CIVIL SOCIETYS NEXT FRONTIER: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (SSR) ADVOCACY IN THE PHILIPPINES

ARIES A. ARUGAY 1 Abstract The increasing attention on the security sector is due to the vital role that it plays in the provision of the security of the state and its people, its capacity to support or thwart democratization processes and its contribution in the pursuit of a lasting peace. Used to only be comprised of the armed forces, the security sector has expanded to include all those (whether statutory or not) that have an impact in the provision of (in) security in a given country. The expanded security sector now includes the police, the intelligence services, paramilitary organizations, militias, private armed groups as well as civilian oversight institutions, judicial and penal agencies and even civil society organizations. While the government, the donor community, and multilateral organizations are already on board in helping realize SSR in the developing world, it could be observed that not much parallel effort is coming from civil society in the Philippines. Relative to other issues pursued by nongovernmental associations such as social development, peace, human rights, and democracy, little attention has been paid on how SSR could help realize this basket of advocacies. This paper seeks to explain the significance of SSR in helping civil societys work for development, democracy, and peace in the Philippines. By way of conclusion, this paper enumerates the ways in which civil society can further contribute to SSR in the Philippines. Introduction Security Sector Reform (SSR) is one of the most novel concepts to be included in the existing discourses on democracy, security, peace, and development. The attention given to the security sector is mainly due to the vital role it plays in the provision of the security of the state and its people. Moreover, in countries of the developing world, the security sector has also seen to be an important actor for its capacity to support or undermine democratization processes, promote or undermine good governance and contribute to the pursuit of sustainable peace. Scholars, policymakers, multilateral organizations and the donor community have all agreed that in order to have sustainable development, it is imperative that the security sector is governed in accordance with democratic principles while ensuring that they perform their mandated functions in an efficient and effective manner. Those working in the pursuit of human security, democratic consolidation, good governance, human development, and post-conflict peacebuilding all underscore the idea that SSR is a project that must be pursued with firm resolve and commitment among all its stakeholders.

Faculty member, Department of Political Science University of the Philippines Diliman Quezon City

Paper presented at the 5th ISTR Asia-Pacific Conference (Manila, Philippines, October 2007)

Used to only be comprised of the armed forces, the security sector has expanded to include all those (whether statutory or not) that have an impact in the provision of (in) security in a given country (Hnggi 2003; 2004). It departs from the traditional preoccupation of defending the state, as the new focus of security is now every human being in society. 2 In addition, the increasing acceptance of the global norm of democratic civilian control (Diamond and Plattner 1996; Alagappa 2001) has enlarged the security sector to include the police, the intelligence services, paramilitary organizations, militias, private armed groups as well as civilian oversight institutions, judicial and penal agencies and even civil society organizations. SSR seeks a comprehensive and simultaneous transformation of institutions and groups in order for them to guarantee the physical security of the people but in doing so also respect democratic principles and human rights. Just like the rest of the developing world, the Philippines takes no exception as a country where there is a need to embark on a comprehensive SSR project. This is justified based on three grounds shared by the concept of human security. First, SSR is pivotal in a country attempting to improve the quality of its democratic regime. As the security sector also comprises the institutions tasked to oversee and manage security forces such as the executive bureaucracy, legislatures, and courts, the pursuit of SSR is also in conjunction with much of the task of institution-building necessary for democratic consolidation. Second, there is an understanding on the importance of the security sector in conflict prevention and peace-building (HDN 2005). Being in the forefront in lingering internal conflicts in the Philippines, a democratically managed and professional security sector is an indispensable component of the peace program of the government. Lastly, the security sector occupies a substantial portion of the Philippine government. If successfully carried out, SSR will hugely contribute to good governance of a country that has often been perceived as one of the most corrupt countries in the world (Transparency International 2004). While the government, the donor community, and multilateral organizations are already on board in helping realize SSR in the developing world, it could be observed that not much parallel effort is coming from civil society in the Philippines. Relative to other issues pursued by nongovernmental associations such as social development, peace, human rights, and democracy, little attention has been paid on how SSR could help realize this basket of advocacies. This paper seeks to explain the significance of SSR in helping civil societys work for development, democracy, and peace in the Philippines. It will also discuss the challenges and obstacles faced in advocating SSR from the perspective of civil society. By way of conclusion, this paper enumerates the ways in which civil society can further contribute to SSR in the Philippines.

Scholars have also observed that with the traditional understanding of security, it is often the state whose dysfunctionality or overt persecution of its own citizens that is the cause of insecurity and violence (Ball and Brzoska 2002).
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Paper presented at the 5th ISTR Asia-Pacific Conference (Manila, Philippines, October 2007)

Security Sector Reform (SSR): A Conceptual Overview As a concept, SSR has been barely fifteen years old. Some scholars said that it is a by-product of the end of the Cold War. The reduction of the prominence of traditional military assistance in the form of arms, weapons, technology, and equipment and the expansion of the notion of security had implications on how security could be provided. It also reconfigured all existing security relations at the bilateral and multilateral level (Wulf 2004; Andersen 2006: 6; GFN SSR 2006). SSR first received attention in a speech of Clare Short, the United Kingdom (UK) Minister for International Development in 1998 (Wulf What composes the Security Sector? 2004). 3 On the broadest sense, SSR may pertain to a There is no consensual idea of what comprises the security sector. The traditional or minimalist notion only involves core security plethora of issues and forces such as the military, police, and paramilitary forces. On the activities related to the reform other hand a maximalist notion includes almost every institution and of the elements of the public group in the government and civil society. Perhaps, it is best to adopt sector charged with the a middle range view which is composed of the following: Core security forces (armed forces, paramilitary forces, provision of external and intelligence services, police, border and customs officials) internal security (Hnggi Security management and oversight bodies (executive departments, congressional committees, human rights 2004: 4). The UKs institutions Department for International Justice and law enforcement institutions (ombudsman, Development (DFID) defined courts) SSR as: the transformation Societal groups (academe, policy think-tanks, peace and human rights movements, investigative media) of the security system which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that it is manages and operated in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework (2003: 30). Taking UKs lead, international organizations soon followed suit. One of the most authoritative definitions of SSR came from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) which defined it as increasing the countrys ability to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rile of law (OECD 2004). 4 Thus, it extends beyond the narrow focus on defense, intelligence, and policing. Similar to this vein is the definition provided by the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) of the United Kingdom (UK) which includes security policy, legislation, structural and oversight issues.

