructure, providing structures and training for
schools and hospitals, and helping reestablish commerce.
SECURITY ASSISTANCE
D-62. Security assistance refers to a group of programs by which the
United States provides defense articles, military training, and other
defense-related services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash
sales. The primary object is to further national policies and objectives.
Army forces support security assistance efforts through military training
teams (MTT), maintenance support personnel and training, and related
activities.
D-14
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations
SUPPORT TO INSURGENCIES
D-64. This type of support includes assistance provided by US forces to
help a friendly nation or group that is attempting to combat insurgent
elements or to stage an insurgency itself. This type of stability action is
normally conducted by SOF.
COMBATING TERRORISM
D-65. In all types of stability operations, antiterrorism and
counterterrorism activities are a continuous requirement in protecting
installations, units, and individuals from the threat of terrorism.
Antiterrorism focuses on defensive measures. Counterterrorism
encompasses a full range of offensive measures to prevent, deter, and
respond to terrorism. Refer to JCS Publication 3-07.2 for more
information on these activities.
ARMS CONTROL
D-68. The reconnaissance platoon may work with another nation’s
military to conduct arms control or nation assistance activities. These are
usually entail short-term, high-impact operations.
SHOW OF FORCE
D-69. Forces deployed abroad lend credibility to a nation’s promises and
commitments. In support of this principle, show-of-force operations are
D-15
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D-16
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations
D-17
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RELIEF OPERATIONS
Types of Relief Operations
D-88. The actions Army forces execute during relief operations can be
characterized as either humanitarian relief, which focuses on the well
being of supported populations, or disaster relief, which focuses on
recovery of critical infrastructure after a natural or man-made disaster.
Most relief operations combine both types of actions. Considerations
include the following:
D-18
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations
· Response.
· Recovery.
· Restoration.
D-92. Recovery Phase. This phase begins the process of returning the
community infrastructure and related services to a status that meets the
population’s immediate needs. Typical recovery operations include these:
D-19
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DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS
D-96. Domestic preparedness includes training, exercises, expert
assistance, and response.
Support to Counterterrorism
D-100. Military units in support of the lead agency may operate to
eliminate identified threats. Assistance may be provided in the areas of
transportation, equipment, training, and personnel. When terrorists pose
an imminent threat to US territory, its people, and critical assets, the US
military may be used to support operations to counter these threats,
using ground, air, space, special operations, or maritime forces.
D-20
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations
COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE
D-103. Community assistance is a broad range of activities in which
Army personnel and organizations provide support and maintain a strong
connection between the military and civilian communities.
D-21
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LEADER REQUIREMENTS
D-113. Flexibility and situational awareness are paramount
requirements, especially for the reconnaissance platoon leader. The
platoon’s role and/or objectives in stability operations and support
operations will not always be clear. The platoon leader will sometimes be
called upon to make on-the-spot decisions that could have an immediate,
D-22
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations
ROADBLOCKS
D-117. A roadblock is used to stop the movement of vehicles along a route
or to close access to certain areas or roads. Roadblocks can be established
separate from checkpoints or used to channel traffic into a checkpoint.
These factors apply in positioning a roadblock:
D-23
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D-24
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations
CHECKPOINTS
D-119. Checkpoints are manned locations used to accomplish the
following:
DELIBERATE CHECKPOINTS
D-120. The deliberate checkpoint is a relatively fixed position established
in a town or in open country, often on a main road (see Figure D-7).
Deliberate checkpoints are classified to handle either heavy traffic or
light traffic, based on the amount of traffic expected to pass through
them. Reconnaissance sections and squads can operate only light traffic
checkpoints (see Figure D-8). The reconnaissance platoon can operate
both heavy and light traffic checkpoints; Figure D-9 shows a platoon-
operated heavy traffic checkpoint.
D-25
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D-26
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations
· Obstacles (barriers).
· Search areas.
· Security overwatch and fighting positions.
· Holding area.
· Vehicles.
· Females.
· Other individuals. These include suspects and other persons
detained for further interrogation.
D-27
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Task Organization
D-126. Personnel manning the checkpoint are organized into the
following teams or elements to accomplish specific tasks:
· Headquarters element.
· Security force.
· Search teams.
· Sentry teams.
D-28
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations
HASTY CHECKPOINTS
D-134. Hasty checkpoints are set up to achieve surprise. They are
established in locations where they cannot be observed by approaching
traffic until it is too late to withdraw and escape without being observed.
Possible locations for hasty checkpoints include the following:
D-135. The hasty checkpoint has the same basic layout as a deliberate
checkpoint; however, because hasty checkpoints are temporary and
mobile, the platoon or section establishing the checkpoint must carry the
materials necessary to construct it.
D-29
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Communications
D-138. Communications must be established between the checkpoint or
roadblock and higher headquarters. FM radios and wire are used within
the checkpoint and between the checkpoint and overwatch positions,
reaction forces, the checkpoint CP, and sentry posts. Checkpoint
personnel also plan for additional means of communications, such as
pyrotechnics, flags, hand-and-arm signals, or code words.
Barriers
D-140. Obstacles should be positioned across the road and around the
search area. These can include barrels filled with concrete or sand,
barrier poles, clearly marked barbed wire, buses parked sideways in the
road, felled trees, abandoned or disabled vehicles, or other readily
available items strong enough and big enough to prevent motorists from
driving through or around them. Hasty minefields, both dummy and
actual, can be used to reinforce an obstacle.
Weapons
D-141. Soldiers must have adequate firepower to withstand an attack or to
stop a vehicle that is attempting to flee or crash through the checkpoint.
Crew-served weapons must be loaded and manned at all times.
Linguists
D-142. Soldiers familiar with the local language are valuable in all
roadblock or checkpoint operations. If they are not available, soldiers
must be familiar with basic phrases necessary for the operation. They
should have a printed reference such as a key word and phrase card; this
should be obtained from the civil affairs section, translation detachment,
local authorities, or liaison officers as soon as the mission is received.
Other Equipment
D-143. Other specialized equipment may be required to support the
checkpoint. Figure D-11 provides a list of equipment that may be helpful.
D-30
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations
D-31
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Search Authority
D-149. Checkpoint personnel perform searches to apprehend suspects or
confiscate contraband only in areas within their military jurisdiction (or
where otherwise lawful). Proper use of search procedures gains the
respect and support of the local population, enhances credibility, and
demonstrates impartiality. Conversely, misuse of search authority can
undermine the credibility of forces conducting operations in the area; it
D-32
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations
can also affect future operations. Checkpoint personnel must ensure that
search procedures are conducted in accordance with established
guidelines and the applicable ROE/ROI.
Search Rates
D-151. Search operations are conducted slowly enough to allow for a
thorough search but rapidly enough to prevent the threat from reacting to
the threat of the search.
Use of Force
D-152. In accordance with established ROE, minimum essential force is
used to eliminate any active resistance encountered during the search.
Courtesy
D-153. Search personnel should remain polite and considerate at all
times. Refer to Figure D-13 for a list of guidelines for personal conduct
during search operations.
D-33
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SEARCH PROCEDURES
Search of Individuals
D-154. To avoid making a threat of a person passing through a
checkpoint, searchers must be polite, considerate, patient, and tactful.
Since the very presence of checkpoints can cause uneasiness or fear, it is
during the initial handling of a person about to be searched that the
greatest caution is required. At least one member of the search team
must provide security at all times while others conduct the search. The
following methods can be used to search an individual:
· Frisk search.
· Wall search.
· Strip search.
· Female search.
D-34
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations
carrying a bag or wearing a coat or hat, these are also searched, with
special attention given to the linings.
D-156. Wall Search. The wall search affords the searcher some safety by
placing the individual being searched in a strained, awkward position
(see Figure D-15). This search method is useful when two searchers must
search several individuals. The individuals to be searched can be
positioned against any upright surface, such as a wall, vehicle, tree, or
telephone pole. The following discussion covers factors that must be
considered during the wall search.
D-157. Position of individual being searched. The individual must
face the wall (or other object) and lean against it, supporting himself with
his hands over his head, placed far apart with fingers spread. His feet are
placed well apart as far from the wall as possible; they are turned
outward so they are parallel to the wall. The individual must keep his
head down as illustrated in Figure D-15.
D-158. Position of the searcher’s guard. The searcher’s guard stands
to the rear of the individual being searched on the opposite side from the
searcher (see Figure D-15). The guard uses his weapon to cover the
individual being searched. When the searcher moves from his original
position to the opposite side of the individual being searched, the guard
also changes position. The searcher walks around the guard to avoid
coming between the guard’s weapon and the individual being searched.
D-35
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D-36
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations
D-163. Strip Search. This extreme search is used only when the
individual is suspected of carrying documents or other contraband on his
person. The search is conducted in an enclosed area such as a room or
tent. Several search techniques are available. One method is to use two
unarmed searchers while an armed guard provides security. The
individual’s clothing is removed and searched carefully. A search is then
made of all possible concealment areas, including the mouth, nose, ears,
hair, armpits, and groin area. A medic is a good choice to conduct this
search. Care must be taken not to subject the individual to unnecessary
embarrassment. Searchers must ensure that the person’s privacy and
dignity are maintained as much as possible.
D-164. Search of Females. Women should be used to search other
females whenever possible. If female searchers are not available, consider
D-37
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
Search of Vehicles
D-165. Vehicles searches may require special equipment such as metal
detection devices and mirrors. Because a thorough vehicle search is a
time-consuming process, a separate search area should be established to
prevent unnecessary delays. Table D-2 shows an example of a search rate
planning guide.
D-166. Searchers instruct all occupants to get out and stand clear of the
vehicle. The driver should be made to watch the search of the vehicle. A
guard watches the passengers and provides additional security at all
times. If sufficient searchers are available, the passengers should be
searched at the same time. Figure D-18 lists some examples of vehicle
search procedures.
D-38
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations
TASK ORGANIZATION
D-168. Task organization for cordon and search operations includes a
security force (cordon force), a search force, and a reserve force. The
reconnaissance platoon will normally operate as part of the security force
or the reserve force; if required, however, it can operate either by itself as
the search force or as part of a larger search force.
