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331.H15 1903
reality;
The pathway to
THE PATHWAY
TO REALITY
BEING THE GIFFORD LECTURES DELIVERED IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS IN THE SESSION
1902-1903
NEW YORK
E.
P.
DUTTON
1903
& CO.
PREFACE
These Lectures contain the outcome of meditations, extending over some years, about the meaning and nature of Ultimate Reality. My chief ground for hope about the conclusion arrived at is that in
substance
it
It
seems
to
me
the
is
history
of
speculative
no record of discordant
hypotheses.
up
of
broadened by criticism, and criticism has then been succeeded by more adequate construction.
structure
Its
of
the
conception has
laid,
remained unaltered.
foundations were
more than two thousand years ago, by Aristotle, and these foimdations were uncovered, and the structure overhauled, by the great German thinkers who began to interpret Aristotle at the beginning As the Time Spirit brings of the last century. fresh materials with which to work, that structure will have to be again overhauled and added It is the legitimate work of ordinary mortals to.
viii
PREFACE
and
is
to seek to understand
all
for
Conduct
in
other voca-
of the
difl&culty of explaining
remote and
assist to
had taught
ought to
watch one's audience, to follow the working of its mind, and to try to mould one's discourse accordingly.
why
be as
true of an
Academic
lecture hall as
me
to be of other places.
Whether
do not know. "What is printed in the pages which follow is, at all events, just what the stenographer took down, with verbal corrections. In conclusion, I wish to express my gratitude
right I
to
my
friend
Mr Kemp
many
suggestions
press.
made while
TABLE OF CONTENTS
BOOK
Lecture
I
Pages 3
to 33.
The purpose of Lord Gifford in founding his Trust may be taken to have been to promote a thinking consideration of the nature of God and of His relation to the world. To such a purpose objection has been taken on the ground that there is no way of applying a scientific criterion of truth, such as we possess in the chronometer, or the balance, or the measuring rod. But criteria of this kind have only a limited application. We cannot apply them to art, or to morals, or to history, or even to the simplest conception of development in Truth must, therefore, have a wider the region of life. meaning. The test of a conception must be, not mere conformity to some external standard, but adequacy to the
The history of philosophy which it has to explain. no mere record of hypotheses rejected successively, but the history of a development in which criticism has succeeded God to construction and again construction to criticism. cannot be defined as less than the Ultimately Real, in terms of which all else can be expressed, while it cannot itself be expressed in terms of any thing beyond. The development
facts
is
is
with sceptics like Hume. At other times it has been conBut through it, if structive, as with Aristotle and Hegel. ix
X
we
philosophy,
CONTENTS
confine our attention to the product of the great
evolution, in ever
minds of deepening
is
This conception
The task of these Lectures will be to answer the question How, in the commencement of the Twentieth Century, ought we to conceive God ? We may, of course, find that Ultimate
:
what
is
meant by
less
is
"God"
is
in
common
parlance;
but,
if
God cannot be
than the
got rid
obscure
cannot be described as a First Cause, for the relation of cause effect is a relation which can obtain only within the forms of Time and Space, and these forms may turn out to fall within the Real, instead of conditioning it. Nor can God be defined as Substance. The deepest and most fundamental of aU
and
relationships appears to
Even the existence of a Universe of mere matter and energy could have meaning only for the mind of a fully equipped spectator. For a lizard it might seem something different from what it does for us, and for an angel something not less
but in another direction. We must try first of all to get at the meaning of subject as distinguished from substance,
different,
for
this
Reality.
Lecture
II
Pages 34
to 60.
only a very
first
We
and
limits
because they both fell within the of being object for the subject. The subject is no substance. For substance means the thing as distinguished
from its properties, an abstract inert identity, a mere pouit of view in experience. Subject is more akin to life than to substance. For in life we have the whole existing, not as distinct from its parts but in and through them, and this
notwithstanding their apparent externality to each other in the thinking of the subject we have more than this.
but
The
CONTENTS
great advance
xi
made by Aristotle as against Plato was to show that thought did not exist apart from its object, any more than the object existed apart from the thought for which it was
He showed that the universal existed in and through the particular, and that, not less, the existence of this particular
object.
him only by and for special purposes, that the individual object in experience could be broken up into universals of thought as operating on particulars of sense. This has been the view of modern metaphysics since
It
was
for
legitimate
only
provisionally
who
first
So
far as
Mill's
docti-ine of
real as
consisting in a system of permanent possibilities of sensation goes, he is at one with this teaching. He shows that
a mere sensation,
if it could be conceived, would not only be a vanishing quantity, but would be indescribable. have none of us experience of our neighbours' sensations, nor can we
We
even reproduce our own past sensations for comparison. We compare properties, universals, which are the outcome, when abstracted, as abstracted they are at every instant of our lives, of thinking and not of feeling. The system according to which we think, and in which our feelings are set, is objectivity,
and on
it
we
this system depends our conception of truth. Through get our notions, not only of our neighbours, but of
Thought and to choose the conceptions under which, and the standpoints from which, it will abstract. The hard-and-fastness of the world of experience which confronts us is the outcome of the selection unconscious, if sufficiently the outcome of habit of particular conceptions and standpoints. Of this the stereoscope, the hypnotised subject, and the madman may be taken as examples. Their world is for them
is
They have
in
it
the sense
But their meaning, and search for certainty. worlds are untrue in so far as they conflict with the general system of experience, and not from any want of the power to produce conviction. The commonsense standpoint appears to combine this power of producing conviction with compliance with the system in which men and women agree in thinking
in experience.
The
"
xii
is
CONTENTS
the outcome of common conceptions and standpoints under which commonsense has abstracted and hypostatised its abstractions. The aims, natm-e and meaning of these abstractions we must examine as the next stage of the journey
Lecture
III
Pc^es 61
to 89.
The dilemma put is that either things make thought, or thought makes things. Berkeley and Mill have shattered the but the second is just as absiurd, if it means first alternative that / make things. There must be a rational explanation of
;
The dilemma on which it rests is When we speak of founded on a false metaphor. "making" or "constructing" we are dragging in the notion
of processes in time and space, and this
for time
is
accounted for as
particular.
much
as anything else.
Further development
is
theory of
is true for practical purposes, and become gradually lessened. The " window mind must be rejected, whether we approach it as
The
is
and
tions of the
when we are inquiring into the foundasystem in the course of which it appears as such. Kant was infected with a point of view which is of great practical utility in psychology, but only provisionally valid, the point of view from which knowledge is assumed to be
is
not adequate
into faculties
capable of being laid on the dissecting table and broken up and separable elements. Modern psychologists
like Miinsterberg thesis is to
is
have carefully pointed out that this hypobe made use of only for strictly limited ends, and
a source of error
reality.
when the inquiry is into the nature of The teaching of Aristotle ought never to be for-
gotten.
CONTENTS
Lecture IV
xiii
....
is
Pages 90
to
114.
Having got rid of the "window" theory of the mind, and of the notion of separate faculties of intelligence, we must inquire what the true nature of experience is. It is
not put together out of atomic sensations, for these are what
Their
esse,
Experience
is
rather to be conceived
as a living
and
indivisible proces.s, in
which the
activity of
organisation by thought of an anrupov, which has no meaning except as a stage in the entirety of experience. Experience
the content of consciousness as immediately present to permeated in every supposed element by the universals of thought, and has no meaning outside of or apart from these universals. It is within this field and through these universals that we frame our distinctions and evolve the notion of the thinker as distinct from what is thought, a distinction which cannot be adequate for the purposes of the ultimate view of things. I can form no picture of myself as distinct from its manifestations, from my body, my history
itself,
us, is
and
tion
relationships.
can,
it is true,
by a process of
abstrac-
and further from what, as myself. For practical a plain commonsense person, I purposes I know well enough what I mean by myself, but
but as
I
do
mean by
this does
The
for us
it
is
what
it is
in all its
many and
under
the pm'pose or end to be realised in each case. The ultimate nature of reality can only be found when these conceptions
and categories have been carefully criticised and their limits When we have understood that the different aspects of nature, such as mechanism, life, etc., are the outcome
ascertained.
xiv
of abstraction
is
CONTENTS
no
conflict
under different categories, we perceive that between the results of the sciences, and that we have no title to reduce, e.g., life to mechanism, and so contradict the commonsense of the plain man, for whom, because he does not abstract and define in the same fashion, these standpoints easily co-exist. Thus our belief in the reality of the world as it seems may be restored to us, and we may come to see that the way to get at the nature of
there
reality is by thinking experience at the highest of standpoints. In this way the conception of experience as containing degrees of reality becomes a legitimate one.
Lecture V.
....
of the preceding Lectures
:
Page* 115
<o
139.
The outcome
1.
may be
expressed
in five propositions
That
activity of intelligence
speak of the subject is not like the motion of a mechanism and cannot be described by the analogy of cause and effect. It is the self-determination of reason which acts on rational grounds,
and which can detach itself even from the most formidable phase of experience, and abstract freely even when confronted by its own negation, such as is pain.
2. The organisation of experience into a world is the result of the purposes and standpoints which reason adopts. That
world
may be
appearances from which they cannot get away in their daily existence, phases which are unknown to us and they may be unconscious of phases, e.g., those which depend on the sense of colour, which are for us omnipresent. What must be common to them and us are, how;
locality in the
For these not only have no time and space for which they form the very conditions of possibility, but apart from them we cannot conceive rational beings at
all.
were impossible.
CONTENTS
To
XV
3. It is thus rather in ends than in causes that we must seek the explanation of the world as it seems.
4.
all
it
differ,
We could
it
not,
even
if
we would,
present
The
idea
of doing so comes only from our not having got rid of the
notion that thought
tion
is
is
The
self
conceived as a
thing
is
Thai the
We
it is.
what
the very condition of self-consciouscan disentangle in reflection the general nature of But thought no more makes things, than things
Aristotle
make
thought.
abstraction.
Each contrasted with the other is a mere and Hegel have both sought to exhibit
the work of Reason in the constitution of the Universe, the But neither has pulsation of thought even in the That.
have done
endeavoured to deduce the Universe, nor could consistently Examination of the criticisms of Professor so.
Pringle Pattison and Professor Royce.
Lecture VI.
....
thinking as
classes,
Page* 140
<o
165.
The view
of the process of knowledge which has been beyond that of the older
text-books of logic and psychology; but the modern view is Modern writers do not draw the distinction closely akin to it.
to
be drawn, and
a process of establishing
between individuals or
atomistic basis, but on a process of determination of what is and abstract into what is more definite and concrete.
and Lotze has prevailed against the abstract view of intelligence which some of the disciples of Hegel took, but which was not taken by Hegel himself. At
The
influence of Schopenhauer
xvi
CONTENTS
the same time modern science has brought about great developments both in logic and in psychology. In modern text-books of logic we are shown how the individual mind builds up its world of reality. The judgment is the bringing of further definitions into the subject of the judgment, which is the that of reality, the qualification of the that by incorporating into it a further what. In modern text-books of psychology what is treated of are the events of a single soul considered merely as events that happen, i.e., immediate experience taken as belonging to something that has a past and a future. These are limited standpoints, but they yield fruitful results, and in no
way
conflict
Fuller con-
BOOK
II
Pages 169
to
188.
Retrospect.
categories
life is essential, if
we
Such a
criticism
Science.
Illustration
Mathematics.
herself.
nality.
'
The
individual object
in Nature,
Her broadest characteristic is the relation of ExterThe method of scientific investigation, and the relation
Character of a true " NaturIt
to
it
of a criticism of categories.
philosophie."
must always be limited by the quality and quantity of the material which the science of its age has provided for it to work on. This was the difficulty which Hegel had to contend with when he tried to treat this part of his system. Yet a careful criticism of the limits of the categories employed in the various Sciences, and an examination of the
relation of these categories to
able by those
who
CONTENTS
Lecture
II
xvii
....
P(^es 189
to
237.
Science comprises every branch of knowledge which aims at a better comprehension of experience by systematically considering
tions.
its
men of Science have benefited mankind, they have also, at times, terrified it by treating reality as if it must be brought under these conceptions to the exclusion of others. How this has happened we must now try to discover in detail by reviewing critically the procedure of various Sciences.
Greatly as
Illustration
of
the
fashion
in
which
applied
Mathematics
abstracts from
real, as
The
difference
between
is
much more
is
abstract and
limited.
The conception
the discrete
The second
the subject of
the Infinitesimal Calculus, the notions of which seem to contradict those of ordinary Mathematics.
the disciples of
Geometry
as the Science
ment.
What
is
called Projective
Geometry does
so,
and thereby
it
Consideration
tend
to
Cause, and are But Physics must always be more than mere applied Mathematics, and consequently in practice it combines several standpoints, and is thus a composite
Science.
a distance.
and the Chemist. For the latter the molecule means the smallest mass into which a substance can be divided without changing its chemical nature. The Atomic
cule of the Physicist
theory
and abstract view of things, and no more than a valuable working hypothesis. The conception of the living organism is quite different from the conceptions of the
is
an
artificial
xviii
CONTENTS
Commence-
Mathematician and the Physicist and the Chemist. ment of the consideration of its nature.
Lecture
III
...
it is
Pages 238
to
278.
They belong
to a different
ence of a whole which does not exist outside the parts and
their behaviour. The problem of "Abiofounded on a confusion of categories. We can no more conceive an ultimate limit of life than we can conceive an ultimately indivisible atom. Both are fictions
determines
is
genesis"
The
life as a whole existing and these as acting in consequence quasipurposively, gave rise to the old Vitalism. The notion of a special vital force was mechanical, and is now exploded. The cell theory Johannes Muller and his work. The influence on biology of Schleiden and Schwann. Schwann's theory of cellular growth and his analogy of crystallisation.
simplicity
parts,
the experience of
its
The "intussusception"
siveness
difficulty.
Protoplasm.
apparent
throughout.
There
is
It
the necessary
outcome of the criticism of biological categories. Between those of mere life and those of conscious life there are intermediate conceptions, such as that of Instinct. To the explanation of these the categories of biology are
stUl
inadequate, and more so to the phenomena of the soul. The definitions of life by the philosophers and by the physiologists. Life
of development.
in health
is
the co-operative action of the parts in a common coui'se The nature of the action of the organism
and in
disease.
We
and
rational being.
CONTENTS
Lecture IV
xix
...
human being
Pages 279
to
312.
The
individuality of a
is
incapable of resolu-
any single aspect. The nature of Consciousness. The attempted regress in analysis to the self as mere subject.
tion into
The
Life.
of Consciousness to those of
from the case of the frog whose cerebral hemispheres have been removed. There appears to be between Consciousness and Life a borderland where action is quasipurposive. The higher the stage of an animal in evolution, the more does its power of adapting itself to its environment,
and of displaying intelligent action, accord with the development of its cerebral hemispheres, and appear to be distinct from the functions of the lower centres and the spinal cord.
soul are in
not
It
It is
Definition of psychology.
its
to suit its
own
standpoint.
The nature
of this transformation.
The
separation
in psychology
of thought
and
volition
is
artificial.
The examination
those
of
psychology.
last
What
has
been
attempted in the
ground, for
it is
sought to construct, that the full truth can be exhibited. Whether the truth can be so exhibited it is not necessary, for the purpose of these Lectures, to determine.
BOOK
LECTURE
The purpose
Lectureships
of
I
in founding these
Lord Gifford
may be
promote
God and
appears
He
Newman
just as
called
we have a
and
call it
arrive at
this
as to
fulfilment,
purpose of
For everyLord Gifford was where we see the unhappy consequences which
highly laudable.
have followed the neglect of Faith to seek support from Reason. The Churches are to-day, in the
commencement of the twentieth century, still very The laity recognise them as the guardians strong. of certain phases of human nature, which they hold But to be real, and esteem as highly as ever.
although the organisation
of
the
Churches,
as
7.
4
level
MEANING OF REALITY
of
[i^^ct.
i.
conduct,
is
held
in
somewhat low. The majority of educated men and women, and, for that matter, the bulk of the people generally, pay to the creeds much less attention than was once the case. The creeds and confessions of faith have come to be looked on as containing a number of metaphors,
of truth has sunk
The
Nothing
They
seem
towards which they turn their eyes, as though they felt themselves separated from it by a gap
The words book of the JEneid, described the figures standing on the banks of the Styx might have been spoken of them also
fail
to span.
which
" Stabant orantes primi transmittere cilrsum, Tendebantque manus ripse ulterioris amore."
seems as though nothing but Reason herself could span the gulf which Reason has made between the Church and the ground on which she longs to plant her feet with firmness and the assurance of having reached final forms of
It
in the last
which
is
women. Of the genuineness of their conviction, and of the depth of their feeling, there can be no doubt. Of the value and validity of this conviction and feeling as a foundation on which to build
a theory, there
doubt.
is
unfortunately
room
for
much
My
The Varieties of Religious Experience, and in which he has brought the results of the most recent
Psychology to bear upon the
nature
question
faith.
of the
and
origin
of
religious
He
has
he
calls the
taken in
an origin, the comprehension of which most important step forward recently Psychology the hidden background of
self
which does not cross the threshold of ordinary consciousness. For its existence he has accumu-
body of evidence. To it, to this subliminal self, he traces alike the phenomena of
lated a great
form.
and of religious emotion even in its highest He shows that the development of all
6/
MEANING OF EEALITY
is
[^-ect.
i.
these
governed by the same psychological laws. The fiinction, he says, of these invasions from a Their sub-conscious region must be permanent.
that they suggest to
peculiarity is
the
get
subject
further
external control.
When we
try
to
result,
he declares that
the inferences
what he
facts
go,
calls
the
"overbeliefs,"
facts, begin.
So
far as the
God, but they are just as consistent with " Thus," recognition of a plurality of finite gods. he
says,
"would a
this point
us."
At
he
stops.
danger of being put on the "Index" of any Church which bases itself on the appeal to right
In these Lectures I shall place no reliance
upon feeling as such. Feeling would appear to become valuable only after it has been justified by thought, and not before and I think the facts which Professor James has collected put that question very nearly beyond doubt. In the twentieth centxiry in which we are living, it must be recognised that apart from the sanction of
;
is
impossible.
We
of
God
to
in the spirit
find
Lord
Gifibrd.
If
we
are
foundation,
truth,
a we must
such
may
lead us.
We
THE ORIGIN OF PHILOSOPHY
must tread it worth anything,
well as to
live,
if
we
can.
All men,
feel that
they
eat,
that to
merry
Most of them had the faith that somewhere there are bridges which span the gulf that separates and isolates the various phases of the world as it seems that separates the conviction produced by the exact sciences from the
is
lives
from those
:
" Thoughts hardly to be packed Into a narrow act, Fancies that broke through language and escaped. All I could never be, All men ignored in me. This was I worth to God, whose wheel the pitcher shaped."
which is the motive of such an undertaking as Lord This is the source of what ArisGiffbrd desired.
It
is
this
sense
of things unseen
totle
called
to
be the
beginning of
Philosophy.
Yet
unseen
is
of value, as
modem
effort
cally.
only
if
the
scientifi:
And
Is there any
of
hope since we must turn to Reason finding in Reason the firm ground for which
MEANING OF REALITY
seek
?
[''^ct.
i.
we
efforts
sophy, afford us the spectacle of system succeeding system, of hypothesis coming after hypothesis,
only to be rejected and laid aside in favour of some new fancy ? The affirmative answer to this
question appears to
me
to turn on a very
narrow
rest
which we can attain a conception which we have formed agrees with some external object or standard. For example,
when we wish
is
necessary for us
to resort to the balance, the measuring rod, or the chronometer. The standard in such a case is
external, but
test of truth.
is
deserves
the
name
just
much
us,
as
the truth
is
and that
the
say,
in the perfection,
great poem, of Shakespeare's Hamlet, of Milton's Lycidas, of Wordsworth's " Lines written
near Tintern
recognise
it
is
inevitably painted as
wise
at
in
the
of
truth which
we
the
find
when we look
of
the
expression
on
face
the
Virgin
one of Raphael's
her
great
ness
calling
mind.
Or take a
There, again,
we
feel
him Nature looked at that very instant as he has shewn her, and not otherwise, and that
before us
we
word. Truth.
of action,
Or
again, if
we
the
Balaclava,
and who
of Arisor in the
life
preferred
the justice
surrender of self to
of Jesus
live
;
God
as manifested in the
as
all
In
as
we
arrived at
when we
test
seems to
what
is
expressed
its
light
of which it can be judged. The no measm-ement by a rigid external standard, and the critics of art and conduct fail if they do
certainly
not recognise
this.
Even
in
some departments
of Science
we
find
is
Take,
for instance,
what we have
10
in
MEANING OF REALITY
Biology,
[i^^ct.
i.
the
development of a
life.
What
is
does
true
development
mean?
the
It
the
development
purpose
of
which
the
fulfils
end
or
quasi-
organism.
According
as
the
Adequacy
true
to
an end
so
far
is
is
adequate
to
its
subject-matter.
like
hypothesis.
When Newton
except
for
what
them by must be with method in every department of knowledge. We first frame an hypothetical conception, and then, in the fashion which is appropriate, test it by applying it to the subject-matter. But the criterion of adequacy is
the
purpose
of
verifying
experiment.
So
it
In Philosophy
comparison by measurement
than
it
is
no more possible
is
is
in Biology,
or in Art, or in Conduct.
The adequacy
wise.
of the conception
judged other-
a conception taken
and enriched and advanced at some great man, who tests in the light of facts the adequacy of what he has thought out. In the history of Philosophy you find true evolution, a
up each stage by
THE HISTOEY OF PHILOSOPHY
tion,
11
to criticism.
There have been different rates of progress at different periods, and the form of the movement has not been always the same. Hume and the
sceptics illustrate
of
it.
turn to
men
like
Plato,
you get the constructive phase. These are men who have worked out the great conHegel,
the sceptics if
testing
and examination
The process by which Philosophy progresses has been described by Hegel in the introduction
to his History of Philosophy * in
will
words which I
sink into the
its
quote to you
"The World
rest
Spirit
does
not
of indifference;
its
this
follows from
life.
very
nature, for
activity is its
This activity
acts,
and which
it
by the addition of new matter, but completely Thus that which each fashions and transforms.
generation has produced in science and in intellectual activity is
* Hegel,
an heirloom to which
all
the
Intro-
Lectures on
12
past
MEANING OF REALITY
generations
["-^ct.
i.
have
all
added
their
savings,
temple in which
races of
men
thankfully and
which rendered aid to them through life, and which they had won from the depths of nature and of mind. To receive this It coninheritance is also to enter upon its use.
cheerfully deposit that
stitutes
generation,
;
its
prin-
and possessions
and
this legacy
morphosed by mind. ... In this manner that which is received is changed, and the material worked upon is enriched and preserved, both at the same time. This is the function of our own and of every age to grasp the knowledge which
:
is
already existing, to
it
make
still
it
so doing to develop
to a higher level."
further,
and
raise
it
me
to be
an accurate
and to give a view of truth which, if we are in earnest about it, will deliver us from the fear of not being able to advance towards the truth about the things with which we have to deal. For Hegel shows that the great problem of
a conception which has developed as generation has succeeded generation, until we have got it, in our time, in a form
rise to
adequate to the
new
Time
What we
have to do
is
to try in our
humble
DOGMATISM
is
13
century.
Many minds
are at
work upon
this pro-
blem
men
one
if
who have
worth
And
is
the problem
is
solving,
for through
we
live,
Whatever may be
able
certainly valu-
when we come
dogmatism
fall
into which men of science are apt to mean dogmatism in the sense in which
Kant used
as in
the term.
The
truth
is
that in Science,
some other
things,
we have
every
now and
lay aside our uncritical assumptions, to " clean our slates," and the cleanis
agreeable process.
But
this at least is
certain,
from particularism and narrowness, that from it, with a clear light, we can detect and put aside
the analogies and metaphors that are inadequate
So only can we rid ourselves of the dogmatic assumptions, most of them unconsciously made, which obscure the view into the ultimate and inmost nature of Eeality. Our
and therefore
false.
14
MEANING OF EEALITY
life,
[i^^ct.
i.
are neces-
and properly assumed to be adequate repreBut for Science and for sentations of the truth. the Philosophy, both of which go beyond phenomena of immediacy, and resolve their
apparent
of
finality,
the
individual
resting-places
as,
that
experience
disclose
themselves
in
fact,
self-contradictory
transient,
It
is
the
task of Philosophy to
this,
and unless
as
I
can do
language,
and I
will
begin by saying at
once
you what I may call the single thought which I shall have to lay before you is no new
tiiought.
It
is
and what we have to do is to try to express it in the form which is most adequate to our
age.
Such will be the aim and spirit of my endeavour. I must begin at the beginning, for I can only hope to have even a chance of carrying out Lord GiflFord's purpose, by trying to work out the truth Only at the end will the in a systematic form. meaning fully emerge. At present the important thing is the foundation. The relationship of man
15
It
God cannot be
expressed in a sentence.
itself in
its
proper place in a
difficulties
It is
epigrammatically or succinctly
w^ith
him a
syste-
matic form
is
essential.
who
which
it
first is
?
What do we mean by
is
:
The second
How,
in the
that
in
the
we
Him ?
Now,
as regards both of these questions
it
seems to
selves
me
with an assumption which has pervaded much of the speculation. In Goethe's story of Wilhelm Meister he tells us how Wilhelm, the
hero,
listened to
conversation
between
two
characters
who
figure
much
in the book,
Lothario
the
hero deeply and influenced the whole course of his Wilhelm had been longing for some remote life.
sphere in which he might give free rein to his
abilities
and
aspirations.
He had
thought
of
a sphere of untrammelled action, but he learns from this conversation a principle which enters
16
into
his
MEANING OF REALITY
very soul
is
[i-^ct.
i.
that
in
the
duties that Ke
him or nowhere is
nearest to
of the kind,
those,
it
his
"America."
Now, something
set
if its
must lie in some sphere remote from the Here and the Now. People are always looking for some other and different world in which the balance of this
search after the nature of
as
God
one
may be
redressed.
And
may
turn out to be a
this
life
It
assumes that
our everyday
known by
by us to
phase of
us, as in
world as it is taken
be,
its reality,
it
comprehended
notion of
this notion
it
God
that
within
we may assume
that
yet
is
And
may be
is
here
comprehended
find
thought
finding
that
shall
we
^hall
God,
find
the
Eeality
world in Him.
The same
dogmatic
sort
of fallacy,
assumption,
manifests
life
in
such
two
possible point of
17
mechanism and
standpoints,
Reality.
disclose
themselves,
different
aspects
of
single
That
a view which
we
shall
have to
lectures.
For the present the only observation that can be made is that what separates mechanism from life, and makes the broad and vast gulf that seems to lie between them, miay quite as well be the ends or purposes of the mind in organising its system of knowledge, as some absolute separation between
the two.
Just so
it is
it
may
which God cannot be looked for, may have to give place to a view in which it becomes apparent that, seen at its highest, viewed from a different standpoint, and with fuller insight, this world may turn
out to be but appearance and
God
the Ultimate
Now the
the
want
which underlies its exclusion, has prevented people from understanding a great deal of what has been most notable in
dogmatic
assumption
the history of speculative thought.
If they
had
of Pure Reason so much as of his Critique of Judgment, they would have learned
Critique
made
it
im-
18
MEANING OF EEALITY
them
['-^t.
i.
possible for
sympathy the bulk of Greek Philosophy. They would have learned that the way in which the world seems to us depends on the standpoint from which we approach it that our ends and purposes,
;
conceptions under which the organisation in knowledge of what we call experience takes place that
;
this experience is
its
signification.
to teach this
truth,
and Kant
it.
To
those
if it
who
was
it
has seemed as
we human
minds
at the highest,
There
who have
;
Moses
Him
yet at
least -have
found
Him
near.
We
beings,
human
beyond the conditions under which alone knowledge is possible for us. If we would rise above the plane at which the world of experience discloses to us the meaning that contents
us in everyday
life,
it
is
main we must
hardly hope.
look.
For
direct
vision
we can
possible
Yet
it
is
men, to great
great poets.
One
finds
DEFINITION OF GOD
it
19
in
he speaks of the
"Sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused. Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns, And the round ocean and the living air. And the blue sky and in the mind of man
;
motion and a spirit that impels All thinking things, all objects of And rolls through all things."
all
thought.
Ah
best,
we have
last,
and
perhaps the highest, result of the greatest speculative thinking in the history of Philosophy.
this
dogmatic
Let us
on the search after the nature of God with our minds free. Let us begin by trying to get some clear notion of that of which we are in quest. To me it seems that by God we mean, and can only mean, that which is most real, the Ultimate Eeality into which all else can be resolved, and which cannot itself be resolved into anything beyond; that in terms of which be expressed, and which cannot all else can
be
itself
itself.
But
is
this definition,
com-
a number of conceptions which have often passed current, but which have never been used without getting the people who
mencement to
20
MEANING OF EEALITY
difficulties.
[l^ct.
i.
cannot talk of God, regarded as the Ultimate That proves to be a Keality, as a First Cause.
totally inadequate
effect is
a relationship that obtains and can obtain and have meaning only within the object world of experience,, in the forms of Time and Space.
Your problem
existence
is
and
It
significance
is,
of that
very
object
Kantian language,, a transcendental problem. For it cannot be assumed that the explanation of Ultimate Reality can be found within the field of the object world, the nature and foundation of that field being one of the very aspects of things which falls within
world
itself.
in
Reality.
You
cannot,
therefore,
speak of
stand
to
God
the
as
Lrifj.iovpy6s,
as a
from
the
outside.
He
cannot
of
world in the
relation
Cause,
For
He
must be independent of Space and Time, and we can attach no meaning to a Cause excepting as operative within Space and Time. We must reject that conception as wholly inadeNor do we fare any better if we define quate.
God as a we know
or
is
it
Substance.
substance
is
that which
attributes
its
its properties. The substance of that table what I mean when I have abstracted from in my mind all the properties by which I
it.
recognise
at
Substance
is
a conception arrived
in relation only
21
or properties.
To
define
God
as as
Him
something
of the
relative,
real.
and not
word
We
Now
one concep-
tion
which,
it
provisionally at
is
least,
we may
use,
because
the
conception
of
God
not
as
me
try to
make
clear
to
you what
is
Subject.
Supposing the
at
heavens which
we know,
which our globe belongs, and the world on which we live as an appendage or part of that solar system. Supposing that we could trace our globe back to a condition in which there was no life in it, at which it had only begun to assume shape as the gaseous matter had begun
starry heavens to
to solidify.
What
then
We
ated
life
but
still
that
mass
and incandescent matter, would be there only as object for the subject. It could have no meaning on any other footing. Its colour, for colom* of some kind it would have, would import the impressions called up in the brain of a
of gaseous
22
MEANING OF EEALITY
it
[^^^'-
'
caused travers-
ing space and striking the retina of the spectator. Its time-duration would only have meaning to
somebody who could conceive and measure it ay, and remember it, so that past and present might be brought together and contrasted with Its relations of space would the possible futtu-e.
not have meaning for a lizard, nor even for a more highly organised intelligence, but would be
mind possessing the categories and conceptions of quantity, and able to take them in. The appearance of that Universe to a being endowed with totally different senses would be wholly different from the appearance of that Universe to a being endowed with the senses
intelligible
only to a
that
saying
to be
human
being, a
man,
is
not
assumed to be
there, because
we have not
what is the meaning of the object world in which such a Universe would appear, excepting for a mind or subject to which it was object ? And the answer must be that it would have no meaning at all, and,
The question
is,
therefore,
assign,
/
we can
ijiind.
And
comes about that even from the very beginning of things you have to presuppose mind, if you would speak in any language which is intelligible or communicable, and the deepest relation of all is that which you find when you
thus
BERKELEY'S QUESTION
23
go even to the very commencement of the Universe, the relation of being object for the subject.
If experience
mind
ing
the
ceptions, past
and
present,
still it
up at every turn. Professor Eraser has shown what was the meaning of the new
question
which
Bishop
Berkeley
put
to
the
materialists.
He
by
of the
was that
of,
And
the conclusion
as
of
Berkeley
may be summarised,
Professor
"To be
is
be perceived."
Do
am
would be nonsense.
I did not
make
the Universe,
made me.
But, on the
we work
that
dilemma which you can put you have asked a question which does not arise when its origin, which rests on a misapprehension, is properly grasped, and you will see that the theory of Bishop Berkeley, worked out in its fuller and
in
the
24
MEANING OF EEALITY
[i-^ct.
i.
deeper meaning, does not in the least imply the notion that the Universe is just a series of states
of as
my
individual
known
"Solipsism," the doctrine that the individual mind which perceives is the only existence in the
Universe.
But
is
I do not
want
to dwell
upon Berkeley,
my
mind,
more remarkable utterance of John Stuart Mill upon this very subject, in what I think was the greatest of Mill's philosophical writings. Mill goes very far down and gets very near to
the conclusions of the great thinkers
in Germany many writers and
who
arose
now
tending.
There
is
no direct
feeling
or perception
says,
of such a world.
*"When," he
"we
stance or body,
that on
we
either
some given supposition we should have, not some one sensation, but a great and even indefinite number and variety of sensations, generally belonging to
different
senses,
but so linked
instant
the
very same
of
any or all of the rest." Thus we get the belief in permanent possibilities of sensation, and also
p. 223.
