Santos vs. Go G.R. No.

156081 FACTS:

October 19, 2005

resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals or quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions. The Department of Justice is not among the agencies enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 43. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.

The petitioners are corporate directors and officers of Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI). Respondent Wilson Go filed an estafa case against the Petitioners for non-return of his payment of the purchase price in full of a real property. Petitioners challenged the jurisdiction of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City to conduct the preliminary investigation on the ground that the complainant was not from Pasig City, the contract was not executed nor were the payments made in Pasig City. Besides, countered petitioners, none of the elements of estafa under Articles 316 and 318 were present. After the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor resolved to dismiss the complaint for estafa.

We cannot agree with petitioners submission that a preliminary investigation is a quasi-judicial proceeding, and that the DOJ is a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause.

Since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of those agencies whose decisions, orders or resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause to indict petitioners for estafa is, therefore, not appealable to the Court of Appeals The DOJ found that there was a prima facie basis to hold petitioners liable for via a petition for review under Rule 43. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals estafa under Article 316 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, pointing out that the correctly dismissed petitioners petition for review. elements of the offense were present as evidenced by the terms of the Contract to Sell. Accordingly, an Information for estafa was filed against petitioners and Federico Campos and Polo Pantaleon before the MTC of Pasig City. However, the arraignment was deferred since Campos and Pantaleon filed a Motion for Judicial PCGG CHAIRMAN MAGDANGAL B. ELMA and PRESIDENTIAL Determination of Probable Cause, which was granted by the trial court. COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, Petitioners, Meanwhile petitioners herein filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for review vs. REINER JACOBI, CRISPIN REYES, MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, in her capacity as Undersecretary of the Department of The appellate court opined that a petition for review pursuant to Rule 43 cannot be Justice, Respondents. availed of as a mode of appeal from the ruling of the Secretary of Justice because the Rule applies only to agencies or officers exercising quasi-judicial functions. FACTS: The decision to file an information or not is an executive and not a quasi-judicial Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. function. Herein petitioners seasonably moved for reconsideration, but the motion PCGG agreed to pay Jacobi 10% of any amount recovered and legally was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals. turned over to the RP from the ill-gotten wealth of Ferdinand Marcos, based on the information Jacobi would furnish. This is evidenced by the so-called PCGG ISSUES: letters. o A $13.2B account in the Union Bank of Switzerland is being claimed and Whether a petition for review under Rule 43 is a proper mode of appeal recovered by the Phil. Government. from a resolution of the Secretary of Justice directing the prosecutor to file Later, Petitioner Chairman Elma (former PCGG Chairman), filed an information in a criminal case? affidavit-complaint with the DOJ, charging respondent Jacobi with the use of falsified documents. The PCGG Letters were allegedly falsified. HELD: Jacobi, thru one Atty. Penalosa, denied the allegations. Atty. Reyes, No. Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly shows that it representing Jacobi, pleaded the dismissal of the case. Averring that they have no governs appeals to the Court of Appeals from decisions and final orders or reason or motive to forge the letter.

when they claimed that the proper remedy was Rule 43. The investigating prosecutor of the DOJ is performing functions of a quasijudicial nature in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. Since he does not make a determination of the rights of any part in the proceeding, or pronounce the respondents guilt or innocence, an investigating prosecutors function still lacks the element of adjudication essential to an appeal under Rule 43. The exclusion of the DOJ in the enumeration of quasi-judicial agencies in Rule 43 is deliberate. This is in consonance with the constitutional power of control lodged in the President over executive departments, bureaus and offices. Thus, being under the control of the presidents, the Secretary of Justice or his decision is subject to review of the former. In fine, recourse from the decision of the Secretary of Justice should be to the President, instead of the CA, under the established principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Notably, Section 1 of Rule 43 includes the Office of the o DOJ found the MR (by Padilla Law) DENIED. (SECOND President in the agencies named therein, thereby accentuating the fact that appeals RESOLUTION) from rulings of department heads must first be taken to and resolved by that office Records show that Padilla Law filed an MR, but Atty. Penalosa also filed before any appellate recourse may be resorted to. an unverified petition for review. However, Memorandum Circular No. 58 of the Office of the President bars an There was no withdrawal of appearance as counsel that was filed , hence, appeal from the decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice on Atty. Penalosa is still the counsel of Jacobi and Padilla Law is co-counsel. preliminary investigations of criminal cases via a petition for review, except for those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Sanidad Law entered appearance as the sole and principal counsel for Jacobi. Therefore, a party aggrieved by the DOJs resolution - affirming or reversing the finding of the investigating prosecutor in a preliminary investigation involving an o They filed an MR for the SECOND RESOLUTION. Alleging that the offense not punishable by reclusion perpetua to death - cannot appeal to the Office DOJ erred in refusing to recognize that Atty. Penalosa had been validly of the President and is left without any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the discharged. ordinary course of the law. This leaves a certiorari petition as the only remedial o MR was GRANTED. (THIRD RESOLUTION) avenue left. However, the petitioner must allege and show that the DOJ acted with o DOJ dismissed the criminal complaint against the respondents. grave abuse of discretion in granting or denying the petition for review. Petitioners filed an MR. DENIED. We also reject the respondents allegation that the present petition suffers from a fatal procedural defect for failure to implead the DOJ (or its appropriate official) o DOJ rejected petitioners' argument that dismissal of the Petition for as an indispensable party. Review bars a reconsideration of the SECOND RESOLUTION. Unlike a Rule 45 petition, one filed under Rule 65 petition requires the petitioner Petitioner PCGG filed a Petition for Review in the DOJ. DENIED. to implead as public respondent the official or agency whose exercise of a judicial o MR was also DENIED. or quasi-judicial function is allegedly tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. Contrary to the respondents assertion, the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioners with the Court impleaded Usec. Gutierrez, who, as then Justice ISSUE: Whether certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to question the Undersecretary, issued the assailed resolutions "for the Secretary of Justice." DOJs determination of probable cause? While the DOJ did not formally enter its appearance in this case, or file any If yes, where should the petition be filed? comment or memoranda, the records show that the Court issued resolutions, RULING: addressed to the DOJ as a party, to submit the appropriate responsive pleadings. Petition lacks merit. Rule 65 is the proper remedy. The respondents are mistaken As an extraordinary remedy, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not require that DOJ found probable cause against the respondents (FIRST RESOLUTION). o Jacobi, thru Atty. Penalosa, filed an unverified petition for review with the DOJ. (FIRST RESOLUTION) o Padilla Law filed its entry of appearance for Jacobi, stating that they are the attorney to deal with the DOJ. o Padilla Law filed an MR (FIRST RESOLUTION). ***2 yung remedy na inavail, PfR and MR by 2 different counsels. o Meanwhile, a manifestation was filed by Jacobi, thru Padilla Law, stated that only Padilla Law is authorized to represent Jacobi. Any other pleadings and documentations are not authorized. o DOJ DENIED the Petition for Review, because it is UNVERIFIED.

