b241184 Appendix Cooper Rev6 Wtoc Wpgno

!
1
I
N

P
R
O

P
E
R

B241184!
COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, Division p

Daniel COOPER,
an individual;
Petitioner/Appellant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Court of Appeal
B241184
Superior Court
YC064994
Lead for additional
consolidated cases
YC065018,
YC065019,
YC065021,
YC065164, and
SC113064
SC113135
SC113136
SC113137
v.

Elia WEINBACH,
an individual;
Defendant/Respondent.

Appeal From a Judgment of
The Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles
The Honorable Robert OBrien

APPELLANTS APPENDIX IN LIEU OF CLERKS TRANSCRIPT
Volume 1 of 2, Pages 1 233 of 445

Kevin M. McCormick
Benton, Orr, Duval and
Buckingham
39 North California Street,
Post Office Box 1178
Ventura, California 93002
Daniel Cooper
1836 10
th
Street #B
Santa Monica, CA 90404
310-562-7668
In Pro Per
AA-1

!
2
I
N

P
R
O

P
E
R

B241184!

AUTHENTICITY OF EXHIBITS
_________________

I, Daniel Cooper, in Pro Per, hereby certify pursuant to the
California Rules of Court, that the exhibits in this Appendix are true
copies of the original documents. They are labeled and consecutively
paginated chronologically with a separate alphabetic index.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of
California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed, at Los
Angeles, California on March 30, 2013.

_______________________________
Daniel Cooper, In Pro Per,

Daniel Cooper
1836 10
th
Street #B
310-562-7668
In Pro Per
AA-2

!
3
I
N

P
R
O

P
E
R

B241184!
APPENDICES
CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX FOR RULE 8.124

DATE APP DESCRIPTION Vol Page
AA-
5/8/2012 A Notice of Appeal (App-002) 1 7
6/5/2012 B Appellants Notice Designating Record
of Appeal (App-003)
1 12
5/25/2012 C Civil Case Information Statement (App-
004)
1 21
8/15/2012 D Certificate of Interested Entities or
Persons, Supplemental (App-008)
1 28
4/18/2012 E Court Order from which Appeal is
taken -- Entry of Judgment
1 31
3/5/2013 F Case Summary (Docket for both
SC113064 and Lead case YC064994)
1 71
6/17/2011 G Civil Complaint against Elia Weinbach
(Including Appendices 1-6);
1 81
6/24/2011 H Recusal of Judge Tarle, Segal and all
West District
1 152
7/7/2011 I Judge Kuhl relates COOPER cases and
assigns to Judge OBrien
1 157
8/15/2011 J Petitioner Response to Request to
Consolidate

1 167
AA-3

!
4
I
N

P
R
O

P
E
R

B241184!
8/30/2011 K Defendant Reply to Opposition to
Motion for Consolidation
1 172
8/31/2011 L Supplemental Response to Request to
Consolidate
1 182
8/31/2011 M Ettlin Joinder of Hearing and Opposition
to Consolidation
1 193
9/12/2011 N Court Orders of Consolidation 1 214
8/25/2011 O Request for Recusal under CCP
170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii)
1 224
8/25/2011 P Court Order Striking Statement of
Disqualification
1 230
9/6/2011 Q Writ of Mandate for Recusal of Judge
Robert OBrien (Excluding duplicated
Appendices 4[part], 5, 7, 8, 9)
2 235
8/1/2011 R Demurrer by Defendant (without 300
pages of case citations)
2 329
8/10/2011 S Motion To Strike Demurrer
(Ruling 9-7-2011)
2 348
8/16/2011 T Plaintiffs Answer to Demurrer
(Appendix omitted, duplicated above)
2 356
10/6/2011 U Motion For Change Of Venue For
Consolidated Cases (Excluding
duplicated Appendices 4, 6, 7, 9)
2 373

AA-4

!
5
I
N

P
R
O

P
E
R

B241184!
APPENDICES
ALPHABETIC INDEX FOR RULE 8.124

DATE APP DESCRIPTION Vol Page
AA-
6/5/2012 B Appellants Notice Designating Record
of Appeal (App-003)
1 12
3/5/2013 F Case Summary (Docket for both
SC113064 and Lead case YC064994)
1 71
8/15/2012 D Certificate of Interested Entities or
Persons, Supplemental (App-008)
1 28
5/25/2012 C Civil Case Information Statement (App-
004)
1 21
6/17/2011 G Civil Complaint against Elia Weinbach
(Including Appendices 1-6);
1 81
4/18/2012 E Court Order from which Appeal is
taken -- Entry of Judgment
1 31
8/25/2011 P Court Order Striking Statement of
Disqualification
1 230
9/12/2011 N Court Orders of Consolidation 1 214
8/30/2011 K Defendant Reply to Opposition to
Motion for Consolidation
1 172
8/1/2011 R Demurrer by Defendant (without 300
pages of case citations)
2 329
8/31/2011 M Ettlin Joinder of Hearing and Opposition
to Consolidation
1 193
AA-5

!
6
I
N

P
R
O

P
E
R

B241184!
7/7/2011 I Judge Kuhl relates COOPER cases and
assigns to Judge OBrien
1 157
10/6/2011 U Motion For Change Of Venue For
Consolidated Cases (Excluding
duplicated Appendices 4, 6, 7, 9)
2 373
8/10/2011 S Motion To Strike Demurrer
(Ruling 9-7-2011)
2 348
5/8/2012 A Notice of Appeal (App-002) 1 7
8/15/2011 J Petitioner Response to Request to
Consolidate

1 167
8/16/2011 T Plaintiffs Answer to Demurrer
(Appendix omitted, duplicated above)
2 356
6/24/2011 H Recusal of Judge Tarle, Segal and all
West District
1 152
8/25/2011 O Request for Recusal under CCP
170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii)
1 224
8/31/2011 L Supplemental Response to Request to
Consolidate
1 182
9/6/2011 Q Writ of Mandate for Recusal of Judge
Robert OBrien (Excluding duplicated
Appendices 4[part], 5, 7, 8, 9)
2 235

!
AA-6
APPENDIX
!
A!
!
!
!
!
APPENDIX
A

AA-7
AA-8
AA-9
AA-10
AA-11
APPENDIX
!
B!

APPENDIX
B

AA-12
AA-13
AA-14
AA-15
AA-16
AA-17
AA-18
AA-19
AA-20
APPENDIX
!
C!

APPENDIX
C
!
! !
AA-21
AA-22
AA-23
AA-24
AA-25
AA-26
AA-27
APPENDIX
!
D!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
APPENDIX
D

AA-28
AA-29
!
!
(6)!MADELEINE FLIER received payments, failed to recuse, at risk
!
(7) LAURENCE D. RUBIN received payments, failed to recuse, at risk

(8) VICTORIA GERRARD CHANEY received payments, failed to recuse, at risk

(9) ROBERT M. MALLANO received payments, failed to recuse, at risk

!
AA-30
ATTACHMENT 2
(SECOND PAGE OF
APP-008)
APPENDIX
!
E!

APPENDIX
E

AA-31
AA-32
AA-33
AA-34
AA-35
AA-36
AA-37
AA-38
AA-39
AA-40
AA-41
AA-42
AA-43
AA-44
AA-45
AA-46
AA-47
AA-48
AA-49
AA-50
AA-51
AA-52
AA-53
AA-54
AA-55
AA-56
AA-57
AA-58
AA-59
AA-60
AA-61
AA-62
AA-63
AA-64
AA-65
AA-66
AA-67
AA-68
AA-69
AA-70
APPENDIX
!
F!

APPENDIX
F
!
! !
AA-71
3/5/13 10:31 AM LASC - Case Summary
Page 1 of 3 http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org/civilcasesummarynet/ui/casesummary.aspx?CT=CI
General Information
Online Services
Tools for Litigators
Complex Court
Get Help
Civil Forms
Civil Fees
Civil Locations
Court Rules

Home Juror Services About the Court Locations Search
You Are In: Home > Civil > Online Services > Case Summary > Search Results
Case Summary
Please make a note of the Case Number.
Click here to access document images for this case.
If this link fails, you may go to the Case Document Images site and search using the case number displayed on this page.
Case Number: SC113064
DANIEL COOPER VS. ELIA WEINBACH
Filing Date: 06/17/2011
Case Type: Civil Rights (General Jurisdiction)
Status: Cons with Lead Case (see X-Ref) 09/12/2011
Consolidated for all Proceedings: YC064994 on 09/12/2011
Future Hearings
None
Documents Filed | Proceeding Information
Parties
ASHMANN-GERST JUDITH M. - Defendant
COOPER DANIEL - Plaintiff & Plaintiff In Pro Per
COOPER DANIEL - Plaintiff
LEVANAS MICHAEL I. HON. - Defendant
MCCORMICK KEVIN M. ESQ. - Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
TODD KATHRYN DOI - Defendant
WEINBACH ELIA - Defendant
WEINBACH ELLA HON. - Defendant
Case Information | Party Information | Proceeding Information
If this link fails, you may go to the Case Document Images site and search using the case number displayed on this page.
Documents Filed (Filing dates listed in descending order)
09/12/2011 Order (RE: MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATING MATTERS FILED BY DEFENDANT LEVANAS (SC 113137) )
Filed by Court
09/08/2011 Notice of Ruling (RE MOTION TO STRIKE DEMURRER AND VACATE ORDER RELATING CASE BY
PLAINTIFF )
Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
09/02/2011 Notice of Ruling (RE MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE BY DENT. LEVANAS JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
PRINT
AA-72
SC113064 prior
to Consolidation

09/02/2011 Notice of Ruling (RE MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE BY DENT. LEVANAS JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF CAL., COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; )
08/31/2011 Response (TO MOTION REQUESTING CONSOLIDATION OF CASES (SUPPLEMENTAL); )
Filed by Plaintiff & Plaintiff In Pro Per
08/31/2011 Joinder in Opposition (TO MOTION REQUESTING CONSOLIDATION OF CASES; (EMERGENCY) )
08/30/2011 Reply to Opposition (TO MTION FOR AN ORDER CONSOLIDATING MATTERS; )
08/30/2011 Miscellaneous-Other (APPENDIX OF FEDERAL AUTHORITIES; )
08/30/2011 1N11's Ntc of Hrng on Demurrer (AND DEMURRER BY DENT. JUDITH M. ASHMANN-GERST, JUSTICE OF
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CAL. SECOND APPELLATE DIST. TO PLNT. IN PRO PER, D. COOPER'S COMPLAINT
(NO.SC 113136);)
08/25/2011 Notice of Ruling (RE DEMURRER OF DENT. MICHAEL I. LEVANAS; )
08/25/2011 1N11's Ntc of Hrng on Demurrer (AND DEMURRER BY DENT. KATHRYN DOI TODD, JUSTICE OF THE
COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT TO PLNT. IN PRO PER DANIEL COOPER'S
COMPLAINT CASE NO. SC113135 AND AUTHORITIES IN)
08/25/2011 Notice of Ruling (RE DEMURRER OF DENT. ELIA WEINBACH; )
08/25/2011 Notice of Ruling (RE MOT. TO CONSOLIDATE BY DENT., MICHAEL I. LEVANES; )
08/22/2011 Miscellaneous-Other (MEDIA REQUEST; [FILED BY LESLIC C. DUTTON, EXECUTIVE PRODUCER-FULL
DISCLOSURE NETWORK] )
Filed by Interested Party
08/22/2011 Order (ON MEDIA REQUEST TO PERMIT COVERAGE; [DENIED] )
08/16/2011 Miscellaneous-Other (ANSWER TO DEMURRER BY DEFENDANTS WEINBACH AND LEVANAS )
08/01/2011 1N11's Ntc of Hrng on Demurrer (TO PLNTS. IN PRO PER D. COOPER'S COMPLAINT; )
07/29/2011 Notice of Motion (AND MOT. FOR ORDER CONSOLIDATING MATTERS; (2 OF 2) (RECEIPT # CCH11878208
5) )
07/29/2011 Notice of Motion (AND MOT. FOR ORDER CONSOLIDATING MATTERS; (1 OF 2) RECEIT # CCH11878208
4) )
07/25/2011 1N11's Ntc of Hrng on Demurrer (AND DEMURRER MICHAEL I. LEVANAS, JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES TO PLNT. IN PRO PER, D. COOPER'S COMPLAINT (CASE NO.
SC113137);)
06/17/2011 Complaint Filed
06/17/2011 Order-Court Fee Waiver (AS TO PLFF DANIEL COOPER )
06/17/2011 Request-Waive Court Fees
06/17/2011 Complaint
AA-73

Community Outreach Volunteers, Interns & Externs Employment
2009 Information Systems and Technology Bureau
Case Information | Party Information | Documents Filed
Proceedings Held (Proceeding dates listed in descending order)
09/12/2011 at 01:51 pm in Department 59, Robert H. O'Brien, Presiding
Court Order - Completed
08/25/2011 at 08:30 am in Department 59, Robert H. O'Brien, Presiding
DEMURRER - Case Taken Under Submission
07/07/2011 in Department 1, Carolyn B. Kuhl, Presiding
Order Re: Related Cases - Transferred to Department One
Case Information | Party Information | Documents Filed | Proceeding Information
AA-74
6/1/12 11:22 AM Los Angeles Superior Court - Civil Case Summary
Page 1 of 6 http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org/civilCaseSummary/casesummary.asp?Referer=index

Case Summary
If this link fails, you may go to the Case Document Images site and search using the
case number displayed on this page.
Case Number: YC064994
DENNIS ETTLIN VS. GLENDA VEASEY
Case Type: Civil Rights (General Jurisdiction)
Status: Other Judgment 04/18/2012
Future Hearings
None
Parties
ASHMANN-GERST JUDITH M. - Defendant
ETTLIN DENNIS - Plaintiff & Plaintiff In Pro Per
ETTLIN DENNIS - Plaintiff, & Plaintiff in Pro Per
MCCORMICK KEVIN M. ESQ. - Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
SLAWSON JOHN - Defendant
TAYLOR KENNETH - Defendant
TODD KATHRYN DOI - Defendant
VEASEY GLENDA - Defendant
WEINBACH ELIA - Defendant
If this link fails, you may go to the Case Document Images site and search using the
case number displayed on this page.
Click on any of the below link(s) to see documents filed on or before the date
indicated:
08/05/2011
AA-75
Consolidated under
YC064994
05/09/2012 Notice (NTC TO ATTY RE NTC OF APPEAL )
Filed by Clerk
05/08/2012 Notice of Appeal (filed by: Daniel Cooper, appellant in pro per )
Filed by Appellant
05/08/2012 Request-Waive Court Fees (filed by: Daniel Cooper, appellant in pro per
)
Filed by Appellant
05/08/2012 Notice of Appeal (Dennis Ettlin )
Filed by Appellant
05/08/2012 Request-Waive Court Fees (Dennis Ettlin )
Filed by Appellant
04/18/2012 Judgment (ON ORDER SUSTAINING DEMURRER WITHOUT LEAVE TO
AMEND IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT GLENDA VEASEY, COMMISSIONER OF THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)
Filed by Court
04/18/2012 Judgment (ON ORDER SUSTAINING DEMURRER WITHOUT LEAVE TO
AMEND IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT ELIA WEINBACH, COMMISSIONER OF THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)
Filed by Court
03/20/2012 Judgment (IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT KATHRYN DOI TODD )
03/20/2012 Memorandum of Costs ($395.00 COST ARE ENTERED 4-12-12 MEMO
SCAN UNIT NO FILE//ORIGINAL JUDGMENT TO DEPT FILED ON BEHALF OF KATHRYN
DOI TODD)
SCAN UNIT NO FILE/ORIGINAL JUDGMENT TO DEPT. FILED ON BEHALF OF THE HON.
MICHAEL I. LEVANAS)
SCAN UNIT NO FILE/ORIGINAL JUDGMENT TO DEPT. FILED ON BEHALF OF JUDITH M.
ASHMANN-GERST)
SCAN UNIT NO FILE/ORIGINAL JUDGMENT TO DEPT. FILED ON BEHALF OF KENNETH
TAYLOR )
SCAN UNIT NO FILE/ORIGINAL JUDGMENT TO DEPT. FILED ON BEHALF OF JOHN
SLAWSON )
SCAN UNIT NO FILE/ORIGINAL JUDGMENT TO DEPT. FILED ON BEHALF OF SANDY R.
AA-76
KRIEGLER)
SCAN UNIT NO FILE/ORIGINAL JUDGMENT TO DEPT. FILED ON BEHALF OF THE HON.
CAROLYN KUHL)
03/20/2012 Judgment (IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT SANDY R. KRIEGLER )
03/20/2012 Judgment (IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT THE HON. CAROLYN KUHL )
03/20/2012 Judgment (IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT JOHN SLAWSON )
03/20/2012 Judgment (IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT KENNETH TAYLOR )
03/20/2012 Judgment (IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT JUDITH M. ASHMANN-GERST )
03/20/2012 Judgment (IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT THE HON. MICHAEL I. LEVANAS )
03/12/2012 Notice (OF VOID ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS BY JUDGE O'BRIEN BASED
UPON HIS FRAUD ON THE COURT FOR NOT DISCLOSING ILLEGAL PAYMENTS FROM
LOS ANGELES COUNTY )
03/08/2012 Objection (TO BASIS FOR FEE AND PROPOSED JUDGMENT AFTER
ORDER )
11/14/2011 Notice of Ruling
10/27/2011 Opposition Document (TO MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE FOR
CONSOLIDATED CASES; )
10/12/2011 Order (RE: DEMURRERS IN CASES YC064994, YC065018, YC065021,
YC065019, YC065164 )
Filed by Court
10/12/2011 Order (RE: DEMURRERS IN CASES SC113064, SC113135, SC113136,
SC113137 )
Filed by Court
10/06/2011 Miscellaneous-Other (ANSWER TO DEMURRER BY DENTS. DOI-TODD
(SC113135) AND ASHMANN- GERTS (SC113136) RENEWED DEMAND O FOR JUDGES
WHO NEVER RECIEVED COUNTY "JUDICIAL BENEFITS"; )
AA-77
10/06/2011 Notice of Motion (AND MOT. FOR CHANGE OF VENUE FOR
CONSOLIDATED CASES: )
10/03/2011 Proof of Serv of Ntc by Mail (RE: MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE,
YC046994 AND CONSOLIDATED CASES; )
10/03/2011 Proof of Serv of Ntc by Mail (FOR RENEWED MOTION TO STRIKE
DEMURRER, YC064994 AND CONSOLIDATED CASES, )
09/29/2011 Opposition Document (TO MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE; )
09/29/2011 Opposition Document (TO MOTION TO STRIKE DEMURRER; )
09/26/2011 Reply to Opposition (TO DEMURRER BY DENT. THE HON. GLENDA
VEASEY, COMMISSIONER TO PLNT. IN PRO PER, DENNIS ETTLIN'S COMPLAINT; )
09/26/2011 Motion to Strike (ON DEMURRER )
09/26/2011 Notice of Motion (MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE FOR
CONSOLIDATED CASES; )
09/16/2011 Answer (TO DEMURRER BY DEFENDANT VASELY, ET AL; )
09/16/2011 Notice of Ruling (RE MOTION TO STRIKE DEMURRER AND VACTE ORDE
RELATING CASE BY PLNT. IN PRO PER, DENNIS ETTLIN; )
08/30/2011 1N11's Ntc of Hrng on Demurrer (TO PLNTS. COMPLAINT; )
08/30/2011 1N11's Ntc of Hrng on Demurrer (TO PLNT. IN PRO PER D. ETTLIN'S
COMPLAINT; )
08/25/2011 1N11's Ntc of Hrng on Demurrer
08/10/2011 Proof-Service/Summons (PARTY SERVED: GLENDA VEASEY; )
08/08/2011 Request (MEDIA REQUEST FILED BY FULL DISCLOSURE NETWORK )
AA-78
08/08/2011 Order (ON MEDIA REQUEST TO PERMIT COVERAGE ** DENIED ** )
indicated:
TOP 08/05/2011
08/05/2011 Motion to Strike (DEMURRER filed under case number SC11064 BY
KEVIN M. McCOMICK AND BENTON, ORR, DUVAL,AND BUCKINGHAM; )
08/05/2011 Summons Filed
Filed by Attorney for Plaintiff/Petitioner
08/05/2011 Motion (TO VACATE JUDGE KUHL'S ORDER RELATING CASES
YC064994, YC065018, YC065019, and YC065021 RENEWED DEMAND; )
08/03/2011 Order (STRIKING STATEMENT OF DISQUALIFICATION )
Filed by Court
08/01/2011 Request (FOR RECUSAL UNDER CCP SECTION 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii)
BASED ON BIAS DUE TO L.A. COUNTY JUDICIAL BENEFIT BRIBES & OBJECTION
UNDER CCP 170.3(c)(1) TO REFUSAL TO RECUSE)
08/01/2011 Order-Court Fee Waiver After Hrg (ON COURT FEE WAIVER )
Filed by Court
07/22/2011 Request for Judicial Notice
06/16/2011 Complaint
06/16/2011 Complaint Filed
06/16/2011 Notice-Case Management Conference (DATE: 11-23-11 )
Filed by Clerk
06/16/2011 Request-Waive Court Fees
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner
indicated:
TOP 08/05/2011
Notice of Entry of Judgment mailed - Completed
AA-79
11/23/2011 at 08:30 am in Department SW11, William G. Willett, Presiding
Conference-Case Management (O/C - CASE TRANSFERRED TO CENTRALDISTRICT,
PER 6/20/11 ORDER OFTHE SUPERVISING JUDGE) - Matter Placed Off Calendar
Ruling on Submitted Matter - Completed
MOTION - CHANGE OF VENUE (FOR CONSOLIDATED CASES;) - Submitted
Ruling on Submitted Matter - Completed
Nunc Pro Tunc Order - Completed
DEMURRER (C/F 10/03/11) - Submitted
DEMURRER (BY DENT. JOHN SLAWSON;DEMURRER BY DENT. KENNETH
TAYLOR;DEMURRER BY DENT. GLENDA VEASEY;MOTION TO STRIKE;) - Court makes
order
Motion to Vacate (AND MOTION TO STRIKE DEMURRER;) - Court makes order
Hrng/Appl for Fees and Costs - Granted in Part
07/06/2011 at 09:00 am in Department 1, Carolyn Kuhl, Presiding
Order Re: Related Cases - Case is reassigned
06/20/2011 at 08:30 am in Department G, Mark S. Arnold, Presiding
Recusal (RECUSAL OF ALL SOUTHWEST DISTRICTJUDGES) - Case is reassigned
06/17/2011 at 08:30 am in Department SW11, William G. Willett, Presiding
Recusal (RECUSAL OF JUDGE WILLETT G.WILLETT) - Case is reassigned
AA-80
APPENDIX
!
G!
!
!
APPENDIX
G

AA-81
AA-82
AA-83

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

CIVIL COMPLAINT AGAINST ELIA WEINBACH 2
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 4
PARTIES ..................................................................................................................... 4
JURISDICTION ........................................................................................................... 4
ASSIGNMENT AND VENUE ...................................................................................... 4
GENERAL ALLEGATION ........................................................................................... 5
TITLE IV-D BIAS ......................................................................................................... 6
SBX2 11 ...................................................................................................................... 9
FRAUD ON THE COURT .......................................................................................... 12
JUDICIAL ETHICS .................................................................................................... 15
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS, OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE ................................ 16
VIOLATION OF INTANGIBLE RIGHT TO HONEST SERVICES ......................... 16
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION ...................................................................................... 20
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION ................................................................................. 23
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION ..................................................................................... 24
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION ................................................................................. 25
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION ...................................................................................... 29
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION ............................................................................... 30
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL ON ALL COUNTS ..................................................... 31
PRAYER FOR RELIEF ............................................................................................. 32
!
APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1 Documentation of payments to Elia WEINBACH ................................... A1
APPENDIX 2 Child Support Services Department Budget ......................................... A4
APPENDIX 3 Title IV-D Child Support Program Duties ............................................. A10
APPENDIX 4 Trial Court Operations Budget Summary ............................................ A17
APPENDIX 5 Text of SBX2 11 .................................................................................... A22
APPENDIX 6 Litigation Cost Manager Report, Public Summary .............................. A26

AA-84

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

Table of Authorities
Cases Page
Austin v. Smith,
312 F2nd. 337,343 (1962) ........................................................................................... 14
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc.,
566 U.S. ___ (2009) .................................................................................................... 17
Carlson v. Eassa
54 CA4th 684,691, 62 CR2d 884, 888 (1997); ............................................................ 14
Carr v. Kamins
151 CA4th 929, 933-934, 60 CR3d 196, 199 (2007) ................................................... 14
Elliott v. Lessee of Piersol,
26 U. S. (1 Pet.) 328, 340 (1828) ................................................................................. 13
In Re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ............................................................................................. 15
Offutt v. United States,
348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) ................................................................................................. 16
Old Wayne Mut. Life Assn v. McDonough,
204 U.S. 8, 27 Sup.Ct. 236 .......................................................................................... 13
Residents for Adequate Water v. Redwood Valley County Water Dist.
34 CA4th 1801, 1805, 41 CR2d 123, 125 (1995) ........................................................ 14
Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles,
167 Cal.App.4th 630, 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 242 (2008) ...................... 9, 10, 11, 16, 17, 19, 31
Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles
___Cal App.4th___(4th Dist.,Div. 1) (2010) ......................................... 10, 11, 16, 19, 31
U.S. v. Throckmorton,
98 U.S. 61 (1878) ......................................................................................................... 13
Vallely v. Northern Fire and Marine Co.,
254 U.S. 348 (1920) ..................................................................................................... 13
Wells,
Res Adjudicata, Section 499 ........................................................................................ 13

Statutes
California Code of Civil Procedure ____ ............................................ 14, 15, 17, 19, 34
1997 Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act ........................................................ 9, 16
U.S. Code Title 42, Chapter 7, Subchapter IV, Part D, Section 654 ................................ 6
U.S. Code Title 42, Chapter 7, Subchapter IV, Part D, Section 655 ............................ 7, 8
U.S. Code Title 42, Chapter 7, Subchapter IV, Part D, Section 658a .......................... 7, 8
U.S. Code Title 42, Chapter 7, Subchapter IV, Part D, Section 666 ................................ 7

Other Authorities
California Senate Bill SBX2-11 ...................................................................... 9-14, 16, 20
California Code of Judicial Ethics ...................................................................... 15, 19, 30

Constitutional Provisions
California Constitution, Article I, Sec. 1 ................................................................... 19, 20
California Constitution, Article I, Sec. 15 ....................................................................... 20
California Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 19 ................................................................. 9, 16

AA-85

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

INTRODUCTION
1. This action arises from the divorce proceedings for Daniel Cooper and Maeve
Crommie. The presiding bench officers received bribes from L.A. County, did not
disclose such, committed fraud upon the court, and still presided over the case.
Plaintiff is suing for damages and for violations of his civil rights pursuant to 42
U.S.C. Section 1983.

PARTIES
2. Plaintiff, Daniel Cooper (COOPER), was at relevant times mentioned a resident
of the County of Los Angeles, State of California.
3. Plaintiffs now ex-spouse, Maeve Crommie (CROMMIE) was formerly known as
Maeve Cooper.
4. Defendant, Elia Weinbach (WEINBACH), is employed by the State of California
as a Superior Court Judge, for the County of Los Angeles. WEINBACH has held
that position since at least November 2007.

JURISDICTION
5. Plaintiff sues for violation of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

ASSIGNMENT AND VENUE
6. The acts and omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs claims occurred in Los Angeles
County, California and therefore the appropriate venue for this action is Superior
Court of California, Los Angeles County. Plaintiff seeks a jury trial with a judge
who has not received judicial benefits and has no experience with Family Law,
Title IV-D or Los Angeles County Domestic Violence programs.

AA-86

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

GENERAL ALLEGATION

7. At the time the family law case, SD026673, was filed in Superior Court in 2008
and throughout the proceedings, Plaintiff was not aware that Judge WEINBACH
was receiving payments from L.A. County. At no time from the commencement of
the filing of the case through the present did Judge WEINBACH disclose that he
was receiving payments from L.A. County. At no time did he disclose the
appearance of, or the actual bias due to the L. A. County payments to him and
the L.A. County Child Support Services Department (CSSD) receipt of Title IV-D
funds from the federal and state governments based upon a percentage of the
disbursements ordered by the L.A. County judges plus an incentive for collections
above an annual floor. At no time did he disclose this partnership with the
CSSD. On January 20, 2011 Defendant denied any bias or prejudice. Defendant
obstructed justice by refusing to acknowledge the appearance of bribery and
obstructed justice by refusing to recuse himself.
8. Plaintiffs January 20, 2011 motion and the January 28, 2011 Writ of Mandate
seeking to void Defendants orders identified and clarified the nature of the bias
introduced by the illegal payments. The linkage of federal Title IV-D funding to the
county budgets and the L.A. County Child Support Services Department (CSSD)
partnership with Judges is sufficient evidence of real and probable judicial bias
against Plaintiff, purchased by the countys illegal payments. This linkage is also
documented here in succeeding paragraphs.
9. Plaintiff seeks damages for the loss of his constitutional rights, for obstruction of
justice, for damage to his livelihood and for emotional distress of not seeing his
children.

AA-87

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

TITLE IV-D BIAS

10. Family Law cases involve a large potential liability for the county. Federal funding
of the Title IV-D programs covers many of the potential county costs but only if the
state and county comply with federal guidelines.
11. L.A. County is an interested party in every divorce case because it receives Title
IV-D money based upon the expenses of its Child Support Services Department
with a Floor payment plus an incentive.
12. U.S. Code Title 42, Chapter 7, Subchapter IV, Part D, Section 654 states in
relevant part:
A state plan for child and spousal support must
(1) Provide that it shall be in effect in all political subdivisions [counties]
of the state;
**********
(4) provide that the state will --
(a) Provide services relative to ....the establishment, modification, or
enforcement of child support obligations...
(b) Enforce any support obligation established with respect to --
(1) A child with respect to whom the state provides services under the
plan; or
(2) the custodial parent of such child.
*******
(7) Provide for entering into cooperative arrangements with appropriate
courts and law enforcement officials...
(a) To assist the agency administering the plan, including the
entering into of financial arrangements with such courts and
officials in order to assure optimum results under such program,
and
AA-88

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

(b) with respect to any other matters of common concern to such courts
or officials and the agency administering such plan
*********
(13) Provide that the state will comply with such other requirements and
standards as the secretary determines to be necessary to the
establishment of an effective program for locating noncustodial parents,
establish paternity, obtaining support orders and collecting support.
13. Title 42, Chapter 7, Subchapter IV, Part D, Section 655 sets forth the payments to
the states and shows the amount of payments to the states.
14. Title 42, Chapter 7, Subchapter IV, Part D, Section 658a provides for incentive
payments to the states.
15. Title 42, Chapter 7, Subchapter IV, Part D, Section 666 requires the states to
have statutorily prescribed procedures to improve the effectiveness of child
support enforcement.
16. A true and correct copy of the Fiscal Year 2005-2006 L.A. County Budget for
Child Support Services Department pages 59-62 is included in the Appendix 2
and is incorporated herein as if set forth in full. Such document shows the Child
Support Services Department establishes, modifies, and enforces financial and
medical support obligations for children, enforces existing spousal support orders
... as required under federal and state law (page 59). The Child Support Services
Department received federal and state Title IV-D funding fiscal years 2003-2006
(pages 61-62).
17. Appendix 3, Guidelines Section 2 makes it clear that support orders must be
issued. (The callous disregard for paternity is an affront to, and blatant disregard
to, the constitutional rights of a man receiving such a support order).
18. The L.A. County budget for the fiscal year 2005-2006 shows that the L.A. County
Child Support Services Department received $103,083,000 Federal Tittle IV-D
and $72,487,000 State Title IV-D for fiscal year 2003-2004; $125,545,000 Federal
AA-89

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

Tittle IV-D and $63,674,000 State Title IV-D budgeted for fiscal year 2004-2005,
and $124,578,000 Federal Tittle IV-D and $62,475,000 State Title IV-D proposed
for fiscal year 2005-2006. The budget shows that the Child Support Services
Department has the Superior Court as a collaborative partner and that it
establishes, modifies, and enforces financial and medical support obligations for
children, enforces existing spousal support orders and determines parentage for
children as required under Federal and state law. Among the services it provides
are establishing parentage and child support orders, modify court orders and
enforce support obligations amongst others.
19. The L.A. County payments to the L.A. Superior Court judges influences the
judges to order higher support awards from noncustodial parents and establish
mechanisms to require/enforce the ordering of higher support awards from
noncustodial parents to enable L.A. County to receive greater monies under Title
IV-D from the Federal and state governments to operate their Child Support
Services Departments and foster care departments. The higher awards by the
judges are made possible because there is no downside for the county. The
higher awards reduce the likelihood that children and supported spouses will seek
indigent aid from the county. The higher awards also increase the need and
likelihood for enforcement. The punitive enforcement mechanisms and excessive
interest rate increase the CSSD operations budget. Title IV-D sections 655 and
658 pay a percentage of the expenses related to support orders as well as
incentives, related to a floor payment for a fiscal year.
20. Page 61 of the 2005-2006 L.A. County budget shows that the Title IV-D federal
and state payments to L.A. County literally paid for the entire budget of Child
Support Services Department for the fiscal years 2004-2006.
21. The L.A. County Payments are bribes as they influence Judges to award
unequal custody and thus by CSSD guidelines establish higher custody payments
from noncustodial parents. The L.A. County Child Support Services Department
AA-90

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

establishes financial .... support obligations for children... as required under
federal and state law and works as a collaborative Partner with the Superior
Court. The payment of money by L.A. County, to the judge who rules on the
amount of child support (which taken in the aggregate) directly determines the
expenses of the L.A. County Child Support Services Department. The amount of
those expenses then directly determines the amount of money that the L.A.
County Child Support Services Department receives in Title IV-D federal and
state funds.
22. The higher the number and monetary amount of support orders against non-
custodial parents, the higher the expenses of the L.A. County Child Support
Services Department, the higher the amount of Title IV-D federal and state
funding. L.A. County has a direct interest in the judge setting the greatest number
and the highest monetary child support orders. L.A. County is a real party in
interest in every divorce case as it reaps a financial benefit.
23. The payments by L.A. County to the judge in a divorce case have no purpose
other than to influence the judges decision to create a non-custodial parent and
high child support order, thus protecting the county interests.

