Fast Detection of Replica Node Attacks in Mobile Sensor Network

Chapter 1

Introduction
1.1 Overview Advances in robotics have made it possible to develop a variety of new architectures for autonomous wireless networks of sensors. Mobile nodes, essentially small robots with sensing, wireless communications, and movement capabilities, are useful for tasks such as static sensor deployment, adaptive sampling, network repair, and event detection . These advanced sensor network architectures could be used for a variety of applications including intruder detection, border monitoring, and military patrols. In these kinds of hostile or potentially hostile environments, the security of unattended mobile nodes is critical. The attacker may be able to capture and compromise mobile nodes, and then he can use them to inject fake data, disrupt network operations, and eavesdrop on network communications. In this scenario, a particularly dangerous attack is the replica attack, in which the adversary takes the secret keying materials from a compromised node, generates a large number of attacker-controlled replicas that share the nodes keying materials and ID, and then spreads these replicas throughout the network. With a single captured node, the adversary can create as many replica nodes as he has the hardware to generate. Note that replica nodes need not be identical robots; a group of static nodes can mimic the movement of a robot and other mobile nodes or even humans with handheld devices could be used. The only requirement is that they have the software and keying material to communicate in the network, all of which can be obtained from the captured node. The time and e ort needed to inject these replica nodes into the network should be much less than the e ort to capture and compromise the equivalent number of original nodes. The replica nodes are controlled by the adversary, but have keying materials that allow them to seem like authorized participants in the network. Protocols for secure sensor network communication would allow replica nodes to create pair wise shared keys with other nodes and the base station, enabling the nodes to encrypt, decrypt, and authenticate all of their communications as if they were the original captured node.

Fast Detection of Replica Node Attacks in Mobile Sensor Network 1.2 Objective The system and attacker models, we have three key design goals for replica detection. 1. First, replica nodes should be detected with reasonable communication, computational, and storage overheads. 2. Second, the detection schemes should be robust and highly resilient against an attackers attempt to break the scheme. More specifically, the scheme should detect replicas unless the attacker compromises a substantial number of nodes. 3. Finally, replica detection should be performed at the cost of minimal false positives and negatives. This is important to prevent turning the replica detection scheme into a tool for denial of service attacks Wireless sensor networks are usually deployed in hostile environments for their unattended nature which makes nodes in the network dangerous to be captured by an adversary. The adversary can compromise the captured nodes and obtain all the secrets of the nodes, replicate the compromised nodes to get many replicas with the same node identity. Then adversary can launch an insidious attack with these legitimate nodes. Dangerous attack is the replica node attack, in which the adversary takes the secret keying materials from a compromised node, generates a large number of attacker controlled replicas that share the compromised nodes keying materials and ID, and then spreads these replicas throughout the network. With a single Captured node, the adversary can create as many replica nodes as he has the hardware to generate. Note that replica nodes need not be identical robots; a group of static nodes can mimic the movement of a robot and other mobile nodes or even humans with handheld devices could be used. The only requirement is that they have the software and keying material to communicate in the network, all of which can be obtained from the captured node. The time and effort needed to inject these replica nodes into the network should be much less than the effort to capture and compromise the equivalent number of original nodes. The replica nodes are controlled by the adversary, but have keying materials that allow them to seem like authorized participants in the

Fast Detection of Replica Node Attacks in Mobile Sensor Network network. Protocols for secure sensor network communication would allow replica nodes to create pair wise shared keys with other nodes and the base station, thereby enabling the nodes to Encrypt, decrypt, and authenticate all of their communications as if they were the original captured node. The adversary can then leverage this insider position in many ways. 1.3 Scope of Study The system and attacker models, we have three key design goals for replica detection. First, replica nodes should be detected with reasonable communication, computational, and storage overheads. Second, the detection schemes should be robust and highly resilient against an attackers attempt to break the scheme. More specifically, the scheme should detect replicas unless the attacker compromises a substantial number of nodes. Finally, replica detection should be performed at the cost of minimal false positives and negatives. This is important to prevent turning the replica detection scheme. 1. Secure the Sensor network. 2. Detect the Replica node attacks in Mobile Sensor network. 3. Avoid the Replica Node Attacks in Mobile Sensor Network. 4. Fast detection of Replica node attack.

