0260-9576/04/$17.63 + 0.

00 Institution of Chemical Engineers 2004

Failure of breathing air supply a potentially fatal situation

Tony Fishwick

Summary
Four men were working inside a tank when, suddenly without warning, their breathing air was shut off. The air supply system had a design fault. Fortunately, all four men were able to remove their air supply masks and leave the tank without harm or injury.

Description of the breathing air supply system

The breathing air system was supplied on hire by a contractor and is represented schematically in Figure 1. A single compressor of 750 cfm capacity supplied plant, process, and breathing air. The breathing air branch was routed to a breathing air filtration (BAF) unit containing four emergency air supply bottles, pressure reductor, alarm, instruments and instrument panel. All of this was in an enclosed structure mounted on wheels. The alarm functions were: At start-up an audible alarm signalled insufficient pressure in the emergency bottles. Under these circumstances, there would be no airflow through the unit. During operation an alarm would signal cessation of airflow into the unit, i.e. compressor stopped. Under these circumstances, air would be supplied automatically from the emergency bottles. They would provide an air supply for four men for approximately 30 minutes.

FIGURE 1: SCHEMATIC ARRANGEMENT OF BREATHING AIR SUPPLY AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT an inoperable on/off switch; empty emergency air bottles. All these faults had clearly been present when the contractor delivered the unit, and the contractor rectified them before the unit was recommissioned.

Problems prior to the incident

An attempt to commission the air supply system was made before the incident without any personnel actually using the breathing air. After nearly two hours operation, the airflow through the BAF unit stopped without warning even though the compressor was still running. Checks showed the following defects: a lubricant leakage; a damaged hose;

The incident itself

While four men were working inside a tank, using breathing air supplied from the BAF unit, their air supply failed without warning. They had to remove their masks and leave the tank. The audible alarm to signal airflow failure did not sound and the air compressor was still running. Thus, the standby man outside the tank was not aware of any cessation of air

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supply. The pressure gauge indicated that the emergency air supply bottles were empty, even though the compressor was still running. The loss of air from the bottles was attributed to a leaking coupling although this was not actually proven. In discussions with the contractor it was established that, if the air pressure in the emergency bottles was lost, the outlet from the BAF unit automatically closed even though the compressor could still be running. This was actually part of the design philosophy even though it was patently flawed from the safety point of view. Not only were both supplies of air lost in these circumstances, but also the lack of air supply was not apparent from outside the tank, so no emergency or rescue action would be taken.

independently operating compressors, both running at the same time, were used to supply breathing and plant air. A third compressor was available as a standby and all three were of 750 cfm capacity. The breathing air went through a blast pot filter then the water separator section of the BAF unit, but the BAF filter and emergency air bottles were bypassed. See Figure 2. A strongly worded letter of complaint was sent to the contractor. The incident was reported to the Health and Safety Executive. All personnel were fully informed of the incident.

Authors comment
As this incident could easily have been fatal, the widespread applicability of the lessons learned and precautions to be taken are well worthy of further thought and comment. The use of independent breathing air while working in a confined space, such as

Actions taken
The breathing air supply system was completely modified prior to re-use by any personnel. Two

FIGURE 2: SCHEMATIC ARRANGEMENT OF MODIFIED BREATHING AIR SUPPLY AFTER THE INCIDENT
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a tank or other vessel, is principally for one of two reasons: The atmosphere inside the vessel, although initially capable of supporting respiration, might for one reason or another become oxygen deficient and therefore incapable of supporting life. This can happen very quickly for example, if personnel activity causes toxic fumes to be released from a residue. The atmosphere inside the vessel is known to be incapable of supporting respiration before personnel entry is even attempted. This might be due to the presence of residual toxic fumes or it may simply not be possible to purge the vessel with air. Sometimes other safety considerations mean that the vessel must not be air purged. An inert atmosphere, such as nitrogen, has to be used. It is also worth noting that vessels in this context can include open topped pits, sumps and trenches if they are deep enough. The provision and use of clean breathing air supplied to high quality breathing masks is absolutely essential to safety in these circumstances. Continuity of supply and

adequate warning of possible or impending supply failure must be assured. The air supply should be via a totally independent system with no cross connections to plant, instrument or other air supplies. In this context, even the modified system described and used in this case was not ideal. The plant and breathing air supplies were connected via the manifold thus presenting the possibility of cross-contamination. Of course, the degree of hazard does depend on what the plant is used for and in this case, that is not known; but certainly if any kind of hazardous chemical or other material is used in a plant, breathing and plant air must be entirely separate from each other. There are certainly recorded cases of corrosive acid fumes entering breathing air via crossconnections between air systems. The contractors air supply system as originally provided was clearly not fit for purpose. Other matters that are worth being sure of before hired equipment is actually used would include the general condition of the equipment and its maintenance history, does it need to be flameproofed for use in electrically classified areas or in plants where highly flammable materials are used and has it been manufactured to a good enough standard.

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