SBX2 11

24. In mid-2010, COOPER became aware of the decision of Sturgeon v. County of
Los Angeles, 167 Cal.App.4th 630 (2008) Rev. denied 12/23/08, which held that
the L.A. County payments to L.A. Superior Court judges violated Article VI,
Section 19 of the California Constitution and that the 1997 Lockyer-Isenberg Trial
Court Funding Act did not prescribe the payments of judicial benefits by
counties to Superior Court judges.
25. In December 2010 COOPER sent a letter to Greg Iverson, Countywide Payroll
Division Chief, Los Angeles County Auditor Controller requesting information on
AA-91

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

judicial benefits that might have been paid to the judges in his case. Appendix 1
contains the correspondence with the county and the auditors information.
26. Subsequent to the Sturgeon decision, on 2/20/09, SBX2 11 was passed by the
California legislature and acknowledged the unconstitutional and illegal nature of
the L.A. County payments by granting retroactive immunity. The full text of SBX2
11 is included in Appendix 5. Section 5 of SBX2 11 limited the immunity to any
liability or be subject to prosecution or disciplinary action because of benefits
provided to a judge effective 5/21/09.
27. This ex post facto immunity did not and could not restore Plaintiffs California
Constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection lost during the
proceedings of Plaintiffs family law case SD026673 under Judge WEINBACH.
28. The Fourth Appellate Courts decision in Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles,
__Cal App.4th___(4th Dist.,Div. 1) (2010), the so-called Sturgeon II concluded
on page 14:
As the parties have recognized, SBX 211 both preserved the status quo
ante Sturgeon I and commenced a process by which the Legislature looks to
adoption of a comprehensive judicial compensation scheme. As we have
explained, this response to Sturgeon I meets the requirements of the
Constitution and is wholly sensible under the circumstances. The Legislature
is uniquely competent to deal with the complex policy problem of establishing
a judicial compensation scheme which both assures recruitment and retention
of fully qualified judicial officers throughout the state while at the same time
providing equity between judges in different parts of the state. By the same
token our role in ensuring that the more general requirements of the
Constitution have been met is, under our system of separate
governmental powers, quite limited. (emphasis added)
29. The Appellate Court continues and contradicts itself on page 15;
However, on its face SBX 211 is not a permanent response to the
constitutional issues we identified in Sturgeon I [and] that interim remedy
[SBX2 11], if not supplanted by the more comprehensive response SBX 211
plainly contemplates, most likely will give rise to further challenges by
taxpayers or members of the bench themselves. As we noted at the outset,
the issue of judicial compensation is a state, not a county, responsibility.
AA-92

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

(emphasis added)
30. If SBX2 11 meets the requirements of the constitution as stated by the court, why
would taxpayers challenge it? Clearly the Appellate Court feels quite limited in
ensuring the Constitution is met and is not willing to fully address this issue.
31. The Sturgeon case and SBX2 11 only address the county judicial benefit
payments. This civil action is undertaken, in part, as one of the citizen challenges
encouraged by Sturgeon II and, more importantly, to address the issue of bias,
the non-disclosure of the payments, and the resulting fraud on the court that
Sturgeon does not address.
32. Since Sturgeon I and Sturgeon II both affirm that judicial payments are not a
county responsibility, since the county is allowed (under SBX2 11) to terminate all
payments and since the county is clearly an interested party in all divorce cases;
therefore the furtherance and continued payments must be in the county
interests. Those county interests are the Title-IV-D incentives and
reimbursements. Those county interests are the basis for judicial recusal and void
orders in divorce cases.
33. SBX2 11 stated that the judicial benefits are not state payments. SBX2 11
deemed prior payments as criminal and in need of criminal immunity. The bill
granted immunity for monies received prior to July 2009.
34. The Judicial Council and the Legislature did not consider the injury and damage
to those who appeared before the judges or the injury by those prosecuted due to
void orders, or to the denial of civil rights by the California Attorney General due to
his cancellation of an investigation into this matter. Thus, there is no immunity
from fraud on the court or civil rights violations. (The state also has an incentive
to encourage Title-IV-D incentives and reimbursements because whatever
general welfare responsibilities the counties do not pick up, could easily be shifted
to the state. Plus the state is the conduit by which the Title IV-D is implemented
and the judges will be liable to bias based on state compensation payments to
AA-93

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

them as well. If the Federal government wants to pass out money it can. As soon
as that money is administered by the courts, that money must meet all federal,
state and local legal and constitutional tests.)
35. Since the Appellate Court admitted that it did not fully address all the
Constitutional issues, the same payments, which received immunity prior to July
2009, no longer have criminal immunity. Defendant is also now liable for criminal
charges for the bribes taken in 2010 and 2011.
36. Los Angeles County is not a sovereign entity and therefore its actual payments to
a judge are no different than payments (hypothetically) by Plaintiff. Both are
bribes. SBX2 11 granted criminal immunity for the bribes prior to May 2009. The
Appellate court in 2010 affirmed the county payments are optional. Thus they still
constitute a bribe and are illegal.

FRAUD ON THE COURT

37. Los Angeles County is the largest user of the Superior Court of California, County
of Los Angeles services. There are approximately, 2.7 million new cases each
year: about 1.7 million traffic tickets, 500,000 criminal cases, 120,000 family law
cases, and 150,000 civil lawsuits. The Office of the County Counsel provides
quarterly reports to the supervisors on the projected costs to the county from on-
going litigation. This report is confidential and thus protects strategic and tactical
planning discussions from being exposed to the public. Appendix 6 contains the
2007 -2008 report signed by the Litigation Cost Manager.
38. Since L.A. County is an interested party in divorce cases and since the judges
receive illegal payments, bribes, from the county, the judges must at a minimum
inform parties that they are receiving such payments. Failure to do so is FRAUD
ON THE COURT.
AA-94

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

39. Defendants acceptance of the L.A. County bribes and his sitting on a case in
which L.A. County was an interested party voided all his orders and judgments.
Senate Bill SBX2 11 gave retroactive immunity because of benefits provided to a
judge under the official action of a governmental entity. Senate bill SBX2 11 did
not give retroactive immunity to judges who had received the county payments,
did not disclose such and then presided over cases in which the county had an
interest.
40. Extrinsic fraud is a basis for setting aside an earlier judgment. The U.S. Supreme
Court stated in U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878):
There is no question of the general doctrine that fraud vitiates the solemn
contracts, documents and even judgments
The Court continued at page 66:
Fraud vitiates everything, and a judgment equally with a contract...
(citing Wells, Res Adjudicata, Section 499)
The U.S. Supreme Court further stated in Vallely v. Northern Fire and Marine Co.,
254 U.S. 348 (1920):
Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot [act] beyond the
power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly
in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as
nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to
reversal. Elliott v. Lessee of Piersol, 26 U. S. (1 Pet.) 328, 340 (1828):
Old Wayne Mut. Life Assn v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 27 Sup.Ct. 236
Since fraud on the court vitiates the entire case, all orders from that court or any
subsequent court are void as none of the courts had subject matter jurisdiction.
No court has the lawful authority to validate a void order; a void order is void at all
times, cannot be made valid by any judge, nor does it gain validity by the passage
of time, Vallely, supra. The order is void ab initio.

AA-95

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

41. The 9th Circuit has stated in the case of Austin v. Smith, 312 F2nd. 337,343
(1962):
If the underlying judgment is void, the judgment based
upon it is also void.
42. All of Defendants orders are void and were void ab initio. Plaintiff sought to
achieve certainty under the law with a new judicial officer who had not taken the
illegal bribes. Plaintiff filed a Writ of Mandate on January 28, 2011, seeking to
void all Defendants orders and judgments as well as seeking his recusal. Appeal
may be taken from an order denying a motion to vacate a void judgment because
denial of the motion constitutes an order giving effect to a void judgment and thus
is itself void and appealable. [Carr v. Kamins (2007) 151 CA4th 929, 933-934, 60
CR3d 196, 199; Carlson v. Eassa (1997) 54 CA4th 684,691, 62 CR2d 884, 888;
Residents for Adequate Water v. Redwood Valley County Water Dist. (1995) 34
CA4th 1801, 1805, 41 CR2d 123, 125]. The Second Appellate Court in Los
Angeles County denied Plaintiffs Writ of Mandate. Each of the Appellate court
Judges received the L.A. County bribes while serving in the Superior Court. Civil
suits are also being prepared against each of them for not recusing themselves
and committing their own fraud on the court.
43. SBX2 11 provided immunity to all those governmental persons associated with
the paying or receiving of judicial payments. SBX2 11 did not address fraud on
the court because it did not address or acknowledge any of the biases bought by
the bribes for the counties.
44. Defendant is not alone in committing fraud on the court by refusing to disclose
the L.A. County payments and refusing to disqualify himself in cases in which L.A.
County was a party or had an interest and in violating Canons 4D(1), 3E(2), 3E(1)
and CCP Section 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii). It appears to be a tacit agreement amongst
all of the L.A. Superior Court Judges, who have received L.A. County payments,
and L.A. County and L.A. Countys attorneys, to conceal such payments from
AA-96

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

opposing parties and commit fraud on the court in any case in which L.A. County
is a party or has an interest.

JUDICIAL ETHICS

45. California Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 4D(1) prohibits a judge from engaging in
any financial and business dealings that involve the judge in frequent transactions
or continuing business relations with lawyers or other persons likely to appear
before the judge or before the court in which the judge serves.
46. Canon 3E(2) requires the judge to disclose on the record information that is
reasonably relevant to the question of disqualification under Code of Civil
Procedure (CCP) Section 170.1, even if the judge believes there is no actual
basis for disqualification.
47. Canon 3E(1) requires a judge to disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in
which disqualification is required by law.
48. CCP Section 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) states A judge shall be disqualified if any one or
more of the following is true: .... A person aware of the facts might reasonably
entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial.
49. Defendant violated Canon 4D(1) by taking payments from L.A. County, violated
Canon 3E(2) by not disclosing such payments on the record, and violated Canon
3E(1) and CCP Section 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) by not disqualifying himself.
50. Defendants actions of taking the bribe, not disclosing such and the resulting
fraud on the court have denied COOPER due process by denying him the right
to an impartial tribunal. In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).

!
!
!
AA-97

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS, OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
VIOLATION OF INTANGIBLE RIGHT TO HONEST SERVICES
51. The L.A. County payments to L.A. Superior Court judges were held to violate
Article VI, Section 19 of the California Constitution in the case of Sturgeon, supra.
SBX2 11 did not change the California Constitution, did not make the judicial
benefits a state obligation, and therefore continuing payments also violate the
Constitution. The Sturgeon II decision acknowledged that SBX2 11 preserved
the status quo ante Sturgeon I
52. Appendix 4 incorporates herein as if set forth in full a true and correct copy of the
L.A. County Fiscal Year 2010-2011 Proposed Budget Trial Court Operations
pages 60.1 to 60.4. Such section shows that the judicial benefits are required to
be paid under the 1997 Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act. This is a false
statement as the Sturgeon case held that the 1997 Trial Court Funding Act did not
prescribe the payment of judicial benefits by counties under Article VI, Section 19
of the California Constitution. All of the L.A. County budgets from 1998 onwards
contain the same false statement.
53. Senate bill SBX2 11 did not give immunity to a judge who did not disclose the
county payments and then presided over a case in which the county had an
interest or was a party. Here the L.A. County Child Support Services Department
is an interested party as it establishes financial ...support obligations for children,
enforces existing spousal support orders... as required under federal and state
law and is a collaborative partner with the Superior Court (see Appendix 2,
pages 59-60).
54. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated in the case of Offutt v. United States, 348
U.S. 11, 14 (1954): A judge receiving a bribe from an interested party over which
he is presiding does not give the appearance of justice. In essence, by making all
L.A. Superior Court judges eligible for the L.A. County payments, L.A. County
has bought the L.A. Superior Court. The U.S. Supreme Court stated in the case
AA-98

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 566 U.S. ___ (2009) at Slip Opinion
page 16 in relevant part:
..just as no man is allowed to judge his own cause, similar
fears of bias can arise when, without the consent of the other
parties, a man chooses a judge in his own cause.
55. By making the payments available to every L.A. Superior Court judge, no party in
a divorce case received a fair trial, as the judge was biased to rule to benefit the
L.A. County Child Support Services Department over the interests of the parties
to the case.
56. The Sturgeon case showed that L.A. County had been making illegal payments to
L.A. Superior Court judges since the late 1980s. From that time through the
present, L.A. County and the L.A. Superior Court judges who received such illegal
payments committed fraud on the court, by not disclosing such. The L.A.
Superior Court judges also committed fraud upon the court by not disqualifying
themselves. They also violated Canons 4D(1), 3E(2), 3E(1) and CCP Section
170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii).
57. These type of actions have been held to be a denial of due process in the U.S.
Supreme Court case of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. ___
(2009). The court stated at Slip Opinion page 16:
.....just as no man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, similar fears
of bias can arise when, without the consent of the other parties, a man
chooses the judge in his own cause.
58. The County-Auditors letter in Appendix 1, combined with the 2010-2011 L.A.
County proposed budget Trial Court Operations section in Appendix 4,
demonstrates that L.A. County has bought the L.A. Superior Court without the
consent of the other party opposing them. The L.A. County interest and
partnership with the court is clearly documented in Appendix 2 for all Family Law
cases.
AA-99

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

59. In addition to fraud on the court and the denial of due process, the non-disclosure
of illegal payments and the Title IV-D partnership are also violations of 18 U.S.C
Section 1346 the intangible right to honest services (which U.S. Constitution
Article 6, CL 2 requires state judges to obey), which mandates that payments by a
party in a case to a judge are illegal, particularly in California which has a unique
bribery statute. Skilling v. United States, (Decided June 24, 2010) ___U.S.
____(18 U.S.C Section 346) criminalizes only the bribe and kick-back core of
the pre-McNally case law, page 45 of opinion. In the case of Adams v.
Commission on Judicial Performance (1994), 8 Cal.4
th
630, 661-663 (Adams I)
the court represented conduct prejudicial to the administration justice that
brings the judicial office into disrepute.) and in U.S. v. Frega, U.S. v. Malkus, U.S.
v. Adams (1999) 179 F. 3d 793 (the payment by a party and attorney appearing
before a judge to such judge are bribery and violate 18 U.S.C section 1346 the
intangible right to honest services) starting at 805-807;
Because no linkage of payment and specific official act is
required under California law and because the indictment
incorporates the relevant state bribery statutes, which, in turn,
state the elements of the bribery offenses, the indictment is
valid in this respect.
60. But for the refusal of public officials to perform their sworn duties, these judges
and all other judges who received county payments would be removed from
judicial office and imprisoned for bribery, obstruction of justice and violation of
the intangible right to honest services.
61. California and Federal statutes and case law show that judges who take money
from persons appearing before them are guilty of accepting bribes, will be
disqualified from the case, removed from office for .. conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute. and
imprisoned for bribery and violation of the intangible right to honest services 18
U.S.C. Section 1346.
AA-100

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

62. The result of these actions is that all cases before Defendant were vitiated and all
orders and judgments in the cases were void. The parties are left in a legal
limbo without any certainty. An entire legal system was corrupted.
63. Plaintiff COOPER brings this civil complaint seeking damages against Defendant
for the denial of Plaintiffs civil rights. The current court partnership, built over 25
years of county bribes and federal incentives, is corrosive to the State of
Californias due process and equal protection guarantees and even to its
fundamental constitutional guarantee that,
SECTION 1. All people are by nature free and independent and have
inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and
liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing
and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.
64. The Fourth Appellate Courts decisions in the Sturgeon, supra , and Sturgeon v.
County of Los Angeles, __Cal App.4th___(4th Dist.,Div. 1) (2010), the so-called
Sturgeon I and II cases, clearly stated that the judicial payments were
unconstitutional. The legislature confirmed the payments were illegal by giving
the judges limited immunity due to the bribes. Plaintiffs case was heard during
this time in L.A. Superior Court. Plaintiff has established the nature of the bias
bought by the county. The orders and judgments in case SD026673 are void.
Judge WEINBACH has refused to recuse himself.
65. Plaintiff seeks damages for the injuries done to Plaintiff. Plaintiff seeks a divorce
judgment consistent with the California Constitution; especially Article 1 Section 1.
The fraud on the court has caused this case to be vitiated and the parties to be
in legal limbo. Case SD026673 needs to be completed, finalized and legal
certainty achieved to avoid problems in the future for the parties who are the
victims of Defendant Elia WEINBACHs fraud on the court, violations of the
Canons of the Code of Judicial Ethics and violation of the California Code of Civil
Procedure. COOPER needs due process and his Constitutional rights restored.
AA-101

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

66. Plaintiff is seeking a jury trial on the issues because judges judging judges does
not provide due process when most judges are bribed. Plaintiff is also seeking an
award for consequential damages and for denial of his civil rights.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Denied Constitutional Guarantees)

67. Plaintiff COOPER re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through
66, inclusive, of this Complaint (including all paragraphs of the Appendices) as if
the same were fully set forth herein.
68. SBX2 11 was passed by the California legislature and acknowledged the
unconstitutional and illegal nature of the L.A. County payments by granting
immunity. Section 5 of SBX2 11 limited the immunity to any liability or be subject
to prosecution or disciplinary action because of benefits provided to a judge.
This unconstitutional ex post facto immunity did not and could not restore
Plaintiffs California Constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection
lost during the proceedings of Plaintiffs family law case SD026673 under
Defendant, WEINBACH.
69. Defendant denied Plaintiff his 5
th
and 14
th
Amendment rights under the United
States Constitution and his similar rights under Article 1, Section 1 and Section 15
from the Constitution of the State of California.
70. Defendants payments from L.A. County from 2007 to 2010 are documented in
Exhibit 1. Defendant heard Plaintiffs case in 2009. No disclosure of the payments
was made as required by CCP. This constituted fraud on the court.
71. Defendant filed papers to seek election as judge. The Fair Political Practices
Commission (FPPC) requires filing of a Form 700 Statement of Economic
Interests. The L.A. County payments are not included on that form as required by
the FPPC. Failure to reveal such information constituted electoral fraud.
AA-102

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

72. Defendant is sworn to uphold the laws and Constitutions of the United States and
the State of California. Defendant is assigned to hear Family Law cases in Los
Angeles County. Litigants in his courtroom have a right to expect that any ruling
will uphold all three bodies of law. The bribes from L.A. County call into question
Defendants ability and willingness to hold the balance nice, clear and true,
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927). The bribes denied Plaintiff his right to
due process of law in his courtroom.
73. The taking of money by a judge who does not throw the case is still corrupt.
Justice Posner of the 7th Circuit stated in his remarks relating to Sir Francis
Bacon, that the judge who does not fulfill the bargain after he has taken the
money is equally as corrupt as the judge who takes the money and fulfills the
bargain.
74. Defendant chose those portions of the law that favored L.A. County because of its
bribe. L.A. County maintains a General Relief program and a Family and Social
Services program. In order to reduce the potential number of recipients and thus
the costs, Defendant used child support provisions of family law to shift the
potential burden of CROMMIE and the children from L.A. County onto Plaintiff.
The Title IV-D calculations, used by Defendant, are not based on California and
U.S. constitutional principles but rather on transferring the countys welfare policy
to a related/convenient single individual earner.
75. Full remediation of Plaintiffs civil rights likely includes, at a minimum, the
complete separation of the family courts from all the countys Title IV-D funded
agencies. The current court partnership, built over 25 years of county bribes and
federal incentives, is corrosive to the State of Californias due process and equal
protection guarantees and even to its fundamental constitutional guarantee that,
SECTION 1. All people are by nature free and independent and have
inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and
liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing
and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.
AA-103

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

76. Divorce is the action of separating two parties and returning them to their pre-
marriage status as free and independent individuals. L.A. Countys bribes
guarantee that Plaintiff is not, and will never be, free and independent from his ex-
spouse following his L.A. County divorce. Defendant did not select the law that
upheld Plaintiffs freedom and liberty.
77. Defendants Status order of July 7, 2009 changed the legal marital status of the
parties CROMMIE and COOPER to separate individuals and removed any prior
contractual obligations between CROMMIE and COOPER. Defendant failed to
return each party to their full constitutional status prior to marriage, required in a
No Fault divorce. By issuing inflated and unnecessary support orders between
the parties, and allowing CROMMIE to remain in a home she could not afford,
Defendant was solely protecting the interests of L.A. County.
78. California Family Law 4336 (b) states in relevant part ..Nothing in this
subdivision precludes a court from determining that a marriage of less than 10
years is a marriage of long duration. This represents a lifetime penalty on Plaintiff
that is without precedent outside of Family Law. It is patently unconstitutional but
is written into the family law code and enforced because of the bribes by L.A.
County and the Title IV-D funding incentives from the Federal Government,
through the state, to Los Angeles County. Plaintiff has no confidence such a
provision would not be invoked in the future by Defendant or other bribed judge.
79. The supported party in a divorce can enjoy any post-divorce self-betterment by
the supporting party. Every salaried pay raise, every sales bonus raises the fear
of a support modification hearing. Thus, the risk and reward tradeoff for any
AA-104

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

investment in ones self or a business venture is seriously and negatively
impacted. Any supporting spouse has a fiduciary responsibility to future business
partners to disclose the adverse impacts of a possible CA Family Law 3651
proceeding.
80. CA Family Law 3651 also applies to the success of this complaint. Plaintiff
therefore is requesting that any awards be placed in a charitable trust benefitting
Plaintiffs children and such non-profits as Plaintiff may designate.
81. Plaintiff seeks $2,000,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000,000 in punitive
damages for violations of his constitutional rights.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Undeclared bribes from Los Angeles County caused fraud and bias)

66, inclusive, of this Complaint (including all paragraphs of the Appendices and all
paragraphs of all preceding causes of action, if any) as if the same were fully set
forth herein.
83. L.A. County Auditor records clearly document, in Appendix 1, the payments to
Defendant. The payments are bribes, paid by L.A. County to influence the courts
and reduce L.A. County liability.
84. Defendant also filed to campaign for a judicial office in 2010. The Form 700 did
not list Los Angeles County judicial payments. This constitutes electoral fraud.
85. Petitioner seeks punitive damages equal to all the bribes taken. The county
auditor records show this total of $153,549

AA-105

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Denial of due process in domestic violence allegations)

forth herein.
87. Defendants practices and conduct have violated Plaintiffs freedom,
independence and inalienable rights guaranteed under the Constitution of the
State of California.
88. On or about October 2008, a false allegation of domestic violence by CROMMIE
led to a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) that forced Plaintiff to move out of
the marital home and leave his children.
89. On or about June 2010, Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff due process in
resolving competing allegations of domestic violence. Defendant failed to notify
the District Attorneys Family Violence Division, which handles cases in
Downtown Los Angeles and the surrounding areas. The District Attorneys Office
will file criminal charges whenever there is legally sufficient evidence of a family
violence crime. No referral was made to the District Attorney, no public defender
was appointed to represent Plaintiff for the domestic violence charges. No
criminal convictions were sought or obtained.
90. Defendants refusal to insist on criminal prosecution for domestic violence
allegations reduced the workload of the District Attorneys Office and thus
reduced L.A. County costs. The L.A. County bribe worked!
91. Based on the administrative review of the COOPER and CROMMIE domestic
violence filings and statements, Defendant abused COOPERs right to due
process, decided in favor of CROMMIE, ordered Plaintiff to remain away from the
marital home and denied Plaintiff equal access to his children.
AA-106

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

92. Defendant consented to Title IV-D incentives to accept into family court a criminal
allegation because a hearing in Family Court provided justification for a lop-sided
custody award and increased child support order to meet Title IV-D incentives. It
provided the pretext for future CSSD administrative actions that would increase
the countys Title IV-D reimbursements. CSSD has indeed taken actions to deny
COOPER his driving privilege and seize COOPERs assets.
93. Plaintiff seeks $500,000 in damages for the emotional distress of being treated
like a violent criminal, when in fact he is innocent, as related to the denial of his
constitutional rights.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Refusal to grant equal 50% custody)

forth herein.
95. Plaintiff has an inalienable right to raise his children. Each parent has an equal
50% right to their children. Defendants custody order is capricious and without
merit and designed solely to generate the largest Title IV-D support payment
possible.
96. On or about April 2009, Defendants final trial judgment made permanent the
temporary custody arrangement created by the TRO. Plaintiff was permanently
forced out of his house and forced to leave his children. Defendant provided
CROMMIE with de facto primary custody, justifying a lop-sided child support
payment for CSSD.
97. The responsibility to support children is also shared equally by each parent.
Defendant never asserted that responsibility to CROMMIE. Instead, Defendant,
AA-107

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

allowed CROMMIE to go to school rather than work full-time in her profession as
a specialty nurse. Full time earnings would have reduced child support owed by
Plaintiff. Plaintiff was thus left to conclude that Defendant intended to order
Plaintiff to assume an unequal share of the parental financial responsibility; again,
justifying a lop-sided child support payment for CSSD.
98. The support order was generated using the Title IV-D influenced support
calculator promulgated by the Los Angeles County Child Support Services
Department (CSSD). Plaintiffs current income was clearly shown as zero.
Defendant, however, used the monthly average annual income for support
calculation; again, justifying a lop-sided child support payment for CSSD.
99. Defendants bias was further evident when CROMMIE became agitated at
Defendant that support was too low. Defendant prompted CROMMIE for F.C.
4062 childcare expenses. Plaintiff stated that such payments were fully
reimbursed by the State and demanded evidence of net childcare expenses by
CROMMIE. CROMMIE screamed at Defendant about the low level of child
support and was then forcibly removed from the Court. Defendant ignored the
apparent perjury and then ordered the highest possible child support, in keeping
with Title IV-D biases. The very next day Plaintiff, with no income, was in default
on his child support payments. Again, this justified CSSD administrative actions,
which increased the reimbursements from the State and Federal governments.
100. Defendants partnership with the CSSD made him aware that CSSD would
vigorously prosecute the defaulted child support. The first step by CSSD is to
revoke a drivers license. Defendant could easily foresee the situation that Plaintiff
would have no vehicle insurance and no drivers license but be attempting to
search for work. The L.A. County bribes clearly influenced Defendants decisions.
101. Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $500,000 for the alienation and
emotional distress of!being deprived of his inalienable right to raise his children
and enjoy stable and safe parental relations with his children as protected by the
AA-108

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.
102. Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $750,000 for the emotional distress
and injury of!being placed in a debtors prison condition as relates to the denial of
his constitutional rights.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Failure to exercise fiduciary responsibility for family assets)

103. Plaintiff COOPER re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1
through 66, inclusive, of this Complaint (including all paragraphs of the
Appendices and all paragraphs of all preceding causes of action, if any) as if the
same were fully set forth herein.
104. Defendant failed his fiduciary responsibility by allowing uncontrolled legal
expenses, not consistent with the marital lifestyle, assets or income and by failing
to provide proper guidance for the parties in settling property claims.
105. Defendant failed his fiduciary responsibility by allowing CROMMIE to remain in
the marital home without the income to support the mortgage payments.
CROMMIEs gross monthly income was stated as $2,800. The mortgage
payments totaled approximately $3,500 monthly. Defendant failed to monitor the
parties home mortgage situation closely, destroying community property asset
value and destroying COOPERs credit rating and future employability.
106. Defendant encouraged CROMMIE to attend school while the family was
without sufficient income. As a registered nurse, CROMMIE could easily have
increased her hours to full-time, allowing her to support the mortgage payment
and provide spousal support to unemployed COOPER.
107. Paragraph 14 of Defendants Final Judgment in SD026673 gave CROMMIE
120 days from July 8, 2009 to refinance the home. After 18 months CROMMIE
AA-109

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

had not completed the refinancing or a loan assumption. COOPER received no
notification, communication or notices from an escrow company or Bank of
America on the pending refinance. COOPER informed the court that CROMMIE
refused to make the loan payments. Defendant refused to address CROMMIEs
lack of income and subsequent default on the mortgage payments and the
consequent impact on getting the loan refinanced.
108. On about January 20, 2011 Plaintiff sought to protect his credit rating and
future employability by seeking court authorization to allow him to sell the home.
Defendant ignored Plaintiffs claim and instead transferred the marital home to a
biased third party without any admonition to protect Plaintiffs credit rating.
109. Defendants irresponsibility caused a destruction of family assets far greater
than any child or spousal support awards. Defendants irresponsibility cost the
State and Federal government far more in education and retirement costs than
could possibly have been saved by L.A. County welfare costs.
110. Defendant allowed the transfer of marital assets to one of the lawyers with
whom he had frequent contact, in violation of Canon 4D(1).
111. Plaintiff seeks $800,000 in compensatory damages for lifetime damage to his
credit rating and employability.
112. Plaintiff seeks $250,000 in damages for allowing CROMMIE to remain in a
home which she could not afford and thus diminishing the value of community
property.
113. Plaintiff seeks $100,000 in damages for allowing CROMMIE to hire counsel,
which she could not afford and deplete community assets contrary to the marital
lifestyle.

AA-110

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Gender Discrimination)

115. In a clear case of gender discrimination, Defendant failed to monitor
CROMMIEs job search and refused to order CROMMIE to fully support the
family, but insisted on punitive weekly job search reports from Plaintiff. Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant has rarely if ever made such an order against women in
other Family Law cases before him.
116. Defendants dismissal of COOPERs motion for spousal support is further
evidence of gender bias against COOPER. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has
rarely if ever ordered and enforced spousal support orders for women to support
men.
117. Defendants child support order of $574 per month for an unemployed home
construction worker in Southern California in the depth of the great recession was
clearly prejudicial. COOPER could only assume that Defendant expected
COOPER to disproportionately bear the responsibility of supporting the children
and was sending COOPER the strongest possible message to that effect.
118. Plaintiff seeks $1,000,000 in gender bias damages and $500,000 in punitive
damages for not making equal orders for CROMMIE and COOPER to find and
secure full-time employment to support the family.

AA-111

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Legal Fees)

120. Plaintiff broke no laws. Plaintiff had no need for a lawyer prior to divorce.
Plaintiffs marital lifestyle and income level were not consistent with significant
expenditures on legal fees. Plaintiff only needed the administrative services of the
court, the principles of fairness that are typically associated with the Small Claims
Court, and respect for his Constitutional rights.
121. On or about April 2009, Defendant indicated that he was in a hurry to decide
the dissolution case because the parties had been to court about 20 times.
122. California Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 4D(1) prohibits a judge from
engaging in continuing business relations with lawyers or other persons likely to
appear before the judge or before the court in which the judge serves. There were
approximately 25 dates on which court proceedings took place. Using a cost of
approximately $12,000 per day per courtroom, Defendants refusal to make
decisions conducive to settlement offers and his rush to justice cost the state
(approximately 1/3 day on average per appearance) about $100,000. This does
not include the state costs of the appellate court.
123. Since all orders in Plaintiffs dissolution case are void, Plaintiff must now re-
litigate his marital dissolution to remove and compensate for Title IV-D biases and
for any influence of L.A. County interests. This new litigation is estimated to easily
exceed $300,000.
124. Plaintiff seeks $300,000 for his injury, $100,000 for the damage to the state,
and $250,000 in punitive damages.
AA-112

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL ON ALL COUNTS
BASED ON WIDESPREAD JUDICIAL BIAS

126. The Sturgeon, supra, case is an example of judges judging judges. Under the
best of circumstances this process upholds the rule of law. Introduction of bribes
corrupts the process. Payment of judicial benefits to 80% of California judges
over a 20-year period not only corrupts the individuals but also the entire system.
127. Plaintiffs first choice was to have this matter fully addressed, decided and
remedied by the Appellate Courts. The Fourth Appellate Court, Fourth Division, in
its December 28, 2010 ruling on Sturgeon II refused to order additional actions
to eliminate the unconstitutional county payments. The court did not in any way
rescind or modify its prior determination that the bribes were illegal. Therefore, the
Fourth Appellate Court, Fourth Division noted that, following its Sturgeon II ruling,
it anticipated additional challenges and remedies by taxpayers. The court, on its
own, would not uphold Plaintiffs constitutional rights.
128. Individual judges and the court system will not stop this corruption and denial
of civil rights. Plaintiff, therefore, seeks a jury trial to achieve declaratory relief,
compensatory relief and also punitive relief.
129. Plaintiff seeks remediation of his impaired civil rights. The countys welfare
biases introduced by the bribes can be partially ameliorated with an un-bribed
judge. However, finding an un-bribed judge who is also un-biased by over 25
years of county-participation in Title IV-D funding incentives will be difficult.
Plaintiff is seeking his constitutional rights, not easy solutions.
AA-113

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays as follows with regard to each of the above causes of
action:

AS TO THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. For general compensatory damages in the amount of $2,000,000;
2. For punitive damages in the amount of $1,000,000
3. For attorneys fees and costs of suit herein according to proof;
4. For interest as allowed by law

AS TO THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. For general and specific punitive damages of $153,549;

AS TO THE THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. Plaintiff seeks $500,000 in damages for the emotional distress of being
treated like a violent criminal when in fact he was innocent.

AS TO THE FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. For general compensatory damages Plaintiff seeks an amount of $500,000
for the alienation and emotional distress of!being deprived of his inalienable
right to raise his children.
2. For general compensatory damages Plaintiff seeks an amount of $750,000
AA-114

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

for the emotional distress and injury of!being placed in a debtors prison
condition

AS TO THE FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. Plaintiff seeks $800,000 in compensatory damages for lifetime damage to
his credit rating.
2. Plaintiff seeks $250,000 in damages for allowing CROMMIE to remain in a
home that she could not afford, diminishing the value of community
property.
3. Plaintiff seeks $100,000 in damages for allowing CROMMIE to hire
counsel, which she could not afford

AS TO THE SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. Plaintiff seeks $1,000,000 for his gender bias injury and $500,000 in
punitive damages.

AS TO THE SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. Plaintiff seeks $300,000 for his injury, $100,000 for the damage to the
state, and $250,000 in punitive damages.

AA-115
AA-116
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
APPENDIX
1
Page A1
AA-117
Page A2
AA-118
Page A3
AA-119
!

APPENDIX
2
Page A4
AA-120
Page A5
AA-121
Page A6
AA-122
Page A7
AA-123
Page A8
AA-124
Page A9
AA-125
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
APPENDIX
3

Page A10
AA-126
3/20/11 11:29 AM Child Support Services in California: Rights and Remedies (December 6, 2002)
Page 1 of 4 http://www.lsnc.net/trainings/child_support/
Home | Food Stamp Guide | Case Summaries | Google

These are electronic copies of materials distributed with the permission of the various presenters of this
training. The materials are organized by the corresponding topics presented. Included are other
documents useful to advocates working on child support issues, including copies of or links to relevant
federal and state statutory and regulatory resources, select court orders and essential administrative
forms. The documents are either Web (HTML) pages or Adobe Acrobat (PDF) files which should open in
your Web browser when you click on the document links, below. We recommend you install MS
Internet Explorer 6.x for optimal viewing. To access the PDF files, you need to have the free
Acrobat Reader installed on your computer.
Current Policy Perspectives and Future Planning within the Department of
Child Support Services (Presenter: Curt Child, Director of California Department
of Child Support Services)
Child Support 101 | Basic Services | Basic Remedies (Presenters: Brian
Paddock, Paddock & Mastin and Stephen Goldberg, Legal Services of Northern
California)
Child Support Distribution and AB 1449 | Medical Support Remedies and
Enforcement (Presenter: Sarah Kurtz, National Center for Youth Law)
California Child Support Services Regulations | CSS Letters
California CSS Administrative Forms
Court Documents
Additional Online Child Support Resources
Current Policy Perspectives and Future Planning
within the Department of Child Support Services
CSS Program Performance and Statistical Report - Annual Report (2001) (103 pages)
CSS Program Draft Strategic Plan (October 17, 2002) (14 pages)
Child Support 101
Basic Services | Basic Remedies
Page A11
AA-127
3/20/11 11:29 AM Child Support Services in California: Rights and Remedies (December 6, 2002)
Page 2 of 4 http://www.lsnc.net/trainings/child_support/
Title IV-D Child Support Program Duties (Brian Paddock: November 2002)
Making the Child Support Program Work for Your Clients, or the Best Way to Fight
Poverty Is Money! - Tennessee CLE Child Support Outline (Brian Paddock: October 16,
2001)
Child Support Distribution and Disbursement (Paula Roberts, Center for Law and Social
Policy (CLASP): October 1, 2000)
Rulings in the Harp distribution, processing fees, recoupment and notices case
Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE)
National Electronic Child Support Resource System (NECSRS)
OCSE regulations, action transmittals and policy documents
ACF Action Transmittals - Listed by Year (1975-2002) - for example, AT 97-13
deals with State Distribution Units (central collections); AT 97-17 deals with the
distribution of support, etc.
Action Transmittal OCSE-AT-98-24 - re distribution of support
collected to TANF families
Financial Institutions Data Match (FIDM) - for finding assets.
Index of California Child Support Services (CSS) Letters (2000-2003)
CSS Letter 01-09 - retroactive support.
CSS Letter 01-16 - case closure.
CSS Letter 01-28 - revisions re retroactive support.
CSS Letter 02-04 - AB 891 re 5% of Title II limit.
CSS Letter 02-14 - clarification re AB 891 (credit toward child support obligation
for Social Security dependent's benefits.
CSS Letter 02-15 - enforcement against SSI benefits
CSS Letter 02-18 - duplicate case transfers.
Local Child Support Agency (LCSA) Letter 02-34 - case transfer coordinators.
22 CCR 119184 - Barnes notice
CSS Regulatory Time Frames - key time frames for case openings, location of
information, enforcement, interstate claims, transfers, closures and complaint resolution.
Child Support Distribution and AB 1449
Medical Support Remedies and Enforcement
How Child Support is Distributed in California: A Guide for Advocates (Sarah Kurtz,
National Center for Youth Law (NCYL): November 2001)
AB 1449
New Law Can Help Reunite Families (Youth Law News: September-October
2001)
Page A12
AA-128
!
""Most states define "diligent efforts as attempting all appropriate statutory
mechanisms for serving process and repeating such attempts as soon as new information
becomes available or yearly, whichever occurs first.
Page 1 of 4
TitIe IV-D ChiId Support Program Duties
I. Location of NoncustodiaI Parents and/or their Assets
Duty: f location of the non-custodial parent (NCP) or his/her assets is or becomes necessary, use all
appropriate sources to locate the NCP or his/her assets.

