...

NACC Journal

ISSN 1906-2087 4 1 ( 2554)

...
361 -
11000
. 0 2281 8421, 0 2281 7126
. 0 2281 7126, 0 2282 7186
E-mail: research@nacc.go.th
Website: http://www.nacc.go.th

William Wyn ELLIS

n


n



n


n

NACC Journal

ISSN 1906-2087 Vol 4 No. 1

(January, 2011)
Publisher

Apinan Isranggura Na-Ayuthaya

Secretary-General
Sansearn Poljieak
Vice-Secretary-General
Puey Ungphakorn Anti-Corruption
Research Center
Office of the National Anti-Corruption
Commission
361 Nonthaburi Road,
Amphur Muang, Nonthaburi Province
11000 Thailand
Tel: 66 (0) 2281 8421, 66 (0) 2281 7126
Fax. 66 (0) 2281 7126, 66 (0) 2282 7186
E-mail: research@nacc.go.th
Website: http://www.nacc.go.th

Advisory Board
Medhi Krongkaew
Pakdee Pothisiri

Chief Editor
Dararatt Anantanasuwong

Editorial Board
Vanpen Surarerks
Kowit Kangsanan
Jaturon Thirawat
Sirilaksana Khoman
Nitinant Wisaweisuan

English Language Editor

William Wyn ELLIS

Managerial Board
Sirirat Vasuvat
Manager
Chintana Ploypatarapinyo Asst.

Manager
Patcharee Meensuk
Somphot Pangprasit
Benjavan Yuprapat
Sunee Tanusit
Wichuta Banthaothuk
Pichit Khamma
Kanokwan Taraprab

Objectives

To serve as the center for compiling

and disseminating research findings

and other academic works on corruption
prevention and suppression.
n To encourage the use of the research
findings and academic works and to
enhance public awareness to collectively
counter the corruption.
n To promote collaboration and
coordination in managing research
information on countering corruption
among the agencies and research based institutions.
n To promote the exchange of
information and documents among the
concerned agencies and networks.

Publication Period
Annual

Views expressed in the published articles in this Journal exclusively belong to the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the NACC



1 :

.. 2003

(United Nations Convention Against Corruption 2003)
.. 2551

1
2

.. 2003

24

49

72

94

118


2 ...
:

:

:

131
132

3 ...
- ...
2553-2554
- 2553
-
2551
- 1 2553
-
... -
-
... -

151
152

138
146

154
157
165
167
172

Table of Contents
Part I : Articles on Anti-Corruption
Extradition obligations under the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC 2003)
and Thailands Extradition Act (2008)
Torsak Buranaruangroj

1
2

Problems in criminal justice and law enforcement

in Thailand, following the UN Convention Against
Corruption 2003
Chantima Thanasawangkul

24

Prevention and Suppression of Corruption

in Business-Oriented Public Entities
Nattanun Asawalertsak and Staffs

49

International Counter Corruption Measures

and Practices: Application for Thailand
Ake Tangsupvattana and Ora-orn Poocharoen

72

Economics of Bid Rigging: a Review of Literature

Sutthi Sunthanurak

94

Behavior of Ex-Post Corruption: Experimental Results

Loylom Prasertsri

118

Part II: Perspective on Anti-Corruption

Against Corruption: Social Enterprise
Mechai Viravaidya

131
132

Against Corruption: Buddhism

W.Vajiramedhi

138

Against Corruption: Private Sector

Dusit Nontanakorn

146

Table of Contents
Part III: NACC Miscellaneous
151
- NACCs research funded in budgetary
152
years 2009-2010
- Annual summary of NACC subcommittee work,
154
year 2010
- Abstract of research funded in budgetary
157
year 2008
- The integrity bouquet
165
- Call for papers to be published in
167
the NACC journal
- NACC journal subscription form
172



...
...
1 ... 2554
4

3 1
:
.. 2003

...

2 ...
3

.



3 ...


...

...

... 4

 4 1 ( 2554)

Articles on Anti-Corruption

...

.. 2003 (United Nations Convention

Against Corruption UNCAC 2003)

.. 2551
Extradition obligations under the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption (UNCAC-2003) and Thailands Extradition Act (2008)
*

..
2003 (United Nations Convention Against
Corruption-UNCAC-2003)
.. 2551




UNCAC

(UNCAC 2003) and Thailands Extradition

UNCAC once the country becomes a Party

This article analyzes about two

issues relating to mandatory obligations

Act 2008. The first relates to the scope of

extraditable offences. Under the UNCAC,
all criminal offences are extraditable, but
the Extraditable Act 2008 states that
only acts punishable under Thai laws are
extraditable. The second issue relates to
the concept of prosecution, instead of
extradition.

These inconsistencies should be

addressed in order to ensure full compliance

with Thailands obligations under the
to the Convention.

for extraditable offences under the United

Nations Convention Against Corruption

*
E-mail: bltorsak@yahoo.com

 4 1 ( 2554)

UNCAC UNCAC
UNCAC

Keywords: International law, Thailand s ..

extradition regime, extradition obligations 2551
under the UNCAC



..
2551
UNCAC
.. 2472





UNCAC





44

.. 2003 (United Nations Convention
Against Corruption or UNCAC 2003)
.. 2551

.. 2551

...

UNCAC

UNCAC





UNCAC

(
...)
UNCAC

(Mandatory
Provision) UNCAC

UNCAC
.. 2551




UNCAC

.. 2551

UNCAC


.. 2003
UNCAC 1. UNCAC


44 UNCAC

UNCAC
UNCAC
UNCAC

 4 1 ( 2554)

(1) (Legal Basis)

()
()


()


()


()


44 UNCAC

UNCAC








UNCAC

44 6 (a)
44 5
3
44 6 (b)
1
2

UNCAC



1
UNCAC

. UNCAC




UNCAC2

.
UNCAC

44 UNCAC 3

UNCAC

UNCAC

...

