Proclus Vs Plotinus On Matter

Proclus vs Plotinus on Matter (De mal. subs.
30-7)1
JAN OPSOMER
ABSTRACT In De malorum subsistentia chs 30-7, Proclus criticizes the view that evil is to be identi ed with matter. His main target is Plotinus account in Enn. I,8 [51]. Proclus denies that matter is the cause of evil in the soul, and that it is evil or a principle of evil. According to Proclus, matter is good, because it is produced by the One. Plotinus doctrine of matter-evil is the result of a different conception of emanation, according to which matter does not revert to its principle. Proclus claims that to posit a principle of evil either amounts to a coarse dualism, or makes the Good ultimately responsible for evil. Plotinus does not seem to be able to escape the latter consequence, if he is to remain committed to the Neoplatonic conception of causation. Plotinus equated matter with privation and said it is a kind of non-being that is the contrary of substance, thus violating fundamental Aristotelian tenets. Proclus reinstates Aristotelian orthodoxy, as does Simplicius in his Commentary on the Categories. It is possible that Iamblichus was the source of both Proclus and Simplicius, and that he was the originator of the parhypostasis theory and the inventor of the anti-Plotinian arguments.
When Proclus in De malorum subsistentia 2 criticizes Plotinus views on matter-evil he is speci cally referring to Ennead I,8 [51], known under the Porphyrian title On what are and whence come evils. It is a text that
My warmest thanks go to Christopher Preston, for help with the English. I am indebted to those who heard versions of this paper given in London, Leeds, and Leuven, and especially to K. Algra, D. Runia, J. Mansfeld, D. OMeara, C. Rowe, R. Sharples, A. Sheppard, R. Sorabji, C. Steel, H. Tarant and G. Van Riel. I acknowledge the support of the following institutions: The Fund for Scienti c ResearchFlanders (Belgium), The Institute of Philosophy of the K.U. Leuven, the Institute of Classical Studies London, Kings College London, The University of South Carolina. 2 For De malorum subsistentia (hence DMS) I have used the edition by H. Boese: Procli Diadochi Tria Opuscula (De providentia, libertate, malo). Latine Guilelmo de Moerbeka vertente et Graece ex Isaacii Sebastocratoris aliorumque scriptis collecta, ed. H. Boese (Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie, 1), Berolini, 1960. Line numbers are to Boeses Latin text, even when I refer to the corresponding words from the Greek parallel texts. Translations are mine and C. Steels. Our translation of the entire text is forthcoming in R. Sorabjis Ancient Commentators series. The present paper will show, among other things, why it is a good idea to include DMS in a series of commentaries on Aristotle.
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Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2001
Phronesis XLVI/2
PROCLUS VS PLOTINUS ON MATTER (DE MAL. SUBS. 30-7)
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Proclus knew well,3 as he was the author of a commentary of the Enneads , now lost, in which he must have paid special attention to the problem of evil.4 It is commonly understood that when Proclus in the De malorum subsistentia criticizes the view that matter is the principle of evil he is addressing the view of Plotinus. Yet, Proclus nowhere in the entire treatise on evil explicitly mentions his predecessor. Indeed he refers to none of his predecessors by name (except Plato and the interlocutors of the dialogues). However, there can be no doubt that Plotinus is Proclus main target. This is demonstrated by the numerous passages in which Proclus paraphrases and sometimes quotes almost literally from Ennead I,8.5 It is con rmed by the parallel text in Simplicius, where Plotinus is explicitly mentioned in a strikingly similar context (cf. sect. XIV). When we look at the text more closely, it becomes clear that throughout Proclus entire section on matter (and privation) Plotinus presence is constantly felt in the background. This does not mean that when Proclus polemicizes against
J.M. Rist (Basils Neoplatonism: Its Background and Nature, Basil of Caesarea: Christian, Humanist, Ascetic. A Sixteen-Hundredth Anniversary Symposium, edited by Paul J. Fedwick, Toronto, 1981, 137-220, and esp. 137-79) has cast doubt on the assumption that Porphyrys edition of the Enneads (presumably 301 A.D.) became widely available soon after its publication. He links Plotinus comparatively slight in uence in the East as well as the West during the fourth century to his surmise that Porphyrys edition was hardly known or available from about 324 until the last quarter of the century. Probably only a few copies of a very small number of works circulated. However, by the time of Proclus, Athens was equipped with good philosophical libraries: cf. H.D. Saffrey and L.G. Westerink, Proclus. Th ologie platonicienne, Livre I (CUF), Paris, 1968, xlviii. Proclus wrote a commentary on the Enneads, which proves that he had a Porphyrian edition at his disposal. See the following note. 4 This can be inferred from a scholion to in Remp. 1,37,23 (2,371,10-18 Kroll): the scholiast, who is obviously well-informed, is referring to other texts where Proclus discusses evil: DMS (t mn n t per tw tn kakn postsevw monobbl), a commentary on the speech of Diotima, a commentary on Theaetetus 176A, and a commentary on the third (?) Ennead Whence come evils? (ka n tow ew tn trthn nneda, pyen t kak). P. Henry (tudes plotiniennes, I, Les tats du texte de Plotin, Paris-Bruges, 1961 [= 1938], 8, n.) suggests reading prthn for trthn. R. Beutler (see below) considers this emendation unnecessary, pointing out that the reference could be to Enn. III,2-3 [47-8], Per pronoaw. Proclus comments on the Enneads (not necessarily a full-blown commentary on all of them) are further mentioned in a few other places. See R. Beutler, Proklos. 4. Neuplatoniker, RE 45 Hb. (XXIII-1), 1957, 198,452; L.G. Westerink, Exzerpte aus Proklos Enneaden-Kommentar bei Psellos, Byzantinische Zeitschrift, 52, 1959, 1-10. 5 The opening phrase and rst chapter of DMS unmistakably echo the Porphyrian title and the rst chapter of Plotinus text. Other parallels are pointed out below.
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the identi cation of matter and evil, he has only Plotinus in mind, to the exclusion of others. Chapters 30 to 39 indeed amount to a refutation of the general view that matter is evil.6 For instance, the dilemma formulated in chapter 31 (cf. sect. VIII) is clearly intended as a refutation of every possible doctrine that makes matter the principle of evil: one horn of the dilemma addresses more primitive views, which are quickly dismissed, the other horn is directed at a Plotinian-type doctrine, and its discussion contains again some obvious allusions to Plotinus. So, although Proclus intends his arguments to be valid against anyone who attributes evil to matter or even makes matter the source of all evil, the details of his arguments are often too speci c to be related to anyone other than Plotinus. This is most noticeably the case in Proclus discussion of privation and contrariety. Before we take a closer look at Proclus criticism of Plotinus, I brie y summarize the latters views on matter and evil as they can be derived from Enn. I,8 [51] and II,4 [12], On matter. I follow the interpretation of D. OBrien, 7 with whom I would hesitate to disagree but who in any case seems to me to have got things right. His interpretation is for the most part also that of D. OMeara.8
6 S. Menn (Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, 14, 1998 [1999], 104) is of course right when he points out that Proclus starts from strong assumptions, i.e. from a speci cally Neoplatonic frame-work (Thus the arguments that evil does not exist proceed on the assumption that all causality proceeds top-down, with each thing being produced by a higher principle and striving to return to that higher principle, and that all beings proceed ultimately from a single rst principle, a good beyond being.). DMS is indeed not written for people who do not accept the fundamental tenets of the school. Herein lie the limitations, but also the value of this text: it addresses an audience sharing a philosophical language and a common background, thus considerably reducing the chance of talking at cross-purposes. And at least Plotinians could be expected to share Proclus basic premisses. However, as I will show, the divergences of views on evil may be reduced to, or rather, may be explainable by different conceptions of the process of emanation (I refrain from making any assertions about what came rst in the development of Plotinus views: his general metaphysics including the details concerning the nal stages of the procession, or his theory of evil, for which some invoke existential explanations I even doubt whether that would be a useful question at all). 7 Esp. Plotinus on Evil. A study of matter and the soul in Plotinus conception of human evil, Le N oplatonisme. Royaumont 9-13 juin 1969 (Colloques Internationaux du Centre National de la Recherche Scienti que, Sciences humaines), Paris, 1971, 11346; Plotinus on the Origin of Matter. An Exercise in the Interpretation of the Enneads, Napoli, 1991; Th odic e plotinienne, th odic e gnostique (Philosophia antiqua, 57), Leiden New York Kln, 1993; La mati re chez Plotin: son origine, sa nature, Phronesis, 44, 1999, 45-71. 8 D. OMeara, Das Bse bei Plotin (Enn. I,8), Platon in der abendlndischen
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I 1. According to Plotinus, matter is produced by a soul, more speci cally by a partial soul, which is itself an image of the higher soul and is said to be sensation and the nature which is found in plants.9 By generating an image of itself, this lower manifestation of soul produces the nonbeing which is matter.10 Yet the generation of matter in no way implies any evil on the part of soul. When the soul produces matter-evil, it does so in all innocence. The production of matter is merely due to an imperfection proper to the nature of the soul, and an imperfection in itself does not yet amount to being positively evil. This constitutes a crucial difference from Gnostic doctrine on the origin of matter.11 2. The product, matter, is evil as such, the principle of evil. For matter is unmeasuredness in comparison with measure, unlimited in comparison with limit, formless in comparison with formative principle, in perpetual need in comparison with the self-suf cient, always unde ned, nowhere stable, subject to every kind of in uence, insatiate, complete poverty (I,8 [51], 3,13-16). These characteristics are not incidental, but in a sense make up the nature of evil, insofar as each part of evil will have all of the characteristics of evil and other things will have any of these characteristics through participation. For these reasons it may be considered a nature of its own, and the properties which Plotinus has summed up truly are its characteristics (3,30-32). In this way, Plotinus says, reason will have reached the substance of evil, if indeed there can be such a thing as a substance of evil (e tiw ka dnatai kako osa enai), the rst evil, the per se evil (kakn prton ka kay at kakn, 3,38-40). 3. Once matter is there, it can cause evil in the soul, when the latter comes down a second time in its endeavour to invest matter with form and becomes fascinated by what it has generated. 12 In order for the soul to become evil, two conditions need to be ful lled: a certain weakness must be present in the soul, and the soul needs to be in contact with matter and
Geistesgeschichte, ed. by Th. Kobusch and B. Mojsisch, Darmstadt, 1997, 33-47; Plotin. Trait 51. I, 8 (Les crits de Plotin), Paris, 1999. 9 V,2 [11], 1,18-21. 10 Cf. III,9 [13], 3; III,4 [15], 1; OBrien, Plotinus on the Origin of Matter, 16-18; Th odic e plotinienne, 19-27. 11 Cf. OBrien, Plotinus on Evil, 128; Th odic e plotinienne, 31; 35. 12 See also V,1 [10], 1,17-19: when matter becomes the object of fascination, the soul, by pursuing it, in a sense confesses its inferiority to the thing pursued.
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undergo the latters negative in uence. Matter and weakness are thus part causes of evil in the soul. The presence of matter is not enough to produce evil in the soul, nor is the souls weakness, for to be weak is not yet to be evil; it is just a necessary condition for the soul to be affected by evil. Only jointly do matter and weakness constitute a suf cient cause for vice. Yet they are not part causes in the same sense, as matter is evil itself, whether or not the soul is weak so as to be affected by it. However, an extra observation needs to be made: without matter the soul would not be weak. So rst matter causes weakness, though not necessarily so, and then matter and weakness together produce evil in the soul. In other words, matter is both the cause of weakness in the soul and the cause of vice. (lh tonun ka syeneaw cux ata ka kakaw ata, I,8 [51], 14,49-50). 13 Even the fact that the soul itself produced matter and, subsequently, descends to it, does not mean that matter is not the cause of evil. Despite the souls descent, and despite the fact that the soul actually produced matter so that it is indirectly the cause for its own downfall, 14 we must still maintain that matter remains the cause of evil: matter is evil rst and the rst evil (prteron ra kak at ka prton kakn, I,8 [51], 14,50-1). 15
