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Haw Liong v. Republic

Bautista Angelo, J. Facts: Petitioner Haw Liong sought to change his name to Alfonso Lantin. Haw filed the petition before the CFI Leyte, averring that he is 47 years old, married, and has been a resident of Tacloban City for more than 20 years Haw said that he wants to change his name to Alfonso Lantin because he is called by his Filipino friends as Alfonso and the name of his father is Placido Lantin; that he wants to have a Filipino name because he will soon be a Filipino citizen; that there is no pending case against him as Haw Liong; and that in the event a case will arise against him as Haw Liong he is willing to appear and answer the same. After hearing, CFI Leyte allowed Haw Liong to change his name to Alfonso Lantin. The government has appealed. Issue/Held: WON the Haw Liong should be allowed to change name? NO. There is no proper or compelling reason that may justify the change of name desired by Haw Liong. Ratio: The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals for purposes of identification and that a change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right. Thus, before a person can be authorized to change the name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied The following may be considered, among others, as proper or reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of name: 1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; 2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change of status, e.g. when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and 3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion IN THE CASE AT BAR, Haw has not shown any proper or compelling reason that may justify the request for a change of name other than his desire to adopt the name Alfonso for the reason that he has always been known by that name by his Filipino friends and associates and because that is the family name of his father which he desires to follow to conform with the customs and traditions in the Philippines. UNFORTUNATELY for Haw, this claim is merely supported by his own testimony. It cannot overcome the fact that the name given him from the very beginning is Haw Liong as in fact this is the name that appears in his landing certificate. The fact that he claims to be the son of one Placido Lantin, a Filipino, is of no moment. Also, if Haws claim true, isnt it strange that the name that was given him upon birth is Haw Liong even when he is born of a Filipino father? And why would he need to file a petition for naturalization to become a Filipino citizen if he is truly born of a Filipino father?

16 SCRA 677 (1966)

The true situation however is, as was disclosed in his cross examination, that in his business dealings with other people he always signed as Haw Liong and never used the name Alfonso Lantin. He came to be called Alfonso only during the Japanese occupation when his Filipino friends asked him how he was called and he told them that his name was Alfonso. Aside from this fact, it is undisputed that he is known in Tacloban City as Haw Liong and he has not contracted with any person under the name of Alfonso Lantin.

Dispositif: Wherefore, the decision appealed from is set aside. The petition (to change name) is hereby denied.

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Llaneta v. Agrava
Castro, J. Facts: Teresita Llanetas mother (Atanacia) was once married to Serafin Ferrer with whom she had but one child named Victoriano Ferrer. Serafin died, and 4 four years later Atanacia had relations with another man out of which Teresita was born. Shortly after Teresita's birth, Atanacia brought her and Victoriano to Manila where all of them lived with Atanacia's mother-in-law (Victoria). Teresita was raised in the household of the Ferrer's, using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealings and throughout her schooling. When she was 20 years old, she applied for a copy of her birth certificate in Irosin, Sorsogon, where she was born, as she was required to present it in connection with a scholarship granted to her by the Catholic Charities. It was then that she discovered that her registered surname is Llaneta not Ferrer and that she is the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown father. Teresita filed a pettion for change of name from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer on the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname Llaneta, instead of Ferrer which she had been using since she acquired reason, would cause untold difficulties and confusion. After trial, the Juvenila and Domestic Relations Court of Manila denied her petition 3 SC decisions that disallowed such change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship. Issue/Held: WON the petition for change of name should be granted. YES Ratio: Teresita has established that she has been using the surname Ferrer for as long as she can remember; that all her records, in school and elsewhere, put her name down as Teresita Ferrer; that her friends and associates know her only as Teresita Ferrer; and that even the late Serafin Ferrer's nearest of kin (who apparently have kept Teresita's illegitimacy a secret from her) have tolerated and still approve of her use of the surname Ferrer. Indeed, a sudden shift at this time to the name Teresita Llaneta (in order to conform to that appearing in her birth certificate) would result in confusion among the persons and entities she deals with and entail endless and vexatious explanations of the circumstances of her new surname. In her official dealings, this would likewise mean a lifelong fending with the necessary affidavits. Moreover, it is a salutary law that would allow Teresita, inspite of her illegitimate birth, to carry on in society without her unfortunate status being bandied about at every turn.