Hamilton's
Philosophy,
25
the groups.
among
Thus he
of association of ideas,
come
real
to
be
and the
possibilities as
much more
than
which these are only the representations, appearances or effects." "The whole set of sensations, as possible, form a permanent background to any one or more of them that are, at a given moment,
actual,
and the
cause to
its effects,
it,
painted on
and
flowers, or of
it,
is
spread over
or,
in transcendental language, of
Matter to Form."
Aristotle might have written that sentence, or
Kant, or Hegel, just as well as Mill. He goes on to speak of the permanent possibilities
:
would
be contrary to
we know
of the constitution of
human
tions
and believed to
from sensaTheir
groundwork
* Idem,
P. 225,
26
MEANING OF REALITY
something
intrinsically
it.
[^-ect.
i.
supposed to be
distinct
from
can withdraw ourselves from any of our (external) sensations, or we can be with-
We
But
of
sensations
existence
;
cease,
the
possibilities
they
are
independent
will,
our
presence,
and
too,
everything
which
belongs to us.
as
to
We
find,
much
to
other
human
find
or sentient beings as
ourselves.
We
other
people grounding
permanent
which we ground ours. But we do not find them experiencing Other people do the same actual sensations. not have our sensations exactly when and as
possibilities
on
we have them
ties
but
;
they
have
our
possibili-
of
sensation
except so far as their organs of sensation vary from the type of ours.
seal
may
final
to
bilities
fundamental reality
in
Nature.
The permanent possibilities are common to us and to our fellow-creatures the actual sensations That which other people become aware are not. of, when and on the same grounds as I do, seems more real to me than that which they do not know of, unless I tell them. The world of possible
;
sensations
to
laws
is
as
much
in other beings as
it
is
in
me;
HERACLITUS ON SENSATION
it
27
;
me
it
is
an external world."
In other words,
reflection,
not impression
made
they
from without,
the
reflect in the
is
object world,
and only
in
so
far
as
we
have, does
exist
for
common. Our sensations they cannot experience nobody can penetrate into the feeling of
;
it
except
in
other words, in
only to
thought.
as
very
real
and exclusive property of him who has it. The world lies in the common system of what
'
we
my
finger,
feeling,
what I
feel.
But
words of description they all convey not sensations to your mind but reflection, judgments about sensations, general conceptions, what are called,
in the language of Philosophy, universals.
I say
"hot" of the
I
fire;
hot
is
a general conception.
is
a general
of
conception.
By enough
of words, each
them
28
MEANING OF REALITY
thoughts
to
[lect.
i.
enable
you
to
frame
general conception, and in this sense I can communicate the actual feeling which I have. It is
something perishing
which
can
only
be
fixed
That is what and described by universals. Heraclitus meant to convey, and that is what Mill meant when he said that the realities of the world consist in the Permanent Possibilities
of sensations.
here.
He
applies his
analyses
to
the
Mind, which he
manner
to be
a series of present
feelings
and
Yet
he comes on a
which he
of,
tells
us his
own words
possibilities
quote his
" Besides
present
feelings
is
and
another
class of
phenomena
an enumera-
tion
making up our conception The thread of consciousness which composes the mind's phenomenal life consists
of the elements
of
Mind.
but likewise, in
are
these?
feelings,
from
sensations.
They
tions
all,
or feelings,
we have
previously
MILL'S
had experience.
this
peculiarity,
VIEW OF MIND
29
belief in
more than
own
if
present
existence.-
sensation
involves
only
this,
but a remem-
and
belief
a copy, or represen;
more or
feeling
that
a sensation or other
to
which
it
directly refers,
Nor can
the
phenomena involved
in these
two
states of con-
is,
that
myself
formerly had, or that I myself and no other shall hereafter have, the sensations remembered or expected.
The
sensations
did actually form, or will hereafter form, part of the self-same series of states, or thread of consciousness, of
the part
now
present.
therefore,
of feelings,
ment by
aware of
calling it
itself
we
are
reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind or Ego is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of
accepting the paradox that something which, ex
hypothesi, is but
a series of
feelings,
can be aware
incompre-
of itself as a
series."
..." The
true
30
hensibility
MEANING OF EEALITY
perhaps
is
is,
[i-ect.
i.
that
has ceased, or
be, in
not yet in
;
a manner, present
past
or
it
were, into a
accompanied by a belief
of reality."
Now
on which he
to
laid
much
the
examine
before
that
you
growing
up
in
the
mind,
you must
already,
sensations
in
to be
The word
cannot,
therefore,
be
explained
I shall have
and I
is
will
now,
is
But,
meanwhile, what
remarkable
do,
its
that
as completely
any Hegelian
idealist
could
that
the
reality
externality,
31
it
independence,
lies
in
this,
that
is
an
objective
of the
moment
have no abiding
fact that the
mind
in
all
men
fixes
and thinks
Therefore, in
of
sense,
are
to
be
So
to?
far
it
is
What
is
in
the
of a
make
experienced,
ternal
that the
reality
of the world,
ex-
and
internal, lies.
How is
this possible
Well,
is
we have
down
into
what
meant by the world being independent of our in other words, what is meant individual wills, of the system of universals objectivity the by which form the setting in which our impresIf it be true as they sions and feelings arise. nearly all competent think, and as, indeed,
thinkers agree,
around
us,
the
reason
why
it
is
so
and
not
and why I cannot alter it by my will, " thirig-in-itself, " the notion lies not in some of which I cannot express in words, and which vanishes under Berkeley's question, but in the
otherwise,
32
fact that
MEANING OF EEALITY
my mind
like the
^^ct.
i.
minds of other people is compelled to think the world according to a system of conceptions, to think it in what may
be called an objective system, then I
ling
am
travel-
on a new road.
for
It
is
in
this
conception,
we have
got a direction in
which to seek
the
Ultimate Reality.
The
becomes
in this sense
the deepest relation of existence, because existence has now resolved itself into the fact that the
subject
thinks
the
is
object,
presents
it
in
fashion
which
determined
by laws of thought.
verge
of a problem which
more
difficult,
far. more remote, than any we What must be the nature of the mind which thinks thus objectively, and which, even as mani-
have got to so
We
journey.
little
way on our
is
To
of existence
the
beginning of wisdom,
but
the
beginning
only.
We
may
whom
feelings
wonder and even alarm have been him the City of Destruction. He has begun to
of
for
look
way
of
escape.
He
sees
in
the
We
find
some
firm
ground
what,
footsteps,
from
many
of
of
you,
has
seemed a
change
the
veritable
Slough
Despond.
still
To
swim
metaphor,
we
are
in
shallow
water
water
in
properly
and
we must
trust
ourselves
learn to
we can
swim
to
properly.
put
before
you
may
is
swim
in.
LECTUEE
II
We
have to try this afternoon to get a stage further on our journey and to make some definite
progress along the pathway to Reality.
For
this
purpose
it is
essential that
we
method of thinking consideration to bear upon the problem of the nature of mind, and of its
relation to
its
experience.
And
before I enter
upon that
task, I think I
had
Lord
trust,
in
founding his
and I
so far as I
was concerned,
common but
no more than a story of hypothesis after hypothesis being thrown overboard in favour of new and inconsistent conI reminded you that, while such a projectures. cedure was inevitable when, with the aid of the
to be
chronometer or the measuring-rod or the balance, we were verifying conjectures about physical
84
SUMMARY OF LECTURE
binations
possible
to
in space,
it
35
was
the relations
or morals
each other
or
phases
of
art
or
history,
even
the
life.
simplest
course
development
in
animal
There, development
was
purpose of the
type which
of the
organism.
we
In
like
manner, in
of
Philosophy
measurement was not a possible test. In this case the truth was rather to be looked for in the adequacy of a conception to the explanation of the matter with which it had to deal. I pointed out that you had only to read the best histories of Philosophy to see that, from this standpoint, we had been the witnesses of the growth of a conception ever increasing in depth and breadth, deepening and broadening as criticism succeeded to construction, and again construction to criticism
;
developing
itself,
as experience discloses, at
different rates
in different periods,
with times of
vitality,
scope to the
new
Time
called
into
back on
its traces.
Vestigia
nulla retrorsum
is
Our
first
36
MEANING OF EEALITY
[i-ect. h.
The contion in a form appropriate to our age. tributions to it. in the past of some great minds,
such as
Hume
less
sceptics,
had not
line
been the
the
common
because they had been in the main negative, and directed primarily to disclosing inadequacies and
abstractness in
what had gone before. But it was in the constructive work of the outstanding men of metaphysical genius, men such as Plato and
Aristotle,
that,
making allow-
we
should
Having so defined the spirit of the endeavour, I insisted that no effort to get a view of the nature of things could be adequate, which failed to take
account of
These,
the
all
it
seems.
common
of plain men,
we
We
had to
to pull
To
this end, if
we had
when we
had ascertained
other.
their
Our
first
we
could what
we meant by
the
word "Eeality." For God, the investigation whose nature was our purpose, could not be less of than the supreme reality that in terms of which all else could be expressed, and to which all else could be reduced, and which could not itself be
;
SUMMARY OF LECTUEE
to
37
any other
level.
God
as a Cause,
is,
first in
time,
and acting ab
extra, that
in space.
The think-
looked on as metaphorical merely. Nor could He be defined as Substance. For that again imported a relation to properties distinguished from it. What then could His real nature consist in if
the
conceptions
it ?
of Cause
and
try
Substance were
inadequate to
better fortune
Subject,
We had to
we spoke
whether we had
as Spirit, as
if
of
Him
we were
to retrace
our steps, and get back to a Universe of atoms and energy in the form of gas at a high temperature,
its
con-
mind as an
object
within
it,
could
still
To be
most
and supreme of the relationships of experiAll others presuppose and are based on it. If we take an experience even in the most limited sense of the word, as meaning only what we have personally perceived and arranged in our minds
real
ence.
emerges
is
that
it
Apart from Mind and except as for it, Matter is an absurdity. The doctrine of Berkeley that esse is percipi, and Mill's
as object for the subject.
38
MEANING OF REALITY
[^-^ct. h.
and Mind
In getting so far as
the pons asinorwni.
we have not
is
crossed
For
its
this
result is_almost a
common-place.
culty
The question
clusion implies as
is
premises.
tion of subject
and
object.
Short of
there
The world as it seems is a hard-and-fast reality. It was not created or even constructed by you or me as we perceived it. It was there before we existed, and will be
searcher after truth.
there after
we
are
cease to
it,
exist.
Nay, we form
we
its creatures,
at least as
much
as
its creators.
These results are, after all, mainly negative. They have taken us away from an old crude conception of the relation of
Mind
to Matter, the
however, one
to
and that
that
we
make an
its
abstract separation
mind from
and to represent the two as if they could be regarded as things different from one another in space and time. People forget, when they speak of object and subject, that they cannot be talking of two separate things, because what they are trying to do is to define the relation of
object,
39
object world,
an object world
have shown, has
as Berkeley and
Mill
meaning only as for it. Therefore, relationship of the mind imaged as a thing existing independently of another thing,
its object,
would be just
fall
within the
and
cannot
be
used
to
account
for
it.
If
we
the
upon the
relation of
mind
to that
and
origin of
which
is
we have
it is clear that we must be in must divest our minds altogether of the idea of mind as a thing, as properly described
got to explain,
earnest.
We
Substance, the
something to
properties, a distinction
and the self-identical inhere, and which can never be the direct object But the notion of this "somewhat" of perception. is a product of a process of abstract reflection which
we
enter
to contemplate
and
which has no bearing when we terms apt to describe the mind, the subject, for which that object world is there, and apart from
are trying to find
which
from
it
has no meaning.
It is only in reflection
from the
emerges.
It is the result of
40
MEANING OF EEALITY
[j-e^t. u.
system of thought analogous to that which Mill described in tracing the origin of the notion of
permanent
feeling.
and
Now
thought
I
is
am
who have
very
difficult for
who come
is
life,
time.
The truth
that
in
the
everyday
we
when they
day operation.
On
the
other
hand,
when we
come
we
And when
to be
is
we come
most of
describe
to Philosophy
all,
we
find
this
so
because language
life,
which
quite
adequate in everyday
ourselves
as
language in which
we
a
if
we were
things,
living
and
in
to
place
in
space,
and regarded,
are borne
this
moment when we
for
away
is
in
our coffins
that kind
misleading
is
of language which
useful
and legitimate
altogether
everyday purposes,
becomes
to
when
we
get
the
problem of what
And
41
the
true
nature
of reality has to
of the
face
is
everyday
get into
we
for
rise
everyday
to
purposes
what we may
properly
call
superstitions
common
may be
spoken of as a
thing.
I need hardly remind you that the standard of knowledge which we call common sense is some-
thing
which
is
gets deeper.
To the
an
as
eclipse is a source
of terror.
He
regards
it
nothing,
but regards
it
as an ordinary occurrence.
In
life
And
find
so
it
when we
common
sense to Science,
to Philosophy.
We
oui"
we
to
find
we
the use
new
tools
in
digging
down
in
the
we have
to build.
knowits
may be
best understood in
it
true
nature
if
we
begin by taking
negatively.
First
42
of
all,
MEANING OF EEALITY
let
is
["-ect. n.
us contrast
it
with
a machine.
machine
that,
the parts
But the parts are external But now, to one another; they are separable. even in nature, we get away beyond the externality of the
arrangement of mechanism.
of the whole
In
life
we have
that the
parts.
in the
life
The body,
in
its
as
biologists
us,
is
made up even
But these
of
what are
called cells.
cells act
common
life
of the
organism.
selves.
We
ated by the
this
life life
of the
body as a whole.
its
But
whole of
does not in
work resemble
more like, more really analogous to, the purpose which the soldiers in an army or the citizens in a State are moved by when they act together. The cells of the body, the cells which make up the totality of the organism, act
is
a better expression
and
of
I refer to
them
in
how
purpose
living
beings,
is
acting
a better
;;
43
the
of the
organism than
the
is
analogy of a machine.
quasi-pm"pose
whole
you have the organism purits embryo state to and from birth to death, and so fulfilling
again,
an end.
Then
itself for
the
life
able feature
which
the
is
called
Metabolism.
is
All
made up
time.
change
There
there
is
in
course
of
very
short
when
the
was
End through
whole
is
life
Meta-
of the
is
preserved, and
maintained.
Now,
In
discloses itself as
externality
and
In
of the
parts
is
that externality
is
superseded,
overcome
the whole
this
and
in
notwithstanding
external
to
the
parts
are
a
is
sense
one
another.
The hand
it
By
abstraction
may even
it
off'
be regarded as
separate thing.
Certainly
may
dead.
be called a thing
when
it
is
cut
and
44
MEANING OF EEALITY
common
[^-ect. n.
quasi-piu-pose,
in
that other
But now, when you come to the mind, you will find that the mind is just as different from life, The mind as life is different from mechanism.
manifests itself in
its
thoughts,
in
its
activity,
and yet
its
its
thoughts,
impressions,
only existence
in
the mind.
They have their existence in the activity of the mind as a whole. The activity of the mind manifests itself in its particulars and differences, and its particulars and differences exist only for and in the conscious mind in which they occur. In other words, the whole, the mind as a whole, exists only in its manifestaone another.
tions
;
My
consciousness
am
conscious
as a separate thing.
My
mind
is
a unity which
difference
cannot be broken up
maintains
itself
amid boundless
and
ceaseless activity.
When you
45
con-
to
a certain
of the
extent,
in
organism.
Take,
by
the
way
of an
organism
and
mental
operation,
example of a melody. What is a melody? A melody is an arrangement of sounds which, comprehended in the light of a relationship that pervades and unites them, form for the mind a musical
whole.
It is only, for instance,
when
the sounds
signifiits
The sonata
and yet
it
is
nothing
apart from
its
its
meaning
and gives
is
it
its
utterance.
Now
that utter-
ance
For a sheep
or a pig
not there.
in
It is the
work
of the
mind, present
every sound as
in reflection.
this
apprehended,
of a
work an
illustration
is
nothing apart
is
nothing
we
own minds we
shall
see just
the
same thing
quite right
Hume was
in his
"Treatise" that he
could not find what Bishop Berkeley seemed to think he could find, some idea of the mind as
apart from
its
He
could
No, because
no perception of the
self to catch.
The
46
self
is
MEANING OF REALITY
nothing apart fi'om
life,
[^-ect. h.
the
life
activity
of
its
mental
has no existence
gives it
except as in a
its
as in a
mind which
meaning
unity and
its
musical
conception
to
the
sonata of Beethoven.
If
you look
you
is
will find
one
quite different
and that is the power of free withdrawal. You can withdraw your mind from its own experiences. You can withdraw it to almost any extent, as the martyrs at the stake, when under the influence of a powerful enough faith, have been able to withdraw it from their own pain and even from their own death. If you try to analyse the notion of self which you have there into mere feeling, you will fail to grasp any feelobjects,
You
will
that
what you
at first take to
be such a
feeling,
And
then
has them.
Experience
is
mind
disclosing itself in
object world
the
the organisation of
is
its
for
it
just the
other pole
we
We
are outside
47 even
we
are
outside
is
in
one
whole of
activity.
Well now,
the world
is
this
brings people to
what looks
say they,
it
Despond,
for,
was
our
made by us. It is all foreign, and knowledge we have but a fragment of it. we do not question this, those of us who
not along these
lines.
in
Now
reflect
It
is
no business of Divine
Philosophy to disfigure her countenance by running her head against brick walls. It is ridiculous to
suppose that
then,
my mind makes
the Universe.
But
I
as
which
quoted to you yesterday, existence has no meaning except for thought and through thought, and,
therefore,
it
is
is
simply the
work
mind.
it
We
are
reduced,
is
Then what
world
?
make
the
Well,
plain that
of
it,
it
is
perfectly
or N. as the case
may
be, living
ticular place,
particular
past and
a possible
future
cannot
itself
which we get by
come
of a particular
standpoint.
But now we
48
MEANING OF EEALITY
be
careful
[i-^ct. h.
must
about
our
metaphors,
for
uncritically.
common
make things. A distinguished writer, Mr Bradley, has summed up the case against that doctrine in the declaration that the Universe is "no unearthly
and he, and that Prime Minister, have directed heavy artillery against those who seemed to suggest the contrary. Not least, at any rate
ballet
of bloodless categories,"
acute
critic,
the
present
in the
case of
Mr
been
deal,
common
Thomas
sense
directed
against
the
late
Hill Grreen, a
owes a great
notion of a
mind as constructing
object world,
as though ah extra.
Mr
Green, of course,
knew a
He
has suffered
in his writing,
is
no doubt who have proved too zealous interpreters of what they believed the
great
that,
But there
Germans to have laid down. I remember when I was at the University, a distinguished
greatly to the
guished Professor
who had
on the
49
It suggests
a saying of which the late Master of Balliol was fond "A false quantity in a man is like a faux
:
pas in a woman."
We
must
Thought does not make and construct, in the sense in which making and constructing take place in the object
world of experience.
We
diffi-
no apparent
on the other
answer to
hand,
Mill's
argument
and
that,
we cannot
and constructing
even express the
it
out of universals.
We
cannot
in
rich,
There-
we seem
With
minds we have to scrutinise the nature of experience. But we are forced to observe at the outset that the object world of experience is always presented in reflection more or less abstractly. We cannot even name the objects around us except by fixing on some aspect which forms but one The time, feature in their individual actuality. for instance, is no sooner pronounced to be one
o'clock than
it
is
past,
and discloses
"
its
nature
50
MEANING OF EEALITY
is
^^ct. n.
which
we
to-day are no
Now, the problems which I have been discussing new problems, nor are the solutions
which I am going to suggest new solutions. We are coming back, as others have come back, after two thousand years, to the light furnished by the Greeks, who thought about these things with a
singular freedom from the incrustations
of mis-
us.
than
we
as
of
the
individual
thing
another
was confronted.
Perhaps
it
was the
men's
is
much
that
the
fruitful
period
the
of
metaphysical
speculation
ceased
at
time
when Greek
The other
day,
in
looking
into
the
latest
Fragments of Heraclitus, I found a remarkable sentence, quoted, indeed, by the earlier collectors of these fragments (such as
collection of the
had less importance. In Hermann Diels' new book Herakleitos von Ephesos, there is a sentence which puts the teaching of Heraclitus, I think, in a different light from that in which it
it
51
generally put.
of Heraclitus
as having
summed up
famous
is
phrase
the Universe
made
up
of
flux,
and there
"
is
nothing
real.
But
in the edition
sentence,* stand-
ing by itself
what exists as one and the same in all men." If you take that, and I think you must, as meant seriously, it shows that Heraclitus had a distinct notion of what it is that imparts stability and objectivity to the flux of the impressions of sense, the fleeting nature of which he had clearly seen. It distinguishes Heraclitus
Thinking
is
from Sophists
deals,
like Protagoras,
with
whom
Plato
who
declared that
man was
the measure of
things,
tive truth.
of all disposes of
up,
doctrine of
exists as one
that
"thinking
what
in all
men."
Take, for
what by
analysis
"impressions" to be.
We
is
no
answer to Mill's reasoning as contained in the passages which I quoted to you from the Examination
of Hamilton, that
* p. 26
:
all
" ^vvov
i<TTi TToicri
52
MEANING OF REALITY
;
[^-ect.
i..
state of flux
that
it
is
by the aid of memory, by judgments of arrangement in space and time, they are set, that you get the kind of " orderliness " which Berkeley
far as
work
mind
that
a true one.
this
Now
system
is
accepting
conclusion,
said
into
an objective
But comes out in his doctrine, he separated these universals from the particulars of sense and set them apart as selfof thought.
in the
subsisting
realities,
with
follow
the
his
result
that
it
is
very
after
difficult
to
reasoning.
Then
not
great
Plato
great
came
Aristotle,
who
was
only a
speculative
thinker
but a
The actual was what most of all interested Aristotle. The great step he took was to show that the universal existed in and through the particular, and that the existence of the particular was in and /or the universal. He saw clearly that the particulars of Heraclitus were fleeting and perishing, and that they could
crbserver of the actual.
something
is
here and
general name.
This paper
here, but, as I
move
but again
53
and whether you take the "here" or the "now," or the "this" or the "that," you will find all these names indicative merely of universals.
reflection,
Still,
its
"thisness"
is
universal,
what
is
out of universals.
You
more
its
Aristotle
in the
came
to
that
indissoluble
and the particular of sense, the Real was to be found, and to be found always as an individual. The individual, then, of experience, and all experience is in its nature individual, is in this light what is ultimate, that behind which we cannot go, what we can separate into universal and particular moments in abstract reflection only, and not in reality. It is the ultimate phase to which you come back. But for Aristotle the individual was what it was only in virtue of I do not the union like to use the word "coalescence," in the individual of what I have called two "moments," the universal and the particular, which you can only divorce by abstraction. I am paraof thought
my own
the
substance
of
his
teaching.
In reading
Aristotle
am
54
afraid,
MEANING OF EEALITY
also
[i-^ct. n.
by a certain confusion which one cannot explain away. In his Logic, he seems to
were the same thing as a whole of extension, as a class, and the result is that his Logic is mainly concerned with the
treat the universal as if
it
discovery of the
common
properties of individuals,
in the in
But though in the Logic the universal appears main as the class or whole of extension, his Metaphysics, and, most of all, in his
he
is
Psychology,
thoroughly
clear
about
his
the real.
much when
"hothing
in
be ascribed to him
the
that there
is
was not first in sense." Perception gives you the individual the universal you only get by abstraction. But
intellect
which
then,
he
also
says
there
in
is
nothing
in
sense
which
was
of
not
first
the
gets
intellect.
its
The
its
particular
distinction
sense
only
meaning,
existence,
from
nothingness,
its
in
by the universals of thought. Now, what makes Aristotle so great is his freedom from the narrowness which appears in
qualification
"make" and
relation
"construct"
when applied
its
to
the
of
thought and
the
object.
expression
"the
55
are apt to be
very misleading.
abused
when made
outside
of these
of reflection which
we occupy
reality,
and
aspects
it
presents to us.
Look
being
who
had no accumulated human experience a baby, for instance, and still more, one of the lower animals, such as a lizard would not know that it was a table. For such a mind, at such a plane of intelligence, it would not be a table. It is only because of conceptions with which the mind has become informed that I recognise this as a table, distinguish it from other things, and
arrange
my
conduct accordingly.
But, even
so,
If a
fresh,
while
it,
we
But
its
should
the
still
look upon
only as a table.
wood
It
reality.
would would
have
still
another
aspect
it
in
be living;
might
the
still,
like the
Rod
into
blossom.
until
its
Yet
by
abstraction
whole
to
fix
world,
attention
was
else.
directed
it,
the
it,
"form" as
dis-
tinguished from
"matter."
raw material
of sensation.
56
MEANING OF EEALITY
table
is
^^ct. n.
it
the
form,
the
the
universal,
the
of
thought,
it its
position
and
setting
shall see
which gives
presently,
meaning, and, as
we
its
reality.
The
is,
universal,
the
form,
what he
duces
matter,
as distinguished from
it
is
what
into
intro-
determination
and
character
the
which
is
an
indefinite
which
requires
and determination before it can be recognised as an individual. Well now, matter can only be regarded as coming before form in the course of the building up of the world of experience of an individual
specification
human
individual
must be regarded, as having a history in time and a knowledge which develops in time. You begin
in individual experience,
and make
it
definite
But then you can perceive that in making it definite you have been guided by these very conceptions and categories which afterwards
turn
out
to
be
it
the
form,
the
"Eidos,"
gives
as
its
Aristotle
called
the
form
which
sense,
and gives
its
and
may
ARISTOTLE'S
sities
DE ANIMA
process,
57
of thought in
the
the
matter
is
presented
as
coming
first,
and
the
form
as
coming second.
to
you
to be a very
modern
you just a few sentences of the De show in a very striking way how far Aristotle had got in this direction. In the fourth chapter of Book III., he " * says In the case of immaterial objects " (that
Animd
is
as
Permanent
Possibilities
of
Sensation)
"the subject thinking and the object thought are one and the same just as speculative science is
;
knowledge
question,
(a
fact,
it
is
true,
why we do
In the
is
investigated).
on the contrary, of
and
implicitly.
And
thus reason
is
not to be
regarded
thought must be regarded as belonging to and regulated by reason." t " The forms of reason," he
goes on to say in the eighth chapter of the same book, "are not something different from the
* Aristotle,
De
Animd,
Book
III.,
end
of
Chapter
iv.
III.,
Chapter
viii.
Wallace's
58
MEANING OF EEALITY
As
there
is,
[i-^ct. n.
forms of sense.
according to the
common
of sense,
opinion,
it
and the various qualities and attributes that determine sensible phenomena." Thus Aristotle refuses to listen to any attempt to show that the concrete riches of immediacy are put together out of universals which exist outside and apart from them. And yet he holds equally firmly that it is only in and through the intelligible notions which are imbedded in sensations and which give them their substance that these sensations have reality. We shall see that Hegel asserted the same position as against Kant. There has been a very great deal of discussion on these matters since Aristotle's day. _The imabstract conceptions
have indicated,
is
that
it
gives
you an explanation of what we mean by "objectivity" and the "reality of the world."
lie
only in a
But that
is
a hard thing to
grasp;
it
is
a hard saying.
show you, by way of conclusion to this lecture, very shortly and simply, that the mere hard-andfastness of this world as it seems, the mere being beyond the control of our wills, is not the test of its reality, or what makes it a real world for us. If you look into a stereoscope, you will see what
59
have what
is called
a stereoscopic view.
There
you have got the conviction of the hard-and-fastness o~f the supposed three dimensions borne in upon you, and yet you know it is not true because it does
not consist with the rest of experience.
In the
his
same way, the hypnotised person has a world of own, hard, fast, and beyond the control of his will, a world produced out of his subconscious self
It is not the
and yet
it
is
The mad-
man, again, believes firmly in the reality of his world, although that world has no reality from the
larger point of view of sane intelligence.
The
fore
test
of hard-and-fastness
cannot there-
That reality be the criterion of reality. cannot be found merely in the circumstance that
the world
It
is
beyond the
must
lie in
something the nature of which we now begin to divine, something I shall endeavour to analyse
in
my
next lecture.
got a
So
far,
all
we can
say
is
that
we have
new
light
phenomena
up
or resolved
things,
but
moments
of uni-
60
versality
[i-ect. h.
that
the
universal
are
only
abstract
individual in character.
We
have found
own
activity
But we have got to we would get at the truth about these matters, and in the next lecture I will try to clear away a mass of weeds which seem to impede the swimmer.
and so
swim
in yet deeper
water
if
LECTUEE
I
III
some of you may have found that portion of the pathway to reality which we had to tread, stony and dry. And yet it was essential that we should tread it. I had to show you how Aristotle refused to go behind the
afraid that yesterday
individual,
AM
how he
ultimate form of reality, in the sense that individuality could not be deduced from any premises
or
shown
to be brought about
by any ground or
same time, could not be resolved Individuality into terms of anything beyond itself. for Hegel after him, the was for him, as it was
cause, and, at the
Indeed,
it is
is
not
necessary, but
ality is
is
how
individu-
made.
Such metaphors
is itself
as "
individual in form.
Individuality
is
any process
in time.
It is just
what we
indicate
62
MEANING OF REALITY
[i-^ct.
m.
and do not define when we point and say "that is." It is the present reality with which we are in direct contact, and from which we start and must always start the form of the ultimate reality to which we always come back. I showed you that while Aristotle, like Hegel, takes the individual to be the true form of the actual, he still recognises that in reflection you do separate in the individual two moments, which you try by abstraction to keep apart from each other, the universal and the particular. The " that," the " is," what I mean when I speak of my immediate experience, is what confronts the mind as ultimate, but yet has for reflection these two moments of the activity of thought. In my immediate experience alone do they gain existence. Now, my immediate experience has meaning only for my mind, and my mind has meaning only in experience. The individual, therefore, is only as the form in which the mind and its experience exist, a form which mind alone can resolve by its power of abstract reflection about its own processes. But if this form be the form of mind, it must be like mind
itself
not
inert,
lifeless
identity, substance,
but
The view
itself,
it
is
complete in
rests in
self-subsisting, unique.
Thought
it
satisfied that it
presented
there for
individual
existence.
Yet
is
only
me
in virtue of
an
infinity of
judgments,
in
of relationships, of universals,
63
and self-developing. The horizon looks to me bounded as it does because there is implied in my recognition of it, and of the
entire view, a reference to myself as a spectator in
a particular position.
changes.
The simplest
as
what seems
involves,
relationships
tively.
The
perception
is
Nay, more,
it is
implicitly
the Universe
itself
When
it
I judge about
it
the
nature,
all
it.
place exclusive of
tially inclusive of
of space
and of
time.
of every judgment, as
reality,
we
and potentially the whole of it, and the work of the judgment is to make explicit what is The sea view is not less the entire implicit.
Universe to me, because in reflection I qualify
as limited by an infinite Beyond.
it
The problem
of Philosophy
may be
defined to
adequate and complete conception of it. by this method and by no other, does
So alone, it seem as
64
MEANING OF REALITY
[lect.
m.
At the we do
are not
we
Our
are
necessities,
our
purposes,
finite only,
our
standpoints,
provisional
and go beyond
them
ence.
in the
The great fallacy in speculative inquiry of looking upon the mind as a thing arises from not
keeping this in view.
We
find
it
in our every-
day parlance very convenient to speak as though the mind could be regarded as *a thing, as though human beings, with souls as well as bodies, could
be talked of as things in space.
This uncritical
way
of speaking
is
but when you an everyday useful tool and divert it to other purposes, use it as a speculative instrument, you get into all sorts of trouble. Let me give you one illustration of this.
legitimate for everyday purposes,
is
take what
The nature of the mind is to be free, active, with the power of withdrawing itself from its own associations. I instanced to you yesterday
the martyr at the stake,
who
is
capable of with-
him.
what he endures, by of a great conception which he has before The nature of the mind is to be capable
which it is manifesting itself; and, that the freedom which the mind possesses
being
so,
FREE WILL
is
65
is
in the
particulars,
which
transforms
the
paiticulars,
which gives them their meaning, gives them their existence, although it does not exist apart from them. And the mind, with an activity of this
nature,
is
of
cause
if
and
effect,
which
has
only
signifi-
cance
space
we
and time.
Consequently
it
it,
becomes at
that the old
once plain,
of causes and
unalterable chain,
was
as,
beside
the
point.
is
We
we
the
and controversy
light
needless,
soon
in
the
of criticism,
as a thing, or as sub-
and
for
free,
effect.
The
to
be
or
is
free.
It
power of acting
irrationally,
rationally,
its
that
but
choice
and
can
indi-
it is
concerned.
Therefore,
little
totle
many
from dogmatic
will,
was
66
MEANING OF EEALITY
;
[^-ect.
..i.
based
tion
tell
drawn from the notion of God as a First Cause, the outcome of which was to make freedom of will impossible to an individual, who
is
in the object
is
another
Thought and
of
and the
object,
them
is
a thing apart.
Well, the individual as
in reflection,
which vary according to the points and purposes which reflection brings to of view If you allow thought to turn in bear on it. upon itself and watch its own operations, you will
see
tion
how
this
is.
of the
stereoscope.
is
What we
flat
it
see in the
in
stereoscope
really only a
surface
two
dimensions
dimensions.
of
space,
but
appears in three
We
are, so far as
mere observation
goes, presented
sions,
with an object in three dimenThe reason of this is, that the instruto us to
we have
to
interpret
the
conceptions
or cate-
dimensions.