Fast Detection of Replica Node Attacks in Mobile Sensor Network

Chapter 2

Literature Survey
2.1 Existing System (Static Sensor Network)
Security of unattended mobile nodes is critical Attacker may be able to capture and compromise mobile nodes, and then he can use them to inject fake data, disrupt network operations, and eavesdrop on network communications. 2.1.1 Static Sensor Network "Static sensor network is a set of sensors which are stable at on place and sense the conditions activities." In static sensor network all sensor nodes are at fix position a having fix difference between them. They can pass message to the controller by communicate with each other. 2.1.2 Attacks in static Sensor network: For Intruder its easy to find the location of Sensor. Create replica node (duplicate node) sends fake messages. Intruder uses more bandwidth. Due to this attack on sensor network easy to attack and disturb the sensor network. It leads to breaking the security of the sensor network. For this problem solution is Mobile sensor network. Unsecure Communication: Receiver node checks the location of sender and communicates with other neighbour nodes. More chances of fake messages as true due to fix distance. Controller gets busy in reading fake messages.

Fast Detection of Replica Node Attacks in Mobile Sensor Network 2.1.3 Mobile Sensor Network "Mobile Sensor Network is network which has sensor nodes with dynamic location". In mobile Sensor network sensor nodes are having dynamic location. Node difference between two nodes is not fixed. Each node is having system assigned speed for its dynamic movement. Due to this dynamic location its not easy to intruder to attack on sensor network. 2.1.4 Attack in Mobile sensor Network Its not easy to intruder to attack on Mobile sensor network due to the dynamic location of the sensor node, because intruder not able to catch the location speed of the moving sensor node. So there are rare chances of attack on Mobile sensor Network. Secure Communication In mobile sensor network if Intruder try to attack on network then it will be detected in Location Verification process. Also if he sends the fake messages they also detected by using different technique. If intruder tries to send fake messages then it will be detected in Location Verification Process. If fake message get detected then it is dropped. 2.2 Proposed System (Dynamic Sensor Network): 2.2.1. Replica Attack in Mobile Sensor Network Due to dynamic location of nodes its not intruder. 2.2.2 Secure Communication If intruder tries to send fake messages then it will be detected in Location Verification process. If fake message get detected then it is dropped. We propose a fast and effective mobile replica node detection scheme using the sequential Probability Ratio Test we first measure the absence time period of a sensor node and then compare it to a pre-defined threshold. If it is more than threshold value, we decide the sensor node as captured nodes. This simple approach achieves efficient node capture detection easy to find the location of sensor node to

Fast Detection of Replica Node Attacks in Mobile Sensor Network capability as long as a threshold value is properly configured. However, it is not easy to configure a proper a threshold value to detect captured nodes. If we set threshold to a high value, it is likely that captured nodes bypass the detection. On the contrary, if we set threshold to a low value, it is likely that benign nodes can be detected as captured nodes. To minimize these false positives and negatives, we need to set up threshold in such a way that it is dynamically changed in accordance with the measured absence time duration for a node For each time slot, every sensor node measures the number of messages sent by its neighbors. Each time the number of messages sent by a neighbor is above zero, it will expedite the test process to accept the null hypothesis that the neighbor is present in the network. 2.3 Comparison between Existing System & Proposed System Existing System: For Intruder its easy to find the location of Sensor. Create replica node (duplicate node) & sends fake messages. Intruder uses more bandwidth. Unsecure Communication Receiver node checks the location of sender and communicates with other neighbor nodes. More chances of fake messages as true due to fix distance. Controller gets busy in reading fake messages.

Proposed System: Replica Attack in Mobile Sensor Network Due to dynamic location of nodes its not easy to find the location of sensor node to intruder. Secure Communication If intruder tries to send fake messages then it will be detected in Location Verification process. If fake message get detected then it is dropped.

Fast Detection of Replica Node Attacks in Mobile Sensor Network

Chapter 3

Methodology
3.1 Replica Node Attack In which the adversary takes the secret keying materials from a compromised node, generates a large number of attacker-controlled replicas that share the compromised nodes keying materials And ID, and then spreads these replicas throughout the network. With a single captured node, the adversary can create as many replica nodes as he has the hardware to generate. Note that replica nodes need not be identical robots; a group of static nodes can mimic the movement of a robot and other mobile nodes or even humans with handheld devices could be used. The only requirement is that they have the software and keying material to communicate in the network, all of which can be obtained from the captured node. The time and effort needed to inject these replica nodes into the network should be much less than the effort to capture and compromise the equivalent number of original nodes.

