The Analysis of Rewards Payment Scheme for

Public Officials on the Performance of Duty

.. 2555

The Analysis of Rewards Payment Scheme for
Public Officials on the Performance of Duty

..


...


.. 2555

 /
... /
...
...

..


...

...
361
11000

(Acknowledgements)


...








...


(Terms of Reference)

ii

2555

iii

()


()
The Analysis of Rewards Payment Scheme for Public
Officials on the Performance of Duty
1. .. ( : PhD, in Criminal
Justice, (Distance Learning), Trinity College and University, Delaware
: : . 02 4133997)
2. ( :
() :
. 02 1419169)
3. ( : (
) :
. 02 2220206)
4. ... ( :
() :
. 02 2514730)
5. ( :
: : . 086 7891464)

2552
2,000,000.00 3 5
2 .. 2552 31 .. 2555

iv

2






2 (Moral Hazard)






(Documentary
Research) (In-depth Interview)
(Focus Group Discussion)
(1)
(2)
(3)

2


2



(1)

(2)
(3)
2






(Reactive law enforcement)




2

.. 2546

vi

ABSTRACT

The reward payment scheme or the money paid to state officials for performance of law
enforcement on investigation and arresting the offender has provided in a number of legislations.
The law has purposes to increase efficiency and compensation for lower salary state officials and
gives incentive to refrain from receiving bribery and other benefits. Moreover, the reward may be
given to perform extraordinary duties. Currently, the reward payment scheme for certain positions
differed considerably to ordinary state officials that shall have at least two difficulties on
performance of government duties: moral hazard and discrimination against and unequal payment
to other officers. The study, therefore, is needed to analyze the reward payment scheme to state
officials whether it shall be sustained or revised in order to serve the objective of efficiency and
fair level field.
In theoretical consideration and case studies on the National Police Agency, Customs
Department and Office of Narcotic Control Board under documentary research and in depth
interview, including convening a hearing and focus group as well as the public opinion and mass
media, the researcher has concentrated on (1) to conduct surveys and analyses of legislations and
regulations concerning reward payment schemes under the Thai laws; (2) to study and analyze
laws and regulations on reward payment schemes; (3) to study and analyze the law on special pay
of the United States as a source of comparison with Thai system
The outcome of current reward payment scheme divided into the payment scheme
under the act governed the reward rendition in the legislation and the reward payment scheme
under regulation of the Ministry of Finance on deduction of the fine collected from the offender
prior to deliver the treasury. Both practices have similar and different characteristics. The
similarity is concerned with principle, method and procedure of payment. The significant of the
reward schemes are provided for receiver and stipend rate or proportion of the reward to the
eligible receiver. These discrepancies of entitlement and remuneration rate of reward payment
have caused difficulties in the reward payment system: (1) inequality for eligible receiver in the
government services, (2) the unfair payment procedure, (3) discrimination on enforcement of law
to the public.

vii

The research has proposed to resolve difficulties divided into policy and revision of
legislation in questions. The policy of reward payment schemes shall separate money award to
state official from reward that gives to the public for assistance the law enforcement officer or
agency. The reward system shall continue for an incentive to public participation in crime
prevention. The award/reward payment schemes render to state official shall be partly continued
and revised the proportion rate according to the specification of job description to encouraging
honesty in undertaking law enforcement duties rather than money incentive. Furthermore, the
reward payment scheme should not promote reactive law enforcement as mean to an end rather
than proactive crime prevention. The reward payment scheme should render to the task of
proactive law enforcement official on evaluation of effectiveness and outstanding crime
prevention program.
For improvement and revision of law on reward payment system, the researcher has
proposed short term and long term measures. The Ministry of Finance that oversees the reward
payment scheme should deliberate to reform existing laws: specific legislation given the reward
and the Regulation of the Ministry of Finance on the Deduction of Fine prior delivery to the
Treasure B.E. 2546. The said legislation shall have same procedure for equal reward payment
system. The short term solution needed to revise Ministry of Finances Regulation of B.E. 2546
to correct discrepancies in rendition of reward schemes for performing similar law enforcement
function, the Regulation of Ministry of Finance on the Rendition of Award and Reward for
Expense in Performance of Duty B.E. 2546 and Announcement of Ministry of Finance Specified
Category and Deduction of Fine Rate prior Delivery to the Treasury. These legislations have
caused problematic discretion under implementation and practices in order to eliminate
controversy and enhance efficiency.
The prevention of corruption under the reward scheme shall be enforcing as other
infringement of laws and regulation, malpractice and criminal offences. The implementation of
reward scheme shall be given in transparent manner in the context of good governance including
a campaign to build the state officials consciousness and dedication in performing their duties.

viii

132
7







.. 2546

ix

.. 2546

50




10
10,000





(1)



(2)

(3)

xi

2






(Reactive law enforcement)





2

.. 2546


.. 2546
.. 2546

xii

Executive Summary
The research project on an Analysis of Rewards Payment Scheme for Public Officials
on the Performance of Duty has affected officers discretion in performing their duties of law
enforcement, rights and liberties of the people. This includes an impact regarding conflict of
interest in law enforcement agencies, namely investigation and arrest of offender in the criminal
justice process under their jurisdictions. Under the Thai reward system, government officials
receive monetary share from pecuniary penalty imposed on the offenders. The concept needs,
more or less, to consider condition in relation to performance of work. In certain agency, the
reward scheme payable is related to perform risk- taking duty in addition to monthly salary. In
principle the monetary based reward scheme shall concentrate on distinction and excellence of
work or achievement rather than basic competency of employment in government service.
Therefore, increasing pay, promotion and salary scale shall not include in the study.
The researchers have analyzed and deliberated at least 132 pieces of legislation
divided into rewards scheme payable according to 7 groups of existing legislation, for example,
law relating to public peace and national security, law relating to finance and taxation, law
relating to communication and mass media, law on commerce and industry. These laws have not
given clear reason or justification on rendition of reward to law officers. However, our
researchers have conducted survey, interview, focus group meeting of the stake holders in various
government agencies. The Comptroller Generals Department that oversees and supervises rule
and regulation of the reward payment schemes assumes the reward scheme derived from
government policy to increase income for government officials, especially police officers to
enhance morals in performing their duties. In certain circumstances, the entrusted duties are
extremely difficult or detrimental to life and body of the officers. The principle based on fund
collected from the wrong doer, especially money from punitive fine imposed in proportion to the
offense given to the officer in charge of the case. The policy has been implemented and widely
practiced in various government agencies since B.E. 2546.

xiii

The case studies focus on three agencies, namely Office of the Narcotics Control
Board (ONCB), National Police Agency (NPA) and The Customs Department. The study found
that justification for the rewards payment scheme in ONCB is due to high risk for law
enforcement in drug trafficking, serious criminal case and organized criminal groups as well as
arresting dangerous offenders and seizure a great number of illicit goods and contraband.
Sometimes application and documentation for rewards are made improper, false or
misrepresentation and other procedural misconduct. The study also found stake holders want the
present reward scheme in this agency to continue as incentive to increase arrest; the statistics
reflect the payment of rewards increasing in the agency. However, in Thai criminal justice
system National Police Agency is empowered to enforce all criminal laws of the Kingdom. The
study found that reward payment scheme has dichotomy feedback and opinion on negative and
positive effects. The enforcement of laws has increased both arrest rates and fine collected. The
negative side effect is attributed to distribution of fund and procedure rendering reward to the
policeman on duty, especially on traffic control laws and land transport laws. The financial
rewards are given in large amount on top of normal salary and benefits. Furthermore some laws
do not control the maximum limit, such as, gambling control and forestry acts that rewards given
to officials on duties are huge in contrary to the proportion of small amounts that deliver to the
treasury. The study also found misappropriation in distribution of fund to official eligible for
reward without trace, inspection and transparency. In the Customs Department there has been
guideline and method of reward payment to most levels of officials in the Department at the
highest to the lowest ranks in proportion according to official level. The reward payable in the
past ten years, as high as ten billion Baht, has rendered in huge amount to officials in the
Department exceeding the customs tax collected on behalf of the treasury. In the analysis of
reward payment scheme under Thai system found factors affected multi facets, namely provision
of law, inequality of distribution, entitlement, payment rate, criterion, method of payment,
standard and fair proportion of reward payable to eligible officer. These factors have considerable
impact for law enforcement officers conduct and public interest. The official misconducts
include discrimination on enforcement of certain law, seeking legal requirement available for
reward and abuse of power that in turn breaking meritorious criminal justice administration. As a
result, the system shall be detrimental to rights and liberty of the people. The improvement of