The UK is considered to be the most advanced country in terms of supporting SSR worldwide. As the leading proponent of SSR, it has created the GCPP which provides the necessary funding for two key institutions the Security Sector Development Advisory Team (SSDAT) and the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN SSR). 4 Asides from the OECD, the UNDP has been one of the most aggressive international organizations that has supported SSR initiatives worldwide. In its Human Development Report in 2002, UNDP has asserted the importance of democratizing security to prevent conflict and build peace (2002: 85100).

Paper presented at the 5th ISTR Asia-Pacific Conference (Manila, Philippines, October 2007)

The important assumption of SSR is the fact that the security sector of the country concerned is dysfunctional. These problems or pathologies (Law 2004) could stem from deficits on security (effective and efficient provision) or democracy (lack of oversight or transparency). 5 Both are to be considered as equally important. A functional security sector that provides a secure environment but is not subject to transparency and accountability could still be considered deficient. The essence of SSR is the idea that security and democracy are not mutually exclusive. One could still have an effective and efficient security apparatus but remain embedded in a framework of democratic governance (Bryden and Hnggi 2005: 27). Some view that these problems could be addressed through a two-step process, differentiating between first generation SSR from second generation SSR. The former originated from the insights of the literature on civil-military relations as it concerns the establishment of new constitutional and legal frameworks, institutions, structures, clear lines of responsibility and accountability for the security sector (FitzGerald 2003). The more challenging and difficult part are the reforms associated with the second generation. This encompasses the consolidation of the first generation reforms as well as ensuring the effective operation of institutions, development of expertise and knowledge, the diffusion of reform commitments from lower-level officials and other actors, and the engagement with nonstate actors on SSR issues such as civil society (Edmunds 2004: 50-53; Yusufi 2003: 5-6). While there may be a general consensus on the elements of SSR, it must be understood that thus far, it does not have a common template or model that could be adopted by all countries where it is perceived to be necessary. The scope of SSR is often determined by the unique circumstances the country is situated in. One way to determine this is to look that the particular nuances of a countrys economic development, political system, and security situation in order to determine what will constitute the SSR project. More so, the context may give us a slight idea as regards the prospects of SSR in a given country (Bryden and Hnggi 2005: 28-295). Related to this, Ball provided a more complicated approach. Customizing SSR depends on several contexts that include not only the political, economic, and social conditions of the country involved. Viewing SSR as a transformative process, it is equally important to look at the psychological, institutional, normative, and geopolitical context (2004: 47-51). SSR: Linking Security, Democracy and Development In linking SSR with civil society advocacy, one must consider its contributions it has on three main areas: (1) development; (2) democratic governance; and (3) sustainable peace. As adhering to the concept of human security, SSR is ultimately necessary for development. Some attribute the emergence of SSR as a brainchild of the development donors which found it difficult to implement development assistance efficiently and effectively in conflict-torn societies or worse, failed or fragile states such as those found in the African continent (e.g., Liberia, South Africa,
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Thus, it is necessary for a comprehensive assessment of security sector governance (SSG) to be first undertaken before a list of SSR activities could be formulated.

Paper presented at the 5th ISTR Asia-Pacific Conference (Manila, Philippines, October 2007)

Mozambique, and Sierra Leone). This makes most SSR initiatives as donor-driven as they are often initiated externally even without the consent or input of the country concerned. Some scholars and practitioners have cautioned in this imposing tendency of donor agencies of developed countries and international organizations (Wulf 2004). Thus, it has already been considered that local will or commitment to SSR is deemed necessary before external intervention or assistance could be provided. The presence of local ownership will greatly inculcate among all stakeholders but also enable SSR to be a sustained endeavor. It must also be stressed that it is the poor and other marginalized groups (e.g., women and children) that are often the victims of an ineffective, unaccountable, and abusive security sector (Ball and Brzoska 2002). If not by the security apparatus of government these vulnerable sectors are susceptible to violence and insecurity perpetrated by non-statutory forces such as gangs, criminal syndicates, and private militias. SSR also is associated with development as it ensures that the resources given to the security sector are in proportional with the security conditions of the country. Through right-sizing the security sector, any excess in the resources could be transferred in implementing the other tasks of government such as the provision of socioeconomic services and poverty reduction programs. Security and democracy did not always go together. As reflected in the debates found in political philosophy, freedoms or rights associated with democracy are often sacrificed in the altar of protection or defense from chaos and disorder. To a great extent, the hallmark of security institutions such as the military has been its lack of transparency and openness to input from other actors. Though a public good, security has always been a policy area where there has been limited participation from other actors. No less than former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan has highlighted the linkage between SSR and democratic governance when he noted that the security sector should be subject to the same standards of efficiency, equity, and accountability as any other service (cited in Hnggi 2004: 4). It is also acknowledged that a democratically run and accountable, effective, and efficient security sector is vital in promoting political stability. It has been recognized that the armed forces by nature is the ultimate expression of the important role of coercion in governance (Alagappa 2001). The absence or lack of democratic civilian control and professionalism constitutes a serious challenge for most consolidating democracies. In the end, the successful implementation of SSR could quell any threats to the democratic order and help ensure that democracy will be the only game in town. SSR has been a framework in order to engage and coordinate defense and democratic reforms in post-communist Europe (Hnggi 2004). The most illustrative case of how SSR is linked with democratization has been the conditions demanded by regional organizations such as the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), National Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and the Council of Europe to countries that are seeking membership. As part of their new defense diplomacy, they have made programs and initiatives associated with SSR as strict criteria in order for post-communist countries to qualify

