G.R. No.

L-18535

May 30, 1962

VALDERRAMA LUMBER MANUFACTURER'S COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. L.S. SARMIENTO CO., INC., HON. MACAPANTON ABBAS and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF, respondents. Eliezer A. Manikan and Aportadera Law Offices for petitioner. Dominguez Law Office for respondents. REYES, J.B.L., J.: Petitioner company applied for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary and/or preliminary mandatory injunction, alleging that the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao committed a clear abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering the immediate execution of an appealed decision of the Justice of the Peace Court of Mabini, Davao. It appears that on September 26, 1960, the petitioner, which has been occupying and using a parcel of foreshore land as its log pond in its logging business, was notified in writing by counsel for respondent L. S. Sarmiento & Company to vacate the premises, within ten days from receipt of notice, as the land has already been leased to it by the government. Not having complied with the demand to vacate within the said period, respondent company instituted an action for ejectment against the petitioner in the Justice of the Peace Court of Mabini, Davao, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 33. Answering the complaint, the petitioner interposed the affirmative defense, among others, of lack of jurisdiction over the case because it had been in prior, peaceful, and open possession of the premises since 1958, more than one year before the suit was commenced, and that there was a conflict pending between the parties in the Bureau of Lands over the land which has not been finally resolved.

After trial, the Justice of the Peace Court of Mabini rendered judgment against the petitioner, and ordered it to vacate completely the premises within 5 days from receipt of a copy of the decision, to pay rentals in the amount of P239.82 a month, commencing from September 5, 1960 until surrender of possession of the land in question, and to pay the sum of P500.00 as attorney's fees and the costs. Upon motion for reconsideration by petitioner and/or new trial, the judgment was amended as follows: a. To vacate the premises completely after the decision shall have become final or sooner upon immediate execution of the judgment pursuant to Section 8, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. In view of the foregoing, the motion for new trial and/or reconsideration is hereby denied and the decision rendered in the above-entitled case dated December 15, 1960, as modified, shall remain in full force and effect. Not satisfied with the aforesaid judgment, petitioner company appealed to the Court of First Instance of Davao by filing on time its Notice of Appeal and a supersedeas bond, which was not objected to by opposing company and which was approved by the court in the amount of P2,178.74, "in order to stay execution of the decision rendered in the present case, dated December 15, 1960, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 72, Section 8, of the Rules of Court", and "conditioned for the performance of the judgment appealed from in case it be affirmed wholly or in part". Upon failure of petitioner to deposit within the first ten days of March, 1961 the adjudged monthly rent of P239.82 allegedly corresponding to the month of February, 1961, while the appeal was pending in the court of first instance, L. S. Sarmiento & Company filed a motion for immediate execution. Over the opposition of the petitioner, the court granted the motion, and respondent Provincial Sheriff complied with the writ of execution on June 21, 1961 (Exhibit 7). However, when respondent company received the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Supreme Court on June 29, 1961, it "allowed the petitioner the use" of the premises (par. 5 (b), p. 5, Answer). A motion to dissolve the said writ of this Court was filed on July 28, 1961.