The replica nodes are controlled by the adversary, but have keying materials that allow them to seem like authorized participants in the network. Protocols for secure sensor network communication would allow replica nodes to create pair wise shared keys with other nodes and the base station, thereby enabling the nodes to encrypt, decrypt, and authenticate all of their communications as if they were the original captured node.

The adversary can then leverage this insider position in many ways. For example, he can simply monitor a significant fraction of the network traffic that would pass through these nodes. Alternately, he could jam legitimate signals from benign nodes or inject falsified data to corrupt the sensors monitoring operation. A more aggressive attacker could undermine common network protocols, including cluster formation, localization, and data aggregation, thereby causing continual disruption to network operations. Through these methods, an adversary with a large number of replica nodes can easily defeat the mission of the deployed network.

Fast Detection of Replica Node Attacks in Mobile Sensor Network 3.2 Mobile Replica Detection We define a mobile replica node u0 as a node having the same ID and secret keying materials as a mobile node u. An adversary creates replica node u0 as follows: He first compromises node u and extracts all secret keying materials from it. Then, he prepares a new node u0, sets the ID of u0 to the same as u, and loads us secret keying materials into u0. There may be multiple replicas of u, e.g., u0 1; u0 2; . . . , and there may be multiple compromised and replicated nodes. Our goal is to detect the fact that both u and u0 (or u01; u02; . .)Operate as separate entities with the same identity and keys.

Fig.[1] System Architecture

In static sensor networks, a sensor node is regarded as being replicated if it is placed in more than one location. If nodes are moving around in network, however, this technique does not work, because a benign mobile node would be treated as a replica due to its continuous change in location. Hence, we must use some other technique to detect replica nodes in mobile sensor

Fast Detection of Replica Node Attacks in Mobile Sensor Network networks. Fortunately, mobility provides us with a clue to help resolve the mobile replica detection problem. Specifically, a benign mobile sensor node should never move faster than the system configured maximum speed, V max. As a result, a benign mobile sensor nodes measured speed will appear to be at most V max as long as we employ a speed measurement system with a low rate of error. On the other hand, replica nodes will appear to move much faster than benign nodes and thus their measured speeds will likely be over V max because they need to be at two (or more) different places at once. Accordingly, if the mobile nodes measured speed exceeds V max, it is then highly likely that at least two nodes with the same identity are present in the network. We apply the neighbor identity to the mobile replica detection problem as follows: Each time a mobile sensor node moves to a new location, each of its neighbors asks for a signed claim containing its location and time information and decides probabilistically whether to forward the received claim to the base station. The base station computes the speed from every two consecutive claims of a mobile node and performs the neighbor identity by considering speed as an observed sample. Each time the mobile nodes speed exceeds (respectively, remains below) V max, it will expedite the random walk to hit or cross the upper (respectively, lower) limit and thus lead to the base station accepting the alternate (respectively, null) hypothesis that the mobile node has been (respectively, not been) replicated. Once the base station decides that a mobile node has been replicated, it revokes the replica nodes from the network.

Fast Detection of Replica Node Attacks in Mobile Sensor Network

Fig. [2] FLOW CHART

This Flow chart that shows the sequence that how the actual system can work.

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Fast Detection of Replica Node Attacks in Mobile Sensor Network

3.3 Mobile Replica Detection Using Sequential Probability Ratio Tests

This section presents the details of our technique to detect replica node attacks in mobile sensor networks. Defining random trip", a generic mobility model for independent mobiles that contains as special cases: the random waypoint on convex or non convex domains, random walk with reflection or wrapping, city section, space graph and other models. In static sensor networks, a sensor node is regarded as being replicated if it is placed in more than one location.