It
is
difficult
to
overcome
this
suggestion even
the illusion to
experience.
to refer
its
It is
UNIQUENESS
follows after
it,
67
ceptions which
we
are
modes of organisation
which are present to us, that give that form and fixity alike to the world of the stereoscope, and to that in which we say that we really live and move and have our being. If thought be allowed to play
of the aspects of experience
freely,
we
own
tion
fixity,
just as
it
convicflat
which makes us
interpret
the
plain
surface which
we
as an
The
actual,
test
of
what
is real,
is
of immediacy.
The
of
picture
in
the stereoscope,
same aspect
reality
as has
been
what
it,
has
been
or
called
the
of
uniqiieness
the
individual,
our
after
sense
all,
purpose
in
satisfied
in
because,
the
is an individual picture which our purpose of searching for reality rests What seems satisfied that it has reached reality.
to be essential
is
that
the conception
we have
formed should
fit
fixity
and
definite-
the
universals
of
reflection
call its "
derives Dasein"
68
the
MEANING OF EEALlTY
being there and as
it
[^^ct.
m.
is
of the individual
thing.
The being
and fixed
its
appearance through
these
the
system
of
conceptions
which gives
me
made me
assign meanings
and uses so
regularly,
infant,
that
tumbler would
it
have
the
significance
which
nor
stand
out
does to
our minds.
The analogy
huge
scale
is
of the
stereoscope
fixity
make
it
The
fied
satisfies
thought only
for
a moment, and
takes up another
it,
when thought
aspect
of the
individual
and so transforms
and gives it another meaning. I gave you as an illustration yesterday the man who cuts down a tree and makes a table. The wood is
living
it
wood
in
his
hands, but
when he makes
into
tree
a table he passes away from the living and thinks only of dead matter. He has
to the conception of the table as
come
a purely
PKOFESSOR ROYCE
69
mechanical arrangement of parts, and of the wood as something dead and inert.
We
the
by the "that,"
into
mere
satisfaction
its
that
we have
is
in
it,
the
mere conviction of
it.
reality,
complete in
would give us real things. But as I will presently show you, that is not the test of Reality. The resolution into
the
stereoscope
satisfaction
of
the
my
meaning of Reality and of the individual, would simply, if we relied upon it, prove, as it seems to me, a broken bridge, because we should then
be confronted with the question, What does the "is" mean when it is applied to the mind, and
the purpose of the
mind which
is
so satisfied
My
Royce of Harvard, has written a very able book upon Idealism, and he appears to suggest that the true meaning of being, of the
ship, Professor
is
to be found in the
it
But
seems to
me
that
push the controversy a little further back, and to leave you to ask what he means by the being of a purpose. Can this be resolved into satisfaction of purpose in having such a purpose ?
I venture to doubt whether this analysis,
helpful.
if true, is
It
seems as though
it
left
us with an
I prefer to
70
MEANING OF EEALITY
purpose,
fulfilled
[^ct. m.
meaning, are
rather
it.
seems to me.
belief in the real
start with.
it
We must have a
of course,
in
world
that,
we must
We
must
is
believe
be in the stereoscope
But what
the test
Not the mere fact of our belief in it, but something else its harmony with our own other experience, that is the main feature. I will show you what I mean. I go into a room, and I think I see a chair in it. The room is dark, with If I trust only only the moonbeams playing in. to my sense of sight, I may make a mistake in
of
its reality ?
;
may
try to sit
down on
and
eflFectively find
out whether
real or not.
But
real.
it is
A
if
even
there
he had sat
madman might believe he saw a chair, down and had painfully found
chair there.
still
was no
in
Even
if
another element
came
he might
He
might be deceived about his past impressions as easily as about those of his present experience. If I look round, and think that I see a chair
before me,
was empty,
may
conclude that
my
present impression
is illusory.
71
His whole experience, what he remembers as much as what is immediately present to him, may be
distorted.
in
satisfied.
My
personal conviction
if it
is
not enough.
My
my
experience,
to be
true,
All
men must
the
see
and
in
feel
in
universals
the impression
is
title
of real.
to be agreement
my own
of
my
personal
experience
be
self- consistent.
self- consistency
own
experience.
There
believe
their
must
senses
be
correspondence
them.
of
what
of
The
chair
must be there for the experiences of all other it must fit in not only with the general people
;
context
of
my
individual
experience
as
this
and
on a particular spot
experience of
all
but
it
must
in to
harmony
is
of the general
a real chair.
My
will
then
satisfied,
In other
72
MEANING OF REALITY
In
fact,
[i-'^ct.
m.
words, I assent.
But my
enough unless
experi-
the reality
in fact in
That
is
what Mill meant by the system of Permanent Possibilities which he said made the reality of the
object world.
Such harmony with a system is a conception which we get only through reflection, only through judgments, which we fix and make definite and
preserve in the mind, in universals such that
we
communicate them to others through language. They do not give you the actual "is" of these
things.
That
it.
is
mind
communicated is a description of a system which you can put in language which deals with universals, and universals alone, and it is in the objectivity of that system, that is
that ha,s
to
What
it
is
the system
of the
you get the You do not make reality you do test of reality. not make the world. You do not construct, or deduce, or put it together, but you have a test of the presence or absence of that which is meant
similar experience of everybody, that
;
when we speak
grasp this
of reality.
elusive
It is very difficult to
point,
it,
rather
but
it
is
very
and we
shall
come
back to
it
Our
change
73
With enough
ceptions
may
may
is
Insanity
We
may,
too,
human
beings.
am
some extent by watching its motions guess what sort of mind a lizard or a dog has. But if there be such a being as an angel, how does an angel think? Again, those who live, if they do live, in Jupiter and Saturn, may construct quite a different world
be.
or a dog
may
I can
to
for themselves
Their senses
may be wholly
But
it
from
ours.
They may
example.
sight,
for
plain that
when you
not
versals
of their
experience,
these
must be the
attach
same, because
we
It
could
otherwise
any meaning to
inhabiting them.
common system
Reason as
even raise
the
of thought,
basis
of
and
foundation
that
of
any
Scepticism can
head.
Now
set
before themselves
this
that
the
mind
lies
74
MEANING OF REALITY
it
^ect. m.
in front of
not vary.
They have penetrated, by the power of genius, over and over again to the fact that the external world which confronts us is only apparently permanent and impenetrable, and may be transformed by thought. I think it is something of that kind which Shakespeare has in his mind
in
the
Tempest
tell
this vision
The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces. The solemn temples, the great globe itself.
Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve. And, like this unsubstantial pageant faded. Leave not a rack behind. We are such stuff As dreams are made on and our little life Is rounded with a sleep."
Or
again,
when Browning
talks of
" Life for ever old yet new, Changed not in kind but in degree,
I
The
is
instant
made
eternity."
He
to
speaking
the
of
the
transform
world to
power
of
the
it
mind
into
turn
system which
may have a
Mr
Worldly Wise-
when
Book
of Revela-
tion tells us of
Him who
sat
on a great white
throne,
whose face the earth and the heavens fled away so that there was found no place for them, he seems to me to have had in
from
mind the unreal and
75
relative
transitory
and
Perhaps one of the most striking and most remarkable breaks-away in our poetry from the
standpoint of the hard-and-fast finality of every-
day immediacy to another point of view, is to be found in that extraordinary poem, I think, too
little
recognised in
its
greatness, that
the
in
by
She
was written
girl
a Yorkshire
lived
a country parsonage.
among
the
girl
that
Swinburne somewhere tells us that she takes rank as the direct descendant of the Titans, as in the line of Shakespeare and of Milton. I will quote Emily Bronte's "Last
Lines
" "
whom Mr
to
you
entire
And
"
arming
me from
fear.
God, within my breast Almighty, ever present Heity Life that in me has rest As I undying Life have power in Thee.
!
" Vain are the thousand creeds That move men's hearts, unutterably vain Worthless as withered weeds, Or idlest froth amid the boundless main.
"
To waken doubt
infinity,
The
76
MEANING OF EEALITY
" With wide-embracing love, Thy spirit animates eternal years. Pervades, and broods above.
Changes, sustains, dissolves, creates, and
"
[^-^^t.
m.
rears.
And suns and universes ceased And Thou wert left alone.
Every existence would
" There
to be,
exist in Thee.
is not room for Death, Nor atom that his might could render void. Thou, Thou art Being and Breath, And what Thou art may never be destroyed."
Whose
soul
Knew no
Darmg,
since
Byron died."
Certainly specu-
lative
lectual level
dying
outburst.
It
contains
the
teaching
of
Aristotle
transferred
Now
of
making us feel what is real. It may be that what they tell us is the outcome of promptings from what Professor James calls the "subliminal self." That is probably true. But none the less
is
it
fall
within
the world as
reality,
and
77
may be
of
just to
show
than
equal
that
they
are
better
pictures
things
the
pictures
that
the
commonplace man
moment from this digression to our threefold test of what we mean by reality Agreement furnished by (1) Our own present senses of every kind (2) Our past sense
Well,
:
we must
experience;
others.
and
(3)
of
have seen.
That these afford only a relative test we But they throw light upon what we mean by reality and unreality in human knowledge,
or,
for that
matter,
in
human
perception.
It
to its If I
am
is
sun
may be tempted
to believe
Why?
all,
that the
falling
of the
upon them.
Everybody standing at
my
fire,
fire
would not agree with the general context of experience, with the place to which the rest of humanity assigned the phenomenon in its reflection. Accordingly, I come to the conclusion when I reflect on it, that what I did when I
78
MEANING OF EEALITY
hills
b-^-^T.
m.
thought the
were on
fire
was, not to
make
in the
phenomenon
it is
to a
wrong place
context of experience.
In other words,
When
ground
in the
same way
in the
common system
is
of their
an accord or correspondence for reflection, and not for mere perception. I cannot experience your sensations any more than you can experience mine, but what we can do is to communicate to one another common judgments, identical judgments, which we have formed about these sensations. We can describe them in language, and if you search the language
you
a
find that
it
If I say
it
that a thing
distant
is here, it is
from
point
of
view,
entirely
in
what
In
as such
knowledge
is
we
rise
by
never
reality,
COERESPONDENCES OF EXPERIENCE
has
79
been taken
by abstraction.
is
On
the
other
the
only
never
real,
because
it is
has
its reality.
is
of the
of
reality
is
correspondence
between
points of view.
what he does as a
is different in
it is
event.
first
The
experience
man
the
from what
foundation
but they
is
recognise a
system, which
interpretation of
what is real only be assented to, which is a matter of will, for belief is an act of will, but it must formally accord with the criterion afforded by a system of common conceptions, and that is what gives
takes place.
it its
objectivity.
Well,
when
in
abstract
its
reflection
we
dis-
what we
have called the subject, and we have now learned that the subject as distinguished from the object is
not
reality.
It will
which
insists
is
existence
We may
call
what we
80
MEANING OF EEALITY
to as the basis of reality
[i-ect. ni.
come
Mind, or we
it
may
is
At any
in
is
it
rate
is
what
as
individual,
irresoluble,
and
it
holds
union which
is
because
analysis,
presupposed
the
basis
of all
universal
outside
of
We
cannot
it,
deduce
in
its
it,
or
the
indiit
unique
"This."
You
presuppose
in
Yet the permanent element is the miiversal which is isolated, it is true, in reflection only, and which gives us the system in which alone permanence is to be
the subject of every judgment.
found.
All language
of poetry.
is
abstract,
which embody the universal in a highly concrete and sensuous form. Philosophy gives us more permanent light than poetry does. Philosophy moves in the region of
suggest to
abstract thought.
individuals
its
art
is
to
But
lifeless.
it
we want
of
artist,
in
our
world,
not
only
the
cold
mind
the the
philosopher,
of the
we have
as
provision-
defined
our
ultimate
reality
Mind
us?
or
Spirit.
How
then do
we
proceed to
it
view the
ordinary world as
we have
before
We
KNOWLEDGE PURPOSIVE
have
to a
81
already
large
seen
that
its
arises from the conceptions which we bring to bear, and the purposes or ends under which we organise our knowledge.
extent
an explosion.
plosion
chemist,
definition;
is.
what is called Nobody can define what an exIn the book of the great French
this,
Berthelot,
there
are
attempts
this,
at
that an
explosion
burning,
nothing
its
more than
very rapid
rapidity
is
and
consequences.
But
a relative
to be to
word.
What
appeared to
giant
an instantaneous detonation, might seem take a very long time to be almost a slow burning. Their tempo is difa
gnat to
ferent.
So
is
it
is
with space.
the
From
the point
of view
of the
just
cell,
which
starry
made up
look
look
very
to
acting
together,
may
much
us
like
heavens
something
there
what the
very
remote and of which we form a mere isolated unit. But it is conceivable and the speculation
has often been
but as
in
entertainedthat
life
in
gence of which
that in which
a similar fashion to
our
own
body.
In
that
way
appearance
of
the
universe
reflection.
In
or
we
82
MEANING OF REALITY
[i-ect.
m.
and which determines the conception under which we attend and abstract, is what really gives its meaning and hard - and - fastness to the world
which confronts
us.
As
sound.
Suppose a man, A.B., comes into my room. person who had never seen him before might think him uninteresting or even repulsive
to look
Another person, who knew that the disfigurement of his face was the result of an
at.
accident which he
life,
met with
and that
was the
result
best.
He
reads
The
one
man
A
did
person
who
quite
did
not
know German
A.B.'s voice
who
know
it
another.
conveys to the
unintelligible
one
man
To
a mere succession of
the
other
sounds.
man
to
it
suggests a
tions.
vast
wealth
the
of
images
of
He
forgets
sounds
only
ceases
the
and
reflec-
dis-
tinguish
them,
thinks
sense
and
the
Ruh."
From
the standpoint
of
mere student of
viduality.
sounds form an experience for the listener complete in its indiacoustics, these
His purpose
rests satisfied
it
nothing beyond.
He
has brought
EFFECT OF STANDPOINT
special conceptions,
83
converted
is satisfied.
it
by abstraction
to the other
into universals,
and
But
man, who knows nothing, and cares little about acoustics, the bare sounds cease at once to be bare sounds. They are merged in the thoughts which they awaken. The result is two totally
divergent experiences, arising from the fact that the two
observers,
in
whom
have
respectively
different
these
experiences
furnishings
have
arisen,
mental
far
and
different
purposes.
So
as
common
im-
But even
this
of
common
wild
animal might not have even recognised a man. lizard might not have even recognised a living
object.
much does
the constitu-
of experience depend
purpose.
at
my
purposes, that
make
the
seems
is
determined in
form rather
by ends and purposes than by causes. Now, the German book which awoke such a mighty response in the mind of the man who appreciated the meaning and form of the thoughts expressed in it, would to the dog be only so
ink,
even
after
84
MEANING OF EEALITY
[l^ct.
m.
dog and in that of the person with an instructed and developed mind, although so far the basis may be a common one.
It
is
the
necessities
of
social
intercourse
to
fulfil,
among
individuals
ethical
purposes
and
really
made
our
common world;
himself,
and
in
order
to
fashion,
common ethical and general world in which we live, we have adopted certain common ends, and these common ends have developed our common language, our common standpoints, and determined us to
each for
the
abstract
from
all
fit
aspects
of the
world except
those
which
in
purposes.
Suppose somebody asks what is the cause of the fire. The scientific man would say that the
fire
of the
atoms of
maid would say that the cause of the fire was the putting of the match to it, and from her point of view she would be right. Her business is to apply the match, and with the chemical side of the question she has nothing to do. Thus what real and true in the world, is however important, depends upon its harmony with the context of experience, and is always in a sense relative. Thought, reflection, is free and self-determining, and can and does select its purposes and ends and the conceptions under which it will work. It is by following certain purposes and ends that the notion
OBJECTIVE CONSTRUCTION
fronts us
85
becomes evolved.
its
dangerous tendencies.
so that
We
really
everyday
life
gives
us,
what are
abstractions
become mistaken by us
We
in
can see
for
enough
force
which,
working hypotheses which the man of science has hypostatised into notions of real individuals, of which he talks as though they could conceivably be reached They are really nothing through the senses.
of the
kind,
but,
as
we
shall
find
later,
only
cate-
the
gories.
What
make
it
comes to
of
notion,
is
this
thought
make
its
does not
thought.
of
That kind
with
implication
sense
at
other
things
is
in
the
outside
world.
This
window theory
It
if
inadequate from
every
point of view.
because,
breaks
down
is
physiologically,
my
optic
nerve
world.
destroyed,
do
not see
the
outside
race
of people
The
is
realities
by
objective
construction.
Psychologically
the
window theory
86
MEANING OF REALITY
Berkeley
[i^ct.
m. at
which
length.
and
Mill
have
given
us
Do
from the notion of separate minds, existing outside each other in space and time, on the footing
of each one being
among many
like
it.
That,
I interpret
myself as one
among many,
as
one
individual
minds or experiences, but by a knowledge of my own I can form a conception of their nature.
Professor Ward, in his admirable Gifford Lectures,
discusses
logist,
"Intro-
jection."
means that
my
picture of
you comes
from interpreting.
among
many.
observe that the critical philosophy of Kant, one of the greatest systems which the world has ever seen, breaks down just at this point.
I
may
Kant had
to
He
said,
"What
possible
I have to do
?
to ask,
it
how
is
experience
activity
"
and
his view of
KANT
of mind, not of
87
with a locality
for
which he refused to attempt to deduce. Kant never would try to deduce the particulars of
But he thought that the activity of intelligence, operating upon the particulars of sense, arranged them in two pure forms of Space and Time. And so the world of experience was constructed, and beyond the limits of the twelve categories which Kant took from the Logic of
sense.
and regarded as exhaustive, he did not allow the categories of experience to go, and he
Aristotle
so constructed.
Now
the
there are
many
criticisms to
shall
be made on
Kant's philosophy.
Aristotelian
criticism
We
I
The
main
which
wish
to
make
and,
word I have to say to you that Kant was infected with the is psychological point of view, the notion that you can break up experience, that you can treat the
to-day
indeed,
the
last
particulars of sense as
into individuals
if
by the synthetic activity of pure intelligence working from outside them, and, as part of the process, welded together in the independently existing forms of Space and
of experience
88
Time.
the
in
MEANING OF EEALITY
How far
this point of
["-ect.
m.
modern psychologist Munsterberg has shown his admirable little volume Psychology and Life*
like
its
own
categories
and
conceptions,
and
that,
and conceptions
certain
for its
own
purposes,
it
views
which
it
selects
rise
by
of
abstraction,
and
the
consequently gives
to the
notion that
mind
consists
of
series
in
what is called atomism is the basis on which the mind is built up. Even by looking into our own minds we can
other words, that
see that this
is
not true.
knowledge grows by the further development of an aireipov by the gradual introduction of definite organisation into a vague continuum. The truth is that Kant,
velopment of a
child's
mind,
we
see that
like
many
make
the
path
so
of
the
philosopher
at
is
once
so
easy and
difficult.
no onion, the coats of which can Experience is not a be peeled off one by one. thing to be laid on the dissecting table and taken
Experience
to pieces.
It is the ultimate reality
behind which
you cannot get if you once realise that it means and is just the individual as the presupposition of knowledge. That is a point of view in which
''
89
Hegel had to correct Kant, in the same way as Aristotle had to correct Plato.
I think that
far,
firm
we have now cleared our way so we may feel that we have got some
in
making our
not less
shall
am
afraid,
we
have
to tread to-morrow.
LECTUEE IV
At
the
that
you
one.
have
in
each lecture
is
the indi-
and that
it is
them elsewhere than in the concrete experience in which we men and women live and move and have our being. Those of you who are theologians may be thinking of the
find either of
old
Scottish
preachers
in
who made a
the
point
of
expounding
scheme of salvation in its completeness. They had a reason for this, and, like them, I have a reason for my
each
discourse
reiteration.
from the language and bad metaphysics, is nothing short of our ttov o-tw, and is the basis on which alone we can build up an intelligible view of the Cosmos, and our place in it. Yet we have found
stated, purified
we
is,
behaves in a
way
that
is
unsatis-
RECAPITULATION
factory
in
91
when we
reflection
try to
keep
it
in the rigid
bonds
it.
which
we seek
as
it
to bind
Under
dictions,
as
self-developing,
much
is
as the
self-
thought which
seems
to
really
When by
individuals
abstraction
we
and fixed shape, these forms always turn out to be mendacious, to disclose inherent contradictions. Yet they point to fuller and more adequate views of themselves which lie beyond. There was an English judge who was fond of saying that the truth lurks even in an affidavit and will come out, and we may say of the individuals of sense that even in them there unfolds itself a higher view of things. The truth shines through them, as, indeed, the poets have shown us in illustrations such as those which I quoted to you in my last lecture.
of experience
into a final
my
way a
little
weeds which might impede more the strokes of the swimmer progressing from the shallow water from which we started to the deeper water in which we must swim if we are to make
to get rid of the
progress.
We
of these lectures
of weeds.
We
"window"
theory
of the
mind; the metaphor of making or constructing things by thought the atomism of the old Psycho;
92
MEANING OF EEALITY
['''ct. iv.
Kant, that
mind
into faculties.
and we
is
we cannot break up
life
take
as a whole
that even in
utterly
when we
forget that
into
we cannot break up
a mechanism.
to
When
his
the
interview Faust,
in
Mephistopheles dressed up
and gown,
Among
to the student
this
" Wer will was Lebendig's erkennen und beschreiben, Sucht erst den Geist herauszutreiben,
Dann
Fehlt leider
and the thought of the scheme of Faust suggest to my mind the yet
of Goethe
* " The
man who
know
class,
so,
Then the
But the
hand and
soul
and the
spirit are
gone, alas
hei'self
GOETHE'S FAUST
wider way in which Goethe put this great
Indeed,
it
93
truth.
and forms the scheme and basis of the whole drama of Faust. Let me try to describe it in a few sentences. Faust, as you all remember, is a man who has spent his life in the acquisition of abstract knowledge. He grows old. He is dissatisfied with the want of the
underlies
richness of
versals,
life
He summons
but
up
first
between
Spirit,
affinity.
he
finds
He
has cut
immediacy of nature.
The Earth
Spirit tells
him
Then
he
is
willing
to
make a
and
rich-
back youth
up, as
for
it
in its freshness
and
so to
at the
make
in
moment,
what he has
it
comes
the subtlety, as
completely furnished
gories
his
is
mind;
he has
lofty
cate-
and perceptions; he knows what truth is; His only the highest point of view.
concrete riches
in
an abstract
and unsatisfying
bargain with the
Well,
of
Power
94
first
MEANING OF KEALITY
[i-ect. iv.
when Faust
shall
say to
fair,"
hands of Mephistopheles.
first
of
delight
of
the
senses,
life,
Faust
of
remains
his
unsatisfied.
The
to
large
conceptions
mind
are
find
in
which
offered
him
something divorced
and purposes, and so what is profoundly unsatisfactory. His great mind cannot find itself, to use a German expression, in the world which is now opened up to him, and accordingly the first part ends in disaster and misery. Then comes that second part, which Goethe
wrote after the meditation
century.
of a quarter
of
We
now a
Faust,
career of his
on a flowery bank,
he
may
of
the
past.
He
awakes, goes
out
into
the
man
in the
He
thrusts
of courts, of state-craft.
He
GOETHE'S FAUST
satisfied,
95
his
to
control
the
affairs
of
is
fellow
creatures;
fied.
not satis-
He
He
gains experience.
Still
For he is desiring these things, not in the light of any large and lofty purpose, but for the mere satisfaction of his individual wishes. Thus his mind still remains divorced from the true object world in which
he
is
not
satisfied.
alone
it
can
find
is
reality,
find
itself
again.
His universal
ticular
rest.
in
But time passes, and there comes a moment when Faust, full of years, but also rich and powerful, sees some poor people on a property of his own, trying to keep out the sea which is breaking through, He directs and destroying their little village. He watches them that they should be assisted. struggling day after day, and struggling at last
situation
The
remains
abstract.
through
his
aid successfully,
to
keep
out the
new
sense,
feels
He
new altogether, is awakened in him. now not only that he is using his
an unselfish end; he realises that he has found objectivity he has found a world in which his mind is face to face with what it recognises as real and akin to its own ends and
power
for
purposes.
He
feels,
too,
that here
is
the real
96
MEANING OF REALITY
:
i^^^-^-
'v.
And
Das ist der Weisheit letzter Schluss Nur der verdient sich Freiheit wie das Leben, Der taglich sie erobern muss. " *
freedom
who
he only can gain life and looks upon them, not merely as
own
energies, but as
through
constant
striving
to
is
it
is
only
when
the
mind
itself
daily
again
exertions,
works out for itself, daily earns for its life and freedom through its own that it can really gain and keep
them.
And so it is that in Faust you have at the end just what we learn in the Prologue. The Deity in the Prologue, after allowing Mephistopheles to have his will and telling
him
that, while
he may go
forth
will in the
end
fail,
because Faust
I
of the
higher
order
The
wisdom stamps it true, He only earns his freedom and existence. Who daily conquers them anew "
last result of
!
GOETHE'S FAUST
of
97
significant
the
:
sons
of
men,
speaks
these
words
"Doch
ihr, die echten Gotter-sohne, Erfreut euch der lebendig reichen Schone Das Werdende, das ewig wirkt und lebt, Umfass' euch mit der Liebe holden Schranken,
Und
This
lesson
is
that
Faust
is
is
to
learn. out.
tragedy of Faust
Faust's
worked
mind
its
must
into
work out
own
So
life
and freedom
that
in the larger
passes
is
when Faust
says to
Moment, "Stay, thou art fair," and at that same instant dies, his soul is saved, the bargain notwithstanding; and the Devil, whose categories of comprehension are of a limited order and cannot take in the true meaning of what has happened,
finds that his prey has escaped him.
you take the greatest minds in literature, the greatest critics of life, that same thought which underlies Philosophy is constantly repropoets
if
how
*"But ye
God
live.
the ever living Beauty, The self-creative changing forms that work and Hold these in bonds of love that never weaken
Enjoy the
The
Fix and
make
98
ducing
in
MEANING OF EEALITY
itself.
[i-ect. iv.
The highest
is
It lies in the
Here and
loftier
Now,
plane.
world comprehended at a
around
What we
have to do
to
clear
of hypostatised
which hinder us from apprehending the nature of reality under adequate conceptions and categories.
Now
than
their
hampered
we
minds were
from some at
least of the
For example, take the great distinction which runs through modern Philosophy, and which I started with in the first lecture, the distinction between subject and object.
abstractions that trouble us.
Scarcely a trace of
it
is
to be found
in
definite
Aristotle,
it
who was
systematic
if
he
we
should call subject and object, nor yet a divorce between the universal and the particular. He is perfectly aware that there is an aspect in which
the
mind appears
as
the
mind
of a
particular
mind
form as something
world
itself
foreign.
He knows
the
field
the
belongs
to
of
nature,
and that
in
the
mind
ARISTOTLE'S NOYE
history
99
For mind in this aspect the come first. Yet these particulars, and the individual intelligence, and the system which is the outcome of thinking of it a this standpoint, presuppose a deeper view of mind in which the categories of the particular self are
and a body.
particulars
of sense
transcended.
De Animd,
dwelling
in
the
chapter,
Aristotle,
after
on
the
all things,
and
also
on
"This phase of reason is separate from and uncompounded with material conditions, and, being in its essential character fully and actually realised, it is not subject to impressions from for the creative is in every case more without
:
it
And
knowledge as a potential capacity is in time prior in the individual, though in universal existthis
ence
it
is
thought.
not even in time thus prior to actual Fiirther, this creative reason does not
[it
when
remains nothing but what it essentially and thus it is alone immortal and eternal. is Of this unceasing work of thought, however, we retain no memory, because this reason is
body,
:
it
100
unaflFected
MEANING OF REALITY
by
its
[i-^ct. iv.
objects
is
and can
and understands, he is drawing the distinction between intelligence as taken at two planes, the passive reason, intelligence viewed abstractly and at a standpoint from which it exhibits itself as within nature and, on the other
Aristotle uses
;
mind
particular
combined
is
Now, another remarkable thing about Aristotle the way in which he realises that when we
standpoint of the
active
get to the
reason,
of
mind
or spirit, as
we
got
should
parlance,
we have
It
has
always
looked
at
been a great
these things
is true,
to
those
who
uncritically to understand
how,
if
idealism
mind can be one thing among many. Arismind can be regarded as one thing among many only when
the
totle sees perfectly plainly that the
looked at from the point of view of a stage of thought which is not that of speculative knowledgd,
it is
* Wallace's Translation,
p.
161.
EVERYDAY EXPEEIENCE
Now, we have always
difference
101
to bear
in
mind the
The stand-
The very basis of my being here and speaking to you, and myself thinking and reflecting, is that I am just
this particular individual
name and a history and relationships, we cannot possibly get away from.
is
one that
and physical
ships.
history,
It is
But
then,
in
it is
we have
learned that
is
mind,
so far as
is
what already
first
is
potentially
experience, that
who
is
approach
the
consideration
of
Philosophy
as
bridged over.
We
individual of experience
not taken
final.
We
our consideration by
individual so taken
soldier
is
assumption
in
that
the
an end
himself
The
on the battle-field who goes to death without a doubt for his country, transcends the The martyr at the stake individual standpoint.
does so likewise.
the mathematician
And
who
in
the field
of Science
worlds,
has
also
transcended
102
the
MEANING OF EEALITY
immediacy of the
senses,
[i^=ct. iv.
which has enabled it to break through the limits of his powers of direct perception. Then again, the mathematician gives us other of extraordinary power of the illustrations
to a point
thought
to
transcend
itself.
He
symbols in mathematics of impossible quantities quantities of which he cannot predicate existbut which are yet symbolical of relationwhich, in mathematics, are not only realships
ence,
ised,
but
made
poet,
practical use
of.
The
again,
who makes
us,
us realise the
Matthew Arnold's
and to
see
it
"to
see
life
steadily,
whole."
In our everyday
life
we, at
every moment,
However much
standpoint
useful one,
it is
the plain
man may
is
of individuality
a necessary and
is
a standpoint which
necessary
and useful only within the limits of the purposes for which it is made available. Without it we could not get on. Unless I, by an abstraction,
which, for the purposes of social intercourse,
essential,
is
looked upon myself as a thing with a particular mind and history attached to it, as a
being standing in social relationships,
it
would
social
be impossible for
tion
me
to
live
with you or to
common
SOCIAL PURPOSES
world.
ship
It is only
103
on the basis of assuming this relationship as our working hypothesis, that we can make any progress at all, and the assumption is, I need not say, a
of the
is
legitimate
ing,
one.
Of
course,
is
even
only
on that footvaluable
the
assumption
and
not
legitimate
it
when used
an
for
is
certainly
assumption
to
which
will
stand
when we come
lative thought.
For social purposes we must regard men, women, and children as beings with histories and names, and look upon them as things with minds in them which peer through the windows of the It is necessary for senses and possess faculties.
everyday
at things
social
life.
life.
It is
common way
evolved
of looking
in
which we have
and use
But
of
in social life
we have
is
view.
Even the
conduct,
everyday
transcends
everyday
constantly
coming
upon
a standpoint which
these
purposes.
The and the duties of the citizen, these all carry you beyond the individual, and they carry you beyond
the individual in the very midst of an experience
and do not break up, because it is our everyday life, in which we have no need to distinguish the purposes and standwhich we
treat
as
single
it.
All these
104
MEANING OF REALITY
side
[lect.
.v.
by
complex whole
what we call social life. I showed you that the relation of cause and effect would not bear looking at in the case of the housemaid putting a match to the fire. I pointed out to you that what she did was not in any
of
intelligible sense
in the
wood was
much
fire
match
to
But
it
was
for
who
fire,
just an illustration
we
use in everyday
talk of a
life
and which we
hypostatise.
We
"cause" as though it were some which we could separate off from other event events and consider by itself; whereas, when we
look scientifically at the burning of the
find
fire
we
that the
cause
is
conditions,
one feature
the cause.
this category
We
it
where
to
the
apply
it
tend in consequence
to apply
in
symbols
in
and forms
which
use.
artists
their
own way
LANGUAGE UNIVEESAL
and
the
artists
see,
105
images,
shining
through
transient
these
contradictory
and
nature
of
all
we
figure to ourselves.
of course
as I have our
often
said in the
social pm-poses
which
desire
develop this
to
way
of looking at things.
The
communicate with those around it develops the child's intellect more than anything or anybody else. Language enables us to think and compare our conceptions, and yet if there is anything which has become plain it is that language conveys, not
the experience of the individual, because that
is
unique and incommunicable, but universals, conceptions which enable other people to view their
individual experience from just the
There
is
We
which does not import a universal. talk in universals, and it is our social neces-
sities
What we have
world,
is
com-
prehension which
and which emerges when we let thought play upon Of course Philosophy, when it does this itself.
systematically,
is
abstract.
