Accession with respect to movable property; quieting of title; ruinous building (Articles 466-483, 1723)

SECTION 3. - Right of Accession with Respect to Movable Property Art. 466. Whenever two movable things belonging to different owners are, without bad faith, united in such a way that they form a single object, the owner of the principal thing acquires the accessory, indemnifying the former owner thereof for its value. Art. 467. The principal thing, as between two things incorporated, is deemed to be that to which the other has been united as an ornament, or for its use or perfection. Art. 468. If it cannot be determined by the rule given in the preceding article which of the two things incorporated is the principal one, the thing of the greater value shall be so considered, and as between two things of equal value, that of the greater volume. In painting and sculpture, writings, printed matter, engraving and lithographs, the board, metal, stone, canvas, paper or parchment shall be deemed the accessory thing. Art. 469. Whenever the things united can be separated without injury, their respective owners may demand their separation. Nevertheless, in case the thing united for the use, embellishment or perfection of the other, is much more precious than the principal thing, the owner of the former may demand its separation, even though the thing to which it has been incorporated may suffer some injury. Art. 470. Whenever the owner of the accessory thing has made the incorporation in bad faith, he shall lose the thing incorporated and shall have the obligation to indemnify the owner of the principal thing for the damages he may have suffered. If the one who has acted in bad faith is the owner of the principal thing, the owner of the accessory thing shall have a right to choose between the former paying him its value or that the thing belonging to him be separated, even though for this purpose it be necessary to destroy the principal thing; and in both cases, furthermore, there shall be indemnity for damages. If either one of the owners has made the incorporation with the knowledge and without the objection of the other, their respective rights shall be determined as though both acted in good faith. Art. 471. Whenever the owner of the material employed without his consent has a right to an indemnity, he may demand that this consist in the delivery of a thing equal in kind and value, and in all other respects, to that employed, or else in the price thereof, according to expert appraisal. Art. 472. If by the will of their owners two things of the same or different kinds are mixed, or if the mixture occurs by chance, and in the latter case the things are not separable without injury, each owner shall acquire a right

proportional to the part belonging to him, bearing in mind the value of the things mixed or confused. Art. 473. If by the will of only one owner, but in good faith, two things of the same or different kinds are mixed or confused, the rights of the owners shall be determined by the provisions of the preceding article. If the one who caused the mixture or confusion acted in bad faith, he shall lose the thing belonging to him thus mixed or confused, besides being obliged to pay indemnity for the damages caused to the owner of the other thing with which his own was mixed. Art. 474. One who in good faith employs the material of another in whole or in part in order to make a thing of a different kind, shall appropriate the thing thus transformed as his own, indemnifying the owner of the material for its value. If the material is more precious than the transformed thing or is of more value, its owner may, at his option, appropriate the new thing to himself, after first paying indemnity for the value of the work, or demand indemnity for the material. If in the making of the thing bad faith intervened, the owner of the material shall have the right to appropriate the work to himself without paying anything to the maker, or to demand of the latter that he indemnify him for the value of the material and the damages he may have suffered. However, the owner of the material cannot appropriate the work in case the value of the latter, for artistic or scientific reasons, is considerably more than that of the material. Art. 475. In the preceding articles, sentimental value shall be duly appreciated. CHAPTER 3 QUIETING OF TITLE Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein. Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property. Art. 478. There may also be an action to quiet title or remove a cloud therefrom when the contract, instrument or other obligation has been extinguished or has terminated, or has been barred by extinctive prescription. Art. 479. The plaintiff must return to the defendant all benefits he may have received from the latter, or reimburse him for expenses that may have redounded to the plaintiff's benefit.

Art. 480. The principles of the general law on the quieting of title are hereby adopted insofar as they are not in conflict with this Code. Art. 481. The procedure for the quieting of title or the removal of a cloud therefrom shall be governed by such rules of court as the Supreme Court shall promulgated. CHAPTER 4 RUINOUS BUILDINGS AND TREES IN DANGER OF FALLING Art. 482. If a building, wall, column, or any other construction is in danger of falling, the owner shall be obliged to demolish it or to execute the necessary work in order to prevent it from falling. If the proprietor does not comply with this obligation, the administrative authorities may order the demolition of the structure at the expense of the owner, or take measures to insure public safety. Art. 483. Whenever a large tree threatens to fall in such a way as to cause damage to the land or tenement of another or to travelers over a public or private road, the owner of the tree shall be obliged to fell and remove it; and should he not do so, it shall be done at his expense by order of the administrative authorities. Art. 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications for a building is liable for damages if within fifteen years from the completion of the structure, the same should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the defects in the ground. The contractor is likewise responsible for the damages if the edifice falls, within the same period, on account of defects in the construction or the use of materials of inferior quality furnished by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect supervises the construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the contractor. Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the cause of action by reason of any defect mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the building.

