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FAILURES
OF
SECULAR
The revival of Islam as a political force in the 1970s is a sociopolitical phenomenon that is often difficult to understand. Much to the confusion of many, the Islamic resurgence took place after waves of modernization, secularism, and nationalism hit the Arab World. In this essay, I argue that extremist strands of both political Islam and Islamic fundamentalism have and continue to gain traction in the Arab world due to continued failures of the state: in the Arab Israeli conflict, in providing for its people, and in exercising sovereignty without foreign influence. To this end, I will compare two extreme cases of Islamic fundamentalism: Islamic resistance movements in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, examining their founding, growth, and national, regional, and international implications.
Background
There are a number of terms that are relevant to the understanding of modern Islamist movements in the Arab World. Political Islam, or sometimes Islamism, refers to Islam as a political ideology rather than as a religious or theological construct. Political Islam can range from moderate to extreme, but in all cases, its adherents hold the belief that Islam as a body of faith has something to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim world (Ayoob, 2004, p. 1). Islamic fundamentalism is a closely relatedbut highly debatedterm, describing a certain strand of political Islam. Islamic fundamentalism is often understood in the context of political Islam; indeed, many scholars use both terms interchangeably to indicate a religious-political belief that the return to the fundamentals of the Islamic tradition is the key to political and socioeconomic prosperity, following the failures of secular, modernist, and nationalist movements (Esposito, 2000, pp. 49-59). Islamic fundamentalism can also be understood independent of Political Islam, as a belief advocating returning to the origins of Islam and the Islamic tradition from the days of the Prophets and the Righteous Caliphs. That is, a belief of Islamic revivalism that advocates a return to what is perceived as a lost purity in religious practice. Islamic fundamentalism contrasts with Islamic modernism, which does not rely on a literal interpretation of the Quran, instead seeking to preserve the spirit of the Quran in a modern social context (Andersen, et al., 2011, pp. 147-8). Within Islamic fundamentalism, Islamic extremists refers to those who would use violent or coercive means to implement a fundamentalist Islamic political agenda. (Andersen, et al., 2011, p. 147) When discussing the rise and salience of Islamic fundamentalism, this essay will use a liberal interpretation of the term to refer to extremist strand Islamic fundamentalism, consistent with common everyday use of the term. Furthermore, Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic extremism implicitly imply a belief in political
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Islamic revival or resurgence, taking place in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Esposito, 2000, p. 50).
Some believe that there is a connection between the decline of Arab unity as a symbol and the rise of Political Islam. Indeed, as Arab unity was becoming increasingly discredited through the years, especially after 1967, new paths were sought. (Andersen, et al., 2011, pp. 77-8). In the same spirit as my main thesis, I argue that the birth of political Islam was indeed a result of the failures of the secular Arab state. A series of crises since the late 1960s has discredited many regimes and Western inspired modernization paradigms, triggering the politics of protest and a quest for greater authenticity. The resulting call for an Islamic alternative has been reflected in slogans such as Islam is the solution and Neither West nor East. John Esposito, (Esposito, 2000, p. 50)
Beginning with the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the failures of Arab Nationalism and Secularism frustrated many Arabs. Further events, including the growth of armed resistance the Arab-Israeli conflict, sectarian conflict in the Lebanese civil war, and the success of the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution all contributed to discredit secularism and modernism, in favor of an Islamic movement. Indeed, Esposito argues that modernism has been perceived as a form of neocolonialism, an evil that supplants religious and cultural identity (Esposito, 2000, p. 50). This is not to say that scholarship such as that of Sayyid Qutb and Hasan al-Banna well before the 1960s played no role in the Islamic revivalism. Indeed, both Qutb and al-Banna advocated political Islam, and Qutb advocated militant extremist Islamism. While both had followers, al-Banna even forming the Muslim Brotherhood, such groups and ideologies never entered the mainstream until the Islamic revival took place. While scholars could agree that the revival could not have taken place if the works of al-Banna, Qutb, and others was unavailable for the masses to draw from, the argument remains that the failures that the failures of the secular Arab state were the trigger of the resurgence.1
It can also be argued that scholarship of those like Qutb and al-Banna is both inspired from such failures of the secular political system and ideology. Indeed, in describing the message of the Brotherhood in one of its founding documents, al-Banna references patriotism and nationalism as essentially flawed systems of belief (al-Banna, ca. 1928, pp. 4-5). In addition, in a letter dated 1947 to Egypts King Farouk and others, al-Banna also references failures of the Western world, especially in foreign relations, as an additional reason for the need for a political Islam. In addition, al Banna attempts to demonstrate how Islam is the Solution through demonstrating potential reform that can be
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Eyas Alsharaiha Though groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Gaza, and Jordan existed before the awakening took place, there are two final points to be made: first, the largest growth of the Brotherhood occurred after the awakening. Second, the founding of the groups and their entrenchment in society took place as charitable organizations providing social services to the poor in area where the state had failed to provide. It is thus still true, and in line with the thesis of this essay, that the Islamization of society took place thanks to the multiple failures of the secular state.
