Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Chinese Guerilla Counter-Offensive Military Campaigns during the Anti-Japanese War (1937-1940)
1
World
War
II-
Pacific
War-Events,
Kidport
Reference
Library.
<
http://www.kidport.com/RefLib/WorldHistory/WorldWarII/WorldWarIIPacificEvents.htm > [accessed 20, November 2012]. An example of Chinese Anti-Japanese propaganda spread during the war.
3. Wartime
Objectives:
The
GMD-CCP
United
Front
versus
the
Japanese
Imperial
Army.14
Imperial
Japanese
Army
.14
The
United
Front
15
6. A
Concluding
Evaluation
of
Chinese
Guerilla
Counter-Offensive
Military
Campaigns
during
the
Anti-Japanese
War
27
7. Bibliography..29
3 We Communists, together with all the other anti-Japanese political parties and the whole people, have no other course than to strive to unite all forces for the defeat of the diabolical Japanese aggressors.2 - Mao Tse-Tung, 1938
1.
Introduction
The
eruption
of
war
between
China
and
Japan
culminated
after
years
of
brooding
hostility.
However,
it
was
the
Marco-Polo
Bridge
incident
on
July
7,
1937,
that
marked
the
beginning
of
Japans
all-out
aggression
against
China
and
Chinas
Anti-Japanese
War.
Forced
into
an
uneasy
united
front,
the
Kuomintang
(KMT)
and
Communist
(CCP)
forces
joined
together
to
resist
the
Japanese
invasion.
It
was
during
the
Anti-Japanese
War
that
Communist
military
leader
and
strategist,
Mao
Tse-Tung,
applied
his
theory
of
guerilla
warfare,
which
enabled
the
Chinese
to
unexpectedly
weaken
the
dominant
Japanese
military
aggression
scheme
and
ultimately
defend
Chinese
territory.
Maos
tactics,
executed
by
the
Eighth
Route
Army
and
the
New
Fourth
Army
National
Revolutionary
Forces,
demonstrated
how
guerilla
warfare
could
be
used
to
build
power
and
weaken
a
more
powerful
aggressor.
Due
to
the
exhausting
surprise
it
gave
the
Japanese,
this
paper
will
examine
Chinese
guerilla
counter-offensive
military
strategy
and
campaigns
during
the
Anti- Japanese
War.
First,
it
will
provide
historical
background
of
the
years
leading
up
to
1937.
Second,
it
will
explore
both
the
Chinese
and
Japanese
objectives
during
the
war.
The
third
section
of
the
paper
will
then
explicate
Maos
theory
of
guerilla
warfare
and
its
application
during
the
war,
highlighting
battles
that
emphasize
the
effect
of
guerilla
counter
offensive-methodology
on
the
Japanese.
The
essay
will
end
with
an
evaluation
of
the
application
of
guerilla
warfare,
exploring
the
significance
of
Chinese
guerilla
warfare
tactics
relative
to
the
overall
Chinese
agenda.
Proceeding
chronologically
throughout
the
decade,
this
paper
will
provide
a
detailed
analysis
of
2
Mao
Tse-tung,
On
Protracted
War,
(Honolulu,
HI:
University
Press
of
the
Pacific,
2001); 2-3. This quotation was taken from a series of lectures delivered by Comrade Mao Tse-tung from May 26 to June 3, 1938, at the Yenan Association for the Study of the War of Resistance Against Japan.
4 Maos guerilla counter-offensive military campaign tactics and overall attest their effectiveness against the Japanese military from 1937 until 1945 during the War of Resistance.
2.
Before
1937:
The
Context
of
the
Chinese
Guerilla
Counter- Offensive
Military
Campaigns
In
order
to
comprehensively
understand
the
use
of
guerilla
counter-offensive
military
campaigns
during
the
Anti-Japanese
War,
it
is
important
to
explore
the
historical
context
from
which
they
were
developed
and
implemented.
Japan:
The
Aggressor
or
The
Aggrieved?
Prior
to
1937,
Japan
imperialism
persistently
besieged
China.
Although
from
the
Chinese
point
of
view,
Japan
was
the
aggressor.
It
is
necessary
to
explore
both
sides
of
the
conflict
and
understand
Japans
motive
for
making
the
decision
to
invade
China.
As
a
country
that
was
characteristically
resource
deficient,
Japan
held
a
strong
interest
in
Chinas
valuable
raw
resources.
Therefore,
an
invasion
was
viewed
as
the
sufficient
means
for
satisfying
Japanese
needs.
That
being
said,
Manchuria,
in
northeast
China,
rich
with
minerals,
fertile
soil,
and
nearly
200,000
square
kilometers
of
land,
was
a
suitable
province,
for
Japan
to
seize
control
over3
and
on
September
18,
1931,
Japan
invaded
accordingly.
Japanese
military
leaders
of
the
Kwantung
Army,
an
army
group
of
the
Imperial
Japanese
Army,
initiated
a
plot
to
seize
control
of
Chinas
three
northeastern
provinces,
illustrated
on
the
map
on
page
six.4
In
his
text
Facing
Japan:
Chinese
Politics
and
Japanese
Imperialism,
1931-1937,
Parks
M.