summons be issued to the respondent; the service upon him of an order to file its Comment or Memorandum is sufficient.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing the appeal of herein petitioner based on pure technicality? YES RULING: Section 6, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court is not to be construed as imposing the requirement that all supporting papers accompanying the petition should be certified true copies.

JESUS R. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, and PHILIPPINE CHILDRENS MEDICAL CENTER (PCMC), respondents. FACTS: Petitioner Jesus R. Gonzales was one of the two Utility Workers II assigned at the Pharmacy Section of respondent Philippine Childrens Medical Center (PCMC), a government-owned and controlled corporation created under P.D. No. 1631, as amended. At PCMC, petitioner served the patients and the public from 6:00 A.M. to 10:00 P.M., seven days a week. petitioner started absenting himself without an approved leave (AWOL) and without explaining the reason for his absence to his superiors. In view of the exigency of petitioners functions he was directed to report for work within three (3) days from receipt of said notice, otherwise, he would be dropped from the rolls officer-in-charge of the Pharmacy Section, reported petitioners irresponsibility and lack of concern for his work to Executive Director of PCMC, recommending that petitioner be dropped from the rolls. Despite the written letter-notice sent to him, petitioner failed to report for work thus constraining PCMC to drop him from the rolls

on petitions for review from the RTC to the CA, the judgments or final orders
of the lower court need to be certified true copies or duplicate originals.

an appeal via a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 and in an original civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rules 46 and 56, what is required to be a certified true copy is the copy of the questioned judgment, final order or resolution. We see no reason why a stricter requirement should be made for petitions under Rule 43, which governs appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies to the CA. This could not have been intended by the framers of the rules. A contrary ruling would be too harsh and would not promote the underlying objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. CASE AT BAR ... petitioner had attached certified true copies of the documents supporting his Motion for Reconsideration and Compliance. THUS, submission of a required document with the Motion for Reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with Section 3, Rule 46.

CESAR JARO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC)-upheld the action of DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD PCMC (DARAB), and ROSARIO VDA. DE PELAEZ, respondents. MR-denied CA- petition for review was filed but denied for failure to comply with Section 6 (c), Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court,[10] particularly for failure to attach certified true copies of material portions of the records and supporting papers. On November 12, 1992, respondent Rosario filed a complaint for prohibition under Section 27 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act (R.A. No. 1199) against

MR - petitioner attached the certified true copies of the required papers. But the petitioner. /Respondent alleged in the complaint that the late Rosenda Reyes y CA denied Padua was the original owner of a parcel of coconut land. Rosenda allegedly Hence, this petition... instituted respondent as tenant of the land. In 1978, Ricardo Padua Reyes the heir

of Rosenda, sold the land to petitioner who, respondent alleged, now wants to Administrative Circular No. 1-95 has now been formulated as Rule 43 of the 1997 eject respondent from the land. Rules of Court.

On October 6, 1993, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 prescribed the manner by which the Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. appeal was to be taken to the Court of Appeals, to wit:

On April 22, 1996, the DARAB issued its decision reversing the decision of the 6. Contents of the petition. The petition for review shall ... Provincial Adjudicator. MR Denied. (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true

CA filed an appeal pursuant to Section 1, Rule XIV of the DARABs New Rules copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, of Procedure. On October 23, 1996, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record as outright the petition because the annexes to the petition are certified as true are referred to therein and other supporting papers; xerox copy by counsel for the petitioner, and not by the proper public official The circular stated that failure to comply with the foregoing requirements would who has custody of the records, in violation of the same Circular and Adm. be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the appeal. Circ. No. 3-96. Petition was dismissed because documents attached were neither duplicate On November 5, 1996, before receipt of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals originals nor were they certified true copies. The annexes were only certified as dismissing his petition, petitioner filed his Amended Petition. On November 8, true xerox copies by the counsel of petitioner, not by the authority or the 1996, upon verification that his petition had been dismissed, petitioner filed a corresponding officer or representative of the issuing entity, in contravention of Motion for Reconsideration and for Admission of Amended Petition. Administrative Circular No. 3-96. On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying the While we agree with the Court of Appeals that the defective petition deserved to Motion for Reconsideration and for Admission of Amended Petition of be dismissed, the amended petition filed by petitioner should have been given due petitioner. ISSUE: WON CA erred in dismissing petitioners appeal? HELD: YES. course. Petitioner filed the amended petition, now in proper form, accompanied by annexes, all of which were certified true copies by the DARAB. This is more than substantial compliance.