Procedures
D-170. An effective cordon is critical to the success of the search effort.
Cordons isolate the search area, prevent the escape of individuals, and
protect the forces conducting the operation. Deployment to the search
area is rapid and is synchronized so it does not provide early warning to
the local population; the security force surrounds the area while the
search force moves in (see Figure D-19).
D-39
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Reserve Force
D-172. A mobile reserve force is located near the search zone. Its specific
mission is to reinforce OPs, patrols, or the search force and to assist the
other elements as required by the mission. Figure D-21 shows the recce
platoon operating as the reserve.
D-40
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations
THE THREAT
D-178. Light infantry fights a variety of threat forces. These may range
from crudely equipped insurgents to technologically advanced
conventional forces. Potential threat targets include the following:
D-41
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LIMITATIONS
D-180. The reconnaissance platoon’s limitations in light/medium
operations include these:
D-42
__________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations
D-43
Appendix E
Antennas
In its role of providing
battlefield information to the CONTENTS
commander, the reconnais- Siting Considerations ................................... E-1
sance platoon operates along Field-Expedient Repairs ............................... E-2
Repair Techniques ................................. E-2
extended frontages and over Field-Expedient Repair Items ............... E-4
long distances. To perform its Field-Expedient Antennas ............................ E-5
missions successfully, the Advantages and Disadvantages ........... E-5
platoon must employ effective Determining Antenna Lengths ............. E-6
communications systems, Omnidirectional Antennas .................... E-6
Bidirectional Antennas .......................... E-9
equipment, and techniques. Unidirectional Antennas ....................... E-12
This appendix covers Field-Expedient 500- to 600-Ohm/2-Watt
antennas, a critical aspect of Resistor ............................................... E-16
the communications system. Antenna Connections ............................ E-17
(NOTE: Refer to Chapter 2
of this manual for a discussion of the means of communications and
the correct application of operational terms and effective RTP.
Appendix B includes formats and employment considerations for
reports the platoon uses.) The discussion focuses on considerations
related to the employment of radio antennas, a critical factor in the
effectiveness of the reconnaissance platoon’s communications
capabilities. Included are discussions on how to site antennas for best
results, how to make field-expedient antenna repairs, and how to
construct a variety of field-expedient antennas.
E-1
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REPAIR TECHNIQUES
WHIP ANTENNAS
E-10. As an example, for a metallic whip antenna broken into two
pieces, a splint job is the quickest type of repair. Scrape off the paint 3 to
6 inches from the broken ends; use sand, rocks, metal, or a knife to scrape
the ends clean. Using about 1 foot of copper wire (stripped WD-1 if
available), overlay the cleaned ends and wrap them together tightly with
the copper wire. Place a dry stick, pole, or branch on each side of the
break and wrap the splint tightly with WD-1, rope, tape, or whatever is
available. If everything else is working right, the radio should be ready to
use.
E-11. In combat, a common emergency would be for the 9-foot whip
antenna getting knocked off in an artillery barrage. To get back on the
air, you will need a pole about 10 feet long, about 9 feet of WD-1, and
some tape. First, scrape off the paint from the top 2 inches of the whip’s
stub. Tightly wrap 12 inches of bare wire around the scraped portion of
the stub. Pass the wire over the top of the stub, jam it in the hole with a
wooden peg, and tape it to hold it securely. Then take the 10-foot pole and
tie it tightly to the antenna base and stub. Attach the WD-1 along the
length of pole with tape. The total length of the upright WD-1 and
antenna stub should not be more than 9 feet. Trim away any extra wire,
and you are ready to communicate. This makeshift mast will not
withstand abuse like the original, but it will serve you well in an
emergency.
E-2
________________________________________________________________ Appendix E – Antennas
WIRE ANTENNAS
E-13. Emergency repair of a wire antenna may involve the repair or
replacement of the wire used as the antenna or transmission line or the
repair or replacement of the assembly used to support the antenna.
E-14. When one or more wires of an antenna are broken, the antenna
can be repaired by reconnecting the broken wires. To do this, lower the
antenna to the ground, clean the ends of the wires, and twist the wires
together. Whenever possible, solder the connection. Use electrical tape, if
available, for added support.
E-15. If the antenna is damaged beyond repair, construct a new
antenna. Make sure the length of the wires for the substitute antenna is
the same as on the original.
E-16. Antenna supports may also require repair or replacement. A
substitute item may be used in place of a damaged support; if properly
insulated, it can be made of any material of adequate strength. If the
radiating element is not properly insulated, field antennas may be
improperly grounded and therefore ineffective. Many common items can
be used as field-expedient insulators. The best items are plastic or glass,
such as plastic spoons, buttons, bags, and bottle necks. Wood and rope, or
both, are less effective than plastic or glass but still are better than no
insulator at all. The radiating element (the actual antenna wire) should
touch only the antenna terminal and should be physically separated from
all other objects (other than the supporting insulator). Figure E-1 shows
various improvised insulators.
E-3
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E-4
________________________________________________________________ Appendix E – Antennas
E-18. Direction and distance are critical factors in determining how well
the reconnaissance platoon is able to communicate. There are three basic
types of antennas, based on their directional features:
E-5
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
E-20. To determine the length of the antenna you need, use the proper
formula below:
OMNIDIRECTIONAL ANTENNAS
MOBILE WIRE ANTENNA
E-21. The mobile wire antenna is basically a whip antenna without the
stiffness of a fiberglass whip. With the appropriate insulators and a
support system, it can become a vertical whip antenna (see Figure E-3).
This antenna is severely degraded when the range is unknown. Since the
vehicle acts as a reflector, the loose wire should be laid over the portion of
the vehicle that faces the receiving station. This ensures that the
reflected radio waves are radiated toward the receiving station. The
coaxial 52-ohm RF cable can be the same cable that is installed in the
vehicle (from the radio antenna receptacle to the antenna matching unit),
or it can be fabricated by the unit communications platoon. If fabricated,
the cable should be only long enough to reach from the radio to the
outside of the vehicle.
E-6
________________________________________________________________ Appendix E – Antennas
E-7
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ELEMENT LENGTH
OPERATING FREQUENCY
(radiating element and
(in MHz)
ground-plane elements
30 2.38 m (7 ft 10 in)
32 2.23 m (7 ft 4 in)
34 2.1 m (6 ft 11 in)
36 1.98 m (6 ft 6 in)
38 1.87 m (6 ft 2 in)
40 1.78 m (5 ft 10 in)
43 1.66 m (5 ft 5 in)
46 1.55 m (5 ft 1 in)
49 1.46 m (4 ft 9 in)
52 1.37 m (4 ft 6 in)
55 1.3 m (4 ft 3 in)
58 1.23 m (4 ft)
61 1.17 m (3 ft 10 in)
64 1.12 m (3 ft 8 in)
68 1.05 m (3 ft 5 in)
72 .99 m (3 ft 3 in)
76 .94 m (3 ft 1 in)
E-24. If insulated wire is used, be sure to loop the wire around the
handle of the radio before attaching it to the antenna connector. If the
antenna is made of bare wire, use a stake and insulator to keep the
antenna wire from pulling out of the antenna connector on the radio.
BIDIRECTIONAL ANTENNAS
END-FED HALF-WAVELENGTH ANTENNA
E-8
________________________________________________________________ Appendix E – Antennas
E-9
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feet high. If you use a tree, make sure the antenna does not
touch any of the branches.
· Step 2. Tie the rope to the pole or tree. While holding the
other end of the antenna wire, pace off 100 feet from the
direction in which you want to communicate. Tie an insulator
to the end of the wire.
· Step 3. Prepare a mast or pole for the second support. To
make a substitute pulley, tie a length of WD-1 wire or nylon
rope to the top of the mast. Leave a good, firm loop.
· Stop 4. Put a rope or wire halyard through the loop and
attach it to the other aide of the insulator. Leave enough rope
to pull the antenna up once the mast is erected.
· Stop 5. Attach 25 feet of WD-1 wire to the antenna side of the
insulator. Make a good electrical connection because this is
the antenna lead-in.
· Stop 6. Put up the second support about 6 feet beyond the
end of the 100-foot antenna. This allows for the insulators at
each end.
· Step 7. Attach guy supports to both sides of the antenna. This
will not be necessary if a tree is used, but any pole you put up
will require a back guy wire because stretching the antenna
puts considerable strain on it.
· Step 8. Pull on the halyard until the antenna is level, then tie
the halyard to the supporting pole.
· Step 9. Connect the WD-1 wire lead-in to the radio.
E-10
________________________________________________________________ Appendix E – Antennas
WIRE ANTENNA
E-28. Pick a support that is at least 15 feet high and pointed in the
direction you need to communicate. Move your vehicle/radio so the
support is on a line with the station you need to reach and 100 feet from
you. Tie a piece of rope or WD-1 wire to the tree or pole you have selected
as a support. Attach an insulator to the rope or WD-1 wire tied to the
support. Connect 100 feet of WD-1 wire (antenna) to the insulator. Pull
the slack out of the antenna. Wrap the other end of the WD-1 wire around
the lower part of the broken whip to secure it, and connect the wire to the
antenna connector on the radio. Make sure you remove the control cable
and antenna cable connecting the matching unit and radio. You are now
ready to operate, as illustrated in Figure E-8. Remember to point your
antenna in the right direction. In addition, do not tie the antenna close to
the tree’s foliage. Also remember that you have converted the original
omnidirectional antenna into a bidirectional antenna.
E-29. Note that the antenna you have constructed has a long piece of
wire as a replacement for the whip. Long-wire antennas are covered later
in this discussion. Do not expect optimum transmission quality in all
directions from this antenna.