Propose a mobile replica detection scheme by leveraging this intuition. The scheme is based on the Sequential Probability Ratio Test which is a statistical decision process. The SPRT can be thought of as one dimensional random walk with the lower and upper limits. A random walk starts from a point between two limits and moves toward the lower or upper limit in accordance with each observation. If the walk reaches (or exceeds) the lower or upper limit, it terminates and the null or alternate hypothesis is selected, respectively. The lower and upper limits can be configured to be associated with speeds less than and in excess of Vmax, respectively. To apply the SPRT to the mobile replica detection problem as follows: Each time a mobile sensor node moves to a new location, each of its neighbors asks for a signed claim containing its location and time information and decides probabilistically whether to forward the received claim to the base station. The base station computes the speed from every two consecutive claims of a mobile node and performs the SPRT by considering speed as an observed sample.

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Fast Detection of Replica Node Attacks in Mobile Sensor Network

Fig. [3] Detection of attacker nodes

I also assume that the base station is a trusted entity. This is a reasonable assumption in mobile sensor networks, because the network operator collects all sensor data and can typically control the nodes operation through the base station. Thus, the basic mission of the sensor network is already completely undermined if the base station is compromised. Each time mobile nodes speed exceeds (respectively, remains below) V max, it will expedite the random walk to hit or cross the upper (respectively, lower) limit and thus lead to the base station accepting the alternate (respectively, null) hypothesis that the mobile node has been (respectively, not been) replicated. Once the base station decides that a mobile node has been replicated, it revokes the replica nodes from the network.

3.4. Efficient and Distributed Detection of Node Replication Attack EDD is based on the assumption that for the network with only benign nodes, the number of times n1 that the node n meets a node m should be restricted to a threshold value within a given interval. When a network has replicas then this number will be greater than the threshold value. With this observation the replica node is detected. Before deployment the length of the interval and the threshold values are selected. During the movement for each move of a sensor node the number of nodes encountered is compared with the predefined value. If it is greater, then a replica is detected.

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Fast Detection of Replica Node Attacks in Mobile Sensor Network A slight variation to EDD is SEDD. In EDD monitoring of all the nodes is done for calculating the number. But in SEDD, only a subset is monitored. That set is called as monitor set. When number of elements in the set is $, the number of nodes to be monitored by each node is randomly chosen $ unique nodes from 1 to n, where n is the number of nodes in the network.

3.5. Fast Detection of Node Replication Attack Using Sequential Analysis It is based on the fact that a benign node should not move with speed which is greater than the system configured speed Vs. When a nodes speed is greater than Vs then we can consider that at least 2 nodes are there with same identity. For this Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) is performed. This can be considered as a one dimensional random walk with lower and upper bounds. The null and alternate hypotheses are defined. The random walk starts at a random point that lies in between the two bounds. When it reaches the bounds any one of the hypothesis is selected based on the bound crossed. Each node sends the location and time information as a claim to its neighbors when it moves to a new location. Then they make decision on whether to forward the claim or not. The BS applies statistical analysis to check for the speed that is measured from the last claim and the current claim. If it is greater than the system configured speed, then replica is detected.

3.6 Centralized Schemes for Detection of Replica Nodes

3.6.1. Simple Approach In a simple Centralized approach, the Base Station (BS) acts as centralized entity, each node sends a list of its neighbor nodes and their claimed locations to a base station. If the base station finds that there are two far distant locations for one node ID, then the node clone must have occurred. The BS simply broadcasts through the whole network to expel the cloned nodes. Then, the BS will revoke the replicated nodes. This solution has several drawbacks, for instance: Single point of failure (BS) or any compromise to BS, and high communication cost due to the relevant number of exchanged messages.

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Fast Detection of Replica Node Attacks in Mobile Sensor Network 3.6.2. Set: Detecting Node Clones A simple way of finding the replica is that each node sends its authenticated report and its neighbors to the base station. But this scheme has high communication overhead due the repeated information send to the base station. Witness based schemes are based on public key cryptography and that is not suitable in case of wireless sensor networks. a sensor network is spited into several non overlapping regions. All nodes are having distinct identifiers. Since each node has a different identifier the intersection of those regions will give an empty set. When the node has a replica the intersection will not be empty and the replica node can be detected.

3.6.3. RED A Randomized, Efficient and Distributed Protocol for the Detection of Node Replication Attacks. Each and every node in the network known its location and the nodes are static nodes and they use public key crypto systems. In this a random value r is shared between the nodes with centralized broadcasting. Each node signs its claim and sends it to neighbours. Set of witness nodes is formed using pseudo rand function. This takes the arguments ID, current r value, and the number of locations that have to be generated. The ambiguity is verified for the witnesses for the claim. Each claim is signed with the private key of that node. For each claim received by the witness node it verifies the signature first. To check for the validity of the message the coherence between the time inserted in the message and the current time is verified.