57 SCRA 29 (1994)
The principle upon which the lower court relied upon remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general. In the case at bar, however, the Serafin's mother, Victoria, and his 2 remaining brothers, Nehemias and Ruben, have come forward in earnest support of the petition. Adequate publication of the proceeding has not elicited the slightest opposition from the relatives and friends of the late Serafin. Clearances from various Government agencies show that Teresita has a spotless record. And the State, which has an interest in the name borne by every citizen within its realm for purposes of identification, interposed no opposition at the trial after a searching cross-examination, of Teresita and her witnesses. Whether the late Serafin, who died some five years before Teresita was born, would have consented or objected to her use of his surname is open to speculation. One thing, however, is beyond cavil: those living who possess the right of action to prevent the surname Ferrer from being smeared are proud to share it with her.

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Secan Kok v. Republic

Makasiar, J. Facts: May 18, 1964 Secan Kok filed a petition to change his name and that of his daughter Marilyn Se respectively to Antonio Cuakok and Gloria Cuakok o although his petition mentions his other minor children, namely Perfecto, Romeo, Betty, Tomas, Daniel and Antonio, Jr. as having been born out of his marriage in the Catholic church on August 2, 1947 at Cotabato City, without, significantly, mentioning the name of his wife (pp. 1-4, ROA). July 28, 1965 TC granted the petition based on the ff. evidence: o Secan Kok = a prosperous businessman, a Chinese citizen, born of Chinese parents in Amoy, China, on September 7, 1917. o Sometime in 1928, the petitioner came to the Philippines, landed at the City of Manila and resided there for ten years. o In 1938, the petitioner transferred to Cotabato, now Cotabato City, and has since then continuously resided therein. The petitioner is in possession of Alien Certificate of Registration No. A-62640, dated September 22, 1950, issued by the Commissioner of Immigration. He is also in possession of Certificate of Legalization of Residence, dated January 24, 1947. o His true and correct Chinese name is Cua Kian Kok but by clerical mistake committed by the immigration official who prepared his registration papers, he is officially called Secan Kok. o In 1947, the petitioner was converted to the Roman Catholic Church and was baptized in Cotabato City with the name of Antonio Cua. In that same year, the petitioner was married to his present wife, Lucia O. Tee, a Filipina. Presently, the petitioner has seven children, namely: Marilyn, Perfecto, Romeo, Betty, Tomas, Daniel and Antonio, Jr., all of minor ages and all born and residents of Cotabato City. o The petitioner has thus presently acquired three distinct names: Cua Kian Kok, Secan Kok and Antonio Cua. o He has consistently used Secan Kok as registered in the Bureau of Immigration in his official and business dealings. o But his family and friends have also made use of his Christian names, Antonio Cua. In fact, his youngest son has been baptized as Antonio Cua, Jr. o This situation has caused confusion and embarrassment to the petitioner so that he has taken this legal step to change his registered name, and adopt his Christian baptismal name of Antonio Cuakok. o Petitioner's daughter, Marilyn, 17 years old, is now enrolled in the Notre Dame College at Cotabato City. Since her childhood, she has been called "Gloria", not by her baptismal name "Marilyn". In official and school records, she has been known as "Maria Gloria Cua". Therefore, to avoid this confusion, petitioner desires to change the name of (his) daughter, Marilyn, to "Gloria Cuakok" for all legal intents and purposes.

52 SCRA 322 (1973)

January 7, 1966 Secan Kok filed a motion for supplemental judgment, alleging that the Bureau of Immigration refused to change the surname of his wife Lucia O. Tee and their aforesaid six (6) minor children to Cuakok who were then registered in the Bureau of Immigration with the surname of Cua The government opposed the motion on the ground that (a) the order dated July 28, 1965 of the trial court authorizing the change of his name from Secan Kok to Antonio Cuakok, and the name of his daughter from Marilyn Se to Gloria Cuakok has long become final and therefore can no longer be supplemented; and (b) that his wife Lucia O. Tee, being of age, should file a separate petition to change her name, such a petition being an individual and personal matter and not a collective one Secan Kok opposed, contending that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father (Article 264, Civil Code of the Philippines) and that the wife has the right to use the surname of her husband (Article 370, Civil Code) TC also granted the motion for supplemental judgment on the ff. evidence: o Lucia Tee Kok is the legitimate wife of the petitioner, with Alien Certificate of Registration No. A 62605. o All their 17 children were baptized in the Roman Catholic Church of Cotabato City bearing the old surname of the petitioner Cua. Now, Lucia Tee Kok desire to follow the new surname of her husband Cuakok. The children Perfecto, Romeo, Betty, Tomas, Daniel and Antonio, Jr., also desire to adopt the new surname of their father, pursuant to law.