Philosophy
is
always
and
religion,
106
bolically,
MEANING OF REALITY
[i-ect. iv.
from Philosophy even though it must at times criticise them. But apart from the test of Philosophy, which never can give you the
their justification
full richness
in art or religion,
but
as Professor
to truth.
no
safe guides
Well,
we have
a conception which
they
is
People talk as
their
is
if
meant by
individual
selves,
they
analyse there
nothing more
of
difficult
than to say
The
appearance,
But
he
may change his name, may ignore his relationmay go to a country where he is not known, and still remain himself He is identified for new
ships,
reasons,
and a
self
is
attributed to him.
Now
still
what
is
his real
self?
Not
remain himself Not his memory even, because although his memory fails
him, he will
still
can cut
and
be recognised as a self
Certainly
if
these
were unknown or had been forgotten, he would still be credited with his selfhood. It is very
come to any other conclusion than that the word "self" is like the word
difficult
really to
SELF-IDENTITY
" cause,"
107
but
which
feeling
The
may be taken
feeling of the
to
mean
the corporeal
the
something distinct
one does not
feel.
feel,
body that one has as from outside things in which but which can make the body
is
a vanishing conception
substance,
if
The and takThe truth is, that you can ing in new material. extrude, one by one, the particulars which you try
the process of Metabolism.
its
we understand
body
always changing
to
self.
You
made
and that the notion of the self as comprising them, although a necessary and valuable working hypothesis, is
which we mean by the self an individual in space and time, one among others. If, on the other hand, I try to
confine
the
identification
of
the
self
to
what
in a
am
if
I abstract
from
all
my
I distinguish
experiences, from the feelings, are, back to the which they I get subject for pure abstraction of mere thinking, and that again is so unreal that, divorced from its particulars, divorced from its manifestation in an object
my
emotions,
world,
cannot
even
name
it,
so
it,
completely
have I eliminated
all reality
from
108
MEANING OF REALITY
[i^^ct. iv.
The truth is, that in order to get the real meaning of self, you must go to a more complete view of mind than the one with which we have
just
been
dealing.
We
which
with
have been
chasing
supposed
individual
it
we cannot
Its
find just
try-
because
is
ing to identify
reality.
notion dis-
emerged because people are forced to go beyond the old "window" theory
which
has
only
of the
mind
no
as
a thing with
in
faculties.
Hume
could
was
catch
perfectly
right
declaring that he
of
separate
his
idea
the
self
when he
is
looked into
look
into
mind.
If your
method
a
to
the
mind,
regarded
as
stream of
of
substance
which manifests
itself
in
them.
It is only
when you
Knowledge, final reality, is Mind; for the final reality is always in an individual form. Your self, your personality, is a phase of final
yourself.
reality
which
it
is
which
self is
it
mani-
It is that
is
experience
final
dependent.
fact,
Your
the
not the
and
ultimate
individual
which
to
the
understanding
self
Your
only
spoken
in
everyday
parlance
is
that
same
THE MOVEMENT OF THOUGHT
ultimate
reality
109
point
at
which
are
to
many.
You
presented
as
one
you
try
identify
it
experience,
divorced
from
It
the
set,
is
movement
and
in
of
thought in
which
the
abstractness
Now,
is
it
is
it
extremely
of
them before the mind. We are in a region where we have passed beyond the contion
ceptions of everyday
life;
but
it
is
body who is discouraged by such a reflection to remember that we have exactly the same sort of
difficulties in
fo,r
the Sciences.
In pure mathematics,
instance,
and
is
down
of our everyday
I
conceptions.
have put
before you
what
says
:
state
to you.
He
* " If thought
universality
never
gets
further
than
the
of the
first
case in the
as
* Hegel's Enaiflopiidie,
par.
12.
The
Logic of
Hegel
p. 21.
"
no
never
MEANING OF REALITY
got beyond
it
'
[^-ect. iv.
Being,
justly
or Heraclitus
beyond
open to the charge of Even in a more advanced phase of formalism. Philosophy we may often find a doctrine which
Becoming),
is
has mastered merely certain abstract propositions or formulae, such as In the absolute all is one
'
'
(elsewhere
the
"
'
night
in
which
all
cows
it
look
black)
to
are identical,'
and
only
comes to parfirst
period
of
we may
firstly,
mere observation of the individual features of a phenomenon. By the aid of thought they are
able to meet Philosophy with materials prepared
for
it,
i.e.,
laws
and
classifications
of
phenomena.
into
When
tain
This,
on
thought
truths.
The reception
Philosophy of these
scientific materials,
now
their data,
immediacy and made them cease to be mere forms at the same time a development of
itself.
thought out of
its
In return
what
is
so vital to them.
"
111
fact
"The
as
experienced
thus
the
becomes
original
an
illustration
and
self-
copy
In
of
and
completely
he
says,
that the
work
of
thinking
ence by setting
to
new lights at the standpoint which thought has now attained. One might
in
this.
multiply illustrations of
What
he says
is
The which I gave you of the fire shows how thought carries you beyond mere immediacy to the conceptions which give to mere immediacy its meaning, and it shows the play of thought with
as true of the Sciences as of Philosophy.
illustration
the individual.
We
The judgment
"that."
of knowledge
always about a
My
a judgment which
which is indefinite, a which I qualify and make definite by the conceptions which I bring to bear on it. The " that is always relative and transient. With new standpoints, with further insight, the "that," the glass
of water, gets a
that I
new meaning for me. It may be am thinking of it now with the knowledge
The process of developing the content is always going on. Water may mean the same to you and me so long as we look at it from the same point of view, but' water means a very dififerent thing from the point of view of the chemist from what it does from the
of certain chemical combinations.
"
112
MEANING OF EEALITY
man who
"
[i-ect. iv.
incorporated in
it,
and
is
we
say that
that
is Intelligi,
we
are careful
that
we understand and
which represents the subject as separable from the entirety of reality, and the predicate as separable from it otherwise than by abstraction. It phrase for making plain the is a very useful
dependence of the "that" of individual actuality
on the universals of thought, and the nothingness of mere feeling. But we cannot, as I have often
said,
separate
thought
from
things
except
by
abstraction.
The
itself
standpoint,
finding
objects
any distinction
itself,
because
it
the abstractions
of lower standpoints,
such a picture
we cannot
present to ourselves,
we
are compelled
But by
reflection
we may
we
as an effect to a cause,
REALITY AND APPEAEANCE
113
any deduction of nature. This is expressed in a passage in Hegel where he speaks of* "the one living Mind whose nature is to think, to bring
to
self-consciousness
what
it,
it
is,
it,
and,
with
its
to be at the
and
allow
reflection,
freed
and metaphors, to
to
disentangle
its
wrong categories allow the movement of mind own nature, and to bring it
from
to self-consciousness.
As Goethe
said
" Natur hat weder Kern noch Schale, Alles ist sie mit einem Male."
"Nature has no kernel as apart from husk." All it and are inseparable. We cannot break them up, and the test of whether we have successfully disentangled the movement of thought, comprehended and grasped its conCan we show crete nature, seems to be this
aspects cohere in
:
is
compared with the world seen from the lower standpoint which by contrast
appearance only
?
is
In the realm of feeling we know that the great artist does this, and that the good man does it,
* Hegel's Encyclopadie, par.
13.
The
p.
Loffx:
of Hegel;
22.
114
MEANING OF EEALITY
['ect.
iv.
and he also who is in the deepest sense religious. They may give us no detailed picture of what they see. But their ideal worlds shine through immediacy, and disclose themselves to the eye of The task of Philosophy is to faith as its truth.
make
There
only a
single
actual
universe,
is
the
thought,
mind.
us
its different
intelhgence at which
categories
we approach
its
it.
With
the
we employ
degrees of appearance
These degrees of appearance, degrees not of substance but of comprehension, give us the differing and changing
aspects of the world as
it
seems, and,
it
may
be,
LECTURE V
We
for
on the road
provisional
only,
and
in
fact
and
truth
no
exists for us, then we have reached ground from which a new view of what lies ahead of us must begin to unfold itself. The end, the final form of reality, can no longer be
longer
or as the last
a chain
form,
of
temporal
evolution.
That
must have been implied and present at the very beginning, and hidden from us only by a veil woven out of abstractions. If our
end,
that
part
If
own
existence the
effect, if in the law of nature mind is only rediscovering and dragging into the light its own activity, then what we take to come last must
really
be
first.
my
individual
experience
116
at
MEANING OF REALITY
my
finite individuality
[l^ct. v.
becomes disclosed as the outcome of a distinction which mind itself has brought about, there is no longer any reason
which
why God
I should hold
my
world to be cut
off
from
as from Another.
objective
The
versals
which give to it reality, disclose themselves as but the workings of a mind which is not another than mine, but the mind in which all reality, myself included,
has
its place.
is
The development
of
my own
knowledge
compels
my
reason to accept
it
as the truth, as
of the indi-
what
alter.
"From
foams back to
can
only
kingdom our infinity and we learn that the world be fully comprehended when it is
viewed sub specie astemitatis. are compelled to throw off the abstract " either, or " of the finite
understanding, and cease to take
it
We
as a garb in
which
has
its
full
itself
Reality
which it is boimd up, in the indissoluble unity of what is individual. Within that object world the self appears, appears as human, as, if you please, the outcome
of a process of evolution through boundless time
and
in
SUMMARY OF EESULTS
itself.
117
Think out the content of this individual and its sharp lines give place to yet other distinctions, which drive us from causes to laws from laws to ends from nature to spirit,
experience,
;
;
first
in
the system of
of reflection.
is
thus
by the incorporation in it of a further "what," and so, while still the "this," has become richer. The judgment in which the universe is sustained now
explicit.
is
made
The "this"
qualified
and space, and as in nowise presupposing them. In the last three Lectures I have tried to bring out certain truths, and these truths I may now summarise in- propositions. The first of these propositions is that intelligence is free and selfdetermining. Now, I do not need to elaborate the meaning of the word freedom, because I dealt with it in a former Lecture. I need only remind you that negatively its definition implies that the relation of cause and effect is totally inapplicable to the relation of motive and volition, and that, therefore, the problem of free will, which has given occasion for so much discussion and so much troubling of spirit, is founded upon a false metaphor, and disappears. The mind is free to
choose
its
course of action.
It
acts
rationally,
its
and
in that
sense
it
is
completely free
is
expressed by
118
the
will
MEANING OF EEALITY
word "causation."
is
[i-^cx. v.
free-
just one
of those applications
calling,
what
the
words just
says
that
or
standing;
things
the
understanding
which
must come
"A"
A," and so creates a dilemma which turns out to have no application, as soon as you see that the genus is too narrow for the subject matter which you are trying to bring
within species " not
under
it.
In the second
place,
we may
take as a leading
and hard-and-fastness of our everyday experience of the world that confronts us, is the outcome of a system of social and other purposes with reference to which we have been forced to organise The our knowledge in order to fulfil them.
abstractions
rise
made
have given
of
arise
to
what I have
sense,"
called
"superstitions
common
you
try
superstitions
which
when
to
outside
stretches
is
that
knowledge that I have of the world as out before me, is always relative to say, however definite it may seem, it
turns out to
owe
its definiteness
to
my
adherence
when
that
in
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
knowledge which
never
alters, is
is
119
categories of thought,
for
all
individual minds.
of
we
could
raise
no question
that
any
is
not
ieven
the
assumes
which,
reason
able
to
raise
doubts
may
take
this,
and not causes make the world seem as That is a corollary of the last proposition, and I need not further explain it.
Passing to the fourth proposition,
this,
I think,
may
be taken to be that
we ought
to be prepared
it
seems
life,
for example, as
much
as
mechanism
morality as morality
much
it
as
life
religion as
much
as
for
the world as
different standpoints,
results of different
in the organisa-
And
if
Philosophy gives us
it
seems,
way
to
and as a
fifth
proposition,
we may
say
that
it is
120
ence
is
MEANING OF EEALITY
individual in
its
[i-^ct. v.
We
made,
of
start
vrith
from the
regard
it
It
is
the
"that"
is
to the
and
is
the
ultimate
form
experience
from
which we cannot get away, and which closes The work of thought is for us the circle.
merely to examine, develop, and further
define,
what
is
The notion
it
as con-
remnant of that
"window"
theory of the
diflFerent
mind
as
kinds through
which
it.
it
What
called the
finite
self,
itself in
day to be carried
of
it is
off
in
cofl&n,
only
Well,
and only
by abstraction resoluble into the moments of the particular and the universal, to exhibit the work of abstract reflection in forming the "that" at
each particular
stage
in
reality.
Now,
as
the
"that"
is
always
relative,
with the
it,
standpoint
from
we may
use a metaphor
of
if
may
thought in
the shaping of
121
We
may even
try to
disentangle
and arrange the abstract conceptions which go to this shaping to the extent of throwing them into a system, as Hegel sought to do. But Hegel never
tried
to
deduce
the
"that"
although
so,
he has
in
and abused
sophy
clusion,
was
The very foundation of his Philothat you could not deduce the
to
what he endeavoured
do
was
to
unfold the
Now,
many
critics
who have
Even
distin-
guished
men
like
should be looked
and nothing else. But there is a much more sympathetic and understanding critic of Hegel, one whom you all know here, Professor
Pringle Pattison.
his
last
has
to
my
comment
to
make upon
except that I would like to have more from In an earlier book, however, the same pen.
Hegelianism and Personality, he has made some criticisms with which I feel myself not wholly
122
MEANING OF REALITY
full
[i-ect. v.
justice.
There
separate
Professor
Pattison
seems
to
but they
to
this
Hegel,
he
to
says,
rightly
declared
indi-
that
was impossible
;
go beyond the
viduals of experience
must
and can only re-think experience and But then, he recognise in it degrees of reality. asks, what did Hegel regard as the highest view of reality what does he give us as the final view of ultimate reality? And, alluding to Hegel's
start,
;
World
it
Spirit,
difii-
is
to take
in
human
the
"Well,
is
self-consciousness, as
it
appeared
to
the
nineteenth
century,
identify
highest
in
manifestation
absolute
mind.
Pattison
criticism
this
view
Professor
Pringle
the same
it
following Lotze,
who made
of
Hegel,
was
movement of the mind could have culminated in what he called "a dialectical idyll on the shores of the Mediterranean." I notice that most of those who demur to the shores of the Mediterranean,
HEGEL'S PEOBLEM
seem anxious
the manifestation of absolute mind
is
123
rather to
But
and
my own
view
is
have recognised that there was any real issue which could legitimately be raised between his
point of view and theirs.
it,
He
how
to present as a system
human
experi-
which could be brought to bear upon it. Hegel never, as I think, meant to identify the absolute
mind with human consciousness; or to say that, because the absolute mind manifested itself at a particular plane of its development in what we call human consciousness, you had, therefore, got
an adequate picture of the absolute mind. What I understand him to have meant is that you
must always deal with the "that," with an individual, and that in the stage of history which in our time has been reached^ we have got what
for
us
is
the
highest
picture
of
it,
with
the
knowledge gets richer we shall get to a conception yet more adequate, and that, if human thought were not subject to the limitations of human weakness, we might have a conception of absolute mind beyond any which
certainty that as
124
MEANING OF EEALITY
human
[^^ct. v.
porary manifestation of
self-consciousness.
And,
to
therefore,
it
Pringle
Pattison,
Lotze's
criticism,
Hegel, because,
ambiguous passages in Hegel, commentators like Dr Hutchison Stirling have pointed to other passages in which his (Hegel's) conclusions on
this point are in a different sense.
Novr, in his
He
self
man
of his proper
by reducing him, as it were, to an object of a Universal Thinker," and "leaves the Universal Thinker also without any true personality." Then he goes on, t " If we speak of God at all, there
must be a divine centre of thought, activity, and enjoyment, to which no mortal can penetrate," + " The point of my criticism has been that in its execution the system breaks down, and ultimately
sacrifices these very interests to
a logical
God
and man
It is
disappear."
no business of mine to stand up here as the apologist of Hegel or of any other philosopher,
but I think that the Hegelian conception
closely akin to the conception
is
so
Ibid., p. 242.
CRITICS OF
to
HEGEL
it
125
is
right
out that this conclusion of Professor Pringle Pattison seems to be founded upon a too
point
is
way
seems to assume that very separation of the universal of thought from the particular which we have been combating. Of
It
course,
is
Professor
Pringle
Pattison's
standpoint
James
and
tive
Mr
Arthur Balfour.
criticism
He
most of the construcside of the system, and only stops short at the end; and in the later book, Man's Place
critique
Hegelian
and
of
Mr
he does not even stop short at the point where he stops in the earlier work, but pronounces himself frankly
Hegelian.
book on Theism, Professor Pringle Pattison again illustrates the gulf which separates him from Professor James and Mr Balfour. Agreeing with the Hegelian criticism upon those who deny or ignore the immanence of reason in the world, he doubts* whether Hegel did not assign
In his
little
"It
is well,
as
on the rational character of the Universe, but to make Thought the exclusive principle is either to fall into a one-sided extreme
insist
Hegel does, to
or
to
use
'thought'
fairly
in
non-natural
to
sense.
Thought cannot
be
made
include will,
* Theism, p. 45.
126
MEANING OF EEALITY
["-ect. v.
system
an
in
impersonal system
Bradley's vivid
Mr
phrase,
gories.'
is real,
and
*
is
own
reality.' "
That is Professor Pringle Pattison's criticism, and if Hegel had really laid down the doctrine against which he is contending, I should agree with that criticism. But whatever shortcomings in expression there are here and there in Hegel, they seem to me to arise, not from a want of desire to insist on the " that " in self-consciousness, but from a habit he had of constantly using his
own
special terminology in
description.
He
is
aware of the limitations which language imposes on him. Does he really differ
perfectly
well
from the conclusion arrived at by Professor Pringle Let us see. Pattison? I will quote first from
the Introduction to his "Logic" in the Encyclo-
pcedia^
"The
is
it
be,"
writes Hegel,
taken up
par.
3.
The Logic
6.
of Hegel;
127
;
and duties
this
From
etc.,
point
contents.
the forms
felt,
and whether they are merely felt, or felt with an admixture of thoughts, or merely and simply thought. In any one of these forms, or in the
admixture of
several, the contents confront con-
But when they are thus objects of consciousness, the modes of the several forms ally themselves with the contents and each form of them appears in consequence to give Thus what is the same rise to a special object. at bottom may look like a different sort of fact."
sciousness, or are its object.
;
Now let
pcedia and see what Hegel says of the nature of mind when he comes to deal with it * " The
:
essential
but
formally
essential
feature
of the
mind
is
Liberty," he says,
negativity
"i.e., it is
the notion's
absolute
or
it
self-identity.
Considered
everything external
its
very existence
infinite
individual
itself
its
immediacy;
identity."
can keep
of
affirmative in
negativity,
and possess
own
from
"The
distinction
Intelligence
par.
Will
is
* Hegel's
Encyclopiidie,
382.
6.
Hegel's Philosophy of
Minds Wallace's
Translation, p.
128
often
MEANING OF EEALITY
incorrectly taken
[^-ect. v.
to
mean
that each
has
existence
of
its
own,"
foul
of;
distinction
which
Professor
clearly in
view)
Pattison
deals
with
intelligence,
be without
as
is
The
possibility of a culture of
and of the heart without the intellect of hearts which in a one-sided way want only proves at intellect, and heartless intellects most that bad and radically untrue existences occur. But it is not Philosophy which should take such untruths of existence and of mere imagining for
it
said,
truth
that
etc.,
belong to a point
of view utterly alien to the mental level or to the position of philosophic study." *
Hegel does not here deny the distinction between will and intellect. What he says is that it turns out to have been provisional merely when
it is
Now
will
is
shown
by abstraclife,
purposes of everyday
Hegel's PMlosophy of
SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS
reality
is
129
sought.
The
is
objection
to
his
language
the mathematician,
who
sometimes forced by
if
it
doB.
If Hegel were reducing the Universe to selfsubsisting substance, as Spinoza did, there
would be
room
to
ness.
human
self-conscious-
self - consciousness is
only
an aspect, a stage, a plane, a degree in Reality. The dog and the angel disclose other degrees of
the logical evolution of the categories of mind.
And human
individual,
religion,
self-consciousness,
itself.
like
all
that
is
transcends
In
art,
morality,
when we
we
their prophets
no warrant
basis
the mere
fact
that
human
Kov a-Tw
self-consciousness
our
"that" our
the
our fellow creatures, but our most abstruse and there is no warrant in this, scientific thinking
human
self-consciousness as
more than a finite and relative presentation of Eeality. The great doctrine of Hegel, and, as I read him, of Aristotle, is that when the immediacy of our world of self-consciousness
out,
its
is
thought a
"that" discloses
new
significance,
130
fuller
MEANING OF EEALITY
"what," seen to be
intelligence
its
[iect.
v.
on
which
separated
by
the
appearance of pertaining
Personality
different faculties.
may
in one sense
all categories
the
and object takes place, and the mind is in its object and the object is for the mind. Now if the universal and the particular are indissolubly united in the individual, you have equally got
the union in that highest conception of individual
in
personality.
itself in
In
a
the parts
is
as
it
does in
life,
You have
at
which the
For the
seen,
objectivity
of this Universe
is,
as
we have
is
and
the
thus for
is
while,
mind
only in so far as
and
The
self,
the
spirit,
is
pre-
supposed as the condition through which experience in time becomes possible. Thus the self is
free,
it is
and
in so far as
It is
it
comprehends
itself
as free,
a person.
then
difficult to see
how we
PEESONALITY
get rid of the conception of
131
personal.
mind as
Personality
is
we proceed
for
us the
apparent foreignness of the 'object world, and even when thought out at its highest, it would seem
as though the mind must still be characterised by what we call self-conscious personality. It
may be
of
is
possible a
conception of personality, so
much above
the plane
human
experience, that
an object of what we
such a personality,
turn out to be,
level at
call worship.
when
mere
appearance.
of the
At such
One of the Many, would, of course, be transcended. But I will not linger over the conception
of personality in this highest sense, because I shall
have to return to
Lectures.
it
in the
What hampers
hard-and-fastness of
us
is
we
start
in
the
common
and that
it
is
we
are,
If I
am
to
if
am
to continue to
my
;
kind,
I must, even in
is
my
human
that
to say,
it is
only in
that, at-
and occasionally in the apergus of art, least on the theoretical side, I can transstandpoint.
cend
my
And
132
life
MEANING OF REALITY
which are not
theoretical, I
[i-ect. v.
standpoint.
the religious
closed circle.
do .transcend my The artist, the poet, the moral being, man they seem to escape from the
They touch a higher level it seems as if they could comprehend at a higher plane of intelligence, and thereby they show us how even
;
finite
Hegel has a sentence which is worth quoting in this connection, because he shows in it how essential reason, the power of thinking, is to He points out that the beast which religion. does not think, in the sense in which we are using the word, is not religious; and that the
higher you go in the scale of capacity to think,
the
more
distinctly
it
emerge, so that
just
itself.
it is
phases
in
:
which
"
manifesting
He
says *
Manand
is
In these
spheres of
human
life,
therefore,
thinking under
its
action
and
its
produc-
Now,
in connection
my
pre-
decessor in one of these Lectureships, Professor Royce of Harvard, has made some striking
contributions
to
the
treatment
of
the
subject.
God and
of Hegel;
par.
2.
The
Logic
Wallace's Translation, p.
133
volume of the series of Gifford Lectures which he calls The World and the Individual, he asks the question How can
the
second
know my
finite
nature?
He
answers
that,
rightly viewed, I
am
linked,
even in
my
weak-
In
God,
he
says,
self is
life
my
individuality.
it
The human
thing,
not a substance,
is
not a
but a
with a meaning.
No
one can
more strenuously than Eoyce refuse to separate Intelligence from Will. The individual is for him the embodiment of a meaning, a purpose, an end, in which Intelligence and Will are found
to be one.
is
an essentially
person
is
whose
viewed,
life,
same
its
eternally
by means of the present knowledge of the whole Now, from our point of its temporal strivings.
consciously
attains
perfection
of view,
God
is
is
a Person.
in its
Temporally viewed,
efforts
His
life
ness in so far
perfection,
temporal
of
towards
universe
this
consciousness
the
from act to
God's
act,
ence,
from stage to
life
Eternally
infinite
viewed,
that
however,
is
the
whole
ii.,
p.
418.
134
MEANING OF REALITY
it
[^-ect. v.
consciously surveys
life.
as
one
life,
God's
for
own
our
God
is
is
thus a Person,
because,
view, he
self-conscious,
is
of which he
perfection
is
ethically significant
as
the
or
however extended,
its
existence
contemporaneously with
in
own
and
it
last note."
*" God
His
totality as the
Absolute
again
Being
of
all
is
And
however
its
is,
arbitrarily
indeed
twofold aspect.
so far as
it
what
it
temporally
in
is
and somehow contrasted with all other events in the universe. It is what it eternally is, by virtue of those relations which appear not now, in our human form of consciousness, but which do appear, from the divine point of view, as precisely the means of giving their whole meaning
* Royce, The World and the Individual,
t
Ibid., p.
vol.
ii.,
p. 419.
429.
ROYCE'S HEGELIANISM
to these transient deeds of ours.
135
To view even
the
selfhood
of the hour, as a service of God, and to regard the life of our most fragmentary selfhood as the
divine
life
taking on
human
form,
From
view
it
is
we
and
are expressing
its
what has
uniquely individual
being."
show you
reality is nothing
is
Royce
Hegelian
is distin-
guished
among
is
those
whom
concep-
by the extent to which the prominent in his system. He has viewed, in the book which I have quoted, the ultimate reality as a mind, active on the practitions have influenced,
notion of will
much
as active on the
human
as a purpose,
as one
among
He
has no
difficulty in getting,
the
moral
element,
is
certainly
;
quite
as
set
and we may
136
MEANING OF EEALITY
I
[^ect. v.
must say for myself that I think that Professor Royce goes to the other extreme, and that to be logical he would have
Hegelian system.
to try to deduce, as he almost seems to do, the
of
what he
are
safer
purpose or meaning.
I think
we
no more than a
test,
of whether
we have
actually
into the
We
keep on with our pictorial representations of what cannot be pictorially represented under
at
level
of concep-
human
beings
we can never
fully rid
our-
selves
life
of this tendency,
seems to require. that "man is hotn not to solve the problem of the universe, but to^ find out where the problem
begins,
limits
and then to
of the
if
restrain
comprehensible."
That
is true,
is,
no
doubt,
finite
as he
living
away without
fellow-men,
ceasing to be a
man among
to
himself,
his
with
SUPREMACY OF EEASON
thought.
137
But
if
we take
is
the
words
in
literally,
to
some gap
in
if
the fabric of
reason,
reality
which
reason
there be
such a gap,
it is itself
the
creation
of
reason,
and reason
to
use
metaphor which I have used before must be adequate to bridge over the gulf which reason has made. No doubt the spectres which are raised by the narrowness of our categories disappear, when we once realise that they are due to narrow categories. We are not in the difficulty in which
the theologians are
to set
when they talk as if they had up another world to redress the balance
of this one.
We
its
and
disclosing
true
and deepest
as
Then,
besides
have
seems to
me
that
when he
offers
us a con-
coming which he
criticises.
When
he speaks of
a "divine centre of thought activity into which no mortal can penetrate," and enjoins an attitude
138
MEANING OF REALITY
is
[i-^ct. v.
of tempered agnosticism, he
really
no agnostic.
up once again the category of substance and the relation of the One and the Many. If he seeks to do more than to call a halt to the arrogance of some of Hegel's disciples, we must put to him Berkeley's new question, and If no answer ask. What do the words mean?
For he
is
surely setting
non apparentibus et de non existentibus eadem est ratio." "Things to which we can attach no meaning are things of which we cannot say that they exist." And He who it is no answer to refer us to Faith. does so comes at once within the range of the guns of critics like Professor James. For Professor James tells us that, in the light which modern Psychology has cast on the functions
apply the old
:
maxim
" De
of the subliminal
of
faith,
self,
man
is
the
man
of
immediate
theologies
certainty,
one which
"antedates
and
is
inde-
pendent of philosophies.
as
Mind
cure,
theosophy,
on
it
and
is
Therefore, it would seem that the only safe place, the only foundation upon which we can build a faith in things unseen, is the foundation of Reason itself, which must be capable of spanning the gulf which Reason has created.
FOEECAST
In the next Lecture
first
139
complete this
shall
new
con-
the one
we have
just
LECTUEE VI
In the course of the
last five Lectures,
a view of
knowledge has been developed which is, in many respects, very different from that which was
current
in
the
old
text-books
of
Logic
and
Psychology.
much
of growth,
and of volition or will, than was formerly the case. Even in connection with the problem of
knowledge, the practical aspect of the
volition has
self
in
come
to be
much dwelt
on.
This
extreme
formalism
of
the
of the
great
German
thinkers of last
century,
and to
dislike of the
On
been
science,
two
streams
of
tendency
origin,
in
speculative
both of German
which account
in great
The
first
of
these
is
Schopen-
made
SCHOPENHAUEE
take
place
141
over
the
teaching
of
Kant.
He
would
ledge as
Well,
Schopenhauer had
this
great merit in
and as
of detail
which caused it to exercise a profound influence upon people about him. But he, too, comes under
the guns of Professor
James.
will,
upon which he
He was
fails to
apt to
explain
how he
in-itself.
to
which
and was still more developed in modern form in the hands of my old master
Gottingen, Lotze.
at
whom He was
142
MEANING OF EEALITY
;
[--ect. vi.
a man, not merely of great intellectual stature, but of high moral worth and you could not be
in his presence without being
We
great
measure
from the Kantian teaching, so far as its theoretical side is concerned; but the influence of
Kant's
personality
still
remains,
because
the
all
students of
So
it
He
was
is
whose personality
It
is
apparent in
out of
quence
ing.
is
adequate as a presentation of
He
frankly
mere
of illusion,
been
that
scrutiny
Lotze, like
Schopenhauer, proceeded per saltum. Herbart and he have turned out to have been
relying
upon a bridge which will not bear the weight which they both tried to impose upon it.
But the
the
actual facts of
process
of
knowing
to
which
men
like
143
thinkers,
The
science
of
Psychology and the science of Logic have been revised under their influence. If, for example,
you take Logic as meaning the science of the construction by the individual mind of its world
of reality, taken as a process in time
tion which I think
defini-
would fit the text-books of the most modern type you find that there have
been co-operating, in producing the view of Logic which these text-books show, a series of modern
writers of great distinction, largely influenced by
Herbart and Lotze. Men like Sigwart, Bradley, and Bosanquet, have done work which stands at a very high level indeed.
Well, there has been another result of this
and psychological notions, and the consequent development of these two sciences. There has been a demand for a
revision
of
cmrent
logical
more
minds
close to
concrete
facts.
Modem
Science
the
early days
of idealism,
and the
it
to
for a
creased vigour.
moment, only to reappear with in" Reculer pour mieux muter " has
tended most to bring about
is
been
its
motto.
What
has
the
the
modern
idealists
have had
144
MEANING OF EEALITY
Aristotle wrote at a time
for
[lect. vi.
to deal with.
results,
which
places,
were non-existent.
And
we
although Hegel
see to-day that
He
as
and investigated
modern Science had put his material on a new footing. There was no Dedekind to work out for him the science of number; there was no liobachewski to throw
of
new
light
geometry.
on the assumptions of the Euclidean Joule and Helmholtz and Kelvin had
the theory of Energy; nor had biologists, like Schleiden and Schwann and Johannes Mliller, revised the conception of the living organism and the methods of Botany No Darwin, bringing to his and Physiology. facts the insight of genius, had yet given to the
world the
conception
of
the
origin
of species
and the view of evolution which came with it. The work of a Hegel was, therefore, necessarily abstract. It had to be done without the insight which these great minds have given to a later generation into nature and her processes. He was without the materials which we should consider absolutely necessary, and when criticism is brought to bear upon his work the criticism of those to
whom
all
everyday knowledge
we
can only
it
feel
that this
was bound
to be so,
and that
AMEEICAN PHILOSOPHY
145
has
operate varies
attitudes
and becomes
of
enriched.
The
critical
men
like
Professor James,
Mr
Bradley, are
is
all
to the good.
It is to the
that there
so
much
of
call
good an
There
is
no more
striking
modern
Harvard University, you have men James, Royce, and Miinsterbe'rg, examining
may
from the United States of America. Well, the standpoint which we have been trying
to
work out
knowledge the essence of the real world lies in its aspect as dependent on a system of universals, that is to say, upon mind and that alike in thought,
;
vidual and
definite,
the process
is
a process of
we
may
call it so,
by mind.
This, as
we have
seen
and as I have
insisted over
in these
mean
object can be
But
K
it
146
does
MEANING OF EEALITY
mean
that
["-ect. vi.
when we
reflect
we
separate out
them
in
but universals.
is
so estab-
mere hard - and - fastness which has been shown to be nothing more than the outcome of abstraction at certain standpoints and for certain purposes. The modern developments of the Sciences of Psychology and Logic
distinguished from the
Let
me
take Psychology
first.
Psychology we
may
arid
is
define in a
modern
Bosanquet on
which
is
happen
that
to
an immediate experience taken as belonging to something that has a past and a future. Now, there is a preliminary observation which one
has always to
kind.