It is not disputed that the petitioner, on August 18, 1958, applied for a permit to use and occupy the log pond in question with the Bureau of Forestry; the District Forester of Davao having permitted petitioner company to construct a pier and log pond, it introduced improvements thereon and since November 3, 1958 had been depositing its log products in, and shipping them for export from, this pond. However, to clear doubts as to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry, petitioner also filed with the Davao District Land Office a lease application for the same property on March 30, 1959. On January 6, 1960, petitioner was informed that the area was being surveyed by Bureau of Lands surveyors in connection with a lease application of the respondent; thereupon, petitioner protested to the Bureau of Lands, but its protest was not entertained by this office because respondent, as successful bidder at public auction, had already been awarded the right to lease the property, and that the petitioner's lease application with the Davao District Land Office on March 30, 1959, did not appear on the records of the Bureau of Lands in Manila. On August 30, 1960, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, entered into a contract of lease over the property in dispute with the respondent company. The main issue in this case is whether or not the Justice of the Peace Court of Mabini, Davao, had jurisdiction over the ejectment case. Petitioner attacks the jurisdiction of said court on the ground that the complaint is insufficient leaving failed to allege prior possession of the land by the plaintiff; neither did it allege that the deprivation of possession by the defendant was done through any of the means mentioned in Section 1, Rule 72, of the Rules of Court, namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy, or stealth; nor is there anything averred as to any contractual relationship, or priority thereof, between the parties over the land. Respondent counters by arguing that the prior possession of the land by petitioner was by tolerance of the Republic of the Philippines, and that respondent, as lessee of the land, stepped into the shoes of the lessor; and, inasmuch as tolerance of possession expires upon demand, which was made by lessee-company upon petitioner, the latter lost the right to possess the land, and, therefore, cannot thereafter withhold the possession of the land. The allegations in the complaint are what determine the jurisdiction of the court. (Baguioro vs. Barrios, 77 Phil. 120).
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Here, the complaint for ejectment recites that the plaintiff is the lessee from the Republic of the Philippines of the foreshore land occupied by the defendant; that on September 5, 1960, plaintiff demanded of the defendant to vacate the premises within ten days from notice as it desired to use said parcel of land itself, being entitled to its possession and use thereof by reason of the aforementioned lease agreement; that defendant refused to vacate the premises, and that because of the "unwarranted acts of the defendant alleged hereinabove", plaintiff has been compelled to hire the services of counsel. Among other things, the complaint prayed for judgment, ordering the defendant "to vacate the premises in question and to restore the possession thereof to the plaintiff", and pay rental value "until the possession of the same is returned to the plaintiff". The complaint not only shows prior possession by petitioner herein, but does not allege that plaintiff (respondent herein) was deprived of possession by any of the means mentioned in section 1, Rule 72, of the Rules of Court namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth, that would have made out a case for forcible entry (detentacion), nor that the right of possession of the petitioner had terminated, and occupancy was being unlawfully withheld so as to constitute unlawful detainer. If the dispossession did not take place by any of these means, Courts of First Instance, not justice of the peace courts, have jurisdiction. (2 Moran 287, 1957 Ed.) And, to make out a case of detainer (desahucio), the complaint must show that the withholding of possession, or the refusal to vacate, was unlawful, though not necessarily employing the terminology of the law (Co Tiamco vs. Diaz, 75 Phil. 672). On this jurisdictional requisite, the complaint under scrutiny is fatally silent. While it is true that the complaint uses the word "unwarranted", the way it was used is merely descriptive of the "acts of the defendant alleged hereinabove"; and thereinabove (referring to the complaint), nowhere can be found any word or phrase describing the withholding of possession by the defendant as unlawful or of a similar tenor.

The Justice of the Peace Court not having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the Court of First Instance of Davao did not acquire appellate jurisdiction.1 Hence, the respondents Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao and Provincial Sheriff acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing and enforcing the writ of execution. With regard to the claim that the action to dispossess petitioner should have been instituted by the government, as owner-lessor, and not by the lessee, it should be observed that while under Article 1664 of the Civil Code a lessee has no direct action against an intruder who questions the lessee's right to possession and asserts it in himself, yet such issue can not be taken up now, as it does not affect the jurisdiction of the court, and the point does not appear to have been properly invoked before the respondent court. IN VIEW WHEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered, making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on June 29, 1961, and declaring all proceedings had in connection with Civil Case No. 33 of the Justice of the Peace Court of Mabini, Davao, to be null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Costs against respondent Sarmiento & Co., Inc. Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur. Footnotes
1

127 Torres v. Pea, 44 Off. Gaz., No. 8, p. 2699; Pealosa v. Garcia, 44 Off. Gaz. No. 8, p. 2709, cited in Juzon de Po vs. Moscoso, 49 Off. Gaz., No. 7, (1953), p. 2786. G.R. No. L-19572 July 30, 1965

