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NACC Journal
ISSN 1906-2087 2 2 2552

165/1 . 10300
66-2207-0171
66-2207-0171
E-mail : nacc_info@nacc.go.th
research@nacc.go.th

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NACC Journal
ISSN 1906-2087 Vol 2 No. 2 : January, 2009

Publisher Research Center

Office of the National Anti - Corruption
Commission
165/1 Pitsaunloke Road, Dusit District,
Bangkok 10300
Telephone : 66-2207-0171
Fax : 66-2207-0171
E-mail : nacc_info@nacc.go.th
research@nacc.go.th
Advisory Board
Professor Dr.Medhi Krongkaew
Professor Dr.Pakdee Pothisiri
Editorial Board
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Kowit Kangsanun Chief Editor
Professor Dr. Vanpen Surarerks
Professor. Dr. Jaturon Thirawat
Asst. Prof. Dr. Dararatt Anantanasuwong
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sirilaksana Khoman
Managerial Board
Mrs. Sirirat Vasuvat
Manager
Mrs. Chintana Ploypatarapinyo Asst. Manager
Mr. Chai Chinnasod
Miss. Patcharee Meensuk
Mrs. Benjawan Yuprapat
Mrs. Sunee Tanusit
Mr. Pichit Khamma
Miss. Suthida Rakkaew
Miss. Kanokwan Taraprab
Miss. Kangamol Bothong

Objectives
To serve as the center for compiling and
disseminating research findings and other
academic works on corruption prevention
and suppression.
To encourage the use of the research findings
and academic works and to enhance public
awareness to collectively counter the
corruption.
To promote collaboration the coordination in
managing research information on countering
corruption among the agencies and researchbased institutions.
To promote the exchange of information and
documents among the concerned agencies and
networks.
Publishing Period
Annual

Views expressed in the articles

published in this Journal exclusively
belong to the authors. and do not
necessarily reflect the official position
of the NACC.


1
:

1
2

11

Should Transparency and Anti-Corruption Movements be

a New ECOTECH Thematic Activity in APEC?
Medhi Krongkaew

17
18

32

.. 2003

47

68

The Political Economy of Corruption: A Philippine Illustration

James Roumasset

79

...

... .. 2542-2551

109
110

... 2552

111

2551

112

...
Call for Papers to be published in the NACC journal

114
116

...

118

1 2551

120

2551

122

...
NACC Journal Subscription Form

131
132

95
96

Part I : special Ariticles

Keynote speaker on Integrity and Ethics in Thai Society:
Obstacle Readiness for Anti-Corruption
Tanin Kraivixien
A Risk Analysis for Corruptino Prevention in PRC:
Lessons Learnded
Pakdee Pothisiri
Part II : Academic Aritcles on Countering Corruption

1
2

11

17

Should Transparency and Anti-Corruption Movement be

a New ECOTECH Thematic Activity in APEC?
Medhi Krongkaew

18

Corruption in Thailand: Results of Survery and Studies

Preparedness of Thailand for Implementation of the
United Nations Convention against Corruption 2003
Swaeng Boonchalermvipas and Terms

47

Action Amounting to Conflict of Interest of a Member of

the House of Representativers and a Senator
Songkhla Vijaykadga and Japan Ratchatathiwat

68

The Political Economy ofCorruption : A Philippine Illustration

James Roumasset

79

Part III : Aritcle Review

Overview Study on Anti-Corruption Strategy for Human Development
In Asia Pacific Region
Paisan Limstit
Part IV : Miscellaneous on NACC from the Editorial Board

95
96

109

- NACCs Research Fund for Budgetary Year 1999-2008

110

- NACCs Research Fund for Budgetary Year 2009

111

- Annual summary of NACC subcommittee works

112

- Call for Papers to be Published in the NACC Journal

116

- NACC Bulletion

118

- Speech Contest Year 2008

120

- Drawing Contest Year 2008

122

- NACC Journal Subscription Form

132

 ...




3

...

:
...
.

.

(APEC) ShouldTransparency and AntiCorruption Movements be a New ECOTECH Thematic Activity in APEC?

.
2540
:
...

.. 2003



The Political Economy of Corruption: A Philippine Illustration

...



-

... ...
2550 - 2551 ... 2552
... 2551 ...
2551
2551
... ...

...
...

 ...
2 2 2552

:

*

*

.. 2003 (UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION UNCAC 2003) 26 2551

.. 2551

 ...
2 2 2552

2






7
1. (Truth)
2. (Honesty)
3. (Sense of duty)
4. (Patience)
5. (Fair play)
6. (Consideration for
others)
7. (Kindness)
7
Integrity
Integrity
1 Integrity


10


(Honesty)

Integrity

3
1.
2.

3.

1.

2.

3.

INTEGRITY

 ...
2 2 2552

( 14) (
16) ( 18) ( 18)
( 23) ( 47)
( 72)

180 ?
80
121
126 141
2
3.6 3.3
3.5

Transparency International

4.
5.

6.

Transparency
International (TI)



Transparency International

10
0
2551
180
5


5

 ...
2 2 2552

.. 2550 279

INTEGRITY

5
:
8. (Gratitude)
9. (Politeness)
10. (Respect for elders)
11. (Promise)
12.
(Public Conscience)
..
2540 77




..
2542
.. 2545

7 - 8

 ...
2 2 2552

 ...
2 2 2552

...

:
...

...

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2 2 2552

96-97
.. 2538
54.6



39.5
11.9
4.7
7.2

 ...
2 2 2552

10 .. 2550 - 2554

 ...
2 2 2552

.. 2003

.. 2003 United Nations Convention against

Corruption - UNCAC 2003

92

...

10

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2 2 2552

could consider to apply to their works in

fighting corruption.

Abstract
China has established a strong institutional framework to fight corruption consistent
with its 2006 ratification of the United
Nations Convention against CorruptionUNCAC. The corruption-prevention body
National Bureau of Corruption PreventionNBCP was newly established as one of
the efforts to accommodate UNCAC. The
Bureau has been assigned the task to develop
methodologies to stem corruptions at their
roots, constantly improve corruption prevention
systems push for the sound operation of these
systems and coordinate corruption prevention
efforts of various departments. NBCP has
adopted the new approach integration risk
analysis with the planning cycle and PDCA
approach at the implementation stage of all
the important projects to prevent and control
corruption from the very beginning. This
approach helps organizations to identify risks
and deal effectively with significant corruption
risks. The pilot project was implemented in six
districts of Beijing with positive progress and
effects and will be extended to cover all
districts next year. NBCPs initiative in the
development of the effective corruption
prevention system is considered the best
practice that other anti-corruption bodies

, NBCP (Nation
Bureau of Corruption Prevention),

(Ministry of Supervision)
22
4

4
14

30,000

* . (Professor Dr.Pakdee Pothisiri) ...

11

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2 2 2552

100

CPI
(Corruption Perception Index)

(Holistic
Approach)
NBCP

1.

(Transnational Crime)

(United Nations Convention against

Anti Corruption - UNCAC) .. 2549

(National
Bureau of Corruption Prevention - NBCP)
.. 2550

2. NBCP

.. 2003
(UNCAC) 6
NBCP

-
(Stakeholders)

NBCP

12

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2 2 2552

3.

... NBCP
2551

(Risk Analysis)
(PDCA)

(Risk) (Probability)
(Adverse
Effect)

NBCP

1. 13

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

13

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4.

3 (Risk Assessment) (Risk Management)

(Risk Communication)

3

(Quantitative)
X





(Qualitative)

(Cost Effectiveness)

on-line

(Risk Communication)

(Stakeholders)


(HIV/AIDS)

14

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2 2 2552

5.
NBCP
...

Chongwen

56

PDCA

Chongwen
3

-
()
-

- (
)

NBCP

(Good Governance)
(Implementation)

PDCA (Plan-Do-Check-Act)

PDCA (Plan-Do-Check-Act)




PDCA

15

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2 2 2552

NBCP

(PDCA)

Chongwen
-
-

Chongwen
NBCP





Chongwen

16


.. 2008 - 2012

6.

16

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2 2 2552

Should Transparency and Anti-Corruption Movements

be a New ECOTECH Thematic Activity in APEC?*
Medhi Krongkaew**

Corruption and Ensuring Transparency in

2004, and the setting of APEC Anti-Corruption
and Transparency Experts Task Force in
2005. As lack of transparency and corruption
are often regarded as obstacles to development
in general, and freer trade and investment in
particular, this new set of activities on transparency and anti-corruption could be seen as a
new ECOTECH thematic activity which could
breathe a new lease on life to this important
but much neglected activity in APEC.

Abstract
Since its establishment in 1998, the SOM
Subcommittee on Economic and Technical
Cooperation (ESC) (which is today renamed
SOM Steering Committee on Economic and
Technical Cooperation or SCE) has tried to set
up a theme for its overall activities but without
much success. Among the list of unsuccessful
activities include ECOTECH Clearing House
project to monitor and coordinate ECOTECH
projects among APEC members, the ECOTECH
Individual Action Plan (ECOTECH IAP) with
an aim for APEC members to learn from one
another on education and human development
policies, and plans to engage international
financial institutions on ECOTECH matters.
A new development took place in 2003,
however. The launch of the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) in
2003 had prompted APEC leaders to include
transparency and anti-corruption movements
among new activities of its members. This has
led, in succession, to the Santiago Commitment
to Fight Corruption and Ensure Transparency,
and APEC Course of Action on Fighting

(APEC SOM Subcommittee on

Economic and Technical Cooperation ESC)
.. 1998

* Earlier version of this paper was presented at the APEC Anti-Corruption Taskforce (ACT) Meeting in Lima, Peru
19 February-3 March 2008.
** Professor Dr. Medhi Krongkaew. Commissioner, National Anti-Corruption Commission of Thailand. Formerly
Founding Director of the Thailand APEC Study Center, Thammasat University, and Chair of APEC SOM Subcommittee on Economic
and Technical Cooperation for 2000 and 2001.