It
make
necessarily
is
involves
presuppositions,
because this
and that
is
what
must have as
its
object the
starts,
Psychology
and
known
it
as an individual in time
in other
words,
system of the
just an event,
PSYCHOLOGY
or a series of events.
reflection at
147
the outcome
of
This
is
logy itself
follow out
teaching.
itself
The
child,
the infant,
The notion of
it is
as distinct from
education
mean education
most elementary sense, the tuition which nature gives and as the outcome of certain purposes, consciously or unconsciously formed, which guide the child in the organisation and building up of its experience, and teach it to look upon itself as belonging to the social whole of which it really
forms a part.
At
first
it
does not
know
itself
consciousness
is
that there
is
a part of
its
outside
it
surroundings
comes to recognise
feeling
capacity for
distinguishes, for
and then by abstraction builds up from this the knowledge of a world, but a process of making more and more definite what I use is at the outset an indefinite continuum. this word " continuum " because I want to impress upon you that for the psychologist there is no
experience
148
MEANING OF REALITY
[i^^ct. vi.
There can be no such thing as a separate feeling or sensation, unless thought has first been there with its universals to qualify
with isolated
units.
The beginnings
Now, while
that
is
perfectly true
as regards
The psycho-
called Psychophysics
the
bringing of Psycho-
and with Physics. The outcome of Psychophysics is a tendency on the part of the modern psychologist to look more and more at the stream of
events in his mind, the subject-matter with which
he has to
units
deal, as
though
or
it
consisted of definite
of
feeling
sensation
which
It
could
be
upon
Hume
artificial,
not a natural
very well.
will
PROFESSOE MUNSTERBERG
berg,
149
who
book of
his,
Psycho-
logy
is
as soon as
we we
speak of psychical
objects, of ideas
and
feelings
and
volitions,
as contents
of consciousness,
speak of an
artificial
life
categories of real
no longer apply,
in has, therefore,
trans-
formation which
connection,
existence
lies
and which
if
a right to
only
acknowledged."
a complex
is
t "
logy.
that
of
each
the accom-
in time
and
space,
is
influenced by others
is
then not an
arbitrary
theory.
It
is
the
human
chosen for
is
its
logical
bound by
its
own
dis-
last
sentence, this
psychologist insists
on what I have
He
it
out that
is
purposes
or
ends which
appearance of
reality.
p. 267.
t Ibid., p. 271.
150
MEANING OF EEALITY
Again,* explaining the
artificial
[lect.
vi.
basis of the
:
psychophysical
states
standpoint,
he says
;
" Psychical
must be described somehow otherwise the If possibility of psychology would be excluded. they are not directly communicable, we must take
refuge in indirect methods;
are
if
vidual,
we must
link
all."
which belong to
look into
my
first,
my
my
two
I
distinct sets of
myself alone
am
all
of the
other
all
of
see
You
if
can
my
of
lips
move.
You
could even,
the contents
my
an end to these Lectures, see the physical concomitants of the process of the development of
my
thought and
its
own mind
who
sit
there
me, I
can
you about it, through those universals of language which are the main medium of intercourse between human beings.
* Miinsterberg, Psychologi/ and Life, p. 49.
PEESENTATIONISM
151
Miinsterberg points out that Psychology can only give us direct experience of what is going on in our own minds, and that, in order to get what
is
and other people, we resort either to mere abstract descriptions in language founded on the imiversal element which has been separated out by reflection,
to
common
ourselves
must
or to
the
physical
processes
which accompany
mind.
Therefore,
endeavours to transform the presentation of his mental experience into that kind of abstract
atomism of which Miinsterberg speaks. It helps him to connect psychical with physical phenomena,
the
latter
of
which he can
subject
to
exact measurement, and so indirectly measure the former. But when you are trying to trace the
genesis of the development of a child's conscious-
you are driven away from the point of view which we have been discussing, and which is sometimes called " Presentationism." Because of its double method, Psychology is a complex science. No doubt the first method is the natural one. But this method of presentation of which I have spoken is a very characteristic feature of the Psychology of our time and in reading books upon Psychology, and in making use of the results which we get in them, we must always remember the transformation of which Miinsterberg speaks as having taken place, and which exists only from standpoints and for purposes
ness,
;
the
standpoints or purposes
of
152
the
MEANING OF REALITY
investigator
into
[^^-^'^- v.
the
ultimate
nature
of
reality.
Passing from this phase of things, and going on, the only other observation which need be
the presentational
it
that
in
is
be
must be antecedent to any knowledge of that change, the answer is, that this view presupposes an abstract knowledge of a system in which the process takes place, a system in which the self has a position, and that the consciousness or knowledge of the mere change is in time antecedent to this abstract knowledge of a system in which it occurs. In other words, you have an inversion of the natural order of things when you are at the psychological point of view. The fact first in time is really the last in reflection, and in the abstract system of knowledge which Psychology creates the natural sequence is just inverted. Even acute writers often forget this, and confuse the order of things, overlooking
self
the
artificial
knew
very
little.
The notion
of
subconscious
which Professor James has so fully discussed, and the notion of corporeal feelings,
processes,
organic sensations,
than
any-
ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS
thing else to do
153
with what
his
the
ordinary
man
upon
in
body and
identifies
these
like
cast light
But,
all
conceptions
of the
as soon as
we
try
to
make use
them-
them
is
disclose
selves as
it
self-contradictory
and vanishing.
simply
let
And
quite clear
that
if
we
the
thought
the
soul
shall
play
the
is,
naturally
upon
time
itself
genesis
in
of
of
apart
from
atomic
artificial
presentation,
soul's
life
we
is
find
that the
origin
of the as
not a
series of
feelings,
Hume
thought, but
the
making more
definite
of an
indefinite
and
changing continuum.
Now
We
why one
memory with
the image
But before you can have any association of ideas you must have the ideas already juxtaposed in some relation, and that you can only have if you have already got the very
system of the object world, the genesis of which
to
account
for
by
its
association.
condition
associated
to
of
possibility,
psychical events
for.
which
it
is
called
in
account
It
is
of
164
very
little
MEANING OF EEALITY
[i-^ct. vi.
nature of reality.
you
try
You
first
eliminate
position as a particular
the
general
to
is
that yoiu"
Ego comes
thinker
all.
The truth
is
The any abiding conception of the- individual. just because when pass you individual eludes you,
from the rough and
practical,
though complex,
life,
way
individuality
comes
and take
life.
When,
is
for instance,
we
always relative
some
special standpoint.
We
really
have some
is
social reference
in our minds.
There
a basis
clear
is,
it
is
155
exists
about the
If said in the
any truth in
is
preceding Lectures,
the soul
it is
" quite simply, and ask what we mean by the use of the expression,
it is
When we
plain that
is
just the
life
When we
is
speak of
just the
we mean
man
free
of a
human
not
being.
We
or
notion of the
individual,
which
fix
in everyday
life
we do
of
it.
analyse
precisely
without
at an exhaustive definition of
When we
mean
speak
man's
soul,
really
we man
The
relation of
much
better expressed
which the rest of his life finds its completion, than in any metaphor that suggests a thing distinguished from another thing. Soul and body are related as higher and
point,
and
in the aspect in
lower,
and
it
is
just
the
idealistic
standpoint that
common-sense way of looking at the matter, quite fully and simply, and so avoid many of the consequences which follow from the adoption of
156
other
[''=ct. vi.
danger of
materialism
are
things
so,
because
we
of
not
regarding
phases,
world
of
as
made up
represents
separate
each
which
of
an
and,
independent
reality.
We
are looking
upon the
soul,
world as containing a
series
aspects,
when we come
to
the aspect
of the
we
human
being just as
and one in which we rise to a standpoint from which the consequences of identifying the individual with his body no longer trouble us, because they have no longer any terrors for us.
Now
clear,
made
pretty
and that
self is
on
development of knowledge,
its
foundation.
With
is
supposed to
be,
in
somehow in contact with reality. Just as Psychology, when you work it out, finds for you no resting-place, so Logic works away
everyday
life,
it
started, the
somehow
different
from
Logic shows
by the individual
how the world is built up mind, how the individual conIt is not
it is
looking at this as a
it
is
not like
LOGIC
Psychology, because
it
157
is
not as a series of events, but as the connected process of thought by which the world becomes
what
it
is
That
is
the
between
this
minds to
the
Logic to be a science which could be dealt with by itself, and isolated from the rest of Philosophy.
Looking at Logic in the light of what we now know to have been a misconstruction of the
spirit
of
the Aristotelian
it
system,
into
there
is
no
doubt that
ceived
really
was erected
very
artificial one.
to
be a
simple
science,
a most
the
The
been
still.
that
science
of
Logic
has
stood
in Aristotle we find something like the hard definitions of the subsequent formal Logic,
Though
still
we must not assume that Aristotle did not know a great deal better than his would-be
interpreters.
Aristotle's
Logic,
to
as
has
been
their
observed,
may be
taken
his
be the method by
which he taught
that
is
pupils to
commence
it
may
well be
really
it
an
artificial
found
Philosophy.
Well, Logic, as
we conceive
it
nowadays, carries
just
158
MEANING OF REALITY
[i-^ct. vi.
came to be and that objective system consists The mind is of what we are obliged to think. free, but the nature of the mind is to be rational, and the mind, following out its own processes,
is
jection,
were,
give
us
the
objective
world.
In
that
way
whole,
is
knowledge more definite. I will follow this out in a moment, but what I want to keep before you is that, as has been pointed out in the earlier Lectm^s, reality consists in an objecis indefinite
what
tive system,
that
is
subject of the
judgment
made
definite
and made
It
permanent by making
is
on the universal aspect of the individual that thought in its abstraction dwells, and Logic is just
the building
of the system
notions, so
of these universals.
familiar that
many
we seem
to be passive in apprehend-
ing them, such notions as present and past and future, are all found to be constructions of
thought
are
which
belong
to
the
universal.
The
general conceptions of a
likewise
constructions
When
one
man
world as the
other
man
to
whom
him,
understands
both
mean
CORRESPONDENCE
common
is
159
;
and what
communicated is the universals of thought which language deals with and embodies, and thus makes possible the establishment of a certain correspondence between the views of These correspondences each particular mind. One man eats are not mere abstract identities. a loaf, and another, seeing him do it, understands what he is doing, and understands it by means of a common system of universal conceptions, through which their experiences correspond in a fashion that makes to each real what the
other
is
doing. of the
self is
judgment
taken
starts
with
as,
to use a
The mere
fact of "thisness" is
and reality is a particular qualified by a and is therefore always individual. The reality of the two is only to be found in the individual, and it is only by abstraction that you can break them up. When I say "this tumbler," I describe it as " this " by an abstraction of thought, dragging out the universal element in it but none the less I start in my judgment with an actual individual of experience, which I cannot construct in thought, and which I cannot get away from. The judgment then starts with the "this," and
universal,
;
the "this,"
when we
follow
it
out, is
found to be
160
related
MEANING OF REALITY
to,
[i-ect. vi.
taken as a whole.
universe,
and inseparable from, the Universe In the individual I have got a potential and implicit relationship to the whole
starting with
reality.
this,
proceeds
tumbler
full
I have
qualified
my
"this" by a
Knowledge
real,
is
is
thus a
continuous judgment,
is
to say
its
subject,
with which
we
are in contact.
The "this" or "that" can never be deduced. The judgment can qualify it, and does quahfy it by bringing it into a new relationship which can only be expressed as a universal, and so we get back
the
"this"
Take,
or
"that"
enriched
with
new
meaning.
for
Euclid
The squares
of a
right-
of
the
hypo-
and taking it as a "this," I proceed to qualify it by judgment after judgment, dragging out its implication, the reXos which is presupposed in it, and I thereby continuously enrich the conception
started.
THE JUDGMENT
significance until I arrive at the
is this
161
conclusion.
It
say-
that the
judgment
is
It is presupposed
by the
of
things
in
vidual mind,
it
is
Now,
footing
I will
on
that
because
you
will find
article* written
He
classes,
with
the
view,
with
the
result
that
Bacon against formal Logic became Even Kant thought that the old formal Logic was final, and had made no progress
revolt
of
inevitable.
162
cies
MEANING OF REALITY
of recent
[^^^- v-
they illustrate
thought which I have been trying to set before you. These sciences, although not properly metaphysical,
have the closest bearing on Metaphysics. They belong to the borderland of the region in
for Reality;
and they
when
They leave the student with the conviction that neither in mere reflection nor in mere feeling is the ultimately Real to be found.
They,
like
other forms
of inquiry,
point
the
to
different
conception
of
it
of the
final
Universe,
analysis,
con-
ception
as,
in
the unique
Mind,
according as
the other.
If
it
is
from the standpoint of Logic, we have it on the one side, but put before us as the subject of judgment, the "this" or "that"
take
we
qualifies,
with
is
same
If
individual, but
Psychology,
we we
take
get
it
it
as the
when
of
we have removed
the
artificial
scaffolding
for
by ourselves
the
of
short
this,
conof
its
venience of treatment,
existence,
discloses
totality
and
nothing
as
content.
we
Whichever, then, of these several paths elect to follow, we find that they all lead to
HISTOEY OF PHILOSOPHY
the same point,
to the
163
Individual which,
more
of
be
the
ultimate
and
irresoluble
nature
Reality.
adhered
pathway.
makes
of the
it
If the
which
it
unfolds
difficulty
little
thought.
He
great thinkers of
mapped out
have hesitated,
have stopped, have even, under the influence of metaphor, strayed, but have not the less improved
the
will
way
see
after
in
them.
He
our
own day
whether
the
reflection,
or
constructive,
is
steady in
same
be
of
direction.
The
history
of Philosophy
it
will
tale
for
no longer a
genuine
progress
towards
more
part
adequate
definition,
I have
now
it
first
I have endeavoured
show
in
how much
seems,
is
world
pass in
as
it
due
to
the
ends
I
or
purposes which
we have
I
shall
in our minds.
shall
my
sciences,
and
show
that
the
special
164
MEANING OF REALITY
purposes, in
virtue of
[i-^ct. vi.
own
set of conceptions
But Science gains greatly in so rid of the Here and the Now.
world from a standpoint which
of the individual,
takes
the
independent
the
abstract
world
beyond the
limits
and it amplifies and extends which it so creates, far within which the senses of the
It places the
same abwhatever
This
is
may be
his
particular
circumstances.
is
to be
found the shaping of the world as And now we have traversed the
the pathway to Eeality.
of
it
seems.
stages of
first
We have
seen something
how
another.
Knowing and Being stand to one The everyday world no longer confronts
remote from
its
intelligence as something
moulding
as
of
power.
purpose.
the manifestation of
But
in front of us lies
who
seeks for
God
Valley of Humiliation.
obscure and
reign.
man
to the
more
region where
the sciences
There we confronted with serious hindrances, and the path barred by notions of reality which present more difficulties
shall find ourselves
THE SCIENCES
165
Yet we need not lose heart. For if we grasp firmly the sharp weapon of criticism with which
we have put to rout the metaphors of the plain man, we may find it a weapon with which we can
dispel as easily the spectral figures that haunt the
traveller over the
ground that
lies in front.
BOOK
II
LECTUEE
In the first part of this course of Lectures I endeavoured to work out a view of the ultimate nature of Reality which would afford firm ground upon which to tread in following the difficult pathway that lies before us. It is one of the chief recommendations of that view that it is by no means novel. We find traces of it in Heraclitus of Ephesus further traces in the Socratic questionings; a yet further development in the Ideas of Plato and something hardly to be distinguished from the most modern form of the doctrine in the teaching of Aristotle about Metaphysics and Psychology. When Hegel first taught
; ;
the world
how
he rendered a great service to men for he showed them that the history of Philosophy is not a vain
rejection of hypothesis after hypothesis, but
truth,
is,
in
of a single
The main featm-e of the answer which Aristotle and Hegel alike gave to the question as to the
ultimate nature of Reality was, that
we can never
170
CEITICISM OF CATEGORIES
the
["-^ci-
1.
form of Individuality, that the ultimately real is an experience in an individual form which contains nothing but what is individual a form in which the particulars of sense can no
get behind
can the
universals
of
thought have
any
and giving meaning and existence to these vanishing particulars. owing to the poverty of It is language, which is always derived from the familiar standpoints of everyday life at which this kind of problem does not arise, that we have not ready to
subsistence except as setting, fixing,
their
hand words adequate to express the proper relationships and conceptions to which this doctrine points, and that the metaphors and analogies into
which we
slip are
thoroughly misleading.
life,
At
the
for the
we speak and
whereas, as
his
is
had a
fixed
nature;
Wordsworth points out in the last of sonnets to the Eiver Duddon, the form alone
" For, backward, Duddon
I see
unchanging
!
as I cast
my
eyes,
Still
and will abide glides the Stream, and shall for ever glide
is,
dies."
When we
let
its
own
find
own movement, we
of experience are no more and permanent than the water of the flowing
THE EXTEENAL WOELD
171
Duddon. It is only in knowledge, and particularly by reason of the purposes or ends which have
to be fulfilled in organised knowledge, that the
its fixity
of aspect.
is
It is only
individual
conceived as a
think
hard-and-fast entity.
nature,
When we
everyday
out
its
even
at
it
our
is
standpoint,
we
discover that
duced orderliness and definiteness into what at another standpoint would be but a confused blur. Between the organism, for instance, ever taking in and giving out in the metabolism of its material, and the environment which surrounds it, we could,
if
we looked
line.
and-fast
may
we know
discriminating
senses
of
a
in
The
to
individual
phenomenon seems,
in
short,
be
rescued
the
general
flux
of
which we bring to bear in developing knowledge a knowledge which therefore depends for its form
determine
is
the
This
everyday
life,
where what we
the same
more
strikingly so in different
kinds of knowledge.
we
172
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
life,
[^^ect.
i.
we apply
in
common-
sense suflBce.
Nowhere
in
do we witness a perfect square or a perfect circle. Yet, the mathematician, by abstracting from every
other property, has definite conceptions of these
his
science.
It is
plain,
that
since
experience
to
must present
the
difference
aspects
according
between the categories employed, a critical examination of these categories must be an essential part in any complete theory of knowledge. Such
a criticism
is
required, for, if
will
it
does not
exist>
the
world of imagination
fallacies
and
when we look through the stereoscope and think that we see things in three dimensions, when we
are only under the influence of an incomplete view
The imcon-
of that knowledge,
and of the
relativity of
what
is
in truth only
a mere aspect of
In
of
this
way
the
life
become hyposta-
and we
God
as though
He
Thus
out
there
come upon us
of
the
SUPEESTITIONS OF COMMON-SENSE
point to
speculative problems,
173
where
it
has no
application.
hypostatised,
The ideas of this standpoint are and the very habits of thought which
our
rough-and-ready
beings
fellow
human
who have
These
of the
main
like social
by
letting
some of
its
aspects
aspects.
other
And
as
it
title
to the appellation
of real.
Such a
by means of abstraction under sets of categories which are peculiar to each of them, and by their use of which the various Sciences are distinguished and ought to be classified. By means of
these categories each Science strips the individual
(for instance, the triangle or the circle, or
what the
man would call a triangle or a circle) of the immediacy in which many points of view uncritically converge. The mathematician abstracts, in
plain
upon
relationships,
which by
this
means
He
body and
his organs of
and
is
174
CRITICISM OF CATEGOEIES
as, for instance, in
[i-^ct.
i.
the science of
Wliat he presents to himself as the result of his reasoning, a result come to through
the
Astronomy.
mediation
of
abstract
knowledge,
is
again
He
lie
own
science,
but,
by
we
knowledge.
Let us turn then to a thinking consideration of the methods of Science. First of all, we must
look at the nature of the
operate, before
field in
we
of their respective
By
this
realm
we
mean
the world as
it
which
is
most foreign
to abstract thought.
really foreign, for the
Yet even
turns out
when
is
turned in
upon
on.
it.
This topic
we shall have
to pursue further
At
how
little
meaning even an ordinary thing in space has apart from the abstract universals of reflection, wiU suffice.
What
is it
that I recognise
is
all
changes of
foliage,
and notwith-
IDENTITY
AND DIFFERENCE
it.
175
it,
life
in the
metabolism of
Its leaves
may
fall, its
branches
may be
cut
off,
but yet
it
remains this
it.
tree, different
Thus we have
and
difference, conceptions
which belong to the xmiversals of thought, playing a vital part in giving us our knowledge of the tree.
Again, the tree means for us the union of experiences through totally different senses
taste,
colour, touch,
etc.
smell, resistance,
is
muscular
effort,
and
is
this
union
In the
supposed hard-and-fast image of the tree which we have really thus fixed through the universals
is an infinity of relations and pre" have incorporated in the " This which we dicates of the tree, and they have meaning only as related
of thought, there
and harmonised in reflection. An infant does not know what a tree is and cannot distinguish it; and in a universe which was known only to a mind at the stage of that of an infant, the existence of a tree would have no meaning.
Now
whole of nature,
this
by abstraction
for the
176
CEITICISM OF CATEGORIES
[lect.
i.
we
con-
and these fine ourselves to the relations of space relations of space, excepting when hypostatised by
abstraction,
lie
relations with
which
life
they are in no
conflict.
The
tree, for
example,
is
quasi-purposive maniin
which
it
The
tree, in
life,
and the
not
relation of the
whole to
parts in this
life is
thing in space,
we
moment,
our view of
regard
it
it
in daily
life
the standlife
or permit of
If,
being expressed in
its
own
terms.
therefore,
can be presented as
life
spatial, it
all
and organisation. But in the case even of things which are more naturally looked at as arrangements which do not transcend the merely spatial
view
such as a rock
of complete
externality
and mutual
other aspects
beauty,
and so on
NATUEE
for
177
very
little
the
mathematician, and
for
the
physicist.
When we
word
it
sense of the
divorce
it
we
try to
it
exclude,
or at
moment
seems
to
start
from a
itself
separated
from
a
self,
we
we
vaguely
indicate
the
sentient
body with
its
organs
a
an
itself as
soon as
is
body
is itself
object in nature.
Thus we
find that
we
are dealing
an
indi-
is
part of the
reflec-
system.
When
out
scrutinised,
of nature
turns
to
be
an
is
abstract
the
character
to the
of which
externality
ceives
its
it,
externality
first
mind which
per-
and, at
sight at
any
rate, externality of
of
own parts each to the other. In the language the German metaphysicians, and for that matter M
178
CRITICISM OF CATEGOEIES
it
[i^ct.
i.
of the Greeks,
from
which thought, as hypostatised in abstraction, is distinguished, and to which thought, similarly dealt
with in abstraction,
Other.
is
itself related
is
only as the
The divorce
is
there
tinction
ledge.
It is a disno such divorce inherent. which emerges at a late stage in knowIn the early life of the soul there is no
distinction
It
self.
comes only with the development of reasoning, and as part of the general intellectual system.
We
may
and the two may be said to be abstract ways of regarding what are the moments in this individuality. As we have already seen, our knowledge as human beings is knowledge from the standpoint of
a particular
self,
conscious of itself as
finite.
We
are, as it were,
self-conscious
It is true that
under
be
these distinctions
but
the
in
our
ordinary proceedings
we
their
on
basis
and
assumption
of
validity,
and
we
sense,
as
ourselves
falling
within
We
can by means of
PLANES OF INTELLIGENCE
with which
it
179
would be otherwise
that
is
to say,
and it may be that our own intelligence, as viewed in daily practice, has meaning only as a stage towards
ours,
It
may be
its
that
it
when
pre-
is
thought out
beginning, end,
it
and ultimate
reality.
Yet
in the
world as
seems
with
we
working
reality
us take an
of
of
the
procedure
of
one
those
shall
we
examine
in
more
to
detail.
What
does a physicist do
say,
when he has
investigate,
an explosion?
its
it
cause.
He
were a mere
example, the
or
outside
event,
for
match to gunpowder. But reflection him much further as he proceeds towards He begins by reasoning and scientific knowledge.
carries
mind
gunpowder
of the
in
atoms of nitrogen of the proximity of the carbon which is required for the production of the carbonic oxide and dioxide and of the presence of the sulphur, which is a useful adjunct in the
;
180
CEITICISM OF CATEGORIES
of
[i-ect.
i.
production
realises
the
chemical
of
change.
infinity
He
of
then
other
essential to enable
and many
In the
end he sees that the setting of the match was really only one out of an inexhaustible multitude of conditions, and that the reason why an tmreflecting
person
such
is
as,
say, the
schoolboy
who put
the
it
light to the
powder
singles it out
and names
as
is
the cause,
What
match to the powder its importance, is the it is a freely done act, for which somebody is responsible and may be punished. The
notion that
reality,
effect,
turns out to be
the
this,
sum
if
of an infinity of conditions.
More than
conditions,
was not
these conditions
an individual form.
of science,
Thus the
is
physicist, the
whose object
clear
will enable
immaterial, and to
181
self-
The
cause,
when thought
from the
effect,
out,
is
which is just the aggregate of its conditions viewed from another standpoint. The
physicist gets as the result of his work, not the
mere abstraction
called
in-
of the phenomenon.
what
mere
facts of things.
He
believes
in laws
reflection;
and so nature,
those aspects of
it
physicist, turns
out to depend, not upon her otherness from thought, her exclusion of mind, but upon the capacity of the reflective mind to discover its own
universals, to find itself in nature.
In this very
same nature, which we started by taking to be the immediate presentation of the senses, confronted with which the mind seemed merely passive, we now
reflection is
everywhere opera-
it.
We
discover in
nature yet higher relations, which take us beyond those of which the pure physicist can alone take
cognisance
the
It is only for
and
therefore
self-abolishing,
that
the
living
182
CEITICISM OF CATEGOEIES
be regarded as a thing.
[^^-
'
organism can
relation of the
itself in
In
the
them and
of the parts,
we
to
nearer
it,
citizens acting
together for
consciously
the fulfilment of a
set
common purpose
when we
that
we
of
life
to
mechanism.
actual
There
as
is
no such conenables
tinuity in
experience
us
to
categories
we
employ.
The tendency
to
hypostatise,
here
and tormented the minds of men with innumThe physicist passes away, by erable spectres. means of his group of conceptions, from the seeming disconnected externality to the
properties of things,
to
one
another
of
the
essence which
The
biologist
away from
just
as
completely
as
life
transcends the
PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
categories
183
results
of mechanism.
Thus, in the
their
abstract
the
appearances
which
nature
reality.
presents
seem to us to be degrees of
of the results
the validity
sciences.
It
simply for
arranges
entangles
various
and
the
of of
the
these
aspects,
and
is
by
categories
that
to say,
by an examination of
gets
rid of con-
it
can, of
bad meta-
As Hegel
be
this,
says
* "
The
first
established
against
there
is
experimental
that in
it
it
much more
it
of thinking
better than
than
it
is
in physics thinking
then, that
it is
imagines.
only in the
mode and
Nature as meaning the entirety of the sciences, and Philosophy of Nature as meaning the account
is
investigating the
1842 edition.
184
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
its
[i-ect.
i.
Science proceeds on
purposes, the exten-
own
is
man
restrained.
knowless
man
is
more
or
the
man
is it
would
social ends, to
make
man of science. In the same way it is not to the purpose of the man of science to make use of the comprehensive categories which are required by him who cannot rest at any stage
conceptions of the
short of the ultimate nature of things.
The knowif
may
he attains to
its
it,
be in
own
fashion
man
of science
more abstract than that of the plain man. Yet each is necessary for the fulfilment of its own end, and none can fulfil the ends of the
others.
It appears to
the
problem
call
of
Natur-
name
HEGEL'S NATUR-PHILOSOPHIE
scrutiny.
185
The reasons
for this
are partly to
be
which people are apt to forget, that those who were endeavouring, even less than a century ago, to work out a view of the system of the different degrees of appearance in nature and of the relations of these degrees to each
frequently, in the fact,
other and to
perfectly
mind
furnished
with
what
to-day,
in
the
twentieth century,
able material.
we
When, for example, Hegel wrote the book which made that distinguished physicist,
the late Professor Tait, so angry, the principle of
the
conservation
of
energy had
in
not
yet
been been
discovered;
condition;
chemistry was
a very imperfect
pushed forward to anything like the point which it has reached in our time and the great doctrine
;
was still in a rudimentary condition. The result was that Hegel, who had to work with such materials as the Time - Spirit furnished to him, could not do more than work
of biology, evolution,
His Natur-Philosophie is no doubt open to criticism by the men of science of our day, but if anyone were to undertake a similar task now, his work would be found
as
it
to be just as defective
if
of the knowledge
later.
of three
186
CEITICISM OF CATEGOEIES
^^ct.
i.
by way of advance more rapid and more certain than that in any other department of knowledge,
the
great
principle
that
the
ultimate
view
of
a particular period
is
He
But men
like
Darwin
in
heroes of the
in
world,
work becomes
the
large
measure
their
take
place
of
those
which
Then
of Hegel,
moment
to speak
we have
to bear in
we
have
is
by himself after the fashion of a German professor, to form the text, each of them, for the lecture of a day, and the notes taken down by the students who heard his oral discourses upon these texts.
As
tells
he lectured no
less
than
eight
times
upon
this subject,
HEGEL'S NATUR-PHILOSOPHIE
ment and substance
have
not, for
187
We
Hegel's
own conmany of
He
the end
of 1831,
out or
form.
even edit
lectures
in
their
final
Had
he
he might have
avoided
many mistakes
of detail, which he
shared with
some of the prominent men of science of his time. For example, at page 304 of the 1842
edition of the
Natur-Philosophie, he,
time,
like
many
The where
others at that
follows
Goethe's theory of
colour
result
in
is is
dealing
with
a topic
form
gives
very
much
affected
us
for
conclusions
even
philosophical
region
where
exact
and
accurate
is
knowledge of true
Indeed,
as
I
scientific
principle
essential.
concerned with the criticism of the categories of science, the work has constantly to be done The contribution which reflection over again.
under abstract categories has made to the science of the time, and the investigation of the nature and limits of these categories, can only be adequately estimated and
who have full knowledge of the results attained by the people who are competent judges of results,
the
men
of science themselves.
This
is
the reason
188
CRITICISM OF CATEGOEIES
I approach the consideration
[i-^ct.
i.
why
of the topics
statements of the
Practical
life
has
taught
me
to
that there
no temptation so
insidi-
the
And
yet,
life
with such
to
knowledge as he can
get,
so
we who wish
obtain.
we can with
better
their
if
such light as
we can
We
we make mistakes in our estimates of work, and we must beg them to believe
is
that
it
of
the limitations of our knowledge, but the conviction of the necessity of trying to get clear notions
through so
difficult
and obscure a
valley.
lies
On
on the
other,
in uncritical metaphor.
We
LECTUEE
" If, Thesetetus,
II
you have a wish to have any more embryo thoughts, you will be all the better for the present investigation, and, if not, you will be soberer and humbler and gentler to other men, not fancying that you know what you do not know." We may take to ourselves the words which Plato makes Socrates address to his pupil after leading him to
a place very like that
Pathway
further,
to Eeality.
we have
was
in
it
all
we remained
so long
its
dangers.
the
Looking backwards, we can see that searcher after truth has escaped from a
of being
overpowered by some evil But now he has learned to be on metaphor. his guard against those who approach him with such suggestions as that mind is a thing, or man a machine, or God a physical cause. He has been
his
search
189
190
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
defence, the
[i-^ct. h.
power
to
with which he can now cut such dangerous figments of confused thinking into If he will keep this always in his hand, pieces.
he
may
lies in front,
Let us take a view of the prospect that lies Experience has turned out to be an before us.
aireipov,
an
indefinite manifold
it
made
definite only
in
so far as
is
bound together and determined as here and now, then and there, this and
general conceptions,
that.
mode
of
reflection which,
by
isolating
and confining
itself
of reality, gets
away
from the here and the now, and transcends the apparently immediate experience by which in selfconsciousness
minds confronted. We have used the word "science," but we have not confined its meaning, as is sometimes done, to. what has the balance, the measuring rod, and
we
find our
its
ultimate
and
future, of the
it
here used.
The
instinct of a
is
is
is
common-
191
But
if
upon which the procedure of, say, the moralist, or the artist, can be shown to be founded, these may
belong to
its
domain.
is
What
journey necessitates
one another.
indications
We
have
already found
in
the
we have
reality,
nature of
to block the
who keeps
which he
is
furnished.
mankind a great deal that is of the utmost use. They have cleared from the pathway of life the weeds of superstition and of prejudice, which are
the outgrowth
of unreflecting
They have
vastly
it
may when
extend
Even
oflSce,
and raised
have afibrded
a new subject of interest for those who have no fear, and have faith in the power of human reason. How these spectres came to be raised, it will be
our business to try to find out as we encounter them one after another at the various stoppingplaces where
we
Our task
will
involve some sort of attempt at a general view of the various sciences, and the marking out on our
192
CEITICISM OF CATEGOEIES
rule over.
[i-ect.
...
map
and
of
what is the most general aspect of things with which Science concerns itself, and of how
it
goes
to
work.
We
will
begin
with a very
simple example.
am
stand-
I see in the
the
line,
field of
my
view,
I want to find out the box from the other. I could, by taking a long time and great deal of trouble,
another
go to the railway with the measuring rod which I have by me, and measure the distance. But the
little
instrument lying by
my
off
side
which can be
to do better.
of,
me
my
rod,
and mark
a distance
say,
and measure the angle of the straight line got by looking at the box from that point. I have now got a triangle, and I know the measurement of the A simple base and of the angles at the base.
calculation gives
me
next ascertain by similar observations and calculation the distances to the other signal-box.