DIONISIO B. GALLARDE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CESAR S. MORAN and LIBORIA L. MORAN, defendants-appellees. Gaspar V. Tagalo and Ambrosio Calo Gallarde for plaintiff-appellant. Teofisto Guingona, Jr. for defendants-appellees. BENGZON, C.J.: The above-mentioned plaintiff prays for reversal of the order of the Honorable Montano A. Ortiz of Agusan dismissing his complaint for ejectment against Cesar S. Moran, et al. The record shows that on June 2, 1961, Dionisio B. Gallarde filed such complaint for "ejectment and damages" in the Court of First Instance of Agusan, alleging substantially that: (a) in 1954, he permitted defendants to occupy a parcel of urban land belonging to him, because the latter promised to pay monthly rentals of P15.00, later reduced to P12.00 and then to P10.00; (b) that the rentals were payable in advance every first week of the month; (c) that defendants were irregular in their rental payments (d) that in view thereof, he notified them in January 1960 that beginning March of that year the rental would be 30 pesos a month and if defendants were not "agreeable" to the new condition, he "made the demand against defendant to vacate plaintiff's land"; (e) that afterwards, defendants failed to pay rentals for several months; (f) that he thereby suffered moral and actual damages; and (g) that defendants, "who in spite of plaintiff's demand against them to vacate the leased land refused to do so" should be required to pay exemplary damages. The complaint ended with the prayer: (1) that defendants be ejected from the parcel of land; and (2) that they be ordered to pay damages and costs. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on several grounds, one of which was based on the lack of cause of action, the complaint having made no allegation of a previous demand upon the defendants to vacate the premises in accordance with the provisions of sec. 2 of Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. On this ground, the trial judge dismissed the complaint, as stated. The plaintiff appealed.

We find this appeal to have no merit. Sec. 2 of Rule 72 of the Rules of Court, in force in 1961, directs specifically that: SEC. 2. Landlord to proceed against tenant only after demand. No landlord, or his legal representative or assign, shall bring such action against a tenant, for failure to pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of his lease, unless the tenant shall have failed to pay such rent or to comply with such conditions for a period of fifteen days, or five days in the case of building, after demand therefor, made upon him personally, or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if no persons be found thereon. We have carefully, and repeatedly, read the complaint. It fails absolutely to make allegations establishing a cause of action conformably to the above Rule. The only allegations of demand to vacate were those hereinabove described. The first was not a definite demand to vacate: it was conditional. It merely said that then plaintiff would demand that they vacate. There is no allegation that defendants refused to agree. The second allegation of demand was quite indefinite. It inferentially says that plaintiff demanded that defendants vacate the land; but it does not say when. So the condition imposed by sec. 2 of Rule 72 that the demand be made at least fifteen days or five days before bringing the action has not been fulfilled. Again, the complaint does not allege that the demand to vacate was made for failure to pay rent or comply with conditions of the contract, 1and again, the complaint does not allege facts to show that such "demand" had been made in the form required by sec. 2, viz., personally, or by serving written notice, or by posting such notice. WHEREFORE, the appealed order is affirmed, with costs against appellant. Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur. Footnotes
1

Maybe plaintiff demanded the return of his land by reason of his "other future plan over said land for his own use" as alleged in par. 7 of the complaint.

G.R. No. L-29275 January 31, 1972 FLORENTINO PANGILINAN, EDILBERTO PANGILINAN, GERMAN PANGILINAN, ALEJA PANGILINAN, FORTUNATO ANGELES, FORTUNATO SANGIL, TROADIO SANTOS, VIRGINIA DAVID, CARLITO DAVID, EUGENIO DAVID, JUANITO PARAS and TOMAS LIWAG, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE ANDRES AGUILAR, Judge of the CFI of Pampanga, Branch III, MARCELO MENDIOLA, ALEJANDRO SUN, JOSE PANGILINAN and BEATRIZ HENSON, respondents. Jorge C. Salenga for petitioners. Abel de Ocera for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:p

This petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction seeks to set aside the proceeding had by the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch III in connection with civil case no. 3221; to restrain the respondent judge from hearing the case in an appellate capacity and from issuing further writs of execution and/or demolition and instead to require him to hear the case under its original jurisdiction by directing the parties to file their appropriate pleadings therein; to restrain respondents Marcelo Mendiola, clerk of court branch III, CFI of Pampanga, and city sheriff Alejandro Sun of the City Court of Angeles, or any of his deputies, from carrying into effect any writ of execution and/or demolition which the respondent judge may or might issue in the premises; and to order the respondents-spouses to pay the costs of the suit (p. 18, rec.). In a resolution dated July 26, 1968, We required respondents to file their answer, not a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from receipt of notice; and with respect to the petition for preliminary injunction, to issue the writ prayed for, upon filing by petitioners of a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 (p. 70, rec.). Respondents subsequently filed the required bond and the same was approved by this Court on August 27, 1968 and the necessary writ was forthwith issued on same date (p. 100, rec.). The records disclosed that herein private respondents (spouses Jose Pangilinan and Beatriz Henson) are plaintiffs in Civil Case No. C-54 for unlawful detainer which they filed on May 4, 1964 against herein petitioners (defendants in the lower court) involving a parcel of land Lot No. 681 of the Cadastral Survey of Angeles City. Herein private respondents acquired said lot "by purchase from the Valdez family on August 15, 1963 (Exh. "B") and their ...Torrens Title No. 34805-R (Exh. "C"), issued on September 9, 1963." Thereafter, respondents had the corners of said lot relocated by a surveyor and discovered that herein petitioners were occupying portions of the lot where their respective houses were erected allegedly through tolerance by the previous owner, from whom respondents acquired the said lot. On March 22, 1964, the respondents gave notice to the herein petitioners to vacate the lot within 15 days therefrom but notwithstanding the expiration of said period, the petitioners refused and failed to leave the premises and remove their respective houses therefrom, which refusal led respondents to institute on May 4, 1964 the detainer case (see Annex "A", pp. 18, 19, and Annex "I", decision of the Angeles City Court, p. 37 rec.). On December 7, 1964, defendants (herein petitioners) filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for illegal detainer on the grounds that the "(a) the City Court of Angeles has no jurisdiction over the nature of the suit or action; and (b) that the complaint states no cause of action," which motion was opposed by plaintiffs (herein private respondents) in a pleading dated December 10, 1964. In an order dated February 10, 1964, said motion to dismiss was denied by the judge of the Angeles City Court (p. 28, rec.). On February 8, 1965, defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion to dismiss, to which an opposition was filed by the plaintiffs on February 27, 1965. In an order dated April 30, 1965 the court denied the motion for reconsideration dated February 8, 1965, and forthwith set the case for hearing on May 10, 1965 at 9 o'clock in the morning (Annexes "E", "F" and "G", pp. 29-34, rec.). On May 12, 1965, the defendants filed their answer to the complaint advancing the affirmative defense that the "land in question is part and parcel of the patrimonial property of the State, which they have occupied, used, and possessed, adversely, publicly, and uninterruptedly for a long period under a claim of ownership; hence by right of acquisitive prescription, defendants have acquired ownership over the land in question" (Annex "H", pp. 35-36, rec.). During the pendency of the detainer case in the Angeles City Court, defendants on May 28, 1965 filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, docketed as Civil Case No. 2784 (Annex "A", pp. 77-78, rec.) seeking to nullify the orders dated February 10, 1965 and April 30, 1965 of the city Judge of the Angeles City Court denying the motion to dismiss dated December 11, 1964 (Annex "B", pp. 20-26, rec.) and the motion to reconsider the same dated February 8, 1965 (Annex "E", pp. 2932, rec.). On June 28, 1965 plaintiffs filed their answer to said petition (Annex "B", pp. 89-92, rec.) and on December 20, 1965, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment upholding the validity of the questioned orders of the Judge of Angeles City Court for the reason that the complaint states a cause of action and the same is within the jurisdiction of the Angeles City Court, and forthwith denied the petition (Annex "C", pp. 93-96, rec.). Defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 37485-R, and on July 19, 1966 were required to file their printed brief, but on October 21, 1966 withdrew their appeal (Annex "D", p. 97, rec.), ( see pp. 72-73, rec.).