(Extraditable)
UNCAC

UNCAC

8
(Double or
Dual Criminality)

UNCAC

(Mandatory Criminalization)
( 15)

( 16)

( 17)
( 23)
(
25)


(2) UNCAC 9
(Extraditable Offences)

UNCAC 4
UNCAC


UNCAC
5

(Non-Treaty-Based
Countries)
(Reciprocity) UNCAC

UNCAC
6

UNCAC

44 4 ( 1)
44 4 ( 2)
6
44 7
7
44 18
8
44 1
9
..
( 44 8)
UNCAC


4
5

 4 1 ( 2554)

UNCAC

(Optional
Criminalization)

( 18) ( 19)
( 20)
( 21)
( 22)

( 24)



UNCAC




10

( )

1 11

UNCAC


(several separate
offences)
UNCAC



UNCAC

44 2
.. 2551 7 ...
- 2 ...




(
) 1

10
11

...

. (Fair

Treatment)
12

14

(3)
.

(Laws of the Requested State)

() UNCAC 15


(Fiscal Matters)16
13 UNCAC


17
44 3
If the request for extradition includes several separate offences, at least
one of which is extraditable under this article and some of which are not extraditable by reason of their
period of imprisonment but are related to offences established in accordance with this
Convention, the requested State Party may apply this article also in respect of those offences

UNCAC
UNCAC

UNCAC

13
44 8
14
44 14
15
44 15
16
44 16
17
44 17
12

 4 1 ( 2554)

. UNCAC


UNCAC
(Political Offence)18

UNCAC

19

20

(4)
(Prosecution or
Extradition)

(Common Law
Countries)
(Civil Law Countries)

.
(Common Law)


21

22

.
(Civil Law Countries)

44 4 ( 3)
44 9
20
44 10
21
(serious offences)
22
, , 193 2539
18
19

10 ...

(character witness)

(resources)

23

(Active Personality Principle)
24

UNCAC

UNCAC

25

26

UNCAC

UNCAC

, , . 193
8
25
44 11
26
44 12
23
24

 4 1 ( 2554) 11

(5)
(Enforcement of Sentence in
Lieu of Extradition)

27

(absolute)

(4)
27
28

44 13
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..
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.. 2551


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.. 2551

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UNCAC


(1)

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29



UNCAC



UNCAC




.. 2551
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2

29
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(time
of criminal perpetration)
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(A One-Year Prison)

30

 4 1 ( 2554) 13

31

33


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(Non-Extradition in Political or Military
Offence)
.

..
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..

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9 3
31
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UNCAC

35

UNCAC

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.. 2551
(Central Authority)

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.

37

(extradition request)

(provisional
arrest request)

10
44 8
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68
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.. 2551

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.. 2551

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UNCAC
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UNCAC

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.. 2551

 4 1 ( 2554) 23

UNCAC
UNCAC


UNCAC


.. 2551

UNCAC

UNCAC

UNCAC

. 2511

.. 2003, ()


.. 2551

24 ...

.. 2003*
Problems in criminal justice and law enforcement in Thailand,
following the UN Convention Against Corruption 2003

**

This article describes the problems
.. 2003 3 of legal application and enforcement of
Thai laws in accordance with the United
Nations Convention Against Corruption
(UNCAC), 2003. It focuses on the problems
in Chapter 3 (Criminalization and Law
Enforcement) as follows: problems with
public procurement regulations in
corruption cases, criminal proceedings
against an accused person in State
Enterprise procurement projects and
conflicts of interest among public
prosecutors.
*
.. 2003
2551 ( ...)
** E-mail: chantima_legal@yahoo.com

 4 1 ( 2554) 25

This paper recommends actions

to address these issues through amendment

of legislation and regulations. Their
implementation will contribute to curbing
corruption efficiently combating conflict
of interest among public prosecutors and
improving litigation proceedings in criminal
cases to guarantee a timely, independent,
fair, efficient and effective prosecution
system.

:


Keywords: International law, corruption,
public procurements, conflict of interest,
public prosecutor

..
2003 United Nations Convention Against
Corruption (UNCAC 2003) 9
2546 Merida

4 2550



(.)


(reservation)

In accordance with Paragraph 3 of Article

66 of the convention, Thailand does not
consider itself bound by Paragraph 2 of
the same Article
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 4 1 ( 2554) 27

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public finances) 9 1

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.. 2553
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.. 2550
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.. 2003

2543.

 4 1 ( 2554) 49

Prevention and Suppression of Corruption in

Business-Oriented Public Entities
*
**
***
****
*****
.. ******

5 (1)
(2)

(3)

(4)
(5)

3
(1)
(2)

(3)

* E-mail: nattanun2003@yahoo.com
** E-mail: ajkomsan@yahoo.com
*** E-mail: siamthongchai@gmail.com
**** E-mail: lawmakeup@hotmail.com
***** E-mail: art2523@hotmail.com
****** () E-mail: vatcharapong@hotmail.com

50 ...

3
(1)
(2)


(3)

corrupt practices in these entities:

1) laws and regulations are not enforced
effectively; 2) relevant legal or regulatory
provisions lack clarity, or are limited
in scope of application, resulting in
enforcement loopholes ; and 3) systems
of inspection and legal proceedings are
weak and dysfunctional.

To address corrupt practices in

Business-oriented public entities, with

business-oriented public entities, three

state enterprise or public organization

guidelines are proposed, 1) tighten selection

status, are authorized with greater

processes for board directors in order to

independence, more flexibility in

eliminate political interference and

operation, and the right to own assets

conflicts of interest; 2) identify and address

and generate revenues. Such autonomy

legal and regulatory loopholes to enhance

presents many opportunities for fraud,

transparency and accountability and

misappropriation, and overlapping interests.

clearly define the scope of authority; and

3) strengthen checks and balances to

A study of corruption within

business-oriented public entities reveals

enhance standards of governance.

that modalities of corrupt practice are

similar to those within State agencies.
Corrupt practices within business-oriented
public entities may be divided into

five categories , as follows: 1) intervention

by political or other interest groups;
2) exploitation of laws for undue benefit;
3) failure or neglect to comply with the
entitys own regulations ; 4) problems
resulting from weak checks and balances;
and 5) problems and obstacles in legal
proceedings. Three factors contribute
to failure in prevention and detection of

Keywords: Anti-Corruption in businessoriented public entities, public organization

management, state enterprise administration

 4 1 ( 2554) 51

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

1.