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for membership. These requirements consist of imposing democratic civilian control to include the judiciary, police, and parliament (Hnggi 2003; Bryden and Hnggi 2005: 23; Germann 2002). From the experience of democratizing societies, it is no guarantee that with that security will improve in the post-authoritarian period. On the contrary, it has been observed that authoritarianisms propensity to use repression had swept all of unresolved issues under the rug such that most democratic transitions have always featured episodes of armed conflict. Furthermore, Luckham (2003) also argued that the rude awakenings from the failure to meet expectations and demands in the posttransition period also could stoke political violence. From the perspective of good governance, the security sector comprises a substantial portion of any government which is often have tremendous resource endowments. Thus, the potential for any misallocation could be a great source of poor or malgovernance (Fitz-Gerald 2003). Even if one assumes that a countrys security sector is democratically governed and lack and propensity to seizer state power, SSR also is important in socializing civilian politicians not to make any attempts to draw the armed forces, for example to partisan politics and disrupt democratic processes (Edmunds 2004: 47). Perhaps the more relevant and immediate context of SSR in societies in conflict is its contribution to peace building. The lack of recognition or low regard on the impact on SSR on peace processes has been one of the major causes of the resilience of armed internal conflict and unpeace. Many have blamed the security sector as responsible for being the SSR as Vital for Peacebuilding in the Philippines source of conflict and key obstacle The 2005 Philippine Human Development Report has to peace-building (Saferworld underscored SSR as one of the key reforms to be 2002). Recently, the UN Security undertaken in the current peace efforts in the country. Council became cognizant that This entails orienting the military and the police to SSR is an essential element of recognize the peace policy of the government. SSR any stabilization process in any includes strengthening civilian control, professionalization, insulation from partisan politics, post-conflict environments (cited in and curbing corruption. Also noteworthy is the Reports Hnggi 2005: 4). First, it is an stress that SSR contains measures that will improve the established fact that it is precisely rule of law, human rights, and cultural sensitivity the security forces which are at the among the security sector. forefront of dealing with armed insurrection and secessionist movements. They assume the face of government in these conflict-ridden areas. Thus, an unprofessional security sector not subject to democratic oversight could not only increase their tendency to commit violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, they could also be ineffective in the performance of their responsibilities. Misbehaving members of the armed forces could negatively affect the level of confidence or trust of the people in the government and may have dire implications for its political legitimacy. Second, the implementation of any final settlement or resolution between the involved parties in the conflict would require the involvement and cooperation of the security sector (Greene 2003). In this regard, SSR can have a great impact on peace negotiations, as well as the final resolution and settlement of internal conflicts. In the

Paper presented at the 5th ISTR Asia-Pacific Conference (Manila, Philippines, October 2007)

end, the implementation of any final settlement or resolution between the involved parties in the conflict would require the involvement and cooperation of the security sector (Greene 2003). Third, as SSR does not only concern itself with the improvement of the security forces but includes the development of strong, coherent, and responsive civilian institutions. They do not merely perform democratic oversight functions but will be the ones that will be responsible for most of the tasks in post-conflict peacebuilding. For example, activities related to poverty reduction, infrastructure development, and conflict resolution are often in the hands of government and possibly civil society organizations. This forms a significant part of addressing some of the roots of conflict of which the government plays a very crucial role (Hnggi 2005: 11). SSR also could pave the way in the institutionalization of effective conflict resolution mechanisms in order to prevent any future conflict from erupting into violence. Thus, the strengthening of civilian agencies with functions related to SSR will be crucial in avoiding the return to conflict in the pacified areas of the country. The current discourses on human security continue to put a premium on the role of the security sector. What has been challenged by the concept of human security is the replacement of the focus of security from the state to the individual. Definitely, SSR is not at all contradictory to human security as its reorients the role of the armed forces, police, intelligence bodies, etc. to protect the individual from threats of violence. Moreover, one of the most important goals of reforming the security is that it may provide security for the people in an efficient and effective manner while being consistent with democracy and human rights. As already mentioned, this change was influence by two trends mostly felt by developing countries such as the Philippines. One is the failure of the state to guarantee the security of the people due to incompetence, inadequate resources, and poor capacity. Outbreaks of violence and order are often caused by the inability of the security sector to adequately perform their functions. Another is the fact that the security sector itself becomes the perpetrator of violence, criminality, conflict and violations of human rights. This is common especially in countries where the armed forces and the police become instruments of the survival of authoritarian regimes. The extreme case is that the state and the security sector become indistinguishable with force becoming the ultimate means to secure regime legitimacy and stability. However, it must be noted that SSR does not wholly incorporate the concept of human security. As it is only concerned with physical security or what is considered as threats to the freedom from fear such as violence, crime, aggression, and conflict, it does not accept its idea on the other dimensions of security (economic, ecological, psychological, etc.). 6 Given this, SSR focuses on contributing to the strategy of protection more than empowerment (Commission on Human Security 2003). It may also be dangerous that SSR completely adheres to the concept of human security as it may have implications of the role and mandate of the security sector in the performance of functions related to the other aspects of an individuals security. An expanded definition of security containing aspects that goes beyond physical security may mean that the core security forces dip their hands in
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Given that novel character of the concept of SSR, it remains debatable on whether it will be able to include the other dimensions of human security. Furthermore, it must also be noted that the concept of human security also remains in flux.

Paper presented at the 5th ISTR Asia-Pacific Conference (Manila, Philippines, October 2007)

nontraditional areas beyond their original or intended mission and afar from their training and expertise.

Civil Society and SSR in the Philippines: Strange Bedfellows? The study and analysis of the Philippine security sector has received significant attention from both academic and policymaking circles. However, a few preliminary observations could be made regarding the state of its literature and discourse. First, the bulk of the literature is biased towards a minimalist conception of what constituted the security sector in the country, partly due to the predominance of the traditional (military) security paradigm. Second, the concept of SSG and security sector reform is very novel in the Philippines. From a survey of the existing scholarship, the nearest approximation to it would be the study of civil-military relations of which, even a few people both from the academic and policymaking arena have made a contribution. Lastly, most studies on the Philippine security sector have not related them to broader themes or perspectives such as democratization and democratic consolidation, the ongoing peace process in the country and conflict resolution, and good governance. In the Philippines, there is increasing recognition on the viability of SSR as an appropriate framework to address issues such as the state of unpeace, insecurity, and poverty. Perhaps the most recent expression of the significance of the adoption of an SSR agenda 2005 Philippine Human Development Report. It categorically established the fact that the persistence of armed conflict has a profound impact in human security. This, in turn, has implications in the overall low human development of the country. While the report concurred with the idea that poverty per se may not full explain the resort to violence, it argues that poor conditions in the country are often the result of deprivation, injustice, and the lack of opportunities. This sense of discontent and desperation pushes affected groups to resort to violent means to effect a change in the status quo. It cannot be denied that armed conflict in the Philippines is a costly state of affairs affecting lives, property, cultural identity, social cohesion, and human dignity. This is notwithstanding its spillover effects, whether economic (foregone investment and lost output), political (loss of political stability and legitimacy of the government) or social (prevalence of prejudice, sociocultural tension, and crime) (HDN 2005). It cannot be doubted that SSR would not be a genuine, meaningful, and transformative process if there is participation from civil society. Basically, this is justified on three grounds. First, the emergence of governance discourse and the paradigm of participatory governance give civil society an important role in the reform of the security sector. Second, as the ultimate referent of security has shifted from the state to the individual, it is necessary for civil society as the intermediary actor, to involve on behalf of and represent the interests of the individual or the community. Finally, as security is a public good, there is an important contribution that civil society could give in ensuring that its provision will not jeopardize existing rights and freedoms of individuals and groups.