Issue/Held/Ratio: W/N the supplemental judgment is valid. No. The rules are very explicit. Section 2 of Rule 103 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a petition for a change of name shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name to be changed, or some other person in his behalf. There is need therefore for a separate petition to be filed by the wife Lucia O. Tee, who is already of age, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children. Then again, to confer jurisdiction on the court, since petitions for change of name are proceedings in rem, strict compliance with the requirements is essential, namely, that such verified petition should be published for three (3) successive weeks in some newspapers of general circulation in the province; and that both the title or caption of the petition and its body shall recite (1) the name or names or aliases of the applicant; (2) the cause for which the change of name is sought; and (3) the name or names or aliases of the applicant; (2) the cause for which the change of name is sought; and (3) the new name asked for. The reason for these requirements is that a change of name is a matter of public interest. The petitioner might be in, the rogues' gallery or hiding to avoid service of sentence or compliance with a judgment in a criminal case, or could have escaped from prison; or if an alien, he might have given cause for deportation or might be one against whom an order of deportation was issued or that the new name the petitioner desires to adopt may be similar to that of a respectable person and the latter might have evidence that petitioner is of unsavory reputation that might impair his own good name. Being a privilege and not a right, a change of name lies within the discretion of the court give or

4 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 withhold. Failure to comply with these jurisdictional requirements, renders the proceedings a nullity. To allow the change of name of the wife and other minor children of petitionerappellee, upon a mere motion as an incident in the proceedings for the change of name of petitioner-appellee, will not only deprive the government of the required filing fees therefor but will also dispense with the aforesaid essential requirements respecting the recitals in the title of the petition and the publication to apprise persons, who may be in possession of adverse information or evidence against the grant of the petition, so that they will come forward with such information or evidence in order to protect public interest as well as the interest of private individuals who may be prejudiced by the change of name of the petitioner. As reiterated in the aforecited cases, all the names or aliases of petitioner must appear in the title or caption of the petition; because the reader usually merely glances at the title of the petition and may only proceed to read the entire petition if the title is of interest to him. Moreover, the petition and the order directing its publication are usually found in the inside or back pages of a newspaper, which escape the notice of the reader who merely glances at the title of the petition and does not notice the other names and/or aliases of the applicant if these are mentioned only in the body of the petition or order. Since there is a total absence of a petition signed by Lucia O. Tee and her other minor children and the publication thereof, the challenged orders dated March 30, 1966 and September 3, 1966 are completely void ab initio. Inasmuch as petitioner-appellee's own petition and the publication of the same do not include all his names and aliases, the new name he desires to bear as well as those of his minor daughter Marilyn Se, the trial court likewise acquired no jurisdiction over his petition and the decision granting his petition is similarly void ab initio and could be attacked collaterally, vitiated as it was by a fatal flaw lack of jurisdiction. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

IN VIEW HEREOF, THE QUESTIONED ORDERS DATED SEPTEMBER 3, 1966 AND MARCH 30, 1966 OF THE TRIAL COURT, AS WELL AS THE JUDGMENT DATED JULY 28, 1965 ARE HEREBY SET ASIDE AS NULL AND VOID; AND THIS CASE IS HEREBY REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT WHICH SHALL DIRECT PETITIONER-APPELLEE TO FILE AN AMENDED PETITION THAT SHOULD BE PUBLISHED AS HEREINABOVE INDICATED. WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER-APPELLEE.

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Villegas et. al. v. Fernando et. al.