13 Not every contact with matter makes the soul do bad things, only too intimate a relation has this result, that is, when the soul is dragged by its own enthusiasm and overeagerness. Cf. IV,8 [6], 7,9-10; OBrien, Plotinus on Evil, 131; Th odic e plotinienne, 48. 14 Cf. OBrien, Plotinus on the Origin of Matter, 22 n. 27. 15 I fail to see how C. Schfer (Das Dilemma der neuplatonischen Theodizee. Versuch einer Lsung, Archiv fr Geschichte der Philosophie, 82, 2000, 20-3; 31-2) could reconcile these texts with his claim that for Plotinus matter is not evil in actu. According to Schfer evils come about only when matter and soul meet. The text quoted by Schfer (p. 21) to prove that it is not matters nature, but its effects on the soul, which make it the opposite of the Good seems to me to show the opposite: j ntiytvn sunsthke ka t nanta poie (I,8 [51], 6,58-9) suggests that its Beschaffenheit is logically prior to its activity (ka t nanta poie seems to follow from the things constitution). ox poin ti does not imply that matter is not evil in what-it-is-to-bematter; Plotinus wants to make clear that matter is evil because it has no positive determinations; it is not something quali ed (cf. 10,12-16). Yet it has pseudo-characteristics (lack of determination, lack of measure, lack of form) that constitute its essence, as it were (3,4-5; 12-22; 30-2). A more careful approach can be seen in J.-M. Narbonne, La m taphysique de Plotin (Biblioth que de lhistoire de la philosophie), Paris, 1994, 130, and esp. J.-F. Balaud , Le traitement plotinien de la question du mal: thique ou ontologique, Les Cahiers Philosophiques de Strasbourg, 8, 1999, 68: la mati re est, au point de vue ontologique, le principe du mal, mais le champ de validit de ce principe est thique.
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II Plotinus solution of the problem of evil certainly has merits from a Neoplatonic perspective. Above all he wanted to avoid making the primary hypostases responsible for evil, without allowing any kind of dualism to enter his philosophy. These two concerns indeed characterize his solution: 1. By carefully distinguishing weakness of the soul and evil, Plotinus does not make the soul alone responsible for its vice. Only the combination of weakness in the soul and the alluring presence of matter constitute a suf cient cause for evil. What is more, the souls weakness is in its turn caused by matter. 2. Plotinus argues for the subtle position that matter is evil itself and the only source of evil, yet is not an independent principle, on equal footing with the One: matter is generated by something else. If indeed evil is entirely due to one source, matter, and the good cannot be held responsible for its existence, Plotinus seems to get away with a paradoxical combination of dualistic and monistic ideas.16 Or does he? Plotinus desperately wants to be a monist, yet by making all evils dependent on one principle, whose nature and effects are the complete opposite of those of the supreme principle, he cannot escape sounding like a dualist. However, if a soul produces the principle of evil, evil will never constitute a threat to the supremacy of the good, as it will never be a true principle nor even raise itself to the level of soul, let alone to the higher levels.17 The hierarchy thus remains intact. The reason why matter is evil is that it is the last degree in the ontological hierarchy, lower than which it is not possible to descend. It is the degree of least possible perfection, in other words, of greatest possible imperfection. With matter the process has reached a stage where something is produced that is of itself incapable of returning to its principle. It cannot even truly receive the forms that soul tries to impose on it. It is important to remark that the gradual loss of perfection that characterizes
Compare Narbonne, La m taphysique de Plotin, 147. OBrien, Plotinus on Evil, 144; Th odic e plotinienne, 48-9: La mati re est, pour Plotin, le non- tre et le mal en soi; mais, du fait m me que cest lme qui la engendr e, la mati re, le mal en soi, ne s levera jamais au-dessus de lme, pour se situer aupr s des tres premiers; et elle ne sera jamais d laiss e par lme, ni condamn e se voir priv e de forme (seule, l cart). See also Chr. Horn, Plotin ber Sein, Zahl und Einheit (Beitrge zur Altertumskunde, 62), Stuttgart-Leipzig, 1995, 172-3 and K. Corrigan, Plotinus Theory of Matter-Evil and the question of substance, Leuven, 1996, 198 (pointing out that when Plotinus says that matter is kay at kakn at I,8 [51], 3,39-40, kay at does not mean absolute self-dependence but simply in itself).
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emanation is itself not caused by any other principle. Matter is just the end of the process. 18 Yet, as D. OMeara has rightly pointed out, it is also its result. And this brings us back at the paradox that at least indirectly the good seems to be causally responsible for evil.19 Apparently Plotinus wants to reconcile the irreconcilable: the cause of evil is the result of a causal chain, yet the cause(s) of the cause of evil should not be called the cause(s) of evil. III Proclus is fundamentally opposed to Plotinus solution of the problem of evil. 1. On exegetical grounds Proclus rejects the claim that matter is the cause of badness in the soul, completely disregarding the sophisticated Plotinian distinctions between the weakness of the soul and its badness. Instead Proclus claims that the souls fascination for what is inferior is in itself already evil. The fairly complex causal analysis of the origin of evil in the soul then becomes pointless, and it is unlikely that Proclus paid much attention to it or even noticed the complexity of Plotinus argument. 2. Proclus goes to great lengths to refute the view that matter could be the source of all evils. His arguments are both exegetical and systemic. Above all he objects to the idea that matter could be a principle of evil, for to believe that there is a principle of any sort for evils inevitably amounts to a dualism of principles. As long as one keeps looking for one single cause of evils, one will always end up with some form of dualism. Instead one should assume, so he argues, that there are many, accidental and inderminate causes for evil, or rather for evils, as evils themselves, too, constitute an indeterminable multitude. They cannot be related to one
Sharples, Plato, Plotinus, and Evil, BICS, 1994, 181: The idea of a progressively diminishing in uence of good not caused by anything separate opposing it enables him to combine monism with an explanation for imperfection. 19 Cf. OMeara, Trait 51, 109: Comment le bien absolu peut-il produire le mal absolu? Une r ponse possible (cf. III 2 [47] 5,27-32) consisterait faire observer que la th orie de la d rivation suppose que chaque tape successive de ce processus repr sente un degr moindre de perfection ou (pour exprimer cela n gativement) un plus grand degr dimperfection. Also p. 11: Il reste vrai, cependant, que la mati re, en tant que mal absolu, nest pas seulement le terme de la d rivation. Elle est aussi le r sultat de la d rivation: la mati re est produite par lme. Nous demeurons avec le paradoxe irr solu que le bien, qui pour Plotin doit donner de lui-m me, de sa bont , en fait engendre le mal.
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principle, 20 they cannot be explained by one cause. Evils are never caused per se, for their own sake (cf. sect. XIII). Now, if matter were the source of all evil, it would have to be either an independent principle, or a being in its turn produced by another principle superior to it. Both are unacceptable: the rst option would amount to a strong dualism which is exactly what Plotinus wanted to avoid at all cost; yet he at least gives the impression of having been tempted by the advantages it offered for the purpose of theodicy, as is suggested by his insistence on the fact that matter is the absolute evil, the ultimate evil, the principle of evil,21 atokakn (I,8 [51], 8,42). * the second option makes the good ultimately responsible for evil. Plotinus did claim that matter is generated, yet tried to escape from the consequence that the superior principles on this account cause evil: the production of matter is in itself innocent, and matter is evil only because it is the last stage of the decline, a complete privation of the good. This position is untenable, so Proclus claims. * Proclus himself will argue that matter is in fact produced by the good, and is not evil, let alone a or the principle of evil. Indeed, it is even good. IV Proclus deals with the view that matter is evil in the large section of De malorum subsistentia (chs 11-38) where he examines the level(s) at which evils may occur. Starting with the gods and the intelligible reality, he descends to the superior kinds angels, demons, heroes , then to the souls, which he subdivides into divine souls and ordinary souls before
20 In other words, Proclus rejects the reduction of plurality to unity in the case of evil (see, e.g., I,8 [51], 3,21-4). In this aspect evils cannot resemble the good. Cf. DMS 47,3-6: For if there is one cause of good things, there are many causes of evils, and not one single cause. If all good things are commensurate with, similar to, and friendly with one another, with evils it is the complete opposite: neither among themselves nor in relation to good beings do they have a common measure. See already Orig. Cels. 4,64 (SVF II 1174). Cf. OMeara, Trait 51, 31; Narbonne, La m taphysique de Plotin, 118: Plotin, serait-on tent de dire, fait du platonisme lenvers. 21 Cf. I,8 [51], 6,33-4: rxa gr mfv, mn kakn, d gayn. As long as one takes rx in the sense of beginning, there is nothing objectionable in the assertion that matter is the rx of evil. This meaning is compatible with, e.g., Arist. Metaph. 5,1, 1013a7-10. It is only when rx is taken to refer to an ultimate principle of reality that the assertion becomes problematic.
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moving on to images of souls or irrational souls. The next level he deals with is that of nature, the governing principle of body that is. The discussion of body leads him to that of matter, to which chapters 30 to 37 are devoted. These are the chapters that interest us most for our present purpose. They are followed by a chapter on privation. The conclusion of the entire section (chs 11-38) is that evil occurs only in particular souls and particular bodies, which are beings capable of change with respect to their rank by letting themselves be guided or ruled by what is either superior or inferior.22 Divine souls are merely hindered in their activities. Therefore they are only affected by a minor or even a merely apparent evil. The higher levels are completely free from evil. But also the levels below that of body matter and privation are not evil. I will come back to matter below, but rst a few words need to be said about privation. Unlike the previous levels privation cannot be considered as a hypostasis. Already from the very fact that Proclus offers a separate treatment of privation, after the section on matter,23 it is obvious that he rejects the Plotinian equation of matter with complete privation. 24 The beginning of chapter 38 is reminiscent25 of Aristotle Phys. 1,9, 192a1325, who criticises certain thinkers (unfortunately Platonists) for not distinguishing matter and privation. Privation, which is the contrary of the form and in its own nature is not, is different from the substrate, which desires form and only accidentally is not. Aristotle says that if one considers privation (the other part of the contrariety, i.e. that which is contrary and hence is the destruction of the form) as an evil agent, 26 it may almost seem not to exist at all (192a14-16). He explains that privation is contrary to what is divine, good, and desirable, which is precisely what matter desires and yearns for. Now, if one con ates matter and privation, the contrary will desire its own extinction, as contraries are mutually destructive.27 Next Aristotle compares matters desire of form to the female desiring the male, an example that does not t his account (the
See also Theol. Plat. 3,94,15-21; in Tim. 1,380,24-381,6. The transition is clearly marked (38,1-2): Sed materiam quidem hic relinquendum. Ad privationem autem rursum transeundum. 24 Cf. I,8 [51], 11-12: partial privation is not good or rather, bad enough for Plotinus, because he wants to arrive at pure, unmixed evil, the rst evil. See also 4,23. OBrien, La mati re chez Plotin, 55; 64-6. 25 As observed already by M. Erler Proklos Diadochos. ber die Existenz des Bsen (Beitrge zur klassischen Philologie, 102), Meisenheim am Glan, 1978, 114, n. 2. 26 kakopoiw, the same word is used by Proclus mali cam in Moerbekes translation: 38,4; also 38,29. 27 Compare DMS 37,17.
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female does not disappear as a result of the ful lment of its desire) but which Plotinus uses for his own theory of matter (II,4 [12], 16,14-17) in order to show that change does not necessarily entail the disappearance of privation. 28 Taking Aristotles rather unfortunate remark as a cue, Plotinus argues against Aristotle that in the case of both change and desire, the privation, i.e. non-being, does not disappear, but persists. Hence the substrate matter can be identi ed with privation, complete absence of form and light, that is, and therefore with evil. This is also why he claims that matter can never truly receive form: the privation remains. Proclus, on the contrary, upholds the distinction between privation and matter29 and in so doing sides with Aristotle against Plotinus. However, Proclus does not concede to Aristotle that privation is evil. If the primal good were identical with being, then indeed privation would have been the primary evil. But the good transcends being. Privation of a form could never be the primary evil, as it merely is privation of being, not of the good. Privation of a form is mere absence, and complete privation leads any being to nonexistence, thus entailing the end of its suffering. Proclus distinguishes between privation of form (i.e. Aristotelian 30 privation), which is a mere absence
