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DREW UNIVERSITY
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FROM:

OFFICER OF THE PRESIDENT

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DATE;

COVER*

COMMENTS
30 2004 12: 1 5 P M DREU U N I V PRESIDENTS OFFI 973-408-3080 p<2

UNCLASSIFIED

Selected Summer 2001 Threat Response Activities

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The following mil give a sense of some of the actions we took in the Summer of
2001. It is not intended to be complete or authoritative,
May 12: State Department issued public, worldwide caution that American citizens
abroad may be the target of a terrorist threat from extremists groups with links to
UBL's al-Qaida organization.

May 17: CSG met on a report of a group allegedly in the U.S. planning to conduct
attack with high explosives. This report had no detail on time, place, or manner of
attack, and was later determined by our intelligence agencies to have been
unfounded. The CSG also met on threats to Americans in Turkey/India/Indonesia.
May 24: CSG met on current threats in Italy and Saudi Arabia, and the possible
disruption of a terrorist operation in Yemen.
May 29: CSG met on current threats in Bahrain, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia.
May 29: Defense Intelligence Agency issued a Defense Terrorism Warning report
assessing Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Israel as the most probable venues for a
terrorist attack. Designed to alert the appropriate authorities to a situation that may
threaten U.S. or allied interests, it was to remain in effect for 30 days.
May 30: State Dept updated its worldwide public caution in light of the conviction
of four men accused of bombing our Embassies in East Africa, reminding all posts
to remain at a heightened state of alert.

May 30: At one of their weekly meetings, based on information provided by Dick
Clarke indicating a possible al-Qaida attack which his team thought would come in
Israel or Saudi Arabia, Condi Rice asked DCI Tenet about whether there was
anything more we could do to "take the offensive" against Abu Zubayda, who we
had learned by then was a key planner involved in these planned attacks, and who
we now know as one of the architects of 9/11. The Chief of CIA's Counterterrorist
Center assured her that CIA was working closely with then* overseas partners to
disrupt terrorist groups and have an active program to penetrate terrorist
organizations. Dick Clarke, who attended that meeting, affirmed to Condi that CIA's
activities to capture Abu Zubayda were, in his view, important offensive activity.
She asked CIA to rate the seriousness of the current threat and was told that, on a
»R 30 2004 1 2 : 1 5 P M DREW U N I V PRESIDENTS OFFI 973-408-3080 p.3

UNCLASSIFIED

scale of 1-10, the Millennium threat was an 8 and the current threat a 7, but higher
in Yemen. Dick Clarke assured her that adequate warning notices had been issued
to appropriate U.S. entities. The DCI and Dick agreed to provide her with a range
of options for attacking UBL and his organization.
Late-May: Defense Department ordered its military facilities in Manama, Bahrain,
to the second highest force protection condition (Charlie). This condition applies
when a terrorist incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating some form of
terrorist action is likely. The security measures implemented under Charlie are so
stringent they can only be maintained a short period before adversely affecting the
peacetime operations of a unit.
Also in late May: Due to the heightened threat in Yemen^ we completed the
evacuation and closure of the U.S. Mission in Aden, Yemen. Embassies in Turkey,
Indonesia, and India conducted Emergency Action Committee meetings to enhance
efforts to detect terrorist surveillance and deter al Qaida kidnappings.
In June: We disrupted a terrorist cell in Jordan; a terrorist plan to attack U.S.
facilities and diplomats in Yemen; and worked with1 the Bahrainis to capture two
Saudi al-Qaida operatives,
June 4: CSG met on current threats in Philippines/Yemen, and how to combat
terrorist travel, including an Abu Zubayda associate's travel to Europe.
June 7: CSG met on current threats in Israel/India.

June 8: CSG met on current threats in Yemen/Saudi Arabia/Israel.

June 14: CSG met on current threats in Yemen/Lebanon.
June 18: CSG met on current threats in Yemen/Kuwait.
June 21: CSG met on current threats in Yemen/Italy and the arrests of extremists in
Malaysia.

Mid June: CIA advised all of its Chiefs of Stations worldwide on specific threat
responses and related activities. /
 2004 12:15PM DREU U h l V PRESIDENTS OFFI 973-408-3080 p.4

UNCLASSIFIED

Mid June: Defense Department ordered many forces in the Middle East to
maximum force protection condition (Delta).

June 22: Civil Aviation Security Information Circular issued warning airline
hijacking in response to Islamic extremist arrests posed a possible terrorist threat
against American citizens. The circular was to be disseminated to all U.S. air
carriers and airport security officials.

June 22: CSG met on current.threats in Yemen/Italy/Kuwait/G-8 Summit

June 22: State Dept cabled all Posts worldwide reporting indications UBL intended
to strike U.S. interests within 2 days. Despite previously heightened state of alert,
Embassy Security Officers directed to review their current security posture and
status. State also updated its worldwide public caution to underscore indications of
a possible near term attack.

June 22: Foreign Emergency Support Team, with overseas-capable aircraft, put on
heightened alert for quicker response to possible attacks.

June 22: Defense Intelligence Agency released Defense Terrorism Warning Report
to forces in Middle East and Europe warning of a possible al-Qaida attack within the
next 2 days. Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bahrain, and Kuwait were assessed as most
probable venues for an attack.

June 25: CSG members agreed continuing threat information about an imminent
al-Qaida attack warranted continuation of alert posture.

June 26: Defense Intelligence Agency issued a FLASH message to alert DoD
interests in the Arabian Peninsula that Islamic extremists had been given possible
go-ahead instructions to conduct a terrorist operation in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait.

June 27: State Department released U.S. demarche to Taliban (via Pakistan and
UAE) declaring Taliban will be held responsible for any terrorist attacks carried out
by bin Ladin or al-Qaida.