Cole
describes
the
invasion,
which
came
be
known
as
the
Manchuria
or
Mukden
Incident.
Coble
writes:
3 China at War: An Encyclopedia, edited by Xiaobing Li, (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2012); 183. 4 Parks M. Coble, Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931-1937,
5 Within hours, the major cities of southern ManchuriaMukden Mukden (Shengyang), Yinkou, Antung, and Changchun fell under Japanese control. Within days, most of Liaoning and Kirin provinces were brought inside the Kwantung Armys orbit; and within weeks, the Japanese military established a puppet government over the entire northeast.5 As described in the passage above, Japanese armed forces successfully occupied the entire Manchuria including the Liaoning, Jilin (Kirin), and Heilongjiang (Heilungkiang) Provinces.
This
attack
arguably
marked
the
beginning
of
Japans
all
out
aggression
against
China.
However,
it
is
important
to
note
that
this
apparent
Japanese
hostility
was
neither
impulsive
nor
random.
It
instead
occurred
following
a
sequence
of
events
during
which
Japan,
made
sincere
and
strenuous
efforts
to
befriend
China.7
In
fact,
in
his
K.K.
Kawakami
wrote
in
1938,
in
the
course
of
the
war,
that
Japan
believed,
herself
the
aggrieved
part
in
the
present
conflict.8
5
Coble,
Facing
Japan:
Chinese
Politics
and
Japanese
Imperialism,
1931-1937,
11.
6
Li
Tien-yu,
Saga
of
Resistance
to
Japanese
Invasion,
(Peking:
Foreign
Language
Press,
1959);
10.
Map
7
Kiyoshi
Karl
Kawakami,
Japan
in
China,
Her
Motives
and
Aims,
(London:
John
Murray,
shows provinces that Japanese invaded during the Manchuria Incident. 1938); 54.
8 Ibid., 54.
rampant in China, while Japans policy was distinctly conciliatory. China developed a technique of anti-Japanese agitation and used it with deadly effect. In June 1928, the National Convention of Anti-Japanese Societies, subsidized by the Nanking Government, issued the following declaration: The objective of our anti-Japanese movement is to ruin the Japanese by causing our economic rupture with them. The pressure will next be brought to bear upon all the rest of the Imperialist nations, with the ultimate object of nullifying all unequal treaties.9 Additionally, until August 1929 the Nanking Government subsidized Societies for the Revocation of Unequal Treaties and openly enforced an anti- Japanese boycott directly punishing Chinese merchants handling Japanese goods, thereby triggering diplomatic complications with Japan. Meanwhile, all educational institutions were utilized to instill hostility toward Japan. For example, in May 1928, the National Education Conference at Nanking adopted the following resolutions: 1. Ample material regarding national humiliations should be included in the text-books of middle and primary schools.10 2. On every available opportunity, the schools should be used to propagate the facts regarding our national humiliations and to impress upon the people what nation is Chinas foremost enemy.11 3. Maps and drawings illustrative of national humiliations should be provided, and attention of the students should be directed to these at every opportunity.12 4. The teachers and students should study together the methods whereby Chinas foremost enemy may be overthrown.13
9
Kawakami,
Japan
in
China,
Her
Motives
and
Aims,71.
10
Ibid.,72.
11
Ibid.,72.
12
Ibid.,
72.
13
Ibid,,
72.
7 Chinas foremost enemy mentioned above was referring to Japan and the
unforgivable
historical
humiliation
it
caused
China
was
accentuated.
Even
before
this
plan
was
adopted,
childrens
textbook
contained
passages
stating:
Japan
is
an
enemy
nation!14
The
effect
of
this
type
of
propaganda
was
significant,
as
the
whole
country
became,
aflame
with
hatred
of
Japannot
a
spontaneous
combustion,
but
a
conflagration
ignited
by
the
Nationalist
Government
itself.15
As
a
result,
anti- Japanese
incidents
occurred
in
rapid
succession
over
the
years
leading
up
to
the
wars
as
displayed
by
the
following
timeline:
May 1935: Two Chinese newspaper editors with proJapanese leanings were murdered in Tientsin.
January 6, 1936: Two thousand Chinese students of middle schools held demonstrations in Swatow demanding war against Japan.
September
18,
1931:
Mukden
Incident
August 24, 1936: A correspondent of the Osaka Minichi and the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi and another Japanese press correspondent were pounced upon by a mob of 10,000 Chinese, mostly young boys and girls, and were most brutally murdered at Chengtu, Szechuan province. Two other Japanese were seriously wounded.
July
7,
1937:
Marco
Polo
Bridge
Incident
December
21,
1935:
About
a
thousand
Chinese
students
paraded
through
the
center
of
the
Shanghai
International
Settlement
shouting
Down
with
Japanese
Imperialism!
Drive
out
every
Japanese
from
Shanghai!
They
distributed
anti-Japanese
pamphlets.
June
19,
1936:
A Japanese was shot dead by Chinese at Fangtou, Shangtung province.
March
1937:
The Kuangsi provincial authorities, for no other reason but to fan antiJapanese feeling, expelled all Japanese from the province.
The
timeline
above
shows
the
violent
result
of
years
of
anti-Japanese
propaganda,
financed
and
encouraged
by
the
Nanking
Government.
However,
as
14
Kawakami,
Japan
in
China,
Her
Motives
and
Aims,
72.
15
Ibid.,
74.
8
revealed
by
his
Appeasement
Policy,
Chiang
Kai-shek
had
no
intention
of
going
to
war
with
Japan,
but
instead
meant
to
exploit
the
Japanese
for
an
ulterior
purpose
of
uniting
the
country
under
his
power
and
strengthening
his
own
position.
Generalissimo
Chiang
Kai-Sheks
Policy
of
Appeasement
Japans
1931
attack
augmented
Chinese
fury,
not
only
because
of
Japanese
During
the
1931
Manchuria
Incident,
General
Chang
Hseuh-liang,
pictured
below
as
leader
of
Manchuria
and
much
of
northern
China,
could
have
put
up
a
credible
defense
against
the
Japanese.
The
Japanese
Kwantung
Army
numbered
11,000,
while
Chang
reportedly
controlled
at
least
one-quarter
of
a
million
troops.
In
addition,
his
arsenal
at
Mukden
was
considered
Chinas
most
modern:
His
air
force
contained
sixty
planes;
his
forces
ad
tanks,
4,000
machine
guns,
and
modern
field
artillery.16Nevertheless,
Chang
refused
to
resist.
Following
the
attack
on
September
20,
1931,
Chang
told
reporters17:
As
soon
as
I
sensed
that
Japan
was
about
to
take
certain
action
in
Manchuria,
I
used
an
order
to
all
my
subordinates
that
when
and
if
Japanese
troop
attacked,
all
the
forces
under
their
respective
commands,
including
the
police,
should
not
resistThat
is
why
Chinese
troops
did
not
retaliate
in
an
authorized,
organized
way.
18
audacity, but also due to the initial policy of the Chinese Government to not resist.
History
later
revealed
that
Chang
Hseuh-liang,
at
the
time,
was
being
pressured
by
Chiang
Kai-shek
and
the
government
to
uphold
the
policy
of
16
Coble,
Facing
Japan:
Chinese
Politics
and
Japanese
Imperialism,
1931-1937,
12.
17
Ibid.,
12.
18
Zhang
Xueliang,
Wikipedia,
<
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhang_Xueliang
>
[accessed
20,
9 appeasement. Chiangs policy demanded, first internal pacification, then external resistance.19 Chiang created the policy first because he believed that his army was inferior to Japans military machine and thus war would be disastrous both for China and himself politically. Second, Chiang was also more concerned with domestic issues, such as defeating the rebellious Chinese Communists and secure control of fractionalized China under his central authority. As a result, Chiang decisively chose to avoid war with Japan and his policy of appeasement ensued. Chiangs appeasement policy carried high political risks.20In fact it can even be argued that, the entire Nanking government lost prestige among the Chinese public over the appeasement issue.21Overall appeasement proved to be unpopular as an emotional charged Chinese populace demanded resistance to Japan. The city of Shanghai particularly bristled with hostility between Chinese and Japanese. The metropolis was the center of the anti-Japanese boycott and student movements, as well as Japanese presence in China as nearly 30,000 Japanese resided in the city. Japanese business and industrial leaders in Shanghai had been hurt by the boycott and pressured by their military authorities to take action. On January 28, 1932, a Japanese carrier aircraft bombed Shanghai. Three thousand Japanese troops then proceeded to invade the city: The destruction from this assault was frightful. Bombs and shells landed in densely populated areas, killing and wounding thousands and destroying untold numbers of house and shops.22 Ending in a ceasefire, the fighting at Shanghai electrified public opinion in China even more. As demonstrations, anti-Japanese boycotts, and even attacks on Japanese citizens augmented dramatically throughout China, as illustrated in the timeline on page eight, Chiangs opponents took the political opportunity to attack him. Parks M. Coble explains that, Nearly every one of Chiangs opponents cloaked himself in an
19
Coble,
Facing
Japan:
Chinese
Politics
and
Japanese
Imperialism,
1931-1937,
1.
20
Ibid.,
2
21
Ibid.,
2
22
Ibid.,
43
10
anti-Japanese
mantle
and
publically
assailed
Chiang
for
catering
to
Japanese
demands;23
most
notably
the
Chinese
Communist
Party
of
China
(CCP).
The
Chinese
Communist
Party
of
China
(CCP)
As
the
Kuomintang
Governments
most
deadly
enemy,24
the
Chinese
Communist
Party
was
the
first
to
appeal
to
the
masses
for
armed
resistance.