Bombales - Santos v. Bernabe Doctrine: If two things of identical or dissimilar nature are mixed and the owners of the things are in good faith, OR if the mixture occurs accidentally and cannot be separated without injury, each owner shall acquire a right in the mixture proportionate to the part belonging to him, according to the value of the things mixed or comingled. FACTS: Santos deposited 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay in the warehouse of Bernabe. At the same time, Tiongson also deposited 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay in the same warehouse. The share of Tiongson and Santos were mixed together and cannot be identified. Tiongson files a case against Bernabe to recover the 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay deposited in Bernabes warehouse. Tiongson files for a petition for a writ

of attachment and the Court granted it. Bernabes properties were attached, including only 924 cavans of rice and 31 kilos of palay. These were sold at a public auction and the proceeds were delivered to Tiongson. Santos intervened in the attachment of the palay but the sheriff still proceeded with the attachment. Santos files a complaint. He alleged that Tiongson cannot claim the 924 cavans of palay because by asking for the attachment of the properties, Tiongson is claiming the cavans of rice all belonged to Bernabe and not only to him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tiongson can claim the 924 cavans of rice as his own? HELD: No, both Tiongson and Santos must divide the cavans and palay proportionately. The cavans belonging to Santos, having been mixed with those belonging to Tiongson, Article 381 of the Civil Code should be applied: If, by will of one of their owners, two things of identical or dissimilar nature are mixed, or if the mixture occurs accidentally, if in the latter case, the things cannot be separated without injury, each owner shall acquire a right in the mixture proportionate to the part belonging to him, according to the value of the things mixed or comingled. The number of kilos in a cavan not having been determined, we will take the proportion only of the 924 cavans of palay which were attached and sold, thereby giving Urbano Santos, who deposited 778 cavans, 398.49 thereof, and Pablo Tiongson, who deposited 1,026 cavans, 525.51, or the value thereof at the rate of P3 per cavan. Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified, and Pablo Tiongson is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff Urbano Santos the value of 398.49 cavans of palay at the rate of P3 a cavan, without special pronouncement as to costs.

Fernandez - Siari Valley Estate, Inc. v. Lucasan Fortes - Aguirre v. Pheng Guy - Sapto v. Fabiana 1) favor of defendant fabiana. The land was not registered. Fabiana registered the land and had been possession of the land up to present. 2) constantino died without a issues. Then the children of cosntantino namely: Samuel, manuel and dora filed in CFI for the recovery and validiy of the land that was executed when constantino sold the 4 hectar potion of land. 3) Cfi- infavor of the defendants and plaintid was compel to execute the necessary deed of conveyance and amortization. On appeal.

Issue:

although the land was not register by the one who bought the land is valid? valid the prescription quieting of the land when you are in possesion of the land? imprescriptible

Ruling even though it was never registered the sale was valid, binding, and effective upon the heirs of the vendor. According to the court, actual notice of the sale served as registration. Futher, that the transfer and possession of the property was a clear indication of the validity of the sale. action for conveyance was actually one to quiet title. In ruling so, the SC cited American jurisprudence and Art. 480 of the New Civil Code, which states, that actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible. The judgement is affirmed.

Hautea - Titong v. CA Kung - Pingol v. CA DOCTRINE: A vendee in an oral contract to convey land who had made part payment thereof, entered upon the land and had made valuable improvements thereon is entitled to bring suit to clear his title against the vendor who had refused to transfer the title to him. It is not necessary that the vendee should have an absolute title, an equitable title being sufficient to clothe him with personality to bring an action to quiet title. FACTS: In 1969, Pingol, the owner of a lot (Lot No. 3223) in Caloocan City, executed a DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF OF AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF [his] PARCEL OF LAND in favor of Donasco (private respondent), payable in 6 years. In 1984, Donasco died and was only able to pay P8,369 plus P2,000 downpayment, leaving a balance of P10,161. The heirs of Donasco remained in possession of such lot and offered to settle the balance with Pingol. However, Pingol refused to accept the offer and demanded a larger amount. Thus, the heirs of Donasco filed an action for specific performance (with Prayer for Writ of Prelim. Injunction, because Pingol were encroaching upon Donascos lot). Pingol averred that the sale and transfer of title was conditional upon the full payment of Donasco (contract to sell, not contract of sale). With Donascos breach of the contract in 1976 and death in 1984, the sale was deemed cancelled, and the heirs continuous occupancy was only being tolerated by Pingol. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Pingol can refuse to (2) Whether or not Donasco has the right to quiet title transfer title to Donasco