Reyes, JBL J. Facts: the heirs of Jose Miranda Sampedro and Leocadio Manahan, hereinafter referred to as appellee appellants heirs 2 petitioned the Court of First Instance of Rizal to approve their amended plan Psu - 697 - Amd. corresponding to a parcel of land and to direct the Land Registration Commission to issue in their name, as successors-ininterest of the original applicants Sampedro, and Pedro Manahan, 3 a decree of registration for lot No. 1 of the same plan. Noting that there was no objection on the part of the directors of the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry, the original oppositors of record, the lower court issued an order on 2 December 1959 approving the plan, together with its technical descriptions, and directing the Land Registration Commission to issue the appropriate decree. The decree was transcribed two days later in the registration book of the Register of Deeds of Rizal as Original Certificate of Title No. 2180.c Within one year from the issuance of the decree, several persons, 5 namely, Prudencio Angeles, Macario Bonifacio, Valentin Buenviaje, the heirs of Roberto Cruz, Severino Cruz, Juana Estanislao, Alfredo Fernando, Justo and Angustia Ibay, Julita Ocampo, Marcelino Ocampo, Dominador Ramos and Biviano Reynoso, Jose Salamat, Roman San Diego and Arcadio Tolentino filed petitions for review in the lower court. o Claiming diverse interests prejudiced by the alleged undue inclusion of some tracts of land in lot No. 1, petitioners for review levelled against appellants heirs various charges commonly denominated by them as fraud in the procurement of the aforementioned decree of registration. During one of the pre-trials in the lower-court, it was discovered that the copy of the Court of Appeals decision submitted thereto by appellants heirs was merely a "certified copy of another copy in the office of the Land Registration Commission which in turn was copied from a copy of the Bureau of Lands". The record of the case, including the original of the Court of Appeals decision supposedly rendered therein, were allegedly lost or destroyed during the second world war.chanrobl This discovery prompted Buenviaje, Fernando, and Justo and Angustia Ibay to file, as they did file in March, 1963, separate petitions to set aside the order of 2 December 1959. o they contended that the lower court had no jurisdiction to issue said order of 2 December 1959 considering that the rendition or the very existence of the Court of Appeals decision on which it was based was doubtful; that said decision was most probably fictitious, or, granting that it was genuine, that it was no longer enforceable not only because it was barred by the statute of limitations but also because it had not been properly reconstituted pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 3110.

27 SCRA 1119 (1969)

Issue 1: WON provisions of Act 3110 (establishing the procedure to be followed in reconstituting pending cases the records of which have been destroyed) apply to Land Registration Case 1117 (G.L.R.O. Record No. 48237) YES Ratio: Appellants arguments: No, they do not apply because when the records were destroyed the case was no longer pending but had been finally decided by the pre-war, Court of Appeals in 1938. SC: This position we find to be untenable, So, long as a decree of registration has not been issued, registration proceedings are still pending for the purposes of the preCommonwealth Act 3110, and, when lost or destroyed, must be reconstituted in conformity with said act. when the records of the case were destroyed no registration decree had as yet been issued, because appellants precisely asked the court below to order the issuance of a decree, annexing thereto an alleged copy of the decision. The registration proceeding concerned was, therefore, still, a pending one under section 9 of Act 3110, and should have been first reconstituted, as prescribed by that law. It does not appear that the copy of the decision in question (and upon which the revoked order was based) was a fully certified copy issued by the chief of the General Land Registration Office. The certification appended thereto (Record on Appeal, page 30) is to the effect that the same is "a true copy from a photostatic copy attached to the Record on (of) Civil Case No. 3726", issued by a deputy clerk of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, who did not even specify what said Civil Case was about. Hence, said copy can not be deemed properly attested by an officer having legal custody of the record, and did not afford it proper basis for the order of 2 December 1959 to issue the corresponding decree. The court below did not, therefore, err in revoking said order on the basis that the pre-war decision of the Court of Appeals was not properly reconstituted, particularly in view of its undisputed finding (in the appealed order of 23 August 1963) that the copy attached to the petition for issuance of the decree merely "was a certified copy of another copy in the office of the Land Registration Commission, which in turn was copied from a copy of the Bureau of Lands" (Record on Appeal, page 268).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Issue 2: WON attaching a copy of the Court of Appeals' pre-war decision was substantially a step to reconstitute the records of the case. Held: No, since there was no sufficient compliance with Act 3110, particularly section 2 thereof, providing for giving of notice of the destruction of the records to those persons who might be interested, such notice to be published for four consecutive weeks "in the Official Gazette and in one of the newspapers most widely read in the province"; nor with Section 3 of the same Act further prescribing that upon receipt of the application for