Thereafter, trial of the detainer case proceeded and on May 8, 1967, the Angeles City Court rendered judgment directing each of the defendants "to immediately vacate lot No. 381 by removing their houses thereon, ... to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P20.00 a month as reasonable rentals beginning with the month of August, 1963 until he or she finally vacates the premises, ... jointly and severally, to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P300.00 as attorney's fees and ... to pay the cost of the suit" (Annex "1", pp. 37-38, rec.). Within the period allowed by law, defendants perfected their unqualified appeal with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, without filing a supersedeas bond. However, they claim in this present petition that their appeal was not for the purpose of recognizing the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga but for the purpose of elevating the case to said court for trial as if the case has been originally filed before it (see par. 16 of petition, p. 7, rec.). In a pleading dated January 7, 1968, defendants themselves moved to dismiss their own appeal on the ground that the court of first instance has no appellate jurisdiction over the case for the reason that the Angeles City Court did not have original jurisdiction over the same, but at the same time making a manifestation that they would conform if the court of first instance decides to try the case under its original jurisdiction as one for accion publiciana pursuant to the provision of section 11 of Rule 40 of the Revised Rules of Court. Plaintiffs filed on January 12, 1968 an opposition to the motion to dismiss. In an order dated January 18, 1968, the respondent judge denied the motion for lack of merit (Annexes "J", "K" and "L", pp. 39-47, rec.). On January 4, 1968, plaintiffs filed a motion for immediate execution, invoking Section 8, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court (Annex "M", p. 48, rec.). On January 17, 1968, defendants filed their opposition to the motion for immediate execution and contended that immediate execution of the judgment of the Angeles City Court cannot be granted for the reasons that the Angeles City Court did not have jurisdiction over the case, that the issue of title has been raised in the pleadings of both parties, and that the decision of the city court did not make a finding as to the existence of a contract between the parties (Annex "N", pp. 49-53, rec.). On January 23, 1968, plaintiffs filed their reply to the opposition and contended that the failure of the defendants to file a supersedeas bond or to deposit on time the monthly reasonable rents fixed in the appealed judgment entitles them to immediate execution of the said appealed judgment; that the question of jurisdiction is already a decided matter since the same has been upheld by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, which denied defendants' petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction in Civil Case No. 2784, from which they appealed to the Court of Appeals, but which appeal they withdrew (CA-G.R. No. 37485-R); and that title could not be involved in this case for the reason that the land in question is one covered by a torrens title, which does not prescribe (Annex "O", pp. 54-55, rec.). On January 26, 1968, defendants filed their rejoinder to the plaintiffs' reply (Annex "P", pp. 56-60, rec.). In an order dated May 16, 1968, the respondent judge ruled that plaintiffs are entitled to immediate execution of the appealed judgment of the Angeles City Court (Annex "Q", pp. 61-62, rec.); and the writ of immediate execution dated May 20, 1968 was issued, commanding the respondent sheriff of the Angeles City Court, or any of his deputies, to execute the appealed judgment of the Angeles City Court (Annex "R", p. 63, rec.). On or about May 25, 1968, the respondent city sheriff of Angeles City, or his deputies, went to the houses of the defendants and attempted to enforce the writ of execution but the same was resisted by the defendants on the ground that the same was illegal and invalid (see par. 28 of petition, p. 12, rec.). On June 12, 1968, defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of the orders dated January 18, 1968 and May 16, 1968, but the same was denied in an order dated July 3, 1968 (Annexes "S" and "T", pp. 64-67, rec.). Hence, this petition. I

It should be noted that herein petitioners had earlier filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a petition forcertiorari and prohibition with injunction (Civil Case No. 2784) raising the same grounds they interposed in this instant petition. The Court in said Civil Case No. 2784 denied said petition, holding that the complaint was one for unlawful detainer and not one for accion publiciana, and confirming, as a consequence, the jurisdiction of the Angeles City Court to try the case on the merits. Said decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga was appealed by the herein petitioners to the Court of Appeals; but the same was withdrawn by them on October 21, 1966 after they were required to file their printed brief. Such withdrawal rendered the said decision final and unappealable as well as conclusive on herein petitioners and estops them from questioning anew the jurisdiction of the Angeles City Court in this present petition. 1 Aware of the adverse effect on their cause of their withdrawal of their appeal to the Court of Appeals, herein petitioners conveniently avoided making mention of the same in this present petition. II Petitioners insist that the Angeles City Court has no jurisdiction over the complaint filed against them by herein private respondents, because it does not allege facts showing that the action is for unlawful detainer as it fails to aver prior physical possession of the plaintiffs, any existing contractual relation between the plaintiffs and the defendants, and the filing of the complaint within one year from the time the possession of the defendants became illegal. It is a settled principle that the complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law; 2 "and the other details like the one-year period within which the action should be brought, and the demand when required to be made by the Rules, must be proved but need not be alleged in the complaint" (emphasis supplied). 3 Such unlawful withholding of possession by herein petitioners of the lot in question is adequately alleged in paragraphs 3, 4, and 6 of the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by herein private respondents, which read thus: . 3. That after acquiring said lot, the plaintiffs had the corners relocated by a surveyor and discovered that the above-named defendants were occupying portion of said lot where their respective houses were erected by tolerance of the previous owners. 4. That on March 22, 1964, the plaintiffs gave notice to the said defendants to vacate the said lot within fifteen days but notwithstanding the expiration of said period, the defendants refused and failed (and) to leave the premises and remove their respective houses therefrom. xxx xxx xxx 6. That the defendants knew that said lot now belong to herein plaintiffs and same is covered by torrens title, and their unjustified and unreasonable refusal to vacate the premises forced the plaintiffs to file this case and engage the service of counsel at an agreed fee of P500.00 as attorney's fees and costs. (pp. 18-19, rec.). While possession by tolerance is lawful, such possession becomes illegal upon demand to vacate is made by the owner and the possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with such demand. 4 "A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him . ." 5 A formal agreement or contract of lease between the vendor or vendee and herein petitioners, is not necessary before an unlawful detainer action can be filed against the latter. 6 . Prior physical possession in the plaintiff is not an indispensable requirement in an unlawful detainer case brought by a vendee or other person against whom the possession of any land is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of a right to hold possession and therefore the allegation of the same in the complaint,