When
the
Japanese
began
to
take
over
Manchuria,
following
the
Mukden
Incident,
in
September
1932,
the
Chinese
Communists
responded
with
the
following
resolutions:
The
Manchurian
Incident
will
have
decisive
influence
on
future
events
in
ChinaAll
these
things
will
prompt
the
collapse
and
bankruptcy
of
the
Kuomintang
ruleWe
shall
exploit
the
popular
disappointment
in
a
hatred
for
the
Kuomintang
rule
so
as
to
organize
the
broad
masses
and
guide
them
toward
a
struggle
to
eliminate
the
KuomintangWe
shall
lead
the
masses...25
Communist
sentiments
to
take
action
won
over
the
increasingly
anti- Japanese
population
and
simultaneously
aided
the
Communists
tactical
goal
to
gain
supporters.
This
caused
the
Nanking
government
to
further
lose
popularity
and
legitimacy.
From
the
KMTs
view,
the
Communists
inadvertently
helped
facilitate
Japanese
aggression
in
China,
by
attacking
the
Governments
rear.26Thus
it
was
these
communist
activities
that
further
compelled
the
KMT
to
uphold
the
policy
of
giving
first
priority
to
internal
peace
in
order
to
resist
external
aggression.
Hence,
suppressing
the
Communists
would
take
precedence
over
resisting
Japan.
However,
in
January
1933,
when
the
Communists
issued
a
proclamation
stating
its
readiness
to
stop
fighting
and
negotiate
with
the
KMT,
in
order
to
rally
all
forces
against
Japanese
invaders
and
save
the
motherland,27
Kai-shek
launched
a
full-scale
encirclement
campaign
against
the
Communist
Red
Army.
As
a
result
of
Nationalist
23
Coble,
Facing
Japan:
Chinese
Politics
and
Japanese
Imperialism,
1931-1937,
2.
24So
Wai
Chor,
The
Making
of
the
Guomindangs
Japan
Policy,
1932-1937:
The
Roles
of
Chiang
Kai-
Shek
and
Wang
Jingwei,
Modern
China,
vol.
28,
(2002):
pp.
214
25
John
C.
Kuan,
The
KMT-CCP
Wartime
Negotiations
1937-1945
(Taipei,
Taiwan:
The
Asia
and
World
Institute, 1976); 3.
11 aggression against the Communists, the Communist Party gained a positive reputation and even more support. On August 1, 1935, the Chinese Communist party called for the establishment of a national anti-Japanese united front and put forward a Ten-Point Program to save the nation. Although the Declaration, like other CCP documents, contained vehement attacks on the KMT and its leadership, it omitted repetition of the slogan calling for the overthrow of the National Government. The Declaration stated: as soon as any troops want to go to war with the Japanese, the Red Army shall immediately stop its hostilities and be willing to cooperate closely with them [Kuomintang troops] in the common task of national salvation, regardless of their past and present grievances with the Red Army, as well as any differences they may have with the Red Army over domestic issues.28 Despite mounting opposition however, their cooperation in dealing with the Japanese threat did not evolve until after 1935. Furthermore, it was not until the attack at Lukou-chiao on July 7, 1938 that Chiang Kai-shek finally agreed to go to war and jointly directed the policy toward Japan with the Communists. Below is a map showing areas under Nationalist Control from 1928 until 1937. The map demonstrates how divided China was prior to 1937.
12
The Bridge that Changed Everything What happened on the night of July 7, 1937, near the Lugouqiao Marco Polo Bridge, ten miles outside Beijing in Hebei, is not entirely clear. Allegedly Japanese forces fired blank cartridges, while undergoing training exercises; which prompted Chinese soldiers to retaliate with live fire. The Japanese then discovered that one of their soldiers was missing. Thinking the Chinese might have captured him, the Japanese demanded permission to search Wanping for him. Refusing the Japanese entry, a shot was heard, and the two sides began firing. Both sides sent more troops to the area and early in the morning of July 8th , Japanese infantry and armored
13
vehicles
attacked
the
Marco
Polo
Bridge.
Attempts
were
made
to
settle
things,
but
the
Chinese
government,
under
strong
anti-Japanese
pressure,
refused
to
make
any
concessions
in
the
negotiation
of
the
dispute.
Concurrently,
the
incident
gave
Japanese
the
excuse
to
mount
a
full-scale
invasion
of
China.
Chiang
Kai-shek
saw
the
Incident
as
the
boldest
attempt
yet
by
Japan
to
completely
separate
northern
provinces
from
Chinese
control
and
incorporate
them
into
the
Japanese
puppet
state,
Manchukuo.
In
his
account,
General
Li
Tien-yu
further
explains
that,
after
the
Lukouchia
(Marco
Polo
Bridge
Incident)
which
the
Japanese
precipitated
on
July
7,
1937,
Japan
arrogantly
expected
to
conquer
China
in
three
months.
Hordes
of
Japanese
troops
capture
Peking,
Tientsin,
Nanknow,
Changchiakou
(Kalgan),
and
later
Tehchow
and
Paoting,
like
a
flood
let
loose
by
broken
dykes.29The
position
of
China
was
daily
deteriorating
and
the
entire
Chinese
people
were
on
the
brink
of
national
subjugation.30
As
a
result
it
was
this
event
that
broke
Chiangs
tolerance
of
Japanese
aggression
as
Chiang
finally
agreed
to
initiate
a
full-scale
war
with
Japan.