xiv

laws and procedures on reward payment scheme is imperative in order to guarantee standard and
best practice concerning reward payment system to avoid arbitrary judgment and improper
discretion. The existing system needs to be deliberation and review by impartial panel of expert
and professional in order to provide feasible and fair reward monetary based payment scheme for
all law enforcement officers. The evaluation of individual, group of individual performance and
achievement as well as outcome of the agency entitled to receive reward is means to an end.
The outcome of current reward payment scheme divided into (1) the payment scheme
under the act governed the reward rendition in the legislation and (2) the reward payment scheme
under regulation of the Ministry of Finance on deduction of the fine collected from the offender
prior to deliver the treasury. Both practices have similar and different characteristics. The
similarity is concerned with principle, method and procedure of payment. The significant of the
reward schemes are provided for entitle receiver and stipend rate or proportion of the reward to
the eligible receiver. These provisions of law are discrepancies in the entitlement and rate on the
amount of reward payment that affect the reward payment system:
(1) the impact arises from the provision of law provided inequality for eligible
receiver in the government services because the criterion is arbitrary without clear standardization
and the proportion of the reward is unjustifiable under the civil service system.
(2) the impact arises from the payment procedure that has discrimination on
enforcement of certain law, abuse of power, malfeasance in office and undermined merit system
of government. There has been widely advantage and disadvantage among agencies and
patronage system in law enforcement.
(3) the impact arises from law enforcement on the public, discrimination, equality and
arbitrary discretion against the wrongdoer.
The research has proposed to improve, in order to prevent the shortcomings and
fairness of the reward system in two folds. The policy of reward payment schemes shall separate
money award to state official from reward that gives to the public for assistance the law
enforcement officer or agency. The reward system shall continue for an incentive to public
participation in crime prevention. The award/reward payment schemes render to state official
shall be partly continued and revised the proportion rate according to the task to encourage
honesty in undertaking law enforcement duties rather than money incentive. Furthermore, the

xv

reward payment scheme should not encourage reactive law enforcement as mean to an end rather
than proactive crime prevention. The reward payment scheme should render to the task of
proactive law enforcement official on evaluation of effectiveness and outstanding crime
prevention program.
The researchers have found that the reward schedule and special pay to law
enforcement officers in the United States did not dispense money imposed on penalty and
collected from offenders, such as fine and seizure of illegal goods price, but appropriate from the
budget under the provision of US Code, Title 5. The payment for federal law enforcement officers
divided into General Schedule and federal wage system. The special pay is given to job
performance for distinction and excellence. The major different between Thai reward scheme and
the US cash payment is the provision of laws and regulations. The US system has specified the
condition, requirement and certain legal provision in all level of officers and executives.
For improvement and revision of legislation on reward payment system, the
researcher has proposed short term and long term measures. The long term proposal shall entrust
Ministry of Finance and law enforcement agencies in charge of the duty under the specific
legislation should undertake study and deliberation on law reform of the existing reward payment
system. The short term solution needed to revise Ministry of Finances Regulation of B.E. 2546
to correct discrepancies in rendition of reward schemes for performing similar law enforcement
function. The Regulation of the Ministry of Finance on the Deduction of Fine prior delivery to the
Treasure B.E. 2546, the Regulation of Ministry of Finance on the Rendition of Award and
Reward for Expense in Performance of Duty B.E. 2546 and Announcement of Ministry of
Finance Specified Category and Deduction of Fine Rate prior Delivery to the Treasury as caused
of controversy are needed to be amended in due time.
In addition, the prevention of corruption under the reward scheme shall be treated as
other infringement of laws and regulation, malpractice and criminal offences. This problem has
nothing to with policy or legislation of the reward payment scheme per se. The implementation of
reward scheme shall be conducted in transparent manner in the context of good governance
including a campaign to build the state officials consciousness and dedication in performing their
duties to serve the public.

xvi

1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2

2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4

2.5
2.6

i
iii
viii
xvi
xix
xx
1-10
1
5
5
6
7
9
11-47
11
13
23
27
39
45

xvii

()
3
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3
3.1

48-91
48
49
56
60
63
82

4 :
92-137

4.1
92
4.2 (...)
93
4.3 (...)
101
4.4
112
4
4.1 " "
125
4.2
134

5
138-177

5.1
138
5.2 (United States Code)
143
5.3
149
5.4
156
160
5.5
.. 2003

xviii

()
5
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4

166
171
173
176

6 178-192

6.1
178
6.2
178
6.3
179

184
6.4
6.5
190
6.6
191
7
7.1
7.2
7.3

193-210
193
194
198

211-222

223-248
-
224

-
228
-
235
-
236

xix

2.1
3.1
3.2
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4

.. 2478
.. 2484
.. 2522

22
68
76
102
103
107
109

xx

4.1
4.2 5 ( .. 2540-2545)
4.3 5
.. 2552

95
98
119

1.1
1
2


(Enforcement)

.. 2546 2 .. 2547

80 60
4 1 4
3
2 4
1 4 (

11 .. 2547
.. 2550
132 )
( 1)
1

.. .. 2537 15






.. 2542 9
100
(1)

(2)


(3)

(4)








101 100


100 (2)

102 100



103


...


100 101
103

122 100 101

103
100
100








(1) (Moral Hazard)


(2)

1.2

1.2.1


1.2.2

1.2.3

1.2.4

1.3

132







1.3.1

1.3.2


1.3.3

1.4
4

1.4.1
(Documentary Research)






1.4.2
(In-depth Interview)

1.4.3

(Focus Group Discussion)

1.4.4

1.5
1.5.1

1.5.2


1.5.3

-

1.5.4


1.5.5

(Reward) (
) (/ )
(Job Performance)

(Law Enforcement) 4

( 2)
/()





( 3)


(
7)



( 4 7)


( 5)


( 7)

( 7)


1.


2.



3.

4.

1.6





(Focus Group)

10

 2


2.1
Reward
(Blacks Law Dictionary)



(American Jurisprudence)





1


(Federal Law
Enforcement, LEO)

(Merit Pay)

World Bank. Rewards & Incentives. [Online]: ttp://web.worl

dbank.org

12

(Pay at Risk)

(Special Pay)

(Basic Competence)

(U.S
Code)


25
(Law Enforcement Available Pay)





15

2 (Reward)

(Bonus)




2

Chew, David C. E. "Civi Servic Pay in the Asian-Pacific Region." Asian Pacific Economic
Literature, vol. 7(1) May, 1993.

13

(Reward) (Job Performance)

4 (1) (2)
(3)
(4)




2.2

(Job Performance)
(Reward)




The American Heritage Dictionary of English Language
(Performance)
Execute, Accomplish,
Achieve, Effect, Fulfill .. (Longman Dictionary of American English,
A.U.A. Edition) Performance

14

40


2
1. (Contents Theories)

2. (Process Theories)





(Vroom)

(EffectPerformance Expectancy)

3
(Herzberg)

(Motivation Factors)
(Hygiene Factors)
(Procedure and Rules)
(Compensation)

4

.
, 2542 . . 42-43.
4
. , (: ), 2545, .63.

15

(2538: 124-125)

(Achievement) (Recognition) (Advancement)
(Interest) (Responsibility) (Participation)
( VIE Theory: Valence Instrumentality Expectancy Theory) 5



Victor Vroom
VIE Theory
3
1.
2.
3.




(Reward) 6


7
3 8

, . .65.
. , ( : ), 2524. . 35
7
. . 2. ( :
), 2540. . 57-61.
8
. . 2. ( :
), 2545. . 114.
6

16

1.

2.
(Wages or Salaries)
3.
(Internal Reward)

(External Reward)

(Reinforcement Theory of Motivation)
(Learning Process)


. (Edward L. Thorndike)
(Satisfaction)
(Reinforcement)
(Dis-comfort) (Punishment)

(Positive Reinforcement-PR) (Negative
Reinforcement-NP)





(Organizational Behavior Modification)

17

(Schedules of Reinforcement)
2
1. (Continuous
Schedule)


2. (Intermittent
Schedule)



4

2.1 (Fixed-Interval
Schedules)


2.2 (VariableInterval Schedules)


1 2
2.3 (Fixed-Ratio-Schedules)

(Piece-Rate
System) 10 1

2.4 (Variable-RatioSchedules)

18

(1)
(2) (3)
(4)
1.


(Beach) 9



10
11

.
.
, 2544. . 11.
10
. . 9. ( : ), 2537. . 198
11
. . , . 20, 76 (-
2537): .11.

19

12

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5) /

2.

13







12

. . ( :
), 2539. .5.
13
.
. ( :
(-)), 2540. .71.

20

(Beach)14






(Reward)
3.



15

14

. 9. . 13
. . ( :
), 2527. . 144-147.
15

21

4.
16 (Drever)

17 (Wolman)
18






19







20

16

Drever, J. A Dictionary of Psychology. (Maryland: Penguin Book Co.), 1972, p.256.

Wolman, B.B. Dictionary of Behavioral Behavioral Science. (Von Nostrand: Reinhold Company),
1973, p.384.
18
. . ( :
), 2522. .79.
19
. . 2. (: -
), 2545. .49.
20
Strauss, G., and L.R. Sayles. Personnel: The Human Problem of Management. 2nded. (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall), 1964,p.22.
17

22

(Davis)

21

2.1





22


23

21

. . 2. ( :
), 2524. . 155.
22
. .
, 2518. . 129.
23
. . ( : ), 2535.
.434.

23

2.3
1980

(Traditional model) Owen E. Hughes24


(/)


B. Guy Peters25

(Market Model)
(Public Choice Theory)
(New Institutional Economics) (New Public
Management) (Participatory State)





- (Principal-Agency Theory)

(Principal-Agency
Theory) (Contracts)27
26

24

Hughes, Owen E. Public management and administration. 3rd ed. (Great Britain: Creative Print &
Design (Wales)), 1998.
25
B Guy Peters and Jon Pierre. Handbook of Public Administration: Concise Paperback Edition.
(London: SAGE publication Inc.), 1994, pp. 295-321.
26
. []: http://202.28.24.120/prms/pdf/tosaporn.pdf.