Then,
straight line
drawn from
MEASUEEMENT
one of
193
my
by subtraction of the already observed angles,, the angle which these lines, taken from that point to the two boxes, make with each other. I have now
got the measurement of each of the two sides of
and the measurement of the angle which they enclose. The base is the very distance between the boxes that I wanted, and a simple
triangle,
it
to me.
In this
way
me
to transcend the
immediacy of the surroundings which confront me, and to anticipate the result of what would have been my experience had I journeyed to the distant railway and measured it piece by piece. But what price have I paid for the power
thus to annihilate the limitations of immediate
experience?
of the riches of
my
eyes
Let
us ask what
thing that
was
that
we
can see or
none of these would ever be precisely straight. We have shut out from consideration the unevenness of the ground, the curvature of the earth's
surface,
the
deflection
of rays
of light
by the
make a
great
gulf between
what
comes
and mathematically
straight lines.
We
194
CEITICISM OF CATEGORIES
["-ect. n.
real
made
up of the absolutely
to point,
with sides that have neither breadth nor depth, but are pure measures of the extent
to which these points
must be thought of as outSuch a presentaside and away from each other. tion of points and their distances, and the angles of these distances, is one which thought can only make through a special kind of abstraction, and is no object to be found in actual experience. Yet it is a very valuable presentation of thought.
It does not guide us to real things, but
it
does
guide us to aspects
present
which
real
things
always
catesocial
the
In our
we have
and
is
seen, expresses
aspects such
sufficient
as
these,
found to be a
record-
means
vidual experiences.
how
when
these
the aspects
of other future
experi-
The intervening
the beauty of
all
we have
for the
moment blotted out, and we pay what we get in return, far clearer
knowledge than any which
so-
and more
definite
more of
MEASUREMENT
otherwise could.
of the wonderful
195
power of thought to overcome Even if we had gone to the railway and measured with our rod, we should have gained no greater victory, nor got any substantially more exact result. We should
the foreignness of nature
!
ment of the
facts
was
impracticable,
because in
it
was only
loose
suffi-
to ascertain.
We
proposed,
in the
is
measure from signal-box to signal-box. We spoke as if these were two definite points which our perceptions would disclose to us when
we went
But what is the real truth? The signal-box is a wooden structure twelve feet To what point in it does the odd in breadth. supposed demand for adequate and exact knowto them.
ledge
make
is
it
proper that
difficulty.
we
It
should measure?
is
mathematician that a point position without only from length, breadth, or depth
exists.
Here
new
only for
the
It is
Mathematically speaking,
it
edge to which we can measure. Even to the naked To the microeye, that edge is rough and uneven. The wood is always, even scope, it is yet more so.
on the
if
stillest day,
parting with
its particles
it
and
be
we
considered
closely enough,
would
196
Ceiticism of categories
to
Kt.
,i.
impossible
particle,
say
whether
particular
loose
itself far
had ceased to be within its edge. It is only from the point of view of practice, and special practice, that there is any distinction between the box and its surroundings. For the practice of the horse which shies at it, or even the baby that looks at it, there might be a wrong distinction, or none at all. For the highly developed reflection of the person who knows what a railway is, or what carpentering is, it exists. But that means that the distinction is derivative and secondary, the creature of reflection, hypostatised
selective
into
What, apart from thought, would be an empty and indefinite manifold is worked up by thought
into a part of the presenta,tion of a real world.
But even
be
activity.
this real
The theory of the senses as windows through which the mind looks, breaks down once
more.
If the mathematician's point turns out to
be a construction
rail-
wayman's
observer
signal-box.
himself.
or the
most passive
Reality
much
in the uni-
MATHEMATICS
point of the observer or of the observed.
197
whether the object be considered from the standThese considerations seem to throw some light on what the science of Mathematics really is, and on the extent as well as the limitations of its
claims.
there
is
of
Euclid
are
we
us.
If
we
so of
legitimate
modes
other branches of
conceptions.
different
only
by
blotting
moment
clear knowledge.
of Goethe
is true, that,
geometer are
tions
in
not,
They
but
indicate rela-
space
and
time,
our
notions
of
The
when he
He
198
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
or
relations
b-^-^-
"
forms
of
externality,
fields
as
does the
forces
mathematician,
operate,
filled.
but
as
in
which
and which are to be conceived as thereby regards Time and Space as the stage on which what occupies them plays its part, as
He
vortex rings,
medium.
Space means a
such a content.
But
for
His space and time are yet more abstract, and even more remote from what is discernible by the eye. They are abstractions as pure as he can
make them.
as
if
isolate
pure out-
In everyday
life
we
talk
they could.
London."
Here we do not
is
mean
at.
to be exact,
and
it
asser-
would mean a straight line composed of so many units of distance. But he knows, or ought to know, that he is not dealing with a real thing. If his assertion meant that such
definiteness
is
himself
at
once
in
difiiculties
to
which
cost
of
drawn
in the illustration
the
signal-box.
It
is
only at
the
it
what makes
real for
what gives
it
its
"
REFLECTION
When we
are
are reasoning about such
forms,
199
we
is
dealing
in everyday parlance,
we mean by
tells
things.
It
same figure, coincide Of a perfect coincidence, our us. They can furnish the proof
It is not for our senses
self-subsisting
It is only
of no axiom of geometry.
that the world
parts,
is
an aggregate of
for thought,
and as relations in thought, that these parts exist. Language leaves out of account that being made what it is through reflection which is of the essence of reality, and speaks as though the object were exhaustively defined apart from this That is why language seems to have relationship.
been inaccurate as soon
as,
even in
for
common
life,
we
"Nothing,"
opposite
is
said the
"is true,
its
always true."
"Nothing,"
said
Heraclitus,
"is,
"Nur scheinbar," wrote Goethe, "steht's Momenta " Das Ewige regt sich fort in alien " Denn AUes muss in Nichts zerfallen," " Wenn es im Sein beharren will."
;
still."
What
at large
is
is
humanity
most
profound mathematician.
We
200
CEITICISM OF CATEGORIES
tried our best to
[^-ect. n.
"When we have
do
so,
we
find that
we
a pictorial
up again in and as something The pure space else than they are meant to be. of the mathematician he talks of as a thing, and tells us to draw a straight line in it, regardless of
are always setting these universals
guise, as individuals,
if
so pictured
it
axioms
will
be self-evidently
true.
The
physicist
made
object,
an abstraction.
Its
This
is
is
the-
disengaged
when
the
by reflection into clear conmeans of a set of categories of which magnitude and number are examples. We can estimate the cost of building a house by calculating the number of bricks required to build it. In
and
time, are brought
sciousness by
doing so
we make
as discrete,
and properly to be exhibited as addition But there is quite another aspect of finite parts. of quantity, upon which is founded quite a different side of mathematics, which treats quantity as con-
tinuous.
Now,
if
THE CALCULUS
experience, like red
201
and yellow apples, but two aspects of one and the same fundamental relationship. The understanding of this would save many a student from confusion. To try to teach him the
Calculus without explaining that
it
trying to
how
Most
no warning, but go on as
occupied with the discrete
the writer
side,
is
whereas in truth
This
how an American
when he
finds
who
the
Calculus.
"He
himself
required
to
ignore
the
principles
axioms that have hitherto guided hi& studies, sustained his convictions, and to receive instead a
set of notions that are utterly
and and
repugnant to
all his
When
he
is
told that
one quantity
increasing
it,
may be added
;
to another without
diminishing
small,
it
may be
still,
infinitely
and another
infinitely smaller
and so on
ad
it
infinitum ;
that a quantity
cannot be divided,
indefinite
is
an
and even an
number of times
that Zero
may be
202
CEITICISM OF CATEGOEIES
it is
[i-ect.
.i.
equation,
"To
clear the
way
for a logical
subject,
we must
may
exist.
must (so to speak) be vitalised so that it shall be endowed with tendencies to change its value, and the rate and direction of these tendencies will be found to
constitute the
The
and
of rates,
peculiar subject
is
quantity in a state of
change." *
bitter
Newton
dispute
and
and elaboration of
of the
Much
was due
only to
to
the
use
of
language
of
appropriate
the
discrete
aspects
it
quantity
for
quantity as
when regarded as Newton, at all events, saw very what he had to do was to conceive Thus he treated of geocontinuous.
and the
solid
by that of a
of
the
surface.
* Buckingham, Elements
Calculus.
Differential
Chicago, 1881.
Preface.
203
we
curve which
velocity of the
two
moving point can be resolved into velocities, one parallel to the axis of X, the other to that of Y. These velocities he calls the "fluxions" of X and Y respectively. Reversing
it
with which
fluent of the
is
described,
component
velocity parallel to
OX.
In
he
this,
is
dealing with
what are
essentially continuous
is
abstracting under
of conceptions.
what was in his age a novel set The difiference between Newton
appears
to
and
the
Leibnitz
have
been
that
while
former
regarded his continuous quantity as in a state of continuous growth, the latter regarded that growth
as taking place by means of infinitesimal increments.
form than
in substance.
both
we
with quantity.
First, that of
respect to
what
equality
with which
we
204
CEITICISM OF CATEGOEIES
i^^-
"
dence.
The fixed magnitude is called the limit. The method based on these notions enables us,
whether we use the language of Newton or that of Leibnitz, to solve problems which lie beyond the
grasp of mathematics on
solve, for instance,
its
other side.
We
can
The
ascertain-
ment of the limit brings us to something about which ordinary calculations can be made, and a
relationship
is
in this
way
we can measure
immeasurable.
The substance
when
and
their work,
with
the
most abstract
and because these most abstract, they are after a fashion the simplest and most easy for reflecWhen reduced tion to grasp and reason about.
of all the relations of reality,
relations are the
to
the
skeleton
figures
of
geometry,
study,
space
its
becomes
relations
precision.
simple
subject
of
and
can be
described
We
do not
really
know what we
mean when we talk of a straight road between London and Bedford, but most of us think we know what we mean when we talk of a
straight line connecting
two
points.
In a sense
MATHEMATICS
we
present
it
205
image.
of
to
ourselves
as an
We
someIt
is
many
other properties.
and heavy, and hard. But from the colour, and weight, and resistance, we divert our attention.
Its
surface
is
irregular,
so
that
line
drawn on that
also
surface
would be crooked.
thus construct an
This
we
is
ignore.
We
image
which
an image, and as such. We have experience of it. Those of the relations of the concrete thing which we want
general experience.
it
But
is
In
this
way
a kind of experience with which he can compare his conceptions, and by which he can test the
outcome of
science.
his
inferences,
common
to all
is
And
they
experience
dim, at least
its
outlines
cause
are
the
and most
relations, just
be-
abstract,
are
the
simplest and most easy to isolate and appreThe result is that the method of mathehend. matics is the most far-reaching of all the
methods
of
science.
Its
concern
is
not
the.
individuals of perception, but the general relations of these individuals in space and time, and
it is
no way limited by the "here" and "now," It was this which have no meaning for it.
in
unrivalled range
led
the
206
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
as well as
in
[i-^cr. n.
of the form, of
number.
tions
But number,
is
like
all
other
relations
of quantity,
under which
of mind, but
brings
the
It
object
is
the
work
work.
is
And
if
it
soon
becomes
apparent
fruitful,
that
is
quantity,
most
in
us the furthest
from the
concrete
richness
of
immediacy.
We
power of the mind to absteact, by means of mathematical reasoning, has taken it into a region lying beyond even magnitude and measurement. Recent mathematical research has,
noticing that the
for example, led to the discovery that
we can
build
up a
parts
which the
totally
the
geometry
of
Euclid,
are
excluded.
is
three dimensions.
assumed to be always
line
is
the
same,
so that
straight
in
every
points,
it,
two
and
as they might do
one of
dimensions had
a twist in
it.
what
is
SPACE DIMENSIONS
assumption, and what difference
if
it
207
occasion
may
he does so without warrant. Suppose a shadow to be thrown on to the sin-face of a smooth sphere. Suppose next that
shadow could become conscious of its own existence. Being a shadow it would have and take cognisance of but two dimensions of space, length and breadth. But the curvatm-e of the sphere would really constitute a third, in which the shadow had its existence, though it could not know it. For the length and breadth would be length and breadth on a curve of a certain radius. Such a shadow would believe that the straight line along which it was moving could be projected to infinity, unconscious of the fact that the line would come round the sphere to the point from which it had started. Such a shadow would have notions of geometry which would turn out to be erronthe
eous.
For, in the
first
place,
certain
lines
that
the
if
produced sufficiently, come round to the point from which they started. Euclid shows that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two But to the shadow this would only right angles.
be true of very small triangles. As the triangles became bigger, the demonstration would be more
Now
we
is it
ourselves,
whose
faculties
more than three dimensions, are, like the shadow, A deceived, and that we really exist in more?
208
CEITICISM OF CATEGOEIES
when he suggested
[i-ect. h.
that to such
in
and an object put into the box without opening it, by a power that could get off the surface of the sphere and move in a third dimension.
Science can only
tell
which we
exist,
and the
which
is
based
be.
parallel lines
straight lines
may ultimately meet; and that two may enclose a space. And it may be
may
axiom which
equal
to
lies
which are
to
the
same
thing
are
equal
one
then,
may
of
from
of
in
which the
notion
has been
distinction
eliminated,
and
which
depends
on
oxu-
quality
this
alone.
We may
make a beginning
preliminary
it
direction
by simplifying
datum
or
assumption of fact,
and confining
PROJECTIVE GEOMETRY
to this,
in
209
which we may assume without bringing the notion of measurement at all, that we
can recognise difference of position. This we do always assume, because it is of the very essence
of that
fact
of
externality
which
we
are
to
endeavour
of points
distinguish
to
treat
it.
under categories
Thus,
if
which
do
not go beyond
we
take a number
on a
thgy
lie.
which joins them, we can them as found in the line on which Their distance from each other we
line
of account,
for this
would require
its
recognition.
is
It
all
that
is
given
the mere
line,
fact
of
several
points
on
straight
they
on
that
line.
We
have,
therefore,
in
out
how
to
which
about
This
will enable us
to distinguish
and reason
them without bringing in that notion. is done by a new and highly abstract
is
called
Geometry."
It
takes a
point out-
on which the original set of, say, four points lies, and draws lines from the new
outside point, intersecting the original line at the
Now
new
lines so
new
lines
at points
which
will
210
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
virtue
[i-ect.
which they can be disIn this fashion a quaUtinguished and described. tative equivalence may be got at which becomes
old points, in
of
new
equality which
was the
Space
is
object
of
treated as
From
two points we cannot, without the category of quantity, describe and determine a third, unless that third lies in a different line. But given three points joined by different lines, we can construct
figures,
to,
which
will enable
number of fresh points, and to distinguish them, and the lines and planes resulting from them,
qualitatively.
A
be an
science
confining
itself
to
such abstract
may
not
application.
from out of
its
branches,
are
for
the
limited
experience with
it
which we
familiar,
the attainment of a
Its
advantage
is
that
its
We
it
here
because
it
PHYSICAL SCIENCE
us,
211
and that the more wide reaching are the conceptions of Science, the less do they present us
with an adequate description of the concrete reality
of experience.
Beyond the
science of measurement,
be,
we have
seen that
in a region yet
mere externality.
next consider
how
what
it is
is
do justice to
real things.
Of the conceptions
broad
characteristic.
of physical science,
not
is
their
One view
all,
is if
they represent
by causes operating from without in space and time. If this be so, their aim must be
to present to reflection the manifold of the depart-
ments of nature with which they deal, as combinations of the simplest and most homogeneous mechanisms. They must seek to represent the universe as an aggregate of atoms, of which the
leading characteristic
is
each
other
from
is
distance,
and
so
produce
such
phenomena
law which
known
of the results
is
of physical science.
But such a
description
not
wholly accurate.
modern
have
physicist
do with the old-fashioned notions. Indeed, the tendency of the most distinguished
little
to
212
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
of science of our time
is
[i-ect. u.
men
the
to try to
do with-
phenomena
of motion.
to the forces of
place,
instead
of
physicists
the
street
the
When we
we When we
space,
real
consider the
are
motion of a point
a
considering
mere
got
to
abstraction.
is
moved
something
physics
sternly
to
sets
consider.
his face
physicist
tells
He
it,
we know
nothing of matter,
as
which
underlies phenomena,
but
of
it
science
rejects
every
definition
except
as
"that
which
if
can
have
force.
its
motion
bodies
Two
mass
This
bodies
produce
in
is
changes
of velocity.
modem
dynamics,
and
they
it is
may be made
When we
bear in mind
we
find
and energy
some
PHYSICAL CATEGOEIES
of
213
of
the
modern
physicists,
merely
two
the
and apparently But if physics be defined, as it has been and must be if it is to cover the whole field without leaving huge gaps, as an inquiry into the causes of the changes in the modes or qualities of dead matter,
is
by which experience
investigated,
cannot
be themselves
further
reduced.
it
is
in will
its
theories "and
far
beyond such abstract definitions as we have been speaking of. Modern physics is in short a composite science, in which the methods of the matheits
on
experimental
side,
go
much more
concrete and
We are
forced in this
new
causes and
faces
in
effects,
do what we
to
a different direction.
ourselves
We
may
try to
confine
mathematical
conceptions,
of to
but
we
cannot.
mass, of
Our definitions of force and matter and of energy, will turn out
if
be circular
we
do.
These
fundamental.
is,
what
it
and cannot be extruded from it. They are, in short, the special categories which lie at its foundaThe failure to realise this fact has made tion. many a good physicist degenerate into a bad
metaphysician.
Now, we have
already,
in
the
first
Book,
214
CKITICISM OF CATEGOBIES
how
far
[j-^ct. n.
the
conception
of
effect,
in time
and
separate from
in space, is adequate to
reahty.
We
of
can
phenomena appears
to be.
If
we
are justified
in
in the
seems,
we
shall
We
will
begin,
however, as
its
usual,
by
application
are dealt
abstract
under
it
it.
If I put a lighted
if
gunpowder
explodes, and
I ask
someone, to
whom
have to justify
the answer
is,
my
conduct, what
was the
cause,
"Why
you, to be sure,
who put
But while
view may
plainly
out,
do,
as
for
was
any
earlier
pointed
insufficient
scientific
it
purpose.
For
off.
if
will not.
go
We
the cause.
consists
Now
Science
tells
us that
gunpowder
of a mechanical mixture of
and sulphur.
The
When
the oxygen
combination with nitrogen and potash. is shaken loose from the nitro-
CAUSALITY
gen and potash, as
it
is,
215
other methods,
among
afl&nity,
by
it
ignition,
it
unite
latter,
bonic
gases,
and carbonic oxide gases. These which increase their volume as heat is developed, produce great pressure, so violent that an explosion is the result. Now what
was,
scientifically
speaking,
of
the the
cause
of
this
explosion?
loose
Which one
in
conditions,
the the
combination
affinity
the
nitrogen
group,
greater
oxygen for the carbon, the dryness of the mixture which made comof
the
bustion possible,
or
what
as
else,
are
?
we
to pick
it
out
and
to
designate
in
the
cause
Plainly
was only
light
a popular sense
that
cause.
putting the
the
For
the
practical purpose
it
of finding who was to blame, was convenient to fasten on that particular one among a multitude of conditions which
were
be
necessary
if if
we were
our
to
witness
are
the
to
explosion.
But
contemplations
scientific,
outside
and
irrelevant
considerations
science
will
guide
us,
our
choice.
The man of
was
the libera-
of
the
potential
energy stored up in
only
varies
let
the
gunpowder.
selection
point.
But
the
this
shows
with
off
that
our
of
cause
our stand-
We
should never
the
man who
216
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
[i-ect. n.
we
It
is
always
a
is
relative
term,
and
always
loose.
no such thing as one independent event which precedes the effect, and is for all purposes its cause. The only antecedent we can name which could be so described with any truth,
There
is
the
entire
sum
of
of
the
conditions,
includ-
ing,
in the
case
the
powder, not
only
the
potential energy
it
and the
And
the
then a
point
at
new
difl&culty at
once arises as to
so
which
the
cause
understood
In nature there seems to be nowhere line of division between the event and
sum
of
its
it
practical purposes
and speak as if it The laws of nature seem to exclude the breach in the continuity which would
conditions,
be involved in aflBrming seriously that the energy which already existed, and which science says
can never be either destroyed or increased, ceased
to be one thing,
When we
try to find
CAUSALITY
such a breach of continuity,
face to
face
217
find
we
ourselves
with
is
another conception,
that
of
something which
increase,
incapable of diminution
or
and
is
indestructible
except in form or
appearance, the conception of substance. For it becomes plain that all the chemical atoms which make up the gas of the explosion were already
in
the
powder.
in
It
is
true
positions
all
But that
is
that
has
happened,
the
efifected
the change
powder.
conclusion
thing
In
end
we
is
are
driven
to
the
that
not
only
the
cause
in
not
time
a
or
nor
an event distinguishable
the
effect,
space
define
from
it
but that
if
we
try to
accm-ately,
it
to
no other
con-
of the
ditions
in other words,
just the
effect itself.
legiti-
Now,
mate
of course, the
use.
But that use is a popular and provisional, and not a scientific one. It means an aspect under which, for practical purposes, and in order to get a clear view for some special end, we separate out some one antecedent and
lay
exclusive
stress
on
it.
That
is
to say, the
is
abstraction,
and
wholly
Here, again,
we
are con-
work
idea
of reflection,
of the per-
ceiving mind.
218
CEITICISM OF CATEGORIES
[i-ect.
h.
The obscurity which we have observed in the conception of cause and effect is, of coxu-se, well known to the modern physicist. He, indeed, has put the words under a ban, and he refuses to talk
in
such language.
He
confines
himself
at
the
energy.
But have we
here,
in
the former
reality itself?
the
subsisting reality,
difficulties
fill
hopeless
it
to
it is
the conception of
impossible,
bodies
as of
numerically
the
for.
separate
but
some
simplest
phenomena cannot be
it
accounted
How can
spark
when
an
electric
passed
through
Space
siirely
cannot be continuously
On
We are then face to face with another difficulty. We have to make clear to ourselves that the action
at a distance on each other of the
in
space, is
intelligible.
Now
action through a
puzzle to physicists
ACTION AT A DISTANCE
since
219
himself
the
days
of
Newton.
it
Newton
to be an ultimate
and
which no account could be given. And modern physicists have struggled hard, only to find that they can get no further than he did. They cannot
accept the
first
that
is
inexplicable, acts
a mere
action at a distance
is
we cannot
ception
action of substance.
of
substance
general,
the
which we have now allowed to reduce itself to the mere point which is sufiicient to account for it, ceases to be interesting to us, and
action at a distance steps into
its
place."
The old
is
Newton
that matter
and indivisible atoms, is hardly tenable by the modern man of science. If it were true, we should have found, what Science
of inelastic
* Paul du Bois-Reymond, Veher die Grundlagen der Erkenntniss in
made up
220
CEITICISM OF CATEGORIES
[i-ect. n.
does not disclose, some indication of a limit to the For this reason men compressibility of matter.
like
atom as no more than a centre and repulsive force is But the question then arises what exercised. force is. In popular acceptance what is meant by the word is a subjective experience, the sensaof the so-called
from
which
attractive
tion of force.
significance,
If
we
try to find
a purely objective
got,
we
find that
we have
not a thing,
relation, the
which work
is
done.
exercised,
is
does
not
indicate
any
conceivably
actual
this,
experience.
Driven by
difficulties
such as
which
This
is is
name
of
Lord Kelvin.
must be taken to be finally resoluble, consist of portions, rotating as do rings of smoke, of some medium which fills the whole space. If
physicist,
such a
medium be conceived
as a frictionless
fluid,
and
if it
fluid there
many
difficulties.
understand
element
is,
how
it
would seem
GRAVITATION
even to
ago,
lend, itself to
221
gravitation which
by Lesage of Geneva.
were assumed
that,
besides
there
is
ordinary and
larger particles
of matter,
an
infinitely
greater
in
all
number
directions
When
two of the
other, the
larger particles are placed near each one screens the other from the impact
of a
number
of the
smaller
particles,
and the
outmost
of the particles to
equivalent
to
an
attraction
;
varying
in other
words, to gravitation.
But even
if
we adopt
and with it the conception of space as filled with larger and smaller vortex rings in a perfectly frictionless and continuous fluid, we do not seem to be any further forward. In the first place, we have no idea what such a fluid means. There is no analogue of it in experience.
tion of gravitation,
So
far
as that experience
is,
is
concerned, such a
medium
image of
selves
In
to
we could present some our mind's eye, we must find ourface with the old
difficulties.
face to
In
experience
we
we
222
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
[^^ct. n.
an ultimate limit. Everything in experience and must always be, capable of being viewed as
divisible,
and further
resoluble.
Were
it
not
so,
Applyfluid,
itself further
we
see that
it
is
self-contradictory.
it
As
by
a thing in space,
pressible, unless
it
we
cannot think of
;
as comthis,
consists of parts
and
hypothesis,
it
cannot
would not
be continuous.
in
But
be not compressible,
how
illustrations,
which might be
diflSculties.
which
setting
attended
the
other
theories
about
is,
the
The truth
that in
up
these
conceptions,
we have
passed
beyond the region of what can belong to any We are making use, not of possible experience. concrete facts such as those to which men of
science sometimes profess and erroneously profess
to confine themselves, but of abstract conceptions
which are
really
only
means by which
the
of
we can
shut out
all
that
is
irrelevant to
process
of their place
in the
really indivisible
and whole of
CONCEPTIONS OF PHYSICS
knowledge.
223
to
Such
conceptions
correspond
methods
abstraction under certain definite and represent the outcome of those methods. They possess a vahdity no greater, and a utility no less than the abstract conceptions of
of
categories,
mathematics.
to a
Most
knowledge which
Yet,
if
which
is
immediate.
them any validity other than that which attaches to the mere figments of abstract thought, and jump to the conattribute
we
to
clusion that,
senses,
if
we
we
sponding to them, we
diction.
Whether we
momentum,
or of
any of the other great physical conceptions, we are dealing with abstractions reached by employing categories such as cause and substance, to guide
our process of
reflection.
What
the categories of
us
that
in
that
of physical
science.
It
is
by the
its
who employs
it
seems, and to
Of the
224
CEITICISM OF CATEGORIES
deny the
it is
[^-ect. n.
reality.
For
no cognisance of these other aspects. Over the interesting sights which are to be seen in the region through which our pathway is leading
us,
we must
not linger.
up by the various menacing forms which beset the region of Science. Over all
further progress
is set
it
is
What we
title
is,
or
But
so
far,
we have
with the mathematician, with him who would bid us limit ourselves, in our search for the real, to
quantity,
physicist,
if
not
tells
to
externality;
who
causes,
substances,
and the
in
We
these
have
the
spoken
friendly
language
with
we have xmderstood
aids to
certain of
immense value of
It
their methods, as
human knowledge.
CHEMICAL CATEGORIES
225
them sought to bar the path, that we quarrelled. Let us now make a step further, and get acquainted with another master of the method of applying
abstraction to the concrete universe.
The methods
the phases of nature than do those of the mathematician; the methods of the chemist rule out fewer than do those of the physicist. When the
physicist defines matter
will enable
and energy,
in terms
which
him to use these conceptions in his methods, he knows that he is thinking abstractly, and without reference to any conceivable particular experience. For him the atom is, as we have
seen, in the last resort but
an ideal point to or
He
is
really,
at
from his
mathematical categories.
The
chemist,
on the
Modern chemistry
elementary
beyond the
atoms of which all its substances consist. For it all substances are, in a special sense, composite, and their qualities and differences depend on the fundamental attributes of
aris-
226
CKITICISM OF CATEGORIES
[^^-
"
main category
is if
the molecule.
For
would mean the point of application of the forces which determine the physical state of bodies, the
small particle which, for the purpose of considering the action of these forces,
unit.
may be taken
it
as a
For the
different
significance.
He
thinks of
only as
divided
without
changing
its
chemical
nature.
I dissolve
in water.
The sugar
is
now
divided up ever
so finely,
and nothing Now add to the water sulphuric acid. The else. solution blackens, and presently there is evolved The sugar has as out of the sugar, charcoal.
sugar,
such ceased to
exist.
Its
constituent elements
have become separated, and some of them have gone into combination with some of the constituent elements of the sulphuric acid.
We have
got a
It
new
set of substances.
can be subdivided almost indefinitely without Indeed, no alteration of its chemical nature. mechanical subdivision of
it
that
we know
it
will
change
its
chemical nature.
of a soap-bubble
in
Just before
is
bursts,
the film
less
it
than
is
loooooo
of an inch
thickness.
When
converted
THE MOLECULE
into
227
is
divided
up yet more
of
finely,
without
any
change
chemical
separate
character.
By means
of heat
we can
finest
by the
If
instruments
can
a
tell,
is
incapable of limit.
still
greater subdivision.
we
pass through
round the two poles of the battery. The bubbles which surround the one pole turn out to be quite
different
other.
For one
set
Here we
tion,
new
sort of opera-
enormously
tells
exceeding
it
in
volume.
The chemist
us
H2O, has been resolved into three constituent atoms, two of hydrogen and one of oxygen. This is his atomic theory. Yet valuable as are the atomic theory and the processes based on it, processes which enable him accurately to foretell phenomena of experience, and so to get
his abstract terminology, as
a method
No
no one
They are
convenient
"I
modern
chemist, "to
228
declare
CEITICISM OF CATEGOEIES
Kt.
n.
my
and consistent as
to the mind.
appears,
is
only a temporary
the Science,
and study, I have the conviction that it is temporary scaffolding around the imperfect building, which will be removed as soon
to investigation
as
is
its
usefulness
is
passed." *
justify,
In other words,
because
it
it
a method which we
gives us
residts
which we can check with experience, and which fit into the context of what we see and feel. But it is the results which are verifiable, and not
method.
And
if
more adequate
ful in results,
more
finit-
of attenuated
forms of matter which could be added to or subtracted from bodies without altering their weight,
and which
at one time
all
the
by means of hypo-
and abstract conceptions that we are able, not to describe what we experience, but to isolate
in thought such aspects of
it
as
we
vsash to bring
The
test
which we
is
the
New
Chemistry, p. 118.
229
experience,
shown by subsequent
Chemistry
deals
with
the
composition
and
changes of substance.
the atomic theory, and this has led to gi'ouping the so-called elements according to their atomic
weight,
and
affinities,
with topics
less
which,
from The latter the concrete than those of physics. of the conceptions of takes no account of most
remote
chemistry,
It deals and structure. on the face of them, are what we see and feel in
its
purpose.
By way
sicist
and the mathematician with those chemical methods to which we have been referring, it is worth while quoting the description of the field of physical science given by a well-known writer;
"That which
is
is the knowledge of relations between natural phenomena and their physical antecedents, as necessary sequences of cause and effect; these relations being investigated by the aid of mathe-
which processes of reasoning on all questions that can properly be brought under the categories of quantity and space
matics
is,
that
by a method
in
and made capable of general appUcation to a degree almost inconceivable by the uninitiated,
through the use of conventional symbols.
There
230
is
CEITICISM OF CATEGOEIES
for
[^^t. u.
no admission
But there
is
able as a precursor
call scientific
is
and
auxiliary,
to
observe
to
and
classify
phenomena, and by
them.
induction
infer the
it is
As, however,
until
Chemistry
called
"scientific
phenomenology,"
its
it.
diifering
conceptions and
The
it
fields over-
in
much
less
degree than
it
does
to
that
of physics.
to
If
is
called in
by the chemist
is is
render
assistance,
the
kind.
assistance
Still
it
of
comparatively
simple
most
atomic theory.
When we
water,
weights of hydrogen and oxygen respectively which were evolved, from the data afforded by
the weight of water
in
lost.
In
this
fashion,
and
connection
of
Avo-
when
like
231
variety of processes.
tration of all
is
molecules,
appear
tells
on one side
us what
new
we
may
whether we have correctly analysed the products of the reaction when it has taken place.
Let us pause for a moment in our journey, and cast a glance back at that group of sciences which
we
relations of things
which are regarded as external to one another, and as being acted on from without.
They
all
chemistry,
Physics is more abstract than and mathematics than physics; but with whatever class of conception they deal, it is invariably one which is conditioned by the notion
space and time.
of
some abstract
each
it
Whether
be
numbers of the
of the
arithmetician,
the
continuous
variation
Calculus,
the
or the
relations
chemical
equation,
we
conceiving
between
falls
no other
relationship.
This relationship
232
into
It
CEITICISM OF CATEGOEIES
many
categories
[^ect.
.i.
might be very useful work to try to make something like a comprehensive table of these categories and their derivatives, which should disclose them
in logical order,
other.
and exhibit
clear understanding
of these relations
But such
the
outside
is
which
simply to
thread the
purpose
way among these categories. For this we have had to try our hands at some
and
it
criticism of them,
make
that
much, amid the gain which Science yields shut out and lose by the assumption, often made as
unconsciously as
gories
it is
how us, we
which take cognisance only of what can be expressed as relationship in space and time, are
the only categories that can guide us in the search
after reality.
For us here
it is sufficient if
further
is
not
so.
