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Panzer Rollen: The Logistics of a Panzer Division From Primary Sources
Panzer Rollen: The Logistics of a Panzer Division From Primary Sources
Panzer Rollen: The Logistics of a Panzer Division From Primary Sources
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Panzer Rollen: The Logistics of a Panzer Division From Primary Sources

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Panzer Rollen provides an insightful look in to the workings of the Military Intelligence Service that was so invaluable in shaping both the strategy and tactics of the Allied forces during the Second World War.
LanguageEnglish
Release dateNov 19, 2018
ISBN9781473868823
Panzer Rollen: The Logistics of a Panzer Division From Primary Sources
Author

Bob Carruthers

Bob Carruthers is an Emmy Award winning author and historian, who has written extensively on the Great War. A graduate of Edinburgh University, Bob is the author of a number of military history titles including the Amazon best seller The Wehrmacht in Russia.

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  • Rating: 2 out of 5 stars
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    very thin on logistics, nothing about food, medical, repair or ammo supply. Familiar TOE but no treatment of changes over time. No analysis, rather a summary of field officer regulations.

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Panzer Rollen - Bob Carruthers

www.penandswordbooks.com

Contents

Introduction

Part 1

The German Armoured Division

Military Intelligence Service, Information Bulletin No. 18, 15 June, 1942

Part 2

The German Motorized Infantry Regiment

Military Intelligence Service, Special Series No. 4, 17 October, 1942

Introduction

The Intelligence Service is all too often disparaged by the men doing the hard and dangerous work in the front lines. When viewed from the perspective of those lost in the fog of war, the old cliché that the concept of Military Intelligence is a contradiction in terms is perfectly understandable. However, the work of the Military Intelligence Service was invaluable in shaping both the strategy and tactics of the Allied forces that won the Second World War.

For historians today the Military Intelligence Service, Information Bulletins published by the US Military Intelligence Division based in the War Department in Washington D.C., provide an intriguing primary source reference with regard to the information that was provided to the men fighting on the Allied side in the field. The two volumes gathered together in this publication were also published by the German War Office. They are particularly valuable as they also provide a rare glimpse into the methodology underlying the operation of an armoured division from the German perspective.

Part 1 of this volume is the Military Intelligence Service, Information Bulletin No. 18, published on June 15, 1942. This interesting document is a translation of a captured German training manual entitled ‘The German Armoured Division’, which was first published by the German War Office in December 1940. At the time of the German publication the number of German armoured divisions was increasing and their organisation was being altered and expanded. However, comments by German commanders in Libya as late as October 1941 indicate that the principles expressed in the 1940 German manual proved satisfactory with little or no modification. The Information Bulletin was therefore still relevant when translated and published in Washington during 1942.

Part 2 of this volume, ‘The German Motorised Infantry Regiment’ is a translation of another captured German field manual that was also published by the German War Office. This publication was entitled ‘Provisional Instructions for the Employment and Tactics of the Motorized Infantry Regiment and Battalion’.

This volume dates from 1 March 1941, and is concerned with the tactics of the motorised infantry regiment and battalion when incorporated into a German armoured division.

The aim of the German command under the guidance of forward looking officers like Guderian, was to bond together the various elements of an armoured division in order to form one homogeneous unit. The principal purpose of the motorised infantry regiment was to take the field in close co-operation with tanks. The purpose of the manual was to shape the tactics of this new type of division to support an armoured spearhead.

At the time the German manual was published the motorised infantry regiment was still a comparatively new concept. In particular the support elements of the new regiments were yet to undergo the transition from fully motorised artillery units to armoured artillery units. Armoured artillery, in the form of the Wespe and the Hummel, did not see service until 1942 and 1943 respectively.

It is indicative of the forward-thinking nature of the German command system and its ability to cope with changing battlefield conditions that these new forms of weapon systems were adopted by the German armoured divisions and their supporting units as quickly as they could be designed and manufactured.

As this second document was designed to supplement ‘The German Armoured Division’ it is fitting that both documents are presented together in this single volume.

Part 1

The German Armoured Division

Military Intelligence Service, Information Bulletin No. 18, 15 June, 1942

The following text is taken from a Word War II U.S. War Department Information Bulletin. As with all wartime intelligence information, data may be incomplete or inaccurate.