Time: Within 75 days after the V-D agency figures out it needs location information for the next step in
the case.
Law: 45 C.F.R. 303.3(b)(3).
ExampIe of FaiIure: Custodial parent's (CP) case is open, she provides the V-D agency with name of
the NCP and certain location information, such as the NCP's home or business address, Social
Security number, name of bank or location of property. The V-D agency does nothing.
Duty: f initial location efforts fail, repeat as long as there is adequate identifying and other information
to meet the requirements for submittal for location efforts.
Time: Every 90 days or immediately upon receipt of new information which may aid in location,
whichever occurs sooner. Quarterly attempts may be limited to automated sources, but must include
state Unemployment nsurance records.

Law: 45 C.F.R. 303.3(b)(5)
ExampIe of FaiIure: CP finds out that NCP has a new job and reports that information to the V-D
agency, preferably in writing. The V-D agency does nothing within 75 days.
II. EstabIishment of Paternity and Support Orders
Duty: f a support order must be established, regardless of whether paternity has to be established,
establish a support order or complete service of process or document unsuccessful attempts to serve
process in accordance with state's guidelines for diligent efforts.
1
Time: Within 90 days of locating the NCP.
Law: 45 C.F.R. 303.4(d)
ExampIe of FaiIure: A support order is needed. The V-D agency locates the NCP, but after 90 days
has failed to establish support or serve with process or even diligently attempt to serve. Note, if the V-
D agency serves the NCP, but never follows up to get the support order, the V-D agency may still be in
compliance with federal regulations.
Page A13
AA-129
!
"""Service of process other than notice by mail is not required for most post-
judgment enforcement actions. Action directed to assets held by third parties, such as a
bank, or for criminal enforcement may require service of process.
Page 2 of 4
III. Enforcement of Support Orders
Duty: Maintain and use an effective system to monitor compliance with support orders and identify the
date that an NCP fails to pay an amount equal to one month's support.
Time: N/A
Law: 45 C.F.R. 303.6(a)
ExampIe of FaiIure: This can be a systemic failure, or the failure of a worker to act on the case when it
reports that the NCP is delinquent. This problem may be corrected by an administrative grievance and
hearing process or the duty to monitor may be enforceable by an injunction or mandate in state court.
This may be the kind of system or administrative requirement which may not be enforceable by a CP
under Blessing v. Freestone, 117 S.Ct. 1353 (1997) especially since Gonzaga University v. Doe, 112
S.Ct. 2268 (2002)
Duty: Notify employer to start income withholding.
Time: Within 2 business days following entry of a support order or locating the employer or learning of
a new employer.
Law: 42 U.S.C. 654A(g)); 45 C.F.R. 303.6(c)(1). [45 C.F.R. 303.100.(e)(2) and (3) incorrectly still
refer to 15 days.]
ExampIe of FaiIure: The V-D agency obtains a support order with an authorization for income
assignment (required in every case), but does not know the NCP's employer. The V-D agency later
learns of the NCP's employer, from the CP or otherwise, but fails to send the Order/Notice to Withhold
ncome within 2 business days.

Duty: Enforce the child support order.
Time: f service of process is not required, within 30 days of identifying a delinquency or locating the
NCP, whichever occurs later. f service of process is required,
2
service must be completed and
enforcement action taken within 60 days of identifying delinquency or locating the noncustodial parent,
whichever occurs later or the V-D agency must document unsuccessful attempts to serve process in
accordance with state's guidelines for diligent efforts. Use of income withholding and federal income
tax refund intercepts is also required.
Law: 45 C.F.R. 303.6(c)(2)
ExampIe of FaiIure: The NCP misses support payments equal to one month's current support
amount. He is self-employed and the V-D agency knows where he is. Sixty days go by and the V-D
agency does nothing. Note, if just 30 days go by, the V-D agency could argue that they were planning
to take action that required service of process, such as a contempt proceeding. Note also that the CP
is unlikely to know about (but can request in writing) other enforcement activities that the V-D agency
could (or must) take, such as initiating the process for driver's license or professional, or business
license revocation.
Page A14
AA-130
Page 3 of 4
IV. Modification of Support Orders
Duty: Notify all CPs that modification services are available. Review support orders for modification if
requested by the CP, the NCP (or The LCSA if the CP is on CalWORKS). Send notice of any proposed
modification to the parents and then adjust the order, as appropriate.

Time: Within 15 days of a request from the custodial parent or NCP the agency must determine if a
review is necessary. Within 180 days of determining that a review is necessary or of locating the non-
requesting parent, whichever occurs later, complete review and obtain modified order from the court, if
appropriate.

Law: 45 C.F.R. 303.8
ExampIe of FaiIure: Custodial parent has asked in writing for a review and has provided the V-D
agency with all requested information. The V-D agency knows where the non-custodial parent is and
has sufficient information about his/her income to proceed. The modification will increase the order by
the amount set out in DCSS guidelines and/or medical support will be ordered. 180 days have passed
and the V-D agency has not completed a requested modification or notified the CP or NCP that it will
not seek modification and provided a notice of appeal rights.
V. TimeIy Distribution of Support.
Duty:
As of 10/1/98, the time limit for distribution of current support became two business days,
provided there is sufficient information to identify the CP and there is no appeal on amount of
arrearages. 42 U.S.C. 654B(c)(1).
Law: 45 C.F.R. 302.32(f), 302.5; (OCSE Action Transmittal 97-13, Sept. 15, 1997, details the
obligations of a State Distribution Unit. CA lacks both a single automated system and a single SDU.
ExampIe of FaiIure: The LCSA receives a support collection for a CP (except support collected from a
federal tax refund intercept), knows to whom it must be sent, but fails to send the support on to the CP
within 2 business days. (Business days are days the State agency is open for business.)
VI. Accurate Distribution of Support.
Duty: Accurately distribute child support collected on behalf of families receiving V-D agency services.
A family not receiving TANF - CalWORKS cash benefits should get all support collected each
month up to the amount ordered for current support in the order.
Effective 10/1/98, post-TANF families must be paid all past-due support owed to the family
before the state receives any welfare recoupment (unreimbursed assistance) except for
permanently assigned arrears arising from periods of AFDC prior to October 1998. The total
amount of child support kept to repay unreimbursed assistance must never exceed the dollar
total of all aid previously provided.

f a family is receiving TANF - CalWORKS cash benefits, the CP should get the first fifty dollars
of support collected. This is a single month maximum amount for the CP and all the children of
which she has custody, no matter how many court orders the CP has, or how many NCPs pay.
Page A15
AA-131
Page 4 of 4
VII. Accessing IV-D agency FiIes
Obtaining information from the V-D agency concerning an individual case can be frustrating.
For all cases, the V-D agency must, within 20 days following the application for services or referral
from the welfare department, establish a case record, and determine the necessary actions to be taken.
45 C.F.R. 303.2(b). Under 45 C.F.R. 303.2(c) the V-D agency has a continuing duty to supplement
the case record "with all information and documents pertaining to the case, as well as all relevant facts,
dates, actions taken, contacts made and results in a case.
We suggest using standard DCSS or other record release forms and requests and that the
cover letter quote and cite the above regulation. You also may want to target your requests to the
record of case actions necessary to determine if the V-D agency has taken timely action. You may
want to state that you are not seeking any information or records which may be protected because they
are from the RS, contain confidential address information in domestic violence cases or otherwise are
required to be held confidential by law. Ask that any LCSA claim of confidentiality or privilege should
be specific as to the nature or source of the document or information and the privilege or confidentiality
law invoked to deny release or review of the record.
VIII. LegaI Resources:
Rulings in the Harp distribution, processing fees, recoupment and notices case
http://www.Divorcetn.com
Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE)
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/
National Electronic Child Support Resource System (NECSRS)
http://ocse.acf.dhhs.gov/necsrspub/
OCSE regulations, action transmittals and policy documents
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/poldoc.htm
ACF Action Transmittals - Listed by Year (1975-2002) - for example, AT 97-13 deals with State
Distribution Units (central collections); AT 97-17 deals with the distribution of support, etc.
http://ocse.acf.dhhs.gov/necsrspub/federal/at/chrono.cfm
Action Transmittal OCSE-AT-98-24 - re distribution of support collected to TANF families
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pol/at-9824.htm
Financial nstitutions Data Match (to find assets):
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/fct/fidm/index.htm
(Revised: November 25, 2002)
Page A16
AA-132
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
APPENDIX
4

Page A17
AA-133
TRIAL COURT OPERATIONS
Budget Summaries
FY 2010-11 Proposed Budget Volume One 60.1 County of Los Angeles
Trial Court Operations
Trial Court Operations Budget Summary
2010-11 Budget Message
The Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act of 1997,
Assembly Bill (AB) 233, Chapter 850, Statutes of 1997, requires
counties to make an annual Maintenance of Effort (MOE)
payment to the State for support of trial courts and to continue
to fund certain court-related expenditures such as indigent
defense, collections enhancement, and local judicial benefits.
The Trial Court Facilities Act, Senate Bill 1732, Chapter 1082,
Statutes of 2002, authorized the transfer of responsibility for
court facilities from the counties to the State and requires that
counties make County Facilities Payment (CFP). Revenue from
court fines and fees is used to partially finance the MOE
obligation to the State and other court-related expenditures.
The 2010-11 Proposed Budget reflects funding for the Countys
$294.7 million MOE payment to the State, which is comprised
of $245.9 million base MOE; $37.6 million CFP; and
$11.2 million representing 50 percent of any excess above the
AB 233 fines and forfeitures MOE, and $93.0 million for
court-related expenditures that are the Countys responsibility.
The Proposed Budget reflects anticipated increases in costs
related to court collections enhancement.
Changes From 2009-10 Budget
FY 2008-09 FY 2009-10 FY 2009-10 FY 2010-11 FY 2010-11 CHANGE FROM
CLASSIFICATION ACTUAL ESTIMATED BUDGET REQUESTED PROPOSED BUDGET
FINANCING REQUIREMENTS
SALARIES & EMPLOYEE BENEFITS $ 28,216,975.26 $ 28,865,000 $ 30,773,000 $ 31,130,000 $ 30,854,000 $ 81,000
SERVICES & SUPPLIES 86,717,568.87 75,607,000 58,946,000 79,106,000 62,150,000 3,204,000
OTHER CHARGES 282,914,026.89 294,596,000 295,938,000 295,938,000 294,650,000 (1,288,000)
GROSS TOTAL $ 397,848,571.02 $ 399,068,000 $ 385,657,000 $ 406,174,000 $ 387,654,000 $ 1,997,000
REVENUE $ 151,882,922.64 $ 143,720,000 $ 146,302,000 $ 149,215,000 $ 148,218,000 $ 1,916,000
NET COUNTY COST $ 245,965,648.38 $ 255,348,000 $ 239,355,000 $ 256,959,000 $ 239,436,000 $ 81,000
BUDGETED POSITIONS $ 50.0 $ 50.0 $ 50.0 $ 50.0 $ 50.0 $ 0.0
Gross
Appropriation
($)
Intrafund
Transfer
($)
Revenue
($)
Net
County Cost
($)
Budg
Pos
2009-10 Final Adopted Budget 385,657,000 0 146,302,000 239,355,000 50.0
Other Changes
1. Salaries and Employee Benefits: Primarily reflects
Board-approved increases in health insurance subsidies.
81,000 -- -- 81,000 --
2. Services and Supplies: Reflects an increase in costs for
the Courts Cost Recovery Program fully offset by fines
and forfeitures revenues.
3,276,000 -- 3,276,000 -- --
3. Intergovernmental Revenue: Reflects a reduction in
services and supplies due to the elimination of the grant
funding for the Drug Court program.
(72,000) -- (72,000) -- --
Page A18
AA-134
Budget Summaries
4. Maintenance of Effort (MOE) Payment: Reflects a
decrease in funding for MOE payments offset by
reductions in revenues.
(1,288,000) -- (1,288,000) -- --
Total Changes 1,997,000 0 1,916,000 81,000 0.0
2010-11 Proposed Budget 387,654,000 0 148,218,000 239,436,000 50.0
Gross
Appropriation
($)
Intrafund
Transfer
($)
Revenue
($)
Net
County Cost
($)
Budg
Pos
Page A19
AA-135
Budget Summaries
TOPE
TRIAL COURT OPERATIONS BUDGET DETAIL
FINANCING REQUIREMENTS
SALARIES & EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
SALARIES & WAGES

$ 2,274,843.16 $ 2,416,000 $ 2,578,000 $ 2,602,000 $ 2,578,000 $ 0
CAFETERIA PLAN BENEFITS 14,714,097.48 16,669,000 17,643,000 17,698,000 17,662,000 19,000
DEFERRED COMPENSATION BENEFITS 5,908,251.79 6,055,000 6,776,000 6,786,000 6,759,000 (17,000)
EMPLOYEE GROUP INS - E/B 1,793,080.50 195,000 247,000 304,000 293,000 46,000
OTHER EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 3,180,170.50 3,234,000 3,202,000 3,246,000 3,225,000 23,000
RETIREMENT - EMP BENEFITS 346,531.83 296,000 327,000 494,000 337,000 10,000
TOTAL S & E B 28,216,975.26 28,865,000 30,773,000 31,130,000 30,854,000 81,000
SERVICES & SUPPLIES
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES 15,088,912.38 14,347,000 11,902,000 15,503,000 15,165,000 3,263,000
COMMUNICATIONS 398.00 0 0 0 0 0
COMPUTING-PERSONAL 1,021.26 0 0 0 0 0
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SERVICES 24,288.00 0 0 0 13,000 13,000
JURY & WITNESS EXPENSE 1,887,874.56 1,700,000 1,700,000 1,700,000 1,700,000 0
MAINTENANCE - EQUIPMENT 226.13 0 0 0 0 0
MAINTENANCE--BUILDINGS & IMPRV 9,608,247.26 135,000 135,000 184,000 135,000 0
MEMBERSHIPS 150.00 0 0 0 0 0
MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSE 13,734.32 14,000 80,000 80,000 33,000 (47,000)
OFFICE EXPENSE 69,394.99 150,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 0
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 58,303,389.94 57,231,000 43,458,000 59,968,000 43,458,000 0
RENTS & LEASES - BLDG & IMPRV 49,218.09 0 0 0 0 0
SMALL TOOLS & MINOR EQUIPMENT 70.23 0 0 0 0 0
SPECIAL DEPARTMENTAL EXPENSE 14,545.15 0 25,000 25,000 0 (25,000)
TECHNICAL SERVICES 1,614,094.51 2,030,000 1,546,000 1,546,000 1,546,000 0
TRANSPORTATION AND TRAVEL 42,004.05 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL S & S 86,717,568.87 75,607,000 58,946,000 79,106,000 62,150,000 3,204,000
OTHER CHARGES
TRIAL COURT-MAINTENANCE OF
EFFORT
282,914,026.89 294,596,000 295,938,000 295,938,000 294,650,000 (1,288,000)
GROSS TOTAL $ 397,848,571.02 $ 399,068,000 $ 385,657,000 $ 406,174,000 $ 387,654,000 $ 1,997,000
NET TOTAL $ 397,848,571.02 $ 399,068,000 $ 385,657,000 $ 406,174,000 $ 387,654,000 $ 1,997,000
REVENUE $ 151,882,922.64 $ 143,720,000 $ 146,302,000 $ 149,215,000 $ 148,218,000 $ 1,916,000
NET COUNTY COST $ 245,965,648.38 $ 255,348,000 $ 239,355,000 $ 256,959,000 $ 239,436,000 $ 81,000
BUDGETED POSITIONS $ 50.0 $ 50.0 $ 50.0 $ 50.0 $ 50.0 $ 0.0
REVENUE DETAIL
CHARGES FOR SERVICES
LEGAL SERVICES $ 3,743,413.57 $ 3,529,000 $ 2,950,000 $ 2,950,000 $ 3,439,000 $ 489,000
COURT FEES & COSTS 7,545,766.23 6,490,000 7,964,000 7,964,000 6,729,000 (1,235,000)
RECORDING FEES 116,805.00 104,000 130,000 130,000 130,000 0
TOTAL CHARGES-SVS 11,405,984.80 10,123,000 11,044,000 11,044,000 10,298,000 (746,000)
Page A20
AA-136
Budget Summaries
TOPE
TRIAL COURT OPERATIONS BUDGET DETAIL (Continued)
REVENUE DETAIL
FINES FORFEITURES & PENALTIES
VEHICLE CODE FINES 7,299,152.51 6,469,000 6,701,000 6,701,000 6,701,000 0
OTHER COURT FINES 132,763,353.59 126,724,000 128,071,000 131,056,000 130,805,000 2,734,000
TOTAL FINES FO/PEN 140,062,506.10 133,193,000 134,772,000 137,757,000 137,506,000 2,734,000
INTERGVMTL REVENUE - STATE
STATE - OTHER 0.00 0 72,000 0 0 (72,000)
STATE-TRIAL COURTS 144.00 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL I R - STATE 144.00 0 72,000 0 0 (72,000)
LICENSES PERMITS & FRANCHISES
OTHER LICENSES & PERMITS 173,670.00 160,000 160,000 160,000 160,000 0
BUSINESS LICENSES 400.00 0 10,000 10,000 10,000 0
TOTAL LIC/PER/FRAN 174,070.00 160,000 170,000 170,000 170,000 0
MISCELLANEOUS REVENUE
MISCELLANEOUS 240,217.74 235,000 235,000 235,000 235,000 0
TOTAL MISC REV 240,217.74 235,000 235,000 235,000 235,000 0
OTHER FINANCING SOURCES
TRANSFERS IN 0.00 9,000 9,000 9,000 9,000 0
TOTAL OTH FIN SRCS 0.00 9,000 9,000 9,000 9,000 0
TOTAL REVENUE $ 151,882,922.64 $ 143,720,000 $ 146,302,000 $ 149,215,000 $ 148,218,000 $ 1,916,000
Page A21
AA-137
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
APPENDIX
5

Page A22
AA-138
Senate Bill No. 11
CHAPTER 9
An act to add Sections 68220, 68221, and 68222 to the Government Code,
relating to judges.
[Approved by Governor February 20, 2009. Filed with
Secretary of State February 20, 2009.]
legislative counsel
s digest
SB 11, Steinberg. Judges: employment benets.
The California Constitution requires the Legislature to prescribe
compensation for judges of courts of record. Existing law authorizes a county
to deem judges and court employees as county employees for purposes of
providing employment benets. These provisions were held unconstitutional
as an impermissible delegation of the obligation of the Legislature to
prescribe the compensation of judges of courts of record.
This bill would provide that judges who received supplemental judicial
benets provided by a county or court, or both, as of July 1, 2008, shall
continue to receive supplemental benets from the county or court then
paying the benets on the same terms and conditions as were in effect on
that date. The bill would authorize a county to terminate its obligation to
provide benets upon providing 180 days written notice to the
Administrative Director of the Courts and the impacted judges, but that
termination would not be effective as to any judge during his or her current
term while that judge continues to serve as a judge in that court or, at the
election of the county, when that judge leaves ofce. The bill also would
authorize the county to elect to provide benets for all judges in that county.
The bill would require the Judicial Council to report to the Senate Committee
on Budget and Fiscal Review, the Assembly Committee on Budget, and
both the Senate and Assembly Committees on Judiciary on or before
December 31, 2009, analyzing the statewide benets inconsistencies.
This bill would provide that no governmental entity, or ofcer or employee
of a governmental entity, shall incur any liability or be subject to prosecution
or disciplinary action because of benets provided to a judge under the
ofcial action of a governmental entity prior to the effective date of the bill
on the ground that those benets were not authorized under law.
This bill would provide that nothing in its provisions shall require the
Judicial Council to increase funding to a court for the purpose of paying
judicial benets or obligate the state or the Judicial Council to pay for
benets previously provided by the county, city and county, or the court.
96
Page A23
AA-139
The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
SECTION 1. The Legislature nds and declares all of the following:
(a) It is the intent of the Legislature to address the decision of the Court
of Appeal in Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th
630, regarding county-provided benets for judges.
(b) These county-provided benets were considered by the Legislature
in enacting the Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act of 1997, in which
counties could receive a reduction in the countys maintenance of effort
obligations if counties elected to provide benets pursuant to paragraph (l)
of subdivision (c) of Section 77201 of the Government Code for trial court
judges of that county.
(c) Numerous counties and courts established local or court supplemental
benets to retain qualied applicants for judicial ofce, and trial court
judges relied upon the existence of these longstanding supplemental benets
provided by the counties or the court.
SEC. 2. Section 68220 is added to the Government Code, to read:
68220. (a) Judges of a court whose judges received supplemental judicial
benets provided by the county or court, or both, as of July 1, 2008, shall
continue to receive supplemental benets from the county or court then
paying the benets on the same terms and conditions as were in effect on
that date.
(b) A county may terminate its obligation to provide benets under this
section upon providing the Administrative Director of the Courts and the
impacted judges with 180 days written notice. The termination shall not
be effective as to any judge during his or her current term while that judge
continues to serve as a judge in that court or, at the election of the county,
when that judge leaves ofce. The county is also authorized to elect to
provide benets for all judges in the county.
68221. To clarify ambiguities and inconsistencies in terms with regard
to judges and justices and to ensure uniformity statewide, the following
shall apply for purposes of Sections 68220 to 68222, inclusive:
(a) Benets and benet shall include federally regulated benets,
as described in Section 71627, and deferred compensation plan benets,
such as 401(k) and 457 plans, as described in Section 71628, and may also
include professional development allowances.
(b) Salary and compensation shall have the meaning as set forth in
Section 1241.
68222. Nothing in this act shall require the Judicial Council to increase
funding to a court for the purpose of paying judicial benets or obligate the
state or the Judicial Council to pay for benets previously provided by the
county, city and county, or the court.
SEC. 5. Notwithstanding any other law, no governmental entity, or
ofcer or employee of a governmental entity, shall incur any liability or be
subject to prosecution or disciplinary action because of benets provided
96
2 Ch. 9
Page A24
AA-140
to a judge under the ofcial action of a governmental entity prior to the
effective date of this act on the ground that those benets were not authorized
under law.
SEC. 6. The Judicial Council shall report to the Senate Committee on
Budget and Fiscal Review, the Assembly Committee on Budget, and both
the Senate and Assembly Committees on Judiciary on or before December
31, 2009, analyzing the statewide benets inconsistencies.
SEC. 7. The provisions of this act are severable. If any provision of this
act or its application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other
provisions or applications that can be given effect without the invalid
provision or application.
O
96
Ch. 9 3
Page A25
AA-141
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
APPENDIX
6

Page A26
AA-142
Page A27
AA-143
Page A28
AA-144
Page A29
AA-145
Page A30
AA-146
Page A31
AA-147
AA-148
AA-149
AA-150
AA-151
APPENDIX
!
H!

APPENDIX
H

AA-152
AA-153
AA-154
AA-155
AA-156
APPENDIX
!
I!

APPENDIX
I
!
! !
AA-157
AA-158
AA-159
AA-160
AA-161
AA-162
AA-163
AA-164
AA-165
AA-166
APPENDIX
!
J!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
APPENDIX
J

AA-167

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR CONSOLIDATING CASES 1
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

Daniel Cooper
1836 10
th
st # B
310-562-7668
IN PROPRIA PERSONA

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Los Angeles County
Case No. SC113137
(Appearance by M. Lavanas)
SC113064, lead

Daniel COOPER,
an individual; Plaintiff,

vs.

RESPONSE TO MOTION
REQUESTING
CONSOLIDATION OF CASES
YC064994 Lead,
YC065018,
YC065019,
YC065021.
SC113064, lead
SC113135
SC113136
SC113137
AND
YC065164

Michael I. Levanas,
an individual; Defendant.

DATE: August 25, 2011
TIME: 8:30 a.m.
DEPT: 59

AA-168

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

Defendants motion for consolidation is pre-mature. The cases will not be
decided in the same courtroom. Unless an unbiased judge is assigned immediately,
a change of venue for each case will be motioned for differing counties, those which
did not pay bribes. Indeed, since all the judicial officers are located within Los
Angeles County, the likelihood of an unbiased judge within Los Angeles County is
extremely remote.
Defendant did not follow the California Rules of Court, Rule 3.350 (a)(1)(C)
which requires the motion to Be filed in each case sought to be consolidated.
Plaintiffs Dennis Ettlin and Anthony Locatelli do not have standing for this hearing.
Plaintiff Locatelli does not agree to the transfer of his case from San Diego, and will
seek recusal of Judge Strauss at the first opportunity. A new motion of consolidation
will be needed if that case is eventually transferred and survives all the appeals to
remain in San Diego County. Furthermore, three new cases will be filed in the next
few weeks with five more likely in four to five weeks. Any consolidation at this point
will be meaningless.
Multiple adjudications are necessary because the judiciary itself has failed to
resolve the issues at hand. The Fourth Appellate Court refused to order an overhaul
of judicial compensation. The Judicial Council and the Administrative Office of the
Courts failed to sufficiently address the issues in writing SBX2 11. Individual bench
officers have refused to recuse themselves. The judiciary has totally failed to resolve
the issues itself.
Multiple adjudications by citizen juries is exactly what the Fourth Appellate
District had in mind with its Sturgeon II decision. The cases YC064994,
YC065018, YC065019, YC065021. SC113064, SC113135, SC113136, SC113137
and YC065164 are all different. Inconsistent adjudications are needed to provide the
necessary guidelines for tribunal reviews of similar cases voided by the bribes.
The Plaintiffs are each separate, In Pro Per individuals. Who could speak for
all three. No single Plaintiff could speak for any of the others. Two Plaintiffs have
AA-169

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

domestic violence issues while one does not. One Plaintiff has a move-away and
international kidnapping issues while two do not. Two Plaintiffs have direct contact
with Child Support Services Department while all three are subject to the guidelines,
polices and threatened sanctions. One lives in San Diego, while two reside currently
in Los Angeles County.
The Defendants are likewise different and separate. Carolyn Kuhl had
supervisory duties and thus had greater responsibility for alerting bench officers to
the inappropriateness of the bribes and also the failure of bench officers to recuse
themselves; thus a greater responsibility for the denial of due process and fraud on
the court. The three appellate judges have a disproportionate responsibility for the
denial of constitutional rights based on the unconstitutionality of SBX2 11 and the
conflicts between Title IV-D laws and the California Constitutional protections. All four
are guilty of Misprision of felony.
The duplication of discovery and evidence is a specious argument. Properly
documented evidence can easily be shared without duplication. The testimony of
experts and officials can again be shared and supplemented if necessary. The
judiciary and its litigators will determine the amount of duplication of effort.
Defendants have made no efforts at negotiation, so the extent of litigation is
also unknown at this time. Defendants mistakenly believe state resources will defend
them. Defendants mistakenly listen to Court Counsel. Defendants are not immune.
After the first couple of jury decisions, the path of negotiations going forward will be
much clearer.
The Memorandum of Points and Authorities fails to support a claim of
consolidation. Section I describes the similarities and makes no references to the
differences between Plaintiffs or Defendants. Section II cites CCP 1048.(a) but
makes no connection or attempted argument linking unnecessary costs with
avoid(ing) inconsistent and/or conflicting rulings. Section III envisions a single
judge of the same Los Angeles County judiciary ruling on the constitutionality of the
AA-170

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

bribes, superseding the Fourth Appellate Courts Sturgeon I and II decisions and
rescuing the judges. The simple statement that the rights of all parties will be
protected by the consolidation is unsubstantiated and simply preposterous!
The Memorandum of Points and Authorities is an opportunity lost in defending
the constitutionality of SBX2 11; in defending the criminality of post May 2009
payments by Los Angeles County; and in defending the actions of individuals taking
monies offered by an interested party. The wishful thinking of the Defendants
Demurrer is contradicted by SBX2 11 and the Fourth Appellate Court.
The Declaration of Kevin McCormick is a regurgitation of the minute orders by
Judge Kuhl. The title suggests a reference to dismissal or stay of action but the body
of the declaration does not elaborate, clarify or make such a request.
The motion to consolidate cases is premature. The Writ of Mandate for
Recusal of Judge OBrien was only submitted August 12, 2011. The motion to vacate
Judge Kuhls void order relating the cases has not been heard. The motion to strike
the demurrer has not been responded to nor been heard. Most importantly, the other
two Plaintiffs are not represented at this hearing and there is no discussion of how
their rights and claims would be protected during any consolidation.

Dated: ___ August, 2011
By: __________________________
DANIEL COOPER
In Pro Per
AA-171
APPENDIX
!
K!

APPENDIX
K

AA-172
AA-173
AA-174
AA-175
AA-176
AA-177
AA-178
AA-179
AA-180
AA-181
APPENDIX
!
L!

APPENDIX
L
AA-182

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR CONSOLIDATING CASES 1
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

Daniel Cooper
1836 10
th
Street # B
310-562-7668
IN PROPRIA PERSONA



)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Los Angeles County
Case No. SC113137
SC113064, lead

Daniel COOPER,

vs.

--------SUPPLEMENTAL--------
RESPONSE TO MOTION
REQUESTING
YC064994 Lead,
YC065018,
YC065019,
YC065021.
SC113064, lead
SC113135
SC113136
SC113137
AND
YC065164

Michael I. Levanas,

DATE: September 1, 2011
TIME: 8:30 a.m.
DEPT: 59

AA-183

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

Defendants motion for consolidation is pre-mature. If an unbribed judge is not
appointed soon, a change of venue will be sought to counties which did not pay the
bribes.
Defendants legal counsel will also change. The civil suits are correctly
filed against individuals outside of their official capacities. The taking of bribes is an
individual act, is outside the scope of all official actions and thus renders the
Government Claims Act inappropriate. Until evidence is presented showing explicit
management direction from the Superior Court, ordering its employees to take the
L.A. County monies, Plaintiff claims these are individual private actions to take the
bribes. Furthermore, as elected judicial officers, the judges status as employees is
highly questionable. An elected official is not normally considered an
"employee". Depending on how this key issue is decided, Court Counsel will likely
not be representing the defendants. New counsel will, most likely, be retained by
each defendant, further denying defendants their own due process rights if the
cases are consolidated now.
Court counsel states that individual Plaintiffs and Defendants rights will be
protected. The current consolidation motions show that Court Counsel cannot even
keep the case numbers and Plaintiffs separate. Plaintiff Ettlin has received copies of
filings in Plaintiff Coopers cases but ETTLIN has not been officially noticed of any
motions on his pending cases. The Notice of Demurrer states an October 3, 2011
hearing date for only two of ETTLINs five cases; but the court calendar as of August
29, 2011 contains no such hearing and thus no opportunities for Plaintiff Ettlin to
address the court on the Demurrer or the Consolidation. Clearly, Court Counsel has
no clue how to protect anyones rights of due process.
///
///
///
///
AA-184

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

AA-185

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

AA-186

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, 167 Cal.App.4th 630 (2008) Rev. denied
12/23/08, held that the L.A. County payments to L.A. Superior Court judges violated
Article VI, Section 19 of the California Constitution because the 1997 Lockyer-
Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act, while it DID authorize judicial benefits, it did NOT
set any standards for exercising the delegated authority and THUS the authorization
under Lockyer-Isenberg of judicial benefits payments by counties to Superior Court
judges was an unconstitutional delegation of power.
As of December 23, 2008 the judicial payments became bribes paid by Los
Angeles County. As of December 23, 2008 Judges lost all immunity for taking such
payments. As of December 23, 2008 Government Code Sections 810 and 821.6
were not applicable.
The Sturgeon II decision was decided on only three very narrow grounds. The
relevant portions state:
Shortly after we filed our opinion in Sturgeon I and while the
Legislature was in a special session, the Legislature passed and the
Governor signed legislation which addressed the constitutional defect we
identified in Sturgeon I. In particular, the legislation required that all counties
continue to provide sitting judges with whatever benefits the counties had
provided as of July 1, 2008. The Legislature permitted the counties to
terminate this obligation, but not with respect to sitting judges and only after
giving the Administrative Office of the Courts and any affected judges 180
days' notice.
On remand Sturgeon asserted the legislation was invalid on three
grounds. He argued the legislation was outside the scope of the Governor's
proclamation calling the special session, did not adequately prescribe
benefits judges are to be provided, and in any event violated equal protection
principles by continuing a statewide system of unequal judicial benefits. The
trial court rejected these contentions and granted the county's motion for
summary judgment.
The legislation Sturgeon challenges, as enacted, implemented an
interim response to the constitutional issues we addressed in Sturgeon I. As
we shall explain, the legislation fell within the scope of the Governor's
proclamation, adequately prescribed the benefits that must be provided to
judges and did not intrude upon any judge's right to equal protection of the
laws. Accordingly, we affirm.