We
seen
do not need to go
nality
into details,
if
we have once
reflec-
tion of
mankind
is
reflection to their
end be able to
it
seems.
no mere
CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT
which
in point of time not only
233
do not precede, fact, are quarried out of it by reflection. Nor have we found any reason to compromise our faith in the world as it seems, by conceding, what is taught by Kant in his Critique of Judgment,
but, in
relations,
and of external conceptions such as those of cause, substance, reciprocity, and the like, it has but a
secondary order of reality with an origin
able to the observer as such.
tion is
refer-
Such a
distinc-
no more capable of being justified than is that "of Locke, between primary and secondary qualities. All the relationships of the phenomena of the object world are by their very origin and nature, as products of reflection, there for reflection and for reflection alone. They are
abstractions secondary in time to the experience
own
breasts.
Only let us be warned by his example. Just as he went wrong when he thought he had found an abstract idea of matter, so shall we go wrong if
we
in
think
we can
of,
consisting
say,
motion.
Such a universe
of,
a possible and
make
use
Nor do we
better the
the
234
CEITICISM OF CATEGORIES
we
call
[i-ect. h.
addition of what
The conception
and
time,
of
and
by these
it is
conditioned.
To
and
Causality
descriptive
one
another,
is
and, just
described,
because
we can
Such
the
is not, in
another
aspect, effect.
Nor do
mind,
is
operating
such
an
external
fashion,
meaningless,
It
subject.
itself
turns
out,
when
scrutinised,
to of of
be
the
an abstraction, to
to
kind,
its
the
analysis
is
of that
reflection
which
notion
the product.
We
are face
man
of science seeks
is
even
wrongful applicaphysical
sciences
of the
categories
of the
Do
not
let
it
down
beckons
us.
But
First
it is
applied.
235
service
they are in assisting us to the fulfilment of a purpose, most of all necessary in the exact sciences,
In most branches of knowledge the measuring rod and the balance and the chronometer are useful. In the exact sciences
they are of the essence.
us,
we behold
which the importance of measurement dwindles. For the man whose thoughts are engrossed with
the beauty of the hills under the glow of the setting
and the balance and the chronometer have no meaning. For the moralist,
sun, the measuring rod
who
is
may
occasionally,
result, bring
them
Golden Section."
who gave
when he
out of a number of different rectangular figures they preferred, there was a marked preference for
those in which the short side stood to the long side
in the
side to the
sum
of both.
Many
investigations
in
of analogous
place
the
psycho-physical
of them.
may come
armed with the categories of measurement, may come to the assistance of the But while throughout the whole of the moralist.
The
statistician, too,
236
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
it
[i-^ct. h.
fields of
no pretence of
these clear
it
being adequate to
cases there
is
reality.
Now besides
has never been so willingly conceded, that the conceptions of the exact sciences are
inapplicable.
life.
The phenomenon
first
in question is that of
its
Our
observation of
nature and
is
its
distinction
probably sug-
what
is
not ourselves.
In the consciousness
we
which go beyond mere lifephases such as those moral and intellectual aspects which go to make up
personality.
is
The consciousness even of sensation more than the consciousness of mere life. For
phase of the object world has, as such, nothing
this
to do with consciousness.
it is
A thing
is
living
its
when
identity
changed.
as
consisting
other.
But as
so presented
its
embodiment.
For
life
does
animates.
its
CONCEPTION OF LIFE
hension a set of conceptions of
feature
its
237
of which is that of a whole, controlling and conserving its parts. Now of such a selfconserving whole, we seem to get om- first notion
own
bodies, as something
is
outside us.
They
We speedily
abstract in
careful
we
under them.
What
mark
for our
more
off"
our
life is
embodied,
is
among
it
material,
and yet
re-
maining identically ours through the change. The substance in which life is at any given moment
no more quantitatively divided from the substance which surrounds it than is the French nation from the Spanish. It is only in a wholly
embodied,
is
we can make
air
use of the
measurement of quantity
cannot even
or the food
tell
in this connection.
We
whether the
we
are breathing,
we
moment
were a
it
part
line
of us or not.
does
LECTUEE
In
this
III
Lecture
we
shall
phenomena
life
of
life.
In the
living
organism, the
of
the
whole
So much common
we can
perceive
any relation like that of cause and effect, or which is capable of being expressed in terms of space and time relations. That it is there, that these are living beings, and that they are objects in nature in which this self-determining and conserving property predominates,
is
a patent
illusion,
is
fact.
To say
is
an
and
of these objects
merely
really
is
to darken counsel.
LIFE
AND MECHANISM
239
pronouncing.
and
our
working hypothe
life
theses,
we might be
say
that
and to
our
of
that
But we are not life to mechanism, or to regarding the two as independent and self-subsisting realities, lying side by side in Both experience, like the leaves of an artichoke. possess, what is the mark of all the construcsiuTOunds,
ing organism
of
life,
is
which
is
a self-con-
disclose to us a point
where the cell is constructed by the operation of energy upon matter, according to mechanical Nowhere do we come to a boundary principles. other side of which mere mechanism the at line The result is analogous to what we found lies.
when we sought
for
final
division
of matter.
An
ultimate unit
of
life
put
together
out
of
atoms
and molecules,
is
no
more
is
it
conceivable
Nor
any more to
240
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
of which
is
[i-^ct.
m.
necessity
law.
forced on us by natural
The problem
for getting
of abiogenesis,
of the necessity
back to a stage at which life is produced by physical and chemical action, disappears
when we
realise
that
experience
gives
us
no
warrant for thinking that anything of the kind can possibly be perceived by the senses, and that
abstract reasoning does not necessitate
it
either.
We
because
we
could
not
For both
of
notions
we understood
but thoughts.
life.
And
it is
so
is
So long as
a living organism
cannot
be a mechanism, because the abstract conception of life, through which alone it is presentable, is
different in
an external
Science,
this
it
progress of Biological
we
and categories of that Science, and to illustrate by examples of them the truth which these Lectures aim at setting forth. Nowhere do we see more clearly than we do here the proof that Science, like Philosophy, really progresses by means of a priori hypotheses, tentatively applied, and afterwards tested by and adapted to the facts Nowhere do we witness more of experience.
VITALISM
distinctly
241
sessions
crude
men
who
of
sort. These men appear to have been under the domination of the conviction that the
the
make no
progress except
by exhibiting the phenomena of life as mere illustrations of mechanical and chemical principles. They refused to accept the view of the plain person, drawn from everyday observation, that
life
was something
not
bring
it
sui generis,
as
much
believe
entitled
They
in
could
themselves
to
the
world as
seemed.
And why!
Because they
thought that to do so was to give up the faith in the universality of the great laws of matter
and energy, which had brought them so far on their way. They were not without an excuse. Vitalism, the alternative view, had up to their time for the most part been put forward as an exception to these laws. The phenomena of life had been sought to be explained as caused by a
vital force,
known forms
to
of energy
in
everything
conformity
the
great
principle
of conservation.
our time
stultification of Science,
can
we
wonder?
mechanism.
The
It
old vitalism
was no more to be reconciled with modern Science than was the notion of Jupiter,
Q
242
sitting
CEITICISM OF CATEGOEIES
[i-ect.
m.
As
we
if
Biology
is
to be rested
on the observation of
vitalism
alike numbered.
facts,
and of the mechanical theory of life are Both notions must be labelled " unconscious metaphysic " and be relegated to the lumber-room, where repose the discarded failures
of Science.
We
now know
that there
is
no trace
We
know
Science
tion of
action.
is
life
The great
lies
is
has achieved,
living
an aggregate of the living units which are often called cells. But the aggregate is no mechanical aggregate. The cells are less like marbles in a heap than like free citizens living in a state. They act for the fulfilment of a common
organism
end, which continues so long as the
life
of the
moves them so to act, cannot, as far as observation and experiment teach us, be brought under the
mechanical category of physical causation.
That
UNCONSCIOUS PUEPOSE
should
243
indi-
grow
into
new and
again,
yet
similar
foot of the
should replace
itself
less is
it
unwarrant-
we
to do
is
what must
be either mechanism or intelligence. We have to disabuse our minds of all a priori limitation of the
possible aspects of experience, and to trust ourselves to careful observation,
and
to that alone.
If
is
no reason why
assure us
we
that
should hesitate to do
so,
or refuse to believe
when they
what experience
life
up
say
When we
is
ment,
we do
not
mean
that there
and purposive application, ab extra, of mechanical Such a conforce by some independent agency. clusion would only signify the reintroduction, under
another form, of the old mechanical theory.
We
mean rather to record that we have observed phenomena which present no analogy to the
mechanical or chemical action on each other of independent atoms, and which do present a certain
but very limited resemblance to the action of a
244
CRITICISM OF CATEGOEIES
a
[i-ect.
m.
number
to
fulfil
common end. There are in nature other and much more remarkable resemblances to the conscious and intelligent common purpose of the
The behaviour of a colony of ants or a hive of bees; the common instinct which makes
citizen.
the
phenomena of
that
achieves
results
far
transcending
what conscious
circumstances,
that the world
intelligence could
all
is
do under similar
of saying to this or
all
we
we
saw that the idea of a final and indivisible atom was not only without foundation in experience, but was inconceivable, and that
find a like result.
We
however useful in practice, was only justifiable as a provisional working hypothesis. In the same way,
we have
our
definitely,
if
microscopes
were
increased
in
power
in-
we
inconceivable
as that
such
microscopes
should
What
for
our
observation
its
characterises
is
living
matter, even in
simplest form,
the capacity,
CRYSTALLISATION
already referred
to,
245
in
of quasi-purposive action,
which the particular material is indifferent, is taken in, passed away, and changed, while the character of the whole remains. Now this is the very antithesis of
what we
not the
find in crystallisation,
where the
the
form
is
reason but
the result of
which,
because of these
the material
affinities,
arrange
themselves,
In
life,
changing,
;
in
mechanism,
To witness the transition from one to the other, would be to witness each contradict its nature. We can no more resolve quasi-purposive action into
the result of molecular arrangement, than
or beauty.
we can
and mechanism are related, not as by side in space and time, but as different points of view, disengaged, by the concentration of attention under definite categories, out of
Life
fields lying side
In
the
contemplating
realisation
life,
we
are
so
disengaging
of
very simple
and
apparently sub-
The word purpose is properly meaning used intelligent purpose, it indicates by an analogy the broad feature which is in view, and which disthe fulfilment of an end.
here
because, although
simplest forms of
life.
Any common
off
name
for the
phenomena we wish
to
mark
246
CKITICISM OF CATEGORIES
well, better, too, if it
[i-^cx.
m.
would do as
the
were
free
from
suggestion of
that
intelligent
action which
of experience.
It is
worth while
new
idea of
known
ago, while
among
biologists
was the
great
Johannes MuUer.
which
vital
life
He
:
thus stated
the
difficulty
attends
processes
conception
believed
of
that
organised
phenomena
result
of
of
the
harmony of
as
it
mutual
action,
were,
of the wheels
is
of the
machine, and
that death
this
a consequence of a disturbance of
This reciprocal action of parts on
exists.
.
. .
harmony.
only by the
is
existence
force,
the
operation of which
extended to
parts of the
and which
exists
ment
of
the embryo.
complicated piece
example, a watch
* Elements
may
for
of Physiology,
English
JOHANNES MIJLLER
from the co-operation
of
individual
parts,
247
and
but,
organic matter their essential constituent organs. This rational creative force is exerted in every
animal
strictly in
what each part requires; it exists already in germ, and creates in it the essential parts of futto-e animal. The germ is 'potentially' whole animal; during the development of germ the essential parts which constitute actual whole are produced." Miiller found
and operating mechanically to
parts
of
set
no
suggest some
kind of internal
force
such a force
was
about to be established as the new and grand Yet Miiller had principle of physical science.
laid hold of the truth
He was
The
fact of quasi-purposive
No
doubt,
men
of science
248
CEITICISM OF OATEGOEIES
[^-ect.
m.
would have been more ready to credit the evidence of their senses, and to record what they saw
without twist or
bias,
They thought, and one side of the teaching of Kant had confirmed them in this dogma, that the real was the mechanical, and the mechanical the real, and that Science could not properly admit any higher categories. The result was a long period of torturing the facts, to make them fit into this modern bed of Procrustes. The notion of a designing force, operating ah ewtra, being laid aside, other hypotheses had to be devised, within which the facts could be brought, and which would dispense with the necessity of assuming the presence of a designer. It was as one of these
an a priori point of view.
hypotheses that the early form of the
cell
theory
was
first
disciple of Miiller.
Before
Schwann's
time
some curious
facts
They had been ascertained by the botanists. had found, by examination, that vegetable tissue was made up of minute cavities or cells, separated from each other by thin walls. Schleiden, another distinguished German investigator, had
reached the conclusion that a plant, taken as a
whole, might be regarded as an aggregate of such
and that
upon
their
essential characters.
249
many
cells there
was present
a round body, subsequently called the nucleus. In the case of the developing cells of embryo
plants Schleiden found that a nucleus
present,
that,
was always and he not unnaturally drew the inference somehow, the nucleus was specially connected
cell
with
development.
As
observation, he drew the inference that formed from a generative fluid which
cavities of the old cells,
were
the
and mechanically precipitated granules that increased in size by accretion. Schwann was struck with this notion, and proceeded to apply it to animal structure. He came to the conclusion that the tissues of animals might be found to develop in the same way as those of plants, and observations which he made led him
to formulate the proposition that all tissues have
one
common
of
cells,
principle of development,
and
arise
and then of
all
tissue.
Because
cellular,
tissue
elements
are
originally
Schwann thought
growth and development are probably everywhere the same, and to be looked for in the nature of The the growth and development of the cell. ovum, for example, of the animal (and in the plant
world there are analogous
cases), is
a single
cell,
and yet it lives by growing. How does it grow 1 It must grow, argued Schwann, in this case quite independently of other cells, and if this be true, does
it
250
CRITICISM OF CATEGOEIES
["^ect.
m.
growth and development of the organism ? " The cause," he said, " of nutrition and growth resides,
not in the organism as a whole, but in the separate
cells."
This phenomenon of
He
deposited
whereas the
Certain cell molecules must therefore be acquired by " intussusception," The power, which observation
showed him
that
the
cell
possessed,
it
of
grows,
pile.
of
the galvanic
Anyhow, he
said,
great merit
of
away from the notion of an outand non-natural mechanical influence. Such a notion had become more and more difl&cult to
new
forward by
last
and with that of development as suggested by Kant and Goethe, and placed on a scientific basis by the embryologists. But almost from the first his theory of cell development had
century,
was soon found that new cells are formed only by the division of " Omnis cellula," said previously existing cells. Virchow, "e cellull" It turned out that no case
to encounter difficulties.
It
VIECHOW
could be found of
directly
living
251
derived
matter being
from a
living
lifeless
except
matter.
New
cells,
it
appeared,
case of
by mechanical division, but by descent. Common descent was found, in point of fact, to be the real explanation of biological similarity.
crystals
muscle
this,
cells.
growth of the
that
it
cell is
to the
quantity
it.
molecules
of its
own kind
supplied to
cell,
We
now
itself,
know
that growth
is
other
may grow
in different liquids,
and
If
cells of different
the
and
the same
true of the
cells.
In the words
"the living
in
oxygen
oxygen."
The next great step in advance of the point reached by Schleiden and Schwann was made when These the nature of the cell was further defined.
252
CRITICISM OF CATEGOEIES
had
laid stress
[i-^cr.
m.
inquirers
cell
and they had not attached much significance to the intervening liquid. But the discovery of protoplasm, as the
common
basis of
life
in the animal
all this.
alike,
changed
The
its
own
cells,
configuration.
fibre
fertile.
A muscle
came
to be regarded as a family of
definitely apportioned
differ-
entiated into
tractility of
The
most various structures and kinds of material found in the organism came to be regarded as either products from the living protoplasm, or as modified protoplasm. When we trace back the develop-
ment
we
arrive at last
at a single cell
the ovum.
Little is
But even in the lowest forms of life, amoeba, and in the simplest manifestations
of
Not
of purposive action,
in the
it,
form of an
The
living
METABOLISM
253
The substances
it
takes
in,
it
and
its
kinds
of
and
them out
in
in
the
same
physics
form.
What
is
explain to us,
the principle of
of
its
metabolism,
in
the
preservation
identity
changing
generation
succeeds
the
generation
of
its
subjects.
life,
For
this,
no name even. On the one hand, this may be a fact which we observe and cannot get behind, in which case we had better agree with Johannes Miiller, and disabuse our minds of the prejudice which either denies to the organism any existence as a self-conserving whole, or, if it looks on the cell as something sui generis, yet insists that the organism is a mere
physical science has no formula,
cells.
On
it
the other
may
be an
which
remains for
no higher than those of physics But why should we start, as so or chemistry. many men of science have done, with the preconception that this last alternative is the true one?
gories which rise
Is
it
idola theatri,
254
CEITICISM OF CATEGORIES
is
[i-^ct.
m,
no option
If the standpoint of
we
world as
it
any aspect of
If the supposed
facts
we
are,
indicate
by our names
plain
and development
what
facts,
all
why should we strain every faculty to explain human beings away into automata, or quiver with excitement when some one writes that he has found that protoplasm may apparently be
reduced to a condition of chemical inertness
in resting seeds), devoid of metabolic activity,
{e.g.,
and
a thousand such results were really established, we should yet be as far as ever from
life.
If
exhibiting
life
as a mechanical
arrangement of
molecules.
as
We
Let
our
we embark on such
enterprises.
a particular set
arranged in knowledge.
self-conserving
We
have
whole
which
is
amid
changing
COMMUNITY OF ACTION
material, the categories of
life,
255
development, and
as are
little
much fundamental
considered,
the categories
we
first
and as
each other.
We
naturally abstract
under
such
of our experience.
We have found
bound to turn a deaf ear to the appeal of the physicist and the chemist about life. Now there is another appeal which we may have to reject, and of which we hear a little even at this
stage
of our journey.
Conceded,
is
it is
said, that
the living
organism
real
is
and
irresoluble
phenomenon of nature,
is
there
at least
no ground
This assertion
marks
neglect
off"
for exploration
if
our inquiry
is
But the
we cannot
satisfactorily
undertake that inquiry without in the first place ascertaining a good deal more about the individual.
Is its reality to be limited to that of
life,
with
its
quasi-purposive manifestations
Or .must we not
256
CEITICISM OF CATEGORIES
conserving
their
["-^ct. in.
quasi-purposively in
identity
individual
and development as organic wholes amid the metabolism of material, but act quasipurposively as members of a community. The
ant-heap and the bee-hive afford illustrations of the
habits of animals vrhich exhibit such action in an
extraordinary degree.
of the
species,
duty to the species even at the cost of life, is another striking illustration of it. And then,
beyond the
owed
assertion of which
is
embodied
This
we
find in a
We
see
something
those of
that
analogous to
it
between the
developed
regions
and
intelligence.
It
is
plain
the
And
it
may
be, also, that our modern notions of evolution, and the interpretations put on the principles of Darwinism, have been in consequence of too narrow an order. The realisation of other ends than those only of natural and sexual selection may have
in
In the course of the further journey that lies front of us, we shall have to pause to consider
257
phenomena, the higher aspects of the individual, and the existence of the community. Before, however, we proceed to the first of these kinds of phenomena,
sets of
two new
the categories of
conceived as a self-conin,
embodied
but controlling,
is
its
We
saw
made up
the attri-
all
fulfilment
of
the
common
If
Not
being
quasi-purposively.
kidney be removed, the other kidney will commence to do double the amount of work, repudiating the characteristic of a mere machine.
eye and the ear adapt themselves in like to the necessities of new surroundings in the mine
or the forest.
another,
it
The manner
is
as a mere
cells
and organs of
The conception of this relationship between parts and whole, a relationship which, as akeady pointed out, more nearly
which
it
is
made
up.
state,
or soldiers
an
army,
mutually
258
CKITICISM OF CATEGORIES
we have
[i-^ct.
m.
yet
come
If so, there is
we shall when we
why
not also
would hardly have been necessary to raise this question at this point, were it not for the circumstance that it is one which arises naturally.
It
Our plane
of intelligence as
several
human
times
beings
is,
as the
remarked,
is
that not
self,
but of
being one
among many.
We
naturally enough
is
with ourselves in
us.
happens to be presented to
living
consist.
But
it is
same
is,
may
of their reality
of direct
perception.
A
could
view from a higher standpoint than that of rnan might find the family and the state presented as
wholes in perception, just as plainly as
find the
it
organism so presented.
But
259
for direct
presentation
through
medium
which has already been discussed, no such view is possible. History and sociology, not to speak of morals and jurisprudence, no doubt recognise its possibility, and speak in language which
suggests
shall
such
a direct presentation.
to
But we
find,
when we come
sciences,
and proceed by putting the individual, and therefore, for the moment, what in everyday parlance is meant by reality, out of account. Throughout
the series of the sciences, one seems to
necessity for a criticism
feel
the
it
of
categories,
were
order
and
this
of
getting
will
rid
of any
preliminary
They
have to be
place.
Meantime,
in
its
nature.
is
we have what
is
fixed
and
The form
of particles
permanent conformation.
from the
changing.
cell
260
CRITICISM OF CATEGOEIES
its
[i-ect.
m.
on each
and
giving
this,
place
to
fresh
material.
More than
is itself
the
form
of
the
organism
from birth to death, and of change in accordance with a definite principle, first of growth, and then of decay. If ^^e held any longer the window
theory of the mind, and looked upon the senses as
we
should be at a
life
how
with the
But
life
and mechanism
we found
in
the
first
Book
to be but abstract
moment
as
and
self-subsisting,
modes
of abstraction.
To
who have
suc-
ceeded in crossing the Asses' Bridge of Philosophy, and have so got away from the region of superstition,
the
difficulty
of
recognising the
living
organism as equally real with the machine, has Both are points of view which of disappeared.
necessity emerge
in
reflection,
and go to the
could
define
making of the
Just
as
we found
that
we
the
we
find that
we
recognise
Its existIt
living organism.
ence
is not,
DIFFERENTIA OF OEGANISM
substance.
It
261
its
and produces
being.
strict
its
It
accordance with this law, and in such accordthe identity of the organism, of which
from
forces
it lies
from within.
We
never find
it
as an aggregate
cobe,
analyse
it,
no more
final or
they belong.
point which
We
is
entirely different
and we
new
set
of
categories.
The
is
differentia
of
the
on which its parts externally act on each other, but As the dominating law of its own development. in that I exhibit am, what I am I a living being, the characteristics of my time of life, and of my relationship to other living beings, from whom I am
descended.
262
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
[^^^-
"
insufficient.
As
soon as its general conceptions were isolated and treated as though they could be exhaustive of reality and more than a useful but temporary and provisional mode of approach, the point of
view
turned
out
to
be
self -contradictory,
to
exhibit
what
-
Plato
called
"Dialectic."
it
The
of
proved to be
conception
subject
so
no
resting
place.
From
to
the
of
abstract
object,
externality
that
and
only
we found
ourselves
safe
long
we regarded the ground we were for the moment treading as only provisionally sound.
as
And,
its
master, of the
acts, this
human
knows and
inadequate.
less
and even the physicist is confined. It has shown us control of parts otherIt has taken us no wise than from without.
mathematician
distance towards
the
us,
notion
of
the
great
fact
which confronts
purposive,
relation
freely
directing
mind.
is
The
one
of
of
mind
to
its
object
not
263
organism
only as
that
changing
in
substance,
for
it
is
embodied
that
changing
;
substance
the living
individual exists
and although
it.
raised above
life is
mere
is
But the
mind
in
it.
external to
it
its
From
that object
is.
When
it
is itself
made
of being
from
of
all
those
which belong
to
the
indi-
externality
nature.
is
Of the conscious
highly composite.
vidual
our conception
is,
His
individuality
dependent on a multitude of considerations, some, at least, of which belong to the province of the He exists as a this, here and outside world.
now, or as a
his situation
that,
in
and of
his
His height and knowledge in weight are made his His organism through the physical categories. belongs to those of life. But beyond all these
relation
to
other
definite
lie
his intellectual
and moral
for
peculiarities,
pecu-
liarities
a mind applying
264
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
[i-^cr.
m.
When we
mean,
we attach meaning to our words, not a substance somehow in contact with the brain, not
if
an
entity separate
which he appears as an intelligent and moral being. To speak of the soul of an automaton, or a rosebush,
or a lobster,
is
to use language of
more
We
if
perceive in
anything, higher
than
life.
Man
lives,
He
is
conscious,
In the and thinks, and acts freely. object world it is this or that man, determined
through,
among
is
other things,
a definite physical
organism, that
His soul is bound up with nature to the extent of being an aspect of the natural individual. But it is an aspect of the individual that passes beyond Body and soul are not two things somenature. how bound together. They are different aspects of one and the same object. Just as the life of the body is the harmonious working together for the fulfilment of a common end of a multitude of parts, each of which consists of independently
living
units,
so
the
existence
of of
the
soul
is
self-direction
of intellectual
life
Between mere
and mere
intelligence there
INSTINCT
first,
is,
265
There
lie
between
lie
of chemistry
man.
But the
those that
like
make him
istics
which are recognised by the application of categories higher than those through which mere
It
becomes something more than merely living. It is finally through them that the externality of space and time is transcended, and we recognise him as equally with ourselves the subject for which an object world which includes ourselves is there. It is so that, in regarding him in
his
and intellectual being, we have transcended space and time. When this
aspect
of a
moral
stage
in
the
logical
scale
is
reached,
we
are
thinking fi'om the standpoint of the subject distinguishing itself from the object, and conscious
What we
the world of nature around us is, in one point of view, not directly this, for it never can be bodied
forth
in
the
relations
of externality,
but
the
266
CEITICISM OF CATEGOEIES
it,
[i-^ct.
m.
suggestion of
suggest
indicate
it
and suggest the conception of the artist. Just as they can be looked at as mere blotches of
can the actions of the conscious individual,
of
paint, so
be regarded as mere life, or even as mere mechanism. But in both cases the truest as well as the most appropriate and ordinary significance would be lost. The complex standpoint
of
the
common
man
And
if
they
it is
in everyday
perception,
because
it is
purposes
of
everyday
life
disentangle them.
The
our
incrustations
and language form the ground on which we tread our daily path. The ground is firm and satisfactory enough for ordinary
intercourse
use.
common
It is only
when we seek
to drive along
it
it
the
proves
Above mere
which we
call
life,
instinct
above mere
instinct,
and the many; between them all a multitude of minor phases; the individual emerging as the result of a combination of aspects and
standpoints; this
brings us.
is
DEFINITION OF LIFE
a moment at the physiologist's microscope discloses it.
individuality,
267
life
and look
life
for
as
To
it
define
difficulty.
itself.
may be
that
that
it
its
conception
so
far
funda-
mental
standpoint
of
is
which
that
it
This
at
at
least
is
clear,
the
attempts
definition
in
terms
of
physical forces
failure.
To
call
as
of
Mr
definite
combination
heterogeneous
both simultaneous and successive, in correspondence with external co-existences and sequences,"
is
we
are to go to
it is
better to turn
"means
"Animal
organic
by
of an internal
principle."*
nature,"
said
a unity.
The physiology
are
themselves developed and conserved in the pro* Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Naturwissenschaft, edited
by Rosenkranz, 1838,
t Propcedentik,
p.
408.
p.
1840 Edition,
176.
268
cess."
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
Hegel,
it
[i-ect. i.
will
try,
like
Mr
it
as a
"definite
combination."
Rather
its
does
he
regard
explanation
alto-
mechanism
this
compare
with a
of an organism given
"Just as an
its
a collection of
all
cells,
each having
own
so
is
life,
yet
bound together
for
mutual
service,
women. And as the perfection of an animal measured by the completeness of the division
labour
of
among
labour.
its cells,
so
is
the civilisation of a
Further, just
many
species of animals
and then given place to higher species, been civilisations which have so there Any flourished for a time, and then died away. fairly complex civilisation will serve as a type of the division of labour in the body of one of the
for a time,
have
higher animals.
mouth
for use
of an animal.
is
prepared
by other labourers such are the digestive The food has to be distributed to all members of the community by
organs of the animal.
the blood
function.
PHYSIOLOGY
269
munity has to be warned of dangers, directed and governed, and made to act harmoniously by the
statesmen of a nation; the same things are done
by the sense organs, brain, and nervous system of an animal." Here we have " subjectivity " brought
in
with a vengeance.
It is analogy merely,
and
fall
not truth.
But
it
is
at least
more
What we know
we
are
to look at facts
and not to allow our faculty of observation to be distorted by theories, we must recognise that the body of the living man consists of a great number of living parts, or organs, each of which has its own special work to Each organ not only does its own special do. work, but acts in harmony with other organs. The relationship between the organs groups them into systems. Thus we have the circulatory
system, that
is,
veins,
etc.)
;
blood
the group of
organs
concerned in the
act of breathing
movement; the
last,
skeletal
body
and
but not
least,
the
270
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
If
[^-fct.
m.
we go
each
further with
our
of
we
find
that
organ
consists
epithelial,
muscular,
and
nervous.
If
we go
yet further,
we
up of
for
structures which
study.
require
tissues,
the
microscope
their
The
when
scrutinised, turn
out to consist of
or less
natvu'e
intercellular
material
to
the
of
the
tissue.
The
have
common
They originate in a living material and may be described as small masses (varying in the case of the human body from siiT to Tinnr of an inch) of protoplasm, conThe simplest taining in each case a nucleus.
characteristics.
called protoplasm,
many
life.
millions.
All
cell
originates from
cell
but
the
original
is
cell,
in
dividing,
forming, as
which
diflFerenti-
development.
When
own
kind,
and
their
own
kind only.
cells,
Thus
epithelial cells
produce
epithelial
and no
others.
Every
cell,
of whatever kind,
PHYSIOLOGY
possesses five great powers
(the
:
271
movement, assimilation
into protoplasm),
But, although
life,
higher unities.
The
tend
cells
of the
more
in
complicated
function.
organisms
to
differentiate
irritability,
and so
on.
In such
cases,
one function
mere dormant
muscle
possibilities.
In
cells,
nerve
cells, fat
and the
see
like.
life
is,
We
now what
It is the co-operative
up the
structure
of
the
common
course
depends
on the co-operation
of
the
parts for
the fulfilment of a
common
is
function.
The
not attained
last for
is
ever.
The
reason,
this,
seen
when we
turn to
turn functions for the attainment of an end beyond its own life. In the process of its greatest
its
which
it
is
capable only in
272
itself.
CEITICISM OF CATEGORIES
This exhaustion
in
[^-ect.
..i.
may
as
of
instant death
the
act,
the
case
with
some of the lower organisms, or it may assume the form of the tax which family life forms in the case of the man and the woman. The species
in
for
the
is
fulfilment
facilitated
end,
is
and
this
requirement
and room
parts of
dissolution
period,
of the individual,
which,
after
the
cease to
co-operate.
In
the
lowest
life
forms
organism,
is
of the species
less
but
so.
it
little
much
strikingly
In
case
of
the
uni-cellular
Protozoa,
contrary
go,
be
But in the higher organisms, the break-up and ending, after the course of development has been run, of the common life of the
immortal. organism,
is
as
much a
life
beginning of that
in birth.
is
The ground
of
to be sought in no
an end which may be called ideal, meaning thereby that it cannot be found in any physical or chemical relation, and operates from within and not from without. This ground is
not a cause, nor on the other hand
of
internal
is it
the kind
ground
the
is
that
we know when
we
it
distinguish
purpose.
There
PHYSIOLOGY
273
with consciousness than to seek for a special vital force to account for it. It is simply a fundamental featiu-e of that sphere of the organic
which
lies
known.
It
but
not
as
living.
has
living.
To
what
mere
in
life
belong
its
phenomena
of
the
to the species. But compared with mere mechanism, is spontaneous action from within and not causation from without, is still something relation
life,
individual
in
as
The consequent, be
is
movement,
or secretion, or sensation,
from
on the one hand, and from motive and consequent volition on the other for there the
this,
phenomena
are
purely
subjective,
so
far
is
as
There
no
room
In the
rela-
consequent, although
some sense physical, as is shown by the electrical phenomena which accompany it, it is not this change, nor yet a mere liberation
the nerve
is in
is
the
s
effect.
274
CRITICISM OF CATEGOEIES
They
["ct. m.
act, in other words, not as machines, but as parts of living beings; and they show all the phenomena of self-con-
are characteristic of
In
Times
distinguished
surgeon,
Sir
Frederick
Treves.
Speaking of the advance of Surgery since the time, 260 years before, of the author of the
Religio Medici, he gave a description of disease
it,
which
is so relevant an illustration of what we have been discussing that I am going to quote the
report without
comment
of Sir
Thomas Browne a
still
coninflu-
and
evil
lion going
about seek-
The conception went ing of disease a Prince of Darkfurther, ness vindictively hostile and potent only for ill. His minions fell upon the land like a hideous
he
blight,
whom
shadow
Primitive
people
regarded
disease as the
work
of a malignant
spirit,
who
entered into
CONCEPTION OF DISEASE
by
gifts
275
and
flattery
on the
To
the
author of
was which was outside the body and quite distinct from it. There was nothing natural in any of its processes, and nothing beneficent in any of its manifestations. It followed from this that every
the outcome of an
symptom
of disease
was of
necessity regarded as
by unconsidered violence. If the patient vomited, the vomiting must be stopped if he coughed, the cough must cease if he failed to take food, he must
; ;
Not for a moment could it be considered that there was any benevolent purpose The physician of the present in these phenomena. day could not include this conception among the In the new Religio Medici articles of his faith. this matter of belief must follow some such lines The human body is highly organised, is as these
be made to
eat.