is not necessary. 7 As heretofore stated, possession of a possessor by tolerance becomes unlawful the moment the owner demands that he vacate the land. The herein private respondent caused the relocation survey of the lot in August, 1963. On March 22, 1964, they notified herein petitioners to vacate the same and to remove their houses therefor. This fact of notice is admitted by herein petitioners in their answer to the complaint (Annex "H", p. 35, rec.). On May 4, 1964, they filed the complaint for illegal detainer. It is patent therefore that the complaint was filed within the one-year period from date of the demand to vacate. Because physical or factual possession is the only issue in an illegal detainer case, mere claim of ownership does not divest the city or municipal court of its jurisdiction over such a case, 8 even if proof of title is submitted at the trial. 9 The Angeles City Court found that, aside from their bare claim of ownership and continuous possession, herein petitioners "have not presented any tangible or concrete evidence of their right to hold and possess the property in suit" (Annex "I", pp. 37-38, rec.). And it is an accepted rule that a person who has a torrens title over the property, like herein private respondents, is entitled to the possession thereof. III Under Section 8 of Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court, if the judgment is against the defendant, "execution shall issue immediately, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient bond, ... to pay the rents, damages and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time ... ." 10 The requirement of a supersedeas bond is mandatory and cannot be dispensed with by the courts,11 except when the delay or failure to file the same is due to fraud, accident or mistake or excusable negligence.12 Herein petitioners did not allege such exception, much less prove the same. The herein petitioners neither filed the supersedeas bond nor deposited the reasonable monthly rental decreed in the judgment of the Angeles City Court, which failure justifies the immediate execution of the judgment. 13 The duty of the court under such a situation becomes mandatory and ministerial 14 as well as imperative. 15 WHEREFORE, petition is hereby dismissed and the preliminary injunction heretofore issued is hereby lifted and set aside, with costs against herein petitioners. So ordered. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-20617

May 31, 1965

BRUNO GARCIA, petitioner, vs. DALMACIO ANAS, ET AL., respondents. Bienvenido L. Garcia for petitioner. Apolonio Barrera for respondent Dalmacio Anas. BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: Dalmacio Anas filed on August 3, 1957 before the Justice of the Peace Court of Zablan Mt. Province a complaint for forcible entry against Bruno Garcia praying that the latter be ordered to deliver to the former the possession of the land in litigation. Defendant, in his answer, averred that the property allegedly owned by the

plaintiff is within the parcel of land handed down to him by his father as his inheritance and that since then he has been in possession thereof and has never been molested nor dispossessed by anyone. The justice of the peace dismissed the case holding that the defendant is the one entitled to the possession of the land. On appeal, the Court of First Instance of Baguio reached practically the same conclusion. It dismissed the complaint on the ground that plaintiff has failed to identify the land which he claims to have been dispossessed by defendant.
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The case went to the Court of Appeals but this time this Court found that the complaint is meritorious. It ordered defendant to restore to plaintiff the possession of the land and to pay him P500.00 as attorney's fees. The case is now before us on a petition for review. The court a quo, after an examination of the evidence, concluded that plaintiff has not been able to identify the land which he claims to have been dispossessed by defendant for, according to the court, even his own witness Rosita Gayo gave as a description of the land sold by her father one consisting of 10 hectares instead of only 4 which is the one allegedly sold by her father to the plaintiff, while, on the other hand, the preponderance of evidence shows that defendant is the owner of the land and the one entitled to its possession. Consequently, on the basis of this finding, the court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals, however, reached a different conclusion. Thus, it found that the plaintiff is the rightful, sole and absolute owner since time immemorial of the parcel of land described in the complaint; that plaintiff bought 4 of the 10 hectares of the land from one Pablo Galbo in 1945 which he occupied and expanded by including the 6 hectares he acquired through a patent application; and that in May, 1957, defendant entered the land, had the same surveyed over his protest, fenced it and turned loose his carabaos thereon. And considering that defendant did not deny these facts but limited himself to proving his title to the land by identifying the tax declarations covering the same, the Court of Appeals reached the conclusion that plaintiff was in actual possession of the land of which he was dispossessed by defendant by having it surveyed and possessed. We agree with the Court of Appeals that in an action for ejectment the only issue involved is one of the possessionde facto the purpose of which is merely to protect the owner from any physical encroachment from without. The title of the land or its ownership is not involved, for if a person is in actual possession thereof he is entitled to be maintained and respected in it even against the owner himself. The main thing to be proven is prior possession and if same is lost through force, stealth or violence, it behooves the court to restore it regardless of its title or ownership. (2 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court 289 [1957 ed.]. In this sense, we find incorrect the procedure adopted by the court a quo wherein, to determine the right to possession, it resorted to an analysis of the evidence regarding its title or ownership, and when it found that the plaintiff failed to establish his ownership it dismissed his complaint. Such finding is not necessary. What is important is to find out who the actual possessor is and if his possession has been disturbed. This the Court of Appeals did, which finding we cannot now look into. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed. Costs against petitioner. Bengzon, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L.. Barrera, Paredes, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur. Concepcion and Dizon, JJ., took no part.