1

(1)

1 (1)

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Articles
James H. Anderson, A Review of Governance and

Anticorruption Indicators in East Asia and

Pacific, Paper for conference on Evidence
Based Anti-Corruption Policy, organised by

Thailands National Anti-Corruption

Commission (NACC) in collaboration with the

World Bank, 5-6 June 2009, Siam City Hotel,

Bangkok, Thailand.
Jim Brumby, Michael Hyndman, and Stuart Shepherd,

Improving the Governance of New Zealands

State-Owned Enterprises, Agenda, Volume 5,

Number 2, 1998.

Other Materials
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, http://

www.insolvency.gov.uk

http://cid-497a53b95b442bd4.spaces.live.com

12 2552
http://gotoknow.org 12 2552
http://news.sanook.com 12 2552
http://nidambe11.net 12 2552
http://thaiinsider.info 12 2552
http://toodchefha.exteen.com 12 2552
www.airportthai.co.th 12 2552
www.aksorn.com 12 2552
www.bangkokbiznews.com 12 2552
www.cabinet.soc.go.th 12 2552
www.hflight.net 12 2552
www.matichon.co.th 12 2552
www.mcot.net 12 2552
www.nccc.thaigov.net 12 2552
www.news.sanook.com 12 2552
www.okmd.or.th 12 2552
www.opdc.go.th 12 2552

72 ...

International Counter Corruption Measures and Practices:

Application for Thailand

*
**

8
(1) (2)
(3) (4)
(5) (6)

(7) (8)

The paper aims to study and search

for appropriate anti-corruption measures

and practices for Thailand by examing
those adopted by leading international
organizations and 6 country cases
renowned for their very low corruption

* E-mail: ake.tangsupvattana@gmail.com
** Assistant Professor Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy National University of Singapore
E-mail: sppp@nus.edg.sg

 4 1 ( 2554) 73
records in Asia and the world, i.e., Finland,
Sweden, Norway, Japan, Korea, and
Singapore. The results indicated 3 main
categories of anti-corruption measures
that can be recommended for application
in Thailand: promotional, preventive,
and punitive measures. Finally, eight
recommendations were made, including
(1) conducting surveys, (2) targeted
training, (3) networking, (4) increasing
transparency in government sector through
media, (5) punishment for deterrence,
(6) whistle-blower protection and rewards,
(7) establishing codes of conducts, and
(8) preventing conflicts of interest.

1 2
3

4

1.
(Anti-Corruption Measures)
Keywords: Anti-corruption organizational

structures, anti-corruption measures
(Stakeholders)


(International NGOs)

74 ...

(preventing corruption)
(prosecuting corruption)

(comprehensiveness)
(scope)
(power)
(political will) (Quah 1999; Pope
and Vogl 2000; Kpundeh and Dininio 2006)

Institutionalism

Institution

(bureaucratic
fragmentation)

(Ombudsman)
(independent commission)
(presidential
commission)
(multisectoral advisory group)
(ethical codes of
conduct) (parliamentary
committee)

 4 1 ( 2554) 75

(anti-corruption commission)

Jon
Quah (2002)

Meagher (2005)

Quah (single
agency)


(multiple agency)

(Ad hoc agency)

Heilbrunn (2004)
4
1. Universal model (Hong Kong)

2. Investigative model (Singapore)

3. Parliamentary model

( New South Wales)
4. Multi-agency model
Office of Government Ethic

(single agency)








(Kim, Kim and Lim 2006)

(Corrupt Practices
Investigation Bureau: CPIB)

(values)

76 ...

(Transparency International 2006)

(single agency)
(coordination)

2.

1. UN Convention Against
Corruption 2003

2. OECD Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business OECD AntiBribery Convention 1997



OECD
Guidelines for Managing Conflict of
Interest in the Public Service
OECD

 4 1 ( 2554) 77

(toolkit)

3. National Integrity Systems (NIS)
Transparency International (TI)
NIS

4.





5.

(ADB)

(OECD)




UN Convention Against
Corruption ...

2.1
(Surveying)

(measurement)


(UNODC
2004: 473)

78 ...

KICAC1
(Integrity Evaluation: IE)
IE KICAC





IE
.. 2548 KICAC
1,330 325

CPIB

CPIB
2 1.
(External
customer survey) 2.
(Public perception
survey)


2

1.

(integrity)

2.

2.2

(Education and Training to Promote
Anti-Corruption Culture)





OECD
UN
Convention Against Corruption

KICAC ACRC

KIKAC ACRC KIKAC

KIKAC
1

 4 1 ( 2554) 79

NACU

TI Norway


dilemma training

2.3
(Networking)

(Institutions)

(1)

K-PACT (the
Korea Pact on Anti-Corruption and
Transparency)



(governance)










citizen charter

80 ...

(3)

(2)





CPIB
(Immigration) OECD Convention on Combating
Bribery







Ombudsman Chancellor of Justice




(citizen
centred)

 4 1 ( 2554) 81

(4)

UN Convention Against
Corruption





ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative
for Asia-Pacific

(regional co-operation)

2.4
(Enhancing
Transparency through Media)

United Nations
Convention Against Corruption 2
10, 12 13

(non-tolerance of
corruption)

Transparency International (TI)
Asia Development Bank (ADB)
OECD

Investigative
journalism

82 ...

...

website

2.5
(Punishment for Deterrence)

ADB







Transparency
International


(sectoral approach)

 4 1 ( 2554) 83

(big fish)

(Punishment is effective for deterrence)
CPIB
(



) CPIB

(seizable case)

2

6
Okokrim
CPIB

2.6
(Whistle blower protection
and reward)

UN Convention Against Corruption

33

84 ...

(silence
culture)



(good faith)

CPIB



Complaint
ID
log-on CPIB

2.7
(Creating Code of conduct)

(code of conduct)

1)
2)



-

 4 1 ( 2554) 85

(
2544)

(private-capacity interests)


(OECD 2005: 7)

2.8
(Prevention of Conflict
of Interest)

(conflict of
interest)

OECD

(definition)

(
Function 1 OECD Guidelines
for Managing Conflict of Interest in
the Public Service) Section 11

86 ...

the Administrative Procedure Act

(ADB) OECD
(2006)

1.