The CAs dismissal of the amended petition on purely technical grounds was The amended petition no longer contained the fatal defects that the original petition had but the Court of Appeals still saw it fit to dismiss the amended unwarranted. At the time that petitioner appealed the DARAB decision to the Court of Appeals, petition. Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 was then the rule that governed appeals The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals which is DIRECTED to to the Court of Appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax reinstate and give due course to the petition for review and to decide the same on Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies, including the DARAB. Revised the merits.

that an examination of the envelope bearing the petition showed that it was mailed on April 12, 2000 or thirteen (13) days beyond the extended period of appeal, and that two of the annexes to the petition, i.e., the two informations filed against respondent along with two others in Criminal Case Nos. 41675 and 41676 were "mere plain copies," in violation of Section 6(c) of Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.16 G.R. No. 144560 April 13, 2004 Petitioner thereupon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above-said CA Resolution of May 31, 2000, manifesting that per June 14, 2000 certification FLORENTINO ZARAGOZA, petitioner, issued by Registry Clerk E. P. Villaruel of the Pasig Capitol Post Office, Registry vs. No. 7439, allegedly covering the petition for review addressed to the CA, was PEDRO NOBLEZA, respondent. mailed on March 30, 2000. In the same breath, petitioner pleaded for a liberal Facts: application of the rules of procedure given the "overriding importance of the The petition for review on Certiorari at bar seeks to set aside and annul the Court factual and legal issues" raised in his petition. of Appeals Resolution dismissing the appeal of petitioner Florentino Zaragoza, a By Resolution, the CA denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of its May motion for reconsideration of which was denied. 31, 2000 Order, noting that the "counter-arguments or points advanced in the Petitioner entered into an Agricultural Leasehold Contract over a 1.18 hectare opposition are so cogent and compelling that they constitute forceful refutation of parcel of land situated in Barangay Banguit, Cabatuan, Iloilo with respondent the reasons or arguments assigned in support of the motion." Pedro Nobleza. Petitioner instituted a complaint, for Termination of Leasehold Relationship with Damages, against respondent before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD) of Iloilo City\. The complaint was later amended, and still later amended, raising as grounds for the termination of the leasehold contract. Ruling: The two informations attached to petitioners petition before the CA need not, as correctly argued by petitioner, be certified true copies. Section 6 of Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure should not be construed as imposing the requirement that all supporting papers accompanying the petition for review be By Decision the PARAD found for respondent and dismissed petitioners certified true copies. complaint for lack of merit. The appellate courts error in holding that the informations should be certified true Petitioner appealed before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication copies to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure notwithstanding, the dismissal Board (DARAB) which affirmed the PARAD decision, and copy of which of the petition filed before it is in order. DARAB decision was received by petitioner. Petitioner is raising a question of fact the finding of the CA that the petition for Before the Court of Appeals (CA), petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of review was filed beyond the prescribed period. fifteen (15) days from March 15, 2000 or until March 30, 2000 within which to In an appeal via certiorari, only questions of law may be reviewed. A question of file a petition for review of the decision rendered by the DARAB. law arises when there is doubt or difference as to what the law is on a certain state The CA, by Resolution of March 27, 2000, granted petitioner an "absolutely non- of facts. extendible period of fifteen (15) days, reckoned from March 15, 2000, or until March 30, 2000" within which to file the petition for review, "subject to the understanding that any such petition for review filed beyond the second mentioned date shall be rejected and shall be expunged from the records of the case." Whether the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by an adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing, whether certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their spurious character by the other side, whether inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of Petitioner appears to have filed via registered mail his petition for review, such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight all these are issues however, the CA dismissed the petition for being procedurally flawed, it noting of fact27 which may not be passed upon in a petition for review on certiorari

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In accordance then with the established rule and practice, in view of the absence of any of the recognized exceptions that would warrant a review of the findings of facts of the appellate court, the issue raised by petitioner as regards the date of the filing of the petition for review will not be considered by this Court, the resolution thereon by the CA being final.

SO ORDERED. ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, respondents.

Since the perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional, the failure of petitioner to so perfect his appeal rendered the questioned decision final and executory. This rule is founded Facts: upon the principle that the right to appeal is not part of due process of law but is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance Private respondent filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally with the provisions of the law. terminated his employment. Petitioner nevertheless harps on the judicial policy of allowing appeals, although The labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner declaring that filed late, when the interest of substantial justice so requires. no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and therefore his While every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the proper and just office had no jurisdiction over the case. Private respondent appealed to the NLRC. determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities, the failure to perfect an appeal is not a mere technicality as it raises a jurisdictional problem which deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal. NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and Only under exceptionally meritorious circumstances may a departure from an remanding the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings. otherwise stringent rule be allowed. In the case at bar, there is no showing of a factual setting which warrants a liberal application of the rules on the period of appeal. Having been extended an additional fifteen (15) day period within which to file his petition for review, it was incumbent upon petitioner to strictly comply with such deadline. That he paid the appropriate docket fee upon filing his Motion for Extension of Time with the appellate court does not help his cause any. The inevitable consequence of his grave inadvertence is to render the DARABs decision dismissing the case final and executory. We must stress that the bare invocation of "the interest of substantial justice" is not a magic wand that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. "Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a partys substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed".35 WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC for lack of merit.

Hence the present petition for certiorari before the SC alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: WON the decision of the NLRC are appealable to the Court of Appeals. RULING: The Court is of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the SC were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action for certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC.

The use of the word appeal in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them, however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action for certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals; whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the SC are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of the Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495. Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired. Case remanded to the CA. Santos vs. Committee on Claims Settlement

ISSUE: Whether the proper remedy of petitioner is to file a petition for review under Rule 45 and not under Rule 43, there being only pure questions of law involved in the case.