18

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Keywords :
National Anti-Corruption, ECOTECH,
APEC, SOM,

ECOTECH
ECOTECH
(ECOTECH Clearing House)
ECOTECH
(ECOTECH Individual Action Plan)

ECOTECH
.. 2003

(United Nations Convention Against Corruption UNCAC)

(Santiago Commitment)

.. 2004

(APEC Anti-Corruption and Transparency Experts

Task Force APEC - ACT) .. 2005

1. Introduction
Since its difficult inception in 1998, the
economic and technical cooperation or
ECOTECH subcommittee has gone through
many changes in the last decade or so. One of
the first tasks of the ECOTECH Subcommittee
(ESC) was to organize a better system of monitoring and evaluation of hundreds of
ECOTECH projects undertaken by various
economies and working groups, and a better
system of coordination through ECOTECH
Project Clearing House. This was followed
strongly by a successful updating of Part II
of the Osaka Action Agenda and an interesting
trial of human resource development Individual
Action Plan in ECOTECH (or ECOTECH-IAP)
in 2001. Human development and capacity
building activities continued to be observed
in APEC ECOTECH activities for a couple
more years after that, but these activities
seemed to have lost their urgency and currency
in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 events
where anti-terrorism and secure-trade
issues dominated much of APEC attention.
ECOTECH seemed to have lost its way or in
the state of bewilderment. In 2003, however, a
new activity was initiated from the Economic
Leaders Meeting in Bangkok. This is
the proposal to set up APEC Transparency
Standards on Services, Investment, Competition
Law and Policy and Regulatory Reform,
Standards and Conformance, Intellectual
Property, Custom Procedures, Market Access

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and Business Mobility. In 2004, in Santiago,

APEC Leaders have agreed to push forward
the Santiago Commitment to Fight Corruption
and Ensure Transparency, and APEC Course
of Action on Fighting Corruption and Ensuring
Transparency. In 2005, in Seoul, the AntiCorruption and Transparency Experts Task
Force ACT) was set up as a special and unique
study group to concentrate on promoting
transparency and fighting corruption in
APEC. Can this be construed as a new lease
on life for ECOTECH in APEC?
This paper will attempt to trace the
origin of this new Task Force, assess its
potential to create new ideas and new measures
to fight corruption in the conduct of free trade
and investment, and to evaluate the prospects
of its becoming a major new activity in
ECOTECH. In so doing, it hopes to be able to
show that while different levels of economic
development among members may make freer
trade and investment within APEC difficult, at
least transparent and non-corrupted practices
in trade and economic transactions within
and among APEC members could alleviate
those difficulties and lead to faster trade and
investment liberalization within this unique
economic community in Asia and the Pacific.

Thus began the opening statement of

Mr Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the
United Nations on the adoption by the UN
General Assembly of the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption in New York
on October 31, 2003. Mr. Annan went on to
say that this evil phenomenon was found in
all countries, rich and poor, but it hurt the poor
more by diverting funds intended for development to the pockets of corrupt politicians and
public officials, undermining a governments
ability to provide basic services, feeding inequality and injustice. Because corruption is
a key element in economic under-performance,
and a major obstacle to poverty alleviation
and development, the United Nations initiated
an urgent preparation for an international
treaty on fighting corruption within and
among its members, resulting in the above
Convention in 2003.
This was not the first time that the
anti-corruption agreement has been reached by
an international organization or a group of
countries. The World Bank is of course one of
the most distinguished and forceful pushers for
worldwide anti-corruption activities. At the
annual meetings of the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund in October 1996,
for example, Mr. James Wolfensohn, the then
new President of the World Bank labeled
corruption as a cancer on the global economy,
and said that it was time to put teeth into the
World Banks efforts to address it. In the
aftermath of this annual meeting, the Bank
had prepared a report on an integrated anticorruption strategy which was formally
endorsed by the Bank in 1997.1

2. The Origin of the Main Idea

Corruption is an insidious plague that has
a wide range of corrosive effects on societies.
It undermines democracy and the rule o flaw,
leads to violations of human rights, distorts
markets, erodes the quality of life, and allows
organized crime, terrorism and other threats to
human security to flourish.
1

This became known as the 1997 Anti-Corruption Strategy Paper. See World Bank (1997).

20

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Also in 1997, the Organisation for

Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) or a group of worlds industrialized
countries had managed to launch its Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions, and was quickly entered into force in
1999.2 This can be looked upon as the supplyside anti-corruption measures among members
in the hope that when the supply of corruption
is not forthcoming from the rich countries
to public officials in poor countries in their
international business transactions, the demand-side corruption is also not consummated. This Convention has later spawn
several more anti-corruption activities within
OECD, and established concrete links with
other international organizations such as with
the Asian Development Bank in the form of
the ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiatives for
Asia and the Pacific.3
Perhaps the most critical event that
brings about the important status of anticorruption policy frameworks in most countries
and international organizations today is the
successful agreements and launching of the
United Nations Convention Against Corruption
(UNCAC) in October 2003. This Convention
has followed an earlier successful Convention
Against Transnational Organised Crime

UNTOC) which was adopted by the UN

General Assembly in November 2000 and
came into force in September 2003. In fact as
the UNTOC is being ratified to come into force,
preparation work was undertaken by the UN
Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention
in Vienna in January 2002. It took less than
two years for the members to work on, and
agree with, the final draft of this new UNCAC.
After two years of minimum ratification by
members, this Convention came into force in
December 2005.
As can be seen from in the Appendix on
the brief nature and characteristics of UNCAC,
this is a powerful convention if members have
all agreed to follow its provisions. The news
of the impending successful conclusion of this
convention must have reached APEC leaders
during the 2003 APEC Summit in Thailand
because they had stated their endorsement
of APEC Ministers on the enhancement of
transparency to combat corruption. They had
agreed that anti-corruption measures be
vigorously enforced, and where appropriate,
laws, institutions, and structures be strengthened in pursuit of the common goals of APEC.
In 2004, in Chile, the APEC Leaders brought
forth the Santiago Commitment to Fight
Corruption and Ensure Transparency within
the framework of the principles and provisions

Information on this OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and other initiatives on anti-corruption strategies and measures can
be found in the OECD Website <http://www.oecd.org>
3
The first Joint ADB/OECD Workshop on Combating Corruption in Asian and Pacific Economies was held at the ADB
Headquarters in Manila, on September 29, 1999. See ADB/OECD (1999). This is not saying that the ADB has to depend on the
OECD for anti-corruption initiatives. Indeed, the ADB has had its own anti-corruption policy since mid-1990s. In fact the East Asian
Crisis in 1997 had helped strengthened the resolve of the ADB in fighting regional poverty through public good governance and anticorruption. See, for example, ADB (1998).

21

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of the UNCAC. In more details, the APEC

Leaders in this Santiago Commitment4 agreed
to:

Take all appropriate steps towards

ratification of, or accession to, and implementation of the UNCAC;
Strengthen measures to effectively
prevent and fight corruption and ensure
transparency by recommending and assisting
member economies;
Deny safe haven to officials and
individuals guilty of public corruption;
Fight both public and private sector
corruption;
Promote public-private partnerships;
These two important initiatives in 2004
had led to the establishment of the APEC
Anti-Corruption and Transparency Experts
Task Force (ACT) in Korea in 2005. Made up
of law enforcement officials from APEC
member economies, the ACT is tasked to do
the followings:
Implementation of the UNCAC,
Santiago Commitments Against Corruption,
and Course of Action;
Information sharing;
Promotion of mutual legal assistance;
Capacity building in areas of corruption
prevention and prosecution; and
Cooperation on denial of safe haven
for corrupt individuals and embezzled assets.
As a result of the ACT Workshop in
January 2007, participants recognized the
timeliness for issuing APEC best practice
principles for the private sector. This included
the prohibition of bribery and prevention
of illegal payments in the forms of charitable
contributions and gifts, hospitality expenses,
political contributions, financial resources and

Encourage each other to deny safe

haven to officials and individuals guilty of
public corruption, those who corrupt them, and
their assets;
Promote regional cooperation on
extradition, mutual legal assistance and the
recovery and return of proceeds of corruption;
Work towards implementation of
punitive and preventive anti-corruption policies
and practices consistent with the UNCAC,
including those policies and practices necessary
for the proper and effective management of
public affairs and public property;
Intensify individual and joint actions
to fight corruption and ensure transparency,
including cooperation with other multilateral
and regional intergovernmental institutions and
exchange of information on implementation of
domestic anti-corruption commitments;
Develop innovative training, targeted
capacity building and results-oriented technical
assistance to fight corruption and ensure
transparency; and
Implement the APEC Transparency
Standards, a key to both the fight against
corruption and progress on the WTO Doha
Development Agenda.
At the same APEC Ministerial Meeting
in Santiago, Chile in November 2004, APEC
government officials and senior experts had
agreed to set up APEC Course of Action on
Fighting Corruption and Ensuring Transparency.
This Course of Action called for the followings:
4

APEC Ministerial Meeting (2004), Santiago Commitment to Fight Corruption and Ensure Transparency, document no.
2004/AMM/032rev1.

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auditing. While the APEC Business Advisory

Council (ABAC) supports the development
of codes of conduct for the private sector to
improve corporate governance, the ACT is to
explore how to inject the issue with law
enforcement mechanisms. In all, it appears that,
today, the anti-corruption activities in APEC
are now firmly established within APEC
mechanisms and work programs. But how
urgent should this be made a thematic activity5
within the ECOTECH framework in APEC?

Second, even within those APEC members

where corruption problems are not serious or
pose little threat to overall free trade and
investment activities, there may a possibility
that these economies are used as a haven for
safekeeping of corruption proceeds and
other money laundering activities.6 Third, the
disparity within APEC members on the
integrity and corruption levels may inhibit
smooth flows of trade and investment or
create unnecessary trade and investment
disputes.7 After we have discussed the origin
of the main idea to install effective anticorruption measures and policies within
APEC, we want to investigate the existing
situations concerning corruption and its
control or eradication.
Today, there are many organizations
that come up with ways to measure corruption
levels in various societies and settings. First
and foremost, we can look at the acceptance
or ratification of the UNCAC as an indication
of seriousness of corruption problems in
APEC member economies, both on the
supply as well as the demand side. Table 1
shows the number and date of acceptance or
ratification of the UNCAC and its elder sister
convention, the UN Convention Against

3. Corruption Situations and Anti-Corruption Movements in APEC

Briefly speaking, if all APEC members
are not faced with worrying degrees of
corruption within their own economies, then
there is little need for this anti-corruption
initiative to be subsumed under a direct purview
of the ECOTECH Steering Committee. But,
as things stand today, this does not seem to
be the case. As it be shown subsequently,
corruption situations within APEC community
are still serious and beg for greater attention
among APEC leaders. First, many APEC
members are still plagued with serious
corruption problems such that greater APECwide free trade and investment may be affected.
5

Thematic activity is here defined as main activity that is undertaken within direct jurisdiction and control of the SOM
Steering Committee on Economic and Technical Cooperation (SCE) or the previous SOM Subcommittee on Economic and Technical
Cooperation (ESC), not a separate working-group level activity. The importance and attention given to this thematic activity by SOM
leaders is of course much enhanced and more meaningful.
6
Imagine an economy which has adopted a free, market-based approach to financial transactions. Its authority is likely to
be averse to screening incoming and outgoing financial flows. Considering the international cooperation and asset recovery aspects
of the Santiago Commitment which was fashioned after the UNCAC, one can see the reluctance of this APEC economy to fully
accept anything that is legally binding.
7
Again, imagine a case where a trade in an APEC economy is controlled by a monopoly made possible through policy
corruption. Any trading regimes that hurts this monopoly (such as lifting of quotas or trade restrictions) may be effectively objected
by this monopoly.