1.1 (recusal)

1.2




1.3

1.4

Function 2 OECD Guidelines
for Managing Conflict of Interest in the
Public Service (identification)

(unacceptable)
(grey situations)
(additional employment)
(inside information)
(contracts)
(gifts and other forms of benefit)

(family and
community expectations)
2.
(outside appointments)
2.1
(activity
after leaving public office)

 4 1 ( 2554) 87

2.2

2.3

2.4

2.5

2.6

2.7

2.8
Commitment

2.9
(quarantine
rules) 6

2.10

(grand corruption)

3.

88 ...

1.

1.1

(measurement)











TI (ranking)

1.2

(External customer survey)

2-3

...

 4 1 ( 2554) 89

2.

(training the
trainers)

..

...
...
..

3.

(International
norms)

...

90 ...

...

4.

...

...

5.

...

 4 1 ( 2554) 91

...

6.

...

.. 2551

...
..


7.

(
)

2550

...

...

92 ...

...

8.

...

...

6

8

8 1.
2. 3.
4. 5.
6.
7.
8.

 4 1 ( 2554) 93

. 2544.

, :

, 4-57-4-61.

Transparency International. 2006. National Integrity

System Country Study Report: Singapore 2006,

Germany: Transparency International.

Heilbrunn, John. 2004. Anti-corruption Commissions:

Panacea or Real Medicine to Fight

Corruption?. Washington D.C.: The World

Bank.

United

Kim, Joongi. Kim, Heejeung. and Lim, Chong-Won.

2006. National Integrity System: Republic

o f K o re a 2 0 0 6 . ( B e r l i n : Tr a n s p a r e n c y

International).
Kpundeh, Sahr and Phyllis Dininio. 2006. The Role

of Parliament in Curbing Corruption. The

World Bank, Washington, D.C..
Meagher, Patrick. 2005. Anti-corruption Agencies:

Rhetoric Versus Reality, Journal of Policy

Reform, 8:1, 69-103
OECD. 2005. Managing Conflict of Interest in the

Public Sector: A Toolkit. www.oecd.org/

dataoecd/31/15/36587312.pdf. accessed

20 April 2008

. 2006. Follow-up Report on the Implementation

of the Phase 2 Recommendations on the
Application of the Convention and the 1997
Recommendation on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions.

Pope,

Jeremy and Frank Vogl, 2000. Making

Anticorruption Agencies More Effective. Finance
and Development 37 (2) http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/fandd/ 2000/06/pope.htm
accessed 12 June 2008.

Quah, Jon S.T. 1999. Corruption in Asian countries:

Can it be Minimized? Public Administration

Review 59 (6): 483-494.
______. 2002. Globalization and Corruption Control in

Asian Countries: The Case for Divergence,

Public Management Review. 4(1).

Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2004. The

Global Programme Against Corruption: UN
Anti-Corrutpion Toolkit 3nd edition. Vienna:
United Nations.

94 ...

:
Economics of Bid Rigging: a Review of Literature

Bid rigging or collusive bidding in

the public procurement market is pervasive
and has a major impact on competition,
resulting inflated prices when bid rigging
occurs. The objectives of this paper are to
explain the importance of collusive bidding
behavior, especially the causes of bid
rigging, facilitating factors of collusion,
and forms of bid rigging. This paper also
compares Thailands anti-collusion law with
those of several other countries, and reviews
the use of an economic model to detect
bid-rigging. This will allow enhanced
detection of potential collusion during
* 6 , Ph.d. (candidate) of School of Development Economics,
National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA) E-mail: sutthisun@gmail.com

 4 1 ( 2554) 95
initial screening of projects, and points to
new policy recommendations.

:


.. 2542

Keywords: Economics of bid rigging,
bid rigging ,collusive bidding, bid
rigging behavior, form of bid rigging,
Thailands anti-corruption law

It is important to emphasize that

screens do not prove collusion

Rosa Abrantez-Metz
and Patrick Bajari (2009)

(Bid Rigging
Behavior)

.. 2542


(Public Procurement
Market)




(Economic Model)

5
1



2




3

1.

.. 2542

96 ...

(...)

(2523)

(Side Payment)



(2533)





(2543)

(2546)
Collusion
A secret agreement that
two or more people make in order to
do something dishonest

(2546)

.. 2542
4

(Corruption in Public
Procurement)
(Cost of Bid Rigging)

(Bidding Ring)

 4 1 ( 2554) 97

2.

2.1

.. 2542 30
2542

.. 2542



4-9
10-13

1
.. 2542

1-3 50
( 4)

()

( 5)

1-5 50

98 ...

/



( 6)

5-10 50

() ( 7)

1-5 50

( 8)

1-3 50

1-10
20,000-200,000
...
( 10)
5-10
100,000-400,000



( 11)

 4 1 ( 2554) 99

5-20
100,000-400,000
()
( 12)
... 7 -20
100,000-400,000

...

(...)

7 ...
( 2)

100 ...

2 ...
.. 2542

2543

176

2544

182

2545

267

2546

194

2547

155

2548

109

2549

105

2550

151

: 2543-2550

2
...

1

(2546)

(In-Depth Interview)

...

 4 1 ( 2554) 101

(2549)

...

2.2

(Victims)


2008 Office of Fair
Trading (OFT) (United
Kingdom)

112 OFT

130 2
Japan Fair Trade Commission
(JFTC)
50

JFTC
1,200

Organization For Economic Cooperation

and Development OECD

(Guidelines for
Fighting Bid Rigging in Public
Procurement)3 OECD





OECD
(Checklist)

OFT http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/
general/CE4327-04_Decision__public_1.pdf
3
http://www.oecd.org/document/29/0,3343,en_2649_40381615
_42230813_1_1_1_1,00.html
2

102 ...