UNIDIRECTIONAL ANTENNAS
E-30. Dismounted patrols can greatly improve their communications in
the jungle by using field-expedient antennas. While moving, you are
generally restricted to using the short and long antennas that come with
E-11
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
E-12
________________________________________________________________ Appendix E – Antennas
Long-Wire Antenna
E-33. When erecting a long-wire antenna, do not forget the basics. The
overall length of the antenna wire must be 3 to 7 wavelengths of the
operating frequency. Use the reference chart in Table F-3 or the
appropriate formula provided earlier in this discussion to calculate the
E-13
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
correct wire length for the frequency on which you are operating. This
antenna is unidirectional for low power VHF radios if you use the 500- to
600-ohm, 2-watt carbon resistor. It is bidirectional, however, for high-
power VHF and HF, because in the field you will not be able to obtain a
carbon resistor large enough to terminate the higher-powered radios. Set
it up for the direction in which you want to communicate because it is
definitely not omnidirectional.
E-34. Erect the antenna as shown in Figure E-10. You will have to use
some side guys on the 9- to 10-foot poles to hold them up firmly. You will
find you can communicate over longer distances in either one or two
directions.
V-ANTENNAS
E-35. The V-antenna is another field-expedient unidirectional antenna.
It consists of two wires forming a V, with the open area of the V pointing
toward the desired direction of transmission/reception (see Figure E-11).
To make construction easier, the legs may slope downward from the apex
of the V. This is called a sloping-V antenna (see Figure E-12).
E-36. To achieve maximum performance, the angle between the legs
varies with the length of the legs. Use Table E-3 to determine the angle
and length of the legs. When the antenna is used with more than one
frequency or wavelength, use an apex angle that is midway between the
extreme angles indicated in the chart.
E-37. To make the antenna radiate in only one direction, connect
noninductive terminating resistors from the end of each leg (not at the
apex) to the ground. The resistors should be approximately 500 ohms and
have a power rating at least half that of the power output of the
transmitter being used. Without the resistors, the antenna radiates
bidirectionally, both front and back.
E-38. The V-antenna must be fed by a balanced transmission line.
E-14
________________________________________________________________ Appendix E – Antennas
E-15
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
distant station, adjust the position of the reflector until the strongest
signal is received. (See Figure E-13.)
· Step 1. Drive nails into each end of the BA-30, leaving room
to attach a wire at each end.
· Step 2. Attach a wire (approximately 6 inches long) to each
nail (metal-to-metal contact must be made).
· Step 3. Secure the BA-30 to the wooden insulator with tape
or wire.
· Step 4. Attach the antenna wire to the insulator while
simultaneously attaching the wire from the BA-30 to the
antenna wire (metal-to-metal contact must be made).
· Step 5. Attach the counterpoise wire to the insulator while
simultaneously attaching the loose wire from the BA-30 to the
counterpoise wire (metal-to-metal contact must be made).
E-16
________________________________________________________________ Appendix E – Antennas
ANTENNA CONNECTIONS
E-42. Of all the antennas used In the Army, the whip antenna is the
most common. It is omnidirectional and can be used to communicate
while on the move. The OE-254 antenna takes a little time to set up, but
it produces a stronger signal than the vehicle-mounted whip and is
omnidirectional. Bidirectional and unidirectional antennas are somewhat
more difficult to construct and align, but the security gained from being
less open to the threat may be worth the effort. On the other hand, no
antenna is worth much if you do not have a good connection. You must
make sure the antenna’s lead connections are clean and free of corrosion.
E-17
Appendix F
SECTION I – DEMOLITIONS
F-1
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
WARNING
The following discussion and accompanying
illustrations may not provide enough information to
allow safe employment of explosives; therefore,
scouts must be thoroughly familiar with fuzes,
charge settings, and firing demolitions before using
this information. For further information, refer to FM
3-34.310 (FM 5-34) and FM 3-34.214 (FM 5-250).
PRIMING EXPLOSIVES
F-1. Explosives may be primed, either electrically or nonelectrically, with a detonating cord.
Refer to the illustration in Figure F-1.
F-2
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles
FIRING SYSTEMS
F-2. Firing systems may be electric or nonelectric. A dual-firing
system is composed of two completely separate systems. They may be
dual electric, dual nonelectric, or a combination of electric and
nonelectric. Figure F-2 illustrates a combination dual-firing system.
SAFETY
F-3. To ensure safety in the employment of explosives, scouts must
maintain a minimum safe distance. Table F-2 lists the minimum safe
distances for detonation of explosives in the open.
F-4. Explosives may be prematurely detonated by induced currents.
Figure F-3 shows the distances at which transmitters can detonate
explosives by transmitted induced currents. The left column indicates
average power and peak power for all other transmissions.
F-5. Electric firing should not be performed within 155 meters (504
feet) of energized power transmission lines. When it is necessary to
conduct blasting operations at distances closer than 155 meters,
nonelectric firing systems should be used or the power lines de-energized.
F-3
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
NOTE: The safe distances listed in this table will normally apply to peacetime conduct of ranges. To
detonate a road crater (about 4 X 40 pounds of cratering charges), it would not be appropriate
to move 800 meters away, especially when using an electric circuit to detonate it.
CAUTION
If electric blasting caps are to be transported near
operating transmitters or vehicles (including helicopters)
in which a transmitter is to be operated, the caps must
be placed in a metal can. The cover of the can must be
snug and lap over the body of the can to a minimum
depth of 1/2 inch. Caps should not be removed from the
container in proximity of the operating transmitters. The
metal container must have metal-to-metal contact with
the lid.
F-4
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles
F-6. Misfires should be handled by the person who placed the charge.
For safety purposes, allow 30 minutes before investigating the misfire on
all nonelectric or buried charges. Aboveground misfires should be blown
in place by priming at least 1 pound of explosive and placing it as close as
possible to the charge without disturbing it. When dealing with buried
misfires, remove excess earth, except for at least 1 foot of earth around
the charge. Then blow the charge in place with at least 2 pounds of
explosive. Do not attempt to move or disarm a misfire, and do not
abandon misfired explosives.
WARNING
Use care when cutting and splicing the shock tube.
When cutting the shock tube, always tie an overhand
knot in the left over shock tube.
F-5
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
Stand-Alone System
F-6
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles
F-10. The stand-alone firing system is one in which the initiation sets
and transmission and branch lines are constructed using only MDI
components and the explosive charges are primed with MDI blasting
caps. It is important to ensure that the firing system is balanced. All
charges must have the same distance in shock-tube length from the firing
point to the charge. Figure F-4 shows the single-firing MDI system;
Figure F-5 shows the dual-firing MDI system; and Figure F-6 shows a
branch-line array.
F-7
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
CAUTION
When making multiple shock tube installations, take care
to protect the shock tubes from the effects of nearby
relay caps and charges. The shrapnel produced by a cap
or charge could easily cause a (partial or complete)
misfire. When there are many shock tubes involved in a
shot, place them carefully away from the junction.
F-12. Use the stand-alone MDI firing system for all types of demolition
missions, including bridge demolitions. The MDI firing system can be
used to initiate reserved demolition targets; however, under current
internationally agreed-upon doctrine, charges cannot be primed with
blasting caps until a change of readiness from state 1 (safe) to state 2
(armed) is ordered. Priming every charge with MDI blasting caps at this
critical moment would take a considerable amount of time and be
unacceptable to the maneuver commander. Priming charges with
detonating cord is the preferred method on reserved demolition targets.
F-8
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles
F-14. Use the combination firing system (MDI and detonating cord) for
all types of demolition missions. It combines the advantages of MDI
components with the simplicity and flexibility of detonating cord. The
combination firing system is the preferred method for reserved demolition
targets, underwater operations, and operations where subsurface-laid
charges are used.
WARNING
Do not dispose of used shock tubes by burning
them because of potentially toxic fumes given off
from the burning plastic.
F-9
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
CAUTION
Taping two cut ends of the shock tube together does not
make a reliable splice.
SAFETY PROCEDURES
F-17. When conducting training and missions with MDIs, follow the
general safety considerations for demolitions as given in FM 3-34.310
(FM 5-34), FM 3-34.214 (FM 5-250), and AR 385-63. Because MDI
components are delivered from the factory precrimped, they are more
reliable and safer to handle and use than the current standard military
blasting caps. Test results for MDI components have shown that the
blasting caps always function correctly if the shock tube is properly
initiated. Misfires normally occur only under the following conditions:
WARNING
Use of MDIs is not authorized for belowground or
internal charges.
· If the primer in the M81 does not fire (the most common
problem), recock the M81 by pushing in on the pull rod to
reset the firing pin, and then actuate the igniter again. If two
or three retries result in a nonfiring, cut the shock tube,
replace the igniter with a new one, and repeat the firing
procedure.
· If the M81 fires and blows the shock tube out of its securing
mechanism without it firing, cut about 3 feet from the end of
the shock tube, replace with a new igniter, and repeat the
firing procedure.
F-10
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles
FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
F-20. The amount of explosive used in any demolition project is
determined by the demolition charts. The following critical factors apply:
F-11
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
F-21. For the most destructive effect, an explosive charge must be of the
size and shape that best fits the target; it must be detonated in close
contact with the target. Any significant air or water gap between the
target and the explosive will lessen the force of the shock wave. Several
types of charges, such as sheet explosives or plastic explosives, can be cut
or molded to fit odd-shaped targets.
F-22. Whenever possible, place explosive charges to act on or through
the smallest or weakest part of the target. Internal charges produce the
greatest destructive effect for the least amount of explosive. Internal
charges are placed in boreholes in the target. They are confined by tightly
packed sand, wet clay, or other material. This is called stemming. Tamp
and pack the stemming material against the explosive to fill the hole to
the surface.
F-23. Place external charges on the surface of the target. Tamp the
charges by covering them with packed sand, clay, or other dense material.
This increases their destructive effect. Tamping may be loose or in
sandbags. To be most effective, the thickness of the tamping should at
least equal the breaching radius. Small breaching charges on horizontal
surfaces are sometimes tamped by packing several inches of wet clay or
mud around them. This process is called mudcapping.
F-12
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles
F-13
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
F-14
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles
F-15
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
NUMBER OF CHARGES
F-27. Calculate the number of charges required to demolish a pier, slab,
or wall using this formula:
N = W/2R
N = Number of charges
W = Width of pier, slab, or wall (in feet)
R = Breaching radius (in feet)
NOTE: The multiplier 2 in the formula is constant.
