DG Contribution To Network Security - R1 PDF

ETSU PROJECT K/EL/00287
NETWORK SECURITY STANDARDS WITH INCREASING LEVELS OF EMBEDDED GENERATION
Final Report 10 August 2002
Professors Ron Allan and Goran Strbac

Manchester Centre for Electrical Energy Department of Electrical Engineering and Electronics
UMIST
Manchester M60 1 QD ______________________________________________________________
ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________
CONTENTS
PREFACE TERMS OF REFERENCE 1. Programme of work 2. Constraints and scope of project 3. Status of report and material EXECUTIVE SUMMARY MAIN REPORT Part I Introduction 1. Background 1.1. DTI/Ofgem targets and reports 1.2. Aims and objectives of these studies 1.3. Structure of report Part II Task A 2. Security and its achievement in distribution systems 2.1. General aspects 2.2. Engineering Recommendation P2/5 2.3. Effective generation 2.4. Present-day position regarding P2/5 2.5. Guaranteed and overall standards relationship with P2/5 2.6. Information and incentives project (IIP) 2.7. Future development of security standard 2.8. Recent DTI/Ofgem developments 2.9. Concluding comments Part III Task B 3. Concepts for evaluating security 3.1. Basic approaches 3.2. Levels of evaluation 3.2.1. Level 1 data 3.2.2. Level 2 models 3.2.3. Level 3 results 3.2.4. Summary of staged developments 4. Security considerations 4.1. Review of P2/5 as a security standard 4.2. Assessment of effective generation 4.3. Direct application of P2/5 5. Deterministic studies using an updated P2/5 5.1. Introduction 5.2. Effect of availability 2
5.3. Effect of number of units 5.4. Effect of technology of units 5.5. Effect of common energy source 5.6. Effect of location Part IV Task C 6. Introductory remarks 7. Formulating and extending the P2/5 approach 7.1. Introductory comments 7.2. Systems studied 7.3. Capacity outage probability tables 7.4. Expected load lost (ELL) 7.4.1. Constant load 7.4.2. Variable load 7.5. Expected energy no supplied 7.5.1. Constant load 7.5.2. Variable load 7.6. Sensitivity study for variable load curves 7.7. Concluding comments 7.8. Implementation 8. Alternative approaches 8.1. Introduction 8.2. Expected demand that cannot be supported 8.2.1. Base case studies 8.2.2. Effect of unit availability 8.2.3. Effect of load model 8.2.4. Comments 8.3. Generating capacity with specified availability 8.3.1. Base case studies 8.3.2. Capacity that can be relied on 8.4. Effect of network 8.4.1. Systems studied 8.4.2. Expected load lost or not supported 8.4.3. Ability to support demand for proportions of time 8.5. Implementation 8.5.1. Expected load lost or supported 8.5.2. Capacity that can be relied on 9. Extending P2/5 concepts to frequency and duration 9.1. Considerations 9.2. Suggested form of a frequency criterion 9.3. Application of the approach 9.3.1. Class A 9.3.2. Class B 9.3.3. Class C 9.3.4. Other supply classes 9.4. Effect of load duration curve 9.5. Benefit of embedded generation 9.6. Implementation 10. An approach compatible with the Information and Incentives Project
10.1. Background and concepts 10.2. Systems studied 10.3. Customer minutes lost 10.3.1. Base analysis 10.3.2. Ability of generation to substitute circuits 10.3.3. Credit for reduction in CML 10.4. Customer interruptions and customer minutes lost 10.5. Overall comments 10.6. Implementation 11. Assessment of intermittent sources and correlation 11.1. Generator considerations 11.2. Load and correlation considerations 11.3. Modelling and assessment approach 11.4. Application 11.4.1. Wind plant 11.4.2. CHP plant Part V Task D 12. Commercial arrangements for rewarding generators 12.1. Introduction 12.2. Form of payment to generators 12.2.1. Option fee 12.2.2. Exercise fee 12.3. Funding arrangements 12.3.1. Payments facilitated through network regulatory asset base 12.3.2. Payments facilitated through network operating expenditure 12.3.3. Payments facilitated through distribution use of system charges 12.3.4. Payments facilitated through IIP incentive scheme 12.4. Transparency and tendering process 12.5. Concluding remarks Part VI Task E 13. General conclusions 13.1. Summary 13.2. Governance 14. Recommendations Part VII - Appendices A1. A2. A3. A4. Capacity outage probability tables Expected load lost ELL with a load duration curve Frequency and duration indices
PREFACE Terms of Reference

1. Programme of Work The agreed programme of work had the following five main tasks:Task A - To identify the issues including the strengths and weaknesses of P2/5 particularly those associated with the effect on embedded generation and the impact on financial and technical risk Task B Task C Task D Task E To determine how the present Table 2 in P2/5 can be amended to accommodate present types of embedded generation To determine how P2/5 could be more extensively amended in the longer term To suggest proposals for a framework for modelling the trading of security and corresponding contractual arrangements To develop conclusions and recommendations to provide focus for further discussion including Governance and future involvement by all relevant parties
2. Constraints and Scope of Project At the first project meeting the following constraints and scope were confirmed: the output of the project would be in the public domain the project is a discrete piece of work and would not form part of the workstreams being created by the DTI/Ofgem Distributed Generation Coordination Group (DGCG) and the Technical Steering Group (TSG). However it was hoped and anticipated that the output could provide input to, and could impact on the future ideas of, the DGCG and the TSG the project was not expected to provide answers to all questions, but it should raise issues in order to provide an understanding of the issues and the various possible ways forward. Also it was not expected to solve all these ways, but to identify them and to discuss the merits and demerits, the implications on the various parties, and the possible consequences the interim report due at the end of April was expected to address Tasks A and B only.
3. Status of Final Report and Material This report is the Final Report of this project and therefore all the content, including concepts and ideas, results, discussions and conclusions are the definitive findings of our studies.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The overall aims of this project were to improve the understanding of security and the contribution that embedded generation can make, and to propose improved methods for assessing security and the embedded generation contribution. This report has identified and discussed weaknesses and strengths of the present security standard P2/5. These include the inability to take into consideration the effect of unit availability, number of generating units, availability of primary energy source, features of modern generating plant and the impact of network reliability performance. A number of small examples are included to expose these weaknesses. It is important to stress that, by using relatively simplistic extensions to P2/5, these parameters could be taken into account, although the underlying weaknesses of P2/5 would not be resolved. Instead, it would still remain a deterministic standard with all the existing demerits remaining. A number of alternative approaches to designing new security standards, with various degrees of complexity, accuracy and ability to take the inherent probabilistic nature of system security into account, were developed and discussed. These include approaches based on: (i) extending the P2/5 approach using expected load lost (ELL) and expected energy not supplied (EENS) as criteria (ii) expected demand that cannot be supported (iii) generating capacity that can be relied on for proportions of time (iv) frequency and duration criteria (v) customer interruptions (CIs) and customer minutes lost (CMLs). These approaches were conceptually developed, their application illustrated on simple examples and the implementation procedure outlined. For any given situation, the contribution that a generator makes to system security, and consequently the monetary value of such contribution, will be driven by the approach on which the security standards are based and the criterion chosen would have a significant impact on the value of the generator contribution to network security. Furthermore, a number of issues associated with the development of commercial arrangements for rewarding generators for their contribution to network security were identified and discussed. These include the form of payment (option and exercise fee), alternative funding arrangements, allocation of risk, transparency and tendering for network security support. In designing new security standards, the question as to how the potential application of each of these approaches would affect customers, generators and DNOs, would require appropriate reliability assessments to be performed (technical aspect) and the framework for commercial arrangements formulated (commercial aspect). The final choice of the approach would also be influenced by the overall regulatory and commercial environment within which network operators are being regulated and incentivised together with commercial arrangements for connecting to and using distribution networks. Therefore, the update of the present security standards should be conducted against a well-defined context in order to ensure consistency.
PART I - INTRODUCTION
1. Background 1.1. DTI/Ofgem Targets and Reports The Government has already set targets for renewable energy and CHP plant to be achieved by 2010, and have recently issued a consultation document suggesting targets for 20201. Because of their individual relative size, this type of plant is expected to be connected into the distribution network, which imposes many technical and commercial challenges. In addition, the new regulatory structure requires distribution network operators (DNOs) to facilitate competition in generation and supply. It follows that DNOs are entering an era in which their modus operandi is rapidly changing with significantly different technical and commercial pressures placed upon them. This background led the DTI and OFGEM to set up a joint Working Group2 to review all the relevant issues. This reported in January 2001. It is not appropriate to review or summarise the WG Report in the present report, but it is appropriate to indicate the connection between them. The WG Report made two overall recommendations. Recommendation 1 stated that Ofgem should review the structure of regulatory incentives on DNOs in the light of the new statutory duty on DNOs to facilitate competition. One of the activities identified under this recommendation was:Review and prepare guidance that will allow DNOs to intepret design and operational codes in such a way as to allow the contribution of embedded generation to network performance to be fully taken into account. A review of the codes themselves and of the governance arrangements for distribution networks should follow. One such code is Engineering Recommendation ER P2/53 dealing with Security of Supply and instituted by the then Electricity Council in 1978. Since the WG Report was issued, ETSU has created small scale projects addressing several of the issues raised by the WG. UMIST was commissioned to carry out one of these projects, and this is the subject of this report. 1.2. Aims and Objectives of these Studies It is useful at this stage to state the aims and objectives proposed by UMIST and which were subsequently agreed with ETSU, the project sponsor. The overall aims were agreed as:
1
to improve the understanding of security and the contribution that embedded generation can make
The Energy Review. Performance and Innovation Unit, Cabinet Office, www.piu.gov.uk/2002/energy/report/index.htm 2 Joint Government Industry Working Group on Embedded Generation, Report into Network Access Issues. Department of Trade and Industry, January 2001 3 Engineering Recommendation P2/5, Security of Supply. The Electricity Council, October 1978. (now the Electricity Association)
to propose improved methods for assessing security and the EG contribution. The objectives were agreed as:-
to review the present issues regarding security, the present strengths and weaknesses with P2/5, and why these limit the contribution that EG is currently allowed to make to identify short term procedures and measures so that Table 2 of P2/5 could be updated very simply in order to recognise modern types of generation plant including renewables to identify longer term procedures and measures that would allow security standards to treat all players equitably, and allow improved design and operating standards to be introduced to identify models for establishing a market in security in order to enhance trading opportunities to support the proposals by small-scale system studies, so the significance and scale of the problem and issues are clearly apparent.
These general aims and objectives led to the specific Tasks stated in the Preface, and repeated here for completeness. Five main tasks were agreed:Task A - To identify the issues including the strengths and weaknesses of P2/5 particularly those associated with the effect on embedded generation and the impact on financial and technical risk Task B - To determine how the present Table 2 in P2/5 can be amended to accommodate present types of embedded generation Task C - To determine how P2/5 could be more extensively amended in the longer term Task D - To suggest proposals for a framework for modelling the trading of security and corresponding contractual arrangements Task E - To develop conclusions and recommendations to provide focus for further discussion including Governance and future involvement by all relevant parties 1.3. Structure of Report This report is divided into separate parts, each dealing with one of the main Tasks set out above. This part addresses the background and general objectives of the project. Part II considers Task A, that is the general aspects of security, the historical developments, how it is presently achieved by DNOs taking into account the obligations set by the Regulator and Statutes and the wishes of customers, and the trends currently in place for the future. Part III considers Task B, that is a consideration of the approaches by which Table 2 of P2/5 could be amended in the short term. Part IV considers Task C, which addresses a range of alternative approaches, including discussion of their merits and demerits and suggestions for the implementation of each approach. Part V deals with Task D and considers alternative approaches for creating a commercial framework to reward embedded generators for their contribution to network security. Finally Part VI summarises the information and suggests the next steps needed to create updated security standards. 8
PART II - TASK A
To identify the issues including the strengths and weaknesses of P2/5 particularly those associated with the effect on embedded generation and the impact on financial and technical risk
2. Security and its Achievement in Distribution Systems 2.1. General Aspects The term security can mean many different things depending on the context, whether it is an operational situation or planning situation, and the viewpoint of the utility or user of the system, including suppliers and end-customers. In the case of distribution systems, it generally refers to the ability to maintain a connection to the end-customers and to supply them with the power level and energy demanded. This appears to be synonymous with the term reliability, but care is needed in this interpretation. The term reliability is nowadays very specific in its meaning, and is accepted to be defined by a set of probabilistic indices even if only expected (average or mean) values are reported or predicted. Reported indices include frequency of interruptions, duration of interruptions, annual unavailability, and load and energy not supplied. In addition there is a growing interest in determining worth of supply and consequently indices representing cost of interruptions perceived by both customers and utilities are rapidly gaining importance. These indices include information regarding the likelihood of interruptions (frequency and duration) as well as information regarding the severity of the interruptions (load and energy not supplied). A combination of likelihood and severity provides a true measure of risk. If only average values are reported or predicted, it is important to recognise that these are not deterministic values, should not be treated as such, and that they are associated with probability distributions, the shape of which may be unknown. It can be argued that the term security should do likewise. However this is not usually the case although the situation is changing and gradually moving in this direction. Instead, security is often measured by deterministic indices that may include the severity of situations but ignore the likelihood. Examples are percentage reserve used in spinning reserve assessment, and the n-1 or n-D criteria used in transmission operation and planning. The current security criteria used in distribution planning and operation generally have similar deterministic characteristics, including the current P2/5 security standard with which all DNOs are obliged to conform. This is a potential weakness, which is partly, but not solely, the cause of embedded generation not being given any or much credit for security contributions. These aspects are discussed in more detail in the following section of this report. 2.2. Engineering Recommendation P2/5 Security is, and always has been, of high priority to the electricity supply industry (ESI). Therefore effort has always been made at both the planning and operational stages to ensure that security is as high as possible commensurate with the
cost of achieving it. Because of the need to balance cost against the benefit, different distribution systems inherently possess different levels of security: the security generally improves with increasing voltage level, and with increasing levels of underground cables compared with overhead lines. Therefore transmission is generally more secure than distribution, and urban systems more secure than rural ones. In order to ensure that all customers have a minimum level of security, guidelines and standards exist. Prior to privatisation of the ESI, the then Electricity Council was responsible for setting and maintaining a range of common technical and economic requirements, one of which was to determine and set appropriate levels of security. In order to create consistency between all distribution companies existing at that time, the Electricity Council formulated Engineering Recommendation P2/54 in 1978. This is intended to be a guide to system planning and design: it is not an operational standard or guide. Although departures from P2/5 recommendations are permitted, these have to be justified using detailed risk and economic studies. Whether any such studies have been done remains unknown although anecdotal information suggests that these are likely to be few in number. Primarily P2/5 consists of two tables. Table 1 specifies the maximum reconnection times following pre-specified events leading to an interruption. This time is dependent on the Group Demand affected by the interruption. Table 2 specifies the security contribution that could be credited to any embedded generation. P2/5 permits this contribution to be added to the cyclic rating of the remaining circuits and the transfer capacity of alternative sources in deciding whether the Group Demand could be satisfied in accordance with the values quoted in Table 1. Although intended to create consistency, P2/5 can not do so for several reasons, the most significant being the following:it specifies duration of interruptions but does not specify frequency. Anecdotal information suggests that frequency was intended to be part of the standard at one stage of development but that this was subsequently deleted. Some in the industry have argued that frequency is considered implicitly in some instances because P2/5 states that Group Demands greater than 60MW must be reinstated immediately, implying that, although a circuit outage has occurred, an interruption is not seen by the end-customer. However, immediately is defined, as loss of supply should not exceed one minute. Consequently the interruption is seen and customers do experience loss of supply, even if the distribution companies do not, and need not, count it. it is treated as a deterministic standard and does not account for the stochastic variations of interruptions. This is frequently misunderstood and some in the industry believe and stress that it is a probabilistic standard: this is implied in P2/5 itself. There is no doubt that the Electricity Council wished to take into account the probabilistic nature of system failures in a more formal way than existing prior to P2/5 and did in fact use reliability evaluation techniques and computer programs (including UMISTs RELNET5 program) in deciding the values to specify in Tables 1 and 2. However, although these values may be based on reliability evaluations, they are used deterministically without recognising the stochastic nature of
4
Engineering Recommendation P2/5, Security of Supply. The Electricity Council, October 1978. (now the Electricity Association) 5 RELNET, Reliability Evaluation of Electrical Networks. UMIST
10
system behaviour. For example, the values are equally applicable to Hydro-Electric which operates in a very adverse environment and with a very low customer density, and to London Electricity which operates in a very favourable environment and with a very high customer density. one of the weaknesses associated with the deterministic nature of P2/5 is the basis of the values quoted in Table 2. This table implies that, in most cases, 67% of the installed generating capacity can be considered as the effective capacity and this can be considered as the contribution which should be credited to the embedded generation. Very little justification for this is provided in P2/5. As this is at the heart of the debate regarding the contribution that embedded generation can make to security, this is discussed in more detail in the next section. Before considering this concept of effective generation in more detail, it is worth re-iterating that P2/5 is a design standard, not an operational one. The significance of this is very important. A design standard simply implies that, if the design conforms with a specified set of conditions, then the designer has satisfied the standard. This does not mean that these conditions will be satisfied under all operational circumstances. If violations occur during the operational phase then perhaps one or more operational standards will not be satisfied, but this does not mean the design standard has been violated. Violations could mean that the embedded generation was insufficient at the time, i.e. the output was less that 67%. However it could also mean that insufficient network capacity was available at that time due to network outages being greater than that considered creditable. It follows therefore that a design standard is intended to minimise these violations, not necessarily to eliminate them. This does not mean that changes to the concept of design standards, particularly P2/5, are not warranted, quite the opposite, but it is important in putting the background and perspective of P2/5 into proper context. 2.3. Effective Generation In the 1970s when P2/5 was developed, considerable amount of local or embedded generation existed in the distribution networks, this generation generally being that left over from the pre-nationalised industry. The main question at that time was whether this local generation had value in the system or should be neglected and declared obsolete. This provided the background logic for creating Table 2 of P2/5. However the reasoning and how the values were determined is not included in P2/5 and little other documentation now seems to exist. Part of the reasoning is contained in an application report ACE Report 516 with reliability cost assessments provided in ACE Report 677. ACE Report 51 defines the effective generation contribution as the transmission circuit capacity which, when substituted for the generating plant in various generation/transmission systems, results in the same reliability of supply from each of these systems. No explanation is given of how this was done, although a
ACE Report No. 51, Report on the Application of Engineering Recommendation P2/5, Security of Supply. The Electricity Council, May 1979. (now the Electricity Association) 7 ACE Report No. 67, Report on Reliability Investment in Radial H.V. Distribution Systems with Overhead Lines. The Electricity Council, March 1979. (now the Electricity Association)
6
11
summary of the outcomes is provided. The report states that the availability of generator units was assumed to be 86% and the reliability of the circuits with which they are compared were considered to be perfectly reliable. The outcomes are quoted as the ratio of effective output to maximum output of generators. Depending on the set size, these ratios varied between 0.4 and 0.9. From these ratios the report concludes that an average ratio of 0.67 could be used, this being the value quoted in Table 2 of P2/5. Although this single value may be convenient for deterministically assessing system security, it does not take into account the fact that the ratios themselves are clearly variables, the availability of units can vary significantly, and lines and transformers with which they are compared are not perfectly reliable. Also it neglects the fact that a mean value is only the long-run average and this value may never be achievable in its own right. For example, a single unit either is capable of delivering full capacity or nothing, the average is only the weighted value of these two actual achievable levels. It follows therefore that the 67% is simply a level deemed to be the contribution that can be associated with the embedded generation. It does not mean that this capacity level will always be available but can be considered to be available sufficiently frequently that violations of network reliability happen infrequently. It is therefore a value that can be added to the cyclic rating of the remaining transformers, which themselves may not always be available, or the actual capacity may be reduced due to adverse environmental conditions. However there is a tacit assumption in P2/5 that 67% of installed capacity can be relied on at all times. This is illusory. It also provides comfort that irrespective of when the original circuit outage occurs, the embedded generation will be able to supply 67% of its installed capacity. In reality this is not possible since it could only provide the capacity of available units, which could range from 100% of installed capacity to nothing at all. It may therefore not be possible to provide the capacity required to satisfy the requirements of Table 1 in P2/5. This aspect of effective generation is considered in more detail in Section 4.2 during the discussion of Task B. 2.4. Present-day Position Regarding P2/5 P2/5 was developed prior to privatisation and the restructuring in 1990 of the ESI. It therefore really reflects the industry structure of the 1970s, and not that of today and certainly not that associated with the underlying market concepts. Despite this, P2/5 was incorporated without revision into the statutes dealing with the privatisation of the industry and is now an inherent part of the licence of each DNO. The consequence is that it must be adhered to in all situations. This leads to several problems and inconsistencies in addition to those outlined above. These additional ones are briefly discussed below:the types of generating units existing in the 1970s are different to those of today. P2/5 recognises two main types of plant, steam and gas turbines. Embedded steam plants operating on 1, 2 and 3 shifts no longer exist. Modern gas turbines should be more reliable. No consideration is given to renewables (wind, solar, water, etc), nor to CHP. Consequently the assumption of generating units having an availability of 0.86 is no longer justified, gas turbines are likely to be better (may be up to about 0.95), and
12
some renewables such as wind are likely to be much worse (perhaps less than 0.40). This means that the 0.67 factor used in Table 2 of P2/5 is likely to be inappropriate for reasons additional to those discussed above. the operation of generating capacity is no longer centrally controlled and dispatched as in the 1970s. Consequently, even if embedded generation exists in the distribution network suffering an interruption and this could provide energy to disconnected customers, there is no obligation on the generator to provide it. Therefore, since security is the sole responsibility of the DNOs, it is reasonable for DNOs to argue why should they rely on embedded generators which have no need to provide the cover unless they so wish. the Regulator determines the mechanism by which DNOs achieve their revenue stream during the price control review; this being done on a fiveyearly cycle. Presently the current regulation process is one effectively based on value of assets, i.e. asset-based regulation. This process seems to financially encourage DNOs to increase the size of their asset base. DNOs are not incentivised to purchase security from some other supplier. 2.5. Guaranteed and Overall Standards - Relationship with P2/5 Since privatisation, the Regulator (Ofgem8, previously Offer9) has established two sets of operational standards, the Guaranteed Standards (GS) and the Overall Standards (OS). Guaranteed Standards set service levels that must be met in each individual case. If the DNO fails to provide the level of service specified, it must make a penalty payment to the customer affected. Overall Standards cover areas of service where it is not appropriate to give individual guarantees, but where customers in general have a right to expect from DNOs predetermined minimum levels of service. No penalty payments are made if these levels are not achieved. Presently the main GS from a security point of view is GS2 relating to restoration of supply. To ensure that inconvenience to customers is kept to a minimum, this GS requires companies to restore the supply within 18 (previously 24) hours of the company becoming aware of a fault on the distribution system. Additional requirements are being developed under the Information and Incentives Project (see Section 2.6). There is debate within the industry that centres on the relationship between P2/5 and these operational standards, and on the need for P2/5 now that DNOs are subject to the increasingly stringent requirements of these GS and OS. It has been argued in some quarters that P2/5 is no longer relevant or needed and has been superseded by these operational standards. This however ignores the fact that there is a fundamental difference between them. P2/5 is a design standard and the relevant GS and OS are operational standards. P2/5 therefore must be satisfied at the design and planning stages and ensures that all customers receive a minimum level of security. The ability to satisfy the relevant GS and OS however is only known after the system is in operation, an operational period that may be quite significant before the information becomes available. Consequently P2/5, or more specifically a standard similar to it but may be one that more truly reflects modern plant, operation and
8 9
Office of Gas and Electricity Markets Office of Electricity Regulation
13
structural aspects, is required if DNOs are to remain committed to obligations set by the Regulator. 2.6. Information and Incentives Project (IIP) Ofgem are currently discussing a series of proposals with the industry that come within a project, which the Regulator has defined as the Information and Incentives Project (IIP). The basis of the project and its possible impact on P2/5 and any future enhancement of this security standard is worthy of reflection. All DNOs are required to report certain performance figures annually to the Regulator. These enable Ofgem to publish the annual Security (number of customer interruptions, CI) and Availability (number of customer minutes lost, CML) performance figures for each DNO. Although published and DNOs compared, these performance figures do not relate to any GS, and therefore are not associated with any penalty payments. Also they are not directly linked to the price control. The only security related GS is the time for reconnection of supply following an interruption. Through the IIP, the Regulator is proposing to increase the amount of information that a DNO must provide on an annual basis, and to extend the use of this information. As discussed in Section 2.4, the current regulation process is one based on the value of assets, i.e. asset-based regulation. This concept is being reviewed within the IIP with the intention of not only extending the information that must be provided, but also linking the network performance to the price control and thus moving towards a regulation process based on performance, i.e. performance-based regulation. Also as part of this IIP, Ofgem is intending to extend GS and OS to include interruption frequencies, with a GS requirement that no customer should experience more than a specified number of interruptions, a value that is not yet finalised. This would mean that P2/5 would have less requirements than the GS, a situation which itself may mean there is a need to review and revise P2/5. 2.7. Future Development of Security Standard It is evident that, although P2/5 exists and is an integral part of the licence under which each DNO operates, it has many weaknesses. This is generally recognised within the industry. One of the most recent occasions when this problem was addressed and exhaustively discussed by all players in the industry (DTI, Ofgem, DNOs, generators, suppliers, customers), was by the DTI/Ofgem Working Group on Embedded Generation Network Issues10. It would not be appropriate to reproduce or specifically summarise the EGWG Report, but the Main Report and Annex 2 contain several important concerns and issues which relate to the present dilemmas and suggestions for the future direction of security standards, particularly with respect to embedded generation. The following brief points are gleaned from this report, not to provide a comprehensive summary, but to indicate the thoughts within the minds of those participating in the discussions:both DNOs and generators agree that the current regulatory framework inhibits DNOs taking account of the contribution that embedded generation could make to security.
Joint Government Industry Working Group on Embedded Generation, Report into Network Access Issues. Department of Trade and Industry, January 2001
10
14
both DNOs and generators agree that there could be material benefits from the contribution that could be made by embedded generation, that this contribution to security has value to DNOs and that this value should be rewarded. both DNOs and generators agree that there is a need to review P2/5 particularly regarding Table 2. One point of consensus is that a guidance note should be agreed to supplement the treatment of the Effective contribution of generation to network capacity paragraphs in Section 3 of P2/5. embedded generators consider that any review should move towards a more probabilistic approach. DNOs consider that any review of P2/5 should take into account the diverse nature of current embedded generation as well as the obligation and risks that DNOs carry for maintaining security. DNOs consider that any method of assessing and valuing security contributions must be transparent. It follows from the above points that the industry is now willing to review P2/5, particularly with respect to embedded generation. However there remains a hesitance to establish a major review of the bulk of P2/5, despite acceptance that a number of weaknesses exist. One reason for this, which is understandable, is that the time required for conducting a major review and obtaining universal agreement could be substantial. On the other hand a short review only of Table 2 and its implications could be achieved very much more quickly. The EGWG Report recognises this dilemma and suggests that the review of Table 2 should then be associated with an early deliverable, with the full review and more extensive studies dealt with subsequently. On the basis of current knowledge, the future of P2/5 can be anticipated as follows: in the immediate future, no changes are likely to occur because of the need to obtain the agreement of all players in the industry and the difficulties of achieving this. This time-scale is likely to be at least 1-2 years in the intermediate future, the likely change is an enhancement of Table 2 of P2/5. This would logically centre on extending the types of generating units considered and modifying the effective contributions that could be associated with each of these. The likelihood is that the industry players would wish these to be based on those underpinning the values in the current P2/5 - the debate however may centre on the difficulty of knowing exactly or even approximately how this was done. Although the EGWG anticipated that a target date of January 2003 would be possible, this is likely to slip in the more long-term, a view is that a more extensive review of the basis of P2/5 is required. This would be two-part. One part would be to review the underlying concepts of P2/5 with the intention of replacing Table 1 and enhancing the criteria. The other part would be to review the method of assessing the benefit that embedded generation could make to security. Both parts would need to address the probabilistic issues. A possible date for achieving this remains difficult to predict because it requires an agreement to proceed, and an agreement of the approach to be used. It is not likely to happen within the next 3-5 years.
15
2.8. Recent DTI/Ofgem Developments Since the EGWG Report was published, several developments have taken place at both the DTI and Ofgem. These include a Consultation Document11 issued by Ofgem and a joint DTI/Ofgem Workshop12 organised by ETSU and UMIST. The Consultation Document in particular is of considerable interest since it outlined and summarised the current views and responses of Ofgem to the outcomes and proposals of the EGWG Report. The document covers many issues relating to the future pricing and incentivising of DNOs with respect to embedded generation, but only the points specific to the thrust of this report are highlighted. The following statements, extracted from the Consultation Document, are relevant and are worth noting:Replacing investment in a relatively reliable network with investment in generating plant that may be less reliable could constitute a disbenefit During the period July 2001 to January 2002, we plan to participate in work on: consideration of changes that might usefully be made to Engineering Recommendation P2/5 In the current framework, DNOs are probably right to argue that there is no profit for them in connecting embedded generation DNOs can argue that existing and planned technical requirements act as disincentives to the connection of embedded generation DNOs are required, by their licences, to design networks in accordance with Engineering Recommendation P2/5. Reliance on embedded generation rather than on network reinforcement could breach P2/5 In the longer term, it might be possible to review P2/5. Ofgem will be discussing the possibilities with other interested parties Ofgem notes that meeting IIP requirements will be a major concern for DNOs when considering embedded generation There are two specific implications that can be extracted from these statements. Firstly, Ofgem seems to recognise the difficulties that DNOs have with regard to embedded generation in the current climate and regulatory regime. Secondly, the time-scale by which changes to P2/5 may be made seem to be long term rather than short term, thus no immediate revisions to any part of P2/5 are imminent. The purpose of the Workshop was to respond to the proposals made by the EGWG, to identify possible work programmes, and to establish priorities and time schedules. It was not intended to propose changes to the proposals, nor did it do so. However it reflected on these in light of the Ofgem Consultation Document.
11
Ofgem, Embedded Generation: Price Controls, Incentives and Connection Charging. A Preliminary Consultation Document, September 2001 12 DTI/Ofgem Joint Workshop on Embedded Generation, Stratford-on-Avon, 1-2 October 2001
16
2.9. Concluding Comments At this point in time, the following aspects and issues are applicable regarding security and P2/5: P2/5 as published in 1978 remains in force DNOs are compelled to comply with this version of P2/5 under their licence DNOs must design to the maximum interruption times specified in Table 1 DNOs may, if they wish and can agree conditions, give some credit to the contribution that embedded generation could make to security this contribution would need to be based on the capacities specified in Table 2 there is a mood within the industry for a review of Table 2, but no decision as to how has yet been proposed there is less inclination in the industry for a more radical review of P2/5 the implication of recent Ofgem consultations is that no immediate changes are likely to be made to P2/5 in our opinion, this could lead to the following concerns: simple changes to the values in Table 2 leaves the underlying problem that the values in this table are only average values because no-one can guarantee that these average values would be available as actual values at all times, DNOs would still be inclined to ignore this possible contribution the weaknesses existing in the bulk of P2/5 would remain, including no association with frequency of interruptions and no recognition that systems behave stochastically.
17
PART III - TASK B

To determine how the present Table 2 in P2/5 can be amended to accommodate present types of embedded generation
3. Concepts for Evaluating Security 3.1. Basic Approaches In order to consider the principles underpinning P2/5 and to consider alternative approaches, it is first necessary to define the principle of the modelling procedure. This is shown schematically in Figure 1. data 1 data 2 data 3 . etc level 1
model 1
model 2
model 3
. etc
level 2
result 1
result 2
result 3
. etc
level 3
Figure 1 - Hierarchical levels in the modelling procedure of security contribution This figure illustrates the hierarchical structure of the modelling procedure. The principle is that a set of input data is selected from known or unknown information (level 1), which is then processed using some defined model that reflects system behaviour (level 2), into a set of output data generally called results (level 3). It is important to recognise that these three levels apply equally to every type of system analysis, including security assessment, and is nothing more than data processing albeit a complex process. The essential problems in such processing is whether the data is known or known with sufficient certainty, whether a processing model can be developed with sufficient accuracy to reflect all system effects, and whether the results and assumptions embedded within them are fully recognised by decision makers and therefore used appropriately. One or more of these steps are frequently performed using significant approximations and simplifications. These are discussed in the following sections with respect to security assessment.
18
3.2. Levels of Evaluation 3.2.1. Level 1 - Data Level 1 could be expected to include such data as the number of units, the type of units, the availability of units, the system demand levels, and similar aspects. Since some of these are stochastic in nature, e.g. unit availability and system demand, it could also be expected that the probabilistic nature of these should be specified, perhaps in terms of average values, variances or probability distributions. In P2/5 however, the unit types are limited to conventional steam plant and gas turbines, and the availability of each set is fixed as 86%. Conventional steam plant no longer exists in distribution systems, and a single value of unit availability does not recognise the considerable variation that exists with modern generating plant. These are two of the main weaknesses of P2/5, as discussed in Section 2.4, and are likely to be two of the most significant reasons why DNOs and others remain reluctant to use P2/5 for assessing the contribution that could be made by embedded generation. In reality it can be argued that gas turbines do form part of modern embedded generation and, since P2/5 does not include any restrictions or assumptions about such plant, the values included in P2/5 applicable to gas turbines could be used by DNOs without violating any of their licence conditions. The only logical reason why such applications are not done is because of uncertainty whether this argument is legally valid and because DNOs remain responsible for ensuring the required security levels, not a third party such as an embedded generator. The present studies address these weaknesses and take into account the stochastic variations that exist in the system attributes. These extensions however are included sequentially, rather than including them all simultaneously. The attributes to be considered are: unit availability, number of units, technology (gas, wind, etc), common source, and location. 3.2.2. Level 2 - Models Modelling the process is the most complex part of the procedure and the most frequent cause of inappropriate results. In order to make the process tractable, or as easy and as straightforward as possible, simplifications and approximations are often made. Sometimes these have to be done because the exact system behaviour is not known or cannot be modelled. Such assumptions must be quantified and the impact of these should, if possible, be assessed by sensitivity studies. However simplifications and assumptions are also made in order to simply reduce the complexity of the evaluations. Downsizing of companies have resulted in some skill levels, particularly those that are used infrequently, being reduced or even eliminated. Therefore the ability for companies to perform complex analyses may no longer exist in certain areas. This is enhanced by companies expecting employees to be more generalist rather than specialist. Two of the most simplistic approaches are the use of look-up tables and the use of spread-sheet assessments. Look-up tables only require knowledge of some specified input data or information, and the result is found directly from the table. P2/5 clearly comes into this category. There is no suggestion that the look-up values quoted in P2/5 were not deduced by extensive evaluations, nor that the values are not appropriate for the set of input data and information specified. Extensive studies were certainly done by the Electricity Council in the 1970s, although the procedures used have become lost
19
with the passage of time. The weakness however is that the values then become rigidly fixed in time and are used deterministically. This is the present position with P2/5. It is fully understandable why such a position has been reached. Firstly, it is easy to demonstrate that a deterministic standard has or has not been satisfied. Secondly, uncertainty about the impact of a new set of standards deters the ready acceptance of such developments. These studies are staged in the usage of additional modelling: Task B retains the methodology used in the original development of P2/5, at least as far as it is possible to decipher this. Therefore this addresses the problem deterministically and provides an approach for producing a suitable set of values, these values then being treated deterministically. It must be recognised that these values retain all the erroneous characteristics that the values in P2/5 possess. The essential difference between updated values and the previous ones is that the updated ones would reflect present-day attributes. The models used to obtain these values are based on probabilistic techniques and the values are therefore underpinned by consistent probability theory. However the results are then tabulated in the form of look-up tables. This Task is considered in this part of the report. Task C will extend the security assessment into a more substantial probabilistic domain with the intention of creating a more objective consideration of the contributions that embedded generation could make to security. Because of its stochastic nature, these considerations will be based more soundly on probabilistic approaches. The framework of assessment is likely to be more complex. One framework could structure the methodology on spread-sheet evaluations in which the elements are evaluated using probability theory and equations. Consequently, no predefined values would exist. Instead the user would identify appropriate attributes, choose these from options or input their values, and the spreadsheet elements would calculate the appropriate result. The second framework could structure the methodology on a sequence of theoretical equations and techniques, probably defined in terms of an algorithm. The benefit of this approach is that it would be completely flexible, and could be structured to reflect any system configuration, plant operation scheme and commercial agreement. This Task however is beyond the scope of this Interim Report, but is discussed in a little more detail in Section 7. 3.2.3. Level 3 - Results The values of the output results clearly reflect the input data and the evaluation approach and theory. The range of results reflect the need within the decision making process. The output results quoted in Table 2 of P2/5 are the percentage of capacity that can be credited to the embedded generation. This is very restrictive, but evidently was sufficient for the purposes proposed for P2/5 in the 1970s. Task B in these studies retains this restriction in order to be compatible with the constraints and structure of P2/5. However Task C extends this concept conceptually to a range of possible values including the possibility of addressing frequency of interruptions (i.e. Security or CIs) and duration of interruptions (i.e. Availability or CMLs). This would make any derivative of P2/5 more compatible with Ofgems IIP.
20
3.2.4. Summary of Staged Developments The above discussion can be summarised as illustrated in Table 1. Table 1 - Summary of the scope in Task B and Task C Task B C Input data to reflect presentday plant and attributes to reflect presentday plant and attributes Model using P2/5 approach Results P2/5 format and scope presented as look-up table
using probability extended set of output results and theory, models and scope that could be presented as techniques Look-up table spread-sheet format algorithmic theory
4. Security Considerations 4.1. Review of P2/5 as a Security Standard The underlying concept of security is that there should be sufficient connections and capacity in the system such that, when an outage event occurs, customers are able to continue receiving a supply or have it restored within an acceptable time period. The minimum level of security for different Group Demands are those specified in Table 1 of P2/5, and these must be achievable by licence and statute. There are various ways in which these levels can be achieved:increasing the capacity of existing circuits constructing additional circuits using embedded generation to replace the capacity of circuits on outage. All three options are permitted by P2/5. The amount can easily be determined through power flow studies in the case of the first two options, i.e. those associated with circuit capacity and, in principle, from a simple comparison with Table 2 in the case of the third option. The latter is the focus of these studies and therefore only this is addressed in this report. This is a relatively straightforward consideration using P2/5 because the only data required is the type of units and the capacities of each unit. P2/5 has an identified Type of Generation defined as Gas Turbine Units. These are not qualified in any way and a simple reading and interpretation of P2/5 would suggest that the values quoted in P2/5 could be used for any gas turbines. The debate for and against this are:For - since the type of gas turbine is not qualified in P2/5 and the licence permits Table 2 to be used, then the licence will be satisfied if the values given in P2/5 are adhered to without amendment
21
Against - although there may not be any qualifications given for gas turbines in P2/5, it is only reasonable to note that P2/5 was written in the 1970s and modern gas turbines are likely to be different to those available at that time. Therefore it is unreasonable to continue using values determined in the 1970s for units being used in the 2000s The dilemma in this debate is that both points are true, although seemingly diametrically opposite. The distinction is solely whether one adheres rigidly to P2/5 and the licence requirements, or whether one adds the qualification, is this adherence now reasonable? This section however is concerned only with reviewing the outcome of P2/5 if it is used without modification. In this case, the security levels must conform with the requirements of P2/5. Table 1 of P2/5 specifies the minimum Demand that must be met after certain specified circuit outages. This level is dependent on the Group Demand or Class of Supply. The amount of demand that can be supplied depends on the available circuit capacity and the amount of generation capacity that can be credited. In the latter case, this can be assessed from Table 2 of P2/5. This table indicates that the effective contribution of most units is 67% of its declared net capability, and that this contribution should be restricted to supplying that part of the demand which is not required to be supplied immediately following the first circuit outage. It is therefore necessary to determine the net capability of the embedded generation, i.e. the capacity that could be provided to the network in terms of security, which would then be weighted by the specified 67%. In many cases net capability will be the rating of the units, in which case the only required knowledge is the capacity and number of units. If restrictions are set by the generator owner or operator then, in addition, knowledge of the export agreements would be needed. The main problem is with CHP plant since the primary purpose of such plant is to supply local heat, electrical energy being a by-product. Because of this, the available electrical energy will be dependent on the amount of steam required at any time, and this may be less than that needed to produce the required electrical capacity levels. This problem is discussed separately later but briefly the effect could be dealt with by considering variation in the available capacity levels and therefore in the value of unit capability. 4.2. Assessment of Effective Generation As discussed in Section 2.3, P2/5 was developed when the embedded generation that existed in the distribution networks was generally that left over from the pre-nationalised industry, and the main question was whether this local generation should be neglected and declared obsolete. Table 2 of P2/5 assisted in this decision making. However the only reasoning of how the values were determined is contained in the application report ACE Report 5113 with reliability cost assessments provided in ACE Report 6714. Since ACE Report 51 seems to be the only definitive document presently available that quantifies the reasoning behind the values specified in P2/5, it is appropriate to consider this report in some detail. The most significant part appears to
ACE Report No. 51, Report on the Application of Engineering Recommendation P2/5, Security of Supply. The Electricity Council, May 1979. (now the Electricity Association) 14 ACE Report No. 67, Report on Reliability Investment in Radial H.V. Distribution Systems with Overhead Lines. The Electricity Council, March 1979. (now the Electricity Association)
13
22
be Appendix A3 of ACE Report 51 headed Comparison of Generation and Transmission/Distribution Firm Capacity, and it is therefore worthy to quote the relevant paragraphs. These are:The effective generation contribution was estimated by determining the transmission circuit capacities which, when substituted for the generating plant in various generation/transmission systems, would result in the same reliability of supply from each of these systems. This substituted capacity was considered as the effective generation contribution; the ratio of effective output to maximum output was determined in each case. For the various combinations of generators and transmission circuits examined, the ratio of effective output to maximum output of generators was not constant, but varied mainly as a function of the ratio of generator unit size to the transmission circuit capacity. Thus, where the set size was about one quarter of the circuit size the ratio ranged between 0.8 and 0.9; with set sizes of one half the circuit size the ratio ranged between 0.7 and 0.8, and with set sizes equal to the circuit size the ratio ranged between 0.4 and 0.5. It should be noted that throughout these studies a winter-time average availability of generation of 86% was assumed. Based on an examination of networks with local generation, it was decided that for the purpose of developing Table 2 of P2/5 a factor of two-thirds for the ratio of effective output to maximum output could be adopted. The following comments and critical assessments can be made: the effective generation contribution is defined as the transmission circuit capacity which, when substituted for the generating plant, results in the same reliability of supply. no explanation is given of how this was done, what the combinations of generation and transmission were, or what the same reliability of supply means. Presumably the transmission capacity and generating plant capacity are the total capacities in each case, in which case the total generating capacity will be greater, perhaps much greater, than the total circuit capacity. Although the reliability parameter is not specified, it was possibly expected energy not supplied since this was one output parameter of the REFOS program15 stated to be used in the studies. several studies have been performed during this project but it has not been possible to replicate the values given in ACE Report 51. The main problem is that the reliability of supply (e.g. expected energy not supplied) depends on whether a load duration curve or a fixed loading level is used, and the value of peak load compared with the installed generation capacity. This information is not provided. a solution to this problem requires extensive system studies, which are out of range of the scope of this project. However they could be done given appropriate time and resources. instead the basic concept of P2/5 is used in this project in order to establish the important issues and to identify appropriate approaches and procedures
15
REFOS: CEGB CS/C/P205. This program is said to perform a risk evaluation of parallel connected transmission circuits and apparently calculates the expected annual outage time for which the demand at a supply point will exceed the available capacity, and the energy lost
23
one of the most significant points is that the values of 0.4 to 0.9 are the ratios between the effective generation (equivalent to the circuit capacity) and the total generation capacity. This provides the following information for the case when a transmission line is used in comparison with a group of generators:assume all generating units in the group are identical and of equal size in each of the following cases, and let: set size = SS circuit capacity = CC total generation = TG ratio of effective generation to maximum generation = R number of generating units = n then: R = CC/TG = CC/n.SS when SS equals CC, R = 0.4 - 0.5. This implies that the number of generating units lies between 2 and 2.5, on average. when SS equals one half of CC, R = 0.7 - 0.8. This implies that the number of generating units lies between 2.5 and 2.9, on average. when SS equals one quarter of CC, R = 0.8 - 0.9. This implies that the number of generating units lies between 4.5 and 5, on average. the value of two-thirds (0.67) is stated to be the average of the range of ratios between 0.4 and 0.9. However, how this average was calculated is not explained. Although the single value of 0.67 may be convenient for deterministically assessing system security, it does not take into account the fact that the ratios themselves are clearly variables, the number of units varies, the availability of units can vary significantly, and lines and transformers with which they are compared are not perfectly reliable. Also it neglects the fact that a mean value is only the long-run average and this value may never be achievable in its own right. For example, a single unit either is capable of delivering full capacity or nothing, the average is only the weighted value of these two actual achievable levels. there is a tacit assumption in P2/5 that 67% of installed capacity can be relied on at all times. This is illusory. It also provides comfort that irrespective of when the original circuit outage occurs, the embedded generation will be able to supply 67% of its installed capacity. In reality this is not possible since it could only provide the capacity of available units, which could range from 100% of installed capacity to nothing at all. It may therefore not be possible to provide the capacity required to satisfy the requirements of Table 1 in P2/5. The significance and a balanced perspective of this is discussed in more detail in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.
4.3. Direct Application of P2/5 Direct application of P2/5 is straightforward. All that is required is to identify the types of units in the system, assume these conform with P2/5 and have a corresponding effective contribution of 67%. Example 1.1 Consider four units each of 60MW capacity Total Effective Contribution = (4 x 60) x 0.67 = 160.8 MW 24
Example 1.2 Consider 30 units each of 1MW capacity Total Effective Contribution = (30 x 1) x 0.67 = 20.1 MW Example 1.3 Consider a single unit of 60MW capacity and 30 units each of 1MW capacity Total Effective Contribution = (1 x 60 + 30 x 1) x 0.67 = 60.3 MW Note: a) These examples assume that all the units considered conform with P2/5.
5. Deterministic Studies Using an Updated P2/5 5.1. Introduction In order to understand how P2/5 might be updated, the current restrictions and assumptions must be recognised. The assumptions underpinning P2/5 are the following:P2/5 assumes that units have an availability of 0.86. {It is likely that many modern units, e.g. gas turbines, have availabilities greater than 0.86, and other units, e.g. wind turbines, have availabilities much less than 0.86. How much greater or less is difficult to assess, as data concerning these values are often difficult to obtain. The main current reason is that most generating companies treat this information as commercially confidential. Therefore all values used in these studies are estimated and it has proved useful to perform a series of sensitivity studies and to observe the effect of changes in the values of the availabilities - It will be essential for transparency of data to be established}. gas turbines in the 1970s were usually installed for security or system support purposes. They were controlled centrally and were available on demand. {Gas turbines and other units in the 2000s are owned by private generating companies who operate them according to commercial principles. They are frequently operated as CHP plant, when their primary purpose is to supply heat and energy to local sites, with external system support being of secondary importance. Therefore they may not be available for system security and support on demand unless a commercial agreement has been established between the generating company and the relevant DNO in advance. This is rarely, if ever, done at present - It will be essential for commercial agreements to be reached} the capability of gas turbines in the 1970s was usually equal to the rated capacity since their primary purpose was to provide system support. {The capability of gas turbines and other units to support the system in the 2000s may be less, or much less, than the rating if only part of the capability is available on demand because of the need to maintain capacity for their primary function of CHP plant - It will be essential for available capacity to be declared and provided when required}
25
These considerations imply the following:the availability of modern units may be greater than those of the 1970s and therefore their effective contribution would also be greater the availability of modern units may be less, even much less, than those of the 1970s and therefore their effective contribution would be less the net capability of modern units may be less as a percentage of installed capacity due to operational practices and therefore their effective contribution could also be less, and that the following attributes are not considered explicitly or in most instances not even implicitly: the effect of unit availability the effect of number of units the effect of a wide range of unit technologies the effect of common energy source the effect of location of units All of these aspects need to be taken into account. This requires knowledge of the relationship, if one exists, between the unit availability and the effective capacity as deduced by the Electricity Council in the 1970s. Since the methodology is not, to the authors knowledge, described in any public document, this is virtually impossible to determine. Instead various approaches that seem compatible with the outcome of P2/5, have been tried and several assumptions have been made. These are described in the following application studies. The attributes are studied sequentially as follows: the effect of unit availability the effect of number of units the effect of technology of units the effect of common energy source the effect of location of units. It is important to note at this point that the following considerations and examples have significant assumptions and approximations embedded within them. These are clearly indicated within the text. The results are therefore not intended to be exhaustive nor firm proposals, only indicative of the variations that may exist and the approaches that may be used. Consequently they illustrate the underlying principles and the impact that may be observed if the input values and modelling procedures used to produce them more truly reflect the parameters of modern generating plant and operational strategies. In order to produce more precise results, agreement is required between all the players on the values of relevant input data and on the relationship between them. In addition, a more exhaustive set of studies is needed than is possible in this short exploratory study. 5.2. Effect of Availability P2/5 assumes all units have an availability of 86% and that such units make an effective contribution of 67% of declared net capability. The first step in updating
26
P2/5 is to allow flexibility in the value of availability. In order to deduce a possible, but simplistic relationship, the following corresponding values are known or can be assumed. A unit availability of 86% corresponds to an effective capacity of 67%, as given in P2/5. It seems reasonable to assume that unit availabilities of zero and 100% correspond to effective capacities of zero and 100% respectively. From a plot of these three points, one can interpolate the values of effective capacities that correspond to a range of unit availabilities. These are shown in Table 2. Table 2 - Effective generation contribution as function of unit availability unit availability % 25 35 40 50 60 70 80 86 - P2/5 90 95 99 effective contribution % 12 17 20 28 36 46 58 67 75 85 98
It is evident, as would be expected, that the effective contribution of the embedded generation increases as the unit availability increases. The main questions that follow are: what value of availability is reasonable? is the assumed relationship reasonable? is the approach used (as per P2/5) reasonable? There are no simple answers to these questions but the following comments are pertinent: the limited data that exists concerning unit availabilities of gas and steam turbines suggests that a value in the vicinity of 0.90 - 0.95 could be considered reasonable since the approach used in P2/5 is not described in any public document, it is not possible to be prescriptive as to whether the relationship between availability and effective capacity given in Table 2 complies with the approach used in the 1970s. However it is not likely to be greatly distant from the reality. Therefore the capacity credit that appears to be implicit from these results is probably fairly consistent with the approach, and that the values given are indicative of the improvements gained from modern types of units. A more important and dubious point is whether the approach itself is reasonable - the third question listed above. the approach used in this section is essentially the same as that used in P2/5. It therefore has all the weaknesses associated with the underlying concepts of the 27
P2/5 approach. Most of these have been discussed before but need to be highlighted once again: it assumes that a constant value of effective generation can be used irrespective of number of units and availability of units. This is known to be incorrect it tacitly assumes that this effective generation (credit value) is constant at all times and neglects the fact that units can be in one of several states, including complete failure the credit value is only the long-run average value, and in some cases can not itself be achieved. For example, a single unit is either up and working or down and not working: it is never in the average output state these assumptions can give a false sense of security. They imply that a demand of this level can be restored at all times irrespective of any other system situation, whereas in reality a demand greater than this level may be restored but at other times a demand maybe much less than this is possible. The only other alternative is the use of an approach based on probabilistic assessment. Application of this enhancement to P2/5 is straightforward. All that is required is to identify the types of units in the system, select an appropriate value of availability, and then to look up the corresponding effective contribution. Example 2.1 Consider four units each of 60MW capacity and availability of 90% Total Effective Contribution = (4 x 60) x 0.75 = 180 MW Example 2.2 Consider 30 units each of 1MW capacity and availability of 40% Total Effective Contribution = (30 x 1) x 0.20 = 6 MW Example 2.3 Consider a single unit of 60MW capacity and availability of 90% and 30 units each of 1MW capacity and availability of 40% Total Effective Contribution = (1 x 60) x 0.75 + (30 x 1) x 0.20 = 51 MW Notes: a) These examples assume that the effective contribution is only affected by the unit availability and not by the number of units. b) The effective contribution of Example 2.1 is greater than that of Example 1.1, but that of the other two examples move in the opposite direction, reflecting the relative changes in the percentage credit with unit availability. c) These results are illustrative only and would need more extensive studies in order to confirm actual and appropriate values 5.3. Effect of Number of Units P2/5 assumes that each unit of a group contributes 67% of its capacity irrespective of the number of units in the group. In fact, as discussed in Section 4.2, ACE Report 51 concludes this value to be an average value only and that, depending
28
on the set size, the actual value varies between 0.4 and 0.9. Also as illustrated in Section 4.2, these ratios depend on the number of units, although ACE Report 51 is not explicit, or even implicit, in this respect. In order to reflect this effect, it is necessary to consider the outcome of the ACE Report 51 studies in a little more detail. The results included in Section 4.2 imply that, if all units of a group are identical, which may not have been the case in the development of P2/5, and each has an availability of 86%, then:effective contribution = 0.4 - 0.5 if number of units is between 2 and 2.5 = 0.7 - 0.8 if number of units is between 2.5 and 2.9 = 0.8 - 0.9 if number of units is between 4.5 and 5. Using these results, a plot of effective generation contribution as a function of number of units can be plotted. This proved to be a difficult task because of the limited information and the significant scatter in the values. This indicates the need for a more extensive set of studies and a known and consistent approach for determining the same reliability of supply. However the results are sufficient to illustrate the effect of number of units and to demonstrate a possible approach. On the basis of these results, the Effective Generation ratios for units having an availability of 86% are shown in Table 3. If similar characteristics are constructed for effective contribution as a function of number of units but for different unit availabilities, then the effect of number and availability can be observed. Such plots were drawn, from which the results shown in Table 3 for unit availabilities of 40% and 90% were deduced. Although no categorical assurance can be given to the preciseness of the values shown in Table 3, the following exhibited trends in the values are certainly expected: the percentage contribution will increase as the number of units is increased because a single unit failure will have less relative impact the percentage contribution will increase as the availability of units increases because of the reduced number of failures the percentage contribution will never reach 100% but only asymptote to 100% as the number of units approaches infinity. Therefore the greatest variation occurs with a relatively small number of units, less than 3 - 4, and changes very little when the number exceeds 5 - 8 units. This effect is clearly beneficial when wind farms with relatively large number of turbines are considered because any change in actual number of units will have little effect on the effective contribution.
29
Table 3 - Effective generation contributions as a function of number of units and unit availability number of units effective generation contribution (%) for unit availabilities of 86% 1 2 P2/5 3 4 5 10 20 30 25 50 67 70 80 85 93 95 96 40% 5 15 20e 30 35 40 50 54 58 90% 35 58 75e 84 87 90 94 96 97 = estimated
The information given in Table 3 is used to deduce results for the following examples. Examples 3.1 - 3.3 assume that each unit has an availability of 0.86, and Examples 4.1 - 4.3 assume that the units have the availabilities defined in the example. Example 3.1 Consider four units each of 60MW capacity and availability of 86% Total Effective Contribution = (4 x 60) x 0.80 = 192 MW Example 3.2 Consider 30 units each of 1MW capacity and availability of 86% Total Effective Contribution = (30 x 1) x 0.96 = 28.8 MW Example 3.3 Consider a single unit of 60MW capacity and availability of 86% and 30 units each of 1MW capacity and availability of 86% Total Effective Contribution = (1 x 60) x 0.25 + (30 x 1) x 0.96 = 43.8 MW Example 4.1 Consider four units each of 60MW capacity and availability of 90% Total Effective Contribution = (4 x 60) x 0.87 = 208.8 MW Example 4.2 Consider 30 units each of 1MW capacity and availability of 40% Total Effective Contribution = (30 x 1) x 0.58 = 17.4 MW Example 4.3 Consider a single unit of 60MW capacity and availability of 90% and 30 units each of 1MW capacity and availability of 40% 30
Total Effective Contribution = (1 x 60) x 0.35 + (30 x 1) x 0.58 = 38.4 MW Notes: a) These examples assume that the effective contribution is affected by the unit availability and by the number of units using the information provided in Table 3. The previous assumptions underpinning these values should be noted. b) The effective contributions vary significantly depending on the parameters included. These clearly demonstrate the need for including all relevant parameters and attributes if appropriate credit is to be given to the contribution that embedded generation can make to security. c) The benefit of a large number of units in Examples 3.2 and 4.2 partly overcomes the reduced contribution made by these units due to a low value of unit availability. d) These results are illustrative only and would need more extensive studies in order to confirm suitable values 5.4. Effect of Technology of Units This effect is implicitly considered in the previous examples because of the capacity levels and associated values of availability that were assumed. However the effect needs to be explicitly addressed. In the 1970s when P2/5 was established, the two main generation sources of electrical energy that existed at the distribution level were conventional steam plant and gas turbines. The steam plant existed at that time because of historical reasons and became stranded within distribution systems as large-scale, centrally-controlled generation stations were constructed following nationalisation of the electricity supply industry. The main question at that time was whether these still had value and whether they contributed to security in a cost-effective manner. Generally they were declared obsolete, gradually removed from service and no such sources now exist. Therefore this category, as far as distribution systems are concerned, is now not relevant and the category can be deleted. Gas turbines existed at that time because they provided standby sources of energy and were frequently installed in remote sites for the sole purpose of supporting the system. Nowadays a few sites of GT generation exist for the same purposes and these can be treated with relative ease. However most GTs embedded in the distribution system are associated with combined heat and power (CHP) sources. Generally the primary purpose of CHP plant is to supply heat and power inside the host premises and not to supply electrical energy to the outside world unless there is a surplus of energy. Since these may involve conflicting requirements, CHP plant must be treated with care in terms of its possible contribution to system security. The only real solution to this problem is for contractual and commercial agreements to be concluded between the embedded generation company and the DNO needing the security support. This market concept is discussed in more detail under Task D. At this point, the assumption is that an agreed capacity has been agreed and would be available for security purposes if required. Since the 1970s, a significantly greater range of prime energy sources have been established. Perhaps the most well-known in the public eye is wind energy.
31
However other sources include hydro, photovoltaic, geothermal, biomass, and other similar production from various wastes. Of these hydro is limited to a few special areas and the others, with the exception of wind, are limited in capacity and scope. Although they may form a sound investment for local or individual usage, only wind energy seems to be significant for general support of system security at the present time. For the above reasons, this section focuses on gas and wind as primary sources of energy. Gas in theory is not restricted by limitations of primary energy and electrical energy production from gas should be available on demand provided the plant itself has not failed. Wind on the other hand is a very variable source of energy and cannot be relied on to be available when required. This uncertainty poses serious concerns to DNOs. However, the output of wind driven plant can be described in terms of probability in exactly the same way as, for instance, gas driven plant. The only real difference is that the source of energy is more variable and therefore less likely, with the result that the probability that energy will be available is also less likely. However this difference can be factored into the assessment: the outcome being that wind driven plant will be given less credit than gas driven plant. The problem is then to decide what levels of availability should be used for gas and wind plant. Increased transparency of such data must be established. In the meantime, we can only make estimates based on available public information. This suggests that gas turbines could have availabilities at least as high as 90-95%. This range of values may need to be downgraded if restrictions are placed on their availability by operators and owners of such plant, e.g. if they are CHP plant. In the case of wind farms, availability values around 40% are suggested for wind turbines during the winter period when windy periods are generally more frequent, but as low as 20-25% overall because of the calmer periods during summer. The values of availability for wind plant are dominated by the lack of wind, not by the failure of the plant itself. Available statistics suggest that plant failures affect the overall value very little. On the other hand, the values of availability for GTs are dominated by the failure characteristics of the plant, and the effect of lack of fuel is not generally considered. It is evident that serious effort must be placed in an activity that centres on establishing reliable and consistent availability values for all plant. The above considerations lead to the following examples. Examples 5.1 - 5.3 and 6.1 - 6.3 are the same as Examples 2.1 - 2.3 (coefficients based on unit availability only) and Examples 4.1 - 4.3 (coefficients based on unit availability and number of units) respectively, but now a specified plant technology is also identified as part of each example:Example 5.1 Consider four GTs each of 60MW capacity and availability of 90% Total Effective Contribution = (4 x 60) x 0.75 = 180 MW Example 5.2 Consider 30 wind turbines each of 1MW capacity and availability of 40% Total Effective Contribution = (30 x 1) x 0.20 = 6 MW Example 5.3 Consider a single GT of 60MW capacity and availability of 90% and 30 wind turbines each of 1MW capacity and availability of 40%
32
Total Effective Contribution = (1 x 60) x 0.75 + (30 x 1) x 0.20 = 51 MW Example 6.1 Consider four GTs each of 60MW capacity and availability of 90% Total Effective Contribution = (4 x 60) x 0.87 = 208.8 MW Example 6.2 Consider 30 wind turbines each of 1MW capacity and availability of 40% Total Effective Contribution = (30 x 1) x 0.58 = 17.4 MW Example 6.3 Consider a single GT of 60MW capacity and availability of 90% and 30 wind turbines each of 1MW capacity and availability of 40% Total Effective Contribution = (1 x 60) x 0.35 + (30 x 1) x 0.58 = 38.4 MW Notes: a) These examples assume that the effective contribution is affected by the unit availability, the number of units and the technology of the units using the information provided in Table 3. The previous assumptions underpinning these values should be noted. b) The effective contributions vary significantly depending on the unit technology as would be expected because of the significant differences in availability of the different types of plant. These clearly demonstrate the need for recognising the impact of different plant if appropriate credit is to be given to the contribution that embedded generation can make to security. c) It is evident that accounting for the number of units rather than using an average value appears to be very beneficial to the contribution that can be made by wind generation. This is clearly observed by comparing Examples 5.2 and 6.2. However this conclusion should be treated with care. The main reason for wind to have a low value of availability is due to the wind regime. When the wind is below or above critical levels, the energy production falls to zero. This is likely to apply to all turbines in the same farm. Consequently it is probably incorrect to increase the availability from 0.20 to as high as 0.58 in the above examples for this source of generation, and a value closer to 0.20 may be more appropriate (see also Section 5.5) d) These results are illustrative only and would need more extensive studies in order to confirm suitable values 5.5. Effect of Common Energy Source There are many ways that a generating unit is unable to output power. Firstly it may fail independently of all other units in the same station or elsewhere. Secondly it may fail simultaneously with some or all other units in the same station due to some common mode event, e.g. a fire or explosion. In the latter case, it is not likely that units in other stations would be affected. Thirdly it may lose its supply of fuel either due to a failure in the supply line, e.g. gas pipeline failure, or due to disruption of the
33
fuel supply because of commercial reasons, e.g. priority of a limited gas supply is given to another customer, or of a strike. In this case, units in other stations may also be affected. In the case of gas turbines, all three events could happen, but generally only the first event, independent failures, is normally considered. In the case of wind however, only the first two types of events are real, i.e. availability of wind can not be disrupted for commercial reasons. As discussed in Section 5.4, the availability of wind has a serious impact on the availability values for wind turbines. The effect of this common source of wind energy is partly taken into account by factoring the effect into the associated values of availability. This is not strictly the correct approach for modelling since, if the unit availability is decreased to account for failure of wind then, when the units are combined into a single wind farm source, each individual unit unavailability is combined as if the values are independent. This clearly does not reflect reality and it would be better to combine the independent states separately and have one common down state representing the common effect of lack of wind (together with any other common effect). One detailed modelling approach has been described.16. If the modelling approach is able to distinguish between independent behaviour and common mode behaviour, and these can be considered mutually exclusive, then the overall behaviour is best modelled by evaluating the contributions in these two separate mutually exclusive states and combining the two contributions using conditional probability:Overall contribution = C1.PC1 + C2.PC2 where Ci PCi PCi = contribution whilst in state i = probability of being in state i =1
Example 7.1 Consider four GTs each of 60MW capacity and availability of 90%. Assume that the probability of suffering a common mode failure is 5% when the contribution of the units is zero. Total Effective Contribution = 208.8 x 0.95 + 0.0 x 0.05 = 198.4 MW Notes: a) This example shows that the effective contribution decreases slightly from that given in Example 6.1. The actual reduction will depend on the frequency and duration of the common mode event and the contribution that can be made whilst in this state. In the case of wind generation, lack of wind will be much more common than lack of gas in the case of GT generation, and therefore its effect will be much more pronounced. b) These results are illustrative only and would need more extensive studies and the development of appropriate models in order to provide suitable values
16
F.Castro Sayas and R.N.Allan, Generation availability of distribution networks containing embedded generation IEE Proceedings - Gener. Transm. Distrib., 1996, vol.143, pp.507-518
34
5.6. Effect of Location The preceding considerations tacitly assume that the source of generation exists where it is required. However this may not be true. Embedded generation is frequently distributed around the network and may be some distance from where an interruption occurs. In such a case, the appropriate question is whether the network is adequate enough to transport the energy from the source to the load demand. If it is not, then that source of energy cannot provide the security being demanded of it. The next question is how can this effect be taken into account using the previous concepts. As far as can be deciphered, ACE Report 51 did not consider the location of the generation group relative to the centre of the Group Demand. Consequently this problem cannot be considered by extending the basic concepts described and used in Task B. In principle there are only two ways to proceed with this problem: identify the line(s) connecting the generation source to the centre of the Group Demand. Establish the likelihood of the line(s) being able to carry the generated energy. Combine this likelihood with the availability of the generating units. This will downgrade the apparent unit availability and therefore decrease the effective contribution that this particular source of generation can make: the stronger the link, the less degradation that will occur. This is a relatively simple extension to the above principles but is fraught with practical problems. The most important is whether this simplistic approach for capturing the effect of the network is adequate for assessing the complexities of the problem. structure the problem as a network reliability problem and evaluate the contribution using conventional reliability evaluation techniques17. This consideration is significantly beyond the scope of Task B, but is the most appropriate approach for assessing the problem.
17
R.Billinton and R.N.Allan. Reliability of Engineering Systems: Concepts and Techniques. Second edition, 1992, and Reliability of Power Systems. Second edition, 1996. Both Plenum Publishing, New York.
35
PART IV - TASK C
To determine how P2/5 could be more extensively amended in the longer term
6. Introductory Remarks Task B was intended to create concepts and methodologies that are able to extend the existing Table 2 of P2/5 easily and quickly. It did this by extrapolating and interpolating the values that were originally used in ACE Report 51 to produce Table 2. This can be interpreted as focusing on Level 3 (Results) of Figure 1 in Section 3.1. On the other hand Task C was intended to create concepts and methodologies that allow more extensive amendments to be done to Table 2 and/or to introduce alternative ways of measuring security. This means that the focus must be on Level 2 (Models) as well as on Level 3 (Results) of Figure 1. Tasks B and C are not completely independent as might initially be thought. This lead to the consideration of an interfacing approach between what might be considered as two extremes; i.e. between the present approach and a new approach. This philosophy developed from the following reasoning. Task B was performed without questioning the basic principles of comparing the ability of the embedded generation with a line capacity that had the same level of reliability. Instead it simply extrapolated and interpolated values, i.e. it was focussed on Level 3. Before proceeding to consider completely new approaches, it was thought essential to first question and review the approach for considering the same level of reliability. Therefore it was decided that the first stage of Task C should be to use the same concepts underpinning P2/5 but now based on objective reasoning and comparisons, i.e. to develop the models (Level 2). This could be done using one of several methods of comparing reliability and one of several reliability indices, including expected load lost (ELL) and expected energy not supplied (EENS), or possibly frequency and/or duration indices. Anecdotal and other information suggests that EENS was used as the comparative criterion during the development of P2/5. For this latter reason, it is appropriate to use EENS as a possible criterion. However, it should be noted that P2/5 is concerned with capacity, what capacity is required to satisfy demand, and the contribution that embedded generation can make to this capacity. Therefore it is reasonable to consider ELL as a measure because this is a capacity-based index and consequently related directly to the capacity basis of P2/5. This argument may not be relevant because the use of this index is simply to compare the same level of reliability. Therefore provided the outcome of the assessment delivers a capacity contribution, it may not be important on what basis the comparison is made. For this reason it is beneficial to compare the merits and differences obtained using both ELL and EENS. This part of the project was therefore divided into a number of sub-activities, each of which is described separately in this part of the report. These sub-activities are: extended P2/5 approach using ELL and EENS as criteria
36
consideration of alternative approaches using expected demand that cannot be supported and generating capacity that can be relied on for proportions of time security standards based on frequency and duration criteria security standards based on customer interruptions (CIs) and customer minutes lost (CMLs)
37
7. Formulating and Extending the P/5 Approach 7.1. Introductory Comments As discussed in Section 6, the first part of Task C centred on developing an objective and transparent approach for determining the effective generation capacity, given by the equivalent line capacity having the same level of reliability. This is the underpinning philosophy of the existing P2/5. The approach is as follows: consider the generation plant and identify relevant parameters such as number of units, capacity of units, availability of units determine the load level (and load shape if a load model is to be used) evaluate the ability of the generation to meet this load, i.e. the reliability of this generation/load system. In the present studies this was measured using ELL and EENS deduce the capacity of a line/transformer giving the same level of reliability, considering the line may or may not fail. In the case when the line does not fail, this implies that the line capacity will be less that the peak load the line capacity is the effective generation that can be credited to the embedded generation plant calculate the ratio between line capacity (i.e. effective generation) and total generating capacity. This is the ratio deduced in Ace Report 51 and recently defined as materiality. To demonstrate the principles of this approach and to illustrate the types of results that may be obtained, the following sections consider typical generation and loading levels. 7.2. Systems Studied The systems and related data used for these studies are as follows: total generation (TG) = 100MW number of units (NS) = 2 and 4 availability of units (AG) = 0.9 line availability (AL) = 1.0 and 0.995 line capacity = CC (effective generation, EG) ACE51 ratio (materiality) = R peak load (PL) = 50, 80, 100, 200 MW load shape 1: constant load shape 2: see Figure 2
38
100%
where:A generally set at 50% but also 20 and 60% B generally set at 0.1 but also 0.2
1.0
Figure 2 Load shape 2
7.3. Capacity Outage Probability Tables The basic generation model needed for this assessment is the capacity outage probability table. These are shown for the two unit system and four unit system in Table 4. They can be evaluated using the principles described in Appendix 1. Table 4 Capacity outage probability tables 2 units of 50MW state state MW probability 0.81 100 0.18 50 0.01 0 1.00 7.4. Expected load lost (ELL) 7.4.1. Constant load ELL is calculated using the principle described in Appendix 2. To evaluate CC, EG and R, the following procedure is used: calculate ELL of generation (ELL) using the principle described in Appendix 2 effective capacity of line = CC.AL ELL of line = load effective capacity = load CC.AL = ELL of generation (ELL) then CC = (load ELL)/AL and R = CC/TG 39 4 units of 25MW state state MW probability 0.6561 100 0.2916 75 0.0486 50 0.0036 25 0.0001 0 1.0000
As and example consider four units each of 25MW capacity and a constant load of 100MW. The ELL table is shown in Table 5. Table 5 ELL table for four units and load of 100MW state MW 100 75 50 25 0 total state load lost probability MW 0 0.6561 25 0.2916 50 0.0486 75 0.0036 100 0.0001 1.0000 ELL MW 0 7.29 2.43 0.27 0.01 10 CC and R if line cannot fail CC = 90 and R = 0.9 if line can fail CC = 90.45 and R = 0.9045
As well as illustrating the process of determining CC and R, the results shown in Table 5 indicate clearly that the effect of line failure is negligible. Therefore the remaining results assume that the line does not fail. Table 6 gives the results of the effective contribution when varying the load level. Table 6 Results using ELL and constant load 2 units unit size = 50MW load MW 50 80 100 200 ELL MW 0.5 6.2 10 110 CC MW 49.5 73.8 90 90 R 0.495 0.73 0.9 0.9 4 units unit size = 25MW ELL MW 0.095 3.122 10 110 CC MW 49.9 76.9 90 90 R 0.499 0.769 0.9 0.9
It can be observed from these results that ELL and therefore the ratio R is dependent on the number of units if the load is less than the total generating capacity but independent of the number of units when the load is equal to or greater than the total generating capacity. This is consistent with all the studies we have made during this project and at previous times. Furthermore, this exercise shows the effective contribution increases with increase in demand, when the load is equal to or less than the total generating capacity. This clearly demonstrates that the contribution made by a particular generator to network security depends on the magnitude of the load to be supported. 7.4.2. Variable Load In this case, ELL is calculated using the principle described in Appendix 3. To evaluate CC, EG and R, the following procedure is used: calculate ELL of generation (ELL) using the principle described in Appendix 3
40
for A = 50% and B = 0.1 if CC < PL/2, then: ELL = 0.1(PL CC) + 0.9(PL/2 CC) and CC = 0.55 ELL if CC PL/2, then: ELL = 0.1(PL CC) +0.0 and CC = PL 10.ELL and R = CC/TG
Using this approach gives the results shown in Table 7. Table 7 Results using ELL and variable load peak load MW 2 units unit size = 50MW overall ELL MW 0.98 1.45 2.0 CC MW 70.2 85.5 90 R 4 units unit size = 25MW overall ELL MW 0.36 1.09 2.0 CC MW 76.4 89.1 90 R
80 100 200
0.702 0.855 0.9
0.764 0.891 0.9
It can be observed from the results shown in Table 7 that, unlike the results shown in Table 6, the value of ELL and therefore CC is different for different number of units when the peak load is equal to the total generating capacity. However, the values of ELL and CC are the same when the load level is twice the capacity. The reason for the difference outcomes is due to the contribution at load levels less than the peak in the present case. In this case, the low load level was assumed to be 50% of the peak. Hence, when the peak load is equal to the generating capacity, the average load is less than the peak. However when the load is twice the capacity, the low load in this example is equal to the capacity. Consequently, the shape of the load model affects the overall outcome of ELL and CC. 7.5. Expected Energy Not Supplied 7.5.1. Constant Load Level The procedure is identical to that for evaluating ELL except the area under the load curve is determined rather than just the ordinate heights. Using this process, the results for both generating systems and a constant load of 100MW is shown in Table 8.
41
Table 8 Results using EENS and constant load 2 units unit size = 50MW load MW 100 EENS MWh 10 CC MW 90 R 0.9 4 units unit size = 25MW EENS MWh 10 CC MW 90 R 0.9
It can be observed that this produces the same results as for ELL except that for ELL the values are in MW and for this case the values are in MWh divided by 8760 (the time axis is specified as the range of 0 1). Therefore little can be gained by repeating all the previous assessments. 7.5.2. Variable Load The procedure is again similar to that for evaluating ELL with variable load. The results for the two unit system is shown in Table 9. Table 9 Results using EENS and a variable load 2 units unit size = 50MW EENS MWh 0.98 1.45 20 CC MW 70.2 85.5 90 R 0.702 0.855 0.9
peak load MW 80 100 200
It can again be observed that this produces the same results as for ELL except that for ELL the values are in MW and for this case the values are in MWh divided by 8760 (the time axis is specified as the range of 0 1). Therefore little can be gained by repeating all the previous assessments for all loads and for the four unit system. 7.6. Sensitivity Study for Variable Load Curves It was considered useful to ascertain how the values of CC and R varied with variations in the shape of the load curve, using EENS as the criterion. In these studies, the basic shape shown in Figure 2 was retained but the values of A and B were varied. In this case the parameters were: peak load = 80MW A = 20, 40 and 60 MW B = 0.1 and 0.2. The results are shown in Table 10.
42
Table 10 Results using EENS and variable load curves
state MW 100 50 0 EENS CC R
state probability 0.81 0.18 0.01
40, 0.1 0 3 44 0.98 70.2 0.70
ENS for values of (A MW, B) 40, 0.2 20, 0.1 60, 0.1 0 6 48 1.56 72.2 0.72 0 3 26 0.8 72 0.72 0 3 62 1.16 68.4 0.68
60, 0.2 0 6 64 1.72 71.4 0.71
It can be observed that the shape of the load curve does not affect the values of CC and R significantly. In all cases these are about 70 and 0.70 respectively. Also the ratio of 0.7 is similar to that quoted in ACE 51, which indicated a reasonably constant value for a given unit size compared with circuit capacity. 7.7. Concluding Comments The following general comments can be made from a consideration of the results given by these studies: Varying the shape of the load curve does not affect the values of CC and R significantly. In all cases these are about 70 and 0.70 respectively. Also the ratio of 0.7 is similar to that quoted in ACE 51, which indicated a reasonably constant value for a given set size compared with circuit capacity. A greater range of load curves (the A and B values), a more representative shape of load curve (as ACE 51), various numbers of units (1, 2, 4, 5, 10, 20, 30), and a range of availabilities (0.25, 0.4, 0.86, 0.90, 0.95, 0.98) need to be studied. However this depth of analysis is outside the scope of the present project There seems to be little to choose between using ELL and EENS as the criterion for same level of reliability. Therefore, because of its general acceptance and use in the past, it seems sensible to continue with EENS. One significant point is that the generation contribution measured in this way depends on the load level or peak load level. However Table 2 of P2/5 specifies a generation contribution irrespective of the loading level. This loading level is only considered when Table 1 of P2/5 is used. Consequently, although the effective generation is dependent on the load, the values quoted in Table 2 seem to assume it is not. The values in Table 2 are then summated with the remaining circuit capacity and this aggregated value is then compared with the demand level.
43
Generally, however, reliability indices ELL and EENS do not fully represent the performance of distribution networks from the customer perspective and alternative approaches may be more appropriate in the longer term.
7.8. Implementation This approach would be implemented in exactly the same way as the present P2/5 approach since the underlying concepts and principles are the same. Therefore the process would be: identify the generation system and its parameters determine the capacity contribution this generation could make. This could be done: from look-up tables similar in form to Table 2 of P2/5 which have been created by consensus. Such look-up tables would have been deduced by comparing generation with a line giving the same level of reliability using EENS as the criterion as described in this section from a spread-sheet assessment, the structure of which performs the comparative assessment using the techniques described in this section and which have been agreed by consensus. In the longer term this approach may prove preferable because it allows more parameters to be considered and therefore a more objective assessment to be made combine this capacity with that of the remaining line/transformer capacity as specified in P2/5 and use this in conjunction with the existing Table 1 of P2/5.
44
8. Alternative Approaches 8.1. Introduction Before discussing the details of alternative approaches, it is worth first reviewing the objective of having certain levels of security associated with distribution systems. Security standards are presently not specifically concerned with reducing the frequency of interruptions that customers may experience, but more concerned with reducing the outage time following an interruption with the constraint that the required measures should be reasonably economic. This could change if the concept of frequency constraints are also included as described later for instance in Section 9. Because of the economic constraints, the underlying stringency imposed by the standards increase with the maximum demand associated with the interruption the required outage times decrease as the demand increases. In order to achieve this objective, two particular aspects are pertinent: the remaining or restoration capacity must be adequate for the demand imposed the capacity must be available when required. These two aspects imply that any alternative approach should be able to respond to their underlying requirements. Consequently two suitable alternative approaches can be based on the following: the expected demand that cannot (or can) be supported the generating capacity that can be relied on for a specified proportion of time. Both of these approaches are based on probabilistic techniques in which the states of the generation plant and the associated probability are determined. Consequently in the basic level of the approach, the modelling centres on capacity outage probability tables (see Appendix 1) 8.2. Expected Demand that cannot be Supported 8.2.1. Base Case Studies The first alternative approach determines the severity associated with the capacity states. It achieves this objective by deducing the expected load lost (ELL) or not supportable due to the various capacity states in the table. This expected load can be evaluated using the techniques described and illustrated in Appendices 1 and 2. Consider four generating systems consisting of 1, 2, 3 and 4 identical units each having an availability of 86%, the value specified in P2/5 and ACE Report 51. The associated capacity outage probability tables are shown in the first three columns of Table 11. Using the approach described in Appendix 2, the values of ELL shown in Table 12 can be evaluated for the four systems and load levels of 30MW, 40MW and 50MW. The entry in this table associated with 2 units and a load of 40MW is the value calculated in Appendix 2. A summary of the overall results from Table 12 is shown in Table 13. This latter table also shows the expected load supported (EL) where (EL = load level - ELL), and the value of EL expressed as a percentage of the load level. These results show the following effects: 45
the ELL decreases (and the EL increases) as the number of units increase this decrease in ELL (and increase in EL) tends to asymptote with larger number of units the ELL increases (and the EL as a percentage of load decreases) as the load increases with relatively large loads (e.g. 50MW, 83% of generating capacity), the percentage load not supportable is very high even with the larger number of units these measures vary considerably with number of units and load (unlike the conventional P2/5 approach) and therefore this approach is much more objective and transparent, and therefore more suitable in reflecting the stochastic nature of the parameters involved.
8.2.2. Effect of Unit Availability The results shown in Tables 12 and 13 were evaluated for a unit availability of 86%. The values of ELL for different unit availabilities and 4 units are shown in Figure 3. The following observations can be made: the trends observed from Tables 12 and 13 remain evident the values of ELL decrease as the unit availability increases, as would be expected the values of ELL are very high in the case of low unit availabilities, such as wind the values of ELL are very low (tending to negligible levels) in the case of high availabilities, such as hydro. 8.2.3. Effect of Load Model The previous results were all obtained assuming a fixed load level. In reality the load varies with time of day and time of year. We are uncertain whether any of the ACE Report 51 results were obtained using a load model or even whether it will be important to do so. However the procedure is only a relatively simple extension of that of the foregoing and therefore it is useful to at least see the effect of doing so. Again consider the previous four systems and a unit availability of 86%. Assume a very simplified load duration curve shown in Figure 4. Using the technique described and illustrated in Appendix 3 gives the results shown in Table 14. Clearly these results illustrate the averaging effect obtained when the ELL associated with two load levels are combined. The conclusions and observations are otherwise similar to those described above. 8.2.4. Comments The results obtained from this approach are clearly superior to the approach used in ACE Report 51 and P2/5 because, unlike the previous approach, the true nature of the parameters affecting the security are reflected in the results and their effect can therefore be measured. One important feature that can be observed is that the results are affected not only by the parameters associated with the generating units themselves, but also by the load level that they are intended to support. This is an
46
important issue because P2/5 and ACE Report 51 seems to evaluate the load level that can be supported without taking any note of the load level itself. It is worth noting that this approach still provides average levels of support which, although much more objectively related, does not assess the likelihood of whether the generation will be available when required. This is the scope of the second alternative approach. 8.3. Generating Capacity with Specified Availability 8.3.1. Base Case Studies The capacity outage probability tables shown in Table 11 can be used to determine the probability of NOT supporting various load levels. These are shown in the last two columns of Table 11, which indicate the probability (expressed in %) of NOT supporting various load levels. The probabilities are evaluated by summating the values in the probability column (col. 3) starting from the bottom value. The results provide the probability of being in the corresponding capacity state or below, and therefore each value represents the probability of not supporting load levels greater than this capacity level. These results are very interesting and illuminating. Consider for instance the case of 1 unit. The results show that there is a 14% probability of not supporting ANY load level above zero: this means that on 14% of the occasions no support is possible. Similar results can be found for the other systems. These are summarised in Table 15 for a load level of 40MW (equivalent to the 67% level) together with load levels of 41MW and 46MW. For the 40MW load level (67% of capacity), the probabilities of not supporting this load are 14, 26, 5 and 10% for 1 - 4 units respectively. In the case of 2 units, this is a very large probability of not performing the security. It may be questioned why the results in the 40MW column are discontinuous. This is simply because of the discrete nature of the states in the capacity outage probability tables. A small change in the load level could mean that a good state in one case becomes a bad state in another: if the probability associated with this changed state is significant, a large change could result. This effect is illustrated by the 41MW and 46MW cases also shown in Table 15. The 1 and 2 unit situations do not change. However the 3 unit case changes from a probability of 5% to 36% for an increase of only 1MW, and that for the 4 unit case changes from 10% to 45% for an increase of 5MW. These results clearly demonstrate that a criterion based on an average load that can be supplied at all times is inconsistent and not justified from a detailed examination of the results and the effects these create. From the above assessment, it can be concluded that the probability of not supporting various load levels can be very high. For 2 units, the probability of not supporting a load of 40MW (= 67% of capacity) was 26%, i.e. about a quarter of the total time. These results can be interpreted as time-based ones. In other words, the value implies that, only for three-quarters of the time could this generating system support the demand when required. The second approach is associated with this time-based criterion. It determines the capacity that can be relied on for specified periods of time and therefore indicates the likelihood of being able to support various load levels. This is concept terms is
47
similar, maybe identical, to the concept of persistence being discussed in WS03 of the DTI/Ofgem Distributed Generation Coordination Group. 8.3.2. Capacity that can be Relied On Again consider the same four systems used previously and the associated capacity outage probability tables shown in Table 11. This time however, summate the values of probability in column 3 from the top downwards. This produces the results shown in the first three columns of Table 16. The probabilities shown in column 3 of this table represent the probability of residing in the associated state or above, i.e. each value of probability represents the likelihood of supporting a load level equal to its associated capacity level since the generating system needs to be in this associated state or better. The information provided in Table 16 can now be used to determine the capacity that can be relied on for specified periods of time. This is achieved by going down the probability column until a value of probability is reached which is equal to or greater than the specified period (with both specified in percentage terms). For example, considering a time period of 90%, i.e. the support is required for at least 90% of the time, gives the results shown in Table 17. In the case of two units, the 90% level is reached at the 30MW (= 50%) capacity level. These results (Table 17) imply that, for at least 90% of the time, i.e. a 90% availability: the 1 unit system can not support any load the 2 unit system can support a load of 30MW the 3 unit system can support a load of 40MW the 4 unit system can support a load of 45MW. It should be noted that all these systems have the same total installed capacity. A more detailed analysis provides the results shown in Table 18, which indicates the load levels for different specified periods. It can be observed that, as would be expected, the load levels that can be supported decrease as the periods of time required for this support increases, i.e. as the required availability increases. Specific points of observation include: the 1 unit system can support 100% load for 80% of the time but zero load above that no system can support 100% load for 100% of the time only the 4 unit system can support any load for a time greater than 98% and then only 50% load no system can support 67% (P2/5 criterion) load for more than 94% of the time the 4 unit system can support a load greater than 67% but not for a time greater than 90%. It follows from these results that this approach provides considerable confidence about how well different generating systems can be relied on to provide adequate security to the load demands in the distribution system.
48
8.4. Effect of Network 8.4.1. Systems Studied P2/5 and ACE Report 51 assume that the effective generating capacity available at a load point can be added to the remaining line capacity to give the capacity to meet the demand at that load point. It concludes that this summed capacity is such that The system could usually be expected to support a maximum demand equal to this capacity. For instance, Example 1A of ACE Report 51 (Figure 5) is as follows: a) remaining line capacity is 55.6MW b) effective generation capacity is 40MW c) thus capacity to meet demand is 55.6 + 40 = 95.6MW The following part of this report reviews this conclusion by evaluating both ELL and the proportion of time that a demand can be supported. The system studied is identical to that shown in Example 1A of ACE Report 51 and consists of one line remaining after the first circuit outage (capacity = 55.6MW) and two generating units (each of 30MW capacity). This is shown in Figure 5. The following line and unit availabilities were used: line availabilities of unity (line cannot fail which represents one extreme situation), 0.999 (corresponds to a failure rate of about 0.1f/yr and a repair time of about 1 week), and 0.98 (corresponds to a failure rate of about 5f/yr and a repair time of about 24 hr, which probably approximately represents the other extreme situation) generating availabilities of 0.40 (wind output in winter), 0.86 (the assumed P2/5 value), and 0.95 (probably nearer to that of modern GTs). Several sensitivity studies were performed taking into account the combinations of all the above line and unit availabilities. In all cases the ELL and the proportion of time that load levels could be supported were evaluated. These are shown and discussed in the next sections of this report. 8.4.2. Expected Load Lost or Not Supported The procedure to calculate the values of ELL is identical to that used previously. The only difference is that the line has to be convolved into the capacity outage probability table in addition to the two generating units. The results are shown in Tables 19 - 21. The following observations and comments can be made from these results: even with a perfect line (availability = 1.0), the average load that can be supported is less than the value of 95.6MW assumed in P2/5 with wind turbines, the load that can be supported is about 20MW less with the assumed unit availability of 0.86, the average load that can be supported is about 3-4 MW less than assumed even with modern units which may have availabilities around 0.95, the load that can be supported is still about 1MW less than assumed
49
the effect of line unavailability is not negligible: between being considered perfect and an unavailability of 0.98, the ELL nearly doubles when the generating unit availability is 0.95 (1.05 to 1.81)
8.4.3. Ability to Support Demand for Proportions of Time The previous procedure to deduce the percentages of time that the generation can be relied on applies equally to the situation when the effect of lines are included. Using this procedure, for the system presented in Figure 5, gives the results shown in Tables 22 - 26, where: Table 22 shows the support given for a load of 95.6MW (the P2/5 level) Table 23 shows the support given for 90% of the time Table 24 shows the support given for 95% of the time Table 25 shows the support given for 98% of the time Table 26 shows the support given for 99% of the time.
These results provide even more significant observations and conclusions than the ELLs discussed in the previous section. First consider some of the observations provided by Table 22 in which the percentage of times that a load of 95.6MW (the P2/5 and ACE Report 51 criterion level) are given. These include the following: For a transformer rated at 45MVA and two generators rated at 30MW each with an availability of 0.86, a load of 95.6MW can be supported according to ACE Report 51. Table 22 shows that for these conditions, this support can be relied on only for 74% of the time if the line is perfect, and less than this if the line is also subject to failure. This seems a low level of confidence in the ability of the system to provide security Even if the generators have an availability of 0.95 (perhaps equivalent to the best of modern units, the percentage of time for support is still only 90% at best With wind turbines (in winter), this support falls to only about 16% of the time If now the load level is relaxed and the percentage of time is taken as the criterion, the degree of security provided by the system is given by the results shown in Tables 23-2618. This level of security can be seen to be very low in most cases, a conclusion that is supported by the following observations drawn from Tables 23-26: If the period of required support is, for illustrative purposes, set at 90%, then with reliable units (0.95) a load of 95.6MW can in fact be supported. However, in all other cases this is not achievable: for unit availabilities of 0.86 (the P2/5 assumed value) the supportable load is only 85.6MW (90% of the P2/5 assumed level) and for wind turbines it is only 55.6MW (58% of the P2/5 assumed level) The degree of security provided by typical wind units (availability of 0.40) does not change with any significance as the required security of support is increased. The only decrease occurs when the required time is increased to
18
In practical applications is probably would be most appropriate to set the required percentage of time and to calculate the effective capacity for given, or a range of, unit availabilities.
50
99% and the line availability decreases to 0.98, in which case the level of support falls to only 30% The situation highlighted in (a) however deteriorates continuously and significantly as the required security of support is increased for all other cases: for the case of units with availabilities of 0.86 (the P2/5 assumption), the level of support that can be provided falls to 60MW (63% of the P2/5 assumed level) when the required time becomes 98% even for very reliable lines, and to 55.6MW (58% of the P2/5 value) when the time becomes 99% for the case considering much more reliable units (0.95 availability), the level of support remains reasonably high but never more than 85.6MW (90% of the P2/5 level) and as low as 60MW (63%) when the line itself becomes less reliable.
These results clearly indicate further weaknesses of the assumptions contained in ACE Report 51 and P2/5. The level of support that embedded generation can provide in conjunction with the line connection rarely meets the assumed level except when the period of time required for that support seems rather low. For the particular example given in Table 22, P2/5 seems to suggest implicitly that for 74% of time the generation will be able to contribute to system security. Clearly, this occurs only for situations after the first circuit outage when the generator support would actually be required, and hence this level may be considered acceptable. If the support needs to be available on nearly every occasion, then the support the system can provide is generally much lower than that assumed in ACE Report 51 and P2/5. Clearly, the critical parameter for assessing the contribution that embedded generation can make to system security will be the agreed time for which certain a capacity level can be relied on. It also follows from this discussion that an approach based on percentage of time for which support can be relied on seems to be an improvement on the approach central to ACE Report 51 and P2/5. 8.5. Implementation 8.5.1. Expected Load Lost or Supported This approach could be implemented in a similar way to the present P2/5 approach although specific aspects would differ. The essential steps of the process would be: identify the generation system and its parameters determine the expected load lost (ELL) and consequently the expected load that can be supported (EL). This value of EL would give the capacity contribution that this generation could make. This could be done from the following: perhaps from look-up tables similar in form to Table 2 of P2/5 which have been created by consensus. Such look-up tables would have been deduced using the techniques described in this section because of the large range of parameters that could affect the results, it could be preferable to use spread-sheet assessments, the structure of which performs
51
the techniques described in this section and which have been agreed by consensus combine this capacity contribution with that of the remaining line/transformer capacity as specified in P2/5 and use this in conjunction with the existing Table 1 of P2/5
8.5.2. Capacity that can be Relied On This approach could also be implemented in a similar way to the present P2/5 approach although there are significant differences in the assessment of effective generating capacity. The essential steps of the process would be: identify the generation system and its parameters agree the proportion of time for which the generation capacity must be relied on determine the generating capacity associated with this proportion of time using the techniques described in this section. It may be possible to create sufficient look-up tables but it is more likely that a spread-sheet assessment will be required. In either case, the approach used would be that agreed by consensus combine this capacity contribution with that of the remaining line/transformer capacity as specified in P2/5 and use this in conjunction with the existing Table 1 of P2/5. This step may be iterative because the assessment using Table 1 of P2/5 may affect the decision about the proportion of time the generation is required. This makes the use of a spread-sheet assessment even more worthwhile Table 11 Capacity outage probability tables
Capacity Outage Probability Tables

capacity %
1 unit 100 0 2 units 100 50 0 3 units 100 67 33 0 4 units 100 75 50 25 0 60 45 30 15 0 0.5470 0.3562 0.0870 0.0094 0.0004 >75 >50 >25 >0 45 10 1 0 60 40 20 0 0.6361 0.3106 0.0506 0.0027 >67 >33 >0 36 5 0.3 60 30 0 0.7396 0.2408 0.0196 >50 >0 26 2 60 0 0.86 0.14
capacity MW
prob
prob (%) of not supporting load (%) of:

load >0 prob 14
52
Table 12 Expected load lost approach
Expected Load Lost Approach

capacity %
1 unit 100 0 2 units 100 50 0 3 units 100 67 33 0 4 units 100 75 50 25 0 60 0 60 30 0 60 40 20 0 60 45 30 15 0 0.86 0.14 0.7396 0.2408 0.0196 0.6361 0.3106 0.0506 0.0027 0.5470 0.3562 0.0870 0.0094 0.0004 0 30 = 4.20 0 0 30 = 0.59 0 0 10 30 = 0.59 0 0 0 15 30 = 0.15 0 40 = 5.60 0 10 40 = 3.19 0 0 20 40 = 1.12 0 0 10 25 40 = 1.12 0 50 = 7.00 0 20 50 = 5.80 0 10 30 50 = 4.76 0 5 20 35 50 = 3.87
capacity MW
prob
expected load lost for loads 30 MW 40MW 50MW
Table 13 Expected load lost and supported
Expected Load Lost and Supported

units
30MW ELL 1 2 3
29.4
load levels of
40MW % 86 98 98 99 ELL 5.6 3.19 1.12 1.12 EL 34.4 36.8 38.9 38.9 % 86 92 97 97 ELL 7.0 5.8 4.76 3.87 50MW EL 43 44.2 45.2 46.1 % 86 88 90 92 EL 25.8 29.4 29.4 29.8
4.2 0.59 0.59 0.15
ELL = expected load lost, EL = expected load supported, % = % of installed capacity
53
Table 14 Effect of including load model on ELL
Effect of Including Load Model on ELL

load 1 unit 40 30 2 units 40 30 3 units 40 30 4 units 40 30 1.12 0.15 0.1 0.9 0.25 1.12 0.59 0.1 0.9 0.64 3.19 0.59 0.1 0.9 0.85 5.6 4.2 0.1 0.9 4.34 ELL probability E(ELL)
Table 15 Probability of not supporting load levels
Probability Of Not Supporting Load Levels

number of units 1 unit 2 units 3 units 4 units probability (%) of capacity less than load level of 40 MW (67%) 14 26 5 10 41 MW 14 26 36 10 46MW 14 26 36 45
54
Table 16 Capacity outage probability tables
Capacity Outage Probability Tables

capacity %
1 unit 100 0 2 units 100 50 0 3 units 100 67 33 0 4 units 100 75 50 25 0 60 45 30 15 0 0.5470 0.3562 0.0870 0.0094 0.0004 >75 >50 >25 >0 45 10 1 0 60 40 20 0 0.6361 0.3106 0.0506 0.0027 >67 >33 >0 36 5 0.3 60 30 0 0.7396 0.2408 0.0196 >50 >0 26 2 60 0 0.86 0.14
capacity MW
prob
prob (%) of not supporting load (%) of:

load >0 prob 14
Table 17 Capacity to rely on for 90% of time
Capacity To Rely On For 90% of Time

capacity %
1 unit 100 0 2 units 100 50 0 3 units 100 67 33 0 4 units 100 75 50 25 0 60 0 60 30 0 60 40 20 0 60 45 30 15 0 0.86 1.00 0.7396 0.9804 1.0000 0.6361 0.9467 0.9972 1.0000 0.5470 0.9032 0.9902 0.9996 1.0000 0
capacity MW
prob
capacity that can be relied on for 90% of time
30
40
45
55
Table 18 Capacities to rely on for variable times
Capacities To Rely On For Variable Times

units % of capacity that can be relied on for the following percentage of time 50 1 2 3 4 60 70 80 50 67 75 90 0 50 67 75 92 94 96 98 99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 50 50 50 67 67 33 33 100 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 75 67 75
50 50 50 50 50
Table 19 ELL with a line availability of 1.0
ELLs (line availability = 1.0)

capacity MW load lost MW state probability for unit availability of 0.4 0.86 0.95 0.16 0.48 0.36 19.2 0.7396 0.2408 0.0196 3.19 0.9025 0.0950 0.0025 1.05
115.6 0 85.6 10 55.6 40 ELL (MW) =
56

capacity MW 115.6 85.6 60 55.6 30 0 load lost MW 0 10 35.6 40 65.6 95.6 probability for unit availability of 0.4 0.1598 0.4795 0.0002 0.3596 0.0005 0.0004 19.3 0.86 0.7389 0.2406 0.0007 0.0196 0.0002 3.23 0.95 0.9016 0.0949 0.0009 0.0025 0.0001 1.09
ELL (MW) =

capacity MW 115.6 85.6 60 55.6 30 0 load lost MW 0 10 35.6 40 65.6 95.6 probability for unit availability of 0.4 0.1568 0.4704 0.0032 0.3528 0.0096 0.0072 20.2 0.86 0.7248 0.2360 0.0148 0.0192 0.0048 0.0004 4.01 0.95 0.8845 0.0931 0.0181 0.0025 0.0019 0.0001 1.81
ELL (MW) =
57
Table 22 Support given to a load of 95.6MW
Support of 95.6MW
line % of time that load can be supported availability for unit availability of 0.4 0.86 0.95 1.00 0.999 0.98 16.0 16.0 15.7 74.0 73.9 72.5 90.2 90.2 88.5
Table 23 Capacities to rely on for 90% of time
Capacities to Rely on for 90% of Time

availability of line availability of units 0.4 MW 1.00 0.999 0.98 55.6 55.6 55.6 % 58 58 58 0.86 MW 85.6 85.6 85.6 % 90 90 90 0.95 MW %
115.6 121 115.6 121 85.6 90
where % represents the capacity expressed as a percentage of 95.6MW, the P2/5 stated value to be relied on
58

availability of line availability of units 0.4 MW 1.00 0.999 0.98 55.6 55.6 55.6 % 58 58 58 0.86 MW 85.6 85.6 85.6 % 90 90 90 0.95 MW 85.6 85.6 85.6 % 90 90 90

availability of line availability of units 0.4 MW 1.00 0.999 0.98 55.6 55.6 55.6 % 58 58 58 0.86 MW 85.6 60 55.6 % 90 63 58 0.95 MW 85.6 85.6 60 % 90 90 63
59

availability of line availability of units 0.4 MW 1.00 0.999 0.98 55.6 55.6 30 % 58 58 58 0.86 MW 55.6 55.6 55.6 % 58 58 58 0.95 MW 85.6 85.6 60 % 90 90 63
E x p e c t e d lo a d lo s t
ELL, MW
30 25 20 15 10 5 0
% % % % % 0 0 0 0 0 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 %
w it h 4 u n it s ( t o t c a p a c it y 6 0 M W )
load level supported

50M W 40M W 30M W
A v a i l a b i l i ty o f u n i t
Figure 3 ELL with 4 generators of 15MW
60
Considering a Load Model

load level, MW
40 30
10
100
time, %
Figure 4 Simplified load duration curve
System Studied
2x45MW lines or transformers
2x30MW generating units
load
Figure 5 System studied
61
9. Extending P2/5 Concepts to Frequency and Duration 9.1. Considerations The criterion used in P2/5 is restricted to: considering one or more circuits on outage depending on the Group Demand specifying the maximum times required to restore this Group Demand, the severity increasing (times decrease) as the Group Demand increases. Consequently the assessment used to determine whether P2/5 is satisfied is made GIVEN THAT a single or double circuit outage has occurred. It therefore neglects the number of occasions that a particular Group experiences an outage, P2/5 being satisfied irrespective of whether a Group experiences none or many such interruptions. This appears to be an inherent weakness of P2/5. It can be overcome by incorporating a frequency of interruption criterion as well as the existing duration criterion. This concept applies equally to networks containing or not containing embedded generation. Therefore the concepts are described for the simpler situation when embedded generation does not exist. 9.2. Suggested Form of a Frequency Criterion Table 1 of P2/5 currently includes a column that specifies the maximum times by which various levels of demand must be met. It is reasonable to suggest that a similar column could be added that specifies the maximum number of interruptions that particular Group Demands should experience. In this case it is also reasonable to assume that the number of interruptions should decrease as the Group Demand increases. An assumed set of such data is given in Table 27. It should be noted that the values included in Table 27 are arbitrary, are illustrative only and have been assumed solely for the purpose of demonstrating the principles of extending the concept of P2/5 to include frequency as well as duration. Table 27 Possible frequency criteria for P2/5 Class of Supply A B C D E F Maximum number of annual interruptions 3 3 0.5 0.1 0.05 0.01
The values that would appear in a table of this type do not require any reliability assessments or system analyses. They are simply deduced by reasoning and agreeing what levels of interruptions are acceptable for the different Supply Classes. This is not within the scope of this project and would need to be decided by representatives of the industry, customers and the Regulator. However, adequate values of frequency and duration of interruption could be determined through a cost62
benefit analysis that balances the cost of providing the appropriate level of service quality against damages caused by the interruptions. The work carried out at UMIST on reliability worth would form a foundation for forming such security standards. It will be noted that two of the Supply Classes have been allocated the same maximum number of interruptions, whilst all others increase in severity. This is quite deliberate in order to demonstrate the application of the approach. This application could involve some reliability assessments depending on the complexity of the network being considered. The following Section illustrates the principles that would need to be considered. 9.3. Application of the Approach The values quoted in Table 27 are criterion levels that should not be exceeded. Therefore the application centres on determining the number of interruptions that could be expected at a particular demand point and comparing this expected value against the criterion. If it is within the specified number, then the network design conforms. If it does not, then the network does not conform and network reinforcement becomes necessary, unless derogation is given by the Regulator. One point of importance is that consideration would need to be given as to whether the number of interruptions should be based on the expected number of the likely maximum. As P2/5 or its replacement is a planning standard setting minimum reliability requirements, it seems logical to assume that the number should be the likely maximum. In practice however, it will be easier to determine the expected value rather than a maximum. Once decided, the principle of application remains the same. The process and implication is best considered for a few of the individual Supply Classes. In order to illustrate the principles, reference to the networks shown in Figure 6 is made, in which a normally-open isolator exists in one line of cases (c) and (d).
GD
GD
GD
GD
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Figure 6 Illustrative network structures
In these examples, the following aspects should be noted:in case (a), the Group Demand (GD) would be expected to be less than the line rating. However, in all situations the outage of the line would cause all load to be interrupted. This load would be restored after repair of the line in case (b): o if GD < line rating, both lines would need to fail to cause interruption of demand, and both lines would need to be repaired to restore the load o if GD > line rating, only one line needs to fail to cause interruption and only this line would need to be repaired to restore the load 63
in case (c), GD would be expected to be less than the line rating as in case (a). Also outage of this line would cause interruption of load. However this load could be restored by closing the normally-open isolator provided sufficient capacity available from this alternative supply in case (d): o if GD < line rating, both lines would need to fail to cause interruption of demand as in case (b), but this would be restored by closing the normallyopen isolator if this alternative source and feeder has sufficient capacity. Otherwise some demand may be restored, the remainder following one repair o if GD > line rating, only one line needs to fail to cause interruption. This load could be restored by closing the normally-open isolator given the previous restrictions and it is technically feasible to have two incoming parallel feeders
These considerations become important when the concepts are applied to the different Supply Classes. These are briefly discussed below. In order to determine the number of interruptions it may be necessary to use some form of reliability assessment. In many cases this will be quite elementary but in some, particularly for large Group Demand Supply Classes, it may require more complex analysis. 9.3.1. Class A Class A would normally be supplied by a single feeder (Figure 6a) since this satisfies the requirement of restoring demand within the repair time. If a frequency criterion is added however, this connection requirement would also depend on the number of times this feeder could be expected to fail. This depends on the failure rate of the circuit or transformer or other connecting components. It would reflect such failure characteristics as length of line, structure, environment and, in the case of multiple lines, whether these are on common support structures or common rights-ofway thus causing possible common mode events. If the assessed failure rate is greater than the criterion, then consideration may have to be given to using a structure similar to Figure 6b. This is most likely in situations where line lengths are long or exposed to adverse environmental conditions. Alternatively, consideration may need to be given to the possibility of having different frequency criteria, for instance demands fed by for rural overhead line feeders having a permitted number of interruptions greater than demands for urban cable feeders. This is a very pragmatic approach and reflects present practice in a transparent and objective fashion. In the present example, the line failure rate is 2f/yr and the repair time is 48h, so both frequency and duration criteria are satisfied 9.3.2. Class B In this case, the frequency criterion given in Table 27 is the same as that for Class A. This may or may not be the case in reality. However it has been done purposefully since the difference between Class A and Class B in these examples is the required restoration time. In P2/5 this is specified as GD minus 1MW within 3h and GD within repair time. 64
Depending on the anticipated repair time, this would require either the network shown in Figure 6a, if repair/restoration time is short, but more likely the network shown in Figure 6c. Present practice would necessitate that the alternative feeder should be connected to a different supply substation or the same substation via a different route. However, technically the alternative supply could be an embedded generator located near to the demand centre. There would generally be little difficulty in obtaining supply from such a generator within the 3h time limit, if not virtually simultaneously. However, present operational practice would prevent this because it would require islanded operation and this is presently not permitted. With the development of basis and advanced distribution management systems, this should become a very practical method and could significantly increase security of supply. In the present example the failure rate is 2f/yr so the frequency criterion is satisfied using either the network of Figure 6a or 6c. However the repair time is 48h so the time requirement of 3h is not met using the network of Figure 6a. However it is likely that this time could be met using either the back-feed shown in Figure 6c or an embedded generator replacing the back-feed (if this is permitted in the future). In both of the restoration procedures it is evidently assumed that the back-feed or embedded generator does not itself fail before the line causing the interruption has been repaired. This is a reasonable assumption in the case of a network back-feed, although the probability could be evaluated if necessary. However it may be a less reasonable assumption for some types of embedded generation such as wind driven. This is because of the variability of the energy source, not of the plant itself. This aspect is discussed in more detail in Section 11. 9.3.3. Class C P2/5 expects that this Supply Class would normally be fed by at least two closed circuits (Figure 6b) or by one circuit with supervisory and automatic switching of alternative circuits (Figure 6c). This is necessary in order to satisfy the time requirement of restoring the smaller of (GD 12MW) and 2/3 GD within 15min. P2/5 only considers one circuit outage and neglects the effect of a second circuit outage. Therefore it assumes any one circuit can carry the GD, i.e. the GD < circuit rating. However, if the GD > circuit rating, then the minimum requirement would be two closed circuits and one alternative feeder. It should also be noted that the time requirement could be satisfied by using an embedded generator in place of the alternative circuit controlled automatically but, as in the case of Class B above, this requires the islanded operation of the generator. Since the use of an alternative circuit requires the introduction of advanced distribution management systems, only the approach using parallel feeders is considered in this report. The frequency criterion given in Table 27 for Class C requires the number of interruptions to be less than 0.5int/yr. Since the assumed line failure rate is 2f/yr, this means that no load should be interrupted following the outage of a single circuit and therefore at least two parallel lines are required, each with a rating > GD. This is compatible with the existing P2/5. However, although P2/5 neglects the failure of the second circuit, in reality there is always the possibility that both lines may fail. Assuming this behaviour is independent, and using Equ.3 in Appendix 4 gives an interruption frequency of 0.044int/yr, which clearly satisfies the assumed frequency
65
criterion. However from Equ.4 in Appendix 4, the average outage time is 24h with individual repair times of 48h, considerably in excess of the required 15min. This leads to further considerations including: the likelihood of losing both circuits is small (P2/5 neglects it altogether) and occurs on average about 4 times in 100 years. This may be considered negligible. If so it may be reasonable to set an acceptable minimum number of interruptions as well as the maximum being proposed. If this minimum is 0.05int/yr say, then the network in this example satisfies both the frequency and the duration criteria. if a rigorous and exhaustive assessment is expected, then on the small number of occasions when both circuits are on outage, the restoration time on average is greater than that specified in P2/5. This would imply that an alternative circuit is also required. 9.3.4. Other Supply Classes A similar approach can be applied to all classes, including D to F. The methodology is to assess the frequency of interruption using reliability evaluation principles (at this level these are very straightforward), and to determine the ability of restoring supply and the interruption durations using either logic in simple cases or reliability evaluation principles in more complex situations (again at this level these are very straightforward). Both the frequency and durations are compared with the specified values. If either or both are exceeded, then system reinforcement is required. At the higher Supply Classes, it is likely that three parallel feeders, or two parallel feeders with one or more alternative feeders, will be needed. In these cases, the alternative supply could be embedded generation under present operational constraints since this could be used following the first circuit outage without needing islanded operation. It is possible that this generation could trip or be tripped following the circuit outage, but could be restored very quickly if such operation is permitted. Presently P2/5 deems that restoration within 60s is considered to be immediate restoration so tripping and reconnection within this time period should also be considered acceptable. 9.4. Effect of Load Duration Curve The assessments made in Section 9.3 assumed a fixed load level defined as Group Demand (GD). In practice, the load is not constant and the circuit outages could occur at any time. Therefore the load may be at any level between minimum and peak when the circuit outages occur. This could have an impact on both the frequency and duration indices. Consider the simplistic load duration curve shown in Figure 7.
Lp load Lmin line rating
t1
t2
Figure 7 Simplistic load duration curve
66
Consider the network shown in Figure 6b, and assume that the GD = Lp and that the line rating (LR) lies between Lp and Lmin. Consequently a load interruption would occur with a single circuit outage during the peak load period, but would only occur with a double circuit outage during the low load period. Given the peak load, the frequency would be 2int/yr, but given the low load period, the frequency would be 0.044int/yr. These can be weighted by the probability of each load period using conditional probability giving, for t1 = 10% and t2 = 100%, a weighted frequency of:2t1 + 0.044(t 2 t1 ) = 0.24 int/yr t2 This could prove to be very important consideration since, if the average frequency is accepted as satisfying any updated P2/5, some periods may occur that satisfy the criterion and others that do not. 9.5. Benefit of Embedded Generation Including frequency as a constraint in an updated P2/5 security standard is not directly relevant to the discussion of embedded generation. It relates to a more general review and updating of P2/5, and resolves around Table 1 rather than Table 2 of P2/5. However, as the above discussion has implied, embedded generation could be affected by any such updating and embedded generation could contribute, perhaps significantly, to these new constraints. Therefore such discussion is relevant. One present problem is that embedded generation is not normally allowed to operate in an islanded mode. Therefore much of the potential benefit that could be derived is not achievable at this time. However, there is a concurrent activity that foresees distribution systems becoming much more active and distribution management systems being incorporated. This trend would enable the ban on islanded operation to be reviewed and possibly reversed. If this happens then embedded generation could contribute to improvements in frequency of interruptions and to reductions in restoration times without network reinforcement so permitting an alternative and perhaps a more effective and cheaper option. This option could then be included as one additional alternative when systems need to be reinforced in order to satisfy P2/5 or its replacement. 9.6. Implementation This approach would need to be implemented in a different manner to the existing P2/5 approach, because the underlying principles are different. This concept would not pre-specify the network design in terms of number of circuits required for any particular Group Demand, as is the case at present, but rather the performance of the system. In practice, this would mean that the same Group Demand could be supplied through a different number of circuits and generators. For example, given a certain Group Demand, the supply design may involve, say, a single cable circuit and a generator giving a similar reliability performance as the solution involving, say, three overhead circuits. Although this approach could lead to a large variety of designs and may be more complex to monitor and demonstrate the compliance, the
67
main benefit of frequency and duration-based standards is that it would place the customer needs in the centre of the design process. The essential steps of the process would be: identify the line/transformer system and its parameters identify the generation system, if any, and its parameters identify the group demand being considered determine the frequency and duration of interruptions using the techniques described in this section compare these frequency and duration indices with the required levels specified in a Table XX of a revised Security Standard for the Group Demand being considered if either of the indices is violated, the Standard is not being satisfied and reinforcement is required the values of frequency and duration specified in this Table XX would have been agreed by consensus Table XX would replace both Table 1 and Table 2 of P2/5
68
10. An Approach Compatible with the Information and Incentives Project 10.1. Background and Concepts
The basic principle underpinning the P2/5 standard is to assess the time taken to restore demand following an interruption using Table 1 of P2/5 and to give a capacity credit to any embedded generation connected to the demand point using Table 2 of that standard. In developing Table 2, the generation credit to be given was estimated by comparing the reliability of generation (using EENS as a criterion) with the reliability of an equivalent network. This was considered to be an acceptable approach when P2/5 was developed in the 1970s and may still be considered to be an acceptable approach. However it is not strictly compatible with the recent trends in assessing the reliability of distribution networks seen from end-customers points of view, nor with the concepts being developed within the Information and Incentives Project (IIP) by Ofgem. These trends have established that customer-orientated reliability is indicated by the Ofgem measures of Availability and Security. These terms are strictly misnomers because they really measure the complementary aspects of unavailability and insecurity. However as they are now used by Ofgem and within the industry, they will be used in this report. The two measures are defined as: Security the number of interruptions per 100 connected customers per year. Also known as CIs, i.e. customer interruptions. In international terminology, this term is generally known as SAIFI, the system average interruption frequency index Availability the number of customer minutes lost per connected customer per year. Also known CMLs, i.e. customer minutes lost. In international terminology, this term is generally known as SAIDI, the system average interruption duration index In order to create compatibility, comparability and consistency between a revised planning standard and present operational standards and measures, it is useful to consider an approach that enables the CIs and CMLs to be assessed and therefore compared. If the approach is restricted to CMLs only, then the approach can be based on capacity outage probability tables with no more complexity than those used in previous sections of this report. However, if CIs are also considered, the frequency of each state must also be deduced. Both aspects are fully described in relevant reliability texts.19 The procedure and impact of this approach is best achieved by way of example. This is described in the following sections. Firstly the concept of CMLs is considered as this requires no additional modelling, then the approach is extended to include CIs.
R.Billinton and R.N.Allan.Reliability of Engineering Systems: Concepts and Techniques. Second edition, 1992, and Reliability of Power Systems. Second edition, 1996. Both Plenum Publishing, New York.
19
69
10.2.
Systems Studied
(a)
50 MW
(b)
50 MW
Figure 8 System studied
The system shown in Figure 8a has two circuits or transformer feeders (CT) supplying a demand of 50MW and 25000 customers. Each feeder is assumed to be rated at 50MW, and have a failure rate of 1 f/yr and a repair rate of 100 rep/yr (equivalent to an average repair time of 87.6 hr). The system shown in Figure 8b has the same circuits or transformers together with a generator (G) having an output capacity of 50MW, an outage rate of 250 out/yr and a restoration rate of 170 rest/yr (equivalent to an average down time of 51.53 hr). These systems are compared in several ways as described in the following. 10.3. Customer Minutes Lost
10.3.1. Base Analysis From the data given, the availability and unavailability of each circuit is 0.9901 and 0.0099. The capacity outage probability table for the system shown in Figure 8a is given in Table 28. Table 28 Capacity Outage Probability Table for Figure 8a state number 1 2 3 components available 2CT 1CT 0CT state capacity available MW 100 50 0 state probability 0.980296 0.019606 0.000098 annual residence time h/yr 8587 172.0 0.850
Since the only deficient state is state 3 and this affects all 25000 customers, the CML for this system is 0.850 x 60, i.e. 51 min lost/yr.
70
10.3.2. Ability of Generation to Substitute Circuits If generation is to be considered as a direct substitute for the network circuits or transformer feeders, the addition of a generator implies that the capacity of the circuits/transformers can be reduced. Consider now that the generator shown in Figure 8b is added and that the capacity of each circuit is reduced to C. For the data given, the availability and unavailability of the generator is 0.4048 and 0.5952. The corresponding capacity outage probability table is shown in Table 29. Table 29 - Capacity Outage Probability Table for Figure 8b state number 1 2 3 4 5 6 components available 2CT + G CT + G 2CT G CT 0 state capacity available MW 50 + 2C 50 + C 2C 50 C 0 state probability 0.396786 0.007936 0.583510 0.000040 0.011670 0.000058 annual residence time h/yr 3475 69.5 5111 0.35 102 0.51
In this case, states 5 and 6 are deficient states since C < 50 MW. If this system is to have the same reliability as that in Figure 1a, then the CML of this system must also be 51 min/yr. Therefore, if Cust is the number of customers affected in state 5: (Cust x 102 x 60 + 25000 x 0.51 x 60)/25000 = 51 giving Cust = 83, i.e. 83 customers are interrupted during state 5. Since each customer takes an average load of 2 kW, the demand not satisfied in state 5 is 166 kW, making the required rating of each circuit or transformer 49.834 MW, a trivial difference from its original rating of 50 MW. This implies that the generator makes a negligible contribution to the system, and little credit could be given using this approach. 10.3.3. Credit for Reduction in CML If instead of considering whether the generator could be used to substitute circuit capacity, the assessment was intended to determine the benefit that the generation could make to a reduction in CML, rather than maintaining the CML at the original level, the following situation would arise. The previous data would still be relevant but the capacity of the network circuits would remain at 50MW. Table 29 now becomes that shown in Table 30.
71
Table 30 - Capacity Outage Probability Table for Figure 8b state number 1 2 3 4 5 6 components available 2CT + G CT + G 2CT G CT 0 state capacity available MW 150 100 100 50 50 0 state probability 0.396786 0.007936 0.583510 0.000040 0.011670 0.000058 annual residence time h/yr 3475 69.5 5111 0.35 102 0.51
In this case, only state 6 is a deficient state affecting all customers, and the system CMLs has decreased to 0.51 x 60, i.e. 25.5 min/yr. This is a huge reduction compared with the original level of 51 min/yr and shows that the generation can contribute significantly to the system if the appropriate approach is used. 10.4. Customer Interruptions and Customer Minutes Lost
If CIs as well as CMLs are to be evaluated, then the frequency of each state must be determined as well as the probability. This can be done is several ways including the use of Markov techniques. In the case of the networks shown in Figure 1, the results are given in Tables 31 and 32. Table 31 Capacity Outage Probability Table for Figure 8a state number 1 2 3 components available 2CT 1CT 0CT state capacity available MW 100 50 0 state probability 0.980296 0.019606 0.000098 annual residence time h/yr 8587 172.0 0.850 state frequency occ/yr 1.9606 1.9802 0.0196 state duration hr 4380 86.7 43.8
Table 32 - Capacity Outage Probability Table for Figure 8b state components number available 1 2 3 4 5 6 2CT + G CT + G 2CT G CT 0 capacity available MW 150 100 100 50 50 0 state probability 0.396786 0.007936 0.583510 0.000040 0.011670 0.000058 72 annual residence time h/yr 3475 69.5 5111 0.35 102 0.51 state frequency occ/yr 99.99 2.785 100.3 0.0179 3.162 0.0216 state duration hr 34.8 24.9 50.9 19.5 32.3 23.7
Tables 31 and 32 also show some very interesting results. It should be noted that the state frequency in this case is directly equivalent to the value of CI, provided the frequency is multiplied by 100, i.e. the CIs are 1.96 and 2.16 interruptions per 100 customers per year. The effect of embedded generation on the CMLs was discussed in Section 10.3, but now the last two columns of the table show the effect on the CIs. In this example, this is less favourable from the generators point of view since the frequency of encountering the deficient state (state 3 in Table 31 and state 6 in Table 32) increases from 0.0196 to 0.0216 occ/yr, an increase of less than 2%. Given the huge reduction in CMLs, however, it seems reasonable to consider that this slight increase in CIs is tolerable. The more significant effect is the great reduction in state duration, i.e. the average time spent in a deficient state once encountered. Despite the fact that the average down time of the generator was assumed to be about 51 hr, the overall down time of the state is reduced from 44hr to 24 hr, an almost 50% reduction. 10.5. Overall Comments
The studies included in this report are very limited and therefore care needs to be taken before too many general conclusions are drawn. For this to be done, significantly more studies are needed. However, it follows from all the above results and discussions that even embedded generation with a low availability, i.e. wind power, can contribute significantly to reducing the durations in particular, of customers experiencing interruptions. Since durations are the present primary objective of P2/5, it therefore seems very appropriate to consider the benefits that embedded generation can make in this respect and identify the most appropriate approach to recognise this effect transparently and objectively. Although compatibility with IIP is desirable, it useful to bear in mind weaknesses of the CMLs type of index. This represents the total annual duration of interruptions and not the duration of individual outages. Secondly, CMLs and CIs are functions of number of customers and therefore, although they may be suitable for application as performance indices to residential and small commercial customers, they may be less appropriate for customers with large consumptions, such as large industrial customers. It is worth noting that the majority of interruptions in distribution networks are caused by faults in the 11 kV and 0.4 kV networks, since these networks are generally operated radially and each fault instigates an interruption of supply to some of the end customers. The reliability performance of the whole distribution system tends to be dominated by the performance of 11 kV and 0.4 kV networks. The relative contribution that a generator can make to reducing CMLs could be generally significant (in the above example the contribution was almost 50%), it is likely that only those generators connected to 11 kV (and 0.4 kV) would significantly contribute to the overall reduction in CMLs in absolute terms. This however would require the generators to be able to ride through 11 kV network faults or to be quickly reconnected after such faults and may require the generators to operate in an islanding mode. All these aspects require detailed investigation but such studies are outside the scope of the present project.
73
10.6.
Implementation
This approach would need to be implemented in a different manner to the existing P2/5 approach, because the underlying principles are different. The essential steps of the process would be: identify the line/transformer system and its parameters identify the generation system, if any, and its parameters identify the group demand being considered determine the values of CI and/or CML using the techniques described in this section o compare these indices with the required levels specified in a Table YY of a revised Security Standard for the Group Demand being considered o if either of the indices is violated, the Standard is not being satisfied and reinforcement is required the values of CI and CML specified in this Table YY would have been agreed by consensus Table YY would replace both Table 1 and Table 2 of P2/5
74
11. Assessment of Intermittent Energy Sources and Correlation 11.1. Generation Considerations
All the previous discussion assumes the plant, specifically embedded generation, is available when required subject only to plant unavailability. Generally this has normally been construed to mean the relevant plant may not be available due to plant failures and forced outages. It would be convenient if this were the current situation. Although it generally was the case in the 1970s when P2/5 was created, there are now other considerations that need to be taken into account. To derive energy output from a generator, the following conditions are required: the generator must be in working state, i.e. it must not have failed. This aspect reflects the technical up and down states of the generating plant and has been captured in the previous sections using capacity outage probability tables there must be a source of primary energy, e.g. gas for GTs, wind for wind generators, etc. If the primary source of energy to a generator is unrestricted then consideration of this source can be neglected. However if there are restrictions or the source is intermittent, then this may need to be considered. The most important area of concern is with wind plant and the intermittency of the wind regime. It would not matter if the wind and load were perfectly correlated because the variation in wind power would mirror the variation in load. it must be commercially advantageous to the generator owner/operator to run the plant. Present-day generating plant is privately owned and therefore its use for network support may be restricted for commercial reasons. Unless the stick approach is used where a generator is instructed to operate in emergencies, the carrot approach must be used, i.e. the generator must be given financial incentives to be available and to deliver when needed. Since this is commercially related, it is covered in more detail under Task D in Part IV of this report. If all these conditions are satisfied, then the generator can output power. However if only one condition is not satisfied, the plant will not output power. In the 1970s, all plant was under national control and generally primary energy was always available because the vast majority of plant was steam driven and relied only on coal. Consequently, only the first condition, plant reliability, was of real concern. This is no longer true. All plant is owned and operated by private companies, and much generating plant rely on intermittent energy sources such as wind and solar. For these reasons all the above conditions must be recognised. These are best defined respectively as: technical availability: relates to whether the plant is in a working state energy availability: relates to whether primary energy is available commercial availability: relates to whether it is commercially available A separate but similar activity20 driven by the DTI and Ofgem has also recognised these parameters but have defined them respectively as reliability, persistence and availability. We think this may be confusing particularly using the
20
DTI/Ofgem Distributed Generation Coordination Group and WS03 of its Technical Steering Group
75
terms reliability and availability to refer to entirely different concepts. When used concurrently, it is widely understood that reliability means the likelihood of a component or system remaining in the operational state, and that availability means the likelihood of a component or system being found in the operational state. To use them otherwise could mislead. We therefore refer to them as we have defined above. The usual approach for modelling generation is by capacity outage probability tables. This was the approach used consistently in the previous applications in this report. However this approach uses unit availability as the unit reliability parameter. Availability however is a measure of the total time the unit is found in the up state over an annual period. This may be due to a small number of up times of long duration or a large number of occasions of short durations. If these durations of up times are very short, then the state of the unit may change during the time it is required to operate, i.e. possibly during the time it is satisfying security demands. If this occurs then the unit fails to provide the level of security expected of it. Most generating units, although exhibiting up-state times that generally shorter than lines and transformers with which they are compared in security studies, still have up times longer than needed for satisfying security. In these cases, availability and capacity outage probability tables are generally sufficient. However, this is not the necessarily the case with units such as wind power units having primary energy sources that can vary very significantly over very short periods. This rapid output variations may require extended modelling principles. 11.2. Load and Correlation Considerations
The load is known to vary randomly with time. In most instances this is modelled using a load duration curve. This model has no chronological representation of time and therefore does not reflect the time variations of the load. If there is no chronological correlation with the generation, then a load duration curve representation is generally sufficient. However if correlation exists, the chronological time pattern may be needed to ensure accuracy of the assessments. A very trivial example is that, if a generator can only output power between 6pm and 6am when a load is zero, and not output power between 6am and 6pm when the load is 50MW, the generator contributes nothing to the supply and therefore nothing to security. This effect would not be seen if the chronological variation of both parameters is not recognised. 11.3. Modelling and Assessment Approach
The only practical approach to deal with these chronological variations, whether random or certain, is to characterise the variable as a time-varying parameter with its chronological behaviour fully represented. Consider the schematic behaviour shown in Figure 9 and the following specific cases:a) load and generation are both certain. In this case only one characteristic for each is required. The occasions when the load exceeds generation are determined (shaded areas in Figure 9). This permits the frequency, duration and energy not supplied to be deduced. This information is then used appropriately
76
b) load is certain and generation is random. In this case the principle is the same as in (a) except for the following. The characteristic for the generation could be the average behaviour. In this case the results obtained as in (a) represent the average values. However, if the variation of these parameters is to be determined, then many generation characteristics need to be assessed, each producing its own individual result. These individual values can be assessed to identify range, likelihood of durations (for instance) being greater than a required level, and other statistical parameters, etc. This could be done for some likely generation patterns found, say, from experimental data, or worst case scenarios, etc. However in principle, the number of possibilities could be infinite or tend to such a limit. In this case the number of scenarios are limitless. In such a case the only serious approach is stochastic simulation, generally known as Monte Carlo simulation (MCS), and probably, because of the chronological time dependencies, needing sequential MCS. c) load and generation are both random. This is an extension of case (b). In reality it further complicates the issue since by definition the number of possible scenarios is very much greater. It is possible that the average characteristic of each may be sufficient: otherwise all possibilities may need to be studied using MCS. It is clear that this problem has a solution but one that requires some very extensive studies, which are outside the scope of this project. Using average characteristics or using a restricted number of scenarios will be an approximate solution to the real problem. This may be an acceptable approximation bearing in mind the significant uncertainties in data and modelling. Such an approach could be based on the developed concept of the proportion of time for which the generation capacity can be relied on (Section 8 of this report). However no statement of the degree of approximation can be reliably made unless a rigorous assessment is first made. This can only be done using sequential MCS. 11.4. Application
11.4.1. Wind Plant It is evident that wind power is the major concern regarding intermittency. The nature of wind is very much a random process and therefore either Case (b) or Case (c) above ought to be considered. The choice is therefore whether the average wind behaviour (Case (b)) is sufficient or the full random behaviour (Case (c)) is required. Significant case studies are needed to resolve this question. Data is available to allow both representations to be considered and modelled. 11.4.2. CHP Plant It is less evident how CHP plant should be modelled. Generally such plant does not have random energy input because most are gas driven. This therefore does not exhibit the randomness associated with wind. However the problem is not concerned with the energy input but with the commercial operation. CHP plant is primarily installed to supply heat in the form of steam to its host organisation. This heat supply generally has total priority over generation of electrical energy for the public supply system. Clearly a commercial framework is required which is outside of
77
the scope of this part of the studies. However records are available of CHP output as a function of time and that for new plants could be predicted on the basis of the operational characteristics of the host organisation. In both cases therefore, a chronological characteristic of generation output is could be determined and can be dealt with using the approaches described in the previous section. This again requires extensive studies to determine actual modelling principles and the extent of the required assessments.
generation pattern
load level
= load > available generation
Figure 9 Chronological comparison of load and generation
78
PART V - TASK D
To suggest proposals for a framework for modelling the trading of security and corresponding contractual arrangements
12.
Commercial arrangements for rewarding generators 12.1. Introduction
As discussed in the introduction, prior to privatisation of the industry, the then Electricity Council was responsible for setting and maintaining a range of common technical and economic requirements, including Engineering Recommendation P2/5. This particular recommendation was intended to be used as a guide to system planning and design. In order to satisfy the minimum requirements regarding the levels of security, system planners were to find minimum cost reinforcement solution necessary to comply with the ER, using both network assets and generation assets in accordance to Table 2. Of course the industry was vertically integrated and both assets essentially had the same owner. Since the introduction of the privatisation and deregulation of the electricity sector, these assets have been owned and operated by different legal entities and the commercial unbundling becomes necessary. In case that an embedded generator makes a contribution to network security it is expected that this contribution will be also recognised through a corresponding commercial reward. There is hence a need to establish a commercial framework within which the impact that each of the network users makes on network investment and operating expenditure would be appropriately recognised. In the context of the problem debated in this report, generators that can substitute for network resources and hence reduce network investment expenditure, should expect to be financially reward for this benefit. The overall value of such a benefit associate with the generator contribution to network security, would be limited by the minimum cost solution of satisfying the security standards through employing alternatives available to for the particular case considered (for example, to build another circuit). On the other hand, generators (and any other user for that matter) that increase the demand for investment in distribution networks should expect to be charged. However, at present DNOs have no incentive to connect embedded generation to solve network problems. Instead, they generally prefer to increase their network asset base, rather than to search for a generation based solution. This is clearly a regulatory issue which is likely to be addressed at the next distribution price control review. It is important to recognise that the introduction of commercial arrangements between generators and DNOs would have an impact on the overall revenues (and profits) received from operating a particular generating plant. In turn, this would impact on the locations at which future generators would be connected and hence influence the overall cost of network development. It is important that commercial arrangements are cost reflective in order to ensure least cost development of the distribution networks.
79
Within Task C a number of approaches to designing of new security standards is discussed: (i) extended P2/5 approach using ELL and EENS as criteria, (ii) approaches based on the concepts of expected demand that cannot be supported and generating capacity that can be relied on for proportions of time, (iii) approach based on frequency and duration criteria and (iv) on customer interruptions (CIs) and customer minutes lost (CMLs). The issues associated with the design of possible commercial arrangements, discussed in this section of the report, are relevant to all of the above approaches. It is worth however remembering that in any given particular situation the contribution that a generator makes to system security, and consequently the monetary value of such contribution, will be driven by the approach on which the security standards are based. In one of the examples presented in task C, it was demonstrated that a generator that makes only a minimal contribution to network capacity, could contribute significantly to reducing frequency and duration of interruptions. Clearly, the chosen criterion would have an impact on the value of generator contribution to network security. The question as to which of these approaches would be most beneficial or least favourable for generators and DNOs, may not have a unique answer and it is likely to be case specific. Such analysis is beyond the scope of this study, although appropriate reliability assessments could be performed to explore such questions. 12.2. Form of Payment to Generators
Payments to embedded generators for their contribution to security of supply (using one of the criteria for assessing the contribution described in task C) could be arranged through two components: option fee and exercise fee. The first component would reflect the availability of the service and the other is associated with actual utilisation, when needed. Such arrangements could take a spectrum of possible forms in terms of the balance between the two payments. At one extreme, purely option based payments, perhaps in the form of a fixed annual amount, could be rewarded to generators for an expected contribution they make to improving security and quality of supply seen by end customers. On the other hand, generators could be rewarded only for the actual delivery after the fault of a circuit occurs that needs the generator to prevent an interruption. Of course, a part of the exercise fee could be a penalty for non-delivery. 12.2.1. Option Fee
In this context, it is useful to analyse the situations in which security standards are fulfilled through network-based solutions and examine the manner in which distribution companies charge customers for the network assets that involve transport and reserve element of network transport function. Consider a typical situation in which two transformers are installed to supply the demand with its maximum being equal to the capacity of one of these transformers. Clearly, two transformers are required to ensure the continuity of supply when one of them is out of service. The network users are however charged for the use of both of these transformers at all times, irrespective of their actual utilisation in the operation time scales. Distribution network assets used under both normal and fault conditions are paid for through network use of system charges. Clearly, network owners recover the
80
cost of their assets through continuously charging users (monthly or annually based) irrespective as to when and how these assets are actually used in the operation of the system. This is obviously very similar to the option fee arrangement. Users are charged at all times for the capacity that is installed, although some of it is there to deal with disturbances on the system, relatively rare events, and would be fully utilised very infrequently. However, by paying DUoS charges, users do not pay any additional specific charge for the utilisation of the assets employed during times of failures. It is important to note that if reserve capacities were to be charged on a utilisation basis, cost of such assets would need to be recovered from very infrequent utilisation, so that the charge at those rare times when the assets are needed to cover for some out of service facilities, would be need to very high. This is why usually, but not exclusively, it is more acceptable to pay relatively small amounts regularly rather than be exposed to rare but very large payments. Generator contribution to systems security is implicitly measured by distribution resources it replace and the value of such contribution could be measured through the cost of the network that this generation replaces. The notion of effective generation capacity in the existing ER P2/5, does explicitly this. Following the above discussion and the existing practice for cost recovery of network reserves, the generator, that substitutes for network assets, could expect to be rewarded through a similar mechanism, i.e., option fee, for the contribution it makes to security of supply. 12.2.2. Exercise Fee
The main weakness of an option fee payment only, is in the lack of incentive to perform in the operation time scale. This of course applies to both distribution network assets and generators. This is why there has been considerable interest worldwide about moving from asset based regulation to performance based regulation. In the UK, this centres on the recently implemented Information and Incentive Project (IIP). This was set up to strengthen the incentives with respect to delivering the quality of output. As the IIP is based on financial penalties and rewards, the overall distribution revenue is a function not only of the operating and capital costs incurred by the network owner in providing the service, but also depends on the actual performance of the assets, i.e. service quality actually delivered to customers. Similarly, a reward-penalty based exercise arrangement could be put in place to motivate embedded generators to be proactive in delivering their contribution to network security. Such agreements would have reward and penalty clauses for performing over and under the agreed level. Such arrangements are necessary to ensure an efficient solution to the problem that DNOs are in charge of ensuring that sufficient resources are available to support network security and manage network performance, while suppliers of such support (i.e. generators) are not under the direct control of the network operator. Generally, however, how the relative balance between option and exercise fees (or penalties), should be determined, is an area that would need further investigation. The issue associated with NETA imbalance charges, arising when the generator is required to operate differently from the energy market driven commitments because of network needs, would also need to be addressed. The cost of managing the imbalance charges will be a function of frequency of occasions when the generator is required to alter its operation to support the network. These costs would also depend on the length of the notice period given to the generator to change
81
its output. Overall, the imbalance charges are likely to increase the cost of generation solution to network security. Operators of technologies such as CHP, that are used for supplying heat demand, may wish to offer support to network operation if this support can be accommodated within the process supplied by the CHP generator. Some storage facilities could be used to build flexibility in the system and create a degree of the decoupling between the operation of the plant and heat demand. The cost of such facilities will need to be incorporated in the contract between the generator and network operator. As en example of option and exercise fee, although not directly relevant, it may be useful to consider popular generation solutions to network problems for managing transmission constraints in New York area. Occasionally, due to transmission constraints, electricity prices increase considerably and suppliers, with fixed price contracts with their customers, that are required to purchase bulk energy at such high prices become very exposed to high financial risks. They have invited operators of stand-by generating plant to contract for supply of electricity during high price conditions. Contracts contain an option fee, to reflect the necessity of maintaining the plant availability, and an exercise fee to reflect the need to recover cost of actual operation when called upon. Generators offering most favourable terms were rewarded contracts. 12.3. Funding Arrangements Whatever payment scheme is adopted, there will be a question as to how these arrangements would be funded, as DNOs currently do not have explicitly recognised expenditure associated with embedded generation since connection and reinforcement costs associate with embedded generation are dealt with outside of price control. In order to correct this problem, two general approaches are possible: (i) to explicitly link the regulated revenue of distribution companies dependent on the amount of embedded generation connected to the system or (ii) to create an incentive scheme, outside of price control, that would stimulate DNOs to connect more generation and use it for network reinforcement where appropriate. In any case, it would seem appropriate to review the principles of allocation of revenues and expenditure within the distribution price control to take into account the contribution that embedded generation makes to network security. One of the central issues in this context would be the allocation of risk to which each of the parties would be exposed as this will impact the relative competitiveness of generation and network based solution to network problems. In addition to the issue of the structure of the contract between the generator and the local DNO might be, funding of such expenditure needs to be identified. Clearly, the mechanism through which DNOs can recover the payments to generators or cost of contracts with generators need to be developed. If the full consistency in the treatment of network and generator assets for security of supply is to be maintained, the generator assets could be deemed to be a part of Regulatory Asset Base (RAB) and paid for correspondingly. Another possibility to fund embedded generators that make contribution to network security would be to allow for additional operating expenditure. Generators could be rewarded through reduced or even negative Distribution Use of System Charges, if they directly reduce the distribution network investment expenditure (capacity substitution). Finally, the cost of contracts with
82
generators could be recovered through savings achieved within the IIP incentive scheme, in case that the generator directly contributes to reductions in CIs and CMLs. These alternative schemes would have different levels of risks associated to distribution network owners, generators and customers. 12.3.1. Payments Facilitated through Network Regulatory Asset Base Clearly, the main advantage of RAB based funding from the generator and DNO perspective, would be in the certainty of future revenue streams for the generator and certainty of expenditure for the distributor. For example, the demand, which supply is being secured by an embedded generator may decide to relocate in which case the contribution of the generator to system security may no longer be required. Clearly, neither the local DNO nor the generators have control over such decisions. If the payment to the generator is built in RAB, the generator would be rewarded continuously for its initially determined contribution over the life time of the plant. If the circumstances change for whatever reason, the revenue stream seen by the generator would not be affected. This scheme would be in line with the present practice for recovering investment in distribution network assets where the return on investment is independent on the actual utilisation. In this scheme, the risk is passed onto end customers. However, it is not clear whether generator should have a guarantee of income steam for the life time of the plant, if they subsequently do not contribute to network security. 12.3.2. Payments Facilitated through Network Operating Expenditure On the other hand, the generator could be rewarded for its contribution to system security through increased allowance for operating expenditure. Under this scheme, the local DNO, responsible for maintaining network security, would be allowed to recover their operating expenditure that include payments to generators. As the level of the operating expenditure is reviewed at the time of price control the need for the generator contribution would also be reviewed and the payments adjusted accordingly. In this arrangement, the certainty in future revenue streams would not be guaranteed to the generator. The uncertainty in future security related income would need to be managed by the generator. The adoption of this funding scheme would hence introduce asymmetry in the treatment of network and generation solutions to network security (at present DNOs are not exposed to risks of recovering the cost of assets that are part of RAB). Consequently, generation based solutions to network security would be comparatively less competitive as the cost of risk associated with future income would need to be included. Since at preset the distribution price control review is conducted every five years, there is considerable uncertainty and significant rigidity as to the whether the required contribution and the income stream should continue unchanged. 12.3.3. Payments Facilitated through Distribution Use of System Charges The contribution that embedded generation makes to network investment can be viewed as a network pricing problem. The central issue in the concept of open access is setting adequate prices for the use of distribution networks as these affect future siting of generators (and loads) and may strongly influence further network
83
development. There is ever growing pressure for these prices to be cost reflective and avoid cross-subsidies. Under present practice, however, generators embedded into distribution networks are not subjected to Distribution Use of System (DUoS) charges and are expected to pay their deep connection charges only. This framework is however not consistent as it does not recognise the impact of embedded generation on network reinforcement costs. In principle, generators that contribute to system security could be credited for the benefit on the basis of an apportionment of avoided capital cost, through appropriately reduced or even negative DUoS charges. At present there is no developed mechanism upon which a generator can get paid for the use of distribution network and therefore, the implementation of such scheme would require the DUoS charging concept to be radically changed. A review of DUoS is expected at the next price control, primarily to take into account the penetration of embedded generation. In this context, the concept of cost reflective exit and entry DUoS charges has been recently debated. DUoS charges are normally subject to periodic reviews at price control. Regarding the risk associated with uncertainty in future DUoS charges would most probably need to be managed by the generator, which would of course reduce the competitiveness of generation based solution to network problems. As in the previous section, since at preset the distribution price control review is conducted every five years, there is considerable uncertainty and significant rigidity as to the whether the required contribution and the income stream should continue unchanged. 12.3.4. Payments Facilitated through IIP Incentive Scheme
In case where the generator contributes to a reduction of CIs and CMLs, it may be possible to fund the cost of contract between the local DNO and the generator through savings achieved within the IIP incentive scheme. Such contract could cover the benefit of embedded generation over and above the contribution that the generator makes to network capacity. Since such scheme would be regularly reviewed, the income streams would be variable and uncertain and therefore increases financial risk to the generator. 12.4. Transparency and Tendering Process
At present, whenever network reinforcement is required to meet security standards, DNOs would generally prefer network to generation-based solutions. This is because DNOs have no incentive to connect embedded generation. Secondly, there is no agreed method for measuring the contribution that embedded generation makes to network security and no commercial environment set up for contractual arrangements to be developed. Moreover, DNOs are generally motivated to increase network asset base. The intention to recognise and reward the contribution that generation can make to support networks security will lead to further unbundling of distribution network services through the introduction of competition between network and generation assets in providing network security. Transparency is one of the key issues to be resolved and there must be mechanisms developed to ensure that the generators are treated equitably, since DNOs are present at the both sides of the market place: they are purchaser and suppliers of network support. 84
In this context the introduction of security standards that explicitly recognise the contribution that generators make to network security is important. Security standards could be seen a device that protects generators, limits the powers of DNOs in selecting options for network reinforcement necessary to maintain minimum level of security of supply, and enables a level playing filed to be established. In case that specific network reinforcement is required, local DNO could invite interested generators and network asset developers to tender for reinforcement projects. This tender would specify technical and other conditions for connection and required flexibility of operation needed to meet security standards. Then the most economic scheme, that satisfies imposed requirements, would be awarded the contract for supply of security. Criterion such as minimum net present value may be used. There is also a question as to how to treat generators that have been already connected to the network (not because of network security reasons but because of other commercial reasons, such as electricity or heat generation). In this case the specific generator plant may or may not be needed to support network security. In case that the generator does provide network support a contract could be struck with the local DNO to reflect this contribution. Alternatively, DNO could invite tenders for purchasing the network support and the generator already connected may decide to take part. 12.5. Concluding Remarks
This section discussed a number of issues associated with the development of commercial arrangements for rewarding generators for their contribution to network security. It was proposed to base payments to embedded generators for their contribution to security of supply through two components: option fee and exercise fee. The first component would reflect the availability of the service and the other is associated with actual utilisation, when needed. Such arrangements could take a spectrum of possible forms in terms of the balance between the two payments. Furthermore, the alternative funding arrangements are described and main characteristics identified. One of the central issues in this context proposed to be examined is the allocation of risk to which each of the parties would be exposed as this will impact the relative competitiveness of generation and network based solution to network problems. Transparency is identified as one of the key issues to be resolved and there must be mechanisms developed to ensure that the generators are treated equitably, since DNOs are present at the both sides of the market place: they are purchaser and suppliers of network support. In this context the introduction of security standards that explicitly recognise the contribution that generators make to network security is helpful. Security standards could be seen a device that protects generators, limits the powers of DNOs in selecting options for network reinforcement necessary to maintain minimum level of security of supply, and enables a level playing filed to be established.
85
PART VI - TASK E
To develop conclusions and recommendations to provide focus for further discussion including Governance and future involvement by all relevant parties
13. General Conclusions 13.1. Summary
This report has identified and discussed weaknesses and strengths of the present security standard P2/5. These include the inability to take into consideration the effect of unit availability, number of generating units, availability of primary energy source (particularly relevant for wind generation), features of modern generating plant and the impact of network reliability performance. A number of simplistic examples are developed to expose these weaknesses. It is however important to stress that using relatively simplistic extensions to P2/5, these parameters could be taken into account, although the underlying weaknesses of P2/5 would not be resolved by this approach. It would still remain a deterministic standard with all the existing demerits remaining. Therefore a number of alternative approaches to designing new security standards, with various degrees of complexity, accuracy and ability to take the inherent probabilistic nature of system security, are developed and discussed: (i) extended P2/5 approach using ELL and EENS as criteria, (ii) approaches based on the concepts of expected demand that cannot be supported and generating capacity that can be relied on for proportions of time, (iii) approach based on frequency and duration criteria and (iv) on customer interruptions (CIs) and customer minutes lost (CMLs). These approaches are conceptually developed, their application illustrated on simple examples and implementation procedure outlined. In any given particular situation the contribution that a generator makes to system security, and consequently the monetary value of such contribution, will be driven by the approach on which the security standards are based and the criterion chosen would have a significant impact on the value of the generator contribution to network security. Furthermore, a number of issues associated with the development of commercial arrangements for rewarding generators for their contribution to network security is identified and discussed. This includes the form of payment (option and exercise fee), alternative funding arrangements, allocation of risk, transparency and tendering for network security support. 13.2. Governance
The organisation responsible for governance is not specifically of importance. What is of greatest concern is that whoever has governance must be willing and able to develop the standard further and be responsive to the wishes and input provided by DNOs, generators, suppliers and customers.
86
14. Recommendations A number of alternative approaches for designing new security standards are developed in this study. The question as to how the potential application of each of these approaches would affect customers, generators and DNOs, would require appropriate reliability assessments to be performed (technical aspect) and then the framework for commercial arrangements formulated (commercial aspect). For each of the finally selected approaches, data necessary for evaluation would need to be identified and its availability and quality critically assessed. Furthermore, methods for quantitative system reliability evaluation would need to be selected and developed. A number of system studies would then need to be performed using realistic and relevant data and information. This should be followed by studies that would contrast the features of each of the potential approaches and examine their relative advantages and disadvantages. This work is necessary to open an informed debate on the long-term future of security standards and selection of the most appropriate approach. This can then be followed by the actual development of a new standard. The final choice of the approach would also be influenced by the overall regulatory and commercial environment within which network operators are being regulated and incentivised together with commercial arrangements for connecting to and using distribution networks. Therefore, the update of the present security standards should be conducted against a well-defined context in order to ensure consistency.
87
PART VII - APPENDICES
Appendix 1 Capacity Outage Probability Tables

The basic model for assessing generation reliability is generally through the use of capacity outage probability tables. Detailed theory relating to these is given in various reliability texts21. A summary is given below. Firstly assume that all units in a given case are identical and that they behave independently. The table can then be evaluated using the binomial distribution in which the probability (P{r}) of a specific state (r) is: P{r} = n! p r q nr r!(n r )! (1)
where n = number of units, r = number of available units, (n-r) = number of unavailable units, p = availability of each unit, q = unavailability of each unit. Example A1 Consider two units each having a capacity of 30MW and an availability of 0.86. This produces the calculations and results shown in Table A1. Table A1 Example A1 of capacity outage probability tables capacity available MW 60 30 0 capacity on outage MW 0 30 60 probability 0.862 2 x 0.86 x 0.14 0.142 0.7396 0.2408 0.0196 = 1.0000
Secondly assume that not all units are identical in capacity, availability or both. Assuming independence, these can be combined with each other or into an existing table using the principle of state enumeration and basic rules of probability. Example A2 Consider a third unit having a capacity of 20MW and an availability of 0.90 being added to the capacity outage probability table shown in Table A1. This produces the calculations and results shown in Table A2.
21
88
Table A2 Example A2 of capacity outage probability tables capacity available MW 80 60 50 30 20 0 capacity on outage MW 0 20 30 50 60 80 probability 0.7396 x 0.90 0.7396 x 0.10 0.2408 x 0.90 0.2408 x 0.10 0.0196 x 0.90 0.0196 x 0.10 0.66564 0.07396 0.21672 0.02408 0.01764 0.00196 = 1.0000
89
Appendix 2 Expected Load Lost

Each state of the capacity outage probability table can supply a certain level of load. If the prevailing load is greater than this level, the excess load can not be supplied and therefore must be disconnected. This is known as load lost. The expected load lost (ELL), or average load not supplied, can be found from the rules of mathematical expectation: ELL = xi pi
i =1 n
(2)
where i = capacity state, n = number of capacity states, xi = load lost whilst in i-th capacity state, pi = probability of i-th capacity state. Considering the capacity outage probability table shown in Table A1 and a load level of 40MW gives the calculations and results shown in Table A3. Table A3 Example of ELL capacity available, MW 60 30 0 capacity on outage, MW 0 30 60 probability 0.7396 0.2408 0.0196 = 1.0000 load lost MW 0 10 40 ELL MW 0 2.408 0.78 ELL = 3.19
90
Appendix 3 ELL with a Load Duration Curve

In order to illustrate the procedure used to account for a load model, consider the results shown in Table 5 and the load model shown in Figure 12. The procedure is as follows: 1. discretise the load model (load duration curve, LDC) into i load levels 2. deduce the value of expected load lost for the i-th load level using the approach described in Appendix A2 to give ELLi 3. calculate the overall value of ELL using the expression for expectation shown in Equation 2, where now i = load level, n = number of load levels, xi = ELLi, i.e. the i-th expected load lost, pi = probability of i-th load level. This procedure gives the calculations and results shown in Table A4. Table A4 Example of ELL with load model load level MW 40 30 ELL, MW (from Table 5) 3.19 0.59 probability of load level (from Figure A3) 0.1 0.9 weighted contribution to E(ELL) 3.19 x 0.1 0.319 0.59 x 0.9 0.531 overall ELL = 0.850
91
Appendix 4 Frequency and Duration Indices

In the discussion of Class C in Section 9.3.3, the importance of considering the failure of the second circuit of two parallel lines was considered. The frequency and duration indices of such a second order event can be evaluated from a set of equations deduced using a Markov approach22. These assume that the individual events are independent (the effect of common mode and dependent events can be assessed if required), and that frequency of an outage is negligibly different from the rate of the outage. Under these conditions, the indices are:12 r12 = 1 . 2 (r1 + r2 ) = r1 .r2 r1 + r2 (3) (4)
If the individual failure rates are 2 f/yr and the individual average repair times are 48hr, then:12 = 0.044 f/yr and r12 = 24 hr
22
92

DG Contribution To Network Security - R1 PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

DG Contribution To Network Security - R1 PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

ETSU PROJECT K/EL/00287

NETWORK SECURITY STANDARDS WITH INCREASING LEVELS OF EMBEDDED GENERATION

Final Report 10 August 2002

Professors Ron Allan and Goran Strbac

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

PREFACE Terms of Reference

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

Office of Gas and Electricity Markets Office of Electricity Regulation

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

PART III - TASK B

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

Figure 2 Load shape 2

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

0.702 0.855 0.9

0.764 0.891 0.9

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

peak load MW 80 100 200

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

Table 10 Results using EENS and variable load curves

state MW 100 50 0 EENS CC R

state probability 0.81 0.18 0.01

40, 0.1 0 3 44 0.98 70.2 0.70

60, 0.2 0 6 64 1.72 71.4 0.71

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________

ETSU Project K/EL/00287 Final Report ________________________________