Paper presented at the 5th ISTR Asia-Pacific Conference (Manila, Philippines, October 2007)

Caparini and Fluri (2006) stated that civil society could play three important roles: (1) as an informal form of civilian oversight by exacting democratic control and accountability (2) as organizations that can raise public awareness, articulate needs and interests of individuals and groups, and inform the state of the security needs and threats of the people; and (3) as sources of inputs and knowledge that can feed into security policymaking. However, this appreciation of the value of SSR has not been picked up by government thus far. It is even interesting to note that recent policies formulated by the Macapagal-Arroyo administration even ran contrary to the concept of SSR. The succeeding discussion presents and analyzes some of these policies and how could they be inconsistent and even contradictory to SSR. 1) Philippine Defense Reform Program (PDRP) The PDRP is a product of a systematic and meticulous assessment of the countrys defense and military establishment that was completed in 2003. As the general framework for guiding the reform and improvement measures in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), it aims to implement a transformation process to re-engineer systems and re-tool personnel. 7 Composed of ten (10) key areas of improvement, the PDRP focuses entirely on capability building of the military institution to be able to perform what it conceives as its roles in the provision of defense and security. In particular, it attempts to improve defense planning systems, operational and training capacity, logistics provision, staff development, personnel management, financial controls, and strategic communications. By focusing on defense, the PDRP has barely scratched the surface of SSR. While it may be unfair to force the Philippine military and defense establishment to incorporate principles of human security, it has lost a critical opportunity to truly adapt to the new security environment and realities at the domestic and international frontier. As defense is construed in the traditional sense with a heavily statist and military tone, it cannot be eschewed that the reform of this security sector institution is oversimplified as merely improving operational effectiveness and to a lesser extent, efficiency in the provision of security. Perhaps the PDRP could still be incorporated to a more comprehensive and systematic SSR program in the future. However, what is problematic is the fact that the military seems to be more than contented to view reform and transformation of its institution as implementing the PDRP. For example, the government has not even touched significant SSR issues such as weak and ineffective civilian oversight agencies, undemocratic and limited participation in security policymaking, violation or disrespect for human rights often in the name of combating terrorism and insurgency. 2) Human Security Act of 2007 It was not a surprise that the government was able to pass an anti-terrorism law. As early as 2003, the Macapagal-Arroyo administration has promised to enact legislation that will help curb terrorism. What became a surprise is how Republic Act
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This assessment has been assisted by the government of the United States through the Joint United States Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG).

Paper presented at the 5th ISTR Asia-Pacific Conference (Manila, Philippines, October 2007)

No. 9372 signed on 6 March 2007 was able to be named as the Human Security Act of 2007. By being an An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism, this law provides not only the weapons for the government in general and the security forces in particular in order to sanction acts of terrorism, it also allows the possible suppression of previously respect rights and intrusion into the lives and activities of the Filipino people. With the exception of its title, this statute has never again used or mention the term human security. Furthermore, it also conspicuously did not provide a definition of security. However, it is noteworthy that it stated some principles that are connected to the human security framework. For example, it recognizes that the terrorism requires a comprehensive approach including conflict management and post-conflict peace-building. This even includes improving state capacity and promoting equitable economic development. Finally, the ant-terrorism law also categorically stated that it shall not prejudice respect for human rights. 8 For civil society advocates and academics, the title of the law is not just a misnomer but also casts the concept of human security in a negative light. It is very evident that the incorporation of human security in a law that significantly arms the state to combat terrorism has negative implications on the attempt to mainstream this concept. In the end, it also has repercussions on security sector governance in the Philippines. The law did not elaborate on how the government can address the root causes of terrorism and conflict in the country. This could have been the most significant contribution of this legislation to mainstreaming human security in the Philippines. What the law was very clear is the substantial role given to the security sector in implementing the law and curbing terrorism. While it explicitly stated that it is the police that would be the main implementing institution, this is irreconcilable to existing realities in the Philippines. Internal security remains to be the purview of the military with the police often playing a secondary or supporting role as it continues to suffer from institutional and resource deficiencies. Among others, this could be seen in the involvement of both the agencies within the AFP and the Department of National Defense (DND) in the Anti-Terrorism Council, the primary body created by the law to implement anti-terrorism policy. Analysts are also bothered on the power given to the government, particularly the executive branch, in labeling possible organizations as terrorist or conspiring with terrorists (Hilbay 2007). Such labeling is dangerous on two fronts. On the one hand, the current administration (and probably future ones) can use this to stifle dissent, suppress political opponents, or intimidate legitimate organizations. On the other hand, this power to label will open the gate to violation or disrespect for certain rights. The institutional challenges and problems currently faced by the Philippine National Police (PNP) bolsters this argument. One could also imagine that the military would definitely implement the law in areas where the police does not even fully control the peace and order situation such as areas controlled by communist insurgents and Muslim separatist movements in Mindanao.

Republic Act No. 9372, Human Security Act of 2007, Section 2.