Cf. OBrien, La mati re chez Plotin, 63-6. See also DMS 32,14-16: Nor is it a removal of measure and limit, for it is not identical with privation, because privation does not exist when measure and limit are present, whereas matter keeps existing and bearing their impression. 30 Cf. Simpl. in Cat. 417,29-418,1. See, however, also S. Menns valuable remarks (Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, 14, 1998 [1999], 106) in his reply to C. Steel. Menn explains that in several texts Aristotle thinks of the evil which is contrary to a speci c good as its privation. Hence it is not unquali edly true that Aristotle considers possession-and-privation as one kind of opposites and contraries (e.g. good and evil) as another. One could also refer to Dexippus in Cat. 52,18-26. In the same reply to Steel, Menn points out that the Stoics did not deny the existence of evil, and that, indeed, they thought that evil (vice) has exactly the same ontological status than good does. Therefore, when Proclus attacks the view that evil does not exist at all, he cannot be referring to the Stoics but is just putting up a strawman. Menn overlooks the fact, however, that Proclus is simply heir to an old Platonic tradition that dialectically construes this position as the Stoic view. And it remains open to debate whether by practically denying evil on a cosmic scale the Stoics can still claim a place for evil at the level of human action. Is not Plutarch (e.g. De Stoic. rep. 1048D; 1049D, and esp. 1050A-D) right to point out that this amounts to an inconsistency? See J. Opsomer C. Steel, Evil without a cause. Proclus Doctrine on the Origin of Evil, and its Antecedents in Hellenistic Philosophy, Zur Rezeption der hellenistischen Philosophie in der Sptantike. Akten der 1. Tagung der Karl-und-Gertrud-Abel-Stiftung vom 22.-25. September 1997 in Trier, herausgegeben von Therese Fuhrer und Michael Erler in Zusammenarbeit mit Karin Schlapbach (Philosophie der Antike, Bd. 9), Stuttgart, 1999, 229-243.
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and in no way evil, from the so-called privation of the good, i.e. that which actively opposes the good and is therefore evil.31 The latter kind of privation derives its power from the good, and should therefore be called not a contrary, but a subcontrary of the good, as he will argue later (chs 52-3). In ch. 38 he just claims that opposition to the good should not be called privation. V Proclus introduces the section on matter by saying that the previous discussion has already led him to mention matter occasionally (30,1-2). So he has said that eternal and universal natures are never evil because they completely dominate the underlying matter, which, by way of an obvious allusion to Plotinus, he calls something ugly, investing itself with a foreign ornament.32 Particular bodies, on the contrary, can get perverted, when they let themselves be dominated by what is inferior.33 Moreover, only material bodies can become evil,34 contrary to immaterial bodies such as light. Even semi-material bodies, such as pneumatic vehicles, can be moderately affected by evil, when they introduce into themselves the baseness of matter.35 In his concluding remarks on bodies and nature, Proclus even explicitly says that down here disorder is due to matter and to the mixture of form with the formless, while up there disorder is due to the deprivation of life.36 Like the sensible bodies, which have a hylemorphic structure whereby the form of the body ultimately inheres in prime matter, immaterial bodies, too, consist of a substrate and a formative principle. Yet there both the substrate and the form are immaterial. It should be remarked that Proclus objects to Plotinus calling the intelligible substrate matter. Instead he prefers the term power (dnamiw), as he wants to reserve matter only for the lowest reality.37 This lower matter seems to be the main cause of disturbance for sensible things:
In the realm of generation, however, disorder is situated in matter, because of the irrational, obscure, and indeterminate character of its nature. For the disorderly character is not accidental to matter nor is matter said to be disorderly with Cf. Steel, Proclus on the Existence of Evil, Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, 14, 1998 [1999], 83-102; 109. 32 DMS 27,19-22; cf. Plot. I,8 [51], 3,35-6. 33 DMS 28,9-10. 34 DMS 28,14-9; Plot. I,8 [51], 3; I,8 [51], 8,27-8 et passim. 35 DMS 28,26-38. 36 DMS 29,12-14. 37 Cf. Theol. Plat. 3,39,24-30,9.
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respect to something else, for what is disorderly with respect to something else is not yet the last. No, absolute unmeasuredness, absolute indeterminateness, absolute darkness: that is the disorder of matter. (29,16-21)
This summary of the characteristics of matter is strongly reminiscent of Plotinus account, 38 and this may be no coincidence. Indeed, in the chapters that follow Proclus will implicitly but unmistakably discuss and reject Plotinus account of matter as we nd it in Ennead I,8 [51]. Proclus will categorically refuse to regard matter as evil. However, in the chapters on the evils of souls and bodies he occasionally seems to attribute the origin of evil to the in uence of matter. Indeed, in his account of the evils of the soul, too, he alludes to the presence of matter:
What then is the origin of evil for us? It is the continuous communion and cohabitation with what is inferior to us. It is also oblivion and ignorance, which come about by looking at that which is unintellectual and dark39 (24,32-35).
However, in the chapters where Proclus explicitly deals with matter he emphatically rejects the view that makes matter evil or even the principle of evil. The fact that he sporadically does give the impression of closely linking matter and evil though he nowhere calls it evil or a cause of evil may be blamed on the Platonic tradition, which had always been subject to the tendency to associate the two things. Indeed, in antiquity, as in more recent times, a number of commentators took the view that for Plato matter is the source of all evils. 40 Among the Middle Platonists, Numenius 41 made matter a positively evil force, identifying it with the Inde nite Dyad. Also Cronius as well as Celsus 42 and perhaps Moderatus 43 considered matter the source of evil, whereas Harpocration 44 is said to derive it rather from the bodies.
See however Plotinus description of matter at III,4 [15], 1,11-12; III,9 [13], 3,1213; I,8 [51], 3,27; 6,41-4. 39 Cf. Enn. I,8 [51], 4,17-32. 40 Some illustrious examples are summed up by H. Cherniss, The Sources of Evil According to Plato, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 98, 1954, 25, n. 21. 41 Ap. Calcidius c. 294. 42 Cf. Orig. Cels. 4,65; 8,55. 43 Cf. Simpl. in Phys. 231,21. H.D. Saffrey and L.G. Westerink, Proclus. Th ologie platonicienne, Livre II (CUF), Paris, 1974, XXXI; G. Bechtle, Das Bse im Platonismus: berlegungen zur Position Jamblichs, Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbch fr Antike und Mittelalter, 4, 1999, 72-3. 44 For Numenius, Cronius and Harpocration see Iamblichus, De anima, ap. Stob. 1,37,12-16.
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VI For the readers convenience, I lay out the structure of the section on matter in the DMS (in a more rigorous way probably than Proclus, who is not used to always clearly separating one counter-argument from another).
1. The view of the opponents: matter is evil [30-31,5] 2. Counter-arguments [31,5-35] 2.1. If matter is the principle of evil, either there are two ultimate principles, which is unacceptable, as there cannot be two rsts, or matter stems from the good (the view of Plotinus), but then the good will be the cause of evil, and hence the good will be evil (as its cause it is to a higher degree what the product is) and evil will be good (as products always assimilate themselves to their cause) [31,5-21] 2.2. Matter is necessary for the universe [32,1-8] 2.3. Matter is called unmeasured not as being the mere absence of measure (since matter is not identical with privation), nor as something that actively opposes measure (since matter [according to Plotinus45] is inert), but as the need for measure46 matter desires measure and therefore cannot be bad [32,9-23] 2.4. Evil existed in the souls prior to their descent to matter: cf. Phaedr. 248A1B1; Resp. 621A6-7 [33] 2.5. Matter is the mother and wet-nurse of generation, it contributes to the fabrication of the world, and is therefore good; cf. Tim. 49A6, 50D3, 51A4, 52D45, 34B8-9 [34,1-5] 2.6. The disorderly previous condition of the world of Polit. 273B4-C3 should not be equated with precosmic matter as such;47 it refers to (precosmic) matter in which partial and hence con icting forms48 are present [34,5-9]
See Enn. I,8 [51], 10; III,6 [26], 11,29-36; 43-5. Plotinus included measurelessness and need (t ndew) among the characteristics of evil: I,8 [51], 3,12-15. He even gives a vivid description of matter begging the soul, making a nuisance of itself and trying to worm its way inside (14,35-36). Cf. III,6 [26], 14,5-15 where the metaphor of begging clearly refers to Plato Symp. 203B4. See also III,6 [26], 19. 47 Plotinus glosses the worlds ancient nature from the Politicus as the underlying matter, not yet set in order by some god (I,8 [51], 7,6-7). 48 These are the so-called traces of the forms. Cf. Tim. 53B2. See also F.A.J. De Haas, John Philoponus New De nition of Prime Matter. Aspects of its Background in Neoplatonism and the Ancient Commentary Tradition (Philosophia antiqua, 69) Leiden New York Kln, 1997, 15-16; 96-8 (chaos is above the level of prime matter, which is incorporeal and formless, but also above that of unquali ed body the substratum of the universe, and the second lowest level , which is already characterized by threedimensionality and determinate size; three-dimensionality (extension), according to Proclus, is not what de nes, but rather what rst characterizes, prime matter.).
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2.7. In the Philebus it is said that matter is produced by the One, and according to Resp. 379C6-7 god does not cause evil things [34,9-14] 2.8. The irregular motion of Tim. 30A4-5 is not matter nor due to matter; cf. 2.6 [34,14-28] 2.9. Matter is generated by god: cf. Phil. 23C9-10; 26C4-27C1 [35] 3. The view of Proclus: matter is necessary [36-37] 3.1. Matter is neither good nor evil, but necessary [36-37,6] 3.2. Evil does not exist in itself, but only in other things, for it is the contrary of the good in other things, not of the rst good. Indeed, nothing can be contrary to the rst good, as (1) contraries are mutually destructive, and (2) contraries must belong to the same genus. [37,6-25]
VII When Proclus in the rst chapter of this section (ch. 30) presents the view that matter is evil, he is almost quoting from Ennead I,8 [51], 3. Plotinus there argues that evil is all kinds of privations of the good (12-16); these do not belong to evil as accidents, they constitute evil itself (16-22). Next he explains the difference between evils that participate, and the absolute evil in which they participate (21-4); this is followed (35-40) by the description of this rst evil as that which underlies all forms and measures, but is incapable of receiving them. The view of Plotinus is clearly what Proclus here reports:
[I]t is by no means possible that evil belongs to matter as an accident, because, by itself, matter is without quality and formless; matter is a substrate,49 and not in a substrate; it is simple, and not some thing in another. If matter is entirely evil and some say it is it must be evil in essence, as they also say, making matter the primary evil and that which the gods abhor.50 For what is evil other than unmeasuredness and indeterminateness and all kinds of privations of the good? Indeed, good is the measure of all things, their boundary, limit and perfection. That is why evil is unmeasuredness, absolute unlimitedness, imperfection and indeterminateness. Now all these things <, they say,> are primarily in matter; they are not other things besides matter, but matter itself and what it is to be matter. Hence matter is the primary evil, the nature of evil, and the last of all things. If good is twofold one being the absolute good and nothing other than good, the other being the good in something else, a partial good, that is, and not the primary good then evil as well will be twofold, the one being as it were absolute evil and the primary evil and nothing else but evil, the other being evil in something else and some evil, i.e., that which is evil because of that < rst>
49 Accidents are predicated not of substrates, but of individuals and of species. Cf. Porph. Isag. 13,10-21. 50 Hom. Iliad 20,65. See also Plotinus V,1 [10], 2,27.
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evil, by participation in or assimilation with it. And just as the good is the rst, the absolute evil will be the last of beings. For it is not possible for anything to be better than good nor worse than evil, since we say that all other things are better or worse by virtue of these. But matter is the last of things: for all other things are disposed to act or to undergo, whereas matter does neither, as it is deprived of both these potencies. Hence the absolute and primary evil is matter. (DMS 30)
The attentive reader of the treatise will immediately realise that Proclus is not here presenting his own view. For in the rst chapters he had emphatically rejected the existence of absolute evil. Of course, this does not lead immediately to Plotinus. The latter was not the only philosopher to have held the view that matter is evil, and Proclus does want to challenge the equation matter-evil in general. Nevertheless, the similarities with Plotinus are striking. Many details point to Plotinus, such as the assertion that matter is deprived of the potency to be affected. For anyone who is familiar with the thought of Proclus but misses the Plotinian background, this is a very surprising statement indeed, as the concept of matter here expressed is foreign to Proclus. But of course, through Proclus we are reading Plotinus, who indeed holds that matter is incapable of receiving the form it lacks, and remains completely unaffected.51 Proclus again refers to the same idea in 32,12-16 where he is arguing against the view he here presents, and dialectically uses Plotinus own view against him:
Now matter is not disposed to oppose nor, in general, to effect anything, since it is also incapable by nature of undergoing an effect because of its lack of potency to undergo anything.
Proclus concludes his account of the doctrine of evil matter by reminding his reader once more of the role that matter apparently played in the perverting of particular bodies and souls (i.e. the realities that were studied in the chapters preceding the section on matter):