24

( /) (Exchange)
( /)




(Division of Labor)







(Conflicts of Interest)

(Information Asymmetry)
(Uncertainty)



(Adverse Selection)
(Moral Hazard)





27

25

.. 1980

(Performance Related Pay-PRP)

28

PRP

PRP

PRP
PRP

29








28

Agnes Festre & Pierre Garrouste, "Rationality, behavior, institutional, and economic change in
Schumpeter," Journal of Economic Methodology, vol. 15(4), 2008, pp. 365-390.
29
Ibid.

26

30
(
)

(Optimal Point)


31

30

Aidt, Toke S. Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey. Economic Journal, vol. 113
(November), 2003, pp. 632652.
31
Ibid.

27

PrincipalAgent Theory
(Incentive structure)


(/Reward)
()


Moral Hazard
2.4

2.4.1

28

(Criminal Policy)

















5






(1) (Rehabilitation)

29

(2) (Restraint)






(3) (Deterrence)










(4) (Symbolism)

30

(5) (Retribution)

(Punishment)
(Reward)
(6)




(Mala in Se)
(Mala Prohibita)







(7)

31

(8)
(Over-Criminalization)




()

32

(

)

(Law
Enforcement) A.C. Germann, Frank D. Day Robert R.J. 32
32

Gallati, Robert R. INTRODUCTION TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE.

12 ed. (Springfield: United States), 1970.
th

33

1.
(Regular Force)

2.



3.





4.


5.





6.



7.



8.

34

9.


10.



11.

12.

2.4.2
(1) (Rationality and
Opportunity Theories)

35

(Risk) 33 ( Hugh D. Barlow,1996)








(Classical
School)
(Economic Model of Crime)






(2)


34
1.
2.

33

Hugh D. Barlow. Introduction to criminology. (Harper Collins College Publishers), 1996.

34

Ibid.

36

(Target)







(3)

(Situation)











(Predatory Crimes)


1.
2.
3.

37

(4)

38

(
4 )

39

2.5
(Public Servants)

Aristotle Plato 35
(Public Service Motivation-PSM)
Perry and Wise (1990)36

Perry (1996) 37 4
(Public interest) (Compassion)
(Self-Sacrifice)
38


39



35

Horton, S. History and Persistence of an Ideal in Perry, JamesL. and Hondeghem, Annie. eds.
Motivation in Public Management The Call of Public Services. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2008.
36
Perry, James L., and Lois Recascino Wise. "The Motivational Bases Of Public Service." PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, vol. 50, (3), 1990, pp. 367-373.
37
Perry, J.L. Measuring Public Service Motivation: An Assessment of Construct Reliability and
Validity. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, vol.6, (1), 1996, pp.5-22.
38
Vandenabeele, W., Scheepers, S and Hondeghem, A.. Public Service Motivation in an
International Comparative Perspective: The UK and Germany. Public Policy and Administration, vol. 21, (1),
2006, pp.13-31
39
Wright, B. E. Methodological Challenges Associated with Public Service Motivation Research in
Perry, James L. and Hondeghem, Annie. Eds. Motivation in Public Management The Call of Public Services.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2008.

40

(Managerialism)


Woodrow Wilson
(Scientific Management) Frederic Taylor
(Economy) (Efficiency)
(Effectiveness)
(Input)

(Output)
(Outcome) (Value for Money)





5





.. 2546
Good Governance

41

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

(Accountability)
(Transparency)

(
.. 2542)
6 4
3 6
1. (Rule of Law)


2. (Ethics)


3. (Transparency)

4. (Participation)


5. (Accountability)

6. (Utility)

42

.. 2551

4








(Rewards) (Bonus)
( ) (
)



40 (World Bank, Rewards &
Incentives, 2009)

40

World Bank, Rewards & Incentives, 2009, Ibid.

43

41

... 2

( , 2548)

1-9
2
1.

2.

41

James, Harvey S. Jr, Why Does The Introduction of Monetary Compensation Produce A Reduction

in Performance? Working Paper, University of Missouri. (2003).

44

( 3) .. 2546

71.6

65.6





50 47.5

27.7 26.2

42


50

42

.
( ). ( :
), 2547.

45

2.6

() ( ) ( )



(Job
Performance)
(Reward)
(Job Performance)


( / )


(Satisfaction)

(Reinforcement Theory of
Motivation) (Schedules of
Reinforcement)
2
(Continuous Schedule)
(Intermittent Schedule) 4

( )

46

(Principal-Agency Theory)

(Conflicts of Interest)

(Information Asymmetry)
(Uncertainty)
(Moral Hazard)

(Contractual
Arrangement)

(Criminal Policy)








(Statutory Crime)

47

(New Public Administration)
(Managerialism) (Economy) (Efficiency)
(Effectiveness)

.. 2546
Good Governance
.. 2551

(Rewards) (Bonus)




(Efficiency) (Effectiveness)

3.1
2






4
1.




2.

3 (1) (2)
(3)




3.
(1) (2)

49

4. 2 (1)
.. 2546 (2)

2

3.2


7
1.
1.1
(1)
.. 2495
(2) .. 2530
(3)
.. 2534
(4) .. 2524
(5)
.. 2549
(6)
.. 2490

50

1.2
()
(1) .. 2543
(2) .. 2543
(3) .. 2511
(4) .. 2518
(5) .. 2518
()
(1) .. 2493
(2) .. 2534
(3) .. 2521
(4) .. 2542
(5) .. 2499
(6) .. 2522
(7) .. 2526
()
(1) .. 2478
(2) .. 2484
(3)
.. 2493
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

.. 2504
.. 2487
.. 2522
.. 10

(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)

.. 2505
.. 2509
.. 2522
.. 2474
.. 2551

.. 2526

51

(13) .. 2539
(14) .. 2507
(15) .. 2528
(16) .. 2535
(17) .. 2551
(18) .. 2551
(19) .. 2525
(20) .. 2478
(21) .. 2517
(22) .. 2542 (
)
(23)
.. 2522 ( )
(24)
.. 2534 ( )
(25) .. 2522 (
)
(26)
.. 2489 ( )
(27) 16 9 2514
( )
1.3
(1) .. 2543
(2) .. 2542
2.
2.1
(1) .. 2534
(2) .. 2485
(3) .. 2535

52

(4) .. 2535
(5) .. 2475
(6) .. 2527
2.2
(1) .. 2486 (
)
(2) .. 2527 (
)
(3) .. 2529 (
)
(4) .. 2469 (
)
(5) .. 2493 (
)
3.
3.1
()
(1) .. 2507
(2) .. 2542
(3) .. 2518
(4) .. 2518
(5) .. 2542
()
(1) .. 2535
(2) .. 2525
(3) .. 2509
(4) .. 2535
(5) .. 2499
(6) .. 2533

53

(7) .. 2490
()
(1) .. 2482
(2) .. 2524
(3) .. 2518
(4) .. 2526
(5) .. 2505
3.2
()
(1) .. 2541
(2) .. 2520
(3) .. 2484
(4) .. 2507
(5) .. 2535
(6) .. 2464
(7) .. 2504
(8) .. 2510
()
(1) .. 2550
(2) .. 2504
(3)
.. 2530
(4) .. 2543
(5) .. 2542
4.
4.1
(1) .. 2497
(2) .. 2494
(3) .. 2542

54

(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)

.. 2535
.. 2522
.. 2522
.. 2456
.. 2481
.. 2522 (

)
4.2
(1) .. 2498
(2)
.. 2511
5.
5.1
(1) .. 2542
(2) .. 2489
(3) .. 2543
(4)
.. 2484
(5) .. 2542
(6) .. 2543
(7) .. 2534
(8) .. 2499
(9) .. 2535
(10) .. 2542
(11) .. 2509
(12) .. 2522
(13) .. 2509
(14) .. 2499
(15) .. 2497

55

(16)
.. 2516
5.2
(1) .. 2514
(2) .. 2511
(3) .. 2535
(4) .. 2535
(5) 28 29 .. 2514

(6) .. 2503 (
)
6.
(1) .. 2535
(2) .. 2531
(3) .. 2535
(4) .. 2525
(5) .. 2510
(6) .. 2523
(7) .. 2541
(8) .. 2522
(9) .. 2535
(10) .. 2535 (
)
7.
(1) .. 2542
(2) .. 2528
(3) .. 2528
(4) .. 2537

56

(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)

.. 2537
.. 2525
.. 2545
.. 2542
.. 2522
.. 2543
.. 2547

3.3

15

.. 2546 132

...


