NSP IP 2.

Containment Context: post WWII Question: how to win the peace Focus: George Kennan (Dr Hammer considers Gaddis best book on US grand strategy) FDR: "as long as you have principles," thinking about post war world wasn't necessary; perception that time was on America's side; New Deal point was to buy domestic peace at home and get through Depression; with global interests become global responsibilities; issue is convincing US to commit means; Plan for world: the "Four Policemen" pg 10--political descendant of Wilson (League of Nations"); multilateralism but not the "everyone is equal" version; technology not manpower (pg 6); not purely idealist...this is a way of putting pressure on Soviets (3 on 1); very aware of domestic influence; willing to make the compromises to get his plan started; Engagement, integration...FDR is optimistic but recognizes Stalin's nature; containment is not yet idea Truman: thinks he's following FDR's plan but actually took on advisors' plan; The Sources of Soviets Conduct: explain Soviets to the US; they have imprisoned themselves within the system; rationalization for retaining internal system is external threat; organs of repression are predatory against them; suspicion is inherent; (pg 20) "nothing short of compete disarmament..."; there is nothing you can do to convince these people; views offers to negotiate as a trap; war is not inevitable--like a stream, it will just adjust course and fill in every space; Kennan's plan (X article): economic vulnerability; model is bound to fall apart because it,is fundamentally flawed; failure to solve internal problems that brought forth communist revolution--if continued, it will collapse Russian society to the point of not being recoverable (prescient); Kennan: ability to shape environment to induce behaviors rather than try to act upon an amorphous mass; therapy vs carrot and stick; ideology of domestic threat then international perpetuates ideology; Two key areas Kennan feels he is misunderstood: Containment is where and how...not everywhere and not military; hard to dispute based n X article the former...the idea of countering at every point; he did not intend universalism; Containment is not focused to communicate to Soviets (pg 581), it is to show the world US knows what it wants and is capable of holding its own. It is a test of two ideologies where the winner is the ideology that passes the tests of the world. Considers himself an alien...seems sidelined; hard time to make system work (perhaps doesn't understand American system); Kissinger sees this and potentially informs his response to the problem of bureaucracy in disrupting strategy...(Kennan gives credit to Kissinger for understanding him better than anyone);

Five industrial centers: provide means to impact interests; "amphibious power"; GB, US, Japan, Central Europe, Soviet Union; don't sweat the small stuff; US departs from his plan: aid to Greece and Turkey--Congressional support leveraged on Acheson selling as containing communism; Truman points out that this is how it has to be done to get action; High point is Marshall Plan (for Kennan's strategy); Idea: Kennan's strategy is theory; in practice, in cannot explain how those domestic politics will function; or external shocks (loss of China and Soviet atomic bomb); How Universal. Where. Strong pt. Mil. Mis-int of X. NSC-68 Flex Response Pol New Look

Kennan

US policy bounces around the four intersections (above) as a result of external influences; Kennan's reaction to China and weapon--not an industrial center and Soviets don't want war; stick with the plan; He doesn't understand the essence of what he is trying to protect: diplomacy and the political system; NSC-68. Paul Nitze Different approach to containment: perception of unlimited means; Why can't we stick to centers? Perceptual failures are not acceptable. Acheson says public mind will only understand universalism, not nuanced approach; Korea--first test--means drive the ends; NSC-68 allows threats to define interests; Argument: If it is a psychological battle, we have to be everywhere and we have the money to do it. Pessimistic view that free world is losing the Cold War. Eisenhower: Republicans back since 20 years Solarium Project: Kennan and team A (containment) vs rollback; Kennan says rollback is too costly; team c says we're losing; Eisenhower's position of New Look falls universal/pol; he coins term domino theory; closer to Kennan in limited means view--deficit spending; concerned about domestic political issues; if this is a long term struggle, we need to be fiscally healthy; Military experience underpins his credibility to make hard decisions on military; How do we connect small means with big ends? Full spectrum power on the cheap; alliances, covert, psyops, PR,

Nuclear weapons and massive retaliation: don't even try it; cheaper than conventional **Risk--a key concept to include in the ends, ways, means construct. Eisenhower chose to allow increase risk; Oct 4, 1957 - Sputnik; no defenses against missiles; delivery capability; homeland immunity gone; high tech was supposed to be US ace; Eisenhower doesn't panic...uses crisis to reinforce long term strategy; Eisenhower ultimately returns to strong point versus universalism by default; unwilling to spend the money; massive retaliation is credible only in certain cases; Kennedy and Johnson Flexible response: overwhelming nuclear superiority required for credibility; is it a strategy at all? Or is it reactive only? Accepted idea of communism coming to power by democratic means; We closed the book after Kennan on the sources of Soviet conduct; after Stalin dies, there's no attempt to readjust/reinterpret;