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Transnational Organised Crime or UNTOC.

It may be seen that, as of the end of 2008,
not all members that are signatories to the
UNTOC (not including Brunei, Hong Kong,
Papua New Guinea, and Chinese Taipei) have
accepted or ratified this convention. Also as
of the end of 2008, Japan, New Zealand,
Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand and
Vietnam who are signatories to the UNCAC
still have not ratified this convention. Many
prominent APEC members will have difficult
tasks at hand to explain why they are still not
accepting these two important Conventions.
Other indications of corruption in
APEC can also show an unpleasant picture.
Here we select two most popular and widely
accepted measures of the level of corruption
in a country or economy to show the corruption
situations in APEC: one is the Corruption
Perception Index (CPI) invented by the
Transparency International (TI), and the
other is the Worldwide Governance Indicator
especially on Control of Corruption invented
by the World Bank.
Table 2 shows the CPIs for APEC in
2007, 2006 and 2005. In 2007, New Zealand
achieved the accolade of being perceived as
the least corrupt country in the world of 163
countries with the CPI score of 9.4 (10 being
the best score of no corruption, and 0 the worst
score of rampant corruption). This is a repeat
of 2006 when New Zealand also ranked first
in the CPI (but with a higher score
of 9.6). Singapore is not far behind at the fourth
rank with a score of 9.3, an improvement from
the fifth rank in 2006. This is followed
by Canada, Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, and
so on. At the bottom of Table 2 lie Papua

New Guinea and Indonesia which were ranked

162 and 143, with the score of 2.0 and 2.3,
respectively. One can immediately see the
disparities in the scores and the ranks of APEC
members. Can these lowly-ranked APEC
members find effective ways to get rid of their
corruption? Can the highly-ranked APEC
members offer any effective assistance? This
is a question that APEC leaders must try to
answer.
Table 3 gives another picture of corruption in APEC. Here the World Bank gives
Singapore the first rank ahead of New Zealand
with the Control of Corruption score of 99.0
(out of the full mark of 100 percentile for all
countries in the world, not just within APEC).
New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Hong Kong,
cluster around the top ranks as economies with
effective control over corruption. At the bottom
in 2006, we still see the same two economies
as in the Transparency Internationals CPIs.
The same corruption spread and disparities
are repeated.
Finally, Table 4 shows the trend of
corruption in Asia from 2004 to 2006 by
a well known business consulting firm based
in Hong Kong called the Political and
Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC). But
this time, the methodology is different. PERC
now assesses the size of political and
economic risk as a result of corruption in
each selected East Asian country with score
ranging from zero being the lowest risk and
10 the highest risk. Here Singapore has the
best rank with the score of 1.30 in 2006.
The relative corruption trend has increased
in Singapore between 2004 and 2006 but this
is still extremely small, and does not translate

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Table 1 : Signatories and Ratifications of UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime

and UN Convention Against Corruption in APEC, as of 17 December 2008
UNTOC

UNCAC

State or Economy

Signature

Ratification

Signature

Ratification

Australia
Brunei
Canada
Chile
China
Hong Kong
Indonesia
Japan
Korea
Malaysia
Mexico
New Zealand
Papua New Guinea
Peru
Philippines
Russia
Singapore
Chinese Taipei
Thailand
US

13/12/00

27/5/04

9/12/03

7/12/05

25/3/08

11/12/03

2/12/08

14/12/00

13/5/02

21/5/04

2/10/07

13/12/00

29/11/04

11/12/03

13/9/06

12/12/00

23/9/03

10/12/03

13/1/06

12/12/00

18/12/03

19/9/06

12/12/00

9/12/03

13/12/00

10/12/03

27/3/08

Vietnam

13/12/00

26/9/02

24/9/04

9/12/03

17/9/08

13/12/00

4/3/03

10/12/03

20/7/04

14/12/00

19/7/02

10/12/02
22/12/03

16/7/07

14/12/00

23/1/02

10/12/03

16/11/04

14/12/00

28/5/02

9/12/03

8/11/06

12/12/00

26/5/04

10/12/03

9/5/06

13/12/00

28/8/07

11/11/05

13/12/00
13/12/00

9/12/03
3/11/05

9/12/03

30/10/06

10/12/03

Source: Compiled from <http://www.unodc.org>

into any meaningful indication of worsening
corruption situations. Other countries are
performing as expected.

situations in APEC are still very important for

the smooth functioning of the overall APEC
community. We have already mentioned above
that the involvement of APEC through the

4. Concluding Remark: Can Anti-Corruption

Initiatives be a New Focus in ECOTECH
Activities?
The above account should suffice
to demonstrate that corruption issues and

Santiago Commitment and APEC Course of

Action on Anti-Corruption procedures
follows the action path of the UNCAC. It is,
therefore, in the interest of each APEC

25

 ...
2 2 2552

or an independent organization, or part of the

legislative and judiciary branch of government.
The Transparency International is already
supporting the preparation of the National
Integrity System (NIS) Report of each country.
This Report can be used to make overall plan
to tackle corruption issues and create efficient
and honest public services system in the

member (or UN member for that matter) to

explore the possibility of accepting, or
adopting, or ratifying the UNCAC. Each
country in APEC already has one or more line
agencies that deal with corruption issues both
on the curative and preventive or promotional
levels. These anti-corruption agencies can
be a part of governments executive branch,

Table 2: Corruption Perception Indices for APEC. 2005 and 2006

Rank in

Score

Rank in

2007

Score

2006

Rank in

Score

2005

New Zealand
Singapore
Canada
Australia
Hong Kong
Japan
USA
Chile
Chinese Taipei (Taiwan)
Korea
Malaysia
China
Mexico
Peru
Thailand
Vietnam
Philippines
Russia
Indonesia
Papua New Guinea

1
4
9
11
14
17
20
22
34
43
43
72
72
72
84
123
131
143
143
162

9.4
9.3
8.7
8.6
8.3
7.5
7.2
7.0
5.7
5.1
5.1
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.3
2.6
2.5
2.3
2.3
2.0

1
5
14
9
15
17
20
20
34
42
44
70
70
70
63
111
121
121
130
130

9.6
9.4
8.5
8.7
8.3
7.6
7.3
7.3
5.9
5.1
5.0
3.3
3.3
3.3
3.6
2.6
2.5
2.5
2.4
2.4

5
5
14
9
15
21
17
21
32
40
39
78
65
65
59
107
117
126
137
130

9.6
9.4
8.4
8.8
8.3
7.3
7.6
7.3
5.9
5.0
5.1
3.2
3.5
3.5
3.8
2.6
2.5
2.4
2.2
2.3

Memo items:
Colombia

68

3.8

59

3.9

55

4.0

Ecuador

150

2.1

138

2.3

117

2.5

Source: Transparency International

26

 ...
2 2 2552

country. By raising these issues among peers

in such organization as APEC, they serve to
raise awareness among those members whose
integrity status is still having some problems.
The more the problems are being discussed,
the better the stimulus for the government or
the society to solve these problems. The APEC
community is already doing this.
Special observations should be made
on the change regarding emphasis on anticorruption movements in two economies in
APEC: China and Indonesia. These are the two
largest APEC economies in East Asia, with
similar corruption levels and problems as
shown by the CPIs and the Control of Corruption index in the Worldwide Governance
Indicators. Perhaps because the situations
regarding corruption in these two countries do
not look so pleasing, their leaders have decided
to pay more attention to these corruption
issues wherever and whenever they can. For
example, in contrast to many more developed
economies in APEC, China and Indonesia were
two of the three East Asian countries (with
Philippines being the third country) that have
already ratified the UNCAC (China on 13
January 2006, and Indonesia on 19 September
2006). At the 2006 Annual Conference of the
Parties to the UNCAC in Dead Sea, Jordan
in December 2006, China and Indonesia had
sent in one of the largest delegations to attend
this meeting. Indonesia then volunteered to
organize the 2007 Conference in Indonesia
in late 2007. China itself has shown an equally
keen interest in combating corruption. At the
end of the 2006 Annual National Peoples
Congress in Beijing in March 2007, Chinas
Prime Minister, Wen Jia Bao, had made a

statement emphasizing the needs for more

reforms to fight corruption, especially corruption at the highest official levels. Both China
and Indonesia can play an equally important
role in APEC as champions or advocates of
anti-corruption movements in APEC.
But it may not be enough for corruptionprone economies to be doing this by themselves. These less developed economies may
need to know best practices on counter
corruption tactics before they plunge into
serious anti-corruption efforts. These best
practices are already being offered by more
developed APEC members to fellow colleagues.
For example, the Independent Commission
Against Corruption (ICAC) of Hong Kong and
the State of New South Wales in Australia are
helping APEC members who are seeking
technical assistance on either legal aspects of
tackling corruption problems, investigative
techniques to criminalize corruption culprits,
research procedures to understand behaviour
of the people on corruption issues, and
effective ways to engage the community and
the people at large in helping the organization
to fight corruption. Perhaps by upgrading these
interests in APEC setting from task force or
working group level to centrally-managed,
APEC-wide level of attention by the SOM
leaders themselves, the overall success and
achievement at combating corruption in the
region may be much higher.
At the 2006 APEC Ministerial Meeting
in Hanoi, APEC Ministers already endorsed
APEC 2006 key deliverables on Prosecuting
Corruption, Strengthening Governance and
Promoting Market Integrity and encouraged
member economies to take actions to realize

27

 ...
2 2 2552

Table 3: Worldwide Governance Indicator (Control of Corruption)

in APEC (and PECC) 2002 to 2005
Rank in
2005
2005
Singapore
1
99.0
New Zealand
2
98.5
Australia
3
95.1
Canada
4
94.1
Hong Kong
5
92.1
United States
6
91.6
Chile
7
89.7
Japan
8
85.2
Taiwan
9
70.9
Korea, South
10
69.0
Malaysia
11
64.5
Brunei
12
63.1
Colombia
13
53.2
Thailand
14
51.2
Mexico
15
43.8
Peru
16
40.9
Philippines
17
37.4
China
18
30.5
Russia
19
28.1
Vietnam
20
26.6
Ecuador
21
24.6
Indonesia
22
21.2
Papua New Guinea
23
12.8
Source: Adapted from <http://www.info.worldbank.org/governance>

28

2004
99.5
99.0
94.6
93.6
92.2
92.6
89.7
86.8
74.0
59.3
64.7
68.6
49.0
48.0
49.5
45.1
34.8
33.3
24.5
23.0
26.0
15.2
16.7

2003
99.0
98.5
93.6
95.1
91.2
92.6
86.3
84.8
73.5
64.2
68.1
62.7
41.2
47.1
53.9
49.0
42.2
38.7
24.0
31.4
24.5
13.2
17.2

2002
99.5
99.0
94.1
95.6
90.7
92.6
91.2
85.8
75.0
67.2
66.7
65.7
35.8
46.6
49.5
49.0
34.8
42.6
15.7
31.4
12.3
6.9
25.0

 ...
2 2 2552

In 2008 when Peru hosted the APEC Summit,

the APEC Ministers endorsed the implementation of the APEC Code of Conduct for
Business in small and medium enterprise
sectors, and the Lima Anti-corruption
Declaration on Financial Markets Integrity
and the APEC Guidelines for Public-Private
Actions against Corruption. There is a good
sign that the status of the ACT may be elevated
from a taskforce to a new APEC working group.
But, as we have alluded to earlier, this is still
not enough. Important issue like transparency
and anti-corruption efforts and initiatives
should be promoted to the level of thematic
activity of the, now, SOM Steering Committee
on Economic and Technical Cooperation
(SCE).