Act on Competition Restriction (480/1992) Finnish Competition Authority (FCA)

Law on Combating Corruption 1997
Section 298 of German Criminal Code

The Bundeskartellamt

Hungarian Competition Act 1996

Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH)

Antimonopoly Act 1956

Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC)

The Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC)
Act 1990
Dutch Competition Act 1998

Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa)

The Swedish Competition Act

The Public Procurement Act

Swedish Competition Authority (SCA)

251 Federal Act of 6 October on Cartels

and other Restraints of Competition
(Cartel Act, CartA)

Swiss Competition Authority

Sherman Act

The Antitrust Division of U.S.

Department of Justice

Taiwan Fair Trade Commission (TFTC)

Fair Trade Act

Competition Law

Turkish Competition Authority (TCA)

Competition Law and Enterprise Act

Office of Fair Trading (OFT)

(Competition Law)
(Antitrust Law)

Fair
Trade Commission

.. 2542

 4 1 ( 2554) 103

4
(Abuse
of Dominance; 25)
(Merger; 26),
(Collusion; 27)
(Unfair
Trade; 29)
(2549)

3. (Bid Rigging
Behavior)

3.1


(2542)

,
,
,


,

,
,
,

,
,

,
,

,
,

...

(2545)



6 ,
,
,
,

104 ...

-
-

1


3

297/2501

() 2022/2519

 4 1 ( 2554) 105

(2544)

5

76 70

3.2

(2545)

Motta (2004)
(Facilitating Bid Rigging)

(High concentration)

(Significant entry barrier)

Goldberg et. al (2004)

(Bidding Ring)

Goldberg et. al (2004)

(Substitution for the product)


(Lock
Specification)



//

106 ...

(Turnkey)

Anti Trust Division US
Department of Justice

(Trade Association)




(Chinese Taipei)

(Networking Association)

3.3

OECD (2008)
4 Bid Suppression,
Complementary Bidding, Bid Rotation
Market Allocation

(1) Bid Suppression
(Withdraw from
bidding)

(Compensation payment)

(2) Complementary Bidding
(Phony Bidding, Phantom Bidding
Cover Pricing)




Complementary Bidding

(3) Bid Rotation

(4) Market Allocation

(Product),
(Customers) (Territories)6

() ()
()

 4 1 ( 2554) 107

(Bid Rigging Cost)



(Sub
Contract)
( 2)
4.

.. 2535

(Bid Rigging Cost)

-
-
-

.. 2535

108 ...

Joseph Welsch Helmut
8
Furth (1983)


3
(Initial Screening),
(Secondary
Bidding Analysis)
(Determination)
( 3 4)

3 4
Joseph Welsch Helmut Furth

(Initial Screening)

-
5
(Estimate
Price) 5%
-

(Prequalied bidder)
, ,

6% 9%
17%

(Secondary Analysis)
-
-

(Determination)

Welsch (Inspector General) US Department of Transportation Furth

Antitrust Division US Department of Justice
8

 4 1 ( 2554) 109

4 Welsch & Furth

1.


2.


3.

4.

5.
(Unit cost)
6.

7.

1.

(Asphalt Plant)
2. Competition Matrix
Matrix
,
, ,


3.


4.

5.

(Firm Characteristic)

(Detecting
of Bid Rigging Model)
Robert H. Porter John Douglas
Zona (1993) Competitive

Bidding Model

New York State Highway
80

(Bidding price)

(Job
Backlog), (Capacity or
Maximum Backlog),
(Utilization Rate)

110 ...

Backlog Capacity
(Dummy
variable)
(ISLAND)

Porter Zona


(Competitive group)

(Cartel group) Porter Zona

Multiple Regression Analysis
Multinomial Logit Chow Test

Competitive
Bidding Model

Porter Zona (1999)


(School Milk Auction in
Ohio)

Competitive Bidding

Porter Zona

Martin Pesendorfer (2000)

Florida
Texas 80

Pesendorfer

Pesendorfer


(Side payment)

Porter &
Zona Pesendorfer

 4 1 ( 2554) 111

Eklof (2000)

(Collusive behavior)

Bergman Jakobsson
(2001)

(Asphalt paving) 90
Porter
Zona
Conditional Independence

Conditional Independence

(Non collusive
bids should be independent)

(Necessary
Condition)
Bergman
Jakobsson (2001)
Conditional Independence

Competitive Bidding
Porter Zona

Lee Hahn (2002)

1995-2000 Competitive
Bidding Model

Lee Hahn

Complementary
Bidding Phantom Bidding

15.5%

Conditional
Independence
Patrick Bajari
Lin Xe Ye (2003)
Exchangeability
(Sufficient Condition)
Bajari
Ye


90
Conditional Independence


Exchangeability

Bajari Ye

112 ...

5 Exchangeability Bajari Ye

1
1

2
1
2

USD

1.19

1.29

1.19

1.19

1.2

1.2

Phony Bid >

1.29

1.3

1.3

1.3

1.3

1.3

1.3

1.2

1.2

1.2

Porter Zona
(1993, 1997) Pesendorfer (2000)

Bajari Ye


Bajari Ye
Exchangeability 5

Bajari Ye


Exchangeability
1
A 1.19 USD A
0.19 USD B C
A

A B
C
A
1.29 USD
0.29 USD B
Phony Bid
A 1.29
USD B 1.29
B
C 1.3 USD

2 C B
A B
A 1
C
1.2 -1.29 USD


1

 4 1 ( 2554) 113

C
A B
Bajari Ye
Exchangeability

C

Bajari Ye
2
Exchangeability

5

Porter & Zona
Bajari & Ye

Jakobsson Eklof (2003)


Competitive Bidding Porter &
Zona

Conditional Independence Bajari & Ye

Saphores et.al (2006)

(Price War)

Rieko Ishii (2007)

Ibaraki
Ishii


Ishii

(Rotation Bidding)


Ishii


Rotation
Bidding

Market Allocation Territorial Allocation

Tukiainen (2008)

114 ...

(School yard snow removal

auction) Helsinki
2003-2005 Tukiainen
Monte Carlo Analysis


(Participation decision)
Market
Allocation

5.




(Initial Screening)

.. 2542

(...),
(.) (DSI)

()

 4 1 ( 2554) 115

(Compliance
Audit)

(Research Audit)

Sub Contract bidding

116 ...