3.6.4. Real Time Detection of Replica Node Attacks Detection of replica node is done with computation of finger print for each sensor node based on the characteristics of the neighbour hood. Then verification of this finger print is done at base station and the neighboring sensors. Before deployment a superimposed disjunctive code C is pre computed .A binary matrix C defines an s-disjunctive code if and only if the Boolean sum of any s-subset of columns of C does not cover any other column of C that are not in the ssubset. After deployment each sensor sends a code word to the neighborhood. Then it calculates the fingerprint for each node that sends their codeword and monitoring the messages sent in the neighborhood. After getting the data the sensor calculates the fingerprint of the neighbour from the code word collected. After calculation the sensor verifies that with the already stored one. If there is a mismatch then it sends an indication to base station. BS sends a query to the

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Fast Detection of Replica Node Attacks in Mobile Sensor Network neighborhoods to get the details of their fingerprint. Then BS decides which sensor should be revoked. Alternatively BS itself finds the replica without any help from the sensors. BS has details of fingerprint with sensor IDs. It collects the message from the sensor and verifies its signature. If it does not match, then replica is detected. . 3.6.5. Detection of Clones Using Random Key Distribution Keys that are present on the cloned nodes are detected by looking at how often they are used to authenticate nodes in the network. Detection is by analyzing node authentication statistics. Each node randomly selects k keys from pool. Key usage refers to the number of times a key is used to set up connections between neighboring nodes. When clones are inserted into the network, the key usage distribution is skewed. Cloned keys are present on a greater number of nodes than normal and are therefore used more frequently than keys that have not been cloned. By collecting key usage statistics, we can determine which keys have been cloned.

3.7 Distributed Schemes for Replica Node Detection

3.7.1. Node-To Network Broadcasting This detection approach utilizes a simple broadcast protocol. Basically, each and every node in the network uses an authenticated broadcast message to flood the network with its location information. Each node stores the location information for its neighbours and if it receives a conflicting claim, revokes the offending node. A big problem of Node-to network Broadcasting is high energy consuming.

3.7.2. Random Multicast In the Random Multicast (RM), when a node broadcasts its location, each of its neighbours sends (with probability p) a digitally signed copy of the location claim to a set of randomly selected nodes. Assuming there is a replicated node, if every neighbor randomly selects destinations, then exploiting the birthday paradox, there is a non negligible probability at least one node will receive a pair of non coherent location claims. The node that detects the existence of another node in two different locations within the same time-frame will be called

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Fast Detection of Replica Node Attacks in Mobile Sensor Network witness. The RM protocol implies high communication costs: Each neighbor has to send messages.

3.7.3. Line Selected Multicast In the Line Selected Multicast (LSM) protocol, uses the routing topology of the network to detect replication, each node which forwards claims also saves the claim. That is, the forwarding nodes are also witness nodes of a node which has the node ID in a claim. Therefore, LSM gives a higher detection rate than that of RM.

3.7.4. Resilient Against Node Replication Attack Extremely efficient detection protocol XED is based on the strategy remembers and challenge. There is no need for a sensor node to know their location. When a sensor node meets another node it sends a random number to that node. Each and every node will have a number associated with the other node they met. When a node p meets the other node q it ask for the number. If the node does not replies or sending a wrong number indicates a replica. When p and q are in the same range, they produce the random numbers rp q and rq p

of n bits where they belong to 0 to 2n-1 and then transfer them to each other. They have entries for ID of the node, the original random number and the received one. When p and q does not met before they exchange random numbers. If not p asks for the random number and q sends it. Now p checks for whether it is correct or not. Replica is detected if it is not matched with the stored one or q does not respond.

3.7.5. Active Detection of Node Replication Attacks Each node is actively test if m other random nodes are replicated or not. They are called as scrutinized nodes. In order to test whether the scrutinized node A is replicated or not. n nodes in the network are randomly chosen and asked to forward a request for a signed location claim to A. If two replicas exist, each will probably receive that and if both answers for that request, then two conflicting claims will be obtained. So that replica can be detected.