4 .. 2491

1

3 (1)
(2)

57

(3)

(1)

2
(1)
(2)



1)
.. 2495
2) .. 2530
3)
.. 2534
4) .. 2524
5)
.. 2549
6)
.. 2490
7) .. 2478
8) .. 2539
9) .. 2551
10)
.. 2534
11) .. 2522
12) .. 2484
13) .. 2507

58

14) .. 2535
15) .. 2504
(2)

2







1) .. 2493
2) .. 2521
3) .. 2478
4) .. 2522
5) .. 2509
6) .. 2539
7) .. 2551
8)
.. 2534
9) .. 2522
10) .. 2542
11) .. 2527
12) .. 2529
13) .. 2469
14) .. 2493
15) .. 2522
16) .. 2542
17) .. 2535

59

(3)
2





(1)

(2)




1.
(1)
.
.
.. 2493 .. 2521
.
.. 2478 .. 2541
.. 2539 .. 2551
.. 2534
.. 2522
(2)
2.
(1)
(2) .. 2486
.. 2527 .. 2529
.. 2469 .. 2493

60

3.
(1)
.
.
.
(2)
.
.. 2484 .. 2507
.. 2535 .. 2464
.. 2504
.
4.
(1) .. 2522
.. 2522 .. 2522
(2)
5.
(1)
.. 2542
(2)
.. 2535
6.
7.

3.4

2 (1)
(2)

61

2
1.

.. 2546

4
1






2
(1) 11
.. 2542 .. 2528
.. 2528
.. 2537 .. 2537

4 .. 2502

62

.. 2525 .. 2545
.. 2542 .. 2522
.. 2543 .. 2547
(2)

.. 2542


4
.. 2546





2.

.. 2546




2
(1)

.. 10
.. 2484 .. 2499

63

(2)
.. 2543
.. 2543 .. 2504
.. 2543
.. 2485 .. 2507
.. 2524 .. 2504
.. 2530

3.5




2
.. 2546


3.5.1
.. 2546
4 2
.. 2491
2

4 13

1


1
(1)

64

.. 2546 3

132

1.
4 4

(2)

(3)
3
10 124 29 2550
10 124 29 2547
4
4

65

2.
75 86



2.1 90

2.2 75

7

4 8

7


(1) 90
(2) 75





6
8 7
7
8

10 124 29 2550, ( 2) ( 3)
( 4) 10 124 29 2550

66

132 9

() 80

() 60

()


10

80 60


( 4)11
80 60
80,000 60,000 16,000
12,000 4,000 3,000 800 600

1
2 1

(1) 80
(2) 60
10
3

11
10 124 6 29 2550

67

- 48 20
21 80 80,000
60 60,000
- 52 31
32 80 16,000
60 12,000
- 49 22
23 80 800
60 600
3.
9 12


80
60


3.1
80 1
2 1
3 20
99 1

12

9 7
(1)

(2)

68

3.2
60 1
2 1
3 40
99 1

1.
. .. 2546
* 1
80%

2
1

20%

60%

99%

* 1

1%

2
1

40%

99%
1%

* 3

3.1

69

4.
1013

.. 254614
4.1 415

4.2 516
(1)
5
13

10 9

14
10 124 29 2550
15

4



16
5
5.1

(1) 5

(2)

5.2

(1)
(2)
(3)

70

(2)

617

2
()

.. 2535
.. 2535 .. 253518

.. 2535 .. 2535 19

.. 2542

.. 254220

.. 2542
.. 254821
17

6

18
6 123 13 18 2549
19

64 123 185 6 2549

20

85 122 19 14 2549

21

85 122 185 14 2549

71

()


.. 254922
.. 254823

.. 254824

2
(1)
.

4
.. 2546
.

.
80 60 9

.


.
-

22

35 123 3 9 2549

23

141 122 17 9 2549

24

24 123 32 15 2549

72

-

9







.


.


(2)



.
2


1)

.. 254725 1626
25

73 121 43 2 2547

73

427


2)
1328

.. 2547 3
1)
2)
3) 1029
26

16
27


28
13
1.

2.

3.

29
10
14
.. 2542 .. 2547
(1)
()
7
() 8
6
() 7
5
() 6
4
() 3 5 3
() 1 2 2
()
1
(2) 2

74

.. 2542 .. 2548 (1)
()
() 8 ()
7 () 6 ()
3 5 () 1 2 ()
(2)
.
2

1)
1530

.. 2549 (1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

30

15
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

75

2) 13

.. 2547

-

-

-


27 31
.. 2548




5.
5.1 1132

31

27
26
.5
2



32
11 9 (1)

( )

76

33
5.2 1334



(
5
)

- /
-

-
.
-

(

)

2 ()

2 ()

658

.
696

.
694

3.2
9 (2)
( )
( )
33
12

34
13

77

6.

5



9



.. 2548
3.5.2





15 1) .. 2503 2)
.. 2535 3) .. 2522 4)
16 9 2514 5) .. 2486 6)
.. 2527 7) .. 2529 8)
.. 2534 9)
.. 2522 10) .. 2510 11)
.. 2542 12) .. 2469 13)
.. 2522 14) .. 2493 15)
.. 2489

78

1.
1.1
- 20
.. 2522

- 33 .. 2542






- 40
.. 2522





1.2

79

- 155 .. 2510


2.
2.1
- 20
.. 2522

- 33 .. 2542

- 40
.. 2522

2.2
- 20
.. 2522


- 155 .. 2510



- 33
.. 2542
43

80

3.

155 .. 2510
33
.. 2542



.. 2546

.. 2546




1.

2.
3.

4.

5.

81

6.


7.

82

3.1

1
2
3
4
5

... .. 2507
... .. 2543
... .. 2542
... .. 2489
... .. 2543

.
.
.
. /
.

/
.
.
.
.

...
.. 2543
... .. 2543
...
.. 2482
...
.. 2524
...
.. 2542
... .. 2497
...
.. 2493
... .. 2534

. 20 - . 24
. 35 - . 41
. 48 - . 52
. 17 - . 21
. 35 - . 59/

1
. 16, 17

.
.

.
.

. 58 - . 64
. 38 - .41

./.

. 59 - . 62

. 135- . 159

.
.

.
.

. 68 - . 117
. 20 - . 23

./.

./.

. 47 - . 50/

,

. 49/

7
8
9
10
11
12
13

14

...
.. 2494

83

15
16
17
18

...
... .. 2499
... .. 2543
... .. 2518

19

...
.. 2542
...
.. 2542

.
.
.
././
..
.

.
.
.
.

.51 - .56
.9 - .10
.27 - .39
.47 - .48

. 34- . 41

22

...
.. 2522
... .. 2490

. 46 . 59

. . 38 - . 41

23
24

... .. 2518
... .. 2478

.
.

25

... .. 2484

26

... .. 2534

20

21

27

./.

... .
.. 2550

. 71

. . 83 - . 84
. 15 .9 , .12 - .
14


. ...

.. 2550 .3
. .16 .26
.

.53 .59

84

28 ... .. 2 522
29
30
31
32

...
.. 2535
...
.. 2493
...
.. 2504
... .. 2487

.
.
/.

.61 .82
.27 .31
. 9
. 22

...
.. 2485
...

.. 2495
...
.. 2530

./.

. 6

36

...
.. 2525

37

...
.
.. 2488

...

.. 2551
. 3(4)
. 57 . 70

38

...
.. 2542
... .. 2542
... .. 2530

33
34

35

39
40

.
.
./.

.
.

.17 .20
. 8

...

..
2546
. 61 . 77
. 45 - . 56
. 41 - . 49

85

41

... .. 2514

42

...

.. 2484
... .. 2522
... .. 2505
...
.. 2543
... .. 2542
...
.. 2535
... .. 2531
... .. 2535
... .. 2534
... .. 2514
...
.. 2511
...
.. 2525
... .. 2528
... .. 2499
... .. 2542
...
.. 2535
... .. 2535
...
.. 2526
... .. 2509
... .. 2535

43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

./.

. 29 - . 32

. 17 - . 21

.
.
.

.
.
.

. 65 - . 68
. 23 - . 27
. 48 - . 51

.
.

.
.

. 63 - . 67
. 11 - . 13

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

. 81 - . 121
. 46 - . 62
. 107 - . 112
. 15 - . 16
. 41 - . 42

. 18 - . 25

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

. 82 . 19 . 31 . 80 -

.
.

.
.

. 191 - . 220
. 11 - . 17

.
.

. 83
. 21
. 33
. 93

. 15
. 84 . 108/2

86

62 ... .. 2535
63 ...
.. 2471

64

.
-

.
. ...

.. 2546
. . 15 - . 23

...
.. 2534
...
.. 2539

./.

66

... .. 2484

. 74

67
68
69

... .. 2507
... .. 2518
... .. 2505

.
.
.

.
.
.

70

...
.. 2504
... .. 2526

65

71

72
73

74

... .. 2518
.
... .

.. 2496
... .. 2473
.

.
.

...

.. 2551

. 31 - . 33
. 56 - . 72/2
...
..
2547 . 3
. 21 - . 22
...
..
2551 .3
. 55 - . 70
. 7

...
..
2551 .3(1)

87

75 ...
.. 2540

76

./.

77

...
.. 2511
... .. 2542

78
79
80
81
82
83

... .. 2510
... .. 2526
... .. 2523
... .. 2535
... .. 2499
... .. 2535

.
.
.
.
.
.

84

... .. 2505

85

... .. 2525

86

... .. 2547

87

... .. 2535

88

...
.. 2542
...
.. 2530
...
.. 2528

89
90

./.

. ...

.. 2551
. 3
. . 48 - . 57

..
2548
.
.
.
.
.

.. 2549 - 2550

. 66 - . 89

. 110 - . 125
. 19 - . 22
. 17 - . 20
. 21 - . 25
. 39 - . 50
. 45 - . 60

. 39 . 41
...