6 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 reconstitution the Clerk of Court "shall send notice to all parties interested, or their counsel, of the day, hour and place when the Court may proceed to the reconstitution". Strict compliance of notice requirements under statutes governing reconstitution is the rule (Manila Railroad Co. vs. Moya, L-17913, 22 June 1965).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The records before us show that notice of the petition for approval of the amended plan for issuance of the corresponding decree was given only to the Director of Lands and to the Director of Forestry. This was plainly insufficient, since the law requires notice to "all other persons as might be interested". There is no showing that notice of the motion was given to the petitionersappellees, who are possessors of lands affected by the decree, or even to the persons whose lots were ordered excluded by the decision of the Court of Appeals. Library The jurisprudence of this Court is to the effect that upon failure to reconstitute destroyed judicial records within the period prescribed by law (which expired on 17 June 1963, pursuant to Republic Act No. 3081) the parties are deemed to have waived the effects of the decision rendered in their favor and their only alternative is to file an action anew for the registration in their names of the long in question". Appellants not having applied in due time for proper reconstitution of their registration proceedings, the court below had no recourse but to set, aside the order for the issuance of the decree.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Issue 3: WON the court below had jurisdiction to determine the authenticity and reliability of the copy of the Court of Appeals decision submitted to it, and to act thereon Argument of appellants: having accepted said copy as authentic in its order of 2 December 1959, the court could not backtrack and set aside that finding by its order of 23 August 1963, because the preceding order by then had become final. Held: This plea is unavailing against herein appellees, for the latter had not been given notice of the petition, and were not heard on its merits. The order of 2 December 1959 never acquired finality as to said appellant and the latter were free to contest the propriety and correctness thereof. For the same reason, the court below was not, barred from re-examining its previous position and could legally reach the conclusion that the previous order, being erroneous, should be set aside. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

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Republic v. Cagandahan
Quisumbing, J. Nature: petition for review under Rule 45 Facts: Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of Live Birth. During her childhood years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was later on diagnosed that her ovarian structures had minimized. She likewise has no breast nor menstruation. Subsequently, she was diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where those afflicted possess secondary male characteristics because of too much secretion of male hormones, androgen. According to her, for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. She filed a petition at RTC Laguna for Correction of Entries in her Birth Certificate such that her gender or sex be changed to male and her first name be changed to Jeff. Issue/Held: WON correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted- YES Ratio: The determination of a person's sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code was looked at by the SC. Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code. The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. CAH is one of many conditions that involve intersex anatomy. (!!!!) According to Wikipedia, intersexuality "is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes." In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.

565 SCRA 72 (2008)

Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed Nature has instead taken its due course in respondent's development to reveal more fully his male characteristics. In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as one's sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent's position and his personal judgment of being a male. In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondent's congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case. As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial court's grant of respondent's change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent's change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent's change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.

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Braza et. al. v. Civil Register, et. al.

Carpio-Morales, J. Facts: Petitioner Ma. Cristina and Pablo Braza (aka Pablito Braza,) were married. Their union bore 3 children Pablo died in 2002 in a vehicular accident in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia. During the wake, a certain Lucille began introducing the minor Patrick Titular-Braza as her and Pablo's son Shocked, Ma. Cristina made inquiries, after which she obtained a copy of Patrick's birth certificate from the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental Patricks birth certificate bore the following Annotation/Remarks: Acknowledge (sic) by the father Pablito Braza on January 13, 1997"; Legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of parents on April 22, 1998 at Manila. Henceforth, the child shall be known as Patrick Alvin Titular Braza Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract of Pablo and Lucille, married April 1998 Thereafter, Ma. Cristina and children filed before RTC Himamaylan a petition to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register, contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo Thus, they prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to Patricks guardians to submit Patrick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous. Patrick filed Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and the RTC dismissed the petition but without prejudice, holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test. MR having been denied, petitioners filed the present petition for review. Ma. Cristina, et al. maintains that the RTC may pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy even in an action to correct entries in the civil registrar. Issue/Held: WON the RTC had jurisdiction over the petition? NO. The dismissed of the petition is proper.