Table 4: The Trend of Corruption in Asia

2004 to 2006
Economy
2006
2005
2004
China
7.58
7.68
7.48
Hong Kong
3.13
3.50
3.60
India
6.76
8.63
8.90
Indonesia
8.16
9.10
9.25
Japan
3.01
3.46
3.00
Korea
5.44
6.50
6.67
Malaysia
6.13
6.80
7.33
Philippines
7.80
8.80
8.33
Singapore
1.30
0.65
0.50
Taiwan
5.91
6.15
6.10
Thailand
7.64
7.20
7.80
Vietnam
7.91
8.65
8.71
Note: Grades range from 0 to 10, 0 being the best
grade possible, and 10 the worst.
Source: Political and Economic Risk Consultancy
(PERC), Hong Kong

References
ADB.1998. Anticorruption: Our Framework
Policies and Strategies, Manila: ADB.
ADB/OECD.1999. Combating Corruption in
Asian and Pacific Economies, papers
presented at the Joint ADB-OECD
Workshop on Combating Corruption in
Asian and Pacific Economies, in Manila,
29 September-1 October 1999.
ADB/OECD.2005. Knowledge Commitment
Action Against Corruption in Asia and
the Pacific, papers presented at the 5th
Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative for
Asia and the Pacific, in Beijing, 28-30
September 2005.
ADB/OECD.2006. Anti-Corruption Policies
in Asia and the Pacific: Progress in
Legal and Institutional Reform in 25
Countries.

their commitments. At the same time,

Ministers also encouraged the APEC AntiCorruption Task Force to strengthen cooperation with other international and regional
organizations, as appropriate, particularly
with the United Nations, the World Bank,
the Asian Development Bank (ADB), OECD,
INTERPOL, Financial Action Task Force and
the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering
(APG) on their anti-corruption initiatives in
the Asia Pacific region. In 2007, the APEC
Ministerial Meeting in Sydney endorsed
a model of Code of Conduct for Business,
a model Code of Conduct Principles for Public
Officials and complementary Anti-Corruption
Principles for the Private and Public Sectors.

29

 ...
2 2 2552

Schultz, Jessica.2007. You Can Stop Corruption the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption: A Primer for
Development Practitioners, U4Brief,
Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI).
World Bank.1997. World Development Report
1997, Washington DC.

governmental organizations and other bodies

of the civil society.
On criminalization of corruption, the
Convention requires countries to establish
criminal and other offences to cover a wide
range of acts of corruption, if these are not
already crimes under domestic laws. This
Convention goes beyond criminalizing basic
forms of corruption such as bribery and
embezzlement of public funds to include
trading in influence and laundering of the
proceeds of corruption. This Convention also
deals with problematic areas of private-sector
corruption.
On international cooperation, countries
have agreed to cooperate with one another on
the prevention, investigation and the prosecution of offenders. Countries are bound to render specific forms of mutual legal assistance
in gathering and transferring evidence for use
in court, to extradite offenders. Countries are
also required to undertake measures which
will support the tracing, freezing, seizure and
confiscation of the proceeds of corruption.
On asset recovery, this is considered a
major breakthrough in anti-corruption
measures. Intensive negotiations were involved
before reaching agreement on this chapter as
the needs of countries seeking the illicit assets
had to be reconciled with the legal and
procedural safeguards of the countries whose
assistance is sought. It is believed that
effective asset-recovery provisions will support
the efforts of countries to redress the worst
effects of corruption while sending a message
to corrupt officials that there will be no place
to hide their illicit assets. Article 43 obliges

Appendix :
United Nations Convention Against
Corruption (UNCAC) in a Nutshell
On accepting or adopting or ratifying the
71 articles in this UNCAC, such member will
be bound by the legal obligations contained in
the Convention. In a nutshell, this convention
contains five important components of
anti-corruption procedures, namely corruption
prevention, criminalization of corrupt practices,
international cooperation measures, asset
recovery agreements, and technical assistance
and information exchange.
On corruption prevention, the Convention
dedicates an entire chapter to this first issue
of anti-corruption procedures. Prevention
techniques include the establishment of anticorruption bodies and enhanced transparency
in the financing of election campaigns and
political parties. States are required to make sure
that public services are subject to safeguards
that promote efficiency, transparency and
recruitment based on merit. And once recruited,
public servants should be subject to codes of
conduct, requirements for financial and other
disclosures, and appropriate disciplinary
measures. Preventing public corruption also
requires an effort from all members of society
at large meaning active involvement of non-

30

 ...
2 2 2552

state parties to extend the widest possible

cooperation to each other in the investigation
and prosecution of offences defined in the
Convention.
On technical assistance and information
exchange, the Convention includes provisions
on training, material and human resources,
research and information sharing. Training
could be considered for topics such as
investigative methods, the planning and
development of strategic anti-corruption
policies, preparing requests for mutual legal
assistance, public financial management, and
methods used to protect victims and witness
in criminal cases.
Of course state parties have to the rights
to specify specific articles in the Convention that
they will not accept or agree. For example, many
countries do not agree to be abide by Article
66 which requires the settlement of disputes
through the International Court of Justice.
Source: Adapted from information provided in
http://www.unodc.org/unodc crime_convention_
corruption_background.html See also Schultz
(2007)

31

 ...
2 2 2552

: *
Corruption in Thailand: Results of Survey and Studies
**

survey on corruption in the public sector of

Thailand in the 1990s and early 2000s. The
picture of corruption at government offices
which provided households with utilities and
services was relatively small in scale and
extent. But corruption was large at offices
which had a role in monetary transaction
including land tax, customs and the courts.
There was a major problem of corruption in
the political system. Vote-buying at election
time was rampant. Buying of important public
position existed. Most people knew of the
problems. Anti-corruption organizations should
focus their attention on the offices with known
problems. Research studies and surveys which
provide the overall picture of levels and
patterns of corruption can be a tool to monitor
corruption problems. It should be carried out
on a regular basis, say every 10 years.

2540

10

,
,
, ,
,

Abstract
The author and the research team at the
Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University carried out many research studies and

*
... 7-8 .. 2543
**

32

 ...
2 2 2552

2540

2540

(.. 2551)

10

1.

()

33

 ...
2 2 2552

2.


2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4


(conflicts of interests)

2.5 (
)

3.
2

3.1

430
.. 2540 (2541)
1
5
(1) (2)

(3) (4)
(5)

430
10 (.. 2540)
422



5
( 2)

34

 ...
2 2 2552

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
7
7
10
10
12
13
13
15
15
15
18
18
18
21

21
21
24

: (2541)

35

90
62
23
22
15
11
9
9
9
7
7
6
5
5
4
4
4
3
3
3
2

20.9
14.4
5.3
5.1
3.5
2.6
2.1
2.1
2.1
1.6
1.6
1.4
1.2
1.2
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.5

2
2
17
99
430

0.5
0.5
4.0
23.0
100

 ...
2 2 2552

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

3 10

(/)

60,793
29,445

19,757

11,121
6,247

4,400

1,686

837

780

1.
2.
3.
4.
()
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.

10.

: (2543)

(2543)

4
5

: (2543)

4,013 .. 2542 (
2543)


3
() (
8)

1.
6.
2.
7.
3.
8.
4. 9.
5.
10.
: (2543)

36

 ...
2 2 2552

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

2524-2530
2532-2533
569
710
217
249
251
242
67
77
83
74
64
71
72
67
45
42
17
23
15
20
12
18
12
17
3
4
5
4

2541-2542
268
151
168
50
19
35
25
19
9
9
10
0.5
7

: ..., ...


.

2540


( ) ( )

3.2

(...),
(...)
(.)

... ...
2524 2542
( 5) 3
100

20

37

 ...
2 2 2552

6 .
()1
:
/
2530
2531
2532
2533

0.02
0.06
0.19
0.20

32.65
14.74
21.84
39.14

0.00
0.06
1.85
1.68

0.11
0.00
1.24
0.45

0.15
0.15
18.27
11.89

0.80
3.38
10.87
9.03

0.00
0.01
0.08
0.12

6.50
5.09
8.25
6.99

0.02
0.48
0.20
0.02

0.00
0.12
0.89
1.29

1.08
2.50
12.12
8.17

1.33
0.16
7.25
6.14

0.26
0.00
42.17
30.58

4.50
1.16
0.18
3.91

47.49
27.99
123.07
119.67

0.09
2.92
1.43
0.68

4.14
1.78
0.88
2.29

0.01
0.10
0.19
0.17

6.01
0.23
8.28
52.72
2

5.11
45.68

5.84

108.72
78.72
131.84
175.50
: .

2
2532 2533

38

 ...
2 2 2552

()

5 5 ( 2)

6 2550
(1.7) (1.7) (1.6) (1.5)
(1.4) (1.4)



2540 (2543)
4.1
10

1,000 /
4.2 31

4.3 430
.. 2540 63

1-20
4.4 422
.. 2542
(2543) 79


52

25

23

4.

(Transparency International
TI)
.. 2538 Corruption
Perception Index CPI

10



12 .. 2538-2550
2.79 .. 2538
3.8 .. 2549 3.3 .. 2550
92 180
6
.. 2550 (9.4) (9.4)
(9.3) (9.3) (9.3)
(9.2)

3

4 .. 2551
913
( . 12 2551)

39

 ...
2 2 2552

4.5

.. 2543

7
4.6

(. , 2543) 597


261 2
4.6.1
4
4.6.2

5.3
(focus group) 85 .. 2536
( 2537)

5.3.1

()
()
()

5.3.2

()
()

(1)


(2)
(3)

5.

5.1 4,013
(2543)
..

5.2
(2543)
4

.. 2536
( 2537 : 5)
20 2533 ...