If, as we have said, in bodies the unnatural arises when matter prevails, and in souls evil and weakness come about when they fall into matter, get drunk with the indeterminateness surrounding it and assimilate themselves to it, why should we dismiss this <explanation> and seek for another cause of evils as a principle of and source for their existence? (31,1-5)
Temptingly easy and self-evident as this reasoning may seem to be, Proclus will not go for this solution. He will argue instead that one should
51 Cf. Plot. I,8 [51], 3,35-40; III,6 [26], 11,29-36; 43-5. See also Porph. Sent. 21 (p. 12,8-9).
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indeed look for other causes of evil. Plotinus, on the contrary, had taken the easy path: in I,8 [51],14,17-24 he argued that the fact that weakness only occurs in souls that are near52 matter is an indication that matter is the cause of this weakness. He also claimed that matter is a principle and that souls become evil by assimilating themselves to it.53 From the text cited above it is already clear that Proclus does not care much about Plotinus subtle distinctions between the souls weaknesses and its vices.54 This impression is con rmed if one looks at the fourth of his counter-arguments, in which he treats weaknesses and de ciencies straightaway as evil:
If, then, the souls suffer weakness and fall, this is not because of matter, since these <de ciencies> existed already before the bodies and matter, and somehow a cause of evil existed in the souls themselves prior to <their descent into> matter. (33,1-3)
Proclus rejects the Plotinian account of the evil in the soul. For the Phaedrus teaches us that weakness was there prior to the descent of the soul. So matter cannot have been the cause, either of weakness or of evil. Before the souls encounter with matter there must already have been some cause of evil (33,1-15). Proclus wants to save the moral responsibility of the souls: Where would be their self-motion and ability to choose (33,23) if we attribute the cause of their descent to the activity
Proclus later neatly refutes this argument. If it were really the case that nearness to matter causes evil, what is nearer to matter should be more evil than that which is less near. But as a matter of fact, there are good reasons to believe that the evils of souls are greater than those of bodies (39,44-50). 53 Cf. I,8 [51], 8,39; 43. In 8 Plotinus discards some other possible candidates for the title principle of evils. Neither form nor body can aspire to be the primal evil (prtvw kakn [8,37-38; see also 11,18]), the evil itself (atokakn [8,42; see also 13,9]), that in which all other evils participate or to which they assimilate themselves. One may safely infer, e contrario, that these terms which Proclus considers highly objectionable do apply to matter. 54 Cf. Plot. I,8 [51], 14,49-51. However, in chapter 24 Proclus says that weakness is not evil, if it is not excessive (24,18: et nondum horum dirum, si non multo; cf. Plot. I,8 [51], 5,12-14). It can safely be assumed that Proclus had Plotinus in mind (but possibly also others) when he made the claim that the souls were evil before they were affected by matter. He must at the very least have been aware of the fact that for Plotinus matter was somehow the cause of vice (the view is clearly evidenced in Enn. I,8), although he may have overlooked the details of Plotinus view. Or possibly he chose to ignore them, as his exegetical arguments are valid against any Platonist who holds that matter directly or indirectly causes vice and are held to be suf cient to refute Plotinus on this point.
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of matter? The souls make their own choices, 55 and when they have chosen badly, they deserve their punishment (21-22). The particular souls have the possibility to choose a different kind of life and as a consequence may admit evil. These souls are susceptible to evil, but not on account of their contact with the body or with matter. No, their own weakness makes them descend to the body and the material world. And it is wrong, claims Proclus, to explain the souls weakness through the contact with matter, as Plotinus does. The soul itself is responsible for descending and ascending, and makes its own choices. VIII In chapter 31 Proclus presents the advocates of the thesis that matter is the ultimate cause of all evil with a dilemma:56 either matter is an ultimate principle, itself not generated by any other principle, or it derives its existence from another principle. The rst horn of the dilemma amounts to a coarse, Numenian-styled dualism that was certainly not shared by Plotinus. 57 Proclus dismisses this thesis in a few lines: there cannot be two independent rst principles that eternally oppose one another; if there were two rsts, another, higher principle would be needed to give existence and oneness to both of them. Elsewhere (36,7-12) he adds the objection that the good would be faced with a perpetual struggle and could not enjoy the tranquillity proper to the gods. Proclus is clearly not exclusively interested in the refutation of Plotinus, but also in that of more crude forms of dualism. The second horn of the dilemma corresponds to the Plotinian position: what if matter, being the source of all evils, is itself generated? Then, says Proclus, the good will inevitably be the cause of evils. But then it will itself be evil, as the cause is what its product is in a greater degree. Also, another absurdity follows: since Neoplatonic causation is not a one-way process, but reversion is an essential aspect of it, the evils produced by matter will be good, for they will assimilate themselves to their ultimate cause. A double conclusion follows: the good, as the cause of evil, would be evil, and evil, as being produced from the good, would be good (31,20-1).
Cf. DMS 20,7-8; 24,32-40; in Tim. 3,313,18-21. Cf. OMeara, Das Bse bei Plotin (Enn. I,8). 57 In his treatise on matter Plotinus himself rejects this coarse dualism. Cf. II,4 [12], 2,9-10.
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Plotinus had wanted to hold simultaneously that matter is intrinsically evil and the principle of evil, on the one hand, and that it is the result of the emanation, on the other. By claiming that an inferior soul produces matter innocently, he tried to escape the consequence that the superior principles and ultimately the One are responsible for evil. Thus he intended to do justice to the Platonic axiom according to which the good is the cause of everything (is responsible for everything) yet is responsible for good things only, not for bad things. 58 Proclus objects that this goes against the Platonist metaphysical principle that the cause is like the effect in an eminent way. That which produces evil must therefore be even more evil than the effect. Fritz-Peter Hager, clearly a Plotinian believer, comments that Proclus, scholastic-minded as he was, could not understand Plotinus sublime insight. Plotinus was more or less alone in having realised the fact that we cannot apply the rules of causation to the relation between the superessential principle and the negation of being:
Hier sieht man den deutlichen Unterschied zwischen Plotins kritischem Blick fr die begrenzte Reichweite logischer Gesetzmigkeiten, der Ruhe des Mystikers, der um die Existenz dessen wei, was ber alle Vernunft erhaben ist, und der spteren neuplatonischen Schulweisheit, fr die es nichts zwischen Himmel und Erde, ja nicht einmal ber Himmel und Erde gibt, was nicht ihren logischen Regeln unterliegt.59
But of course Proclus has a point. Plotinus ingenious construction clashes with the laws of causation, which hold that the effect is implied in the cause and that the product reverts to its cause. It is indeed questionable whether his position is tenable on late Neoplatonic principles. Even if it is granted that the descent of the soul and the resulting generation of matter is not yet evil itself, from where could evil get its evil nature if not from its principle? D. OMeara concedes that Plotinus is confronted with a di f cult paradox.60 One could say that Plotinus tries to have it both ways in claiming
58 Resp. 2, 379B15-16: ok ra pntvn ge ation t xntvn ation, tn d kakn nation . 59
gayn,
ll tn mn e
F.-P. Hager, Die Materie und das Bse im antiken Platonismus, MH, 19, 1962, 96-7. Cf. W. Beierwaltes, Die Entfaltung der Einheit. Zur Differenz plotinischen und proklischen Denkens, Th ta-Pi, 2, 1973, 154; 156; 160 n. 2; Steel, Proclus on the existence of evil, 84-5: In this context it is not surprising that the more incoherent view of Plotinus now nds more defenders than Proclus own exposition. It is said that at least Plotinus had a deeper respect for the harsh intractable character of evil. Compared to the vivid language of Plotinus, Proclus words seem pale and too rationalistic. 60 D. OMeara, Trait 51, 109; 111.
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that matter is an intrinsically evil principle and the source of all evil, and that it is not an independent principle in any dualistic sense, as it is produced by the good. Or, as D. OBrien puts it:
Plotinus has left embedded in his philosophy a remnant of the old Platonic and Aristotelian dualism of two eternal and independently existing principles. Proclus offers a clearer notion of the total dependence of nite existence upon the One. He achieves this, by freeing matter from its role as the primary evil and as cause of evil in the soul. From this broader point of view, we may like to say that Plotinus conception of matter as evil, and as part cause of evil in the soul, is at odds with the general direction of his metaphysics. Taken more narrowly, however, Plotinus conception of matter and the souls weakness as part causes of sin is skillful and consistent.61
What we have here seems to be an irretrievable difference of philosophical styles, both between ancient philosophers and some of their modern commentators.62 In a recent article, D. OBrien has made the valuable observation that the causal relation by which matter is produced differs from other causal relations: the origin and nature of matter have to be understood as very different from the double process of emanation which lies at the origin of Intellect and of Soul.63 Indeed, the One does not simply create intellect; rather it generates something indeterminate. The latter constitutes itself as intellect when it returns towards its origin. The generation of the soul is to be understood analogously. With matter, however, the situation is completely different. For here we have reached the lowest point of the emanation; matter is non-being, the lifeless offspring, absolute indeterminateness. Out of itself, this lifeless non-being is not capable of returning to its principle. That is why the soul has to come down a second time in order to invest its product with form, by projecting its image on it, without being able, however, to change the nature of its product. So, contrary to the One and Intellect, that produce by their immobile activity and can leave their product to its own activity, the (lower) soul that generates matter has to move itself in order to produce, and it even needs to take the initiative a second time. Being itself an image of the higher
D. OBrien, Plotinus on Evil, 146. A similar remark concerning the difference between Proclus and Plotinus has also been made by OMeara, Trait 51, 32, more speci cally regarding the question whether the soul is itself responsible for its vices every time it fails to reach the good, without there being a principle that constantly harasses the soul (Proclus), or whether there is such a malicious principle at work in the world (Plotinus). The difference would be that between an optimistic and a pessimistic outlook on the world. 63 D. OBrien, La mati re chez Plotin, 45. See also 67-9.
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soul, the lower soul wants to imitate the latter by producing its own image, but contrary to what happened at the higher levels of production, this image is completely unlike its producing cause, up to the point even that it is utterly lifeless.64 Plotinus was very conscious of what he was doing when he described the production of matter as being fundamentally different from all other forms of production. For the same reasons he stressed the incapacity of matter to receive the forms that it gets from the soul: matter remains unaffected by them. It cannot return and cannot assimilate itself to its origin. In order to make this argument Plotinus had to reject the Aristotelian notion of matter by identifying the substrate with privation, having privation actively oppose the forms, and making matter the contrary of the forms and the contrary of substance. Proclus conception of matter could not be more different. According to him matter is produced by the good and its mode of production is not fundamentally different from that of other beings. His account of the generation of matter is mainly based on the Philebus , yet he has a very Aristotelian65 conception of what matter is and what its function is. In order for us to understand why he so utterly disagrees with Plotinus, we should take a look at the chapters where he explains his own doctrine. IX The ultimate reason why matter cannot be the principle of evil is ontological: matter derives its existence from the One, in other words it is produced by god. 66 Proclus fully integrates matter in his Neoplatonist ontology and avoids making its generation an exception to the laws of causality. According to these laws higher causes are to a greater measure causative of a given product than its proximate cause, and their in uence extends further down the ontological scale.67 Proclus holds that matter is
Enn. III,4 [15], 1,6-7. I refrain from taking a position in the prime matter debate among contemporary Aristotelians. The ancients, at least from as early as Alexander, took the PlatonicAristotelian pedigree of the doctrine of prime matter for granted. 66 The creation of matter is of course not to be understood as generation in time, but as dependence on a cause, since divine production is eternal and motionless. Cf. De Haas, John Philoponus New De nition of Prime Matter, 7-8. 67 Cf. L. Siorvanes, Proclus. Neo-Platonic Philosophy and Science, Edinburgh, 1996, 183; De Haas, John Philoponus New De nition of Prime Matter, 15. See Elem. theol. prop. 56-7; 70-2.