AA-187

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

But the disturbing portion of the decision is the final paragraph which
contradicts the above opening statement by stating that SBX2 11 is not a permanent
response to the constitutional issues. How can a law be temporarily constitutional?
It either is or is not constitutional. Again, the Fourth Appellate Court, acknowledges
the contradiction and encourages these particular civil suits by stating:
However, on its face SBX 211 is not a permanent response to either the
constitutional issues we identified in Sturgeon I or the difficult problem of adopting a
compensation scheme that deals with varying economic circumstances in an
equitable and efficient manner. Thus, we would be remiss in discharging our duties if
we did not state that while the Legislature's interim response to Sturgeon I defeats
the particular challenges asserted by Sturgeon in this litigation, that interim remedy,
if not supplanted by the more comprehensive response SBX 211 plainly
contemplates, most likely will give rise to further challenges by taxpayers or members
of the bench themselves. As we noted at the outset, the issue of judicial
compensation is a state, not a county, responsibility. We are confident that the
Legislature within a reasonable period of time will act to adopt a uniform statewide
system of judicial compensation.
The SBX2 11 Section 2 is unconstitutionally vague about the same terms and
conditions as were in effect on that date. Since the Fourth Appellate Court is
deferring to the taxpayers and judges, these civil cases will ask for jury decisions on
whether the countys terms and conditions were defined anywhere and thus are
arbitrary (and unconstitutional) or whether they were one year payments and thus
terminated on June 30, 2009. Section 2 only identifies judges as recipients. No
authority is provided to pay Court Counsel or Commissioners.
The SBX2 11 Section 4 is unconstitutional because the Judicial Council is now
paying judicial benefits to commissioners, Court Counsel and others, as will be
determined at trial. (The payments in SBX2 11 Section 2 made by L.A. County to
Commissioners are called warrants by the L.A. County Auditor because they are
issued by L.A. County but funded by the Judicial Council.) The continued payments
by the counties under Section 2 now makes these Judicial Council payments a
continued obligation, which is prohibited by Section 4. The opinions of the
Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) are that these payments are
AA-188

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

unconstitutional. The CJP has requested the Attorney Generals opinion in this matter
because the judges are clearly biased. Again, since the Fourth Appellate Court is
whether the Superior Court payments obligated by the county payments are legal
and constitutional.
The SBX2 11 Section 5 immunity is unconstitutional, has not been challenged
in the Appellate Court and preserved the status quo ante Sturgeon I. The attempted
immunity is unconstitutional under the California Constitution, ARTICLE 1, SECTION
9 that states A bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of
contracts may not be passed. Furthermore, SBX2 11 Section 5 legislation conflicts
with the constitutional responsibilities of the Commission on Judicial Performance
(CJP). The extensive CJP analysis and arguments shows the legislatures attempt to
usurp constitutional powers and requests an opinion from the California Attorney
General on the constitutionality of SBX2 11. Again, since the Fourth Appellate Court
is deferring to the taxpayers and judges, these civil cases will ask for jury decisions
on whether the judges have immunity from civil liability and if so whether the Plaintiff
is due damages for the biases bought by the L.A. County bribes
///
///
The constitutionality of the severable portions of SBX2 11 is only one issue in
the civil suits. These civil suits are, first and foremost, about the biases experienced
by the Plaintiffs as a result of the county payments.
The United States Census Bureau data and analysis published in 2009 clearly
identifies the bias, at the national level, shown against Plaintiff by both Defendants
Weinbach and Levanas. These civil cases will establish that defendants county
bribes encouraged denial of Plaintiffs rights to raise his sons and gross exaggeration
of the child support due from zero income Plaintiff. A jury, with evidence, will decide if
the defendant judges are biased.
AA-189

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

///
///
8/23/11 7:16 PM The bias against fathers in U.S. custody and child support
Page 1 of 39 http://www.the-spearhead.com/2011/08/22/the-bias-against-u-s-fathers-in-custody-and-child-support/
The Spearhead
Home
About
Contact
Commenting Policy
Forum
Submissions
Marriage Reform
Subscribe
The bias against fathers in U.S. custody and child
support
by Dalrock on August 22, 2011
We all know the system is biased against fathers, but the actual data is important when discussing this with those who
are skeptical. It cant be that bad, can it? Here is the data I pulled together from Table 1 in the latest US Census
Bureau report on the topic, Custodial Mothers and Fathers and Their Child Support: 2007
All of the steps of the process are biased against men except the percentage of support due which is collected (the two
are roughly equal).
It starts with who is granted custody:
Looking at the figures for 2007, it appears to me that there may be a sampling anomaly. The percentage of custodial
mothers awarded support dropped by 4% between 2005 and 2007. This is 3% lower than any other year in the series.
Im not aware of any sweeping changes which occurred in this time frame, and since parents receive child support for
between 18 and 21 years it seems highly unlikely that the makeup of the population would change this much in just 2
years. Im also not sure why they dont have data beyond 2007. Since they publish this every other year they should
have data out for at least 2009. Once they publish the 2009 and 2011 data we will have a better understanding of if
the 2007 data shows a trend towards slightly less bias against fathers or if it was in fact a sampling error.

*Clarences experience makes sense, as Table 2 shows that 47.6% of all custodial parents with support agreements in
2007 were on public assistance. In these cases the state is generally the recipient of the child support payment,
although some states do pass $50 a month or a similar token amount on to the parent. This also shows up in the
numbers, as only 27% of custodial parents who stated they were due support payments in 2007 were on public
assistance. Those parents who didnt receive anything arent included in the average figures reported by the Census,
but those who received $50 are.
{ 78 comments read them below or add one }
Firepower August 22, 2011 at 08:56
A fine report such as this, (replete with concrete, irrefutable evidence in chart form) is normally expected to be
enough to get men finally motivated to fight.
If they do not, nor even emerge victorious, then not much can be said for the feebleness of their state.
Nor should any more tears be shed or energies expended on their behalf.
Liberty or slavery
Liberty, or death
AA-190

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

The $7,000 annual professional development bribe encouraged attendance at
anti-father conferences by the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges
and yielded biased rulings against Plaintiff on domestic violence and financial
settlements. Similarly, as lawyers, the judges would also have been included in the
anti-father advocacy campaigns of the American Bar Association in its distribution of
materials to discredit allegations of Parental Alienation Syndrome, encourage the
family court to take up domestic violence issues and otherwise prejudice the court in
the presentation of evidence. (A portion of one such document is shown below.)
Domestic violence is the purview of the District Attorney. A jury, based on the
evidence, will decide if the defendant judges were biased based on the payment of
L. A. County bribes.
Four judges who have taken the bribes have sworn on a stack of holy
documents that they are not biased. Plaintiff does not believe them and defendants
actions also speak otherwise. Plaintiff demands to have multiple jury decisions to
resolve these matters.
AA-191

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

The motion to consolidate cases is premature. A Writ of Mandate for Recusal
of Judge OBrien will be submitted at about the time of the next hearing. The motion
to vacate Judge Kuhls void order relating the cases has not even been heard. The
motion to strike the Demurrer based on Court Counsels erroneous and unilateral
misrepresentations has not been responded to nor been heard. The motions for
change of venue have not yet been completed. Most importantly, the other two
Plaintiffs are not represented at this hearing and there is no discussion of how their
rights and claims would be protected during any consolidation.

Dated: 29 August 2011
By: __________________________
DANIEL COOPER
In Pro Per

"I declare, under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States and under the
laws of the State of California, that the foregoing images inserted herein are true and
correct representations of the documents and information delineated."

Dated: 29 August 2011
By: __________________________
DANIEL COOPER
In Pro Per

AA-192
!
APPENDIX
!
M!

APPENDIX
M
AA-193

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

ETTLIN JOINDER OF SEPT 1, 2011 HEARING AND RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR CONSOLIDATION 1
D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

Dennis Ettlin
4520 Toucan Street
Torrance, CA 90503
310-795-9507
IN PROPRIA PERSONA



)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Los Angeles County
Case No. YC064994, lead for
YC065018,
YC065019,
YC065021
and
YC065164
Dennis ETTLIN,

vs.

--------EMERGENCY --------
JOINDER OF HEARING AND
OPPOSITION TO MOTION
REQUESTING
YC064994, lead for
YC065018,
YC065019,
YC065021, and
YC065164
AND
SC113064, lead for
SC113135
SC113136
SC113137
Glenda VEASEY,

DATE: September 1, 2011
TIME: 8:30 a.m.
DEPT: 59

AA-194

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

Plaintiff Dennis Ettlin (hereafter referenced as ETTLIN) requests a Joinder with
Plaintiff Daniel Cooper of the responses in opposition to the motion for consolidation
of civil cases. The sole purpose of the joinder is a request to appear at the hearing
on consolidation and submit his response in opposition. Plaintiff ETTLIN strongly
opposes consolidation.
ETTLIN is surprised that Court Counsel doesnt propose consolidating all
handgun murders in the county. They all involve a similar small metal gun. Why not
also consolidate all traffic tickets where a radar gun is involved. Each of those would
share many of the same points of law and the same legal theories and would save
Los Angeles County large sums of money. Court Counsel knows the public and even
the judges would not stand for such a travesty of justice.
ETTLINs cases are against Glenda Veasey, John Slawson, Kenneth Taylor,
Carolyn Kuhl and Sandy Kriegler. COOPER has no direct experience with any of the
facts in those cases. The similarity of any foundational facts and foundational
evidence is no different than that of handguns or radar measurement devices.
Court Counsel did not follow the California Rules of Court, Rule 3.350
(a)(1)(C) that requires the motion to Be filed in each case sought to be
consolidated. (emphasis added) Plaintiffs Dennis Ettlin and Anthony Locatelli did
not have standing for the August 25, 2011 hearing. Only with the Courts acceptance
of this joinder of the response in opposition to consolidation is ETTLIN asserting his
rights to be heard, with the Courts permission.
Court Counsel states that individual Plaintiffs and Defendants rights will be
protected. The current consolidation motions show that Court Counsel cannot even
keep the filings and Plaintiffs separate. Plaintiff Ettlin has received copies of filings in
Plaintiff Coopers cases but none of defendants motions have been filed on
ETTLINs pending cases. Did service alone entitle ETTLIN to speak at the August 25,
2011 hearing?
The Notice of Demurrer for YC065019 and YC065164 (mailed on August 25,
AA-195

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

2011) shows an October 3, 2011 hearing date for only these two of ETTLINs five
cases; but the court calendar as of August 29 and August 30, 2011 contains no such
hearing. Since ETTLIN was served with the COOPER filings in July, 2011, does that
now mean that the Demurrer which the Court has taken under submission applies to
both ETTLIN and COOPER? Is the October 3, 2011 hearing now expected to be a
sham for ETTLIN? A mere rubber stamp by the Court of its decision in the COOPER
cases? Is this how Court Counsel plans to protect the due process rights of multiple
litigants with multiple suits?
The Motion for Consolidation was mailed to Plaintiff ETTLIN on July 29, 2011.
Glenda Veasey (case number YC064994) was not served a summons until August 2,
2011. The consolidation motion was not filed in any of the ETTLIN cases as indicated
by the Courts own website. Was Glenda Veasey represented at the hearing on
August 25, 2011? Court records make no mention of Plaintiff ETTLIN or Defendant
Veasey. Did service AND mere inclusion of ETTLINs cases in the caption of the
motion in COOPERs case provide the proper standing for ETTLIN or Veasey?
The August 30, 2011 Reply to Opposition for consolidation includes ETTLIN
on the service list and the proof of service states that ETTLIN was served by email.
However, ETTLIN received no email from Kevin McCormick and is not aware of any
telephone messages requesting an email address. This is an unfortunate mistake
and error by the process server, Jacqueline Mora. Perhaps the service by Federal
Express shipment will include ETTLIN, although not in a timely fashion for the
September 1, 2011 hearing.
Is this the kind of due process that Court Counsel has in mind for Plaintiffs and
Defendants? Clearly, Court Counsel has no interest in and no clue how to protect
anyones rights of due process. Plaintiff ETTLIN strongly objects to any contention by
Court Counsel that due process rights will be protected following consolidation!
Court Counsel claims in the last minute reply to the opposition that a copy of
the Motion to Consolidate was filed in all five ETTLIN cases. The screen captures
AA-196

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

below show this is not true for three of the cases. The other two also were not filed.

AA-197

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

AA-198

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

AA-199

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

Court Counsels reply to COOPERs opposition asserts that ETTLIN chose not
to oppose the motion. Nothing could be further from the truth. Did the Court ascertain
ETTLINs presence or request ETTLIN to come forward to the Plaintiffs table. NO.
Did the Court solicit any information on the whereabouts of ETTLIN or otherwise
indicate that ETTLIN was a party to the matters before the Court? NO. Did the
Courts own minutes in any way reference, include or mention ETTLIN or any of his
case numbers or Defendants. NO. Did Kevin McCormicks version of the minutes in
any way reference, include or mention ETTLIN or any of his case numbers or
Defendants? NO.

THE CASES ARE PROPERLY SUED AND SERVED
AGAINST INDIVIDUALS.

Court Counsel fails to appreciate the larger point made by COOPER that
the taking of the bribes is an individual action, not approved for employees and
not approved for elected officials. Court Counsel fails to provide any evidence as
to supervisors directly ordering the employees to accept the L.A. County
monies. Court Counsel fails to identify Election Code that absolves the
Defendants from declaring the bribes on their Form 700 financial disclosure
forms. Then the judges would not need SBX2 11 immunity and may be entitled
to Court Counsels services. Until each piece of that evidence is forthcoming,
Plaintiffs ETTLIN and COOPER assert the taking of the bribes was an individual
action not required by the employer as part of the judges official duties. Such
individual actions do beg for immunity. Plaintiff COOPER filed case SC113137
against Michael I. Levanas as an individual. The case was not erroneously sued
and served as stated by Kevin M. McCormick and the firm of Benton, Orr, Duval
and Buckingham (BODB). The case very properly is sued against the individual
person of Michael I. Levanas.
AA-200

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

Plaintiffs' argument that the judges are being sued as individuals must be
respected as true until such time as there is a ruling to the contrary.
These cases are against individuals, tailored to the actions taken and
specific biases shown by each defendant. They are not a class action, they are not
against public officials as used in Government Code section 6103; they are against
the actions, biases and misdeeds of individuals because of the bribes they took.
Plaintiff demands to know who authorized the services of BODB for the Demurrer
in case SC113137 or SC113064,lead. Any work by or documents presented by
Kevin McCormick and BODB are, at this time, a misuse of public funds.
The civil suits are being filed against the judges for actions and omissions
they took as individuals. The individuals accepted the monies made available to
them by or through the County of Los Angeles. The damages are associated with
the favors to Los Angeles County shown by the defendants subsequent actions
as bribed individuals unqualified to be bench officers who failed to disqualify
themselves. Those biases/ favors were perpetrated as individuals who attempted
to not disclose such payments to litigants and cover up their fraud on the court.
Plaintiff demands to see written evidence that Superior Court of California
supervisors of bench officers, acting in their official supervisorial capacity are
promulgating Superior Court of California command media or specifically directing
the bench officers to accept monies offered by Los Angeles County as part of their
employment contract with the State of California. In the absence of such
management direction, Plaintiff must again assume that it was individual actions to
accept and cash the checks offered by L.A. County. Those individual actions are
the basis of the civil suits against individuals. Consequently, Plaintiff demands to
see a signed private agreement between the individual Defendants for
representation by BODB. Plaintiff also demands that filing fees be paid, as they are
not exempt under Government Code section 6103.
The discussion of whether the individuals are acting in their official judicial
AA-201

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

capacities or as individuals can be settled by identifying the precedents for judicial
officers to take money from parties that are frequently before the court. If
defendant can produce such case law, Plaintiff will gladly review it.
The judiciary-drafted SBX2 11 decided that the affected individuals needed
and were to be given retroactive criminal immunity for making or taking judicial
payments. While judicial officers already had broad immunity for the conduct of
their normal judicial duties, the briberous, unconstitutional and illegal nature of the
county payments necessitated the attempted special immunity described in SBX2
11. That immunity is itself unconstitutional as are the current payments illegal and
that is exactly why the Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) has asked the
Attorney General for a determination.
Court Counsels actions as a state employee to usurp the Courts authority
to determine if these complaints are properly sued against an individual, as stated
on the summons and on the complaint, and to volunteer state legal services to
these individuals may itself be illegal and possibly obstructions of justice.
Information from the County Auditors office for Brett Bianco indicates he himself
gets a bonus, a 23% bonus for 2010, from these same judicial benefits. Thus, he
has a personal individual interest and bias in preserving and protecting the status
quo for judicial benefits. Furthermore, by asserting an error on Plaintiffs part, he
is using State legal resources to protect his own illegal payments and the illegal
payments to individuals who just happen to be judges.
The Court Counsel, with his personal and individual interest in protecting the
practice of county-paid judicial benefits, works in concert with the Los Angeles
County Office of the County Counsel to obscure the simple truth that bribes were
paid to individuals who protect the interests of Los Angeles County and illegally
hide behind the veneer of organizational authority. The Litigation manager provides
quarterly risk management reports to the supervisors on the projected costs to the
county from on-going litigation and is responsible for working with the Superior
AA-202

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

Court and the District Attorney to reduce risk and protect the countys interests.
This report is confidential, protecting planning discussions from being exposed to
the public. The Appendix of the complaint contains the 2007-2008 public report
signed by the Litigation Cost Manager. The Commission on Judicial Performance
is now finally investigating the Superior Court payments with the linkage to county
payments.
Court Counsel has intimidated process servers and apparently instructed
court personnel to prevent the service of court documents to the individuals at their
place of work by directing process servers to his office. After the process server
sought a restraining order against Court Counsel, the court personnel now accept
service for the individuals at their place of work.
Plaintiffs continues to believe and must assume the POS-010 form for
individual service is the proper form and process for serving these individuals and
is in compliance with California Code of Civil procedure Section 415.10 or 415.20.
For a court bench officer, the court executive officer should be served (per page 32
of the Action Guide, Handling Claims Against Government Entities, November
2010). Plaintiff is not aware that Court Counsel is simultaneously the court
executive officer and therefore his intercepting the court documents intended for
individuals at their place of work has denied proper service to those individuals.
Defendants cashed the L.A. County bribe as individuals. No supervisor,
acting in an official role, directed them to accept the monies in an official capacity.
It was not part of their state employee compensation package. They acted as
private citizens not in a judicial capacity when they used those monies for personal
gain. Plaintiffs complaints are properly sued against the defendants as individuals.
///
///
///
///
AA-203

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

THE COMPLAINT IS NOT DEFECTIVE

The demurrer is based on Defendants changes to Plaintiffs complaint and
raises a straw man that does not represent Plaintiffs position and then provides
totally irrelevant citations and arguments that the judges were acting in an official
capacity when they accepted Los
Angeles County payments. Just as
the Pennsylvanian judge denied
any wrongdoing even after his
conviction by a jury for bribery,
Court Counsel and the Los Angeles judges deny their own law-breaking.
Plaintiff demands a jury trial because judges judging judges has not put this
subject to rest. The Fourth Appellate Court deferred to the civil cases like this and the
juries of taxpayers to bring about the constitutional changes needed to restore due
process and remove bias from the courts.
Court Counsel claims Sturgeon and SBX2 11 make the cases suitable for
consolidation. Just the opposite is true. In front of a jury, the Sturgeon and SBX2 11
issues will take 20 minutes each. The Title IV-D issues will take 2-4 hours. The
damages due to ETTLIN will take 8-15 hours in front of a jury. The damages due to
COOPER may take 15-20 hours because of the loss of lifetime earnings. The
damages to LOCATELLI may take 20-40 hours because of the complexity of
international law in child kidnapping cases. Concatenating these sessions will only
lengthen the jury service, confuse the jurors, trivialize arguments and complicate
appeals.
The Plaintiffs are each separate, In Pro Per individuals. None are lawyers,
none can legally represent anyone else. No single Plaintiff could speak for any of the
others. Each case is different in key respects. Two Plaintiffs have domestic violence
issues while one does not. One Plaintiff has a move-away and international
AA-204

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

kidnapping issues while two do not. Two Plaintiffs have direct contact with Child
Support Services Department while all three are subject to the guidelines, polices
and threatened sanctions. One lives in San Diego, while two reside currently in Los
Angeles County.
The Defendants are likewise different and separate. Carolyn Kuhl had
supervisory duties and thus had greater responsibility for alerting bench officers to
the inappropriateness of the bribes and also the failure of bench officers to recuse
themselves; thus a greater responsibility for the denial of due process and fraud on
the court. The three appellate judges have a disproportionate responsibility for the
denial of constitutional rights based on the unconstitutionality of SBX2 11 and the
conflicts between Californias Title IV-D laws and the California Constitutional
protections. All four are guilty of Misprision of felony.
Defendants legal counsel will also change. The civil suits are correctly
filed against individuals outside of their official capacities. The taking of bribes is an
individual act, is outside the scope of all official actions and thus renders the
Government Claims Act inappropriate. Until evidence is presented showing explicit
management direction from the Superior Court, ordering its employees to take the
L.A. County monies, Plaintiff claims these are individual private actions to take the
bribes. Depending on how this key issue is decided, Court Counsel will likely not
be representing the defendants. New counsel will, most likely, be retained by each
defendant, further denying defendants their own due process rights if the cases are
consolidated now.
The judges are also different. COOPER has zero current income yet has
three different fee waiver determinations; immediate, show the court tax returns,
and 30 days only with review. ETTLIN is unemployed and likewise received three
different fee waiver determinations; waived, initial filing fee only waived, denied.
The duplication of discovery and evidence is a specious argument. Properly
documented evidence can easily be shared without duplication. The testimony of
AA-205

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

experts and officials can again be shared and supplemented if necessary. The
judiciary and its litigators will determine the amount of duplication of effort.
Defendants have made no efforts at negotiation, so the extent of litigation is
also unknown at this time. Defendants mistakenly believe state resources will defend
them. Defendants mistakenly listen to Court Counsel. Defendants are not immune.
After the first couple of jury decisions, the path of negotiations going forward will be
much clearer.
The Memorandum of Points and Authorities fails to support a claim of
consolidation. Section I describes the similarities and makes no references to the
differences between Plaintiffs or Defendants. Section II cites CCP 1048(a) but makes
no connection or attempted argument linking unnecessary costs with avoid(ing)
inconsistent and/or conflicting rulings. The unnecessary costs are the bribes
themselves. Further, if the defense arguments are as compelling as Court Counsel
claims, there would be no chance of conflicting rulings. Thus a tacit admission that
the cases are not the slam-dunk for consolidation and justice as alleged. Section III
envisions a single judge of the same Los Angeles County bribed judiciary ruling on
the constitutionality of the bribes, superseding the Fourth Appellate Courts Sturgeon
I and II decisions and rescuing the judges. The simple statement that the rights of all
parties will be protected by the consolidation is unsubstantiated and simply
preposterous!
The Memorandum of Points and Authorities is an opportunity lost in defending
the constitutionality of SBX2 11; in arguing the criminality of post May 2009 payments
by Los Angeles County; and in defending the actions of individuals taking monies
offered by an interested party. The wishful thinking of absolute judicial immunity
asserted in the Defendants Demurrer is contradicted by SBX2 11 and by the Fourth
Appellate Court.
L.A. County is not a sovereign entity. Its payments to judges are no different
than (hypothetically) Plaintiffs gifts to the judges. Both are bribes. The jury gets it.
AA-206

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

The Los Angeles County supervisors and the California legislature are unable to
justify wage increases for the judiciary and thus resort to briberous payments.
Defendants motion for consolidation is pre-mature. The cases will not be
decided in the same courtroom. Unless an unbiased judge is assigned immediately,
a change of venue for each case will be filed in differing counties, those which did not
pay bribes. Indeed, since all the judicial officers are located within Los Angeles
County, the likelihood of an unbiased judge within Los Angeles County is extremely
remote.
Plaintiff Locatelli does not agree to the transfer of his case from San Diego,
and will seek recusal of Judge Strauss at the first opportunity. A new motion of
consolidation will be needed if that case is eventually transferred and survives all the
appeals to remain in San Diego County. Furthermore, three new cases will be filed in
the next few weeks with five more likely in four to five weeks. Any consolidation at
this point will be meaningless.
Multiple adjudications are necessary because the judiciary itself has failed to
resolve the issues at hand. The Fourth Appellate Court refused to order an overhaul
of judicial compensation. The Judicial Council and the Administrative Office of the
Courts failed to sufficiently address the issues in writing SBX2 11. Individual bench
officers have refused to recuse themselves. The judiciary has totally failed to resolve
the issues itself.
Multiple adjudications by citizen juries is exactly what the Fourth Appellate
District had in mind with its Sturgeon II decision. The cases YC064994,
YC065018, YC065019, YC065021. SC113064, SC113135, SC113136, SC113137
and YC065164 are all different. Inconsistent adjudications are needed to provide the
necessary guidelines for tribunal reviews of similar cases voided by the bribes.
///
///
///
AA-207

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

SBX2 11 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, 167 Cal.App.4th 630 (2008) Rev. denied
12/23/08, held that the L.A. County payments to L.A. Superior Court judges violated
Article VI, Section 19 of the California Constitution because the 1997 Lockyer-
Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act, while it DID authorize judicial benefits, it did NOT
set any standards for exercising the delegated authority and THUS the authorization
under Lockyer-Isenberg of judicial benefits payments by counties to Superior Court
judges was an unconstitutional delegation of power.
As of December 23, 2008 the judicial payments became bribes paid by Los
Angeles County. As of December 23, 2008 Judges lost all immunity for taking such
payments. As of December 23, 2008 Government Code Sections 810 and 821.6
were not applicable.
The Sturgeon II decision was decided on only three very narrow grounds. The
relevant portions state:
Shortly after we filed our opinion in Sturgeon I and while the
identified in Sturgeon I. In particular, the legislation required that all counties
days' notice.
summary judgment.
interim response to the constitutional issues we addressed in Sturgeon I. As
AA-208

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a


But the disturbing portion of the decision is the final paragraph which
contradicts the above opening statement by stating that SBX2 11 is not a permanent
response to the constitutional issues. How can a law be temporarily constitutional?
It either is or is not constitutional. Again, the Fourth Appellate Court, acknowledges
the contradiction and encourages these particular civil suits by stating:
constitutional issues we identified in Sturgeon I or the difficult problem of adopting a
we did not state that while the Legislature's interim response to Sturgeon I defeats
The SBX2 11 Section 2 is unconstitutionally vague about the same terms and
conditions as were in effect on that date. Since the Fourth Appellate Court is
whether the countys terms and conditions were defined anywhere and thus are
arbitrary (and unconstitutional) or whether they were one year payments and thus
terminated on June 30, 2009. Section 2 only identifies judges as recipients. No
authority is provided to pay Court Counsel or Commissioners.
The SBX2 11 Section 4 is unconstitutional because the Judicial Council is now
paying judicial benefits to commissioners, Court Counsel and others, as will be
determined at trial. (The payments in SBX2 11 Section 2 made by L.A. County to
Commissioners are called warrants by the L.A. County Auditor because they are
issued by L.A. County but funded by the Judicial Council.) The continued payments
by the counties under Section 2 now makes these Judicial Council payments a
AA-209

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

continued obligation, which is prohibited by Section 4. The opinions of the
Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) are that these payments are
unconstitutional. The CJP has requested the Attorney Generals opinion in this matter
because the judges are clearly biased. Again, since the Fourth Appellate Court is
whether the Superior Court payments obligated by the county payments are legal
and constitutional.
The SBX2 11 Section 5 immunity is unconstitutional, has not been challenged
in the Appellate Court and preserved the status quo ante Sturgeon I. The attempted
immunity is unconstitutional under the California Constitution, ARTICLE 1, SECTION
9 that states A bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of
contracts may not be passed. Furthermore, SBX2 11 Section 5 legislation conflicts
with the constitutional responsibilities of the Commission on Judicial Performance
(CJP). The extensive CJP analysis and arguments shows the legislatures attempt to
usurp constitutional powers and requests an opinion from the California Attorney
General on the constitutionality of SBX2 11. Again, since the Fourth Appellate Court
is deferring to the taxpayers and judges, these civil cases will ask for jury decisions
on whether the judges have immunity from civil liability and if so whether the Plaintiff
is due damages for the biases bought by the L.A. County bribes.

BIAS, INJURY AND DAMAGES
!
The constitutionality of the severable portions of SBX2 11 is only one issue in
the civil suits. These civil suits are, first and foremost, about the biases experienced
by the Plaintiffs as a result of the county payments.
The United States Census Bureau data and analysis published in 2009 clearly
identifies the bias, at the national level, shown against the Plaintiffs by the family law
Defendants. These civil cases will establish that defendants county bribes
AA-210

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

encouraged denial of Plaintiffs rights to raise their children and exaggerated the child
support due from Plaintiffs. A jury, with evidence, will decide if the defendant judges
were biased.

Looking at the figures for 2007, it appears to me that there may be a sampling anomaly. The percentage of custodial
mothers awarded support dropped by 4% between 2005 and 2007. This is 3% lower than any other year in the series.
Im not aware of any sweeping changes which occurred in this time frame, and since parents receive child support for
between 18 and 21 years it seems highly unlikely that the makeup of the population would change this much in just 2
years. Im also not sure why they dont have data beyond 2007. Since they publish this every other year they should
have data out for at least 2009. Once they publish the 2009 and 2011 data we will have a better understanding of if
the 2007 data shows a trend towards slightly less bias against fathers or if it was in fact a sampling error.

*Clarences experience makes sense, as Table 2 shows that 47.6% of all custodial parents with support agreements in
2007 were on public assistance. In these cases the state is generally the recipient of the child support payment,
although some states do pass $50 a month or a similar token amount on to the parent. This also shows up in the
numbers, as only 27% of custodial parents who stated they were due support payments in 2007 were on public
assistance. Those parents who didnt receive anything arent included in the average figures reported by the Census,
but those who received $50 are.
{ 78 comments read them below or add one }
Firepower August 22, 2011 at 08:56
A fine report such as this, (replete with concrete, irrefutable evidence in chart form) is normally expected to be
enough to get men finally motivated to fight.
If they do not, nor even emerge victorious, then not much can be said for the feebleness of their state.
Nor should any more tears be shed or energies expended on their behalf.
Liberty or slavery
Liberty, or death
The Spearhead
Home
About
Contact
Commenting Policy
Forum
Submissions
Marriage Reform
Subscribe
The bias against fathers in U.S. custody and child
support
by Dalrock on August 22, 2011
We all know the system is biased against fathers, but the actual data is important when discussing this with those who
are skeptical. It cant be that bad, can it? Here is the data I pulled together from Table 1 in the latest US Census
Bureau report on the topic, Custodial Mothers and Fathers and Their Child Support: 2007
All of the steps of the process are biased against men except the percentage of support due which is collected (the two
are roughly equal).
It starts with who is granted custody:
AA-211

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

The $7,000 annual professional development bribe encouraged attendance at
anti-father conferences like the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges
and yielded biased rulings against Plaintiffs on domestic violence and financial
settlements. Similarly, as lawyers, the judges would also have been included in the
anti-father advocacy campaigns of the American Bar Association in its distribution of
materials to discredit allegations of Parental Alienation Syndrome, encourage the
family court to take up domestic violence issues and otherwise prejudice the court in
the presentation of evidence. (A portion of one such document is shown below.)
Domestic violence is the purview of the District Attorney. A jury, based on the
evidence, will decide if the defendant judges were biased based on the payment of
Los Angeles County bribes.
Four judges who have taken the bribes have sworn on a stack of holy
documents that they are not biased. Plaintiff does not believe them and defendants
actions also speak otherwise. Plaintiff demands to have multiple jury decisions to
resolve these matters.
///
AA-212

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

If Court Counsel wants to achieve cost savings, BODB can start by
systematically addressing the questions and issues identified and then convincing
both the Court and the Plaintiffs of the robustness of those answers. Plaintiffs have
no interest in duplicating 50-page Appendices and generating pleadings with the
same information and questions repeated. Plaintiffs would be very interested in a
process for building a foundation of evidence and admissions of fact.
The motion to consolidate cases is premature. Another Writ of Mandate for
Recusal of Judge OBrien will be submitted on September 5, 2011. The motion to
vacate Judge Kuhls void order relating the cases has not even been heard or
responded to by Court Counsel. The motion to strike the Demurrer based on Court
Counsels erroneous and unilateral misrepresentations has not been responded to
nor been heard. The motions for change of venue have not yet been completed.
Most importantly, prior to any consolidation, a stipulation must be in place for proper
representation of Plaintiffs and Defendants at these hearings and discussion of how
their rights and claims would be protected following any consolidation.

Dated: 31 August 2011 By: _______________________________
DENNIS ETTLIN
In Pro Per

"I declare, under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States and under the
laws of the State of California, that the foregoing images inserted herein are true and
correct representations of the documents and information delineated."

Dated: 31 August 2011 By: _______________________________
DENNIS ETTLIN
In Pro Per

AA-213
!
APPENDIX
!
N!

APPENDIX
N
AA-214
AA-215
AA-216
AA-217
AA-218
AA-219
AA-220
AA-221
AA-222
AA-223
!
APPENDIX
!
O!

APPENDIX
O
AA-224

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

REQUEST FOR RECUSAL AND OBJECTION TO REFUSAL 1
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

Daniel Cooper
1836 10
th
st # B
310-562-7668
IN PROPRIA PERSONA



)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Los Angeles County
Case No. SC113137
SC113064, lead

Daniel COOPER,

vs.

REQUEST FOR RECUSAL
UNDER CCP 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii)
BASED ON BIAS DUE TO L.A.
COUNTY JUDICIAL BENEFIT
BRIBES AND FAILURE TO
DISCLOSE L.A. COUNTY
INTERESTS IN THE CASE

OBJECTION UNDER CCP
170.3(c)(1) TO REFUSAL TO
RECUSE

REQUEST UNDER CCP
170.3(c)(5) FOR A JUDGE
SELECTED BY THE
CHAIRPERSON OF THE
JUDICIAL COUNCIL
Michael I. LEVANAS,
an individual; Defendant

TIME: 8:30 a.m.
DEPT: 59

AA-225

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

The Judicial Council report of December 2009 states that all L.A. County judges
have been receiving L.A. County Judicial Benefits. Under California Code of Civil
Procedure (CCP), Section 170.1(a)(3), Judge OBrien must disclose all such monies
he receives now or in the past from L.A. County or similar benefits from the Los
Angeles Superior Court. He has not done so. An Internet search for Judge Robert
OBrien shows that he has indeed received such monies. An email from Gregg
Iverson of the L.A. County Auditors office clearly confirms that Judge OBrien
took $277,925 of L.A. County judicial payments from 1989 to 1999 before
he retired.
California Code of Civil Procedure, 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) states A judge shall
be disqualified if any one or more the following is true: ....(iii) A person aware of the
facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be
impartial. Plaintiff doubts that Judge OBrien, like Michael Lavanas and others,
can be impartial in Plaintiffs family law and alleged domestic violence matters.
Code of Judicial Ethics, Canon 3E(1) states, A judge shall disqualify himself
or herself in any proceeding in which disqualification is required by law. Code of
Judicial Ethics Canon 3E(2) states, In all Trial Court proceedings, a judge shall
disclose on the record information that is reasonably relevant to the question of
disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no actual basis for
disqualification. That L.A. County is an interested party and paid bribes to the
judges, is extremely relevant to Plaintiffs case.
Plaintiff has seen no such disclosures. Since this case is totally about L.A.
County payments to judges and the bias arising therefrom, Judge OBrien must
AA-226

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

recuse himself and transfer the case to a judge who has not received benefits as
demanded in the civil complaint.
This objection is also a formal CCP section 170.3(c)(1) objection to Judge
OBriens refusal to disqualify himself for cause under CCP 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii).
Based upon Judge OBriens taking of L.A. County payments and the presumed
bias against Plaintiff, Judge OBrien must disqualify himself under the standard set
forth in the cases of Michael v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co. (2001) 88
Cal.App.4th 925 , as modified at 89 Cal.App.4th 406; Roitz v. Coldwell Banker
Residential Brokerage Co., 62 Cal.App.4th 716, 723 (1998); Ceriale v. AMCO Ins.
Co., 48 Cal.App.4th 500,506 (1996).
The CCP 170.3(c)(1) required facts constituting the grounds are
voluminously detailed in the Writ of Mandate filed August 12, 2011 in the Second
Appellate Court, Division 8, case number B235113 against Robert OBrien, are
again partially described in the underlying complaint to this very case SC113137
and are not included here for the sake of brevity.