RULING: (1) No. The contract between Pingol and Donasco is a contract of sale and not a contract to sell. The acts of the parties, contemporaneous and subsequent to the contract, clearly show that the parties intended an absolute deed of sale; the ownership of the lot was transferred to the Donasco upon its actual (upon Donascos possession and construction of the house) and constructive delivery (upon execution of the contract). The delivery of the lot divested Pingol of his ownership and he cannot recover the title unless the contract is resolved or rescinded under Art. 1592 of NCC. It states that the vendee may pay even after the expiration of the period stipulated as long as no demand for rescission has been made upon him either judicially or by notarial act. Pingol neither did so. Hence, Donasco has equitable title over the property. (2) Although the complaint filed by the Donascos was an action for specific performance, it was actually an action to quiet title. A cloud has been cast on the title, since despite the fact that the title had been transferred to them by the execution of the deed of sale and the delivery of the object of the contract, Pingol adamantly refused to accept the payment by Donascos and insisted that they no longer had the obligation to transfer the title. Donasco, who had made partial payments and improvements upon the property, is entitled to bring suit to clear his title against Pingol who refused to transfer title to him. It is not necessary that Donasco should have an absolute title, an equitable title being sufficient to clothe him with personality to bring an action to quiet title. Prescription cannot also be invoked against the Donascos because an action to quiet title to property in ONEs POSSESSION is imprescriptible.

Manalaysay - Gallar v. Hussain Source: Paras Book 1. Hussain sold a retro in a private instrument, a parcel of land protected by a Torrens Title to Chichirita, but the right to repurchase was never exercised. 2. The buyer sold the land to another who in turn sold and delivered the property in 1919 to Gallar. 3. These subsequent sales were in private instruments. 4. Gallar who had been in possession since 1919, sued in 1960 (or 41 years later) the heirs of Hussain to compel them to execute a formal deed of conveyance so that Gallar could obtain a TCT. 5. The heirs interposed a defense of prescription. Issues: 1. Is Gallar's suit one for specific performance or quieting of title? 2. Has the action prescribed? 3. If the heirs of Hussain had been possessors of the property (instead of Gallar), would the answer be the same? Held: 1. Gallar's suit should be considered as an action to quiet title because Gallar was the owner and the sale had been consummated, despite the fact that the transactions had all been merely in private instruments. 2. Gallar's suit had NOT prescribed. In an action to quiet title, if the plaintiff is in possession, the suit does not prescribe.

3. If the heirs of Hussain had been in possession, Gallar's sui would have been prescribed for then the action would not be one to quiet title but one to recover real property. The latter must of course be brought within the proper legal period (depending on ordinary or extraordinary prescription)

Montinola - Vda. E Aviles v. CA

Vda. E. Aviles v. CA Source: http://www.batasnatin.com/law-library/civil-law/property/1810-vda-de-aviles-v-caaction-to-quite-title.html An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be brought for the purpose of settling a boundary dispute. Facts: Eduardo Aviles, the predecessor of the petitioners is the bother of defendant Camilo. They inherited their lands from their parents and have agreed to subdivide the same amongst themselves. The area alloted (sic) to Eduardo Aviles is 16,111 square meters more or less, to Anastacio Aviles is 16,214 square meters more or less, while the area alloted to defendant Camilo Aviles is 14,470 square meters more or less. Defendants land composed of the riceland portion of his land is 13,290 square meters, the fishpond portion is 500 square meters and the residential portion is 680 square meters, or a total of 14,470 square meters. The Petitioners claim that they are the owners of the fish pond which they claim is within their area. Defendant Camilo Aviles asserted a color of title over the northern portion of the property with an area of approximately 1,200 square meters by constructing a bamboo fence (thereon) and moving the earthen dikes, thereby molesting and disturbing the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over said portion. Petitioners say that the fences were created to unduly encroach to their property but the defendant said that he merely reconstructed the same. Petitioners brought an action to quiet title but were denied thus this case. ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners filed the right action RULING: No, Petitioners filed the wrong action. This is obviously a boundary dispute and as such the action must fail. Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon a title to real property or any interest therein. Petitioners fail to point out any any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that could been a cloud to their title. In fact, both plaintiffs and defendant admitted the existence of the agreement of partition dated June 8, 1957 and in accordance therewith, a fixed area was allotted to them and that the only controversy is whether these lands were properly measured. A special civil action for quieting of title is not the proper remedy for settling a boundary dispute, and that petitioners should have instituted an ejectment suit instead. An action for forcible entry, whenever warranted by the period prescribed in Rule 70, or for recovery of possession de facto, also within the prescribed period, may be availed of by the petitioners, in which proceeding the boundary dispute may be fully threshed out.