:
frail, is finite,
and
is,
and
dissolution.
it
It grows,
reaches
its
maximum
In the
power,
declines,
and
its
capacities
fail.
which attend old age, there was nothing preternatural, and nothing which could be considered to be due to other than the
tion of the evidences of
life
it
liable to accident,
it
of
all
other
injury.
organic structures
276
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
also
[lect.
m.
The body
was prone
depended.
to be infested by parasites,
many maladies
Not only was there nothing preternatural in disease, but it was the outcome of natural processes, and, more than that, there was evidence to show that
many
methods were marked by a purpose, and that that pxu-pose was The time had come when it would beneficent. rather appear that many of the so-called symptoms of disease were expressions of a natural effort towards cure. Having enlarged on the relation to
of
its its
manifestations and of
specific
diseases,
followed out a
little
more
in detail in connection
In this malady a in the appendix. The wall of occmred trouble the little tube became perforated, and an acrid
poison found
the abdomen.
its
way
was the essential The perforation was sudden, w^as accidental, and might be preceded by no warning sign of any kind. The manifestations
This, at
calamity in
many
instances.
which followed the perforation were termed the They were distressing symptoms of peritonitis.
all
benevolent in intent,
and collapse imposed upon the victim absolute rest, and, more than that, enforced rest in the most advantageous posture
The
intense pain
CONCEPTION OF DISEASE
277
rendered
that, namely, of
recumbency.
He was
helpless at a
be attended by
The sickness and the it secured some emptyand forbade the intro-
for recovery
The skin
necessary
end was further secured by another the remarkable rigidity of the abdominal
the affected area be accident-
which covered it would shield it like a protecting cuirass. Thus was brought about that state of absolute rest which was essential as the very first step towards the repair of the injury. At the same time, the condition of the circulation was so
modified as to render absorption of septic matter
district as little
ready as possible.
Within the abdomen the manifestations of periPeritonitis had commonly tonitis are appearing. been spoken of as one of the most deadly and most malignant of calamities. Never was a condition
The phenomena of
peri-
Peri-
was concerned only in effecting good. Many of the symptoms of disease, instead of being pounded out of the body by violence, as wholly pernicious, should rather be regarded as means
278
for
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
guiding the physician
in
[i>ect.
m.
the
treatment he
should adopt."
We
have
now
seen what
life
means,
from
the point of
physician
;
and we have
and the
But the meaning of these can only be appreciated when man has been considered as a
conscious and rational being, for
it
is
to these
We must,
therefore, pass
life
the
LECTURE IV
Let us make a start by again trying to disentangle what is meant by a man's personality. It must not be forgotten that the individuality of a human
being depends on no single aspect.
his physiological, his psychical
His
physical,
idiosyncracies, all
go to make this up. He is just this, and no other man, from the standpoint of everyday life, w^hich is
never
precise,
very
abstract,
and
therefore
never
very
and which brings in, without distinguishing them, a number of wholly distinct aspects. It is another of these aspects which we have now to Man not only lives, but knows and consider.
wills.
His existence
is
self-
As
a being
wills,
and
he
is
is
an
of society,
we must now
baffling one,
its solution.
We
280
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
it
[^^ct. iv.
have found
seems, as
nality.
it
be expressed
in
terms
that
are
We
it
found
seems,
far as
and as unreal so
we found
names given to abstractions from the concrete and individual facts of experience. Let us begin, then, by getting an idea of what we mean by consciousness,
to exhibit all such terms as the
for
it
may
it
reduce
to
to
mere
to
life,
as
it
proved to be to try
reduce
life
mere
mechanisifi.
Now,
it
is
generally best
to find
out the
nature of
by
asking what
If
we
speaks
what he
is
not in a profound
mind is awake, that is when he knows, and knows that he knows, he is aware of two sorts of object the one, the world which he perceives, the other, himself perceiving it. Of the perceiving self, he will probably add that, so far as
his
When
it,
it
is
an individual
among
CONSCIOUSNESS
pertaining to himself
of the universe.
as, in
281
may be
it
got to say
the only
that
it is
it is
memories of
what has been here and now, and expectations of what will be here and now. All else is, has been, or will be, there and then. Pressed further, he will, as was pointed out in the first Book, trace
all
this
see,
or hear, or
of
knowledge
which
can
never
as
such
be go
he
can
back
tion.
indefinitely
perceiving self
particular
which are experienced in a direct fashion in which It the feelings of no other self can be perceived. would seem as though at times he was seeking to isolate the subject and make it an object of
perception,
was a constant
When
tions,
he
nature
of this subject
he does
it
by means of abstracreal,
of
it,
in
a form which
provisional
282
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
are,
[>'='^t. iv.
abstract
conceptions
which
is
transcended
even
in
life,
more
the
in thought.
We
acts
of
particular place
upon the body at any It particular moment. any or is neither here and now, nor there and then. When we speak of it in such terms, we have
body that
it
and have passed to another standpoint from which the body is conceived as a mechanism. Now, in the plain
really ceased to
speak of
life,
all
these standpoints
him
mind, and
and mechanism, as though they were so many separate things lying side by side
life,
many
different points
Just as he talks, in a
in
and necessary everyday intercourse, has become embedded the language by which it was created, so
and as
this
idea,
useful
when he
talks of himself he indicates a highly complex and derivative conception, drawn from more standpoints than one, embracing features
organic,
intellectual,
sesthetic,
THE SELF
and moral,
the reasons
all
283
unconsciously combined.
it is
One
of
why
meant by
self in
common
is
from the process by which even in childhood the idea began to be built up. A man's self includes,
in a sense, even his clothes.
In a more precise
only relatively here.
it
off",
it
But
his finger
From another
outside him.
point
It
of
view
cut
is
may be
self.
remains
the
same
He
remains himself,
though his moral character changes, and although he is temporarily unconscious. Surely we have
here just one of those practically useful but only
provisionally true constructions of language, such
as
we became aware
identical object
world perceived
practical
self
common by
of
and
a figment of the
sense.
common
The word
seems in
this connection
an asymptotic approach to the conception of the subject, and a vast accumulation of material picked up and stored in memoiy in
to indicate
life,
inexplicable
and unreal
taken to be
if
final,
284
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
real
final,
[i-^ct. iv.
and
be
when
the
latter
were
seen
not
to
region
their
of
in
turn
within
the
life,
sphere
of
their
application.
Mechanism,
and
conscious-
we
it
insist
on
making
reality
stop
short
at
something below
in
some-
thing above.
ness,
and we
conceptions which
abstraction.
we make
distinct to ourselves
by
are
external
and independent.
Their
position
of
life
the
through
is
their ideal
it
is
neither
external
to
or
separate from
its parts.
That
sciously purposive
we have no
pigeon
reason to believe.
cerebral
The
frog
or the
whose
hemi-
is
always in response to
There
is
is
none
characteristic
of the intact animal, '-and makes its action imposThe plant lives, but sible to foresee in advance.
it
self-adaptation.
It
WILL
rules that can be
ascertained.
285
of reflex action,
not seem to be
There
is
between mere life and purposive action a borderland, where what takes place is g'Masi-purposive,
yet not, so far as the observer can get evidence,
But when we get to the region of consciousness, the phenomena are of an entirely different order. Here we experience the will to act, and the nearer we get to comactually
purposive.
pletely
voluntary self-determination,
the
further
we have
ness.
is
distinguished.
Such an act of comparison is essentially an act of will, of what is inward and self-determined. My body is what is mine, what I have control The process of selective attention, the over. foundation of all abstraction, and therefore of all knowledge, is an act of the will. The more one reflects upon the phenomena of this region of consciousness, the less does it seem possible to separate or even distinguish intelligence and volition.
They are
in
itself
it
different
What
ultimate
to
analysis
be,
would
disclose
is difficult
iffielf
to
ascertain,
because
object world
alone
introspection
can
take cognisance.
attention that
286
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
it
[^^^t.
iv.
is
difficult
see
how
the act of
it
attention
itself,
as dis-
be observed.
We
are here
But
if
we cannot
infer
to ourselves intelligence
logists,
and
as psycho-
we can but
that
they are,
without
most apparent.
a
fact,
When
for
set
I distinguish the
it is
which
I have
call myself.
This
turns out, as
we have
indefinite presentation
its
The
question,
what
it
it
excludes,
proves
But from
is in
the point of view of the plain man, the rough distinction is clear enough.
My
self,
so taken,
;
the closest
way
identified with
my body
living,
not with
my body
looked at as merely
but with
my
body viewed as also a sentient, intelligent, responsible, and free being. For the plain man there is no such entity as a soul separate from this body. That notion comes only to the mind that has
But no more does he think of himself as having a body without a soul. The soul is, for him, the body in its highest
passed into the wilderness of theory.
287
is
When
he speaks of
feeling,
he
speaks of a feeling
head.
One
from the
It is
rience.
rest
is,
that
it feels,
felt,
feels.
In
so far as
is
self,
interpreted
Its
movement
wills.
is
self-determined.
It
thinks as well as
If I
am
standing on a
is
mountain
I stand
my
surroundings
am
the centre.
perceiving,
It is here that
and
as object to
my
thinking in
I
find
my
the
brain.
If I
turn to Physiology,
an
brain.
The
fluctuations
increase
of mental
activity.
The
to
its
higher the
more does
action,
accord with the development of its cerebral hemispheres, and appear to be distinct from the
functions
cord.
If
one
may
for
the
moment speak
in
288
CKITICISM OF CATEGORIES
[i-^ct. iv.
it
may be
and
what
tion.
is
The The
aphasia results
lobe of the
utter.
left frontal
;
he can
But he cannot arrange his words. It seems that in most people the left hemisphere of the brain is the seat of control, not only of the power of orderly
speech, but also of that of orderly writing.
If the
and
spell, is affected.
The
faculty of vision in
man
appears similarly to
be dependent on the health of his occipital lobes. Alexia, or inability to read, and general want of
capacity to understand, results from injuries to
lobe
may
;
affect
hearing
said to him.
It
was
ob-
was
which with
are
right-
most people
with
all,
indeed,
who
BODY AND
handed
SOtJL
289
is
mere hearing sense did not disappear, for that was provided for by the centres on the other side. But the power of translating the soimds heard into conceptions, and the conceptions into words, had disappeared, a result which points to the conclusion that the nerve stimulations which are the conditions of the sensations of hearing, do not innervate our motor centres directly, but only do so after arousing what corresponds to the mental
control, the
seems
to
self,
separate the
two excepting
and
The body
it
But
in another
equally
real
aspect
is
living.
So when we turn
certain
features,
to the
mind we may,
the
individual
but
regard
as a living organism, and his brain as exercising the functions of life in an immensely high degree.
none the less true that, in the experience of the plain man, the individual whom he sees and hears has a higher aspect than that of mere life.
But
it is
That individual
is
conscious and
knows and
wills,
knowledge, so far as these can be made object to It is through categories which the subject itself.
are as far above and beyond those of
categories of
life
life
as the
are above
290
CRITICISM OF CATEOOEIES
the individual are alone possible.
of soul
[i-bjct. iv.
make up
would seem to be, not one in which they appear as two things, but another in which they disclose themselves as two aspects. So far from pointing to the conclusions of materialism and mechanical or causal determination, such a result points to
just the reverse.
It
is
only
because
we
will
real
assmne that the mechanical aspect is one that we think of living beings
really
the only
as
automata.
Whenever we
is
superstition,
a vista that
entirely
new opens
up.
mind as directly presented object in knowledge, and its methods are Just partly introspective and partly physiological. as mathematics and physics and chemistry can be made of immense use in the study of that region of
Psychology
is
life
to
which
none the
less
brought to the
By
abstraction,
we
represent to
as broken
are
phenomena
of mental
life
up
into
separate elements,
still
which
elements
emptied by
we have
which we
processes,
call
mere
feelings.
These feelings we
by abstraction, we make available for the chronometer, the measuring rod and the balance. In
PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY
this
291
fashion
into
we
indirectly
mena
but
relations
of
quantity.
But
just
as
is
an
artificial
construction
so
we
the the
are
and
unreal.
We
never, as
psychologists,
what we do get
it.
is
We
self,
and
but
we
of them.
in,
The
limitation
human
faculty steps
and tells us that so far and no further shall we see, and that beyond we can only proceed symbolically, or by means of indirect metaphysical methods, the results of which are
shadowy and
bloodless.
What we
mind our
have done,
object, is to
the
the subject.
We
is
break up and
neither broken
isolate
the standpoint of
common
sense
For the ordinary man He does his personality is one and indivisible. not separate soul and body. The body, which is the man himself, feels, and no one but he himself
up nor
consists of parts.
can be directly conscious of this feeling. This fact separates off what he calls his body from the rest Yet, just because he does of the external world.
not separate soul and body, he regards other people
292
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
feel,
[^^-
iv.
notwithstanding that he
their
feelings.
cannot
himself
experience
His
standpoint,
to
when examined
scientifically,
turns out
most limited validity. But such as it is it lands him in no doubts or difficulties. These arise only from the abstractions of Science, not from those of a common sense which is willing to admit every aspect of the world as it seems. Now Psychology
like
other sciences
attention,
is
forced,
in
order, through
selective
to
get
clear
knowledge, to
of reality
make
which
first
own purposes
It begins
it
by shutting out in the of mind to body, though it may afterwards talk as though a great thing had been accomplished in the rediscovery
to require.
instance the
reference
of this relationship.
consciousness,
all
It pictures the
is
contents of
that
loosely
sense,
spoken of as
consisting of
ideas.
known through
attributes
internal
as
and
It
mind
in
dealing
with
these
memory,
ment,
volition.
only
by the
is
though
limited
it.
knowledge
the contents
which
obtained through
Of
293
were, into
sensation,
it
the
field of
A
The
mere
qualifying
work
is
always present.
But
it
suits
the
purpose
of
artificial
knowledge, say of
of the
so-called
if
it
were merely passively received, and could be held out at arm's-length and inspected. When we
pass to such so-called faculties as
memory, or
difficult to ignore.
We
we can go
of
a lon^
way
in presenting the
object
The process
such
our
construction
tions
we
call thought,
of our plane
it
of intelligence
its
presenting
abstraction,
to ourselves in
by
as
aspect
of
it
this
way
we
what
has been
usual to call formal logic, the logic of the oldfashioned text-books. It is really the science of
thought, transformed by abstraction into an object of introspection, and represented as a faculty of
particular
thinker.
None
the
less
on
this
294
CRITICISM OF CATEGOEIES
does such
logic
lies
[i-ect.
v.-.
account
form a transition to
finite
what
When we
our procedure as
we
find that
we
proceed
by concentrating attention on aspects which we select. Such selection is an act of will, and the motive which impels it is the particular purpose
we happen
street
to have in view.
The man
in the
world as
ends which
we
will.
of
judgment.
is
As
It
a judgment
a true one
experience generally.
us further
split
to, reality,
that
we
up the judgment into the subject, the copula, and the predicate. For the judgment is the elemental and characteristic form of the activity of the subject, and though it be true that where intelligence
is
to
the judgment
as
the
more
presented, this
is
is
a view
we have
on
already seen,
As
soon as we
295
have penetrated the hard crust of everyday conventions and metaphors with which language has
overlaid reality, this becomes apparent.
There
is
is
only a
single
experience,
that which
ours.
Other human beings have neither the same experience, nor a different experience.
ality of experiences
is,
For a
plur-
as
we have
and
already found
self-contradictory
are,
notion.
as
other
human
is
and
If
we
pass to a higher
and
this
of glasses,
which the
creates.
Yet
this
simile
is
no
presentation
of
of
the
and time that they are inadequate, and useless, and misleading, and have been the occasion in Philosophy of difficulties far greater than those they were called in to explain. When we form a judgment we start from something which is an actual object to our minds, and
externality
space
is in this
sense real.
"
Croquet
is
is
a tqdious game."
game to what
am
refer-
my
is
Keality
296
CEITICISM OF OATEGOEIES
[i-ect. iv.
my
judgment.
But
this
is indefinite,
so far as
my
amusement
grass,
go.
I proceed to connect
it
with a
damp
and I frame a general conception, the predicate, and by means of this render definite and apparent what was before indefinite. If my judg-
ment
a right one, I have so far unravelled experience and extended its connotation. The present conception is amplified, and receives Content. Now
is
if,
as
we have
seen
it
must
be,
experience
is
and knowledge
this
is
we can
are in search
experience
We
frame imaginative
we
find
testing,
emerges as in
rest of experience.
We
thus
This
is
induction.
system before our minds, we wish to whether a particular case belongs to it,
here
out
"
;
"Games
we have a
"Croquet involves standing we have the minor pre" miss, with a middle term asserting a harmony
about in the rain
;
here
SELECTIVE ATTENTION
297
between a general feature of croquet and the special system of tedious experiences with which we want to know whether it is connected. "Croquet is tedious"; here we have the conclusion of the syllogism, making explicit a feature of croquet which was not explicit before, because the game had not been assigned a place in my system of tedious experiences. It will be observed how abstract, subjective and selective, both these processes
of
reasoning
are.
Abstract
they
are,
arbitrarily.
same man to walk up and down the grass reading a book, and he will complain bitterly, and, without waiting, draw the inference that
But
set the
reading on
the tedious.
in.
damp
Thus the
comes
Now
probably
He
has con-
centrated
feature
attention
in
the
second
case
on
the
first.
willing,
that
it
Thus it is that thinking passes into and willing into thinking, and we find is only artificially and by abstraction
represented as different kinds of
as
mental
as
it
acts.
is idea,
much
is
it is will.
Assent,
and
subjective aspect
belief,
the
298
CEITICISM OF CATEGORIES
will.
C^^cr. iv.
manifestation of this
sistent
It
is
attempt of
some psychologists
and not merely provisionally separated, that has led to the difficulty which has puzzled people when looking for light on the
nature of the act of assent or
belief.
The
will is
it is
confronted by a world of
it.
hem
it in,
But
we
was aware
of itself
as one with
it,
its object,
and of
its
then
we
that
was wholly
The
of reality which
we have pursued up
in our journey
to the stage
we have reached
shown
seems to have
Even
in experience
we seem
to have
power of thought or to its work in the construction of reality, and now the same appears to be true of will, which by its selection seems to sustain, alter, and, to an extent which is for us limitless, create What has the experience amid which we live.
obscured this truth
is
man
man
make,
and energy.
considering,
Even
it
at
the standpoint
we have been
seems
RETEOSPECT
Causes.
I will
299
now
Not
external compulsion,
but
the end, the purpose, of the observer, determines the method of his investigation. the method
categories.
is
The essence of
set of
is
abstraction,
under a particular
The point
of departure
always the
world as it seems, the world of concrete fact, which is thus stripped of its wealth and diversity. In a sense, too, the subject-matter is, throughout,
concrete
fact.
But
it is
fact
only. When I set myself to solve the problem of whether the square of the hypothenuse of a right-
angled triangle
is
two
sides, I start
thing,
the
idealised
construction of
fact,
is
never to be
I can reason
from
its properties,
In the course of
my
Thought
It
is
in this
made adequate
;
to reality.
constructs
object.
It is free in so doing, to
go right or
to go
wrong
but
if,
determining activity of
thought
is
to go right,
it
principles
is
300
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
By
so doing,
construct,
[i-ect. .v.
operating.
it
possible to
the
the subject
satisfied
it
on the theoretical
finds the ideal
individual
of
because the
beyond.
self is
outcome, and
has no desire
seek
anything
and so
unique.
In geometry, in
and mould, the fact as we do in chemistry. The perfect square is as much, and as little, a fact as the molecule made up of two atoms of hydrogen, and one of oxygen. In both cases, we make experiments which we could not make, without materials purified and rendered When we have thus definite by abstraction. idealised a fact of experience, we go on to reason to a result which, if true, must disclose itself as
on,
another idealised
fact.
That
is
this should
activity of
lies.
Truth and
error,
and there is no need of repetition what was there found, in order to prove that the proposition, Esse is Intelligi, in no way conflicts
third Lectures,
of
FALSE METAPHORS
Much
301
and without
reserve, arises
its
Now,
really
so long as
we
of construction,
we
mean, we
be apt
to
give
false
impression.
and
space.
It
is,
how-
world
in
and space themselves, that we have to account, and we shall only fail if our metaphors seem to beg the very point on which we employ them to throw light. In truth, thought no more exists apart from its object, than does the object exist apart from thought. It is in self-conscious mind that the two are distinguished, and, except as aspects within self-conscious mind, they seem to
have no meaning or
reality.
is
comprised,
moves,
and has its being. Within it, we must look for It truth and error as well as everything besides. is the whole field of reality, because it is the whole And mind creates reality only in field of mind. the sense that reality has no meaning, save as a distinction within mind, while, on the other hand,
self,
save
self-
an
and
302
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
[j-^ct. iv.
That the distinction of the one from the other exists only in thought, is plain. The one
subsisting.
is
I see
that chair!
for
What makes
what
me ?
medium
please,
of which
is first
consciousness as an
you
And
yet I cannot
square of the
triangle as a deduction.
my
though
though confronted by a
reality
which was
beyond
able,
my
control
by abstraction, to take one of its relationships or aspects, and mould, control, and experiit
much wider limits than my now in the concrete world of actuality enabled me to do with the real That was how I set things of that world.
ment with
within
position as here and
immediacy at naught, and could take flight on the wings of inference to the most distant regions of
space and time.
recog-
has to give an
as a whole containing
is
303
and
for him,
in
certain
Yet, in other
spectator
self-consciousness,
and as such
individu-
ality
may be
of reflection,
and turned
in
on
its
So looked at, his limitations, at first sight impenetrable and baffling, disclose themselves as mere appearances. From the everyday working standpoint from which the onlooker must be taken as a thing of which his thought is
operation.
own
a property or
reality.
activity, these
appearances are
final
But pass from the practical standpoint even for a moment. He sees the branches of a The branches with tree waving in the wind.
their leaves are
now
in a
moment, while
and opening again, they are in a new position. Just as we found earlier that the individual man could have no direct experience of his neighbour's sensations, and could recognise in their descriptions no more than universal elements, that is to say, elements which exist for thought only,
passively
received
sense
impres-
moment
to
before.
He
an
All he
can do
is,
like
the geometer,
construct
304
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
["^ct.
iv.
image embodying those general features of them, which thought alone can apprehend and retain
in
an act which
is
moment by
reference
past moment.
He
wind moves its branches, and he so enriches and expands its present actuality for But the work done is obviously not himself. However accomplished by passive reception.
as
the
proper
matter
for
attention
the
aspect
of
passive reception
may be
at another standpoint,
it
here,
where the
That between his mind and its content. content can be described by him to himself and to others only in terms of the universals which
mind establishes, and which give meaning, nature, and actuality to that content. The object world
of nature has sometimes been called externalised
Such a name is good enough if we bear in mind what we mean by the words. We do not mean that in the aspect in which John Smith appears as a reasoning animal, an individual among other individuals, whose reason is the soul of what otherwise would be a soulless body or thing, his thinking faculty can be shown
thought.
EESULTS OF IDEALISM
to put together the universe of which he
It is only
305
is part.
when
in reflection
we have
transcended
observer,
find the
as well as what he
difference
we
between them to be distinguished only within knowledge. Such a view of reality is far removed from subjective idealism, and even from the modified doctrine of the Critique of Pure Reason. If the distinction between subject and object emerges at a plane of intelligence, which
is
the
doctrine
to
for
which
this
is
so
is
more
subjecit
analogous
treats
realism
than to the
old
tive idealism of
Nature
is
as real just as
much
as
the
individual
in
percipient.
For a
percipient,
who
many
part of nature itself, and conditioned by it, the nature from which he has emerged must always be impenetrable and uncontrollable, expanding itself in a contingency which is boundless, and disclosing itself at every turn as
aspects
its
creature.
But the individual is more than an individual. He is a thinker, and in thinking of his own These limits become limits he transcends them.
disclosed as
falling
within thought
is
itself.
He
who
side
in
one aspect
a creature,
distin-
appearance
can,
only.
Finite
he
appears,
he
by
letting
intelligence
306
CEITICISM OF CATEGOEIES
among the
whose
intelligi,
[^^^-
"
aspects
discovered
own
foreignness to disappear.
The and physics can help him to get far in this direction. The use of the higher categories of life and soul bring him still further along the path which leads to the discovery that the reality and actuality of nature are simply intelligence. The final result, achieved only when the whole series of the categories is made use of, and
the truth and very substance of nature
is
to be
itself in
own
object.
It has
possible to
it as a complete system, a system in which the three aspects of ultimate reality would
First,
mind under
in in
their
aspect
of
its
categories
relation
each
other;
second,
mind
the
work done by
intelli-
and, third,
in
mind as the concrete and final activity which not only do the categories and nature
SYSTEM IN PHILOSOPHY
one.
307
In such a presentation, nature would figure as characterised by the feature of atomism, in other words self-subsistence, and mutual exclusion of its components. For it would be distinguished from its counter abstraction, intelligence taken
fer se, only by appearing as not-thought, the background against which intelligence is distinguished
itself
as
in
This distinction
side of
dis-
it.
A
in
complete system of
the
task
of
own movement
and
Self-
own
categories
and
their distinctions,
Now it is
in
Reason
such a system.
My
observations
form but an introduction to Philosophy, to the thinking about these things of the great minds in Their pm-pose the history of speculative thought.
merely to try to help towards an xmderstanding of what the function of speculative thought has
is
work which
it
has accomplished.
308
CKITICISM OF CATEGORIES
and,
[i-^ct. iv.
He who
discourses,
having
which leads to
reality,
the
in
both
work
of Reason.
still
In modern times
more thoroughly.
matter of connot mastered
is
still
But just
himself
a mathematician
is
who has
properly equipped as a
philosopher
who
Hegel is very hard For that matter, so are the books on the higher mathematics. Yet people do not turn aside from the books on higher mathematics on that
Hegelian system as a whole.
account,
or pronounce
their
contents nonsense.
of their difficulty is
own
imagination
is
with
a wholly
novel
set
of conceptions
about
which are
life.
The
incrustations of
common
we
every science
we have
and
case
is
Why in the
of Philosophy should
be different!
There
The
HEGEL
removed by patient study and
less
309
reflection are not
but greater.
men working through two thousand years, are not likely to prove
labour of successive generations of
easy to grasp without preparation.
told
When we
are
by the most distinguished thinkers in this country, on the Continent, and in the United States, that they get more from Hegel than from any one else, and when we see how profoundly his teaching
has modified studies such as those of history and of
mention no others, it seems as though the main preparation for the would-be philosopher must still be to find out what Hegel really meant, and to learn to read him. The best assurance that I can give you of my own conviction on the subject is to tell you that all that is in these Lectures I have either taken or adapted from Hegel, and
logic, to
that in
Hegel there is twice as much again of equal importance which these Lectures cannot even
touch.
We
may
all
Perhaps no
single intellect,
its totality
may
think
that the meagre and inadequate knowledge which Hegel possessed of Science, as Science has since
his time
the presence of
of
universals
of
310
part,
CEITICISM OF CATEGORIES
in
[i-^ct. iv.
large
measure a
failure.
We
may be
dissatisfied
being
rewritten and the doing of much of the work anew. We may be grateful for the work which remarkable
men
many
are
of
our
own
time,
men
such as
Mr
we bound
we
are
face
of
the
greatest
master
of
speculative
He
is
He
He damps
by successive and deliberate refusals to fire his imagination. Himself a master of rhetoric, he seems to despise it even where it woiild serve
to
for
a moment the
He
is
He
will
not
stop
to
explain
that
questions
that
point
irrational.
He
prefers
in
such
311
amuse himself by assuming the part of a humorist. Herr Krug thinks that Hegel
ought,
if
were true, to be able to Herr Krug's, pen. Hegel only hints a doubt whether the pen be worth deducing. So deduce
his,
his philosophy
does not matter. Yet it is not the language which Hegel uses that is the real diffidifference
culty.
It is the
mode
of thinking.
If
we have
to
little
difficulty.
We
come
see
be
special,
special as is
of
the
mathematical
will
The
Hegelian
Its
Philosophy
always be
difficult.
truths
do not
lie
of things,
on the surface of the pictorial aspect but beneath it. You have to break up
that surface in order to get at what this great mine of Philosophy holds buried beneath a ter-
minology necessarily novel, but not necessarily as difficult as its creator has chosen to make it.
None
the less no
tell
who
will
make
the
No
other
so
helpful.
is
Far
away,
across
the
off
German
from the
Ocean, there
busy
traffic
of the
of Berlin.
You go
deserted
There,
gateway
which
leads
into
the
now
312
CKITICISM OF CATEGORIES
[^^^-
'v.
under a simple stone, lie the mortal remains of the greatest master of abstract thought that
the world has seen since the day
died.
when
Aristotle
INDEX
Abioqenesis, 182, 240.
^Esthetics, 235.
of,
169
et
Alexia, 288.
of,
20,
37,
Amoeba,
the, 270.
Aphasia, 288.
Mr
Brad-
125.
of, 3, 4.
Common
sense, 41.
Logic
Consciousness,
150, 279
123,
157, 161.
et seq.
Cooke's
(note).
The
New
Okemistry,
228
Creeds, influence
Critique 273.
Critique of
of, 4.
of Judgment,
Kant's,
17,
230.
17.
65.
Hermann,
Body,
the,
286-292
organism
of,
42,43.
(note).
Dogmatism,
13.
Bradley, Mr, 48, 143, 145, 146, 310. Bronte, Emily, "Last Lines" of,
75.
Brown, the Botanist, 248. Browne, Sir Thomas, 274. Browning, Robert, 74.
Bywater, Ingram, 50.
gis
295
Kant's view
of,
86, 92.
religious, 5.
314
Faraday, 220.
Fechner, 235.
Feeling, the value
Fiohte, 310.
of, 6.
INDEX
Imponderables, the notion
68, 90,
of,
228.
255, 259
305.
Form,
as
distinguished
from
Individuality, 61.
Instinct, the
Matter, 55.
Fraser, Professor, 23.
phenomena
117,
of,
285.
as
Intelligence,
distinct
264,
307;
Introjection, 86.
German
Thinkers, 140, 177. Gifford, Lord, 6, 7 ; purpose of, in founding the GiflFord Lectureship, 3, 14, 34.
Jame8,
of, 49.
God,
What we mean
of,
189 ; Hegel's
view
Goethe,
129.
Kant,
197,
Faust, 92.
Pure Reason, 17
Gravitation, 221.
of
Green,
Thomas
Language,
Lesage, 221.
Life, the
et seq.,
Hbsel, 11,12,
phenomenon
261, 267.
of,
236, 238
his
the founda;
Life
hia
121,
Helmholtz, 144.
Heraclitus,
27,
28, 169,
Logic, the
Science
of,
143,
146,
199
the
156-162.
Lotze, 122, 123, 124, 141, 142, 143.
teaching
of, 50,
51, 52.
Lucretius, 219.
Hume,
Man, 189
God, 15
the relationship
of,
to
sophy, 10.
Personality).
Man's Place in
Idealism, the thesis
Ideas, the association
of,
of,
Goamos,
121,
69, 143.
30.
125.
of,
197.
INDEX
Matter, the conception
55, 56, 218
et seq.,
315
of,
37, 38,
244.
Philosophy, 80
11, 12,
110
114.
Life, the gulf be-
Mechanism and
tween, 17, 42, 43, 284. Melody, a, the nature of, 45. Metabolism, 43. Metaphysics, as distinguished from Psychology, 146, 162.
Michelet, 186.
Mill,
the
Stuart, 24, 28, 30, 31, 37, 39, 40, 47, 51, 58 ; and " PerPossibilities," 72.
of,
John
Protoplasm, 252.
Protozoa, 272.
manent
of, 5,
143,
127,
Molecules, 226
et seq.
Quantity, 200
144,
et seq.,
235.
Quasi-purposive
246, 247, 285.
action,
252,
257,
Munsterberg, 145
his Psychology
of,
et seq.,
77,
and
Reason,
;
7,
125, 137,
Nature, the
object world
of,
304.
138 essential to religion, 132. Reasoning, the process of, 296. Reflection, 84 ; the source of our knowledge of the object world,
27, 131, 171.
Newman,
Cardinal,
3.
and
the
"Science of God,"
Medici,
Royce
to Subject,
32, 37, 38, 57, 79, 98, 305.
and
132,
idealism, 69
and
reason,
133-136, 310.
meaning
of, 58.
Scepticism, 73.
of,
the
methods
Possibilities of Sensa;
of,
174, 192.
"Permanent
tions,"
26
of,
140,
158.
316
Self,
INDEX
the,
106,
107,
108,
130-136,
113,
Self-Consciousness, 112,
129,
Time, 197
et seq.
236,307.
Sensations, the,
24, 25,
Trendelenburg, 121.
26
the
of, 8,
Universal,
290
;
264,
286,
of,
287,
153, 155.
Space, 197
et seq.
of Religious
Experience,
Stirling,
Dr
Hutchison, 124.
Vortex
Subject,
WUl and
sense, 118,
Superstitions of
173.
common
between, 127, 128, 133, 285. Willing, 297. " Wonder," the source of Aristotle's,
7.
Tait,
of,
22,
Tempest, Shakespeare's,
World