RENEWED DEMAND FOR UNBRIBED JUDGE
Plaintiff seeks a judge who has not received judicial benefits from any
county, has no personal or professional ties to lawyers or judges in Los Angeles
County, has no familiarity with Title IV-D agencies, and no familiarity with domestic
violence agencies or advocates. The Court must inform the parties if this requires a
change of venue to a county where the judges are not receiving supplemental judicial
payments.

Dated: ____ August, 2011
By: __________________________
DANIEL COOPER
In Pro Per
AA-227

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

VERIFICATION

Verification of Pleading and
Declaration under Penalty of Perjury Form

By Party
DANIEL COOPER

CASE TITLE:
DANIEL COOPER
v.
Michael I. LEVANAS,

I, Daniel Cooper, declare:
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter.
2. I have read the foregoing Request for Recusal and know the contents
thereof.
3. The same is true of my own knowledge, except as to those matters which
are therein stated on information and belief, and, as to those matters, I
believe it to be true.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. This
verification was executed on August 21, 2011, at Los Angeles County,
California.

____________________________
Daniel Cooper
In Pro Per

Daniel Cooper
1836 10
th
st # B
310-562-7668
IN PROPRIA PERSONA
AA-228
POS-030
ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address): FOR COURT USE ONLY
CASE NUMBER:
PROOF OF SERVICE BY FIRST-CLASS MAILCIVIL
I am over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am a resident of or employed in the county where the mailing
took place.
My residence or business address is:
On (date): I mailed from (city and state):
the following documents (specify):
I served the documents by enclosing them in an envelope and (check one):
a. depositing the sealed envelope with the United States Postal Service with the postage fully prepaid.
b.
The envelope was addressed and mailed as follows:
Name of person served:
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Date:
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF PERSON COMPLETING THIS FORM) (SIGNATURE OF PERSON COMPLETING THIS FORM)
Form Approved for Optional Use
Judicial Council of California
POS-030 [New January 1, 2005]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1013, 1013a
1.
2.
3.
placing the envelope for collection and mailing following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with this
businesss practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is
placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service in
a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid.
4.
Address of person served: b.
a.
www.courtinfo.ca.gov
PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF:
RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT:
TELEPHONE NO.:
ATTORNEY FOR (Name):
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF
STREET ADDRESS:
MAILING ADDRESS:
CITY AND ZIP CODE:
BRANCH NAME:
FAX NO. (Optional):
(Do not use this Proof of Service to show service of a Summons and Complaint.)
The name and address of each person to whom I mailed the documents is listed in the Attachment to Proof of Service
by First-Class MailCivil (Persons Served) (POS-030(P)).
The documents are listed in the Attachment to Proof of Service by First-Class MailCivil (Documents Served)
(form POS-030(D)).
5.
E-MAIL ADDRESS (Optional):
(Proof of Service)
AA-229
!
APPENDIX
!
P!

APPENDIX
P
AA-230
AA-231
AA-232
AA-233

!
7
I
N

P
R
O

P
E
R

B241184!
! COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, Division p

Daniel COOPER,
an individual;
Petitioner/Appellant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Court of Appeal
B241184
Superior Court
YC064994
Lead for additional
consolidated cases
YC065018,
YC065019,
YC065021,
YC065164, and
SC113064
SC113135
SC113136
SC113137
v.

Elia WEINBACH,
an individual;
Defendant/Respondent.

Appeal From a Judgment of
The Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles
The Honorable Robert OBrien

Volume 2 of 2, Pages _______________

Kevin M. McCormick
Benton, Orr, Duval and
Buckingham
39 North California Street,
Post Office Box 1178

Daniel Cooper
1836 10
th
Street #B
310-562-7668
In Pro Per

AA-234
Q
APPENDIX
Q
APPENDIX
AA-235
AA-236
Statement of Decision Requested on
Constitutional Issues

!
WRIT OF MANDATE FOR RECUSAL OF JUDGE OBRIEN 1
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
.

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

B________________

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Los Angeles County
Case No. SC113137

DANIEL COOPER
APPELLANT

v.

SUPERIOR COURT,
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
RESPONDENT
from the Judgment of the
Superior Court
Hon. Robert OBrien, Judge
SC113064, lead
SC113135
SC113136

APPELLANTS PETITION FOR
WRIT OF MANDATE FOR
IMMEDIATE ORDER FOR RECUSAL OF
JUDGE ROBERT OBRIEN

from the Judgment of the Superior Court
Honorable Robert OBrien, Judge

Daniel Cooper
1836 10
th
Street # B
310-562-7668
IN PROPRIA PERSONA

Statement of Decision Requested on Constitutional
Issues. Sturgeon II left constitutional issues unresolved.
Plaintiff seeks Second Appellate decision to avoid
change of Venue and hardship on all parties to the cases.
!
AA-237
AA-238

!
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
.

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

B________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX&TO&APPENDICES&SUPPORTING&PETITION&FOR&WRIT&.....................&3&
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES&...............................................................&4&
CASE SUMMARY STATUS&...............................................................&6&
PLAINTIFFS APPELLATE SUMMARY&...........................................&7&
REQUEST&FOR&STATEMENT&OF&DECISION&...............................................&8&
APPELLANT&SEEKS&THE&RECUSAL&OF&JUDGE&OBRIEN&.............................&10&
JUDGE&OBRIEN&COMMITED&FRAUD&ON&THE&COURT&..........................&12&
JUDGE&OBRIEN&COMMITED&A&DENIAL&OF&DUE&PROCESS&......................&14&
SBX2 11 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL&.................................................&16&
LOS&ANGELES&COUNTY&IS&AN&INTERESTED&PARTY,&.................................&23&
JUDGE&OBRIEN&VIOLATED&CODE&OF&JUDICIAL&ETHICS&...........................&26&
DEMAND FOR UNBIASED JUDGE&.................................................&27&
CONCLUSION&...................................................................................&27&
PRAYER&.............................................................................................&28&
VERIFICATION&................................................................................&29&

INDEX TO APPENDICES SUPPORTING PETITION FOR WRIT
APPENDIX 1 Request for Recusal .............................................................. A1
APPENDIX 2 Order Striking Disqualification ........................................... A7
APPENDIX 3 County Auditor Data on OBrien Payments ..................... A14
APPENDIX 4 COOPER Correspondence with County Auditor. ............ A19
APPENDIX 5 Text of SBX2 11 ................................................................. A27
APPENDIX 6 Commission on Judicial Performance Opinions ............... A31
APPENDIX 7 Trial Court Operations Budget Summary .......................... A55
APPENDIX 8 Litigation Cost Manager Report, Summary ....................... A60
APPENDIX 9 Child Support Services Dept. Budget ................................. A66
APPENDIX 10 Zolin 1988 Memorandum to L.A. Superior Court ........... A72
AA-239

!
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
.

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

B________________

Table of Authorities
Cases
Austin v. Smith,
312 F2nd. 337,343 (1962) .................................................................................. 16
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc.,
566 U.S. ___ (2009) ....................................................................... 8, 12, 14, 25
Carlson v. Eassa
54 CA4th 684,691, 62 CR2d 884, 888 (1997); ........................................ 24
Carr v. Kamins
151 CA4th 929, 933-934, 60 CR3d 196, 199 (2007) ............................. 24
In Re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ................................................................................... 26
Offutt v. United States,
348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) ......................................................................................... 25
Elliott v. Lessee of Piersol,
26 U. S. (1 Pet.) 328, 340 (1828) .................................................................... 16
Old Wayne Mut. Life Assn v. McDonough,
204 U.S. 8, 27 Sup.Ct. 236 .............................................................. 12
Residents for Adequate Water v. Redwood Valley County Water Dist.
34 CA4th 1801, 1805, 41 CR2d 123, 125 (1995) .................................................... 24
Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles,
167 Cal.App.4th 630, 84
Cal.Rptr.3d 242 (2008) ............................................ 9-11, 14-16, 18, 20-21
Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles
___Cal App.4th___(4th Dist.,Div. 1) (2010) ......................... 9-11, 20-21, 27
U.S. v. Throckmorton,
98 U.S. 61 (1878) .................................................................................................. 13-15, 23
Vallely v. Northern Fire and Marine Co.,
254 U.S. 348 (1920) .............................................................................................. 13-15, 23
Wells,
Res Adjudicata, Section 499 ....................................................................................... 15

Statutes
California Code of Civil Procedure ____ ....................................... 12-14, 22, 26-27
1997 Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act ............................................. 14-16, 18
Other Authorities
California Senate Bill SBX2 11 .................................................................... 9-11, 18-22
California Code of Judicial Ethics .................................................................... 12-13, 26
Constitutional Provisions
California Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 19 ............................................................. 14-17
AA-240

!
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
.

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

B________________

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Los Angeles County
Case No. SC113137

DANIEL COOPER
APPELLANT

SC113064, lead
SC113135
SC113136

v.

SUPERIOR COURT,
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
RESPONDENT

from the Judgment of the
Superior Court
Hon. Robert OBrien, Judge
APPELLANTS PETITION FOR
WRIT OF MANDATE FOR
IMMEDIATE ORDER FOR
RECUSAL OF
JUDGE ROBERT OBRIEN

AA-241

!
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
.

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

B________________
CASE SUMMARY STATUS

Appellant (hereinafter COOPER) requested recusal with
cause of Judge Robert H. OBrien. The order striking the statement of
disqualification provided only this Writ of Mandate process for review.
COOPER has been in civil case proceedings since June 17, 2011 in Los
Angeles County. On August 25, 2011, Appellant filed with the court,
prior to the proceeding, a written request for recusal, a section
170.3(c)(1) objection and a section 170.3(c)(5) request for independent
review. During the proceeding, Appellant verbally requested Judge
OBriens recusal due to receipt of Judicial Benefits. The Judge replied
he would take the matter under consideration. Later on August 25, 2011,
Judge OBrien issued an order striking the statement of disqualification.
That statement denied current receipt of Los Angeles County judicial
benefits and never admitted to receipts in the past. Judge OBrien then
declared his complete lack of bias on Appellants judicial benefit
matters before the court.
Appendix 1 contains a true and correct copy of the August 25,
2011 Request for Recusal and 170.3(c)(1) Objection. Appendix 2
contains a true and correct copy of the Court Order
Striking Statement of Disqualification. Appendix 3 contains the
evidence Judge OBrien tried to conceal from Appellant. Appellant
believes this to be true and correct copy, similar in key respects to actual
data received directly by the Appellant from Gregg Iverson of the
County Auditors office, which is shown in Appendix 4. The L.A.
County Auditor data in Appendix 3 clearly indicates that Judge
OBrien took $277,925 in judicial payments from 1989 to 1999.
AA-242

!
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
.

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

B________________

PLAINTIFFS APPELLATE SUMMARY

COOPER requested recusal of Elia Weinbach on January 20,
2011from case SD026673. Weinbach refused. COOPER requested a
Writ of Mandate from the Second Appellate District on January 26,
2011. On February 8, 2011. The Writ was summarily denied by Justices
Boren, Doi Todd and Ashmann-Gerst. Civil complaints were
subsequently filed against Kathryn Doi Todd (SC113135) and Judith
Ashmann-Gerst (SC113136) for civil rights violations.
Another Plaintiff and Appellant, Dennis Ettlin, filed a civil suit
against Sandy Kriegler (YC065019) for failure to recuse himself in
family law appeal case, B187741, filed in the Appellate Court in 2006.
Subsequently, Ettlin requested recusal of Robert OBrien on
August 1, 2011. OBrien refused. Ettlin requested a Writ of Mandate
from the Second Appellate District on August 10, 2011. The petition
was denied by justices Bigelow, Rubin and Flier. Civil suits are in
preparation for all three and will be filed in counties where the judges
did not take bribes.
A third Appellant, Anthony Locatelli, requested Thomas Trent
Lewis to recuse himself from case BD516629. Lewis refused. Locatelli
requested a Writ of Mandate from the Second Appellate District on
August 19, 2011. The petition was denied on August 25, 2011 by
justices Mallano, Chaney and Johnson. Civil suits are in preparation for
all three and will be filed in counties where the judges did not take
bribes.
AA-243

!
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
.

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

B________________
Nine of the 32 justices in the Second Appellate District are being
sued for civil rights violations due to the county paid bribes. The three
current cases will seek a change of venue and the six new cases will be
filed outside Los Angeles County. This will create great hardship on the
Plaintiffs and Defendants because a fair trial cannot be had in Los
Angeles County. All nine justices were silent and failed to recuse
themselves because of the bribes they received from Los Angeles
County and the interest that Los Angeles County had in the cases
involved. Additionally, eight have participated in the denial of Writs of
Mandate where they refused to recuse themselves, participated in a
judgment upholding the bribes and then remained silent about any legal
reasoning on the constitutionality of the county payments. Under the
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., 566 U.S. ___ (2009) test
for bias, Plaintiff sees an unconstitutional potential for bias that is
widespread and persistent.

REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION

COOPER requests a detailed Statement of Decision to include an
opinion on each of the constitutional questions identified in this
Petition.
1. Affirm that Los Angeles County is not sovereign, is a private
entity no different than Appellant in the eyes of the law.
2. Affirm that judicial compensation by sovereign entities is an
accepted compromise by the sovereign when the sovereign entity
is involved in a matter before the judiciary. The same principle
AA-244

!
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
.

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

B________________
does not apply to non-sovereign entities, such as county
government.
3. Affirm that Los Angeles County judicial payments are made to
individuals who are making personal and individual choices to
live and work in Los Angeles County. Affirm that acceptance of
the payments is an individual act, not required for employment.
4. Affirm that the immunity of SBX2 11, Section 5 is
unconstitutional due to Article 1, Section 9 of the California
Constitution.
5. Affirm that SBX2 11, Section 2 does not authorize Los Angeles
County Superior Court (not a county) to make judicial benefits
payments to Commissioners, Court Counsel and other non-
Judges.
6. Affirm SBX2 11, Section 2 allows a reduction in judicial benefits
for all judges equally within a county or court. The state salaries
are annual salaries, the judicial benefits are annual benefits and
therefore taxpayers facing judicial layoffs would expect the terms
and conditions might allow for a reduction in the amount (not
termination) of annual judicial benefits following May 20, 2010.
7. Affirm that judicial benefit bribes from a county, received in the
past, but not recently, will continue to influence the judicial
officer.

Failure of this Court to provide detailed opinions that apply and
extend the legal reasoning of the Fourth Appellate Districts Sturgeon II
decision will be used as prima facie evidence of the Second Appellate
Courts bias and protection of Los Angeles County interests. Ideally, a
AA-245

!
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
.

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

B________________
permanent solution for the Sturgeon cases by the judiciary would
originate at the source of the largest bribes. Only if the judiciary has the
courage to uphold and protect the California Constitution in all matters
pertaining to the judiciary itself, can it have any authority to rule upon
or impose a solution on the voters and their legislators.

APPELLANT SEEKS THE IMMEDIATE RECUSAL OF
JUDGE OBRIEN

Judge OBrien lost all judicial immunity when he accepted
monies from a party (Los Angeles County) frequently before the court.
To fill this void, California Senate Bill SBX2 11 offered judge Robert
OBrien, as an individual, retroactive immunity from civil liability,
criminal prosecution and disciplinary action effective 5/21/09 for
accepting the L.A. County payments. He did NOT receive any
retroactive immunity for presiding over cases such as the present one in
which L.A. County had an interest, in which neither he nor L.A. County
disclosed the L.A. County payments, and for which he did not
disqualify himself.
It is important to be clear that there are three disqualifying events
here. The first is the mere acceptance of any judicial payments. The
second is Defendants failure to identify the Los Angeles County
interest in the family law case to Plaintiff, and the third event is the
failure of either Judge OBrien or the County Counsel to disclose such
and notify Plaintiff at the outset of proceedings. SBX2 11 only
attempted to provide immunity for the first disqualifying event.
AA-246

!
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
.

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

B________________
Appellants civil case is about damages due to the failure to
disqualify in any case where L.A. County has an interest in the case.
Clearly Judge OBrien does not comprehend the enormity of the
Sturgeon rulings and SBX2 11. The immunity intended by SBX2 11
acknowledged the criminality of the judicial payments. The bias that
arises from a bribe does not cease at the end of a fiscal year. Ten years
of a bias in favor of L.A. County by Judge OBrien easily persists to
todays review of the issues surrounding those payments.
This case, and others like it, originates in the judicial bribes paid
by L.A. County. It is the individual responsibility of Judge OBrien to
voluntarily identify anything in his past, which might indicate a bias. It
is the height of arrogance for Judge OBrien to proclaim his lack of bias
without even acknowledging his past judicial benefit payments or the
retroactive immunity for him under the unconstitutional SBX2 11.
Appellant seeks an IMMEDIATE ORDER FOR THE
RECUSAL OF ROBERT OBRIEN and a stay on any further
proceedings, orders or judgments that impact this case, especially the
motions seeking a consolidation order. Such order will immediately
deny Appellant his 5
th
and 14
th
amendment rights.
Court Counsel seeks to portray the three plaintiffs seeking
damages for the loss of those constitutional rights as disgruntled
litigants. Court Counsel would also have characterized all African-
Americans seeking their full constitutional rights in the 1960s as
disgruntled domestic help; and all women seeking their full
constitutional rights in the 1970s as disgruntled housewives; and all
those in the 1990s seeking full constitutional rights for marriage as
disgruntled lovers.
AA-247

!
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
.

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

B________________
Three In Pro Per litigants today have the courage to stand up to
the entire judicial establishment and argue for NO MORE BRIBES,
NO MORE BIAS; to fight for the rights of our children and for other
fathers. It would be professional suicide for any lawyer to advance the
same truths or represent us. We seek judges who have not taken bribes
and are not biased toward the interests of Los Angeles County.
Court Counsel has spewed the same absolute immunity
hogwash to each of the judges striking statements of disqualification
and to the Orange County Superior Court judge appointed for an
independent CCP 170.3(c)(5) review. The U.S. Supreme Court would
not have wasted its precious time on Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal
Company, Inc., 566 U.S. ___ (2009) if judges had the absolute
immunity envisioned by Court Counsel.

JUDGE OBRIEN COMMITED FRAUD ON THE COURT

Judge OBrien refused to volunteer information about his judicial
benefits. Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 3E(2) requires the judge
(including a commissioner acting as a temporary judge) to disclose on
the record information that is reasonably relevant to the question of
disqualification under Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) Section 170.1,
even if the judge believes there is no actual basis for disqualification.
CCP Section 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) states A judge
(including a commissioner acting as a temporary judge) shall
be disqualified if any one or more of the following is true: ....
A person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt
that the judge would be able to be impartial.
Judge OBrien was evasive about, and never admitted to the
payments he did receive from L.A. County from 1989 to 1999.
AA-248

!
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
.

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

B________________
California Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 4D(1) prohibits a judge
(including a commissioner acting as a temporary judge) from engaging
in any financial and business dealings that involve the judge in frequent
transactions or continuing business relations with lawyers or other
persons (such as Los Angeles County) likely to appear before the judge
or before the court in which the judge serves.
L.A. County officials and employees are involved or have an
interest in all divorce, domestic violence, traffic and many civil matters
before the Superior Court.
Canon 3E(1) requires a judge (including a commissioner acting
as a temporary judge) to disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding
in which disqualification is required by law.
Judge Robert OBrien violated Canon 4D(1) by taking payments
from L.A. County, violated Canon 3E(2) by not disclosing such
payments on the record, and violated Canon 3E(1) and CCP Section
170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) by not disqualifying himself.
Judge Robert OBrien committed fraud on the court by not
disclosing the L.A. County payments to COOPER at the outset of the
case and not disqualifying himself. His having committed fraud on the
court renders any orders and judgments made by him void. See U.S. v.
Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878); Vallely v. Northern Fire and Marine
Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920)
Since the fraud on the court vitiates the entire case, all orders
from that court or any subsequent court are void as none of the courts
has subject matter jurisdiction, no court has the lawful authority to
validate a void order. A void order is void at all times, cannot be made
valid by any judge, nor does it gain validity by the passage of time. The
AA-249

!
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
.

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

B________________
order is void ab initio. (See U.S. v. Throckmorton, supra; Vallely v.
Northern Fire and Marine Co., supra).

JUDGE OBRIEN COMMITED A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS

Judge Robert OBrien is not alone in committing fraud on the
court by refusing to disclose the L.A. County payments and refusing to
disqualify himself in cases in which L.A. County was a party or had an
interest and in violating Canons 4D(1), 3E(2), 3E(1) and CCP Section
170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii). It appears to be a tacit agreement amongst all of the
L.A. Superior Court Judges and Court commissioners, who have
received L.A. County payments and L.A. County and L.A. Countys
attorneys, to conceal such payments from opposing parties and commit
fraud on the court in any case in which L.A. County is a party or has
an interest.
This type of action has been held to be a denial of due process in
the U.S. Supreme Court case of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.,
556 U.S. ___ (2009). The court stated at Slip Opinion page 16:
.....just as no man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, similar
parties, a man chooses the judge in his own cause.
The L.A. County payments to L.A. Superior Court judges were
held to violate Article VI, Section 19 of the California Constitution in
the case of Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, 167 Cal.App.4th 630
(2008) rev. denied 12/23/08. Such case also held that in the 1997
Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act, the State Legislators did not
prescribe county payments to Superior Court judges under Article VI,
Section 19 of the California Constitution. (See last four paragraphs of
AA-250

!
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
.

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

B________________
opinion.) The 1997 Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act was an
unconstitutional delegation of power because it did not also set the
standards for that authority.
Appendix 7 incorporates herein as if set forth in full, a true and
correct copy of the L.A. County Fiscal Year 2010-2011 Proposed
Budget Trial Court Operations pages 60.1 to 60.4. Such section shows
that the judicial benefits are required to be paid under the 1997
Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act. This is a false statement as
the Sturgeon case held that the 1997 Trial Court Funding Act did not
prescribe the payment of judicial benefits by counties under Article VI,
Section 19 of the California Constitution. All of the L.A. County
budgets from 1998 onwards contain the same false statement.
Judge OBrien committed fraud on the court by not disclosing
the L.A. County payments to him and not disqualifying himself at the
outset of the case.
The fraud on the court vitiates the entire case and voided all of
the orders and judgments entered in this case. The U.S. Supreme Court
stated in U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878):
There is no question of the general doctrine that fraud vitiates the
solemn contracts, documents and even judgments
The Court continued at page 66:
Fraud vitiates everything, and a judgment equally with a
contract... (citing Wells, Res Adjudicata, Section 499)
///
The U.S. Supreme Court further stated in Vallely v. Northern Fire and
Marine Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920):
AA-251

!
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
.

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

B________________
Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot [act] beyond
the power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority,
and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are
regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and
this even prior to reversal. Elliott v. Lessee of Piersol, 26 U. S. (1
Pet.) 328, 340 (1828): Old Wayne Mut. Life Assn v. McDonough,
204 U.S. 8, 27 Sup.Ct. 236
The 9th Circuit has stated in the case of Austin v. Smith, 312
F2nd. 337,343 (1962):
If the underlying judgment is void, the judgment
based upon it is also void.

SBX2 11 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, 167 Cal.App.4th 630 (2008)
Rev. denied 12/23/08, held that the L.A. County payments to L.A.
Superior Court judges violated Article VI, Section 19 of the California
Constitution because the 1997 Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding
Act, while it DID authorize judicial benefits, it did NOT set any
standards for exercising the delegated authority and THUS the
authorization of judicial benefits payments by counties to Superior
Court judges was an unconstitutional delegation of power.
The unconstitutionality of judicial benefits is not new. In fact it is
a long simmering debate and intrusion by Judges, at least in Los Angeles
County, into the labor-management relationship between the State and
the Judges. In 1976 the Attorney General issued an opinion that health
insurance benefits were unconstitutional;
AA-252

!
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
.

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

B________________
The Attorney General has issued an opinion that a statute
permitting superior and municipal court judges to be covered
under county health insurance programs is an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority. 59 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 496
(1976). The constitutional provision at issue states:
The Legislature shall prescribe compensation for judges
of courts of record. Cal. Const. Art. VI, 19 (as amended in
1974; emphasis added).
The Attorney General argues that, Because of the use of
prescribe the Legislature cannot delegate the authority granted
to it by Article VI, section 19 of the Constitution. Any attempt to
make such a delegation would be constitutionally invalid. 59
Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. at 497. The Attorney General reasons that
benefits such as health insurance are part of compensation, that
the effect of the statute in question is to allow counties to
determine this aspect of a judges compensation, and thus the
statute is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.
In 1988 the County of Los Angeles, Office of the County
Counsel, advised Frank Zolin, County Clerk/Executive Officer of the
Superior Court that it would be permissible for the county to pay
additional benefits for judges, although he acknowledged the Attorney
General had opinions otherwise (see Appendix 10).
Leading up to the new legislation for Trial Court Unification, a
memorandum was generated in 1995 that again laid out the law and
updated the Attorney Generals opinion on the unconstitutionality of
such county benefits. The Commission staff memorandum then
expressed a fear of the voters and went on to conclude that the
legislature should take action and gamble on the validity of the
delegation of authority.
Although there is certainly a possibility that SB 162 will
be held to be an invalid delegation of legislative authority ., a
case can be made that this will not occur. The problems that
would be created if it is held invalid are substantial.
(emphasis added)
AA-253

!
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
.

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

B________________
(see Trial Court Unification: Delegation of Legislative Authority; California
Law Revision Commission Staff Memorandum; Memorandum 95-77, Study
J-1201; November 27, 1995; pages 1, 4, 5, 9,and 10 included in App. 10)
The Sturgeon I decision called the Legislatures bluff in the 1997
Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act. Now the substantial
problems of unconstitutionality and bias accrued over the last 15 years
must be made whole. Sturgeon I was no surprise or rogue ruling.
After the Sturgeon I decision, the State legislature hastily passed
and the Governor signed Senate Bill SBX2 11, which became effective
5/21/09. The judiciary and the legislature tried to do in two months what
they failed to do in 30 years. It is no surprise that SBX2 11 is also
unconstitutional.
Senate Bill SBX2 11 attempted to give retroactive immunity such
that no governmental entity, shall incur any liability or be subject to
prosecution or disciplinary action because of benefits provided to a
judge under the official action of a governmental entity prior to the
effective date of this act on the ground that those benefits were not
authorized under law. Senate bill SBX2 11, Section 5, did not give
retroactive immunity to judges or temporary judges who had received
the county payments and did not disclose such and presided over cases
in which the county had an interest. It did not give immunity for being
disqualified as a judge in the past, present or future.
Senate bill SBX2 11, a true and correct copy of the full text of
which is included in Appendix 5, acknowledged both the criminality of
the payment of judicial benefits by the counties to the judges and also
the loss of immunity protections under current state and federal laws by
attempting to give all parties to the bribes limited retroactive immunity.
The immunity in SBX2 11, Section 5, effective 5/21/09, is not part of
AA-254

!
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
.

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

B________________
California government codes. The attempted immunity is also
unconstitutional under the California Constitution, ARTICLE 1,
SECTION 9 that states A bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law
impairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed. Furthermore,
the legislation conflicts with the constitutional responsibilities of the
Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP). Appendix 6 contains the
extensive CJP analysis and arguments obtained under the Freedom of
Information Act. The CJP has not publicized its analyses showing the
legislatures attempt to usurp constitutional powers from the CJP and
their requests for an opinion from the California Attorney General on
the constitutionality of SBX2 11.
The SBX2 11 Section 4 is unconstitutional because the Judicial
Council is now paying judicial benefits to commissioners, Court
Counsel and others. (The payments in SBX2 11 Section 2 made by L.A.
County to Commissioners are called warrants by the L.A. County
Auditor because they are issued by L.A. County but funded by the
Judicial Council.) The continued payments by the counties under
Section 2 now makes these Judicial Council payments a continued
obligation, especially since any increase is prohibited by Section 4. The
opinions of the Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) are that
these payments are also unconstitutional. The CJP has requested the
Attorney Generals opinion in this matter because the judges are clearly
biased. Again, since the Fourth Appellate Court is deferring to the
taxpayers and judges, these civil cases will ask for jury decisions on
whether the Superior Court payments obligated by the county payments
are legal and constitutional.
AA-255

!
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
.

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

B________________
The SBX2 11 Section 5 immunity is unconstitutional, has not
been challenged in the Appellate Court and preserved the status quo
ante Sturgeon I. The attempted immunity is unconstitutional under the
California Constitution, ARTICLE 1, SECTION 9 that states A bill of
attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts
may not be passed. Furthermore, SBX2 11 Section 5 legislation
conflicts with the constitutional responsibilities of the Commission on
Judicial Performance (CJP). The extensive CJP analysis and arguments
shows the legislatures attempt to usurp constitutional powers and
requests an opinion from the California Attorney General on the
constitutionality of SBX2 11. Again, since the Fourth Appellate Court is
deferring to the taxpayers and judges, these civil cases will ask for jury
decisions on whether the judges have immunity from civil liability and
if so whether the Plaintiff is due damages for the biases bought by the
L.A. County bribes.
The Fourth Appellate Courts decision in Sturgeon v. County of
Los Angeles, __Cal App.4th___(4th Dist.,Div. 1) (2010), the so-called
Sturgeon II concluded on page 14:
As the parties have recognized, SBX 211 both preserved the
status quo ante Sturgeon I and commenced a process by which the
Legislature looks to adoption of a comprehensive judicial
compensation scheme. As we have explained, this response to
Sturgeon I meets the requirements of the Constitution and is
wholly sensible under the circumstances. The Legislature is
uniquely competent to deal with the complex policy problem of
establishing a judicial compensation scheme which both assures
recruitment and retention of fully qualified judicial officers
throughout the state while at the same time providing equity between
judges in different parts of the state. By the same token our role in
ensuring that the more general requirements of the Constitution
have been met is, under our system of separate governmental
powers, quite limited. (emphasis added)
AA-256

!
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
.

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

B________________
The Appellate Court continues and contradicts itself on page 15;
However, on its face SBX2 11 is not a permanent response to
the constitutional issues we identified in Sturgeon I [and] that
interim remedy [SBX2 11], if not supplanted by the more
comprehensive response SBX 211 plainly contemplates, most
likely will give rise to further challenges by taxpayers or members
of the bench themselves. As we noted at the outset, the issue of
judicial compensation is a state, not a county, responsibility.
(emphasis added)
If SBX2 11 meets the requirements of the constitution as stated by
the court, why would taxpayers challenge it? Clearly the Appellate Court
feels quite limited in ensuring the Constitution is met and is not willing
to fully address this issue.
The Sturgeon case and SBX2 11 only address the payment of county
judicial benefits. Appellants civil action is undertaken, in part, as one of
the citizen challenges encouraged by Sturgeon II, but more importantly,
to address the issue of bias, the non-disclosure of the payments, and the
resulting fraud on the court that Sturgeon does not address.
Since Sturgeon I and Sturgeon II both affirm that judicial payments
are not a county responsibility, since the county is allowed (under SBX2
11) to terminate all payments and since the county is clearly an
interested party in all divorce and traffic cases; therefore the continued
payments must be in the countys interests. Those county interests are
the Title-IV-D incentives and reimbursements as well as the penalty
assessments on traffic tickets. Those county interests are the basis for
judicial recusal and void orders in most divorce and traffic cases.
SBX2 11 deemed prior payments as criminal and in need of criminal
immunity. The bill granted immunity for monies paid and received prior
to May 2009. This attempted ex post facto immunity is unconstitutional
AA-257

!
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
.

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

B________________
and furthermore did not and could not restore Appellants California
Constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection lost during
the proceedings of Appellants family law case SD026673 under Judge
Weinbach or Appellants civil case SC113137 now under Judge OBrien.
Senate bill SBX2 11 did not even attempt to give immunity for
the biases inherent in the nature of a bribe. Judge OBrien did not
disclose the county payments, refuses review by another judge under
CCP 170.3(c)(2), makes his own ruling on the sufficiency of the law,
contrary to CCP 170.3(c)(5), and then attempts to continue presiding
over a case in which the county has a major interest. Judge Weinbach,
likewise, did not disclose the county payments and then presided over a
case in which the L.A. County Child Support Services Department is a
very interested party as it establishes financial ...support obligations for
children, enforces existing spousal support orders... as required under
federal and state law and is a collaborative partner with the Superior
Court. (See Exhibit 9)
Appendix 9 contains a true and correct copy of the Fiscal Year
2005-2006 L.A. County Budget for Child Support Services Department
pages 59-62 and is incorporated herein as if set forth in full. Such
document shows the Child Support Services Department establishes,
modifies, and enforces financial and medical support obligations for
children, enforces existing spousal support orders ... as required under
federal and state law (page 59). The Child Support Services
Department received federal and state Title IV-D funding fiscal years
2003-2006 (pages 61-62).
///
///
AA-258

!
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
.

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

B________________
LOS ANGELES COUNTY IS AN INTERESTED PARTY,
NOT A SOVEREIGN ENTITY
Los Angeles County is not a sovereign entity; only the Federal
Government and each of the 50 states are sovereign within the United
States of America. Therefore Los Angeles Countys actual payments to
a judge are no different than payments (hypothetically) by Appellant.
Both are bribes. The stated purpose of Los Angeles County payments is
to retain judges in Los Angeles County. The favorable disposition
related to job assignment reasonably and easily carries over to a pre-
disposition toward Los Angeles County in matters where the county has
an interest. Judge OBriens acceptance of the L.A. County bribes and
his sitting on a case in which L.A. County is an interested party voids all
his orders and judgments. Judge OBriens failure to disclose the county
payments to Appellant, constituted an extrinsic fraud on the court. All
of Judge OBriens orders in case SC113137 are and will be void.
Furthermore, Judge Kuhls order relating Plaintiffs cases is void and
Judge OBriens actions to sustain and implement that order are also
void ab initio.
Extrinsic fraud is a basis for setting aside an earlier judgment.
See U.S. v. Throckmorton 98 U.S. 61 (1878) since fraud on the
court vitiates the entire case, all orders from that court or any
subsequent court are void as none of the courts had subject matter
jurisdiction. No court has the lawful authority to validate a void order.
See Vallely v. Northern Fire and Marine Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920) a
void order is void at all times, cannot be made valid by any judge, nor
does it gain validity by the passage of time.
AA-259

!
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
.