607 SCRA 638 (2009)

Ratio: In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108, the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation. Rule 108 vis a vis Article 412, CC charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed IN THE CASE AT BAR, Ma. Cristina, et al.s petition clearly seek to nullify the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patricks filiation in connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test. By no stretch of the imagination can these be merely incidental to what Ma. Cristina claims to be as the main cause of action which is the correction of Patricks birth records. Contrary to Ma. Cristina, et al.s assertions, their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucilles marriage as void for being bigamo us and impugn Patricks legitimacy these causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and Art. 171 of the Family Code. THEREFORE, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code. Doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such The cases relied upon by Ma. Cristina, et al. are misplaced since the facts involved therein are off tangent with the ones obtaining in this case. Dispositif: the petition is DENIED.

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Corpuz v. Sto Tomas et. al.

Brion, J. Facts: Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization. Gerbert married Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce on Dec. 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later. 2 years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, NSO informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts. RTC denied Gerberts petition. Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the 2ND par. of Art. 26 FC in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law. This is consistent with the legislative intent as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido - avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." Gerbert - his petition is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the 2nd par. of Art. 26. He contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the Philippines since 2 marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. OSG and Daisylyn both support Gerberts position.

628 SCRA 266 (2010)

Issue/Held: (1) WON the 2nd par. of Art. 26 of the FC extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree. NO (2) WON a petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry. NO Ratio: The alien spouse can claim no right under the 2nd par. of Art. 26 of the FC as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse The FC recognizes only 2 types of defective marriages void and voidable marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage. Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens. Pres. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, enacted EO 227, amending Art. 26 of the FC to its present wording. Through the 2nd par, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the 2nd par. provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Art. 17 CC provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the 2nd par. provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse. Additionally, an action based on the 2nd par. not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law. The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.

10 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 Direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law. The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Sec. 24, Rule 132 requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Art. 26 interests that will be served and Daisylyns obvious conformity with the petition. A remand will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties. In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the 2nd par. of Art. 26. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN decrees registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.

Cancellation of the entry in the civil registry A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry. Art. 412 of the CC declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order." The RoC provides for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings; and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation. As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108. This ruling should not be construed as requiring 2 separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

Registration of the foreign divorce decree Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere presentation o f the decree. We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done. Art. 407 CC states that "acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and status. A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a persons legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry. But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the

11 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

Taneo et. al. v. CA

DISCLAIMER: Guys, this case is under the topic recognition of minor natural children in Maams syllabus. However, I have triple-checked the damned citation, and Family Home talaga ang topic ng case na ito. Weve discussed this case in Persons. I am including a onesentence facts/doctrine at the beginning galing sa Persons reviewer ko. Im hoping nagkamali lang si Maam ng lagay sa syllabus. Kasi wala nang ibang Taneo na case kundi ito. Kapunan, J. Quick Facts and Ratio from Persons: Facts: As a result of a judgment against them, two of petitioners prope rties were levied to satisfy the judgment amount. Subject properties were auctioned and subsequently conveyed to private respondent. One of the properties was the family home of the petitioners. Held: Since money judgment/debt was rendered/incurred before the house was erected and instrument constituting it as family home was registered, the family home is not exempted from execution or forced sale. Besides, house should be constructed on land not belonging to another. Facts: Two of the Taneos properties were levied to satisfy a money judgment of about 5,000 against them. (a parcel of land in Opol, MisOr and the other was the family home) The subject properties were sold at public auction on February 12, 1966 to the private respondent as the highest bidder. Consequently, after petitioners' failure to redeem the same, a final deed of conveyance was executed on February 9, 1968, definitely selling, transferring, and conveying said properties to the private respondent. To forestall such conveyance, petitioners filed an action to declare the deed of conveyance void and to quiet title over the land with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners allege that the property which they inherited from their parents, has been acquired through free patent, therefore the same is inalienable and not subject to any encumbrance for the payment of debt, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 141. Private respondent refuted petitioners' contentions alleging that he lawfully acquired the subject properties described as Lot No. 5545, Cad. 237 which was a private land, by virtue of a Sheriffs Sale on February 12, 1996. Said sale has become final as no redemption was made within one year from the registration of the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale. The validity of the sale in favor of Abdon Gilig was even confirmed by the Court of Appeals in a related case

304 SCRA 308 (1999)

Private respondent averred that the subject land was originally owned by Lazaro Ba-a who sold the land to Pablo Taneo on September 18, 1941, as evidenced by an Escritura de Venta. Despite it being a private land, Pablo Taneo filed an application for free patent which was final only in 1979. As counterclaim, private respondent alleged that since petitioners are still in possession of the subject property, he has been deprived of acts of ownership and possession and therefore, prayed for payment of rentals from February, 1968 until possession has been restored to them. RTC dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.