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the lowest manifestation of Unlimitedness (apeiria ), which itself as a principle is the immediate manifestation of the in nite power of the One.68 As the nal and indeed most powerful counter-argument against the thesis of matter as the principle of evil, Proclus comes to speak of its generation. His account is based on his interpretation of Philebus 23C9-10: we agreed earlier that the god had revealed a division of what is into the unlimited and the limit (tn yen lgomn pou t mn peiron dejai tn ntvn, t d praw;), where to reveal (dejai) is in standard Neoplatonic fashion interpreted as to produce.69
In the Philebus, however, he produces matter itself and the whole nature of the unlimited from the One, and, in general, places the divine cause before the distinction between limit and the unlimited. (34,9-10)
The same doctrine is explained at length in the third book of the Platonic Theology , but also in various passages in the commentaries.
Socrates says in the Philebus that god brings into existence limit and unlimitedness and that he has generated all beings by mixing these elements.70 If then, as we have explained, god brings all unlimitedness into existence, He also brings matter into existence, which is the lowest form of unlimitedness. And this is the very rst and ineffable cause of matter.71 It has been demonstrated elsewhere that Plato founds the rst unlimitedness the unlimitedness before the mixtures , at the summit of the intelligibles, and that he extends its irradiation from up there as far as the last of things, so that, according to him, matter proceeds from the One and from the unlimited that is prior to the one-being, if you wish, and that it proceeds from the one-being insofar as it is, potentially, a being. Therefore it is a good thing in a sense and unlimited, although it is utterly vague and without form, because those two (the One and the unlimited), too, are prior to the forms and their manifestation.72 Cf. Elem. Theol. prop. 92; Theol. Plat. 3,32,15-23; De Haas, John Philoponus New De nition of Prime Matter, 80-1 n. 93. 69 Cf. Theol. Plat. 3,36,10-19. 70 Cf. Theol. Plat. 3,30,19-21: lgei tonun n Filb Svkrthw w ra yew pratw sti ka peiraw postthw ka di totvn panta t nta mignw pargage . 71 in Tim. 1,384,30-385,3: e on, sper epomen, yew p san peiran fsthsi,
68
ka tn lhn fsthsin, sxthn osan peiran. ka ath mn prvtsth ka rrhtow ata tw lhw. 72 in Tim. 1,385,9-17: ddeiktai d n lloiw, ti tn prthn peiran, tn pr tn miktn, n t krthti tn nohtn druse ka keyen atw diatenei tn llamcin xri tn sxtvn, ste kat atn lh preisin k te to nw ka k tw peiraw tw pr to nw ntow, e d bolei, ka p to nw ntow kayson st dunmei n. di ka gayn p sti ka peiron, ka mudrtaton n ka nedeon, di ka tata pr tn edn ka tw kfnsevw atn.
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God not only produces the unlimited, he is also the cause of its mixture with limit, as can be derived from the Philebus .73 This allows Proclus to claim:
For god is the cause both of the existence of limit and the unlimited and of their mixture. This <unlimited>, therefore, and the nature of body, qua body, must be referred to one cause, namely god, for it is he who produced the mixture. Hence, neither body nor matter is evil, for they are the progeny of god, the one as a mixture, the other as unlimitedness. (35,9-14)
Even the lowest form of unlimitedness, namely matter, is produced by god, for all the forms of unlimitedness derive from one single cause. Especially in the case of sensible matter, gods power is necessary, as matter cannot out of itself, taking the initiative, engage in any mixture. Even more than at the higher levels, god is now needed a second time, since he is the cause of both the existence of limit and the unlimited, and their mixture (Theol. Plat. 3,36,20-24). This means that both matter and material bodies are produced by god: matter as the expression of his unlimitedness, body as a mixture brought about by god, of constituents (viz. matter/unlimited and form/limit) also produced by him. Hence neither of them can be evil. The evil in material bodies can therefore not be due to their material component. Every physical body of a hylemorphic structure by its material aspect resembles the unlimited; its form corresponds to limit:
For what else is the unlimited in body but matter? And what else is limit in it but form? What else but the whole is that which consists of both these? (35,19-21)74
However, the unlimited at this level is no longer power (dnamiw), but sheer potentiality. Matter is indeed the lowest expression of in nity; it is everything potentially (dunmei d lh t pnta)75 but is is incapable of entering into any mixture by itself, which is why gods power is required a second time. In this analysis of the hylemorphic structure Proclus is, of course, blending Platonic and Aristotelian elements.76
Phil. 26C4-27C1. Theol. Plat. 3,34,1-3: ka prw totoiw a tn fsei ginomnvn kaston kat mn t edow t prati prosoike, kat d tn lhn t peir&. Cf. in Tim. 1,384,28-30. 75 Theol. Plat. 3,34,7. See also in Parm. 843,13-23. Compare chapters 4 and 5 of Plotinus essay On what exists potentially and what actually, esp. II,5 [25], 4,3-4 and 5,5-7 (t tonun dunmei o ti, ll dunmei pnta: mhdn d n kay at, ll stin lh n, od nerge& stn); OBrien, Plotinus on the Origin of Matter, 31-4. 76 One may compare some of the re exions made by De Haas, John Philoponus New De nition of Prime Matter, xii; 5.
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X When Proclus nally gives his own view on the nature of matter, he explains that it is something that is necessary for the generation of the world:
If we consider matter itself from this perspective, we will see that it is neither good nor evil, but just necessary; in having been produced for the sake of good it is good, but as such it is not good; and as the lowest of beings it is evil if indeed what is most remote from the good is evil but as such it is not evil, but necessary, as we have explained. (37,1-6)
In a loose way of talking matter can be called both good (as contributing to the whole) and bad (as de cient with respect to the higher levels), but sensu stricto it is neither. When Proclus admits that matter, as the last of beings, could be called evil, or when he says that what is most remote from the good is evil, he obviously refers to Plotinus, who claimed that this last, after which nothing else could come into being, is evil. 77 Proclus agrees with Plotinus 78 that since the good had to produce (it is better to produce than not to produce) and could not produce an exact duplicate of itself (but only something that is different, and therefore inferior to its cause), it was inevitable that there had to be some kind of imperfection, and what is more, an imperfection that increases as the realities that produce become more distant from the good. And he also fully agrees that this decrease in perfection is not yet evil. And of course the emanation has to stop somewhere; there must be a lowest level after which nothing can exist. Plotinus says it stops at the level where the good is completely absent. This is the level of matter, which he de nes as absolute privation and complete opposition to the good. Therefore matter must be evil (I,8 [51], 7,16-23). This is not acceptable for Proclus: matter is the lowest hypostasis, but it is not to be identi ed with privation, and it is not completely opposite to the good.
For the cause of all good things had to produce not only beings that are good and that are good by themselves, but also the nature that is not absolutely and intrinsically good, but that desires the good and through its desire and, as it were, by itself gives other things the possibility of coming into being. Indeed, through its need for good things this nature <i.e., matter> contributes to the creation of the sensibles. (36,23-8)
77 78
Plot. I,8 [51], 6,36-59; 7,19-20. E.g. V,1 [10], 6,28-39; I,8 [51], 7,2-5.
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Proclus holds that even the lowest level that receives existence from the One participates in the good. The emanation does not proceed down to a point where the good is entirely lacking. 79 Absolute non-being does not exist at all. A fortiori , absolute evil does not exist, since it is not the contrary of being, but of that which is beyond being (the Good). Absolute evil, if it existed, would therefore even be below absolute non-being. 80 Hence, nothing that exists can be the absolute evil. Since matter exists, it cannot be irretrievably evil. Instead, by desiring the good it contributes to the generation of the world. If we carefully look at Proclus reasoning in chapter 36, we should now see that it is rather subtle. It starts out as a dialectical argument: if one regards matter as simply the last stage of the emanation [as Plotinus does], then one could admit that matter is evil although it would be better just to say that it is not good. 81 Then Proclus moves over to his own positive doctrine of matter: as being necessary for the generation of the world, matter is in a sense good. Proclus implies that matter is not just the last stage of an emanation process whereby increasingly less perfect causes produce increasingly less good products. 82 His account of emanation is different: the higher the causes, the further down their in uence reaches,83 which entails that the lowest reality is directly produced by the highest cause. Matter is therefore the (lowest) manifestation of the power (dnamiw) of the One. As an offspring of the One, it is part of the cycle
And moreover, the mere absence of good is not yet evil, as Plotinus elsewhere concedes (II,9 [33], 13,25-33). See Steel, Proclus on the Existence of Evil, 88-9. 80 Cf. 3,1-3. Plotinian matter is non-being, but not in the sense of the non-existent. In Plotinus interpretation of the Sophist (based on a variant reading), matter is that part of otherness that is opposed to real beings, i.e. to the forms. It is then equated with the substrate and with privation: it is a privation that is not in the substrate, but is the substrate. It persists through all change (contrary to Aristotelian privation, but in accordance with the function of the Aristotelian substrate) and is not only the correlate of form, but also that which opposes form. For Plotinus view of matter as nonbeing, see OBrien, La mati re chez Plotin, 56-66; 62 n. 49. 81 See esp. 36,1-6, quoted above. 82 Cf. E. Schrder, Plotins Abhandlung POYEN TA KAKA (Enn. I,8), Leipzig, 1916, 199 n. 7. 83 This concept of emanation is a post-Plotinian development, yet de nitely older than Proclus. Cf. Syr. in Metaph. 59,17-18; Procl. Elem. Theol. prop. 57; E.R. Dodds, PROKLOU DIADOXOU STOIXEIVSIS YEOLOGIKH. Proclus. The Elements of Theology, Oxford, 1963, 230-2; J. Opsomer, Proclus on demiurgy and procession in the Timaeus, Reason and Necessity. Essays on Platos Timaeus, edited by R.M. Wright, London, 2000, n. 97 p. 140. See esp. Dodds, o.c., 231: The direct ascription of sterseiw to the causal agency of the One, bold as it is, was the only possible view
79
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of procession and reversion,84 although it may not be able to revert by itself alone. Let us take another look at the dilemma that Proclus presents to the proponents of the doctrine of evil matter, and especially at the dramatic conclusions that are said to follow for those who, like Plotinus, hold that matter is not an independent principle God as the cause of evil will be evil, and evil as the product of the Good will be good. It is now clear that the second half of this conclusion, which is based on the idea that products revert and assimilate to their causes is fairly harmless for Plotinus, who was not committed to the view that matter engages in reversion. But the rst part, which is based on the idea that causes are in an eminent way what their products are, does confront Plotinus with a bigger problem,85 as he is generally committed to this premiss. He tries to get away with it by referring to the peculiar way in which matter is produced: not by the One, but by the lowest soul. But that does not solve the dif culty, of course. And the idea that matter is the very last level of the emanation, and hence a reality that is no longer able to produce and hence is no longer good (for everything that is good has to produce)86 does not
if they were not to be attributed (as both Aristotle and Plotinus sometimes seem to attribute them) to an active power of resistance resident in Matter. 84 Cf. in Tim. 1,209,13-210,14. 85 As is recognised by Narbonne, La m taphysique de Plotin , 129-31, and C. Schfer, Proklos Argument aus De malorum subsistentia 31,5-12 in der modernen Interpretation, Philosophiegeschicheund Logische Analyse/Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy, 2, Antike Philosophie, 1999, 178. However, the examples that Schfer offers in defence of Plotinus (life bringing forth death; and 1 bringing forth 0 in a mathematical series of natural numbers proceeding by the abstraction of one unit at every step) are of little help. They merely show that one should not be committed to the view that nothing can be derived from its contrary (or, in the Neoplatonic lingo of causation: that causes always produce like effects but then the analysis of these examples in terms of causation is hardly acceptable in any contemporary account of causation). The question is rather: what if you do hold this view? Schfer should therefore have shown either that Plotinus was not committed to the premiss at all, and next explain what Plotinus view on causation actually is (under what conditions are effects like their causes, and why is this not the case for matter?), or else show how Plotinus would justify his contention that matters evil nature is not already contained in its causes despite the rule that causes contain their effects and are eminently like them (but from where, then, does matter get its evil nature, if not from causes?). It is moreover very unlikely that Plotinus would analyse the examples in the same way as Schfer does: (1) does life produce/cause death? (2) Plotinus could never conceive a downward mathematical series ending in 0. 86 The bottom line of an analysis made by D. OMeara at a one-day conference in Leuven on 24 November 2000.