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

B________________
Contrary to Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge OBriens
Order Striking Statement Of Disqualification, the order is indeed
appealable as a void order. An appeal may be taken from an order
denying a motion to vacate a void judgment because denial of the
motion constitutes an order giving effect to a void judgment and thus is
itself void and appealable. [Carr v. Kamins (2007) 151 CA4th 929, 933-
934, 60 CR3d 196, 199; Carlson v. Eassa (1997) 54 CA4th 684,691, 62
CR2d 884, 888; Residents for Adequate Water v. Redwood Valley
County Water Dist. (1995) 34 CA4th 1801, 1805, 41 CR2d 123, 125].
The L.A. County interest and partnership with the court is clearly
documented for all Family Law cases (Appendix 9). The L.A. County
Payments are bribes as they influence Judges, in family law cases,
to award unequal custody and thus by L.A. County Child Support
Services Department (CSSD) guidelines establish higher custody
payments from noncustodial parents. The L.A. County Child Support
Services Department establishes financial .... support obligations for
children... as required under federal and state law and works as a
collaborative Partner with the Superior Court. The payment of money
by L.A. County, to the judge who rules on the amount of child support
(which taken in the aggregate) directly determines the expenses of the
L.A. County Child Support Services Department. The amount of those
expenses then directly determines the amount of money that the L.A.
County Child Support Services Department receives in Title IV-D
federal and state funds. (Page 61 of the report in Appendix 9 shows the
$176 million received from Title IV-D compared to the small $3 million
cost to L.A. County.) The annual $30 million cost of judicial benefits
was cost effective for L.A. County at a ratio of 6:1 for just one program.
AA-260

!
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
.

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

B________________
The higher the number and monetary amount of support orders
against non-custodial parents, the higher the expenses of the L.A.
County Child Support Services Department, the higher the amount of
Title IV-D federal and state funding. L.A. County has a direct interest in
the judge setting the greatest number and the highest monetary child
support orders. L.A. County is a real party in interest in every divorce
case as it reaps a huge financial benefit.
The payments by L.A. County to the judge in a divorce case have no
purpose other than to influence the judges decision to create a non-
custodial parent and high child support order which must frequently also
use federally-funded enforcement resources.
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated in the case of Offutt v. United
States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954): A judge receiving a bribe from an
interested party over which he is presiding does not give the appearance of
justice.
In essence, by making all L.A. Superior Court judges eligible for
the L.A. County payments, L.A. County has bought the L.A. Superior
Court. The U.S. Supreme Court stated in the case of Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., Inc., 566 U.S. ___ (2009) at Slip Opinion page 16 in
relevant part:
...... just as no man is allowed to judge his own cause, similar
parties, a man chooses a judge in his own cause.
By making the payments available to every L.A. Superior Court
judge, no party in a divorce case received a fair trial, as the judge was
biased to rule to benefit the L.A. County Child Support Services
Department over the interests of the parties to the case.
AA-261

!
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
.

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

B________________
By making the payments available to every L.A. Superior Court
judge as individuals, no party in a civil case involving the Judges of the
Superior Court can receive a fair trial, as the judge is biased to rule for
any benefit to L.A. County over the interests of the other parties to the
case.
The County-Auditors data (in Appendix 3) combined with the
Judicial Councils report (in Appendix 4) and the 2010-2011 L.A.
County proposed budget Trial Court Operations section (in Appendix 7)
demonstrate that L.A. County has bought the L.A. County Superior
Court without the consent of the other party opposing them in any
case. The L.A. County interest and partnership with the court is clearly
documented for all Family Law cases (Appendix 9). Based on the
payment information in Appendix 3, Appellant has serious doubts that
Judge OBrien can be impartial during a jury trial on damages due to the
biases inherent in the L.A. County bribes. Judge OBriens actions
constitute fraud on the court and have denied COOPER due process
by denying him the right to an impartial tribunal. In Re Murchison, 349
U.S. 133, 136 (1955)

JUDGE OBRIEN VIOLATED THE CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS
AND THE CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Judge OBrien also violated California Code of Judicial Ethics
Canon 4D(1), which prohibits a judge from engaging in any financial or
business dealings with a person (Los Angeles County) who is likely to
appear before the court upon which the judge serves; Canon 3E(2)
which requires the judge to disclose on the record information that is
reasonably relevant to the question of disqualification under CCP
AA-262
AA-263
AA-264
AA-265

!
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
.

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

B________________

APPENDIX
APPENDIX 1 Request for Recusal .............................................................. A1
APPENDIX 2 Order Striking Disqualification ........................................... A7
APPENDIX 3 County Auditor Data on OBrien Payments ..................... A14
APPENDIX 4 COOPER Correspondence with County Auditor. ............ A19
APPENDIX 5 Text of SBX2 11 ................................................................. A27
APPENDIX 6 Commission on Judicial Performance Opinions ............... A31
APPENDIX 7 Trial Court Operations Budget Summary .......................... A55
APPENDIX 8 Litigation Cost Manager Report, Summary ....................... A60
APPENDIX 9 Child Support Services Dept. Budget ................................. A66
APPENDIX 10 Zolin 1988 Memorandum to L.A. Superior Court ........... A72

AA-266
AA-267
AA-268
AA-269
AA-270
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
APPENDIX
1

A-1
AA-271

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

Daniel Cooper
1836 10
th
st # B
310-562-7668
IN PROPRIA PERSONA



)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Los Angeles County
Case No. SC113137
SC113064, lead

Daniel COOPER,

vs.

REQUEST FOR RECUSAL
UNDER CCP 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii)
BASED ON BIAS DUE TO L.A.
COUNTY JUDICIAL BENEFIT
BRIBES AND FAILURE TO
DISCLOSE L.A. COUNTY
INTERESTS IN THE CASE

OBJECTION UNDER CCP
170.3(c)(1) TO REFUSAL TO
RECUSE

REQUEST UNDER CCP
170.3(c)(5) FOR A JUDGE
SELECTED BY THE
CHAIRPERSON OF THE
JUDICIAL COUNCIL
Michael I. LEVANAS,
an individual; Defendant

TIME: 8:30 a.m.
DEPT: 59

A-2
AA-272

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

The Judicial Council report of December 2009 states that all L.A. County judges
have been receiving L.A. County Judicial Benefits. Under California Code of Civil
Procedure (CCP), Section 170.1(a)(3), Judge OBrien must disclose all such monies
he receives now or in the past from L.A. County or similar benefits from the Los
Angeles Superior Court. He has not done so. An Internet search for Judge Robert
OBrien shows that he has indeed received such monies. An email from Gregg
Iverson of the L.A. County Auditors office clearly confirms that Judge OBrien
took $277,925 of L.A. County judicial payments from 1989 to 1999 before
he retired.
California Code of Civil Procedure, 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) states A judge shall
be disqualified if any one or more the following is true: ....(iii) A person aware of the
facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be
impartial. Plaintiff doubts that Judge OBrien, like Michael Lavanas and others,
can be impartial in Plaintiffs family law and alleged domestic violence matters.
Code of Judicial Ethics, Canon 3E(1) states, A judge shall disqualify himself
or herself in any proceeding in which disqualification is required by law. Code of
Judicial Ethics Canon 3E(2) states, In all Trial Court proceedings, a judge shall
disclose on the record information that is reasonably relevant to the question of
disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no actual basis for
disqualification. That L.A. County is an interested party and paid bribes to the
judges, is extremely relevant to Plaintiffs case.
Plaintiff has seen no such disclosures. Since this case is totally about L.A.
County payments to judges and the bias arising therefrom, Judge OBrien must
A-3
AA-273

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

recuse himself and transfer the case to a judge who has not received benefits as
demanded in the civil complaint.
This objection is also a formal CCP section 170.3(c)(1) objection to Judge
OBriens refusal to disqualify himself for cause under CCP 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii).
Based upon Judge OBriens taking of L.A. County payments and the presumed
bias against Plaintiff, Judge OBrien must disqualify himself under the standard set
forth in the cases of Michael v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co. (2001) 88
Cal.App.4th 925 , as modified at 89 Cal.App.4th 406; Roitz v. Coldwell Banker
Residential Brokerage Co., 62 Cal.App.4th 716, 723 (1998); Ceriale v. AMCO Ins.
Co., 48 Cal.App.4th 500,506 (1996).
The CCP 170.3(c)(1) required facts constituting the grounds are
voluminously detailed in the Writ of Mandate filed August 12, 2011 in the Second
Appellate Court, Division 8, case number B235113 against Robert OBrien, are
again partially described in the underlying complaint to this very case SC113137
and are not included here for the sake of brevity.

Plaintiff seeks a judge who has not received judicial benefits from any
county, has no personal or professional ties to lawyers or judges in Los Angeles
County, has no familiarity with Title IV-D agencies, and no familiarity with domestic
violence agencies or advocates. The Court must inform the parties if this requires a
payments.

Dated: ____ August, 2011
By: __________________________
DANIEL COOPER
In Pro Per
A-4
AA-274

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

VERIFICATION

Verification of Pleading and
Declaration under Penalty of Perjury Form

By Party
DANIEL COOPER

CASE TITLE:
DANIEL COOPER
v.
Michael I. LEVANAS,

I, Daniel Cooper, declare:
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter.
2. I have read the foregoing Request for Recusal and know the contents
thereof.
3. The same is true of my own knowledge, except as to those matters which
are therein stated on information and belief, and, as to those matters, I
believe it to be true.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. This
verification was executed on August 21, 2011, at Los Angeles County,
California.

____________________________
Daniel Cooper
In Pro Per

Daniel Cooper
1836 10
th
st # B
310-562-7668
IN PROPRIA PERSONA
A-5
AA-275
POS-030
ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address): FOR COURT USE ONLY
CASE NUMBER:
I am over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am a resident of or employed in the county where the mailing
took place.
My residence or business address is:
On (date): I mailed from (city and state):
the following documents (specify):
I served the documents by enclosing them in an envelope and (check one):
a. depositing the sealed envelope with the United States Postal Service with the postage fully prepaid.
b.
The envelope was addressed and mailed as follows:
Name of person served:
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Date:
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF PERSON COMPLETING THIS FORM) (SIGNATURE OF PERSON COMPLETING THIS FORM)
Form Approved for Optional Use
Judicial Council of California
POS-030 [New January 1, 2005]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1013, 1013a
1.
2.
3.
placing the envelope for collection and mailing following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with this
businesss practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is
placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service in
a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid.
4.
Address of person served: b.
a.
PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF:
RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT:
TELEPHONE NO.:
ATTORNEY FOR (Name):
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF
STREET ADDRESS:
MAILING ADDRESS:
CITY AND ZIP CODE:
BRANCH NAME:
FAX NO. (Optional):
(Do not use this Proof of Service to show service of a Summons and Complaint.)
The name and address of each person to whom I mailed the documents is listed in the Attachment to Proof of Service
by First-Class MailCivil (Persons Served) (POS-030(P)).
The documents are listed in the Attachment to Proof of Service by First-Class MailCivil (Documents Served)
(form POS-030(D)).
5.
E-MAIL ADDRESS (Optional):
(Proof of Service)
A-6
AA-276
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
APPENDIX
2

A-7
AA-277
A-8
AA-278
A-9
AA-279
A-10
AA-280
A-11
AA-281
A-12
AA-282
A-13
AA-283
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
APPENDIX
3

A-14
AA-284
A-15
AA-285
A-16
AA-286
A-17
AA-287
3 2011 9:29PM
Richard I. Fine ~ Assoc.
310 277 1543
>
': ~
...
Real Party in Interest
RICHARD 1. FINE,
3 Telephone:
Filcsitnile:
4 .Permer Attorney for P~t.iHoJler
Marina Strand Colony U Homeowners Associailon
S Respondent in Contempt Proceeding, alee
6, In Pro Pel' in the Contempt Preceedlng
ORIGiNAL
FILED '
J,.OS ANOJLSS SUPWOJ. C()tOO"
MAR 02 2ml
J~~"K
IV~IMV
StJPERIOR COURT OF THE S'fA; B OF CALIFORNIA
f."ORTHE COUNTY OF L S ANOELE~
CENTRAL orsr CT
7
8
9
10
T 1
12
13
14
v.
MARINA STRAND COLONY TTl
HOMEOWNERS ASSOClA nON,
Petitioner,
15 COUNTY OF LOS AN(TBtES,
16
Respondent.
17 DEI, My SHORES JOJNf VDNTIJRE,
18 DtJ ...REY SHORES JOTNT VBNTIlRE
NORTH
19
20
21
22
2~
24
25
26
27
28
22621 wl'd1t7a
)
)
)
) Rep y in SUpP()rt of Notice of Mot101l3nd
) MQ on for Renewal of the Motion to V,~id
) and AnQul AU Orders and Judgmenb
) Inti djng Thoso In tbe Contempt
) Pro eedings in the Cage Made by Judge
) VII e; Request for ."-Idictal Notice aud
) D~ nrafifm of Rlchard J. Fine
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Dal' : March 10. 201 J
Tim: 9:00 am
Ne Place: Dept. 1
, filed: 11/3/2008
Date: 1212212{)O~
CC Section I008(b)(e)
Reply In Support of Motion
p. 1
A-18
AA-288
source le: LASCRedactedReply3-2-11.pdf
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
APPENDIX
4

A-19
AA-289
A-20
AA-290
A-21
AA-291
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
APPENDIX
6

A-31
AA-292
A-32
AA-293
A-33
AA-294
A-34
AA-295
A-35
AA-296
A-36
AA-297
A-37
AA-298
A-38
AA-299
A-39
AA-300
A-40
AA-301
A-41
AA-302
A-42
AA-303
A-43
AA-304
A-44
AA-305
A-45
AA-306
A-46
AA-307
A-47
AA-308
A-48
AA-309
A-49
AA-310
A-50
AA-311
A-51
AA-312
A-52
AA-313
A-53
AA-314
A-54
AA-315
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

APPENDIX
10

A-72
AA-316
lb:92
E>2&2372ee3
JUDICIAl WATCH
P4(j[ 17/43
. .

COUNTY OF L05 ANCELES
o FFICf Of TH COU Nl1' CO U N .s.! l

0' AO ,,,,, '.A'f'IO ...
00 ".CC"
,-os C.A"'''OAN'A .00'.
__.,., ..."",T. cov-yy
November 10. 1988
Mr. Frank S. %011n
countf Orfic.,
Court
11 North B111 Stre.t
tos Ang_l , 90012
Attention, Eric D. Webber, Chi,t Deputy
Rea 3udic1al Compens.tlon
Dear Hr. ZOlin:
You hive .sked out opinion concerning the le9ality
of judgea with County employee benetits such
the Flexibl. and Svin98 Plans.
It 18 oue opinion th.t judges' salaries mu.c b. set
by the Le91slature, but oth.r benefits may (and in ,ome
case. must) b. by the county.
ANALYSIS
Article VI, Section 19 ot tne California
Constitution provides#
Lev181ature shall prescribe compenaat1on for
judV ot court. ot recor4. A judge of court of
record ftal not rece!v. the .alary tor the ofticial
of tic. he d by the j udge while Iny cause before the
j
ud
9- remAin. pen41n9 .nd tor '0 days
after it ha. been 8ubmitte4 ear deci.lon.
u
.
/ I I:<
A-73
AA-317
02/2&/2eee 1&: 132 &2&231'28eJ JUDICIAl.
18/43
Mr. Frank S. &olln
Nov.abel" 10, 1988
Pa9. 'rW0
Aa generAl proposition, the word
o r191nally ...nt or salary,- but otber
b.net1t. ha it h to hev. a
ni n9, and 1. now use4 to include both 1Ary
and frLn9. benefit.. qu or whlch me.nln9 wa.
intended 1ft section 19 i. celtical, since the courts
h.ve th.t where th. Constitution requlr tbe
Le9i.1ature to cribe .ameth1n9, the Leg1alature
.Y8t do .0 It lf, .nd may not leave or deleqate the
tunctlon to another body or person. County of Kadera v.
Superior CoutS (1974) 39 C.A.Jd 665.
For reon. which vill belov, we
belleve that compen t1on- .s Ysed 1n Section 19 reCers
only to the l.ry which 1. the of the
judiclal ottlce. The Attorney Gener.l does not agree.
S , 9., S, Ope. Cal. Atty. Cent 496; 6l Ope. Cal.
Atty. a.n. 31S. w. note initially th.t jud9 , like
other elected .re p.id under the law
rule that the 11 an incident of the oflic
Consequently, they do not technically hay. such benefits
a. vacltlon, sick leave or overtime, which otherwise
alvht be considered a p.rt of compensation.
Rdin9 18 ae a whole, it appear. that the
word. "coapention- and ere
inte(chan9b1y; that is, "salary'l in the second
sentence 'PP4ars to refer to the "compensation-
prescrib4d purau.nt to the first sentence.
Th1. r dln9 of Section 19 i. supported by the t.ct
that Article VI, Section 20 provldes:
"The Legislature sh.l1 provid. for retir.ment, with
r onable .llowanc., of judgea of courts of record
tor a;e or dlsAb111t,."
If aa used in Section 19 was intended to
include triD98 ben.tit. such benerits,
there would b. no need for Section 20.

A-74
AA-318
82/26/2eBe 1&:82 6262372883
JUDICIAL WAT(>4 INC
Pc.GE 19/43
.'

Hr. Frenk S. Solin
Nov..be C' 10, 1 , as
'.9- Thr..
Prior to Art1cle VI, Section 19 (vhieh was
196'). jydlcial ..tlon w provided under
91, S.ctlon 11, which r d in p.rtl
added 1n

"The of the ju.t-Ices ot" j ud9 ot .u
court. 0 .h&ll be fixe4
f
.n4 th. payMent
ther80f pr cr1bed by the Le9ial.tuce.-
Thi. langU4V. a;a1n sU99tl
ratber than other benefita.
the payment ol a salary,
The pre4eceor to Article VI, Section
Article VI, Section 17, which pcov1deda
11
"The juetic of the Supreme Court and of the
Distr1ct of Appeal, and the judge. or the
.uperlot court., .hall leverallf' at times
during their continuance in oft ee, recelve for
their aervlce such compen tion a8 ia or shall
provided by lAW, The sal.ri of the ju49 of the
court, in all eounties heviMQ but one
judve, an4 1n .11 count i in which the term. of
the of the Bupecior court expire at the same
tl , .hall not her lter be incr d or
diminished .rter their election, nor the
ter. tor which they 'h.ll h&ve b n elected. Upon
the adoption this the s.la:1 then
e8t.b118hed by law shall be paid unitormly to the
juatleea and judges then 1n ottlee. The salaries
of the justice. ot the Supreme Court and of the
Olatrict of Appeal be paid by the
State. One h.lt of the SAlary of each sup.rioe
cour' jud9hall be by the St.t8J .nd
halt thereof .hAll paid by the county tor
which he 18 elected, On and after the first day of
J&nU8ry, A.D. 1907, the jUItice8 oC the Supreme
Court sh.ll each rlceive an annual salary of
$8,000, and the ju.tice. of the several Diatrict
Court. of App l shall .ach receive en annual
salarr of $7,000, the 1d salar1ee to be payable
IDOnth ,."
rer r Section
compensation-
11 elso to use the
and w l ary" lntlrchanQeably.
/1, '3
A-75
AA-319
1&: 82 6262312ee3
JUDICIAL WATCH
PAGE 2e/43
"
Hr. rcank S. &011n
November: 10, 1981'
P.g. rour
The laft9ua,. of former Sect10n 17 1. directly
trac.able to the COnatltutlon of 1879, an4 thence to the
Con.tltutloft of 11.9.
Artlcle VI, S.ctlon 15 at the Conetltutlon of 1849
prOYide4r
-The Juatlce8 of the Couct, and Jud9 ot
the Dlatrict Court, sh.ll severally, at stated
tl... durin; their continu.nce In office, reo.iv,
toe thelc servic a co-pen.atlon, to be paid out
of the tr which shAll not be incred or
d1.1n18hed duriA9 the ter- tor which they shall
have be.n .1ected. The County JUdqes shall 41so
v.call" at atated ti , r.celv. tor their
fyie- co.pentlon to paid out of the
county tr of their re.pect1ve counties, whjch
'hAll not be lncr or dimini.hed dur1n9 the
term which they eh.ll have been
It 1. 011' that weompensltion" as used in Section
15 meant M.alary.- POt th.t we doubt that
public offlcSal. in eith.r 1849 or 1879 received much in
the w.y 01 fr1nge benet1ta any
Thus, hlatorlc.l1y N compens.t1on" for judges has
bn and under.toO<! to m... n "salary," And this hAS
carried ovec to the pre nt day.
The Legi.lature ha. interpreted the constitutional
lan9uage in the way. 1.5 at Titl. 8 of the
Government Code (Sections 68200, et seq.) entitled
tlon of JU8tic or Court. ot
Record." It dl. with salary and not with
fring. benetit. or any other torm of
Similarly, Code Seceion 7S00J, which is a
part of the Jud9 - Retirement define. selaryM
follow.:
me.ns the eompens.tJon received by
judve a8 the eaolument. of the oEfie. of: judge .
Ie-! tj
A-76
AA-320
e2/2&IZeee 1&:62
JUDICIAL WATCH INC
PAGE 21/43
..
Kr. Frank S. Zo11 n
Novber 10, 1988
P.ge Five
we conclude that while the
Le91.1ature the .al.ry ot a auperior
court jud9. and ..y not d.leg.te r ponalbillty to
AnI otber pee.on or Artlcl. VI, Section l' of the
Ca do not prohibit the board ot
ot a county fra. providlno
b.netlta tor jud9 in eounty. In fact.
the Leqls1.ture h or required .uen
additional benetit. in .0 in.t.ncea.
ror pl., GOV8rnN.nt Code Section 53200.3
pcov14 th.t are dee.ed to be county e.ployees
tor the 11-1te4 pucpo.e or th. application ot th.t
article (d11n9 with 9roUP in.urance) and provides that
ju4ge8 are entitled to the lame or similar health and
weltlre benet its ace to of the
1n whioh the court i. loeated. Thua, judgee are
ele.rly .ntitled to dental and lite insurance
b.nctlte auch tho provided 1n the Fl ible Senefit

Government Code Section 53214.5
judge. to in deterred
compensation plan. establ1ahed by counties,
S.ct1on 53214.5 w probably inepired tn. existence
of d.ferred tlon plantablished purSuAnt to
Section 457 ot the Internal Revenue Cod., 401(k) plana
auah ouc Savln9a Pl.n are also dererred compensation
pl.nlf and health care .nd dependent C4ce reimbursement
accounts well salary reduction
under the Plexlbl, Benefit Plan ace deterred
campention An4 consequently we believe
that 'udge_' therein i8 author12ed by
Section 53214.5.
It 1. true that participlnt. in the Flexible
Benefit may elect to take ot all oe the
County'. contcibutlon aa taxable cAah, and that the
County provide...tehln9 conttibutlons to the 401(k)
plan. Wt b.118ve that thel. ben@flts are similarly
authorlze4 by Sectione 53200.) and 53214.5, linea they
Ir. part of the plana .uthorl1ed by those sections. In
addition, Government Code Sect10n 68206.6, whlch
prc9id for pay.ent of luperlor court jUQ9 solely
J'r; A
A-77
AA-321
&26'2371883
JUDICIAL WATCH
PAGE
.:
Mr. Fr.nk S. Zolln
November 10, 198'
Page st.x
tro county payroll, wdded tOt the speclfic
purpo ot to in
county caeeterla end 401(k) plan,.
low even that such benefit. are not
apec1t! ca111 by atatute, w. believe that the
provide them to , so 10n9 the
,"
Board of SUr_rYl.0rs tlndt that there i benefLt
the "dol"9 eo. This would a1.o be tcu. ot
other benefit. tor judge., such .8 prote ional
development allowance or bonu8.
Supecior court judge. are tech"1c.lly St.te
conatltutional ottieer., but they .re in re.pecta
qu i-county officecs. Ther rve the populatlon of a
particular countr' the1r .a arie. are paid in part by
the county ln wh ch they .it, and as noted above, they
are d.emed to be county ' eor purpose. or
partlclpatlon in h lth end 1 fe insurance program5
well aa in 4.rerr.d compensation plans.
The lary of a superior court judge is the m
tat.wide. Thus,. jud,e in a rural county m.y
be well compen ted bd upon the cOlt ot living there
.nd In eOMperleon to what he could rn in privat.
pract1ce. On the other han4, judgee 1n Loa Angel
County Are cONpen ted based upon the co.t of
l1vlnQ here and in to what th.y could in
private practice. The 90.rd of Supec v !8oce h
evidently found th.t 1n ocder to .ttraet and
retain quallfJed 'u4gel to .erve 1n this County, it i.
neceary and appropriate to provide with benefit.
luch .8 the Flexible Benetlt Pln contribution an4 the
401(k) matcb, which .re Available to employe in
the priv.te .ector, ae well as to CQunty and
court And employees other thAn jud9
lip
A-78
AA-322
282'8 1&:e2 6262372ee3
WATCH INC
PAGE 23/43
HI. rr.nlc s. %ol.in
Noveaber 10, 19
Page S...n
It .. be nec&ry tor the of Supervl.ors to
provide additional benet it. foe jud ges in the future in
order to .. a hi9h level of judicial competenee
and pertor.ance in th18 County.
It we oan be ot turth.r 1.tence to you in thl
..
..tter, pl lee u. know.
Very truly yours,
De WITT W. CLINTON
County Counsel
By "
ROGER M. WHITBY (
Senior A 1stant
county Counsel
APPROVED AND RELEASED:

County Counl
RMWr jk
NovlOW
I]
A-79
AA-323
CALI FORNI A LAW REVI SI ON COMMI SSI ON STAFF MEMORANDUM
Study J-1201 November 27, 1995
Memorandum 95-77
Trial Court Unification: Delegation of Legislative Authority
The trial court unification legislation, Senate Bill 162 (Lockyer), is effective
January 1, 1996. The measure provides that on occurrence of a vacancy in a
municipal court judgeship, if the Governor makes certain findings concerning the
conversion of the judgeship to a superior court judgeship, the number of
municipal court judges for the county shall then be reduced by one and the
number of superior court judges for the county shall be increased by one. Is this
a valid delegation of legislative authority?
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES
The California Constitution provides:
The Legislature shall prescribe the number of judges and provide
for the officers and employees of each superior court.
Cal. Const. Art. VI, 4 (emphasis added).
The Legislature shall provide for the organization and prescribe
the jurisdiction of municipal courts. It shall prescribe for each
municipal court the number, qualifications, and compensation of
judges, officers, and employees
Cal. Const. Art. VI, 5(c) (emphasis added).
The statutes reiterate the mandate: The Legislature shall prescribe the number
and compensation of judges, officers, and attaches of each municipal court.
Govt Code 7200.
Pursuant to these provisions, the Legislature has prescribed the numbers of
superior court and municipal court judges in each county. See Govt Code
69580-69615 (superior court); 72600-74987 (municipal court).
Although historically the Legislature has prescribed a fixed number of judges
in each county, beginning a decade or so ago the Legislature began to allow the
boards of supervisors of some counties to provide for a greater number. The
statute governing the superior court in Los Angeles County, for example,
provides:
1
A-80
AA-324
It fixes the compensation of the employees, declares a policy that
such compensation shall be commensurate with that furnished
county employees with equivalent responsibilities and provides for
interim changes, subject to review by the Legislature, in the event
there are local changes which would otherwise cause discrepancies
in compensation in violation of the legislative policy.
8 Cal. App. 3d at 862.
In Board of Supervisors v. Krumm, 62 Cal. App. 3d 935, 133 Cal. Rptr. 475
(1976), the municipal court ordered the hiring of two new marshals pursuant to a
statute that allows more than the statutorily prescribed number of deputies in
case of an increase of business of the municipal court or other emergency. The
board of supervisors contested this order on grounds that included the primacy
of the Legislature to determine municipal court staffing under Article VI, Section
5 of the Constitution. The court rejected the argument, stating:
Such argument proceeds from plaintiffs view of the effect to be
given to section 5, article VI, of the California Constitution, already
noted, which specifies that the Legislature ... shall prescribe for
each municipal court ... the number ... of... officers, and employees.
The short answer to that contention is that the Legislature itself
enacted section 72150 and within the constitutional prescription
thereby provided a specific mechanism for the staffing of municipal
courts under emergency circumstances.
62 Cal. App. 3d at 944.
Attorney General Opinions
On the other hand, the Attorney General has issued an opinion that a statute
permitting superior and municipal court judges to be covered under county
health insurance programs is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority. 59 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 496 (1976). The constitutional provision at issue
states:
The Legislature shall prescribe compensation for judges of courts
of record.
Cal. Const. Art. VI, 19 (as amended in 1974; emphasis added).
The Attorney General argues that, Because of the use of prescribe the
Legislature cannot delegate the authority granted to it by Article VI, section 19 of
the Constitution. Any attempt to make such a delegation would be
constitutionally invalid. 59 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. at 497. The Attorney General
4
A-81
AA-325
reasons that benefits such as health insurance are part of compensation, that the
effect of the statute in question is to allow counties to determine this aspect of a
judges compensation, and thus the statute is an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority.
The Attorney General distinguishes the Martin case, pointing out that the
statute involved in that case was a detailed treatment of compensation of
employees in a particular county, and was subject to continuing legislative
review of the countys actions. The health care statute involved in the Attorney
General Opinion, on the other hand, is of statewide applicability, and is not
subject to continuing legislative control over subsequent changes by counties.
The Legislature responded to the Attorney Generals opinion by amending
the statute in 1977 to provide that judges would participate in the health plan
subject to the same or similar employee benefits as are now required or granted
to employees of the county. This was evidently an effort to make the statute
similar to the parity statute held constitutional in Martin. The Attorney General
did not buy it, again issuing an opinion that the statute is unconstitutional. 61
Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 388 (1978). The opinion elaborates:
Thus, the Constitution explicitly mandates the Legislature to
itself determine the compensation of judges. Therefore if the
Legislature seeks to involve other agencies in this compensation
determining process, it would, at the very least, have to formulate
reasonably precise standards as a constraining statutory guide for
such agencies. (59 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 496, supra. See Blumenthal v.
Board of Medical Examiners (1962) 57 Cal. 2d 228, 235. See also the
discussion in 59 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 496, supra, at pp. 498-500, of
the statutory standards approved in Kugler v. Yocum (1968) 69 Cal.
2d 371 and in Martin v. County of Contra Costa (1970) 8 Cal. App. 3d
856.)
61 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. at 390.
APPLICATION TO SB 162
Does SB 162, by vesting in the Governor the authority to increase the number
of superior court judges and decrease the number of municipal court judges in a
county, run afoul of the constitutional requirement that the Legislature shall
prescribe the numbers of superior court and municipal court judges? Cal.
Const. Art. VI , 4, 5.
5
A-82
AA-326
before the election. There are interests opposed to unification, and the argument
that unification will increase judicial salaries has been effective with the voters in
at least one previous unification effort, despite the fact that unification should
yield overall savings to the judicial system. The fact that the Governor must
consider the fiscal impact of the conversion and find there are sufficient funds to
do it may help in this respect.
Add Statutory Savings Clause
One way to proceed is to assume the validity of SB 162, but to add curative or
savings language to the statute to deal with potential problems in the event it is
ultimately held invalid. This should be do-able, since before converting a
judgeship the Governor must consider the existence of a coordination plan in the
county that permits blanket cross-assignment of judges. The staff envisions a
statute along the following lines:
If conversion by the Governor of a municipal court judgeship to
a superior court judgeship under Section 68083 is determined by a
final judgment of a court to be invalid for any reason:
(a) All judgments, orders, decrees, and other acts of any
incumbent of that judgeship within the jurisdiction of the superior
court shall be deemed to be acts of the incumbent made as a judge
of the municipal court acting under cross-assignment pursuant to
the trial court coordination plan of the county.
(b) The Judicial Council shall reallocate to the municipal court
the funding in support of the municipal court salary and the
chamber staff positions and other previously allocated funding for
the judgeship, but all salary, benefits, and other payments made in
support of the converted judgeship before the effective date of the
final judgment shall be deemed to have been made as part of the
trial court coordination plan of the county.
We would need to consult with the Judicial Council to make sure that all bases
are covered in such a statute. The existence of such a statute could make it easier
for a court to determine the underlying invalidity of SB 162, however, by
lowering the stakes.
CONCLUSION
Although there is certainly a possibility that SB 162 will be held to be an
invalid delegation of legislative authority to determine the number of superior
court and municipal court judges, a case can be made that this will not occur. The
9
A-83
AA-327
problems that would be created if it is held invalid are substantial. The staff
believes something should be done in anticipation of this possibility. All of the
alternatives discussed in this memorandum have drawbacks. However, of the
alternatives, the staff prefers a savings clause that would validate actions taken
under the converted judgeship if the conversion is held invalid. This approach
appears to be low-key and workable; it could substantially minimize risks of
implementation without causing substantial delay of implementation.
Respectfully submitted,
Nathaniel Sterling
Executive Secretary
10
A-84
AA-328
R
APPENDIX
R
APPENDIX
AA-329
AA-330
AA-331
AA-332
AA-333
AA-334
AA-335
AA-336
AA-337
AA-338
AA-339
AA-340
AA-341
AA-342
AA-343
AA-344
AA-345
AA-346
AA-347
S
APPENDIX
S
APPENDIX
AA-348

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

MOTION TO STRIKE DEMURRER AND RENEWED DEMAND FOR UNBRIBED JUDGE 1
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

Daniel Cooper
1836 10
th
st # B
310-562-7668
IN PROPRIA PERSONA

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Los Angeles County
Case No. SC113137

Daniel COOPER,

vs.

MOTION TO STRIKE
DEMURRER filed under case
number SC113064
BY KEVIN M. MCCORMICK
AND BENTON, ORR, DUVAL
AND BUCKINGHAM

RENEWED DEMAND FOR
JUDGE WHO NEVER
RECEIVED COUNTY
JUDICIAL BENEFITS
Michael I. Levanas,

DATE:
TIME: 8:30 a.m.
DEPT: 59

AA-349

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

Plaintiff filed case SC113137 against Michael I. Levanas as an individual.
The case was not erroneously sued and served as stated by Kevin M. McCormick
and the firm of Benton, Orr, Duval and Buckingham (BODB). The case very
properly is sued against the individual person of Michael I. Levanas.
Court Counsel is desperate is to protect judges from the bribes they
took as individuals. Court Counsel has intimidated process servers and apparently
instructed court personnel to prevent the service of court documents to the
individuals at their place of work. One of the first motions to the court will now be a
request for determination on the adequacy of service. Additionally, the flow of
information to Plaintiff from the L.A. County Auditors office has recently slowed
dramatically and become more evasive.
These cases are against individuals, tailored to the actions and specific
biases taken by each defendant. They are not a class action, they are not against
public officials as used in Government Code section 6103; they are against the
actions, biases and misdeeds of individuals. Plaintiff demands to know who
authorized the services of BODB for the Demurrer in case SC113137. Any work by
or documents presented by Kevin McCormick and BODB are, at this time, a
misuse of public funds.
The civil suits are being filed against the judges for actions and omissions
they took as individuals. The individuals accepted the monies made available to
them by or through the County of Los Angeles. The damages are associated with
the favors to Los Angeles County shown by the defendants subsequent actions
as bribed bench officers who failed to disqualify themselves. Those biases/ favors
were perpetrated by and as individuals who attempted to not disclose such
payments to litigants and cover up their fraud on the court.
The matter of whether the individuals are acting in their official judicial
capacities or as individuals is not an issue here. The judiciary-drafted SBX2 11
decided that the affected individuals needed and were to be given retroactive
AA-350

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

criminal immunity for taking judicial payment. The individuals already had broad
immunity for the conduct of their normal judicial duties. The briberous,
unconstitutional and illegal nature of the county payments necessitated the
immunity described in SBX2 11. That immunity is itself unconstitutional but will not
be argued here by Plaintiff. The bureaucratic resistance to moving forward on the
issue of judicial payments since June 2009 and the illegality of the current
payments is exactly why the Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) has
asked the Attorney General for a determination. The CJP would prefer to not be
the body sanctioning judges statewide.
The Commission on Judicial Performance submitted two questions to Harris
in late May 2011, inquiring whether lawmakers would have the authority to pass a
measure which purports to preclude the [CJP] from disciplining California superior
court judges for authorizing supplemental compensation to be paid to themselves
from public funds, and/or receiving that supplemental compensation, on the ground
that such benefits were or are not authorized by law.
Court Counsels actions as a state employee to usurp the Courts authority
to determine if these complaints are properly sued against an individual, as stated
on the summons and on the complaint, and to volunteer state legal services to
these individuals may itself be illegal and possibly obstructions of justice.
Information from the County Auditors office for Brett Bianco and Fred Bennett
indicates they are both eligible for these same judicial benefits. Thus, they have
an individual interest and bias in preserving and protecting the status quo for
judicial benefits.
Plaintiff further demands to see written evidence that Superior Court of
California supervisors of bench officers, acting in their official supervisorial capacity
are promulgating Superior Court of California command media or specifically
directing the bench officers to accept monies offered by Los Angeles County. In
the absence of such management direction, Plaintiff must assume that it was
individual actions to accept and cash the checks offered by L.A. County. Those
individual actions are the basis of the civil suits against individuals. Therefore,
AA-351

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

Plaintiff demands to see a signed private agreement between the individual
persons for representation by BODB. Plaintiff also demands that filing fees be paid,
as they are not exempt under Government Code section 6103.
Court Counsels actions necessitate a motion for a determination on the
adequacy of service. Plaintiff continues to believe and must assume the POS-010
form for individual service is the proper form and process for serving these
individuals and is in compliance with California Code of Civil procedure Section
415.10 or 415.20. For a court bench officer, the court executive officer should be
served (page 32 of the Action Guide, Handling Claims Against Government
Entities, November 2010). Plaintiff is not aware that Court Counsel is
simultaneously the court executive officer and therefore his intercepting the court
documents intended for individuals at their place of work has denied proper service
to those individuals.
For these many reasons, the Demurrer document by Kevin McCormick
must be struck from the record.