provided by Islam in Arab states (al-Banna, 1947, pp. 2, 10-1). It should be noted that al-Banna, unlike Qutb, never advocated militant or extremist Islamism; the brotherhood indeed unequivocally rejected Qutbism (Ayoob, 2004, p. 2).
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Eyas Alsharaiha After the participation of the PLO in the Madrid Peace Conference and Oslo, the Palestinian Authority exerted some self-governance over some areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, thus beginning some signs of a secular state in these areas. Hamas emerged as the main opposition of the Palestinian Authority. With the PLOs diplomatic failures, as well as increasing evidence of economic corruption, and a poor handling of the states economy, the secular nationalist movement felt incompetent, and many turned to Hamas; they were clean. After Israel withdrew from Gaza in its unilateral disengagement of 2005, the Palestinian Authority failed yet again to rise to the occasion and govern properly. (Usher, 2006, p. 4) By 2006, during the Palestinian Parliamentary Elections, and against all expectations, Hamas crushed Fatah in a massive victory, winning 76 seats out of the 132-member chamber, with Fatah getting only 43. Graham Usher lists three factors contributing to Hamass victory: Palestinian disillusionment with PLO diplomacy and the prospects for peace, Hamass record of clean and selfless service, and the Palestinian Authoritys failure to bring political progress, economic recovery, law or order in the aftermath of the Gaza withdrawal (Usher, 2006, p. 4).
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Eyas Alsharaiha Hezbollahs loyalty over Amal can be seen as a success on their part to provide effective services, and a secular Amals failure to do the same. Indeed, the desperate state of Shiites in Lebanon, and Amals inability to effect a solution to their strife, especially at the height of the civil war, is directly linked to Hezbollahs popularity (Andersen, et al., 2011, p. 86). Hezbollahs growth also occurred in light of the general condition of statelessness in Lebanon, during the civil war and after. Enabled by its grassroots orientation, and thanks to the ineffectiveness of the state, and contending secular movements, Hezbollah was triumphant. Since the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, and Lebanons Cedar Revolution that year, the country has been sharply divided into two camps: the first, known as the March 14 Alliance, includes secular and pro-Western groups such as the Sunni Hariris Future Movement, as well as Christian groups like the Phalanges and the Lebanese Forces. The second is known as the March 8 alliance, and includes Shiite Hezbollah and Amal, Christian Free Patriotic Movement, and other others. While Islamism is certainly not a common policy of the March 8 alliance, the popularity of Hezbollah directly affects the popularity of the alliance. Since 2005, Lebanons government has been largely controlled by the March 14 alliance, especially the Future Movement or Saad al-Hariri. Such group was seen as pro-Western, and not too hostile towards Israel. But also, Lebanons successive governments from 2005 until 2011 were accused of corruption and favoritism. Such corruption, combined with the statelessness of Lebanon, contributed to the popularity Hezbollah (Haddad, 2006), leading to a 2009 Parliamentary Election victory of the March 8 movement, and a 2011 change in government, with the March 8 Alliance in power for the first time. Another factor for Hezbollahs popularity is the 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. First of all, the war was a proof to many that the moderates towards Israel were both ineffective and wrong, Israel being an aggressive, expansionist state that needs to be resisted. As such, the Lebanese moderates lost ground, and the idea of armed resistance against Israel became sensational. The resistance was viewed as victorious after Israels withdrawal (Salem, 2006, p. 13), and Hezbollah therefore was seen as more effective vis--vis Israel, compared to the Future Movement and other moderates.