HELD: Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly states: Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are . Government Service Insurance System, authorized by law. xxx Section 3. Where to appeal. An appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. A question of law exists when there is doubt or controversy on what the law is on a certain state of facts. There is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises from the truth or the falsity of the allegations of facts. As a general rule, appeals on pure questions of law are brought to this Court since Sec. 5 (2) (e), Art. VIII of the Constitution includes in the enumeration of cases within its jurisdiction all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. It should not be overlooked, however, that the same provision vesting jurisdiction in this Court of the cases enumerated therein is prefaced by the statement that it may review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, the judgments or final

FACTS:

petitioner Jose S. Santos retired from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) 1616 after rendering almost 21 years of service. He was re-employed in the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman Petitioner initiated moves to avail of early retirement under R.A. 660. In a letter, GSIS Operating Unit informed petitioner that he could no longer retire under R.A. 660 but he could do so under R.A. 8291. Petitioner appealed to respondent GSIS Committee on Claims. Respondent affirmed the GSIS Operating Units computation. Petitioner filed with the GSIS Board of Trustees a complaint against respondent. Denied. Petitioner was compulsorily retired for reaching the age of sixty-five. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The GSIS Board of Trustees denied his motion for reconsideration . Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43. CA dismissed petition for lack of jurisdiction. Filed a MR but still denied

orders of lower courts in the cases therein enumerated. Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure constitutes an exception to the aforesaid general rule on

HELD:

No. The purpose of an assignment of errors is to point out to the appeals. Rule 43 provides for an instance where an appellate review solely on a appellate court the specific portion of the decision appealed from which the appellant seeks to controvert. This requirement is deemed complied with where question of law may be sought in the CA instead of this Court. the assignment of errors are embodied in the arguments, and the clear discussion of the points in issue have accomplished the task of informing the Court which Undeniably, an appeal to the CA may be taken within the reglementary period to part of the appealed decision is sought to be reviewed. appeal whether the appeal involves questions of fact, law, or mixed questions of Petitioner's brief in the Court of Appeals is severely wanting on this matter. It does fact and law. As such, a question of fact or question of law alone or a mix not appraise the appellate court of the portions of the trial court's decision which she contests, but rather, it quoted at length the decision of the Regional Trial Court question of fact and law may be appealed to the CA via Rule 43. Hence, appeals in the ejectment case. Consequently, We see no reason for a liberal interpretation from quasi-judicial agencies even only on questions of law may be brought to of the Rules of Court in petitioner's case. the CA. LIANGA LUMBER COMPANY and NORTH ZAMBALES LUMBER COMPANY, petitioners, vs. LIANGA TIMBER CO., INC. and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. FACTS: This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 and at the same time a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. Petitioners has timber concession in Agusan. Respondents in Surigao. Petitioners filed a complaint against respondents, alleging that the respondents, thru force, intimidation and threats, prevented the petitioners employees from entering the land they are licensed to do some logging. o Both parties reached a compromise agreement but the respondents did not honor it and they started constructing a road in such area. Respondents denied the allegations and claimed that the subject area is within their timber concession and is part of their province. The trial court granted the petitioners application for a writ of preliminary injunction. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision favoring the petitioners. Respondent appealed to the CA. AFFIRMED. (Original Resolution) o Respondent filed an MR. DENIED. o Respondent, with leave of court, filed another MR, Same grounds.

Bucad vs. C.A. G.R. No. 93783 December 11, 1992 FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari by Evangeline C. Bucad from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19321, affirming the dismissal of petitioner's complaint against respondents Asilda Guanzon, William Guanzon and Emilia Guanzon for annulment of sale and cancellation of certificate of title by the RTC. In dismissing the petitioner's appeal, the appellate court found that the appeal did not comply with Section 16, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court with regard to the contents of an appellant's brief, particularly paragraphs (b) and (d) and thus dismissable under Section 1 (g), Rule 50. After her motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner instituted the instant petition, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing her appeal on a procedural technicality. ISSUES: Whether petitioner's appeal should be dismissed for failure to include a statement of facts with page references to the record and assignment of errors in her appellant's brief?

o Petitioners filed their opposition to the second MR. Because it was filed 2 days beyond the period. o After oral arguments, CA REVERSED its earlier decision. (Esguerra Reso.) Petitioners filed a Motion for rehearing or MR of the Esguerra Reso. o CA REVERSED Esguerra Reso. (Known now as Enriquez Reso.) Respondents filed an MR. CA SET ASIDE the Enriquez Reso. And ordered the remand of the case to the trial court. (Gancayco Reso.) Petitioners filed an MR of the Gancayco Reso. CA DENIED. ISSUE: Is there necessity for remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings? RULING: No. When the trial court found for petitioners, it was clearly established by evidence that the area of Tagabaca is part of petitioners Timber Concession, and that respondents claim that it is theirs is not supported by evidence. There is no justification of remanding the case only for the purpose of locating the political boundary between 2 provinces Agusan and Surigao. To allow the remand of the case to the trial court will only prolong termination of a case that has been pending for almost 2 decades. The determination of the political boundary between the 2 provinces has not been raised in the trial court. Well-settled is the rules that questions which were not raised in the lower court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. In order that the question may be raised on appeal, it is essential that it be within the issues made by the parties on their pleadings. In short, a party may change his legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new legal theory. Respondent is mistaken when it contended that the SC has no power to revive to the ORIGINAL RESOLUTION of the CA (Affirming the Trial Court of favoring Petitioners). That power to revive judgments is implied from the authority granted by the Constitution to the Court. Moreover, the Court need not actually revive the original decision. By reversing the Gancayco Resolution (Remanding the case to the lower court), the SC can just as well affirm the decision of the trial court and treat the Esguerra Reso. as non-existing.

FACTS: Melinda F. Bonga is the owner of a two-door residential apartment and another unfinished apartment ,she sold on installment her 2-door residential apartment to [petitioner] which was embodied in a Deed of Conditional Sale. The contract specifically states that [petitioner] pays a down-payment of P130,000.00 and [the] balance of P200,000.00 shall be paid within twelve months from execution thereof to [respondent] alone. The down payment was paid by [petitioner]. In the absence of [respondent] who was then abroad, [petitioner] occupied the other vacant door of the former's apartment, which was not the subject of the contract, and rented out the unit or apartment door which [petitioner] was supposed to occupy per contract. Aside from this violation, [petitioner] also failed and refused to pay the balance of P200,000.00 to [respondent] despite repeated demands. For failure to pay BONGA filed a case. ANSWER was filed. PRE trial they agreed on two issues "1. Whether or not [respondent] has the right to rescind the Contract, and"2. Damages suffered by the prevailing party." RTC-held that contract be rescinded and ordered petitioner to pay for damages CA- on appeal petitioner raised his argument The CA Ruling that respondent had no right to ask for the rescission of the Deed of Conditional Sale, because the latter had no title to the subject property. Petitioner argued that since respondent's husband had acquired the property from an awardee of the National Housing Authority (NHA) within five years from the award without the NHA's prior written consent and authority, the acquisition was void and transferred no title to respondent. And because respondent had no title to the property, the Deed of Conditional Sale in favor of petitioner was also void. Hence, respondent had no right to ask for its rescission. The CA held that such argument had not been presented before the trial court and could not be raised for the first time on appeal.