Plaintiff continues to insist upon a judge who has not received judicial
benefits from any county, and has no personal or professional ties to lawyers or
judges in Los Angeles County. The Court must inform the parties if this requires a
payments.

Dated: ________, 2011
By: __________________________
DANIEL COOPER
In Pro Per
AA-352
AA-353
AA-354
AA-355
T
APPENDIX
T
APPENDIX
AA-356
AA-357
AA-358
AA-359
AA-360
AA-361
AA-362
AA-363
AA-364
AA-365
AA-366
AA-367
AA-368
AA-369
AA-370
AA-371
AA-372
U
APPENDIX
U
APPENDIX
AA-373

!
!
PLAINTIFFS RESUBMITTED NOTICE, MOTION AND AUTHORITIES FOR CHANGE OF VENUE
1!

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

Dennis Ettlin
4520 Toucan Street
Torrance, CA 90503
310-795-9507
IN PROPRIA PERSONA

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Los Angeles County
Case No. YC064994
Lead for Consolidated cases

Dennis ETTLIN,

vs.
NOTICE OF MOTION;
AND
MOTION FOR CHANGE OF
VENUE FOR CONSOLIDATED
CASES;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT THEREOF;
DECLARATIONS OF DENNIS
ETTLIN AND DANIEL COOPER
Glenda VEASEY,

AND CONSOLIDATED MATTERS
)
)

Ettlin v. Slawson, Case No. YC065018,
Ettlin v. Kriegler, Case No. YC065019,
Ettlin v. Taylor, Case No. YC065021,
Ettlin v. Kuhl, Case No. YC065164,
Cooper v. Weinbach, Case No. SC113064,
Cooper v. Levanas, Case No. SC113137,
Cooper v. Todd, Case No. SC113135
Cooper v. Ashmann, Case No. SC113136,

DATE: November 9, 2011
TIME: 8:30 a.m.
DEPT: 59
AA-374
AA-375
AA-376
AA-377

!
!
5!

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

Section 4 allows state employees to give compensation raises to the judges,
bypassing the legislatures Article IV section 19 responsibility to set judicial
compensation.
The California Attorney General (AG) ruled in 1976 that county judicial
benefits were unconstitutional. In 1995, the California Law Revision Commission
4
,
reviewing a precursor to the Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act,
acknowledged judicial benefits were probably illegal but suggested it was unlikely
that anyone would object. Now in 2011, the CJP has requested an updated
opinion from the AG on the constitutionality of SBX2 11 and the payment of
judicial benefits.
The widespread, pervasive and negative nature of the bribes paid by
Counties and by the Superior Courts have made it impossible in Los Angeles
County to accomplish pretrial and jury-trial actions to resolve Plaintiffs claims.
Plaintiffs have seen the recusal of all judges from both the Southwest-
Torrance and the West-Santa Monica courthouses but have been denied an
unbribed judge at the Los Angeles Central District Courthouse. For the Sturgeon I
case, all Los Angeles County Superior Court judges recused themselves.
For these civil suits under Sturgeon II, the downtown judges have decided
to hold the line, not recuse themselves, to fight back against any attack on
SBX2 11 or the Sturgeon II decision, to preserve their immunity and the continued
payments under the unconstitutional legislation SBX2 11, and continue the
biases bought by the county and court bribes.
On September 14, 2011, the Second Appellate Court denied a fourth Writ
of Mandate for judicial recusal of Robert OBrien, refused to issue a Statement of
Decision and confirmed that a prima facie case exists for denial of due process for
Plaintiffs at the trial court and also at the Appellate Court levels (See Appendix 1).
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4
!Trial!Court!Unification:!Delegation!of!Legislative!Authority;!California!Law!Revision!
Commission!Staff!Memorandum;!Memorandum!95R77,!Study!JR1201;!November!27,!1995!
AA-378

!
!
6!

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

Therefore, aware of a greatly increased hardship for all parties involved, Plaintiffs
regretfully seek a change of venue in accordance with California Civil Code of
Procedure (CCP) Sections () 397 (b) and (d).
1.2 Trial Court Under Judges Kuhl and OBrien
Plaintiffs rights of due process for the civil suits have already been denied
in Los Angeles County. Judges Kuhl and OBrien refused to recuse themselves in
the face of direct evidence that they took the bribes. Judge OBrien has further
denied due process by allowing the civil complaints to be arbitrarily and without
stipulation modified by Court Counsel for The Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. The change in defendant status from Individual to Judge, allows Court
Counsel to use state resources to defend the bribes and to assert totally
inappropriate legal protections for defendants. Judge OBrien has refused to insist
that the Defendants appear as individuals. An untainted general public jury will
have no trouble seeing the prejudice shown in Los Angeles County against
Plaintiffs and that the civil cases were properly sued against individuals.
Judge OBriens consolidation of the nine cases under a single bribed
judge as sought by Court Counsel further demonstrates a judicial bias in focusing
only on the common issues of bribery. Court Counsel seeks to declare judicial
immunity and throw out all the civil suits.
The civil suits take the bribes as a disqualifying event, as a starting point,
and address the subsequent and explosive issue of personal damages inflicted by
the fraud on the court of each of the disqualified judges who failed to
voluntarily recuse themselves and remained on the bench in cases where Los
Angeles County was an interested party.
A judges acceptance of money from Los Angeles County is an individual
action. Defendants offer no evidence that such monies are part of the
employment contract between the State and the judges or part of any
AA-379

!
!
7!

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

management direction to the judges. The San Diego Superior Court, in a similar
matter of judicial bribes, determined that Defendant Thomas Trent Lewis was an
individual and needed to pay his own court fees. The San Diego Superior Court
rejected Court Counsels argument and did not recognize Defendants status as a
judge, which would exempt defendant Lewis from fees under Government Code
section 6103.
1.3 Los Angeles Superior Court
Court Counsel for The Superior Court of Los Angeles County seeks to
portray the three plaintiffs seeking damages for the loss of their constitutional
rights as disgruntled litigants. Court Counsel would also have characterized all
African-Americans seeking their full constitutional rights in the 1950s as
disgruntled domestic help; all Chicanos in the 1960s as disgruntled field workers,
all women seeking their full constitutional rights in the 1970s as disgruntled
housewives; and all those in the 1990s seeking full constitutional rights for
marriage as disgruntled lovers.
Plaintiffs Motion for Change of Venue is necessary because Los Angeles
County refuses to appoint unbribed judges, refuses to follow California Code of
Civil Procedures for judicial recusal, and has arbitrarily redefined the defendants
as Judges from the original filings against individuals. Court Counsel of Los
Angeles Superior Court interfered with the service process to such a degree that
Plaintiff Ettlin sought a restraining order (see Appendix 3). Court Counsel is also
misappropriating state funds to represent the individuals without any
determination by a court that such representation is appropriate.
Court Counsel deceives at the very first opportunity. Information from the
County Auditors Office in Appendix 2 for Brett Bianco indicates he himself gets a
bonus, a 23% bonus for 2010, from these same judicial benefits. Thus, he has a
personal and individual interest and bias in preserving and protecting the status quo for
AA-380

!
!
8!

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

judicial benefits. By asserting the bribes were accepted by an official judicial officer,
Counsel is able to unilaterally enter the case, defend the judicial payments for himself
and for the defendants by mis-appropriating state funds, and attempting his own
interpretation of SBX2 11.
Court Counsels opposition to the first motion for a change of venue continues
the deception. By claiming the Court of Appeal in Sturgeon I found that Lockyer-
Isenberg statutorily authorized the payments, Court Counsel suggests the payments
are legal and he completely ignores the Appellate Court finding that Lockyer-
Isenberg did NOT set any standards for exercising the delegated authority and THUS
the authorization of judicial benefits payments by counties to Superior Court judges
was an unconstitutional delegation of power. The payments became petty bribes.
Court Counsel also deceives about the benefits not being a waste of public
funds and thus a bribe. Sturgeon I held that if the public funds were used for a public
purpose, they were not a gift
5
. While the courts logic certainly made sense for state
or sovereign monies, the application to funds from a private entity with an interest
before the court such as Plaintiffs, herein, or the County of Los Angeles, the largest
user of court services, was not considered by the court. The Court made no finding
with respect to interested individuals making payments and claiming a public
purpose. Without equal protection for Plaintiffs, such judicial benefit payments by the
counties are unconstitutional.
In addition to the deceptive interpretations of the law, Los Angeles Court
Counsel attempted to interfere with the proof of service process. The complaints
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5
!It is well settled that the primary question to be considered in determining whether
an appropriation of public funds is to be considered a gift is whether the funds are to
be used for public or private purpose. If they are to be used for a public purpose, they
are not a gift within the meaning of this constitutional prohibition. [Citation] [Citation]
(Jordan v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4
th
431, 450.)
Importantly, (t)he determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a
matter for the Legislature, and its discretion will not be disturbed by the courts so long
as that determination has a reasonable basis. [Citations.] (County of Alameda v.
Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730,746.)!
AA-381

!
!
9!

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

were sued against individuals. When attempts were made to serve the complaints
on the individuals at their place of work, Court Counsel insisted they be served on
his office. The bullying was so extreme that Dennis Ettlin, serving documents for
Daniel Cooper, was confronted by Court Counsel, two Sherriff deputies and a
supervisor from the risk management department and threatened with a restraining
order. Ettlin himself then sought a restraining order against Court Counsel, it was
denied, but subsequently, court staff quietly accepted the packages from the
process servers. (See Appendix 3)
The Court Counsel, with his personal and individual interest in protecting the
practice of court-paid and county-paid judicial benefits, works in concert with the
Los Angeles County Office of the County Counsel to obscure the simple truth that
bribes were paid to individuals who protect the interests of Los Angeles County
and illegally hide behind the veneer of organizational authority.
The Los Angeles County Litigation manager provides quarterly risk
management reports to the supervisors on the projected costs to the county from
on-going litigation and is responsible for working with the Superior Court and the
District Attorney to reduce risk and protect the countys interests. This report is
confidential, protecting planning discussions from being exposed to the public.
Appendix 4 contains the 2007-2008 public report signed by the Litigation Cost
Manager. The Commission on Judicial Performance is now finally investigating the
Superior Court payments with the linkage to county payments.
1.4 Appellate and Supreme Courts
These civil suits are specifically called for by the San Diego-based Fourth
Appellate Courts Sturgeon II decision, which explicitly called for further challenges
by taxpayers or members of the bench themselves. Unfortunately, Plaintiffs have no
effective Appellate recourse in Los Angeles County.
Plaintiff and Appellant, Dennis Ettlin, filed a civil suit against Sandy Kriegler
AA-382

!
!
10!

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

(YC065019) for failure to voluntarily recuse himself and concealment of his bribes in a
Los Angeles family law appeal case (B187741) filed in the Second Appellate Court in
2006. Subsequently, Ettlin requested recusal of Robert OBrien on August 1, 2011.
OBrien refused. Ettlin requested a Writ of Mandate from the Second Appellate District
on August 10, 2011. The petition was denied by Justices Bigelow, Rubin and Flier
without any explanation and without the requested Statement of Decision. Civil suits are
in preparation for all three and will immediately request a change of venue in those
cases to counties where the judges did not take bribes.
Another Plaintiff and Appellant Daniel COOPER requested recusal of Judge
Elia Weinbach on January 20, 2011 from his family law case (SD026673).
Weinbach refused. COOPER requested a Writ of Mandate from the Second
Appellate District for the recusal of Judge Weinbach on January 26, 2011. On
February 8, 2011, the Writ was summarily denied by Justices Boren, Doi-Todd and
Ashmann-Gerst without any explanation and no Statement of Decision. Civil
complaints were subsequently filed against Kathryn Doi-Todd (SC113135) and
Judith Ashmann-Gerst (SC113136) for civil rights violations for failure to recuse
themselves because of the same bribes they had taken.
Another Plaintiff and also Appellant, Anthony Locatelli, requested recusal of
Los Angeles County Judge Thomas Trent Lewis from a family law case
(BD516629). Lewis refused. LOCATELLI requested a Writ of Mandate from the
Second Appellate District on August 19, 2011. Justices Mallano, Chaney and
Johnson denied the petition on August 25, 2011, again, without any explanation
and no Statement of Decision. Civil suits are in preparation for all three and will
immediately request a change of venue to a county where the judges did not take
bribes.
The judiciary has failed to resolve the bribery issue and Plaintiff simply seeks
to let a jury of his peers make that incidental determination as part of the trial on bias
and damages. Los Angeles County, as a private party, pays all judges in the county
AA-383

!
!
11!

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

$57,000 for 2011 to look favorably on the county. This creates an especially strong
bias in the family courts toward the county where large sums of revenue are at stake.
Twelve of the 32 justices in the Second Appellate District will be or are
already being sued for civil rights violations due to the county paid bribes. All 12
justices were silent and failed to recuse themselves because of the bribes they
received from Los Angeles County and the interest that Los Angeles County had
in the cases involved. Additionally, eight of the 12 have participated in the denial of
Writs of Mandate where they refused to recuse themselves, participated in a
judgment upholding the bribes and then remained silent about any legal reasoning
on the constitutionality of the county payments. Under the Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Company, Inc., 566 U.S. ___ (2009) test for bias, Plaintiffs see, and
believe a citizen jury will also see the unconstitutional potential for bias that is
widespread and persistent. A change of venue is mandated. No justice can be
had in Los Angeles County.
1.5 Legislative History on Judicial Compensation
Appendix 5 (with additional supporting material in Appendices 6-8)
contains a more substantial but still brief legislative history of the
unconstitutionality of county and court judicial payments. The key item to bring
forward is that the Fourth Appellate Court acknowledged during oral arguments
on October 13, 2010 the great turmoil among the judges over Sturgeon I. Chief
Justice Ron George, a strong and long-time proponent of increased judicial
salaries, then reasserts his interests, one week before a decision on Sturgeon II,
by assigning Presiding Judge Tricia Benke, on December 22, 2011, as Acting
Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, on another high-profile case. This
collegial plum of an appointment had no purpose other than to influence the
Sturgeon II decision-making process. On December 28, 2010 the Sturgeon II
decision claims the Justices have limited authority to enforce the California
AA-384

!
!
12!

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

Constitution, refuses to declare SBX2 11 unconstitutional, and dares the people
of California to stand up for their due process rights. It would be professional
suicide for any lawyer to challenge the courts or represent us, so three In Pro Per
litigants, today, fighting for themselves and their sons and daughters, have the
courage to stand up to the entire judicial establishment and argue for NO MORE
BRIBES, NO MORE BIAS.
1.6 Jurisdiction and Venue
The need for a change of venue is self-evident to Plaintiffs in these civil
rights lawsuits against the judiciary. Early judges in the cases recused
themselves. Plaintiffs had some initial hope for an unbiased judge. Now the
Central judges are judging themselves, refusing to recuse themselves, swear they
are unbiased even though they took the very bribes at the heart of the complaints.
Defendants claim that Plaintiffs voluntarily selected to bring these consolidated
actions in Los Angeles County. Quite the contrary is true! For a civil suit against
an individual for bribery, the jurisdictional guidelines provided in the CCP provide
very little discretion in selecting a venue. CCP Section 395(a) states Except as
otherwise provided by law and subject to the power of the court to transfer actions
or proceedings as provided in this title, the Superior Court in the county where the
defendants or some of them reside at the commencement of the action is the
proper court for the trial of the action. The suits are filed in the correct court. The
basis for changing the venue is provided in Section 397, which states in relevant
part:
The court may, on motion, change the place of trial in the following cases:
(a) When the court designated in the complaint is not the proper court.
(b) When there is reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be had
therein.
(c) When the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be
promoted by the change.
(d) When from any cause there is no judge of the court qualified to act.!
AA-385

!
!
13!

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

Sections 397(b) and (d) capture Plaintiffs major concerns. The key
reasons for a change of venue. Plaintiff will not get an impartial trial with Los
Angeles County bribed judges and furthermore, no judge from any county which
paid judicial benefits is qualified to act. Even the Appellate Court judges in Los
Angeles are not qualified to provide due process for Plaintiffs there. CCP Sections
397(b) and (d) supercede CCP Section 395(a).
These are civil suits not criminal suits. However, since the cases are
subsequent to a criminal action, it might be instructive to consider the California
Supreme Courts five part test for Change of Venue in criminal cases; Martinez v.
Superior Court (1981) 29 Cal.3d 574; Williams v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d
584. Those factors are:
1. The nature and gravity of the offense;
2. The size of the community;
3. The status of the victim and accused
4. The nature and extent of the publicity, and
5. The existence of political overtones in the case
While, a first analysis of these factors would further confirm that a change
of venue out of Los Angeles County is required, a second analysis is critically
needed to identify the factors governing selection of any new venue for the trial of
these civil suits. Since 90% of all state judges received the judicial benefits and
since a high percentage of the Appellate Court justices are drawn from former
Superior Court judges, the selection of a new venue can be equally challenging.
Appendix 9 shows the data tables of Appendix D of the Judicial Council of
California report titled, Historical Analysis of Disparities in Judicial Benefits, dated
December 15, 2009, and mandated by SBX2 11. The scope of the problem in
identifying a new venue is identified in Appendix 10 showing the geographic
dispersion and pattern of the judicial benefit payments using the raw data
contained in Appendix D of the Judicial Council report. Most likely, Plaintiffs must
go to the far corners of the state to get a fair trial.
AA-386

!
!
14!

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

The recourse to an unbribed and independent Appellate Court is of equal
concern to Plaintiff. The map of county payments in Appendix 10 also shows
California appellate districts. No district presents itself as an obvious choice.
Given the pervasiveness of the judicial benefits and the near certain uproar and
lobbying from the California Judges Association, appeals and mandates are likely.
Plaintiffs must have an unbiased trial court and also an unbiased channel for
appellate review.
The normal process of venue selection would fall to the Judicial Council.
However, since the Judicial Council along with the California Judges Association
sponsored SBX2 11, the Judicial Council is hardly unbiased and its ability to
choose an appropriate venue will give every appearance of gaming the system.
This bias was already evident in the proceedings during the request for recusal of
Los Angeles Judge Trent Lewis. The Judicial Council just appointed another
bribed judge from neighboring Orange County (which also pays bribes) who was
then subjected to the legal hogwash of the same self-serving bribed Los Angeles
Court Counsel and then decided the matter without a hearing from all parties
using Los Angeles Court Counsels favorite phrase of absolute judicial immunity.
Plaintiffs analysis of the data in Appendix 9 is shown in table form in
Appendix 10. The conclusion of that analysis is that Humboldt County is the
Plaintiffs preferred choice for a new venue. There are 12 counties which do not
pay bribes and which have more than five judges in the county Superior Court.
Humboldt is geographically isolated and small enough to likely be removed from
the intense lobbying influence of the CJA. In the interest of achieving a fair trial
and due process, all costs associated with travel, video conferencing and media
distribution should be paid by the Superior Court of the county in which the civil
suit originates. Appellate reviews in San Franciscos First District will serve to
keep this issue in the forefront of the California Supreme Court and the Attorney
General.
AA-387

!
!
15!

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

Instead of crying forum shopping, Defendants could be more productive
suggesting their own forum selections that meet Plaintiffs concerns. Plaintiffs are
mindful of the LOCATELLI civil suit in San Diego County where LOCATELLI
voluntarily selected his home county. The Los Angeles Court Counsel then
requested transfer of the San Diego civil suit to Los Angeles under the very same
CCP 395. Since the San Diego Superior Court is also bribed, it is not surprising
that it also failed to uphold LOCATELLIs due process rights. The Fourth
Appellate District Court continues to wash their hands of this issue and chooses
to Let L.A. handle it. LOCATELLI is seeking an Extraordinary Writ to block the
transfer until an unbiased court is identified. Part of LOCATELLIs evidence is this
very Change of Venue motion. LOCATELLI also plans a civil suit action against
Richard E. L. Strauss, employed as a judge in San Diego Superior Court for
concealing his own judicial benefits, the resulting fraud on the court and failing to
recuse himself for the approximately $15,000 he received annually in judicial
benefits.
CONCLUSION
Failure to grant a Change of Venue would be a travesty of justice and a
waste of jury trial resources. Court Counsel has spewed the same absolute
immunity hogwash to each of the judges striking statements of disqualification
and to the Orange County Superior Court. Immunity disappeared on December
23, 2008. Citizen juries will emphatically and quickly repudiate Court Counsels
wishful thinking. The U.S. Supreme Court would not have wasted its precious time
on Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., 566 U.S. ___ (2009) if judges
had the absolute immunity envisioned by Los Angeles Court Counsel.
This case bears striking similarity to a northeastern Pennsylvania judge
ordered to spend nearly three decades in prison for his role in a massive juvenile
justice bribery scandal that prompted the state's high court to toss thousands of
AA-388
AA-389
AA-390
AA-391

!
!
19!

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1 Mandate for Recusal Prima Facie Evidence ........... A1
APPENDIX 2 Court Counsel Payments and Conflict of Interest ..... A7
APPENDIX 3 Civil Harassment Case against Court Counsel ....... A11
APPENDIX 4 Litigation Cost Manager Summary Report. .............. A27
APPENDIX 5 Limited History of Judicial Compensation ................. A33
APPENDIX 6 1988 Zolin Memorandum to L.A. Superior Court .... A42
APPENDIX 7 1995 Calif. Law Comm.!Memo on Court Unification A50
APPENDIX 8 Appointment of Patricia Benke ................................. A61
APPENDIX 9 Judicial Council Report on Benefits .......................... A66
APPENDIX 10 Analysis Recommending Humboldt County ........... A75

AA-392

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

PLAINTIFFS NOTICE, MOTION AND AUTHORITIES FOR CHANGE OF VENUE

APPENDIX
1

A-1
AA-393
A-2
AA-394
A-3
AA-395
A-4
AA-396

!
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
.

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

B________________
Nine of the 32 justices in the Second Appellate District are being
sued for civil rights violations due to the county paid bribes. The three
current cases will seek a change of venue and the six new cases will be
filed outside Los Angeles County. This will create great hardship on the
Plaintiffs and Defendants because a fair trial cannot be had in Los
Angeles County. All nine justices were silent and failed to recuse
themselves because of the bribes they received from Los Angeles
County and the interest that Los Angeles County had in the cases
involved. Additionally, eight have participated in the denial of Writs of
Mandate where they refused to recuse themselves, participated in a
judgment upholding the bribes and then remained silent about any legal
reasoning on the constitutionality of the county payments. Under the
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., 566 U.S. ___ (2009) test
for bias, Plaintiff sees an unconstitutional potential for bias that is
widespread and persistent.

REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION

COOPER requests a detailed Statement of Decision to include an
opinion on each of the constitutional questions identified in this
Petition.
1. Affirm that Los Angeles County is not sovereign, is a private
entity no different than Appellant in the eyes of the law.
2. Affirm that judicial compensation by sovereign entities is an
accepted compromise by the sovereign when the sovereign entity
is involved in a matter before the judiciary. The same principle
A-5
AA-397

!
D
a
n
i
e
l

C
o
o
p
e
r
.

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

B________________
does not apply to non-sovereign entities, such as county
government.
3. Affirm that Los Angeles County judicial payments are made to
individuals who are making personal and individual choices to
live and work in Los Angeles County. Affirm that acceptance of
the payments is an individual act, not required for employment.
4. Affirm that the immunity of SBX2 11, Section 5 is
unconstitutional due to Article 1, Section 9 of the California
Constitution.
5. Affirm that SBX2 11, Section 2 does not authorize Los Angeles
County Superior Court (not a county) to make judicial benefits
payments to Commissioners, Court Counsel and other non-
Judges.
6. Affirm SBX2 11, Section 2 allows a reduction in judicial benefits
for all judges equally within a county or court. The state salaries
are annual salaries, the judicial benefits are annual benefits and
therefore taxpayers facing judicial layoffs would expect the terms
and conditions might allow for a reduction in the amount (not
termination) of annual judicial benefits following May 20, 2010.
7. Affirm that judicial benefit bribes from a county, received in the
past, but not recently, will continue to influence the judicial
officer.

Failure of this Court to provide detailed opinions that apply and
extend the legal reasoning of the Fourth Appellate Districts Sturgeon II
decision will be used as prima facie evidence of the Second Appellate
Courts bias and protection of Los Angeles County interests. Ideally, a
A-6
AA-398

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a


APPENDIX
2
A-7
AA-399
Dennis Ettlin
4520 Toucan Street
Torrance, CA 90503
T 310-356-6947
C 310-795-9507
cyberidme@gmail.com
July 15, 2011
Administrative Records Request
c/o Central Civil Operations Administration
Room 109, Stanley Mosk Courthouse
111 N. Hill Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012
Dear Sir or Madam,
I am seeking information on payments made by Superior Court of California, County of Los
Angeles to the following persons from 1990 to the present while these persons were California
state employees.
D. Brett Bianco
Frederick R. Bennett
Glenda Veasey (Commissioner)
John Slawson (Commissioner)
Carolyn Kuhl (Judge)
Sandy Kriegler (Judge)
In addition to their compensation by the state, the Los Angeles County Auditor says they were
eligible to receive additional judicial benets payments (matching those paid by Los Angeles
County). For each of the persons above, I would like to know the amount and type of any
payments for each benet below for each year from 1990 through 2011:
1. Matching payments into the Countys 401K/457 Retirement Savings Plans
2. Cafeteria fringe benet plan (approximately $34,000)
3. Professional development allowance (approximately $7,000)
I would also like to know the name, nancial object or other identier name for the account
from which these payments (accounting transactions) were made.
I appreciate your help in this matter and I look forward to your response.
Sincerely yours,
Dennis Ettlin
A-8
AA-400
A-9
AA-401
A-10
AA-402

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a


APPENDIX
3

A-11
AA-403
9/19/11 12:17 PM Los Angeles Superior Court - Civil Case Summary

Case Summary
Case Number: BS132755
DENNIS ETTLIN VS. BRETT BIANCO
Case Type: Civil Harassment (General Jurisdiction)
Status: Dismissed - Other 07/12/2011
Future Hearings
None
Parties
BIANCO BRETT - Defendant/Respondent
ETTLIN DENNIS - Petitioner
07/12/2011 Application for TRO
Filed by Petitioner
07/12/2011 at 02:00 pm in Department 75, Carol Boas Goodson, Presiding
Exparte proceeding - Denied
A-12
AA-404
A-13
AA-405
A-14
AA-406
A-15
AA-407
A-16
AA-408
A-17
AA-409
Dennis Ettlin
4520 Toucan Street
Torrance, CA 90503
T 310-356-6947
C 310-795-9507
cyberidme@gmail.com
June 29, 2011
Brett Bianco
Court Counsel
Stanley Mosk Courthouse
111 N. Hill Street, Room 546
Dear Mr. Bianco;
This letter is in response to your comments and actions while I was serving San Diego
Superior Court documents on Thomas Trent Lewis. Without disrupting the
courtroom, I handed the documents to a clerks assistant about 1:30pm Tuesday, June
28. I was told by said clerk the papers were unusual and to come back later at 3:30pm
to speak to the supervisor. At 3:30pm I returned and was told that the matter was being
referred to the regional clerk and I should return the next day after 1:30pm.
I then went to your ofce and informed you that the process seemed to be out of
control and that I was supposed to return the next day and that you might want to
intervene and accept the document. You indicated at the time that I had set the process
in motion, there was nothing you could do and you refused to sign a proof of service
form at that time as you had done before. Furthermore, you indicated there would be
repercussions if I continued to try to serve Judges.
I returned June 29 at about 3:00pm as requested by the clerk to retrieve my proof of
service form. The clerk told me case management was coming, asked me to have a
seat. Shortly thereafter, the bailiff said there was chatter on her communications device
and asked me to step into the corridor. Outside the courtroom, we were immediately
met by yourself demanding to know why I was there. I repeated that I was told to
return and that I wanted to retrieve my original stamped proof of service form for the
county of San Diego. At that time a sergeant showed up, brandished a restraining
order, indicated to me that you, the court counsel were shown at the top of the form
and assured me that you were indeed Bret Bianco. You refused to indicate at that time
what the restraining order restrictions were and told me not to play games with you.
At about that time a risk management representative showed up with my packet from
the day before. I was asked what I wanted. I requested my original proof of service
CH-100, Item 12, Temporary Order
Letters not mailed
A-18
AA-410
form that I needed to le in San Diego and a signature by someone to indicate it had
been sufciently delivered. I received the form and the signature. At that point I was
threatened to never come back to the judges courtroom and I would be receiving
paperwork soon.
You have stated that the Proof of Service process is different for judges. You refused to
offer to me what that process was so that I could follow it. I inquired of all the
following ofces;
the clerk in the Torrance courthouse,
the clerk at 111 North Hill Street,
the sheriffs ofce at the Santa Monica Courthouse
the sheriffs ofce at the 111 Hill Street Courthouse
if there were separate procedures for serving a judge or serving a judge as an
individual and all indicated there was no special process for a judge.
The reference librarian at the Los Angeles Law Library did identify for my review,
Chapter 17.23 of the highly specialized California Civil Procedure Before Trial, Volume
1 as applicable to public entities. She also identied a section for service on a judicial
branch entity, page 32 of the Action Guide, Handling Claims Against Government
Entities, November 2010 which would cover a judge as part of a judicial entity. Page 32
(attached) indicates the court executive ofcer should be served. Again, this references
a judge as a member of a judicial branch entity. Since the paperwork identied the
defendant as an individual, this reference is not applicable and furthermore, I am not
aware that you are the court executive ofcer.
I will certainly abide by the restraining order after it is served on me and in the
meantime I will honor your request to not serve the judges directly.
Sincerely yours,
Dennis Ettlin
Letters not mailed
A-19
AA-411
file:///Users/FastDennis/Desktop/00001-01000/415.10-415.txt
CALIFORNIA CODES
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
SECTION 415.10-415.95
415.10. A summons may be served by personal delivery of a copy of
the summons and of the complaint to the person to be served. Service
of a summons in this manner is deemed complete at the time of such
delivery.
The date upon which personal delivery is made shall be entered on
or affixed to the face of the copy of the summons at the time of its
delivery. However, service of a summons without such date shall be
valid and effective.
415.20. (a) In lieu of personal delivery of a copy of the summons
and complaint to the person to be served as specified in Section
416.10, 416.20, 416.30, 416.40, or 416.50, a summons may be served by
leaving a copy of the summons and complaint during usual office
hours in his or her office or, if no physical address is known, at
his or her usual mailing address, other than a United States Postal
Service post office box, with the person who is apparently in charge
thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and
complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be
served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were
left. When service is effected by leaving a copy of the summons and
complaint at a mailing address, it shall be left with a person at
least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof.
Service of a summons in this manner is deemed complete on the 10th
day after the mailing.
(b) If a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable
diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served, as
specified in Section 416.60, 416.70, 416.80, or 416.90, a summons may
be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the
person's dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of
business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal
Service post office box, in the presence of a competent member of the
household or a person apparently in charge of his or her office,
place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United
file:///Users/FastDennis/Desktop/00001-01000/415.10-415.txt (1 of 8) [3/11/11 1:20:05 PM]
Letters not mailed
A-20
AA-412
Letters not mailed
A-21
AA-413
Letters not mailed
A-22
AA-414
Dennis Ettlin
4520 Toucan Street
Torrance, CA 90503
T 310-356-6947
C 310-795-9507
cyberidme@gmail.com
June 29, 2011
Brett Bianco
Court Counsel
Stanley Mosk Courthouse
111 N. Hill Street, Room 546
Dear Mr. Bianco;
This letter is in response to your actions complicating and interfering with the service
of court documents. As a Plaintiff waiting for a fee waiver determination and looking
forward to having a summons and complaint served on four different judges, I nd
your actions very confusing.
The civil suits are being led against the judges for actions they took as individuals.
The individuals accepted monies made available to them by or through the County of
Los Angeles. The damages are associated with the favors to Los Angeles County
shown by the defendants subsequent actions as bribed bench ofcers. Those biases/
favors were perpetrated by and as individuals who attempted to cover up their fraud
on the court by not disclosing such payments to litigants.
The matter of whether the individuals are acting in their ofcial judicial capacities or
as individuals is not an issue here. The judiciary-drafted SBX2 11 decided that the
affected individuals were to be given retroactive criminal immunity. The bureaucratic
resistance to moving forward on the issue of judicial payments since June 2009 and the
illegality of the current payments is exactly why the Commission on Judicial
Performance (CJP) has asked the Attorney General for a determination. The CJP would
prefer to not be the sanctioning body.
The Commission on Judicial Performance submitted two questions to Harris in late May, in-
quiring whether lawmakers would have the authority to pass a measure which purports to pre-
clude the [CJP] from disciplining California superior court judges for authorizing supplemental
compensation to be paid to themselves from public funds, and/or receiving that supplemental
compensation, on the ground that such benefits were or are not authorized by law.
While I applaud your pro-active response and thoughtfulness, your actions as a state
employee to volunteer state legal services to these individuals, as stated on the
summons and on the complaint, may itself be illegal and possibly an obstruction of
Letters not mailed
A-23
AA-415
justice. I have requested county payment information from the County Auditors ofce
for you and Fred Bennett to help clarify your interest in these judicial benets cases.
One of the rst motions to the court will now request a determination on the adequacy
of service.
While I have no objection to providing you courtesy copies of the complaints, until I
see written evidence that supervisors of bench ofcers, acting in their ofcial
supervisorial capacity are promulgating Superior Court command media or specically
directing the bench ofcers to accept monies offered by Los Angeles County, and, in
the absence of such, until I see a signed private agreement between the individual
persons and yourself as private counsel, I will continue to believe and must assume the
POS-010 form for individual service is the proper form and process for serving these
individuals and is in compliance with California Code of Civil procedure Section
415.10 or 415.20.
On a related matter from Mr. Bennetts letters to me, the county auditors ofce has
provided a small clarication that I will be pursuing in the weeks ahead. While
Commissioners and Judges both receive payments from the County of Los Angeles, the
payments to Commissioners are from an account funded by the Superior Court. The
payments to the judges are funded by a county judicial operations account. Thus, it
appears that there is no separate reimbursement transaction by the Superior Court to
the county.
This accounting arrangement does, however, bear directly on the Attorney Generals
inquiry of the question of whether judges may be disciplined for authorizing
supplemental compensation to be paid to themselves from public funds.
Sincerely yours,
Dennis Ettlin
Plaintiff, In Pro Per
case # YC064994
Letters not mailed
A-24
AA-416
A-25
AA-417
A-26
AA-418

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a


APPENDIX
5

A-33
AA-419

! 17!