. (2546). . 29

2552, http://www.transparency
thailand.org.
.(..).



.
.(2543).

.. 2543.





.
. (



.. 2542) .. 45 6

(..-.. 2543): 20-29.


.. 2542
.



.

27 2544.
.(2533). .

.( 2533): 90-91
. (2546).



.. 2542. .
.(2546).



.


.(2545).

10.

.
.(2549).

.

.:

.(2523). .

.

1 (..2523).54-60


. (2544).



..

2542

Bajari, P., & Summer, G. (2002). Detecting Collusion

in Procurement Auctions. Anti-Trust Law

Journal, 70, 143-170.
Bajari, P., & Ye, L. (2003). Deciding Between

Competition and Collusion. Review of

Economics and Statistics, 85, 971-989.
Eklof, M. (2000). Hunting for Collusion in

Procurement Auctions. Uppsala: Uppsala

University.
Goldberg, P., Anderson, M., & Aubertine, A. (2004).

Bid Rigging Detection in Government. Retrieved

August 29, 2009, from www.osbar.org/_docs/

sections/antitrust/attr_cle_bid_rigging.pdf
Ishii, R. (2008). Collusion in Repeated Procurement

Auction: A Study of a Paving Market in

Japan . Osaka: Institute of Social and Economic

Research.
Jakosson, M., & Eklof, M. (2003, February 16).

B i d - r i g g i n g i n S w e d i s h P ro c u re m e n t

Auctions. Retrieved August 29, 2009, from http://

www.ne.su.se/research/seminars/pdf/051101.pdf
Khemani, R., & Shapiro, D. (1993). Glossary of

Industrial Organization Economics. Paris:

Oecd.
Lee, I. K., & Hanh, K. (2002). Bid-Rigging in Auctions

for Korean Public-Works Contracts and

Potential Damage. Review of Industrial

Organization, 21, 73-88.

 4 1 ( 2554) 117
Organization Economic Co-operation and Development.

(2008). Guidelines for detecting bid rigging

in public tenders . Guidelines for detecting

bid rigging in public tenders . Retrieved August

29, 2009, from http://www.oecd.org/document/

19/0,3343,en_21571361_44258691_44904915_1_

1_1_1,00.html
Pesendorfer, M. (2000). A Study of Collusion in

First-Price Auctions. Review of Economic

Studies, 67, 381-411.
Porter, R., & John, Z. (1993). Detecting of Bid Rigging

in Procurement Auction. Journal of Political

Economy, 101, 518-538.
Porter, R., & Zona, D. (1999). Ohio School Milk Market:

An Analysis of Bidding. RAND Journal of

Economics , 30, 263-288.
Saphores, J., Vincent, J. R., Marochko, V., Abrudan,

I., Bouriaud, L., & Zinnes, C. (2006, December 27).

Detecting collusion in timber auctions : an

application to Romania, Vol. 1 of 1. Data &

Research. Retrieved August 29, 2009, from

http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?

pagePK=64165259&theSitePK=469382&piPK=

64165421&menuPK=64166093&entityID=

000016406_20061227164638
Tukiainen, J. (2008). Participation Screen for

Collusion in Auctions. Empirical Analysis

of Competition in Procurement Auctions

(pp. 77-110). Helsinki: University of Helsinki.
Welsch, J., & Furth,H. (1983). Suggestions for the

Detection and Prevention of Construction

Contract Bid Rigging. Retrieved August 29, 2009,

from http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/programadmin/

contracts/dotjbid.cfm
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/211578.htm.

(2003). Price Fixing, Bid Rigging and Market

Allocation Schemes. Welcome to the United

States Department of Justice. Retrieved

August 29, 2009, from http://www.justice.gov/atr/

public/guidelines/211578.htm

118 ...

: *
Behavior of Ex-Post Corruption: Experimental Results

**

Sub-game Perfect Nash
Equilibrium (SPNE)

This article compares two anti-

corruption responses, (reward and

punishment) to solve the ex-post corruption
problem, including analytical comparison
between theoretical prediction and
empirical results

from laboratory

experimentation.

* ... (
.. 2553)
** , E-mail: iamlom2007@gmail.com

 4 1 ( 2554) 119

extensive game with perfect information
under the Sub-game Perfect Nash
Equilibrium (SPNE) model reveals that
reward and punishment measures have
an insignificant impact on solving the
problem of ex-post corruption. This is (2547 : 4-30, 4-31)
because strategies of paying and taking 117
bribes are rational best-response strategies

for both players. Therefore, in equilibrium,
rational players are likely to be corrupt.
Comparing the theoretical predictions
with empirical findings from laboratory
experimentation confirms that neither
measures is effective in addressing


corruption.

However allowing an offender to
accuse an agent of taking a bribe while
protecting him/her as a witness is found to
be effective. Experimental finding confirm Becker (1968 : 169-217)
theoretical predictions showing that such
a measure can contribute significantly to

reducing the incidence of corruption.

:

K e y w o r d s : E x - p o s t c o r r u p t i o n ,
experimental economics, SPNE, game

theory
JEL Classification: D73, C92, C72, D03,
(2538 : 131-134)
K42

Theoretically, analysis of an

120 ...

Khalil et al. (2007 : 1-51)

(rules of the game)



(strategic
behavior)

(institutional design)

2


(Game Theory) 2
(conventional
lab experiment)1

Harrison & List (2004 : 9-10)

4 1: Conventional lab experiment
(subject pool--sample), 2: Artefactual field experiment
(non-student subject pool), 3: Framed field experiment
4: Natural
field experiment

 4 1 ( 2554) 121

(Extensive
Game with Perfect Information)
Sub-game Perfect
Nash Equilibrium (SPNE)


(game simulation)

(ex-post corruption) 2

2

2

(student
subject pool--sample) 160

( )

()

- 2553

(
)

(Non-parametric statistics)
Fishers exact test
( , 2552 : 312315; , 2548 : 136-141)

(ex-post corruption)

(ex-ante corruption)

122 ...