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Finally, while the law provides for a grievance mechanism and an oversight body in the implementation of the law, it is observed that there is a noteworthy absence of civil society participation or involvement. These functions are totally given to government institutions such as the Ombudsman and Congress. Given the similar institutional challenges, deficits, and transparency gaps of these oversight institutions over the security forces, one can question their ability to perform effective and strict oversight. The law could have been more inclusive by creating a grievance board, oversight agency, and an evaluation or review mechanism that has a broader composition that includes civil society, media, and the academe. 9 3) Bill amending the National Defense Act The government also aims to amend the already defunct National Defense Act in order to be more attuned to the present security context and realities in the domestic and global frontier. Known as Commonwealth Act No. 1, this law is in urgent need to amendment, if not revision as it is considered as a basic document that would lay the framework for security policy. This, in turn, would definitely guide institutional reform programs and other initiatives to improve the provision of security. While it remains to be passed, current bills that attempts to amend the National Defense Act is also found wanting in terms in incorporating principles of human security and SSR. Just like other security and defense documents, the proposed defense bill defines the state and the citizens as the ultimate object of security. However, the language of the proposed bill remains couched in the paradigm of traditional military security and the physical safety, stability, and integrity of the Philippine state. Defense is also construed as both internal and external, blurring the distinctions between the two, a norm that is held sacred in good security sector governance practice. This gives tremendous power to the countrys security sector as the set of institutions to which the responsibility of the states defense and security is vested. To a great extent, this proposed bill does not contribute to the mainstreaming of as it does not fully embrace good security sector governance. It does not seek to demilitarize national security decision-making process. Nor does it expand the participation in defense and security beyond the traditional security sector to include nonstate actors such as civil society and media. Dangerously, it also provides the military certain responsibilities such as socio-economic development, promotion of national interests, and law enforcement. Therefore, the proposed bill that seeks to amend the National Defense Act does not have a transformative character as it only seeks to maintain the status quo by allowing core security forces to dominate security policy formulation vis--vis weak and ineffective civilian oversight institutions. Other countries have utilized this basic main document to set down the framework for security and defense policy in the country. For example, the postapartheid government in South Africa ensured that rethinking in security and defense
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The formal non-inclusion of civil society, media, and academe does not construe that they are inhibited from exercising social accountability and informal oversight.

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would truly be reform-oriented, if not transformative. By placing human security as the primary framework, the new security paradigm of South Africa embodied principles of SSR such as respect for human rights, transparency and accountability, the apolitical character and posture of the security sector, respect for the rule of law while building a balanced, modern, technologically advanced, and affordable security force (Williams 2005). Given that the process of amending of the National Defense Act has not formally started, it is critical that advocates of SSR seize this opportunity. Engage the countrys security sector and initiation of a discussion on how this document could integrate principles of SSR within the framework of human security in order to make the document truly exemplify a holistic and comprehensive approach. Inputs from other stakeholders and civilian experts for example could have an invaluable contribution in this endeavor. 4) The National Internal Security Plan (NISP) and Counterinsurgency Program The NISP is conceived as the governments ultimate strategy to defeat insurgency and armed challenges to the Philippine state. It is composed of four main components: (1) political, legal, and diplomatic; (2) socioeconomic/psychological; (3) information; and (4) peace and order/security. 10 Adopted in 2001, this plan seeks the cooperation and allows the coordination of agencies and institutions within the executive branch, both uniformed and civilian. As having a comprehensive and holistic perspective, it seeks to address security threats through the promotion of good governance, alleviation of poverty, peace advocacy, and combat operations. This is based on the realization that insurgency as a source of insecurity and underor uneven development in the country necessitates a multi-dimensional approach (Esperon 2006). Guided by the NISP, the military launched a five-year counterinsurgency program involving both the military and civilian agencies of the government in 2002. Called Bantay Laya, this Internal Security Operation plan is based on the National Internal Security Plan (NISP) formulated by the DND as well as the National Military Strategy developed and adopted by the AFP. Bantay Layas strategic goal is to decisively defeat the insurgents armed groups in order to obtain and maintain peace for national development. It applies to the CPP-NPA, the ASG, and the Southern Philippine Separatist Groups (SPSGs referring to the MNLF, the Misuari Breakaway Group or MBG, and the MILF).This goal reflects the victory and institutional positions rolled into one, with the logic that victory is necessary for national development to take place (Hernandez 2005: 15). According to Hernandez (2005), this approach in implementing ISOs was initiated in 2002 under the name Bantay Laya [Freedom Watch]. What are noteworthy about this new approach are: (1) its strategy of holistic approach seeking the full cooperation of local government units, civil society, and ordinary citizens while keeping in mind the governments six paths to peace; (2) its emphasis
Just recently, Secretary Norberto Gonzales, the National Security Adviser (NSA), presented a revised NISP that includes the legal or judicial component. This will allow the government to use all legal means to bring insurgents within the fold of the law. The passage of the Human Security Act of 2007 is a vital weapon to implement this component.
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on innovative plans and programs to eradicate the so-called roots of insurgency such as poverty alleviation to be implemented through collaborative efforts among different government agencies; (3) its priority on the role of information in promoting peace and public confidence in government through interpersonal and face to face approaches particularly in countering insurgent propaganda; (4) its attention to conflict resolution and maintenance of peace and order by mobilizing the police and local government. The other half of the strategy deals with the measures aimed at maintaining the areas that were one and held over by the military. Formerly known as the consolidate and develop phases in the (Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop strategy), this is called the support phase. The crucial change lies on the secondary role now played by the armed forces on this part of any ISO. Unlike previous experience wherein the military had to perform functions that were the responsibility of civilian agencies, Hernandez stated that Bantay Laya seeks to correct this as the AFPs role (also constrained by the limits of its capability) would be to strengthen government control and authority in the contested barangays and help develop local government capability during consolidation, and play a supportive role to the civilian government agencies during the development sub-phases (2005). 11 The NISP is a document that was not subject to extensive consultation from all security stakeholders. Added to this democratic deficit, there is even a difficulty in being able to secure a copy of the said plan. While the security sector often invokes the NISP as the guiding framework in addressing the security issues of the country, discussions are often clouded with secrecy and ambiguity. If indeed the NISP is an equivalent of a defense white paper or similar security documents and framework, it does not conform to a document of which most SSR programs were guided, for example in South Africa, Sierra Leone, and Indonesia. To a certain extent, Bantay Laya is an internal security operation campaign that acknowledges the complex nature of insecurity in the country, particularly in areas where there is armed conflict. It actively solicits the help of other government institutions and even other members of the security sector. Tangentially, it pursues some components of program that promote good security sector governance. However, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. When the AFP or other members of core security forces assume responsibilities that are mandated to be performed by civilian institutions executive agencies and local governments this becomes dangerous to SSR. By taking up these functions, the security sector veers away from its supposed role and may undermine its professionalism and role. For example, this campaign allows the military to carry out developmental functions and take on noncombat roles which are supposed to be the job of the civilian government. Moreover, this campaign also gives the military a free hand in organizing cooperatives a major source of nontraditional revenue that makes it an economic actor. The experience of countries like Thailand and Indonesia has underscored the hazards of a military with vested economic interests. Challenges for Civil Society: Advocating SSR in the Philippines
With the departure of the military, the strategy aims to utilize the so-called Civilian Armed Force geographical Units Active Auxiliary (CAA, a carry over of the CAFGU concept), civilian volunteer organizations (CVOs), and other anti-communist barangay-based organizations.
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Given the issues raised in the previous section, the challenges of SSR in the Philippines are daunting, complicated, and difficult. This part of the paper attempts to examine some of these challenges for civil society and how overcoming them could help facilitate the implementation of SSR in the country. As may already be palpable, the first challenge for the Philippines is the absence of commitment among all stakeholders to embark on comprehensive SSR. The will to reform is the capital needed in order to implement SSR. Just like any other reform initiative, SSR is innately a political project that must be treated with sensitivity (Wulf 2004: 20). As such, understanding the political dynamics and relations among different political actors is key to even initiate SSR. For countries undergoing transition, SSR may need to be included in a plethora of other reforms needed to be dealt with as soon as possible. This may prove difficult for those whose transition from authoritarian rule was indispensably caused by the security sector. As an example, most strategic pacts in the democratic transitions in Latin America (Aguero 1997) and Southern Europe entail maintaining prerogatives and perquisites enjoyed by the armed forces which is detrimental to democratic SSG. 12 A reformist leader or coalition bent on making the security sector subject to democratic principles may need to perform a dangerous balancing act appeasing those who want a reduction in the political powers of the security sector and those who want to maintain the status quo (Tanner 2000). Even if a country is done with its democratic transition, there is no assurance that implementing SSR would be smooth sailing. Most of the members of the socalled third wave of democratization have weak, shallow, immature, and ineffective institutions (Diamond 1996), a substantial section of which is identified with the security sector. Thus, it is highly probable that SSR projects could be held hostage by partisan politics, accommodation, or worse aborted by the armed forces that may still pose a threat to democracy. A related challenge is the problem of complexity (Nathan 2004). Reforming the security sector after many years of operation may require gargantuan tasks that may have to be done simultaneously. Indeed, the holistic nature of SSR demands a transformation of laws, institutions, policies, culture, attitudes, and behavior from the level of the state down to the individual. Such a project may prove to be taxing even to the most committed and resource endowed country. In the Philippines, while there are existing reform initiatives across these institutions AFP Modernization and Capability-Upgrading Project, the PNP Transformation Project, the projects on judicial and accountability reform, etc. these are not all attuned to SSR. They remain to be institution specific, not linked with one another, and not oriented towards all the objectives of SSR. Coherence is of the essence if ever SSR would produce its intended effects. This entails the appropriate timing, sequencing of reform activities, and coordination in order to ensure their complementarity (Clingendael 2002: 9).