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help much either: all this argument could prove is that matter is not good, not that it is evil. If it were evil, then its causes too would have to be evil. The only way out is to say with Proclus that it is not good.87 XI It has been remarked that Proclus conception of matter ready and eager to be informed is Aristotelian, rather than Platonic, whereas Plotinus has a conception of matter that is de nitely un-Aristotelian, and possibly more Platonic:
Il sagit chez Proclus dune lecture plutt aritstot licienne du Tim e: la mati re est con ue de mani re voquer la compl mentarit aristot licienne de la forme et de la mati re, dans laquelle la contrari t ne peut avoir de place. Or le Tim e de Platon semble envisager plutt la mise en ordre par lintellect (en fonction des Formes) dun d sordre ant rieur, d sordre li un milieu, un r ceptacle qui reste r fractaire la forme, dans lequel les formes apparaissent sans vraiment lapprivoiser. Dans ce sens, la lecture plotinienne parat plus proche du texte de Platon.88
I would agree that Proclus view of matter has an overall Aristotelian outlook, but do not concede that Plotinus is closer to the conception of matter in the Timaeus . It is true that there is a refractory element in the Timaeus , and this is associated with the receptacle. However, without wanting to open the discussion about the nature of the receptacle and its relation to Aristotelian matter,89 I should at least say that it is far from obvious that this refractory element needs to be identi ed with matter. This is however the step Plotinus takes, when he equates matter with the
87 Although there may be new problems in store for this view, too, similar to those that I discussed in Proclus on demiurgy and procession in the Timaeus: decrease of perfection is already hard to analyse within the Neoplatonic theoretical framework (stating that there always is a decrease of perfection does not explain how this comes about), and complete loss of perfection even more so let alone the passage from a cause to its contrary. Therefore the view that matter is less good is easier to defend than the view that it is not good, and to say that it is evil may well turn out to be untenable on Neoplatonic premisses. See also R. Chiaradonna, Essence et pr dication chez Porphyre et Plotin, Revue des sciences philosophiques et th ologiques, 1998, 601; 603. 88 Cf. OMeara, Trait 51, 33 See also R. Beutler, Proklos. 4. Neuplatoniker, RE 45 Hb. (XXIII-1), 1957, 242,29-35; Erler, ber die Existenz des Bsen, 104(-5), n. 2. 89 See the most illuminating discussion by K. Algra, Concepts of Space in Greek Thought, Leiden New York Kln, 1995, ch. 3. Also De Haas, John Philoponus New De nition of Prime Matter, 50-5.
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necessity of the Timaeus.90 But that is a rather dubious thing to do.91 Even the precosmic disorder does not seem to be due to matter alone. 92 XII Proclus concludes the section on matter by another argument in which he uses and defends the Aristotelian view against Plotinus. Plotinus had argued that evil is contrary to all the forms and hence to the Good. Proclus insists on distinguishing between these two: if Plotinus wants to maintain that absolute evil exists, he should make the case that it is contrary to the Good, not just to being. Moreover, whereas a contrary of a form exists, it is impossible for something to be entirely contrary to all the forms or to the Good. Now, if evil is that which is contrary to the good that exists in other things, and not to the good on its own, evil, like its contraries, can only exist in other things, and not on its own. Hence evil cannot be matter, for matter exists on its own (37,6-13): matter is a substrate, and not in a substrate as Proclus had said earlier (30,5), when he paraphrased the view of his opponents. They indeed concluded that if matter is evil, it can only be essential evil (kat osan kakn) and not evil as an accident (30,2-8). Therefore, if Proclus can prove that evil does not exist on its own, he has refuted the identi cation of matter and evil. If matter is absolute evil, he argues, it has to be contrary to the primary good. But this is impossible: nothing can be contrary to the primary good. Proclus rst argument is that everything that exists, exists because of the good. But of course the contrary of the good would not exist because of the good; it is rather the opposite: contraries are mutually destructive (37,15-17). The second argument is based on the Aristotelian de nition of contrariety: contraries belong to the same genus. So if the rst good had a contrary,
Enn. I,8 [51], 7,2-7. Proclus has an entirely different explanation, not entirely acceptable either to modern Plato scholars, I am afraid. He maintains that necessity is the motive cause of bodies, also called emarmnh, acting jointly with the demiurge (De Providentia 13,13-17; Theol. Plat. V,31). Theologically it is the monad of the hypercosmic-encosmic Moirai, which itself is situated in the intellective diakosmos. See H.D. Saffrey (& L.G. Westerink ), Proclus. Th ologie platonicienne, Livre VI (CUF), Paris, 1997, 102 n. 2 (p. 181). At any rate, for Proclus, unlike Plotinus, necessity in the Timaeus has nothing to do with the necessity of evils of Theaet. 176A. 92 According to Proclus, precosmic disorder is caused by the in uence of the intelligible Forms, whose activity is logically prior to that of the demiurge (and the intellective forms that he contains).
90 91
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both would belong to the same genus. But there can be no genus prior to the Good, since the Good is the very rst principle. (37,18-23) This is again clearly directed against Plotinus. The latter had taken Theaetetus 176A to imply that evils must necessarily exist, since there has to be something contrary to the Good (t gr kak enai ngk, peper tonanton ti de enai t gay [I,8 [51], 6,16-17]). Subsequently he developed an argument to circumvent Aristotles assertion 93 that there is no contrary to substance. It can indeed be plausibly inferred through induction that there are no contraries of particular substances, thus Plotinus. But it has not been demonstrated that this does apply to substance in general. As a consequence, there may be a contrary to the supreme, unquali ed Good after all. And indeed, he continued, the contrary of substance is non-substance and the contrary of the nature of the Good is the nature and principle of evil: for they both are principles, the one of evil things, and the other of good things. And all the things which are included in one nature are contrary <to those in the other>; so that also the wholes are contrary and even more so than the other things [i.e. particular goods or evils]. 94 For other things still have something in common, they belong in the same genus or species. Then how could one not call contraries things that are furthest removed from each other and that have absolutely nothing in common? All the characteristics, or rather pseudocharacteristics, of evil are completely contrary to what is contained in the divine nature (in a superessential mode), for even its being is false. So Plotinus claimed to have demonstrated that it is not universally true that there is nothing contrary to substance (6,36-48). 95 In order to do so he had to truncate Aristotles de nition 96 of contraries as things which stand
93 94
Cat. 5, 3b24-32; Phys. 1,6, 189a32-3. I,8 [51], 6,31-6: [ ll t t kaylou os& stai nanton ka lvw tow
prtoiw; t mn os& m osa, t d gayo fsei tiw st kako fsiw ka rx:] rxa gr mfv, mn kakn, d gayn: ka pnta t n t fsei katr& nanta: ste ka t la nanta ka m llon nanta t lla.
Plotinus adds that it had even been possible for individual substances to be contrary to each other: were it not the case that (prime) matter provides a common substrate for the elements, water could be the contrary of re. I,8 [51], 6,49-54. Compare Simpl. in Cat. 107,25-30 and Dexipppus in Cat. 52,5-10: water and re are not contraries as substances to substances; only their qualities are contraries. 96 Cat. 6, 6a17-18. A problem, however, is 14a15-25. There it is said that contraries are (1) either in the same genus, or (2) in contrary genera (e.g. justice and injustice), or (3) are themselves genera, e.g. good and bad. Cf. J.L. Ackrill, Aristotles Categories and De Interpretatione, Oxford, 1963, 111: Contraries in contrary genera means contraries whose immediate genera are contrary. This solves (2) [see also Elias in
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furthest apart in the same genus to things which stand furthest apart. An extreme contrariety would imply, so he claimed, that the contraries have nothing at all in common, not even a genus (6,54-9). This construction is completely rejected by Proclus: he reaf rms the Aristotelian axiom that contraries are always in the same genus. In chapter 45 he also strongly renounces the idea that a substance could have a contrary:
And in general all evil is outside the substance and is not substance. For nothing is contrary to substance, but good is contrary to evil. (45,15-17)
Proclus rmly re-establishes Peripatetic orthodoxy. XIII Proclus own solution to the problem of evil will involve the notion of the subcontrary, which he derives from Theaetetus 176A. There Socrates indeed says penanton [and not just nanton] gr ti t gay e enai ngkh , a distinction Plotinus has failed to make and according to Proclus should have made. Subcontrariety as Proclus de nes it in this treatise is a special form of contrariety whereby a particular evil derives its being and power from the good it is opposed to.97 This notion allows Proclus to maintain a form of contrariety between partial, i.e. relative,98 evils and
Cat. 250,28-251,4; Philop. in Cat. 191,5-14], but (3) is more problematic. Ibid.: Good and bad are not in a genus: does Aristotle mean that they are not in any ordinary genus (but fall immediately under a category), or that they are not in any one category because good like being occurs in all the categories (Nicomachean Ethics 1096a23-29, Topics 107a3-17)? If the latter is Aristotles point he does not express it very well by saying that good and bad are themselves genera. Cf. Philop. in Cat. 190,6-191,5. I have a strong suspicion that Ackrills comment was inspired by Philoponus account. However, Ackrill has left out one element that is crucial for our purposes. Philoponus offers the additional comment that strictly speaking ( kribologoumnoiw) good and bad are not contraries, but are opposed as disposition and privation (kat strhsin ka jin ntikesyai ). For in order for them to be contraries both of them would have to have a determinate nature, but evil has no determinate existence (t d kakn ok xei rismnhn pstasin ). 97 Cf. Steel, Proclus on the Existence of Evil, 101: a privation which somehow coexists with the good disposition of which it is the negation and which through this coexistence shares in that dispositions form and power. 98 They are relative in that they are merely evil relative to a particular good. Compare H. Chernisss interpretation of Theaet. 176A in its own right (The Sources of Evil According to Plato, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 98, 1954, 24, n. 7).
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the good, without attributing any independent being to them. They are parasitic on true being. This brings us to the concept of parhypostasis , the kind of existence attributed to evil in the Neoplatonic tradition from as early as Iamblichus. This notion can only be understood properly in the context of causation. 99 Only that which is directly caused by a cause per se, i.e. results from a cause proceeding in accordance with its nature towards a goal that is intended, has existence hypostasis in the proper sense (kurvw). Whenever an effect is produced that was not intended or is not related by nature or per se to the agent, it is said to exist besides (par) the intended effect, that is, as a side-effect.
For there is no other way of existing for that which neither is produced, in any way whatsoever, from a principal cause, nor has a relation to a de nite goal and a nal cause, nor has received in its own right an entry into being, since anything whatever that exists properly must come from a cause in accordance with nature indeed, without a cause it is impossible for anything to come about100 and must connect101 the order of its coming about to some goal.102
Evils are never intended as such by any cause: there are no proper ef cient nor formal nor nal causes for them. At least there is no antecedent or principal cause for their coming about. They can only be caused by accident.103 That which is merely caused accidentally and in no way per se (principally) has parhypostasis (parasitical existence) as its mode of existence.
Therefore it is appropriate to call such generation a parasitic existence, in that it is without end and unintended, uncaused in a way and inde nite. For neither is there one cause for it, nor does that which is a cause in its own right and a principal cause produce something for the sake of evil itself and the nature of evil, nor does anything which is not a principal cause nor a cause in its own right. For a more extensive analysis, see Opsomer-Steel Evil without a cause, 24457; Steel, Proclus on the Existence of Evil, 97-8. 100 Cf. Tim. 28C2-3. 101 i.e., everything that exists is produced by an ef cient cause, but must also revert to this cause, which then simultaneously functions as its nal cause. 102 DMS 50,3-9 (adopting D. Isaacs interpunction: Proclus. Trois tudes sur la Providence, III, De lexistence du mal (CUF), Paris, 1982, ad loc.). 103 Proclus seems to be referring implicitly to Aristotles analysis of accidental causality. Cf. Metaph. 6,2-3; 5,30, 11,8, Phys. 2,4-6. Moreover, Proclus interpretation may be not too far removed from Platos original intuitions. Many observations of great interest concerning Platos views on evil can be found in H. Cherniss, The Sources of Evil According to Plato, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 98, 1954, 23-30 (esp. p. 28 on the accidental causation of evils).