Hence to SC The SC preferred to treat this as an appeal thru petition for review, rather than as an original action for certiorari. ISSUE:WON CA ERRED when it ruled that no question [could] be entertained on appeal unless it ha[d] been raised below? NO.... RULING: ELAINE A. DEL ROSARIO, petitioner, vs.MELINDA F. BONGA, respondent.

 GENERAL RULE: no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the court below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of due process impel this rule.

October 5, 1997.

On October 20, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file the appellant's brief. In a Resolution dated November 24, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for having been filed fifteen (15) days late and dismissed the appeal.

EXCEPTION:, 1. issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be

considered by the reviewing court, as it may be raised at any stage 2. issue not properly raised during trial when there is plain error and 3. when there are jurisprudential developments affecting the issues, or when the issues raised present a matter of public policy. CASE AT BAR: the records show that the theory of petitioner before the trial court was different from that before the appellate court. In the lower court, she had argued that rescission may be invoked only by both Spouses Deodato and Melinda Bonga, and not by the latter alone. Likewise, she said that since there was a dispute between the spouses about the subject property, she was justified in suspending the payment of the balance of the purchase price. Furthermore, she manifested her willingness to settle her obligation, urging the court to fix a period for, and to determine to whom to give, the payment.

On January 12, 1998, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that his motion for extension was timely filed since he has 45 days, not 30 days, from notice to file the appellant's brief. The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution of February 10, 1998, denied the motion.

However, on appeal, she abandoned such legal theories and adopted a different ISSUE: WON appeal should be dismissed for being filed late?
stance, relying instead on the alleged nullity of the transaction between respondent's husband and one Renato Morales, an NHA awardee. The invalid agreement supposedly conferred no title to respondent and, consequently, rendered the subHELD: YES. ject Deed of Conditional Sale void. It should be stressed that this matter had not been presented or discussed in the trial court and involved personalities not parties to the case. Petitioner's posturing before the CA was not a mere shift of emphasis or an elaboration of a priorly argued defense; it was a new and different theory al- According to petitioner, Section 3, Rule 124 providing for a 30-day period was together impliedly repealed by Section 7, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended providing for a 45-day period. WRONG!!! VINA vs. CA Facts: On April 24, 1997, petitioner was convicted by the RTC for violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction. On September 5, 1997, petitioner, through his counsel Atty. Agustin C. Tarroza, received a notice from the CA requiring him to file the appellant's brief within 30 days from notice, or until Section 7, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, did not impliedly repeal Section 3, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. There is no such implied repeal here whatsoever since these two rules deal with distinct subject matters. Section 7, Rule 44 provides for the period within which an appellant's brief must be filed in civil cases, which is 45-days, while Section 3,

Rule 124 provides when brief for the appellant should be filed in criminal cases, which is 30 days.

Petitioner, being a lawyer, should have readily understood that the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, apply only to civil cases, not to criminal cases which are governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

(Nonoc Mining), Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), Asset Privatization Trust (APT), Island Cement Corporation (ICC) and petitioner, on the ground that they are assignees/ transferees of the real and personal properties, chattels, machineries, equipment and other assets of Marinduque Mining. In particular, petitioner was impleaded because "the properties, real and personal, chattels, machineries, equipment and all other assets of the Marinduque Mining & Industrial Corporation at Sipalay, Negros Occidental, mining projects at Rizal Province, which were foreclosed by the Philippine National Bank and Development Bank of the Philippines, were transferred to (petitioner). Petitioner and its co-defendants PNB, DBP, Nonoc Mining, ICC and APT filed with the CA an appeal. The CA dismissed their appeal in a Decision.

Moreover, petitioner submits that he honestly believes he followed the correct procedure.

DBP and PNB filed before the Court separate appeals respectively. On its own, petitioner also attempted to institute an appeal with the Court by filing a motion for an extension of 30 days within which to file a petition for review on certiorari and to pay the legal fees. However, for lack of an affidavit of service as required under paragraph 2 of Supreme Court Circular No. 1-88 and Administrative Circular No. 3-96, the Court denied its motion, which became final . Petitioner also sought to intervene in PNB v. CA but the Court disallowed it due to the tardiness of its motion. Thus, private respondent filed with the RTC a Motion for Execution solely against petitioner on the ground that the decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals affirming the decision of this Honorable Court dated April 10, 1990 has now become final and executory, as far as [petitioner] is concerned. Over petitioner's objection, the RTC granted the Motion for Execution in an Order. It denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Consequently, a Writ of Execution was issued on the basis of which certain bank accounts of petitioner were garnished. This prompted petitioner to file with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (With Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Preliminary Injunction).

Petitioner's avowal of "honest belief" is misplaced. He was fully aware that the Court of appeals directed him to file the appellant's brief within 30 days from notice. But he did not comply. He even faulted the Chief of the Judicial Records Division of the Court of Appeals for sending him a notice which was "presumably an old form."