G.R. No. L-20330, 1966 Dec 22, En Banc ADOLFO RACAZA, petitioner, vs. SUSANA REALTY INC., respondent., REGALA, J.: Petitioner is the lessee of a portion of a piece of land located at San Juan St., Pasay City, and owned by respondent corporation. He started renting this

portion of the lot in 1952 when his wife, Evarista P. Racaza, bought an unfinished house that had been built on it. On assurance of respondent that petitioner's family could stay on the land by paying a monthly rent of P15, petitioner finished the construction of the house and he and his family lived in it. On December 16, 1955, however, petitioner was asked to vacate the land because respondent needed it. The demand was followed by the filing on February 10, 1956 of a complaint for ejectment in the Municipal Court of Pasay City. Petitioner and his family remained in the premises as the case was dismissed for failure of respondent to proceed to trial. On December 17, 1957, petitioner received another letter from respondent demanding anew the surrender of the premises. On February 19, 1958, another ejectment suit was filed against him, the complaint alleging that respondent needed the lot "for the purpose of constructing improvements thereon and for other uses," but that despite repeated demands petitioner refused to leave the premises. In his answer, petitioner denied that the lease was on a month-to-month basis and claimed that his understanding with respondent was that he would be allowed to stay on the premises as long as he paid a monthly rent of P15. As counterclaim, petitioner demanded the payment of P12,000 which he said he had spent to finish the construction of his house. After trial, the court ordered petitioner to vacate the premises and pay P15 a month until he had done so, even as it dismissed his counterclaim for lack of merit. Petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance of Pasay, reiterating his counterclaim. He asked for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the municipal court to try it, claiming that the complaint was filed more than one year after the alleged unlawful detainer. 1 According to petitioner, the first complaint for ejectment was dismissed on November 23, 1956, while the complaint in this case was not filed until February 19, 1958. Again, petitioner was ordered evicted; his counterclaim was thrown out for lack of jurisdiction. It was held that petitioner's illegal possession should be deemed

to have started on December 17, 1957, when the second demand to vacate was made on him, because the complaint in this case was not intended to revive the one previously dismissed for lack of prosecution. Since the complaint was filed on February 19, 1958, jurisdiction over the case was properly acquired by the municipal court. At the same time, it was held that the counterclaim was correctly dismissed as the amount of the demand (P12,000) was beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal court to grant. Petitioner asked for a reconsideration and, failing to secure one, appealed to the Court of Appeals. First, he contended that the municipal court did not have jurisdiction because by respondent's own evidence rents had not been paid since July, 1955 and it should be from this date that the one-year period should be counted. Second, petitioner claimed that, instead of dismissing his counter claim, the lower court should have assumed original jurisdiction over it, considering that evidence to support the counterclaim had been allowed without objection from the respondent. After stating that in actions for unlawful detainer, notice to vacate need not be alleged but may merely be shown by evidence, the appellate court ruled that the one-year period should not be counted from July, 1955 because the parties had stipulated that petitioner was up to date in the payment of rents. Neither should it be reckoned from November 23, 1956 2 when the first demand to vacate was made because it was respondent's privilege, as lessor, to waive the right to bring an action based on the first demand. (Zobel vs. Abreu, 98 Phil 343 [1956]) Rather, the starting point should be December 17, 1958 when the second demand to quit was made by respondent because, as held in Cruz vs. Atencio, G. R. No. L11276, February 28, 1959, "Where despite the lessee's failure to pay rent after the first demand, the lessor did not choose to bring an action in court but suffered the lessee to continue occupying the land for nearly two years, after which the lessor made a second demand, the one-year period for bringing the detainer case in the justice of the peace court should be counted not from the day the lessee refused the first demand for payment of rent but from the time the second demand for rents and surrender of possession was not complied with."