40

 ...
2 2 2552

30 - 50%

+ BOQ

Specification

1
(Vote) 1

()

15%

//
/

7% - 30%

: .. 2543

41

20,000 5%
40,000 - 0.1%
40,000 /
5,000 - 40,000 /
5,000 - 20,000 /
3% - 5%
5%
2%
5 - 10%

1
5,000 - 10,000 /
20,000 - 40,000 /

10%
1 - 2
( 1,000 )

 ...
2 2 2552

6.2

(2537)


(..2500-2506)
- (..
2507-2516)
(.. 2531-2533)
604, 600 1,900
(GDP)
0.14
2 0.05 0.04
( , 2537):
7 196)5

(2537 : 185)

6.
6.1
(O.E.G. Johnson, 1975)

(
)

(...) .. 2534
.. 2534 . (, 2537 :
456-467)

42

 ...
2 2 2552

7.

(1)





(2)
(3)

(4)
6 (5)

(6)





(2543)


1 3 30
2 3 70

... ..
61, 57 20

20-40

(..
2541)
( )

()

( , 2545)

43

 ...
2 2 2552

...

..
( 1)
1

...

..

..

( 7)

8.

8.1

8.2
7

, 2543.

44

8.3

8.3.1
-

7

-

 ...
2 2 2552

-


8.3.2
-

...

- ...

?
-

?
?

9.4

10
9.5

. 2537

,
2537.
, ,
. 2541.

.

, 2541.
, ,
. 2543.
:


.. 2543

9. :

( ,
2543)
9.1

10





9.2


9.3

45

 ...
2 2 2552

2543
, ,
. 2543.

.. 2543

2543
. 2543.

13-14 2543
O.E.G. Johnson. 1975. An Economic Analysis of
Corrupt Government, With Special Application to Less Developed Countries, Kyklos,
Vol. 28, 1975, pp. 47-61.

2543
, ,
, ,
,
. 2545. ,

... .. 2545.
, ,
,
. 2543

,
2543.
. 2543

.. 2543





2543
. 2543
:

.. 2543

46

 ...
2 2 2552

.. 2003*
Preparedness of Thailand for Implementation of the
United Nations Convention against Corruption 2003
**
***

..

(.)
19 2550
3

Abstract
Thailand signed the United Nations
Convention against Corruption (2003) and
is now, during the process to become a
State Party to this Convention as per the
resolution made by the National Legislative
Assembly (NLA) on 19 December 2007
in accordance with a resolution of the

*
.. 2003 .
2551 ( ...)
**
***

47

 ...
2 2 2552

Cabinet to approve three relevant draft

Acts, enabling the implementation of the
obligations under this Convention, before
becoming one of the State Parties to this
Convention.
However, the public authorities of
Thailand need to, in unity, cooperate with
each other and should make the Office
of the National Anti-Corruption Commission
(Office of NACC) a central authority
according to this Convention as well as
focusing more on the prevention of corruption
than in the past. Laws and measures to
prevent the interference from the government
or the politicians and to prevent the conflicts
of interest of public officials attached to
the law enforcement authorities especially
the public prosecutors are needed to be
established. Good governance in the private
sector needs to be promoted as well as
promoting the prevention of and the
fight against corruption by the civil society
sector and non-governmental organizations
and supporting freedom of the press. These
are important factors for success in dealing
with the problems of corruption in Thailand.

.. 2003

.. 2003 (United Nations Convention against
Corruption-UNCAC, 2003)
9 - 11 2546
14
.. 2548 (.. 2005)

, ,
, ,
, ,
, UNCAC 2003, United Nations
Convention against Corruption (2003)

48

 ...
2 2 2552

128 1

9 2546

UNCAC

UNCAC

1.2
(Chapter 3 Criminalization
and Law Enforcement)

(bribery in the private sector)

(trading in
influence) (illicit enrichment)
(embezzlement of
property in the private sector)
(laundering of proceeds
of crime)

1.
.. 2003 (UNCAC)


.. 2003 (
UNCAC)

UNCAC
4
1.1 (Chapter 2
Preventive Measures)

1

www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html ( 28 2551)

49

 ...
2 2 2552

(concealment)
(obstruction of justice)

1.3
(Chapter 4 International Cooperation)

(mutual legal assistance)

(extradition)

double dual criminality

1.4 (Chapter
5 Asset Recovery)

(value based)

2.
UNCAC

..2003
(UNCAC) 9 2546

4 2550


.. 2003

(reservation)
In accordance with Paragraph 3 of Article 66 of
the convention, Thailand does not consider itself
bound by Paragraph 2 of the same Article.2
66 3 UNCAC
66 2

/
.. .

50

 ...
2 2 2552

(defeat the object and purpose

of a treaty)3

(.)
UNCAC
19 2550

3

1. ...
(







)
3

2. ...
.. 2535 (


)
3.
.. ....

UNCAC

(flexibility)

3

UNCAC

(Chapter 3 Criminalization and law
enforcement), (Chapter
4 International Cooperation)
(Chapter 5 Asset Recovery)

(Chapter 2 Preventive
Measures)

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Article 18

51

 ...
2 2 2552

2)

3. :
4

UNCAC 4
, ,

(Common Law)

(Civil Law)

4

1)

3)

4)

5)

52

UNCAC

(whistleblower protection law)

,
(Freedom of
Information Act)

 ...
2 2 2552

6)

(Organization
for Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentOECD) (Organization of
American States-OAS)

(Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: FCPA)

(Special Prosecutor or Independent Counsel)
Independent Counsel
Ethics in Government Act of 1978 and the Ethics
in Government Act

Public Bodies Corrupt
Practices Act 1889

Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 Serious
Crime Act 2007


UNCAC
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002
(valuedbased)

(property based)
UNCAC

(Serious Organised
Crime Agency-SOCA)
(Suspicious Activities
Reports-SAR)

53

 ...
2 2 2552

...
)

, OECD
UNCAC

(the Rule
of Law)

)




3 ,

civil ombudsmen 1980
civil watchdogs

54

 ...
2 2 2552

(Integrity) 5

(the
Rule of Law)
UNCAC

(mega project)

UNCAC
OECD

4.

UNCAC



.. 2003 (United
Nations Convention against Corruption-UNCAC,
2003 - UNCAC)

(Transparency International)
(Corruption Perceptions Index - CPI) .. 2007 (.. 2550) 84
.. 2549 ( 63), .. 2548 ( 59), .. 2547 ( 64) (
)
5
Integrity

Integrity strength and firmness of character, uncompromising adherence

to a code of moral values moral uprightness
Integrity integer wholeness ,
Integrity
: Stephen L. Carter, Integrity (New York: Basic Books, 1996), p. 7.
, ( :
.., 2547, 13.

55

 ...
2 2 2552

1.

(


)
UNCAC
(International Regimes)
UNCAC

(norms)

OECD

UNCAC

(.) 19
2550

UNCAC

56

 ...
2 2 2552

(monitoring system) (enforcement)
UNCAC

OECD, AU,
OAS, APEC

(Trans-regional
Cooperation)

(Interpol), (World Bank),
(ADB)





APEC
-

UNCAC

(International)
(Transnational)

(dynamics)

(social space)


(International Non-Governmental Organizations:
INGOs)

UNCAC





APEC
ASEAN



(ASEAN Community)
(Toward ASEAN
Way of Integrity)
(Toward Thai Way of Integrity)

57

 ...
2 2 2552

2.
( 43 - 50)

(safe haven)

2.1

(mandatory)

2.1.1
UNCAC

14

UNCAC

2.1.2
aut de dere aut judicare6

UNCAC

42 3 44 11
aut de
dere aut judicare
2.1.3
Dual Criminality Double
Criminality7 UNCAC 43


... .. 2551 12



2.2

Legislative guide for the implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption by United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime Division for Treaty Affairs (New York: United Nations, 2006), pp. 155, 157.
7
(Dual Criminality)

.. 2551 7

58

 ...
2 2 2552

2



2

2.2.1 UNCAC
2
1)

(recognition of foreign
judgment)

2)

2.2.2

(assets sharing)

3.

3.1 (
5 - 14)

(1)
( 5 - 6)
1)

59

 ...
2 2 2552

(...)
..
2550 246
2)
..., ...

(2)
( 8)
1)
...

...
...
7

2)
.

.

3)

(3)
( 11)
1)

27 28

2)

3)

4)
.. 2550

60

 ...
2 2 2552

5)

6)

(4)
( 12)
1)

2)





(whistleblower protection law)

...

3)

4)
.. 2540

5)

6)

61

 ...
2 2 2552

3.2
(
15 - 42)

UNCAC
3

(1)
( 15 - 17)
1)

(2) ,
(
18 - 20)
1)

.. 2542

( 75
)
2)

(Universalrechtsgut)

(3) ,
( 29 - 31)
1)
.. 2550



CTX
2)

62

 ...
2 2 2552

2.1

.
.

2.2

...

2.3

2.4

State Capture

3)

63

 ...
2 2 2552

3.3 (

51 - 59)

(proceeds of crime) 2
1) (value based) 2)
(property
based)

UNCAC

3.3.1 5

UNCAC

.. 2535

3.3.2

Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA)

financial intelligence unit (FIU)

( .) .

...

3.3.3

64

 ...
2 2 2552

UNCAC
(property based)

3.3.4

3.3.5

3.3.6

4.

4.1

( ...)

UNCAC

(action plan)


...

(1)

(2)

(3)

65

 ...
2 2 2552

(4)


4.2

,
, ,
,

(corporate governance)

4.3
4.3.1






UNCAC

4.3.2

4.4
4.4.1
watchdog

4.4.2
(investigative reporting)

4.4.3

4.4.4

4.4.5

4.5

66

 ...
2 2 2552

,
( :

.., 2547, 13.
2551



.. 2003

(
...)
Legislative guide for the implementation of the United
Nations Convention against Corruption
by United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
Division for Treaty Affairs (New York:
United Nations, 2006), pp. 155, 157.
www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/
signatories.html ( 28
2551)

.. 2003
...

67

 ...
2 2 2552

Action Amounting to Conflict of Interest of a Member

of the House of Representatives and a Senator
*
**

(Terminology)

1.

41 ..
2535 612
.. 2518

*
**
1
4
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

68

 ...
2 2 2552

2.
()3

259

( 1)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)

2
61
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)

3

( 481/2535)

69

 ...
2 2 2552

3.
5/25434
109 (11)
2540 (
102 (11)
2550 )

1.
2.

3.

4.

1 4

5

266

5

1.
2.
3. (...)
4.
5. (..)
6.
7.
8.
9. (... )
10. (... )
11. (... )
12. (... )
13. (... )
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

70

 ...
2 2 2552

(...
... )

.. 2522

.. 2534

.. 2539

297/25446

( 5)
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
6
208

71

 ...
2 2 2552

1.


123/25517
98
.. 2535

265
(1) 9

2517
2534
2540
265 (1) 10

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)
(6)
(7)

(8)
(9)

9

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)
10
9,
8

72

 ...
2 2 2552

6112
.. 2518

10213
(8)

10614(5) (6)

265 (1)
106 (6)11

265 (1)

265 (1)

11

106
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4) 101
(5) 102
(6) 265 266

12
2,
13
102
(1)
(2)

73

 ...
2 2 2552

102
265


265

106 (5)
(6)
116 15

2.

102 (11) 16




115 (8)17

( 13)
(3) 100 (1) (2) (4)
(4)
(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)

(13) 263
(14) 274
14
11,
15
116

16
13,

17
115

(8) 102 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(11) (12) (13) (14)

74

 ...
2 2 2552

102 (11)

106 (5)18
119 (4)19

3.

265 20

265

110 21
2540

18

11,
119

(4) 115

20

(1)

21
110
(1)

19

75

 ...
2 2 2552

3



(6)
2 (4)22

265



(Principe de Separation des Pouvoirs)
200

22

2(4)

23
184

76

 ...
2 2 2552

184 23

17124

177 25

2540

2540
265(1) 265 26
2550
110 (1) 110 27
2540

2540
10

24

171

172

25
177

26
20,
27
21,

77

 ...
2 2 2552

(Code
electoral)




.. 2550

.. 2550

78

 ...
2 2 2552

The Political Economy of Corruption:

A Philippine Illustration*
James Roumasset**
Abstract

()




3 .. 1973
.. 1998

This essay explores the nature, causes,

and consequences of corruption as it pertains
to entire regimes. Grand corruption is modeled
as the type of unproductive rent-seeking at the
highest levels of government. The economic
costs of corruption are assumed to increase in
the decentralization (and relaxation) of its
governance, increase convexly in the percentage
extracted, and decreasing in the opportunities
for productive rent-seeking. Combining these
assumptions with the benefits of corruption
yields the results that optimal corruption
revenues are increasing in greed of the regime
and in economic opportunities but that the
economic costs of corruption may be highest
in the least avaricious regime. The theory is
illustrated with a stylized account of corruption
in three Philippine administrations, from
1973-1998. Policy implications are discussed,
including the role of the economist in making
corruption less attractive.

Keywords: Corruption, Philippines, Kleptocracy

*This paper was originally drafted for the Western Economics Association International meetings in Seattle, July 1997,
and was issued as University of Hawaii at Manoa Working Paper 97-10 under the title, The Political Economy of Corruption.
Thanks to Lee Endress and Roger Blair for helpful discussions, Majah-Leah Ravago for research and editorial assistance, and to an
anonymous referee for constructive comments. All remaining errors are my responsibility
** Professor at the Department of Economics, University of Hawaii, Manoa, and Environmental Director for University
of Hawaii Economic Research Organization. Saunders 542,2424 Maile Way, Honolulu, Hi 96822 USA. E-mail : jimr@hawaii.edu

79

 ...
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usefully regarded as part of the same thirdbest theory of government (Dixit, 1996), also
known as political economy.
The purpose of the present paper is to
extend the theory of corruption and imbed it in
a more general political economy, To dramatize
the theoretical points, I provide a stylized
account of corruption in three Philippine
administrations, from 1973-19982. Inasmuch
as hard evidence about corruption at the
highest levels of government is generally
unavailable, these accounts should be
regarded as perceptions and common allegations, not fact.

1. Introduction
Corruption, according to Rose-Ackerman
(1996, p.365), occurs when officials use
their positions of public trust for private gain.
It is are extralegal institution used by
individuals or groups to gain influence over
the bureaucracy (Leff, 1964, p.8). That is,
corruption involves transactions, typically
between private parties and public officials,
designed to manipulate the machinery of
government. It may be of the permissionseeking type (quotas, licenses, permits,
passports, and visas), the enforcement
avoiding type (tax evasion, illegal pollution)
or the competition-harassing type.
Corruption is closely associated with
bribery that has been recognized since the 15
century B.C. as a gift that perverts judgment
(Noonan, 1984, p.12). Most of the literature
on corruption and bribery is implicitly applied
to lower level public officers (e.g. Mocan,
2008).1 This essay explores the nature, causes,
and consequences of corruption as it pertains
to entire regimes what Rose-Ackerman (1996,
1997) calls grand corruption or kleptocracy,
including high level manipulation of
policies and projects. We shall see that grand
corruption is similar to rent-seeking at the
highest levels of government and may be

2. Lessons from the Philippines:Marcos era

A stereotypical account of corruption in
the Philippines may be used to clarify and
extend Shleifer and Vishnys (1993, hereafter
referred to as S-V) theory of corruption. In
the Marcos regime, corruption was highly
centralized. Imported goods, for example, were
routinely seized and bribes paid to expedite
their timely release and facilitate lower duties.
Such operations had the tacit approval of higher
authorities who were repaid with both bribe
shares and political support.
Not only did the centralization of
corruption permit both higher bribe collection

Because an increase in perceived corruption in a country is thought to be associated with a slower rate of economic
growth (Mauro 1995), a sizable literature has emerged recently to examine factors that impact the level of corruption across
countries. For example, Ades and DiTella (1999) found that corruption is higher in countries where domestic firms are sheltered
from foreign competition. Graeff and Mehlkop (2003) documented the relationship between a countrys economic freedom and its
level of corruption. Brunetti and Weder (2003) found that a higher freedom of the press is associated with less corruption. Van
Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) showed that the higher the ratio of government wages to manufacturing wages, the lower is
corruption in a country (Mocan, 2007)
2
Marcoss first two constitutional terms, 1965-73 are excluded from this account.

80

 ...
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an 18% tax was imposed on the gross (!) sales

of coconuts and copra. Farmers were told that
this tax was in exchange for shares in the
newly formed United Coconut Planters Bank
(UCPB), headed by Marcos best crony.
UCPB, however, had the status of a quasipublic corporation whose collections and
disbursements were not fully revealed. UCPB
then acquired United Coconut Oil Mills
(UNICOM), a holding company for coconut oil
processing plants, which quickly monopolized
the industry through bureaucratic harassment
of the competition. UNICOMs monopoly
position was further enhanced by banning
exports of copra, thus leaving sale of whole
coconuts to the very small domestic market as
the only alternative outlet to the oil industry.
These policies allowed UCPB/UNICOM
to substantially increase the wedge between
prices paid to farmers and charged to
consumers. Figure 1 illustrates.5
S-V (1993) characterize the Philippines
under Marcos as effectively a monarchy. While
the Republic of the Philippines nominally
retained its democratic institutions under
Marcos, the legislature, judiciary, as well as

and lower excess burden (S-V, 1993), it

permitted greater grand corruption as well.
According to President Aquinos Commission
on Good Government, Transparency International, and the U.N. Commission on Drugs
and Crime, the Marcoses and their cronies
were able to accumulate $10-15 billions in
assets from various operations.3
But the styles of grand corruption were
quite different even within the Marcos
regime. Imelda Marcos allegedly extorted hefty
percentages from many government contracts
under her authority as Governor of Metro
Manila and Manila and Minister of Human
Settlements and expected wealthy business
owners to contribute generously to her various
public works projects. 4 President Marcos,
in contrast, devised numerous schemes to
extract wealth under the guise of legitimacy.
2.1 Legitimate Corruption
One of the most ingenious of such
schemes involved the Philippine coconut
industry. First a media campaign was launched
to convince farmers and consumers of
coconut products that they were being
exploited by unscrupulous middlemen. Next
3

Adams, 2008 http://www.eprf.ac/probeint/OdiousDebts/OdiousDebts/chapter13.html>; Transparency International, 2004,

the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; Hotland (2007) http://www.etan.org/et2007/september/22/19suharto.htm>; and GMAnews
TV http://www.gmanews.tv/story/119981/PCGG-Recovered-Marcos-wealty-now-at-193B.
4
Indeed, when Mr. Suharto earned the nickname Mrs. 10%, many Filipinos were envious. The figure 33% is often
heard in connection with Metro Manila and Ministry of Human Settlements contracts, and may have played a part in the Transparency
International estimate (footnote 3). Mrs. Marcos also reportedly expected a 35% discount on her numerous shopping sprees, during
which other customers had to be cleared from the store http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20093327,00.htm>l,
The following quotes are illustrative: I get my fingers in all our pies. Before you know it, your little fingers including all your
toes are in all the pies.--cited in Ang Katipunan, October 1980. Its the rich you can terrorize. The poor have nothing to
lose....Im like Robin Hood. I rob the rich to make these projects come alive... not really rob. Its done with a smile.-- in Fortune,
1979- The Wit and Wisdom of Imelda Marcos http://www.thewilyfilipiono.com/imelda.htm
5
See Clarete and Roumasset (1983) for further details.

81

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African hybrid variety on a plantation given

to the head of UNICOM as compensation
for a relatively small amount of land that was
lost under the countrys land reform program.
Moreover coconut farmers were mandated to
replant their coconut farms with these same
hybrids on the grounds that their higher yields
would improve both farmers yields and the
national economy.
In summary, under the guise of what
appeared to be legitimate public programs,
a single private individual was given a
monopsony on coconut, a monopoly on
coconut oil, and monopoly on the one variety
of coconut trees that farmers were required to
buy. Moreover the oil and hybrid monopolist
was not required to buy the industries but was
largely gifted them through the allocation
of public funds.

provincial and local government offices

were increasingly centralized under his
presidency and later combined presidency/
prime-ministership.6 Nonetheless, Marcos
power was also contingent on his ability to
maintain the appearance of legitimacy. Once
government was no longer viewed as legitimate,
due to the assassination of Benigno Aquino
and other developments, popular and even
military support waned, and the People Power
Revolution was able to overthrow the regime.
Thus, unlike a kleptocracy modeled
along the lines of Brennan and Buchanans
(1997) Leviathan, Marcos was not free to
directly pocket the proceeds from the 18%
production tax. Further entrepreneurship was
needed to develop schemes that transferred
wealth of the quasi-public entity, UNICOM,
into private hands. One clever scheme involved
using UCPB funds to purchase and plant an

Figure 1: Legitimate Corruption of Philippine Coconut Policies

6

Under the 1973 Constitution, the President, in derogation of the traditional separation of powers, exercised legislative
powers (in cased thought by the President to constitute an emergency) and retained the residual powers of the government.
http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Publish /Als/pdf/13.pdf. The 1976 constitutional amendments substituted and Interim Batasang
Pambansa (IBP) for the Interim National Assembly and specified that the President would also become the Prime Minister.