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

Selective History of Legislative on Judicial Compensation
The only way to understand the actions of the Los Angeles Courts and the
Los Angeles Court Counsel is to understand the legislative history and the
powerful dynamics of judicial salaries.
The Chief Justices of the United States Supreme Court and the California
Supreme Court have spent years trying to simply increase the salaries of their
respective bench officers. They have had no direct success. The frustration in
California led to the passage of the unconstitutional 1997 Lockyer-Isenberg Trial
Court Funding Act under the just do it Chief Justice Ron George.
Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, 167 Cal.App.4th 630 (2008) Rev.
denied 12/23/08, held that the L.A. County payments to L.A. Superior Court
judges violated Article VI, Section 19 of the California Constitution because the
1997 Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act, while it DID authorize judicial
benefits, it did NOT set any standards for exercising the delegated authority and
THUS the authorization of judicial benefits payments by counties to Superior
Court judges was an unconstitutional delegation of power.
The unconstitutionality of judicial benefits is not new. In fact it is a long
simmering debate and intrusion by Judges, at least in Los Angeles County, into
the labor-management relationship between the State and the Judges. In 1976
the Attorney General issued an opinion that county payments for health insurance
benefits were unconstitutional;
The Attorney General has issued an opinion that a statute
permitting superior and municipal court judges to be covered
under county health insurance programs is an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority. 59 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 496
(1976). The constitutional provision at issue states:
The Legislature shall prescribe compensation for judges of
courts of record. Cal. Const. Art. VI, 19 (as amended in 1974;
emphasis added).
A-34
AA-420

! 18!

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

The Attorney General argues that, Because of the use of
prescribe the Legislature cannot delegate the authority granted
to it by Article VI, section 19 of the Constitution. Any attempt to
make such a delegation would be constitutionally invalid. 59 Ops.
Cal. Atty. Gen. at 497. The Attorney General reasons that benefits
such as health insurance are part of compensation, that the effect
of the statute in question is to allow counties to determine this
aspect of a judges compensation, and thus the statute is an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.
(see Trial Court Unification: Delegation of Legislative Authority;
California Law Revision Commission Staff Memorandum;
Memorandum 95-77, Study J-1201; November 27, 1995)
In 1988 the County of Los Angeles, Office of the County Counsel, advised
Frank Zolin, County Clerk/Executive Officer of the Superior Court that it would be
permissible for the county to pay additional benefits for judges, although he
acknowledged the Attorney General had opinions otherwise (see Appendix 6).
Leading up to the new legislation for Trial Court Unification, a
memorandum was generated in 1995 that again laid out the law and updated the
Attorney Generals opinion on the unconstitutionality of such county benefits (see
Appendix 7). The Commission staff memorandum then expressed a fear of the
voters and went on to conclude that the legislature should take action and
gamble on the validity of the delegation of authority.

Although there is certainly a possibility that SB 162 will be
held to be an invalid delegation of legislative authority ., a case
can be made that this will not occur. The problems that would
be created if it is held invalid are substantial. (emphasis
added)
(see Trial Court Unification: Delegation of Legislative Authority;
California Law Revision Commission Staff Memorandum;
Memorandum 95-77, Study J-1201; November 27, 1995)
The Sturgeon I decision called the Legislatures bluff in the 1997 Lockyer-
Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act. Now the substantial problems of bias and
A-35
AA-421

! 19!

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

unconstitutionality accrued over the last 15 years must be made whole. Sturgeon I
was no surprise or rogue ruling.
In a last ditch effort to overturn the Sturgeon I decision, the California
Judges Association (CJA) filed an amicus curiae brief asking the Supreme Court
to grant review in Sturgeon. The review was denied December 28, 2008. Michael
Belote, lobbyist for the California Judges Association said, "I always thought it
was likely there would have to be legislative action, but this certainly steps up the
urgency." (See Appendix 10)
After the Sturgeon I decision, the State legislature hastily passed and the
Governor signed Senate Bill SBX2 11 on February 20, 2009 amidst all the frantic
activity on the state budget. There was no public debate and no legislative
analysis. The judiciary and the legislature tried to do in two months what they
failed to do in 30 years. It is no surprise that SBX2 11 is also unconstitutional.
Sturgeon II appealed the constitutionality of SBX2 11. The response was
swift and stiff from the County of Los Angeles, from the Superior Court of the
State of California, County of Los Angeles, and from all the current and former
judges of the Los Angeles Superior Court who were or had received judicial
benefits.
The Sturgeon II decision was decided on only three very narrow grounds.
The relevant description states:
Shortly after we filed our opinion in Sturgeon!I and while the
identified in Sturgeon!I. In particular, the legislation required that all counties
days' notice.
A-36
AA-422

! 20!

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

summary judgment.
interim response to the constitutional issues we addressed in Sturgeon II. As

But the disturbing portion of the decision is the final paragraph of the
decision, which contradicts the above opening statement by stating that SBX2 11 is
not a permanent response to the constitutional issues. How can a law be
temporarily constitutional? It either is or is not constitutional. Again, the Fourth
Appellate Court, acknowledges the contradiction and encourages these particular
civil suits by stating:
constitutional issues we identified in Sturgeon!I or the difficult problem of adopting a
we did not state that while the Legislature's interim response to Sturgeon!I !defeats
The SBX2 11 Section 2 is unconstitutionally vague about the same terms
and conditions as were in effect on that date. Since the Fourth Appellate Court is
deferring to the taxpayers and judges, these civil cases will ask for jury decisions
on whether the countys terms and conditions were defined anywhere and thus
are arbitrary (and unconstitutional) or whether they were one year payments and
thus terminated on June 30, 2009. Section 2 only identifies judges as recipients.
No authority is provided to pay Court Counsel or Commissioners. The
A-37
AA-423

! 21!

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) is also very interested in the
constitutionality of this section and has requested an opinion from the Attorney
General.
The SBX2 11 Section 4 is unconstitutional because the Judicial Council is
now paying judicial benefits to commissioners, Court Counsel and others, as will
be determined at trial. (The payments in SBX2 11 Section 2 made by L.A. County
to Commissioners are called warrants by the L.A. County Auditor because they
are issued by L.A. County but funded by the Judicial Council.) The continued
payments by the counties under Section 2 now makes these Judicial Council
payments a continued obligation, which is prohibited by Section 4. The opinions
(see Appendix 6 of the Writ of Mandate identified in this Appendix 1) of the CJP
are that these payments are unconstitutional. The CJP has requested the
Attorney Generals opinion in this matter because the judges are clearly biased.
Again, since the Fourth Appellate Court is deferring to the taxpayers and judges,
these civil cases will ask for jury decisions on whether the Superior Court
payments obligated by the county payments are legal and constitutional.
The SBX2 11 Section 5 immunity is unconstitutional, has not been
challenged in the Appellate Court and preserved the status quo ante Sturgeon I.
The attempted immunity is unconstitutional under the California Constitution,
ARTICLE 1, SECTION 9 that states A bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law
impairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed. Furthermore, SBX2 11
Section 5 legislation conflicts with the constitutional responsibilities of the
Commission on Judicial Performance. The extensive CJP analysis and arguments
show the legislatures attempt to usurp constitutional powers and requests an
opinion from the California Attorney General on the constitutionality of SBX2 11.
Again, since the Fourth Appellate Court is deferring to the taxpayers and judges,
these civil cases will ask for jury decisions on whether the judges have immunity
A-38
AA-424

! 22!

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

from civil liability and if so whether the Plaintiffs are due damages for the biases
bought by the L.A. County bribes
Behind the Scenes Judicial Turmoil and Stress
The California Court of Appeal 4th District in San Diego heard oral
arguments for Sturgeon II on October 13, 2010. Jones-Day Attorney Elwood Lui
(former Appellate Court Justice representing Los Angeles County) stated that the
Sturgeon I decision was quite alarming to many judges throughout the state of
California; prompting Presiding Judge Tricia Benke to interrupt and concur, it
was very disruptive (emphasis from oral argument). Apparently the Appellate
Court justices have taken a lot of heat since Sturgeon I. Judge Gilbert Nares
suggested the court might just delay and see what happens; then he predicted a
Sturgeon III after the legislature acts
1
.
Sturgeon II Fizzled
The Sturgeon II decision was decided on only three very narrow grounds.
The Fourth Appellate Courts decision in Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles,
__Cal App.4th_(4th Dist.,Div. 1) (2010), the so-called Sturgeon II concluded on
page 14:
As the parties have recognized, SBX 211 both preserved the status quo
ante Sturgeon I and commenced a process by which the Legislature looks
to adoption of a comprehensive judicial compensation scheme. As we have
explained, this response to Sturgeon I meets the requirements of the
Constitution and is wholly sensible under the circumstances. The
Legislature is uniquely competent to deal with the complex policy problem of
establishing a judicial compensation scheme which both assures recruitment
and retention of fully qualified judicial officers throughout the state while at
the same time providing equity between judges in different parts of the state.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
!Media!coverage!by!Full!Disclosure!!the!news!behind!the!news,!Are)Judicial)Double)
Benefits)Constitutional?)Judges)To)Rule)on)Judges)Benefits)Round)II,)!Internet!Exclusive!
Video!News!Blog:!10:00!min;!http://fulldisclosure.net/Blogs/92.php;!!Release!Date:!
November!21,!2010;!
A-39
AA-425

! 23!

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

By the same token our role in ensuring that the more general
requirements of the Constitution have been met is, under our system of
separate governmental powers, quite limited. (emphasis added)
The Appellate Court continues with the!disturbing!portion!of!the!decision!is!the!
final!paragraph!of!the!decision and contradicts itself on page 15,
constitutional issues we identified in Sturgeon I or the difficult problem of
adopting a compensation scheme that deals with varying economic
circumstances in an equitable and efficient manner. Thus, we would be remiss
in discharging our duties if we did not state that while the Legislature's interim
response to Sturgeon I defeats the particular challenges asserted by
Sturgeon in this litigation, that interim remedy, if not supplanted by the more
comprehensive response SBX 211 plainly contemplates, most likely will give
rise to further challenges by taxpayers or members of the bench themselves.
As we noted at the outset, the issue of judicial compensation is a state, not a
county, responsibility. We are confident that the Legislature within a
reasonable period of time will act to adopt a uniform statewide system of
judicial compensation. (emphasis added)
How can a law be temporarily constitutional? It either is or is not
constitutional. If SBX2 11 meets the requirements of the constitution as stated by
the court, why would taxpayers challenge it? Clearly the Appellate Court feels
quite limited in ensuring the Constitution is met and is not willing to fully address
this issue. The bold Sturgeon I decision by the Fourth Appellate Court fizzled
when they decided Sturgeon II.
The key to understanding the Courts unwillingness to fully address their
responsibility is found in the Fourth Appellate Courts acknowledgment during oral
arguments on October 13, 2010 of the great turmoil among the judges over
Sturgeon I. Chief Justice Ron George then. Following oral arguments, and only
one week before a decision on Sturgeon II, Ron George, a strong and long-time
proponent of increased judicial salaries, reasserts his interest and assigns the
Sturgeon II Presiding Judge Tricia Benke, on December 22, 2011, as Acting Chief
Justice of the California Supreme Court, on another high-profile case. (See
Appendix 8 Media Advisories.) This collegial plum of an appointment had no
A-40
AA-426

! 24!

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

purpose other than to influence the Sturgeon II decision-making process. On
December 28, 2010 the Sturgeon II decision claims the Justices have limited
authority to enforce the California Constitution, refuses to declare SBX2 11
unconstitutional, and dares the people of California to stand up for their due
process rights. Now both the legislature (in 1997) and the judiciary (in 2010) have
dared the people to fight for their due process rights!
The Sturgeon case and SBX2 11 only address the payment of county
judicial benefits. Plaintiffs civil actions are undertaken, in part, as one of the
citizen challenges encouraged by Sturgeon II, but more importantly, to address
the issue of bias, the non-disclosure of the payments, and the resulting fraud on
the court that Sturgeon does not address.
Since Sturgeon I and Sturgeon II both affirm that judicial payments are not
a county responsibility, since the county is allowed (under SBX2 11) to terminate
all payments and since the county is clearly an interested party in all divorce and
traffic cases; therefore the continued payments must be in the countys interests.
Those county interests are the Title-IV-D incentives and reimbursements as well
as the penalty assessments on traffic tickets. Those county interests are the basis
for judicial recusal and void orders in most divorce and traffic cases. SBX2 11 did
not even attempt to give immunity for the biases inherent in the nature of a bribe.
A-41
AA-427

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a


APPENDIX
8

A-61
AA-428

JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF
CALIFORNIA
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE COURTS
Public Information Office
455 Golden Gate Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94102-3688

415-865-7740

Lynn Holton
Public Information Officer
MEDIA ADVISORY
Release Number: 32 Release Date: December 21, 2010

Supreme Court Justices Disqualify
Themselves in State Building Sale Case;
Will Assign Temporary Justices

San Francisco The California Supreme Court today issued an order in
which all justices disqualified themselves from hearing an emergency
writ involving the states sale of California state buildings.
(Schwarzenegger v. Court of Appeal, S189114).

In addition to announcing the recusal of all members of the court from
hearing this matter, the Supreme Court order also directs that seven pro
tem justices from the state Courts of Appeal be assigned to hear the case
in accordance with applicable provisions of the California Constitution
and pursuant to the court's Internal Operating Policies and Procedures.

The order was signed by Acting Chief Justice Marvin R. Baxter.

Previously, all members of the Supreme Court recused themselves, and
Court of Appeal justices were assigned in their place, in the case of Mosk
v. Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 474.

The Supreme Court issued its order today in response to a petition for
writ of mandate and request for emergency relief filed by the Governor's
Office this morning.

-#-

A-62
AA-429
A-63
AA-430

JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF
CALIFORNIA
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE COURTS
Public Information Office
455 Golden Gate Avenue

415-865-7740

Lynn Holton
Public Information Officer
MEDIA ADVISORY
Release Number: 33 Release Date: December 22, 2010

Supreme Court Assigns Temporary
Justices in State Building Sale Case

San FranciscoYesterday, the justices of the California Supreme Court
unanimously recused themselves in a matter involving the sale of
California state buildings, Schwarzenegger v. California Court of Appeal,
Sixth Appellate District, S189114. This morning, the California Supreme
Court issued an order assigning seven Court of Appeal justices to serve as
pro tempore (temporary) justices to the Supreme Court in that same
case.

The assigned Court of Appeal justices are: Justice Richard Aronson
(Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, Santa Ana); Justice William
Bedsworth (Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, Santa Ana);
Justice Patricia Benke (Fourth Appellate District, Division One, San
Diego); Justice M. Kathleen Butz (Third Appellate District, Sacramento);
Justice Dennis Cornell (Fifth Appellate District, Fresno); Justice Betty
Dawson (Fifth Appellate District, Fresno); and Justice Richard Fybel
(Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, Santa Ana.)

Justice Patricia Benke was assigned as Acting Chief Justice of the
California Supreme Court in this matter.

The justices were assigned according to procedures set out in the
Supreme Courts published Internal Operating Practices and
Procedures.

The order, signed by Acting Chief Justice Marvin R. Baxter, assigns the
Court of Appeal justices to the case starting today, December 22, 2010,
until they have completed and disposed of all related causes and matters
submitted to them, and all petitions for rehearing arising out of such
causes and matters. The immediate matter before the court is a writ of
mandate and request for an emergency stay filed by the Governors
Office on Tuesday, December 21, 2010.
A-64
AA-431
A-65
AA-432
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

APPENDIX
10

A-75
AA-433
ANALYSIS OF SUPERIOR COURTS BY COUNTY
SELECTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE
Draft
!
!
The conclusion of this analysis is that Humboldt County is the Plaintiffs
preferred choice for a new venue. There are 12 counties which do not pay
bribes and which have more than five judges in the county Superior Court.
Humboldt is geographically isolated, large enough to accommodate the jury
trials and small enough to likely be removed from the intense lobbying
influence of the California Judicial Association. Since travel costs are a major
concern, Superior Court of each county where the civil suit cases originate
should pay all costs associated with travel, video conferencing and media in
the interest of achieving a fair trial and due process for residents of that
county.
!

!
Unbribed Counties With
Fewer Than 5 Judges
!
County #
Judges
2007
Population
Lake 4 63,821
Tehama 4 62,093
Del Norte 3 29,207
Alpine 2 1,261
Amador 2 38,320
Colusa 2 21,945
Inyo 2 18,253
Lassen 2 36,223
Modoc 2 9,747
Plumas 2 20,891
Sierra 2 3,400
!
A-76
AA-434
!
!
County Appellate
District
# and City
Unbribed
Counties
#
Judges
Population
2007

Comments
Santa Cruz 6 San Jose 1 of 4 10 265,183 Small number of Appellate justices
Stanislaus 5 Fresno 3 of 9 22 523,095 Small number of Appellate justices
Madera 5 Fresno 3 of 9 10 149,916 Small number of Appellate justices
Merced 5 Fresno 3 of 9 10 252,554 Small number of Appellate justices
Imperial 4 San Diego 2 of 6 9 174,322 Appellate already bowed to pressure
Shasta 3 Sacramento 11 of 23 11 181,380 Legislature and lobbyist Influence
El Dorado 3 Sacramento 11 of 23 6 178,689 Legislature and lobbyist Influence
Sutter 3 Sacramento 11 of 23 5 95,516 Legislature and lobbyist Influence
Yuba 3 Sacramento 11 of 23 5 71,612 Legislature and lobbyist Influence
Santa Barbara 2 Los Angeles 1of 4 19 425,710 Prima Facie evidence of bias
Marin 1 San Francisco 4 of 10 10 256,310 Proximity to San Francisco Judges
Humboldt 1 San Francisco 4 of 10 7 132,364 Isolated
!
!
!
Appellate District
Size
!
1
st
Appellate District has 20 justices
2
nd
Appellate District has 32 Justices
3
rd
4
th
5
th
6
th
Appellate District has only 7 Justices
!
A-77
AA-435
!
All Appellate reviews should be held in San Franciscos First District to
keep this issue in the forefront of the California Supreme Court. The First
District is the largest of the remaining districts, when the Los Angeles and
San Diego Districts are excluded. The Second Appellate is dominated by Los
Angeles with the highest bribe amounts and has provided the prima facie
evidence they are biased. The Fourth Appellate has bowed under judicial
pressure during its Sturgeon II decision, backing away from the uprightness of
its landmark Sturgeon I decision. Additionally, the Third Appellate District in
Sacramento is too susceptible to California Judicial Association lobbying.
!
!
!
!
A-78
AA-436
A-79
AA-437
MAP SHOWS PAYMENTS BY TYPE
red=County
orange=Court
green =NONE
blue = appellate districts

California State Association of Counties May 2009
Provision of Supplemental Judicial Benefits
Summary of SBX2 11 (Steinberg, 2009)
BACKGROUND
PriortoandfollowingthepassageofAB233,theTrialCourtFundingActof1997,somecountieshaveoptedto
paysupplementalbenefitstolocaljudges.Althoughtherecordisnotentirelyclearonwhichcountiescurrently
areprovidingjudicialbenefits,webelievethatasofFebruary2009thosecountiesincluded,ataminimum,all
ofthefollowing:
Alameda Kings Riverside SantaClara

Calaveras LosAngeles Sacramento Sonoma
ContraCosta Mendocino SanBernardino Trinity
Fresno Monterey SanFrancisco Ventura
Kern Orange SanMateo Yolo
In2006,ataxpayerfiledsuitagainstLosAngelesCountyoverthisissue(Sturgeonv.CountyofLosAngeles),
challengingthevalidityofthebenefits.InOctober2008,astateappellatecourtoverturnedthetrialcourt
decisionwhichhadinitiallyfoundinfavorofthecountyandruledthattheprovisionofbenefitsbythe
countywasunconstitutionalonthegroundsthatSection19,articleVIoftheCaliforniaConstitutionrequires
theLegislaturetoprescribecompensationforjudges.(BecausetheLegislaturehadnotapprovedlocal
judicialbenefits,theprovisionofsuchbenefitswasincompatiblewiththeconstitutionallimitation.)The
CaliforniaSupremeCourtoptednottoreviewtheappellatecourtdecision,sotherulinginSturgeonstands.
2009 LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE STURGEON DECISION

ToaddresstheSturgeondecision,theJudicialCouncilandtheCaliforniaJudgesAssociationjointlysponsored
SBX211,bySenatePresidentproTemporeDarrellSteinberg.TheLegislatureapprovedthismeasureinthe
200910SecondExtraordinarySessionaspartofthe17monthbudgetresolutionadoptedinFebruary2009;
SBX211wassignedintolawbytheGovernoronFebruary20.Giventheenactmentofthismeasureasanon
urgencybillinthesecondextraordinarysession,themeasuregoesintoeffectpursuanttoconstitutional
provisionsonthe91
st
dayfollowingtheadjournmentofthespecialsession.Thesecondextraordinary
sessionadjournedsinedieonFebruary19,meaningthattheprovisionsofSBX211becomeeffectiveonMay21,
2009.
Thekeyprovisionsinthesupplementaljudicialbenefitsmeasuredoallofthefollowing:
1. ObligatesanycountythatwasprovidingsupplementaljudicialbenefitsasofJuly1,2008,tosustainthe
samelevelofbenefitsthatwereeffectiveonthatdateforthetermofthejudge,whichlimitscounties
liabilitytoamaximumofsixyearsperjudicialofficer;
2. AllowscountiestoterminatefutureobligationsbygivingtheAdministrativeOfficeoftheCourtsa180day
writtenterminationnotice;
3. Definesbenefitstoincludefederallyregulatedbenefits,deferredcompensationplans,andprofessional
developmentallowances,asspecified;
4. Givesimmunitytoentitiesthatprovidedsupplementaljudicialbenefitspriortotheeffectivedateofthe
measure;and
5. RequirestheJudicialCounciltoreporttothelegislativebudgetandjudiciarycommitteesbyDecember31,
2009,regardingtheprovisionoflocaljudicialbenefits.
A-80
AA-438
California State Association of Counties May 2009
CSACremainedneutralonSBX211foranumberofreasons.First,themeasureprovidedanecessarysafeguard
forthoseentitiesthathadprovidedandwerecontinuingtoprovidejudicialbenefitspriortoandfollowingthe
Sturgeondecision.Further,severalcountiesexpressedanintenttosustainjudicialbenefitsfortheforeseeable
future.
TECHNICAL NOTE ON LEGISLATIVE FINDING

Althoughlegislativefindingsanddeclarationsarenotcodifiedand,therefore,havenoforceoflaw,courts
routinelytakenoteoftheseforpurposesofdetermininglegislativeintent.Forthatreason,wefeelitis
importanttostatefortherecordthatweobjecttothecharacterizationofahistoricelementdescribedin
Section1(b)ofSBX211,whichstates:
ThesecountyprovidedbenefitswereconsideredbytheLegislatureinenactingtheLockyer
IsenbergTrialCourtFundingActof1997,inwhichcountiescouldreceiveareductioninthe
county'smaintenanceofeffortobligationsifcountieselectedtoprovidebenefitspursuantto
paragraph(l)ofsubdivision(c)ofSection77201oftheGovernmentCodefortrialcourtjudges
ofthatcounty.
Thissummaryisamisstatementoffacts.TheTrialCourtFundingActof1997(AB233)cappedcounty
responsibilityforcourtoperationsatthe199495level.Responsibilityforfuturecourtcostsandgrowth
transferredtothestate.Countieswererequiredtoidentifyfortheirindividualjurisdictionsthehistoricalcosts
ofsupportingthetrialcourts,basedonstatutorilydefinedcostelements(allowablecosts)thatwere
necessaryandrequiredtosustaincourtoperations.Theseelementswerebundledintoanoperations
MaintenanceofEffort(MOE).
Therewereotherelementsoutsideofthenecessaryandrequiredelementsofcourtoperations(unallowable
costs);amongthosewerelocallynegotiatedjudicialbenefits.(Animportantdistinction:Therearetwotypes
oflocaljudicialbenefits.Thefirsttypewasprovidedtojudgesacrosstheboard,regardlessofjurisdiction;
responsibilityforthosestatewidejudicialbenefitstransferredtothestateunderAB233.Thissecondtypewas
aclassofsupplementalbenefitsthatclearlyfelloutsidethestandardbenefitsjudgesreceivedstatewide.These
benefitswereagreeduponlocallybetweenthecourtandthecountyandmighthaveincludedperquisitessuch
asacarallowanceorsabbaticalpay.)
Thestatetookthepositionthatthissecondtypeofbenefitswasunallowable,forthefollowingreasons:they
werediscretionary,werenotnecessaryandrequiredelementsofcourtoperations,and,therefore,werenot
appropriatefortransfertothestate.Therefore,countiesunderwentaprocesstoidentifycostsassociatedwith
theseextrajudicialbenefits;thiscostelementwasexcisedfromcertaincountiesongoingobligationtothe
state.TheactiontoamendacountysMOEtoexcludeanycomponentassociatedwithlocallyprovidedjudicial
benefitsshouldnotbeconstruedasabenefittocounties;itwasatthedirectionoftheLegislature,in
recognitionofthefactthat(1)thestatewouldnotassumeresponsibilityforthesediscretionarybenefitsand
(2)provisionofthosebenefitsremainedelective,pursuanttolocaldecisions.Stateddifferently,therewasno
offsetorreductiontotheMOEjustanexclusionofunallowablecoststhatwerenotgoingtobeassumedby
theState.ThelegislativefindinginSBX211characterizestheMOEreductionwasabenefittocounties,when
itinfactwas,asstatedpreviously,simplythenecessaryresponsetotheLegislaturesrejectionofwhatit
deemedtobeunallowablecourtoperationcosts.
QUESTIONS
Ifwecanprovideanyfurtherinformationaboutthisissueorthespecificlegislativemeasuretoaddresslocal
judicialbenefits,pleasedonothesitatetocontactElizabethHowardatehoward@counties.orgor916650
8131.
A-81
AA-439
3/15/09 10:35 AM Law.com - Calif. Supreme Court Won't Take Up Judge Perks
Page 1 of 2 http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202427031446&rss=newswire
Law.com Home Newswire LawJobs CLE Center LawCatalog Our Sites Advertise

Calif. Supreme Court Won't Take Up Judge Perks
State high court's unanimous vote means that judges will lose the perks
unless lawmakers decide to help
Mike McKee
The Recorder
December 29, 2008
Printer-friendly Email this Article Reprints & Permissions

Any hope the California Supreme Court might resolve a politically sensitive
imbroglio over extra judicial benefits dissipated Tuesday when the high
court refused to review the case that stirred things up.
The Supreme Court's unanimous vote -- minus participation by Justice
Kathryn Mickle Werdegar, who was absent -- means the judges will lose
the perks unless lawmakers decide to help.
The Supreme Court's decision to not take up Sturgeon v. County of Los
Angeles , S168408, lets stand a lower court ruling that could void L.A.
County's 20-year practice of supplementing judges' $178,000 salaries and
state-provided benefits with perks that amounted to almost $50,000 a
year.
The Oct. 10 ruling by San Diego's 4th District Court of Appeal held that
the practice violated the state Constitution's requirement that the
Legislature "prescribe compensation for judges." County-funded judicial
perks occur in many of the state's 58 counties, but Los Angeles' appear to
be the most lucrative.
The decision was a blow to judicial advocates who say the state already
has trouble attracting judges to the bench with salaries that often pale in
comparison to those of major law firms.
"I always thought it was likely there would have to be legislative action,"
Michael Belote, lobbyist for the California Judges Association, said
Tuesday. "But this certainly steps up the urgency."
The benefits package provided by the county includes travel and
professional development allowances that judges could take in cash, as
well as additional contributions to retirement accounts.
The CJA had filed an amicus curiae brief asking the Supreme Court to
grant review in Sturgeon. "We have heard from judges who have indicated
it would be their intent to leave the bench," Belote said. "Just as we all
have financial obligations and need to plan, there are judges who believe
this completely disrupts their career plan."
CJA President Mary Wiss said Tuesday that Los Angeles County Superior
Court Judge Joseph Hilberman indicated in a recent news report that he
will leave the bench next month after only seven years partly because of
Sturgeon. Wiss, a judge with the San Francisco Superior Court, said it
"would be a shame to lose talent and experience from the bench because
of the loss of benefits and [because of] the difficulty in attracting quality
members of the bar to the bench."
Search Top Stories: Register for Legal Newswire | Legal Blogs | Newsletters | Feeds
Top Stories From Law.com
Legal Technology
Case Management: Time for a Tune-Up
In-House Counsel
Why Obama's Health Care Reforms Won't Be Easy
Small Firm Business
In Tough Times, Look Out for Legal Malpractice
Claims
MORE JOBS >>
POST A JOB >>
TOP JOBS
ATTORNEY
CONFIDENTIAL SEARCH
New York, NY
Air Force Judge Advocate
United State Air Force
Pennsylvania
Small Claims Made Easy
Your Small Claims Department CA's leader in online
submissions
www.smallclaimsdepartment.com
Compensation Management
Free Whitepaper - Tips to Improve Employee
A-82
AA-440
3/15/09 10:35 AM Law.com - Calif. Supreme Court Won't Take Up Judge Perks
Page 2 of 2 http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202427031446&rss=newswire
About Incisive Media | About Law.com | Customer Support | Privacy Policy | Terms & Conditions
Copyright 2009. Incisive Media US Properties, LLC. All rights reserved.
members of the bar to the bench."
California Chief Justice Ronald George has criticized some counties'
provisions for extra benefits, but has never tried to block it. Instead, he
has tried to raise judges' salaries and benefits statewide. George's recent
decision, along with Justice Marvin Baxter, to not participate in what was
very likely Judicial Council discussion of the Sturgeon case, had left
observers wondering whether he and Baxter were preparing to hear the
case in the high court.
Attorneys for the San Marino-based Judicial Watch Inc., which filed the
case on behalf of L.A. County resident and taxpayer Harold Sturgeon,
didn't respond to calls on Tuesday.
But in their brief arguing against review, they said the 4th District's ruling would still ensure that California judges would "remain
the highest paid" in the nation.
"Far from deviating from long-standing constitutional doctrines," attorney Sterling Norris wrote, "the ruling restores the Legislature's
proper constitutional role in setting the compensation received by the state trial court judges, a role that had been usurped by the
county."
Neither Elwood Lui, the L.A.-based Jones Day partner who represented Los Angeles County, nor J. Stephen Czuleger, presiding
judge of L.A. County Superior Court, returned calls seeking comment Tuesday.
But in his petition for review, Lui, a former justice on L.A.'s 2nd District, accused the Sturgeon court of cutting "a swath through the
law," imperiling "the livelihood of judges" and leaving "the law and bench in confusion."
"The ultimate victims," Lui wrote, "will be the people, who depend on quality in the courts."
Lui also predicted that the ruling could lead to "copycat suits by disgruntled lawyers and litigants" in other counties that offer extra
benefits.
Belote said the CJA now needs to step up its efforts to come up with a legislative solution.
"We've been talking to people ... about how you might craft a bill or a legislative solution," he said, "and actually we were kind of
getting down to a draft that might be workable and we'd hoped to have that in early January. But we are going to have to move
this thing as quick as possible."
Belote acknowledged that pushing for perks during a recession and budget crisis is a daunting task, but was still optimistic.
"I would say you could not have picked a more challenging time to discuss any issue that relates to money," he said. "But I would
say the legislators we have talked to, in general, have expressed a willingness to consider" the issue.

Subscribe to The Recorder
Marketplace
Is Your Database Safe? Free Database
Security Guid...
Get the 10 Best Practices for Database
Security. Download FREE Guide Now from
Application Security.
http://www.AppSecInc.com
Are You Six Sigma Certified?
Earn 100% Online-Six Sigma
Certificate From Villanova.
LEARN More Now!
www.VillanovaU.com/SixSigma
Investment Notebook Tool
Save, Organize & Monitor your
Investment Ideas with
ImpactOven - Free Trial.
www.impactoven.com
Compensation Processes.
SumTotalSystems.com/Compensation
Art Prints for Lawyers
Framed prints and paintings for Lawyers and Judges-
Shop Now!
www.LawGallery.com
Binder & Associates
Train accident and personal injury attorneys since 1973
www.binderassociates.com/
A-83
AA-441
AA-442

!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

PROOF OF SERVICE BY FIRST-CLASS MAIL --CIVIL
D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

SERVICE LIST

Defendant:
Kevin M. McCormick
Benton, Orr, Duval and Buckingham
39 North California Street, Post Office Box 1178
Plaintiff, In Pro Per
Daniel Cooper
1836 10th Street #B
310-562-7668

Interested Parties:

Commission On Judicial Performance
500 W. Temple Street, Suite 505

Kamala Harris, California Attorney
General
California Department Of Justice
Attn: Public Inquiry Unit
PO Box 944255
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550

Commission On Judicial Performance
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 14400
San Francisco, CA 94102

Kamala Harris, California Attorney
General
California Department Of Justice
Ronald Reagan Building
300 So. Spring Street, 3rd Floor
Thomas O'Brien, U.S. Attorney
1200 U.S. Courthouse
312 North Spring Street
Los Angeles CA 90012

Supreme Court of California
350 Mc Alister St.

Judicial Watch, Inc.
501 School St, SW Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20024

AA-443

!
PROOF OF SERVICE
8!

PROOF OF SERVICE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

B241184 / SC113064
PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF: DANIEL COOPER, an Individual
RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT: Elia Weinbach, an Individual

I am over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am a resident of
he county where the service took place. My residence or business address is
2601 E. Victoria St. #108
Rancho Dominguez, CA 90220

On MARCH 31, 2013, I served on the interested parties in this action (SEE
ATTACHED SERVICE LIST with type and address) the following documents


I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that
the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on MARCH 31, 2013 at Los Angeles, California,

________________________________
FRED SOTTILE

AA-444

!
PROOF OF SERVICE
9!

SERVICE LIST

Mail Service -- Defendant:
Kevin M. McCormick
Benton, Orr, Duval and Buckingham
39 North California Street, Post Office Box 1178

!

AA-445

b241184 Appendix Cooper Rev6 Wtoc Wpgno

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

b241184 Appendix Cooper Rev6 Wtoc Wpgno

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

!

Alameda Kings Riverside SantaClara

2009 LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE STURGEON DECISION

TECHNICAL NOTE ON LEGISLATIVE FINDING

You might also like