On this score, the court overruled petitioner's first assignment of error. But the court found merit in petitioner's other contention that evidence having been admitted without objection from respondent, the Court of First Instance, pursuant to Rule 40, section 11, could take cognizance of the counterclaim in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Citing article 1678 of the Civil Code, the court held that petitioner should be reimbursed one half of what he had spent in building his house. While petitioner claimed that he had spent P12,000 for the improvement of his house, the appellate court found that the fair market value of the house was P7,000 and, on the basis of this amount, awarded P3,500 to petitioner. Still not satisfied, petitioner asked the appellate court to reconsider its decision. When his motion was denied, he appealed to this Court. It is contended that respondent's complaint is defective and did not vest jurisdiction on the municipal court because it does not state the date when the alleged unlawful detainer started so as to afford a basis for determining whether the case was filed within a year from the accrual of the cause of action. In this connection, it is claimed that, according to the evidence, petitioner stopped paying rents in July, 1955 and that it should be from this date that the one-year period should be counted. To begin with, this case was brought not on the theory that petitioner, as lessee, failed to pay rents, but on the theory that the lease had expired and that respondent had asked petitioner to vacate the land. Thus, the complaint states that respondent needs the land but that despite his demands petitioner refused to vacate it. The averment that the lease was on a month-to-month basis is equivalent to an allegation that the lease expired at the end of every month. 3 It is therefore immaterial that rents had not been paid since July, 1955, since what made petitioner liable for ejectment was the expiration of the lease. This being the case, demand to vacate was unnecessary. As this Court explained in Co Tiamco vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 672 (1946), Rule 70, section 2 requires previous demand only when the action is "for failure to pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of his lease." Where the action is to terminate the lease because of the expiration of its term, no such demand is necessary. 4 In the latter case, upon the expiration of the term of the lease, the landlord may go into the

property and occupy it, and if the lessee refuses to vacate the premises, an action for unlawful detainer may immediately be brought against him even before the expiration of the fifteen or five days provided in Rule 70, section 2. Accordingly, upon the expiration of the lease in this case, petitioner became a deforciant unlawfully withholding possession of the property. There was no need for a demand to be served on him, except to negate any inference that respondent, as lessor, had agreed to an extension of the term of the lease under article 1687 of the Civil Code. This brings us to petitioner's next point. As earlier stated, petitioner was twice asked to quit the premises. The first was on December 16, 1955, but as pointed out in the beginning, the complaint filed afterwards was dismissed for non-suit. The second time he was asked to move out was on December 17, 1957, followed by a complaint filed on February 19, 1958. Petitioner insists that respondent's cause of action must be deemed to have accrued on December 16, 1955. But, as already stated, respondent's action is not based on non-payment of rent coupled with a demand; its action is based on the expiration of the term of the lease and the demand made by it to vacate the premises merely evidences its determination not to extend the lease. Moreover, even if the action were based on non-payment of rent, the one-year period should be reckoned from the second notice, on the theory that respondent has the right to waive his action based on the first demand and to let the lessee remain in the premises. Nor is there merit in petitioner's last point that he should have been allowed full reimbursement for what he had spent by applying to this case article 448 of the Civil Code. It is now settled that article 443, in relation to article 546, applies only to possessors in good faith and since lessees, like petitioner, are not possessors in good faith, because they know that their occupation of the premises continues only during the life of the lease, they cannot recover the value of their improvement from the lessor, much less retain the premises until they are reimbursed. Their rights are governed by article 1678 which allows reimbursement of lessees up to one-half of the value of their useful improvements. (Lopez, Inc. vs. Philippine & Eastern Trading Co., 98 Phil. 348 [1956]) The Court of Appeals correctly applied article 1678 to this case.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against petitioner. Concepcion C. J., Reyes, J. B. L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J. P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.