G.R. No. 158332

February 11, 2008

MARICALUM MINING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, respondent. Facts:

Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Maricalum In the interregnum, the Court rendered a Decision in DBP v. CA, where the Mining Corporation (petitioner) assails before this Court the Decision and original complaint filed in the Regional Trial Court is hereby DISMISSED. Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA). In PNB v. CA, the Court rendered a Decision where the Court REVERSES the Remington Industrial Sales Corporation (private respondent) sued Marinduque decision of the Court of Appeals and in lieu thereof, enters judgment Mining and Industrial Corporation (Marinduque Mining) for payment of DISMISSING the complaint of Remington Industrial Sales Corporation, as P921,755.95 worth of construction materials and other merchandise. The against defendants Philippine National Bank and Development Bank of the complaint, docketed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19 (RTC) as Philippines[sic] which became final on February 12, 2002. Civil Case No. 84-25858, was amended four times to implead as co-defendants 24 Philippine National Bank (PNB), Nonoc Mining and Industrial Corporation Thus, citing PNB v. CA, petitioner filed, a Manifestation urging it to dismiss the

claim of private respondent and annul the March 9, 2001 and May 10, 2001 RTC TERESITA PACAA CONEJOS, petitioner, Orders. vs. The CA rendered the February 10, 2003 Decision assailed herein, dismissing the COURT OF APPEALS and EUTIQUIO PLANIA, respondents. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and affirming the questioned RTC Orders. It denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Issue: Facts: Whether the Court's Decisions in DBP v. CA and PNB v. CA inured to the benefit of petitioner which was not a party to either case, as to bar execution of the April Plania instituted an action for specific performance/rescission with 10, 1990 RTC Decision, as affirmed in the October 6, 1995 CA Decision in CA- G.R. CV No. 27720, against it. damages before the Municipal Trial Court. Ruling: This time, petitioner's recourse is not in vain. The CA ruled in the negative, thus: He averred that he entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Teresita Pacaa Conejos whereby they agreed that each of them would pay half of The respective appeals filed by the Philippine National Bank and the the purchase price of the 134-square-meter residential lot in Cebu City. Development Bank of the Philippine did not inure to the benefit of their codefendants, including the petitioner, who did not appeal nor can it be deemed to be an appeal of such co-defendants from the judgment against them. Simply After paying his share of the one-half portion of the lot, Conejos refused put, the appeals interposed by the Philippine National Bank and Development Bank of the Philippines, in no way, prevented the aforementioned decision of to divide the lot. this Court from becoming final and executory as against the petitioner and the other defendants notwithstanding the fact that all of said defendants were held solidarily liable in the said decision. In her Answer Conejos alleged that the Memorandum of Agreement dated Indeed, one party's appeal from a judgment will not inure to the benefit of a coparty who failed to appeal; and as against the latter, the judgment will continue to 19 September 1989 was mutually abandoned by the parties and that Plania's run its course until it becomes final and executory. To this general rule, however, alleged payment was frowned upon by the Statute of Frauds. one exception stands out: where both parties have a commonality of interests, the appeal of one is deemed to be the vicarious appeal of the other. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 10, 2003 Decision and According to Conejos, the stipulations contained in the Minutes of the the May 21, 2003 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 65209 of the Court of Appeals Hearing (Bgy.) were mere proposals by Plania for an amicable settlement which are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the March 9, 2001 and May 10, 2001 she rejected. Orders of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 84-25858 are ANNULLED. No costs. SO ORDERED. MTC dismissed the complaint.

The Regional Trial Court reversed the MTCC

Conejos moved for reconsideration but the same was denied, hence she 2001 to file a petition for review on certiorari before this Court. filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. However, instead of a petition for review on certiorari petitioner filed on 13 August 2001 a petition for certiorari or one (1) month and twenty-five (25) Finding no merit in her arguments, the appellate court affirmed the days after the lapse of the allotted period within which to file a petition for review Regional Trial Court. on certiorari.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, she filed the Apparently, petitioner resorted to this special civil action after failing instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. to appeal within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period. Issue: Whether the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is proper.

This cannot be countenanced.

Held: NO. The special civil action of certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal which petitioner already lost. At first glance, petitioners Petition for Certiorari should be summarily dismissed for adopting the wrong mode of appeal.

The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision dismissing petitioner's petition for review on 9 January 2001 and received by petitioner on 22 January 2001.

Certiorari lies only where there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on 29 January 2001 but the Court of Appeals denied the same in its Resolution of 31 May 2001, notice of which was received by petitioner on 13 June 2001.

There is no reason why the question being raised by petitioner, i.e., whether the appellate court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitions, could not have been raised on appeal.

Concededly, there were occasions when this Court treated a petition for certiorari as one filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner's remedy would have been to file a petition for review on certiorari before this Court, and, counting fifteen (15) days from receipt of the However, the circumstances prevailing in the instant case do not justify a resolution denying her motion for reconsideration petitioner had until 28 June deviation from a general rule.

Notably, the instant petition was filed way beyond the reglementary Nercy M. Demeterio, Excel Mangubat, Ma. Lourdes Deutsch, and the spouses period allowed under Rule 45 without any justifiable reason therefor nor any Numeriano Rabadon and Leonila Burlaos were charged with Estafa reasonable explanation being proffered by petitioner. prosecution filed a motion to discharge Mangubat, Demeterio and the spouses Rabadon and Burlaos, to become state witnesses. trial court granted the said motion but only with respect to the spouses Rabadon In addition, the arguments she cited are without merit and are in fact and Burlaos mere rehash of the issues raised before and judiciously resolved by the courts a quo.

trial court rendered a decision finding Deutsch, Demeterio and Mangubat to

have conspired with one another to deceive complainant, and convicted them of Estafa

The issues require a review of the factual findings which, verily, could Deutsch, Demeterio and Mangubat interposed a timely appeal to the Court of not be done because this Court is not a trier of facts. Appeals Court of Appeals modified the trial courts judgment It upheld the conviction of Demetrio and Mangubat and acquitted Deutsch More importantly, a reading of the records of the case strengthens our disposition that both the trial and the appellate courts did not abuse their Wilson filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of discretion in assessing their factual findings. Appeals On the other hand, Demeterio and Mangubat filed their Motion for SC finds their conclusions amply supported by the records of the case Reconsideration on March 26, 1998, which was denied by the Court of Appeals and grounded in law. Petitioner Wilson filed this instant petition for review under Rule 45 alleging abuse of discretion by the Court of Appeals when it acquitted Ma. Lourdes Deutsch [G.R. No. 132396. September 23, 2002] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and MA. MILAGROS G. WILSON, Petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MA. LOURDES DEUTSCH, NERCY DEMETERIO and EXCEL MANGUBAT, Respondents. [G.R. No. 134553. September 23, 2002] NERCY DEMETERIO, and EXCEL MANGUBAT, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and MA. MILAGROS G. WILSON, Respondents. Petitioner argues that between the decision of the Court of Appeals and that of the trial court, it is the latters decision that should prevail since it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and behavior of the witnesses and was in a better position to weigh their credibility and properly appreciate the relative weight of evidence Petitioner likewise denies that Deutsch would suffer double jeopardy should this petition be granted