Perez - Oblea v. CA Pabalan - Gapacan v. Omnipet Sanchez - Robles v. CA DOCTRINE:

To be entitled to the remedy of quieting of title, petitioners must show that they have title to the real property at issue, and that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy. Buyers of unregistered real property, especially banks, must exert due diligence in ascertaining the titles of mortgagors and sellers, lest some innocent parties be prejudiced. Failure to observe such diligence may amount to bad faith and may result in the nullity of the mortgage, as well as of the subsequent foreclosure and/or auction sale. Unless the co-ownership is clearly repudiated, a co-owner cannot, by prescription, acquire title to the share of the other co-owners. FACTS Petitioners (all surnamed Robles) trace their ownership of a parcel of land (9,985 sq m.) to Leon and Silvino, their grandfather and father, respectively. Upon Silvinos death in 1942, said petitioners inherited the property and started cultivation thereof. Hilario Robles, private respondent and half-brother of the petitioners, was entrusted with the payment of land taxes due on the property. In 1962, Hilario caused both the cancellation of the tax declaration covering the property and its transfer to Ballane (his father-inlaw). Ballane mortgaged the property and, for some reason, the tax declaration thereon was subsequently named to Hilario. The latter then mortgaged the property to private respondent Rural Bank of Cardona. The mortgage was foreclosed and said bank acquired by public bidding the property which was then sold by it to the spouses Santos. Petitioners learned of the mortgage only in 1987. Subsequently, the action was filed, impleading also as parties-defendant the Director of Lands and the District Land Officer sue to an issuance of a free patent in favour of spouses Santos. Trial court ruled in favour of petitioners, declaring null the patent, declaring the heirs of Silvino absolute owners of the subject land. CA reversed on the ground that petitioners no longer had title to the property.

ISSUES (1) whether petitioners have the appropriate title essential to an action for quieting of title (relevant issue) and whether title claimed by respondents is valid (2) (3) whether REM between Hilario and RBC is valid whether issuance of free patent is valid

HELD (1) Petitioners have valid title by virtue of their continued and open occupation and possession as owners of the subject property. In this case, the cloud on petitioners title emanate from the apparent validity of the free patent issued and the tax declarations and other evidence in favour of respondents

ultimately leading to the transfer of the property to spouses Santos. WRT title of the spouses Santos, such is deemed invalid/inoperative insofar as it is rooted in the title and appropriation of Hilario. Hilario could not have prejudiced the rights of his co-heirs as co-owners of the real estate. He must have first repudiated the ownership clearly and evidently. CA failed to consider the irregularities in the transactions involving the property. No instrument/deed of conveyance was presented to show any transaction between petitioners and Ballane or even Hilario. (2) Mortgage was only valid insofar as Hilarios undivided interest is concerned there being co-ownership between the heirs. Court also delved into gross negligence which amounted to bad faith on part of bank by not exercising due diligence in verifying the ownership of the land considering such was unregistered. Free patent was also not valid, the land in question having been converted ipso jure to private land by virtue of the adverse possession in the concept of owners since.

(3) 1916 by the petitioners. Issuance of patents covering private lands is out of the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands or Bureau of Lands. Hence, the sale of the property in favour of the spouses Santos WRT the share of Hiario was valid but the patent issued was null.