F-28. If the calculated value of N is between zero and 1¼, use one
charge. If the value is between 1¼ and 2½, use two charges. If the value
is greater than 2½, round it to the nearest whole number.
PLACEMENT OF CHARGES
F-29. For best results, arrange the charges in a flat square shape with
the flat side toward the target. The first charge is placed in from one side
of the target; the remainder of the charges are spaced at a distance of 2R
apart. When breaching hard-surface pavements, use one M112 (1¼-
F-16
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles
STEEL-CUTTING CHARGES
F-31. In the employment steel-cutting charges, the type of explosive is
critical to success. Confinement or tamping of the charge is rarely
practical or possible. Placement of the charge in direct contact with the
target is more important with steel than with other materials.
F-32. Select steel-cutting charges for their cutting effect and
adaptability to placement. The M112 block (C4) is a highly adaptable
explosive. Its size and shape are suitable for most steel-cutting
operations, and it can be used without cutting or reshaping. In addition,
the M112 block adapts well to steel targets because of the adhesive
compound on one face, which allows it to be affixed securely to the target.
F-33. The amount of steel-cutting charge to be used depends on the type
and size of steel and the kind of charge to be used. Figure F-11 shows
formulas for the use of TNT in steel-cutting operations. Table F-8 lists the
amount of C4 explosive required in steel-cutting operations.
F-17
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
Rails
F-35. Cut rails at crossings, switches, or curves. Cut at alternate rail
splices for a distance of 500 feet. The rules of thumb are the following:
F-18
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles
NOTE: These guidelines apply to chains and cables that are under tension. Both sides of
the chain link must be cut.
CHARGE PLACEMENT
F-37. The size and type of steel section will determine the placement of
the explosive charge. Cut extended sections by placing all of the explosive
on one side of the section along the proposed line of rupture. In some steel
trusses with individual members fabricated from two or more primary
sections (such as angle irons or bars separated by spacer washers or
gusset plates), place the charge with opposing portions offset the same
distance as the thickness of the section being cut. This will produce a
shearing action. Heavier I-beams, wide flange beams, and columns can
also require auxiliary charges. Never place the charges directly opposite
each other because this tends to neutralize the explosive effect.
F-38. For an illustration of charge placement for cutting steel members
and railroad rails, refer to Figure F-12.
BUILT-UP MEMBERS
F-39. Built-up members frequently have an irregular shape, making it
difficult to obtain close contact between the explosive charge and a
sufficient portion of the surface. If it is impractical to distribute the
charge properly to obtain close contact, increase the amount of explosive.
F-19
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
PRECAUTIONS
F-41. Place the steel-cutting charge on the same side as the firing party
because explosive charges throw steel fragments (missiles) long distances
at high velocities.
TIMBER-CUTTING CHARGES
F-45. Use composition C4 for untamped, concentrated, external charges
because it can be easily tied or fastened to the target. Because types of
timber vary widely from locality to locality, it is impractical to try to cut
all kinds of timber with charges calculated from a single table. It may be
necessary, therefore, to make test shots to determine the size of charge
F-20
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles
needed to cut a specific type of timber. Table F-9 shows the amount of
M112 (1¼-pound blocks) C4 needed for the various sizes of timber. Figure
F-14 provides several formulas for determining timber-cutting charges
and illustrates charge placement.
F-46. Place the charge in a borehole parallel to the greatest dimension
of the cross section and tightly tamp it with moist earth. If the charge is
too large for one borehole, make two boreholes side by side in the
dimensional timber. For round timber, make two boreholes at
approximate right angles to each other, but do not intersect them (see
Figure F-15). Tamp both boreholes and fire the charges simultaneously.
F-21
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
OBSTACLE DESTRUCTION
F-47. The reconnaissance platoon may be tasked to destroy obstacles.
The illustrations in Figures F-16 through F-20 show the recommended
methods for explosives placement to achieve the greatest destructive
effect with various types of obstacles.
F-22
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles
F-23
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
F-24
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles
CRATERING CHARGES
F-48. The explanation and sketches in Figure F-21 includes
explanations and illustrations for procedures to be used in creating
various types of road craters.
F-25
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
SECTION II – MINES
F-26
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles
F-27
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
F-28
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles
F-29
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
F-30
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles
F-31
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
CAUTION
1. Antipersonnel tripwire may not deploy properly if mines land in mud or snow.
2. Mine antihandling devices may cause premature destruction of mines if placed on snow.
3. Mine self-destruct times are classified CONFIDENTIAL and are available through unit.
F-32
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles
TYPES OF MINEFIELDS
F-51. The reconnaissance platoon may employ or encounter one of four
main types of minefields. Refer to Table F-10 for a summary of
characteristics and uses of these minefields.
AUTHORITY
TYPE DESCRIPTION TACTICAL REPORTS RECORDS MINES USED (Delegated
USE REQUIRED REQUIRED to)
AP AT S* **
Protective
Hasty Above-ground; Aids in unit’s Intention DA Form Brigade
X X X
protective random pattern; local, close-in Initiation 1355-1-R commander
no antihandling protection of (to parent (Battalion or
Completion
devices defensive unit) company
perimeter Change/
removal commander)
* Use the scatterable minefield report and records for all scatterable minefields (under “S” column).
** The corps commander is the initial employment authority for all scatterable minefields (“S” column). Long
self-destruct minefields (more than 24 hours) may be delegated to division and brigade level. Short self-
destruct minefields (24 hours or less) may be delegated to battalion/task force level.
F-33
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
MINEFIELD MARKING
F-34
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles
F-35
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
OBSTACLE TYPES
F-58. Figure F-26 shows various obstacles that the reconnaissance
platoon may encounter during combat operations.
REPORT FORMATS
OBSTACLE REPORT
F-59. Table F-11 shows a sample format for an obstacle report. For
further information on reporting procedures for obstacles, refer to
Appendix B of this manual.
F-36
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles
ITEM
INFORMATION REQUIRED
NO
8 Provide details of what and where the target is
(such as town, bridge, or general vicinity).
11 Sketch must show relative position of objects to
be demolished, terrain features, safe distances,
routes, avenues of approach, and location of
features of the site. One sketch must show fully
dimensioned plan view, side views, and cross
sections of object and each member to be cut
(this may be listed under item 12).
12 Show the plan and cross-sectional sketch of
each member to be cut. Show details of
chambers, line of cut, and location of charges.
Show quantity of explosive per charge and
method of ignition. Sketch must show firing
circuits and firing points.
13 Describe each item in detail and show location
on the situation map sketch.
F-37
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
F-38
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles
MINE DETECTORS
F-64. The reconnaissance platoon may use mine detectors to help
detect mines and clear lanes in minefields.
AN/PSS-12 CHARACTERISTICS
F-65. The AN/PSS-12 mine detector (see Figure F-28) is a man-portable
metallic mine-detection system that is used to detect AT and AP land
mines. Its search head contains two concentric coils—the transmitting
coil and the receiving coil. During operation, the transmitting coil is
energized with electric pulses to build up a magnetic field. The magnetic
field induces currents in metal objects near the search head, and the
currents build up a magnetic field in the metal objects. Depending on the
metal's composition and quantity, the magnetic field may be strong
enough to be picked up by the receiving coil. The signals from the
receiving coil are processed in the AN/PSS-12's electronics. When a signal
is considered positive, the electronic unit provides an audible alarm to the
operator.
WARNING
Users must keep in mind that magnetic detection is
effective only when there is a sufficient amount of
alloy in the mine to trigger an alarm from the
detector.
SEARCH METHODS
Use the following procedures and guidance in searching for mines using
the AN/PSS-12:
· Move the search head in sweeping motions a maximum of 5
centimeters above the ground. Sweeping speed should be
approximately 0.3 meter per second.
F-39
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
· Listen for an audible tone indicating that the inner ring of the
magnetic search head is over a metal object. The intensity of
the tone depends on the size, the shape, the content, the
depth, and the position of the object.
· Make an X-pattern sweeping movement (Figure F-29) across
the area when a tone is heard. The tone will be loudest when
the search head is immediately above the object.
· For small, horizontal metal pins, the tone will be louder when
the inner ring is near the pin rather than when the pin is in
the center of the ring.
· If you are searching for large, metal objects, detecting and
localizing is faster when the sensitivity control is turned down
(counterclockwise).
F-40
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles
M58A3 Trailer- AT/AP 3,100 8 (26) 100 Crane and 4 (25 mph)
(MICLIC) mounted (328) crew – 35
minutes
F-41
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
NOTE: Another nonexplosive breaching asset is the M1-series tank equipped with either
the mine-clearing blade or mine-clearing roller. Use of the tank affords a
combination of breaching capability, firepower, and mobility. The primary
disadvantage is the vehicle’s weight. The blade adds 3.5 tons and the roller 10 tons
to the tank’s base weight of more than 60 tons. An M1 equipped with the roller
exceeds the weight capacity of the AVLB.
OBSTACLE-CROSSING CAPABILITIES
F-67. Table F-14 summarizes the obstacle-crossing capabilities of
selected vehicles and equipment of the US Army and allied nations.
F-42
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles
in meters (inches)
in meters (inches)
FORDING DEPTH
MAX STRADDLE
MILITARY LOAD
MAX GRADIENT
in meters (feet)
in meters (feet)
in meters (feet)
in meters (feet)
in meters (feet)
CLASS (MLC)
CLEARANCE
HEIGHT TO
TRAVERSE
MAX STEP
WIDTH TO
MAX GAP
MAX TILT
GROUND
CLEAR
CLEAR
(%)
(%)
COUNTRY/
VEHICLE
CAUTION
The field-expedient devices and techniques described in
this discussion are intended for use only by personnel
who are experienced in mine and demolition employment
and safety. Other units/personnel should NEVER use
expedient mines and demolitions in place of standard
devices and methods.