(corruption
behavior)




















1
:



1

(best-response strategy)

(rational players)

SPNE



87.50

56.25

(
1 )

2
:

 4 1 ( 2554) 123

1: 1

12.50%

87.50%

43.75%

56.25%

:






SPNE
1

81.25
56.25

( 2 )


Fishers exact

2
1



Mookherjee & Png
(1995 : 145-159)

124 ...

2: 2

43.75%

18.75%

56.25%

81.25%

2

SPNE



87.50
68.75 ( 3
)

3: 3

12.50%

87.50%

31.25%

68.75%

 4 1 ( 2554) 125

Fishers exact


3
1

Mookherjee & Png (1995
: 145-159); Flatters & Macleod (1995
: 397-417)


Mookherjee & Png;
Flatters & Macleod
Motta (2008 : 3-15)

(interaction effect)



SPNE
1

87.50
62.50


Fishers exact

126 ...

4: 4

12.50%

87.50%

37.50%

62.50%

1

( 4
)

(private information)

:


5

1-4

1
SPNE

5
SPNE

 4 1 ( 2554) 127

(private information)
(public information)

( 1 )

(Pareto efficient solution)






(sequential rational players)
(optimal
behavior)

SPNE

1: 5
SPNE:

18.75%

37.50%

56.25%

43.75%

128 ...

prisoners dilemma

Cooter & Garoupa (2000 : 1-26)


(coordination
failures)




37.50

37.50
18.75

6.25

43.75 56.25

37.50





( 2)
.. 2554
18 2554

103/6 3
...

1)

103/6

...
...
3

 4 1 ( 2554) 129

2)

3)

(moral
character)

4)










5)

2

(private information)



2

...

103/6

130 ...

(conventional lab
experiment)

(field
experiment)

...
2554

.(2538).

. ,

.
.(2552). .

: .
. (2547).

:

(

). :

.
.(2548).

. :

.
Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and Punishment: An

Economic Approach. The Journal of Political

Economy, 76(2), 169-217.
Cooter, R., & Garoupa, N. (2000 ). The Virtuous Circle

of Distrust: A Mechanism to Deter Bribes and

Other Cooperative Crimes. Unpublished

Working Paper Series. Berkeley Program in

Law & Economics.
Flatters, F., & Macleod, W. B. (1995). Administrative

corruption and taxation. International Tax and

Public Finance, 2(3), 397-417.
Harrison, G. W., & List, J. A. (2004). Field Experiments.

Journal of Economic Literature, 42(4),

1009-1055.
Khalil, F., Lawarre, J., & Yun, S. (2007). Bribery vs.

Extortion: Allowing the Lesser of two Evils.

Unpublished Working Paper No. 1993. CESifo.
Mookherjee, D., & Png, I. P. L. (1995). Corruptible Law

Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?

The Economic Journal, 105(428), 145-159.
Motta. (2008). Optimal Machanisms againt Corruption:

Incentive, Self-reporting and Delegation Padova.

 4 1 ( 2554) 131

...

Perspective on
Anti-Corruption

132 ...

: 1
2

.. 2517

.. 2537

.. 2552

... 4 18 2553 12
...
2

1

 4 1 ( 2554) 133

...





(NGO)
(Social Enterprise)



.. 2517

(Non-government organization-NGO)

BREAD Business
for Rural Education and Development






(Social
Enterprise)


Cabbage and Condom
Birds and Bees Resort

(Social Enterprise)

134 ...

( . .
. .
)

15


15

..

.. 2515

 4 1 ( 2554) 135

IT

2,400,000
(SDH)
6

20


6



.


6

136 ...

2 Optical Fiber


12,000 7,500

...

3

1


6,000

 4 1 ( 2554) 137

(...


)

3





...

...


(Prevention)

138 ...

: *

**

*
... 5 2553
...
**

 4 1 ( 2554) 139

1)

2)




3

3)





2

140 ...

4)



4.1
10 4 1
(Public Mind
Service)
2

3

4

4

4.2 8
8

4



4















4

1.


( )
( )
(
)

 4 1 ( 2554) 141

2.

-

8
8

142 ...

10 1.
2. 3.
4. 5.
6. 7. 8.
9.

10.

 4 1 ( 2554) 143

-








...

3.

-
-

144 ...

4.

-

key message

-
(
)

-

 4 1 ( 2554) 145

4


4

146 ...

: *

**

*
... 5 2553

**

 4 1 ( 2554) 147

(Transparency International: TI)
(Corruption
Perceptions Index: CPI)

2553
3.5 10
78 180

1) 2) 3)

148 ...

3-4

IOD











18






2541
Nation Integrity Pact

 4 1 ( 2554) 149

50

Post Audit


5,000

Post Audit
3

5,000 3
3,000




5,000 3
7,000

150 ...

 4 1 ( 2554) 151

...

NACC Miscellaneous

152 ...

... 2553-2554
1. 2554 2

1

2

2
2. 2553 5

1

2
:
3

4

5




5

()
2,000,000
2,000,000
4,000,000

()
1,250,000
300,000
200,000
1,000,000
498,400
3,248,400

 4 1 ( 2554) 153

3. ... 2553
5

1


2
3


4

5

1

...:

...

()
50,000
50,000
50,000
50,000
50,000
250,000

154 ...

2553

1. ()
1.1
2553
7
1.

2.

3. Benchmark

4.

. 157
5.

6. :

.. 2542

7.

1.2
2553 5
1.

2.

3.

4.
:

5.
.

 4 1 ( 2554) 155

1.3
...
2553 5
1.

1
2.

3.
...

...
4.

5.

1.4
2553
4
1.

:
2.

3.

4.

2.

2.1 ...
3 2553

2.2

Conference on EvidenceBased Anti-Corruption Policy 5-6

2552
2.3 ...
3 3

...

2.4

2.5

2.6

2.7

156 ...

2.8

 4 1 ( 2554) 157

2551

158 ...

4 3
()
()
() 1

(conflict of interests)

5
1)
2)
3)

4)
5)

3 1)
2)

 4 1 ( 2554) 159

3)

3
1)
2)

3)

(1)

(conflict of interest)

(2)

(3)

160 ...