OSG, in turn, avers that in case of acquittal, the appeal on the criminal aspect should be taken solely by the state and the private complainant is limited only to Petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the decision of the the appeal of the civil aspect Court of Appeals OSG argues that Deutsch stands to suffer from double jeopardy in the event that this petition is given due course

 Respondent Deutsch, on the other hand, questions the standing of petitioner to appeal her acquittal she contends that petitioner cannot adopt a position contrary to the appellate courts decision on the criminal aspect since the Solicitor General alone is authorized in criminal appeals to represent the State she argues further that a review of her acquittal would place her in double jeopardy She underscores that her civil liability, aside from being extinguished by her acquittal, may no longer be reviewed since what is involved is a factual question, not proper for review by this Court

certiorari under Rule 65 are two separate and distinct remedies. Under Rule 45, a petition brings up for review errors of judgment while a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 concerns errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction Grave abuse of discretion is not an allowable ground under Rule 45. However, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 may be considered as one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, where it is alleged that the respondents have abused their discretion in their questioned actions, as in this case Generally, it is the Office of the Solicitor General who can bring actions on behalf of the state in criminal proceedings, before the Supreme Court and/or the Court of Appeals action must be filed in the name of the private complainant and not of the People of the Philippines. even if we treat this petition as one under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the conclusion in our view is the same: the petition is without merit

In G.R. No. 134553, Wilson this time as respondent manifests that the MFR
filed by Demeterio and Mangubat was filed late and should therefore be dismissed petition indicates that the defendants received a copy of the Court of Appeals decision as early as November 25, 1997. However, they filed their Motion for Reconsideration only on March 26, 1998, or 4 months from the receipt of the decision, way beyond fifteen (15) days period within which to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45

No
ISSUES: 1) whether or not petitioner Wilson properly availed of the remedy of petition for review on certiorari In acquitting Deutsch, the Court of Appeals merely interpreted the evidence presented before the trial court, as it deemed fit. Note, however, that the acquittal of Deutsch is based only on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, considering the circumstances, it is without prejudice to whatever civil action might be appropriately taken by petitioner Wilson in regard to respondent Deutsch. whatever error might have been committed by the Court of Appeals in said decision, it could only be an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction It could not affect the intrinsic validity of its decision Consequently, the acquittal of Deutsch may no longer be reviewed, for to do so would place her in double jeopardy in violation of the basic tenets of our fundamental law and current jurisprudence This, however, is without prejudice to any appropriate civil action that might be taken against her by the aggrieved party No

2) whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion when it acquitted Ma. Lourdes Deutsch

3)In G.R. No. 134553, whether or not defendants Mangubat and Demeterio filed MFR on time

HELD:

No petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and the special civil action of

Be that as it may, a petition for certiorari may be treated as a petition for review Comparatively, a party is given 60 days to petition for certiorari under Rule 65 under Rule 45. Such move is in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the It is clear, therefore, that the decision of the Court of Appeals has long become final and executory as against Demeterio and Mangubat for they allowed 120 days Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice, especially (1) if the petito lapse before they filed their motion for reconsideration. tion was filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition for review; (2) Clearly, they have lost their remedy of appeal errors of judgment are averred; and (3) there is sufficient reason to justify the reOaminal vs. Castillo G.R. No. 152776 FACTS: Oaminal filed a complaint for collection against Castillo. Judge Zapatos rendered a decision on the merits in favor of the petitioner. Respondents filed with the CA a Petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order (TRO). In the main, they raised the issue of whether the trial court had validly acquired jurisdiction over them. CA issued a TRO to enjoin the lower court from issuing a writ of execution to enforce the latters decision. It ruled that trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over respondents, because the summons had been improperly served on them. It based its finding on the Sheriffs Return, which did not contain any averment that effort had been exerted to personally serve the summons on them before substituted service was resorted to. ISSUES: Whether the Petition for certiorari before the CA was proper? HELD: No. Well-settled is the rule that certiorari will lie only when a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. As a condition for the filing of a petition for certiorari, Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court additionally requires that no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law must be available. It is axiomatic that the availability of the right of appeal precludes recourse to the special civil action for certiorari. Here, the trial courts judgment was a final Decision that disposed of the case. It was therefore a fit subject of an appeal. However, instead of appealing the Decision, respondents filed a Petition for certiorari. laxation of the rules. Besides, it is axiomatic that the nature of an action is deterOctober 8, 2003 mined by the allegations of the complaint or petition and the character of the relief sought. The present case satisfies all the above requisites. Hence, there are enough reasons to treat the Petition for certiorari as a petition for review.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Twentieth Division), HON. PRESIDING JUDGE FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, RTC-BR. 35 and APOLINARIA MALINAO JOMOC, respondents. FACTS: RTC of Ormoc City granted the petition for the declaration of presumptive death of absentee spouse Clemente Jomoc. o Trial Judge Madrona, cited Art. 41, par. 2 of the Family Code: for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage, where the prior spouse has been absent for 4 consecutive years, the spouse present must institute a summary proceedings for the declaration of presumptive death. Petitioner RP sought to appeal the RTC Order by filing a Notice of Appeal. RTC stating that no record of appeal was filed and served, as required by Sec. 2(a), Rule 41, the present case being a special proceeding disapproved the notice of appeal. RP filed a MR. DENIED. RP filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA, contending that the case is not a special a proceeding or a case of multiple or separate appeals requiring a record on appeal. DENIED. o CA: Petition is not sufficient in form. RP questioned the order declaring Jomoc presumptively dead, likewise ofr having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, yet, not even a copy could be found in the records. This score alone, the petition should have been dismissed outright pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 46. ISSUE: Whether a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a person is