National Implications
The national implications of the popularity of extremist political Islam parties in the Palestinian territories is the Hamas victory in the 2006 elections, explained earlier in context of the failure of the moderate secular movement. This victory, after an initial period of disagreement, eventually led to a Palestinian national unity government that included both Hamas and Fatah members. Both the initial Hamas government and the national unity government were subject to economic sanctions (to be discussed in International Implications). The strain on the unity government and Fatahs blame of Hamas for the
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Eyas Alsharaiha sanctions ultimately lead to the breakup of the unity government. Intense fighting between Hamas and Fatah followed, and the Hams siege of Gaza (Hovedenak, 2009, pp. 70, 74). Today, Gaza and the West Bank are separate political entities, with the Gaza Strip controlled by Hamas. Hamas-controlled Gaza has been more hostile towards Israel and has been connected to more resistance operations against Israel, including firing rockets towards civilian and other targets. In Lebanon, the popularity of Hezbollah was a contributing factor to its growth and support, and contributed in the March 8 victory in the 2009 elections. The Pro-Syrian Alliance now controls the government, and has strong stances against controversial topics of national interest, including the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, and its implications on the status of the investigations of the assassination of former PM Rafik al-Hariri (Salem, 2011).
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Eyas Alsharaiha Hezbollahs sizeable popularity in Lebanon and its stance against peace and negotiation with Israel also complicates regional politics. Hezbollahs activity provides pretext for many of Israels action, including its possession of the Golan Heights for security, and its fear of Iran. Hezbollah is deemed a western threat and a terrorist organization, and as such Lebanese regional politics is affected. The most prominent example of such implications is the 2006 Lebanon War, which was a direct result of Hezbollah prominence and activity in the region.
Conclusion
One pattern that perhaps becomes evident is that political Islam rarely seems to become popular on its own right. The same applies to Islamic fundamentalism and extremism. Though one can observe a number of thinkers adhering to political Islam, or militant extremism, the salience of political Islam and Islamic extremism into mainstream culture and politics seems to be a result of external factors, not the content of the ideologies themselves. In the case of the Palestinian territories, we can see how the failure of peaceful negotiations, the corruption of Fatah, and reputation of Hamas as honest and upright lead directly to its explosive popularity. Hamass firmness with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict makes it a more attractive ideology, given the results of Fatahs attitudes. In the case of the Shiite groups of Lebanon, Hezbollahs growth and popularity can also be understood in the context of the failures of the secular groups; the Amal movements inability to lift Lebanons Shiites out of poverty, and their weak stance on the Israeli invasion of Lebanon during the civil war were all contributing factors, causing the Shiite constituency to turn to Hezbollah. There is something to be said, however, about political Islam on its own right, and its effectiveness in attracting the masses. After all, it is no coincidence that it is always the Islamist party that gains traction after the failures of the secular groups. Once secularism and western modernism fails, political Islam in itself becomes attractive to the Arab constituency; this has been shown in the discussion of the Background and Islamic Resurgence. It is thus sufficient to have an ineffective secular movement for the Islamist parties to make gains.
Works Cited
al-Banna, H., 1947. Toward the Light. [Online] Available at: http://bit.ly/rMkM0J [Accessed 16 December 2011]. al-Banna, H., ca. 1928. Our Message. [Online] Available at: http://bit.ly/rXAIS0 [Accessed 16 December 2011]. Andersen, R. R., Seibert, R. F. & Wagner, J. G., 2011. Politics and Change in the Middle East. 10 ed. s.l.:Prentice Hall. Page 7
Eyas Alsharaiha Ayoob, M., 2004. Political Islam: Image and Reality. World Policy Journal, Fall, 21(3), pp. 1-14. Byman, D., 2005. Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Esposito, J. L., 2000. Political Islam and the West. Joint Force Quarterly, Spring, pp. 49-55. Haddad, S., 2006. The Origins of Popular Support for Lebanon's Hezbollah. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29(1), pp. 21-34. Hovedenak, A., 2009. Hamas in transition: the failure of sanctions. Democratization, February, 16(1), pp. 59-80. Salem, P., 2006. The Future of Lebanon. Foreign Affairs, Nov.-Dec., 85(6), pp. 13-22. Salem, P., 2011. Lebanon's New Government: Outlines and Challenges. [Online] Available at: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2011/06/15/lebanon-s-new-government-outlinesand-challenges/1sq [Accessed 16 December 2011]. Smith, C. D., 2009. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 7th ed. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's. Tekuma, M., 2009. How Israel Helped to Spawn Hamas. The Wall Street Journal, 24 January, p. W1. The Associated Press, 2011. Arab League threatens Syria with suspension. [Online] Available at: http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2011/11/12/syria-arab-league.html [Accessed 16 December 2011]. Usher, G., 2006. Hamas Triumphant. The Nation, 20 February, pp. 4-5.
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