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No, it is the exact opposite: everything that is produced is produced for the sake of the good; but evil, being from outside and adventitious,104 consists in the failure to attain that which is the appropriate goal of each thing.105
XIV When Simplicius in his commentary on the Categories expands on 3b24, where Aristotle makes the claim that there is no contrary of substance, 106 the commentator not only refutes the view of Plotinus that the non-being that is matter is the contrary of substance as such, 107 but he also inserts a concise summary108 of his own views on evil. The latter are remarkably close to those of Proclus. Prior to his explicit criticism of Plotinus, Simplicius had already explained Aristotles view, refuting various objections: substances do not have contraries. Contrariety is to be found in differentiae and qualities that inhere in substances; they are at the furthest remove from each other, but belong to a common subject. Then Simplicius comes to speak of those who situate contrariety in the substance, and more in particular, those who say that the principles (tw rxw) are completely opposed, 109 having nothing
peisodidew. See also in Remp. 1,38,26-9, in Tim. 3,303,22; Simpl. in Cat. 109,29-110,5; De dec. dub. 15,2; 20,3; De prov. 34,11; Plut. De an. procr. 1015BC; Quaest. conv. 734C. The metaphor derives from Aristotle: Poet. 1451b33-5. See OpsomerSteel, Evil without a cause, 256 n. 145. 105 DMS 50,29-36. 106 I thank Frans De Haas for having me let use his forthcoming translation of this passage. All translations from Simplicius are his. 107 This polemic is lacking in Ammonius commentary. 108 A more elaborate exposition of his views on evil can be found at in Epict. Encheir. 35. Cf. A.C. Lloyd, The Later Neoplatonists, The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, edited by A.H. Armstrong, Cambridge, 1967, 317-19; I. Hadot, Simplicius, Commentaire sur le Manuel dpict te (Philosophia antiqua, 66), Leiden, 1996, 114-44. At in Phys. 249,26-250,3 Simplicius vehemently condemns the view that matter is evil. 109 Dexippus in Cat. 52,26-53,4 allows that form and privation are called contraries, but they are not opposed as substances, but rather as being to non-being, as rst principle to last element, and as good to evil. The one is existent, the other non-existent. Dexippus account then is characterised by some ambiguity as to the status of nonbeing: he seems to say that it is simply non-existent, but then he should neither call it the last element nor evil. Dexippus claims that Aristotle in the Physics says that form is contrary to privation and matter to form. In fact, Aristotle (190b27-34) says that a given quality and its privation are in a way contrary and in a way not, as is pointed out by J. Dillon, Dexippus on Aristotles Categories, London Ithaca, New York, 1990, 95 n. 77.
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in common, because they have no relation to each other. These principles would be completely independent and would have no need of any other principle to relate the two of them to each other. Such people straightforwardly state that the principles are contrary substances, without there being a common subject, not even being (108,10-15). Their principles are opposed as being to non-being, as the beginning to the last, as good to evil. Such indeed is the opinion of the great Plotinus, says Simplicius, who then goes on to quote Enn. I,8 [51], 6,28-30: That nothing is contrary to substance is credible with respect to particular [kinds of ] substances, individual, speci c, and generic, because it is proven by induction but it is not proven in general. Simplicius refutes this claim arguing that substances not having a contrary is not only shown by induction, but can also be proved by the method of complete division (108,33-35) : given that all substances without exception are divided into primary and secondary substances, and neither of them possesses contrariety, substance as a whole cannot possess contrariety either. Moreover, in the case of essential attributes and completers of substance, what is true in each case is also proved to be true of every case. Therefore, given that to exist in itself is essential to substance, not to have a contrary will also belong to it essentially (109,24: ka t os& tonun eper t kay atn enai osidew prxei, ka t mhdeman xein nantvsin n at kat osan prjei).110 Then Simplicius explicitly addresses Plotinus view that good and evil are related as being to non-being. Simplicius rst develops a number of counter-arguments by way of divisions (109,12-32): (1) (1a) Either non-being does not exist at all, (1b) or it is something. But then (1a) it has no relation whatsoever either, not even one of contrariety, or (1b) it is not cut off in all respects from that which is, as it participates in being. (continuing from option 1b) (2) Being and non-being are (2a) either separate as two substances, or (2b) they are separately transcendent because of outstanding otherness (109,15: e d kat kbebhkuan terthta jrhmnai esn xvristw). In the rst case (2a) they have being in common, in the second (2b) they have nothing in common and will not even share a relation of contrariety. (3) Not-being is either (3a) produced out of being, or (3b) it subsisted from the beginning per se. But if (3a) it is brought about by being, it
110
Here Dexippus concurs: in Cat. 53,5-25.
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cannot enjoy any contrariety to it, given that it has its entire existence from being (if it were to turn against its cause, its cause would no longer sustain it111). If, on the other hand, (3b) it has an entirely independent existence, it will be of equal dignity to being, since it too would be primary. And there would be no reason to call the one being, the other nonbeing. It would have a principal existence (a prohgoumnh pstasiw, 109,23-4, which is precisely what Proclus in DMS 50 denied to evil). Moreover, it will not be evil, since it has a primary existence. It will also be dif cult to gure out how the two of them could ever come together. [Given (3b), only a third party can bring them together.] Hence, (3b,a) if something else brings them together, they will no longer be primary. But if (3b,b) they remain separate, because (3b) they have neither come into existence the one out of the other 112 nor from a prior principle, 113 generation and this universe could not be fully established, i.e., the principles could not be part of the same reality (they could not be used to explain the presence of both good and bad in this world). These objections are said to hold for all those who posit evil and notbeing at the beginning, and most of all for Plotinus and for the others who start from uni cation (109,30-2). Simplicius arguments are powerful indeed. If, as a Platonist, you hold that the One-Good is the principle of everything, evil cannot be considered a principle in its own right, whether you consider this an ontologically independent principle (which is actually already excluded by your most basic tenet) or a derived principle (Plotinus view, but114 then the Good does not only cause good, but also bad things). Non-being cannot
111 I would like to point out that this is not an argument against the Proclean notion of the subcontrary, as for Proclus there is no such thing as a single substance that perpetually opposes the good. It is the particular beings that intermittently participate that derive power from their cause to become its opposite temporarily. Hence, one should avoid saying that the difference between Plotinus and Proclus is mainly terminological, pace Beierwaltes, Die Entfaltung der Einheit. Zur Differenz plotinischen und proklischen Denkens, 158. 112 For obvious reasons Simplicius does not even envisage the other option, that the good might be produced by evil. 113 This follows from the denial of (3b,a), as it is understood that a third party bringing them together could only do so if it produced both of them. 114 Proclus therefore rejects the idea of a single principle causing evil. However, a problem remains: whatever causes evil, must itself be produced by principles in the hierarchy of the good, so that the good could ultimately be held responsible after all. That is why Proclus irts with the idea that evil is in a way uncaused. Cf. Opsomer-Steel, Evil without a cause, 255-60; DMS 50,31: non causatam aliqualiter entem.
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both be caused by the rst principle and be contrary to it.115 Simplicius arguments are remarkably similar to those of Proclus that we examined in sect. VIII (DMS ch. 31).116 Simplicius continues by saying that those who start from uni cation are required to make the multitude that results from division adventitious (the problem of evil can indeed be reduced to this more fundamental problem: the transition from unity to multiplicity, or, in other words: procession) and to claim that evil supervenes accidentally and has no priority whatsoever. 117 This is the vocabulary and the theory that is familiar from DMS. Plotinus, however, is said to contradict himself (110,2-25). Simplicius repeats the idea that nothing that has a derived existence to be more precise, a parasitical existence ( parhypostasis : 110,5) can be contrary to its own principle. If something were completely cut off from its cause, it would destroy itself. Furthermore, it would no longer be contrary, as it would have nothing in common with its cause any longer.
It will not even be the case that the non-substantial is contrary to the substantial, as they claim, for the very substantiality will belong to them in common, and no longer will the one be being, the other not-being. They ought to have subtracted contrariety too from not-being for it to be truly not-being. [. . .] So neither statement is to be made at all, (1) that it both is-not and is a contrary, and (2) that it is both ultimate and a principle, i.e. that it creates contraries and cannot create anything at all. (110,13-20)
115 R. Chiaradonna, Essence et pr dication chez Porphyre et Plotin, 602: Contre la s paration plotinienne de losa et la non-osa, Simplicius adresse des objections subtiles, qui soulignent le caract re paradoxal dune telle doctrine du point de vue de la th orie de la participation. Le commentateur observe quil est impossible dadmettre entre deux r alit s, telles que lintelligible et la mat rielle, une s paration comme celle quenvisage Plotin. Lun des deux termes de cette s paration d rive, en effet, de lautre; mais, en m me temps, le non- tre en vient avoir, dans la conception plotinienne de lnantvsiw, une consistance qui le rend irr ductible et le met au m me niveau par rapport ce qui en devrait tre la cause. 116 See esp. 31,9-15: Now, if matter stems from a principle, then matter itself receives its procession into being from the good. If, on the other hand, matter is a principle, then we must posit two principles of beings which oppose each other, namely the primary good and the primary evil. But that is impossible. For there can be no two rsts. From where would these two come at all, if there were no monad? For if each of the two is one, prior to both there must exist a single principle, the One, through which both are one. 117 in Cat. 109,32-110,2: otoi gr t n ka t gayn n rx protiyntew
peisodidew felousi poien t p tw diairsevw plyow ka t kakn kat sumbebhkw piginmenon ka mhdamw prohgomenon pofanesyai . Compare esp. DMS
50,24-27; 36.
188
JAN OPSOMER
The arguments partly overlap with those of Proclus, and are partly new, that is, to the reader of Proclus. Also they are elaborated in a slightly different way. At any rate all of the arguments are compatible with Proclus views. Simplicius may very well have devised the arguments himself. However, it is equally possible that he relied on earlier sources, such as Iamblichus commentary on the Categories . Further down in his own commentary, Simplicius once again clashes with those who make evil an alternative principle. He mentions Iamblichus, who polemically developed many beautiful arguments designed <to show> that one ought to assume that evil lies in parhypostasis and failure [i.e. to reach ones goal] (418,5-6: tn pollow ka kalow katatenanta lgouw prw t n parupostsei ka potux& t kakn oesyai den). Presumably, then, it is Iamblichus, not Proclus, who is to be credited with all of these nice arguments against Plotinus. 118 Department of Philosophy University of South Carolina
One could have argued that Simplicius imposes his own, late-Neoplatonic vocabulary on Iamblichus (see also in Cat. 130,14-18; 361,7-12), were it not that there is independent proof for a more ancient provenance of the parhypostasis doctrine. See Julian, Ew tn mhtra tn yen 11,21; Greg. Nyss. in Eccl. 5,356,9-15; De opif. hom. 164,6-8; Contra Eun. 3,7,58,2-6 (cf. Basil Hom. 1,7,21; 6,3,60); 3,9,5,1-3. For potuxa see Epict. Ench. 27. It is not a coincidence that Neoplatonists use parhypostasis language when they are discussing the Stoic doctrine of incorporeals: they may have understood that their own term parhypostasis was perfectly suited to explain the ontological status of Stoic incorporeals (being parasitic on bodies), but it is equally possible that the Stoics themselves coined parhypostasis as a technical term. See OpsomerSteel, Evil without a cause, 249. G. Bechtle, Das Bse im Platonismus: berlegungen zur Position Jamblichs, Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbch fr Antike und Mittelalter, 4, 1999, esp. 79-82 shows that many of Proclus arguments on evil were pre gured by Iamblichus. Bechtle seems to have overlooked Simpl. in Cat. 418,5-6. On Syrianus use of the notion of parhypostasis (in Metaph. 107,8-9) see A.D.R. Sheppard, Monad and Dyad as Cosmic Principles in Syrianus, in: Soul and the Structure of Being in Late Neoplatonism. Syrianus, Proclus, and Simplicius. Papers and discussions of a colloquium held at Liverpool, 15-16 April, 1982, edited by H.J. Blumenthal and A.C. Lloyd, Liverpool, 1982, 10.
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Proclus Vs Plotinus On Matter