Contents

Chapter 1

Characteristics and Organization

Chapter 2

Role of the Armoured Division

Chapter 3

Employment of the Armoured Division

Chapter 4

Components of the Armoured Division

Section I: Tank Brigade

Section II: Motorized Infantry Brigade

Section III: Artillery Regiment

Section IV: Anti-tank Battalion

Section V: Armoured Engineer Battalion

Section VI: Armoured Signal Battalion

Section VII: Light Anti-aircraft Battalion

Chapter 5

Reconnaissance

Section I: General

Section II: Air Reconnaissance

Section III: Motorized Reconnaissance Battalion

Section IV: Unit Combat Reconnaissance

Section V: Cooperation Between Air and Ground Reconnaissance

Chapter 6

Movement

Section I: General

Section II: March Organization

Section III: Security On the Move

Chapter 7

Deployment

Chapter 8

Attack

Section I: General

Section II: Conduct of the Attack

Section III: Attack from an Assembly Position

Chapter 9

Pursuit

Chapter 10

Defence

Chapter 11

Withdrawal from Action

Chapter 12

Special Conditions

Section I: Attack Against a Permanently Fortified Position

Section II: Attack Across a River

Section III: Fighting In Built-up Areas

Section IV: Fighting In Woods and Mountains

Section V: Fighting In Smoke and Fog

Chapter 13

Rest

Chapter 14

Services

Chapter 1

Characteristics and Organization

1. The armoured division is intended for strategic roles. It combines great fire power with high mobility, and its armour and speed restrict the effectiveness of enemy weapons.

2. Its strength lies in attack. It is especially suited for surprise appearances on the battlefield, rapid concentration of considerable fighting power, obtaining quick decisions by breakthroughs, deep penetrations on wide fronts, and the destruction of the enemy. The attack of the armoured division has a serious effect on the enemy’s morale.

3. The nature of the terrain is a decisive factor for successful employment of the armoured division. Full use of its speed can be ensured by choice of good roads with bridges of adequate capacity, and by their being kept clear of other troops. Speed across country depends upon weather, formation of the ground, nature of the soil, and density of vegetation. It is slower than on roads. The full striking power of the armoured division can best be developed in attack over rolling country with few features. Marshy, wooded, and rough country allows movement off the road only for short stretches, with reduced mobility. It may exclude the employment of tanks.

4. The components of an armoured division are so proportioned that the detachment of individual units, especially of tanks, or their attachment to other units, restricts the fitness of the division for employment in strategic roles.

5. The main striking force of the division lies in its tank brigade. Its offensive infantry element is the motorized infantry brigade. In addition the armoured division comprises motorized reconnaissance elements, motorized artillery, anti-tank units, armoured signal units, anti-aircraft machine-gun troops, and supply and maintenance services. In active campaigns an observation squadron (serves also for artillery observation) and a light anti-aircraft battalion are attached to the division.

Chapter 2

Role of the Armoured Division

6. The armoured division normally fights in the framework of the armoured corps, but is also suited to carry out independent operations, in which case reinforcement with motorized infantry and artillery is usually necessary.

7. Its supreme role is to obtain decision in battle. Within the framework of the armoured corps it can carry out the following tasks:

a)Break through an enemy protective screen to make early contact with the enemy’s main force;

b)Obtain early possession of topographical features and sectors of decisive importance for further fighting;

c)Gain surprise in an attack on the advancing enemy to frustrate his plans and take the initiative from him;

d)Attack an enemy incompletely prepared for defence;

e)Attack on a narrow front against a prepared enemy;

f)Restore momentum to an attack which has come to a standstill;

g)Break through on a wide front against a demoralized enemy;

h)Exploit success and complete the destruction of the enemy by deep penetration or flank attack;

i)Pursue a defeated enemy;

j)Carry out strategic envelopment;

k)Attack to destroy enemy tank units;

l)Cooperate with parachute and airborne troops.

8. The armoured division acting independently can carry out the following strategic tasks:

a)Reconnaissance in force in cooperation with strategic aerial reconnaissance;

b)Early occupation of sectors important for further operations, of politically

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