Bisnar - Calacala v. Republic

Calacala v. Republic Facts: Spouses Camilo and Conchita Calacala (predecessors-in-interest of petitioners) were the registered owners of a parcel of land. To secure the provisional release of an accused in a criminal case pending, the spouses offered the parcel of land as a property bond. For failure of the accused to appear at his scheduled arraignment and for the bondmans failure to produce in court the body of the accused, the bond was ordered forfeited in favor of the government and judgment was rendered against the bond for P3,500. o Notice of levy was annotated on the title of the property as Entry No. 83188. The Republic of the Philippines (Respondent) was the winning bidder in the public auction of the parcel of land. o Certificate of sale issued to the Republic was registered and annotated on the title as Entry No. 83793. Despite the spouses having 1 year to redeem the property, they never did. Gaspar, Baltazar, Melchor, Solomon, Felecidad, Petronila and Salome, all surnamed Calacala (Petitioners) filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Cancellation of Encumbrance, praying that Entries No. 83188 and 83799 on the title of the parcel of land be cancelled or declared null and void. Complaint was dismissed on the ground of failure to state a cause of action and prescription of petitioners right to redeem. Petitioners are questioning the dismissal contending that: a) That their complaint sufficiently states a cause of action because they are still the owners of the parcel of land despite their failure to redeem it within the 1-year period because of the Republics failure to: 1) Secure the Certificate of Sale;

2) Execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership; and 3) Obtain a writ of possession over the property within 10 year from the registration of the Certificate of Sale. b) That the Republics right over the property has already prescribed or has been abandoned and waived. c) That the Republic failed to perfect its title. Issue: Whether the trial courts dismissal of petitioners complaint for Quieting of Title proper? Ruling: Yes! Petitioners failed to satisfy the requisites for quieting of title. Quieting of title o A common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property. o Purpose: To secure an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger of hostile claim. o Court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right to would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best. When remedy may be availed of: o Art. 476: Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid, or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. o An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon a title to real property or any interest therein. Who may bring an action to quiet title: o Art. 477: The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject-matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property. 2 Requisites for an action to quiet title to prosper: 1) Plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; 2) Deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. Petitioners failed to fulfill both requisites. 1) Petitioners are not holders of any legal or equitable title over the property. Petitioners predecessors-in-interest lost whatever right they had over the land from the very moment they failed to redeem it during the 1-year period. Republics failure to execute the acts referred to by the petitioners within 10 years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale cannot, in any way, operate to restore whatever rights the petitioners predecessors-in-interest had over the same. Expiration of the 1-year period forecloses the owners right to redeem, making the sale absolute. The issuance thereafter of a final deed of sale becomes a mere formality, an act merely confirmatory of the title that is already in the purchaser and constituting official evidence of that fact. Petitioners never put in issue as in fact they admit in their pleadings the validity of the Certificate of Sale.

Bombales - Portic v. Cristobal Doctrine: An agreement in which ownership is reserved in the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price is known as a contract to sell. The absence of full payment suspends the vendors obligation to convey title. This principle holds true between the parties, even if the sale has already been registered. Registration does not vest, but merely serves as evidence of, title to a particular property. Our land registration laws do not give title holders any better ownership than what they actually had prior to registration. Facts: Spouses Clodualdo Alcantara and Candelaria Edrosalam were the original registered owners of a parcel of land with 3-door apartment in Valenzuela City. On October 2, 1968, spouses Clodualdo Alcantara and Candelaria Edrosalam sold the subject property to petitioners with the condition that the latter shall assume the mortgage executed over the subject property by spouses in favor of the SSS Petitioners defaulted in the payment of the monthly amortizations due on the mortgage. SSS foreclosed the mortgage and sold the subject property at public auction with SSS as the highest bidder. On May 22, 1984, before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioners sold the subject property in favor of respondent in consideration of P200,025.89. o The parties agreed that respondent shall pay the sum of P45,025.89 as down payment and the balance of P155,000.00 shall be paid on or before May 22, 1985. The parties further agreed that in case respondent should fail to comply with the conditions, the sale shall be considered void and petitioners shall reimburse respondent of whatever amount already paid. o Also included in their contract is an agreement "3. That while the balance of P155,000.00 has not yet been fully paid the FIRST PARTY OWNERS shall retain the ownership of the above described parcel of land together with its improvements but the SECOND PARTY BUYER shall have the right to collect the monthly rentals due on the first door (13-A) of the said apartment On August 6, 1984, TCT was issued in the name of respondent Respondent however was not able to pay on the due date. Hence, petitioners filed this instant civil case against respondent to remove the cloud created by the issuance of TCT in favor of respondent. o Petitioners claimed that they sold the subject property to respondent on the condition that respondent shall pay the balance on or before May 22, 1985 and in case of failure to pay, the sale shall be considered void and that respondent should be required to reconvey back the title to the subject property to petitioners. Respondent on her part claimed that her title over the subject property is already indefeasible; that the true agreement of the parties is that embodied in the Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage; that respondent had fully paid the purchase price; that respondent is the true owner of the subject property; and that petitioners claim is already barred by laches. The CA held that respondents title to the property was amply supported by the evidence.Therefore, petitioners petition for the quieting of title would not prosper, because they failed to show the invalidity of the cloud on their title.