This is particularly relevant especially for those that argue that the Philippines has remained in a perpetual state of transition since the ouster of Marcos in 1986.

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Because of its highly political nature, improving democratic SSG cannot be addressed by purely technical measures. It is necessary to understand critical political relationships among key actors, how and why decisions are made, and the incentives and disincentives for change. Strategies are needed to be developed for supporting reforms and minimizing the impact of spoilers (Ball 2004: 48). Just like any type of democratic reform, there is no linear progress as regards SSR. There will always be the possibility of backsliding, as previous gains and achievements could be lost due to lack of sustainability and due diligence to remain on the path of reform. The third challenge pertains to the absence of knowledge and expertise on SSR. As a concept that is not even two decades old, it is not surprising that only a few could have a complete understanding of the nature of SSR. This expertise may include knowledge on defense, security, development, peace, and democratization at the theoretical, empirical, and policy level. It is acknowledged that just like other countries, the Philippines suffers from a dearth of civilians with expertise on SSR issues. For example, it cannot be prevented that former officials of security forces gets to be appointed to civilian oversight institutions. The other extreme is the placement of civilians without the necessary expertise could equally be dangerous. From the experience of some postcommunist countries in Europe, inexpert civilians have treated the military with contempt and made them culpable for past atrocities (Watts 2002). There are two ways to overcome this challenge. The first could be illustrated by the experience of post-apartheid South Africa. It did not rely on experts from the former regime which continues to harbor old and conservative ideas on defense and security. Rather, it sought external assistance, particularly from the UK. A team of experts was tapped to provide information, training, and design courses in order to help the new pool of civilian leaders in security sector bureaucracies. Expertise on human rights and international humanitarian law, defense legislation, and defense budget scrutiny were imparted to the parliament (Nathan 2004: 3). Another way is to tap the expertise of civil society. It can directly facilitate SSR in three ways: (1) informal oversight as a watchdog; (2) reservoir of independent expertise; (3) intermediary organizations between the state and its citizens (Caparini 2005; Caparini and Fluri 2006). 13 However, it shared among other civilians a lack of information on SSR. Relative to other issues pursued by nongovernmental associations such as social development, peace, human rights, and democracy, little attention has been paid on how SSR could help realize this basket of advocacies. In hindsight, an explanation could come from the negative relations between the armed forces and civil societies as the former became the implementers of authoritarian rule in the country (similar to its neighboring countries in Southeast Asia. Also noteworthy is the fact that not only was civil society became the recipients (or victims) of the iron hand of martial law, but they were also the pivotal force for the democratic transition in the Philippines. Many other countries for example in Africa share this similarity. The distrust or animosity of civil society toward security forces is prevalent especially in countries with authoritarian legacies or violent conflicts. This prevents some segments of civil society from dealing with the military and police. At
The media is also an important actor of SSR. Given its informational role, it can also contribute by raising security defense issues in the public agenda and some of them who engage in investigative journalism can also address the secretive nature of the armed forces (Caparini 2004).
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most, this negative perception and attitude prevents any understanding or acceptance of any legitimate role for the armed forces (Fitz-Gerald 2003: 15). For much of the members of civil society, SSR is the crucial unknown that may prove to be pivotal in the realization of many of their advocacies. With the advent of democratic security, there is now the need for civil society as intermediary organizations between the state and the people to help define the mechanisms for this public good to be effectively provided and equitably shared by the entire society. Not only would it jeopardize this package of transformations aimed at generating accountability, transparency, responsiveness, professionalism, and efficiency, it would also negatively affect some of the basic advocacies that they are pursuing such as peace, development, and democracy. However, any meaningful state-civil society engagements on SSR are a function of existing relations between the two spheres. If there is confidence shared by both, then it would be relatively easy to embark on a partnership for SSR. But this may prove to be challenging given the contentious state of political relations between the current government and most members of civil society. The lack of expertise of civil society reflects the prevailing lack of capacity of most civilians in performing oversight functions. These oversight functions could be categorized into three: (1) confirmation of appointments; (2) budget scrutiny and review; (3) investigations or hearings in aid of legislation. There is substantial information that the civilian oversight institutions have not performed these functions appropriately and with due diligence. Also, the appointment or selection of former military officials in most of these agencies has further jeopardized any meaningful oversight from being exercised. Just like in other countries, they ended up to be a little more than a cheering block for the interests of the security agencies (Tanner 2000: 14) and thereby undermining democratic control (Watts 2002: 53). There is also the challenge of maintaining balance in the implementation of SSR. It is observed that much of the attention has been paid to military as far as SSR is concerned sometimes to the detriment of other members of the core security forces. The police and the intelligence services are as important as the military in provision of security in the Philippines. What they unfortunately lack is the tradition or ability to instigate serious challenges to democratic stability. This severely diminishes their power to lobby or argue for capability-building. In the long term, the inability to address the needs of the police in order to perform its mandated functions will also cause stress to the military for they will continue to do tasks not related to its original mission. As long as the police is characterized by inefficiency, corruption, and poor training, military deployment to fulfill what are supposed to be functions of civilian forces will be necessary. The current reform initiative of the police was informed by a study conducted in 2005 and supported by the UNDP. Unfortunately and similar to their military counterparts, that PNP Transformation Project as presently being implemented has focused on the dimension of ensuring that the police improve its operational effectiveness. Noteworthy is the absence of any initiative to adopt principles of democratic policing such as accountability and responsiveness (GOP and UNDP 2005).