2551

(Bureaucratic Model)

(Public Service)




..

2542
(Service Delivery
Unit (SDU))

3 8

.. 2542 3
(1) (2)

(.) (3)
(. The Office
of Knowledge Management and
Development : OKMD)

 4 1 ( 2554) 161

3 (1)
(.) (2)
(.)
(3)
(...)
2
(1)
(.) (2)
(Institute for Good
Governance Promotion : IGP) ...

2 (1)

(2)

3 (1)


(2)

(3)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)



(1) (
)

(2)

162 ...

(3) ...
3

(4)

 4 1 ( 2554) 163

2551

1)

2)


3)

5


20

164 ...

 4 1 ( 2554) 165

2553

166 ...

Weakness of Attitude become Weakness
of character

 4 1 ( 2554) 167

...

1.

2.

/

3.
25 ( A4)
16
Angsana New TH Sarabun_PSK

12 Times New Roman

4.
(1)

(2)
( E-mail address,
/ )
(3)
10-15 ()
100-150 ()
(4) ()
10-20

(5)
()
4
(6)
10-15
20
(7)

(8)


()
( ) /
ISBN/ISSN ()
(
)
(9) websites
electronics
(8)

168 ...

5.
4 .

4 .

2.5 .

3 .

6.

(1)
...

()

(2)
...
3,000

(3)

(4)

(5)

...

...

361 -



11000

. 0 2281 8421, 0 2281 7126

. 0 2281 7126, 0 2282 7186

chintana_plo@nacc.go.th,

chintana589@hotmail.com

 4 1 ( 2554) 169

Call for Papers

National Anti-Corruption Commission Journal
(NACC Journal)

The NACC Journal is dedicated

2. Manuscripts must be submitted

to academic discourse on the roots,

in double space with margins as shown

modalities and suppression of corruption.

below, with references on separate pages

The Journal is a peer-review journal of

and a maximum length of 25 pages

social science and humanities, providing

including tables and figures. Please use

a forum for researchers to present their

Angsana New or TH Sarabun_PSK 16

research findings and viewpoints on

font for manuscripts written in Thai,

anti-corruption concepts and activities.

or Times New Roman 12 for English

language manuscripts.

The Journal is published annually

in January by the Office of the National

Anti-Corruption Commission (ONACC)

4 cm.

Articles should therefore be submitted

before September to be considered for
publication.

4 cm.

2.5 cm.

Instructions for submission

1. All manuscripts should be

submitted on the understanding that they

are original, unpublished works and are
not also being submitted for publication
elsewhere.

3 cm.

170 ...

3. Authors should submit two

(9) A bibliography or reference

hard copies of their papers and a diskette

list should appear at the end of the text.

or a soft file attachment by e-mail, written

The bibliography must list all authors

in Microsoft Word

cited in the text. Please ensure that dates,

spelling and titles used in the text are

4. The manuscript should have

the following components:

consistent with those listed in the

bibliography. For articles written in Thai,

(1) Article title or topic in

English and in Thai (as appropriate)

works cited that are written in Thai

(2) Authors name in English,

should appear first. The Journal prefers

only (for non-Thai authors) and both Thai

the reference system of the American

and English (for Thai authors). Include

Psychological Association (APA) which

institutional affiliation and contact

can be found at http://www.liu.edu/

information: e-mail address, telephone, and

CWIS/CWP/library/workshop/citapa.htm.

fax.

Books appear before other kinds of

(3) Abstract in Thai and English

materials and each reference should

(Thai manuscripts) or English only (English

contain the author, year of publication,

language manuscripts) of approximately

title, publishers name and town/city in

10-15 lines (Thai) or 100-150 words (English).

which the publisher is located. Please

include the ISBN/ISSN, if any. For

(4) Keywords (about 5 words)

that describe the articles focus.

references quoted in the article, the

(5) Content of about 10-20 pages.

page(s) from which the quotation was

(6) Figures and Tables must

taken must be shown in the corresponding

be numbered and have titles and captions.

entry in the bibliography.

Article should not contain more than

4 pages of figures and tables.

other electronic forms should appear after

(7) C o n c l u s i o n

and

recommendations based on research

findings or discussion, not exceeding
20 lines.

(8) F o o t n o t e s

sequentially numbered.

must

be

(10) References to websites or

references to books and articles.

 4 1 ( 2554) 171

Manuscripts should be submitted

to the Puey Ungphakorn Anti-Corruption

Research Center, Office of the National
Anti-Corruption Commission at the
following address:

Puey Ungphakorn Anti-Corruption

Research Center

Office of the National

Anti-Corruption Commission

361 Nonthaburi Road,

Amphur Muang,

Nonthaburi Province 11000

Thailand

Tel. 66 2281 8421, 0 2281 7126

Fax. 66 2281 7126, 0 2282 7186

E-mail: chintana_plo@nacc.go.th,

chintana589@hotmail.com

172 ...

...
-.......................................................................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................................................
/........................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
/.............................................................................................................................
E-mail........................................................................................................................................................

...

: ...

...

361 -

11000
: . 0 2281 8421, 0 2281 7126 . 0 2281-7126, 0 2282 7186

 4 1 ( 2554) 173

NACC Journal Subscription Form

Name-Last Name.................................................................................................................
Position.................................................................................................................................
Affiliated with......................................................................................................................
Postal Address......................................................................................................................
..............................................................................................................................................
Telephone/Fax.................................................Mobile Phone...............................................
E-mail...................................................................................................................................
Suggestions

In your opinion, what anti-corruption issues should be emphasized in the

NACC Journal? Please list them in order of importance.

Address:



Telephone:
E-mail:

Editorial Board, NACC Journal

Puey Ungphakorn Anti-Corruption Research Center
Office of the National Anti-Corruption Commission
361 Nonthaburi Road, Amphur Muang, Nonthaburi 11000
Tel. 66 2281 8421, 0 2281 7126 Fax. 66 2281 7126, 0 2282 7186
research@nacc.go.th

174 ...

 4 1 ( 2554) 175

176 ...

 4 1 ( 2554) 177

178 ...

 4 1 ( 2554) 179

180 ...