The
KMT-CCP
United
Front
Following
the
attack
at
Lukou-chiao,
Mao
Tse-tung
and
high-ranking
Communist
military
leaders
sent
a
telegram
to
Chiang
Kai-shek
expressing
their
wishes
to
join
forces
to
fight
the
Japanese
under
Chaings
leadership.
In
response,
on
August
22,
1937,
the
National
government
formally
issued
orders
to
incorporate
the
Communist
forces.
Under
agreement,
the
main
force
of
the
CCPs
Red
Army
was
reorganized
into
the
Eighth
Route
Army
establishing
the
Eighth
Route
Army
National
Revolutionary
Forces,
with
Chu
The
and
Peng
The-huai
as
Commander
and
Deputy
commander.
The
army,
composed
of
three
divisions
with
a
total
strength
of
46,00031
men,
was
assigned
to
the
Second
War
Area
in
Northern
Shansi
province
under
the
command
of
Yen
His-shan.
Meanwhile,
Lin
Tsu-hu
and
Chang- Kuo-tao
were
appointed
Chairman
and
Vice
Chairman
of
the
Shansi-Kanus-Ningsia
29
Tien-yu,
Saga
of
Resistance
to
Japanese
Invasion,
1.
30
Ibid.,
ii.
31
China
at
War:
An
Encyclopedia,
edited
by
Xiaobing
Li,
469.
14 Border Area Government. Chu The and Peng The-huai assumed their new command on August 25, 1937 and pledged their sincere support to Chiang as Generalissimo. In the south, the Red Armys guerilla troops were reorganized into the New Fourth Army of the National Amy, totaling 10,30032 men, including four field divisions. Ye ting would command the New Fourth Army National Revolutionary Forces. The Chinese people, now unified, embarked on the War of Resistance against Japan. More significantly, it is within this framework that the Chinese performed their guerilla counter-offensive military campaigns against the Japanese.
3.
Wartime
Objectives:
The
GMD-CCP
United
Front
versus
the
Japanese
Imperial
Army
In
order
to
fully
value
the
guerilla
counter-offensive
military
campaigns
performed
by
the
Chinese,
it
is
beneficial
to
review
the
objectives
of
each
party
involved
in
the
development
and
execution
of
the
campaign.
The
following
section
will
provide
a
comprehensive
outline
of
the
Chinese
objective
to
unite
and
effectively
weaken
the
dominant
Japanese
Army
versus
the
Japanese
military
objective
to
conquest
Chinese
territory.
Imperial
Japanese
Army
Prior
to
the
outbreak
of
the
war,
the
Empire
of
Japans
main
objective
was
to
establish
a
newly
advanced
position
in
Asia.
In
order
to
guarantee
its
supremacy
in
the
East,
Japan
adhered
to
a
policy
of
self-preservation.
This
policy
was
adopted
in
response
to
a
range
of
external
problems.
In
the
late
1920s
Japan
experienced
serious
economic
turmoil.
Protectionism
and
trade
tariffs
introduced
by
the
United
States
to
protect
its
industry
placed
high
barriers
on
Japanese
trade.
In
addition,
due
to
an
increasing
Russian
presence
and
influence
with
China,
Japan
was
facing
a
looming
political
threat.
Furthermore,
Japan
was
experiencing
the
detrimental
economic,
diplomatic,
and
political
effects
of
anti-Japanese
propaganda
spreading
throughout
China
perpetuated
by
the
Nanking
32
China
at
War:
An
Encyclopedia,
edited
by
Xiaobing
Li,
469.
15 Government. As a result of these various issues, high unemployment, growing over- population, and acute shortage of raw materials plagued the Japanese economy. In order to solve these problems, Japan implemented their self-preservation policy and set out to gain new territory hoping to preserve their East Asian supremacy. Logically, Japan, held a strong interest in Chinas abundance in valuable natural resources. Moreover, because of the chaotic and instable situation in China, which was at the end of a large-scale civil war and vulnerable, Japan was provided with an excellent opportunity to expand and enhance foreign trade and industry. That being said, when the Japanese resumed their military operations in North China in July 1937, they informed the world that they meant to chastise the Chiang Kai-shek government, and eradicate the anti-Japanese activities in China. Overall, they viewed an invasion as the vehicle to secure Japanese supremacy. The United Front The goal of the Chinese United Front in short was to unite and fight the encroachment of Japanese imperialism on Chinese sovereignty. However, being only a temporary and exceedingly shaky military and political coalition, the objectives of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Nationalist Party should be further examined separately. It is important to note that with the establishment of the United Front came the formation of two fronts: first, the Kuomintang Front and second, the front of the liberated areas and that of the Communist Party. Although the goal of the Kuomintangs National Revolutionary Army was to resist Japanese aggression, because of looming tensions and continual paranoia towards the Communists, controlling the growth, expansion, and influence of the Communist Party remained a priority. That being said, Generalissimo Chiang Kai- sheks wartime platform included both armed resistance and national reconstruction. On the other hand, the Communist Chinese forces fought as a nominal part of the National Revolutionary under the United Front. However, a distinctive feature of their wartime policy was their belief in defeating the enemy by extending the
16 duration of the war. Mao-Tse-tung further explicates this policy in his 1938 treatise, On Protracted War. He explains that although the political aim of the War of Resistance against Japan is to drive out Japanese imperialism and build a new China of freedom and equality, to reach that goal the object of the Chinese must be to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy, meaning disarm him or deprive him of the power to resist.33 This policy resulted in the Communist forces guerilla status and furthermore their efforts to expand their military strength by absorbing Chinese guerilla forces, an objective, which unsurprisingly irritated Chiang Kai-shek, as explained later, in section four. The basic Communist strategy to achieve their objective of a protracted war was to engage in guerilla warfare and expand their strength and territories thereby preserving their ability to resist relentlessly and eventually exhaust the Japanese. Below is an overview of Communist bases during the war.
17
34
The subsequent section will explore Maos remarkable strategy, as Maos guerilla style tactics during this war are a solid example of an effective counter- offensive guerilla warfare campaign.
18 Mao Tse-tung
35
Mao
Tse-tung,
pictured
above,
adopted
a
Chinese
nationalist
and
anti- imperialist
outlook
early
in
life.
He
was
particularly
influenced
by
the
events
of
the
Xinhai
Revolution
of
1911,
which
overthrew
the
Qing
Dynasty
and
May
Fourth
Movement
of
1919,
a
populist
movement,
which
prepared
the
ideological
foundation
for
the
establishment
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
(CPC).
He
was
one
of
the
early
members
of
the
CPC,
quickly
mounting
to
a
senior
position.
In
1922
when
the
Communists
first
agreed
to
an
alliance
with
the
KMT,
Mao
aided
in
creating
a
revolutionary
peasant
army
and
organizing
rural
land
reform.
In
1927
however,
Chiang
Kai-shek,
the
KMTs
military
leader
terminated
the
alliance
and
enforced
an
anti-communist
purge.
In
response,
the
CPC
formed
an
army
of
peasant
militia
and
the
two
sides
fought
in
the
Chinese
Civil
War.
Mao
was
responsible
for
commanding
part
of
the
CPCs
Red
Army.
That
being
said,
during
the
Anti-Japanese
War,
Mao
agreed
to
help
lead
the
Red
Army
forces
incorporated
into
the
United
Front.
Numbering
only
20,000
men,
the
Communist
Army
was
numerically
inferior
to
the
Nationalist
Government
troops,
and
therefore
could
not
be
expected
to
play
a
decisive
role
no
matter
how
good
their
performance
was
on
the
battlefield.
That
35
The
Key
Codes:
The
Asian
Leopard,
(Bible
Code
Research);
(White
Stone
Foundation
for
19
being
said,
from
the
beginning
of
the
war
against
Japan
Communist
military
leader
and
strategist,
Mao
argued
against
having
his
Communist
troops
join
in
regular
warfare
battle.
Mao
presented
three
tenets
that
gave
guerrilla
warfare
a
new
potential.36First,
he
admitted
that
guerillas
troops
could
not
win
unaided.
He
therefore
envisaged
an
effort
to
create
regular
forces
while
guerrillas
waged
their
hit
and
run
tactics.37He
argued
that
at
a
later
phase,
the
guerillas
and
regular
units
would
collectively
coordinate
their
campaigns
against
the
opponent.
He
overall
stressed
that
both
styles
of
fighting
were
needed
to
win.
Second,
Mao
demanded
a
mass
effort
in
organizing
popular,
political,
logistical,
and
moral
support
for
guerrillas
and
regulars.
He
argued
that
the
entire
population
should
be
actively
enlisted
in
either
organization
and
fighting
for
the
cause.
According
to
Mao,
youths,
farmers,
teachers,
workers,
artists,
and
both
men
and
women
were
eligible
to
participate
in
the
common
cause
of
waging
war.
He
asserted
that
mass
support
was
extremely
vital.
Finally,
Maos
doctrine
established
that
it
was
essential
the
war
be
a
protracted
one.
He
made
no
promises
of
quick
victory,
but
argued
for
prolonged
sacrifice.
He
explained
that
effective
guerrilla
warfare
took
time.
Overall,
Mao
viewed
guerilla
warfare
as
a
powerful
special
weapon
with
which
we
resist
the
Japanese
and
without
which
we
cannot
defeat
them.
It
is
a
way
for
the
Chinese
to
expel
an
intruder
that
has
more
arms,
equipment,
and
troops.
His
overarching
goal
was
thus
to
adopt
a
policy
of
protracted
war
characterized
by
guerilla
operations.
He
believed
that
this
technique
could
at
least
partially
destroy
the
Japanese.
In
order
to
effectively
execute
guerilla
operations
Mao
argued
that
it
would
be
important
for
Communist
troops
to
undergo
an
all-out
effort
to
increase
Communist
military
strength.