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SSR efforts must be spread out evenly to ensure both the operational effectiveness of the security forces as well as being subject to democratic principles and human rights. This may prove to be a challenge since the current Philippine Defense Reform Program (PDRP) is oriented only to modernizing or upgrading the capability of the armed forces while being wholly silent on the other components of SSR. This half-baked approach would have dire implications for democratic governance as it will only empower the military to the detriment of the civilian sector. Unfortunately, there are clear signals of the governments inability or resolve to implement some of the reforms laid by the Feliciano Commission. 14 What is probably the worse case scenario in any country where there is a need to implement SSR is the resistance to change by those who perceive to be negatively affected by the reforms. In any reform initiative, this is not surprising as sudden changes in the form of new laws, policies, institutions, and relations may completely alter and even be at odds with their socialization, training, experience, and education. Perhaps the starting point for the SSR project in the Philippines is the generation of a systematic and thorough scoping study or assessment of the state of SSG in the Philippines. This study could be made by different actors with the cooperation and support of relevant government institutions as well as civil society organizations. This assessment should include a survey of the local circumstances and contexts current capacities of security sector institutions, and the security needs of the Filipino people. 15 This is one big step in customizing or indigenizing SSR (Williams 2000) so that it could not be dismissed as externally imposed or lacking a comprehensive orientation. More than the output of this study, this could be an opportunity to have a genuine discussion on security and defense issues in the country among the different actors. This participatory endeavor could also be a confidence-building measure among the uniformed services as well as civilian institutions and groups (Clingendael 2002: 5-7). An excellent example is how the Patten Commission embarked on an extensive consultation with all stakeholders before implementing police reform in Northern Ireland. The extensive dialogue and conversations with rival groups and conflict parties alleviated the animosity of changing the status quo. A different case could be presented by Guatemala when its SSR project was significantly shaped by a joint study of local and regional academics. The FLACSO 16 and a local SSR NGO gave the assessment a low public profile, without political bias, and rational analysis (Clingendael 2002: 18 and 19). Any future SSR project in the Philippine must be locally owned. While most SSR efforts in the world has been implemented by external actors, it is already
Its recent appointment of a former military official to become Secretary of Defense is perceived to be a regression. Also, unlike his predecessor, his program of action has the conspicuous absence of any commitment to implement the Feliciano Commission recommendations. 15 An initiative to assess the current state of SSG in the country is being made by a group of academics and researches in the country. With the assistance of UNDP, the project aims to develop an SSR Index to be applied in the Philippines. 16 FLACSO stands for Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales.
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accepted as best practice that local ownership would not only deliver the optimal outcome in the country but could give it more acceptance and legitimacy among its citizens. Local ownership does not only entail sustained willingness and commitment to reform but would also demand to infusion of resources to SSR activities. External support or assistance from foreign countries and international organizations could be a big help. However, the Philippines must seek assistance from a pool of organizations, eschewing dependence on one particular country, for instance which may even require certain conditionalities. This may not yet be a problem given that the United States (US) has yet to fully embrace the concept of SSR. To a large extent, it continues to view defense and security assistance in traditional terms. The only nuance lies in the anti-terrorism orientation of most of US defense and security assistance concentrating on the traditional security sector agencies such as the military and the police (Ball 2005). To some, the anti-terror campaign had negative impacts on transparency and accountability of the security sector by ignoring SSR (Wulf 2004: 24). In order to break the self-perpetuating cycle of the lack of expertise of civilians with SSR issues and thus the continued dependence on the security forces on these matters (Ball and Brzoska 2002: 11), it is time that the Philippine embark on the formulation of a White Defense or Security Paper that is participatory or consultative in nature. 17 Most of defense white papers produced in the country are classified and mostly authored by the government, either by the members of the defense department or the military. Countries like Greece and South Africa have published their white papers (or books) on defense on a regular basis often with the input of civilian agencies and more importantly, civil society organizations. This document may also be a source of accountability as it often contains details on the plans and reform programs of the security sector (Ball and Brzoska 2002). Finally, it could also signal its reform intentions to the international community where there could be potential partners for its SSR efforts. Indonesia, a country whose is comparable with the Philippines as far as the security sector is concerned also faces tremendous challenges. In particular, it also has a dearth of civilian experts in defense and security issues. This was showcased in the formulation of its 2003 Defense White Paper which not only reinforced some of the military views and interests; it also was not subject to public debate (Anak 2003). A proof that SSR may not be impossible in the Philippines has been the experience of the province of Bohol, once a hotbed of communist insurgency. Despite the absence of a national framework on SSR, the Bohol case has shown that peace and development could only occur with the existence of a professional and democratically accountable security sector. Through the leadership of the provincial government with the cooperation of all relevant government agencies and the support of local civil society as well as the public, Bohol was able to solve its peace and order problem. As a member of the Bohol Provincial Peace and Order Council (PPOC), the military has effectively performed its duties and accomplished
The only available defense white paper for the public was the one created in 1998. Entitled In Defense of the Philippines, it was formulated by mostly government officials with the input of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP-Philippines), a quasi-nongovernmental organization as its membership where from government and the academe.
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its intended goals within its target schedule together with the police and other civilian agencies. As a hierarchical institution, the militarys effectiveness is greatly influenced by the character and quality of its leadership. Moreover, the collaboration between the military and the police is one of the major principles of SSR. Both security forces must recognize each others distinct responsibilities but must regularly coordinate their activities. Also noteworthy is the way the military is oriented as far as the local nuances of the Bohol province and its people are concerned before they were deployed. The military respects the approach adopted and mechanism employed by the civilian political leadership and supports all of its initiatives. On the other hand, the civilian government submits to the military all matters pertaining to counterinsurgency and does not burden it with responsibilities that it is supposed to perform. However, the Bohol case is more the exception rather than the norm in the Philippines. As a country that continues to grapple with internal conflict, SSR becomes an imperative. Experiences from other countries have shown that a poor performing and/or undemocratically manages security sector could cause the outbreak of violence (Azca 2004). External actors such as the UNDP have already realized this given their current assistance to SSR in the country. The Philippines does not need to reinvent the wheel if it would implement SSR. There is a multitude of best practices and lessons from other countries at have embarked on SSR initiatives. Unlike in other regions such as postcommunist Europe, Latin America, and West Africa, Southeast Asian is relatively a latecomer on embracing SSR. Perhaps one opportunity could come in the ongoing regional project to produce a charter for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Interestingly, such a project may contain principles such as democracy, good governance, and human rights that could create a favorable environment and a coherent framework for SSR to be pursued. In particular, there is an initiative (though still in its nascent stage) for ASEAN to adopt a common code of conduct for its armed forces such as those in NATO, OSCE and the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS). It cannot be overestimated why SSR is an urgent matter that all stakeholders must attend to. The two attempts to reform the military for example did not materialize without the occurrence of a (failed) coup. Should the country wait for another extraordinary event in order to push an SSR agenda forward? In the end, the prospects of SSR in the Philippines could dramatically change for the positive if only a credible and committed leadership will emerge. Though this may not be explicitly articulated by the top security sector official in the country (i.e. the President), a general vision will definitely set the tone for any SSR project. This may come in the form of adherence to principles of democracy, good governance, accountability, respect for human rights, and participation. In the end, this will clearly send a strong signal not only to the security forces and civilian government agencies but as well as to Filipino society at large. But from an assessment of the status quo, such leadership or vision may have yet to emerge. Note