F-43
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
EXPEDIENT MINES
F-69. When constructing and employing improvised mines, the
reconnaissance platoon must consider safety, neutralization, and
disarming requirements. Authorization of employment depends on the
minefield in which the mine is to be used. Figures F-29 through F-36
provide design and function guidance for expedient mines. Actual
construction will depend on several factors, including the availability of
materials.
F-44
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles
F-45
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
F-46
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles
F-47
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
EXPEDIENT DEMOLITIONS
CRATERING CHARGE
F-70. To make a cratering charge, use a mixture of dry fertilizer (at
least one-third nitrogen; refer to the package contents list) and liquid
F-48
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles
SHAPED CHARGE
F-71. Figure F-37 illustrates how to construct an expedient shaped
charge.
SATCHEL CHARGE
F-72. Melt ordinary paraffin (wax) and stir in ammonium nitrate
(fertilizer) pellets. Make sure the paraffin is hot while mixing. Before the
mixture hardens, add a ½-pound block of TNT, or its equivalent, as a
primer. Pour the mixture into a container. Shrapnel material can be
added to the mixture if desired, or it can be attached on the outside of the
container to give a shrapnel effect.
F-49
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
together, and prime one stick of dynamite with one of the strands. (The
dynamite is used to clean the hole.) Place the wick and the dynamite in a
hole. The wick must extend from the bottom of the hole to the surface.
Prime the wick and detonate the dynamite. Make sure the hole is “cold”
before putting in any other explosives.
MOLOTOV COCKTAIL
F-77. Fill a bottle with napalm, jelly gas, or a 2-to-1 mixture of gas and
oil. Insert a rag wick dipped in wax. Light the wick before throwing the
bottle. (NOTE: Cotton rags burn slower than some other materials, such
as silk. Use a rag wick that will burn long enough so the Molotov cocktail
reaches the target before exploding.) Refer to Figure F-39.
F-50
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles
SATCHEL CHARGE
F-78. Fill a #10 can with a mixture of ammonium nitrate and melted
wax; stir vigorously to ensure a complete mix. Add a small amount of C4
or TNT, and prime the charge with a time-fuze cord before the mixture
hardens. A rope handle creates a convenient improvised satchel charge.
PERCENT PARTS
MATERIALS REQUIRED
(by weight) (by volume)
POTASSIUM NITRATE 74 28
POWDERED CHARCOAL 16 3
SULFUR 10 2
F-80. Dissolve the potassium nitrate using a ratio (by weight) of three
parts water to one part nitrate. In a second container, dry-mix the
powdered charcoal and sulfur by stirring with a wooden stick or swirling
or shaking them in a tightly closed container. Add a few drops of the
potassium nitrate solution to the dry mixture, and blend to obtain a
thoroughly wet paste. Then add the rest of the solution and stir. Pour the
mixture into a shallow dish or pan and allow it to stand until it has a
paste-like consistency. Mix the paste thoroughly with a wooden stick to
assure uniformity, and set it aside for further drying. When the mixture
is nearly dried, granulate it by forcing it through a piece of wire screen.
Spread the granules thinly, and allow them to dry.
IMPROVISED FUZES
F-81. The following are three methods for making improvised string
fuzes:
F-51
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
IMPROVISED GRENADES
F-82. Use the following steps to make two types of improvised grenades:
· Combine 7.8 parts potassium nitrate or sodium nitrate, 1.6
parts charcoal, and 1 part sulfur. No detonator is required,
just a fuse.
· Combine 3 parts sodium chlorate and 3 parts sugar. Load the
mixture into a lead pipe. No detonator is required, just a fuse.
FLAME ILLUMINATOR
F-84. Fill a container to 3 inches from the top with thickened fuel, and
seal the container tightly. Put three wraps of detonating cord on the top
inside rim, and pack with dirt or mud. Wrap a grenade with detonating
cord. Place the grenade next to the container, and tie it to the main
detonating cord line. See Figure F-41.
F-52
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles
HUSCH FLARE
F-85. To construct a Husch flare, which burns for 90 minutes and lights
a diameter of 50 meters, remove the crossbars from a metal 60-mm
mortar can. Punch three 3/8-inch holes in each side of the can halfway
between the top and bottom. Punch a hole no bigger than 1/8 inch in the
bottom of a metal 81-mm mortar shell container. Temporarily fill the
holes; then fill the 81-mm container three-fourths full with thickened
fuel. Apply heavy grease to the cap, and tighten it. Place the 81-mm
container cap-down in the 60-mm container, and use stones or other
materials to wedge it tightly. Then fill the 60-mm mortar can up to the
holes with thickened fuel. Remove the plug from the hole in the bottom of
the 81-mm shell container. Tie an illumination hand grenade between the
81-mm shell containers just above the level of the 60-mm mortar can.
Run a trip wire from the grenade pin.
F-87. Use the following steps to construct the dried seed timer:
· Step 1. Determine the rate of rise of the dried seeds selected;
this is necessary to determine the amount of seeds needed to
provide the required delay time. Use these steps:
n Place a sample of dried seeds in the jar that will be used
as the timer. Cover the seeds with water.
n Measure the time it takes for the seeds to rise a given
height. Most dried seeds increase in volume by 50 percent
in 1 to 2 hours.
· Step 2. Cut a disk from a thin metal plate. The disk should fit
loosely inside the jar. (NOTE: If the metal is painted, rusty,
F-53
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
F-88. Use the following steps to activate and employ the dried seed
timer:
F-54
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles
F-55
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
FIELD-EXPEDIENT DELAYS
F-91. The reconnaissance platoon can take advantage of a variety of
materials for use as expedient delay mechanisms in the employment of
demolitions. Examples include the following:
F-56
_________________________________________________ Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles
including local sites that may provide the reconnaissance platoon with
access to necessary chemicals.
F-57
Appendix G
Environmental Protection
Protection of natural
resources is an ever- CONTENTS
increasing concern. It is Environmental Risk Management Process .......... G-1
Step 1 – Identify Environmental Hazards ..... G-1
the responsibility of all
Step 2 – Assess Environmental Hazards ..... G-1
unit leaders to decrease Step 3 – Develop Controls and
and, if possible, eliminate Make Decisions ........................................... G-2
damage to the Step 4 – Implement Controls ......................... G-2
environment when Step 5 – Supervise and Evaluate .................. G-2
Environmental Risk Assessment Worksheet ..... G-2
conducting all types of
operations. This
appendix focuses on measures the reconnaissance platoon must
understand and implement to accomplish that objective. TC 5-400
provides a comprehensive listing of procedures and considerations
applicable when operating in environmentally sensitive areas.
G-1
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
MISSION
· Identify and assess known environmental risks during planning.
· Determine environmental impact on mission execution.
· Specify areas of risk and/or concern to minimize the impact on the unit’s scheme of maneuver.
· Select alternate training methods or goals as necessary.
· Develop maps and/or sketches with detailed areas of environmental concern.
· Emphasize the importance of every soldier playing an active role in the identification and timely
reporting of new environmental risk elements.
· Rapidly and effectively respond to all petroleum, oil, and lubricants, and/or hazardous waste
accidents.
TIME AVAILABLE
· Maximize planning time. (NOTE: One key step is to minimize the complexity and length of the
mission briefing as much as possible.)
· Practice and develop various mission profiles that emphasize adjusting for changing environmental
factors, while maintaining the desired momentum.
CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS
· Identify and emphasize rules of engagement and/or rules of interaction that minimize environmental
damage.
· Expect media coverage and analysis of troop actions that affect the environment.
· Anticipate and limit collateral damage to civil infrastructure (such as agriculture and other food
production, delivery and supply systems, and hazardous chemical storage facilities).
· Identify environmental targets of value that the threat might attack.
G-2
__________________________________________________ Appendix G – Environmental Protection
G-3
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
WORKSHEET INSTRUCTIONS
Block
A–E Self-explanatory.
F Identify Hazards. Identify hazards by reviewing METT-TC factors for the mission or
task. Additional factors include historical lessons learned, experience, judgment,
equipment characteristics and warnings, and environmental considerations.
H Develop Controls. Develop one or more controls for each hazard to either eliminate the
hazard or reduce the risk (probability and/or severity) of a hazardous incident. Specify
who, what, where, when, and how for each control. Enter controls.
I Determine Residual Risk. Determine the residual risk for each hazard by applying the
risk assessment matrix (refer to Chapter 2, FM 3-100.4). Enter the residual risk level
for each hazard.
J Implement Controls. Decide how each control will be put into effect or communicated
to the personnel who will make it happen (written or verbal instruction: tactical, safety,
garrison SOPs, rehearsals). Enter controls.
K Determine Overall Mission/Task Risk. Select the highest residual risk level and circle it.
This level becomes the overall mission or task risk level. The commander decides
whether the controls are sufficient to accept the residual risk. If the risk is too great to
continue the mission or task, the commander directs development of additional
controls or modifies, changes, or rejects the COA.
Supervise and Evaluate. This last step is not on the worksheet. Plan how each control
will be monitored for implementation (continuous supervision, spot checks), and
reassess hazards as the situation changes. Determine if the controls worked and if
they can be improved. Communicate lessons learned.
G-4
A. Mission or Task: B. Date/Time Group C. Date Prepared:
Begin:
End:
G-5
__________________________________________________ Appendix G – Environmental Protection
A. Mission or Task: B. Date/Time Group C. Date Prepared:
G-6
Platoon STX Lanes Begin: 010600 JUN XX 22 MAY XX
End: 020100 JUN XX
FM 3-20.98
Establish a tactical Starting range and Moderate (M) 1. Inform soldiers Low (L) Troop SOP para
assembly area. training area fires. that no open fires 7(a), Range
are allowed. regulations.
2. Brief soldiers on
use of pyrotechnics.