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Proclus vs Plotinus on Matter (De mal. subs.

Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2001

PROCLUS VS PLOTINUS ON MATTER (DE MAL. SUBS. 30-7)

PROCLUS VS PLOTINUS ON MATTER (DE MAL. SUBS. 30-7)

PROCLUS VS PLOTINUS ON MATTER (DE MAL. SUBS. 30-7)

PROCLUS VS PLOTINUS ON MATTER (DE MAL. SUBS. 30-7)

PROCLUS VS PLOTINUS ON MATTER (DE MAL. SUBS. 30-7)

PROCLUS VS PLOTINUS ON MATTER (DE MAL. SUBS. 30-7)

PROCLUS VS PLOTINUS ON MATTER (DE MAL. SUBS. 30-7)

PROCLUS VS PLOTINUS ON MATTER (DE MAL. SUBS. 30-7)

PROCLUS VS PLOTINUS ON MATTER (DE MAL. SUBS. 30-7)

PROCLUS VS PLOTINUS ON MATTER (DE MAL. SUBS. 30-7)

PROCLUS VS PLOTINUS ON MATTER (DE MAL. SUBS. 30-7)

PROCLUS VS PLOTINUS ON MATTER (DE MAL. SUBS. 30-7)

PROCLUS VS PLOTINUS ON MATTER (DE MAL. SUBS. 30-7)

PROCLUS VS PLOTINUS ON MATTER (DE MAL. SUBS. 30-7)

PROCLUS VS PLOTINUS ON MATTER (DE MAL. SUBS. 30-7)

PROCLUS VS PLOTINUS ON MATTER (DE MAL. SUBS. 30-7)

Here Dexippus concurs: in Cat. 53,5-25.

PROCLUS VS PLOTINUS ON MATTER (DE MAL. SUBS. 30-7)

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