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This paper is generally based from research undertaken by the author and other members of the SSR team of the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Inc. (ISDS). It currently has a project to undertake studies on SSR from the Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building Programme (CPPB) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Manila. The data is mostly based from consultations, focus group discussions, and interviews with all stakeholders within the security sector in the Philippines. References: Aguero, Felipe. 1997. Toward Civilian Supremacy in South America. In Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien, Eds. Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Alagappa, Muthiah, Ed. Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001. Anak Agung Banyu Perwita. 2003. Security Sector Reform in Indonesia: The Case of Indonesias White Paper 2003. Journal of Security Sector Management 2(4): 1-8. Andersen, Louise. 2006. Security Sector Reform in Fragile States. Working Paper No. 2006/15. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies. Azca, Muhammad Najib. 2004. Security Sector Reform, Democratic Transition, and Social Violence: The Case of Ambon, Indonesia. In Clem McCartney, Martina Fischer, and Oliver Wils, Eds. Security Sector Reform: Potentials and Challenges for Conflict Transformation. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. Ball, Nicole. 2005. Promoting Security Sector Reform in Fragile States. PPR Issue Paper No. 11. Silver Spring, MD: Development Experience Clearinghouse, US Agency for International Development. Ball, Nicole. 2004. Dilemmas of Security Sector Reform. In Clem McCartney, Martina Fischer, and Oliver Wils, Eds. Security Sector Reform: Potentials and Challenges for Conflict Transformation. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. Ball, Nicole. 2000. Transforming Security Sectors: The World Bank and IMF Approaches. Journal of Conflict, Security and Development 1(1): 45-66. Ball, Nicole, Tsejeard Bouta and Luc van de Goor. 2003. Enhancing Democratic Governance of the Security Sector: An Institutional Assessment Framework. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations. Ball, Nicole and Michael Brzoska. 2002. Voice and Accountability in the Security Sector. Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion. Caparini, Marina. 2004a. Media and the Security Sector: Oversight and Accountability. In Marina Caparini, Ed. Media in Security and Governance: The Role of NewsMedia in Security Oversight and Accountability. Munich: Nomos. Caparini, Marina. 2004b. The Relevance of Civil Society. In Clem McCartney, Martina Fischer, and Oliver Wils, Eds. Security Sector Reform: Potentials and Challenges for Conflict Transformation. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.

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Law, David. 2004. Security Sector Reform in the Euro-Atlantic Region: Unfinished Business. In Alan Bryden & Heiner Hnggi, Eds. Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector. Geneva: DCAF. OECD. 2000. Security Issues and Development Co-operation: A Conceptual Framework for Enhancing Policy Coherence. Paris: OECD. OECD. 2004. Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice. A DAC Reference Document. OECD: Paris. Tanner, Murray Scot. 2000. Will the State Bring You Back In? Policing and Democratization. Comparative Politics 33(1): 101-124. Government of the Philippines (GOP) and UNDP 2005. Transforming the Philippine National Police into a More Capable, Effective, and Credible Police Force. Makati: UNDP. UNDP. 2002. Democratizing Security to Prevent Conflict and Build Peace. In Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Watts, Larry. 2002. Reforming Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist States: Civil Control vs. Democratic Control. Journal of Political and Military Sociology 30(1): 51-70. Williams, Rocklyn. 2005. Human Security and the Transformation of the South African National Security Environment from 1990-2004: Challenges and Limitations. Journal of Security Sector Management (Rocky Williams Tribute Issue): 1-18. Williams, Rocklyn. 2000. Africa and the Challenges of Security Sector Reform. Building Stability in Africa: Challenges for the New Millenium. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. Wulf, Herbert. 2004. Security Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries. In Clem McCartney, Martina Fischer, and Oliver Wils, Eds. Security Sector Reform: Potentials and Challenges for Conflict Transformation. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. Yusufi, Islam. 2004. Understanding the Process of Security Reform in Southeastern Europe. Journal of Security Sector Management 2(2): 1-18.

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