He
therefore
concluded
that
during
the
initial
stage
of
the
war,
it
would
be
therefore
be
important
for
the
Communist
troops
to
act
in
36
Rod
Paschall,
Guerrilla
Warfare,
The
History
Channel,
<
20 accordance with the assignments orders of the Nationalist Government in order to create a good image and thereby reap propaganda advantages. This caused already suspicious Chiang to believe the Communists were trying to infiltrate the Kuomintang on a large scale.38 Consequently, making the initial execution of his strategy was initially difficult to accept by the KMT. The Application of Maos Guerilla Strategy within the Anti-Japanese War Mao argued that there were six requirements to ensure to conservation and development of Chinese strength and the destruction of the Japanese: 1. Retention of the initiative; alertness; carefully planned tactical attacks in a war of strategically defense; tactical speed in a war strategically protracted, tactical operations on exterior lines in a war conducts strategically on interior lines. 39 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Conduct of operations to complement those of the regular army.40 The establishment of bases.41 A clear understanding of the relationship that exits between the attack and the defense. 42 The development of mobile operations.43 Correct command.44
38 Chinas Bitter Victory: The War With Japan 1937-1945, edited by James C. Hsiung and Steven I.
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-warfare/ch07.htm > [accessed 19 November 2012] 40 Ibid., < http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla- warfare/ch07.htm >. 41 Ibid., < http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla- warfare/ch07.htm >. 42 Ibid., < http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla- warfare/ch07.htm >. 43 Tse-tung, On Guerilla Warfare, < http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-warfare/ch07.htm > [ 44 Ibid., < http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla- warfare/ch07.htm >.
21 Of these requirements, the most evident during the Anti-Japanese War was Maos contention that guerilla activities could be carried out directly complementary to traditional operations of the Nationalist army. He further explained his strategy in following terms: The division of labor between the KMT and the CCP in the anti- Japanese war, in which the former carries on frontal regular warfare and the latter carries on guerilla warfare behind enemy lines, is both necessary and proper, and is a matter of mutual need, mutual coordination and mutual assistance.45 Guerilla operations during the Anti-Japanese War are best exemplified in the following two cases. Battle at Pinghsingkuan The Battle at Pinghsingkuan46 on September 1937 is an example of the execution of Maos division of labor strategy. During the battle, the Communists managed to ambush an entire Japanese division, inflicting about 5,000 casualties in the process. In this battle, the casualties of the Government troops, which carried on regular frontal warfare were double those of the Communist troops which carried out ambushes on the flank.47 Below is a map of the 8th Route Armys movements from September Movements from September until November 1937.
45
Kuan,
The
KMT-CCP
Wartime
Negotiations
1937-1945,
24.
46
Ibid.,
24.
47Kang-jih
chan-cheng
shih-chi
ti
Chung-kuo
jen-min
chieh-fang-chun
(The
Chinese
Peoples
Liberation Army during the Anti-Japanese War), (Peking: Jen mi chu-pan-she, 1945), p. 18 Cf. Hu Hua, Lectures, p. 365 reprinted in John C. Kuan, The KMT-CCP Wartime Negotiations 1937-1945 (Taipei, Taiwan: The Asia and World Institute, 1976); 3.
22
48
The
Hundred
Regiments
Offensive
A
second
execution
of
Maos
division
of
labor
strategy
was
during
the
Hundred
Regiments
Offensive.
Beginning
on
December
5,
1940,
the
Communist
division
commanded
by
Peng
Dehuai
launched
a
surprise
massive
guerrilla
offensive
against
the
Japanese
counterinsurgency
campaign
led
by
General
Tada
Hayao.
The
eighth
route
army
began
the
battle
with
400,000
troops,
about
half
guerrillas
and
half
regular
troops.
The
attacks
focused
on
the
Shihchiachuang- Taiyuan,
Peiping-Hankow,
and
Tatung-Fenglingtu
rail
lines.
Catching
the
Japanese
off-guard
the
offensive,
which
lasted
three
months,
managed
to
greatly
annoy
the
Japanese.
There
were
25,000
Japanese
casualties
and
another
20,000
prisoners.
48
Kataoka,
Tetsuya,
Resistance
and
Revolution
in
China:
The
Communists
and
the
Second
United
23 Material damage was fairly significant, with 600 miles of railroad destroyed and the Chingching coal mine near Taiyuan shut down for six months. Due to this damage, Japanese occupation of North China was disrupted. The following is a photograph of a Communist guerilla soldier waving the Nationalist Flag of China after a victorious battle against the Japanese during the Hundred Regiments Offensive.
49
Analyzing
the
Damage
In
both
of
these
Chinese
soldiers
fought
relentlessly
utilizing
Maos
non- traditional
guerilla
tactics.
An
historical
account
from
the
time
exemplifies
this
persistence:
The
Japanese
people
are
disillusioned
and
the
army
is
baffled
by
the
stubbornness
and
courage
of
the
Chinese
soldiers
in
the
act
of
defending
their
national
honour
and
existence.50
Another
account
states:
49
Hundred
Regiments
Offensive,
Wikipedia,
<
50
National
Southwest
Associated
University
Library.
Japans
Aggression
and
Public
Opinion
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hundred_Regiments_Offensive > [accessed 20 November 2012]. (Kunming, China: 1938); pp. iii.
24 In China there is an increasing conviction that right will finally overcome might, as the war of attrition is protracted, there has been manifested in the whole nation an indomitable will and power of resistance to the bitter end, in spite of Chinas immense sacrifice which is the greatest she has ever experienced in the course of her long history. As illustrated by this remarkable passages Communist guerilla campaigns can be recognized for exhausting the Japanese forces. This claim can be further accredited by the Japanese responsive three all policy, which included killing, burning, and destroying all Chinese. (A map of the Japanese 1941 plan can be seen on the subsequent page) Although the vicious counterinsurgency program by the end of 1942 severely eroded Communist power as it reduced the Red Army from 400,000 to 300,000 and the population of Communist base areas from 44,000,000 to 25,000,000, the Japanese lacked the military resources needed to prosecute this campaign to its conclusion, allowing the communist army to survive and recover. Mao himself acknowledged that the enemy was in a weak strategic position. The Japanese Empire had grievously and with Communist satisfaction, overextended itself.
25
51
51
Patrick
Clancey,
China
Defensive:
The
U.S.
Army
Campaigns
of
World
War
II,HyperWar
26
27 Jiang Jieshi dissolved the New Fourth Army and closed CCP military liaison offices in many GMD held cities. Although this incident was a detrimental to the Communist effort, it was also an advantageous for their popularity as it drew party support. The Incident provided the Communists with a powerful propaganda tool by which they could present themselves as martyred patriots.53 The Nationalist Party of China was criticized for creating internal strife when the Chinese were supposed to be united against the Japanese, while the Communist Party of China seen as heroes at the vanguard of the fight against the Japanese and Nationalist treachery.54 Overall, no single event during the Anti-Japanese war did more to elicit sympathy for the CCP and establish its patriotic credentials both at home and abroad.55 In 1939, Mao Tse-tung issued a declaration stating: we [CCP forces] will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counter-attack.56 Maos remark signaled the start of Communist military attacks, which aggravated the already strained KMT-CCP relations. Overtime, KMT influence in North China was greatly lessened as Government troops were either absorbed by the Communists or expelled by the Japanese.
6.
A
Concluding
Evaluation
of
Chinese
Guerilla
Counter-Offensive
Military
Campaigns
during
the
Anti-Japanese
War
When
evaluating
Chinese
guerilla
counter-offensive
military
campaigns
against
the
Japanese
throughout
the
Anti-Japanese
War,
it
is
both
important
and
necessary
to
note
that
at
no
point
did
the
Chinese
threaten
to
completely
dislodge
the
Japanese
occupation.
Even
Samuel
Griffith,
Maos
sympathetic
American
translator
admits:,
No
authentic
records
support
the
proposition
that
Communist
military
operations
succeeded
in
forcing
the
Japanese
invaders
from
an
extensive
53
China
at
War:
An
Encyclopedia,
edited
by
Xiaobing
Li,
319.
54
Ibid.,
319.
55
Ibid.,
320.
56
Kuan,
The
KMT-CCP
Wartime
Negotiations
1937-1945,
24.
28 territory they physically occupied and wanted to hold57 However, Maos military writings and possibly this paper thus far may create a mistaken impression that Chinese Communist were engaged in constant fighting against the Japanese, that most of Japanese war effort was directed against the Communists and that in the end the Japanese were defeated chiefly because of the relentless attacks of the Communist divisions. In reality, even after 1940 only about one-quarter of the Japanese forces in China were operating against the Communists. However, although the Communists never succeeded in destroying the forces of the Japanese occupation, a successful application of guerilla counter-offensive military campaigns did occur during the Anti-Japanese War. During the eight-year war of resistance, the Communists indeed achieved their basic strategy to engage in guerilla warfare to expand their strength and exhaust the Japanese. In fact, Japanese Army Archives recall that Chinese Communist forces carried out successful guerilla operations against the Japanese Army, and that Communist forces created numerous, popularly supported anti- Japanese enclaves in each of the provinces in North China. Overall, as comprehensively demonstrated throughout this essay, Maos guerilla style-tactics were supplementary to Chinese efforts to destroy the Japanese aggressor as they effectively exhausted and thereby weakened Japanese army during the Anti- Japanese War. Moreover, the legacy of Maos guerrilla operations led to a successful defeat of Chiang Kai-sheks Nationalists after World War II, and inspired emulation by many insurgent leaders thereafter.
57
Benjamin
Borgeson,
The
Principles
of
Destruction
in
Irregular
Warfare:
Theory
and
Practice,
Small Wars Journal, (4 January 2012), < http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-principles-of-destruction-in-irregular-warfare-theory- and-practice#_ftnref127 > [accessed 19, November 2012].
29
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