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Fast Detection of Replica Node Attacks in Mobile Sensor Network 3.8 Performance Analysis of These Schemes Wireless sensor networks are designed with very limited battery power, limited memory size and limited processing capabilities. So any of protocol that is used in WSN should have restrictions in the usage of battery power and memory. A variety of attacks can be mounted in the network using replica nodes. The protocols suggested for these types of attacks should also have minimum energy and storage consumption. The communication cost due to the transfer of messages is O (N). In this each root node is having N/T identifiers each of which is only 12bits. They occupy only limited space according to the number of trees formed. For RED only a very few nodes are storing more than 10 messages. So the storage overhead is reduced. In terms of energy consumption, it needs only the witness nodes perform the verification of the signature, which in turn reduces the energy consumption. It also has better detection probability. In XED the location of each not is not recorded and only a constant communication cost O(1) is needed for exchanging the random numbers, since each node is capable of finding the replica per each move. Real time detection of replica attack is based on generation of finger print and forwarding. It has O (N) message transmission for fingerprint generation. If the total number of regular data messages is Num then the total messages message transmission cost is num.N. EDD provides distributed detection, individual detection and network wide revocation avoidance. The additional communication overhead incurred by EDD and SEDD method is only b that is the beacon resulting in O(1). It has the reasonable storage overhead as O(N) and SEDD has improved storage overhead as O($) where $ is the number of elements in the monitor set. In fast detection of replica using SPRT, communication overhead in the worst case will be O (N.N). BS needs to store only one claim per node. So at most N claims are to be stored in the base station.

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Fast Detection of Replica Node Attacks in Mobile Sensor Network

Chapter 4

Advantages & Applications

Advantages:
1. Location Verification detects and avoids about 80%-90% attacks in mobile sensor network. 2. Remaining 10%-20% detection done by Encryption-Decryption i.e. System with Location verification & Encryption-Decryption makes total secured system. 3. Detects attacks in mobile sensor network fastly.

Applications:
1. Intrusion detection. 2. Border monitoring. 3. Military patrols. 4. Green House Effect. 5. Agriculture. 6. Chemical Industry.

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Fast Detection of Replica Node Attacks in Mobile Sensor Network

Chapter 5

Conclusion & Future scope

Future Scope:
For future work, we would like to thoroughly explore how localization and time synchronization errors affect the detection accuracy of our scheme. We will examine analytically and in simulation how time synchronization and localization errors influence the false positive and negatives of the scheme. Furthermore, we would like to evaluate our scheme against various types of attacker models. In particular, we are interested in exploring how a variety of attacker models impact on the security of the scheme. We believe that a game theoretic model is suited for investigating the interactions between the detector and the adversary. In this model, we will first study a variety of strategies that may be taken by detector and adversary. Then, we will try to find the Nash Equilibrium for those strategies.

Conclusion:
We have proposed a replica detection scheme for mobile sensor networks based on the Sequential Analysis .We detect mobile replicas by using the basic idea that a mobile node should never move at speeds in excess of the system-configured maximum speed. Our scheme quickly detects mobile replicas with very small number of location claims.

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Fast Detection of Replica Node Attacks in Mobile Sensor Network

References

[1] D. Boneh and M.K. Franklin. Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing. In Advances in Cryptology CRYPTO, 2010. [2] J-Y. L. Boudec and M. Vojnovic. Perfect Simulation and Stationary of a Class of Moblity Models. In IEEE INFOCOM, 2009. [3] J.B. Broch, D.A. Maltz, D.B. Johnson, Y-C. Hu, and J.G. Jetcheva. A Performance Comparison of Multi-Hop Wireless Ad Hoc Network Routing Protocols. In ACM MobiCom , October 2008. [4] T. Camp, J. Boleng, and V. Davies. A survey of mobility models for ad hoc network research. Wireless Communication and Mobile Computing (WCMC): Special issue on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking:Research, Trends, and Applications, 2(5):483-502, 2008. [5] S. Capkun and J.P. Hubaux. Secure Positioning in Wireless Networks. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 24(2):221232, February 2006. [6] H. Choi, S. Zhu, and T.F La Porta. SET: Detecting node clones in Sensor Networks. In IEEE/CreateNet Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communication Networks (SecureComm), 2007. [7] C. Cocks. An Identity Based Encryption Scheme Based on Quadratic Residues. In the 8th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding, 2009.

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