June 28: CSG met on current threats in Lebanon/Bangladesh.

June 28: Clarke informed Condi that stepped-up U.S. defensive measures and/or
recent warnings to Taliban may have delayed potential terrorist activity.
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UNCLASSIFIED

Late June: All 56 FBI Field Offices tasked to increase surveillance and contact
with informants related to known or suspect terrorists in the U.S.
In July: U.S. Government activities resulted in the capture of an al-Qaida operative
intheUAE.

July 2: Civil Aviation Security Information Circular issued to all U.S. air carriers
and airport security personnel reiterating possibility of terrorist attacks against
Americans. FAA warns improvised explosive devices could be left in unattended
baggage at airport terminals, reinforcing the need for all airport personnel to remain
vigilant and report any unattended baggage to authorities.
July 2: FBI nationwide alert issued warning of increased volume of reporting
indicating potential attacks against U.S. targets abroad, but noting that possibility of
attack in U.S. could not be discounted.
July 2: Clarke informed Condi of the capture of two al-Qaida operatives in
Bahrain. Al-Qaida talked about a "game" being delayed 7-10 days, with al-Qaida
"scattered" and on alert.
Early July: DCI requested special assistance from friendly intelligence services.
July 5: Following a meeting Condi called, which included the Chief of Staff, the
CSG convened FAA, INS, Customs, Secret Service, FBI, and Coast Guard to urge
review of domestic security measures and increase alert status. Activities to better
secure Federal buildings followed.
July 5: The Vice President called the Saudi Crown Prince to seek high level
support for cooperation against possible impending attack.
July 5: At Condi's request, the DCI briefed the AG on the current threat and
activities to combat it.
July 6: Defense Intelligence Agency issued second amplification to 22 Jun Defense
Terrorism Warning Report citing addition indications that al-Qaida was planning for
multiple, significant, terrorist attacks. /While the timeframe for the attacks
fluctuated, the weight of reporting suggested attacks within 1-2 weeks.
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UNCLASSIFIED

July 6: CSG met oil current threats and decided to suspended all non-essential
travel for Washington DC-based counterterrorism professionals.
July 6: Clarke updated Condi on CSG actions in light of intelligence that al-Qaida
believed upcoming attack would be spectacular, qualitatively different than anything
done to date.
July 9: CSG prepared response plans for 3-5 simultaneous terrorist incidents,
July 10: Clarke provided Condi a summary of terrorist warnings and notifications
issued by the Federal government throughout the summer.
July 16: CSG met on current threats in Morocco/Israel/against G-8 Summit, and
explosives smuggling in Saudi Arabia.
July 17: Clarke informed Condi of a National Security Agency intercept indicating
a possible terrorist attack within 48 hours.
July 18: Steve Hadley hosted the DCI's weekly meeting at which serious threat
reporting suggesting an imminent attack, possibly in Saudi Arabia, was discussed.
July 18: Steve Hadley was informed that the DCI, at Condi'a request, had briefed
the Secretary of Defense on the current threat.
July 18: Civil Aviation Security Information Circular issued on possible terrorist
threat against U.S. interests in the Arabian Peninsula. All civil aviation security
personnel were urged to be on alert.
July 18: FBI issued nationwide advisory advising of the conviction of Mokhtar
Haouari in New York City,

July 19: CSG met on current threats in Yemen/Uganda.

July 20: Defense Intelligence Agency issued an extension to the 22 Jun Defense
Terrorism Warning Report to remain in effect for another 30 days. Given the
unprecedented number Of indicators of near-term al-Qaida network terrorist
planning, they assessed al-Qaida was positioned to execute attacks when operatives
believed the timing was right. Earlier planned attacks on the Arabian peninsula
believed to have been hampered or delayed by increased U.S. security measures,
 JO 2004 12: 16PM DREU U N I V PRESIDENTS OFFI 873-408-3080 p.?

UNCLASSIFIED

arrests or logistical problems. Although al-Qaida was believed to be capable of a

near-worldwide reach, the primary venue for anti-U.S, attack planning appeared to
be the Arabian peninsula with official U.S. personnel and facilities in Saudi Arabia
al-Qaida's priority targets.

July 23: CSG met on suspected terrorist travel to U.S.,^

current threatin Europe.
T*

July 26: CSG met on current threats in S, Africa/Colombia/Indonesia.

July 27: Clarke informed Condi that the "spike" in intelligence indicating a near- ''
term attack had "ceased," though noting that readiness levels should remain high.'
. • . •/•
July 31: Civil Aviation Security Information Circular disseminated to all U.S. air
carriers on continued Middle Eastern threats to civil aviation. The Arabian
Peninsula and/or Israel were considered more probable targets but a high degree of
alertness was encouraged as currently active extremist groups were known to plan
and train for hijackings.

August 1: FBI issued nationwide advisory recognizing 3rd anniversary of E. Africa

bombings and warned of increased threat abroad, citing attacks in the U.S. could not
be discounted,

August 4: The President sent a second letter to President Musharraf (first letter sent
16 Feb 01) urging Pakistan to engage actively against al-Qaida and to impress upon
the Taliban the importance of changing its Current policy of harboring terrorists.

August 6: PDB

August 8: CSG met on current threats in Indonesia.

August 14: CSG met on current threats in Indonesia/Israel.

August 16: Civil Aviation Security Information Circular issued on disguised

weapons - warning of existence of artfully disguised firearms in the shape of key-
rings, cellular telephones, and writing pens; that other disguised weapons may be
difficult to detect, pass through metal detectors unnoticed or placed in collection
containers during screening; and commonly used items might also be used to
camouflage weapons.