.. 2550 .3
. 59 .61
. 70 . 86
. 10 . 13

. 24 . 26

. 46 . 48

88

91
92
93
94

... .. 2537
... .. 2537
... .. 2525
...
.. 2498

.
.
.

/
.
.
.
.

95
96
97

... .. 2498
... .. 2542
...
.. 2535
... .. 2509

.
.
.

.
. 71 . 73
.47 . 56

99
100
101
102
103

... .. 2541
... .. 2533
... .. 2543
... .. 2509
...
.. 2517

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

104
105

... .. 2497 .
... .. 2498 . /.

... .. 2464 .
... .. 2522
.
... .. 2509
.
... .. 2507
.
...
.. 2475

98

106
107
108
109
110

. 50 . 53
. 50 . 53
. 43 . 44
...

.. 2551 .3(1)
. 23 . 27
.71 . 73
.47 . 56
.25 . 28/3

.
.

.56 . 73
.43 . 50
.71 . 73
.41 . 54

2, 000
/

.10 .12
.13 . 15

.
.
.
.
.

.17 . 22
.81 . 87
.48 . 60
.35 . 37
. 3

89

111 ... .. 2 522

112 ... ..
2490
113 ... .. 2 522
114 ... .. 2 504
115 ...
.. 2527

.
.

. . 63 . 73
. . 72 . 77

.
.
./.

.
.
. 11/1

116

.. 2516

.. 2524
...
.. 2499

. 47 . 73
. 24 . 27

25 %
. 8, 9

. 19 . 22

. 17 . 25

. 73 . 91

122

...
.. 2474
...
.. 2535
...
.. 2528
... .. 2535

. 3 . 46
,

. 49 . 68
. 12 . 12

. 69 . 73/2

123
124

... .. 2520
... .. 2545

./.

.
.

.
.

. 36 . 44
. 54 . 57

117
118

119
120
121

90

125 28
29 .. 2 514

126 ... .. 2522
127 ... .. 2522
. 23 .1, 25 .1, 26 .1,
. 27 . 3, 31, 31(1), 32, 33, 36, 37, 38,
39, 40, 41, 42, 52, 53, 79, 113 .2, 159,
31, 65 .1, 66 .2 , 68 70, 71, 78, 81,
82, 83, 90, 74 .1, 76, 158, 93, 102,
103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 152, 153, 156,
161, 26 .2, 115 .3, 121, 122, 123,
124, 125, 159, 153, 160, 162
128 ...
.. 2456

129

130

131

132

...
.. 2477
7
...
.. 2477
13,14 16
...
.. 2 481
9
... .. 2 481
47 ,47
48 ,50,51 53

. 4 - 6

.
./.

.
.

. 58 . 67
. 126 . 162

.. 2548

.. 2548

.. 2548

.. 2548
.

. 297 . 311

. 7

. 15,16

. 9

. 62 . 67/

91

.. 2546
..2546

.. 2547 ...
.. 2491 4 (2) ... ( 2) .. 2495
:
... .. 2522 ...
.. 2546 ... .. ... .. 2503
... .. 2522 ...
.. 2522 ... .. 2486 ... .. 2493 ...
.. 2509 ... .. 2527 ... .. 2522 ...
.. 2543 16
9 .. 2514
: .

 4
:

4.1





(LEOS
Agency)






(Outcome)

93

4.2 (...)

.. 2522
.. 2534






()

.. 2537 1
() ()

4.2.1


.. 2537
1.
6 2

1

111 33 12 10 2537
( 2) 114 109 9 24 2540
( 3) 120 19 15 11 2546
( 4) 123 97 7 18 2549
2

( 4) .. 2549

94

1.1

1.2

2.



2.1
15 3


16


174


.. 2537

195

(1)

3

( 4) .. 2549
4

( 4) .. 2549
5

( 4) .. 2549

95

(2)
(1)
2.2


4.1

1.

2.

3. ()

4.

5. ()
6.

7.

8.

9.

10

11-500

501

500

10. ()

10
4
4
0.02
10
10
10
3
20
200
5,000
5,000
3
200,000
3

2.3
(1)

1)

96

2)

(2) 6
1)
.. 2545 200
2)
1,000 1,000

3)
1,000


4)


5)


(3) 4
1)
) (
)
- 1, 2, 4 1
2 100,000
- 5 50,000
- 30,000

18
.. 2537 ( 4) .. 2549

97

)
5,000
)
10,000
2)
- 1, 2, 5
1, 2 100,000
-

-

3)


-
200,000
-
100,000
-
20 40,000
4)

1 100 2,000
4.2.2
( ..., 2550) 2545
70
1)
2)
.. 2537

98

4.2 5 ( .. 2540-2545)7

2540
2541
2542
2543
2544
2545

21,866
14,871
11,271
20,168
35,928
31,744

()
22,866
16,920
11,683
21,738
46,460
33,989

()
20,255,242
45,500,127
62,526,874
72,047,370
65,736,432
115,790,4198

.. 2540-2545
1.
2.

.. 2540 -2545
3. .. 2540 -2545

4. .. 2537
( 3) .. 2546 1 2546


() 2546
122,092,927 2547


( ..., 2550)

7
8

: ..., 2550
73,130,524 115,790,419

99

4.2.3
1. .. 2522



.. 2537

...













200,000

2.
.. 2534

100

(
)







...

2546 2547
( 2546 122,092,927 )



...

101

4.3 (...)

(Law Enforcement) 9







3
1.
2.

.. 2522 .. 2522 2478
.. 2484
3.
.. 2522

10
4.3.1


9

383

10

1. 2.
3.
4.

102

99 1
11

99%
1%

4.1

4.3.2
11
.. 2547 132
.. 2546 ( 2) .. 2547

80
60
4 1 4
3
2 4
1 4

11

151/2550 21 2550

103

. .. 2546
* 1
80%

2
1

20%

60%

99%

* 1

1%

2
1

40%

99%
1%

* 3

4.2
1. .. 2522
1.1

11 2547
3 10 2548
.. 2522 23 25 26
27 31 31(1) 32 33 36 37
38 39 40 41 42 52 53 79 113
159 31 65 66 68 70
71 78 81 82 83 90 74 76
158 102 103 104 105 106 107
152 153 156 161 26 115 121
122 123 124 125 159 153 160 162

104

45
15 40
99 1

1.2

7112

14813
.. 2541 2542
500 1,000 14



22 2553 09.00
13
4 300 .
4 7 3

12

71
73 85

13
148 71
83
14

105

1,000 15







16


2,000 2,000,000
17



. 5
.. . 60 ( 45 15
) 40 ( 1 99

15

22 2553 www.siblor.com
16

-

17
1,000 /
500

106

)

(1) . 6 18
(2) 1
(3) 8
(4) 1
4- 5
(5) 3
(6) 7-8
(7) 2-3 )19
2
14 15 1 5
(
) 2 (-)

2. .. 2478 ..2484
2.1
.. 2478
.. 2484 50
50 2 80 1
2 1 (
3 ) 20
99 1

18

.

19

107

1. ... .. 2478 ... .. 2484

(1,000 )

3
1 (200 )

(2,000 )

(1,000 )

80%
(800 )

20%
(200 )

2 (400 )

1 (200 )
99%

1%

4.3 .. 2478
..2484
2.2




20
20

20

108

21
4.3.3

.. 2522
.. 2535
.. 2534 .. 2522
16 9 2514
.. 2522





1. .. 2522

2 50
50 47.5
2.5 1
99 14622
.. 2522

21

22
146

109

60

10,000 //
2,000 /
2. . .. 2544
... .. 2522

./

., .,

95%
50%

5%

50%

./

100%

., .,

99%
1%

*
,

... .. 2522, ... .. 2535 16 9 .. 2514

./

95%
5%

., .,

100%

99%
1%
99%
1%

* .

4.4 .. 2522

110

1.

10,000 /23

10,000
2,000 / 10,000 /
24


2,000 3,000 / 1,000




15 2549 11.30 .
.. 200 4
4

2548 58 452,400
76
2,790 3,000 1,000
170,000

23

( 4) .. 2547 26 .. 2547
24

111

25

25

112

80%

4.4

3 .. 2469
.. 2489
.. 2522

1 5
10

3 1)
2) 3)

113

4.4.1
1. .. 2497
2726
102 27

26

27
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.
8.


9.

27
102

(1)
55

30
(2) 55
30

114

(1)
55

30
(2) 55
30
(3)
10

2.
.. 2517
29 2517
2.1

2.2

3
1
102 (1)
2
102 (2)
3 102 (3)
2.3
(1) 1 55
30 25

(3)
10

115

30
28
(2) 2 55
30 25
30
(3) 3 10

2.4
1)

(1)

(2)



(3)


2) 2
(1)

28

116

()


()

()


()

()


()

(2)

()


()

3)

.. 2517 6 (4)

117

(1) 2
() 1 3

() 2 3



(2)
()
- 12
- 10 ( )
11
- 11
- 10
- 9 (
)
- 7 8
9
- 7 8 (
7 8 )
8
- 5 6 7
- 3 4 6
- 2 5
- 1 3
- 1
()

118

- ...(
)
- ...(
)

- ...() ... ...