Issues/Held: 1) 2) W/N the conveyance made by way of the sheriff's sale pursuant to the writ of execution issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. 590 is prohibited under Sec. 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 No. whether or not the family home is exempt from execution No.

Ratio: 1) Petitioners contend that under Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the subject land which they inherited from their father under free patent cannot be alienated or encumbered in violation of the law. Citing in particular the cases of Oliveros v. Porciongcola 3 and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, 4 the execution or auction sale of the litigated land falls within the prohibited period and is. likewise, a disavowal of the rationale of the law which is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land which the State had gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating it. Republic v. Court of Appeals It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State to landdestitute citizens for their home and cultivation. This Section 117 is undoubtedly a complement of Section 116. It aims to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State had gratuitously given to him. It would, therefore, be in keeping with this fundamental idea to hold, as we hold, that the right to repurchase exists not only when the original homesteader makes the conveyance, but also when it is made by his widow or heirs. This construction is clearly deducible from the terms of the statute. The intent of the law is undisputable but under the facts of the case, the prohibition invoked by the petitioners under Section 118 does not apply to them. The prohibition against alienation of lands acquired by homestead or free patent commences on the date of the approval of the application for free patent and the five-year period is counted from the issuance of the patent. Following this ruling, we agree with the respondent court that the conveyance made by way of the sheriff's sale was not violative of the law. The judgment obligation of

12 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 the petitioners against Abdon Gilig arose on June 24, 1964. The properties were levied and sold at public auction with Abdon Gilig as the highest bidder on February 12, 1966. On February 9, 1968, the final deed of conveyance ceding the subject property to Abdon Gilig was issued after the petitioners failed to redeem the property after the reglementary period. Pablo Taneo`s application for free parent was approved only on October 19, 1973. The sequence of the events leads us to the inescapable conclusion that even before the application for homestead had been approved, Pablo Taneo was no longer the owner of the land. The deed of conveyance issued on February 9, 1968 finally transferred the property to Abdon Gilig. As of that date, Pablo Taneo did not actually have transferred to herein petitioners. The petitioners are not the owners of the land and cannot claim to be such by invoking Commonwealth Act No. 141. The prohibition does not apply since it is clear from the records that the judgment debt and the execution sale took place prior to the approval of the application for free patent. Anent the second issue, petitioners aver that the house which their father constituted as family home is exempt from execution. In a last ditch effort to save their property, petitioners invoke the benefits accorded to the family home under the Family Code. A family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family. It is said, however, that the family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain specials cases. Under the Civil Code (Articles 224 to 251), a family home may be constituted judicial and extrajudicially, the former by the filing of the petition and with the approval of the proper court, and the latter by the recording of a public instrument in the proper registry of property declaring the establishment of the family home. The operative act then which created the family home extrajudicially was the registration in the Registry of Property of the declaration prescribed by Articles 240 and 241 of the Civil Code. 10 Under the Family Code, however. registration was no longer necessary Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied in the family. It reads: The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment, except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. FAMILY CODE NOT RETROACTIVE: While Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence, it does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences, petitioner's included, are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN Neither does Article 162 of said Code state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V thereof have retroactive effect. It simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code (Modequillo vs. Breva, supra). Since petitioner's debt was incurred as early as November 25, 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Family Code. His property is therefore not exempt from attachment (Annex "O," Plaintiff's Position Paper and Memorandum of Authorities, p. 78)." (pp. 5-6, Decision; pp. 64-65, Rollo) (emphasis ours) The applicable law, therefore. in the case at bar is still the Civil Code where registration of the declaration of a family home is a prerequisite. Nonetheless, the law provides certain instances where the family home is not exempted from execution, forced sale or attachment. o Art. 243 reads: The family home extrajudicially formed shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment, except: (1) For nonpayment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred before the declaration was recorded in the Registry of Property; (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such record of the declaration; (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building. 12