in the nature of a special proceeding? RULING: No. It is a summary proceeding under the family code, not a special proceeding under the RoC. Being a summary proceeding, the filing of a notice of appeal from the RTCs order sufficed. In a special proceeding, period to appeal is 30 days and the party appealing must file with the trial court a record on appeal. Otherwise, if the petition is an ordinary action, period to appeal is 15 days and the appeal is perfected by mere notice (Sec. 3, Rule 41) Under Rule 72, Sec. 1 The Subject Matter of Special Proceedings includes Declaration of absence and death. Under Rule 72; Sec. 2 Applicability of rules on civil actions. In the absence of a special provisions, the rules provided in ordinary actions shall be applicable in special proceedings. Under Art 41 of the Family Code: For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouses present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. Sec. 2, Rule 41 provides that in Ordinary Appeals: No records on appeal shall be required except in Special Proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or rules require.

signment due to his union activities. His only job was to distribute the companys Christmas calendars.

Thus, he filed with (NLRC), a complaint for constructive dismissal and nonpayment of backwages. LA ruled for petitioner NLRC on appeal reversed LA and dismissed petitioner's complaint. MR-denied CA- petition for certiorari- dismissing the petition for petitioners failure to pay the docket and other legal fees

MR- petitioner alleged that when he filed the petition through registered mail,
he enclosed P1,030.00 in cash as docket fee. He thus prayed that he "be allowed to pay once more the docketing fee so required.DENIED Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON CA acted with GAD in dismissing the petition? NO..

Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:Sec. 3. Contents The RTCs citation of Art. 41 gathered that the petition to declare Jomoc presump- and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. The petition tively dead had for its purpose the desire to contract a subsequent marriage. shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the Hence, the petition is a summary proceeding as provided in Art. 41. case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.

The petitioner shall pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees to the
LEOPOLDO V. MENDOZA, Petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS and MERCHANDISING INSPECTION COMPANY, LTD., Respondents. FACTS: For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Resolutions dated March 16 and June 4, 20011 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 4266 (UDK). clerk of court and deposit the amount of P500.00 for costs at the time of the filing of the petition.The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

a court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case unless the
docket fees are paid. It is clear that non-compliance with any of the requirements stated above warrants the dismissal of a petition. While the Rules of Court must be faithfully followed, however, they may be relaxed for persuasive and weighty reasons to relieve a litigant from an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedures.

Leopoldo Mendoza, petitioner was employed as a checker by the Overseas Mer- SC ruled that the appellate court may extend the time for the payment of docket chandising Inspection Company Ltd., private respondent. From March 1 to Defees if appellant is able to show that there is a justifiable reason for the failure to cember 18, 1993, however, respondent company did not give him any work aspay the correct amount of docket fees within the prescribed period, like fraud, ac-

cident, mistake, excusable negligence, or a similar supervening casualty without fault on the part of the appellant.

In the early months of 1987 and pursuant to Executive Order No. 119 issued on January 30, 1987 by president Corazon C. Aquino reorganization of the various

An appeal was reinstated despite appellants failure to pay the docket fees after offices of the Ministry of Health commenced; existing offices were abolished, almost one year from the filing of the notice of appeal. We found that there was no transfers of personnel effected. deliberate refusal on his part to pay the required docket fee within the reglementary period. At the time of the reorganization, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente was the Chief of CASE AT BAR...petitioner has not shown any reason which justifies relaxation Clinics of the National Children's Hospital, having been appointed to that position of the Rules. His insistence that he enclosed in the mailing envelope the amount of P1,030.00 as docket fee does not convince us. If it were true, why did he pray on December 20, 1978. in his motion for reconsideration that he be allowed to pay once more the docketOn February 4, 1988 Dr. de la Fuente received notice from the Department of ing fee? Health that he would be re-appointed "Medical Specialist II." Considering this to It bears stressing that procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced a partys substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed.Not one of these exceptions is present here. be a demotion by no less than two ranks from his post as Chief of Clinics, Dr. de la Fuente filed a protest with the DOH Reorganization Board. When his protest was ignored, he brought his case to the Civil Service Commission -declares the demotion/transfer of appellant dela Fuente, Jr. from Chief of Clinics to Medical

Specialist II as null and void: hence, illegal. Moreover, petitioner resorted to the wrong remedy. What he should have filed with this Court is a petition for review on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, not a petition for certiorarun- No MR of this Resolution was ever submitted nor appeal there from essayed to der Rule 65 of the same Rules. the Supreme Court, within the thirty-day period prescribed therefore by the Constitution. Consequently, the resolution became final, on September 21, 1988. ISABELITA VITAL-GOZON, petitioner,vs. Three months having elapsed without any word from Vital-Gozon or anyone in her behalf, or any indication whatever that the CSC Resolution would be obeyed, HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJANDRO DE LA FUENTE, respondents. and apprehensive that the funds to cover the salaries and allowances otherwise due him would revert to the General Fund, Dr. de la Fuente repaired to the Civil Service Commission and asked it to enforce its judgment. He was however Facts: "told to file in court a petition for mandamus because of the belief that the Commission had no coercive powers unlike a court to enforce its final decisions/resolutions."

So De la Fuente instituted in the CA on December 28, 1988 an action of "mandamus and damages with preliminary injunction" to compel VitalGozon, and the Administrative Officer, Budget Officer and Cashier of the NCH to comply with the final and executory resolution of the CSC. On 7 May 1997, the CA promulgated a Resolution finding petitioner liable for damages and ordered her to pay private respondent P50,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and P10,000.00 as attorney's fees. ISSUE: WON CA erred in awarding moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees. HELD: NO irreversible error committed by CA. *** I BELIEVE THE ONLY IMPORTANT THING WITH REGARD TO OUR TOPIC IS THAT YOU COULD FILE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS ORIGINALLY @ CA PURSUANT TO R46 S 1&2 BUT IT WAS NOT DISCUSSED IN THE CASE.