7 8
- ... ... 5 6
- ... ... 4 5
- ... ... 3
- ... .. 2
- ... ... ...
1
4.4.2
1 5
10
11,047.65
6,321 4,726.65 2553
23,610.8
2552
2,009
186.43 723 124.66
1,286 61.77

1,858 431.588
680 220.601
1,178 210.987

119

4.3 5
.. 2552

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

( )
34.71
12.90
12.21
4.37
3.89

()

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

9.50
2.37
1.96
1.82
1.27

4.4.2
29


(1)
10






29

120

(Conflict of Interest)
(2)


55

30

(1)


2





(2)


16

30

121

(3)

(4)

4
10


(5)


(6)
(7) 30
55 55
30


1 3 2 3

4.4.3

122

30
30
25
55 25 30










07.20
XXXX





55
30

123

...




...



31

31

Insider 5 7

124

125

4.1
" "

1.
300

-


(..)

10 4

70-75
..



...



24 ..


...

126

... .. ...
..
...
2

... ..
()
.
.





. (..)






..
..
1

35% 35% 30%

. ..

127

..

2544 5 .
2.5 10
2 ...
50 .. 4 ... 40
... 38 ... 40 ...
40 . .
1-5
17 .. 2544
90 10
12 2541-2542
... () ..
... ..
50 ..
. 2
... 60
30 18

18
..


50-70
... ...

...

128

573 /2541
572/2541 29 .. ... ..
..
2.

2

1,000-4,000


30-40 /

.
2 30
5-6


2

1,000
100-200 / 1
40-50 /

129

100% 50%
. 47.5% 2.5%





75% 1,000 750,000
5,000

- .. 4

9.00-13.00 . -
- 2 -

3. () 300
09.00 . 22
13 4
300 .
2 . 4 . 7 3
-

130

6
-

(..) 10
4



70-75





(22 ..)


"
..



.. "



13 4

131

10.30 .







10

75

1,000
10.50 .






"
25


"

132

13
4

12.15 .
4. 2 - 70%
2 - 70

23 .. 53 ...
-



... .. ... ..

...
2
... ..
.

.





. ..

133

..
...
..
1

35% 35% 30%
.
..


..

35%



12 2541-2542 ... ..
() ...
.. 50 ..
.
2 60
30
18

50-70 ...
...

134

4.2

10

2552

3 (.)




.. 2552 .

4
( 21-23 .. 2552)
4
55% 4


3,000 - 4,000
2,000 10 20,000
.. 2552


2 - 4 .. 2552

135

4 0-4
55%
4 800
450 4

9 .. 2553 . ...
0.5 - 4
.
2 (

2 . )
2



26 .. 2553 ...
.. 2540
10 5



8 .. 2553


22-24 .. 2553 10 .
10
20,000 11,000

CSAE

136

1,534

10
10,000

30%









1. 1 10


2. 10


2
...

3.
...

...

137

2


10
.
1

10,000

19,045

8,500

5,455

9,250

647.5

4,545

647.5
:
2

2 2552
( 4 27
2489)

14 2552
( )
( ) 17%
25 2553

10 ()
22 2553
( )
() 1
25 2553

29 2553

5.1
( )












1

(Kala Finn and Anne Skove. Anticorruption Laws: Knowledge & information Services Office,
The national Center of State Courts, 2004)

139

(ABA Center
for Professional Responsibility)



(Racketeer Influenced
Corrupt Organization)
(Sunshine Laws)
(Freedom of Information Act)

Ofosu-Amaah, Soopramanien, and Uprety

( Finn and Skove)

140

1. 2.
3. 4. 5.
1.
2. 3.
(Finn and Skove,
2004)
1.

2.


3.


1. (Freedom of Information Act)
2. (Whistleblower Law)
3. (Conflict of Interest)
4. (Procurement)
5. (Money Laundering)

141

Mobilier 1870 19 Tammany Hall

Tammany Hall 1888
Pendleton Act
Teapot Dome

Lockheed 1977
(Foreign Corrupt Practices Act : FCPA)
Lockheed
(Office of
Government Ethics)
(John R. Heilbrunn, Anti-Corruption Commissions Panacea or Real
Medicine to Fight Corruption?, World Bank Institute, pp. 9-10, 2004)





.. 1978



(Federal
Bureau of Investigation)

142

.. 1988

1 .. 1989
(Congress)

143

5.2 (United States Code)

(United States Code (U.S.C.))
(Federal Law) 50 6

(U.S. Code) 5 3 1
2
3 3

(Subpart D-Pay and Allowances) (
5104 Basis for Grading Positions) (GS)

15 (Grade GS-1-15) 15
(Super Grade)
10


5391-5392


5541

144

(Availability Pay)
5545A
40
4

40

106
24 40

1. GS-15

2. 5 (
15 )

145

(1)
(Law Enforcement Officers, LEOs) (2)



1.
(GS)

51 53 5
(Special Pay)

106,000 91,000
( 86,000
4,500 ) 1
7,000
2,000 29,000
1

General Schedule (GS)

(Federal Wage System)

146

29,000
24,500

1,300

1,200

(Homeland Security)
32,000
22,000
2

20
.. 2004

GS3 - GS10 3 23
32,000
403
(Federal Law Enforcement Pay Reform Act .. 1990)
(Locality)
3

5 5305


2

5 U.S.C. 9701 and 9902

147

3,100



(Basic Pay)




.. 1996

(GS)



1.


(Capitol Police)
(Law Enforcement Officer)
2.

(Park Police)
3.



Band1

148

96,175 / 13
93,742 / 3
4.

5.

6.
(GS)

7.

7

8.


9.


10. (Government Printing Office)





1.

149

2.

3.


4.

5.

5.3




1.
2.
3.

4.

150

5









1.




2.

151

3.



4.

5.



5


1. (Overtime Pay)
2.
3.
4.
5. (Holiday Premium Pay)
6.

15 10
5 128,200
1

152

10-25
2
25 9



( )



(5 U.S.C. 8331 (20)
8401 (17))


(Law Enforcement Availability Pay) 25
( 2 )
(1) (2)
(3)



25

153

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.






1.

2.

3.

4.
5.

6.

154

11 .. 2001







10
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
5 501

250,000

155

502
.. 1956


5



25,000
(18 U.S.C. 3059)


1 (18 U.S.C. 3059B)
5
5 1
(18 U.S.C. 3071-3077)

5 2 5
10


250,000

( 501, 18 U.S.C. 3071)
101



5
502 5

156

5.4
(Incentive Awards)
45 1 ( )

. . (District of Columbia)



4505a U.S. Code
4502(a)
(b)
10,000



10,000 10,000
25,000
(Subchapter)






()

157

(
)



(b)

(a b) 4502 U.S. Code (Cash Award)
(Monetary Award) (Such Award)

1.



2.

4503
( 4503 U.S. Code)




( 4505 U.S. Code)

158

4505a

10 ()
10

20




2 12 71 2302(d)

(a b)
3 53
e ( 4505a)

(a-c)


( 4506 U.S. Code)





(d)
1.

159

2.
(Extraordinary)

4
5 (Senior Executive)
(Distinguished Executive)
1

20
35


(Executive Schedule, 5 U.S.C. Arts. 53115318 I-V) 2 53

2 53

( 4509)
1 20
( )

3132 (a)(c)
5 U.S. Code

160

5.5
.. 2003


(Federal Law Enforcement Officers)

2
(1) 8331 8401
5

(2)


30
(1)

(2)





5 33

161

.. 2001 (Homeland Security Act)

(High Jacking)

(Department of Homeland Security)

13 . .


.. 2003




.. 1940


(Basic Pay) (Premium Payments)

1)

162

2)


1.

2.


3.



4.
11 .. 2001

50
(General Schedule)

163

50,000




5

(Cost-Effective)

164

165

166

5.1

(The Ethics in Government Act of 1978)

Watergate (Richard Nixon)







2
(1)
(2)




.. 1970

(Ethics in Government Act, Title I, Answers. Com. 2010)

GS-16
(Federal Government)


( General Schedule 1-15, GS 1-7 GS 8-12 GS
13-15 and GS Supergrades, GS 16, 17,18, 5 U.S.C. Art. 5331, http://www.law.cornell.
edu/uscode/5/5331.html)

167

1 250
100

(Capital gain)
100 9 1,000
5
200



5,000




5,000 2








6

168

2
1

169

170

171

5.2
(The Office of Government Ethics, OGE)

.. 1978
(Office of Personnel Management)
.. 1988





5 4

1. (Office of Government
Relations and Special Projects)


2. (Office of General Counsel and
Legal Policy)

3. (Office of Agency Program)

3 (1) (2)

172

(3)

4. (Office of Administration and

Information Management)
(OGE) 2 (1)

(2)







(Robert
Longley, Who Oversees Ethics in Government? About.com guide)

173

5.3

.. 2009 (Global Integrity Report)


.. 2009 85
.. 2007





.. 2009
(lobbying)

.. 2009


(Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission)

(Good Governance)

174

(Inspectors General)
(Integrity Indicators Scorecard) 6
1 (Civil Society)
(86) 3
1. (86)
2. (91)
3. (81)
2 (Election) (84) 3
1.
(92)
2. (82)
3. (77)
3 (84) 4
1. (91)
2. (88)
3. (66)
4. (92)
4 (84)
4
1. (81)
2. (77)
3. (84)
4. (96)

175

5 (85)
5
1. (50)
2. (97)
3. (90)
4. (98)
5. (89)
6 (86)
4
1. (100)
2. (75)
3. (96)
4. (73)

176

5.4

(Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2007)
(Whistleblower)





(Federal Circuit Court of Appeals)

(178 180 )






1.