82

 ...
2 2 2552

have partially overcome the failure to foresee

adverse consequences. That is, secrecy not only
begets inefficiency in intersectoral resource
allocation, it begets collective stupidity.
Another famous scheme involved the
construction of a nuclear reactor project on the
Bataan peninsula. The Westinghouse power
plant, originally estimated at $500 million
for two reactors, ended up costing $2.8 billion
for a single reactor. 7 Again the transfer
to private hands was achieved through
relatively sophisticated means, relative to
Mrs. Marcoss more blatant alleged tactic of
simply demanding a share of government
contracts. A number of specialized or dummy
corporations were set up to obtain contracts
for the construction of the power plant, to
insure the plant (for $688 million), and to
handle other aspects of the project. Both
Marcos and his crony Herminio Disini had
substantial interests in these companies. Desini
was also apparently paid $80 million for
consulting services largely for his role in
helping Westinghouse win the contract.8
The high level of corruption in the Marcos
administration accords with Persson and
Tabellinis (2005) thesis that parliamentary
government tend to have a higher level of
corruption than presidential ones. Marcos was
able to establish himself as both President
and Prime-Minister and to effectively limit
checks and balance on his power (cf. footnote 6).

2.2 Secrecy and Stupidity

Lucrative as it was, however, the
scheme was too clever by half. The coconut
oil monopoly, popularly known in the
Philippines as COPEC, tried to imitate
OPEC and stockpiled coconut oil in order to
raise the world price. The plot backfired
when the oil went rancid and, when it was
eventually sold, spoiled the reputation of
Philippine oil. As a result of this 18% tax and
the nuisance value of the replanting
requirement, the Philippines irreversibly lost
its position as the worlds leading exporter
of coconut oil. Moreover, the government was
not in a position to exploit its oil monopoly in
the domestic market. Cooking oil, like rice
and gasoline is regarded as a basic commodity
among urban consumers and the political
repercussions of a rise in price can be severe.
Finally, the African dwarf hybrid program was
a bust. Farmers were unwilling to replant, even
under the threat of law and a highly subsidized
price, and the program became unenforceable.
These errors suggest a corollary to the
proposition that bribery is more distortionary
than taxation. The necessity of secrecy leads
government officials to discourage more
transparent activities in order to stimulate the
more bribable sectors (S-V, 1993), to say
nothing of differences in revenue disposition.
While the coconut scheme described above was
not entirely secret, neither was it the product
of thorough public debate, which likely would
7
8

Adams, 2008.
Ibid.

83

 ...
2 2 2552

she was the Presidents wife and in part

because of her own following (the analogies
with Mrs. Suharto of Indonesia and Evita
Peron speak for themselves). Mrs. Aquinos
brother allegedly directed government spending
to marketing facilities and then sold space
therein. His power to do so derived not from
any official position but from his familial
relationship with the President.
Because of the excesses of the Marcos
administration in its later years and the decline
in central authority during the Aquino
regime, the Philippines missed out on the
1980s Asian growth miracle. It was not
until the mid-90s under President Ramos that
the Philippines grew out of its stray cat
status (Vos and Yap, 1996; Roumasset, 1997).
Ramos restored central authority through
legitimacy, reputation, and ability. As a
General in the Philippine Army under
Marcos, he opposed the use of force to
suppress the People Power Revolution. The
nature of corruption, accordingly, became less
burdensome. In addition, Ramos benefited
from the increased demand for foreign
investment, especially in real estate and
industrial techno-parks, that was the inevitable
consequence of low wages, low land values,
and high literacy/human capital relative to other
Asian newly-industrializing economies (NIE).
This afforded the opportunity for higher bribe
revenues at lower per unit bribe prices.
If the Philippines is to sustain its current
high rate of economic growth, it needs to keep
corruption not only centralized but growth-

3. Post-Marcos Evolution of Corruption

After the legitimacy of the Marcos administration had waned and the government of
self-proclaimed housewife and widow of
Benigno Aquino came into power, corruption
returned to the decentralized, Spanish-mestizodominated form that had prevailed before
Morcos declared martial law on Sept 21, 1972.
The loss of central control of corruption
has two deleterious effects. First, the number
of expropriators and the level of effort
expended in government plundering increased,
much as in the Tragedy of the Commons.9
First the degree of theft from the highest
level of government increases. This in turn
feeds the further spread of corruption through
a kind of Greshams Law (corrupt officials
outcompete honest officials for jobs and
bribe-giving producers drive out their
competitors: observance of law does not
survive in a competitive market (S-V, 1993
p.604). Second, and relatedly, the loss of
central authority allows independent
entrepreneurs to create or simply add more
roadblocks to business ventures, in the limit
driving the cumulative bribe burden on
private agents to infinity (S-V, 1993 p.615)
and bribe revenue to zero. As a consequence,
the Philippine economy stagnated during
the Aquino regime, even recording negative
growth in some years.
A common element in both the Marcos
and Aquino administrations was the tolerance
for corruption by relatives. Mrs. Marcos
blatant extortion was tolerated in part because
9

Hardin, 1968

84

 ...
2 2 2552

compatible. The coconut scam described in

section 2 was an effective pilfering mechanism
in the short-run, but in the long-run it destroyed
the incentive to invest in coconut farming and
downstream industries.
Road construction provides a similar
example. Suppose public officials wish to
collude with construction contractors to pilfer
50% of a road contract. Building the highway
half as long as prescribed is not an option -it is transparent. Instead, suppose that they
collude to make the highway somewhat less
than half as deep (making allowance for costs
of design, clearing, asphalting, etc.). The cost
of keeping this operation secret is that the
road will depreciate more than twice as fast as
in the design, albeit road washouts and other
types of deterioration can be conveniently
blamed on acts of nature or road misuse.
Clearly the inefficiency of corruption, measured
as waste per peso of revenue, increases with the
bribe percentage (see figure 2). For growth to
be sustained, the percentages extracted need to
be kept at a manageable level as exemplified
by, say, Korea and the U.S.10

4. Generalizations
In most of the corruption literature, the
nature of central government is taken as given.
Either authority is centralized in an honest
principal government that designs incentive
compatible mechanisms to motivate corruption
bureaucrat-agents (Rose-Ackerman, 1978),
authority is centralized in a kleptocratic (RoseAckerman, 1996), Leviathan (Brennan and
Buchanan, 1980), monarchy (S-V), or authority
is not centralized (and corruption is S-V
inefficient). As Shleifer and Vishny
themselves confess, this approach does not
illuminate the far deeper question (S-V,
1993 p.608) concerning the ability of high
government officials to centralize corruption.
The case of the Philippines suggests that
legitimacy is an important determinant of
central authority. Power does not, as Chairman
Mao suggested, emanate entirely from the
barrel of a gun, though legitimacy and the
ability to monopolize violence are clearly joint
inputs in the production of central authority.
To the extent that such authority is
gun-produced, leaving it as exogenous
in economic models is understandable. On
the other hand, high-level and low-level
corruption are co-evolutionary.
High-level or grand corruption may be
distinguished from rent-seeking in shaping
public policies on the basis of whether it is
inside or outside of the law. Thus, Imelda
Marcos extortion may be said to be
corruption and the coconut scam said to be

Figure 2: The Excess Burden of Corruption

10

The tolerable percentage may also depend on the contract. The highest percentage take that I have heard of, for example,
was 80% for curtains in selected government offices in Metro Manila under then Governor Imelda Marcos.

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Excess burden costs

of corruption

Figure 3: Equilibrium Centralization of Corruption

In any case, the economic causes of
corruption and rent-seeking are very much the
same, and the theory of political economy can
be applied to grand corruption. Indeed, it has
been suggested above that Imelda was very
much dependent on President Marcos ability
to maintain popular support and the appearance
of legitimacy about his government.11 Since
petty corruption and grand corruption are
also usefully seen as part of the same theory,
this suggests a unified theory of rent-seeking
which encompasses corruption as well. Figure
3 illustrates the application of neoclassical
political economy12 to the problem of how
cooperation became more or less centralized.

more rent-seeking. This distinction may turn

to be superficial and elusive in practice,
however. What surreptitious threats were
used, for example, to deter opposition to new
laws governing coconut policy? It may be
recalled, for example, that Senator Palaez
was shot for revealing consequences of these
policies for coconut farmers. Similarly in the
U.S., there is a fine line between policies than
have been influenced by legal and illegal
campaign contributions. Politicians need for
campaign gifts in effect offers protection for
sale, and special interest groups are willing
buyers (Grossman and Helpman, 1994).

11

Peter Kann, publisher and CEO of the Wall Street Journal, once referred to Marcos martial law government as smiling
martial law. Marcos himself was extremely persuasive in arguing that martial law was itself consistent with the emergency power
granted to the President under the Philippine constitution.
12
Neoclassical political economy is also known as the economics of the third-best (Dixit, 1996; Roumasset, 1989.)

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Figure4 : Comparative Corruption

the agency c ost curves are minimized, at
CA and CM.
Figure 4 illustrates the plausible
consequences of centralization and corruption
opportunities for the regimes discussed in
this paper. The marginal costs of corruption,
MCA and MCM, are derived by combining
figures 1 and 2. As corruption revenue
is increased, the excess burden costs shift
increasingly upward leading to the rising
MC curves in figure 4. The position of MCA
above MCM reflects the greater excess burden
per dollar of corruption rents under the more
decentralized Aquino administration relative
to that of Marcos. The marginal cost of
corruption under Ramos is shown as lower

The downward sloping excess burden costs

represent the S-V (1993) theory discussed
above.
For the same corruption revenue, the
excess costs fall with the degree of centralization. The upward sloping curve, CCM and CCA
represent costs of centralization under
Marcos and Aquino respectively. Marcos
entrepreneurial skill and credible commitment
to punishing corruption-seeking independents
is represented as a lower cost of organizing
a sustainable central system of corruption.
Agency costs, ACA and ACM13 represent the
corresponding vertical summation of the two
curves for the two administrations. The
optimal degrees of centralization are where
13

Jensen and Meckling (1976) pioneered the use of agency theory in their theory of corporate governance, especially
regarding corporate finance.