2)

The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the house in question, erected on the land of Plutarco Vacalares, as the family home. The instrument constituting the family home was registered only on January 24, 1966. The money judgment against Pablo Taneo was rendered on January 24, 1964. Thus, at that time when the "debt" was incurred, the family home was not yet constituted or even registered. Clearly, petitioners' alleged family home, as constituted by their father is not exempt as it falls under the exception of Article 243 (2). Moreover, the constitution of the family home by Pablo Taneo is even doubtful considering that such constitution did not comply with the requirements of the law. The trial court found that the house was erected not on the land which the Taneos owned but on the land of one Plutarco Vacalares. By the very definition of the law that the "family home is the dwelling house where a person and his family resides and the land on which it is situated," 13 it is understood that the house should be constructed on a land not belonging to another. Apparently, the constitution of a family home by Pablo Taneo in the instant case was merely an afterthought in order to escape execution of their property but to no avail. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

13 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

Uyguanco et. al. v. CA

Cruz, J. Facts: Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975, leaving his wife, Dorotea, four legitimate children (her co-petitioners herein), and considerable properties which they divided among themselves. Claiming to be an illegitimate son of the deceased Apolinario, and having been left out in the extrajudicial settlement of his estate, Graciano Bacjao Uyguangco filed a complaint for partition against all the petitioners. Graciano alleged that he was born in 1952 to Apolinario Uyguangco and Anastacia Bacjao and that at the age of 15 he moved to his father's hometown at Medina, Misamis Oriental, at the latter's urging and also of Dorotea and his half-brothers. Here he received support from his father while he was studying at the Medina High School, where he eventually graduated. He was also assigned by his father, without objection from the rest of the family, as storekeeper at the Uyguangco store in Mananom from 1967 to 1973. 4 In the course of his presentation of evidence at the trial, the petitioners elicited an admission from Graciano that he had none of the documents mentioned in Article 278 to show that he was the illegitimate son of Apolinario Uyguangco. These are "the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or (in) any authentic writing." The petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the private respondent could no longer prove his alleged filiation under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code. Issue: whether he should be allowed to prove that he is an illegitimate child of his claimed father, who is already dead, in the absence of the documentary evidence required by the Civil Code Ratio: We find that this case must be decided under a new if not entirely dissimilar set of rules because the parties have been overtaken by events, to use the popular phrase. The Civil Code provisions they invoke have been superseded, or at least modified, by the corresponding articles in the Family Code, which became effective on August 3,1988. Under the Family Code, it is provided that: Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. The following provision is therefore also available to the private respondent in proving his illegitimate filiation: Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

178 SCRA 684 (1989)

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Argument of private respondent: While the private respondent has admitted that he has none of the documents mentioned in the first paragraph (which are practically the same documents mentioned in Article 278 of the Civil Code except for the "private handwritten instrument signed by the parent himself'''), he has nevertheless been "in open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," which is now also admissible as evidence of filiation. Thus, he claims that he lived with his father from 1967 until 1973, receiving support from him during that time; that he has been using the surname Uyguangco without objection from his father and the petitioners as shown in his high school diploma, a special power of attorney executed in his favor by Dorotea Uyguangco, and another one by Sulpicio Uyguangco; that he has shared in the profits of the copra business of the Uyguangcos, which is a strictly family business; that he was a director, together with the petitioners, of the Alu and Sons Development Corporation, a family corporation; and that in the addendum to the original extrajudicial settlement concluded by the petitioners he was given a share in his deceased father's estate

SC RULING: since he seeks to prove his filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, his action is now barred because of his alleged father's death in 1975. The second paragraph of this Article 175 reads as follows: The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (Italics supplied.) Graciano's complaint is based on his contention that he is the illegitimate child of Apolinario Uyguangco, whose estate is the subject of the partition sought. If this claim can no longer be proved in an action for recognition, with more reason should it be rejected in the said complaint, where the issue of Graciano's filiation is being raised only collaterally.

The complaint is indeed a circumvention of Article 172, which allows proof of the illegitimate child's filiation under the second paragraph thereof only during the lifetime of the alleged parent.