Garcetti V. Ceballos
1

.. 1978
2.
(FBI)

177

3. (1)



(2)


4.


.. 1985
5. (1)


.. 1978 (2)

(3)
(4)

(5)

(6)
(7)

6.1


3


4
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.2







1.

179

2.
3.
4.


5.
6.

6.3




.. 2546

180

( 5)






( )

(LEO)


( )





1.
4

181

.. 2537



13
3 (1)
(2)
(3)
10



3
1.1



1.2





1.3

182

2.

(1)
7
9

(2)
(3)

( 4)









132


3.
3
(1) (2)

183

(3)

3
3.1











3.2

4








3.3

184

4. 4
.. 2546

.. 2546

4



11


6.4



4 (1)
(2)
(3) (4)

185

1.
1.1

(..) -
.5 ..1

500
1,000 75 1 1
100 500 5 12,500
37,500 1 1.5 375,000
1.12


2,000
2,000,000 /
2


1

, 23

10,000 //

2553

186

1.2


(Sub-Culture)

10,000 /


10,000 / 2,000
/ 10,000 3

4



1.3






(Selective Justice)

( 4) .. 2547 26 .. 2547
4
7,000 - 8,000 /
1,000

187

2.
2.1




(1)

(2)
(3)
5

38() 32
.. 2547 8

188

2.2



(. .)



(..) (..)
6


7


2.3





6

7
2553 256
132.50 110.42

189

100 200



3.
3.1

3.2

38 ()
29 .. 2546
( 2) 11



3.3 (Conflict of Interest)



3.4

190

()
3.5
(1)






(2)



.. 2546

6.5
1.

191

2.
















6.6
1.





2.

192

30
30 25

30
55
25 30

7.1

(Reward)
(
5)

2
2

194

(Reactive Law Enforcement)




(Proactive Law Enforcement)

(
)

7.2




(1)
(2) (3)

195

1.
3


.. 2546











(1)

()
()

196

.. 2539
.. 2551
.. 2534 .. 2522
.. 2484 .. 2507
(2)




.. 2521 .. 2509
.. 2469 .. 2522 .. 2535

197

2.
3
2


2 ()
()

198

7.3


3 (1)
(2)
(3)
1.


.. 2546














.. 2546

199

2.

.. 2546
.. 2546






.. ....
.. ....
.. .... 1

0406.3/8748 20 2551



5 2551

200

2.1

4







4
.. ....



.. ....
.. 2546
4

.. 2546

201

.. 2546

......

5

5.1


(1)
5

(2)

12

(1)




(2)


(3)

202

2.2

(1)
(2)
(3)
2
()
()

.. 2546

.. ....

7
8

203

.. 2546

(1)
90

(2)
75

.. ....



50

50






()
()


2.3
3
(1) (2)
(3)

204

.. 2546


.. 2546

......

5

5.1


(1)
5

(2)

13


15

2.1

205

2.1
2.4

.. 2546


6
.. 2546




.. ....

6

206

4
.. 2546








3. :

207

(Whistleblower Law)


















5

208

(Law Enforcement Availability
Pay) 25




. .

209

4.









4.1







4.2







170

210

4.2



30 25


.. 2546







.. 2546


4.3





... ...


(Bibliography)

- : /:
329 2552
- . .
, 2518.
- . . , . 20, 76 (): 2537.
- . . ( :
), 2527.
- ,
, ,
2542 .
- . 2530. .
: .
- . . 2. ( :
), 2540.
- . . 9. ( : ),
2537.
- .
.

, 2544.
- . .
. 2550
- . . 2. ( :
), 2524.
- . . ( : ),
2535.

212

- , . :
. : , 2547.
- (..). :
. , 2544.
- ,
1, . ..2545
- .
( ). ( :
), 2547.
- . . 2. (: -
), 2545.
- . , (: ), 2545,
- . . ( :
), 2539.
- . . ( :
), 2522.
-
.. 2003.
- .
. ( :
(-)), 2540.
- . .
, 2542.

- 23
2553
- 2 2552
- 24 2552
- 10 2552
- 14 2552
- 21 2552
- 22 2552

213

2 2552
14 2553
18 2553
25 2553
1 2553
5 2553
4 2553
1 2553
22 2553
25 2553
29 2553
2 2553
6 2553
20 2553
6 2554

- . []: http://202.28.24.120/prms/pdf/tosaporn.pdf.

- 2550
- .. 2507
- .. 2543
- .. 2542
- 2489
- .. 2543
- .. 2543
- .. 2543
- 2482
- .. 2524
- .. 2542
- 2497

214

.. 2534
.. 2534
.. 2494
.. 2521
.. 2499
.. 2543
.. 2518
.. 2542
.. 2542
.. 2522
.. 2490
.. 2518
2478
2484
.. 2534
.. 2535
.. 2522
.. 2535
2493
.. 2504
2487
2485

.. 2495
.. 2530
.. 2525
2488
.. 2542
.. 2542
.. 2530
.. 2514

215

-
2484
- .. 2522
- .. 2505
- .. 2543
- .. 2542
- .. 2535
- .. 2531
- .. 2535
- .. 2534
- .. 2514
- .. 2511
- .. 2525
- .. 2528
- .. 2499
- .. 2542
- .. 2535
- .. 2535
- .. 2526
- .. 2509
- .. 2535
- .. 2535
- 2471
- .. 2534
- .. 2539
- 2484
- .. 2507
- .. 2518
- .. 2505
- .. 2504
- .. 2526

216

.. 2518
.. 2496
2473
.. 2540
.. 2511
.. 2542
.. 2510
.. 10 .. 2526
.. 2523
.. 2535
.. 2499
.. 2535
.. 2505
.. 2525
.. 2478
.. 2535
.. 2542
.. 2530
.. 2528
.. 2537
.. 2537
.. 2525
.. 2498
2498
.. 2542
.. 2535
.. 2509
.. 2541
.. 2533
.. 2543
.. 2509

217

.. 2517
.. 2497
2489
2464
.. 2522
.. 2509
.. 2507
2475
.. 2522
.. 2490
.. 2522
.. 2504
.. 2527
.. 2516
.. 2524
.. 25499
.. 2474
.. 2535
..2528
.. 2535
.. 2520
.. 2545
28 29 .. 2514
.. 2522
.. 2522
.. 2456
.. 2477
.. 2477
.. 2481
.. 2481

218

- .. 2491
( 2) .. 2495
- .. 2546
( 2) .. 2547
- .. 2519
-
.. 2547
- 274/2547


- Ades, Alberto and Rafael Di Tella. The New Economics of Corruption: A Survey and some
New Results. Political Studies XLV, 496-515, 1997.
- Agnes Festre & Pierre Garrouste, Rationality, behavior, institutional, and economic change
in Schumpeter, Journal of Economic Methodology, vol. 15(4), 2008, pp. 365-390.
- Aidt, Toke S. Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey. Economic Journal, vol. 113
(November), 2003, pp.632652.
- Ali Muhammed, Eradicating Corruption-The Singapore Experience, The Seminar on
International Experiences on Good Govemance and Fighting Corruption, The Grand Hotel
Bangkok, February 17, 2000.
- American Bar Association. ABA, Center for Professional Responsibility.
- Armstrong M. Cowans, Vickers J. Regulatory Reform. Economic Analysis and British
Experience. Cambridge, MIT Press, 1994.
- Bardhan P. Mookherjeed. (2000) Corruption and Decentralization of Infrastructure Delivery
in Developing Countries. Working Paper, University of California, Berkeley.
- Chew, David C. E. Civil Service Pay in the Asian-Pacific Region. Asian Pacific Economic
Literature, vol. 7(1) May, 1993.
- Dairokuno, Kosaku. Corruption and Rewards for High Public Offices: A Japanese
Experience. Asian Review of Public Administration, Vol. XIII, No. 1, January-June 2001.
- David C. Kang. Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the
Philippines. Imprint Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

219

- Davis, K. and J.W. Newstrom. Human Behavior at Work: Organizational Behavior.

Singapore: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1989.
- Drever, J. A Dictionary of Psychology. (Maryland: Penguin Book Co.), 1972.
- Federal Law Enforcement Pay Reform Act, 1990.
- Finn, Kala and Anne Skove. Anticorruption Laws: Knowledge & information Services
Office, The National Center of State Courts, 2004.
- Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977.
- Frdric Boehm. Anti-Corruption Strategies as Safeguard for Public Service Sector Reforms.
Anti Corruption Training & Consulting (ACTC), and Research Center in Political Economy
(CIEP), Universidad Externado de Colombia, September 2007.
- Gallati, Robert R. INTRODUCTION TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE. 12th ed. (Springfield: United States), 1970.
- Germann, A.C., Frank D. Day and Robert R.J. Gallati. Introduction to Law Enforcement and
Criminal Justice. Springfield, Ill., 1970.
- Global Integrity Report, 2009.
- Gunnar S. Eskeland and Henrik Thiele. Optimal Corruption under Moral Hazard. The World
Bank for Development. Research Group, Washington, D.C., U.S.A (1999).
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/18137/wps2204.pdf
- Guy Peters and Jon Pierre. Handbook of Public Administration: Concise Paperback Edition.
(London: SAGE publication Inc.), 1994, pp. 295-321.