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2 2 2552

bribe is in effect a water price and a transfer

payment. The bribe keeps the water price from
increasing to its first-best efficient level, but
even the lower water price helps allocate
water towards the highest and best users. One
can think of the bribe market as similar to
an auction. At the equilibrium bribe price, the
marginal user is indifferent between paying
the bribe and not getting irrigation water.
Irrigators with higher demand schedules
successfully obtain water and earn inframarginal rents.
4.2 Bad Policies and an Impossibility Theorem
While good corruption can result
from bad policies, it doesnt fully offset the
excess burden created by the bad policies. In
the water case, the government could have
charged for irrigation water in the first
place or provided transferable water rights.
Moreover good corruption, which improves
resource allocation albeit through extra-legal
means can also promote bad corruption.
Indeed, Japan has been characterized as
pursuing deregulation as a device to reduce
opportunities for corruption (Schlesinger,
1999).
Prohibition of alcohol in the 1920sU.S. and of mind-altering drugs today is
suggestive of a kind of prohibition impossibility theorem. In the alcohol case, prohibition
initially reduced consumption by one-third and
dramatically increased the wedge between
production costs and sales price. This made
it increasingly attractive for suppliers to
find innovative ways to provide their product

than that of Marcos due to the opportunities

before the Asian financial crisis, to take
a smaller share from the greatly expanded
private foreign investment.
In addition, the marginal benefits are
drawn to reflect the characterization that the
Marcoss and their cronies were the most
avaricious in their quest for corruption
revenues. The figure illustrates the possibility
that a less avaricious regime (Aquino) can
be more costly to the economy relative to more
centralized (Marcos and Ramos) even though
less corruption revenues were produced.
Figure 4 also illustrates the logical possibility
that a less avaricious regime (including
the officials of local governments in the time
of Ramos) could produce as much revenue
as the more avaricious Marcos regime by in
effect taking a smaller slice ofa bigger pie.
4.1 Good corruption
Corruption can be welfare enhancing
when it prevents bad laws from being enforced.
Laws that prevent voluntary exchanges that
have no third party effects, for example, are
welfare-reducing. To the extent that black
markets reverse the effects of such laws and
to the extent that corruption greases the
wheels of those markets, corruption can be
welfare-increasing.
A more direct example concerns bribes
paid to officials responsible for allocating
water in irrigation systems (Wade, 1982;
more generally, see Leff, 1964). If the highest
willingness-to-pay users are the ones that
end up buying water from the officials, the

88

 ...
2 2 2552

McLaren paints an unnecessarily bleak picture

of this problem. He explains that Myrdals
suggestion of raising bureaucrats salaries
is likely to be either insufficient to deter
collusion or high enough to promote effort
shirking. Moreover, paying tax officials on
a commission basis may promote a corruption
market where in taxpayers self-select into
those willing and unwilling to pay bribes,
thereby violating both efficiency and equity
conditions of desirable taxation.
The problem that remains to be
solved is under what conditions privatizing
tax collection can be effective. What is needed
to prevent this from merely degenerating
into the above result concerning bonuses or
commissions is the possibility of developing
guidelines for the tax collectors auditing
procedure and the possibility of auditing the
auditor. This of course presumes that some
part of the central government is incorruptible,
but it would still represent an advance over
existing literature.
A related and also unsolved problem
concerns how a kleptocratic center enforces
centralization. Anecdotal accounts suggest
that simple pyramid sharing-schemes are
commonplace, with lower officials receiving
higher percentage shares but higher officials
receiving larger bribe revenues due to the
nature of the pyramid.

at acceptable risks to themselves and their

customers. One such method was the corruption
of law enforcement. As a result, alcohol
consumption approached pre-prohibition
levels even as enforcement efforts tripled
(Roumasset and Thaw, 2003).
In general, characteristics of some
products and the enforcement technology of
their prohibition may be such that increased
enforcement expenditures drive the wedge
between production costs and sales price high
enough to motivate enough additional corruption that effective enforcement actually
declines and consumption of the product
increase. That is, a higher monetary product
price is consistent with higher sales when the
expected punishment is sufficiently reduced.
The prohibition-impossibility theorem
dramatizes the irrationality of evaluating
policy proposals without evaluating their
consequences for corruption and effective
enforcement. Yet that is exactly what economists
and policy-markets alike normally do.
4.3 Incentive-compatible audits
It remains to connect the S-V theory
of corruption and the more traditional principal-agency (P/A) theory (Rose-Ackerman,
1978 and McLaren, 1996). To some extent
these are two sides of the same coin since P/A
theory is germane to the question of how to
keep lower-level officials from operating on
their own.
The P/A mechanisms discussed in
the literature usually presume an honest center
and potentially corruptible lower official. Tax
evasion by bribing a tax official is prototypical.

5. Conclusions and Policy Implications

Grand corruption is modeled as a type
of unproductive rent-seeking at the highest
levels of government. The economic costs of

89

 ...
2 2 2552

Since there is no such thing as a social

engineer, however, one may ask about more
pragmatic approaches. It is widely recognized
that a free press and a demand for investigative
journalism is one of the most effective weapons
against bribery and rent-seeking generally.
The government can be more proactive by
improving auditing and reporting requirements
so as to render the nature and consequences
of government programs, policies, and projects
more transparent to the public. Mandating
benefit-cost analysis and reports such as
environmental impact statements can similarly
increase transparency. Indeed the Australian
government at one time actually created
a transparency agency to monitor government
programs and to document who gained and lost
from programs and how much. And
Transparency International14, based in Berlin,
ranks countries according to corruption as
perceived by private companies. In the same
vein, the Philippine government has over
the years15 recognized that there is a need to
fight graft and corruption and thus established
agencies that are mandated to rebuke erring
presidential appointees and government
officials. In President Cory Aquinos time, two
other special agencies were created in reaction
to Marcoss abuses: the Commission on
Human Rights and the Commission on Good
Government (PCGG)16. The latter is tasked to

corruption are assumed to increase in the

decentralization (and relaxation) of its governance, increase convexly in the percentage
extracted, and decreasing in the opportunities
for productive rent-seeking. Combining these
assumptions with the benefits of corruption
yields the results that optimal corruption
revenues are increasing in greed of the
regime and in economic opportunities but
that economic costs of corruption may be
highest in the least avaricious regime. The
theory is illustrated with a stylized account of
corruption in three Philippine administrations,
from 1973-1998.
Most of the corruption literature presumes
a social engineering perspective. From this
vantage point, one can recommend the
following sequencing of reforms analogous to
the sequencing of liberalization literature.
First, corruption should be centralized under
the highest level of government. This will
dramatically lower the costs of corruption
and set the stage for the second step. Next,
the per unit price of corruption should be
reduced. This will promote mechanisms of
corruption that are more conducive to growth
without even necessarily reducing the
take of high officials. A third step involves
liberalizing those policies whose enforcement
increases corruption. The fourth step involves
auditing systems that render government
enforcement incentive-compatible.
14

http://www.transparency.org/
Starting from Pres. Elpidio Quirinos Integrity Board of President in 1950 to Presidential Anti-graft commission of Pres.
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. <http://www.pagc.gov.ph/pagc_predecessor.htm>
16
See e.g.<http://www.pcgg.gov.ph/> and Dolan, 1991.
15

90

 ...
2 2 2552

to greater tolerance of amoral familism and

nepotism (Treisman, 2000, p.428). These
forces may become part of a nations social
capital and may help explain why the
Philippines is often characterized as a Latin
American country in Asia.

repossess ill-gotten wealth allegedly stolen by

the Marcoses and cronies.
Treisman (2000) finds evidence that the
process of economic development may lessen
corruption thereby promoting a virtuous circle
inasmuch as corruption impedes growth.
Education offers another way out of the
stagnating sort of corruption inasmuch as
education promotes civil vigilance, in part by
leading to a broader social understanding of
predatory practices and polices. The more
people understand that win-lose strategies tend
to generate lose-lose results in situations where
agents repeatedly encounter one another, they
will be more inclined to employ win-win
strategies. By characterizing and sometimes
quantifying not only aggregate benefits
and costs of projects and policies but their
distribution, economists can make an
important contribution to transparency.
The nature of the political regime has
been emphasized as a cause of corruption.
Other causes have and will be explored in
the future as statistical patterns regarding
the correlates of high and low corruption
emerge. One example that may apply to the
Philippines regards the role of religion.
Treisman (2000) suggests that corruption
tends to be higher in predominantly Catholic
countries due to less tolerance of challenges
to authority, less weight on individual
responsibility (relative to human fragility
protected by a forgiving church), less separation
between church and state (leading to less
autonomous monitoring of the state), and
more weight on family over individual, leading

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-*
**

(United Nations Development Programme -UNDP)

(.. 2008)
:

(Millennium Development Goals -MDGs 1)

.. 2015 (.. 2558)

2
(the Second Session of the Conference of State

Parties to the United Nations Convention against

Corruption) 28 1
2551 (State
signatory)2 ...

(UNCAC)


(preventive measures),
(criminalization and
law enforcement),
(international cooperation)
(asset recovery)

* - ()
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Asia Pacific Human Development Report Tackling Corruption,Transforming Lives: Accelerating Human Development
in Asia and the Pacific (United Nations Development Programme, 2008)
**
.. 2003 . ...
1
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.. 2015 (.. 2558) MDGs the Millennium
Declaration 189 the UN Millennium Summit
.. 2000 www.undp.org/mdg/basics.shtml
2
9 2546 (.. 2003)

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(the Rule of Law)

UNDP

-

(petty corruption)


(grand corruption)

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.. 2007 140
UNCAC
.. 2005

19
20

98

 ...
2 2 2552

99

 ...
2 2 2552

- 18

100

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2 2 2552

2 8

( )
( )

10

101

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(whistleblowers)

102

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fish) 3

()

103

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(UNCAC) -
19
10

(UNDOC) (World
Bank)
(Stolen Assets Recovery Initiative StAR)

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105

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1.

StAR
2.
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3. (
)

4.


5.

6. -

7.

(mega project)

(whistleblower
protection law)

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Call for Papers the National Anti Corruption

Commission Journal (NACC Journal)
The Office of the National Anti Corruption Commission (ONACC) wishes to

4 cm.

announce the publication of and academic

journal on counter corruption. The NACC
Journal in January each year, Article should
be submitted before September to be consid-

4 cm.

2.5 cm.

ered for publication in January.

The NACC Journal is a refereed journal

3 cm.

of social science and humanities, providing

a forum present their research findings and
viewpoints on anti-corruption activities and
concepts.

3. The authors should submit two hard

copies of their papers and a diskette or an
e-mail attachment.
4. The manuscript should have the

Instructions to Authors
1. All manuscripts should be submitted

following components:

with the understanding that they are original,

unpublished works and are not being submitted

(1) Article Title or topic in English

and in Thai (if appropriate)

for publication elsewhere.

(2) Authors name in English (and

2. Manuscripts must be submitted in

in Thai and English for Thai authors) with

double space with margins as shown, with

institutional affiliation and contact information:

reference on separate pages and a maximum

e-mail address, telephone, and facsimile

length of 25 pages including tables and figures.

(3) Abstract in Thai and English of

The fonts must be Angsana New 16 for articles

approximately 10-15 lines for Thai or 100-150

written in Thai or Times New Roman 12 for

words for English

papers in English.

116

 ...
2 2 2552

(10)

(4) Keywords (about 5 words) that

References to websites or

other electronic forms should appear after

describe the articles focus.

the references to books and articles.

(5) Content: about 10-20 pages.

(6) Figures and Tables must be

Manuscripts should be submitted to the

numbered and have titles and captions. An

Research Center, Office of the National Anti

article should not contain more than 4 pages

Corruption Commission at the following

of figures and tables.

address:

(7) Conclusion and Recommendations based on the research findings or papers

Research Center
Office of the National Anti-Corruption

discussion, not exceeding 20 lines.

Commission

(8) Footnotes must be sequentially

numbered and appear at the end of the article

1550 Thanaphum Building 18th Floor,

before the references.

New Phetchaburi Road, Makkasna

(9) The bibliography or reference

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