Issue: W/N the petition has merit? YES Who is the rightful owner of the parcel of land? PORTIC Ruling: Article 476 of the Civil Code provides: Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. Suits to quiet title are characterized as proceedings quasi in rem. Technically, they are neither in rem nor in personam. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant. However, unlike suits in rem, a quasi in rem judgment is conclusive only between the parties. Generally, the registered owner of a property is the proper party to bring an action to quiet title. However, it has been held that this remedy may also be availed of by a person other than the registered owner because, in the Article reproduced above, title does not necessarily refer to the original or transfer certificate of title. Thus, lack of an actual certificate of title to a property does not necessarily bar an action to quiet title. Petitioners have not turned over and have thus retained their title to the property. On the other hand, the claim of respondent cannot be sustained. The transfer of ownership of the premises in her favor was subject to the suspensive condition stipulated by the parties in paragraph 3 of the MOA, which states as follows: 3. That while the balance of P155,000.00 has not yet been fully paid the FIRST PARTY OWNERS shall retain the ownership of the above described parcel of land together with its improvements but the SECOND PARTY BUYER shall have the right to collect the monthly rentals due on the first door (13-A) of the said apartment; Hence, the above-cited provision characterizes the agreement between the parties as a contract to sell, not a contract of sale. Ownership is retained by the vendors, the Portics; it will not be passed to the vendee, the Cristobals, until the full payment of the purchase price. Such payment is a positive suspensive condition, and failure to comply with it is not a breach of obligation; it is merely an event that prevents the effectivity of the obligation of the vendor to convey the title. In short, until the full price is paid, the vendor retains ownership. The mere issuance of the Certificate of Title in favor of Cristobal did not vest ownership in her. Neither did it validate the alleged absolute purchase of the lot. Time and time again, this Court has stressed that registration does not vest, but merely serves as evidence of, title. Our land registration laws do not give the holders any better title than that which they actually have prior to registration. Under Article 1544 of the Civil Code, mere registration is not enough to acquire a new title. Good faith must concur. Clearly, respondent has not yet fully paid the purchase price. Hence, as long as it remains unpaid, she cannot feign good faith. She is also precluded from asserting ownership against petitioners. The appellate courts finding that she had a valid title to the property must, therefore, be set aside.

Fernandez - Aznar v. Aying Fortes - Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Alejo Guy - Spouses Benito v. Agapita Saquitan Ruiz FACTS: 1. Petitioners Horacio and Felisa Benito, originally, bought the land from Francisco Morales and instituted ejectment proceedings against all of the other squatters in the land. 2. Respondent, Agapita Saquitan-Ruiz bought a portion of the land from petitioner on a promise to contribute Php 6000 for the ejectment proceedings which will serve as the consideration for the sale. 3. On 17 April 1979, a Deed of Absolute Sale was issued in favor of respondent, however, he failed to pay his obligation of Php 6000. Thus, the petitioner never caused the issuance of the certificate of title despite demands of the respondent for such issuance. Instead, petitioner subdivided the lot where respondents land was located into five while the latter continued to possess such land. 4. Petitioners, then borrowed Php75,000 from a certain Basilia Dela Cruz, who later sued them for collection. 5. For failure to pay the borrowed money, a writ of execution was issued by the RTC and the disputed petitioners land was sold to Dela Cruz at a public auction, in which the latter was the highest bidder. 6. On 25 March 1996, the assailed Certificate of Title was issued to Dela Cruz but it was only on 27 May 1999 that the Certificate of Final Deed of Sale was issued. 7. On 1 April 1999, respondent filed the case for specific performance with declaration of nullity of titles and damages. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners action to quiet title had already prescribed?No RULING: No. The respondent is in possession of the disputed property. If a person claiming to be the owner of a wrongfully registered parcel of land is in actual possession, the right to seek reconveyance does not prescribe. A petition for the quieting of title, although essentially an action for reconveyance, should not be dismissed on the ground of prescription, if it is alleged that the plaintiff is in possession of the property. Furthermore, the action was seasonably filed since Dela Cruzs right to its conveyance