- Heilbrunn, John R. Anti-Corruption Commissions Panacea or Real Medicine to Fight

Corruption? World Bank Institute, 2004.
- Herzberg, F., B. Mausner and B. Snyderman. The Motivation to Work. New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 1959.
- Horton, S. History and Persistence of an Ideal in Perry, JamesL. and Hondeghem, Annie.
eds. Motivation in Public Management The Call of Public Services. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press), 2008.
- http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/5/5331.html
- Hugh D. Barlow. Introduction to criminology. (Harper Collins College Publishers), 1996.
- Hughes, Owen E. Public management and administration. 3rd ed. (Great Britain: Creative
Print & Design (Wales)), 1998.

220

- James, Harvey S. Jr, Why Does The Introduction of Monetary Compensation Produce A
Reduction in Performance? Working Paper, University of Missouri. (2003).
- Kadish, Sanford H. editor in chief. Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, vol. 4. New York: The
Free Press, 1983.
- Kaufman and S.-J. Wei. Does `grease payment speed up the wheels of commerce?, 1998.
- Klitgaard, R. Controlling Corruption. University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1998.
- Kofman and J. Lawaree. Collusion in hierarchical agency. Econometrica 61, 629-656. 1993.
- Kofman and J. Lawaree. On the optimality of allowing collusion. Journal of Public
Economics 61, 383- 407, 1996.
- Krueger, A. The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society. American Economic
Review 64, 291-303, 1974.
- Laffont, J. Regulation and Development. Federico Caff Lectures. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 2005.
- Laffont, J. and J. Tirole. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. MIT Press,
Cambridge, 1993.
- Lambert-Modiliansky. Essays on Corruption. Ph.D. thesis, Stockholm University, 1996.
- Leite and J. Weidmann. Does Mother Nature corrupt? Natural resources, corruption, and
economic growth. IMF Working Paper, 1999.
- Longley, Robert. Who Oversees Ethics in Government? About.com guide.
- Mookherjee and I. Png. Corruptible law enforcers: How should they be compensated?
Economic Journal 105 145-159, 1995.
- M. Polinsky and S. Shavell. Corruption and optimal law enforcement. NBER Working Paper
No. 6945, 1999.
- OECD, IADB Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service Background, 2004 and
Document for the Forum on Implementing Conflict of Interest Policies in the Public Service,
Rio de Janeiro 5-6 May 2004.
- OECD. Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Services. OECD Guidelines and Country
Experiences. OECD, Paris, 2003.
- Perry, J.L. Measuring Public Service Motivation: An Assessment of Construct Reliability
and Validity. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, vol.6, (1), 1996, pp.5-22.

221

- Perry, James L., and Lois Recascino Wise. The Motivational Bases Of Public Service.
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, vol. 50, (3), 1990, pp. 367-373.
- Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of
Law, Journal of Economic Literature, 2000.
- Quah, Jon S.T. Comparing Anti-corruption Measures in Asian Countries: Lesson to be
Learnt, Asian Review of Public Administration, Vol, XI, No 2, July-December 1999, and
No 491, November 2003.
- R. Strausz. Collusion and renegotiation in a principal-supervisor-agent relationship.
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 99, 497-518, 1997.
- Rance P.L.Lee. Corruption and its control in Hong Kong: Situations up to the late seventie.
Imprint Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1981.
- S. Becker. The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour. The University of Chicago Press
(1976).
- S. Shavell. A note on marginal derrence. International Review of Law and Economics 12
345-355, 1992.
- Schuler, R.S., N.J. Beutell and S.A. Youngblood. Effective Personal Management, 3d ed.
Minnesota: Nest Publishing Company, 1989.
- Strauss, G., and L.R. Sayles. Personnel: The Human Problem of Management. 2nded.
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall), 1964.
- Tanzi, Vito. Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures, IMF
Staff Papers, Vol. 45, No. 4 (December 1998), International Monetary Fund, 1998.
- Tirole, J. Hierachies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations. Journal
of Law, Economics and Organization 2, 181-214, 1986.
- U. S. Code, Title 5.
- U.S Public Law 108-196 108th Congress, Federal Law Enforcement Pay and Benefits Parity
Act of 2003.U
- U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office. Comparing the Pay of Federal and Nonfederal
Law Enforcement Officers, A CBO Paper, August 2005.
- U.S.The Ethics in Government Act, 1978.
- United States Office of Personnel Management, Kay Coles James, Director, Federal Law
Enforcement Pay and Benefits Report to Congress, 2004.

222

- Vandenabeele, W., Scheepers, S and Hondeghem, A. Public Service Motivation in an

International Comparative Perspective: The UK and Germany. Public Policy and
Administration, vol. 21, (1), 2006, pp.13-31
- Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act, 2007.
- Whitaker, L. Paige. The Whistle Protection Act. CRS Report to Congress, March 12, 2007.
- Wolman, B.B. Dictionary of Behavioral Behavioral Science. (Von Nostrand: Reinhold
Company), 1973.
- World Bank. Rewards & Incentives. [Online]: http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/
EXTADMINISTRATIVEANDCIVILSERVICEREFORM/
0, contentMDK: 20132995~menuPK: 286372~pagePK: 148956~piPK: 216618~theSitePK:
286367, 00.html.
- Wright, B. E. Methodological Challenges Associated with Public Service Motivation
Research in Perry, James L. and Hondeghem, Annie. Eds. Motivation in Public
Management The Call of Public Services. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2008.

224

1.
1.1

(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)
1.2
(1)

(2)

225

2.

2.1
(1)


(2)
2.2
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

2.3

2.4

(1)



(2)

226

2.5




3.

(1)

(2)
(3)

4.
4.1
(1)
(2)

(3)


(4)

227

4.2

(1)

(2)
(3)

(4)
(5)
5.
(1)

(2)

(3)

228

:
.... 2546


... .. 2491 4

1

11
.. 2547 117 ( 2) 6
.. 2547 8 ( 3) 10
.. 2548 7 132

229

4

...

1. .. 2522

71
... 148
71







-

2,000 2,000,000 (
1,000 /
500
)

230

. 5 .. . 60 ( 45% 15%
) 40% 1% 99%
)
. 6 /
( .
...) ..
. 8 / . 1 (
4 5 /)
3 7-8 / (. )
2-3 /( )
2 14 15 1
5 (
) 2 ()

(


)
2. 146
50

50% 47.5% 2.5% 1%
99% ...
10,000


( 10,000 ) ( 2,000

231

) 10,000 1
(
)


7,000 - 8,000 / 1,000









3.
.. 2478 .. 2484
50 50 2
80 1 2 1 (
3 ) 20
99% 1%




20
1

( 4) .. 2547 26 .. 2547

232

4.


4.1 .. 2497
27
102 2

(1)
55

30
(2) 55
30
(3)
10

102 ( 2) .. 2497 9

233

4.2

10










(Conflict of Interest)


55

5. 2
5.1 ...



.. 2537
...

234

200,000

5.2 ...

235

1.
1.1 ...
1.2 ...() . 6

1.3 ...() .
. (
)
1.4 ... . ( .
..
)
2.
2.1 . (
)
3.
3.1
3.2 8
3.3 .
4.
4.1 ( 7)
5.
5.1
5.2 .
5.3

236

: .
... .
2542

...
.. 2491 4
1


11 .. 2547
117 ( 2) 6 .. 2547
8 ( 3) 10 .. 2548
7 132

237

4 (1)
(2)
... (3)
(4)

1. ... .. 2522
71
... 148
71

-





2,000 2,000,000 (
1,000 /
500
)

238

. 5 .. . 60 ( 45%
15% ) 40% ( 1%
99% )
. 6 /
( .
) .. 1
. 8 / . 1 (
4 5 /) . 3
. 7-8 / (. ) 2-3 /
( )
2 14 - 15 1
5 (
) 2 (-)


(


)
2. ... 146 50
50%
47.5% 2.5% 1%
99% ...
10,000


( 10,000 ) ( 2,000

239

) 10,000 3
(
)


7,000-8,000 / 1,000









3. ...
.. 2478 ... .. 2484
50 50 2 80
1 2 1 (
3 ) 20
99% 1%




20

3

( 4) .. 2547 26 .. 2547

240

4.

4.1 ... .. 2497
27
102 4

1.
55

30
2. 55
30
3.
10

102 ... ( 12) .. 2497 9

241

4.2

10










(Conflict of Interest) ...


55

, : / :

242

(1)


2





(2)


16

(3)

(4)

4
10


(5)

243

(6)
(7) 30
55 55
30


1 3 2 3






4.3

30
30 25
55
25 30

244

5. 2
5.1 ...



.. 2537
...











200,000

5.2 ... ...

245

10,000 / .























...

246

.. 2547

11 ..
2547 132

... .. 2478 15


24

.. 2548








...
.. 2522 ... .. 2522

247

(
)
20

248

132


(Moral Hazard)







(Sub-Culture)