2 Risk Management
4 Risk is the chance of
6 injury or death for CONTENTS
8 individuals and damage Risk Management Procedures ............................. H-1
Step 1 – Identify Hazards ............................... H-1
10 to or loss of vehicles and Step 2 – Assess Hazards to Determine
12 equipment. Risks, and/or Risks ............................................................ H-3
14 the potential for risks, Step 3 – Develop Controls and
16 are always present in Make Risk Decisions .................................. H-4
18 every combat and Step 4 – Implement Controls ......................... H-5
Step 5 – Supervise and Evaluate .................. H-5
20 training situation the Implementation Responsibilities ........................ H-6
22 reconnaissance platoon
24 faces. Risk management
25 must take place at all levels of the chain of command during each
26 phase of every operation; it is an integral part of all tactical planning.
27 The reconnaissance platoon leader, his NCOs, and all other platoon
28 soldiers must know how to use risk management, coupled with
29 fratricide reduction measures, to ensure that the mission is executed
30 in the safest possible environment within mission constraints.
H-1
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
MISSION
· Duration of the operation.
· Complexity/clarity of the plan. (Is the plan well developed and easily understood?)
· Proximity and number of maneuvering units.
TIME AVAILABLE
· Time available for troop-leading procedures and rehearsals by subordinates.
· Time available for PCCs/PCIs.
CIVILIAN CONSIDERATIONS
· Applicable ROE and/or ROI.
· Potential stability and/or support operations involving contact with civilians (such
as NEOs, refugee or disaster assistance, or counterterrorism).
· Potential for media contact/inquiries.
· Interaction with civilians from the host nation or from organizations participating in
nation support.
11
H-2
_________________________________________________________ Appendix H – Risk Management
28
H-3
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
1
2 Figure H-2. Example Risk Management Worksheet
H-4
_________________________________________________________ Appendix H – Risk Management
H-5
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
3 SUPERVISION
4 H-12. Leadership and unit discipline are the keys to ensuring that
5 effective risk management controls are implemented. In general, a
6 constant concern for soldier health and welfare is the key to fostering an
7 environment for successful, risk-free operations. All leaders are
8 responsible for supervising mission rehearsals and execution to ensure
9 standards and controls are enforced. In particular, NCOs must enforce
10 established safety policies as well as controls developed for a specific
11 operation or task. Techniques include spot checks, inspections, SITREPs,
12 confirmation briefs, buddy checks, and close supervision.
13 H-13. During mission execution, leaders must continuously monitor risk
14 management controls, both to determine whether they are effective and
15 to modify them as necessary. Leaders must also anticipate, identify, and
16 assess new hazards. They ensure that imminent danger issues are
17 addressed on the spot and that ongoing planning and execution reflect
18 changes in hazard conditions.
19 EVALUATION
20 H-14. Whenever possible, the risk management process should also
21 include an after-action review (AAR) to assess unit performance in
22 identifying risks and preventing hazardous situations. Leaders should
23 then incorporate lessons learned from the process into unit SOPs and
24 plans for future missions.
25
H-6
_________________________________________________________ Appendix H – Risk Management
H-7
1 Appendix I
3 Fratricide Prevention
5 Fratricide is defined as
CONTENTS
7 the employment of
9 friendly weapons that General Considerations ...................................... I-1
The Reconnaissance Platoon’s
11 results in the unforeseen Fratricide Risk ............................................ I-1
13 and unintentional death Role of Training in Fratricide Prevention .... I-2
15 or injury of friendly Effects of Fratricide .............................................. I-2
17 personnel or damage to Causes of Fratricide ............................................. I-3
19 friendly equipment. Failures in the Direct Fire Control Plan ....... I-3
Land Navigation Failures .............................. I-3
21 Fratricide prevention is Failures in Combat Identification ................. I-3
23 the commander’s Inadequate Control Measures ...................... I-3
25 responsibility. He is Failures and Reporting and
27 assisted by all leaders Communications ........................................ I-3
29 across all operating Weapons Errors ............................................. I-4
Battlefield Hazards ........................................ I-4
31 systems in accomplishing Reliance on Instruments ............................... I-4
33 this mission. This Fratricide Risk Assessment ................................. I-4
35 appendix focuses on Fratricide Prevention Measures .......................... I-6
37 actions the reconnais- Principles of Fratricide Prevention .............. I-6
39 sance platoon leader and Additional Guidelines .................................... I-7
Stopping a Friendly Fire Incident ........................ I-8
41 his subordinate leaders Actions as Victim of Friendly Fire ................ I-8
43 can take with current Actions as Firing Element ............................. I-8
45 resources to reduce the Actions as Observer of Friendly Fire ........... I-8
47 risk of fratricide. Leader Responsibilities ................................ I-9
48
49
I-1
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
I-2
_______________________________________________________ Appendix I – Fratricide Prevention
I-3
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
1 the tactical “picture” available at each level and can lead to erroneous
2 clearance of supporting fires.
3
4 WEAPONS ERRORS
5 I-14. Lapses in individual discipline can result in fratricide. These
6 incidents include charge errors, accidental discharges, mistakes with
7 explosives and hand grenades, and use of incorrect gun data.
8
9 BATTLEFIELD HAZARDS
10 I-15. A variety of explosive devices and materiel may create danger on
11 the battlefield: unexploded ordnance; unmarked or unrecorded
12 minefields, including scatterable mines; booby traps. Failure to mark,
13 record, remove, or otherwise anticipate these threats will lead to
14 casualties.
15
16 RELIANCE ON INSTRUMENTS
17 I-16. A unit that relies too heavily on systems such the FBCB2 and
18 GPS devices will find its capabilities severely degraded if these systems
19 fail. The unit will be unable to maintain situational awareness. To
20 prevent potential dangers when system failure occurs, the reconnaissance
21 platoon leader must ensure that his he and his scouts use a balance of
22 technology and traditional basic soldier skills in observation, navigation,
23 and other critical activities.
24
I-4
_______________________________________________________ Appendix I – Fratricide Prevention
1
Potential risk categories
(with variable conditions and point values)
Factors affecting Low risk Medium risk High risk
fratricide (1 point) (2 points) (3 points)
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
CONTROL MEASURES
NOTE: Point values alone may not accurately reflect fratricide risk. The commander
must tailor his assessment to the unit’s requirements.
I-5
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
2 SPECIAL NOTE
3 In many situations, the primary cause of fratricide is the
4 lack of positive target identification. To prevent fratricide
5 incidents, commanders and leaders at all levels must
6 ensure positive target identification before they issue
7 commands to fire. In addition, all units must accurately
8 report their locations during combat operations, and all
9 TOCs and CPs must carefully track the location of all
10 subordinate elements in relation to all friendly forces.
11
12 I-19. The measures outlined in this section, including those listed in
13 the special note above, provide the platoon with a guide to actions it can
14 take to reduce and/or prevent fratricide risk. These guidelines are not
15 directive in nature, nor are they intended to restrict initiative.
16 Commanders and leaders must learn to apply them as appropriate based
17 on the specific situation and METT-TC factors.
18
19 PRINCIPLES OF FRATRICIDE PREVENTION
20 I-20. At the heart of fratricide reduction and prevention are five key
21 principles.
I-6
_______________________________________________________ Appendix I – Fratricide Prevention
I-7
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
27 · Cease-fire.
28 · Report the following on the next higher net:
29 n Identification of the engaged friendly force (if the unit is
30 unidentified, report number and type of vehicles).
31 n The location of the incident.
32 n Direction and distance to the engaged force.
33 n The type of fire.
34 n The target effects.
35
36 ACTIONS AS OBSERVER OF FRIENDLY FIRE
37 I-30. The following are recommended actions at crew and leader level
38 in the event the crew observes a friendly fire incident:
I-8
_______________________________________________________ Appendix I – Fratricide Prevention
I-9
1 Appendix J
2 Debriefing Format
3
4
5 5-1. This appendix outlines information that should be included in the
6 debriefing of friendly personnel following the completion of tactical
7 operations. The information and format are applicable to virtually every
8 type of operation. The reconnaissance platoon leader can adapt the
9 format according to the commander’s intent, unit SOP, and other
10 operational requirements.
11
12
13
14 Team Number: __________ DTG: __________
18 B. Mission.
J-1
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
J-2
_________________________________________________________ Appendix J – Debriefing Format
2 H. Miscellaneous information.
3 1. NBC.
4 2. Abandoned equipment (type, number, location, and markings).
5 a. Out of fuel.
6 b. Destroyed or damaged.
7 c. Abandoned towns or villages.
21 K. Routes back.
22 1. Planned primary and alternate routes.
23 2. Actual routes taken and reason for deviation from planned routes.
24 3. Halts en route, to include security and linkup with vehicle.
25 4. DTG arrived at assembly area.
26 L. Exfiltration.
27 1. DTG of exfiltration.
28 2. Method of exfiltration.
29 3. Point of exfiltration.
J-3
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
1 N. Condition of team.
2 1. Disposition of dead and wounded personnel.
3 2. Team leader’s estimate of when team will be ready to start a new
4 mission.
5 3. Personnel and equipment shortages.
24 Enclosures:
25 Patrol log
26 Communications log
27 Surveillance log
28 Photograph log
J-4
Glossary
A
A2C2 Army airspace command and control
AA avenue of approach; assembly area
AAR after-action review
ABCS Army Battle Command System
ABF attack by fire (position)
ACA airspace coordination area
ACE armored combat earthmover
ACF aviation close fires
ACR armored cavalry regiment
ADA air defense artillery
ADAM area denial munitions
AFATDS advanced field artillery tactical data system
AGMB advance guard main body (enemy force)
AI area of interest
A/L administrative/logistics
ALICE all-purpose lightweight individual carrying case
AM amplitude modulation (radio)
AMC air mission commander
AMDS advanced monitoring display system
ammo ammunition
AO area of operations
AOR area of responsibility
AP antipersonnel
APC armored personnel carrier
APDS armor-piercing, discarding-sabot (ammunition)
APOBS antipersonnel obstacle breaching system
APOD aerial port of debarkation
ARTEP Army Training and Evaluation Program
ASAS all-source analysis system
AT antitank
ATACMS Army tactical missile system
ATGM antitank guided missile
ATHS airborne target handover system
AVLB armored vehicle launched bridge
B
BAT battery assembly training
BCT brigade combat team
BDA battle damage assessment
Glossary-1
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
C
C2 command and control
C4I command, control, communications, computers, and
intelligence
C4ISR command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance,and reconnaissance
cal caliber
CAM chemical agent monitor
CANA convulsant antidote for nerve agent
CAS close air support
CASEVAC casualty evacuation
CATF commander, amphibious landing force
cav cavalry
CBU cluster bomb unit
CCIR commander’s critical information requirements
CDE chemical defense equipment
cdr commander
CEOI communications-electronic operation instructions
CFF call for fire
CFL coordinated fire line
CFSO counterintelligence force protection source operations
CFV (Bradley) cavalry fighting vehicle
CFZ critical friendly zone
cGy/hr centigray(s) per hour
CI counterintelligence
CIP combat identification panel
CITV commander’s independent thermal viewer
Glossary-2
_____________________________________________________________________________ Glossary
D
DA Department of the Army
DAP decontamination apparatus, portable
DC direct current
DD; DoD Department of Defense
DED detailed equipment decontamination
div division
div cav division cavalry
DoD (United States) Department of Defense
DP decision point (illustration text)
DPICM dual-purpose improve conventional munitions
DS direct support
DSO domestic support operations
DST decision support template
DTD detailed troop decontamination
DTG date-time group
DU depleted uranium
DZ drop zone
E
E&E evasion and escape
EA engagement area
EAC echelons above corps
ECM electronic countermeasures
EECP early entry command center
Glossary-3
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
F
1LT first lieutenant
1SG first sergeant
FA field artillery
FAC forward air controller
FARP forward area refuel and rearm point
FBCB2 Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (system)
FCR fire control radar
FDC fire direction center
FEBA forward edge of the battle area
FFA free fire area
FHA foreign humanitarian assistance
FIPR flash immediate priority routine
FIST fire support team
FKSM Fort Knox Supplemental Material
FLIR forward-looking infrared (system)
FLOT forward line of own troops
FM frequency modulation (radio); field manual
FO forward observer
FPF final protective fires
FRAGO fragmentary order
FS fire support
FSCL fire support coordination line
FSCM fire support control measure
FSCOORD fire support coordinator
FSE fire support element; forward security element (threat forces
only)
FSO fire support officer
ft foot; feet
FWF former warring factions
FY fiscal year
Glossary-4
_____________________________________________________________________________ Glossary
G
GCT ground cavalry troop
GHz gigahertz
GIRS grid index reference system
gpm gallons per minute
GPS global positioning system
GS general support
GSR ground surveillance radar
H
H hour (used for timeline designation)
HAB heavy assault bridge
HE high explosive
HEI-T high explosive incendiary tracer (ammunition)
HEP-T high explosive plastic tracer (ammunition)
HHC headquarters and headquarters company
HMMWV high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle
HN host nation
hp horsepower
HPT high-priority target
HQ headquarters
hr hour(s)
HUMINT human intelligence
HVT high-value target
I
ICAM improved chemical agent monitor
ICE individual chemical equipment
ICM improved conventional munitions
ICOM integrated communications security (COMSEC)
ID identification
IEDK individual equipment decontamination kit
IFF identification friend or foe
IFSAS initial fire support automated system
illum illumination
IMINT image intelligence
in inch(es)
INS inertial navigation system
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IPE individual protective equipment
IR infrared; information requirements
IREMBASS improved remotely monitored battlefield sensor system
Glossary-5
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
J K
JAAT joint air attack team
JSLIST joint service lightweight integrated suit technology
JSTARS joint surveillance target attack radar system
JVMF joint variable message format
JWARN joint warning and reporting network
L
LAV light armored vehicle
LAW light antiarmor weapon
lb pound(s)
LBE load-bearing equipment
LBV load-bearing vest
LD line of departure
LD/LC line of departure is line of contact
LO liaison officer
LOA limit of advance
LOGPAC logistics package
LOS line of sight
LP listening post
LRP logistic release point
LT lieutenant
LU linkup (point)
LZ landing zone
M
m meter(s)
MAG magnetic sensor
MANPADS man-portable air defense system
MASINT measurement and signal intelligence
MBA main battle area
MC mobility corridor
MCOO modified combined obstacle overlay
MCS maneuver control system
MDI modern demolition initiator
MDMP military decision-making process
mech mechanized
Glossary-6
_____________________________________________________________________________ Glossary
N
NA not applicable
NAAK nerve agent autoinjector kit
NAI named area(s) of interest
NAPP nerve agent pyridostigmine pill
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC nuclear, biological, chemical
NBCRS NBC reconnaissance and surveillance
NBCWRS NBC warning and reporting system
NCO noncommissioned officer
NCOIC noncommissioned officer in charge
Glossary-7
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
O
ob obstruction (in route classification)
obj objective
OBSTINTEL obstacle intelligence
OCIE organization clothing and individual equipment
OCOKA observation and fields of fire; cover and concealment;
obstacles; key terrain; and avenues of approach
(considerations in evaluating terrain as part of METT-T
analysis)
OEG operational exposure guidance
OI operations and intelligence
OIC officer in charge
OP observation post
OPCON operational control
OPLAN operational plan
OPORD operation order
OPSEC operations security
OPTEMPO operational tempo
ORP objective rally point
OT observer-target
P
P persistent chemical agent (abbreviation on overlays)
PAO public affairs office; public affairs officer
PB pyridostigmine bromide
PC point of curvature (in curve calculation)
PCC precombat check
PCI precombat inspection
PDDE power-driven decontamination equipment
Glossary-8
_____________________________________________________________________________ Glossary
Q
QRF quick reaction force
R
R&S reconnaissance and surveillance; reconnaissance and security
(patrol elements)
RAA reconnaissance avenue of approach
RAAMS remote antiarmor mine system
RC reserve component
recon reconnaissance; reconnoiter
rd; rds round; rounds
recce reconnaissance
REDCON readiness condition
regt regiment
REMBASS remotely monitored battlefield sensor system
RES radiation exposure status
retrans retransmission
RF radio frequency
RFA restrictive fire area
RFL restrictive fire line
Glossary-9
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
S
2LT second lieutenant
S1 personnel staff officer (US Army)
S2 intelligence staff officer (US Army)
S3 operations and training staff officer (US Army)
S3-Air air operations staff officer (US Army)
S4 logistics staff officer (US Army)
S5 civil-military operations staff officer (US Army)
S6 signal staff officer (US Army)
SA situational awareness
SALT size, activity, location, and time (simplified format for the
initial contact report of enemy information; used in FBCB2
reporting)
SALUTE size, activity, location, unit identification, time, and
equipment (complete format for reporting enemy information)
SAW squad automatic weapon
SBCT Stryker brigade combat team
SCBA self-contained breathing apparatus
sct scout
SDS sorbent decontamination system
SEB staphylococcal enterotoxin B
sec section; second(s)
SENSEREP sensitive items report
Glossary-10
_____________________________________________________________________________ Glossary
T
T snow blockage (in route classification)
T&EO training and evaluation outline
TAC CP tactical command post
TACFIRE tactical fire direction system
TACSAT tactical satellite
TAI target area(s) of interest
TBM tactical ballistic missile
TC technical circular
TCP traffic control point
TEP theater engagement plan
TF task force
TI tactical internet
Glossary-11
FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________
U
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
UHF ultra high frequency
UMCP unit maintenance collection point
UN United Nations
UNMO United Nations military observer
US United States (of America)
USAARMC US Army Armor Center
USAARMS US Army Armor School
USAF US Air Force
USAR US Army Reserve
USMC US Marine Corps
VWX
veh vehicle
VHF very high frequency
VHR vertical half-rhombic (antenna)
XO executive officer
Glossary-12
Bibliography
AR 385-63. Policies and Procedures for Firing Ammunition for Training, Target
Practice, and Combat. October 1983.
ARTEP 17-97F-10-MTP. Mission Training Plan for the Reconnaissance Platoon.
July 2002 (Final Draft). DA-authorized edition to be published FY 2003.
DA Form 1155. Witness Statement on Individual. June 1966.
DA Form 1156. Casualty Feeder Report. June 1966.
DA Form 1355-1-R. Hasty Protective Minefield Record. September 2001.
DA Form 1971-R. Radiological Data Sheet-Monitoring or Point Technique. September
1994.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms. February
1974.
DA Form 2408-18.Equipment Inspection List. November 1991
DA Form 5988-E. Equipment Inspection Maintenance Worksheet. March 1991.
DA Pamphlet 738-750. Functional Users for the Army Maintenance Management System
(TAMMS). August 1994.
DD Form 551. Record of Interment. August 1984.
DD Form 1077. Collecting Point Register of Deceased Personnel. July 1984.
DD Form 1833. Isolated Personnel Report. February 1984.
FM 1-02 [FM 101-5-1]. Operational Terms and Graphics. 30 September 1997.
FM 1-04.10 [FM 27-10]. The Law of Land Warfare. 15 July 1976.
FM 2-01.3 [FM 34-130]. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 8 July 1994
FM 3-01.21 [FM 90-43]. Multiservice Procedures of Joint Theater Missile Target
Development. 27 October 1999.
FM 3-04.513 [FM 1-513]. TTP for Aerial Recovery of Aircraft. 27 September 2000.
FM 3-05.70 [FM 21-76]. Survival. 5 June 1992.
FM 3-05.204 [FM 31-20-5]. Special Reconnaissance TTP for Special Forces.
23 March 1993.
FM 3-06.11 [FM 90-10-1]. Combined Arms Operations In Urban Terrain.
February 2002.
FM 3-15.3 [TC 20-32-3]. Foreign Mine Handbook (Balkan States). 15 August 1997.
FM 3-15.4 [TC 20-32-4]. Foreign Mine Handbook (Asia). 15August 1997.
FM 3-20.8 [FM 17-12-8]. Scout Gunnery. March 2002 (Draft). DA-authorized edition to
be published FY 2003.
FM 3-20.15 [FM 17-15]. Tank Platoon. 1 November 2001.
FM 3-20.95 [FM 17-95]. Cavalry Operations. 24 December 1996.
Bibliography-1
FM 3-20.98 ___________________________________________________________________________
Bibliography-2
Index
brigade reconnaissance troop multisensor ground platoon,
A (BRT), 1-2, 1-11 – 1-12, ground sensor platoon, NBC
3-1, 3-13, 3-22 – 3-23, 4-36 reconnaissance platoon,
actions on contact, 3-15 –
engineer operations (BCT),
3-21, 3-32, 7-29 – 7-30
air defense.
eight forms of contact, C
command and control (C2),
3-16 cavalry squadron (RSTA), 1-2,
2-6 – 2-12
advanced field artillery tactical 1-3 – 1-8
digital systems, 2-31 –
data system, (AFATDS), CHAT, 2-38
2-38
1-13, 2-31, 6-8, 6-12 COLT, 1-8, 1-12, 5-32, 6-12 –
FM radio nets, 2-29 – 2-30
air defense, 6-60 – 6-62 6-13
troop-leading procedures,
all source analysis system combat service support, 6-57,
2-12 – 2-28
(ASAS), 2-31, 3-29 7-31
command post, 1-6, 1-11, 2-6,
analysis and control team combat health support,
2-33
(ACT), 3-29 8-26 – 8-28
battle drills, F-5 – F-6
area of responsibility (AOR), enemy prisoners of war
1-22 – 1-23 (EPW), 8-29 BRT, 1-11 – 1-12
Army aviation, 6-25 evacuation, 8-26 – 8-27 communications, F-6 –
F-11
air cavalry, 6-25 – 6-26 FBCB2 role, 8-5 – 8-6
continuous operations, F-3
air-ground integration, for brigade
6-26 –6-32, 7-18 – 7-20 reconnaissance troop, displacing, F-5
attack helicopter support, 8-13 positioning, F-4
5-32, 6-33 –6-41 for RSTA squadron , 8-10 responsibilities, F-1 – F-2
assault and cargo graves registration SOP, F-11 – F-19
helicopter support, (GRREG), 8-24 – 8-25 security, F-4 – F-5
6-42 – 6-44 maintenance and recovery recce troop, 1-6
Army battle command system, operations, 8-22 – 8-24
commander’s critical
2-31 – 2-32 personnel and information requirements
Army tactical command and administration center (CCIR), 1-2, 3-1
control system (ATCCS), (PAC), 8-25
commander’s reconnaissance
2-31 resupply operations, guidance, 3-4, 3-11, 4-3
assembly area, 5-33 – 5-36, 6-42 – 6-44, 8-16 – 8-22
engagement criteria,
5-41 in stability and support 3-12
operations, D-25
focus, 3-11
B supply operations, 8-14 –
tempo, 3-11 – 3-12
battle command methodology, 8-16
common operational picture
2-2 – 2-5 tactical functions, 8-2 – 8-4
(COP), 1-1, 2-7
battle handover, 5-43, 5-46 troop trains, 8-7 – 8-10
communications, 2-28 – 2-30,
breaching, 5-45 – 5-47 unit ministry team, 8-28 7-3, 7-6, 7-10, 7-12 – 7-14,
brigade combat team (BCT), combat service support control 7-17, 7-19, 7-24, 7-25, 7-27,
1-9 – 1-12, 3-2 – 3-11, 3-13, system (CSSCS), 2-31, 8-2 7-28
3-15 – 3-17, 3-19, 3-22 – combat support. See compliance inspection. See
3-23, 3-31, 3-39, 3-45, 3-50, intelligence, fire support, stability operations and
4-3 – 4-5, 4-9 – 4-11, target acquisition, army support operations,
4-18 – 4-19, 4-29, 4-31 aviation, unmanned aerial reconnaissance troop
ISR operations, 1-10 vehicle (UAV) platoon, employment.
Index-1
FM 3-20.971_______________________________________________________________________________
Index-2
_____________________________________________________________________________________Index
defense, C-1 – C-3, and security, 3-16. See screen, 1-4, 4-10 – 4-30
C-5 – C-6 also nuclear, biological, situational awareness, 1-6,
operations, 6-54 – 6-56 and chemical (NBC). 1-11, 1-16, 1-30, 2-5, 2-7,
marking, C-8 – C-9 and surveillance (R&S), 2-27, 4-4, 4-8, 4-10, 4-18,
3-13 – 3-15, 4-22, 4-30, 4-30, 4-34, 5-1, 5-10, 5-15
mission-oriented protective
4-36 situational understanding, 1-2,
posture (MOPP), C-4
aerial, 3-26 – 3-27 1-31, 2-3, 2-5, 2-7, 3-5, 3-6,
protection, C-3
area, 1-4, 3-43 – 3-49 3-20, 4-3
reconnaissance and
dismounted, 3-28 smaller-scale contingencies
security, C-13 – C-14
(SSC), 1-1, 1-3, 1-30 – 1-31,
reconnaissance platoon, engagement criteria, 3-13
3-8, 3-10, 3-50, 6-3, 6-7
1-4, 1-9 focus of, 3-1, 3-7, 3-11
stability operations, D-1 – D-9.
reports, C-10 fundamentals of, 3-2 – 3-6 See also stability operations
unmasking, C-9 – C-10 handover, 3-21 – 3-26, and support operations.
5-36 arms control, D-7
O missions, 1-13 combating terrorism, D-6 –
observation and fields of fire, mounted, 3-28 D-7
cover, obstacles, key terrain, multidimensional, 3-7, diplomatic effort
and avenues of approach 7-25 operations, D-4 – D-5
(OCOKA), 2-15, 3-10, B-9 planning, 3-11 – 3-14, peace enforcement
obstacles, 3-16, 3-19, 3-32, A-11 – A-19 operations, D-4
3-33, 3-38, 3-42, 3-44, 3-48, platoon, 1-7 – 1-8, 1-12 peacekeeping operations,
3-50, 3-51, 3-53, 5-25 D-4
route, 3-49 – 3-54
offensive operations, 1-25 – show of force, D-7
sensor, 3-26
1-26, 5-9 – 5-14, 6-10, 6-57,
tempo, 3-11 – 3-12 stability operations and support
8-9
operations, D-1
operational environment, zone, 1-4, 3-38 – 3-43,
4-12 compliance inspections,
1-20 – 1-32, 3-6 – 3-7, D-16,
D-32 – D-33
D-25 rehearsals, 2-24 – 2-27, 4-8,
4-30, 5-32, 5-37 environment, D-16
orders 2-5, 2-10 – 2-12, 2-35
relief in place, 5-36 – 5-40 intelligence, D-17
FRAGO, A-8 – A-9
risk management, B-1 – B-6 media interviews, D-39 –
OPORD, 2-22 – 2-23,
D-40
2-35, A-1 – A-7, B-10 – rules of engagement (ROE),
B-13 3-11, 3-18, 3-46, minefield clearance,
D-22 – D-23 D-42 – D-43
WARNO, A-9 – A-11
rules of interaction (ROI), D-24 presence operations,
D-30 – D-32
P
reconnaissance troop
passage of lines, 5-40 – 5-45 S
employment, D-15
PROPHET, 3-29, 5-32, 6-52 – security drill, 4-26 – 4-30 tempo, D-17
6-54 security operations, 1-28 – Stryker brigade combat team
1-29, 4-1 – 4-5, 4-31 – 4-32, (SBCT), 1-2, 1-3, 1-4,
R 8-10, 8-13, 8-21 3-23 – 3-24, 4-16
security missions, 1-4, 1-10, support operations, D-9 –
readiness condition
1-13, 4-2 D-15. See also stability
(REDCON), 5-35
area security, 4-30 – 4-34 operations and support
recce troop, 1-2, 3-1, 3-6, 3-23,
3-36, 4-36, 4-38 convoy security, 4-34 – operations.
organization structure and 4-38 domestic support, D-10
personnel responsibilities, drill, 4-26 – 4-30 foreign humanitarian
1-5 – 1-9, 1-15 – 1-19 fundamentals, 4-3 – 4-5 assistance, D-11
reconnaissance, 1-1, 7-24 – high-value asset, 4-33 relief operations, D-11
7-31
Index-3
FM 3-20.971_______________________________________________________________________________
surveillance troop, 1-8 – 1-9, threat, 1-20, 1-25, 1-28, 3-8, patrolling, 7-25 – 7-29
7-22 – 7-23 4-26 physical environment,
troop-leading procedures, 7-6 – 7-10
T 2-12 – 2-28, 3-11, 3-13, society, 3-8, 7-10
3-14, 3-17, 3-39, 3-44, 3-45,
tactical internet, 2-31 – 2-32 terrain, 3-10, 7-5
3-51, A-1
tactical movement, 1-29 – threat, 3-8, 7-10 – 7-11
1-30, 5-3. See also tactical
road march. U
W
tactical road march, 4-12, 5-4 – unmanned aerial vehicle,
(UAV), 1-4, 1-9, 3-2, 3-4, wide area network, 2-31
5-9
3-14, 3-17, 3-18, 3-22 –
target acquisition, 5-27, 5-32 –
3-24, 3-27, 3-29, 3-40, 3-42,
5-33, 6-8 – 6-9
3-45, 3-46, 3-48, 3-51,
terrain, 3-3, 3-4, 3-6, 3-7, 3-10, 3-53, 4-9, 5-32
3-11, 3-13, 3-14, 3-18, 3-19,
platoon, 6-45 – 6-48
3-27 – 3-30, 3-34, 3-36,
3-38, 3-39, 3-42 – 3-46, urban operations, 3-7
3-48 – 3-51, 3-53, 5-2 – 5-5, infrastructure, 3-9, 7-10
5-7, 5-9, 5-10, 5-17, 5-18,
5-20, 5-21, 5-23, 5-29, 5-33,
5-35, 5-38, 5-40, 5-42,
5-46 – 5-48
Index-4
FM 3-20.98
2 December 2002
ERIC K. SHINSEKI
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
JOEL B. HUDSON
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0232407
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and US Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with
the initial distribution number 111041, requirements for FM 3-20.98.
PIN: 080503-000