and possession was subject to the 12-month redemption perion provided under section 33 of rule 39 of the Rules of court. In this case, only a month had passed. Hautea - Juan Nakpil & Sons v. CA Kung - Manuel P. Ney v. Spouses Celso P. Quijanc Petitioners Manuel P. Ney and Romulo P. Ney (petitioners) are the registered owners of a residential lot located at 1648 Main Street, Paco Manila, with an area of 120 square meters more or less, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). A three (3) door apartment was constructed on the subject lot one for Manuel, the other for Romulo; and the last one for their sister Mina N. Quijano and her husband Celso Quijano (respondents).

On October 8, 1999, respondents filed with the RTC of Manila a suit for reconveyance, partition and damages against petitioners. They averred that they are coowners of the subject property having paid part of its purchase price; that Celsos name was inadvertently omitted as one of the buyers in the execution of the deed of sale. Consequently, TCT covering the subject property was issued only in the names of Manuel and Romulo. To obtain a separate certificate of title, they requested from petitioners the segregation of the portion allotted to them, but the latter refused. They later discovered that the entire property was mortgaged with Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company, prompting them to execute and register their adverse claim with the Register of Deeds; and to file the instant complaint.[4]

Petitioners, in their answer,[5] denied respondents allegation of coownership. They averred that Celso Quijano was not a vendee of the subject lot; thus, his name did not appear on the title. They asserted that respondents cannot validly maintain an action against them because the latter possessed the property by mere tolerance; and even assuming that respondents had a valid cause of action, the same had already been barred by prescription and/or laches. Petitioners, therefore, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision[6] dismissing the complaint. It rejected respondents claim of co-ownership, and declared their documentary and testimonial evidence unreliable. The RTC sustained petitioners assertion that respondents possessed part of the property through mere tolerance; and that their cause of action, if any, already prescribed. The RTC thus ruled that respondents can no longer demand the segregation or reconveyance of the claimed portion of the property. Finally, the RTC granted petitioners counterclaim and ordered the reimbursement of the expenses they incurred in defending the case.

From the aforesaid Decision, respondents went to the CA. They faulted the RTC for dismissing their complaint and insisted that they are co-owners of the subject lot; and that their share was erroneously included in petitioners title. Respondents also

took exception to the trial courts declaration that their action was already barred by prescription and laches.

On June 29, 2007, the CA rendered the now challenged Decision,[9] reversing the RTC. The CA found sufficient evidence to support respondents claim that they are indeed co-owners of the property; and were excluded by petitioners in the deed of sale and certificate of title. The CA considered respondents complaint as one for quieting of title which is imprescriptible; and granted to respondents the reliefs that they prayed for.

Undaunted, petitioners took the present recourse. They ascribe reversible error to the CA for treating respondents action as one for quieting of title. They claim that nowhere in the complaint does it state that respondents seek to quiet their title to the property. All that respondents averred and prayed for in their complaint was for petitioners to surrender their certificate of title, and for the partition of the subject property. Petitioners assert that the CA ruled on an issue not raised in the pleadings; and substituted the respondents action with an entirely new action for quieting of title.

Undoubtedly, respondents did not only seek the partition of the property and the delivery of the title, but also the reconveyance of their share which was inadvertently included in petitioners TCT.

An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner.[11] Indeed, reconveyance is an action distinct from an action for quieting of title, which is filed whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title for purposes of removing such cloud or to quiet title. [12] However, we find nothing erroneous in the CAs ruling treating respondents action for reconveyance as an action to quiet title.

Indubitably, the characterization by the CA of respondents action as in the nature of an action for quieting of title cannot be considered a reversible error.

In a number of cases, the Court has ordered reconveyance of property to the true owner or to one with a better right, where the property had been erroneously or fraudulently titled in another person's name. After all, the Torrens system was not designed to shield and protect one who had committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad faith.[18] Thus, the CA acted correctly in rendering the challenged decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86047 is AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners.