Ideas of 'Survival' and 'Progress' in the Finnish Foreign Policy Tradition Author(s): Osmo Apunen and Helena Rytvuori

Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1982), pp. 61-82 Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/423850 . Accessed: 19/04/2011 06:24
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sageltd. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Sage Publications, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Peace Research.

http://www.jstor.org

ISSN 0022-3433 Journal of Peace Research No. 1, Vol. XIX, 1982

in the Finnish and 'Progress' Ideasof 'Survival' Foreign Policy Tradition

OSMO APUNEN & HELENA RYTOVUORI
Theauthors froma postulation of a dialectical between meansandends:the essenceof proceed relationship meansis takento constitute the natureof the desired end state.Survival is definedas an end state available withhuman of twoconceptions of power:repressive actionindicative andprogressive. Witha conpursued in Finlandareanalyzed: framework around thesenotionstwo fieldsof research the tradiceptual centering tionalforeignpolicythoughtand peaceresearch. Thequestionaskedby the authorsis to whatextenttwo schoolsor modesof thought indicated andprogressive bytherepressive conceptsof powercan be discerned andwhatis thestateof thepostulated dialectical between meansandendswithinthe two fields. relationship in research substance andthepersuaout fromtwo angles:the cognitive is carried aspectmanifest Analysis in socialsettings. As thestudyis at a preliminary to theroleof thescholar siveaspectreferring stage,thepuris to elaborate the analytical framework andto provideillustrations in the firstcategory. poseof thearticle On the basis of the pilot study it is concludedthat the two schools tend to exhibitdistinctive cognitive featuresof their own. Withinthe traditionalpattern,thereis a cognitivedistanceto global problems; thepeaceresearchers, a persuasive existsas to the meansin the immediate socialenvironhandicap amongst ment.Instead of a mutual or a confrontation, thetwo schoolsshowtendencies of cognitiveinsuladialogue tion. Nevertheless, a non-discrimination of the use of violentmeanswouldseemto providesomemeeting groundfor the two schools.

political action since the end of the Swedish rule in 1808-09. Snellman's mode of thought 'It is truethatthereis not a singlepeoplewhichhas been became an even more important issue in Finso powerfulthat it has not bent to historical necessities outsideof its control. Even less can a small and weak nish politics during the last decades of the people be an exceptionto this. But such a people can 19th century as Finland's autonomy was in submission itselfbecause thereareno threatened by rising Russian chauvinism and proveits strength such fates over whichit cannotattainby developing in termsof its own limits. In the case a nationreallyhas by imperial military interests. it is conscious herselfculture of this:its rightto acquired The writings of Snellman reveal clearly the submitto the externalconstraint of historyin orderto dialectical pattern in which the end state of its own future.Onlyignorant safeguard peoplesare seen action is constituted through the essence of to fight untiltheirfinalcollapse.' available means. He employed two dichotoThese words were written in 1863 by J. V. mous concepts as means: repression and Snellman, a Hegelian philosopher and states- emancipation. man who formulated the philosophical preTaking these distinctions as a point of demises of the Finnish national emancipation parture, we may discern something which and existence, in an article bearing the head- could be called an emancipatory concept of line: War or Peace to Finland? Snellman power, for simplicity here called progress. It emphasized that Finland cannot establish her- indicates that power as an organizing concept self as an autonomous entity with violence. is defined in terms of ability. Individual or The power of its culture would be the only collective autonomy and existence as an end rescue. state is gained through efforts to gain full Snellman naturally contemplated in terms control of own capabilities. In relation to of his days' historical circumstances when others, it suggests integrative and cooperative Finland was still part of the Russian empire, actions in order to gratify such needs, and conquered by force of arms and controlled by gratifying experiences in such efforts lead to the Russian administrative system. But what increasingly integrated action and to positive he said in his philosophical writings and discrimination of self from outer world. As polemical articles in newspapers crystallized a Berenice A. Carroll remarks, this emancipaway of reasoning which actually had oriented tory concept of power has its philosophical

1. Two concepts ofpower: 'repression' and 'progress'

62

Rytovuori OsmoApunen/Helena studies, it clearly provides some fundamental choices. This is apparent in the comments of Elizabeth Converse (1972) on what she named 'Carroll's Fork', two concepts of power elaborated by Berenice A. Carroll:
'But in everynationand culture,I suspect,thereis a dichotomybetween(1) scholarsand otherswho believe that the humanneed for power-as-social-domination althebasicstrucandalwayswillprovide wayshasprovided and humanconflicts,and turesfor humancommunities who believe andotherordinary citizens (2) otherscholars is that the humanneed for power-as-social-competence to thatotherneed.For real, effective,and contradistinct are as for other,thesedichotomous scholars, assumptions - among unconscious usuallytacit - perhapssometimes of our time.'6 the peaceresearches

The power of man is his present means to obtain some future apparentgood. This state'Evenif the doctrine of civilized people,whichhas no othertask in historybut to take its site amongindepen- ment of Thomas Hobbes reveals that human dentpeopleswiththe forceof speeches and writings, is a action is understood in terms of a teleological fiction, so we cannot howeverdeny that the historyof of thought. To attain this apparent mode whichallowpossibieverypeoplemaycomeuponperiods lities only to such peacefulworkfor culture.Withgood good one has to follow his internal appetites reasonswe maysay that suchperiodhas now dawnedin and aversions.7 Finland.'2 If we take it that individual and collective The fundamental task of the state is to im- existence indicate essential end states of huprove, to develop its power and might pro- man action, the apparent good envisioned, it gressively and in competition with other provides some substance to the abstract Hobstates.3 This indicates another aspect, the rep- besian concept. And, further, if we take for ressive pattern, which implies power in terms granted that the qualities of end states in huof control and dominance over others. man action are constituted through the proPower in terms of domination is clearly the perties of the means used to attain these appaprevailing pattern in theories of international rent goods, one methodological judgment of politics. For example, K. J. Holsti states that pre-theoreticalnature has been done. One has power means 'the general capacity of a state only to add some substance to this conceptual to control the behavior of the others'. Control framework. refers here to 'any physical or mental object The Hobbesian element, an essential feaof quality available as an instrument of in- ture of the prevailing mood in international ducement, to persuade, reward, threaten, or relations nowadays, enters with the notion of punish'.4 Such a definition of power seems to danger or threat. If there is a common and extend to the uses of knowledge. This is re- persistent feeling that the existence of indivivealed, to quote the words of Anatol Rap- duals and collective entities are threatened, oport, by the fact that the strategists do not the mere question of survival as the end state make really searching questions but use most- of action becomes paramount or at least ly formalized assumptions of standard cliches acute. Small nations in the vicinity of big, exbecause of their 'libidal commitment to power panding powers often experience such feelings over the other, not to knowledge of the of survival more or less permanently. Hence other'.5 the conceptions of Snellman, even though This dichotomy is naturally not any specifi- they were designed from a very narrow Fincally Finnish dilemma. In the field of peace nish point of view, seem to bear some releresearch and more broadly in war and peace vance to the global feelings of insecurity

background, e.g. in Rousseau's concept of a harmonious society.'1 To do justice to Snellman we have to add that his conception of the nature of social dynamics was not limited to the emancipatory notion of power or to progressive action as it will here be called. The repressiveconcept of power was equally elaborated in his writings. Snellman considered that opportunities (or initial conditions) for cultural emancipation were of a temporary nature as are the periods of repressive action. Together they constitute the rhythm of history which philosophers and statesman have to grasp in order to guide their nation:

Finnish Foreign Policy Tradition

63
FALL

which seem to lie behind the Hobbesian notions of politics emerging rapidly after the feelings of trust in the 1960's and of relaxation in the 1970's. This background reasonably justifies us to state that our world is obsessed with power and survival. And Thomas Hobbes was an analyst of power, as C. B. Macpherson says in his opening remarksto the translation of Leviathan. Why not proceed with the notions of Hobbes? But equally justified and urgent seems to be the question raised above with the quotations of Snellman, that is, whether the issue of survival will be solved with progressiveor repressiveusage of power. Let us assume that survival is something which fundamentally ignites human appetites and could hence be used in order to describe one fundamental apparent good in human action. And, consequently, one may think of states of affairs which tend to arouse human aversions. Let us say that they are issues of fall. Relevant modes of action logically constituting these end states would be persistence for survival and decay for fall. Thus we may take it for granted that there exists an inherent and necessary logical unity between the end states and actions, i.e. the means to attain the end states. Obviously we may survive by developing our competence and faculties, but equally we may need repressivemethods in order to safeguard our existence individually or collectively. Logically one may conclude that if the essence of the means constitutes the nature of an end state, then survival preserved or achieved through repressive methods bears the inherent marks of repression; it is in other words genetically of a repressive nature. Persistence may hence have two distinctive aspects: progress and repreision. The process of decay may be split equally into two distinct categories having both their respective terms. As a matter of simplicity we only state here that decay is a process characterizedby failure to progress and repress. This judgment is guided by our interest towards the notions of survival. Our conceptual framework consists then of following elements:

End state

of action

SURVIVAL

of means used consistinq Processes - Power Secific notions of

eans

PERSISTENCE

DECAY

Proressive (emancipatory)

Repressive

Non-P

-R

These concepts have been chosen by applying two definitional criteria: Each pair must have an inherent positive feature providing an overall character to it; each pair must be reasonably exclusive with each other (survivalfall, persistence-decay, progressive-repressive). As we now return to the dialectical judgment made above we are able to define two types of persistence, one of progressive (Pp) and one of repressive (Pr) nature. And, consequently, if we assume that the means constitute the essence of end states, we may state two types of survival: one of progressive (Sp) and one of repressive (Sr) nature. Pp, Pr, Sp, Sr are analytical categories but they imply a fundamental dilemma of moral philosophy which peace researchers have to confront: Is Survival achieved with repressive methods (Pr) morally acceptable to the point that one is ready to have it as a serious alternative to Fall? Evidently we are confronted with similar moral philosophical problems even though we are operating within the framework of traditional security policy. The question is whether we have to sacrifice our personal survival in order to guarantee or to facilitate the survival of a collective entity. In traditional security policy framework the issue of Sr seems to be less problematical: survival achieved through repressive means is generally taken to be morally acceptable. In order to increase the substantial content of our conceptual framework, we may specify further the respective notions of progress and repression. Tord Hoivik has split the concept of progress into three operational aspects: quantitative, qualitative and structural.8Perhaps a parallel distinction in terms of repression could be the one between overt, covert and structural. With respect to structuralprogress and repression we are of the opinion that in both cases the concept must imply a voluntary option. That means that an actor or

64

OsmoApunen/Helena Rytovuori perceived and presented to their audiences issues of survival since 1918, i.e. during the independence period. In order to accomplish this empirical research task we have constructed a methodical tool which is called Helen's box. Our purpose is to analyse two aspects of scholars' social action: the cognitive patterns and the social setting. The cognitive patterns will be outlined using the theoretical framework above. The present article reports results from a pilot project. We intend to do a more detailed study of individual scholars covering the Finnish research communities since 1918, i.e. the independence period. The traditional level of analysis distinction in international politics is made between individual, state and system. This time we approach the same problem from another angle. We ask what is the primary point of reference one has in mind when relating oneself to the external world. The Hobbesan view proceeds from the notion of individual selfishness; the dynamics of human action are reduced to the idea that everyone is taking care of his own individual interests. The perspective is hence egocentric. The egocentric point of view is on a higher level reflected by different chauvinistic notions concerning the inherent rights and duties of the 'own' state to attain its particularistic interests. This individualistic pattern is in clear contradistinction to what we simply may call collectivistic or community pattern evident in, for example, Hegel's philosophy and Rousseau's social theories. Helen's box (see the figure) is constructed from two levels which we call 'Fundamentals' and 'Policy Channels'. And, as stated above, we are dealing with two aspects of scholars' social action: cognitive and persuasive. The substance of the Finnish security issues is accordingly divided into theoretical fundamentals and policy statements. Theoretical fundamentals will be analysed mainly in terms of the above theoretical framework, whereas policy statements will be further divided into sentences indicating declaratory policies and policy implementation. By declaratory policy

group of actors must have ways and means to change the state of affairs if they so decide. Otherwise we step outside of the ends-means framework into causal relationships where we hardly can speak about repression. This is not, however, any obstacle to use causal relationships as an element of initial conditions and of environmental factors. After this reverse 'reading' of our conceptual framwork, we may specify the above figure as follows:
S End state p SURVIVAL S FALL

Means

--

, ----,,_P
,I

PERSISTENCE P

Pros

.I -

W _ -]
1 I

(left

out)

I | ii
IiI

Progressive Repressive POWER I l ive Overt--Covert--

(left

out)

I 1

L-. L-uant Quali.tative

(left ..-----.Structural Structural---

out)

This conceptual framework is intended to serve as a tool in order to analyse to what extent in Finland we may discern the two schools or modes of thought indicated above by Carroll and implied in the writings of Snellman. We crudely assume that the traditional security policy pattern follows the line Pr-Sr as their predominant strategy whereas the peace research community, which is a much move recent phenomenon in the Finnish society, is expected to outline in their writings the strategy line Pp-Sp. In order to accomplish this empirically we need some additional tools of research. Traditionally a scholar has two primary taSks or functions in his social setting be it then national or international: cognitive and persuasive. The cognitive task refers to the functions of scholars to create meaningful structures of knowledge. In this case we are particularly interested in such cognitive patterns which are action oriented. The persuasive role in turn refers to the ways and means by which the scholars try to incorporate their specific structures of knowledge to the social action. Equally, we should enquire whether scholars are influenced by their social settings as they perform their cognitive functions. Our idea is to research how Finnish scholars have

Finnish Foreign Policy Tradition

65

we mean statements of intent without any specific references as to how this goal will be achieved. Policy implementation statements, in turn, refer to mobilization and allocation of available means, telling us thus not only what should be done but also how this should take place and by what means. Into policy implementation statemens we include even such causal explanations which indicate a 'voluntaristicoption'. By that we mean such structural relationships which specific actors are able to change or modify if they so wish. If a scholar points out in his study that there is a state of affairs which should and could be changed he opens the window of voluntaristic option and hence expresses at least implicitly a specific policy line. Without such a voluntaristic option most structural relationships do not fulfil the criteria of policy orientation. The social setting of a scholar constitutes in our framwork three distinct categories: power establishment, academic establishment and social forces and movements. Because we do not report results from this part of the study we do not go further into the operational details of these categories either. It is sufficient to state that these three settings provide the scholar with fora for persuasive action and, at the base level, the scholar normally should make reflections on his relations to the different social value bases these three settings imply.
SOCIAL SETING

Snellman already indicated a dual-track approach according to which the two strategies (Pp-Sp, Pr-Sr) actually alternate and are of complementary nature depending on the historical circumstances. In order to test our theoretical reasoning we did the first reading not trying to establish the individual patterns but looking to see whether the relevant scientific literature reveals appropriate factors for our further analysis. In the following we outline how two basic policy issues have been dealt with in recent Finnish historical and political science literature. The issues under enquiry are: (1) How environmental factors influence the freedom of choice of Finnish foreign policy makers; is there in other words a voluntaristic option? (2) What types of means has scientific research produced for persistence and survival? We hope to gather some evidence for the empirical feasibility of our research framework. In the next chapter similar efforts are made with respect to peace research in Finland.

power establishment

academic establishment

social forces and movements

declarator

policy policy implementation mobilization - allocation w-

z
t

SOCIAL

VALUE

IBASE

2. The traditional pattern In the preceding section we made a crude assumption that the traditional security policy pattern would predominantly follow the line Pr-Sr, that is survival by repressive means. At the same time one should bear in mind that

2.1. Environmental issues Reading the Finnish scholars' assessments reveals that the environmental factors are analysed mainly in terms of balance of power and spheres of influence models as well as of Russian/Soviet big power intentions. The Russian conquest in 1908-1909 brought to Finland both continuity and change. Swedish rule, which had lasted for over 600 years, was terminated but it had left clear impressions on cultural and judicial institutions of Finland. The Russian emperor, Alexander I, promised to respect these institutions and consequently he conceded to Finland an autonomous position in the empire under his personal rule. This meant continuity, and preservation of this continuity constituted the essence of the Finnish security policy during the 19th century. Survival has hence a limited and specific meaning in Finland during these years. Especially because it was a century of the Pax Russica. The Finns were not confronted with war practically for 100 years. Survival meant under these conditions

66

Osmo Apunen/Helena Ryti6vuori

inviolability of the national institutions. Externally the Finns were obsessed from the very beginning with a fear that the Russian rulers would get free hands to deal with Finland as they liked. They were taught their first lesson about this during the Napoleonic Wars when the Russian emperor got free hands from Napoleon to conquer Finland and to annex it to his empire. After this the Russian emperor regarded Finland as an internal Russian matter and thus no issue in international conferences and negotiations. This was made clear at the Congress of Vienna where Finland was kept off the agenda. During the Holy Alliance period Finns knew that they were practically at the mercy of the emperor. Things had to be settled directly with the emperor without external interventions or support.9 The idea of external guarantees to the international status of Finland was activated during the First World War when the internal decay of the Russian empire increased and the German government was plotting to decompose the multinational Russian state permanently. Even the rebellious groups in Finland were reluctant to resort to force during the war without firm big power guarantees. Such guarantees were not, however, available. The Germans wanted free hands for a possible separate peace agreement with the Russians and so the Finnish activists got only vague promises from Berlin. Neither were the Western powers interested in giving any guarantees to Finland for fear that it would alienate Russia from the Entente. o The Ribbentrop agreement in 1939 between Moscow and Berlin manifested the worst fears in Finland: a big power agreement which left the Soviet rulers with free hands. By the agreement, Germans had neutralized themselves with respect to Finland. The Western powers, in turn, were too far away and too much occupied with the Germans to play any significant counter-balancing role in Finland. The German-Soviet agreement and the following war years provided Finland with hard evidence to draw the conclusion that security of this exposed country could not be built on

the balance of forces between competing big

powers.11

In 1944 the Finns had only one choice left: their relations to the Soviet Union must be built on other premises than the balance of power between big powers. This conclusion has left its mark on the research community, too. Balance of power as a concept in war and peace studies in Finland has been used only in an unclear manner. Some vague notions referring to an overall East-West balance in Europe or globally can be found. But even then balance of power is understood rather in terms of an existing state of affairs than as a purposeful policy aimed at keeping a balance. This applies to Northern Europe as well, where the concept of 'Nordic balance' has been common since the early 1960's. By the end of the 1960's it comprised a policy of constraints but later it has been used as a mere description of the existing status of alliance commitments and basic statements of
policy.12

To Russian observers, Finland was during the first half of the 19th century a remote and backward corner where hardly anything happened and which did not deserve any specific attention. Sweden was no security risk to Russia any longer. In a way, Finland was a corner left over from big power dealings: it was not part of Sweden but it was not incorporated into the Russian empire either. This experience nurturedin Finland the idea that Finland really had a special status, i.e. that its international position was somehow unique. An absolute condition to a policy of invisibility was that Finland had no essential value in the Russian security calculations. That was the state of affairs for most of the 19th century. The Crimean War in the 1850's raised the issue of war and peace in Finland. Attacks of the British navy against Finnish coastal cities demonstrated that Finland really could be drawn into conflicts to which the Russian empire was a party. After this, world politics became a serious issue in Finnish public debate.13 Russian suspicions were, however, headed off with a loyal attitude towards the

Finnish Foreign Policy Tradition

67

mother country and its foreign policy problems. A more serious turn took place during the 1880's and 1890's: Finland was involved in Russian security interests. This brought the consequence that war and peace issues were evaluated in an increasing manner in terms of the concept spheres of influence. It all started with the military interests of the Russian empire for the northern cape area. Count Witte propagated in the beginning of 1980's that Russia should establish a major naval base in the Kola peninsula. Finnish railway lines provided then the best possible access to the Murmansk area and consequently such a connection was planned. Only the death of the emperor rescued Finland from this fatal construction work. Witte's plan was abandoned and the Russian navy was based in Libau on the Baltic Sea. The Finnish railway lines had still some military value to Russia.14 During the First World War Russia finally established permanent access to the high seas via Murmansk. At this stage Finland was not, however, considered to be safe for communications between the capital and Murmansk. Railway lines were constructed outside the proper Finnish territory but very close to the border. East Carelia was the Finnish irredenta in 1920's and this ambition involved unavoidably the question of the Murmansk railway line."5 In German war plans, the Kola area was one of the targets and the railway line had again great political and military value because of the allied supplies delivered through the northern route. The Finnish troops even reached the railway but the Soviet command could keep the northern route open by using a roundabout way to Archangklsk.16 After World War II, the Kola area remained a security issue to Finland. Its military value as one of the primary naval bases even increased in comparison with the situation in the 1920's and 1930's. Soviet nuclear submarines operating from Murmansk involved Finland in the Soviet-American strategic balance, a development which still continues, causing instability in Northern Europe as a whole."7

The Russian empire suffered a military disaster in the Russo-Japanese war in 1905 and this activated a new external concern for the Finns. Shifts in military balance exposed the Russian capital, St. Petersburg, to German and British military and naval threats. This possibility surfaced already in the 1890's. Russian military planners began to ask what possibilities and threats the Finnish territory offered to the defense system of St. Petersburg. A serious threat was perceived. This seems to be one of the reasons why the Russian authorities came to the conclusion that Finland should be incorporated more closely into the empire. Revolutions in Russia in 1905 and 1917 relieved this pressure, but only for a while. The Soviet government raised the issue again in the late 1930's. Soviet territorial demands concerning the security of Leningrad were satisfied only after the two wars in 193940, and in 1941-44. But already during the war the Finnish leadership tried hard not to involve the country too heavily in German war efforts against Leningrad. This restraint possibly had some political impact later on, as Finland had to negotiate peace as a defeated country. Anyway, the problem remained: What was Finland's share in the sufferings of It seems to be unavoidable that after war the question was raised: Was all this necessary? War and peace studies in Finland come repeatedly back to the issue of Russian and Soviet intentions. Why did the Russian government resort to political and administrative repression in the 1890's and again after the revolution in 1905? What did the Soviet leadership really have in mind when they demanded political and territorial concessions from Finland referring to the security needs of Leningrad? What really was at stake: a painful but still tolerable concession from Finland in order to safeguard the survival of Leningrad? Or survival of the Finnish people itself as an independent nation? Research has provided us with several alternative models which outline some possible answers to these crucial questions. There seems to exist two modes of explanations
Leningrad?18

68

Osmo Apunen/Helena Rytovuori

which both proceed from the assumption that basically Finno-Soviet relations should be seen in terms of power-as-dominance. This was expressed, for example, by J. K. Paasikivi, the founding father of Finnish foreign policy since 1944, when he stated in April 1948, on the occasion when the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistence was signed:
'As long as the conflicts between big powers are settled with the force of arms, the big ones do not let the legal points of view prevent them from measures which they esteem necessary from a military point on view, quite irrespective of the fact whether they injure the small ones or not. This is a regrettablefact, which we small ones cannot change but which we have to take into consideration if we want to stay on realistic ground and to get unscathed out of the mortar of life.'19

One of these explanatory modes implies that Finland may obtain political leeway by making skillful use of the constraints which international factors impose on Russia and the Soviet Union. Another explanation concerns the legitimacy of Russian vs. Soviet policies towards Finland. Being inherently of a political nature, the Finnish responses as they are indicated in the existing literaturecould be characterized as persistence by progressive means (P,). Let us begin with the problem of legitimacy claims. There are research references to the effect that Finland has survived as an independent nation and as a pluralistic democracy because the Russian emperor stayed true to his legal commitments and to his liberal principles or because of the consistent policy of the Soviet government to observe the principle of national sovereignty and the right to selfdetermination. The policy of legitimacy preserve aims at measures which strengthen and preservesuch Russian/Soviet feelings of legitimate commitments. The realist pattern, indicated, for example, in the statement of Paasikivi, takes these assertions with some misgivings. Undisputably, there are several such periods in Finno-Russian/Soviet relations which do not fit into the power-as-domination mould. This dilemma is often solved by referring to the 'window dressing' function which Finland is supposed to play in Russian and Soviet world politics.

The power-as-domination model implies that the Russian and Soviet concessions to Finland should be explained in terms of the external constraints imposed by the foreign policy difficulties and priorities of the big power. In 1809 the Russians skillfully pacified the newly conquered country with political concessions while the turmoils of the Napoleonic Wars still kept the European situation unstable. In 1905, when Finland's autonomy was restored and far-reaching parliamentary reform with universal suffrage was carried out, the Russian empire undisputably had great internal and external problems. A delicate issue for national history is whether Finns achieved these political victories with their own resistance, which included a complete general strike in the country, or whether it was a consequence of the revolutionary movements in Russia and of international politics.20 In 1917, the newly formed Bolshevik government faced an extremely difficult situation internally and was exposed to external intervention in which Finland possibly could be a staging area. It is argued that the Soviet government actually had no other choice but to recognize Finnish independence, and to hope that the traditionally well organized and strong Finnish labor movement would carry out its own revolution.21 During the Winter War, in 1939-40, the notion of an expansionist tendency in Soviet foreign policy aims was nurtured by the establishment of the so-called Kuusinen government in Terijoki, i.e. an exile government of Finnish communists in the Democratic Republic of Finland. This was an argument in favor of the constraint model whereas the legitimacy model clearly suffered a setback. The government in Terijoki was, however, abandoned as the resistance of Finland proper did not collapse as was evidently expected in the first weeks of the war. In summer 1944, the Soviet forces gave up their plans to occupy the Finnish capital and other core areas and consequently the border was established on the lines where the military front lines were stabilized late in summer of 1944. The constraint

FinnishForeignPolicy Tradition model explains this by the Soviet interest to remove their troops to more important areas in Eastern Europe.22 Ater World War II, Finland clearly was considered to be one of the defeated countries heading through 'sovietization' to the Soviet orbit. Soviet declarations that the relations between Finland and the Soviet Union would be established on the policy of good neigborhood and on the principles of Lenin's policy in 1917 were taken in the West with misgivings and references to window dressing. In 1948, however, Finland broke the mold applied in Eastern Europe and adopted a carefully formulated course of its own. References to external constraints were made again, especially to the fact that other Scandinavian countries were about to make their decision whether they should join the Western defense community or stay neutral, perhaps in a framework of a Scandinavian defense union as was proposed by the Swedish
government.23

69

The international framework in Scandinavia was stabilized in the beginning of 1950's. Stability of this security framework has clearly been in the interest of all parties concerned. Debate on security issues is thus mainly concerned with such issues which might disturb the prevailing patterns of stability. In a very general sense, this implies that the overall East-West balance, politically and militarily, may function as a constraint to big power activity not only towards Finland but generally in Northern Europe. But this constraint is rather an environmental feature than a result of conscious balance of power policy, even if such points of view have been expressed recently.24 These features of different explanatory models in scientific literature indicate that the two theoretical lines, Pr-Sr' Pp-Sp, clearly coexist. Hence, inside the traditional school one may discern two 'wings'. Their proportional shares are at this stage hard to document but, hardly as any surprise, one may say that repressivereasoning seems to have an upper hand which simply tells us that the realist school seems to be well established in Finland.

2.2. Strategies for persistence and survival Somehow Finland as an international actor reminds one easily of a bee. Considering the laws of aerodynamics the bee seems too clumsy to be able to fly. But the bee itself does not know this, it does not calculate - it flies. If we simplify things, we may state that the emphasis of the Finnish post-World War II security strategies lies in the power-as-socialcompetence. This governmental policy, however, does not necessarily prevail in the views of the scientific communities. The principal solution of the governmental policy has been the idea of progress in terms of the material and social welfare of the people, its integration and resoluteness, and its ideological unity. Of these factors the last one, ideological unity, seems to be the most precarious one. This pattern seems to have dominated Finnish politics also before the 1920's, whereas the 1920's and 1930's were clearly a time of repressive models of security. In the scientific literaturedifferent explanatory models pertainingto the problems of persistence and survival alternate and overlap. They extend in terms of time from the beginning of the 19th century to the present. They can be described in terms of the following models: bureaucratic patriotism, national emancipation, emancipation through the class struggle, legal defense, passive resistance, activism, chauvinism, cooperative neighborhood, and the policy of collaboration. Bureaucratic patriotism as a strategy prevailed during the first half of the 19th century. It left, however, more permanent traces on the Finnish foreign policy tradition. Some of these patterns are discernible even today. The term 'bureaucratic' refers to the fact that politics was mainly the business of an elite made up of civil servants. 'Patriotism', in turn, denotes that these persons acted for the good of the country which above all meant Finland. One should remember that the Russian empire offered as a whole excellent opportunities for careers outside Finland provided that the individual in question nurtured clear loyalties towards the empire. These opportunities were made use of frequently. It

70

OsmoApunen/Helena Rytovuori of sympathy towards Sweden, or towards the Poles who resorted to armed struggle. All demonstrations in Finland would be futile, Snellman lectured to his compatriots, who did not want to stay cool in their holes. They would arouse Russian suspicions and repressions in Finland but would not help a bit the Polish rebels.26 Again, we may find a parallel in the present-day Finnish reasoning. Finland has adopted a low political profile in cases where the Soviet Union has used force in order to secure its interests. In Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, and Afganistan 1980, Finland practically abstained from protests. The reason was that it would not help Hungarians, Czechs, or Afghans if Finland protested, but that it might help cause trouble for FinnoSoviet relations. The Finnish people loves protest politics, President Paasikivi used to say, but it is often against its own interests.27 Now, as Finland has adopted a policy of neutrality, its credibilityprovides that parallel constraints apply to the Finnish attitudes towards other countries. Accordingly, a low profile is kept with respect to such controversial issues where the blame lies in the quarters of Western powers, or even of more remote countries. Class struggle and emancipation. The Finnish labor movement had its origins in the 1880's and 1890's. Since 1905 it has drawn approximately 50% support from the electorate and received almost half of the parliamentary seats, a few times even over. Labor and trade union movements naturally aimed for social emancipation and political liberation of its own group of reference, manual workers in countryside and cities. In the beginning the labor movement was in common front for defense of Finnish autonomy and for the integrity of its political institutions. This is easy to understand: in Russia the revolutionary movement was persecuted, whereas in Finland labor could operate legally. Political autonomy of Finland was in the interest of the political and trade union movements.28 Class relations developed toward violent conflicts since 1905. The Bolshevik revolution

was crucial that during the 50 years of Russian rule of Finland, before the national movement on a broader basis emerged in Finland, there existed a loyal national body of administrators who took care of the political interests of the country and not only of the empire. As a policy bureaucratic patriotism was preemptive. Finnish administrators tried to settle matters with the emperor directly and in good time to avoid that they should turn out to be controversial. Finland's political profile was kept as low and unnoticed as possible and in Finland domestic affairs were conducted by Finnish officials under the supervision of the Russian Governor General. Dissenting political ideas and individuals were suppressed. Shortly, Finland was ruled in the spirit of the Holy Alliance, cautiously and conservatively. But under this calm a lot of material improvements were carried out. Many Russians were in the 1880's astonished, and even annoyed, that the remote and unnoticed corner of the empire, a country of bears and odd stubborn people in the prevailing Russian image, had changed so much during these decades. In the 1880's the Russians met not only emerged Finnish national movements but a rising Finnish capitalism which penetrated the Russian economy vigorously and opened its trade to the Western markets.25 The Finnish foreign policy line since 1944 exhibits many substantial features which are similar to the patterns of bureaucraticpatriotism. A popular saying seems still to be: Stay cool, in your hole, Finn! National emancipation was ideologically founded on Snellman's philosophy and on the emerging modern mass media which together with mass education disseminated modern ideas in Finland during the last decades of the 19th century. Politically, the social and cultural emancipation of the Finnish speaking majority was founded on an accord with the Russian emperor. Provided that Finns remained loyal to the throne, they could, in return, prosper and develop their cultural faculties. That was the reason why Snellman strongly opposed all political manifestations

Finnish Foreign Policy Tradition

71

in 1917 posed real dilemmas for the Finnish which constitutes the essence of the Paasikivilabor movement. Should it lean to the Rus- Kekkonen line. sian movement in order to accomplish social As the integrity of the Finnish institutions revolution in Finland? Internally split, the was threatened, the Finns tried to defend Finnish Social Democrats opted for national themselves by force of arguments. The constiindependence in December 1917, a factor tutional history of Finland was studied and which from the Russian point of view was im- the results used in debates with the Russian portant. In January 1918, an extreme leader- experts arguing against their interpretations.29 ship and radicalized masses of Finnish labor In Finland the optimistic mood prevailed hoisted the red flag for independent and that, in the end, what is right must win in real socialist Finland. In the following civil war, life. They only had to prove their case and the Finnish labor was left practically alone and opponent would submit. was defeated by the united forces of Finnish Unfortunately, such days had dawned to white guards and the German army. After the Finland that not even the most elaborate Civil War, which lasted for four months, the arguments and voluminous evidence could Finnish labor movement was definitely split convince the Russians. into two independent parties: the Social DeLegal defense in the 1880's and 1890's mocrats operated legally in Finland, whereas clearly failed in terms of action. But it left the Communist Party had its leadership in the deep marks on conceptions in Finland as to Soviet Union and an underground organiza- the premises of what is legitimate in politics. tion in Finland. Since the legal defense of Finland's autonoAfter the split, the Social Democratic Party my, Finns had a tendency to judge political adopted a loyal attitude to the new republic. problems in the framework of legal principles Its efforts to promote social and political and norms. This was clear even before the emancipation of the working class would take Winter War when in Finland there prevailed a place in the framework of national unity. This mood that the country had right on its side in was tested in the wars of 1939-40 and a legal sense, as it really had, and that it 1941-45. After World War II, the Commu- should resist the Soviet presssures because the nist Party became legal in Finland again. issue was a matter of principle. Later in 1940, Since then the problem of double-edged loyal- the judicial wrangling went so far that J. K. ties of the labor movement has been a perma- Paasikivi sent a telegram from his ambassanent issue in Finnish security policy. The pro- dorial post in Stockholm reminding the blem is, how to fit together solidarity in the government that the Kremlin was no municinational and in the international frameworks. pal court. For Communists this distinction naturally is The coin has, however, always two sides: sharper than for Social Democrats, but with during the critical end phases of the war in respect to the legitimacy of foreign policy 1944 the Finnish government managed to deboth exhibit ideological demands. fuse the German strangling policy with a legal Legal defense as a strategirfor national sur- trick. vival developed as a result and in reaction to Passive resistance went along with the legal the rising Russian chauvinism since 1880's. defense. Using civil disobedience and passive The Russian government took measures resistance by the domestic administrative offiwhich violated the integrity of Finland's auto- cials, the nationalist movement tried to obnomous institutions. The literature concern- struct the Russian efforts. More important ing the causes of this conflict is rather volumi- than the results in obstruction seems to have nous and contains several explanatory mo- been the politically mobilizing effect of pasdels. But out of the conflict emerged a mode sive resistance methods. Passive resistance tried to some extent to of thought which J. K. Paasikivi transmitted to the post-World War II generations and collaborate with the Russians and to avoid

72

Osmo Apunen/Helena Rytivuori

extreme measures and illegal acts in order to preserve the political and judicial institutions in Finnish hands. It was considered more prudent to bend even to illegal Russian measures than to leave the country solely under Russian administration. More important to the passive resistance than the legal forms, which the legal defense held for paramount issues, was the substance, a working Finnish political community. In the 1910's it became evident that passive resistance as a method of persistence could be used only for a rather limited period of time. The internal strains grew overwhelming during the resistance years. There was not much hope left when the First World War broke out and changed the setting completely. After World War II, Finland was supervised by the Allied Control Commission and heavily under Soviet influence. Under this circumstance, passive resistance proved to offer modes of thought and criteria for legitimacy which were of great avail. Since then the pattern of passive resistance has been instrumental in Finnish foreign policy doctrine.30 Activism emerged in the beginning of the 20th century as methods of legal defense, and passive resistance lost its effectiveness as the internal decay of the Russian empire proceeded. In practice it meant preparations for armed struggle and cooperation with the underground Russian revolutionary movements. After 1905 activism was repressed but it emerged again during the First World War as the Swedes and Germans encouraged Finnish rebels to work against the Russians. In Germany a special Finnish military unit got training and combat experience on the Eastern front, but when it finally arrived in Finland, in 1918, it was involved in Finnish Civil War instead of a liberation war against Russia."3 Chauvinism developed in the early 1920's out of a mixture of activism, Finnish and Swedish chauvinist ideas, anti-Soviet feelings and prefascist currents.32 This chauvinist mood had above all an impact on the internal political climate in Finland. An integral part of the chauvinist mood was demand for a strong national defense. During the Interven-

tion Wars in Soviet Russia, Finnish volunteer troops tried to instigate and support Carelians in Soviet Russia. The aim was to force secession of Eastern Carelia from Russia to Finland. After the peace of Dorpat, in 1920, the activity was slowly transformed into an ordinary right wing political currentin Finland. In the 1930's it revived and had its heyday during the autumn of 1941 when Finnish troops advanced far into Eastern Carelia and the Carelian dream appeared to be at hand. With German defeat in 1945 this Finnish irredenta movement finally faded away.33 Cooperative neighborhood denotes the Finnish-Soviet relations since 1944. Its key term seems to be mutual trust. As a matter of substance it refers to a set of principles and rules governing the mutual relations of these two countries with different social and political systems. The starting point of post-war FinnishSoviet relations is that Finland has acknowledged the existence of a legitimate Soviet security interest. To be legitimate, this interest must, however, be defensive. The Finnish foreign policy leadership has adopted the realistic point of view that the Soviet Union will anyway look after its interests, possibly even against the will of Finns themselves as the two wars witness. Thus it is in the Finnish interest to safeguard those defense interests as far as they concern Finnish territory and as far as their execution is within the limits of Finnish defense capability. If Finnish capabilities are inadequate, it has treaty commitmehts to receive Soviet aid in the case of an armed attack against Finland or through its territory against Soviet territory. Non-interference in internal affairs is clearly the topmost principle and criterion of mutual trust from the Finnish point of view. This implies that the Soviet Union does not pursue in Finland any other but defensive interests. After the World War II Soviet leaders made it clear that they would not tolerate hostile governments any more on their borders. This principle, clearly accepted in Jalta by the Allied Powers34,implies that Finland shall have good relations with the Soviet Union as its

Finnish Foreign Policy Tradition

73

primary foreign policy objective. As President Kekkonen has said, Finland will not and cannot pursue good relations with the West at the expense of its relations with the Soviet Union, but as a consequence of good FinnoSoviet relations. Finnish policy of neutrality proceeds from this premise and it is accordingly a delicate effort to balance between competing demands from East and West. From the very beginning the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line had strong emancipatory flavors. Damages caused by the war had to be repaired and compensations to the Soviet Union had to be paid. The moral and psychological effects of two lost wars were deep. People from ceded areas, amounting to 10% of the total population, had to be resettled and integrated. This work took time until the 1960's. Along with the Western trade ties, a FinnishSoviet trade and economic cooperation pattern began to emerge since the 1950's, when the war compensation deliveries ended. In the beginning some political efforts were needed in order to give impetus to these transactions. But later in the 1960's and 1970's the complementary nature of the Finnish-Soviet trade and its stabilizing effects because of long-term control systems transformed the economic relations so that they were driven more and more by material incentives. Trade was used in the 1950's as a political instrument a few times against Finland: since the 1960's it has been out of the political agenda." The policy of collaboration is a mode of thought denoting certain features in FinnoSoviet relations. Actually it seems to be a common denominator to the combination of different strategiesin the Finnish foreign policy tradition.36 The best way to describe this 'model' is to quote the source of the idea, Henry Kissinger's work A World Restored:
'Metternich was proposing a policy which can only be carried out by a state certain of its moral strength or overwhelmed by the consciousness of moral impotence. It is a policy which places a peculiar strain on the domestic principles of obligation for it can never be legitimized by its real motives. Its success depends on its appearance of sincerity, on the ability, as Metternich once said, of seeming the dupe without being it. To show one's purpose is to court disaster; to succeed too completely is to invite dis-

integration. In such a period the knave and the hero, the traitor and the statesman are distinguished, not by their acts, but by their motives. At what stage collaboration damages the national substance, at what point it becomes an excuse for the easy way out, these are questions that can be resolved only by people who have lived through the ordeal, not by abstract speculation. Collaboration can be carriedout successfully only by a social organism of great cohesiveness and high morale, because it presupposes a degree of confidence in leadership which makes treason seem inconceivable.'37

2.3 Concluding remarks to the traditional pat tern Reading of recent historical and political science literature in Finland confirms that there exist distinct explanatory models amongst those who do not claim to be peace researchers. Several of these models are of Pp-Sp type, some clearly are mixed and many again of the type Pr-Sr. The traditional Finnish security patterns reveal that the fundamental group of reference has been the national unit. But there are, however, ideological cleavages in it. One of those cleavages can be traced to the efforts to emancipate with class struggle. Competing loyalties may arise, however, if one takes it for granted that we should see our primary group of reference in terms of more universal humanistic values. Without any doubt, the traditional perspective has been strongly ethnocentric. Foreign policy issues were flavored by the fact that Russia and the Soviet Union are so close and Europe so far away. It took time before Finns learned that there are global issues which are important to them. The effect of ethnocentric bias among intellectuals is possibly still alive and it may be summarized as follows:
'Typical for the academic intellectuals (of the 19th century) was belief in development as a kind of absolute idea. It was conceived to have own internal laws and similarly it was conceived that progress will take place with the force of its own dynamics. All this did not imply anything to the effect that Finns themselves should somehow have a share in revolutionary changes. Their role was one of a European bystander. It was not so essential how many supporters progress has, because the firm belief was that it will go on anyway.'38

We do not suggest that his description could as such apply to the present Finnish intellectual climate. But we wish to remind that

74

OsmoApunen/Helena Rytoivuori manifested in the Marxist idea of uneven development. Taking this combination of values and an inclination for causal analysis typical of behavioralist methodology, we may describe the predominant orientation in the research as postbehavioralist. As is the case with most of the peace research carried out in other Nordic countries, the Marxist value premises have been mediated through the dependencia school, whereas the more direct influence of Marxism or neomarxism is only slight. In the research reviewed, we may discern two types of cognitive models. The predominant one may broadly be termed the 'organizational' model: the focus is on international organization, above all on the impact of transnational corporations on dependency and its related phenomena. Only a minor part of the research may be said to reveal a bud of a different pattern. In line with Etzionian concepts we may call this the 'preformistic' model. The concept bears elements of functionalist thinking and assumes that a 'primitive' social unit contains, in embryonic form, all the basic modes of social relations that later become structurally differentiated.40 In the research carried out on North-South or global issues, the predominant causal relationship conceived as an environmental factor focuses on transnational corporations (cause) and dependence (effect). In these general categories there exist only minor variations, whereas interpretations of the 'laws' conceived to connect these two variables differ slightly. A research on problems of international food politics provides an illustrative example of the organizational model.4' The research takes its point of departure in the notion that the world food problem is a logical syndrome resulting from the skewed structure of the world food economy, which represents a particularly polarized aspect of international inequality. The cause is seen in the position and policies of transnational corporations, by whose commercial interests rather than the basic needs of the people in different countries the world food production and consumption is steered. The problem

these intellectual patterns have their origins in the formative period of Finnish nationalism. With the wisdom, and limits, of this tradition the present generation meets new problems and issues.

3. Peace research: issues of global survival 3.1 Environmental issues In comparison with the traditional pattern, the domain of peace research is theoretically more compact. Methodologically a bulk of the research is causal analysis within the framework of the behavioral approach. The less diffuse nature of the research is also due to the shortness of the time period relevant for analysis: judged according to institutional criteria, peace research is only somewhat more than a decade old in Finland.39Our analysis is kept within this temporal framework. The value components in the research reviewed may be summarized in three words: equality, autonomy, and development. By the same token, aversions are related to such concepts as underdevelopment and dependence, globalizing technological and economic structures of dominance and control etc. These notions would not be very informative to those acquainted with peace research. In its philosophical considerations, peace research by and large originally developed as a reaction against the 'realist' assumptions of power political thinking. Also, the idea of peace research goes against the hidden values of behavioralist ideals of ivory tower science. It is, however, worth while digging somewhat deeper in the concept of science actually prevailing in the research. Within the conceptual framework of positive and negative peace characteristic of the Scandinavian tradition, an analysis of unequal structures or relationships refers to a state of affairs where certain conditions required for the creation of positive peace are lacking. The moral philosophical premises are to be found in distributivejustice, a basis also

Finnish Foreign Policy Tradition

75

formulation and analytical tools utilized are tries - and the masses in the periphery, whereillustrative of an implementation of the as 'the NIEO wave' research puts more emconcept of structural power-as-social- phasis on the state level contradiction between domination: the effect of the structural power industrializedand developing countries.44The of the TNCs, manifested in increasing con- explanatory models in these studies tend to centration and internationalization in world vary from the inherent logic of capitalism to agribusiness, is dependence and the loss of the historical perspective of colonialism and self-reliance in national food production, neocolonialist mechanisms of control and dowhich in turn results in starvation in LDCs. minance. Studies on armaments and militarization The 'law' combining these variables rather generally refers to the inherent characteristics of with a focus on the North-South axis have market mechanism, the free reign of which similarly mainly dealt with the detrimental has resulted in increasing internationalization role of internationalizing (arms) industries on and concentration. In addition to this line of socio-economic development in LDCs. E.g. in theorizing, elements of the structural violence a research carried out on the relationship of school can be traced in the project, as the transnational and domestic arms production number of years lived by a person considera- in developing countries, it is concluded that bly depends on the nutritional situation. Here increased domestic production capability does the dependent variable would, instead of de- not lead to a lessening of dependency in devependence, be ratherstarvation, in the structu- loping countries. On the contrary, this means ral violence terminology a gap between the ac- strengthened dependence on foreign military tual and the potential.42 technology, which tends to perpetuate and reIn the approach represented by the study, produce other forms of economic, technolothe active element is included in environmen- gical and, in the last instance, political depental processes, whereas the countries becoming dence. As the problem formulation concerns more and more dependent on food exports the impacts of armaments on development, are treated as objects of structural power. It is the fundamental contradiction conceived folargued that food politics need to be studied lows the patterns of neocolonialist control on the international or global level since indi- and dominance, with a focus on structuralpovidual states are becoming increasinglydepen- wer and a need to disengage from it. Aldent on these processes in their national though the point of departure in these studies decision-making. From the perspective of the - which represent a recent emphasis in peace 'underdogs' the methodology thus tends to research more generally, too - is the globalbring along deterministicundertones, whereas ization of technostructures and increasing dethe voluntary aspect is rather - but only mo- pendencies, i.e. structuralpower with tones of destly so - manifested on the part of the 'top- environmental determinism, the focus on aldogs' in references about the interests of the ternative strategies also means an emphasis on TNCs and especially the US 'food power'. voluntarististic and emancipatory aspects.45 More voluntaristic philosophical underin a number of A similar approach is takyen 'political economy' studies dealing with the pinnings are also reflected in a research anarole of the TNCs in international trade, com- lyzing mobilization in Africa.46The scientific munications, seabed minerals, and the inter- and conceptual points of departure can be national patent system, among other traced to the antidomination tradition of themes.43 The identified contradictions do, peace research and development studies in however, differ slightly in focus. The studies Nordic countries. Taking its starting point in of the early seventies tend to stress somewhat the global economic relations and processes more the contradiction between the structural related to NIEO, the research focuses on the power of corporations (and sometimes banks) relationship between international and natio- pressuring governments in dominant coun- nal development processes with a nexus in the

76

OsmoApunen/Helena Rytiovuori for peace research, the research should be a peace search with an intentionally oriented goal. 'A peace researcherhas no fatherland.'47 To put it slightly differently, the concept of security, instead of the state, should be taken to refer to the community (world and local) and the people. And, although a peace researcher has no fatherland, he or she nevertheless has a field of action and influence in the immediate environment. As peace research by definition proceeds from the notion of distributive justice, the primary group of reference is constituted by those subordinated in social relations. From the aspect of policy implementation, a point of departureis often taken in the opinion that what (critical) peace research has to offer can only be put into practice by or with the help of those most seriously affected by the lack of positive peace.48 Suggesting policies to decision-makers need not, however, by definition contradict this perspective; the state may constitute one of the channels utilized by the researcher in his endeavours - although delicate problems no doubt are involved in this policy. Our intention here is to approach these issues only empirically, i.e. to investigate how the dilemma of choosing between individualistic (egocentric national) motivations and collectivistic or international community orientations of the research has been approached in Finnish peace research. The need for a logical linkage between ends and means has strongly been advocated in Gandhian thinking: 'There is no road to peace. Peace is the road.' In Scandinavian peace researchthis idea is manifestedin the very development of the Galtungian concepts of negative and positive peace; positive peace, which lays emphasis on cooperative measures, ability and emancipation, makes the point that (negative) peace may be created by repressive means and, consequently, as an end state bear elements of repression. In the causal analysis of peace conditions the interpretation of such requirementsis necessarily, more or less explicitly, derived from a vision about the desired end state. An analysis of peace strategies again is methodologically based on

role of the state and, more concretely, analyzes the potential and possibilities of realizing self-reliant development strategies in the structural-historical context of the African continent. In the problem formulation we find the preformistic model: the relevant question concerns the control mechanisms to be created in order to realize the development potential. Within the conceptual framework of mobilization, development is defined as a teleological process to be consciously planned and manipulated. However, the actual content given to the concept of power-as-socialcompetence or progress is by and large that of mobilization potential in terms of power capabilities, economic resources to be more specific. Thus, although the very concept of mobilization indicates teleological explanation of action, what is analyzed is rather (structural) emancipatory potential in the context of structural repressive power. This, we feel, is mainly a result of the methodological premises: the structural approach typical of peace research in Scandinavia tends to leave the voluntary aspect in a secondary place. However, as capabilities or resource power (mobilization potential) are conceived as a means to attain more self-reliant development or autonomy, the concept of structuralpower is basically emancipatory here. By way of a tentative conclusion, we may say that in the analysis of environmental factors (the structural variation of) the line P,-S, seems to have predominated, but that this nevertheless increasingly tends to be combined with the emancipatory concept (P,-S,). In fact, it seems that whereas the structural analyses of the early seventies were more of a deterministic nature, the 'NIEO wave research'has its point of departurein more voluntaristic approaches. At this point we may only raise the question about the impact of the servered international climate of 'the after NIEO era' on the cognitive patterning of environmental issues in research. 3.2 Strategiesfor global persistence and survival According to the widely accepted guidelines

FinnishForeignPolicy Tradition the teleological or finalistic explanation of action and - what is our empirical problem here - the means dimension may or may not contain the qualitative elements of the desired end state. Following from the inclination towards causal analysis in the research, the dimension of action is dealt with in terms of (structural) interest conflict.49 Therefore, strategies must be 'scarved out' from the analytical elements of structuralpower/violence. For this reason, our intention is to make an experiment on utilizing the analytical tools offered by Galtung's structural violence framework. The Galtungian elements of social order are the following:5?
structure, higher rang a lower rang sy stems structure, level n-i level n

77

.. actor

systems

In this conceptualization, actors are organized in systems through particular types of interaction, whereas the entirety of systems forms a structure. Structures may be distinguished at various levels. The concept of a rank refers to actor status in a particular system. From these concepts we are able to derive five theoretical models and related strategies: (1) Level equalization model aims at reducing hierarchy between structures, whereas (2) structural change refers to internal transformation of this unit (relationships between systems). As to the individual systems, we can distinguish between (3) system transformation and (4) system differentiation models. Finally, there is the (5) status equilibrium model, which refers to equalizing the actor status in various systems.

Level equalization as a strategy may be found in most of the researchin the form of general references to the need to realize a new international (economic) order; the object is equalization of structures of the developed and underdeveloped worlds. E.g. in the context of problems of food politics it is emphasized that solutions to these should not be looked for in isolation but as part of comprehensive international measures."5More generally, typical of the approaches we have called the organizational pattern is to concentrate on analysing the means of repression in the mode of causal analysis, and then to refer to NIEO by way of a solution. As a consequence the policy formulation in these studies tends to favor the declaratory manner. The mobilization researchwhich in its problem formulation rather exemplifies the preformistic model focuses similarly on structure equalization, but instead of only treating this as a solution also takes it as the very object of analysis.52 The system transformation strategy is represented by a number of studies dealing with e.g. the international patent system, communication networks, international banking and trade etc.53 The concept of a 'system' tends to point out the internationally dependent nature of the field in question.54A line of reasoning characterizing the approach is that in the light of growing internationalization and concentration (structuralpower of TNCs) national policies alone are not of much relevance. Instead, solutions should be looked for in the revision of the system internationally. Consequently, changes at the international level are often conceived as a precondition for changes to take place at the national level. Also in this case the policy formulations are mainly declaratory and, naturally enough, focus on international multidiplomacy. The system differentiation strategy comprises the research advocating different policies for different actors within the system context. The main categories here focus on more selfreliant agricultural, industrial, and security policies in LDCs, disengagement from the international context in other words. Since the research on alternative security policies offers

78

Osmo Apunen/Helena Rytiivuori

some interesting points of comparison in respect to the 'political economy' studies, our focus is on this here. In line with the organizational model, even studies with a security policy orientation tend to concentrate on reasoning about why alternative security strategies should be adopted (repressive power of armaments industries) rather than primarily focussing on analysing the elements and implementation of such strategies. In this type of research the societal dimension is often more clearly articulated than is the case with a bulk of the 'political economy' researchmainly focusing on international multidiplomacy. The reason for this is partly definitional: it is emphasized that in this context measures (reorientation of armaments industry) must take place separately in the industrialized and developing countries since it would be politically very difficult to create multilateral and intergovernmental arrangements.55An emphasis on the societal context

of an is, however,also a logicalconsequence applicationof approachesfocusingon internal domestic(bureaucratic politics, militaryindustrialcomplex, autism etc.) ratherthan external (action-reaction, power game etc.)
factors in the arms race. Studies of this type by definition concen-

trate on policy implementation, and consewith inquentlythe end state - development

creased autonomy - remains the value basis behind. In policy formulation the declaratory

of armaments, aspectsreferto the illegitimacy whereaspolicy implementation is concerned with ways and meansof mobilizing resources
for development (slowing down R&D in developed countries and channelling the re-

lease to the LDCs).56 In this contextit is easy

to hypothesize that the fact that the specific

is more clearlyarticupolicy implementation

lated in matters of militarization and the arms race is related to the fact that peace researchis

here more 'professional'than in the more issues. genuinefield of development

In the policy proposals concerning alternawith the dilemma of repressive means consti-

legitimation here lies in the argument that a people's army also representsa form of social defence, which contributes to the creation of democratic social structures and, above all, does not undermine self-reliant economic development. Two kinds of cognitive patterns can be identified here. The first goes along the line of arguing for the case of the least evil: if we take it that an army is needed anyhow, it should be of a kind which is least harmful to the harmonious development of civilian sectors, economic growth, and political democracy. Within this context it may also be recalled that nonviolent forms of defence may be better combined with a military system based on a people's army. According to another line of argument, the military is no evil by definition, but what is decisive are its functions and purposes in society; in a particular societal and historical context the military may have a positive role to play in increasing the emancipatory powers of the people. In concrete analyses these arguments are not very clearly distinguished from each other. It seems, however,warrantedto conclude that in the final analysis the values of distributive justice tend to weigh more than the principle of non-violence. Finally, we are to note that the categories of structural change and status equilibrium remain scarce in our pilot study. In the case of the former this would indicate that entire unit changes (revolutions) are not very commonly proposed strategies. 'Structuralchange' is indeed one of the most repeated terms in the research but the concept is not, stricto sensu, used in its Galtungian meaning. The scarcity of studies with a rank equilibriumfocus again indicates the hegemony of more comprehensive system approach over actor relations in the research. There are, however, indications of a 'come back' of the more traditional actor status approach, above all representedby studies on regional power centers."57 3.3. Finland and the international community

tive military strategies, we are confronted The policy statements in the researchreviewed nature.The sense. In the research characterizedby the ortutingan end stateof a repressive
as a rule focus on the state level in a general

Finnish Foreign Policy Tradition

79

ganizational model, it is sometimes pointed out that Finland, too, is becoming more internationally dependent within the system context in question."58 In the few studies particuFinland as the channel for larly emphasizing international community measures, basically two types of cognitive patterns may be distinguished: the active support and the passive follow-up model. The active support model is characterized by attempts to 'steer' the Finnish input in international cooperation towards qualitative agreement with the community as against the egoistic national approach. E.g. in an analysis on Finnish food aid it is argued that multilateral agencies - The World Food Programme is advocated - should be used for channelling the aid, because egocentric motives (own agriculturalsurplus relieved by food aid) easily intrude in bilateral aid. The logic of the argument is thus that, in order to avoid the distorting impact of selfinterest, collectivistic measures should be preferred to own initiatives."59 Elements of the activist model can also be discerned, e.g. in a study dealing with Finland's relations with the Republic of SouthAfrica. An increase in the aid to ANC and SWAPO is suggested in order to speed up the break of repressive structures in Southern Africa: the aim is to contribute actively to the emancipation of the black population.6 The more passivefollow-up model takes internationally formulated norms as a point of departure and emphasizes that Finland, too, should contribute to progressive measures internationally. Characteristicof this model is a concentration on UN issues and a concern about the Finnish foreign policy image. Domestic interest groups suffering from the realization of internationally formulated norms (like NIEO principles, economic sanctions against 'pariah' states etc.) may be identified and the costs involved calculated. As a rule no major hindrances for the implementation of policies formulated internationally are conceived and, consequently, a question about political willingness is often raised by the research community.6' The approach taking a point of departure in a contradiction between

norms advocated within the international community and Finnish self-interests is by definition declaratory in its policy formulation and as such also reflects Finland's historical role as a bystander and the related lack of tradition in Third World policies. 3.4. Concluding remarks in peace research Our findings indicated that in the research the dependent variable (structuresof dependency) is kept relativelyunchanged - only the notions on starvation implied a different pattern here. The independentvariable, again, is more multidimensional. In moral philosophical considerations the premises are to be found in distributivejustice. Thus ideas of non-violence in concrete analyses tend to be related to the end state only, whereas these issues in the means dimension are not problematized - rather they are typologized. Consequently, this problematique - from the perspective of which our analytical framework has been constructed turns up in the categories of just/unjust; the use of violence is qualified, but not discriminated. Hence, the value premises tend to distance themselves somewhat from the Gandhian ideas of reaching the principle of nonviolence also to include the means utilized. In this sense, ideas are shared with the traditional school: violence as a means is qualified in both, although in a different manner. Empirically our conclusions are merely based on a tentative analysis of Finnish research, but the questions opened should nevertheless have relevance in the wider Scandinavian tradition more widely, too. Perhaps we need to emphasize that we do not here argue for any particular value basis for peace research but instead wish to point out a need to reflect on these premises. We would also conclude that an egocentric national bias in Finnish peace research would be hard to find. The explanation is, however, more intricate than a mere preference for a community or collectivistic international approach - although this explanation by no means should be excluded. The first reservation relates to our focus on North-South issues, which, until more recently, have remain-

80

Osmo Apunen/Helena

Rytiivuori

ed peripheral for Finnish foreign policy con- least, left in the background. The peace recerns; studies on more regional matters might search community, in turn, is intellectually modify our conclusions. The point about the preoccupied with global issues and has clearly so far relatively peripheral significance of a world community point of view. But peace these matters to Finland is also supported by researchers are not very specific with respect the fact that in most studies Finland is not any to the means to be used in order to attain the object of interest. To this there is, however, desired end states. If traditional security polialso another explanation, viz. the preoccupa- cy scholars keep at a clear cognitive distance tion of the research tradition with interna- with respect to the world community point of tional dominance structures and patterns of view and North-South issues, then the peace dependency, in the global context of which research community in turn exhibits a similar Finland in many respects rather belongs to the persuasive handicap: peace researchers are semiperipheral than center countries. How- not very specific as to the means of persisever, the reason we would regard as the most tence their immediate social setting, the Finimportant one refers to the sociological nish society and state, should utilize. And so aspects in a particular research community, the two 'communities' - the word written in i.e. that research influences are rather gained parentheses because of the small number of from the international or Scandinavian peace individuals respectively involved - do not meresearch community than any nationally bas- et or confront each other intellectually in any ed research traditions or domestic problems. substantial manner. Hence the idea of With regard to our conclusions we are development as an absolute idea, i.e. progress obliged to make the reservationthat in a small that takes place with the force of its own dyresearch community like the Finnish merely namics, seems to prevail in both traditions. stochastical processes by necessity play a role One is not very much concerned with what in the various choices made - but probably takes place outside the immediate ethnocentric not in the more fundamental premises pos- perspective; the other is not too much preocsessed. cupied with how its social setting may contribute to the persistenceof the global communi4. An absolute idea of progress? ty. Comparing the two traditions in Finland, security policy and peace research, one easily perceives that they do not confront each other NOTES a great deal over the same issues. As a result, such an intellectual particularism can be best 1. A definition of A. Kardiner, quoted in Berenice A. illustrated with the distinct cognitive distances Carroll, Peace Research: The Cult of Power, J.ournalof these two traditions or schools exhibit in Fin- Conflict Resolution, vol. XVI, N:o 4, December 1972, p. land. In spite of this cognitive particularism, 590. 2. Jussi Valtiojayhteiskunta Snellmanin valtiofilothe two schools do, however, perform persua- sofiassa,Teljo, (State and society in Snellman's philosophy), sive roles within the same and overlapping so- Helsinki 1934, p. 87 3. Teljo, op.cit. p. 84. cial settings. 4. K. J. Holsti, International Politics, Englewood The traditional security pattern, as one almost by definition may expect, is preoccupied Cliffs, N. J. 1977, p. 165. 5. Anatol Rapoport, Strategy and Conscience, New with issues of paramount importance to Fin- York 1969, p. 124. land as a state actor in international relations. 6. Elizabeth Converse, A. Post-editorial, Journal of This has resulted in a small power perspective Conflict Resolution, vol. XVI, No. 4, December 1972 p. in the research, too. Authors of this school 617. 7. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. by C. B. Macpherare not much preoccupied with 'distant' pro- son, Aylesbury 1976, p. 118. blems; global issues of survival and world 8. Tord Heivik, Basic goals of development: Survival, community points of view are, to say the integrity, and progress, PRIO publication S-26/77.

Finnish Foreign Policy Tradition 9. Paivio Tommila, La Finlande dans la politique europeenne en 1809-1815, Helsinki 1962. 10. Osmo Apunen, Suomi keisarillisen Saksan politiikassa 1914-1915 (Finland in German politics 1914-1915), Helsinki 1968; Deutschland und die finnische Freiheitsbewequng in 1914-1915, gedenkschrift Martin Gohring, Wiesbaden 1969. 11. Max Jakobson, The Diplomacy of Winter War, An account of the Russo-Finnish War, 1939-1940, Cambridge, Mass. 1961. 12. Five roads to Nordic security, ed. by J. J. Hoist, Cooperation & Conflict 3/4 1972. 13. Lauri Hyvaimki, Suomalaiset ja suurpolitiikka, Venaijaindiplomatia Suomen sanomalehdiston kuvastimessa (Finns and the World Politics 1878-1890), with an English summary, Helsinki 1964. 14. Tuomo Polvinen, Die finnischen Eisenbahnen in den militirischen und politischen Pliinen Russlands vor dem ersten Weltkrieg, Helsinki 1962. 15. Stacy Churchill, The East Karelian autonomy question in Finnish-Soviet relations, 1917-1922, London 1972; Mauno Jaiskelaiinen,Itai-Karjalan kysymys (The question of East Karelia), Helsinki 1961. 16. Tuomo Polvinen, Suomi suurvaltojen politiikassa 1941-44 (Finland in big power politics 1941-44), Porvoo 1964. 17. Osmo Apunen, Geographical and political factors in Finland's relations with the Soviet Union, Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy 1977, Helsinki 1978. 18. Helge Seppali, Taistelu Leningradista ja Suomi, (The Battle of Leningrad and Finland), Porvoo 1969. i9. J. K. Paasikivi, Paasikiven linja, Puheita vuosilta 1944-1956 (The Paasikivi Line, Speeches 1944-1956) Porvoo 1962 p. 99. 20. Osmo Jussila, Nationalismi ja vallankumous vendiIlis-suomalaisissa suhteissa 1899-1914 (Nationalism and revolution in Russian-Finnish relations 1899-1914) with an English summary, Helsinki 1979. 21. Tuomo Polvinen, Veniajiin vallankumousja Suomi 1-2, (The Russian revolution and Finland 1917-20, Helsinki 1967, 1971. 22. Polvinen, op.cit. (1964). 23. Krister Wahlback, Norden och blockuppdelningen 1948-1949, Internationellastudier B/1973; Raimo Vayrynen, Conflicts in Finnish-Soviet relations, Three comparative case studies, Tampere 1972. 24. Osmo Apunen, Three 'Waves' of the Kekkonen Plan and Nordic Security in the 1980's, Bulletin of Peace Proposals 1/ 1980. 25. Keijo Korhonen, Suomen asiain komitea (The Comittee for Finnish Affairs 1811-1826) mit deutschem Referat, Helsinki 1963; Juhani Paasivirta, Suomija Eurooppa (Finland and Europe 1808-1914) Helsinki 1978. 26. Th. Rein, Juhana WilhelmSnellman, 1-2 (biography), Helsinki 1928, p. 319-328. 27. Max Jakobson, Veteenpiirretty viiva (Line drawn into water), Keuruu 1980, p. 95-98. 28. Jussila,op.cit. (1979) 29. Taimi Torvinen, J. R. Danielson-Kalmari Suomen autonomian puolustajana (J. R. Danielson-Kalmari, de-

81

fender of the Finnish autonomy), Helsinki 1965. 30. Pirkko Rommi, Yrjo-Koskisen linja (The line of Yrj6-Koskinen), Lahti 1964. 31. Apunen, op.cit. (1968). 32. Matti Klinge, Vihan veljistd valtiososialismiin, Yhteiskunnallisia ja kansallisia nakemyksia 1910- ja 1920- luvuilta (Social and national conceptions from 1910's and 1920's), Porvoo 1972. 33. Churchill, Jaaskelainen, op.cit. 34. Tuomo Polvinen, TeheranistaJaltaan, Suomi kansainvalisessa politiikassa 1944 (From Tehran to Yalta, Finland in international politics 1944), Juva 1980. 35. Vayrynen, op.cit.; Harto Hakovirta, Puolueettomuus ja integraatiopolitiikka (Neutrality and integration policy), with an English summary, Tampere 1976; Hannu Kyrolainen, Talous ja politiikka eri jiirjestelmainomaavien valtioiden suhteissa: Suomi ja Neuvostoliitto 1944-1979 (Economics and politics in the Finnish-Soviet relations 1944-1979), Tampere 1981. 36. Jakobson, op.cit. (1980). 37. Henry Kissinger, A World Restored, Thetford 1964, p. 20. 38. Paasivirta, op.cit, p. 144. 39. The Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI) was founded in 1970. The process which resulted in the establishment of the institute had its roots above all in the following factors: First, during the sixties, peace researchinstitutes had been established in other Nordic countries. The second factor was the influence of the domestic opinion climate in the late sixties, manifested e.g. in the birth of the Committee of the Hundred. The third factor was the Finnish foreign policy of active neutrality, for the realization of which also the international situation began to work favorably; a peace research institute was considered desirable from the aspect of foreign policymaking. 40. Etzioni elaborates the approaches of preformism (or differentiation) and epigenesis (or accumulation) in the analysis of integration theory. Amitai Etzioni, The Epigenesis of Political Communities at the International Level. In Rosenau, James N. (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy. Revised ed., New York & London 1969, 349-358, esp. 347-348. 41. Vilho Harle (ed.), Ruoka ja politiikka (Food and Politics). Tampere Peace Research Institute, Research Reports No. 21, 1980. At an earlier stage in the research project, an international seminar was organized on the subject, the proceedings of which have been published in Vilho Harle (ed.), The Political Economy of Food. Saxon House Publications, Westmead 1978. 42. Harle (ed.) 1980, op.cit. For notions on structural violence see the preface of the report. 43. Some examples: Uolevi Arosalo - Raimo Viyrynen, Financial and Industrial Oligarchy: Present Structure and Some Trends, Tampere Peace Research Institute, Research Reports No. 1, 1972; Tapio Varis, The Impact of Transnational Corporations on Communication, Research Reports No. 10, 1975; Raimo Viyrynen, The Role of Transnational Corporations in International Trade, Research Reports No. 3, 1976 (a); Raimo Vayrynen,

82

Osmo Apunen/Helena Rytovuori

49. For conflict definitions see e.g. HAkan Wiberg, Konfliktteori och fredsforskning. Stockholm 1976, 8-24. 50. Johan Galtung, Strukturelle Gewalt. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1975, 20-21. 51. Harle (ed.) 1980, op. cit. e.g. p. 19. 52. Mobilisaatio Afrikassa... op. cit. For the NIEO analyses by the research team see e.g. Esko Antola, Uuden kansainvailisen taloudellisen jarjestyksen toteuttaminen (The Implementationof the New International Economic Order)Politiikka 4, 1976 and Esko Antola, Jan-Otto Andersson & Jyrki Kakonen, Uusi kansainvalinen taloudellinen jairjestys(New InternationalEconomic Order) Tiede & Edistys, No. 2, 1978, pp. 44-57. 53. See reference no. 43. 54. See e.g. Harle (ed.) 1980 op. cit., in which the concept of 'the world food system' is elaborated with such aims and Vayrynen 1976 (b) op. cit. 55. Tuomi-Vayrynen, op. cit., 253-271, esp. 265, see also Vayrynen 1981 op. cit. 56. Tuomi-Vayrynen op. cit. 253-271, esp. 264. 57. Raimo Vayrynen, Economic and Military Position of the Regional Power Centers. Journal of Peace Research no. 4, Vol. XVI, 1979, 349-369. 58. Harle (ed.) 1980. op. cit., 220-236. 59. Mervi Gustafsson, Suomen elintarvikeapu kehitysmaille. (Finnish food aid to developing countries) Tampere Peace Research Institute, Occasional Papers No. 10, 1978. 60. Raimo Vayrynen, Suomen ja Etela-Afrikan taloussuhteet (Economic Relations between Finland and South Africa). Tampere Peace Research Institute, Occasional Papers No. 8, 1977. 61. Ibid. The two models are clearly intertwined in the study.

The InternationalPatent System, TransnationalCorporations and Technological Dominance, Research Reports No. 11, 1976 (b); Raimo Vayrynen, The InternationalPatent System and the Transfer of Technology to Africa, Occasional Papers No. 9, 1977; Raimo Vayrynen, The Struggle for Seabed Minerals. Instant (later Current)Research on Peace and Violence 4/1974. 44. Of the first type e.g. Arosalo-Vayrynen, op.cit. may be mentioned; of the second e.g. Vayrynen 1976 (b) and 1977 op. cit. 45. Helena Tuomi - Raimo Viyrynen, Transnational Corporations, Armaments and Development, Tampere Peace Research Institute, Research Reports No. 22, 1980. On similar problem focus and suggestions for alternative military strategies in the Third World, see also Raimo Vayrynen, Industrialization,Economic Development and the World Military Order. Industrializationand Country Case Studies. Industry 2000 - New Perspectives. Collected Background Papers, vol. 6. United Nations Industrial Development Organization. (UN Doc. ID/Conf. 4/3, prepared for the Third General Conference of UNIDO, New Delhi 21. Jan - 8. Feb. 1981, 409-508.) 46. Mobilisaatio Afrikassa. Mobilisaation kasite ja tieteelliset laht6kohdat tutkimusprojektille 'Mobilisaatio Afrikassa (Mobilization in Africa. The Concept of Mobilization and Theoretical Bases for the research project 'Mobilization in Africa'). Universityof Turku, Studies in Political Science No. 34, 1977. 47. Johan Galtung, Editorial. Journal of Peace Research 1, 1964, 4 and Rauhantutkimus (Peace Research). Tapiola 1969, 17. 48. On these considerations see e.g. Hubert Groten & Jiirgen Jansen, Interpretersand Lobbies for Positive Peace. Journal of Peace Research no. 2, Vol. XVIII, 1981, 175-181.